Socrates' Daimonic Art - Belfiore PDF

S O C R AT E S D AI M O N I C A RT
Despite increasing interest in the figure of Socrates and in love in

ancient Greece, no recent monograph studies these topics in all four of
Platos dialogues on love and friendship. This book provides important
new insights into these subjects by examining Platos characterization
of Socrates in the Symposium, Phaedrus, Lysis and the often neglected
Alcibiades I. It focuses on the specific ways in which the philosopher
searches for wisdom together with his young interlocutors, using an
art that is erotic, not in a narrowly sexual sense, but because it
shares characteristics attributed to the daimon Eros in the Symposium.
In all four dialogues, Socrates art enables him, like Eros, to search
for the beauty and wisdom he recognizes that he lacks and to help
others seek these same objects of eros. Professor Belfiore examines the
dialogues as both philosophical and dramatic works, and considers
many connections with Greek culture, including poetry and theater.
e l i z a b e t h s . b e l f i o r e is Professor Emerita of Classics at the

University of Minnesota, where she taught from 1980 to 2010. She
is the author of two books, Tragic Pleasures: Aristotle on Plot and
Emotion (1992) and Murder Among Friends: Violation of Philia in
Greek Tragedy (2000). Her numerous articles and book chapters on
a wide range of topics in Greek literature and ancient philosophy
include many influential studies of Platos views on poetry.
SOCRATES DAIMONIC ART
Love for Wisdom in Four Platonic Dialogues
ELIZ ABETH S. BELFIORE

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c Elizabeth S. Belfiore 2012

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Belfiore, Elizabeth S., 1944
Socrates daimonic art : love for wisdom in four platonic dialogues / Elizabeth S. Belfiore.
pages cm
Includes bibliographical references and index.
isbn 978-1-107-00758-1
1. Plato. 2. Socrates. 3. Platonic love. 4. Friendship Philosophy. I. Title.
b398.l9b45 2012
184 dc23 2011049196
isbn 978-1-107-00758-1 Hardback
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Contents
Preface page xi
Acknowledgments xv
Abbreviations xvii
Introduction: overview of the erotic dialogues 1

1.1 Eros and Philosophia 1
1.2 Eros, sex and interpersonal love 8
1.3 Techne 13
1.4 Setting and characterization 18
1.5 The erotic dialogues in context 21
part i socrates and two young men

1 Your love and mine: eros and self-knowledge in
Alcibiades I 31
1.1 Puzzles about eros 31
1.2 Acquiring the greatest power 34
Stage i 36
Stage ii 38
Stage iii 41
Stage iv 43
Stage v 45
Stage vi 48
Stage vii 50
1.3 Eros for the greatest power and interpersonal eros 51
1.4 The eye and the soul 56
1.5 Eros the stork 65
2 In love with acquiring friends: Socrates in the Lysis 68

2.1 Impasse as success 68
2.2 Linguistic and conceptual issues 74
2.2.1 Greek friendship terms 74
vii
viii Contents
2.2.2 Philos and philein in the Lysis 77
2.2.3 To like wisdom (philo-sophein) 82
2.3 Socrates daimonic art 88
2.3.1 I am inferior and useless 89
2.3.2 I am in love with acquiring friends 89
2.3.3 This has been given to me by god 93
2.3.4 This is how one should converse with ones beloved 96
2.4 Socrates and his interlocutors 98
2.4.1 Hippothales: the lover 98
2.4.2 Lysis: the beloved 103
2.5 Conclusion 108
part ii er os and hybris in the symposium

Introduction to Part II: the narrators of the Symposium 110
3 In praise of Eros: the speeches in the Symposium 117
3.1 Victories in words 117
3.2 The first five speakers: the best and most beautiful of the gods 120
3.2.1 The symposiasts and the poets 120
3.2.2 Phaedrus: courage 122
3.2.3 Pausanias: education 125
3.2.4 Eryximachus: medicine 127
3.2.5 Aristophanes: comedy 131
3.2.6 Agathon: tragedy 134
3.3 Socrates: Eros the philosopher 137
3.3.1 Interlude: Socrates and the Gorgon 137
3.3.2 Socrates and his teacher 140
3.3.3 Pregnant men on ladders: the Lesser and the Greater
Mysteries 146
The Lesser Mysteries (201e8209e4) 146
The Greater Mysteries (209e5212a7) 150
3.4 I am persuaded and I try to persuade others 155
4 You are hubristic: Socrates, Alcibiades and Agathon 161

4.1 Alcibiades Silenus-statues 161
4.2 Disdain, hybris and satyrs 163
4.3 Agathon 168
4.4 Alcibiades 177
4.5 Three men on a couch 180
4.6 Socrates as daimon and satyr 187
Contents ix
part iii love and friendship in the phaedrus
Introduction to Part III: the erotic art in the Phaedrus and
Symposium 198
5 The lovers friendship 211
5.1 Lysias speech 211
5.2 Socrates first speech 215
5.3 Socrates second speech 222
5.3.1 Divine madness and the arousal of the lover 222
5.3.2 Lover and beloved 228
The search for remembered beauty (passage A:
252c3253c6) 230
Persuasion, love, and friendship (passage C: 255a1256e2) 232
5.4 Socrates and Phaedrus 239
6 The lovers dance: charioteer and horses 247

6.1 Introduction 247
6.2 Charioteer and horses (passage B: 253c7255a1) 250
6.3 Horses, satyrs and Socrates 257
6.4 Dancing with the gods 264
6.5 Conclusion 270
Conclusion 272
Glossary 274
Works cited 276
Index 297
Preface
This study examines Platos characterization of Socrates in four dialogues:

Symposium, Phaedrus, Lysis, and Alcibiades I (the erotic dialogues). It
focuses on the specific ways in which the philosopher is represented as
searching for wisdom together with his young interlocutors, using an art
that he himself calls the erotic art (erotike techne) in the Phaedrus (257a7
8). In focusing on Socrates erotic art, I hope to shed light on a number of
important dramatic and philosophical issues, including: the relationship
between eros and philosophy; the interconnection between love of wisdom
and interpersonal love; Socrates treatment of his interlocutors and their
responses to this treatment; the relationship between Socrates claims to
have knowledge or wisdom about ta erotika (erotic matters) and his recogni-
tion of his own lack of wisdom. Above all, I hope to demonstrate that Platos
Socrates is not represented as a figure associated with eros merely because
this association was a traditional theme in the works of many ancient writ-
ers, and one that provided considerable dramatic interest. In Platos erotic
dialogues, Socrates is not a philosopher who happens to have erotic inter-
ests, but rather a man whose erotike techne is skill in practicing philosophy.
An Introduction provides an overview of Socrates erotic art. I argue
that it is not craft-knowledge, but another kind of art or skill, based on
both experience and reason, and that it has five distinct, but interrelated,
components. I also claim that Socrates art is erotic, not in a sexual sense,
but in that it is closely associated with the characteristics of the philosopher-
daimon Eros in the Symposium. This Eros, like every daimon, is a being
neither god nor mortal, but in between both (202d8e1). Neither wise
nor ignorant, he is a marvelously skilled hunter after the good things he
recognizes that he lacks and passionately desires to obtain (Symp. 203c1
204c6). Socrates art can thus be called daimonic as well as erotic.
The chapters of this study show how, in each of the erotic dialogues,
Socrates practices this art in response to different dramatic situations and
interlocutors.
xi
xii Preface
My work is indebted to many previous studies, whose methodology it
follows in some important respects. Partly in reaction against the influence
of Gregory Vlastos and others, who concentrated on the arguments in the
dialogues, many scholars in recent years have emphasized the importance
of studying Platos dialogues as literary works, in which literary and
philosophical aspects are inseparably interrelated.1 They hold that the
dialogues are, above all, works with characters who speak and act, dramas
with settings, plots, and narratives. Attention to the dramatic aspects of
the dialogues has also encouraged many scholars to argue that we cannot
assume without question that any character in them, even Socrates, speaks
for Plato.2 I have been influenced by these scholars in many ways. I do not
assume that any character speaks for Plato; I pay particular attention to the
characterization of Socrates, and I study the dialogues as both philosophical
and dramatic works, considering many connections with Greek culture,
especially poetry and theater.
I hold, moreover, that the Socrates of the erotic dialogues sincerely
avows ignorance and disclaims craft-like knowledge, even though he
has beliefs and opinions, and sometimes even claims to have god-given
true belief. I therefore disagree with those scholars who argue that
these disavowals are ironic or insincere. I also disagree, at least as far
as the erotic dialogues are concerned, with those who claim that the
author Plato makes use of Socratic aporia (impasse) in order to pro-
mote his own, more positive, views.3 My views, then, are closer to
those of Michael Frede and Debra Nails4 than to those of Gregory
1 Vlastos 1991 has been especially influential. Among the few recent monographs that successfully
combine philosophical with literary approaches are Blondell 2002; Blundell 1989; Ferrari 1987;
Nightingale 1995 and 2004. Helpful surveys of approaches to Platos dialogues include those of
Annas 2003; Corlett 2005; Gerson 2006; Gonzalez 1995a and 1998: 116; Nails 1995: 331 and
Socrates, section 2, with bibliography; Osborne 2006; Press 1996 and 2007: 3954; Ralkowski
2007.
2 Good introductions to this issue are the essays in Gonzalez 1995c, in Griswold 1988, and in Press
1993 and 2000.
3 For example, Penner and Rowe 2005: 184 state: [O]ur view is that there is no Platonic dialogue that
is genuinely aporetic in the way specified. We suppose that Platos general aim, when writing in
aporetic mode, is that we come to see for ourselves the kinds of ideas that he wishes, at the time, to
promote.
4 Frede writes: [T]here are a large number of reasons why Plato may have chosen to write in such a way
as to leave open, or to make it very difficult to determine, whether or not he endorses a particular
argument. It seems that these reasons are at the same time reasons against writing philosophical
treatises . . . the dialogues are not philosophical treatises in disguise (1992: 219). According to Nails,
the dialogues are occasions to philosophize further, not dogmatic treatises, and they demonstrate
a principle of double open-endedness, according to which it is not only the conclusions of
philosophical argument but the assumptions on which those arguments are based that must remain
radically open to further challenge (1995: 3 and 21819). Opinions similar in some respects to those
Preface xiii
Vlastos. 5 However, it is beyond the scope of this study to enter into
the debate over dogmatic or non-dogmatic interpretations of Platos
dialogues.6
The focus of my work, however, differs in two main respects from that of
previous studies of the erotic dialogues. First, I concentrate on the character
Socrates in all four dialogues. Even though the secondary literature on
these dialogues, and especially on the Symposium and Phaedrus, is very
extensive, surprisingly few scholarly monographs focusing on Socrates and
eros in these dialogues have been published in the last hundred years.7
Many books are concerned with one or more of the erotic dialogues only
as part of a broader study of themes or characteristics of the dialogues
as a whole.8 Other books concentrating on eros in Platos dialogues do
not discuss all four dialogues, and are not primarily concerned with the
persona of Socrates.9 Some monographs concerned with Platos Socrates
discuss the erotic dialogues only tangentially, if at all.10 Second, my study
differs from those that are concerned generally with the literary aspects
including Platos characterization of Socrates of one or more of the erotic
dialogues.11 I focus on a single aspect of Platos protagonist: his possession
of an erotic or daimonic art that helps to make him unique, and to explain
his philosophical activities. Taken together, the four erotic dialogues, I
argue, create a coherent portrait of this man.
My interpretation differs in still another respect from that of many
scholars. Gregory Vlastos has been especially influential in arguing that
of Nails and Frede are expressed by Gonzalez 1998; Hadot 2002; Krentz 1983; Meinwald 1991: esp.
811 and 1701 and 1992: esp. 371 and 3901; Nehamas 1998; Peterson 2011; Roochnik 1987 and 1996:
23351; Wolff 1997.
5 Vlastos holds that Platos Socrates says whatever he Plato thinks at the time of writing would be
the most reasonable thing for Socrates to be saying just then in expounding and defending his own
philosophy (1991: 50, emphasis in original, quoted by Beversluis 2006: 88). Note the very similar
language used by Penner and Rowe 2005, quoted above n.3.
6 Recent surveys of this highly controversial issue are given by Beversluis 2006; Corlett 1997. Many
modern scholars reject a dichotomy between dogmatic and skeptical interpretations. See, for
example, Press 2007: 90, and Scott and Welton 2008: 24.
7 Among these, my approach is closest to that of Scott and Welton 2008, in that they also are concerned
with philosophy as an erotic art. However, their interpretation of Socrates art differs from mine
in important respects (see Introduction nn.15 and 17). Moreover, they focus on the Symposium alone,
and are concerned with the psychological, epistemological and metaphysical ramifications of this
art. In contrast, I concentrate on Platos characterization of Socrates as a practitioner of this art,
within the context of Greek culture.
8 For example: Arieti 1991; Friedlander 1969; Guthrie 1975; Kahn 1996; Lutz 1998; Nichols 2009;
G. A. Scott 2000.
9 For example: Corrigan and Glazov-Corrigan 2004; Gould 1963; Hunter 2004; Osborne 1994; Price
1989; Robin 1908; Santas 1988; Sheffield 2006a.
10 Blondell 2002 does not discuss these dialogues; Clay 2000 discusses them tangentially.
11 For example: Nussbaum 1986; Rutherford 1995.
xiv Preface
Socrates never wins over an opponent,12 and that, far from being friendly,
Socrates is guilty of a failure of love: there is a last zone of frigidity
in the soul of the great erotic.13 More recently, John Beversluis writes
of the Socrates of the early dialogues: His humor is always at someone
elses expense usually demeaning, often unkind, and occasionally cruel.14
My focus on Socrates erotic art in these four dialogues provides counter-
examples to these claims, and support for those who argue that Socrates
has a positive effect on his interlocutors.15 I hold that in portraying Socrates
as practicing an erotic art, Plato represents him as succeeding, at least to a
significant degree, in enlisting his interlocutors, with whom he establishes
friendly relations, in his own search for wisdom.
This book is intended primarily for specialists and advanced students
of both classics and ancient philosophy. It is also written so as to be
accessible to all serious readers who have an interest in the ancient world.
Translations of the Greek and a glossary of commonly used Greek words
are provided. Unless otherwise noted, all translations are my own, and I
use the following texts: Plato: Duke et al. (1995), for Euthyphro, Apology,
Crito, Phaedo, Cratylus, Theaetetus, Sophist and Statesman; Slings (2003),
for Republic; Burnet (19001907), for other dialogues; Euripides: Diggle
(19861994); Iamblichus: Dillon (1973); Olympiodorus: Westerink (1956);
Proclus: Segonds (2003); Sophocles: Lloyd-Jones and Wilson (1990).
12 Vlastos 1971: 2, quoted by Beversluis 2000: 5. 13 Vlastos 1971: 1617.

14 Beversluis 2000: 259. Gill 2001 provides some helpful criticisms of Beversluis views, noting, for
example (317), that Socrates varies his mode of discourse to match that of his interlocutor.
15 Opinions differ greatly about the effects of Socrates on others. Those who argue that Socrates fails
to benefit his interlocutors include: Beversluis 2000: 346; Blondell 2002: 1257 (citing passages in
n.78), who notes (126) that sympathetic or youthful interlocutors are treated less harshly; Nehamas
1998: 656. Positive results are emphasized by, for example: Brickhouse and Smith 1994: 1629;
Michelini 1998; Rossetti 2000. Clay 2000: 17989 contends that the elenchus (cross-examination)
has a positive effect on Platos readers, although not on Socrates interlocutors within the dialogues.
G. A. Scott 2000: 4 argues that Socrates achieves some degree of success in the two exceptional
cases of Lysis and Alcibiades. Teloh 1986: 203 claims that Socrates fails because of the defects of
the culture in which he lives. I hold that Socrates success is to be measured not only by his use of
the elenchus, but also by his interactions of many other kinds with his interlocutors.
Acknowledgments
This book could not have been written without the help and encourage-
ment of many people. I am indebted to Julia Annas for encouraging me
to write about ancient views on love and friendship, and to Frank Lewis
for introducing me to Socrates, many years ago, and for his continued
support even as our interests have diverged. I thank my colleagues and
students in Minnesota for providing a community that fostered stimu-
lating discussions of philosophical ideas, and for reading drafts of all or
part of my book. Among these are Norman Dahl, Gene Garver, Richard
Graff, Christopher Moore, Sandra Peterson, Del Reed and William Vann.
Many other scholars have helped me to understand particular issues and
provided insightful comments on earlier drafts. For discussions about the
Symposium I owe thanks to Ruby Blondell, Jill Gordon, Christopher Rowe
and Constance Meinwald; for insights into the Phaedrus I am indebted to
Paul Dotson, John Finamore and Richard Seaford. Gale Justin and George
Rudebusch gave me valuable suggestions concerning the Lysis, and David
Konstan provided much stimulating discussion about issues concerning
friendship in this and other dialogues. I am indebted to David Leitao and
Marilyn Skinner for help with issues concerning sex and gender, and to Jill
Frank for providing me with new perspectives on many issues. My hus-
band, Peter Belfiore, provided encouragement, good-humored willingness
to keep hearing about Socrates, and valuable editorial assistance as I wrote
and rewrote many successive drafts.
I also benefited greatly from the opportunity to present papers at
Columbia University (2002), the University of Minnesota (2005), Uni-
versity College London (2009), the Arizona Colloquium in Ancient Phi-
losophy (2002 and 2006), the annual meeting of the American Philolog-
ical Association (2003), the annual meeting of the Society for Ancient
Greek Philosophy and of the American Philological Association (2004),
the annual meeting of the Classical Association of the Middle West and
xv
xvi Acknowledgments
South (2005), and the annual Minnesota Conference on Ancient Philoso-
phy (2002, 2005 and 2006). Grants from the University of Minnesota in
20012002, 2004 and 2009 supported research for this book.
I am deeply grateful to the anonymous readers for Cambridge University
Press for their careful analyses of an earlier draft of this book, and for their
many insightful suggestions and constructive criticisms that have helped
me to improve it in many ways. I owe special thanks to the Classics editor,
Michael Sharp, for helping me to make good use of the readers comments
in order to clarify my views about many issues, and to present them more
effectively, and for his patient, expert assistance at every stage. I am also
grateful to my other very helpful editors at Cambridge University Press:
Elizabeth Hanlon, Jodie Hodgson, Josephine Lane, and to my copy-editor,
Elizabeth Davison.
Earlier versions of parts of this book have been previously published.
Chapter 6 is a substantially revised version of Belfiore 2006, and Chapter 3
contains some material of which an earlier version was published as Belfiore
2011.
Abbreviations
For ancient works, I usually adopt the abbreviations used in the Oxford Clas-
sical Dictionary, 3rd edn., eds. S. Hornblower and A. Spawforth (Oxford,
1996). Some exceptions are, for Platonic works:
Lys. Lysis
Sts. Statesman
For the works of Aristotle:
NE Nicomachean Ethics
EE Eudemian Ethics
For modern journals, I follow those of LAnnee Philologique. Other
abbreviations are the following:
ARV 2 Attic Red-Figure Vase-Painters, ed. J. D. Beazley (Oxford, 1963,

2nd edn.)
DK Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, eds. H. Diels and W. Kranz,
3 vols. (Berlin, 19511952, 6th edn.)
LSJ A Greek-English Lexicon, eds. H. G. Liddell and R. Scott
(Oxford, 1940, 9th edn.), with a revised supplement, ed.
P. G. W. Glare (Oxford, 1996)
SSR Socratis et Socraticorum Reliquiae, ed. G. Giannantoni, 4 vols.
(1990)
xvii
Introduction: overview of the erotic dialogues
1.1 er os and philosophia

Of the three speeches in the first half of the Phaedrus, the first is delivered
by Phaedrus, who attributes it to Lysias, while the second and third are
given by Socrates. Socrates first speech argues, like Lysias speech, that a
lover is harmful to his beloved, and that a boy should grant his sexual favors
to a man who is not in love instead of to a lover. However, Socrates recants
in his second speech, which praises the lover. At the end of this second
speech, Socrates prays to Eros not to take away the erotic art (erotike
techne) that is essential to his philosophical activities:
This palinode, dear Eros, has been given and offered in payment to you, the most
beautiful and the best I am able to make, especially considering that it had to
be spoken in a somewhat poetic style, for Phaedrus sake. In forgiveness for my
previous words, and in gratitude for these, be kind and gracious, and do not in
anger take away or weaken the erotic art [erotike techne] that you gave me. Allow
me to be held in honor by the beautiful even more than now . . . [And as for Lysias,]
turn him toward philosophy . . . so that his lover here [sc. Phaedrus] may no longer
be of two minds, as he is now, but dedicate his life wholly to eros together with
philosophical words. (257a3b6)1
Eros is also a major theme in the Socratic dialoguesthose in which Socrates
is protagonist of many ancient writers other than Plato. Some characterize
Socrates concern with eros in a positive way. For example, in the Alcibiades
of Aeschines, Socrates claims to have benefited Alcibiades by means of eros
(di t rn).2 In the works of other writers, however, Socrates connection
with eros is represented in a very negative fashion. For example, Phaedos
1 Following Rowe 1988, on 257b6, I read eros, not Eros. Throughout this study I leave eros
untranslated or I translate it as love or passionate desire. On the different senses of the Greek
term see further below I.2.
2 Aeschines, Alcibiades: SSR, frag. VI A53, quoted by Kahn 1996: 21, whose ch. 1 provides an excellent
survey of the theme of eros and philosophy in the Sokratikoi logoi.
1
2 Socrates Daimonic Art
dialogue Zopyrus opposes Socrates erotic tendencies to his devotion to
philosophy. Here, the physiognomist Zopyrus, reading Socrates character
from his physical appearance, states that he is stupid and a womanizer.
Socrates says that Zopyrus is right: these are his natural weaknesses, but he
has overcome them by the study of philosophy.3
In Platos own dialogues, as in the passage from the Phaedrus just quoted,
eros is often associated with philosophy in a positive way. In other passages
and dialogues of Plato, however, eros is opposed to reason and philosophy.
In the Phaedo, Socrates says that eros is among the affections of the body that
impede wisdom (phronesis) and philosophy (64c468c3, especially 66c28).
In the Republic, Cephalus quotes with approval Sophocles characterization
of sex (t frodsia) as a mad master (1.329b8d2), Glaucon agrees that
the pleasures of sex are mad (3.403a46), and Socrates agrees with those
who characterize Eros as a tyrant (9.573a4575a7). According to Timaeus,
eros is among those things that a just person must conquer (Ti. 42a6b2),
and it is one of the terrible and necessary affections of the mortal soul
(69c5d6). In Laws 6.782d10783b1, the Athenian Stranger associates eros
with madness and hybris and says that it is a disease that needs restraint.4
Such passages appear to suggest that a philosopher would need, like the
Socrates of Zopyrus, to attempt to overcome erotic inclinations. How, then,
can Platos Socrates claim, as he does in the Phaedrus, that erotic art is not
only compatible with, but actually necessary to, philosophical activities?
I argue that Plato answers this question in a group of four dialogues:
Alcibiades I, Lysis, Symposium and Phaedrus.5 I refer to these four dialogues
as the erotic dialogues, in part because ordinary eros (desire for sexual or
other objects such as wealth or power) is a central concern in all of them.
The Symposium contains a series of speeches in praise of Eros, followed by
Alcibiades praise of Socrates, his beloved. The Phaedrus begins with three
speeches about the relationship between lover and beloved speeches that
are the subject of subsequent discussions about rhetoric and in the Alcib-
iades I Socrates represents himself as the lover of Alcibiades. Although the
central philosophical concern of the Lysis is the question of what a friend is,
the dramatic framework of this dialogue concerns Socrates demonstration
to Hippothales, a young man in love with Lysis, of how a lover should treat a
3 filosofav skhsin: Rossetti frags. 10 (Alexander of Aphrodisias, De fato 6) and 6 (Cicero, De fato
10). The texts relevant to Zopyrus are collected in Rossetti 1980, and discussed in Blondell 2002: 724,
and Kahn 1996: 11. On Socrates physical appearance see further Chapter 4 at 4.6 and Chapter 6
at 6.3.
4 Bres 1968: 21532 gives a helpful survey of negative attitudes toward eros, in the sense of desire for
sexual pleasure, expressed in Platos dialogues.
5 I take Alcibiades I to be Platos own work, for reasons given in Chapter 1 n.1.
beloved. Most important, all of these dialogues are erotic in that they depict
Socrates as practicing an art or skill that is itself erotic because it shares
certain characteristics attributed to the daimon Eros in the Symposium. In
all four dialogues, Socrates art enables him, like Eros, to be marvelously
skilled in the philosophical activities of searching for wisdom and beauty,
and of helping others to seek these same objects of eros. A central compo-
nent of the erotic art is Socratic eros: a passionate desire for the wisdom,
beauty and other good things that one recognizes that one lacks.6
Socrates claim to have an erotic art is explicit in his prayer to Eros
in the Phaedrus, quoted above. Here, Socrates states that he has a special
relationship to Eros, the god who has given him erotic art. He also claims
in this passage to have used his art, in the recantation speech he has just
made, to exhort Phaedrus to devote himself to the life Socrates second
speech has represented as best, and to which he himself is devoted: a life
that combines philosophical words with eros (cf. 249a12 and 256a7b1).7
The nature of the erotic art, and of the relationship between eros and
philosophy, is clarified in the Symposium. Socrates teacher, Diotima, says
that eros in a broad, or generic, sense is desire for any of a number of good
things. For example, one kind of eros is desire for wisdom (philosophia:
literally, liking, or love, for wisdom).8 According to Diotima: Wisdom
[sophia] is among the most beautiful things, and eros is concerned with
beauty [or the fine: to kalon], so that it is necessary for Eros to be a
philosopher (204b24). Diotima goes on to substitute the good for the
beautiful (204e13, 205e7206a12), and to define eros as desire for good
things (205d13). According to Diotima, then, philosophy is one kind of
eros, eros for wisdom, something that is not only good, but also among
the most beautiful things.9 This view of philosophy as one kind of eros is
clarified by Diotimas further characterization of Eros, the personification
of eros. Eros is neither god nor mortal, but a great daimon (202d13), who
is not the beloved but the lover (eron: 204c13). He desires to become wise
(sophos: 204a12) because he realizes that he lacks wisdom. Moreover, Eros
is a marvelously skilled plotter and hunter (qhreutv deinv: 203d46) after
the good and the beautiful things he recognizes that he does not possess
6 I am indebted to an anonymous reader for Cambridge University Press for suggesting the helpful
terms ordinary eros and Socratic eros.
7 Some complexities concerning the nature of philosophy in the Phaedrus are discussed in Introduction
to Part III.
8 See 205d18, discussed further below I.2.
9 Cf. Resp. 3.402d6: the most beautiful is the most lovable. The relationship in Symp. between the
good and the beautiful is close but not necessarily identical: see Rowe 1998, on 201c12, 204e12,
206e23. On eros as desire for the good see especially Chapter 1 n.9 and Chapter 2 n.68.
(203d4204c6). Thus, philosophy, as practiced by Eros, is not simply one
kind of eros. It also includes marvelous skill in searching for the objects of
eros.
Socrates concludes his speech with a declaration of his own devotion to
this Eros and to ta erotika, matters with which Eros is concerned:
Diotima spoke and I am persuaded. Being persuaded I attempt to persuade others

that . . . one could not easily acquire a better co-worker for human nature than
Eros. And so I say that every man should honor Eros, and I myself honor ta
erotika and am especially devoted to these matters, and I urge others to be so also.
Both now and always I praise the power and courage of Eros as much as I am
able. (Symp. 212b18)
In this passage, Socrates claims to be especially devoted both to Eros, the

daimon who provides the greatest benefits for humans, and to ta erotika, and
he urges others to be similarly devoted. Elsewhere in this dialogue Socrates
claims to have an erotic art, just as he does in the Phaedrus, saying that
he is marvelously skilled in ta erotika (deinv t rwtik: 198d12), and
that he knows (pstasqai) nothing other than ta erotika (177d78). In
the Symposium Socrates does not explicitly claim to have been given erotic
art by Eros. However, the claim, unusual for him, to have knowledge,
and his special devotion to the philosopher-daimon whom he himself
resembles suggest that Eros may be his patron here, just as he is in the
Phaedrus.
Although Platos Socrates does not explicitly claim to have erotic art
in the Lysis and Alcibiades I, he is nevertheless characterized as practic-
ing it, especially by being particularly devoted to eros and by exhorting
and advising others in respect to ta erotika. In the Lysis, Socrates rep-
resents himself as devoted from childhood to a particular object of eros
(cw . . . rwtikv): the acquisition of good friends (211e23). He also
states that, although he is inferior in other respects, a god has given him
the ability to recognize lover and beloved (204b8c2). Socrates implic-
itly claims to have an erotic art when he tells Hippothales how some-
one who is wise (sophos) in ta erotika treats a beloved (206a12), and
says that he might be able to give a demonstration of this treatment by
questioning Lysis (206c57, 210e25). He does not need to exhort Hip-
pothales to become devoted to eros, as he exhorts his audience in the
Symposium, for he knows that the young man is already far gone in love
(204b58). In giving his demonstration, however, Socrates is portrayed as
using erotic art to show Hippothales how to become wise concerning ta
erotika.
In Alcibiades I, Socrates is himself in love with a particular individual,
for he claims to be the only lover of Alcibiades soul (131d1e5, 131e1011).
He is so devoted to this object of love that he has closely and continually
observed Alcibiades for many years before speaking to him (103a14, 106e4
9). Socrates erotic art is shown in this dialogue in large part by means of
his unique ability, as the lover of Alcibiades soul, to help the young man
acquire the object of Alcibiades passionate desire: the greatest power in
the city, which, Socrates demonstrates, is conferred not by tyranny, but
by self-knowledge and self-care (105b4, d34, e45, 124a7b6). He exhorts
Alcibiades in respect to ta erotika when he urges the young man to become
as beautiful as possible (131d7) in soul, and says, moreover, that by doing so
Alcibiades will remain Socrates beloved (131d1132a2). Socrates does not
explicitly say that Eros has given him erotic art, but he does claim to have
received divine encouragement to approach Alcibiades (103a4b2, 105e5).
In the Lysis and Alcibiades I, the term philosophia and its cognates play
a much less important role than they do in the Symposium and Phaedrus.
Nevertheless, philosophy in the Lysis and Alcibiades I, as in the Symposium
and Phaedrus, is represented as requiring Socratic eros, a passionate desire to
attain as much wisdom as it is possible for one to attain.10 In the Lysis, those
who philosophize are said to be people who desire (epithumein: 217e79)
one kind of good: wisdom. These people are those who, like Eros in the
Symposium, do not think they know what they in fact do not know (Lys.
218a2b3). That this desire can be passionate is shown by the association
of eros with epithumia (desire) at Lysis 211d7e8, 221b78 and 221e7222a7.
When Socrates uses his erotic art to question his young interlocutors, he
induces aporia (impasse), which leads them to recognize that they lack
wisdom. He thereby encourages them to desire passionately to acquire this
good thing. While the term philosophia and its cognates do not occur in
Alcibiades I,11 in this dialogue also love for wisdom is an important concept.
Socrates uses his erotic art to persuade his beloved, Alcibiades, that the true
object of Alcibiades eros is the power conferred by self-knowledge and self-
care (epimelein), that is, by caring for the soul and striving to know oneself
(for example, 124a7b3). Self-knowledge and self-care, like philosophia in
other dialogues, require a passionate desire (e.g., proqumo: 131d78) to
acquire as much wisdom and virtue as one can.
In each of the four erotic dialogues, then, Socrates is characterized as
practicing what is called in the Phaedrus an erotic art, or skill that
10 Good recent surveys of the vexed question of the possibility of attaining wisdom are provided by
Detel 2003 and Yonezawa 2004: 16. A detailed discussion is beyond the scope of this study.
11 According to Brandwood 1976.
is essential to his philosophical activities.12 It is this erotike techne that
distinguishes Platos Socrates from the sophists, who claim knowledge they
do not have; from ordinary lovers of boys, horses, gold and honor; and
from the Socrates portrayed by other Socratic writers. Platos Socrates is a
uniquely powerful and fascinating figure in large part because of his unique
erotic skill.
There are five components to Socrates art, or skill, emphasized to
different degrees in the erotic dialogues:
(1) Socrates claims to be under the patronage of, or devoted to, Eros and
to ta erotika: the wisdom, beauty, and other good things that are the
objects of the passionate desire (eros) that is the sphere of this god or
daimon.
(2) He recognizes that he himself lacks wisdom and other good things.
(3) Under the influence of eros (see (1)), he has a passionate desire (Socratic
eros) for the wisdom and the other good things he recognizes that he
lacks.
(4) He is marvelously skilled (deinv t rwtik: Symp. 198d12) in the
search for as much wisdom and other good things as he can attain.
(5) As an essential part of the skill he has in pursuing his own search,
Socrates is also marvelously skilled at helping others to acquire erotic
art. That is, Socrates is skilled in helping others to become devoted to
Eros and ta erotika, to recognize their own lack of wisdom and other
good things, to desire these good things passionately, and to become
skilled both in seeking to attain as much of them as they are able, and
in helping others to acquire the erotic art.
These five components are all closely interconnected. The preoccupation
with beauty and other good things associated with Eros (component (1))
induces in Socrates, first, the recognition of his own lack (component (2)),
followed by the desire to repair the lack (component (3)); finally, the desire
and the lack together are complemented (components (4) and (5)) by his
skill in prosecuting his own search, which also includes the skill of enlisting
others in the same search.13
By exhorting others and helping them to recognize their own lack of
wisdom, and to desire passionately the wisdom they lack, as component (5)
requires, Socrates is himself engaging in a passionate striving to attain as
12 Socrates erotike techne differs significantly from lovers hunting by means of gifts that is called erotike
techne in Soph. 222d10e3. I disagree with Balansard 2001: 232 in connecting the two.
13 His skill includes the ability to affect others, but is not limited to this, as suggested by Yunis 2005:
121: Socrates claim to be an erotic expert (rwtikv) . . . refers to his ability to affect men like
Alcibiades, Charmides, and perhaps Phaedrus with his passion for inquiry and philosophy.
much wisdom as possible. The way in which he seeks wisdom is by exam-
ining himself and others by means of question and answer (dialectic), as he
explicitly states, for example, in Alcibiades I 127e47. Dialectic, moreover, is
a non-competitive and mutually beneficial activity that requires, and helps
to create, friendly relationships among interlocutors.14 In helping others to
search for wisdom, Socrates creates or increases the friendly feelings that
are an especially important issue in the Lysis and Phaedrus.15
Socrates art, then, is essentially both philosophical and erotic together,
in that it helps him to seek the wisdom and other good things that are
the objects of his passionate desire. However, philosophy, as Socrates is
represented as practicing it in the erotic dialogues, is not simply one form
of eros.16 Instead, Socratic eros (component (3) above) is one of several
components of the erotic art that allows Socrates, like Eros, to practice
philosophy with marvelous skill. The kind of skill involved in component
(5) also has a dimension more closely connected with ordinary eros for
another person. To help someone else seek wisdom is to benefit and act
as a friend to the person examined, and also can, but does not always,
lead an older partner to become or continue to be the erastes (lover) of an
individual young person who has a beautiful soul. Thus, in Alcibiades I,
Socrates, the erastes of Alcibiades beautiful soul, says that his own love will
not cease as long as Alcibiades goes on improving (131d4132a2). In this
dialogue, Socrates eros for Alcibiades soul helps the young man to become
better.
Socrates art can be characterized as daimonic as well as erotic in that
each of the five components of this art is associated with the characteristics
attributed to the philosopher Eros in the Symposium.17 This daimon, a being
14 On the differences between dialectic and eristic see below n.51 and Chapter 2 n.47.
15 My account, arrived at independently, of Socrates erotic art is similar in some respects to the
characterization given by Scott and Welton 2008 of Socratic philosophy as an art of love (136),
although my approach to this topic is very different (see Preface n.7). However, I disagree in two
major respects with Scott and Weltons views on Socrates erotic art. First (190), they identify
Socrates erotic art with the true art of rhetoric, whose practitioner can explain all it does with
reference to the good of the subject (Grg. 464465a). I argue below (I.3 and Introduction to Part III)
that Socrates erotike techne differs significantly from craft-knowledge of this kind. Second, Scott
and Welton claim that in the Symposium Socrates awareness of his ignorance is inseparable from
some partial recollection of the Forms (186). I believe that this view relies too heavily on material
from dialogues other than the Symposium (see below n.17).
16 On philosophy as a form of eros see Kahn 1987: 967; Nehamas 2007a: 67 and 2007b: esp. 131;
Pakaluk 2004: 108; Ruprecht 1999: 103; Sier 1997: 823; de Strycker and Slings 1994: 64; Wohl
2002: 1601 and n.91, on Grg. 481d35. According to Rowe 2009: 139 eros, properly understood, is
philosophy.
17 The interconnections among Eros, Socrates and philosophy are discussed at length by Scott and
Welton 2008, who argue that philosophy is fundamentally erotic (3). I agree with much of what
neither god nor mortal, but in between both (202d8e1), to whom Socrates
claims to be devoted (212b6), is himself devoted to, and passionately desires,
ta erotika: the beauty, wisdom, and other good things he recognizes that he
lacks (203e4204a7); he is a marvelously skilled hunter after these things
(203d48); and he is the best co-worker for human nature in its striving to
attain wisdom (212b24). Indeed, Socrates is portrayed in these dialogues
as a daimonic figure, who, like Diotimas Eros (Symp. 202d13), is called
daimonion (Alcibiades, at Symp. 219c1). He resembles not only Eros, but
also a satyr, a being who, like Eros, is a daimon.18
1.2 er os , sex and interpersonal love

The daimonic qualities of Socrates art can help to clarify further the sense
in which it is erotic. In the first place, his skill is not erotic in a sexual sense.
As James Davidson points out, the English term erotic has acquired
sexual connotations not present in the Greek terms erotikos and erotika,
which refer instead to love in a broad sense.19 With this difference in
mind, I begin with Diotimas discussion of eros in the Symposium, in which
she first calls attention to the fact that the term eros and its cognates are
used in two senses:
we separate off one kind of eros and apply to it the name which belongs to the
whole; we call it eros, and for the other kinds we use other names. (205b46)
Diotima then defines eros:
To sum up, the whole of desire for good things and for happiness is the supreme
and treacherous eros, to be found in everyone; but those who direct themselves
to it in all sorts of other ways, in business, or in their love of physical exercise, or
in philosophy, are neither said to be in love nor to be lovers, while those who
proceed by giving themselves to just one kind of eros have the name of the whole,
eros and theyre the ones who are in love, and lovers. (205d18)20
they say about the intermediate state of all three entities, although my own interpretation differs
in many respects. In particular, I question their attempt, explained at length in their Appendix,
to fill out the account of Eros given by Diotima in the Symposium by means of psychological and
metaphysical theories drawn from other dialogues.
18 On Socrates resemblance to Eros see Chapter 4 at 4.6; on his satyr-like characteristics see 4.2, 4.6
and Chapter 6 at 6.3.
19 Davidson 2007: 35, who comments further: Socrates is the archetype of the erotikos man because
he is permanently besotted (with knowledge, with handsome young men) and never manages to
achieve a finality, not because he was an erotic philosopher in the modern sense of the term
someone who converses about sex, or who gives lectures wearing fishnet stockings and a red silk
basque (36).
20 Rowes translations, 1998, adapted.
According to Diotima, then, eros has a broad sense, referring to desire
for good things of all kinds, and a more restricted sense, used of only one
kind of desire. Scholars often refer to these two senses of eros as generic
and specific, respectively.21 Diotima gives helpful examples of generic
eros in the passage quoted above, but in characterizing specific eros she
simply refers to the way in which people speak. Although there are many
disagreements about how to interpret Diotimas distinction, most scholars
agree that specific eros in this passage has a sexual component.22
However, Diotimas distinction is not simply one between desires with
and without a sexual component, as Paul Ludwigs recent detailed analysis
of Greek usage helps to show. In Homer, eros does not necessarily refer
to sexual desire, or even to a particularly strong desire, but includes the
desires to eat (e.g., Il. 1.469), weep, dance and make war: Homeric eros
seems to mean mere desire of any kind, for any object or aim, no matter
how mundane, no matter how intense or lacking in intensity.23 According
to Ludwig, then, Diotimas generic eros resembles Homeric eros in referring
to a mere desire of any kind.24 Her specific eros, however, differs from the
Homeric kind of generic eros not only in its association with sexual desire,
but also in being intense and passionate.25 According to Ludwig, there is
also a third category of usage, one transferring (literally or metaphorically)
the passionate intensity of the specific eros to a wider range of objects
found only in generic eros.26 For example, in Aeschylus Agamemnon
3412, Clytemnestra says: Let not an eros first fall upon the army . . . to
ravage what they ought not.27 Ludwigs third category, then, would seem
to include cases comparable to the English use of lust to characterize
passionate desire for such non-sexual objects as power and wealth. In
interpreting individual passages, Ludwig concludes, it is important, but
often difficult, to distinguish sexual from broader uses of eros, and to
determine what degree of passionate intensity is involved.28
What Ludwig calls the transferred sense of eros can help us to under-
stand the sense in which Socratic eros is erotic. Plato often uses the term
eros and cognates to refer to passionate desire for non-sexual objects.
The Laws mentions eros for wealth (831c4, 870a26), and a divine eros
for temperate and just pursuits (711d67). In the Republic Plato writes of
21 For example, Bury 1932: xiii and 106, on 205a; Ferrari 1992: 254; Ludwig 2002: 127 and 1456; Santas
1988: 329.
22 See Ferrari 1992: 254; Rowe 1999a: 243; Santas 1988: 33; Sier 1997: 213.
23 Ludwig 2002: 1246; quotation: 126. In quoting, I preserve Ludwigs use of italics to refer to the
Greek word eros, and his lack of italics in using the modern English word eros (7 n.5).
24 Ibid. 127; cf. 145. 25 Ibid. 127. 26 Ibid. 128. 27 Ibid. 133, his translation. 28 Ibid. 128.
lovers (erastas) of rule (521b4) and of eros for poetry (607e7, 608a5), while
in the Phaedrus Socrates says that his interlocutor, Phaedrus, is in need
of a fellow lover [erastou] of speeches (228c12). In Theaetetus 169b5c2,
Socrates states that he has a strong sickness, consisting in a terrible eros
for discussions. Alcibiades is said to have eros for renown (Alc. I 124b36),
and in the Statesman, the Eleatic Visitor discusses eros for peace (307e56).
The contexts of these passages suggest that the term eros is used by Plato
to indicate an intensity of desire for non-sexual objects that is closer to
sexual passion than to a generic desire for such objects as food.
Especially when Plato uses eros and cognates to refer to love of wisdom
or truth the term is often used of an intense desire that is explicitly compared
to sexual passion. The vision of the lover who arrives at the sight of truth
in the Symposium is described in sexual terms (211e4212a7), as is the lovers
eagerness to see the plain of truth (248b6) in the Phaedrus (251a1252c2).
The Phaedo compares lovers [erastai] of wisdom [phronesis] to lovers of
sexual objects (66e23, 68a28). In the Republic, Socrates characterizes an
eros of reality (490a8b7) by means of an elaborate metaphor of sexual
intercourse and generation that lends sexual overtones to a later passage
in which he speaks of the eros for true philosophia that comes from
some true divine inspiration (499b8c1), and asks if philosophers are not
lovers (erastas) of being and truth (501d12). In the erotic dialogues, then,
Socrates eros for wisdom and other good things is a desire as passionate
as sexual desire. His art is erotic in part because it includes this passionate
desire.
In the erotic dialogues, Plato also uses erotic vocabulary and themes in
adapting for his own purposes Greek conventions concerning interpersonal
love. One especially important convention is that of the erotic-educational
relationship, in which an older lover (erastes) seeks to educate and improve
a younger beloved (eromenos) in exchange for the younger mans sexual
favors. This relationship is reflected especially clearly in the speech of
Pausanias in the Symposium.29 The negative aspects of this convention are
highlighted in the first two speeches of the Phaedrus that attributed to
Lysias, and Socrates first speech. In both speeches, a lover is said to seek
only his own physical pleasure, while harming the object of his lust.30
29 I borrow the phrase erotic-educational relationship from Gill 1999: xv. On Pausanias speech as
exemplifying one kind of Greek love, Athenian love, see Davidson 2007: 41845. In his discussion
of the multiplicity of homoerotic relationships in ancient Greece, Davidson decisively refutes the
view, argued for in Dovers influential study (1989, originally published 1978), that a single kind of
relationship constitutes the norm. Skinner 2005 also calls attention to the great variety of love
relationships in antiquity.
30 See further Chapter 5.
Plato also represents the relationship between erastes and eromenos in a
more positive light, as he uses and adapts the erotic-educational convention
in his portrayal of Socrates throughout the four dialogues. While Socrates
resembles the erastes of convention in being concerned with the education
of beautiful young men, his motives are very different. The Alcibiades I,
which comes closest to representing Socrates in the role of an older erastes
in love with a younger eromenos, whom he educates, also shows how greatly
Socrates differs from the erastes who seeks sexual favors. Socrates says that
he is in love with Alcibiades soul instead of his body, and he does not
use his erotic skill for sexual seduction. He explicitly denies that he seeks
pleasure from physical beauty when he says that he has remained as the
lover of Alcibiades soul, even after the young mans physical bloom has
faded (131c5e11). The Socrates of the erotic dialogues also differs from the
erastes of Pausanias speech in providing another kind of education, one
that does not involve claims to teach. Socrates disclaims wisdom himself
(component (2) of the erotic art), and he seeks to make others aware of their
own lack of wisdom (component (5)). Plato emphasizes this last difference
when his Socrates shows Hippothales in the Lysis that the way to capture
a beloved is not by praising, but by humbling him (206a13, 210e25), and
when Socrates leads Alcibiades to agree that he has long been in a shameful
state without realizing it (Alc. I 127d78). Finally, Socrates differs from
the erastes of Pausanias speech in that he leads others to become lovers
in turn.31 For example, Alcibiades I ends with Socrates suggestion that his
own love may have hatched a new love in Alcibiades (135e13). This love is
both Socratic eros for wisdom and other good things and, in the Alcibiades
I, eros for Socrates himself.
Sexual desire also plays a more positive role in the erotic dialogues than
it does in the Greek erotic-educational convention. Although Socrates
art, and the love he himself has for Alcibiades, are not erotic in a sexual
sense, Socrates nevertheless recognizes that sexual desire need not be mere
lust, but can instead play an important and legitimate role in relationships
between those who search together for wisdom. The lover who has been
initiated into the Lesser Mysteries, which are preparatory to the Greater
Mysteries, experiences sexual desire, which he satisfies at least in part, by
touching . . . the beautiful one, and associating with him (Symp. 209c2
3). In the myth in Socrates second speech in the Phaedrus, the lovers who
occasionally complete the sexual act (diepraxsqhn: 256c45) are said
to be more vulgar and less philosophical than those who refrain from sex.
31 I am indebted to Eugene Garver for pointing this out.

Nevertheless, these second-best lovers, like the others, win many advantages
through erotic madness (256b7d6).
Another important difference between the conventional erotic-
educational relationship and the educational relationships portrayed in
the erotic dialogues is that the latter may, although they do not always,
involve interpersonal love. What is essential to the common search for
wisdom is not interpersonal eros, but the good will and affection that make
dialectic possible. This is true even in the Alcibiades I (see below 1.4). In
the Symposium, Socrates is concerned with the welfare of Alcibiades, but
he never claims to be in love with him, or to desire sexual favors. Instead,
Socrates spends the night in the arms of the beautiful and willing young
Alcibiades just as though Socrates were a father or an older brother (Symp.
219b3d2). In the Lysis, Socrates helps Hippothales to acquire the erotic
art that can lead him to become liked by his beloved, the beautiful and
noble Lysis (Chapter 2). If Hippothales succeeds in becoming an accepted
lover, he and Lysis may go on to search for wisdom together. His success
will increase interpersonal love, but there is no suggestion that it will lead
to sexual relations. Within the dialogue, moreover, it is the older Socrates
and the younger Lysis and Menexenus who actually engage in the search
for wisdom. These people have good will and affection, but they are not
in love with one another. In Diotimas account of the Lesser Mysteries,
interpersonal love makes it possible for a lover to give birth in beauty
(Symp. 206e5, 208e5209e4). These Lesser Mysteries prepare a lover for
initiation into the Greater Mysteries (210a12), the first stage of which is
love for a particular beautiful body and beautiful soul (210a4c3). However,
this narrative leaves open the extent to which interpersonal love continues
as the lover ascends the ladder toward the vision of beauty itself. Moreover,
the way in which Socrates presents Diotima and her speech encourages
his audience to question and examine her views, without accepting them
as authoritative. The possibility is left open that there are other ways of
searching for wisdom and beauty, in which interpersonal love plays other
roles, or no role at all (Chapter 3).
Interpersonal love is given particular importance and emphasis in the
Phaedrus (Chapters 5 and 6). The myth of the charioteer and horses in
Socrates second speech is a vivid dramatization of the way in which a lover
possessed by erotic madness creates with his beloved the mutual eros and
friendship that allows them to search together for the divine beauty that is
the object of Socratic eros. In this poetical myth, moreover, interpersonal
eros is itself portrayed as a form of Socratic eros, for the physical beauty of
the beloved is a reflection of divine beauty. There are also indications in
this dialogue, however, that Socrates myth, composed so as to appeal to
Phaedrus, does not represent the only way in which the search for divine
beauty can be conducted. Indeed, in the Phaedrus, as in the Symposium
and Lysis, Socrates himself is represented as using his erotic art to search
for wisdom and beauty, together with others for whom he has good will
and affection, without being in love with a particular individual.
1.3 techne
Socrates art, then, is erotic and daimonic in that it has five specific com-
ponents associated with the characteristics of the philosopher-daimon Eros
in the Symposium, who is both philosopher and lover. But in what sense is
it art (techne)?
One answer to this question specifically concerns Socrates use of the
term techne in the Phaedrus. In the passage from his second speech, quoted
at the beginning of this Introduction (257a3b6), Socrates use of the
phrase erotike techne distinguishes his own art from (1) a true techne of
rhetoric (rhetorike), and from (2) an atechnos diatribe, a practice without
art (260e26, 261a7). He says that the true techne of rhetoric is to the soul
what the techne of medicine is to the body. Just as the practitioner of the
art of medicine understands by means of techne the nature of the body,
and how to make it healthy and strong, so the person who has rhetorike
techne must understand the nature of the soul, and know how to produce
persuasion and virtue within in (270b19). The practice without art, on
the other hand, aims at pleasure rather than the good. It is directed toward
pleasing fellow slaves rather than good masters, that is, mortals instead
of gods (273e9274a2), and is used, for example, by experts in seduction
in order to gain physical pleasure. Socrates erotic techne differs from the
atechnos diatribe in not seeking pleasure, and from the true techne in not
being craft-knowledge. It nevertheless resembles true techne in having the
goal of pleasing gods rather than mortals, as indicated by the passage quoted
at the beginning of this Introduction, and of striving, and helping others
to strive, to attain as much craft-knowledge as they can. These similarities
help to explain why Socrates uses the term techne in characterizing his own
erotic art in this dialogue.32
A more general answer to the question about the sense in which Socrates
erotic art is a techne takes into account a range of passages concerning techne
in many dialogues. Socrates frequently uses the term techne to refer to a
32 On these distinctions see further Introduction to Part III.

kind of craft-knowledge that is, in the characterization of Julia Annas: (1)
teachable, (2) demands a complete understanding of the relevant field,
and (3) requires that the person with skill be able to give an account
[logon didonai] of what it is that she is expert in [and] . . . can explain why
she is doing what she is doing.33 As an example of (2), Annas states that
an understanding of French requires knowledge of grammar, syntax and
vocabulary. She argues that this requirement can be seen as an expansion
of the demand, already seen, that our understanding of a subject matter
should unify the various beliefs that we have about that subject matter.34
For example, [u]ntil we understand what it is that we understand bravery
to be, we will not understand why we recognize the examples of bravery
that we do.35 Or, [i]n the case of the productive skills, exercise of the skill
produces a unified object whose organization reflects the experts unified
grasp of her skill and its requirements.36 Other scholars have also given
good accounts of techne in Platos dialogues.37 However, that of Annas best
fits Socrates characterization of techne in the Phaedrus. As I will argue in
the Introduction to Part III, those who have rhetorical techne are said to
be able (1) to teach their skill to others (e.g., 266c25, 271b15); (2) to
understand their subject as a whole, by practicing collection and division,
and by understanding the nature of the soul to which particular speeches are
suited (277b5c6); and (3) to give an account of their skill, by explaining
the causes why one speech is able to persuade and another one is not
(271b45), and by submitting their work to questioning and examination
(278c47).
In the erotic dialogues, Socrates sometimes expresses strong convictions
and even claims knowledge about ta erotika, but he sincerely denies that
his art has any of these characteristics of craft-knowledge. He says that
33 Annas 2001: 244. As examples of teachability, Annas cites (n.20) Meno 89eff. (which refers to doctors,
cobblers and pipe players), and Prt. 319eff. (see the entire discussion at 319a320c, with the examples
of house and ship building: 319b5c1). As an example of (3), she cites (n.22) Grg. 465a and 501a,
which give medicine as an example.
34 Annas 2001: 244. 35 Ibid. 241, discussing Lach. 191ce.
36 Ibid. 244 n.21, citing Grg. 503d504b. In this passage, painters, builders and doctors are said to
arrange things according to a certain order, and to compel one part to be suitable and fitting to
another, so that the whole is composed as an arranged and ordered thing (503e4504a4).
37 Other helpful accounts of the criteria for techne include those of Brickhouse and Smith 1994:
57, whose first three criteria are essentially the same as those of Annas; Reeve 1989: 3745, who
states (39) that craft-knowledge is explanatory, teachable, and luck-independent; Woodruff
1990, who lists as necessary conditions teachability, specialisation, and completeness (702).
Roochnik 1996 provides a helpful survey that includes (1788) pre-Platonic criteria for techne. Less
useful is Balansard 2001, whose bibliography does not cite Brickhouse and Smith 1994, Reeve 1989,
Roochnik 1996, or Woodruff 1990, and who draws from Phdr. 269a13ff. the unwarranted inference
that authentic poetry is said to be a techne (12830, 139).
Diotima taught (ddaxen) him about ta erotika (Symp. 201d5), but that he
himself only tries to persuade others (212b23). In the Lysis, he responds
to Hippothales request for advice about how a lover can become liked by
a beloved by saying that this is not an easy thing to tell (epen), that is,
to give an account of, but claims that he might perhaps be able to give
a demonstration (epideixis) by talking to Lysis (206b9c7). And in the
Phaedrus, he attributes his techne not to an understanding of ta erotika that
he has acquired by his own efforts, but to a divine gift (257a79), which is
also the source for his knowledge (oda) that Hippothales is in love (Lys.
204b7c2).38
One important way in which Socrates erotic art differs from craft-
knowledge is that an important aspect of erotic art is recognition of ones
own lack of wisdom (component (2) of the erotic art).39 In the erotic
dialogues, Socrates is represented as recognizing that he lacks wisdom in two
important respects. First, in two passages he explicitly states that he knows
nothing except ta erotika: Symposium 177d78 (cf. the spurious Theages
128b16) and Lysis 204b8c2, where Socrates claims to be inferior and
useless in matters other than the ability to recognize lover and beloved.40
Socrates avowals of ignorance in other passages in the four dialogues also
suggest that he knows only about ta erotika, and that his knowledge fails
him in other respects. In the Lysis, for example, Socrates says that he does
not know how to acquire the good friend, the possession of which is the
object of his eros (212a46), and he is in fact unable to say who or what
the friend is (222e67) that is the object of his search in this dialogue. In
Alcibiades I, he states that he and Alcibiades need self-care more than all
other people, and that he does not differ from Alcibiades in his own need
for education and self-care (124b10d5). The Socrates of the Symposium
claims that his own wisdom (sophia) is inferior and questionable, like a
dream (175e24), and he warns Alcibiades that he, Socrates, may be worth
nothing (219a12). In the Phaedrus, Socrates says that only a god should be
called wise (sophos); a human can be, at most, only a lover of wisdom
38 On divine inspiration cf. Resp. 499b8c1. I will argue that the kind of knowledge Socrates claims
to have been given by a divine source is true belief. On support from divine sources for Socrates
beliefs see Brickhouse and Smith 1994: 189201, and 1989: 1057; Forster 2007.
39 A discussion of the many complex and controversial epistemological issues surrounding the status of
the kinds of knowledge Socrates claims and disclaims in the dialogues generally is beyond the scope
of this study. However, I agree with Benson 2000: 168 about the impossibility of determining the
precise nature of the knowledge Socrates disavows in the early dialogues. Helpful surveys of the
controversy surrounding Socrates claims to and disclaimers of knowledge are provided by Forster
2007; Reeve 1989: 5362; Wolfsdorf 2004a; Yonezawa 1995.
40 Insightful interpretations of Socrates claim to know ta erotika include those of Blondell 2006; Detel
2003; Roochnik 1987 and 1996: 23351; Scott and Welton 2008. See also Chapter 4 at 4.6 and n.81.
(philosophon: 278d36). In this dialogue, when Socrates says that he spoke
at length because of his own longing (pq) for things seen in a former
life (250c78), he implies that he, like the fallen souls in his speech, has
forgotten the truth he once glimpsed.
Another way in which Socrates recognizes his own lack of wisdom
is by claiming to have only limited knowledge even of ta erotika; that
is, he does not have the complete understanding of the relevant field
which would be required by craft-knowledge, according to Julia Annas
characterization quoted above. Specifically, he claims to have only the
kind of skill that is gained from his own personal experience.41 This skill,
however, is not the kind of empeiria (experience) disparaged in the Gorgias,
by means of which cookery, for example, aims at producing pleasure,
without the use of reason, and without having considered the nature or
cause of pleasure (Grg. 501a3b1).42 Socrates art instead includes, but is
not limited to, the use of reason to consider what the natures and causes
of things might be, and to arrive at the conclusion that he lacks knowledge
about these matters.43 His ability to recognize his own lack of wisdom
(component (2) of the erotic art) is gained from his experience, as are the
four other components of this art. Socrates has experience in being devoted
to the daimon Eros or to ta erotika (component (1)), and in passionately
desiring to attain as much as he can of wisdom and other good things
(component (3)). His experience in searching for the wisdom he realizes
he lacks (component (4)) is represented in two different ways in the erotic
dialogues. First, the dialogues make frequent use of a pun on eran (to
love) and erotan (to question) in order to emphasize Socrates use of
human reasoning to examine and question (erotan) others.44 In so doing,
he strives, together with the people he questions, to attain the object of his
eros; that is, to become as wise and good as it is possible for him to become
(for example, Alc. 1 127e57). Second, Socrates searches by using certain
41 Cf. English adjective expert (from the Latin experior, to try or experience), used of someone
who has tried or experienced something: see Oxford English Dictionary Online, s.v. expert, adj
(accessed September 12, 2011).
42 Brickhouse and Smith 1994: 9 correctly deny that this kind of empeiria is necessary or sufficient for
the use of the elenchus.
43 See Resp. 9.582a45, where Plato writes that we judge by means of empeiria, phronesis and reason.
This passage was drawn to my attention by Frank 2007: 460.
44 Griswold 1986: 116, notes that Socrates erotic art ([Phdr.] 257a78) is the dialectical rhetoric that uses
the power of questioning to lead the soul to insights (emphasis in original); Reeve 2006a: 135 writes
of [t]he identification of the craft of love with that of asking questions, and Roochnik 1987: 128
states that the paradigmatic form of philosophical discourse is the question, which itself is erotic in
structure. I hold that the art of questioning is an important aspect of erotic art, but not identical
with it. On the connection between loving (eran) and questioning (erotan) see below, 2.3.4 and n.93.
god-given abilities, which do not depend on reasoning, to attain true belief.
He claims, for example, to have a god-given ability to recognize lovers and
beloveds (Lys. 204b7c2, discussed further in Chapter 2). Socrates also has
experience in exhorting others to acquire erotic art (component (5)). An
important aspect of his exhortation of others involves leading them to
recognize that they lack wisdom.45 In giving his demonstration of how to
produce friendliness in a beloved, Socrates leads Lysis to agree that Lysis
lacks wisdom (phronein) and needs a teacher (210d48). Moreover, the
Lysis ends in aporia about what the friend is (222e17). In the Alcibiades I,
Socrates shows his ambitious young beloved that he, Alcibiades, lacks self-
knowledge and needs to care for himself (for example, at 124b79, 127d6
8), while in the Symposium, Socrates induces Agathon to agree that he did
not know what he was talking about when he gave his speech about Eros
(201b1112), and he leads Alcibiades to be ashamed of his own deficiencies
(216a4b3). In the Phaedrus, Socrates shows his young interlocutor that the
speech of Phaedrus beloved, Lysias, is inferior in both content and style
(234c6235a8, 263d5264e3), thus implying that Phaedrus did not know
what he was talking about when he expressed admiration for it.
Socrates erotic art, then, is not craft-knowledge, but is instead erotic or
daimonic in that it, like its possessor, the daimon Eros in the Symposium,
is always in a state in between wisdom and ignorance.46 A passage in the
Cratylus (397d10398c4) supports interpreting this daimonic state as a kind
of skill that is based on experience rather than on knowledge of the truth.
Socrates begins his discussion of daimones, and heroes, and daimonic
humans47 by quoting Hesiods account of the daimones as the golden race
of humans who, after their death, become guardians of mortals. Hesiod,
he says, named them daimonas because they were wise [phronimoi] and
experienced [daemones] (398b67).48 In Homer, daemon means skilled,
experienced, and the verb dao means to acquire practical knowledge of
or skill in.49 This connection of daimon with daemon is appropriate to the
Eros of the Symposium. As the son of Resource (Poros: 203b3), Eros is a
schemer after the beautiful and good, courageous, impetuous, and intense,
a marvelously skilled hunter, always weaving new devices, both passionate
for wisdom and resourceful in looking for it, philosophizing through all his
45 This aspect of Socrates use of dialectic is well analyzed by Frede 1992: 210.
46 Cf. Roochnik 1996: 23940, Scott and Welton 2008.
47 My translation of 397d9e1 includes the words bracketed by Duke et al. 1995.
48 At 397e12398a2, Socrates quotes Hesiod, Op. 1213, with slight variations from our texts. On the
Cra. passage see Clay 1972 and 2000: 519; West 1979: 1534.
49 Cunliffe 1963.
life, a marvelously skilled magician, sorcerer, and sophist.50 Socrates, like
Eros, is daimonic in that he recognizes his own lack of wisdom, and has the
kind of art that allows him to be a marvelously skilled hunter for wisdom.
Like the daimones of the Cratylus, he is daemon, skilled or experienced.
1.4 setting and characterization

Two dramatic elements that contribute to Platos representation of Socrates
successful and friendly use of his erotic art are the settings of the erotic
dialogues and the characterization of his interlocutors. These dialogues are
not set in a public place, such as the Lyceum, which is the setting of the
Euthydemus, or the entrance to the law courts, where the Euthyphro takes
place, but in a private or secluded location. Such a setting is conducive to
conversations with younger people, who are, from the beginning, friendly
and sympathetic toward Socrates. Absent are adult antagonists like the
sophists, who engage in eristic (contentious) competition.51
In the Alcibiades I, Socrates is alone with Alcibiades, a young man who
is not quite twenty years old, being just past the bloom of adolescence
(131e11) and soon to address the Assembly for the first time (105a7b1).52 We
are not told exactly where they are, but Socrates stresses the fact that they
are alone (118b5).53 Alcibiades is sympathetic to Socrates from the beginning
of the dialogue, saying that he would have approached Socrates if Socrates
had not first approached him (104c7d3). He is sometimes exasperated by
Socrates questioning (for example, at 114d7, where he calls Socrates hubris-
tic), but is always friendly and cooperative. In the Lysis, Socrates is alone
with a group of boys and young men (203a35, 207a1) in a wrestling school
(palaistra: 204a2). Their distance from the adults with whom these young
people often associate is emphasized by the fact that the only adults who
appear are slave attendants (pedagogues), who are characterized as drunken
barbarians and whose removal by force of Lysis and Menexenus puts an
end to all conversation (223a1b3).54 All of the interlocutors are friendly
toward Socrates: Hippothales invites him to enter the palaistra (203b34);
Lysis is eager to listen to the conversation (207a56); Menexenus comes
to sit down beside Socrates and willingly answers the latters questions
50 Symp. 203d48: Rowes translation, 1998, adapted.

51 Coventry 1990: 17484 provides a good discussion of the difference between dialectic and eristic.
52 Denyer 2001: 94, on 105a7, notes that citizens could address the Assembly at age twenty.
53 Cf. Forde 1987: 222.
54 The adult trainer who interrupts the conversation at 207d23 remains off stage and sends an
unidentified person to summon Menexenus.
(207a7c12). The Phaedrus is set in the countryside, outside the city of
Athens and its crowds of bystanders (230c6d5).55 Moreover, Socrates is
alone with the younger Phaedrus, a sympathetic interlocutor who shares
Socrates love of speeches like a fellow Corybant (228b7).56 Phaedrus is
in fact characterized, toward the beginning of the dialogue, as another
self in Socrates statement: If I do not know Phaedrus I have also forgot-
ten myself (228a56, cf. 236c46). In the story narrated by Apollodorus
in the Symposium, Socrates is at first alone in the street with his lover or
fan (erastes), Aristodemus (174b14), and is afterwards an invited guest at
the house of Agathon. The symposiasts create further privacy by sending
the aulos (pipe) player away at the beginning of the dialogue (176e69).
Moreover, before telling the story of his attempted seduction of Socrates,
Alcibiades orders the servants to shut their ears (218b57).57 In this narra-
tive, Alcibiades repeatedly stresses that he was alone with Socrates (mnov
mn: 217b34, cf. 217d7e1) when the events occurred. Socrates has a
large number of sympathetic interlocutors in the Symposium. According to
Alcibiades, all of the guests named in the dialogue share with Socrates a
philosophical madness and Bacchic frenzy and have been bitten by philo-
sophical words that seize upon a young and noble soul and make it do and
say anything at all. Alcibiades specifically mentions Phaedrus, Agathon,
Eryximachus, Pausanias, Aristodemus and Aristophanes, and says that he
himself experiences these same things (217e6218b5). The symposiasts also
share Socrates interest in eros (177d6e3). Not all of them are young, but
one of Socrates main interlocutors, Agathon, is a youth (neaniskos: 198a2),
and Alcibiades tells a story about the relationship that he had as a young
man with Socrates. The symposiasts compete in praising Eros, but they
do so as friends, and Socrates does not subject them to the harsher treat-
ment he reserves for the sophists in other dialogues. The only elenchus
(cross-examination) narrated, that with Agathon, ends in a friendly way,
for Socrates addresses the young man as beloved (201c8).
Socrates is able to use his erotic art successfully in large part because
of these private settings and young, sympathetic interlocutors. In contrast
to dialogues in which Socrates does not succeed in changing his inter-
locutors minds, in these four dialogues, he is represented as producing,
55 On the setting of the dialogue see the excellent discussion of Ferrari 1987: 136.
56 Phaedrus explicitly states that they are alone in a deserted place and that he is younger than Socrates
(smn d mnw n rhm . . . g ka neterov: 236c8d1). According to Nails 2002: 232 Phaedrus
is in his mid-twenties.
57 Nails, 2006: 204 rightly notes, however, that there are some indications that the conversation is
overheard by non-participants: women and slaves.
at least temporarily, positive changes in others. His success is shown, in
part, by the eros or friendly feelings he arouses in his interlocutors. At
the end of the Alcibiades I, Alcibiades says that he will be Socrates atten-
dant (pedagogue) and begin to study justice. Socrates then speculates that
his own eros may have hatched a new eros in the young man (135d7e3).
Although Socrates expresses fears about his own future and that of Alci-
biades, he also states that he does not distrust Alcibiades nature (135e68).
The Lysis ends in aporia (impasse) about what the friend is, but within
this dialogue Socrates successfully demonstrates to Hippothales his ability
to create friendliness in a beloved (206c47 with 210e15). Lysis, the sub-
ject of the demonstration, is humbled by Socrates. Far from being angry,
however, Lysis addresses him in a friendly manner (211a3). By the end of
the dialogue, all of the interlocutors give the impression of being friends
with one another (223b57). In the Symposium, Agathon yields gracefully
to Socrates criticisms of his speech about Eros. When, in the final scene,
he gets up to sit next to Socrates in order to be praised by him, Agathon
clearly indicates that he does not object to receiving more of the same
kind of critical treatment (223a35). Alcibiades in this dialogue is benefited
at least temporarily by his association with Socrates, for he feels shame
and agrees with all that the philosopher says (215e7216b6). Moreover, the
behavior of Socrates that Alcibiades calls hybris (219c5) leads him to fall in
love with Socrates (222b34, c23), and Alcibiades warns Agathon against
doing so also (222b47).58 In the Phaedrus, Socrates interlocutor, Phae-
drus, seconds his prayer to Eros (sunecomai: 257b7) that both Phaedrus
and Lysias may turn their lives toward eros and philosophical words. At the
end of the dialogue, Phaedrus joins in another prayer made by Socrates,
this time to Pan, and remarks that friends have possessions in common
(279c67).
This is not to deny that Socrates success, as the examples just noted
make clear, is also due to his ability to arouse emotions very different from
friendliness. In showing his interlocutors that they lack the wisdom and
other good things they think they have, Socrates gives them a beneficial
humbling that is necessary for the removal of false beliefs and for the arousal
of love for wisdom.59 He acts, moreover, in ways that sometimes appear
to his interlocutors to be offensive, or even hubristic. In the Symposium,
58 I leave untranslated the Greek term hybris (often rendered as insolence) because its meaning is
controversial. See detailed discussion in Chapter 4 at 4.2.
59 Cf. the end of the Apology (41e142a2), where Socrates asks the jurors to give his sons the same
punishment Socrates has given the Athenians, if his sons appear to care more for wealth or anything
else than for virtue. On the beneficial effects of shame see further Chapter 1 at 1.2 and n.23.
both Agathon and Alcibiades tell Socrates: You are hubristic (bristv
e: 175e7, 215b7). Alcibiades compares the man to an hubristic satyr and
his words to the skin of an hubristic satyr (215b38, 221e24). Even though
they occur in a friendly and playful atmosphere, these accusations of hybris
highlight an important aspect of Socrates use of erotic skill in helping
others to acquire it also: his ability, like that of the daimonic satyr, to
arouse shame. Indeed, Alcibiades says that Socrates is the only one who
can cause him to feel shame (Symp. 216a8b3). Socrates gives Alcibiades a
similar humbling in Alcibiades I by, for example, showing the young man
that he knows even less than the women of his adversaries (124a57), and
that he is in the most shameful state (127d68). As a result, Alcibiades
says, just as he does in the Symposium: You are hubristic (Alc. I 114d7).
The humbling of Lysis in the company of his friends could also be seen as
offensive, and it makes Lysis lover, Hippothales, very uncomfortable (Lys.
210e56). In the Phaedrus, Socrates speaks disrespectfully of a speech that
was much admired by Phaedrus, thereby in effect showing the young man
that he did not know what he was talking about when he admired this
speech (234c6235a8).
Thus, my focus on Socrates erotic art helps to explain some puzzling
features of Platos Socrates. In the erotic dialogues, at least, Socrates is more
successful in persuading others, and more friendly towards them, than he
is often represented as being by those scholars who emphasize his use of
the harsh elenchus against adversaries.60 His friendliness, however, does
not prevent him from arousing painful emotions in those who require the
beneficial humbling that is conducive to their recognition of their own lack
of wisdom.
Not only does the youth of Socrates interlocutors contribute to his
comparative success in the erotic dialogues, it also helps us to understand
the emphasis on eros in these dialogues, as the next section will argue.
1.5 the erotic dialogues in context

In other dialogues also, Socrates practice of philosophy is represented as
having characteristics similar to those portrayed in the erotic quartet. He
is devoted to divine matters; he desires to attain the wisdom he recognizes
he lacks, and he helps others to do the same. Eros, however, has a much less
prominent role in other dialogues, nor is Socrates represented as practicing
an erotic art. While the emphasis on eros in the erotic dialogues increases
60 For examples see Preface nn.1215.

dramatic interest, it also serves crucial philosophical purposes. Comparison
with another quartet, the trial and death dialogues (the Apology, Euthyphro,
Crito and Phaedo) helps to clarify what these purposes are. In the erotic
quartet, Socrates practice of philosophy is represented as the education of
passionate young men for a life devoted to Socratic eros for wisdom. In the
trial and death dialogues, in contrast, philosophy is a preparation for death
of older people, and of Socrates in particular as he nears death.
Three thematic aspects of the erotic dialogues are especially important
for an understanding of the emphasis on eros in this quartet as a whole.
First, as discussed above (I.2 and I.4), all four are concerned with education
of the young. In this context, it is appropriate for Socrates to use and adapt
the erotic-educational conventions of his social and literary culture. Each
dialogue makes use of these conventions, partly in order to appeal both
to Socrates young interlocutors and to Platos own audience, and partly
in order to highlight the contrast between the ordinary eros of convention
and Socratic eros.
Second, Plato makes use of the traditional association of eros with mys-
tical initiation in representing Socratic education as an initiation into the
mysteries of Socratic eros.61 The initiatory role of eros is explicit in Dio-
timas speech in the Symposium. According to this account, initiation into
the Lesser Mysteries, in which ordinary eros plays an essential role (208e
209e), is necessary preparation for initiation into the Greater Mysteries
of eros for true beauty (209e5212a7: Chapter 3 at 3.3.3). In the Phaedrus
also, when he uses the language of the Mysteries in the myth of his second
speech, Socrates portrays eros as a madness and enthusiasm accompanying
mystic initiation (248a257a: Chapter 5 at 5.3 and Chapter 6). As in the
Symposium, ordinary eros is represented as contributing to an initiation
that leads a lover toward Socratic eros for true beauty. Although the Lysis
and Alcibiades I do not use mystical terminology, Socrates activities in
these dialogues may nevertheless be considered initiatory in that the edu-
cation with which they are concerned helps young men to begin to live
the same kind of life that is described in the language of the Mysteries in
the Phaedrus: a life turned toward eros together with philosophical words
(Phdr. 257b6), in which lover and beloved are also friends (255b67, 256c7).
In the erotic dialogues, then, Plato adapts erotic-educational conventions
and religious traditions very effectively so as to represent Socrates art as
61 Eros and initiation: Seaford 1994: 2845, citing Soph. Aj. 6856 and 693 (frix rwti), Eur. Bacch.
813, and Platos Phdr. 251a. Philosophy as initiation: Morgan 1990 and 1992: esp. 235.
including the proper guidance of ordinary eros so that it becomes a power-
ful and positive motivational force in the search for the wisdom and beauty
that are the objects of Socratic eros. As Socrates says, there is no better
helper than Eros for human nature (Symp. 212b24).
Third, Socrates interlocutors in the erotic dialogues are passionate by
nature and deeply concerned with ordinary eros. These young men, unlike
the sophists in other dialogues, are capable of being motivated by ordi-
nary eros to strive to acquire Socratic eros for beauty and wisdom. It is
Alcibiades eros to acquire the greatest power, a power that he at first
mistakenly believes to be renown and tyranny (Alc. I 105c34, 124b46,
134e8135b5), that makes it possible for him to acquire eros for what is
truly the greatest power, namely, the power conferred by wisdom in the
form of self-knowledge and self-care. In the Symposium, Alcibiades pre-
occupation with ordinary eros is evident in his attempt to seduce Socrates
(217a219d), in the theme of his sexual jealousy of Socrates (213cd, 222c
223a), and in Aristodemus statement that Alcibiades still seems to be in
love with Socrates (222c23). This is so, even as Alcibiades description
of his own strong emotional reactions to Socrates philosophical words
(215e216c, 218a27) suggests that his passionate nature makes it possible
for him to be drawn, however temporarily, toward Socratic eros. Agathon,
who benefits greatly from his association with Socrates, is characterized by
Eryximachus as, like Socrates, marvelously skilled in ta erotika (Symp.
193e5). The young poets speech demonstrates his skill in praising an Eros
who is the patron of many activities, including the composition of love
poetry (196d6e6), that are erotic in the ordinary sense. The first two
speeches in the Phaedrus are evidence of the interest of both Socrates and
his interlocutor in ordinary eros. At the end of his second speech, Socrates
claims to have used erotike techne (257a78) in an attempt to lead Phaedrus
from his interest in ordinary eros to a life motivated by Socratic eros, just as
the lover within his speech is led by erotic enthusiasm from love of physical
beauty in this world to love of heavenly beauty. In the Lysis, Hippothales
eros for Lysis drives the dramatic action, in which Socrates demonstrates
his erotic skill by showing how a lover can become liked by his beloved
(206b9c7) if the two engage in the common search for the wisdom that
is the object of Socratic eros.
In the trial and death dialogues, in contrast, Socrates and his interlocutors
are preoccupied not with eros but with death. This difference is especially
evident in the use of initiation language in the Phaedo, where Socrates
compares true philosophers to initiates into the Mysteries who prepare
for a better afterlife (69d3e3, 81a89).62 The other three dialogues may
also be said to represent Socratic philosophy as a kind of initiation, in
a non-mystical sense, that prepares one to face death courageously. This
training for death (Phd. 81a12) emphasizes the avoidance of wrongdoing
rather than the passionate striving toward the objects of Socratic eros. These
different philosophical purposes of the two quartets help to explain why
eros is all but absent from the trial and death dialogues.
Socrates makes his defense in the Apology by emphasizing his lack of
wisdom about divine matters, his pious obedience to the divine, and the
ways in which he has benefited others. He thus resembles the Socrates
of the erotic dialogues in many respects. However, the absence of eros
from this dialogue corresponds to a notable difference in his philosophical
purposes.63 Socrates represents himself as devoted to a god very different
from the daimon Eros: Apollo, the god of the oracle, who is associated not
with passionate striving toward beauty and wisdom, but with the restraint
that comes from knowing ones own limits.64 Socrates is also obedient to his
daimonion, the divine voice that, like Apollo, urges restraint, and that may
in fact be the sign of Apollo.65 Unlike the daimon Eros in the Symposium,
who provides the impetus that moves lovers toward the objects of eros
(Symp. 203d48), the daimonion is a divine voice that always turns him
away (apotropei) from doing something wrong, and never turns him toward
(protrepei) anything (Ap. 31c8d4). Socrates claims, as he does in the erotic
dialogues, to lack wisdom of the kind only a god has (19b4c6, 20d9e2,
21b45, 23a5), and instead to possess a kind of human wisdom (20d79) that
consists in knowing that a human being is worth nothing with respect to
wisdom (21d48, 23b24). However, Socrates is not represented as eagerly
striving for the wisdom and beauty that he recognizes that he lacks, but
as searching more narrowly to discover what the oracle means (21b27,
e5), in obedience to Apollo (23b4c1, 29a4, 29d34, 30a57). This search
is not passionate striving, but a labor (pnouv: 22a68), undertaken
with great reluctance (mgiv pnu: 21b8), that has aroused hatred and
enmity (21de, 23a, 23e24a, 28ab) instead of the mutual philia Socrates
62 I am concerned here only with the fact that Plato uses the language of initiation in the Phaedo,
and am unable to consider many controversial issues. See Bussanich 2006; McPherran 1996: esp.
26871; Morgan 1990: 5579 and 1992; Peterson 2011: ch. 6.
63 Eros and cognates do not appear in the Apology.
64 The presence of Apollo is also felt in the Phaedo, in which the gods festival delays Socrates execution
(58bc), and Socrates calls himself the servant of Apollo (85a9b5), to whom he composes a hymn
(61b23). On the association of Apollo with Socrates see McPherran 1996: 166, 21718, 2269;
Morgan 1992: 231; Reeve 1989: 2837.
65 Bussanich 2006: 203; McPherran 1996: 137, 140.
common search creates in the erotic dialogues. Socrates represents himself
as skilled in, or at least uniquely fitted to conduct, this search when he
says that he himself is a gift from the god that cannot easily be replaced
(30d6e6). Socrates benefits others by means of his search, specifically by
helping them to recognize their own lack of wisdom and to be ashamed of
placing higher value on things that are in fact of lesser value (29d730c2).
In so doing, however, he does not represent himself as educating the young,
but as serving the god and providing the greatest good to the city (36c4).
In describing his obedience to Apollo, Socrates appropriately character-
izes himself not as an erotic, but as an heroic figure, explicitly comparing
himself to Homers Achilles (Ap. 28c1d4). Socrates avoids wrongdoing by
thinking little of death and danger, and placing the highest value on the
affairs of the god (21e24, 28b6c1), on justice (32e25), and on remaining
at the post where the god placed him (28e429a2). He cares nothing for
death, and everything about doing whatever he can to avoid acting unjustly
or impiously (32d14). An attitude more consistent with an erotic striving
toward what is both good and pleasant, appears, significantly, only after
the verdict, when Socrates looks fearlessly toward death and the possibility
of an afterlife. He then says that the greatest good for a human being in
this life is to converse about virtue (38a23), and that doing so in Hades
would be a great good, something not unpleasant, and an immeasurable
blessing (41c34). In living the philosophical life that has prepared him
to face death courageously, Socrates has also prepared himself to receive
blessings in the afterlife, if in fact the soul goes to another place after death
(40c610).
In the Euthyphro, Socrates search for wisdom is represented as moti-
vated not by Socratic eros, but by fear of acting impiously. Indeed, eros and
cognates are absent, as in the Apology, from discussions about the search
for wisdom.66 Socrates tells Euthyphro that Meletus has indicted Socrates
on the charge of corrupting the young by inventing new gods (3a9b4).
Socrates is well aware of the dangers to which this charge exposes him (3c6
e4). He shows no fear of death, however, but is instead deeply concerned, as
he has always been, with knowing about divine matters (5a67). What he
fears is acting impiously, through ignorance of these matters (15e516a4). To
avoid this great evil, Socrates claims that he desires (epithumo: 5c5) to learn
from Euthyphro.67 Euthyphro, Socrates says, clearly has knowledge about
66 It is disputed whether or not cognates of eros occur, at 14c4, in the context of a general remark
about leading and following. Duke et al. 1995 read rwtnta . . . rwtwmn; Burnet 1924, on
14c3 defends rnta . . . rwmn.
67 See also 5a39, 11e34, 12e15, 14b8c3, 14d46, 15c1116a4.
what is holy, because he has no fear (o fob) of doing something impious
when he prosecutes his own father (4e48). If he did not have this knowl-
edge, Socrates says, fear (deisav) of the gods and shame before humans
would have prevented him from taking the risk of doing something wrong
(15d48). Although his motivation differs, Socrates has characteristics that
are similar to those in the erotic dialogues. He is devoted to learning about
divine matters so as to avoid acting impiously. He also recognizes that
he lacks wisdom about divine matters, and he desires to obtain this wis-
dom (sophia: 14d4). In attempting to learn, Socrates uses the question and
answer method, in which he claims to have skill. When Euthyphro com-
plains that Euthyphro does not know how to say what he means, and that
Socrates makes Euthyphros statements move around (11b68), Socrates
replies that he must, then, be more marvelously skilled (deinoteros . . . ten
technen) than his ancestor Daedalus (11d34). Socrates uses his skill in a
vain attempt to help Euthyphro recognize that Euthyphro lacks wisdom
about what is holy, and so to experience fear and shame at the possibility
of wrongdoing.
In the Crito, Socrates friend Crito arrives at the prison to bring Socrates
the news that his death is imminent and to persuade him to flee (43c544c5).
This dialogue represents Socrates as using his reason to make a courageous
decision to avoid acting unjustly. He says that one should value living well
rather than merely living (48b45), and that death and suffering are of no
concern compared with doing injustice (48d36; cf. 54b35). In contrast to
the pain and grief of Crito, Socrates remains calm and fearless in the face
of death (43b3c8). He claims to revere and honor those arguments he has
followed in the past, arguments that have always persuaded him to obey
the reasoning that appears best to him. He cannot, he says, cast out these
arguments in his present circumstances, through fear of death (46b3c6).
Specifically, Socrates listens to and obeys the arguments telling him that it
is best to obey the laws of his country (50a54e), who are his parents and
masters (50e24). In so doing, Socrates indicates that he acts in obedience
to the divine, for he characterizes his country and its laws (51a25) as having
divine qualities, being more honored and revered and holy than father and
mother, in the eyes of gods and humans (51a9b4). The dialogue concludes:
Let us act in this way, since the god leads us in this way (54e12). The
Crito shows Socrates using his accustomed question and answer method,
when he answers the questions put to him by the Laws (50c910), and
persuades Crito that it would be unjust to escape.
Socrates, then, is portrayed in the Crito as devoted to the divine, in
that he obeys the laws of his country, which have divine qualities. His
recognition of his own lack of wisdom about justice and other virtues,
and his search for wisdom about matters that do not directly concern his
present crisis, are not issues in this short and sharply focused dialogue.
Socrates is also portrayed as placing the highest value on avoiding injustice
and obeying the laws, as skilled in searching for what justice is in his present
circumstances, and as helping Crito to value acting justly, and to search
for what justice is by means of reasoning. Eros is never mentioned in this
dialogue concerned not with Socrates eager pursuit of wisdom and beauty,
but with his decision to turn away from doing injustice, even in the face
of death.68
In the Phaedo, Socrates companion, Phaedo, narrates the death of this
man whose practice of philosophy has prepared him to die fearlessly and
nobly (58e45). Socrates spends his last hours in philosophical conversa-
tion, just as he has done all his life. He notes that the topics of discussion,
death and the afterlife, are appropriate (prpei: 61e1; cf. 70b10c2) for
this occasion. The Phaedo, however, is exceptional among the trial and
death dialogues in using erotic terminology to refer to love for wisdom.
The argument shows, Socrates says, that only after death might we be
able to obtain that which we desire [piqumomn] and that of which we
say we are lovers [erastai]: wisdom [phronesis] (66e24). It would be very
illogical, he says, if the true philosophers, those who practice dying,
should fear to go where there is hope of obtaining that which they have
loved [rwn] throughout life and what they have loved [rwn] is wis-
dom (67e568a2). Someone truly loving [rn] wisdom, he says, and
who hopes to find it nowhere else than in Hades, will not grieve when he
dies (68a7b6).69
One explanation for this exceptional use of erotic vocabulary is that,
in the Phaedo, philosophy is explicitly compared to initiation into the
Mysteries, just as it is in the Phaedrus and Symposium, and, as noted
above, eros is associated with the Mysteries. The one who has practiced
philosophy correctly, Socrates says, is like the initiate into the Mystery
rites (teletas) who is described at Phaedo 69c3d3. This philosopher is not
profane and uninitiated (mhtov ka tlestov), but, being purified
(kekaqarmnov) and initiated (tetelesmnov), will dwell with the gods
after arriving in Hades. The account of eros and initiation in the Phaedo,
however, differs significantly from that of the Symposium and Phaedrus. In
the Phaedo, the initiate prepares not for a life devoted to eros together with
philosophical words (bon: Phdr. 257b6), but for death. Moreover, the eros
for physical beauty that is portrayed very positively in the erotic dialogues,
68 As is the case in the Apology, eros and cognates do not occur in the Crito.
69 Cognates of eros are also used in this dialogue to refer to ordinary eros associated with the body
(66c2, 81a7, b3), and to lovers reminded of their beloveds (73d6).
as preparatory to initiation into Socratic eros for true beauty, is represented
in the Phaedo as a hindrance to attaining the wisdom that is achieved only
by separation, or purification, of the soul from the human body (64c
69e), which fills us with (ordinary) eros, desire and fear, and thus prevents
us from hunting for the truth (66c14). The characteristics of Socrates
practice of philosophy in the Phaedo differ from their counterparts in the
erotic dialogues in large part because of this difference in the way in which
Socratic eros is represented. In the Phaedo, Socrates expresses and enacts his
devotion to the search for wisdom, a divine good that can be obtained, if
anywhere, only among the gods in Hades. He does not emphasize his own
lack of wisdom, but his statement that there is no hope of obtaining wisdom
anywhere else than in Hades (67e568b5) makes it clear that he recognizes
that he now lacks it, as does his exhortation to his interlocutors to examine
more closely the first assumptions of his arguments (107b46). Socrates
also has a passionate desire, called eros, to obtain wisdom of the kind that
results from purification of the soul from the body. He demonstrates his
skill in searching for wisdom by his use of the question and answer method
(78d12) to present a number of arguments for immortality. Socrates also
helps others, by argument and exhortation, to share his own devotion to
and desire for wisdom so as to do everything so as to participate in virtue
and wisdom in life (114c78), and thus to have hope of gaining a better
afterlife as well (107c1d5).
As he nears death, Socrates and his interlocutors turn away from life in
this world. He no longer needs a daimonic, erotic art that mediates, like
the daimon Eros, between mortals and gods, for he now speaks of the hope
of going to live not with mortals and daimones, but with gods, who do not
desire the wisdom they already possess (see Symp. 204a12, Lys. 218a24).
part i
Socrates and Two Young Men

c h a p ter 1
Your love and mine: eros and self-knowledge in

Alcibiades I
1.1 puzzles about er os

The Alcibiades I, a dialogue I take to be authentic, was long thought to be a
good introduction to Platos philosophy.1 It is also an excellent introduction
to Platos characterization of Socrates as a man who practices erotic art. At
the beginning of the dialogue, Socrates approaches Alcibiades as his first and
only remaining lover (103a13) and at its end, he declares that his own love
is like a stork, if it has indeed hatched a new love in Alcibiades (135e13). In
the course of the dialogue, Socrates accomplishes what has been described
as a philosophical seduction,2 thus demonstrating that his erotic art
is superior to the expertise in sexual seduction possessed by the many
lovers who failed to persuade the young man (103b45). This dialogue,
unfortunately, has been neglected in modern times, and what attention it
has received has tended to focus on issues concerning authenticity, religion
or psychology rather than on its erotic aspects.3 As a result, important and
puzzling questions about eros have not been adequately addressed. One
question concerns Socrates love for Alcibiades, who might appear to be an
1 This view of the Alcibiades I was expressed in antiquity over many centuries by a wide range of
sources, including Olympiodorus (10.1811.6) and Proclus (11.121), both cited by Denyer 2001: 14;
Iamblichus (frag. 1), cited by Pradeau 2000: 22; and Segonds 2003, vol. i, Introduction: xxiv.
The dialogues authenticity was not questioned until Schleiermacher in 1836 (Schleiermacher 1973:
32836); see Denyer 2001: 1415 and Pradeau 2000: 245. Pradeau 2000, Annexe I: 21920 provides
a useful survey of positions taken on the question of authenticity from Schleiermacher to 1997. I
add to this list, on the side against authenticity: Gribble 1999: 2602; Joyal 2003; Slings 1999: 1634;
Smith 2004, and on the side for authenticity: Allen 1962; Annas 1985 and 2006: 414; Denyer 2001:
1426; Giannantoni 1997: 36373; Gordon 2003; Grote 1867: 13269; Johnson 1999: 1; OConnor
1999: 35; Pangle 1987a; Pradeau 2000: 229 and 81; G. A. Scott 2000: 2057 n.1. I am convinced by
the arguments of many scholars that there are no sound reasons, internal or external, for suspecting
this dialogue.
2 Denyer 2001: 59; Gordon 2003.
3 Exceptions include Denyer 2001: 59; Forde 1987; Friedlander 1921: esp. 20; Goldin 1993: 1416;
Gordon 2003; Wellman 1966. In antiquity the erotic aspects of the dialogue were studied extensively
by Proclus (for example, 2637, 4767, 2334) and Olympiodorus (for example, 13.1023 [on 103a],
42.743.8 [on 104c105c], 215.225 [on 130d133c]; 232.1617 [on 135e]).
31
32 Part I Socrates and Two Young Men
unlikely love object for Socrates. He is a wealthy young man from a noble
and powerful family (104b1c1), whose arrogance (103b4104a1, 104c2)
has led him to repulse his many lovers. Socrates characterizes Alcibiades
political ambition as a desire for tyranny (135b35).4 What is more, he has
now lost the youthful bloom (131c1112, e1112) which is said, in other
dialogues, to be attractive to Socrates.5 Why does Socrates love this kind
of person? A second puzzle concerns Alcibiades love for Socrates. When
Socrates refers at the end of the dialogue to Alcibiades eros for him, is he
merely using a figure of speech, or are we to understand that Alcibiades
really loves the older and physically unattractive man who rebukes him
and shows him his own deficiencies? If he does love Socrates, what kind of
love is this? A third question can be raised about the relationship between
interpersonal eros and the self-knowledge and self-care that are major issues
in the dialogue.6 Is Socrates eros for Alcibiades merely a conventional theme
that adds dramatic interest, or does it play a significant role in acquiring
self-knowledge and in caring for oneself? If interpersonal eros does play a
role in self-care and self-knowledge, in what specific ways does Socrates,
as erastes (lover), differ from a conventional erastes, like that of Pausanias
speech in the Symposium, who also educates his eromenos (beloved)?7
In this chapter I address these and other issues about eros in this dialogue.
The Alcibiades I represents Socrates as the lover, not of Alcibiades body, but
of the young mans beautiful soul (131c5e4). The souls of both Alcibiades
and Socrates are beautiful and lovable for two reasons: they are beautiful by
nature, and they also have a passionate desire to use this nature to become
as good as they are able to be.8 That is, they desire to obtain the greatest
power that it is possible for a human being to obtain. Indeed, Socrates and
Alcibiades, unlike the erastes and eromenos of Pausanias speech, come to
share, by the end of the dialogue, a reciprocal love for each other, in part
because they share another kind of eros: a passionate desire to acquire this
greatest power. Just as Alcibiades hopes to obtain the greatest power in the
city, so Socrates hopes to acquire the greatest power with Alcibiades by
4 Noted by Denyer 2001, on 135b3.
5 Platos Socrates is represented as attracted to physical beauty, for example, in Chrm. 153d45, 155c5e2,
Lys. 204b12 and e510, Symp. 211d48, although he loves beauty of soul rather than physical beauty
(see Introduction at I.2).
6 Self-care or care for oneself translates t auto pimelesqai: 127e9, and passim. I agree with
Annas 1985: 118 and Friedlander 1964: 2367 that self-care and self-knowledge are ultimately the same
thing: see below stage v, part 3 at 1.2. Pradeau 2000: 4653 argues instead that self-knowledge is one
of the conditions for self-care.
7 Many of the close connections of eros with self-care and self-knowledge are well brought out by
Gordon 2003: 224. On the erastes of Pausanias speech see Introduction at I.2 and n.29.
8 See below 1.3.
Your love and mine: eros and self-knowledge in Alcibiades I 33
demonstrating that Alcibiades cannot gain the power he desires without
Socrates help (105d7e5). He does so by showing Alcibiades that the young
man is mistaken about the object of his own desire.9
Alcibiades at first believes that the greatest power in the city (105b4) is
tyranny, the ability to do whatever he wants to do in private and political
life (134e8135b5). Socrates, however, shows Alcibiades that the greatest
power in the city is in fact the same kind of power that Socrates himself
desires: the power to act well (prxein rqv ka kalv: 134b11c1) that is
conferred by wisdom in the form of self-care and self-knowledge. In order
to know and care for oneself, one must first realize that one lacks a good
thing, wisdom, about oneself and other matters (component (2) of the
erotic art). Only then can one acquire Socratic eros, the passionate desire to
obtain as much wisdom as one can (component (3)). The power conferred
by self-knowledge and self-care is greatest because it makes possible every
other good thing, including political power that Alcibiades desires and also
power in the private sphere that Socrates hopes to obtain, in his relations
with Alcibiades (134c57). At the end of the dialogue, Alcibiades, with the
help of Socrates erotic art, comes to understand that he and Socrates really
desire the same kind of power.10 Their love for each other is based in part
on this common desire and on the ability each has to help the other to
attain it. For the self-knowledge that confers the greatest power can only
be gained by looking into the soul of another (133b710), who must, at
least in Athens, also be a lover. The dialogue dramatizes Socrates use of
his erotic art to nurture the growth of these two interdependent kinds of
eros shared by Alcibiades and Socrates: eros for the greatest power that is
conferred by wisdom, and eros for one another.
9 On the idea that what people really desire is the good, even if this good is different from what
they believe it to be, see Brickhouse and Smith 1994: 868; Penner and Rowe 2005: esp. 1468 and
20530; Reshotko 2006: esp. 2156; Weiss 2006a: 825, discussing Grg. 466a9468e10. This idea is
not directly addressed in Alc. I, and 115e15, where Alcibiades agrees that he desires things because
he believes them to be good, might suggest that in this dialogue people are represented as desiring
what they believe to be good rather than what is really good. Wolfsdorf 2008: 2985 offers a recent
defense of this kind of subjectivist theory of desire. However, what Alcibiades desires at 115c1e7
is something that is in fact good, courage, and throughout the dialogue he desires what is in fact
good: the greatest power. He is simply mistaken, at first, about what this power is.
10 On the greatest power see below 1.2, stage vi at 133c18135c11, and 1.3. I would not characterize
Socrates as redirecting Alcibiades desires (Gordon 2003: 1417), or as inflating his political ambition
in order to increase his sense of the value of what Socrates can offer him (OConnor 1999: 367),
or as alternately arousing and humbling him (G. A. Scott 2000: 101), but rather as showing him
that he is mistaken about the true object of these desires (cf. Lutz 1998: 11419). This point is made
by Olympiodorus, who notes that Socrates loves Alcibiades both because he despises the things he
now has and would rather die than go on having these things only (42.743.8, on 104c105c), and
because he does not really desire those things but greater things (49.1013, on 105a).
1.2 acquiring the greatest power

In this section, I trace the successive stages of Socrates use of component
(5) of his erotic art in the Alcibiades I.11 Socrates uses his art to approach
Alcibiades effectively, and to help the young man make progress in acquir-
ing the erotic art for himself. In so doing, Socrates also makes progress in
accomplishing his stated goal, that of acquiring the greatest power with
Alcibiades by showing him that he, Alcibiades, cannot obtain what is in
fact the greatest power without Socrates help (105e25). In addition to
passionate desire for what is in fact the greatest power, Alcibiades acquires
eros for Socrates himself.
I also discuss three kinds of claims made by Socrates and Alcibiades.
Some claims are represented as assertions made by Alcibiades rather than
by Socrates because they are Alcibiades answers to Socrates questions. As
Alcibiades agrees early in the dialogue, when one person asks questions and
another answers, it is the answerer and not the questioner who asserts that
something is the case (113a710). I distinguish Alcibiades assertions from
two kinds of claims made by Socrates.12 Some of Socrates claims concern
the kinds of matters about which he often denies that he has knowledge.
These are explicitly said to need more rigorous demonstration or to be
conditional.13 Other claims (including exhortations that are in fact claims
that something should be done) are made by Socrates with confidence and
on his own authority. Claims in this second category are erotic in that
they are associated with one or more of the components of the erotic art.
They are consistent with Socrates recognition of his own lack of wisdom
concerning matters about which only a god could have knowledge. In this
chapter I use lower case Roman numerals in bold (for example: stage i) to
mark the stages in Socrates use of his art, and I indicate the erotic claims
made by Socrates at each stage by using a combination of Roman numerals
11 On these components see Introduction at I.1. Olympiodorus and Proclus divided the dialogue into
a prologue (103a106c) and three sections: (1) 106c119a, (2) 119a124a, (3) 124a135d (or 135e): see
Segonds 2003, vol. i, Introduction: xlviii and lxxii and Dillon 1973: 2301. My first three stages
correspond to the prologue and first two sections of Proclus and Olympiodorus.
12 Cf. Annas 2006: 414, who argues that the dialogue contains two kinds of views: those of Alcibiades
that are expressed in the course of Socrates ad hominem arguments, and Socrates own positive
views.
13 For example, arguments about the identity of the soul and the human being are said to be made
not exactly but moderately well (m kribv ll ka metrwv) at 130c7d1, and Socrates adds a
qualification at 131b4 when he says, if sophrosyne is to know the self. These and other qualifications
lead me to disagree with those who hold that Socrates is uncharacteristically dogmatic in this
dialogue: see, for example, Smith 2004: 1012; de Strycker 1942: 1423; Weil 1964: 81. This view
is challenged by Gordon 2003: 15; Johnson 1999: 67 n.13; Pradeau 2000: 57 n.1. On the issue of
Socrates disclaimers of knowledge see Introduction at I.3 and n.39.
and lower case letters in italics (for example: claim i.a). Below is an outline
of these stages and claims.
Socrates use of the erotic art in Alcibiades I

Stage i. Socrates approaches Alcibiades (103a1106c3).
claim i.a Socrates is Alcibiades first and last lover.
claim i.b The daimonic opposition to Socrates approach has been with-
drawn.
claim i.c Socrates loves Alcibiades because he knows that Alcibiades hopes to
obtain the greatest power in the city.
claim i.d Socrates hopes to acquire the greatest power with Alcibiades.
claim i.e Alcibiades cannot obtain what he desires without Socrates.
claim i.f Socrates is able to demonstrate that what he has said is true if
Alcibiades is willing to answer questions.
Stage ii. Alcibiades agrees that he lacks wisdom, but does not yet
have sufficient motivation to search for it (106c4119a7).
claim ii.a Alcibiades is living with the greatest lack of understanding.
Stage iii. Alcibiades is convinced that he needs to care for himself,
and he asks Socrates for advice (119a8124b9).
claim iii.a Socrates is vexed on account of your love and mine.
claim iii.b In Athens only a lover cares about a persons education.
claim iii.c Alcibiades does not heed the lover who tells him to care for himself.
claim iii.d Alcibiades needs to know and care for himself in order to obtain
what he loves.
Stage iv. Socrates and Alcibiades engage in a common search for
improvement (124b10127e8).
claim iv.a Socrates and Alcibiades need education and care.
claim iv.b Alcibiades will have epiphany only through Socrates, with the
help of the god.
claim iv.c Alcibiades must answer Socrates questions.
claim iv.d If Alcibiades answers, he and Socrates will become better.
Stage v. Alcibiades accepts Socrates as the only lover of his soul,
who alone can help him to become better (127e9133c17).
Stage v, part 1. Alcibiades agrees that to care for himself he must
know his own soul (127e9131c4).
Stage v, part 2. Alcibiades accepts Socrates as the only lover of his
soul (131c5132a6).
claim v.a Socrates is the only lover of Alcibiades soul.
claim v.b Socrates love will continue if Alcibiades is not corrupted.
claim v.c Alcibiades must strive to improve; by doing so he will retain
Socrates love.
claim v.d Socrates is lovable.
Stage v, part 3. Alcibiades agrees that he can improve by looking
into another soul (132a6133c17).
claim v.e Alcibiades must care for himself.
Stage vi. Alcibiades agrees that self-knowledge confers the greatest
power (133c18135c11).
claim vi.a Socrates pledges that if he and Alcibiades know themselves, they
will act well and be happy.
Stage vii. Alcibiades offers to exchange roles with Socrates
(135c12e8).
Stage i. Socrates approaches Alcibiades. He claims to be his only lover, and
the man without whom Alcibiades cannot obtain what he desires. Alcibiades
agrees to listen to Socrates and to answer his questions (103a1106c3).
When the dialogue opens, Socrates approaches Alcibiades for the first time
and asserts (claim i.a) that he is the young mans first and last lover (103a1
4, 104c5). Socrates explicit declarations of his love (cf. 131e10 and 135e1)
and his long and assiduous care in following Alcibiades about and paying
close attention to him (103a13, 104d13; cf. 106e89) are evidence of his
special devotion to ta erotika (component (1) of the erotic art). He also
explains (claim i.b) that his reason for approaching Alcibiades now is that
the daimonic opposition has been withdrawn (103a4b2). Previously,
Socrates thinks, the god did not allow him to converse with Alcibiades so
that he would not speak in vain with the young man (105e6106a1). Here,
as in other dialogues, Socrates claims that his erotic activities are divinely
sanctioned (cf. Lys. 204b8c2; Phdr. 257a69) help to characterize him as
especially devoted to ta erotika. Indeed, some scholars go so far as to argue
that the god at 105d5106a1 stands for the erotic impulses.14 Alcibiades
immediately shows that he has a nature suited to the search for wisdom,
for he says that he was going to question Socrates about why he annoys
Alcibiades; he expresses wonder (qaumzw: cf. 103a1) about what the older
man hopes to gain in doing so, and says that he would be glad to learn
(puqomhn) what Socrates means by taking such care (pimelstata) to
follow him around (104d15).15 His curiosity is aroused, in part, by Socrates
strangeness, or outlandishness (atopia). Alcibiades says: Now that youve
started to speak, Socrates, you seem much more outlandish [topterov]
14 Joyal 2000: 989, citing Proclus, 62.1617, 63.13ff.
15 Alcibiades wonder and its connection with philosophy are noted by Laurent 2002: 819; Olympi-
odorus 13.1216 and 24.2125.7 (on 103a); Proclus 42.543.5.
than when you followed me in silence (106a23). This interest in Socrates
contrasts with Alcibiades arrogant rejection of his other lovers (103b45),
and, as Socrates remarks, it makes Alcibiades willing to listen to Socrates
(104d68; cf. 106a1).
Socrates explains (claim i.c) that he has not gotten rid of his love long ago
(104e6105a1) because he does not merely conjecture but knows well (e
oda: 105c67) that Alcibiades has the hope (lpv: 105a7, c6, d7) and desire
(piqumev: 105e5) of obtaining the greatest power (mgiston dunsesqai:
105b4, d7e2) in the city of Athens and among non-Greeks as well (105b4
7). Indeed, he thinks that Alcibiades would rather die than go on living
without being able to acquire more than what he now has (105a36). Just
as Alcibiades hopes to acquire the greatest power in the city, so Socrates
hopes to acquire the greatest power with Alcibiades (claim i.d, at 105e23).
He asserts, moreover (claim i.e), that it is not possible for Alcibiades to
achieve what he desires without Socrates (105d24), and that no one else
is able to give Alcibiades the power he desires (105e35).16 Alcibiades then
asks Socrates: Assuming that I do have these thoughts, how will I achieve
these things through you, and could not do so without you? (106a6
8). Socrates replies that he is not able to make a long speech but (claim
i.f) that he would be able to demonstrate that what he has said is true if
Alcibiades will do him the service (phretsai) of answering his questions
(106b110). As Nicholas Denyer notes, this verb has sexual connotations.17
In this context, however, it is the first hint of the very different kind
of erotic service that Socrates wants from his beloved. When Alcibiades
agrees to do this service for Socrates (106b510), his statement: Ask
(Erta: 106b10) is also an invitation to Socrates to keep on loving (rn)
him.18
Socrates erotic claims at this stage concern his special devotion to erotic
matters (component (1) of the erotic art), as shown by his assertions that
he loves Alcibiades (claims i.a and i.c), a love for which he claims divine
sanction (claim i.b). They also concern his own and Alcibiades eros for
the greatest power (claims i.c, i.d and i.e).19 This power, closely associated
16 Proclus 156.1013 makes the insightful observation that Socrates does not say that Alcibiades will
attain his goals with Socrates help, but only that he could not attain them without this help.
17 Denyer 2001, on 106b4
18 The close connection in Alc. I between eran (to love) and erotan (to question), noted by Laurent
2002: 789, citing (78 n.2) Lacan 1991: 138 (sic: correct citation is 141), is one of the bases for the
analogy between eye and soul, discussed below 1.4. The pun in Platos dialogues is discussed in
Chapter 2 at 2.3.4 and n.93.
19 With claim i.c, Socrates claim to know what Alcibiades desires (105c67), compare Socrates claim
in Lys. 204c12 to know who is the lover and who is the beloved.
with Socrates eros for Alcibiades in this passage, turns out to be the power
to act well in public and private life that is conferred by wisdom in the
form of self-knowledge and self-care (see below stage vi). In desiring the
greatest power, then, Socrates also desires the wisdom that confers this
power (component (3)). Claim i.f is concerned with eros for the greatest
power and with the way in which this power is acquired: by means of the
skill in questioning (erotan) and answering that is, in this dialogue, not
only included in components (4) and (5) of the erotic art (skill in seeking
to acquire wisdom and in helping others to become similarly skilled), but
also closely associated with eros for another person (see below stage v). For
his part, Alcibiades shows that he has qualities well-suited to acquiring the
erotic art. When Socrates says that he thinks that Alcibiades would rather
die than live with what he now has (105a36), he indicates that Alcibiades
recognizes his own lack of things that Alcibiades himself believes to be
good, and that he passionately desires to obtain them. These qualities can
help prepare Alcibiades to acquire components (2) and (3) of the erotic
art, once he understands that the good he desires is in fact conferred by
wisdom.
In order to help Alcibiades arrive at this understanding, and to convince
him that he cannot accomplish what he desires without Socrates help,
Socrates must first show the young man that he lacks wisdom, and that
in order to achieve his goals he needs to acquire wisdom in the form of
knowing and caring for himself. Socrates does this in stages iiiv.
Stage ii. Alcibiades agrees that he lacks wisdom about the most important
things, that he thinks he knows about them when he does not, and that it
would be shameful not to be able to answer questions about things he claims
to know. He nevertheless does not yet have sufficient motivation to search
for wisdom (106c4119a7).
In answer to Socrates questions Alcibiades says that he intends to counsel

the Athenians about matters in which he is more knowledgeable than they
are (106c4d1). Next, he makes three preliminary admissions. Alcibiades
first admits that he would never have learned anything from another or
discovered anything for himself if he did not wish to do so. Second,
he admits that he would not wish to discover or learn things that he
thought he knew. Third, Alcibiades admits that there must have been a
time when he did not know the things he thinks he now knows (106d7
e3). In response to Socrates questions, Alcibiades next admits that there
are many matters about which he does not know (107a10c12, 108c610,
108d9e4), including justice and injustice (113b8c1, 114b15), and that
he wanders (112d710) in respect to these latter things.20 After further
questioning, Alcibiades agrees that it would be shameful (aischron) for him
not to be able to answer questions about things he claims to know (108e5
109a4). At one point, Alcibiades is exasperated with Socrates to the point of
calling him hubristic (bristv e: 114d7), just as he does in the Symposium
(215b7), and threatening to refuse to answer questions (114d11e1). He soon
agrees, however, that answering questions is the only way to be persuaded
of something (114e26), saying: I must answer. I dont think that I shall
be at all harmed (114e1011). He then agrees to continue to provide the
service of answering questions that Socrates requested at 106b110.
Next, Alcibiades freely admits his own deficiencies, thereby showing
that he has made progress. When Socrates asks whether Alcibiades would
laugh at someone who makes the contradictory statements about justice
that Alcibiades has made (116d7e1), the young man finally admits that he
himself shares the outlandishness (atopia) that he previously attributed
to Socrates: By the gods, Socrates, he says, I dont know myself what
I am saying, but I am simply like someone in an outlandish state [oika
tpwv conti]. When you question me I sometimes think one thing,
sometimes another (116e24). That is, Alcibiades understands that he has
now arrived at aporia (impasse).21 This is an important stage in acquiring
self-knowledge, which, whatever else it may include, must begin with the
recognition of ones own lack of wisdom (component (2) of the erotic
art).22
Socrates now asserts (claim ii.a) that Alcibiades is living with the greatest
lack of understanding (amathia), and that Alcibiades own statements have
convicted him of this (118b48). Socrates statement shows that he has
used his erotic art to help Alcibiades recognize his own lack of wisdom.
He has thus made an important step in demonstrating that Alcibiades
cannot obtain what he desires without the help of Socrates. As Alcibiades
has admitted, thinking that one does not know something is a necessary
condition for desiring to search and learn. Desiring to search and learn,
and thus to take care of oneself, is, in turn, a necessary step toward the goal
20 Alcibiades later agrees that wandering involves thinking that one knows what one does not know
(118a15b3).
21 On aporia see below 2.1. On the relationship between atopia (strangeness, being out of place,
outlandishness) and aporia, and on Socrates atopia see Blondell 2002: 73 n.102 and 2006: 177;
Guldentops 2001: 67; Lefka and Motte 2001: 148; Montiglio 2005: 1545, 16671; Opsomer 2001:
43.
22 Noted by Gordon 2003: 212. On self-knowledge in the Alcibiades I see Annas 1985; Brunschwig
1996; Foucault 1988: 1630; Pradeau 2000: 4753. See also Rappe 1995 on self-knowledge in Plato
generally.
of acquiring the greatest power that is the true object of eros for both men
(see below stage iii).
However, recognition of his own lack of wisdom does not by itself
provide Alcibiades with sufficient motivation to search and learn, for,
as his statements at stage iii will make clear, Alcibiades does not yet
understand how education can help him to achieve his goals (119b1c1).
What is needed, in addition, is the shame that results from being shown
that he is inadequate with respect to what he values most.23 Socrates begins
to arouse shame at stage ii, in a somewhat indirect manner, by making
hypothetical statements and by asking questions about what is shameful.
Socrates uses conditionals (e: 108e5; n: 109a2) in asking Alcibiades if
it would not be shameful, and he would not be ashamed, if he had nothing
to say when someone asked him questions about the things he claims to
know (108e5109a3). Alcibiades assents (109a4), but he does not begin to
connect this idea with strongly held personal values until Socrates asks him
what price he would accept for being deprived of courage (115d56). Just as
Socrates had said earlier that Alcibiades would rather die than fail to acquire
greater things than he now has (105a36), so Alcibiades himself now states
that he would rather die than be a coward (115d7). His reply reveals that
Alcibiades has strong views about what is shameful, and a strong desire
to avoid doing things he believes are shameful. Alcibiades personal values
are also apparent in his agreement that cowardice is evil and shameful
(115d8116a5), and in his denial that shameful things can be just (115a68).
Socrates uses Alcibiades own values concerning courage and cowardice to
lead him to self-contradiction in an elenchus (cross-examination) in which
Alcibiades first agrees that some just things are beneficial (sumfrein) and
others are not (115a13), and then that (all) just things are beneficial (116d3
4). Socrates then asks another hypothetical question concerned with shame
when he asks if Alcibiades would not laugh at (katagelhv n) someone
who contradicts himself in the way Alcibiades has done (116d7e1). The
fact that Alcibiades response is an admission of aporia (116e24) shows
that he is moved by this appeal to his sense of shame.
In stage ii, then, Socrates begins to bring out into the open and to
appeal, somewhat indirectly, to Alcibiades sense of shame. He uses it to
23 I am indebted to Woodruffs account of Socratic shame. This involves a full awareness that one
has betrayed values that are entirely ones own. Feeling such shame brings on two discoveries about
oneself that one is truly committed to these values, and that one is not living up to them (2000:
144). On the positive role of shame in Socrates philosophical methods, explained in Soph. 230b4d4,
see also Belfiore 1992: 3315; Gordon 1999: 229; Kahn 1996: 13742; McKim 1988; Renaud 2002;
Seeskin 1987: 1415; Teloh 1986: 1, 11, 23, and passim.
lead Alcibiades to care about his own self-contradictions, realizing that they
may not only incur the shame of being laughed at, but also have practical
consequences for the noble actions he cares about (116b2c12).
Socrates does not make other erotic claims in this passage, nor does
he mention eros. He does, however, invoke the god of friendship (m tn
Flion: 109d7) and he addresses the young man as dear (fle: 109d1,
116e5, 117b11). In accord with this friendly attitude, he invites Alcibiades to
join in a common search for the knowledge he lacks (117c2).
Stage iii. Alcibiades is convinced that he needs to care for himself, and he
asks Socrates for advice (119a8124b9).
Even though Alcibiades has realized that he has arrived at aporia (stage ii:
116e24) concerning matters he cares about, he is still not convinced that
he needs to take care of himself in order to achieve the greatest power that
he passionately desires. When Socrates asks Alcibiades whether he intends
to stay as he is or to take some kind of care (119a89), the young man
shows that he has made progress by saying that this is something that they
must consider together. Alcibiades then states, however, that most of those
involved in politics are uneducated and that he is superior by nature to
these people. He therefore does not see how education can help him to
achieve his goals (119b1c1). Socrates then exclaims (claim iii.a) that these
statements are unworthy of Alcibiades and that he, Socrates, is vexed on
account of your love and mine (119c25).24 Because his eros for Alcibiades
depends, in part, on the young mans desiring what is in fact the greatest
power (see claim i.c, at 104e6105a1), it is threatened by Alcibiades apparent
willingness to settle for less than he is able to achieve.
Socrates now shows Alcibiades, both by asking questions and in a long
speech, that his true rivals, the Spartans and Persians, are in fact superior to
him in birth, wealth and education (119c7124b6). Friedrich Schleierma-
cher took this speech to represent Socrates own claims about the virtues
of these people, and used it as evidence against the authenticity of the
dialogue.25 However, this long speech is not represented by Socrates as
containing the truth, and it is not dialectically tested.26 Instead, the speech
is best interpreted as a kind of myth, with many ironic and comic elements,
that reflects Alcibiades own aspirations to political power among Greeks
24 The text and interpretation of 119c5 are discussed below 1.3.

25 Schleiermacher 1973: 3304; cf. Vlastos 1975: 156 and n.91; Weil 1964: 80. Croiset 1949: 51 and
Friedlander 1964: 2356 also take the claims seriously, although they do not share Schleiermachers
doubts about authenticity.
26 Noted by Denyer 2001: 172.
and barbarians, and aims at discrediting them.27 In this speech, Socrates
again uses his erotic art to arouse shame in Alcibiades, thereby motivating
him to desire to become better.
Socrates begins by stating that Alcibiades ancestry would appear laugh-
able (glwta flen) in comparison to that of his Spartan and Persian
rivals (121b14), and he attributes to a comic poet the idea that no one pays
attention when an Athenian is born (121c7d2). That Socrates speech is not
to be taken as representing his own views about the Persians and Spartans is
shown by his statement that the nurses and tutors of the Persians are those
who seem best (121d4, e6) and by the fact that theology takes the place
of knowledge and wisdom in his account of their education (121e5122a3).
Wisdom is also notably absent from the list of Spartan virtues.28 Socrates
again appeals to Alcibiades sense of shame when he says that Alcibiades
would be ashamed of himself if he compared his own wealth to that of the
Persians (122b8c4).
In this speech, Socrates also focuses on the Spartan and Persian women
in a way that is both comic and particularly humiliating to Alcibiades.
The Persians are so wealthy that the resources of large tracts of their land
are devoted to supplying adornment (ksmwn) for the queen (123b1c3),
while Alcibiades mother has adornment worth at most fifty minae (123c6
7). For this reason (st: 123c3), Socrates says, the Persian queen would
wonder what advantages Alcibiades could possibly rely upon in competing
with her son, and she would conclude that these could only be care and
wisdom (pimele te ka sof: 123c8d4). If she learned that Alcibiades
is entirely without education, and that, when his lover says that he must
learn and care for himself, he does not wish to do so, but says he is well
enough as he is, the queen would not only wonder, but think him mad
(123d4e7). The Spartan queen, who is daughter, wife and mother of kings,
would also wonder at Alcibiades (123e7124a4). Does it not seem to be
shameful, Socrates concludes, if the women of our enemies know better
than we ourselves what kind of people we need to be in order to compete
with them? (124a57).
In addition to arousing shame in his myth about Alcibiades rivals,
Socrates also makes a number of erotic claims. He states (claim iii.b) that
in Athens only a lover cares about (mlei: 122b58) a persons upbringing
and education, but (claim iii.c) that Alcibiades does not heed the lover who
27 Myth: Forde 1987: 228 n.4; irony: Annas 2006: 41 n.25 and Giannantoni 1997: 370; comic elements:
Pradeau 2000: 54 and Forde 1987: 231; reflection of Alcibiades aspirations: Gordon 2003: 26; aims at
discrediting them: Pradeau 2000: 55 and G. A. Scott 2000: 209 n.15.
28 These points are noted by Pradeau 2000: 556.
says that he must take care of himself (pimelhqnta: 123d7e2). Socrates
also urges Alcibiades to know himself, in obedience to Socrates and the
Delphic precept. For Socrates says to him (claim iii.d) that there is only
one way in which Alcibiades can achieve the renown that Alcibiades loves
(eran) more than anyone loves anything. That way is by knowing himself,
and by taking care and acquiring skill (techne: 124a7b6). All of these claims
demonstrate Socrates marvelous skill in helping Alcibiades to recognize his
own deficiencies and to desire passionately to correct them, with the help
of the lover who cares about these matters (component (5) of the erotic
art).
After Socrates speech, Alcibiades realizes that he needs to care for himself
in order to attain the object of his eros: renown (that is, political power; cf.
105c34). He not only says that Socrates has spoken the truth but also asks
him to explain what kind of care he needs (124b79). This marks a new
stage in Alcibiades progress, for it is the first time that he asks Socrates for
advice.29 In so doing, Alcibiades heeds the lover who says that he must care
for himself (see claim iii.c). He does not yet understand, however, what
the greatest power really is or how it can be acquired, and he does not yet
admit to feeling shame. Socrates has more work to do.
Stage iv. Socrates and Alcibiades engage in a common search for improvement.
Alcibiades asserts that he is in the most shameful state, and agrees that he must
continue answering questions in order to care for himself (124b10127e8).
Socrates replies to Alcibiades request for advice by saying that they must
consider together the way in which they can become better (124b10c1,
d9). He also states (claim iv.a) that both he and Alcibiades need education
and care more than all other people (124c13, d23) and that (claim iv.b)
Alcibiades will have epiphany (pifneia) only through Socrates, with
the help of the god who now allows him to engage in dialectic with the
young man (124c910).30 Alcibiades shows his willingness to heed Socrates
advice by saying that he, Alcibiades, certainly needs care, and by asking
Socrates what they should do (124d26). In answer to Socrates questions,
Alcibiades then attempts to define friendship and like-mindedness (126b8
127c10). After he does so, Socrates says that the young man has made
inconsistent assertions about these very things (127d15). Alcibiades then
29 Denyer 2001, on 124b7126a4.

30 Denyer 2001, on 124c1011 (apparently following Olympiodorus 175.22176.1) notes that pifneia
is ambiguous, referring either to the renown that Alcibiades hopes to gain, or to the revelation of
the god to whom Socrates refers at 124c59. In my view the term is also an anticipation of the visual
analogy, in 132d1133c17, of soul and eye (note mfanetai [appears in] at 133a1).
exclaims: By the gods, Socrates, I dont know myself what I am saying,
and its likely that for a long time I have been in the most shameful state
without realizing it (127d68). He asks Socrates what he should do about
this (127e4). Socrates replies (claim iv.c) that he must answer Socrates
questions (erotomena: 127e5). He then says (claim iv.d): If you do this and
god wills, if my divination is trustworthy, you and I will become better
(127e57). After this, Alcibiades agrees to continue answering questions
(127e8).
Socrates claims are all associated with the components of his erotic
art. He recognizes his own lack of wisdom (component (2); claim iv.a),
and claims to have marvelous skill in helping Alcibiades become better
(component (5); claims iv.b and iv.d; cf. claim i.e). In stage iv, Socrates
claims, specifically, to be able to help Alcibiades to become better by
engaging in dialectic, that is, question and answer (claims iv.b and iv.c).
Socrates also claims to be skilled in seeking to become better himself
(component (4); claim iv.d). This same claim also exhibits his passionate
desire to acquire the wisdom he recognizes that he lacks (component
(3)). Socrates claims to have a special kind of devotion to erotic matters
(component (1)) when he invokes the god (claim iv.b; cf. claim i.b), and
mentions his own powers of divination (claim iv.d). Socrates erotic claims
in this passage are also linked to eros for Alcibiades. Socrates is able to help
Alcibiades to become better (claims iv.b and iv.d) because, as Socrates has
claimed, in Athens only a lover is concerned with education and self-care
(claim iii.b), Socrates alone is Alcibiades lover (claim i.a), and therefore
Socrates is the only one who can help him to achieve what he desires (claim
i.e). The idea of love for Alcibiades is playfully emphasized by Socrates
statement: Answer the questions (127e5), in which the term erotomena
puns on the verb eran (to love).
The common search and Socrates erotic claims help to reinforce the
lesson Alcibiades learned in stage iii, that he needs to care for himself in
order to achieve his goal. Stage iv also reinforces the appeals to shame
made in stage ii and stage iii. At 127d68, Alcibiades admits that he does
not know what he is talking about, just as he admitted in stage ii, at
116e24, that he sometimes thinks one thing and sometimes another. Now,
however, Alcibiades explicitly admits that he feels shame: for a long time I
have been in the most shameful state without being aware of this (127d7
8). He emphatically asserts this himself, rather than merely responding
affirmatively to Socrates. Alcibiades thus shows that he has made progress
in acquiring component (2) of the erotic art.
During the next stages in Socrates use of the erotic art, Alcibiades will
show that he has learned this lesson well. After stage iv, when his attempts
to define friendship and like-mindedness fail, he no longer claims to know
things he in fact does not know.31 In response to Socrates questions he says,
for example: You speak the truth (128e3, 131b3, c8, 133a4, b1, 134c8, 135a4,
b6), or You speak correctly (129b4), remarks that he doesnt understand
(128a7, b4), or is unable to say (128d12, 129e10), and asks for an explanation
(132b45). In his most positive assertions after stage iv, Alcibiades expresses
doubt (129a56: sometimes it seems easy to know oneself, sometimes hard),
asks Socrates not to leave (131d6), says that he will strive to become better
(131d8), and states that Socrates is a safe guarantor (134e3). At the end
of the dialogue, however, when Alcibiades confidently asserts that he will
become Socrates pedagogue and start from this moment to care for justice
(135d710, e45), Socrates suggests that the young man may once again
be too self-confident. Socrates love, says Socrates, will be like a stork if,
having hatched a new love in Alcibiades, it will in turn be cared for by this
love (135e13), and he expresses fears about the future (135e68). Socrates
expresses doubts, then, that Alcibiades has fully recognized his own lack of
wisdom.
Stage v. Alcibiades accepts Socrates as the only lover of his soul, who alone
can help him to become better (127e9133c17).
At this stage, Socrates establishes, and Alcibiades acknowledges, that
Socrates has an erotic art that can benefit Alcibiades. As the only lover
of Alcibiades soul, Socrates is the only one who can help Alcibiades to care
for himself and to achieve self-knowledge. I divide stage v into three parts.
Stage v, part 1. Alcibiades agrees that in order to care for himself he must
know his own soul (127e9131c4).
In the first part of stage v, Alcibiades, as answerer, makes important claims
about the soul, the self and self-care. Alcibiades first gives answers that
constitute an argument showing that the skills that care for us and make
us better differ from the skills that care for things belonging to us (127e9
128d10). Socrates concludes: It has been agreed [molghtai] that the
skill that makes us better is not the one that makes anything belonging to
us better (128e12). Alcibiades agrees (128e3). As the questioning proceeds,
31 Olympiodorus 190.1214, on 127d notes that Alcibiades moves from double to simple ignorance
when he agrees that he is ignorant. See also 128.22129.6, on 116e, where Olympiodorus writes that
Alcibiades moves from double ignorance to an intermediate state.
however, Socrates carefully qualifies his own views about self-knowledge
and care for the self, avoiding claims to have knowledge about these mat-
ters, although he does appear to agree with the conclusions arrived at. He
says: Its like this: if we know it [sc. ourselves] perhaps [tc n: cf. n tc:
129b2] we would know the care of ourself, but not knowing [ourselves]
we would never do so (129a89). After further questioning, Socrates asks
if a clearer demonstration is needed to show that the soul is the human
being. Alcibiades replies that this seems to have been adequately demon-
strated (130c57). Socrates, however, qualifies his own views by saying that
this conclusion has not been proven in a strict sense (kribv), but only
moderately well (metrwv), because they have not yet investigated what
the itself itself (at t at) is (130c8d6).32 Nevertheless, Socrates
says, this argument will perhaps suffice (swv xarksei: 130d5; cf. xarke:
130c8), because we could speak of nothing more authoritative than the
soul (130c8d6). Socrates does not, then, claim certainty, but only that
the argument suffices to further Alcibiades progress in caring for himself.33
Later in the dialogue, at stage v, part 3 (132b6c2) Socrates sums up, in sim-
ilarly qualified terms, the conclusions arrived at earlier. He says: What we
are [that is, that we are the soul] has been agreed reasonably well [pieikv
molghtai: 132b67] and after this [it was agreed reasonably well]
that the soul must be cared for (132c1).34 Socrates qualifies his opinions
yet again when he says: If sophrosyne is to know the self (131b4). Socrates
opinions about the soul, then, are not stated with the same confidence
and authority as are his erotic claims, none of which are made in stage v,
part 1. He nevertheless appears to agree, in qualified terms, that the soul is
the self that must be cared for, and that self-knowledge is the same as, or
closely associated with, self-care.
Stage v, part 2. Alcibiades accepts Socrates as the only lover of his soul
(131c5132a6).
After laying the groundwork by means of the arguments made reasonably
well Socrates continues to question Alcibiades. First, Alcibiades asserts, in
answer to Socrates questions, that the lover of the soul, unlike the lover
of the body, will not depart as long as the soul improves (131c5d3). After
32 I follow Gill 2007: 102 in translating the phrase in this way. On the text and interpretation of 130d4
and 129b1 see also Allen 1962; Annas 1985: 1303; Brunschwig 1996; Goldin 1993.
33 Cf. Denyer 2001, on 130d6.
34 It was agreed, at 128d11e3, that we must care for ourselves, and not for what merely belongs to us,
and at 130c57 that the soul is the human being.
this, Socrates does not ask questions, but makes several erotic claims that
give evidence of his special devotion to erotic matters, including his love
for Alcibiades soul. He states (claim v.a) that he alone has remained as the
lover of Alcibiades soul (131d45, e14, e1011; cf. claim i.a, at 103a14). In
making this claim, Socrates also claims to be the only one who can help
Alcibiades to care for himself, for he has previously said that in Athens only
a lover cares about a persons education (claim iii.b, at 122b58). Socrates
also states (claim v.b) that he will not depart as long as Alcibiades does
not become more shameful-and-ugly35 (ascwn) in soul (132a12), and
he exhorts (claim v.c) Alcibiades to be eager to be as beautiful as possible
in soul, so that (tonun) he may retain Socrates love (131d7), as well as
making progress toward acquiring the object of his desire. In response
to these claims, Alcibiades says: You did well, Socrates. Dont depart
(131d6) and states that he will indeed be eager to be as beautiful as possible
(131d8). Socrates enduring love for Alcibiades soul has led the young
man not merely to allow Socrates to question him, as he did in stage i,
at 106b10, but to ask him not to leave. Alcibiades thus expresses a more
positive willingness to accept both Socrates love (eran) and his questioning
(erotan). Moreover, Alcibiades desire to have Socrates remain as his lover
has helped to make him eager to be as beautiful in soul as possible. Socrates
makes one more erotic claim when he says (claim v.d) that he, Socrates,
is lovable (gaphtv: 131e3). Alcibiades assent to this statement (131e5) is
some evidence that he is beginning to love Socrates in return.36
Stage v, part 3. Alcibiades agrees that he can improve by looking into another
soul. The implication is that, in Alcibiades case, this soul must be that of his
only lover, Socrates (132a6133c17).37
As the accepted lover of Alcibiades soul, Socrates uses component (5) of
his erotic art in exhorting (claim v.e) Alcibiades to exercise (132a6b3)
35 Proclus 210.1211.5, on Alc. I 108e5109a4 perceptively connects shamefulness of soul with ugliness
(ascov) of soul. As the comparative of ascrv, ascwn means both more shameful and more
ugly (LSJ s.v. ascrv).
36 Olympiodorus 215.2225, on 130d133c, notes that when he asks Socrates not to leave, Alcibiades
begins to return Socrates love. Cf. Denyer 2001, on 131e23. On Alcibiades love for Socrates see
below 1.3.
37 The authenticity of 133c817 has long been suspected and the passage is bracketed by Burnet 1900
1907; Carlini 1964; Croiset 1949; Denyer 2001. Arguments in favor of retaining the passage are given
by Havet 1921 and Bos 1970 (in Dutch: I rely on the favorable review of Westerink 1974). Bos holds,
however that the dialogue is not Platonic. The arguments for excision given by Carlini 1963: 1747;
Linguiti 1981; and Pradeau 2000: 2218 are more convincing. I offer additional support for excision
at the end of 1.4. However, my argument does not depend on the status of this passage.
in taking care of himself. Alcibiades asks Socrates to relate how they can
take care of themselves (132b45). Socrates begins by summing up their
previous agreements about what we are (that is, the soul), and that the soul
must be cared for (132b6c2). Socrates then asks how they might know the
soul and themselves most clearly (132c79), thus suggesting that self-care
is the same as, or closely related to, self-knowledge.
Next, Socrates offers a way of interpreting the Delphic precept to know
oneself (132c9133c17; cf. 124a8b1 and 130e89, where the precept is also
mentioned). Just as an eye can see itself only by looking into a mirror
or another eye, so the soul can only know itself by looking into another
soul. Socrates initial statement, I will tell you what I suspect [poptew]
this writing says and counsels us (132d12), marks the interpretation of
the precept as Socrates own proposal, while at the same time indicating
that he does not claim to have the knowledge about this that only a god,
for example, the god in Delphi, could have. The analogy of soul and
eye is merely likely (kinduneei: 132d2), and Socrates uses conditionals in
speaking of the way we might see ourselves (n doi: 133a67, e . . . blpoi:
133a9, e mllei: 133b2), in discussing the way in which the soul might know
itself (e mllei: 133b78, n gnoh: 133c6, crmeq n: 133c14, n rmen:
133c15), and in making theological claims (133c46, c1314). Socrates sug-
gested interpretation, then, is not an erotic claim made with confidence,
but opinion concerning psychological and theological matters about which
only a god could have knowledge. It does, however, have implications for
erotic matters. First, it implies that the soul in which Alcibiades sees himself
must be that of a lover, because in Athens only a lover cares enough about
education (claim iii.b, at 122b58) to provide the requisite soul-gazing.
Second, Socrates interpretation concerns the psychology that explains the
specific way in which erotic art can be used to seek wisdom in the form
of self-knowledge and self-care, and to help others do so also. These issues
are discussed below 1.4.
Stage vi. Alcibiades agrees that self-knowledge confers the greatest power
(133c18135c11).
At this stage, Socrates concludes his demonstration, promised at the begin-
ning of the dialogue (claims i.e and i.f, at 105e2106b10) that Alcibiades
cannot achieve the greatest power without Socrates help. Socrates has
already demonstrated (stage v) that Socrates alone can help Alcibiades
care for and know himself. He now demonstrates that self-knowledge is
necessary for virtue and happiness.
In response to Socrates questions, Alcibiades agrees that:
(1) Self-knowledge is sophrosyne (133c1820).38
(2) Someone who does not have self-knowledge and sophrosyne lacks polit-
ical knowledge, errs, fares badly in private and political affairs, and is
wretched (133e4134a12).
(3) Therefore (ra), unless one has sophrosyne and is good (gaqv), one
cannot be happy (134a13b1).
(4) If one is going to act correctly and well in the city, one must impart
excellence (arete: that is, from agreements (1) and (3), above, the good-
ness and the sophrosyne that are the same as self-knowledge) to the
citizens (133b11c1).
(5) Therefore (ra), because one cannot give what one does not have,
excellence must first be acquired by someone who is going to engage
in private and political affairs (134c38).
(6) Therefore (ra), it is not the power of doing whatever one wishes (that
is, tyranny: 135b35) that must be acquired by the person who is going
to rule in the city, but justice and sophrosyne (134c912).
(7) Therefore (okon), those who know themselves act well or fare
well (e prxete: 134d711).
According to this argument, if self-knowledge (sophrosyne) is necessary
for political knowledge, that is, for the ability to rule well in the city, and for
happiness, it is self-knowledge rather than tyranny that confers the greatest
power, that is, the power to act well in both private and public affairs. In
agreeing with the statements listed above, Alcibiades shows that he believes
that self-knowledge confers the greatest power. His belief is reinforced by
the erotic claims make by Socrates.
To the assertions made by Alcibiades listed above, Socrates adds his own
promise (claim vi.a). He pledges or guarantees (qlw ggusasqai) that
if he and Alcibiades act in this way (that is, in the way mentioned just
previously, in agreement (7) in the list above) they will be happy (134e1
2). Socrates claim, linking self-knowledge to happiness, gives evidence of
his passionate desire to seek wisdom in the form of the self-knowledge
he realizes that he lacks (component (3) of his erotic art), and to help
Alcibiades do the same (component (5)). In making this claim, he also shows
that he agrees with the conclusions of the argument, without claiming to
have knowledge that they are true. Indeed, this argument is anticipated
38 This claim is not argued for, but at 131b46 Alcibiades agreed to Socrates conditional statement: If
sophrosyne is self-knowledge. On the equation of sophrosyne with self-knowledge see Denyer 2001,
on 131b4, and Annas 1985.
by Socrates statement (claim iii.d, at 124a7b6) that the renown (that
is, political power: 105c34) that Alcibiades desires can only be gained
by means of care and skill. When Alcibiades says that Socrates is a safe
guarantor (134e3), he shows that he has at last come to see that the power
he desires is really the same as the object of Socrates desire: the power
to act well that is conferred by self-knowledge and self-care. Socrates goes
on to reinforce Alcibiades agreements with another appeal to shame, and
in response to Socrates questions, Alcibiades agrees that he is in a slavish
condition (135c1011).
Socrates has now completed the demonstration which he undertook
to give at 106b14, that Alcibiades cannot obtain the power he desires
without Socrates. In having convinced Alcibiades that this is true, Socrates
has begun to realize his own hope of acquiring the greatest power with
him (105e25). Alcibiades has asserted, by answering questions, that if he
wants to acquire the greatest power, he first needs to know and care for
himself, and that Socrates alone, as the lover of his soul, can help him to do
this. In addition to asking questions, the answers to which are the opinions
of Alcibiades, the answerer (112e1113a10), Socrates has made on his own
authority many positive statements associated with his erotic art. The
dialogue, however, does not end with Socrates successful demonstration.
Stage vii. Alcibiades offers to change roles with Socrates (135c12e8).
At the end of the dialogue, Alcibiades first says that he will change roles
with Socrates and become his attendant (pedagogue: 135d710). Socrates
then states that his love is like a stork if it has hatched a new love in
Alcibiades (135e13). Alcibiades says that he will begin right away to take
care about justice, but Socrates expresses fears that the power of the city
may overcome both of them (135e48).39
This short final section of the dialogue dramatizes Alcibiades response
to Socrates successful demonstration, and Alcibiades own further progress
in acquiring erotic art. Alcibiades has already acknowledged that he lacks
wisdom (component (2)), and his agreement that he is in a slavish condition
indicates that he now has a passionate desire to acquire wisdom in the
form of self-knowledge (component (3)). His statement that he will begin
to care about justice indicates a similar desire. By answering Socrates
questions, Alcibiades has also begun to acquire skill in searching for wisdom
(component (4)). His statement that he will act as Socrates pedagogue
shows his desire to acquire the skill in helping others attain wisdom that is
39 This important concluding section of the dialogue is discussed further below 1.5.
included in component (5). Socrates unrefuted statement about Alcibiades
love is an indication that the young man has also made progress in becoming
devoted to erotic matters (component (1)). Nevertheless, the fact that the
dialogue concludes with Socrates use of the conditional (if: 135e2) in
speaking of Alcibiades love for him, and of Socrates own fears about the
power of the city, are indications that Alcibiades still needs a great deal of
practice in the erotic art.
The preceding summary of the stages in Socrates use of his erotic art
provides the foundation for a deeper understanding of the relationship
in this dialogue between eros for the greatest power and eros for another
person. These topics are the concern of 1.3 and 1.4.
1.3 er os for the greatest power and interpersonal er os

At the beginning of his encounter with Alcibiades, Socrates tells the young
man that they both have similar hopes: Just as you have hopes in the city
[sc. to gain the greatest power in the city: 105b4], so I also have hopes to gain
the greatest power with you.40 Alcibiades at first mistakenly believes that
the greatest power is tyranny, the ability to do whatever one wishes (134e8
9, 135b3). In the course of the dialogue, however, he comes to agree with
Socrates that it is instead the power to act well that is conferred by wisdom
in the form of self-knowledge and self-care. Self-knowledge confers the
greatest power because it makes it possible for one to rule well, and to take
care in both private and public matters (134c57).41 When Socrates desires
to acquire the greatest power with Alcibiades, then, he desires the power
to rule well and to take care in his private affairs, including caring for the
soul of his beloved, Alcibiades. And when Alcibiades desires to acquire the
greatest power in the city, the real object of this desire is not tyranny, but
the power to rule correctly (rqv) in the city, by imparting excellence to
the citizens (134b11c1). When he comes to understand, guided by Socrates
questions, the true nature of the greatest power, Alcibiades also begins to
acquire Socratic eros for the wisdom that confers this power.
Alcibiades is represented as having a passionate desire for the greatest
power from the very beginning of the dialogue, even though the term
40 sper gr s lpdav ceiv n t plei, otw kg par so lpzw mgiston dun-

sesqai: 105d7e3. I translate Carlinis text (1964, defended in 1963: 1778), omitting ndexas-
qai . . . dunsesqai (d7e2).
41 In this passage, Socrates uses the term excellence (arete) rather than self-knowledge. It has
previously been agreed, however, that excellence is self-knowledge (sophrosyne) and goodness. See
above 1.2, stage vi.
eros is not used of this desire until 124b46.42 When he first meets Alcib-
iades, Socrates says that the young man desires (piqumev: 105e5) power
to such an extent that he would rather die than fail to acquire greater
things than he now has (mezw: 105a45), and that he desires to have the
greatest power (mgiston dunsesqai: 105b4) not only in Athens, but also
among other Greeks and the barbarians (105b47). Socrates characterizes
Alcibiades desire for political power as a passionate desire for renown,
saying that Alcibiades would not wish to live if he failed to fill the world
with his name and power (e m mplseiv to so nmatov ka tv
sv dunmewv: 105c23). He uses the term eros for this passionate desire
when he says that Alcibiades has more eros for renown than anyone else
(to nomastv gensqai . . . 0 moi dokev rn v odev llov llou:
124b46). Socrates use of the term hope (elpis) to refer to Alcibiades
desire to acquire the greatest power (105a7, c6, d7, e6) also helps to char-
acterize the young mans desire as ordinary eros for power. The term elpis
is frequently associated with eros in Greek literature, where both are said
to be the cause of harm and deceit.43 In Alcibiades case, hope and love
are indeed deceitful, leading him, at first, to mistake the greatest power for
tyranny.
Like Alcibiades, Socrates hopes to attain the greatest power (105d7e3,
quoted above, at the beginning of 1.3). His hope is evident in the very
first lines of the dialogue, where Socrates says that he is hopeful (eelpiv:
103b1) that the divine opposition will no longer oppose his conversing
with Alcibiades. Socrates hopes are mentioned again, at 104d2, where
Alcibiades says that he was going to question Socrates about what he hopes
for in annoying Alcibiades. Socrates hopes, like those of Alcibiades, are
associated with eros, for Alcibiades and for wisdom. Unlike Alcibiades,
however, Socrates is not deceived by his hopes. In helping Alcibiades to
understand that the greatest power is that conferred by self-knowledge,
and that without Socrates he cannot acquire this greatest power, Socrates
42 Fordes (1987: 232) claim that 124b46 represents a change in Alcibiades, who only becomes erotic
after talking to Socrates (cf. Lutz 1998: 119; G. A. Scott 2000: 87) is challenged by Gordon 2003: 17
n.9. Blitz 1995: 349 does not provide sufficient evidence for his claim that Alcibiades is not erotic
but desires only mastery.
43 For example, Plato, Ti. 69c8d6; Thucydides (3.45.5): Elpis and eros, the one leading and the other
following, and the one thinking out a plan while the other suggests the ease of success, cause the
greatest harm. On elpis in Thucydides see Cornford 1971a: esp. ch. 12, on the association of eros
and elpis with Alcibiades, and Rutland 1984. In Sophocles Antigone (discussed by Cornford 1907),
the chorus says that elpis can benefit people, but can also deceive them with fickle loves ( gr
d polplagktov lpv pollov mn nhsiv ndrn, pollov d pta koufonwn rtwn:
61517. On the ambivalence of elpis in Hesiod and elsewhere see Montiglio 2005: 667 and n.18;
Vernant 1989: 7886; Zeitlin 1996: 647.
actually begins to acquire the object of his desire: the greatest power with
Alcibiades.
The term eros is not used of Socrates desire to obtain the greatest power
with Alcibiades, but the dialogue in fact represents that desire as erotic in
a Socratic sense. Socrates eros for wisdom leads him to enlist others in the
search to obtain it (component (5)). If he acquires the greatest power with
Alcibiades he will achieve this erotic goal. Socrates eros for the greatest
power differs from that of Alcibiades not only in being divorced from
deceitful hopes, but also in receiving encouragement from divinity. His
references to the aid of a god (105e5, 124c810, 127e57, 135d6) suggest
that his eros is in part a divine gift.44 These references also suggest that
Socrates claims to have a special, divinely sanctioned, relationship to eros
(component (1) of his erotic art). Moreover, Socrates says that he differs
from and is superior to Alcibiades in only one way: his guardian is the
god (124c210).45 It is likely that this god is the one who also encourages
Socrates to pursue his erotic goals.46 The fact that Socrates has a divine
guardian helps to explain why he, unlike Alcibiades, does not require the
stimulus of shame in order to desire passionately to acquire as much as
he can of the wisdom he realizes that he lacks (component (3)).
In the Alcibiades I, eros for the greatest power is closely associated with
eros for another person. Socrates eros for Alcibiades depends, in part, on
Alcibiades having eros for the greatest power. Socrates says: If I saw that
you were content with the things I just recounted and that you thought you
should pass your life with these things, I would long ago have gotten rid
of my eros (104e68). As long as Alcibiades continues to have this desire
for the greatest power, and does not become merely a lover of the people
of Athens (dhmerastv: 132a3), he will continue to improve and Socrates
will remain his lover (131d1132a3). Alcibiades, in turn, makes progress in
acquiring the power he desires because of the love he and Socrates have for
one another. This interconnection between eros for the greatest power and
eros for another person needs further clarification.47
First, it is important to understand that the Alcibiades I does not support
the view that an individual is loved only as instrumental to a higher object
44 A similar idea is suggested in the Lysis: see Chapter 2 at 2.3.2. See also Resp. 499b8c1, where Socrates
states that eros for philosophia may be given by divine inspiration.
45 Denyer 2001, on 124c34 notes that diafrw means be superior here.
46 Pradeau 2000: 208 n.106 sees an allusion here to the daimon of 103a106a.
47 I am sympathetic to Dorions view (2004: 208) that mutual aspiration to the good is the basis for
love and friendship in Alc. I (131d) as in Lys. but I hold that this is only one of the bases for loving
(philein, eran) in both dialogues. On the Lysis see Chapter 2 at 2.2.3.
of Socratic love.48 Alcibiades desire for improvement makes him well-
suited to engaging with Socrates in the common search for self-knowledge
by means of which both partners will become better (127e47). However,
Socrates does not love Alcibiades merely because the young man is a means
to his own self-improvement, but also because Alcibiades has a beautiful
soul that is in itself an object of love.
Eros is caused by beauty, either physical, like that of the beautiful body
that inspires eros in Alcibiades other lovers, or psychic, like that of the
beautiful soul that arouses Socrates love (131c5d7).49 Alcibiades soul is
beautiful for two reasons. First, it has a beautiful nature (physis 119c1, 123e5,
135e7), one that is capable of becoming better and more beautiful. Physis in
these passages refers to a good natural endowment that needs learning and
care in order to improve.50 The beautiful nature of his soul, however, could
also make Alcibiades capable of tyranny if it were corrupted. As David
OConnor has noted, the nature that is suited to philosophy can also, if
corrupted, be used to acquire the greatest tyranny.51 Second, Alcibiades
soul is beautiful because it has, in addition to a beautiful nature, eros for
the greatest power, that can, with proper guidance, also lead him to acquire
Socratic eros for the wisdom that confers this power. That Alcibiades physis
is distinct from his desire is clear from the fact that he might lose his desire
while still retaining his physis (see, for example, 119b5c5, 135e68). This
desire helps to make Alcibiades soul capable of striving to improve.52 It
depends, in part, on the realization that he lacks what he desires. Even
before meeting Socrates, Alcibiades is aware that he lacks what he desires,
for he would rather die than remain living with only the possessions he
now has (105a36). Socrates strongly emphasizes this fact when he states
(claim i.c) that he does not merely conjecture that this is so but knows it
48 This view of Socratic love, associated most often with Vlastos 1973, is recently defended by Penner
and Rowe 2005, who write that in the Lysis Socrates construes all love and all desire . . . as involving
a means-end . . . hierarchy, culminating in a single ultimate end, which end . . . is then asserted by
Socrates to be the sole thing loved or desired (248).
49 Cf. Phdr. 250c8251a7, 255c4d3, where eros is said to be caused by beauty, and Symp. 201a910, e5,
204b3, d3, where eros is said to be of or concerned with beauty. Denyer 2001, on 131d1, notes that
the statement loving the soul is without exact parallel in Plato or Xenophon.
50 Denyer 2001, on 119c1, citing Phdr. 269d. See also Resp. 6.485a502b, listing qualities specific to the
philosophical nature, especially courage, high-mindedness, facility in learning and good memory
(esp. 490c911; cf. 487a25 and 494a10b2). A contrast between physis and upbringing is explicitly
mentioned at Alc. I 120e34, although trophe in this passage is not the same as paideia (Denyer 2001,
on 120e5; Pradeau 2000: nn.76 and 84).
51 OConnor 1999: 367, quoting Resp. 494b1496c5. Cf. Gordon 2003: 28; Gribble 1999: 21921;
Olympiodorus 173.29. On this idea in the Lysis see Chapter 2 at 2.4.2.
52 On the idea that Alcibiades high thoughts make him worthy of love see Proclus 99.6100.6,
137.3138.9, 148.10150.27.
well (105c67). Alcibiades soul, then, is not only beautiful, but also lovable
because of its beautiful nature and its desire to acquire the good things that
it realizes that it lacks. These qualities, as noted above (stage i, 1.2), help
to prepare Alcibiades to acquire components (2) and (3) of the erotic art.
Socrates says that he will love Alcibiades soul as long as it continues to
become better, and he urges the young man to try to be as beautiful (in
soul) as possible (131d17). By the end of the dialogue, Alcibiades comes to
love Socrates soul for the same two reasons. When Socrates says that he
himself is gaphtv, worthy of love (claim v.d, at 131e3), the implication
is that he is worthy because he also has a beautiful soul, one that has a
beautiful nature, and a passionate desire for the self-knowledge that confers
the greatest power. These qualities also make Socrates soul beautiful and
lovable.
The close relationship in this dialogue between eros for the greatest power
and eros for an individual can help to illuminate 119c5, a line that presents
difficult textual and interpretive problems. After Alcibiades questions his
need for improvement, saying that his nature alone will make him superior
to his competitors (119b5c1), Socrates states, according to the manuscripts:
I am vexed on account of your love and mine (ganakt pr te to
so ka to mo rwtov).53 Whose eros is referred to in this passage?
According to Nicolas Denyer, the text just quoted (with te to so) implies
that Socrates and Alcibiades love each other. He objects, however, that it
would be far too presumptuous of Socrates to assume that, at this stage,
Alcibiades has already come to love him, and instead interprets Socrates
to mean on your account, and on account of the love that I have [sc.
for you].54 Such an interpretation, however, requires emending the text.55
Modern editors do so on the basis of Olympiodorus text: ganakt
pr so ka pr mauto (I am vexed on account of you, and on
account of myself). Olympiodorus explains: On your account because
you are small-minded [smikroprepv] and on mine because I love what is
small-minded. Olympiodorus, however, goes against the manuscripts in
omitting te to.56
53 Codicil T. Cf. Codicil B: ganakt pr te to so ka to mauto rwtov (I am vexed on

account of your love and my own).
54 Denyer 2001, on 119c5.
55 Burnet 19001907; Carlini 1964; Croiset 1949; and Denyer 2001 read: ganakt pr te so
ka to mauto rwtov. Cf. Lamb 1927: ganakt pr te so ka to mo rwtov, who
translates: I am grieved for you, and for my love. Hutchinson 1997 and Marboeuf and Pradeau
2000 translate similarly.
56 Olympiodorus 147.1113 (who also omits rwtov).
The manuscript readings (with te to) can be preserved if we interpret
Socrates as referring to the two kinds of love shared by Socrates and
Alcibiades: love for the greatest power and love for one another. If one way
in which love is created is by gazing into the beautiful soul of another, and
if soul gazes at soul by asking and answering questions, then Alcibiades
has already begun to reciprocate Socrates love by falling in love with his
beautiful soul.57 Socrates also refers to the love they both share for the
greatest power. Socrates is grieved on account of both kinds of love. He
fears that if Alcibiades is willing to settle for lesser objects he will no longer
have a passionate desire to attain the greatest power and his soul will be
less beautiful. If this happens, Socrates love for Alcibiades will cease and,
in turn, Alcibiades developing love for Socrates beautiful soul will be
overcome by his desire for lesser objects.
1.4 the eye and the soul

Another controversial passage helps to shed light on the relationship
between Socratic eros and eros for another person in this dialogue. Socrates
explains the process by means of which a person can gain self-knowledge
by drawing an analogy between the eye and the soul at 132a6133c17 (at
stage v, part 3, discussed above 1.2). I argue that in this highly controversial
passage Socrates suggests (poptew: 132d1) that self-knowledge is gained
by means of dialectic with the most god-like part of the soul of another
person, who, at least in Alcibiades specific case, must also be a lover. He
thus provides further support for his earlier claim that he alone, as the only
lover of Alcibiades soul, is able to help the young man to acquire the object
of his desire.
Alcibiades has agreed that in order to care for himself he must know
his own soul (stage v, part 1, at 127e9131c4), and that Socrates alone is
a lover of Alcibiades soul (stage v, part 2, at 131c5132a6). He then asks
Socrates to show him how they might care for themselves (stage v, part 3:
132b45). After summing up the agreements previously arrived at (132b6
c2), Socrates asks how we can know the soul most clearly (132c7), and says
that he will say what he suspects (poptew) the Delphic precept to
mean (132d12). At 132a6133c7, Socrates and Alcibiades agree that if soul
is to know itself, it must look into (another) soul (133b78), just as an eye
could see itself by looking into another eye (133a57). Moreover, the soul
must look into the most divine part of another soul, that in which the
57 See 130d8e6, with 132d1133c17, discussed further below 1.4.

excellence of a soul, wisdom (sophia), comes to be, and into anything else
that is like this part (133b8c3). Socrates concludes: This part of the soul,
then, resembles god, and by looking into it and coming to know all that
is divine, that is, the god and wisdom [phronesis], one could best come
to know oneself also (133c46).58 Before considering the significance of
Socrates highly controversial statements about the divine and the god
in this passage, it will first be helpful to consider the theory of vision that
is operative in this passage.
To see oneself (132d6) according to Socrates interpretation of the
Delphic precept, one looks into a mirror, or something similar, in which
the eye sees itself (132d7e3). The eye itself can serve this same purpose
(132e45). In this latter case, one sees an image (eidolon) of oneself in the
eye of another person: Do you recognize that the face of the one looking
into an eye appears in the pupil [opsei] of the person opposite as if in
a mirror, and we call this [sc. the reflection of the face] the doll [kore],
being a kind of image of the person looking into the eye? (Ennenhkav
on ti to nblpontov ev tn fqalmn t prswpon mfanetai
n t to katantikr yei sper n katptr, d krhn kalo-
men, edwlon n ti to mblpontov: 132e7133a3). My translation follows
the interpretation of Jacques Brunschwig, who argues that opsei refers to
the pupil, while the kore is the doll, the little image of a persons face
reflected in the eye. The antecedent of (this) is, then, the reflection
of the face (prswpon) of the person looking into the eye of another.59
Interpreted in this way, the passage states that the pupil, the best part of
the eye, that with which one sees (133a57, 133b25), also contains a doll
that is an image of the face, the best part of the body of the person look-
ing into the eye.60 There is, moreover, a very close connection between
the pupil and the reflection in ancient Greek theories of vision, accord-
ing to which sight is caused by the reflection of objects on the pupil.61
According to the Timaeus, when we see something, an inner fire, or
ray of light, coalesces with a similar fire from outside (45b246a2). Reflec-
tions are a particular case of this general principle (46a2b3). It is the
coalescence, or intercourse with each other (koinwnav llloiv: 46a5),
58 Reading qon te ka frnhsin (133c5) with the MSS., Burnet 19001907; Croiset 1949; and Denyer
2001. Suggested emendations are noted by Carlini 1964 and 1963: 176.
59 Brunschwig 1973: 258, followed by Denyer 2001, on 133a7 and Pradeau 2000: 21314 nn.143 and
144. Opsis clearly refers to the pupil at 133b5.
60 In the Timaeus the head is said to be the best and most divine part of the body (44d56, 45a1,
69d6e3, 85a6).
61 Brunschwig 1973: 245. A recent discussion of ancient theories of vision, with bibliography, is
provided by Nightingale 2004: 1012.
of the inner and outer fires on a smooth, bright surface that allows us to
see the reflection of a face (prswpon: 46b2) in a mirror. A. E. Taylor
explains: [T]he ray of light proceeding from my eye and the light reflected
from the real face of the person whom I see in the glass coalesce at the
surface of the mirror and the united ray is then thrown back from it.62 In
the Timaeus, then, it is the surface of the mirror that allows the ray of light
from the eye to unite with the ray of light from the face that is reflected
in it. If, as seems probable, the Alcibiades I relies on this same theory of
vision, what Socrates means at 132e7133a3 is that one sees ones face in a
mirror or in the pupil of another eye because this mirror or pupil allows
the ray from ones own eye to unite with the ray reflected from ones face.
The two united rays are then thrown back from the mirror or the pupil.
The kind of reflection discussed in the Alcibiades I, however, is more
complex than that outlined above. Socrates goes on to say that, just as we
can see our face reflected in the eye of another person, so an eye can see itself
by looking into the best part of another eye, that part with which it sees.
This part is the pupil (133a5b5). Because it is also the pupil that looks into
another eye, Socrates statements imply that the eye sees itself by looking
at the reflection of its own pupil within the pupil of another eye. When
this happens, according to the theory of vision discussed above, the ray of
light proceeding from the pupil of the gazer unites, within the pupil of
another person, with the ray reflected from the gazers own pupil. Nicholas
Denyer perceptively remarks: Hence, when an eye sees itself by seeing its
reflection in a pupil, it is seeing itself by seeing how another sees it.63
The image of soul looking into soul can be better understood within the
context of the theory of vision just discussed. Just as we see an image of
the best part of our eye (the pupil) reflected in the best part of the eye of
another person, so we see the best part of our soul reflected in the best part
of the soul of another person. This best part of the soul, corresponding to
the pupil of the eye, is that part in which wisdom comes to be (133b710).
It might be thought that one difference between the two cases that of
the pupil-mirror and that of the soul is that we see our soul in a medium
that is active rather than passive. However, not only are pupils active,64
according to Aristotle, mirrors are not passive but are changed by what is
reflected in them.65 Some support for the idea that Plato held a similar
62 Taylor 1928: 2867. A similar theory of mirrors is given at Soph. 266b9c4.

63 Denyer 2001: 233. 64 Noted by Gill 2007: 108; Linguiti 1983: 6.
65 On Dreams 2.459b23460a26 states that when a menstruating woman looks into a mirror it takes
on the red tinge with which her eyes are colored. Sprague 1985 makes the intriguing suggestion that
the mirror in this passage represents an eye.
view of mirrors is provided by Phaedrus 255c1d6, where the beloved is said
to see, as in a mirror, the flood of his own beauty reflected back from the
lover in a process that changes both lover and beloved.
This theory of vision helps to explain the mechanism by means of
which one sees oneself, according to Socrates, but it does not tell us how
to interpret Socrates statements about the god and the most divine part
of the soul. Scholars have proposed two main explanations. According
to the theological interpretation, we acquire self-knowledge by looking
into the best and most divine part of another soul, because in so doing
we see the god that is our true self. This is the rational, impersonal
soul that is the same in each person.66 This interpretation, however, does
not take into account the emphasis on interpersonal communication in
this dialogue. The gaze has erotic connotations (discussed below), and the
focus throughout is on dialectic between two people. It is by asking and
answering questions that one becomes better (127e57), and to associate
(prosomilen) with one another by means of words is to address soul
with soul (130d8e5), that is, to engage in dialectic (130e3). A second,
humanist, interpretation focuses on dialectic, arguing that to look into
another soul is to converse, asking and answering questions.67 Scholars
who hold this view, however, do not adequately explain the emphasis on
the god and the divine in this passage (133c1, c4, c5, and, in the lines
of doubtful authenticity, 133c13).68 However, the god, or a god, plays an
extremely important role in this dialogue, as Socrates guardian, who did
not allow him to engage in dialectic with Alcibiades until this day (124c5
10; cf. 105e5106a1), and by whose will Socrates and Alcibiades can become
better by asking and answering questions (127e47; cf. 135d6). Moreover, in
introducing the analogy of eye and soul as an interpretation of the Delphic
writing (that is, know thyself: 132c9d2; cf. 124a8b1), Socrates alludes
to the god Apollo. An interpretation of the analogy, then, must take into
account both elements: the interpersonal and the divine.
A third interpretation, recently proposed by Christopher Gill, does just
this. Gill argues for a triangular model, in which both psyches are related
to each other (as active capacities for knowing), and in which this (shared)
active capacity is also god-like. That is, the psyches are related to each
other at one axis, while their converging axis is directed to god . . . the
66 This view is held by Annas 1985: 1303 and Brunschwig 1996: 7280, who both note the Neoplatonic
sources for it.
67 Johnson 1999: 9; Linguiti 1981: 2645 and 1983: 18. The term humanist is used by Brunschwig
1996: 72.
68 On the authenticity of 133c817 see above n.37.
god-like element is shared or common to the two psyches, and . . . self-
knowledge . . . is knowledge of this shared, common element.69 According
to Gill, then, the part of the soul in which excellence comes to be is a
god-like capacity for knowing that is shared by two souls.
Gill does not provide a more detailed account of his model, but I
suggest that other passages in the dialogue allow us to make some plausible
inferences about this shared, god-like part of the soul. Just as that part of
the eye with which it sees is the best part of the eye (bltiston: 133a6), so,
according to the analogy, the best part of the soul is that concerned with
knowing and wisdom (phronein), in which wisdom (sophia) comes to be
(133b7c2). Now the best part of the soul is also the most beautiful (131d2:
bltion; 131d7: kllistov) and therefore the most lovable (131d12). As I
argued above at 1.3, Alcibiades soul is beautiful and lovable, both because
it has a beautiful nature, one that is capable of becoming better and more
beautiful, and because it has a passionate desire to acquire the greatest
power. His soul is also similar to Socrates own soul in these respects. There
is reason to infer, then, that the best part of the soul in the analogy is in fact
its beautiful nature and desire for the greatest power. This nature and this
desire make it possible for the soul to strive to acquire the self-knowledge
that confers the greatest power. The soul does this by using dialectic to look
into the best part of another soul that has the same nature and desire. The
god has an appropriate place in this analogy for two reasons. A beautiful
nature and eros for the greatest power might reasonably be thought to be
god-like, and, according to Socrates, desire for the greatest power is closely
associated with divinity. The god who is Socrates guardian allows him to
converse with Alcibiades only after the young man acquires this desire,
and Socrates hopes that this god will help both Socrates and Alcibiades to
achieve the objects of their desires (105e2106a1, 124c510, 127e57).
There is nothing impersonal about either the god-like part of the soul or
about the process of gazing. This part of the soul can be used in different
ways by different people; for example, in public affairs by Alcibiades, and
in private matters by Socrates. Moreover, the dialectic by means of which
self-knowledge is obtained in soul-gazing varies considerably depending
on the people involved. The questions Socrates asks Alcibiades have to do
specifically with his particular desire for political power. To see ones soul
by looking into the soul of another, then, is to engage in the dialectic in
which Socrates and Alcibiades have participated throughout the dialogue
in a mutual striving for self-knowledge,70 an activity that is god-like and
encouraged by a god, but that is also specific to the individuals involved.
69 Gill 2007: 109. 70 Cf. Goldin 1993: 1416.

If this interpretation is correct, self-knowledge results more from answer-
ing than from asking questions, for it is the answerer who gives his opinions
(112e1113a10) and who, as a result, becomes persuaded (114e29). If the
mirror analogy can be pushed yet further, we might say that to answer
questions is to see ones own opinions most clearly, reflected in the mirror
of the soul of the questioner, who responds by asking more questions. To
ask questions, on the other hand, is to provide something analogous to the
surface of the mirror on which the two rays of light coalesce. In asking
questions, questioners do not state their own opinions and so do not come
to know themselves in the same way that answerers do. However, in testing
the opinions of answerers, questioners also test opinions that they might
hold themselves, or consider holding. To the extent that questioners share
the opinions of answerers, they question themselves as well as their inter-
locutors. Questioners might also come to know that they would not be
justified in holding opinions that do not stand up to scrutiny when others
assert them.71
In addition to suggesting that dialectic is the means by which soul
looks into soul, the mirror analogy has yet another dimension, for in
Greek art and literature gazing into the eyes of another has intensely
erotic connotations.72 Socrates is, famously, inflamed when he sees inside
Charmides cloak (Chrm. 155d34). Equally important, but less often noted,
is the fact that the encounter in the Charmides begins with a gaze of eye into
eye: He looked at me with his eyes in an indescribable manner, Socrates
says (155c8d1). Moreover, mirrors themselves have erotic connotations.73
The gaze of soul into soul, then, explicitly said to be analogous to the gaze
of eye into eye or mirror, would certainly have had erotic connotations for
Platos original audience.74
This passage in the Alcibiades I has rightly been compared with the
mirror passage of the Phaedrus.75 In that dialogue, a stream of beauty
flows from the beloved to the lovers eyes, where it enters and fills him to
overflowing. The stream then rebounds and enters the beloved through
his eyes, filling him in turn with an image of love that is a counterlove
71 It is also possible to ask questions of oneself; see, for example, Hp. mai. 298b11c2 and 304b7e9.
On questioning oneself as well as others see Griswold 1986: 1723, citing Tht. 189e[190a], Soph.
263e[264a], and 21516.
72 Denyer 2001: 229 cites many examples in Greek literature, although he misses the erotic implications
of the Alc. I passage that are noted by Gill 2007: 109 and Goldin 1993: 16. On the erotic connotations
of the gaze see Calame 1999: 203; Skinner 2005: 857. On the gaze in the visual arts see also Frontisi-
Ducroux 1996: esp. 82 (sight is the medium of Peitho).
73 Frontisi-Ducroux 1996: 8990; Stewart 1996.
74 Forde 1987: 236; Goldin 1993: 14; Gordon, 2003: 1213.
75 See Annas 1985: 132 n.52; Clark 1955: 2389; Friedlander 1921: 446; Johnson 1999: 1415; Soulez-
Luccioni 1974: 2046. On Phdr. 255c1e2 see Chapter 5 at 5.3.2.
(255c1e1). Thus, the beloved sees his own beauty reflected in the lover
and falls in love with it. In some ways, the psychology of the Alcibiades
I is less complex than that of the Phaedrus. In contrast to the elaborate
description of the three capacities of the soul in the myth of the charioteer
and horses in the Phaedrus, the soul in Alcibiades I is merely said to have a
part that reasons. Socrates also acknowledges individual differences more
explicitly in the Phaedrus when he says that different lovers and beloveds
follow different gods, each pair following that god whose nature (physis:
252e3, 253a1) it shares.76
In other respects, however, the image of the Alcibiades I is more complex
than that of the Phaedrus, in which the beloved sees only the reflection of
his own beauty. Alcibiades sees reflected in Socrates soul that part of his
own soul that is best and most beautiful. The term kore, used of the image
reflected in the eye (133a2), also means votive image of a divinity, and
this sense is in the background here.77 If, as in the Phaedrus, the beloved of
the Alcibiades I sees the best part of himself in the eyes of the lover, he sees
his soul as the lover sees it, as beautiful and god-like.78 In addition, unlike
the beloved of the Phaedrus who sees only the beauty of his own soul with
which the lover is in love, the beloved of the Alcibiades I also sees and falls
in love with the beauty of soul of his lover. Moreover, the gazer in Alcibiades
I also sees the reflection of his own defects. By engaging in dialectic with
Socrates, Alcibiades gains knowledge that he is at risk of becoming ugly
in soul. Immediately before the mirror passage, Socrates urges Alcibiades
to be eager to be as beautiful (in soul) as possible (131d7) and warns
him against becoming ascwn (more ugly-and-shameful: 132a2: see above
stage v, part 2). After the mirror passage, Socrates questions Alcibiades
and concludes by asking him, Do you perceive what state you are in now?
Is it a state worthy of a free man or not? Alcibiades answers: I think I
see very well indeed (135c1011). One thing that Alcibiades has seen by
answering Socrates questions is that he needs to care for himself in order
to avoid shame and ugliness, and that Socrates alone can help him to do
this.
The mirror passage does not tell us into whose soul one must gaze.
Paul Friedlanders view that the soul must be that of Socrates alone has
been opposed as too restrictive by many scholars. David Johnson offers a
broader interpretation, according to which the important thing is that the
76 Johnson 1999: 1415 rightly notes that there are multiple gods in the Phaedrus, which also contains
a psychology that is more complex in some respects. On the psychology of the Phaedrus see
Chapters 5 and 6.
77 Pradeau 2000: 75 n.2, citing Phdr. 230b[8]. 78 Phdr. 255a12, Alc. I 133c16.
other person be a friend or lover.79 There is some truth in both positions.
Taken as an analogy with general applications, what is required is the good
will, affection or love that makes dialectic possible. This is in accord with
Socrates description of his practice in the Apology, where he says that he has
affection and love (spzomai mn ka fil: 29d3) for the Athenians, that
he goes around to each person like a father or older brother, persuading
[him] to care for virtue (31b35), and where he asks the jury to admonish
his own sons if they seem to care for anything more than for virtue (41e1
42a2).80 This broad interpretation is also consistent with the account of
other erotic dialogues, in which interpersonal love is not represented as
being necessary to the practice of the erotic art. However, as applied to
the specific case of Alcibiades in the Alcibiades I, the only soul available is
that of Socrates. Socrates alone is the lover of Alcibiades soul (claim v.a,
at 131d4e11), and in Athens almost no one81 except a lover cares about
a persons education (claim iii.b, at 122b58). Socrates mention of Athens
provides an important qualification. He does not say or imply that progress
in education can be made only if there is interpersonal love between two
people; he says that this is usually (almost no one) the case in Athens. In
Persia, in contrast, the kings son is educated by four men who are reputed
to be the best in wisdom, justice, sophrosyne and courage, but who are never
said to love their pupil (121e122a).
Socrates helps to explain why only a lover can help Alcibiades to improve
when he says that the lover of Alcibiades soul will not depart when physical
beauty fades, but will remain as long as the beloved keeps on becoming
better and more beautiful (131c11132a2). Alcibiades soul-lover, this state-
ment implies, desires to associate with the beautiful soul that is the object
of his eros, just as the lover of the body desires to associate with the object of
his desire. However, the soul-lovers eros is more lasting because its object,
unlike physical beauty, does not necessarily fade, but can become more
beautiful over time. In helping it to do so, the lover makes his object more
lovable as well as more beautiful. For in the Alcibiades I, as in the Phaedrus,
the sight of a beautiful object creates eros.82 The soul-lover, however, must
himself be lovable (gaphtv: 131e3), having a beautiful nature and a
desire to improve, if he is going to help his beloved to become better. Now
79 Friedlander 1923: 14 and 1964: 3512 n.15; and Johnson 1999: 9. Friedlanders restrictive view is also
opposed by Bluck 1953: 49 n.6; Clark 1955: 238; Linguiti 1983: 78; Wellman 1966: 17.
80 I thank Sandra Peterson for calling this parallel to my attention.
81 v pov epen (so to speak) is used in qualifying a too absolute expression: LSJ s.v. pov, 4.
82 See above n.49. However, I disagree with Friedlander 1923: 268, who holds that eros in the Alcibiades
I must begin with the sight of physical beauty.
Socrates has long been in love with Alcibiades beautiful soul, even before
conversing with the young man, and his love, we may assume, increases
as he engages in dialectic with Alcibiades, thereby gazing into his soul and
helping it to become more beautiful. Alcibiades, in contrast, comes to love
Socrates in the first place as a result of soul-gazing. When Alcibiades returns
Socrates psychic gaze, by seeking self-knowledge through dialectic of soul
with soul, he not only sees himself, reflected in Socrates soul, he also sees
and falls in love with the best part of Socrates soul.
The mirror passage, like the end of the dialogue, contains a warning
to Alcibiades, this time in the form of a literary allusion. In Sappho 31,
an observer watches a man sitting opposite (nntiov: 2) a woman and
listening to her speaking and laughing. This man appears to the observer
to be equal to the gods (faneta moi knov sov qoisi: 1). In contrast,
when the observer briefly looks at her beloved (v gr v s dw brce:
7) she loses control of the heart in her breast (kardan n stqesin: 6),
which is, in Greek thought, the seat of thought as well as feeling. She is
no longer able to hear, speak or see (712) and is close to death (1516).83
The poem thus implies that it is god-like to be able to look at, speak with
and listen to the person one loves, while still retaining ones physical and
intellectual senses. Similarly, in the Alcibiades I passage, the person who
looks at (blepton: 133b8) the soul of another who is opposite to him
(katantikr: 133a1) comes to resemble a god in that he might come to
know the god and wisdom [phronesis] (133c5). Significantly, if we exclude
the doubtful lines 133c817 the passage is bracketed by mfanetai (appears
in: 133a1) and fanetai (It appears so: 133c7, cf. 133a8). Now fanetai
(He appears) is the first word of Sapphos poem, and would have been
quoted in references to this poem.84 When Alcibiades uses the word at
133c7, this educated young man, who is deeply concerned with eros in
the ordinary sense, picks up and caps Socrates poetic allusion at 133a1
(appears in).85 In alluding to Sappho, Socrates is implicitly contrasting
the love of soul he offers Alcibiades, as a result of which the beloved comes
to know himself, with the love of physical beauty described by the poet, as
a result of which one loses ones senses and comes close to death. Socrates
83 Sappho 31, Lobel-Page 1955.
84 The older lyric poems were usually referred to by their opening lines: Maehler 1996: 251.
85 Alcibiades has learned to read and write, play the lyre, and to wrestle (106e56). Learning to play
the lyre included learning lyric poetry (Denyer 2001, on 105e6). Alcibiades also says fanetai (It
appears so) in other passages (for example, 131c13, 134b6, 134c12, 135b10), but the use of this word
has a particular significance in a passage that recalls Sapphos poem in other respects. There are also
allusions to Sappho 31 in Phdr. 251c15: see Chapter 5 n.34. On Platos use of literary allusions see
further Chapter 3.
is also contrasting the kind of self-knowledge that he urges Alcibiades
to cultivate with the knowledge of her own senselessness that Sapphos
observer expresses.
1.5 er os the stork

The love Socrates offers Alcibiades also differs from that of Sapphos
observer, and from that of the conventional erastes, in another respect:
the lover will become a beloved. The end of the dialogue makes this trans-
formation explicit. Socrates says: My love will be no different from a stork,
if, after having hatched a winged love in you, it will in turn be cared for
by this love (pelargo ra mv rwv odn diosei, e par soi
nneottesav rwta p totou plin qerapesetai: 135e13). In this
passage, as at 119c5 (above 1.3), the eros in question is both eros for the
greatest power and eros for another person. Socrates eros for the greatest
power that only self-knowledge and self-care can confer, and his eros for
Alcibiades have, in turn, created in Alcibiades both the eros for the greatest
power that is conferred by self-knowledge, and eros for Socrates, without
whom he cannot obtain the object of his desire.
Alcibiades says that he and Socrates will change roles (135d79), but
the end of the dialogue does not simply represent a role reversal, for the
love that has been created in the beloved is a reciprocal eros, in which
both partners love and are loved.86 Socrates remains a lover, who is now
permitted to help Alcibiades care for himself. Alcibiades remains a beloved,
but he also becomes a lover of Socrates who may now be able, in turn,
to help Socrates acquire greater self-knowledge. This interpretation helps
to explain a puzzling passage at the end of the dialogue. Alcibiades says:
There is no way I will not be your pedagogue from this day on, and
that you will not have me as your pedagogue (o gr stin pwv o
paidagwgsw se p tsde tv mrav, s d p mo paidagwgsh:
135d910). The verb paidagwgen (literally, child-lead) does not simply
mean attend on, or follow, as some scholars claim.87 It refers instead to
the reciprocal education between the two men: Alcibiades says that he will
now, in turn, become Socrates pedagogue.88
86 On this idea see Halperin 1986: 6970. Role reversal is stressed by Friedlander 1921: 3842. Davidson
2007: 4757 discusses examples of life-long relationships between same-sex couples in ancient Greece,
although he denies that Greek eros can be both mutual and concurrent (2332). Alc. I, I contend, is
a counter-example to this view.
87 For example, Denyer 2001, on 135d911; Lamb 1927: 220 n.1.
88 Pradeau 2000: 218 n.165 notes that the verb paidagwgen means both to follow and to instruct a
child. Gordon 2003: 23 states that Alcibiades could become as erotically expert as Socrates.
Earlier in the dialogue Socrates says that both he and Alcibiades are
especially in need of education (124c13), and that they both very much
need to care for themselves (124d23). In the course of their conversation,
the two men have joined in a common consideration (koin boul: 119b1,
124b10; skepton koin: 124d9) about how to become educated. Socrates
believes that he is benefiting himself no less than Alcibiades in asking the
questions the young man answers (127e57) in the course of this com-
mon consideration. It is obvious how Alcibiades benefits from answering
Socrates questions. He gains self-knowledge, both about his own defects
and about his true beauty, by seeing the best part of his own soul as he looks
into Socrates soul, and by realizing that wisdom alone, in the form of self-
knowledge and self-care, can help him to acquire the greatest power that is
the true object of his eros. He also gains by acquiring a worthy love object
when he falls in love with Socrates soul. Socrates also benefits from his
conversation with Alcibiades. He achieves greater self-knowledge and cares
for himself by testing and rejecting Alcibiades belief that tyranny confers
the greatest power.89 He also makes progress toward acquiring the greatest
power with Alcibiades by enlisting the young man in the common search
for wisdom, and by demonstrating that he alone is able to help the young
man know and care for himself. In so doing, he helps to make Alcibiades
soul more beautiful and more lovable, for as Alcibiades self-knowledge
increases, so does his beauty of soul, the object of Socrates love.
Finally, Socrates gains Alcibiades not only as a beloved, but also as a lover
of Socrates soul, who engages to educate Socrates. At the beginning of the
dialogue, Socrates asked Alcibiades to question him or to make a speech
by himself. Alcibiades, however, said that he did not know if he would be
able to make a speech to Socrates (114b25), did not seem to be willing to
ask questions, and even hesitated briefly before agreeing to answer them
(114d11e11). The image of eros as stork suggests that now, at the end of the
dialogue, Alcibiades may finally be able to take an active role in questioning
Socrates. In this way he will care for Socrates and be his pedagogue.90 The
stork image also suggests that the love between Socrates and Alcibiades is,
like the counterlove of the beloved in the Phaedrus, not only eros, but also
89 On the idea that Socrates gains self-knowledge by testing others see Brickhouse and Smith 1994:
14 n.23 (citing Chrm. 166c7d4, Grg. 486d2488b1, Prt. 348c5d5, Resp. 336e2337a2, 348a7b4);
G. A. Scott 2000: 1034; Weiss 2006b: 248; Yonezawa 2004: 1218.
90 Friedlander 1964: 2334 notes that in this dialogue we witness for once someone undergoing a
profound change (cf. Forde 1987: 2223). As G. A. Scott 2000: 83 points out, Friedlander does not
notice that Lysis changes in a similar way. Guthrie 1971: 75 misses the change in Alcibiades when he
writes of Socrates erotic delusion about the possibility of converting Alcibiades. The conversion
may be temporary, but it is real.
a kind of philia (Phdr. 255d6e2). Just as storks were thought to return the
care they received from their parents by caring for them in old age, so the
younger Alcibiades will care for the older Socrates as for a father.
Of course, the dialogue ends before Alcibiades actually plays this more
active role of questioner. Socrates uses the conditional, if, in referring to
the care he may receive (135e2). Moreover, the future tense is used by both
men to refer to Alcibiades activities of being a pedagogue and caring for
Socrates (135d910, e3) and it is used again when Alcibiades says that he will
begin to take care about justice (135e45). This future, Socrates suggests in
his last words about his fears (135e68), may never come to pass. Instead,
just as Socrates fears, the great strength of the city will in fact overcome both
Alcibiades and Socrates. The city has power over Alcibiades because the
young man is tempted by eros for the people of Athens (132a25), a senseless
love similar to that described in Sappho 31. The dialogue concludes, then,
with a reminder of the sad historical future, in which Alcibiades is in fact
corrupted by his love of the demos, and Socrates questioning is silenced by
death.91 It also gives us a brief and tantalizing glimpse of an alternate future,
in which Alcibiades and Socrates do in fact care for and know themselves
and each other by means of reciprocal eros for the soul.
In this dialogue, Plato indicates that Socrates, aided by the god (105e5,
124c810, 127e57, 135d6), used his erotic art to do everything possible to
bring about this better future. Socrates is represented here as a lover of both
Alcibiades and of wisdom, as he is in the Gorgias (481d34), and as someone
who has a passionate desire to obtain wisdom because he recognizes that
he lacks it. He is also portrayed as a man who has marvelous skill in using
his erotic art. Socrates, unlike all of the lovers of Alcibiades body, is able
to persuade the young man not only to accept him as lover, but also to
return his love, and to acquire Socratic eros for the wisdom he recognizes
that he lacks. Socrates is not responsible for the fact that Alcibiades will
again be overcome by ordinary eros for tyranny. This dialogue, then, is an
apology not only for Socrates in his relationship with Alcibiades, but also
for an erotic art that desires and strives to attain wisdom rather than sexual
pleasure.92
91 Friedlander 1964: 2323.
92 For the idea that the dialogue is an apology for Socrates see Denyer 2001: 1314; Weil 1964: 767.
On the relationship between Alc. I and Symp. see Chapter 4 at end of 4.5.
c h a p ter 2
In love with acquiring friends: Socrates

in the Lysis
2.1 impasse as success

The failure of the Lysis to arrive at a positive conclusion frequently induces
in its readers the kind of dizziness Socrates reports that he himself experi-
ences as a result of the inconclusive discussions that take place (eliggi
p tv to lgou porav: 216c56). During a large part of the dia-
logue, Socrates and two young interlocutors, Lysis and Menexenus, attempt
to answer the question: What is the friend (philos)?1 A number of possible
answers are proposed, to all of which objections are raised. Near the end of
the dialogue, Socrates says: We are as though drunk with the argument
(222c2), and he sums up the difficulties: If none of these is the friend, I no
longer have anything to say (222e67).2 Socrates concludes that he and his
young interlocutors will be ridiculed (kataglastoi) by the bystanders
for not having been able to discover what the friend is (223b48).
What can Socrates interlocutors and Platos readers learn from these
conversations that, according to Socrates own admission, do not arrive
at a positive conclusion about the topic of discussion? As the history of
scholarship shows, each of the proposals about what the friend is contains
1 ti stin flov (223b7); cf. per tn flwn, o tugcnousin ntev (214a3); xhurkamen
stin t flon (218b7); per flou, stin (222b5). Against the view that the Lysis is a dialogue
of definition (e.g., Justin 2005; Levin 1972: 239; Robinson 1986: 63) Sedley 1989 (followed by
Dorion 2004: 172) argues that it instead attempts to discover what the relationship is between those
who are friends. Bordt 1998: 768 correctly notes that it is fruitless to choose between these two
interpretations. Indeed, the Lysis is about the term flov, which describes a relation (Mackenzie
1988: 26).
2 In this chapter, I reserve the translations love and to love for eros, eran, and cognates, and I use
English terms cognate with friend, like and dear to translate Greek phil- words. To like,
however, is a much weaker term than the Greek philein, which can refer to affection as intense as
love, although usually without an erotic component. See further below 2.2.1. Moreover, lack of an
English equivalent forces me to translate the nominal forms philos (masc.) and philon (neut.) as
friend, even though both can be used to refer to things, as well as to persons, that are objects of
affection. When Socrates asks, What is the friend? he is not necessarily referring to a human being,
as the English friend would usually imply.
68
In love with acquiring friends: Socrates in the Lysis 69
important insights into the nature of friendship. It is, however, a mistake to
interpret the dialogue as containing a hidden message concealed within
what merely appears to be aporia (impasse).3 I will argue that aporia itself
plays an important and positive role in this dialogue, a role that can be
better understood within the context of Socrates erotic art. In the Lysis, as
in the other erotic dialogues, Socrates recognizes his own lack of wisdom
and other good things (component (2) of the erotic art). At the same time,
he also claims to be marvelously skilled in searching for wisdom and the
good things he desires (component (4)), and in helping others to join in
this same search, by leading them, in the first place, to recognize that they
lack wisdom and other good things (component (5)). Inducing aporia in
his young interlocutors is an important part of this process.4
It is, then, essential to take seriously Socrates explicit statements that
an impasse has been reached. In the last words of the dialogue he says:
These people will say that . . . we have not yet been able to discover what
the friend is (223b58). However, aporia has a positive function in many
of Platos dialogues, for it is a necessary condition for further inquiry. In the
Meno, Socrates asks: Do you think that he [sc. the slave] would attempt
to search for or learn that which he thinks he knows but does not, before
he fell into aporia and, thinking that he did not know it, longed to know
it? (prn ev poran katpesen . . . ka pqhsen t ednai: 84c46).
After the slave arrives at aporia, Socrates says, he would gladly search
(zhtseien n dwv) for what he does not know (84b1011). According
to S. R. Slings, these passages are evidence that [a]poria is a necessary and
sufficient condition for attempting to search and learn (84c45); in other
words, one who is thrown into aporia will automatically feel a desire to
know (cf. 84c56).5 As Chapter 1 has shown, however, aporia is not a
3 Hidden message: Bossi 2000: 172. Although few are as explicit as Bossi, most scholars claim that
Socrates or Plato actually endorses a particular view about issues that are represented in the dialogue
as leading to aporia. They include: Adams 1995; von Arnim 1914: 613 and 1916: 371; Bordt 1998: esp.
8993 and 2000: esp. 1589 (Bordts approach is criticized by Murphy 1999 and Rudebusch 2002);
Dorion 2004: esp. 1115 and 21420; Fraisse 1974: 1434; Gonzalez 2000; Jenks 2005; Kahn 1996:
28191; Narcy 1997: 21718; Penner and Rowe 2005: esp. 1824; Pohlenz 1913: 36771, 1916: 25161
and 1917; Reshotko 1997; Rudebusch 2004, 2006 and 2009: ch. 8; Taylor 1956: 73; Teloh 1986: 7781;
Versenyi 1975; Westermayer 1875: 92101. Rudebusch 1999: 917 provides a thoughtful defense of
this position. Among those who hold that the Lysis and other dialogues contain genuine aporia are
Krentz 1983; Matthews 1999: 2730; Nails 1995: esp. 21819; Robinson 1986 and no date; Wolfsdorf
2004b: 237; Yonezawa 2004. A helpful survey of interpretations of aporia in Platos dialogues is
provided by Wolfsdorf 1997: 121.
4 On the components of the erotic art see Introduction at I.1. I agree with Weiss 2006b: 252 that [f]or
Socrates, definition is not an end in itself. Cf. Weiss 2006a: 34.
5 Slings 1999: 1401. Mackenzie 1988 also appears to hold that aporia, in at least one sense, is both a
necessary and a sufficient condition for desiring to learn. She writes that puzzlement is productive
sufficient condition for desiring to obtain wisdom. Alcibiades agrees that
he would not wish to discover or learn things that he thought he knew
(106d1012). He also admits that he sometimes thinks one thing, sometimes
another, as a result of Socrates questioning (116e24).6 Thus, even though
he does not use the term aporia, he admits that he has in effect arrived at
this condition. Nevertheless, Alcibiades is still not convinced that he needs
education, since, as he states, his competitors in politics are also uneducated
(119b1c1).7 Before he arrives at a desire to become educated and acquire
wisdom, Alcibiades also needs, in addition to aporia, to experience shame
resulting from the recognition that he is inadequate with respect to what
he values most.8 Only then is he able to experience the aporia . . . [that]
is a fertile self-awareness of ignorance that . . . works together with eros [to
compel] the philosophic soul to seek and find a path towards truth.9
In the case of arrogant people, like Alcibiades, shame is needed to help
produce this Socratic eros for the good things that they believe they lack.
A gentler humbling, that does not produce shame, is all that is needed by
interlocutors like Lysis, who have less pride to overcome.
In the Lysis, as in other dialogues, aporia stimulates fruitful philosoph-
ical reflection in Socrates interlocutors and in Platos readers because it
leads them to become aware of their own lack of wisdom about issues that
are genuinely puzzling and of real importance to them. This awareness,
together with the desire to obtain wisdom, helps them to become philoso-
phers (literally, wisdom-likers) in respect to these matters.10 The Lysis
dramatizes this kind of success when it represents Socrates and his inter-
locutors becoming fellow searchers for wisdom about what the friend is.
The dialogue also dramatizes another way in which impasse leads
to success, for the dramatic framework within which the aporetic
conversations take place represents a successful demonstration by Socrates
and progressive . . . since it constitutes both an awareness of [ones] own ignorance, and the desire
to inquire further (20). She states that aporia in one sense does not merely refer to lack of
knowledge of an answer but characterises a deeper sense of puzzlement whereby we recognise
and admit our puzzlement, and realise its source, but find ourselves inextricably committed to the
inquirys continuing by our inability to extricate ourselves from the pora (23). Mackenzies
conclusions about aporia are supported by Opsomer 2001: esp. 59. See also Politis 2006, who
distinguishes a cathartic from a zetetic aporia that leads one to seek solutions to particular
problems.
6 See Chapter 1 at 1.2, stage ii. According to Opsomer 2001: 37 and 47, aporia and cognates occur
only once in Alc. I: at 110b3. In that passage, Socrates uses the term to characterize a state like that
at which Alcibiades arrives at 116e24.
7 See Chapter 1 at 1.2, stage iii. 8 See Chapter 1 at 1.2, stage ii and n.23.
9 Nightingale 2004: 106; see further 11416. On eros and aporia see also Sheffield 2006a: 5574.
10 On the effects of aporia on Platos readers see Gordon 1999: 4361.
of what a lover should say to a beloved (206c17).11 Socrates meets a young
man, Hippothales, who is in love with Lysis, a boy whom he has not been
able to persuade to accept him as lover. Hippothales asks Socrates to give
him advice about what someone might say or do in order to become liked
(prosphiles) by his beloved.12 Socrates replies that it is not easy to explain this
in so many words, but that he might be able to demonstrate, by conversing
(dialegesthai) with Lysis, what a lover should say to a beloved (pidexai:
206b9c7). Socrates then demonstrates, by means of dialectic with Lysis,
that humbling and restraining a beloved is the best way to make him
friendly (210e25). Socrates leads Lysis to confess that he is still without
sense and needs a teacher (210d48), but instead of becoming angry with
Socrates, as so many interlocutors do in the dialogues, Lysis responds in a
friendly way (filikv: 211a3). Socrates demonstration in the Lysis, then, is
similar in many respects to his successful demonstration in the Alcibiades
I (ndeixmenov: 105e3) that Alcibiades cannot obtain the greatest power
without Socrates. In both dialogues, Socrates use of his erotic art to help
others recognize their own lack of wisdom also produces affection in his
interlocutor. Moreover, Socrates demonstration is a success from Hip-
pothales point of view also. When Hippothales blushes with pleasure after
Socrates says that the genuine lover must necessarily be liked (filesqai)
by his beloved (222a6b2), he appears to believe that he himself is, or is
able to become, this genuine lover, who has learned how to become liked
by his beloved. An interpretation of the Lysis must take into account not
only the aporetic search for what the friend is, but also Socrates successful
demonstration of how to create friendliness.
Insights into both success and impasse can be gained through close
study of an important distinction that has been neglected by scholars: in
the Lysis, aporia arises from the search for what the friend is or for what
friendly relationships are, and not from questions about what it is to like.13
This fact is reflected in a difference in linguistic usage. Socrates normally
uses nominal and adjectival forms of Greek phil- words (masculine, philos;
11 This point is made by Narcy 1997: 21314. Others who stress the importance of taking into account
both the arguments and the actions represented in the dialogue include Bossi 2000; Brumbaugh
1962: 414; Friedlander 1964: 92104; Gadamer 1980; Gonzalez 1995b; Hoerber 19451946 and 1959;
Renaud 2002: esp. 185; Tessitore 1990; Tindale 1984; Westermayer 1875.
12 Nichols 2009: 159 notes that Hippothales use of the term prosphiles contains an intimation of a
desire for a friend that influences Socrates agreement to Hippothales request.
13 Two exceptions are Robinson 1986, who, after a discussion of the Greek terms philein (to like),
philos (friend or dear), and philia (friendship), notes that the main discussion in the Lysis is done
almost entirely by the use of the word flov [friend] (68), and Glidden 1981: 43, who writes that
the dialogue ignores questions about affection and focuses instead on what makes someone philos.
On the topic addressed by the dialogue see above n.1.
neuter, philon: friend or dear) in framing questions about the subject
being investigated: what the philos (friend, whether person or thing: see
above n.2) is. On the other hand, Socrates and his interlocutors often use
verbal and participial forms (philein: to be friendly or to like; philon:
being friendly or liking) to make statements, that are accepted without
being questioned, about friendly feelings and relationships. For example,
Socrates asks: When someone likes (philei) someone, who is the friend
(philos) of whom, the one liking of the one liked, or the one liked of the
one liking? (peidn tv tina fil, pterov potrou flov ggnetai,
filn to filoumnou filomenov to filontov: 212a8b2). Here
and elsewhere in the dialogue Socrates asks questions about who or what
the friend is, but merely asserts that he and his interlocutors like certain
people or things, without examining the nature of liking. Moreover, his
successful demonstration of how to make a beloved friendly assumes that
it is possible to like (philein) and to induce others to like without knowing
what the friend (philos) is, or what liking is.
This important distinction between the philos, that is the subject of
investigation, and philein, that is not examined, can help to illuminate the
dialogue in two philosophically important ways. First, the fact that neither
Socrates nor his interlocutors ask questions about philein is an important
clue to an avenue of investigation that could help to resolve the aporia
about what the philos is. In particular, the last arguments of the dialogue
(220e5222b2) suggest that we cannot understand what the philos is without
also examining the nature of philein, loving, and epithumein (desiring).
Second, attention to the distinction in linguistic usage helps to illuminate
the nature of Socrates erotic art by demonstrating how skill in liking and
loving is compatible with recognition of ones own lack of wisdom. In
the Lysis, Socrates, the narrator, portrays himself as claiming both that he
does not know what the friend is (222e37) or how to acquire a good
friend (212a46), and that he has skill in loving and liking.14 He also says
that he is erotic with respect to the acquisition of friends (cw prv d
tn tn flwn ktsin pnu rwtikv: 211e23), and that he is such
a companion-liker (philetairos: 211e8) that he would rather have a good
friend than anything else (211d7e8). Moreover, Socrates claims to have a
god-given ability to recognize lover and beloved, although he is inferior in
other respects (204b8c2). Socrates also represents himself as having skill
in liking and loving when he tells Hippothales how someone who is wise
14 That is, he claims to an expert in the sense of someone who has knowledge that comes from having
tried or experienced something. See Introduction at I.3 and n.41. For a more detailed discussion of
the connection between Socrates claims and the specific components of his erotic art see below 2.3.
(sophos) in erotic matters treats a beloved (206a13), and when he claims
to be able to demonstrate how a lover can become liked by his beloved
(206b9c7).
The Lysis demonstrates how Socrates assertions that may appear to be
inconsistent his claims to have skill in philein and loving, and his acknowl-
edgement of his own lack of knowledge about the philos that is the subject
or object of philein are in fact closely connected: philein is a necessary
condition for philosophein (wisdom-liking). To like and to love a good thing
that we believe we lack necessarily leads us to like and love wisdom about
this object. Moreover, people who engage in a common search for wisdom
must necessarily like one another, in the sense of cooperating in a friendly
way instead of competing. Finally, the experiences of liking and loving
invite examination into the nature of these important activities themselves.
One of the questions that is not asked in the Lysis what is loving? will
be the main topic of the Symposium. The two aspects of the Lysis, then
aporetic search and successful demonstration are associated with different
components of the same erotic, or daimonic, art, in which recognition of
ones own lack of wisdom (component (2)) is compatible with marvelous
skill in searching for what one lacks (component (4)) and helping others
to do so also (component (5)). The dialogue is a demonstration of the
essential interconnection of aporia and success.
As the preceding discussion has suggested, loving and liking are closely
related in the Lysis, and erotic skill is also skill in philein. Even though the
philos is the explicit topic of the Lysis, this dialogue is equally concerned
with eros.15 The dramatic framework represents Hippothales ordinary eros
for Lysis, and Hippothales request for advice about love from Socrates, a
request that leads to a demonstration of Socrates erotic skill in inducing
a beloved to like a lover. Socrates god-given ability to recognize lover and
beloved is also represented as an ability to recognize at least one category
of those who like (212b8c1: see below 2.3.3). Moreover, the acquisition
of a good friend is the object of Socrates eros and of his passionate liking
(Socrates is philetairos: 211e8) that is not essentially different from eros.16
In this chapter, I first discuss (2.2) some important linguistic and con-
ceptual issues about liking and the friend, and argue that they provide
the background necessary to an understanding of the two philosophically
15 There is an extensive literature on the relationship between eros and philia in this dialogue, beginning
with the dispute between Pohlenz (1913, 1916, 1917 and 1921) and von Arnim (1914 and 1916),
summarized by Bolotin 1979: 20125. Surveys of the issue are also given by Gonzalez 2003: 27 n.32
and Levin 1972: 2402. The wider ramifications of this question are beyond the scope of my study.
16 See Ludwig 2002: 205 n.116.
important issues noted above: aporia about the philos, and the compati-
bility of skill in loving and liking with recognition of ones own lack of
wisdom. I then analyze (2.3) the specific claims Socrates makes about his
own erotic art. I conclude (2.4) by focusing on one important way in which
Socrates skill is manifested: his friendly interactions with his interlocutors,
Hippothales and Lysis, whom Socrates recognizes at the beginning of the
dialogue as lover and beloved.
2.2 linguistic and conceptual issues
2.2.1 Greek friendship terms

Socrates uses phil- terms in a confusing variety of senses and linguistic forms
in the Lysis. For example, he uses a rhetorical figure known as polyptoton
when he plays on different cases of the noun philos and on the inflections
of the verb philein.17 Socrates also exploits the ambiguities to which phil-
compounds and the nominal and adjectival forms of philos can easily give
rise. Philos (masc.; pl. philoi) and philon (n.; pl. phila) can be adjectives,
referring to someone or something liked or dear, or, especially in Homer, to
something that is ones own. They can also be nouns, meaning friend.18
It is, however, often difficult to distinguish between adjective and noun
because the two are identical in form. Sometimes, but not always, an article
distinguishes the noun (ho philos) from the adjective (philos).19 Socrates
plays on these ambiguities when he says to Menexenus: And so nothing
that does not like in return is philos to the one liking (Ok ra stn
flon t filonti odn m ok ntifilon: 212d45). This statement
can mean either (1) Nothing that does not like in return is a friend or
(2) Nothing that does not like in return is dear.20 To further complicate
matters, the noun philos can have either an active sense, referring to the
17 Examples: t filomenon ra t filonti flon stin (212e6); t filon n eh flon to

filoumnou (213b56); pollkiv flon enai m flou . . . tan m filon tiv fil ka
mison fil (213c13); Eneka ra to flou t flon flon (219b23, omitting Burnets addition
of to flou; the passage is by discussed by Robinson 1986: 69); flon to flou t flon ggonen
(219b67).
18 Philos and cognates are also commonly used to refer to kinship relations. (For arguments against
Konstans view [1996 and 1997: esp. 536] that philos does not normally mean kin in the classical
period see Belfiore 2000: 1920.) In the Lysis, however, philos is never used to refer exclusively to
kin, although kin may be included among those who are called philoi (e.g., 210d14).
19 Helpful discussions of philos and related words include those of Adkins 1963; Benveniste 1969; Bordt
1998: 5060; Dirlmeier 1931; Hooker 1987; Konstan 1996 and 1997: 2831, 539; Landfester 1966;
Robinson 1986: 658.
20 The ambiguities in 212d4e4 are discussed by Bolotin 1979: 115.
one who likes, or a passive sense, referring to the one who is liked or dear.
This distinction between the active and passive senses of philos is one issue
in Socrates question to Menexenus: Who is the philos of whom, the one
liking of the one liked, or the one liked of the one liking? (212a8b2).21
Another kind of ambiguity arises in the case of compound words formed
by a phil- prefix. These compounds can be either verbal (liking) or nomi-
nal (friend of). For example, Manfred Landfester argues that philoptolemos
is to be interpreted as philon (ton) polemon (war-liking) but that philan-
thropos means philos (tou) anthropou (friend of a human being). He notes,
however, that there is much disagreement about how these compounds are
to be interpreted in particular passages.22 A problem about how to inter-
pret compounds arises at 212d5e4, where Socrates asks Menexenus about
people who are philippoi, philortuges, philokunes, philoinoi, philogumnastai
and philosophoi, and about the objects they like horses, quail, dogs, wine,
gymnastics and wisdom. His use of both verbal forms (antiphilei, philousin)
and of nominal or adjectival forms (phila, and, in the quotation, philoi) in
this passage makes it difficult to decide whether the terms philippoi and
philosophoi mean horse-liking and wisdom-liking or friends of horses
and friends of wisdom.23
The many linguistic ambiguities in this passage would have been even
harder to disentangle in the oral conversation dramatized within the dia-
logue, or when reading Platos written words aloud, as was the usual prac-
tice in antiquity.24 When Menexenus simply answers Socrates questions
by saying, It doesnt seem so (212d5, e5) he shows that he is unaware
of these difficulties. Lysis outburst at 213d23, however, suggests that his
liking for wisdom (philosophia), to which Socrates calls attention (213d7),
has given him, among other benefits, a better understanding of the need
to disambiguate usage.
It is important to understand that these ambiguities only arise with
regard to nominal and adjectival forms of phil- terms and in the case of
phil- compounds. As has been noted, the same word, philos or philon,
21 Scholars disagree about the uses to which Socrates puts the ambiguities to which philos and philein
can give rise: see Annas 1977: 5323; Bolotin 1979: 11415; Bordt 1998: 1537; Glidden 1980 and
1981: 404; Levin 1972: 2445; Penner and Rowe 2005: 5161; Price 1989: 34; Robinson 1986: 669;
Shorey 1933: 115.
22 Landfester 1966: 10973; examples: 173, a. and b.
23 Similar interpretive issues arise in connection with Solon (23 West = 13 Diehl), whose lines Socrates
quotes at 212e34, and the very similar lines in Theognis 12536. See Landfester 1966: 1212 and 124.
24 Whether or not Platos dialogues were performed in the Academy (discussed by Blondell 2002:
227; Sayre 1992: 22336), reading aloud was the usual practice in the ancient world: see Balogh
1927; Harris 1989: 356; Hendrickson 1929; Knox 1968; Svenbro 1988: chs. 3 and 9, and, on reading
in Plato: 21838; Thomas 1992: 913; Turner 1954: 14.
can be either noun or adjective, active or passive, and phil- compounds
can be interpreted as either verbal or nominal. In contrast, the verbal and
participial forms of phil- terms (philein, philon) are in most cases clearly
distinguished from one another by the ordinary rules of inflection. When
the same word (for example, fil) can be parsed in different ways, the
correct parsing can usually be determined by grammar and context. These
differences between noun and verb are one reason why aporia arises more
easily in the case of philos than concerning philein.
Other kinds of problems arise concerning the meanings of Greek phil-
terms. The verb philein can be used impersonally, of things as subjects or
objects, to mean be fond of doing and in other, more specialized senses.25
Two of the dictionary definitions are especially important and especially
relevant to the Lysis: (I.1) love, regard with affection, opp. misen [hate]
and (I.2) treat affectionately or kindly, esp. welcome, entertain a guest.26
Scholars have long debated the relative importance of these two aspects
emotional and practical that philein shares with other Greek phil- terms.
According to Arthur Adkins, filen [philein] is an act which creates or
maintains a co-operative relationship; and it need not be accompanied by
any friendly feeling at all: it is the action which is all-important.27 This
view has been challenged by David Konstan, who argues convincingly that
the verb philein . . . signifies various kinds of love and affection.28 There
seems to be general agreement, however, that both emotions and actions
are important elements in the concepts of philos and philein. Even Adkins
admits that philos can often be translated as dear and that the term
has a powerful emotive aspect.29 And, according to Konstan, being a philos
depends not only on sentiments, but also on actions: friends are defined by
good will . . . [which is] manifested in beneficial actions.30 Indeed, those
who have friendly emotions tend to express them in various ways and this
expression is itself evidence of friendly emotion.31
In the Lysis, in which questions about the philos are unanswered, the
meaning of the term philos cannot be determined. However, because the
25 LSJ, s.v. filw: of things as subjects: I.6; of things as objects: I.5; be fond of doing: II.
26 LSJ, s.v. filw.
27 Adkins 1963: 36, emphasis in original. Similar ideas about the concepts referred to by means of phil-
terms are expressed by Bordt 1998: 53 and Landfester 1966: 723.
28 Konstan 1997: 556. See also Konstan 1996; Mitchell 1997: 323; Robinson 1990.
29 Adkins 1963: 323.
30 Konstan 1997: 559, quotation: 58. Cf. Konstan 2006: 1756 and 182. The importance of both
actions and feelings is also stressed by Blundell 1989: esp. 2659.
31 A good account of the interconnection of emotion with action in the concepts of philos and philein
is given by Normann 1952: 49, as cited and quoted by Landfester 1966: 109.
verbal and participial forms are not subjects of philosophical investigation,
it is reasonable to give them the meanings they have in ordinary Greek
usage. These forms fall into three categories that are not easily confused with
one another. (1) Most often, they refer to experiencing friendly emotions
that are expressed by acting in friendly ways. For example, Lysis parents
like him very much (207d6), and they show this by doing all they can to
promote his happiness (207e35). (2) In other passages, the verb is used
with things as subjects (e.g., the body is compelled by disease to welcome
and like medicine: 217b34). (3) In a third category the verb is sometimes
used as the equivalent of to be a friend. In these passages its meaning
is problematic because it depends on the meaning of the noun (philos or
philon).32
2.2.2 Philos and philein in the Lysis

The preceding analysis can help the reader to understand a philosophically
important distinction made in the Lysis. As noted above, questions about
the subject of investigation, the friend, are usually framed by means of
nominal and adjectival forms of Greek phil- words (philos, philon). On the
other hand, Socrates and his interlocutors often use verbal and participial
forms (philein, philon) to make statements, which are not examined, about
liking, and about acting in a friendly way. These verbs and participles are
used in their ordinary Greek senses, to refer to common human experiences
familiar to Socrates and his interlocutors. Instead of investigating these
experiences themselves, Socrates uses them as starting points, or hypotheses,
from which to search for what the philos is.33
This distinction in usage between the noun philos, referring to the
friend that is the object of investigation, and the verb philein, referring
to things that are not themselves subjected to investigation, is apparent
from the beginning of the discussion about what the philos is. Socrates asks
Menexenus: When someone phile [likes] someone, who is philos [friend]
of whom? (212a8b1). His question explicitly raises issues about what it is
to be philos (Who is philos of whom?), but it assumes that both Socrates
32 See below 2.2.2 and n.35.

33 Socrates treatment of the experience of philein is in some respects similar to the procedure of
geometers in Resp. 6.510c2d3. They treat as known the odd and the even, the figures, three forms
of angles, and other things akin to these in each kind of inquiry. These things they make hypotheses
and dont think it worthwhile to give any further account of them to themselves or others, as though
they were clear to all. Beginning from them, they go ahead with their exposition of what remains and
end consistently at the object toward which their investigation was directed. Translation: Bloom
1968.
and Menexenus understand what philein refers to (When someone likes
someone), and it does not ask about what the verb philein means or what
it is to like. When Socrates notes that an impasse has been reached, he
also makes it clear that the subject of inquiry is what the friend is, and not
what it is to like.34 After his discussion with Menexenus, Socrates remarks:
What shall we do if neither those liking are friends [philoi], nor those
who are liked, nor those both liking and liked? (213c57), and at the end
of the dialogue he states: If neither those liked, nor those liking, nor the
similar, nor the dissimilar, nor the good, nor the kindred, nor the other
cases we went through . . . if none of these is the friend [philon], I no longer
have anything to say (222e37). The same distinction in usage between
philos and philein appears throughout the dialogue. After asking whether
the philos is the one liking or the one liked (212a8b2), Socrates goes on
to use nominal or adjectival forms in discussing many other possibilities.
He considers, for example, whether: (1) the similar is philon to the similar
(214b34); (2) the opposite is philon to the opposite (215e34); (3) the neither
good nor bad is philon to the good (216c23); (4) the neither bad nor good
is philon to the good, because of the bad and for the sake of the good
(219a6b2); (5) there is a first philon for the sake of which all other things
are phila (219c7d2); (6) the good is philon (220b7); (7) that which desires
is philon to that which it desires, at the time when it desires, and that which
was previously said about the philon was nonsense (221d35); (8) that which
lacks is philon of that which it lacks (221e12). In examples (1)(8) above,
Socrates use of neuter forms (philon, phila) emphasizes the impersonal
nature of the subject being investigated in this section of the dialogue.
That is, he does not assume that these friends are persons (see above n.2).
When Socrates does appear to frame the discussion by using forms of
philein, he appears to be employing the verb as equivalent to philon einai
(to be a friend or to be dear). For example, at 221c2d5, Socrates shifts
from the (or a) cause of being some friend (to flon ti enai: 221c2),
to another cause of philein and phileisthai [to like and to be liked] (221d1
2) and then, at 221d45, he shifts back again to is a friend (flon stin)
and to be a friend (flon enai). In other passages also, forms of philein
are freely interchanged with forms of to be a friend.35 In all of these
34 Cf. Glidden 1981: 43.

35 See, for example: flon enai at 215d5 and filen at 215d7; filen at 217b4 and flon ggnetai at
217b5. At 220b6e5 verbal forms (filetai [220b8]; filomen [220d2]; filetai [220d5]) are inter-
changed with nominal and adjectival forms followed by to be or equivalent (stin flon [220b7];
fla famen enai [220e1]; fla kklhtai [220e2]; flon . . . fanetai [220e3]; flou . . . nefnh
n [220e4]; sq mn flon [220e5]).
passages the context shows, as it does throughout the dialogue, that the
subject of investigation is not what it is to like but what the philos is.
The use of philein as equivalent to philon (or philos) einai is especially
noteworthy at the end of Socrates opening conversation with Lysis. He
begins by asking the boy: Do your father and mother like [philei] you very
much? (207d6) and goes on to state that if they do like him they want
him to become happy (207e35). Lysis readily agrees with both of these
statements. Socrates then questions Lysis at length about how his parents
treat him, without, however, making philein the subject of investigation.
For example, he does not consider such issues as how liking a son and
wanting him to be happy can be consistent with preventing him from
doing what he wants, with putting others in control of him and with
punishing him (207e1209a4). In fact, this conversation, that begins with
a question about philein, does not, unlike all of the succeeding ones about
the philos, end in aporia.36 At the end of the conversation, however, Socrates
begins to elicit responses from Lysis that could lead to aporia because they
appear to conflict with earlier statements. It is at this point that Socrates
first uses nominal or adjectival forms of philos interchangeably with verbal
forms: Will we be friends [philoi] to anyone and will anyone like [philesei]
us in those matters in which we are useless? (210c56); neither your father
nor anyone else likes you in so far as you are useless (210c78); everyone
will be your friends (210d1); neither anyone else nor your father will be
your friend (210d34). These statements, taken together with the many
statements in this conversation about the ways in which Lysis is useless,
might appear to call into question Lysis earlier assertion that his parents
like him very much (207d6). How can they do so if he is useless? Socrates,
however, does not pursue these issues.
Socrates also avoids asking important questions about philein in his first
conversation with Menexenus. Socrates assumes that philein can be either
one-sided (212b5c2, 212e7213a3, 213c13, 213e8) or reciprocal (212c7d3,
213c67), but neither he nor Menexenus asks questions about what it is to
like.37 In other passages, Socrates says that lovers philein as much as possible
(212b8c1), and his interlocutor agrees that it is not possible for a man who
desires (epithumounta) and loves (eronta) not to philein that which he
desires and loves (221b78). However, these ideas are not questioned, and
do not lead to any examination of the relationships among philein, eran and
36 Noted by Narcy 1997: 215.

37 On the different kinds of relationships in question in this passage cf. Bordt 1998: 789; Justin 2005:
824.
epithumein.38 Socrates argument that the good cannot be friends because
they do not long for each other when they are absent (215b3c1) could
also lead to important questions about philein, and indeed, the argument
is preceded by the statement that the one who is not philon [liking] is
not philos (215b23). Once again, however, questions about liking are not
asked. The dialogue consistently focuses on the question of what the friend
is and does not subject statements about liking and related affective states
to examination.
The distinction observed in the dialogue between the experience of
philein, which is not examined, but assumed to be understood by speakers
of Greek, and the search for the philos that leads to aporia, can help us to
understand the ending of the dialogue.39 In the final sentence, Socrates says:
As they go away, these people will say that we think we are friends of one
another and I count myself among you but that we have not yet been
able to discover what the friend is (223b58). These people (ode) are the
bystanders referred to in 223a6 (o periesttev), who have been listening
to the whole conversation. These people, who include the boys (padav:
206e4) and youths (neanskoiv: 207a1) who approach Socrates along with
Menexenus and Lysis (206e3207b7), are said to arrive at conclusions both
negative (that . . . we have not yet been able to discover what the friend
is) and positive (that we think we are friends of one another). The final
sentence of the dialogue, then, distinguishes between beliefs about being
friends and lack of knowledge about what the friend is.40 If people think
that they themselves are friends, or if they are thought to be friends, this is
likely to be because they are thought to philein: to have friendly emotions
that lead them to act in friendly ways. Socrates statement that he counts
himself among the boys implies that he, like the boys, philei (likes), but
does not know what the friend is.
38 The attempt by Hyland 1968: 368 to draw conclusions from this passage about Platos use of these
terms is rightly criticized by Cummins 1981: 1213.
39 Westermayer 1875: 1023 calls the ending a farce and compares it to a satyr play. Most modern
scholars have less negative views, arguing, for example, that a positive outcome of the dialogue is
friendship among Socrates and his interlocutors (Narcy 1997: 21214 and 2000: 1846; G. A. Scott
2000: 80); that Socrates competes with parental authority in forming friendly relationships with the
boys (Bolotin 1979: 657 and 1979; Gonzalez 1995b and 2000; Tessitore 1990: 1267), or that the
reference to the bystanders points toward a larger community that will continue the discussion
(Nichols 2009: 191).
40 On this distinction see Narcy 1997: 211 and 2000: 182. Narcy, however, makes a common mistake
in mistranslating the sentence: Socrate dit: nous croyons etre amis (1997: 211). Bolotin correctly
notes: Socrates does not say, in regard to himself, that he even supposes he is the boys friend; he
merely claims that the others will say so as they go away (1979: 199).
Attention to this distinction between the philos that is the subject of
investigation and philein, that is not examined, can help Socrates inter-
locutors, and Platos readers, to understand that an analysis of the nature
of philein could help toward resolving the aporia about what the philos is.
The questions, noted above in this section, that are not asked about philein
could all help to do this. For example, examination of whether Lysis par-
ents like him only because he is useful could help to answer questions about
whether the philon must be useful.
The importance of examining philein is particularly evident near the
end of the dialogue. The passage at 221b7e4, just before the final aporia,
contains unexamined ideas about philein and related terms referring to
affection that vitiate the arguments that desire (epithumia) is the cause of
friendship, and that eros, philia and desire are for the kindred (oikeion).
These views are presented as those held by Socrates interlocutors, who
respond affirmatively to his questions.
(1) Socrates asks: Is it possible for someone desiring [epithumein] and loving not
to like [philein] that which he desires and loves? Menexenus replies: It does not
seem so to me (221b78).
In answering in this way, Menexenus assumes that there is a close, but
unspecified and unexamined, relationship among desiring (epithumein),
loving and liking. According to Terry Penner and Christopher Rowe,
epithumein is virtually interchangeable with philein,41 and they speculate
that epithumia (desire) is the genus of which philia and eros are species.42
This view, however, is not supported by the text, in which no attempt is
made to examine the nature of liking, loving and desiring, either separately
or in relation to one another.
(2) Socrates then asks: Is it the case, as we were saying just now, that desire
[epithumia] is a [or the] cause of philia, and the one desiring [epithumein] is
philon of that which it desires . . . ? Its likely, replies Menexenus (221d26).
Menexenus assents too readily, however, because the nature of epithumein
has not been investigated. It might be argued, following Penner and
Rowes interpretation of assertion (1), that philein is interchangeable with
epithumein and can be substituted for it at 221d24. However, this sub-
stitution would imply that the statement: The one desiring is philon is
41 See Penner and Rowe 2005 (110, 113 n.37, 115 n.44, 249 nn. 345, 269, quotation: 249 n.34), who do
not distinguish between the nominal and verbal forms of these terms. Others who argue that there
is little or no difference among the terms for affection include Dorion 2004: 294 n.174 and Renaud
2002: 189 n.23.
42 Penner and Rowe 2005: 190 and 249 n.35.
equivalent to the statement: The one that philei is the philon, which
was said to be false at 213a4 (Ok ra filn flov), and which will be
rejected again at 222e34.
(3) Socrates next asks two questions: That which desires desires what it lacks,
doesnt it? and: Is that which has a lack, then, philon to that which it lacks?
(221d7e2).
In answering both questions in the affirmative, Menexenus commits him-
self to the view that if something desires, it has a lack, and if something
has a lack it is philon to that which it lacks. The idea that desire is for what
one lacks is supported by Socrates own assertions about this matter earlier
in the dialogue (see below 2.3.2). However, the same problems about the
relationship between desire and the philon arise for this view as for (2).
(4) Socrates then states the conclusion that follows from Menexenus previous
affirmations: Then, as it seems, eros and philia and epithumia are for the oikeion
[kindred], as it appears. Menexenus and Lysis agree (221e34).
Not only does this conclusion introduce a new and unexamined term,
the kindred, it also does not follow in any obvious way from the other
steps in the argument.43 Socrates repeated use of qualifying terms (as it
seems, as it appears) suggests that he views it as problematic. Among
the problems, we may infer, is the failure to examine the nature of eran,
philein and epithumein before drawing conclusions about the objects of
these feelings.
Unexamined views about friendly feelings, then, help to create serious
problems for the arguments that desire is a (or the) cause of philia, and
that eros, philia and epithumia are for the kindred. These problems provide
further reasons for taking as genuine the final aporia (222e17), in which
the kindred is listed among the things that have turned out not to be the
philos.
2.2.3 To like wisdom (philo-sophein)

In addition to providing clues about how to make progress in resolving the
aporia about what the philos is, attention to the distinction between the
43 I agree with Rowe 2000 that: the argument Socrates uses is not only poor but appalling (211) and
that [t]here are no grounds for Socrates implicit claim that the position arrived at in 216d221d
amounts to, or implies, that it is what is akin that is philon (212). However, Penner and Rowe
2005: 15360, defend the argument. The defense of Rudebusch 2004 appeals unconvincingly to an
unstated premise (72).
usage of philein and that of philos helps us to understand how the erotic art,
skill in liking and loving, includes recognition of ones own lack of wisdom
about the philos. The Lysis and Platos other dialogues support the view
that philein arises in us prior to, and is a necessary condition for, seeking
wisdom about its object: the philos (neuter: philon). Young children are
capable of pleasure and liking, pain and hatred, before they are able to
reason.44 This is why, in the Laws, the earliest education is said to train the
emotions by means of music and dance, leading children to love and hate
correctly. It thereby prepares them to form true opinions when they are
older (653a8) about which objects are lovable or hateful.45 Because philein
arises naturally in all humans and is something that we all experience from
earliest childhood, we easily understand ordinary language referring to it,
and it does not tend to give rise to questions about what it is to philein.
However, philein does lead us, after we become able to reason, to ask
questions about the objects we like and believe to be good, especially when
we do not think we possess these objects (see Lys. 217e4218c2), or fear
that we might lose them. When we like something good that we believe
we lack, we naturally want to learn everything we can about it and to find
out how to keep or acquire it. In this way, the experience of philein leads
us to desire wisdom about the object we like, the philos (the friend, or
the dear). That is, philein leads us, especially when we are guided by
someone who has erotic skill, to philosophize, literally, to like wisdom:
philo-sophein.46 This process, once started, builds on itself. As will be seen
shortly, the aporia to which the search for wisdom about the philon naturally
leads increases our doubts about whether we possess or will continue to
possess the object we desire. This in turn increases our liking and desire for
the philos, and our liking for wisdom about what it is and how to acquire
it. More generally, philosophein leads us to desire and seek wisdom about
other objects, including philein.
Philein is also closely related to philosophein in another way. An impor-
tant aspect of Socrates marvelous skill in helping others to love and search
for wisdom involves his extraordinary ability to create friendly relations
among fellow searchers. The search for wisdom is a cooperative endeavor, a
shared search that proceeds by means of question and answer (dialectic).
44 Lys. 212e7213a3 states that young children like and hate. According to Laws 2.653b24: pleasure
and philia and pain and hatred could come to be in a correct way in souls that are not yet able to
receive reason.
45 Laws 2.653a5654c4; cf. Resp. 3.401d4402a4. On musical education in the Laws see Chapter 6 at
6.4.
46 On the interconnections between philosophein and loving or liking see further Chapter 3 at 3.3.3
with n.125.
Friendly, non-competitive cooperation with others is necessary for dialectic
to take place, and the activity of searching for the wisdom one lacks cre-
ates and increases reciprocal friendliness among fellow searchers.47 In the
Alcibiades I, the shared search for wisdom in the form of self-knowledge
and self-care creates or reinforces mutual eros between two searchers, and
eros for the object of their search. In the Lysis, in which interpersonal
eros is not represented as necessary to the common search, a similar idea
is expressed in terms of philein rather than eros: the shared search for
wisdom about the philos helps to create and reinforce liking for fellow
searchers and for wisdom. In all of these ways, then, philein is conducive
to philosophein which, in turn, requires and is conducive to philein. The
interconnections are well stated by Ludovic Dugas, although I disagree
with his characterization of what Socrates does as instructing or com-
municating wisdom: Philosophical instruction is based upon friendship;
moreover, it takes the form of friendship. To teach is to like [or love:
aimer]; it is to like wisdom; it is to like those to whom one communicates
wisdom . . . Finally friendship . . . itself becomes one of the objects of this
instruction.48 These relationships between the experience of philein and
philosophein are not explicitly discussed within the Lysis. Instead, they are
enacted within it.
The subject of the inquiry, What is the philos? is particularly well suited
to create a liking for wisdom in Socrates young interlocutors, who have a
deep personal interest in this topic, concerning which they lack wisdom.
Hippothales is in love with Lysis but does not know how to induce the
boy to become friendly in return. Lysis and Menexenus claim to be friends
(206d45, 207c89), but in the course of answering Socrates questions they
reveal that they sometimes disagree (207c24), and they learn that they do
not really know what the friend is. Lysis, moreover, agrees that he is much
liked by his parents (207d6), but Socrates questioning suggests that they
also have good reasons for not liking him (210c5d1). In having a passionate
interest in love and friendship, and doubts about acquiring or keeping the
objects they like or love, these young men resemble Socrates himself, who is
in love with acquiring friends, but who claims that he does not even know
47 Dialectic, in contrast to eristic (contentious) argument, is frequently said to require friendly,
non-competitive cooperation among the participants; for example: Meno 75c8d7, Prt. 337b13,
Tht. 146a58 and 167e3168b2, Grg. 486e6487b7, 499c24 and 500b5c1, where Socrates invokes
Zeus of Friendship. On the shared search see Gill 1996: esp. 28396 and 2002: esp. 14953. Good
analyses of the close connection between friendship and dialectic are also provided by Dugas 1976:
2174; Fraisse 1974: 15167; Halliwell 1995: 914; Wolff 1997. On this idea in the Lysis in particular
see Gonzalez 1995b and 2000; Narcy 1997: 20718; Tessitore 1990.
48 Dugas 1976: 50 and 60.
how people become friends (211e23, 212a46).49 These characteristics of
Socrates interlocutors make them especially receptive to discussions about
what the philos is. Socrates increases their interest when he states that he
has desired to possess a friend from boyhood (211d78), thus establishing
a connection between himself and his young interlocutors.50
The topic of discussion, moreover, is one that naturally leads to aporia
and philosophein. As Socrates states, the concept of friendship presents
considerable difficulties (213e4), and people disagree radically about it.51
For example, some poets and those who write about nature think that
similar is friend to similar (213e5214b5), while Hesiod and others hold
that opposite is friend to opposite (215c4216a1). In the course of his
conversations with the young men, Socrates makes use of these and other
conceptual difficulties, and of linguistic ambiguities, not because he wants
to take advantage of his young interlocutors, as some scholars claim, but in
order to induce in them a fruitful philosophical aporia.52 His motives are
indicated by the fact that he participates fully in the search, sharing in the
dizziness, drunkenness and aporia (216c5, 222c2, 222e67) of the young
men.53 Socrates explicitly reveals his goal at the end of the dialogue. After
summarizing the impasse to which the search for what the friend is has led,
and concluding that he doesnt have anything more to say, Socrates remarks
that he has said these things in order to stir up (kinen: 223a2) one of the
older people, that is Hippothales, or one of the bystanders (222e1223a6).54
The progression from philein (or eran) to philosophein is enacted by
Socrates and each of his interlocutors. Hippothales unrequited love leads
him to seek Socrates advice (206b9c3). Socrates, for his part, is philetairos
(211e8), someone who has friendly feelings for acquiring good friends. His
49 The friendly relationships represented by the characters in the dialogue are discussed by Bashor 1968:
273; Brumbaugh 1962: 415; Friedlander 1964: 92104; Gadamer 1980; Hoerber 19451946 and 1959;
Morris 1986; Robinson and Hermann no date, Lysis 1. Arguments and Theses 1. 203a207b;
Westermayer 1875: 205.
50 I owe this suggestion to David Konstan, in correspondence.
51 Gonzalez 1995b: 70, correctly notes that the aporia is rooted in the very nature of friendship.
52 Among those who claim that Socrates makes use of eristic arguments are Bordt 1998: 1489;
Friedlander 1964: 95; Gadamer 1980: 9; Guthrie 1975: 147; Tejera 1990; Teloh 1986: 745.
53 Note the frequent use of first person plural verbs in passages where Socrates discusses difficulties in
the arguments: e.g., crhsmeqa (213c5), fsomen (213c8), zhtomen (213d2), skopomen (213e2),
kinduneomen (218c8), ntetuckamen (218d3), meqomen (222c2), crhsameqa (222e1), genmeqa
(223b8). On eliggi (I am dizzy: 216c5) see Bordt 1998: 1867, who notes that this verb and
cognates are used in other dialogues to refer to an intellectually dizzying situation from which there
seems to be no way out. Bordt cites Grg. 486b1 and 527a2, Prt. 339e2, Letter 7.325e3 and Laws 892e7.
54 Cf. Resp. 329e1 (called to my attention by Sandra Peterson) where Socrates stirs up Kephalos in
order to get him to say more, and Aristophanes Clouds 477, where the Clouds tell Socrates to stir
up (diaknei) Strepsiades mind.
passionate desire (piqume: 211e1; cw . . . rwtikv: 211e23) to acquire
good friends, combined with his belief that he does not have them and
does not know how to acquire them, leads him to search, together with his
interlocutors, for the wisdom he does not have. He does this by questioning
Menexenus, who claims to have a friend (207c89, 212a67), about how
one person becomes the friend of another (212a47). Although Menexenus
is characterized as eristic (contentious: 211b89), he does not respond
angrily when Socrates raises objections to his statements, but readily admits
that he has reached an impasse (o pnu epor: 213c9). Socrates ques-
tioning of Menexenus then leads his companion, Lysis, who had been
paying keen attention (213d45), to burst out with a statement (213d2) that
reveals, according to Socrates, his philosophia (213d7). Lysis friendly feel-
ings for wisdom are apparent throughout the dialogue, from the beginning,
when Socrates questioning leads him to desire the wisdom that will help
him to acquire friends (210a9d8), to the end, where his silence (222a4)
indicates that he is reflecting about the argument.55
Socrates interactions with his interlocutors also dramatize how
philosophein requires and increases friendliness toward other people.
Socrates acts in a friendly, non-competitive way toward his interlocutors,
thereby producing friendly feelings in them. In demonstrating to Hip-
pothales how the lover can cause the beloved to become friendly, Socrates
engages in dialectic with Lysis. His treatment of the boy is a process of
beneficial humbling (210e24) that produces in Lysis a recognition that
he lacks knowledge. It also helps to create in him a desire to gain the
knowledge that he lacks, for he agrees with Socrates that he needs a teacher
(210d48). As a result, Lysis comes to like Socrates, whom he addresses in
a friendly way (philikos: 211a3), and the boy has increased friendly feelings
toward Menexenus, whom he wants Socrates to punish in conversation,
just as Lysis himself has been punished (211a2c9). The dialogue ends with
a suggestion that Hippothales, if he is a genuine lover, will be liked by
his beloved, Lysis (222a67). That is, we may infer, if Hippothales is able
to acquire Socrates skill in dialectic, he, like Socrates, will also be able to
create friendliness in Lysis.56
The interconnections, discussed above, between philein and philosophein
indicate that interpersonal friendship is based, in part, on a mutual desire
for the good. In this respect, the Lysis resembles the Alcibiades I, where
the mutual eros of Socrates and Alcibiades is based, in part, on their
55 Cf. Seech 1979: 12. There is no indication that Lysis is reflecting about his own relationship with
Hippothales, as is held by Bolotin 1979: 185 and Gonzalez 1995b: 845.
56 On Hippothales, see further below 2.3.3 and 2.4.1.
mutual desire for the greatest power, and the Phaedrus, in which the
lover loves a particular beloved because both partners followed the same
god in another existence (see Chapter 5). It is important to note, however,
that the Lysis, unlike the other two dialogues, contains no explicit statement
of this principle. The reader, and Socrates audience within the dialogue, are
instead shown, by means of Socrates demonstration, that a mutual striving
to attain the good in the form of wisdom about what the philos is requires,
and helps to increase, a mutual liking or loving in the interlocutors.
Many studies of the Lysis provide important insights into this principle.
For example, Terry Penner and Christopher Rowe argue: The picture we
see of the truest form of eros in the Phaedrus is of a friendship between lover
and beloved that is based upon a joint seeking of wisdom . . . That is exactly
what we . . . find in the Lysis.57 Michael Bordt makes a similar claim when
he writes: The deeper a friendship is the better it seems the two friends
can help each other to realise the Good in living a good life. The better and
closer one knows ones [sic] friend who is aiming at the Good, the better
one gets to know the Good oneself.58 Many scholars, however, including
Penner and Rowe and Bordt, attempt to find theoretical underpinning for
this view of friendship in the Lysis by appealing to Socrates statements
about the first friend or about the kindred. In doing so, they err both in
reading more into the text than it contains, and in explaining away the
explicit final aporia.
Penner and Rowe argue that the only thing we love in itself is the
first friend. Nevertheless, they write: Why would that stop it being
the case that one . . . may love a person . . . in given circumstances: namely,
those in which that person and his happiness are a really best means to the
first friend?59 The first friend, according to Penner and Rowe, can be
identified with wisdom or knowledge, with happiness, and with the Form
of the Good.60 Their arguments for these views are long and intricate
and I cannot address them in detail.61 These identifications, however, and
many of their other conclusions, go beyond what is explicitly stated in the
text, as they are the first to admit. In interpreting the passage at 221c5d6
as an argument that desire for the good is the cause of friendship, they
state: All of this, or much of it, we are left to work out for ourselves.
And this is quite characteristic of the Lysis as a whole.62 In addition to
57 Penner and Rowe 2005: 312. See also Dorion 2004: 20811 and 295 n.179; Gonzalez 2000 and 2003.
58 Bordt 2000: 170. 59 Penner and Rowe 2005: 257 (emphasis in original). 60 Ibid. 211.
61 Dancy 2006 provides some excellent arguments against identifying the first friend with the Form
of the Good, or goodness with knowledge.
62 Penner and Rowe 2005: 155.
asking readers to work out for themselves things that are not in the text,
Penner and Rowe require them to ignore what is explicitly stated: that none
of the suggestions about what the philos is have been found satisfactory
(222e17).
Similar objections apply to Michael Bordts attempt to construct a the-
oretical account of friendship based on inferences about the first friend
and the kindred. In summarizing Platos model of friendship in the Lysis,
Bordt states that (1) two people, a and b, are friends, or love one another,
because they both love F, and (2) a and b can only be friends if F is the
Good, which is kindred to both of them, and if a and b love F as their
individual first friend.63 In arguing for this theory, Bordt claims that the
final refutation of a thesis about what the friend is, at 222b3e7, takes
place only on the level of the dialogue, and not on the level of facts.
Plato doesnt really believe that the good cannot be friends: he believes
that friends can be good when they both desire the same goal, the good,
which is also the first friend and the kindred. According to Bordt, Plato
does not give an argument for this view but instead indicates what form a
solution must have.64 This kind of interpretation is, as George Rudebusch
puts it, not exegesis but eisegesis.65 The text simply does not tell us what
the first friend is, and it explicitly denies that the kindred is the friend
(222e5).
2.3 socrates daimonic art

Aporia in the Lysis, then, is not only genuine, but philosophically important.
By producing or increasing the recognition that one lacks a good thing,
aporia also produces or increases philein, the liking for something good that
is a necessary condition for wisdom-liking (philosophein). When he induces
in others an aporia that he himself shares, Socrates employs component
(5) of his erotic art, which is represented in this dialogue as skill in both
loving and passionate liking (above 2.1). The Lysis also provides important
information about Socrates daimonic, or erotic, art by means of a number
of explicit claims that he makes. This section examines in detail these
claims and the ways in which each is linked to one or more of the five
components of his erotic art or skill.
63 Bordt 2000: 158, summarizing the thesis of his 1998 commentary. Other scholars who identify the
oikeion with the good in some way include Bolotin 1979: 18895; Dorion 2004: 21620; Gonzalez
2000: 3935; Kahn 1996: 266 and 28991; Taylor 1956: 723.
64 Bordt 1998: 231: Platon . . . deutet an, wie eine Losung auszusehen hat, aber bringt kein Argument
dafur.
65 Rudebusch 2002: 180.
2.3.1 I am inferior and useless

In a number of passages, Socrates denies that he has wisdom, thus claiming
to have component (2) of the erotic art. He says: I am inferior and useless
in other matters (that is, matters other than the ability to recognize lover
and beloved: 204b8c2). He also claims that he is so far from having a good
friend that he does not even know how one person becomes the friend of
another (212a46).66 Socrates also disclaims wisdom when he places himself
(we) in the category of those who are in a state between the good and
the bad (220d56). Finally, Socrates concludes his search by admitting that
he has arrived at aporia, stating that if none of the candidates considered
is the philos, then he has nothing more to say (222e67).
2.3.2 I am in love with acquiring friends

At 211d6212a7, Socrates says that from boyhood he has desired (piqumn:
211d7, piqume 211e1) the possession of friends just as others desire to have
horses, dogs, gold, honor, quails or roosters. Socrates claims to be very
erotic (cw . . . pnu rwtikv) with respect to the acquisition of friends
(211e23) and he says that he is philetairos (a companion-liker) to such
an extent that he would rather have a good friend than anything else.
Nevertheless, he says, he is far from possessing a friend (212a45).67 These
statements provide important information about components (1), (2) and
(3) of Socrates erotic art.
Socrates statement (1) that the object of his desire is to have a good friend
(211e3) helps to support the view that, according to Socrates, desire is for
the good.68 He says (2) that he does not have the good thing that he desires,
and that he does not have wisdom about how to acquire it (212a46). This
statement supports the view, explicitly stated at 221d7e1, that in the Lysis,
as in the Symposium, desire is for what one lacks. Statements (1) and (2),
66 The objection of Tejera 1990: 183 (cf. Dorion 2004: 2734 n.84) that Socrates statement that he
does not have a friend cannot be taken seriously because his company is sought by young people and
he is friendly to Lysis, does not distinguish between Socrates liking and being liked (philein) and
his lack of the philos, the object that he likes. However, Jenks 2005: 6970 points out that Socrates
claim to have no friends might be false, since he also denies that he knows what a friend is.
67 Contrast Xen. Mem. 1.6.14, where Socrates says: Just as another man takes pleasure in a good horse,
or a dog, or a bird, so I take pleasure even more in good friends. Bandini and Dorion 2003: 163
n.314 correctly note that Xenophons Socrates says that he takes pleasure in having friends, while
Platos Socrates states that he would take pleasure in having them.
68 Rowe 2004: 270 n. 12 states that the Lysis contains the most extended treatment of the theory [that
all humans desire the good] to be found anywhere in the dialogues, a view that is defended in
detail in Penner and Rowe 2005. See also Chapter 1 n.9.
then, are claims that Socrates has component (2) of the erotic art, for he
recognizes his own lack of good things, and component (3), because he
passionately desires to obtain these good things.
The idea that Socrates desires the good that he recognizes he lacks is
further supported by his statements about those who like wisdom (phi-
losophize). He asserts: We would say that those who are already wise
[sophoi] no longer like wisdom [philo-sophein], whether they are gods or
humans (218a24). These people do not desire wisdom, for they already
possess this good thing. Nor, says Socrates, does anyone philosophize who
is bad and lacking in understanding (218a56). Those who philosophize
are instead those thinking that they do not know what they in fact do
not know (218b1). Only these people, those who are neither good nor
bad (218b2), believe that they lack a good thing and so desire to obtain
it. This characterization of people who philosophize is never questioned
in the Lysis.69 Moreover, it is remarkably similar to the characterization of
Eros as a daimon and philosopher in the Symposium.70
In claiming to be erotic with respect to acquiring the good friend he
desires more than anything else, Socrates also claims to have component
(1) of the erotic art, devotion to the good things that are the objects of
loving and liking (ta erotika). Moreover, his statement that he has had this
desire from boyhood (k paidv: 211d7), just as other people desire other
things, suggests that the desire is a part of his nature. It might, then, be the
gift of a god, like his ability to recognize the one who loves and the one
who is loved (204c12), or like his erotic skill in the Phaedrus (257a78).71
If this is the case, Socrates passionate desire is evidence that he is under the
patronage of Eros. Furthermore, if he has had this desire from boyhood on,
and if desire is for what one realizes that one lacks, from this same period,
then, he must also have had the belief that he lacks a good friend. If the
desire is a part of his nature and the gift of his patron god, the same may
also be true of the belief that he lacks this good thing. Thus, whether or not
Eros is his patron, Socrates is by nature a companion-liker, and he is erotic
with respect to acquiring a good friend, just as Eros in the Symposium is
69 Immediately after this passage Socrates says that he fears he has spoken falsely (218c4d4). What
he finds wrong in his previous statements, however, is not the characterization of those who
philosophize, but the idea that in every case (pantaco) the neither bad nor good is philon of the
good because of the presence of the bad (218b8c2). There may in fact be another cause of liking
and being liked (221c5d2).
70 Symp. 203e4b5. Compare especially Symp. 204a12: qen odev filosofe od piqume sofv
gensqai stin gr od e tiv llov sofv, o filosofe and Lys. 218a24: famen n ka
tov dh sofov mhkti filosofen, ete qeo ete nqrwpo esin otoi. Cf. Phdr. 278d36.
These three passages are discussed by Burkert 1960: 1656.
71 See further below 2.3.3.
a lover and a philosopher by nature (fuse: 203c3; cf. 203e3, 204b7) and
by birth (gnesiv: 204b6). Although Socrates is not called a philosopher
in the Lysis, he in fact resembles Eros the philosopher in the Symposium in
that he readily admits his own ignorance (Lys. 212a46; cf. 204b8c2) and
engages in a passionate search for the good things he believes he lacks.72
The Socrates of the Lysis, then, is daimonic, like Eros.
The connection between Socrates being a companion-liker and his being
a philosopher helps us to understand his use of the two phil-compounds:
philetairos and philosophein. Walter Burkert has shown that phil- com-
pounds often indicate intimacy with something that is present: the philop-
tolemos is someone who enjoys fighting real battles, not someone who longs
for battle without finding it, and the philippos possesses a horse.73 In the
same way, philetairos usually refers to someone who likes the companions
he already has. Socrates, however, cannot be using the term in this usual
sense, for he denies that he has any companion.74 The phil- prefix in
this word, then, is best interpreted as verbal (companion-liking) rather
than nominal (friend of a companion).75 Similarly, philosophein in the
Lysis does not mean to be a friend of wisdom that one already has, but
to like wisdom that one does not have, and to be philosophos is to be
wisdom-liking with respect to what one lacks, not a friend of the wisdom
one possesses.76 This interpretation of the meaning of the term philosophos
in the Lysis allows us to give a positive answer to the question Socrates
asks Menexenus at 212d5e5: Can people be philosophoi (wisdom-likers) if
wisdom does not like them in return? The relationship between people and
the objects they like need not be reciprocal.
That Socrates in fact desires, as he claims, to acquire the good friend
he believes he lacks is shown by his friendly, non-competitive speeches
and actions. Indeed, the search for wisdom about the good friend requires
him to be friendly toward others who are able to reciprocate his friendly
actions and to participate in the search for wisdom.77 At the beginning of
72 Cf. Dorion 2004: 199. 73 Burkert 1960: 1723.

74 Cf. Bolotin 1979: 56 n.34. 75 On these compounds see above 2.2.1.
76 Philosophos originally referred to someone who was devoted to and possessed knowledge in a broad
sense (Burkert 1960: 1734; Chroust 1947: 235; Nightingale 1995: 1415 and 2004: 2930). In Plato,
it sometimes has a narrower sense, being used, in contrast to sophos, to refer to someone who desires
but does not have the kind of knowledge that only a god can possess (Burkert 1960: 1656, citing
Lys. 218a, Symp. 203d, Phdr. 278d; against whom Gottschalk 1980: 279 argues unconvincingly that
this contrast does not play a major role in Platos dialogues). On the origin and history of the term
philosophos see also Chroust 1964; Granger 2004: esp. 24655; Guthrie 1962: 1646; Jaeger 1948:
4323; Joly 1956; Morrison 1958.
77 These characteristics of Socrates interlocutors are discussed below 2.4. On Socrates need for friendly
relations with others see Dugas 1976: 5074, and above 2.2.3.
the dialogue, Hippothales invites Socrates to enter the wrestling school,
saying that it is worth his while (xion). When Socrates questions him,
Hippothales replies that many beautiful young men engage there in dis-
cussions in which they would be glad to have Socrates participate. Socrates
replies: You are doing a fine thing (203b3204a4). He thus represents him-
self as friendly toward beautiful young men who engage in conversation.
Socrates develops a more specific friendly interest in a particular beautiful
young man and particular conversations after he questions Hippothales
and learns that Hippothales is in love with a noble boy (204b1e10). He
shows this interest by continuing to question Hippothales. When Socrates
says that Hippothales is laughable (205d5; cf. 206a1), the young man,
unlike so many of Socrates interlocutors, does not become angry with
Socrates, but instead asks him to explain: Whats the fact of the matter?
(t d pv cei: 205d10). After this friendly response, Socrates tells Hip-
pothales, whom he addresses as friend (or dear: fle: 206a1), that in
praising Lysis before he has captured him, Hippothales is treating Lysis
in a way in which someone who is wise (sophos) in ta erotika would not
treat the boy (206a14).78 When Hippothales continues to accept this and
other criticism without becoming angry, Socrates gives further proof of his
friendliness toward the young man by agreeing to give a demonstration of
how a lover should talk to a beloved (206a5c7). Thus, Socrates interac-
tions with Hippothales demonstrate the beginning and further growth of
friendly relations between Socrates and the young man.
Socrates also addresses Lysis and Menexenus in a friendly way. Toward
the end of his first conversation with Lysis, during which the boy shows
himself to be cooperative and willing to learn, Socrates says, echoing Hip-
pothales words to Socrates, Heres how it is, dear Lysis (otwv ra
cei . . . fle Lsi: 210a9; cf. companion at 214d4 and 216a1). Socrates
also addresses Menexenus as dear companion ( fle rare: 213b3),
in the course of a conversation in which the young man is cooperative
and admits having arrived at aporia (213c9), and as dear at 217d7, after
Menexenus says that he does not understand (217d1).
Significantly, however, Socrates does not represent himself as having
one kind of erotic experience: love for a particular individual. Aristo-
tle defines eros as excessive philia for one person (NE 1171a1112; cf.
78 I agree with Halliwell 1995: 91 that fle is a marker of [Socrates] tendency to show amity
towards, and to foster intellectual closeness with, his partners in argument. In contrast, Dickey
1996: 10919, argues that this and other friendship terms in Plato indicate the dominance of the
speaker rather than being complimentary to the addressee.
1158a1113), a definition that could be applied to the Lysis.79 Socrates says
that lovers like very much (212b8c1), and the fact that he assumes that
lovers usually love only one individual at the same time is apparent from the
opening exchange between Socrates and Hippothales. When Hippothales
tells Socrates that there are very many beautiful young men in the wrestling
school (203b8), Socrates asks him who the beautiful one is (tv kalv), and
further explains that he wants to know who seems beautiful to Hippothales
(204b14). Socrates thus indicates that he assumes that one person is a par-
ticular object of interest to Hippothales. In the Lysis, however, Socrates
himself never shows this kind of interest in a particular individual. In not
having eros for one person, the Socrates of the Lysis differs importantly from
the Socrates of the Alcibiades I, who repeatedly calls attention to his love for
Alcibiades.80 The Socrates of the Lysis expresses only reciprocal friendliness
toward other people, and neither the unreciprocated eros that Hippothales
has for Lysis, nor the reciprocal eros that Socrates comes to share with
Alcibiades (Alc. I 135e13).81 In the Lysis, Socrates expresses Socratic eros
only for what he also likes: he is in love (cw . . . rwtikv) with respect to
the acquisition of a good friend, and he is a companion-liker (philetairos:
211e28). His eros for acquiring a good friend, however, resembles the eros
of Aristotles definition in being excessive philia for one object. Socrates
is philetairos to such an extent that he would rather acquire a good friend
than anything else. His exclusive eros for this object leaves no room for any
other love, although it is conducive to liking other people and wisdom.
2.3.3 This has been given to me by god

At the same time that he disclaims wisdom, Socrates also claims to have
a special, god-given, ability. He tells Hippothales: I know (oda) that
you are not only in love, but that you are already far gone in love. I am
inferior and useless in other respects, but this has somehow been given me
by god: to be able to recognize (gnnai) quickly the one loving and the
one loved (204b7c2).82 The dialogue also suggests that, in recognizing
79 Similar ideas are expressed at Laws 837a69, and Symp. 179c12, cited by Renaud 2002: 189 n.23.
80 For example, at 103a12, 104e8, 119c5, 131e10, 135e1.
81 On reciprocal and non-reciprocal relationships in the Lysis see Gonzalez 2003: 23; Justin 2005; Kahn
1996: 2645; Konstan 2000: 15761.
82 Planeaux 2001: 62 and Tejera 1990: 175 both find this claim uncharacteristic of the Platonic Socrates.
It is, however, consistent not only with Socrates claim in Phdr. 257a78 to have erotike techne
given him by Eros, but also with his claim in Symp. to have knowledge (pstasqai) of nothing
else except ta erotika (177d78), and to have an inferior kind of wisdom (sophia) in other respects
(175e24; cf. Symp. 193e45, 198d12).
those who love, Socrates is able to recognize at least one category of those
who like, for he asserts that lovers (erastai) are people who like as much
as possible (filontev . . . v on te mlista: 212b8c1). The fact that
Socrates claims to be able to gain knowledge about lover and beloved
quickly and by means of a gift of god indicates that he does not do so
by means of human reasoning and a lengthy process of questioning like
that in which he engages with Lysis and Menexenus.83 Socrates ability to
recognize lovers and beloveds, then, differs significantly from his skill in
demonstrating how one should speak to a beloved (206c57).
Socrates statement that god has given him his ability to recognize lovers
and beloveds deserves to be taken seriously.84 In mentioning god, Socrates
claims that his identification of lover and beloved is correct, even though
he cannot give an account of it. That is, Socrates claims to have true beliefs,
backed up by divine authority, about lovers and beloveds, even though he
does not claim to have knowledge in the sense of being able to give an
account.85 In the Lysis, Socrates does not identify a particular god who has
given him this skill. In the Phaedrus, however, Socrates addresses Eros as
the god who gave him erotic skill (257a38) and the reader of the Lysis
might well think of Eros also. Moreover, as noted above (2.3.2), Socrates
god-given ability might be connected with the love and liking he has had
since boyhood for acquiring a good friend (211d78). That is, it may be
part of his nature, assumed to be given him by a god, to like and love, and
to recognize others who do so also. In any case, Socrates unique, god-given
ability is, like his passionate desire to acquire a good friend, evidence of
his special devotion to erotic matters (component (1)). Moreover, this god-
given ability contributes to his marvelous skill in seeking wisdom about
the friend (component (4)) and in helping others to do so also (component
(5)), for it allows him to identify those who are able to acquire his own
skill.86 In sum, Socrates claim to have this god-given ability is evidence of
his own daimonic qualities, and of his daimonic, erotic skill.
Toward the end of the dialogue, Socrates makes another statement that
is relevant to an understanding of his ability to recognize lover and beloved.
83 Cf. Bordt 1998: 123, on 204c1, who notes that just because Socrates has a divine gift does not mean
that he can give an account of it. On Socrates ability in Tht. to recognize individuals without being
able to give an account see Roochnik 2002: esp. 413.
84 It is not merely ironic, as Penner and Rowe claim (2005: 45 n.7). The idea that wisdom comes
from god is traditional: Hadot 2002: 1819.
85 Cf. McPherran 2005: 1617, who writes that the daimonion is a source of non-expert moral
knowledge (or justified belief ); cf. 20 n.26 and 1996: 199. I am indebted to Gale Justin for helping
me to understand that Socrates claim to have god-given abilities implies a claim to have true beliefs.
86 Cf. Tht. 151a35, where Socrates says that his daimonion allows him to associate only with those
people who are able to make progress by means of this association.
He says that it is necessary for a genuine lover, someone who is not
merely pretending, to be liked by his beloved ( A nagkaon ra t gnhs
rast ka m prospoit filesqai p tn paidikn: 222a67).
Scholars have long debated how to interpret this statement, and, in par-
ticular, the meaning of the genuine lover. According to Paul Friedlander,
the genuine lover is someone who is kindred to his beloved.87 However, the
premise that the friend is what is kindred or belongs to one (oikeion: 221d6
222b2) is questioned at 222b3d8 and rejected in the summary at 222e37
(mte o okeoi . . . flon stn). Another interpretation holds that the
genuine lover, like the lover in Socrates second speech in the Phaedrus,
is simply someone who really loves and does not merely pretend to love,
and that someone who is the genuine lover of a particular beloved really
loves that individual.88 One problem for this view is that it distinguishes
between the genuine and the pretending lover solely on the basis of
feelings.89 If this were the case, however, Hippothales would already be
liked by Lysis, and would have no need to ask Socrates advice. As I inter-
pret the phrase, a genuine lover must not only love, but also have the
erotic skill that enables him to become liked by his beloved. This view is
consistent with Socrates claim to be able to give a demonstration of how
someone who is wise (sophos) in ta erotika converses with a beloved so as to
become liked by him (206a1c7, 210e25). Thus, when Socrates says that
he knows, on the basis of his god-given ability, that Hippothales is very
much in love (204b5c2), he recognizes Hippothales as someone who loves,
and who has the ability to become a genuine lover by acquiring erotic skill.
Socrates claims to be able to recognize not only the lover, but also the
beloved (gnnai rnta te ka rmenon: 204c2). This statement has
been taken to mean that Socrates is able to discover the identity of a
particular beloved.90 However, Socrates is not represented as finding out
that Lysis is Hippothales beloved by means of his god-given ability, but
because Ktesippos tells him so. After Ktesippos first mentions Lysis (204d1),
Socrates replies that he does not recognize (ok gnwn: 204e2) the name.
It might be argued that Socrates says he is able to recognize the beloved
merely because a lover necessarily has a beloved. Against this view, however,
is the fact that the Socrates of the Lysis has an intense interest in the beloved,
first wanting to learn who seems beautiful to Hippothales (204b14), and
87 Friedlander 1964: 1001. A more complex relationship is proposed by Bordt 1998: 2245 and 2000:
158, on which see above, end of 2.2.3.
88 Robinson and Hermann no date, on 222a6b2, write: The noble lover, i.e. the one who does not
pretend but is genuinely attracted to his beloved, will inevitably himself be loved by his beloved.
89 Noted by Bordt 1998: 2245. 90 Bolotin 1979: 72.
then who Lysis is and how Hippothales treats him (204e7205b3). Socrates
claim is best interpreted as indicating that he has the ability to recognize
a beloved who has lovable qualities, including the ability to learn to like
a genuine lover. Socrates readiness to demonstrate to Hippothales how to
treat a beloved suggests that he thinks Lysis is an appropriate object for
this young man, whom he recognizes as someone who has the potential to
become a genuine lover. That is, just as Socrates claims in the Theaetetus
that the god or the daimonion (Tht. 150c78, d45, d8e1; 151a4, d1,
d5) helps him in midwifery and match-making (Tht. 150b6151d6), so in
the Lysis, Socrates claims to have the god-given ability to recognize which
beloved is a worthy object for a genuine lover and to have true beliefs about
this matter.91
2.3.4 This is how one should converse with ones beloved

In addition to his god-given ability, Socrates also explicitly claims to have
another, more human, kind of skill.92 He asks Hippothales to demonstrate
(pdeixai) what he, Hippothales, says to Lysis, so that I might know if
you understand (na ed e pstasai) what a lover should say about
the beloved, to him and to others (204e10205a2). After learning what
Hippothales says to Lysis, Socrates makes a claim about how a wise person
treats a beloved: Whoever is wise [sophos] in ta erotika, friend, does not
praise the beloved until he captures him. Someone who praises a beloved,
Socrates continues, fills him with pride and makes him harder to capture
(206a17). Hippothales next asks Socrates to advise him about what the
lover should say or do to the beloved so as to become liked by him
(206c13). Socrates replies that this is not easy to tell (epen), but that
he might be able to demonstrate (pidexai) how a lover should converse
(dialgesqai) with a beloved (206c47). After giving his demonstration,
by questioning Lysis, Socrates as narrator says that he was about to tell
Hippothales: This is how one should converse with ones beloved (otw
cr . . . tov paidikov dialgesqai: 210e23). He did not speak because
he remembered that Hippothales, who had been listening without being
seen, did not want to call attention to his presence (210e1211a1).
In these passages, then, Socrates, claims to have practical knowledge
about how a lover should converse with a beloved so as to create friendliness
in him, and he claims to be able to demonstrate this practical knowledge
to others. The dialogue provides specific details about Socrates skill in
91 On recognizing the beloved see further below 2.4.2. 92 Cf. Bolotin 1979: 74.
treating a beloved. First, it includes skill in conversing and questioning.
This idea is brought out by the association in this dialogue of the terms
eran (to love) and erotan (to question). Socrates knows that Hippothales
loves (rv: 204b6, 7; rwtov: 204b8), and Hippothales reveals his love by
blushing when he is questioned (rwthqev: 204b5; rwtmenov: 204d7
8) by Socrates.93 Second, being able to create friendliness in someone is
not the same as knowing how to acquire a friend, for Socrates denies
that he has this latter kind of knowledge (212a46). Third, Socrates skill
in creating friendliness differs significantly from his ability to recognize
lover and beloved. He is able to recognize lover and beloved quickly, by
means of a divine gift and without the use of reason. His demonstration
of how to converse with a beloved, on the other hand, involves lengthy
questioning of Lysis and reasoning about a specific issue. Fourth, Socrates
claims that his questioning humbles and restrains Lysis instead of puffing
him up and pampering him (210e35), and it is characterized by Lysis
himself as punishment (211c3). Fifth, Socrates claim to have this kind of
skill is shown to be justified. The fact that Lysis addresses Socrates (211a3)
in a friendly way (filikv) and in the fashion of a child or a boyfriend
(paidikv means both94 ) shows that Socrates has succeeded in making him
friendly by means of his questioning that is a kind of beneficial punishment.
Punishment, then, can actually produce friendliness instead of the hatred it
sometimes produces in young children (212e7213a3).95 In demonstrating
how to produce friendliness in a beloved, then, Socrates also demonstrates
how to benefit the beloved. Finally, Socrates success with Lysis, with whom
he is not in love, shows that skill in creating friendliness in a beloved is the
same skill that creates friendliness in someone who is not a beloved.
93 The pun in the Lysis was drawn to my attention by Sandra Peterson. Cognates of eran and erotan also
occur at the beginning of Socrates conversation with Menexenus: rwtv (211d5), rwmai (211d7),
rwtikv (211e3). That Socrates plays on these words in Symp. 177d89 and 199b8e6 is noted by
Reeve 1992: 923, who also calls attention to the explicit word play in Cra. 398c5e5, where the word
rwv (heros) is said to be derived either from rwtov (love), because heroes were born from the
love of gods and mortals, or from rwtn (to question) because they were wise [sophoi] and clever
rhetors and dialecticians, being able to question [rwtn] (398d17). Cf. Reeve 2006a: 135 and
2006b: 2945, who writes (294): Socrates knows about the art of love in that but just insofar as
he knows how to ask questions. Roochnik 1987: 1278 notes (127): Philosophical discourse . . . is
forever the love, and not the possession, of wisdom . . . [It is] fundamentally interrogative (emphasis
in original). The pun on eran and erotan also occurs at Alc. I 106b10 (on which see Chapter 1 at
1.2 and n.18); Chrm. 155d1, e2; Prm. 137a4 with c2; Euthphr. 14c45 (where the MSS vary between
forms of the two verbs.)
94 Bordts translation (1998) captures the double meaning: ganz wie ein Liebling und ein Freund.
95 Renaud 2002: 198 writes that Lysis is one of the few interlocutors who is genuinely thankful for the
humbling given him by Socrates. G. A. Scott 2000: 70 also notes that Lysis reacts positively to this
humbling that borders on humiliation.
Skill in conversing with a beloved is demonstrable and, unlike Socrates
ability to recognize lover and beloved, it depends on the use of reason. It
is not, however, craft-knowledge, for Socrates does not claim to have a
complete understanding of the relevant field, or to be able to teach, or to
give an account of his field and his skill. In fact, Socrates says that it is not
easy to tell (epen), that is, teach or explain to, Hippothales how to speak
to his beloved, but that he can perhaps give a demonstration (206c47).96
Socrates demonstration shows that his knowledge (pstasai: 205a1) and
wisdom (sophos: 206a1) about how to treat a beloved is practical wisdom
about how to create friendliness by benefitting someone in a particular
way. It is skill in questioning an interlocutor so as to induce a recognition
of lack of wisdom, together with a desire to obtain this good thing. That
is, Socrates skill induces philosophein.97 His wisdom about how to treat a
beloved, then, is component (5) of the erotic art: skill in helping others to
acquire this same art. Even though Socrates believes that he is inferior and
useless in other respects (204b8c1), he demonstrates that he is justified in
claiming that he himself has this skill, and that he is able to demonstrate
it to others. Through dialectic, Socrates also expresses friendliness toward
others and creates reciprocal friendliness in them. He is useful and therefore
likable (210d13) in so far as he has erotic skill. However, Socrates success
in producing friendliness in others, for wisdom and for other people,
depends on their having certain characteristics. Socrates god-given ability
to recognize lover and beloved includes, I argue in 2.4, the ability to
recognize these characteristics.
2.4 socrates and his interlocutors
2.4.1 Hippothales: the lover

When Socrates says that it is necessary for the lover who is genuine and
not merely pretending to be liked by his beloved (222a67), Hippothales
reaction he turns all kinds of colors because of pleasure (222b2) suggests
that he takes himself to be this genuine lover. Most scholars, however, agree
that Hippothales is not the kind of genuine lover Socrates has in mind,
but instead an inferior lover, fundamentally selfish or misguided, or a
96 I follow the criteria for craft-knowledge given by Annas 2001: 244. On Socrates techne see Intro-
duction at I.3 and nn.337.
97 Cf. Rudebusch 2006: esp. 197, who argues that Socrates is portrayed in Lys. as trying to convert his
interlocutors to philosophy by bringing them to a state of awareness of their lack of wisdom, and
Reeve 2006a: esp. 134.
pretending lover.98 Socrates criticism of Hippothales treatment of his
beloved (205d5206b8) might appear to support this view. If Hippothales
is not the genuine lover, however, why does Socrates help him, by giving
his demonstration, to become liked by his beloved? Is Socrates merely an
unscrupulous pander? Is he himself the genuine lover who is pleading his
own cause?99 Or is he simply mistaken about Hippothales?
I argued above (2.3.3) that Socrates phrase, the genuine lover, refers
to someone who not only loves, but has also acquired the erotic skill that
enables him to become liked by his beloved This skill includes the ability
to converse with this beloved in the way in which Socrates converses with
Lysis.100 That is, the genuine lover knows how to engage in dialectic in
a common search for wisdom, a search for which friendly feelings are
necessary, and which in turn increases these feelings (see above 2.2.3). My
interpretation provides support for the view that Socrates aids Hippothales
because his god-given ability leads him to recognize that the young man
has the potential to acquire the erotic art, and thus to become a genuine
lover. His demonstration is also an initiation into this art.
There are a number of indications that Hippothales is represented as
someone who has the potential to become a genuine lover, and that he
begins, in the course of the dialogue, to acquire erotic skill. That he has
at least the potential to become devoted to ta erotika (component (1)
of the erotic art) is suggested by the statements that he is far gone in
love (204b78), to the point of being mad (205a78), with a beautiful
beloved, about whom he is always speaking, composing poems and even
singing (204c5d7). The young mans ordinary eros for someone with a
beautiful body is not in itself a sign that his motive is merely pleasure,
for in Greek thought, physical beauty is closely associated with beauty of
soul.101 Moreover, Socrates exclamation at 204e910 (how noble . . . in
every way is this love you have found) indicates that Lysis has beauty of
soul as well as physical beauty, and suggests that Hippothales loves the boy
98 Such views are held by Bolotin 1979: 768; Bordt (who holds that Hippothales is really in love,
but that emotion is not the criterion for a genuine lover) 1998: 2245 and 2000: 15960; Dorion
2004: 161; Gonzalez 1995b: 856 and 2003: 2336; Hoerber 1959: 1922; Nightingale 1993: 116;
Penner and Rowe 2005: 1689; G. A. Scott 2000: 72; Teloh 1986: 72 and 801; Tindale 1984:
1045. One of the few to argue that Hippothales is the genuine lover is Kuiper 1909: 98 and
106.
99 Gonzalez 1995b: 85 writes: While pretending to advance Hippothales cause, Socrates has been
seducing Lysis for himself. On Socrates as the genuine lover see also Friedlander 1964: 100 and 315
n.12; Gonzalez 2003: 2336; Penner and Rowe 2005: 16970 and 191; Teloh 1986: 7281; Tindale
1984: 104.
100 Cf. Justin 2005: 812. 101 On the connection see Nehamas 2007b: esp. 1067.
for both reasons.102 Moreover, there is no indication in this dialogue that
Hippothales motive is sexual pleasure.103 His request to Socrates (206c23)
indicates that he simply wants to be liked by Lysis.
Hippothales also shows the intense liking for speech (logoi) which is a first
step toward becoming skilled in searching for wisdom (component (4)) by
means of dialectic. At the beginning of the dialogue, Hippothales accosts
Socrates and asks him to enter a wrestling school Hippothales himself
frequents, in which there are many beautiful young men whose chief
occupation is speech (logoi: 204a23), and where the teacher (didskei:
204a4) is Mikkos, an admirer of Socrates (203a5204a5).104 In saying that
he spends time in this school (203b7), Hippothales shows that he shares
Socrates liking not only for beauty, but also for speech. He is, however,
misguided in having learned about speech from Mikkos. Hippothales says
that this Mikkos is a companion and praiser of Socrates (204a5), but
Socrates himself casts doubt on both characterizations. When he calls
Mikkos an able sophist (204a67) and characterizes himself as inferior
and useless in everything except ta erotika (204b8c2), Socrates suggests
that the kind of wisdom (sophia) Mikkos would be likely to praise is
very different from the erotic skill Socrates himself possesses.105 Either
Hippothales has misunderstood Mikkos, or Mikkos is himself wrong about
Socrates. Moreover, when Socrates later denies that he has a friend (212a4
6), he in effect denies that Mikkos is his companion. The opening of the
dialogue, then, represents Hippothales as very much interested in speech,
but as having learned about it from the wrong kind of teacher. His speeches
(katalogdhn: 204d3) and poems about Lysis are also, as Socrates will
soon point out, indications of his lack of wisdom.
Hippothales, however, demonstrates that he is capable of learning, with
Socrates help, to recognize his errors about both speech and love. In so
doing, he shows that he has acquired component (2) of the erotic art. When
Socrates asks who is beautiful to him (204b14), Hippothales reveals his
love by blushing (204b5, c3, d8) and confesses that Lysis is his object
(205a45). Hippothales blush not only reveals that he really is in love, it
also indicates that he is modest and, at least in the presence of Socrates,
subject to shame.106 His shame, like that of Alcibiades, makes him more
102 Justin 2005: 812 perceptively notes that Hippothales apparently loves Lysis for his good character
traits as well as for his physical beauty.
103 As Wolfsdorf claims (2008: 701). Contra: Ludwig 2002: 2289.
104 Nothing certain is known about this Mikkos as an historical figure: Nails 2002: 206.
105 Cf. Symp. 175e26, where Socrates contrasts Agathons bright wisdom with his own inferior and
doubtful kind of wisdom.
106 Noted by Hoerber 19451946: 272; cf. Bolotin 1979: 725.
ready to recognize his lack of wisdom. Socrates next questions Hippothales
to learn whether he knows how a lover should speak (legein: 205a2) to his
beloved, asking the young man about the ideas expressed in the poems and
speeches he makes to Lysis (204e10205b3). Because of modesty and shame,
Hippothales does not respond himself, but refers Socrates to Ktesippos.107
According to Ktesippos, Hippothales praises Lysis for his ancestors, among
whom were wealthy men who won victories in athletic contests and played
host to their relative, Heracles (205b4d4). According to Ktesippos, Hip-
pothales songs and words are ridiculous (kataglasta: 205b7, c2).
Socrates then proceeds to show that Hippothales is as laughable as his
poems. He addresses the young man as ridiculous Hippothales (205d5),
and by questioning leads Hippothales to agree that when he praises his
beloved before capturing him, he shows himself not to be wise (sophos) in
ta erotika, but to be an inferior hunter of his beloved (206a111). In response
to Socrates questioning, Hippothales further agrees that he is uneducated
(unmusical: 206b23), makes himself obnoxious to everyone (206b56)
and harms himself (206b68). However, instead of taking offense at what
could be construed as public humiliation, Hippothales immediately agrees
that what he has been doing is very unreasonable (poll . . . loga) and
says that for this reason (di tata) he wants to ask Socrates advice about
how to speak with and act toward his beloved (206b9c3).
This last statement clearly reveals that Hippothales has come to recognize
that he lacks wisdom, in addition to lacking his beautiful beloved (compo-
nent (2) of the erotic art). It also indicates that he passionately desires to
acquire these good things (component (3)). His eros for Lysis and for speech
led him to question (erotan) Socrates. When he asks Socrates for advice,
Hippothales also takes a first step toward becoming skilled in searching for
wisdom together with others (components (4) and (5)). It is noteworthy
that he now asks Socrates how he might converse (dialegomenos: 206c2)
with Lysis, rather than how he might make speeches (logoi) to the boy. He
is now interested in a kind of speech different from the logoi associated
with Mikkos. In asking for Socrates advice, Hippothales also indicates that
he is willing to admit that his way of courting by praising the beloveds
ancestors as the epinician poets do is inferior to Socrates philosophical
method.108
107 Shame: Bolotin 1979: 75.

108 Hippothales positive response to Socrates criticisms is not usually noticed. Scholars argue that
this scene reveals that Hippothales has selfish motives (Bolotin 1979: 78); that his love is really
self-love, and that he is unwilling or unable to enter into a dialogue with Socrates (Bordt 1998:
11620); that he is a fundamentally selfish character, whom Plato uses to criticize the traditional
Another indication of Hippothales desire to acquire the wisdom he rec-
ognizes that he lacks, and to become skilled in searching for it, is his silent
presence throughout Socrates lengthy questioning of Lysis and Menex-
enus. Before he consulted Socrates, Hippothales never stopped speaking.
According to Ktesippos, Hippothales tortures and deafens his hearers by
speaking so often about his beloved (204c5d1, 205b5). After Socrates asks
him about his love, however, Hippothales does not speak, but blushes
(204b5, c3, d8), and he lets Ktesippos do almost all of the talking about
Hippothales love.109 Hippothales longest speech (206c8d6) merely gives
information about how Socrates can enter into conversation with Lysis.
After this, Hippothales is silent. His extremely attentive presence, however,
is referred to on three significant occasions.
After Lysis joins Socrates group, Hippothales stands behind the rest
of the bystanders, where he thinks he wont be seen by the boy. Socrates
comments: Standing thus, he listened (207b47). Socrates calls attention
to Hippothales silent presence for a second time after Lysis, in response
to Socrates questioning, admits that he is without sense and needs a
teacher (210d48). As narrator, Socrates remarks that he almost made a
mistake when he looked at Hippothales and was about to say that this
is the way to treat a beloved, humbling and restraining him and not,
as Hippothales does, pampering and puffing him up. However, Socrates
says that he checked himself and did not speak, for he saw that Hippothales
was in agony and disturbed, and he remembered that Hippothales did not
want to be noticed by Lysis (210e1211a1). Why is Hippothales distressed?
There is no indication that he reacts in this way because he is jealous of
Socrates.110 Nor is he distressed because he is afraid that Socrates will reveal
his presence. Hippothales does not react in response to fears about what
Socrates will say or do, but because of what is being said (p tn
legomnwn: 210e6), that is, Socrates conversation with Lysis. Hippothales
is disturbed on Lysis account because of the lesson Socrates has just given
the boy, a humbling that Lysis himself refers to as punishment (211c3).111
Hippothales distress gives evidence of his emotional involvement with
concept of eros (Gonzalez 2003: 24); and that Hippothales treatment of Lysis, in contrast to that
of Socrates, corrupts the boy (Nightingale 1993: 116 and 1995: 10710). Vann 2006 provides a rare
positive interpretation of Hippothales response, as well as an excellent analysis of the parallels
between Socrates and Hippothales.
109 Hippothales says that Ktesippos will speak for him at 205b45, and Ktesippos does so at 204c3d8
and 205b6d4. Hippothales remark at 205a3 indicates that Ktesippos is also the speaker at 204e36
and e8.
110 As suggested by Bordt 1998: 1323.
111 G. A. Scott 2000: 58 and 197 n.17 suggests that Socrates comes at least close to committing hybris
in his treatment of Lysis.
Lysis, just as his blushing indicates the strength of his love. The fact that
he does not stop Socrates, in spite of his anguish, shows the intensity of his
desire to acquire wisdom about erotic matters.
At the end of the dialogue, Socrates calls attention to Hippothales silent
presence for the third time. After Socrates says that the genuine lover
must necessarily be liked by his beloved (222a67), Hippothales turns
all kinds of colors because of pleasure (222b2). Hippothales blushes,
just as he did at the beginning of the dialogue when Socrates asked him
whom he considered beautiful (204b45). Now, however, he blushes for
a very different reason. The young man is pleased because he correctly
understands that in order to become liked by his beloved he must first
acquire Socrates erotic skill, which includes the ability to engage in dialectic
in a common search for wisdom. After listening to Socrates demonstration
and the ensuing conversations, Hippothales believes that he will be able to
become a genuine lover, because he has made progress in acquiring erotic
skill.112 In the course of the dialogue, he goes from blushing in shame,
to distress and agony at Socrates humbling of his beloved, and finally to
blushing with pleasure. These silent indications of emotion are evidence
of his intellectual progress, and correspond to important stages in it.
Hippothales is not mentioned by name again after his last blush, but it is
possible to see an allusion to him in Socrates remark after his summary of
the difficulties of the argument: Saying these things, I had it in mind finally
to stir up someone of the older people (223a12). It is likely that Socrates
includes Hippothales among these older people. If the conversation had
not been interrupted, Socrates suggests, Hippothales would at last have
taken an active part in the philosophical discussion, conversing with both
Socrates and Lysis. In so doing, Hippothales would have continued to
make progress in acquiring the erotic art.
2.4.2 Lysis: the beloved

I argued above (2.3.3) that when Socrates says he is able to recognize the
beloved (204c12) he does not merely claim to be able to recognize the
identity of someones particular beloved. Nor does he include the beloved
in his statement merely because a lover necessarily has a beloved. Socrates
is instead claiming that he can recognize a beloved who has qualities that
make him lovable for his own sake, including the ability to learn to like a
genuine lover, with whom he shares a mutual desire for the good.
112 Renaud 2002: 191 correctly notes that Socrates examines and guides both Lysis and Hippothales.
This interpretation is supported by Socrates reaction when he learns
that Lysis is Hippothales object. After hearing the boys name mentioned
(204d1), Socrates conjectures that Lysis is young, because he does not
recognize his name (204e12). Ktesippos then tells Socrates that Lysis is
the oldest son of a very well-known father, Democrates, and that Socrates
cannot be ignorant of the boys beautiful form (204e38). More information
about Lysis relatives is given shortly afterwards, when Ktesippos reveals
that they are famed in the whole city for having achieved victories in
athletic contests and for hospitality to their kinsman, Heracles (205c2
d3).113 Socrates confirms that he thinks Lysis is not only beautiful, but
also noble, in appearance (smatov . . . gennaou: 209a12). Socrates also
indicates that he believes Lysis to be noble in other respects when he
remarks that the boy appears to be beautiful and good (kalv te kgaqv:
207a3). Moreover, after Ktesippos explains who Lysis is, Socrates exclaims:
O Hippothales, what a love you have found, noble [or true born] and
vigorous [gennaon ka neanikn] in every way! (204e910). The term
neanikv (vigorous or spirited: 204e9) is used, significantly, in the
Republic to refer to people who have the superior natural qualities that can
be trained either for great good or great evil.114 Since Socrates does not
know Lysis, he presumably calls him vigorous because he believes that
the boy is likely to have inherited superior natural qualities from his father.
Socrates, then, calls Lysis a noble and vigorous love-object because he is
young and beautiful, and is the noble or true-born oldest son of a family
well known for its achievements and noble ancestry.115 These qualities make
Lysis a worthy object of affection for his own sake, both to the parents who
like him very much (sfdra file: 207d6), and to a lover.116 In being
noble or true-born (gennaov), Lysis is a proper love-object for a genuine,
or legitimate (gnsiov: 222a6) lover.117
113 The historical evidence about Lysis family is collected by Nails 2002: 1957.
114 In Resp. 491e26 Socrates says that great injustices do not come from an inferior nature, but from
one that is vigorous (neanikv fsewv), but has been corrupted by education. This vigorous
nature is the philosophical one (492a1). Cf. Resp. 503c27, where Socrates states that those who
are both intellectually superior and vigorous (neaniko) do not usually want to live in an orderly,
quiet and stable way. On the application of this idea to Alcibiades in Alc. I see Chapter 1 at 1.3.
115 Cf. Chrm. 154e13, where Socrates remarks that it would be fitting for Charmides to have a soul
that is good by nature (e pefukv), since he comes from the house of Kritias.
116 Westermayer 1875: 34 notes that Lysis is characterized in this dialogue as an especially lovable
boy. This characterization tells against the interpretation of Penner and Rowe 2005: 1512, 167,
25160 that love for individuals is purely instrumental. A non-instrumentalist view of friendship is
defended by Dorion 2004: 208.
117 Seech 1979: 11 n.1 notes that gnsiov can mean legitimate as well as genuine.
In being beautiful and from a noble family Lysis resembles Alcibiades in
the Alcibiades I.118 This comparison can help us to understand why Lysis
natural and social superiorities make him an interesting object not only to
lovers but also to Socrates. Platos contemporary readers might also make
the connection between Lysis and Alcibiades because Democrates, Lysis
father, was Alcibiades lover.119 Moreover, the term used to characterize
Lysis, neanikv (vigorous, or spirited: 204e9), is also used to characterize
the family of Alcibiades (neanikwttou: Alc. I 104a6). As discussed in
Chapter 1, Alcibiades advantages give him a very high opinion of himself
(megalofrnwn . . . perblhqev t fronmati), and he rejects all lovers,
thinking that he has no need of anyone for anything (103b4104a2). To
correct this arrogance, Socrates gives Alcibiades a beneficial humbling, one
that also leads the young man to love him in return (135e13). Unlike
Alcibiades, Lysis has not yet become arrogant. Indeed, as Hugh Benson
points out, Lysis is the only interlocutor in Platos early dialogues who
does not claim to have wisdom and who is not reputed to be wise by
others.120 However, Lysis natural and social superiorities put him at risk
of becoming arrogant. For one thing, they subject him to flattery, which,
as Socrates says, puffs up and pampers a beloved (210e45). Because of all
his advantages, Alcibiades is given to boasting (megalaucomenov: Alc. I
104c2), and Socrates warns Hippothales that praise fills the beloved with
arrogance and boasting (fronmatov . . . ka magalaucav: Lys. 206a4).
Just as Socrates corrects Alcibiades, so he counteracts the flattery Lysis
receives from Hippothales and others by showing him that he has no reason
to have a high opinion of himself (mga fronen: 210d5; megalfrwn: d7)
and that he needs a teacher (210d6). He thus helps Lysis to become more
aware of his own lack of wisdom (component (2) of the erotic art).121 This
treatment will not only benefit Lysis by humbling him, it will also make
him, like Alcibiades, more able to return affection. As Socrates later states,
no one likes something if he does not need it (215a7b2).
In the course of this dialogue, Lysis, like Alcibiades, shows that he is able
to submit to and learn from the humbling process, and thus become able
to like the person who benefits him in this way.122 Lysis is able to do so
because he, like Alcibiades, already has a desire to improve, in addition to
118 See especially Alc. I 104a6b6. On Socrates similar treatment of the two young men cf. OConnor
1999.
119 Plut. Alc. 3, cited by Nails 2002, s.v. Democrates I.
120 Benson, 2000: 28; cf. Dorion 2004: 182 and 270 n.65.
121 Dorion 2004: 270 n.67 notes that Socrates treatment has the effect of preserving Lysis moderation.
122 Cf. Renaud 2002: 197 and Versenyi 1975: 1978.
an excellent nature (physis). He, like Alcibiades, is lovable in part because he
has this desire. Alcibiades has eros for the greatest power, although he at first
mistakenly believes that this power is tyranny. His ordinary eros, however,
helps Alcibiades to acquire Socratic eros (component (3) of the erotic art),
once he understands, aided by Socrates erotic skill, that the greatest power
is in fact conferred by wisdom in the form of self-knowledge.123 Similarly,
Lysis has an intense liking, but is at first mistaken about the object he
likes. Before Socrates meets Lysis, Hippothales states that the boy has
an exceptionally strong liking for listening (filkoov . . . diaferntwv:
206c10), that he is, literally, a liker of listening. The same term is used in
the Republic of people who run about to every Dionysian festival but have
no interest in philosophical conversations (5.475d1e1). In the Lysis passage
also, the term suggests that Lysis is indiscriminate in what he likes listening
to, just as Hippothales at first likes the wrong kind of speeches (logoi).
Just as he helps Alcibiades understand the true object of his love, so
Socrates helps Lysis to recognize that what he really likes listening to is
not just any kind of speech, but the philosophical conversation that can
help him to acquire wisdom. Socrates begins by noting Lysis liking for
speeches, when he says that the boy wants to approach when he sees
that Socrates and Ktesippos are conversing (dielegmeqa: 207a36). He
then says that Lysis is perplexed (at an impasse: prei) and reluctant
to approach (207a67), referring to the boys praiseworthy reserve, and
also using a verb, cognate with aporia, that has connotations of fruitful
philosophical impasse.124 When Socrates converses with Lysis, the boy
is responsive to his questioning, readily admitting that he does not yet
have sense (210d48), and becoming friendly to Socrates as a result of
this questioning (211a3). Lysis responsiveness leads Socrates to address
Lysis as phile (friend or dear: 210a9) toward the end of their first
conversation. Finally, Lysis is able to become an active seeker of wisdom in
the conversations he likes listening to. After the boy breaks into Socrates
conversation with Menexenus (213d13), Socrates says that he is pleased by
Lysis philosophia, his liking for wisdom (sqev t filosof: 213d7). He
thus indicates that the boy has come to understand, by listening to Socrates
conversations, that the true object of his liking is wisdom. Lysis, then,
acquires components (2) and (3) of Socrates erotic art by recognizing that
he has a passionate liking for the wisdom he recognizes that he lacks. In the
process, he becomes friendly toward Socrates, who helps him to arrive at this
understanding.
123 See Chapter 1 at 1.2, stage vi. 124 Reserve: cf. Dorion 2004: 264 n.34.
Lysis friendliness and his progress in acquiring the erotic art are also evi-
dent in his relationship with Menexenus. Lysis is very much a companion
(mlista tarov) to the young man (206d4), and he demonstrates this by
following and sitting beside Menexenus (207a6b3). Lysis also shows that
he likes his companion when he asks Socrates to give Menexenus the same
punishment he himself has just received from Socrates (211a2c3). Lysis
does not want Socrates to punish his companion because he is resentful
of the treatment he himself has received from Socrates, but because he
likes Menexenus.125 Lysis has just told Socrates that his mother, who likes
him very much, would beat him if he touched her weaving (208d7e2),
and Socrates will go on to say that young children are most of all liked
(philtata) by their parents when these parents punish them (212e7213a3).
Socrates punishment of Lysis, then, is like that of a father, who expresses
his friendship by correcting and improving his child.126 Lysis wants Menex-
enus, who is eristic (contentious: 211b89), to receive the same beneficial
punishment.127 Moreover, when Lysis asks Socrates to use dialectic to cor-
rect Menexenus eristic tendencies (211c78), he shows that he is beginning
to acquire Socrates own erotic skill in searching for wisdom (component
(4)), and that he has the desire to help others acquire this skill also (com-
ponent (5)). Socrates indicates that the boy has already acquired some of
this skill when he tells Lysis that Lysis has paid such close attention to
his own conversation with Socrates that the young man is now able to
question others (211a6b5). In being able to question, Lysis has become
lovable not only for his own sake, but also because he can be instrumental
in helping others to acquire this good. Lysis, then, resembles Alcibiades
in the Alcibiades I in being able to help others. Lysis, however, has begun
to acquire erotic skill more quickly and with less resistance, and Socrates
expresses no fears about his future.
Socrates, then, correctly identifies Lysis as a beloved, someone who is
lovable for his own sake, and who has the ability to learn to like a genuine
lover, a person who not only loves, but who has also acquired the erotic
art. Lysis has the potential to like Hippothales, provided that this lover
125 Bolotin 1979: 1056 argues unconvincingly that Lysis responds to his humiliation by loving Socrates
and by turning his resentment for his humiliating treatment against Menexenus, whom he wants
Socrates to punish.
126 Cf. Fraisse 1974: 1512, who notes that the Lysis contains an example of Socratic friendship, in which
the wiser person makes the less wise aware of his imperfections by means of a certain humiliation.
Socrates is also said to act like a father or older brother in Ap. 31b35 and Symp. 219c6d2.
127 Menexenus is a cousin of the Ktesippos (206d34) who imitates eristic techniques in Euthydemus
(303e78). Gonzalez 2003: 202, interprets Lysis request that Socrates punish Menexenus as part
of the competition for wisdom and virtue in which the philosopher engages Lysis and Menexenus.
I would characterize the activity Socrates encourages as a shared search rather than competition.
acquires Socrates art. In the course of the dialogue, Lysis and Hippothales
have made progress in establishing the basis for a new kind of relationship
(sunousan: 223b3), in which a beloved is captured (lh: 206a2), not by
listening to ridiculous words of praise, but by participating in philosophical
conversations in which lover and beloved search together for wisdom. In
emphasizing the aporia at which they have arrived, Socrates encourages
them to do just this.
2.5 conclusion
The Lysis represents Socrates as sharing the dizzying puzzlement of his
young interlocutors, as he examines and finds objections to many state-
ments about what the friend (philos) is. It also represents him, however,
as someone who has skill in loving (eran) and liking, and who recognizes
his own deficiencies. Socrates uses his skill to show his young interlocutors
how a lover can question his beloved so as to lead this beloved to become
aware of his own lack of wisdom and to reciprocate friendliness, so that
lover and beloved may engage in the dialectic that is an expression of liking
both for wisdom (philosophein) and for each other. In so doing, he initiates
them into the erotic art. These conversations may lead to aporia about a
particular subject, but they are worthwhile (xion: 203b3) for their own
sake, in part because aporia helps to produce a fruitful awareness of ones
own lack of wisdom. The conversations also help to create the reciprocal
liking that is necessary to the common search for wisdom. In this dialogue,
then, Socrates does not arrive at a definition of philos, but he does raise
important questions about who or what the philos is, and he encourages
the search for wisdom among people who need not be lover and beloved,
but who must be friendly.
part ii
Eros and Hybris in the Symposium

Introduction to Part II: the narrators
of the Symposium
The Symposium has the extremely complex formal structure of a dramatic

dialogue in which narratives are nested within narratives.1 In the intro-
ductory framework (172a1174a2), Apollodorus says that he will comply
with the request of some unidentified friends (172a1) to tell them about
the speeches made at a symposium in honor of Agathons victory with his
first tragedy (173a56), and an unnamed Companion speaks a few lines
(173d410, 173e46). The rest of the Symposium takes the form of a long
narration by Apollodorus. Within his narration is another narration, for
Apollodorus, who was not present at Agathons symposium, reports what
the eyewitness Aristodemus told him. The reader is constantly reminded
of this narrative frame by Apollodorus use of indirect discourse (He
said that . . . : e.g., 174a3).2 Moreover, within Apollodorus narration of
Aristodemus narration are still other narrations, for Apollodorus narrates
Aristodemus narration of what the symposiasts said, including the speeches
some of them made in praise of Eros. Furthermore, two of these speeches
themselves narrate speeches made by still others: Socrates narrates what
Diotima said, and Alcibiades narrates what Socrates said. Of course, still
another narrator Plato tells the entire story to the reader.
This narrative complexity corresponds to, and helps to produce, an
equally complex characterization of Socrates. The multiple narrators por-
tray him as an erastes, an eromenos, a man who is marvelously skilled
concerning ta erotika, and as a figure who resembles the daimon Eros of
Diotimas speech. Socrates is also represented as both hubristic and virtu-
ous, comic and serious, wise and lacking wisdom. According to Alcibiades,
Socrates spends his life playing, but is also capable of being deeply serious
(216e46). Alcibiades Socrates has the virtues of moderation (sophrosyne),
courage, wisdom (phronesis) and endurance (219d47), but is also guilty of
1 On the narrative frame see, among many others, Gill 1999: xviiixix; Halperin 1992; Hunter 2004:
224.
2 Indirect discourse: Dover 1980, on 174a3175e10.
110
disdain, mockery, hybris and arrogance (219c36; hybris: cf. 215b7, 222a8).
In Alcibiades narrative, Socrates himself disclaims wisdom (218d6219a4),
just as he does in his initial conversation with Agathon (175e14). Agathon,
like Alcibiades, thinks that Socrates is wise (sophos: 175c8), but also accuses
him of hybris (175c7). Taken together, all of the narrators create a perplex-
ing, composite portrait of the philosopher who is said to play roles erotic,
ethical and dramatic that are usually thought to be incompatible.3 Like
Alcibiades (216c3), many of Platos readers have not known what to do with
this man.
The narratives within the Symposium, then, present readers with puzzles
that encourage them to open up Platos representation of Socrates, just
as Alcibiades claims that Socrates himself needs to be opened up in order
to be understood (216e57). Part II of this study does just this. I argue
that a focus on Socrates daimonic art can help to illuminate the many
puzzling, even apparently incompatible, accounts given by the narrators of
the Symposium, as well as many other aspects of the dialogue.
Indeed, the subject of Platos Symposium is not eros but Socrates.4 This
man is the main concern of Apollodorus and Aristodemus. In the opening
passage, Apollodorus tells his unnamed friends, who want to learn about
the speeches on love made by Socrates, Alcibiades and others at Agathons
symposium: I think that I am not unpracticed [melthtov] in the things
about which you ask (172a12). We learn shortly afterwards, however,
that the business of Apollodorus life, for the last three years, has been to
become practiced (pimelv), not about eros, but in knowing what he [sc.
Socrates] says and does (172c36). Moreover, Apollodorus has gotten his
information about the symposium from Aristodemus, a man whom he
identifies as a lover (rastv: 173b3), that is, an admirer, of Socrates.5
That Socrates is the main subject of the Symposium is also emphasized by the
structure of Aristodemus narrative as reported by Apollodorus. It begins as
Aristodemus first meets Socrates (He said that Socrates met him: 174a3)
and then follows him to the symposium, and it ends as Aristodemus again
follows the philosopher, as is his custom (223d10), after the party is over.
Moreover, of the dialogues fifty-one Stephanus pages, Socrates dominates
more than thirty. He is the topic of conversation in the introductory
3 Clay 2000: 143 notes that Socrates was characterized as dimorphos (two-formed) by an anonymous
comic writer (citing SSR I.A.17, vol. i: 7). On the ambiguity of Socrates persona cf. Blondell 2002:
6980 and 2006: 177; Blundell 1992: 12830; Corrigan 1997; Hunter 2004: 910; Nehamas 1998: esp.
5969; Ziolkowski 1999: 301.
4 Cf. Bury 1932: lxv.
5 Sheffield 2006a: 89 notes that the Symposium itself is a narrative passed on by the lovers of Socrates.
112 Part II Eros and Hybris in the Symposium
dialogue (172a1175e10); he converses with Agathon at 193e3194e3, and
plays an important role in the general discussion reported 176a1178a5.
The entire last section of the Symposium (198a1223d12) is concerned with
Socrates, who refutes Agathon, makes his own speech about Eros, is the
subject of Alcibiades speech, and is the protagonist in the concluding
drama. Not only is Socrates the subject of Platos dramatic dialogue, he
also dominates the other characters within the drama, defeating Agathon
and Aristophanes in debate (223d36), and being crowned by Alcibiades as
victor in speech over all people . . . for all time (213e16).
More specifically, the Symposium is concerned with Socrates practice of
the daimonic, erotic art. He is portrayed both by himself and by the other
characters in the dialogue as being marvelously skilled in ta erotika (denov
t rwtik: 198d12; cf. 193e45), and claiming to have knowledge about
these matters (pstasqai: 177d78). He is also represented as a lover
(211d38, 213c8d1, 216d23, 218c7, 222b34, 222d12), as a beloved (173b3,
217c78, 222b34) and as someone who shares many of the characteristics
of Diotimas Eros.6 He resembles the philosopher-daimon Eros in being a
lover of wisdom (component (3) of the erotic art), who recognizes his own
lack of wisdom (component (2)), who is marvelously skilled in seeking to
attain as much wisdom as he can (component (4)) and in helping others
to acquire his own erotic art (component (5)). Socrates is also represented
as being devoted to Eros and to ta erotika (component (1)), and as urging
others to become similarly devoted (212b58). These characteristics all
contribute to Platos representation of Socrates in this dialogue as a man
who has all five components of the erotic art.7 One aspect of Socrates
use of his erotic art that is especially emphasized in the Symposium is his
profound emotional effect on a variety of other people.
In this dialogue, Socrates does not influence others primarily by means of
argument. He does not engage in dialectic in response to Agathons request
to share the wisdom he has acquired in solitary thought (175c6e6), nor
in response to Alcibiades proposal to exchange wisdom for physical beauty
6 For the specific shared characteristics see Chapter 4 at 4.6. Scott and Welton 2008 argue at length
that the nucleus of the Symposium is the association of philosophy, in the person of Socrates, with
Eros (13). Gould 1963: 58 refers to Socrates as the great expert on love. Others connect Socrates
knowledge of eros with his knowledge of his own ignorance: see, for example, Nightingale 1995:
129 (quoting Lowenstam 1985: 88, and citing Reeve 1992: 93); Roochnik 1987. On Socrates as lover
and beloved see Blundell 1992: 12330 (citing [123 n. 17] Halperin 1986: 6870 and 1990: 1323);
Edmonds 2000. For Socrates as Eros see Bacon 1959: 424; Brisson 1998: 524; Bury 1932: xlii and
lxlxii; Clay 1972: 58 and 1975: 2489 (with n. 18, citing Maximus of Tyre, Philosophoumena 18. 84b
[Hobein], and Ficino, Commentaire sur le Banquet de Platon, ed. Marcel [Paris 1956]: 242); Osborne
1994: 93101; Robin 2002: cicix.
7 On these components, see Introduction at I.1.
(218c7219a4), although he offers to consider with Alcibiades in the future
what the best thing to do about this matter might be (219a8b2). What little
dialectic the Symposium contains or refers to is usually interrupted, forgot-
ten or not reported.8 When engaged in thinking, Socrates turns inward,
paying no attention to Aristodemus (174d47), or to his fellow soldiers at
Potidaea (220c1d5), and he does not reveal the subject of his thoughts.
Socrates questioning of Agathon is interrupted by Phaedrus (194d18),
and most of his concluding debate with Aristophanes and Agathon is for-
gotten or missed by Aristodemus, who falls asleep (223c6d2). The only
example of a complete dialectical exchange between Socrates and another
symposiast is that with Agathon at 199c3201c9. There, however, Socrates
casts doubt on the conclusions he arrives at by saying that it is not hard
to refute Socrates (201c89). The philosophers own speech, in which he
claims to report what Diotima has taught him, is not dialectic but an
unexamined account of what the prophetess taught Socrates (201d5) after
an elenchus that he does not report, other than to state that it resem-
bled his own elenchus of Agathon (201e67). When Socrates says that his
speech about Eros aimed to persuade people, he uses wordplay like that of
the sophist Gorgias: ppeismai . . . pepeismnov . . . peirmai . . . peqein
(212b13). This speech is good rhetoric, and it is praised by the rest of
the symposiasts. However, the fact that it is not dialectic is emphasized
when Aristophanes is prevented from questioning Socrates by the arrival
of Alcibiades (212c48). Alcibiades, moreover, crowns Socrates as victor in
words (213e16), but also calls him a liar (214d12).
Socrates words, however, have profound emotional effects on others.
According to Alcibiades, all of the symposiasts Phaedrus, Agathon, Eryx-
imachus, Pausanias, Aristodemus, Aristophanes and Socrates himself
have shared in philosophical madness and Bacchic frenzy (218a7b4), and
Socrates, more than any rhetorician, is responsible for producing this effect
on others (215e45).9 When we hear Socrates words, says Alcibiades, we
are stunned and possessed (215d56). He uses the word kpeplhgmnoi,
whose cognates are used elsewhere in the dialogue to refer to the effects of
sexual passion (192b7c1, 211d5, 216d3). As for Alcibiades, his heart pounds,
he weeps, is confused, pained, enslaved and ashamed, to the extent that
he thinks life is not worth living in his present condition of self-neglect
(215e1216c2). According to Alcibiades, no matter who hears them, and
8 On this point see Plochmann 1972: 330 and 333; Wardy 2002; Warner 1992: 158.
9 Unlike Rowe 1998, on 218b2, I see no reason to doubt that the symposiasts have all been strongly
affected by Socrates philosophical words. This does not imply, however, that they have become
philosophers in the sense that Socrates is a philosopher.
even if they are reported by someone very inferior, Socrates words never-
theless produce the same powerful effects (215d36). These effects are due
to Socrates use of component (5) of the erotic art: his ability to use words
to persuade others to recognize their own ignorance and to desire to seek
wisdom.
Socrates also produces another kind of emotional effect on those who
associate with him, many of whom become his lovers. Aristodemus, as
noted above, is a lover of Socrates (173b3), and after Alcibiades speech, the
symposiasts laugh because Alcibiades seems to them still to be in love with
the older man (rwtikv cein: 222c23). Alcibiades confirms that he is in
love when he says that Socrates deceives people into thinking that Socrates
is a lover, when he is actually a beloved. In addition to himself, Alcibiades
names Charmides, Glaucon, Euthydemus, Diocles and very many others,
and he warns Agathon against suffering the same fate (222a8b7).
The narrative structure of the dialogue is ideally suited to portraying
the ways in which the philosopher affects others, for the reader is always
aware of seeing Socrates through the eyes of the narrators on whom he has
these powerful emotional effects. This structure, however, also contributes
to the difficulties of interpretation, for each of the narrators has a different
point of view, and none is represented as completely reliable. In particular,
and as Apollodorus readily admits, neither Apollodorus nor Aristodemus
provides a narrative that is complete, accurate and objective: All that each
person said, Aristodemus did not entirely remember, nor did I remember all
that he said. But I will tell you what he remembered best, and what seemed
to me most worth remembering in the speech of each person (178a15).10
Apollodorus claims to have verified Aristodemus report: I asked Socrates
about some of the things that I heard from him [Aristodemus], and he
agreed that it was as he [Aristodemus] said (173b56). This very statement,
however, is an admission of bias, for Apollodorus asked Socrates about
only some of the things that happened at Agathons symposium, and he
questioned Socrates only about what Aristodemus said, without attempting
to fill in the gaps in this story. Apollodorus apparently did not, for example,
ask Socrates about the speeches that occurred between those of Phaedrus
and Pausanias, that is, the speeches, given by some other people, that
Aristodemus did not entirely remember (180c12), or about Socrates
final discussion, during most of which Aristodemus was asleep (223b8d2).
In addition to being selective and forgetful, Apollodorus and Aristode-
mus are also represented as biased due to their individual natures and ways
10 I discuss these two narrators in greater detail in Belfiore 1984.

of imitating Socrates.11 Apollodorus shows himself to be disdainful and
quarrelsome in the introductory section of the dialogue. He tells Glaucon
that, before becoming a follower of Socrates, he, Apollodorus, used to be
more wretched than anyone, no less than you are now (173a2). His low
opinion of others is also evident in his statement that he enjoys exceed-
ingly (perfuv v carw) hearing speeches about philosophy, and that
when he hears other kinds of speeches, especially those of wealthy money-
makers, he is annoyed (cqomai) and feels pity for the speakers (173c27).
Apollodorus is, paradoxically, very confident that his recognition of his
own defects makes him superior to others: Perhaps you believe that I am
unfortunate, and I think that you are right. But I do not just think that
you are unfortunate, I know it well (173d13). That Apollodorus uses the
elenchus in a combative way is evident in the exchange at 173d4e4. Accord-
ing to the unnamed Companion, Apollodorus reviles (kakhgorev) and is
harsh to (grianeiv) himself and all others except Socrates (173d410).
My very dear friend, Apollodorus replies, is it clear that I am mad and
out of my senses to have this opinion about myself and you? The Com-
panion responds: Its not right to quarrel [rzein] now about these things,
Apollodorus. Apollodorus appears, then, to be like the young imitators
of Socrates mentioned in the Apology, who lack real understanding, but
take pleasure in listening to Socrates public refutations and in engaging in
these activities themselves (23c26, cf. Resp. 7.539b16).12
Aristodemus is a different kind of imitator of Socrates. He is a lover
or fan (erastes), not of wisdom, but of Socrates (173b34), and we know
from 223d10 that he makes a practice of following Socrates about.13 He
even imitates the philosopher in going unshod (173b2, 174a34, 220b6).
Aristodemus is small (173b2), and his low social status corresponds to
his physical stature. Aristodemus inferior social status is suggested by the
fact that he needs to be described in detail (173b12), unlike the well-
known figures Agathon and Alcibiades, and by the fact that he does not
make a speech and is otherwise ignored by the others.14 That Aristodemus
has a low opinion of his own social and intellectual status is apparent
11 The view of Osborne (1994: 86101) that the two narrators are philosophical guides is refuted by
G. A. Scott 2000: 4, 223, 1801 n.7, and Scott and Welton 2008: 2831. On the two narrators see
also Arieti 1991: 967, 1078; Babut 1980; Blondell 2006: 14752; Blundell 1992: 131; Corrigan and
Glazov-Corrigan 2004: 818; Halperin 1992; Hunter 2004: 249; Kofman 2002: 48; Nightingale
1995: 11718; Penwill 1978: 1667.
12 On Apollodorus in Plato and in the Socratic literature see Burnet 1911, on Phd. 59a9; Nails 2002:
3940; de Vries 1935.
13 On lovers as fans see Davidson 2007: 246.
14 These characteristics of Aristodemus are noted by Rowe 1998, on 173b23, and 2001.
from his statement that, in going to Agathons party uninvited, he will
be an inferior man going to visit a wise man (falov n p sofo
ndrv: 174c7). Moreover, the fact that he goes to the symposium uninvited
(klhtov: 174b1, c7, c8) by his host, and is put in the ridiculous (geloon:
174e2) position of arriving without Socrates, who invited him, would
have reminded Platos audience of the akletoi, the uninvited hangers-on of
inferior social, physical and ethical status, who earned a dinner by providing
comic entertainment for the invited guests.15 Instead of imitating Socrates
by using the elenchus in a combative way, as Apollodorus does (173e4),
Aristodemus yields to Socrates authority, telling him, Ill do whatever
you order (174b2), and instead of defending himself against the charge of
being an uninvited guest, he asks Socrates to do this for him (174c7d1). In
keeping with his humble opinion of himself, Aristodemus, unlike Agathon,
Alcibiades and the very many others Alcibiades mentions (222a8b3),
never aspires to be an eromenos of Socrates, but is represented from the
beginning as an erastes.
Apollodorus and Aristodemus, then, are unreliable narrators, who imi-
tate Socrates words and deeds but are not able to acquire the erotic art
that is essential to his practice of philosophy. The stories told by these
narrators, and by the narrators within their narratives, serve to remind the
reader that the dialogue cannot be accepted as an historically accurate tran-
scription of what Socrates said and did (172c6), that it is fiction, and that
it requires critical evaluation.16 Part II analyzes these puzzling narrations of
what Socrates says and does (172c6), first, in Chapter 3, by contrasting
Socrates with the first five speakers, and then, in Chapter 4, focusing on
his interactions with Agathon and Alcibiades.
15 Akletoi: Fehr 1990; Halliwell 2008: 1434; Wilkins 2000: 7186.

16 Clay 2000: 31, writes that the narrative framework suggests that the memory of Socrates cannot be
independent of the character of his memorialist.
c h a p ter 3
In praise of Eros: the speeches in the Symposium
3.1 victories in words

The Symposium is set within the context of a number of competitions.
At a symposium honoring Agathons victory in a dramatic competition
(173a56), six speakers compete in praising Eros, and a seventh, Alcibiades,
praises Socrates. Before this competition begins, Agathon says that he and
Socrates will soon be judged by Dionysus concerning their wisdom (sophia:
175e79). Socrates is explicitly represented as winning a victory not just
once but six times.1 First, like Perseus killing the Gorgon, he overcomes
the Gorgianic power of Agathons words that threaten to reduce him to
silence (198b1c5). Second, he defeats Agathon in an elenchus, at the end
of which the poet admits his own lack of wisdom (199c3201c9). Socrates
is awarded a third victory by Alcibiades, who crowns him, declaring that
this man wins the victory in words over all people, not just the other day,
like you [sc. Agathon], but always (213e16). At the end of the Symposium,
Socrates wins two more victories in words. He wins a fourth victory by
persuading Agathon, the most beautiful man present, to sit beside him in
order to receive Socrates praise (223a35). And in a fifth victory, Socrates
compels Agathon, the tragedian, and Aristophanes, the comic poet, to
agree that a comic poet who has skill also knows how to compose tragedies
(223c4d6).
Most importantly, Socrates wins a sixth victory in the competition
(gnisai: 194a1) in praising Eros proposed by Eryximachus (177a1d5).
That his speech is the best is not explicitly stated in the dialogue. There are,
however, several indications that Socrates in fact wins the victory. For one
thing, his speech receives the most enthusiastic responses from the other
symposiasts. After Phaedrus speech, we are merely told that Pausanias
1 I discuss some of these victories in detail below. Socrates first victory is the subject of 3.3.1 below,
his second that of Chapter 4 at 4.3, and his fourth and fifth victories are analyzed in 4.5. Socrates
sixth victory is discussed throughout Chapter 3.
117
criticized Phaedrus view that there is only one Eros (180c1d1), while Pau-
sanias own speech is followed by Eryximachus criticism of the last part of
this speech (185e6186a2). Eryximachus speech is accompanied by Aristo-
phanes comic attempts to stop his own hiccups (185c4e5) and followed
by Aristophanes jokes about this speech (189a1b2). Aristophanes speech
receives only slightly better treatment, for Eryximachus, after politely say-
ing that it was pleasantly spoken, states that he knows that the next speakers,
Agathon and Socrates, will not be at a loss since they are marvelously skilled
in ta erotika (193e37). Agathons speech receives applause (naqorubsai)
from everyone for having been spoken appropriately (prepntwv: 198a1
3). Socrates, however, suggests that this speech, like all the others, paid no
attention to the truth (198d3e4). He then praises the beginning of the
speech (199c36), but goes on to demonstrate that Agathon did not know
what he was talking about, an assessment with which Agathon himself
agrees (201b912). Socrates speech receives by far the most positive reac-
tions, for everyone except Aristophanes is said to praise it (painen:
212c4). This verb and its cognates are used, significantly, to characterize
the praises of Eros that the speakers give (for example, 177b3, 6, d2; 198d7;
199a5). Aristophanes does not join in praising Socrates speech because
he is about to discuss a point that Socrates made about Aristophanes
speech (212c46). He is, however, interrupted by the entrance of Alci-
biades, who gives Socrates part of the victory crown he had intended for
Agathon, declaring the philosopher to be the victor in words, not just on
one occasion, but over all people at all times (213d8e6).
Socrates is represented as winning these victories because he really has
marvelous skill concerning ta erotika, in contrast to the other speakers, who
falsely claim to have expert knowledge that they lack. The first five speakers
Phaedrus, Pausanias, Eryximachus, Aristophanes and Agathon all claim
to be experts on eros, each according to his own kind of skill.2 Aristophanes
tacitly accepts Socrates statement that Aristophanes whole occupation
is concerned with Dionysus and Aphrodite (177e12), and he prefaces his
speech by saying that his audience must learn from him and teach others
(189d36). Phaedrus and Pausanias discuss the role of eros in political virtue,
stressing military and intellectual virtue respectively (178e3179b3, 182a7
d4, 184c4e4). They claim to have superior knowledge in these areas when
they confidently make long speeches and criticize the views of others. The
2 Bacon 1959: 429 writes that each man sees love in terms of his own profession; Reeve 1992: 91 views
the speakers as representatives of conventional wisdom. Scott and Welton 2008: 43 hold that each
speech is an expression of one kind of love. Sheffield 2006a: 21516 n.8, argues convincingly that
each of the first five speakers can be associated with one of the Muses.
In praise of Eros: the speeches in the Symposium 119
physician Eryximachus speaks as an expert when he argues that medicine
is an erotic science (186c5e3), as does the tragedian Agathon, when he
contends that the god Eros is a wise (sophos) poet, who is able to make
others wise also (196e13).
Each of these speakers happens to make some good points about eros,
as scholars have often noted.3 However, because they do not examine
their claims critically, each is in fact characterized by amathia, lack of
understanding, about eros. According to Socrates Diotima, amathia is the
condition of someone who is not fine and good or wise [phronimos] but
thinks that he is adequate in these respects (204a46).4 Socrates remarks
after Agathons speech indicate that he believes that all the speakers have
exhibited this amathia. He says that all of the previous speakers5 seem
to have thought that the task set by Eryximachus was to represent Eros
so that he might appear to be as beautiful and good as possible [v
kllistov ka ristov], to the ignorant, clearly certainly not to those
who know (198e6199a2). This comment refers most immediately to
Agathons statement that Eros is most beautiful and best (kllistov ka
ristov: 197c2, 195a7), but it is a criticism of the other speeches as well,
each of which represents Eros as the best and most beautiful of the gods.
This view of Eros, as Socrates will show in his speech, is a result of amathia.
In addition to Socrates explicit criticism of these speeches, Plato uses other
techniques to portray the first five speakers as lacking understanding. Their
speeches contain internal inconsistencies, make a selective and uncritical
use of literary authority, and fail to give an adequate account of the good
things they claim Eros gives to humans.
Socrates, like the other speakers, represents himself as having skill con-
cerning eros. He says that he knows nothing except ta erotika (177d78),
and claims to be marvelously skilled in these matters (198d12). He also
claims to have learned about eros from a wise woman (sophe), Diotima
(201d15). Socrates claims, however, are justified by his possession of the
erotic art. Socrates is wiser than his competitors because he does not lack
understanding, but recognizes that he lacks wisdom (gnoe: 216d34). He
3 Detel 2003 (858, with bibliographical survey n.18) and Sheffield 2006a (1539 and 20724, with
bibliographical survey 212 n.2) and 2006b discuss the positive contributions of all of the speeches.
Friedlander 1969: 238 and Sedley 2006 emphasize Agathons speech in particular.
4 For amathia as lack of understanding see LSJ, Supplement s.v. maqv. Plato does not always use
the term in this sense, however. Brickhouse and Smith 1994: 126 n.41 point out that Socrates uses it
of his own ignorance at Grg. 488a3, and I note in Introduction to Part III n.1, that he also uses it
in this sense at Phdr. 235c28. On the comic aspects of the speakers false conceit of wisdom see
Patterson 1982: esp. 8490 (quotation: 82).
5 This is suggested by each of us at 198e3. Plurals are also used at 198e5, e6.
demonstrates this component of the erotic art (component (2)), not only
by criticizing the false pretense to wisdom of the other speakers, but also
when he suggests, in part through his characterization of Diotima, that
he did not acquire wisdom from Diotima in the form of truths contained
in a body of teachings that are to be accepted without critical examina-
tion. Socrates speech also exhibits the other four components of his erotic
art, especially (5): his marvelous skill in persuading his audience to devote
themselves to ta erotika, to recognize their own lack of wisdom and other
good things, to desire these things passionately, and to seek to attain as
much of them as they can. In making a speech that appeals to each of the
self-styled experts with whom he competes, Socrates uses his daimonic
art very effectively to persuade his audience that the philosopher-daimon
Eros described by Diotima is the best helper for humans (212b24).
3.2 the first five speakers: the best and most

beautiful of the gods
3.2.1 The symposiasts and the poets

One way in which each of the first five speakers exhibits amathia is by
appealing uncritically to the Greek literary tradition, especially poetry.6
This tradition is explicitly mentioned at the moment when the contest in
making speeches about Eros is proposed. After the initial sparring between
Socrates and Agathon (175c7e10), the guests dine and agree to drink
only as much as each man pleases (176a1e6). The physician Eryximachus
then makes a proposal about the kind of entertainment they will enjoy:
I propose that we let the aulos-player who just now came in go and
pipe to herself or, if she wishes, to the women inside, and that today
we spend our time with each other in talk (176e69). After all of the
guests enthusiastically agree to decline the womans services, Eryximachus
proposes, specifically, that they compete in praising the god Eros (177a1
d5). In proposing Eros as a topic for competitive speaking, Eryximachus
reports the complaint of Phaedrus that neither poets nor prose writers have
yet made an encomium of Eros (177a5b1). Prodicus, Phaedrus said, praised
Heracles,7 and another man praised salt for its usefulness, but no one has
6 As far as I know, this aspect of the theme of rivalry between poetry and philosophy in the Symposium
has never been discussed. A good, recent account of this theme from another perspective is that of
Scott and Welton 2008: esp. 3543, 1513, 1812 and 1913.
7 Bury 1932, on 177b, notes that Prodicus story about Heracles choice of Virtue is recounted in Xen.
Mem. 2.1.21ff.
adequately praised Eros (177b1c4). The salt example suggests that the kind
of encomium Phaedrus and Eryximachus have in mind is one that praises
something or someone for qualities that are useful to humans. Phaedrus
complaint, then, while perhaps an exaggeration, is an accurate reflection
of much of Greek literature, in which eros is often represented as more to
be feared than praised, a destructive force causing sickness and madness.8
Eros is also frequently associated with hybris, a term that has connotations
of violence, lust and dishonor.9 There are indeed hymns to Eros in tragedy
that are encomiastic in that they represent the god as a powerful force.10 In
another respect, however, these passages are not encomia, for they attribute
to Eros a power destructive to human beings. In Sophocles Antigone, Eros
is addressed in these terms: You who make unjust the minds of even just
people, to their ruin, you have stirred up this quarrel of kindred men (Ant.
7914), and in Euripides Hippolytus the god is called: Eros, the tyrant
of men . . . destroying mortals and sending all misfortunes to them when
he comes (Hipp. 53842). In giving his encomium, then, each speaker is
asked to remedy what is presented as a deficiency in the literary tradition,
by praising Eros for the good things he gives to humans.
One way in which the first five speakers do this is by their use of
quotations and allusions to show that, even if the poets and prose writers
have not made formal encomia of Eros, their works do in fact praise the god
for his beneficence. Despite having agreed to entertain one another with
their own words and to dispense with the musical entertainment provided
by another person, the aulos-player, each of the first five speakers in effect
invites others to speak for him when he quotes extensively from poets and
prose writers.11 The symposiasts competitive use of quotations is itself a
traditional sympotic game, and an activity at which Platos Socrates excels,
as will be seen below 3.3.1.12 In the context of the Symposium, however,
8 Numerous examples, especially in archaic poetry, are given by Calame 1999 and Cyrino 1995.
9 Examples of the association of eros with hybris are given by Fisher 1992: esp. 10411; Lattimore 1969:
23 and 812 n.24; and MacDowell 1976: 17. On hybris and violence see Lattimore 1969: 23. Hybris
and dishonor are discussed in Chapter 4 at 4.2.
10 Sophocles Antigone 781[801] and Euripides Hippolytus 525[564] are cited by Bury 1932: 19. Cf.
Soph. Trach. 4415, where Eros is said to be a sickness and to rule gods and humans. In lyric poetry,
Alcaeus (frag. 327 Voigt 1971 = Lobel and Page 1955) characterizes Eros as deintaton (most
terrible) without attributing beneficence to the god (cited by Rowe 1998, on 177b12). Friedlander
1969: 10 cites evidence for the worship of Eros.
11 Brandwood 1976: 9911003 provides a useful Index of Quotations in Plato, although it has
limitations noted by Halliwell 2000: 95 n.4. Brownson 1920: 2273 and Tables: 15965 collects
and discusses Platos quotations of and references to the poets. Tarrant 1951 is also helpful. A good
survey of each speakers use of rhetorical figures is given by Brisson 1998: 4951.
12 See Halliwell 2000 on the general Greek practice of invoking and citing poetic texts to formulate,
illustrate, or reinforce a point of view (95), and on Platos portrayal of and reaction to this practice.
the reliance on, and selective use of, quotations and allusions by the first
five speakers reveal not only their own lack of understanding about eros,
but also the inadequacies of the Greek literary tradition itself. When the
symposiasts quote or cite literary works without examining critically the
views these authorities express, they implicitly claim expertise they do not
in fact have. Poetry is itself full of contradictions.13 Moreover, as Socrates
notes in the Protagoras, it is not possible to question the poets, whose
works can be interpreted in different ways by different people. To quote
poetry, he says, is to act like inferior people who invite aulos-players to their
symposia.14 The first five speakers, then, demonstrate not only their own
amathia, but also the accuracy of this assessment of the poets and other
literary authorities.
3.2.2 Phaedrus: courage

According to Phaedrus, Eros is a great god (178a7) who is the cause of the
greatest goods for us (178c23). His encomium follows Greek conventions
in idealizing an asymmetrical relationship between two men, the older
erastes, lover, and the younger eromenos, beloved (178e12, 180a4b5).
Eros is a benefactor because he inspires the lover with shame in regard to
shameful things and with love of honor (philotimia) with respect to what is
noble (178d12, 178e6). Phaedrus is almost exclusively concerned with only
one aspect of Eros: the gods role as a source of courage in facing death either
in battle or in other circumstances.15 More specifically, courage leads the
lover to protect (179a6) or even to die for the beloved (179b4). Eros inspires
even the most cowardly man with the virtue of courage (nqeon poiseie
prv retn . . . mnov mpnesai), so that he becomes like someone who
is by nature bravest (179a7b3). Phaedrus holds that courage is conducive
to political virtue. An army or city of lovers and beloveds, he says, would be
Competitive quotation of poetry at symposia is discussed by Lissarrague 1990b: esp. 135, and in
several of the chapters in Murray 1990, Lukinovich, esp. 264, Pellizer, esp. 17980 and Rosler. Vetta
1983 provides an excellent introduction to the role of poetry in the Greek symposium. Of particular
interest is his discussion of metapoiesis, the correction or transformation of a poem known to an
audience (xxxxxxi).
13 Halliwell 2000: 102 cites Laws 4.719ce, Meno 95d96a and Prt. 339aff. for Platos view that self-
contradiction is a fundamental characteristic of mimetic poetry. Two poets may also contradict each
other. For example, in Platos Lys., Homer and Hesiod are cited in support of opposite views: Lys.
214a6 quotes Od. 17.218, on the attraction of like to like, and Lys. 215c5d1 quotes Hesiod, Op. 256
on their enmity (noted by Vicaire 1960: 1921).
14 Prt. 347b8348a9, noting that different people have different interpretations of poetry; cf. Phdr.
275d4e5.
15 Military terminology is used at 178e4 (stratpedon), 179a1 (macmenoi), 179a34 (lipn txin,
pla pobaln).
best governed, for they would refrain from all shameful things and compete
with each other in love of honor (178e3179a2).16
There are, however, indications that Phaedrus lacks understanding when
he makes these claims. For one thing, he seriously compromises his own
thesis when he attributes the same virtues to the beloved, who is not inspired
by Eros, as he does to the lover, who is so inspired. According to Phaedrus,
the beloved, like the lover, experiences shame and loves honor, and he
fights courageously in the presence of his lover (178e1179a2). The beloved
is even capable of dying for his lover, as Achilles dies to avenge his lover
Patroclus by killing Hector (179e1180a4).17 Indeed, Phaedrus suggests that
the beloved who acts courageously has virtue superior to that of the lover
precisely because he is not inspired by love: [T]he gods . . . marvel and
admire more . . . when the eromenos has affection for the erastes than when
the erastes has affection for his boyfriend. For the erastes is more divine than
the boyfriend, since he is inspired (nqeov gr sti: 180a7b4).18 If the
beloved acts virtuously without the inspiration of Eros, however, it would
appear that the god is not, after all, the cause, or at least the sole cause, of
the greatest goods for us, as Phaedrus claims (178c23).19
Another weakness in Phaedrus account is that he appeals uncritically
to sources that could also be used to undermine his claims. In support of
his view that Eros is the oldest of the gods, Phaedrus quotes from Hesiod,
Theogony 11620: Hesiod says that first Chaos came to be, but next [came]
broad-breasted Earth, the ever steadfast seat of all things, and Love (178b3
7). However, he leaves out any negative associations and attributes when he
omits Hesiods reference to Tartarus (119) and stops just before the poets
lines attributing destructive powers to the god: Love . . . the loosener of
limbs, who overcomes sense and prudent counsel in the breasts of all gods
and humans (Theog. 1212).20 Phaedrus also quotes Homer selectively
16 Bury 1932, on 178e notes that this principle was exemplified in the sacred band of the Thebans and
cites a parallel in Xenophon, Symp. 8.32.
17 Phaedrus follows Aeschines (1.142: Against Timarchus) and Aeschylus, Myrmidons (frags. 228, 229
Mette 1959 = 135, 136 Radt 1985) in representing this relationship as an erotic one, although he
departs from Aeschines in portraying Achilles as the eromenos (noted by Dover 1989: 53 and 197).
Dover 1980 on 180a4 suggests that Aeschylus may have been the first to represent Achilles as the
erastes. Unlike Phaedrus, Xenophons Socrates (Symp. 8.31) denies that there is an erotic element in
Homers representation of this relationship (Dover 1989: 199). Davidson 2007: 25584 argues that
the relationship was erotic even in Homer.
18 I borrow the translation boyfriend from Gill 1999.
19 Cf. Corrigan and Glazov-Corrigan 2004: 534 and Rowe 1998, on 180a7b4.
20 On the omission of 1212 cf. Hunter 2004: 401. Theog. 119 is bracketed by Solmsen 1990 and by
Mazon 1951, who cites Plato in support of the excision. The line is, however, accepted by West 1966,
and Phaedrus omission of Tartarus is consistent with his omission of Theog. 1212.
when he argues that Eros inspires courage in lovers. According to Homer,
says Phaedrus, a god breathed battle-strength into some of the heroes
(179b12). Phaedrus, however, omits the name of the god who does this
in Iliad 10.482: Athena, a virgin goddess, whose domain is not eros but
wisdom.21 The passages omitted by Phaedrus, then, suggest that wisdom is
more desirable than eros. His use of the example of Achilles and Patroclus
reinforces the same idea. In stating that Achilles gave aid to his lover
Patroclus by taking vengeance on Hector (179e1180a7), Phaedrus omits
the fact that it was Achilles mistake in judgment that caused Patroclus
death in the first place. Indeed, Achilles blames himself for his companions
death when he speaks the well-known lines in the Iliad:
I must die soon, then; since I was not to stand by my companion
when he was killed. And now, far away from the land of his fathers,
he has perished, and lacked my fighting strength to defend him.
Now, since I am not going back to the beloved land of my fathers,
since I was no light of safety to Patroklos, nor to my other
companions, who in their numbers went down before glorious Hektor,
but sit here beside my ships, a useless weight on the good land,
I, who am such as no other of the bronze-armoured Achaians
in battle, though there are others also better in council. (Il. 18.98106)22
According to these lines, courage without wisdom leads to disaster. More-
over, Phaedrus example of Alcestis, the lover who so excelled in philia
[friendship] because of eros (179c12) that she was willing to die for her
husband, Admetus, is also questionable. At least in Euripides play, Alcestis
appears to be motivated by philia rather than by eros.23 It is instead Adme-
tus who exhibits sexual passion for his wife, saying that he will embrace
a model of her in bed (34852). Admetus eros does not make him coura-
geous, however. He allows his wife to die for him because he is a coward
(Alc. 9547), and because of a mistake in judgment that he later recognizes
(rti manqnw: 940). A more comprehensive survey of the passages Phae-
drus quotes, then, suggests that, according to the very tradition to which
he appeals, the association of eros with courage is a dubious one, and that
eros and courage without judgment lead to disaster. One way in which
Phaedrus shows his amathia, then, is by failing to ask questions about the
relationship between eros and courage represented in these passages.
21 In Il. 15.262 the phrase is used of Apollo, another god associated with wisdom. References are given
by Bury 1932, on 179b.
22 Translation: Lattimore 1951. Lines 1056, often suspected, are ably defended by Edwards 1991.
23 Noted by Rowe 1998, on 179b56. See especially Alc. 279: sn gr filan sebmesqa (I honor
your friendship).
3.2.3 Pausanias: education

Pausanias departs from Phaedrus in distinguishing two kinds of Loves and
two kinds of lovers. The inferior lover, governed by the Eros who is the
son of the vulgar Aphrodite, loves women as well as boys, bodies more
than souls, and foolish more than sensible people, being concerned only
with accomplishing the act (181a7b6). The statement that the heavenly
Aphrodite, the mother of the superior Eros, has no part in hybris (brewv
morou: 181c4) suggests that, in contrast, the inferior Eros and lover are
indeed hubristic. When they are governed by the inferior Eros, both lover
and beloved act shamefully and give rise to negative judgments in others,
who blame this kind of eros and think it shameful for a beloved to yield to
a lover of this kind (182a13, 183c4d3). Pausanias is primarily concerned
with the superior lover, inspired by the superior Eros, who is the son
of the heavenly Aphrodite. This man loves only males, who are by nature
stronger and more sensible (181c26), and he loves good character (qouv
crhsto: 183e5) more than body. Superior lovers love with the intention
of being together and living in common for life with their beloveds
(181d35).
Aside from positing two Loves, Pausanias accepts much of what Phaedrus
says, including the idealization of the relationship between older erastes
and younger eromenos, and the assumption that Eros is a god (180d3).
Pausanias also agrees with Phaedrus in holding that the superior Eros
inspires virtue. The superior lover educates (padeusin: 184e1) the beloved,
who in turn gratifies his lover sexually (184c7e4). Like Phaedrus (see
178e3179a2), Pausanias is concerned with virtue within a civic setting.
He stresses the importance of law and custom, and favorably contrasts
Athens with other cities.24 Pausanias, however, stresses the intellectual
virtues that are conducive to political virtue, whereas Phaedrus emphasized
love of honor and courage. Pausanias beloved gratifies the lover in order
to acquire philosophy and other virtues (filosofan ka tn llhn
retn: 184d1) or wisdom [phronesis] and other virtues (frnhsin ka
tn llhn retn: 184d7e1).
Closer examination of his speech, however, reveals that Pausanias lacks
those intellectual virtues that he himself emphasizes, for his account of the
two Loves depends on a dubious way of distinguishing noble from shameful
24 The word nmov (law) and cognates appear at 181d7, e3; 182a5, a7, b2, b7, d3, d4, e2; 183b4, c2, c3,
d3; 184a1, a6, b5, b7, c4, d4, e3. Davidson 2007: 41845 provides an insightful analysis of Pausanias
speech as a source of information about distinctively Athenian customs.
acts.25 Pausanias states that an act is not noble or shameful in itself, but
that it is noble if done well, shameful if done shamefully (180e4181a4;
183d46). He also claims that it is noble to do anything whatsoever for the
sake of virtue (185b15). These statements entail that superior lovers who
act for the sake of virtue can act nobly even while engaging in activities
that would be thought shameful in other circumstances. They can, for
example, resort to entreaties, swear oaths, lie in doorways (183a46) and
in other ways endure a kind of voluntary slavery (183a67, 184b7c1).
According to Pausanias, superior beloveds, like their lovers, can also act
nobly even while doing things that might appear to be shameful. Pausanias
holds that it is right for the beloved to endure even voluntary slavery in
gratifying the lover (184c27), and to serve him in any way whatsoever
if the beloved will thereby become wise [sophos] and good (184d57).26
Even if the beloved is deceived and his lover turns out to be a bad man, his
deception is a noble one (kal pth), for he has shown that for the
sake of virtue he is ready to do anything for anyone (pn . . . pant), and to
do anything in any way (pn pntwv: 185a5b5). These last statements in
particular, with their repetition of any, can be taken to imply that license
is justified if it promotes virtue.27 They thus risk collapsing Pausanias
distinction between the vulgar Eros and the heavenly Eros. At the very
least, their phrasing suggests that Pausanias views need to be supported
further. Pausanias also shows his own lack of understanding about eros in
another way. According to his account, one kind of lover is superior because
he is able to educate his beloved, by giving him wisdom (phronesis) and the
other virtues (184c7e4). What really distinguishes the superior from the
inferior lover, then, is not eros of a certain kind, but virtue and wisdom.
Like Phaedrus, Pausanias uses quotations to support his criticism of
the inferior lover, whose oaths are no oaths (183b7) and who goes flying
away (183e34).28 In referring to the genealogies of the two Aphrodites, the
heavenly and the vulgar (180d6e1, 181b8c4), who are the mothers of the
two Loves, Pausanias does not name his sources, but his fellow symposiasts
would have recognized them as Hesiod and Homer.29
25 Bury 1932: xxvixxvii notes that Pausanias is sophistic in taking the side of law against nature, and
in being inconsistent and self-contradictory.
26 In contrast, Socrates in Euthydemus 282b36 restricts the slavery of the beloved to noble service:
tion . . . phreten tn kaln phrethmtwn.
27 Cf. Corrigan and Glazov-Corrigan 2004: 601; Nichols 2009: 423; Rosen 1987: 812; and Rowe
1998, on 185b34.
28 Bury 1932 notes that the statement at 183b7 is a proverbial expression with a number of poetic
versions and that 183e34 recalls Il. 2.71.
29 Dover 1980, on 180d69 cites Hesiod Theog. 190ff. (daughter of Ouranos) and Il. 5.370430 (daughter
of Zeus and Dione).
Pausanias also resembles Phaedrus in using literary sources selectively,
omitting those lines that tell against his distinction between the two Loves.
Specifically, he omits important details of the Hesiodic account of the birth
of Ouranian (Heavenly) Aphrodite. According to Hesiods well-known
story, Ouranos hates the children Gaia bears him and hides them deep
within her, causing her pain. Gaia then persuades her son, Cronos, to
castrate his father, and Aphrodite grows from the severed genitals (Theogony
154200). The circumstances surrounding Aphrodites birth in Hesiods
poem might well lead Pausanias audience to question his view that she
has no share in hybris (181c4). The outrage Ouranos commits against
Gaia could be considered hubristic, as could Cronos dishonoring violence
against Ouranos. Hesiods Aphrodite, then, does share in hybris, at least in
so far as her birth is the result of hubristic acts by her father and brother.30
Pausanias also fails to mention Hesiods statement that deceit is included
in Aphrodites portion (moran . . . xaptav: Theog. 2035). Nevertheless,
his contention that the superior beloved may be deceived (pth: 185b1,
cf. 185a1, a7) might well remind his audience of this characteristic, of
dubious morality, attributed by Hesiod to the heavenly Aphrodite. The
Greek literary tradition to which Pausanias appeals, then, suggests that the
son of the heavenly Aphrodite may, like his mother, have some share in
hybris and deceit. If this is so, the superior Eros may not be very different
from the inferior Eros, the son of the vulgar Aphrodite. It appears, then,
that the literary sources to which Pausanias appeals could equally well be
used to support the view that there is no distinction between the two
Loves. His selective and uncritical use of these sources is one indication
that Pausanias lacks understanding of his subject.
3.2.4 Eryximachus: medicine

The physician Eryximachus agrees with Pausanias in holding that Eros
is a god (186b1) who is double (186a23) and in idealizing the Eros
who inspires virtue and lacks hybris. The common association in Greek
literature of eros and hybris is downplayed in both of these encomia of
a non-hubristic Eros.31 The physician also resembles his predecessor in
failing to give adequate criteria for distinguishing the two Loves, thereby
demonstrating his lack of understanding in the very field in which he
claims expertise.
30 The circumstances of ones birth were thought to influence character. For example, in Platos Laws
775d4e2, the Athenian states that people who commit hybris or injustice before conception stamp
these effects upon the souls of their children.
31 For the association see above n.9.
Eryximachus distinguishes the noble, heavenly (187d7) and orderly
(188a3, c3) Eros, who acts with sophrosyne (moderation) and justice (188d5
6) from the shameful (186d1) and vulgar Eros (pndhmov: 187e1), who is
hubristic and unjust ( met tv brewv Erwv . . . dkhsen: 188a78). He
does not limit the gods effects to human relationships, a topic he mentions
only briefly (186a34), holding instead that Eros has power over all human
and divine affairs (186b12), and over medicine in particular (186e4187a1).
The hubristic Eros produces greed and disorder, plagues, diseases of ani-
mals and plants, and bad weather (188a7b5), while the noble Eros creates
philia and community (koinwna: 188c1) among humans, and between
humans and gods (188b6d9). Medicine is the science of distinguishing
(diagignskwn) the noble from the shameful eros in the case of the body,
and the most accomplished physician is someone who knows how to cre-
ate the former instead of the latter (186c5d5).32 Other sciences music,
gymnastics, agriculture (187a1) and divination (188b7) know how to do
this with respect to other things.
Far from telling us how to distinguish the noble from the shameful eros,
however, Eryximachus does not even explain why the shameful eros should
be called eros at all, rather than hostility. The science of medicine knows how
to make things that are most hostile (cqista nta), that is, the opposites
in the body (for example, the cold, the hot, the wet and the dry), become
friends and have eros for one another (186d5e1). Similarly, the science of
music knows how to produce eros and agreement (187c34) between high
and low sounds that were formerly in disagreement (187a8b2). In both
cases, then, the skilled physician does not replace a shameful with a noble
eros, but rather produces eros instead of hostility and disagreement. The
doctor adds further confusion when he recommends making judicious
use of the vulgar and shameful Eros: One must take care in applying
this Eros to those to whom one does apply him, so as to provide benefit
from the pleasure he brings without producing licentiousness (187e13).
In making this surprising concession to the shameful Eros, Eryximachus
fails to distinguish science from the shameful gratification of appetite,
and undercuts his own fundamental distinction between the noble and
the hubristic eros.33 It seems, then, that because Eryximachus does not
32 In this passage, diagignskwn (cf. 187c7) is used almost in the technical sense of making a medical
diagnosis (Bury 1932, on 186c).
33 Cf. Rosen 1987: 11516. Attempts to justify Eryximachus statement do not satisfy. Konstan and
Young-Bruehl 1982: 42 write: It is permissible . . . to take advantage of the baneful desires, so long
as they are not permitted to gain the upper hand. Rowe 1998, on 187e12 (cf. 1999b: 624) argues
that Eryximachus addresses Aristophanes and refers to comedy.
have the knowledge that would enable him to make an accurate diagnosis
by distinguishing the noble from the shameful eros, he is not a good
physician, according to his own definition (186c7d1). Moreover, his failure
to recognize that he is ignorant in these matters is an indication of his
amathia.34
In support of his views about music, Eryximachus does not, like his
predecessors, appeal to poetic authority, but instead quotes the prose of the
philosopher Heraclitus. Music, he says, is governed by Eros:
as perhaps Heraclitus means to say, although he doesnt say it well with his words.
He says that the one being at variance with itself agrees with itself, like the
harmony of bow and lyre [diafermenon at at sumfresqai, sper
rmonan txou te ka lrav]. It is very illogical to say that harmony is at
variance or is composed of elements that are still at variance. But perhaps this is
what he meant to say: that harmony has come into existence, by means of musical
skill, from things that were previously at variance (that is, the high and the low)
and then later came to be in accord. (187a3b2)
The text of the Heraclitus passage quoted by Eryximachus is problematic.

Fragment 22 B51 DK reads: they do not understand how, being at variance
with itself it is in accord [homologeei] with itself; there is a back-turned [pal-
intropos] harmony like that of bow and lyre.35 Kirk, Raven and Schofield
(1995), on the other hand, read sumpheretai (agrees) instead of homolo-
geei (is in accord with) on the basis of Symposium 187a5, and they read
palintonos (back-stretched or counter-stretched) instead of palintropos
(back-turned). They translate: being at variance it agrees [sumpheretai]
with itself . . . there is a back-stretched [palintonos] connexion, as in the
bow and the lyre.36 They convincingly argue that palintonos, which has
as much support in ancient sources as does palintropos, gives better sense,
referring to something tending equally in opposite directions. A tension
in one direction automatically produces an equivalent tension in the other;
if not, the system collapses.37 The texts of both DK and Kirk, Raven and
Schofield, then, indicate that Eryximachus misquotes Heraclitus, adding
the one before being at variance, and leaving out back-stretched
34 McPherran 2006 argues that Eryximachus speech is philosophical in that it places eros within the
context of the universal. He does not, however, address the concerns noted above.
35 o xunisin kwv diafermenon wuti mologei palnpropov rmonh kwsper txou ka
lrhv.
36 Kirk, Raven and Schofield 1995: 192, frag. 209: o xunisin kwv diafermenon wut xumfretai
palntonov rmonh kwsper txou ka lrhv.
37 Kirk, Raven and Schofield 1995: 1923; quotation: 193 n.2.
(or back-turned).38 The addition is of little significance for present pur-
poses, but the omission, as will be seen below, has serious philosophical
consequences.
The doctor not only misquotes, but also radically misinterprets
Heraclitus.39 One problem is that Eryximachus is concerned with harmony
between musical notes, while Heraclitus focuses on the very different kind
of equilibrium that exists within a single physical object.40 Heraclitus pal-
intonos harmonia is a back-stretched connection in which two opposite
tensions that produced by the strings of a bow or lyre and that produced
by the curved arms of these artifacts are balanced so as to create a sin-
gle unified effect.41 According to Heraclitus, this kind of war and strife
between opposites produces order in the cosmos: One must know that war
is common and justice is strife, and all things happen according to strife
and necessity (DK 22 B80). Eryximachus, however, calls this principle
of equilibrium of opposites very illogical (187a67), and he reinterprets
Heraclitus so as to eliminate it. What Heraclitus really means, according
to Eryximachus, is that a harmony cannot exist where there is variance. He
then uses his corrected version of Heraclitus to support his own view that
medicine and music produce eros, friendship and harmony between things
that were previously enemies and in disagreement (186c5187c5).
Eryximachus correction of Heraclitus contains playful elements.42 How-
ever, it can also be taken as symptomatic of this physicians lack of under-
standing of his own science (episteme: 186c6) of medicine. There is con-
siderable evidence that many medical writers, from Alcmaeon on, held a
Heraclitean view of health as a krasis (blend) of opposing powers in the
body (for example, the hot, the cold, the wet and the dry). In this dynamic
equilibrium, no opposite was suppressed: it retained its own power, but
was restrained by the corresponding opposite.43 The fact that Eryximachus
simply calls this theory illogical and omits the word back-stretched,
which characterizes the kind of harmony constituted by a dynamic
38 DK vol. i, 162 n.3 note Dielss suggestion that mologe n (the one agrees) is a possible reading,
quoting Symp. 187a.
39 Pace McPherran 2006: 80, who provides (n.27) helpful bibliography on the issue.
40 Cf. Konstan and Young-Bruehl 1982: 41; Nehamas and Woodruff 1989: 21 n.24.
41 I follow Kirk, Raven and Schofield 1995: 1923.
42 Hunter 2004: 539, and Rowe 1999b: 62 and n.34.
43 Alcmaeon, DK 24 B4. On ancient medicine see Vlastos 1947: esp. 1568, citing Alcmaeon, and
Tracy 1969: 2276: esp. 234 and 67: Health . . . is . . . a dynamic equilibrium maintained through
the active interplay of opposing forces (24: emphasis in original). I argue in Belfiore 1986, 2006
and Chapter 6 at 6.4 that psychological health is also said to depend on an equilibrium of opposites
in Platos dialogues.
equilibrium, suggests that Eryximachus has neither the medical knowl-
edge he claims, nor an adequate understanding of Heraclitus.
Another indication of Eryximachus lack of understanding is provided
within the dramatic framework by Aristophanes, who was prevented by
the hiccups from speaking in his proper turn. Throughout Eryximachus
speech, Aristophanes hiccups and applies the remedies prescribed by the
doctor: holding his breath, gargling with water, and tickling his nose in
order to sneeze (185d6e5). When he finally stops, after applying all of
these cures, he remarks that he is surprised that the orderliness of the body
desires such noises and ticklings (188e4189a6). In actions and words, then,
Aristophanes ridicules (gelwtopoiev: 189a8) the doctors speech.44
3.2.5 Aristophanes: comedy

As befits a comic poet, Aristophanes presents his encomium in the form of
a humorous myth. Humans, he says, were originally whole people, with
two heads and two sets of limbs, who, when they moved quickly, went
rolling around like giant beach-balls with appendages (189e5190a8). After
Zeus cut them in two as punishment for their attack on the gods, each half
longed for and sought after its other half (191a56). Eros, then, is desire and
pursuit of the whole (192e10193a1). If we succeed, with the help of Eros,
in becoming reunited with our other halves, we will return to our former
condition as whole people and so become blessed and happy (193d15).
Although it has more comic aspects, this account resembles those of
the first three speakers in idealizing Eros as a god (189c8, 193c8) who
benefits humans. Aristophanes states that Eros is the most people-loving
of the gods, an ally of humans and a healer of those things the healing
of which would be productive of the greatest happiness for the human
race (189c8d3; cf. 193d45). Like Phaedrus and Pausanias, he values most
highly an asymmetrical relationship between an older man and a young
boy (191e6192b3). He agrees with Eryximachus in characterizing Eros as
a physician and healer, arguing that eros is an innate part of our nature
as half-people, beings who lack what is needed to make us whole, and
that the god provides a remedy for the defects of human nature (189d13,
191c8d3, 193d5). Aristophanes eros, like that of Phaedrus and Pausanias, is
a civilizing force. Satisfaction of desire allows lovers to practice husbandry
and the other means of subsistence45 (191c78) instead of being idle in
44 On the hiccups see Bury 1932: xxiixxiii; Clay 1975: 2412; Lowenstam 1986; Plochmann 1972: 334;
Scott and Welton 2008: 57; and Wardy 2002: 1920.
45 Translation: Bury 1932, on p t rga (191c).
these matters due to frustrated desire, as was the case before Zeus made
sexual intercourse possible (191a8b1). Eros also contributes to political life,
according to Aristophanes, for boys who enjoy embracing men are the only
ones who turn to political affairs in later life. These boys, he says, are not
shameless, but brave and manly (192a27).46 Aristophanes Eros, then, like
the Eros of Phaedrus, is a single entity having nothing to do with shame,
instead of being a double god, like the Eros of Pausanias and Eryximachus.
Aristophanes begins his speech by explicitly claiming to have supe-
rior knowledge of Eros. Because people have entirely failed to recognize
the power of eros (189c45), Aristophanes says, he will try to initiate the
symposiasts into an understanding of this power.47 They in turn will be
teachers (didskaloi) of others if they first learn (maqen) from Aristo-
phanes (189d36). In using the term didaskaloi (teachers), Aristophanes
elevates his own art, for the term can also mean producers or trainers of
a dramatic chorus.48
In spite of his authoritative claims, Aristophanes, like the previous speak-
ers, does not really have the wisdom he claims, for he does not give an
adequate account of how the god benefits humans. He fails to explain how
reunion with our other halves is good for us, or how eros can help us to
achieve the union that may in any case be an unattainable ideal (193c58).
Whatever the good is that the two halves of the whole people want from
each other, Aristophanes says, it is certainly not sex (192c4d2). Indeed,
far from being the greatest human good, sex in Aristophanes myth is a
thoroughly ridiculous affair. The whole people were the reverse of the beast
with two backs, resembling in some respects two modern people joined
at the back. Their faces and genitals were turned outwards (189e5190a4),
and they reproduced not in each other but within the earth, like cicadas
(191b7c1).49 Aristophanes leaves the exact nature of this laughable sexual
act to the imagination of his audience. The sexual practices of the half-
people are even more comical. When the whole people were first cut in
two, the face of each half was turned around toward the cut (190e25), but
the genitals remained in their former position, at what is now the back or,
more accurately, the buttocks.50 These half-people embraced one another
46 Ludwig 1996 and 2002: 2768, takes these statements seriously; others interpret them as irony or
humor, for example: Dover 1980, on 192a17; Hug 1876: 91 n.4; and Rowe 1998, on 191e8192a3.
47 eshgsasqai (189d3) means initiate into: Bury 1932. 48 LSJ, s.v. didskalov, II.
49 The exact shape of the whole people is open to debate. See Ludwig 2002: 723 and Morrison 1964:
469. The comparison with cicadas concerns only means of reproduction (Bury 1932, on 191c) and
does not extend to ethical qualities, as Dorter claims (1969: 2202).
50 Cf. Ludwig 2002: 73 n.10.
(191a7), but were unable to have sexual intercourse because their genitals
were in the wrong position. They therefore continued to reproduce within
the earth, like the whole people (191b7c1). Finally, Zeus had pity on the
half-people and turned their genitals around to the front, so that they could
reproduce and relieve their frustration by means of each other (191b5c8).
These half-people are us, and the juxtaposition of their sexual practices
with the practices of the whole people, and with those of the half-people
before their genitals were turned around, brings out the comic aspects of
our own sexual acts.51
The greatest good that Eros could give us, then, according to Aristo-
phanes, would not be the ridiculous act of sexual intercourse, but a return
to our original nature as whole people (193c25, d4). In fact, Aristophanes
supposes that Hephaestus might offer literally to fuse lovers together in
order to make them whole (192d2e5). This story, unfortunately, recalls
Homers myth of Aphrodite and Ares, who were chained together in bed
by Hephaestus as a shameful punishment for adultery, while the other gods
stood around laughing (Odyssey 8.266366). Indeed, the comic poet fails
to explain how a return to our former whole state will benefit us, anymore
than being chained together helped Aphrodite and Ares. The whole peo-
ple were licentious (selganein: 190c6), incontinent (kolasav: 190c8),
arrogant (fronmata megga) and attacked the gods (190b6). Aristo-
phanes identifies them with, or compares them specifically to, Homers
Giants, Ephialtes and Otus (190b7),52 and more generally to the Giants
of myth (190c34).53 The half-people are too weak to have these defects,
but Aristophanes does not rule out the possibility that the Eros who could
return them to their ancient whole nature would also make them licentious
and arrogant again.54 Aristophanes says that humans must be pious if they
are going to return to their ancient whole nature (193d35), but he does not
explain how, if they do become whole again, they will be different from
the original whole people, who were notably impious. Indeed, if satisfied
eros could make people more vicious, it is hard to see how it could be a
true healer of human nature or lead to happiness.
The poetic sources to which Aristophanes alludes, then, could also be
used to support the view, contrary to his own, that being whole is a bad
51 Nussbaum 1986: 1716 gives a good account of the humorous aspects of sex in Aristophanes speech.
52 Dover 1980, on 190b7 cites Il. 5.385ff. and Od. 11.30720.
53 Sources include Pindar, Nem. 1.679, Eur. HF. 17780 and Ion 20618, cited by Gantz 1993, vol. i:
44554.
54 Ludwig 2002: 107 makes a good point, although he expresses greater certainty than the text warrants:
If eros . . . aims at reconstituting the natural man in each of us, then the fulfillment of eros would
entail becoming lawless once more.
thing. Socrates later takes him up on this very point, when his Diotima
argues that eros is not of the half or the whole unless these are good (205d10
206a1). While Aristophanes can tell a good story, then, he does not give
evidence of being able to answer important questions about eros, which,
according to Socrates, is one of the main subjects of his plays (177e12).
3.2.6 Agathon: tragedy

According to the tragic poet, Agathon, Eros is the most happy, most
beautiful, best (195a67, cf. 197c2) and youngest of the gods (195a8, c1).
He is the embodiment of good things, and he gives them to humans. Eros
is delicate (195c7), and he flees the hard character in order to settle in
the soft one (195e57). The god is gracious (lewv), good (agathos) and a
giver of gentleness, good will and attachment (okeithtov), a god who
removes ill will, harshness and alienation (llotrithtov) (197d15). Eros
creates friendship and peace among the gods (195c56), and to humans he
brings peace and, when we are grieving, sleep (197c56). For good measure,
Agathon also attributes to the god the virtues of courage (196c8), justice
(196b6), moderation (196c3) and especially the wisdom (sophia: 196d5) that
has enabled people, under loves guidance (rwtov gemonesantov), to
invent crafts (197a67), including Agathons own art of poetry (196e12).
As is suitable for a poet, Agathons views about eros depend, more than
those of any other speaker, on the literary tradition. His speech is full
of quotations and allusions to poetry and prose writers, and the end of
his speech employs an extraordinary variety of metrical forms.55 Agathon
quotes and echoes Homer,56 and he adapts a line from Sophocles, substi-
tuting Eros for necessity.57 He also quotes the rhetorician Alcidamas,58
Euripides,59 and a poetic source unknown to us.60 Agathons statement
that Eros lives among flowers (kat nqh daita: 196a8) recalls a common
theme in literature and, of course, the title of Agathons own play, The
55 Dover 1980: 124.
56 Bury 1932 notes that 195b5 (moion mo e pelzei: like always draws near to like) is derived
from Od. 17.218, and that the couplet at 197c56 recalls Od. 5.391[2] = 12.168[9].
57 Not even Ares withstands Eros ( Erwti od *rhv nqstatai: 196c8d1). Bury 1932; Brand-
wood 1976: 992 #338 and 1002 #261; and Vicaire and Laborderie 2002: 42 n.3 cite Soph. Thyestes,
frag. 235; Nauck 1964 (= 256 Radt 1977).
58 The laws, kings of the city, are just (o plewv basilv nmoi dkaia enai: 196c23). Aristotle,
Rh. 3.1406a1823 attributes a similar phrase to Alcidamas: cited by Bury 1932; Hug 1876: 105 n.3;
and Brandwood 1976: 992 #337 and 995 #51.
59 Eros is said to make everyone a poet even if he is previously unmusical (kn mousov t prn:
196e23): Eur. Stheneboea, frag. 663 Nauck 1964, cited by Bury 1932 and Brandwood 1976: 996, #84.
60 To govern gods and humans (kubernn qen te ka nqrpwn: 197b3) is possibly from a tragedy
of Agathon (Bury 1932 and Brandwood 1976: 994, #49) or Aeschylus (Renehan 1990: 1256).
Flower.61 Agathon uses other terms that are common in poetry when he
speaks of Eros as enchanting (qlgwn: 197e4) gods and humans, and says
that Eros is the father of charms, yearning, longing (cartwn, mrou,
pqou patr: 197d7).62 Moreover, Eros is himself a poet, who inspires
other poets (196d6e6).
However, Agathon leaves out lines, in the very passages he quotes, that
cast doubt on the beneficence of Eros. Agathon implicitly claims to be
Homers equal when he speaks at length about the delicacy (paltaton:
195e8) of Eros and argues that a poet like Homer is needed to show
us this delicacy (195c6196a1). Agathon first quotes the lines in which
Homer states that Ate (Delusion) is delicate because she walks on soft
things (195d45, quoting Il. 19.923). He then offers a similar proof for
the delicacy of Eros, saying that Eros lives in the softest things. However,
Agathon omits the words immediately preceding and following those he
quotes: Delusion . . . the destructive, who deceives all . . . harming people
(Il. 19.912, 94).63 Homers lines, then, could be used to support the view
that delicate things like eros can be harmful.
In other respects also Agathon uses the literary tradition selectively,
omitting ideas that call his own views into question. The tragic poet says
that Eros hates old age, which he flees (195b14), and he also states that there
is always war between Eros and ugliness (196a67). Not only does Agathon
fail to explain how the god of love, who brings peace and friendship (195c5
6, 197c5), can also hate and engage in war, he also makes statements that
are contrary to both the Greek literary tradition and everyday experience.
Indeed, old people as well as young fall in love, and one persons beloved
may be considered ugly by others.64 Diotimas statement that a person can
love someone with a beautiful soul, even if the beloved has only a small
amount of bloom (literally, flower, anthos: 210b8c1) will later correct
Agathons view that Eros and ugliness are opposed, perhaps with a pun on
the title of his play, The Flower. Moreover, poetry is full of instances that
contradict Agathons claims that eros is just, commits no violence, and is
always served willingly (196b6c2).65 Indeed, immediately after Agathons
61 Eros and flowers: Calame 1999: 15364. On Agathons play, Anthei, see Leveque 1955: 10514.
62 Examples are given by Calame 1999. See subject index s.v. thelgein, pothos, himeros, kharis.
63 Omissions are noted by Corrigan and Glazov-Corrigan 2004: 878; Dorter 1969: 225; and Rosen
1987: 179.
64 Old age: Plato, Prm. 136e9137a4, referring to Ibycus frag. 287 Page 1962; traits considered ugly:
Resp. 5. 474d4475a2.
65 Dover 1980, on 196b7 cites Sappho frag. 172 [Lobel and Page 1955], in which Eros is said to give pain,
and Theognis 13536. See also Ibycus 287.7 (force) and above nn.810. Inadequacies in Agathons
arguments about the virtues of Eros are noted by Robin 2002: lxviiilxix.
speech, Socrates reminds his audience of the deceits practiced by lovers
and of the disasters eros can cause when he quotes Hippolytus famous
line in Euripides play: My tongue swore but not my heart, spoken
by Hippolytus when he threatens to break his oath and reveal Phaedras
incestuous love for him.66
After Agathon finishes his encomium, Socrates delivers a harsh criticism,
remarking that, apparently, in giving an encomium, one should make the
subject appear as good and beautiful as possible, without regard for the truth
(198d8e2). In his elenchus of Agathon and in the teachings he attributes
to Diotima, Socrates argues that Agathons portrayal of Eros is inaccurate
in a number of respects. In fact, according to Socrates and Diotima, Eros
is not a god (202b10c2); he lacks good and beautiful things (201c45,
202d5), and he is himself neither beautiful nor good (202b23). Whether
or not all of Socrates arguments in his conversation with Agathon are
valid, and whether or not all of Diotimas views are adequately supported
by argument, the issues they raise about eros (or Eros) show that Agathon
has not subjected his own ideas, or those of the authorities he quotes, to
critical examination. For example, Agathon has not asked the questions he
needs to ask before attributing all good things to Eros. The poets account
of a perfect and wise god does not explain how eros can be compatible
with perfection, or how the wise can love the wisdom they already have,
a question raised by Diotima at 204a12. Moreover, in claiming that Eros
is eros of beauty (197b39), Agathon does not address the issues Diotima
raises about why we love beauty (204d39) or what the function (ergon) of
eros is (206b14).
Agathons speech, then, demonstrates that neither he nor the tradition
within which he claims expertise is able to give a satisfactory account of the
benefits of eros. There are, however, two indications that Agathons amathia
is less serious than that of the other speakers. When he cites Hesiod and Par-
menides, Agathon questions their veracity, saying: If they spoke the truth
(195c23). This statement suggests that he may be open to engaging in crit-
ical examination of his authorities. Second, Agathon concludes by saying:
Let this speech from me, Phaedrus . . . stand as my dedication to the god,
sharing as it does partly in play, partly in a modest seriousness [spoudv
metrav], to the best of my personal ability.67 Agathons modesty is con-
sistent with his ability to admit mistakes in his later conversation with
Socrates (201b1112). Moreover, Agathons explicit acknowledgement that
66 199a56 uses nearly the same words as Eur. Hipp. 612. On Platos use of Hippolytus in the Phaedrus
see further Chapter 6 at 6.3.
67 197e68. Translation: Rowe 1998.
his speech is partly serious, partly play indicates a self-awareness shared
by none of the other five speakers. Each is in fact playing a game, but
one in which he has a serious stake, as a self-proclaimed expert on the
topic.
I have argued in 3.2 that each of the first five speakers lacks understanding
of eros in that each claims to be an expert on this topic when in fact he is
not. The speakers show their amathia by expressing ideas, supported by a
selective use of literary quotations and allusions, without questioning or
examining these ideas. According to Socrates, they give encomia by making
Eros appear to be the most beautiful and best (199a1) without regard for
the truth (198e12). Specifically, the speakers claim that Eros is a god, that
he possesses beauty and virtue, and that he gives good things, including the
virtues, to humans.68 After their speeches, Socrates agrees with the other
speakers that Eros is the cause of good things (212b24). In other respects,
however, he calls their views into question. Before doing so, he wins his
first victory in words, aided by means of his skillful manipulation of poetic
allusions.
3.3 socrates: eros the philosopher
3.3.1 Interlude: Socrates and the Gorgon

Socrates prefaces his elenchus of Agathon (199c3201c9) with a brief inter-
lude (198b1199b5) in which he comments on the poets speech and con-
trasts his own manner of giving encomia with that of the other symposiasts.
When he describes his reactions to Agathons encomium, Socrates alludes
to Homer:
Indeed, thinking that I myself would not be able to say anything anywhere near
as fine as this, I almost ran away out of shame, and would have done so if Id had
anywhere to go. For the speech reminded me of Gorgias, so that I really had the
experience recounted by Homer. I was afraid that Agathon would end by sending
against my speech the head of Gorgias, who is terribly skillful at speaking, and
turn me to stony speechlessness. (198b6c5)
The reference to Homer in this passage indicates that Socrates is alluding

to the Gorgons head Odysseus fears encountering in the Underworld:
68 Eros is a god: Phaedrus (178a7), Pausanias (180d3), Eryximachus (186b1), Aristophanes (189c8 and
193c8d1), Agathon (195a5). Eros possesses beauty: Pausanias (181a56), Agathon (195a7 and 197c2).
Eros possesses virtue: Agathon (196b4197b3). Eros gives good things to humans: Phaedrus (179a3b3),
Pausanias (185b5c1), Eryximachus (188d49), Aristophanes (193c8d5), Agathon (197c1e5).
[G]reen fear took hold of me
with the thought that proud Persephone might send up against me
some gorgonish head of a terrible monster up out of Hades.
So, going back on board my ship, I told my companions
also to go aboard, and to cast off the stern cables.69
The image of the Gorgias/Gorgons head, placed exactly in the mid-
dle of the dialogue,70 has a wider resonance, however. For one thing, it
recalls the common sympotic motif of the Gorgons head on the inside
of drinking cups. As Francoise Frontisi-Ducroux points out, the Gorgon,
the aulos-playing satyr and Dionysus are often presented frontally on the
inside of drinking cups, staring at the drinker and presenting him with
representations of both the divine and the bestial aspects of his own nature
under the influence of wine.71 Socrates punning allusion to the Gorgons
head would also remind his audience of the story of Perseus and Medusa.
In Pindars Pythian 12, Perseus kills the Gorgon Medusa in order to use her
head to turn his enemy, Polydectes, to stone. Pindars story has sympotic
and musical associations, for Athena invents the aulos as a way of imi-
tating the cries of the Gorgon.72 Socrates image of the Gorgias/Gorgon
head brings with it all of these associations: Homeric, Pindaric, musi-
cal and sympotic. At this symposium, the philosopher does not play the
role of Homers Odysseus, who leaves Hades in fear, but that of Perseus,
who appropriates the powers of the Gorgons head for his own use. After
hearing Agathons poetic and Gorgianic eloquence, Socrates almost runs
away (198b7c1). But of course he does not do so, and far from being
turned to stony speechlessness (198c5) he proceeds to speak at great length.
Indeed, according to Alcibiades, Socrates resembles an aulos-playing satyr,
who, rather than being turned to stone by others eloquence, immobilizes
people with his words and leads them to examine their own lives (216a28).
The image of the Gorgias/Gorgon head in the middle of the dialogue,
then, is a good example of Socrates erotic skill in persuading his audience to
search for wisdom. Its sympotic imagery appeals to his fellow symposiasts,
and it also functions, like the images in drinking cups, as an invitation to
Socrates audience to search for the truth about themselves that is reflected
within the speech that Socrates is about to give. Socrates use of this image
also serves as a skillful and persuasive warning against the amathia of the first
five speakers, demonstrating that truth cannot be found by merely citing
literary sources, for these authorities must always be subject to philosophical
69 Od. 11.6337. Translation: Lattimore 1951.
70 Symp. 198 is 26 Stephanus pages from the beginning of a dialogue 51 pages long.
71 Frontisi-Ducroux 1989: esp. 156 and 163. 72 Sympotic associations: Belfiore 1992: 1419.
interrogation.73 Like Perseus killing the Gorgon, the philosopher must
overcome any servile dependence on literary authority that his traditional
education has given him. He must learn to use others words for his own
purposes, as Perseus does when he uses the Gorgons head to kill his enemy,
and as Athena does when she uses its cries to create the art of aulos-playing.
Socrates goes on to contrast his own manner of speaking with that of
the other symposiasts. When he agreed to give an encomium, he explains:
I thought in my foolishness that it was necessary to speak the truth about
each aspect of the thing praised, and with this as a foundation, picking out
the finest of these things, to arrange them as suitably as possible (198d3
6). Accordingly, he thought highly of his ability to speak well (198c6d3,
d67). After the others have spoken, however, Socrates changes his mind.
According to the previous speakers, he says, the way to praise something
is:
to attribute to the subject that which is greatest and most beautiful, whether this
is true or not. If its false, it doesnt matter. It was proposed, so it appears, that each
of us should seem to praise Eros, not really to praise him. For this reason, I think,
you call up everything that can be said and attribute it to Eros, and you say that he
has such and such qualities and is the cause of so much, so that he might appear
to be as beautiful and good as possible, to the ignorant, clearly certainly not to
those who know and your praise is beautiful and awe-inspiring. (198d8199a3)
Socrates refuses to give this kind of encomium, saying that he had
agreed to give one without knowing what was expected (199a35). He now
says that he will speak the truth about Eros, in his own way, leaving the
arrangement of words and phrases to chance (199a6b5).
At the same time that he undertakes to tell the truth, however, Socrates
also raises questions about whether or not he will in fact do so. In refusing
to keep an agreement he made in ignorance, Socrates quotes Euripides
line, My tongue swore but not my heart (Hipp. 612, quoted at 199a56).
In so doing, he not only suggests that he might be a liar, he also gives a
strange preface to his praise of Eros, by reminding the audience of Phaedras
disastrous passion for her stepson. Indeed, at the end of his speech he does
not quite claim to have given an encomium: If you wish, Phaedrus,
take this speech to have been spoken as an encomium to Eros, or call
it whatever you please (212b8c3). Furthermore, Socrates concludes his
elenchus of Agathon by stating that, although Agathon cannot contradict
73 On philosophy and poetic authority see Halliwell 2000: 1049. Cf. Hunter 2004: 39, and Ford
2002: ch. 9, who argues that Plato uses quotations in Resp. 1 and 2 to illustrate the unreliability of
taking poets as founts of wisdom or sources of technical knowledge (216).
the truth, it is not difficult to contradict Socrates (201c89). He thus
suggests, and modern scholars have been quick to agree, that there are
flaws in his arguments.74 Alcibiades will later confirm that Socrates is a
liar: Does Socrates persuade you of anything he said just now? Dont you
know that its entirely the opposite of what he said? (214c8d2).75
This interlude between Agathons speech and Socrates elenchus of the
poet, then, not only casts doubt on the truth of the claims made by
the previous speakers, it also raises questions, as do passages later in the
dialogue, about the truth of what Socrates himself says. The conflicting
claims made by Socrates in this interlude are Gorgon-like in that they
warn and invite the reader to examine critically the ideas he will present
in his speech. They also prepare his audience to consider the possibility
that the views he attributes to Diotima may, like the speech of Agathon
(197e7), and like the character Socrates himself (216e46), combine play
with seriousness.
3.3.2 Socrates and his teacher

After his elenchus of Agathon, Socrates begins his own speech by saying
that he will tell what he himself was once told by Diotima, who taught him
about ta erotika (201d58). With a pun on mantic (prophetic), Socrates
characterizes her as a Mantinean woman (201d2).76 Diotima was wise
(sophe) in many things, and on one occasion, she used her wisdom about
divine matters to help the Athenians delay a plague for ten years by means of
sacrifice (201d35).77 Socrates speech is both playful and serious in that he
introduces her as an authority by whom he claims to have been persuaded
(212b14) and taught (201d5), while at the same time presenting her in such
a way as to suggest that her teachings cannot be accepted uncritically, in the
way in which the other speakers accept the views of the literary authorities
to whom they appeal.
74 Szlezak 1985: 256 n.16 points out that the phrase at 201c89 is ambiguous, meaning either that
Socrates does not tell the truth or that Agathon should think much less of Socrates than of the
truth. Logical difficulties in the elenchus of Agathon are discussed by Allen 1966 and Payne 1999.
75 Alcibiades is alluding to Socrates statements at 213c6d6, but his use of peqei (persuades) also
reminds his audience of Socrates recent statement (not heard by Alcibiades) that Socrates attempts
to persuade people about Eros (212b14).
76 As Bury notes (1932: xxxix and on 201d), Diotimas characterization as Mantinikv (Mantinean)
recalls the mantic (prophetic) art, and Cod. W reads mantikv (mantic).
77 Rowe 1998, on 201d1204c8, notes that the passage represents her as having powers of intervention
with the gods, and that she, like a seer, has an understanding of things, past and present as well as
future, which is superior to that possessed by ordinary human beings.
Socrates Diotima first discusses the nature of Eros (201e3204c6) and
then talks about his deeds, that is, his usefulness to humans (204c7
212a7).78 Her teachings correspond to the two stages of initiation into
the Mysteries of Eleusis: the Lesser Mysteries (discussed at 201e8209e4)
and the Greater Mysteries (described at 209e5212a7).79 She begins by
rejecting ideas about Eros held by all of the first five speakers. They claimed
that Eros is a god who possesses beauty and virtue, and who gives good
things to humans.80 According to Diotima, however, Eros is not a god
but a daimon, a being between god and mortal (202d13203a8), who lacks
good things (201e67, with 201c45). Eros is not evil and ugly, nor is he
beautiful and good, but between the two states (202b15). He is also in a
state between amathia and wisdom (sophia), and his realization that he lacks
good things is a necessary condition for his desiring to acquire them. Eros
is therefore a philosopher and a lover instead of a beloved (203e5204c6).
Moreover, Diotima denies that eros is desire for the whole (205d10206a1),
as Aristophanes claimed (192e10193a1), or for beauty, as Agathon held
(197b39), saying instead that it is a desire to generate in beauty (206e2
5).81 She goes on to explain that eros is a desire for generation, because
generation is a kind of immortality for mortals, and that all people desire
immortality together with the good (206e7207a4, 208b26, 212a27).
Diotima further explains the connection between eros and immortality by
claiming that people may be pregnant not only in body but also in soul,
giving birth to spiritual children who live on after their parents are gone
(208e1209e4). In the last part of her speech, she also says that it is necessary
(de) for the successful initiate into the Greater Mysteries of love to proceed
in the correct way (210a45, 211b7c1). This person must ascend as though
climbing a ladder from lower to higher objects of eros, in order to attain,
at last, the sight of divine beauty (211e3), in which he can give birth to
true things (211e4212a7).
It is a common view that Plato, or the Socrates of the Symposium, or
both, endorse at least a significant part of Diotimas teachings, in particular
the views expressed in the passage about the ladder of love. Charles Kahn
suggests that we read the final section of Diotimas speech as Platos self-
interpretation of the philosophical and pedagogical intention of his earlier
78 The distinction between the nature of Eros and his deeds is made at 201e12 and 204c8. At 199c36,
Socrates compliments Agathon for having followed this same procedure.
79 On the division into these two stages Brisson 1998: 6971 agrees with Riedweg 1987: 21. I discuss
the two stages of initiation below 3.3.3.
80 See above end of section 3.2 and n.68.
81 It is often difficult to distinguish Eros the daimon from eros, passionate desire, in Socrates speech.
I agree with Payne 1999: 2389, that the ambiguities may be deliberate.
work. The ladder of love is here the path that leads from the Socratic
elenchus to the doctrine of Forms.82 According to Kurt Sier, this passage
is a revelation of the truth.83 The idea that Diotima, or anyone else in the
dialogues, speaks for Plato has been sufficiently refuted by the arguments
of many scholars.84 It is more difficult to determine the extent to which
Socrates represents himself as endorsing the ideas Diotima expresses. It is
true that Socrates says that he has been persuaded by Diotima (212b12),
thus indicating that he agrees with at least some of what she says. Diotima
also employs question and answer with Socrates, just as Socrates does
with Agathon.85 Moreover, the first part of Socrates conversation with
her (201e37) recapitulates his own previous discussion with Agathon, in
which the two men came to agreement about certain things (201d57).86
On the other hand, that discussion ends with Socrates statement that it is
not difficult to refute Socrates (201c89), thus calling attention to possible
flaws in his argument (see above 3.3.1).
In other respects also, Socrates Diotima is characterized so as to raise
rather than answer questions. First, she is a woman who praises pederasty,
a relationship between an older and a younger male, and she is a female
expert on eros and birth who, as far as we know from Platos dialogue, has
never borne a child. These incongruities would lead Socrates audience to
question her knowledge and experience about eros and reproduction, and
to wonder why such a figure should idealize male homoerotic love.87
Another strange thing about Diotima is the fact that this teacher differs
so radically from the philosopher-pupil who reports her words. As noted
above, Diotima is a prophet (201d15), who, by definition, has knowledge
of a kind that is inaccessible to ordinary mortals. Socrates underscores this
idea when he replies to one of her statements: It would need prophecy to
know what you mean (206b9). Diotima is not only a prophet, but also,
as Deborah Nails notes, the priestess of a mystery religion, from whom
82 Kahn 1996: 271; cf. Santas 1988: 25, who writes that Socrates speech is usually taken to present
Platos own theory of eros.
83 Im Unterschied zu den alteren Dialogen aber folgt hier die Aufdeckung der Wahrheit; mit 209e5
der Ubergang vom Bereich der dxa zur lqeia erfolgt (Sier 1997: 3 and 270).
84 See, for example, the essays in Gonzalez 1995c and Press 2000.
85 The last point is made by Blondell 2006: 152. 86 Cf. Sheffield 2006a: 36.
87 David Leitao, in correspondence, called my attention to the fact that, in being childless, Diotima
is unlike the midwife of Platos Tht. 149b4c3. On the issue of Diotimas childlessness see Hobbs
2006: 2645. Plato may have had good reasons for making Diotima a woman (Halperin 1990;
Saxonhouse 1984: 1922; and Sier 1997: 1011), but her gender raises many questions. Arieti 1991:
105 calls the introduction of Diotima subversive. Gill 1999: xxix remarks that Platos use of this
figure is paradoxical and surprising.
one should not expect profound philosophy.88 Indeed, Socrates speech
repeatedly calls attention to her unphilosophical characteristics. If Dio-
tima really is wise (sophe: 201d3, cf. 208b8), as Socrates states, she cannot
be a philosopher, who, according to her own account, is not wise, and who
recognizes his or her own lack of wisdom (204a17). If, on the other hand,
she merely speaks like the accomplished sophists (sophistai: 208c1), she
may be deceitful.89 Diotimas claims to teach Socrates (peirsoma se
didxai: 204d12; cf. 201d5, 207a5, c6) also imply a claim to have the kind
of wisdom that her own philosopher-Eros lacks. Socrates, in contrast, states
that he persuades rather than teaches (212b13), and repeatedly acknowl-
edges his own lack of wisdom. The philosophical life of examination that
he is represented as leading is very different from the mystical contempla-
tion advocated by Diotima.90 Moreover, although Diotimas teachings as
reported by Socrates begin with a question and answer procedure like the
one that Socrates uses with Agathon (201e27), much of what she says, and
especially her account of pregnancy and the ladder of love (208c1212a7), is
in the form of a long speech, uninterrupted by questions and unsupported
by arguments.
Not only does Diotima differ significantly from Socrates, she also dis-
parages him, laughing at what he says (202b10) and suggesting that he may
be unable to understand her teachings so as to become marvelously skilled
in ta erotika (207c24; cf. 204b1, 209e5210a2), as he claims to be in this
dialogue (177d78, 198d12). She warns him, in particular, that he may not
be capable of being initiated into the Greater Mysteries of love (210a12).91
Why does Socrates represent his teacher as laughing at him?
It has been suggested that one reason why Diotima ridicules Socrates
is that the Socrates to whom Diotima speaks is young and has not yet
completed his initiation. According to Frisbee Sheffield, Socrates plays two
roles in his speech: that of his own youthful self, who resembles Agathon,
and that of the resourceful Diotima, who is his alter ego.92 At the time
of his conversation with Diotima, Socrates had advanced only part way
up the ladder of eros. The text, however, does not give clear indications
that Socrates, at the time of the Symposium, has in fact arrived at the top
of Diotimas ladder. The great variety of opinions about how far Socrates
88 Nails 2006: 1845 and 1923.
89 For this translation of Socrates phrase see Rowe 1998, on 208c1. 90 Nails 2006: 1923.
91 Sier rightly notes that Diotimas remarks are similar to traditional comments made by Muses (e.g.,
Hes. Theog. 26), although I do not agree that Diotimas remarks are merely ironical (1997: 12).
92 Sheffield 2006a: 669. She argues (69 n.38) that Diotima makes disparaging remarks about Socrates
because the latter is playing the role of Agathon. Socrates youth at the time of his conversation with
Diotima is also discussed by Blondell 2006: 1623; Ludwig 2002: 219, 31315; and Sedley 2006.
has advanced are in themselves some evidence that we are given no clear
indications about how far he has advanced, if in fact he has done so at
all.93 Indeed, Socrates never says that he has been initiated, nor does he,
as Aristophanes claims to be able to do (189d34), attempt to teach others
the knowledge he has acquired from Diotima. He is never represented as
following the specific itinerary of Diotimas ladder of love.94 Diotimas use
of the subjunctive at 211d3 (if you ever see it) indicates that he has not
seen the objects at the top of the ladder at the time of his conversations
with her, and there is no suggestion that he is contemplating them at
a later time, for example, when he is represented in the Symposium as
standing and thinking.95 Moreover, Socrates says that he does not know
(204d1011, 206b56, 206b910, 207c2) and needs teachers (207c56), and
he continues to disparage his own wisdom, even after he has been taught
by Diotima (175e24, 219a12).
Socrates responses to Diotima also indicate that he questions rather
than accepts much of what she says, and that, in particular, he has doubts
about her teachings concerning pregnancy and the ladder of eros. The
metaphor of pregnancy is introduced at the Lesser Mysteries stage of Dio-
timas teachings. At 206b7e5 she defines the function of eros as birth in
beauty, with respect to body and soul (206b78). Socrates expresses the
puzzlement shared by readers of the dialogue when he puns on Diotimas
epithet, Mantinean (201d2), in stating that divination (manteia) would
be required to understand what she means and that he doesnt understand
(ou manthano) what she is talking about (206b910). The pun also marks
with a note of humor the introduction of Diotimas metaphor of male
pregnancy.
Socrates puzzlement is especially noteworthy because up to this point,
he, like Agathon in his conversation with Socrates,96 has indicated agree-
ment with Diotimas teachings about Eros as a daimon who lacks and desires
beauty and wisdom. Socrates says in response to Diotima: You speak the
truth (202a10, 205a4, c3, c10, d9); You speak well (204c7), and finally,
You speak most truly (206a13). After Diotima introduces the metaphor
of pregnancy at 206b, however, Socrates ceases to express this kind of
93 Among those who hold that Socrates is at or near the top of the ladder are Anton 1974: 288;
Friedlander 1969: 301; Nussbaum 1986: 195; and D. Scott 2000: 32. That Socrates has not been
initiated into the Mysteries is argued by Lutz 1998: 108; Nails 2006: 1845; and Reeve 2006a: 1356.
Lowenstam 1985: 946 believes that Socrates has ascended many times, and Blondell 2006: 1748
agrees with him, while also contending that Socrates occupies all of the steps at the same time.
94 Bres 1968: 248. 95 As is claimed by D. Scott 2000: 312.
96 Agathon says: Certainly (Pnu ge or on: 199d8, e8, 200a4, e1, e6); You speak the truth (200b8);
Yes (201a1, b3), and Necessarily (201b5).
agreement. He asks: What then? (206e4); says: Well then (206e6);
states that he does not know (207c2); says that he needs teachers, and asks
her to explain (207c57). His last reported words in his conversation with
Diotima express wonder and ask if the things she has said about reproduc-
tion are true: And I having heard her speech marveled and said: Really,
I said, O most wise Diotima, are these things truly so? (208b79). He
then reports that she answers sper o tleoi sofista (208c1), a phrase
that can mean either like the most perfectly wise people, or like the
accomplished sophists. It is likely that Socrates puns on both senses, just
as he punned shortly before on Mantinean and manteia (206b910).
Significantly, this phrase occurs just before her detailed account of spiritual
pregnancy (208e5209e4), with its comic image of pregnant males.97 This
marked change in Socrates responses, before and after Diotima begins
her account of pregnancy, indicates increased difficulty in following and
accepting her views.
Diotima, then, is characterized in such a way as to call attention to her
strangeness as a teacher of Socrates. As priestess and prophet, she is not a
philosopher, but instead the possessor of a kind of god-like wisdom that
cannot be acquired by ordinary mortals, who, like Socrates in the Apol-
ogy, are wisest when they realize that they lack wisdom.98 Her differences
from Socrates strongly suggest that she is not Socrates alter ego in the
sense of someone who has acquired wisdom that the mature Socrates of
the Symposium has also come to possess. This mature Socrates does not
have wisdom, but the daimonic art of the philosopher who recognizes his
own lack of wisdom and desires passionately to acquire as much of it as
he can.
Why, then, does Socrates introduce this extraordinary figure as his
teacher about ta erotika? One clue is provided by Diotimas ridicule of
Socrates. As noted above, she laughs at what he says (202b10), and dis-
parages him on a number of occasions, just as Socrates also disparages his
own wisdom, in the Symposium and in other dialogues. Stephen Halliwell
insightfully connects Diotimas ridicule with the self-mockery in which
Platos Socrates sometimes engages, on occasion using an alter ego for this
purpose.99 According to Halliwell, Diotima is an alter ego, not in that
97 See further below. Rowe 1999a: 2501 gives an excellent account of this phrase as an introduction
to the following passage, with its ironical tone and questionable ideas. Cf. Rowe 1998, on 208b89
and c1.
98 That one of you . . . is wisest who, like Socrates, recognizes that his wisdom is worth little or
nothing (Ap. 23b24).
99 Halliwell 2008: 2915, citing Hp. mai. 286c and 298bc. See also Chapter 4 at 4.2 and n.21.
she expresses specific doctrines that Socrates endorses, but because she
ridicules those who merit [ridicule] through their dialectical arrogance or
self-ignorance which piquantly includes [Socrates] himself.100 One use
that Socrates makes of his character Diotima, then, is to contrast the erotic
art that he himself has acquired with the wisdom that only a god or an
inspired prophetess and priestess could possess, and to ridicule those who
believe that they themselves can actually attain such extraordinary wisdom.
This does not mean that Socrates rejects Diotimas teachings: rejection as
well as acceptance would imply a certainty that he disclaims. He represents
himself as having a more complex attitude towards them. Socrates treats
Diotimas detailed accounts of male pregnancy and of specific steps up a
ladder as fruitful ways of thinking about eros that deserve further investi-
gation, rather than as truths to be accepted because they are stated by an
authority. Only a prophet, he suggests, could know that these things are
true, and any ordinary mortal who claims to have this knowledge deserves
ridicule. When Socrates says that he has been persuaded by Diotima, then
(212b2), he does not mean that he has been persuaded that her detailed
account of the ascent up the ladder of love contains authoritative truth.
Diotimas views about the nature of Eros as daimon and philosopher have
a different status, however, for her Eros is a personification of the erotic,
daimonic art that Socrates himself has acquired. What Diotima persuades
Socrates about, then, concerns the erotic art, an important component
of which is the recognition of ones own lack of wisdom, even about ta
erotika.101 Diotima herself is not a philosopher who practices this daimonic
art, but instead has a status similar to that of the god from whom Socrates
acquires true belief in the Lysis (see Chapter 2 at 2.3.3). Socrates also
reveals an important aspect of his erotic art in characterizing Diotimas
teachings as initiation into the Mysteries of eros. The acquisition of erotic
art is, like the Mysteries of Diotima, a kind of initiation in which ordinary
eros for physical beauty is a necessary preparation for Socratic eros for true
beauty and wisdom.
3.3.3 Pregnant men on ladders: the Lesser and the Greater Mysteries
The Lesser Mysteries (201e8209e4)
After Socrates remarks that divination is needed to understand what
she means in saying that the function of eros is to give birth in beauty
100 Halliwell 2008: 293; Diotima as alter ego: 292.
101 Cf. Scott and Welton 2008: 88, who argue that Socrates learned awareness of his own ignorance
from Diotima. I disagree, however, with their view that she also teaches the philosopher to achieve
a partial recollection of the Forms (99 and 136).
(206b110), Diotima proceeds to explain. She says: All people [anthropoi],
Socrates, are pregnant [kuousin] in body and soul, and when they reach
a certain age our nature desires to give birth (206c14). According to
Diotima, the intercourse of a man and a woman is the giving of birth
(206c56). Later on (208e1209e4), now speaking exclusively of males,
she provides a more detailed explanation of the two kinds of pregnancy
that of body and that of soul. Men who are pregnant in body are erotic
with respect to women because they desire to beget children (208e15).
Other men, she says, are pregnant in soul still more than in body (208e5
209a2), and the beloved they seek is beautiful in both body and soul
(209b27). Touching and consorting with the beautiful beloved, the lover
who is pregnant in soul gives birth to and generates that with which
he has long been pregnant, and brings up the offspring together with
his partner (209c24). Their offspring are not human children, but dis-
courses about virtue (209b8). The relationship between these two parents
is a reciprocal one in which both experience a much greater commu-
nity and more steadfast philia [friendship] than do parents who raise
human children together, because they share in more beautiful and more
immortal children (209c57). These parents produce many and beautiful
[poll ka kal] works, giving birth to all kinds of virtue [gennsantev
pantoan retn] (209e23). For Diotima, as for the first five speak-
ers, the ideal erotic relationship is one between an older and a younger
male. The lover who produces offspring of the soul is not explicitly char-
acterized as exclusively homoerotic, but he is contrasted with the lover
of women and is said to have educational goals (209c12) that are most
appropriate to the pederastic relationship between Greek males of different
ages.
In this part of her speech, then, Socrates Diotima presents an ideal-
ized relationship between lover and beloved that is, in some respects, like
that portrayed in Socrates second speech in the Phaedrus (discussed in
Chapter 5 at 5.3.2). Here also, Socrates describes a relationship of reciprocal
philia, in which both partners value the soul more than the body, and share
in what is more divine.
The differences, however, are instructive. Instead of providing a detailed
and original psychology of love to support and clarify her views, as Socrates
does in the Phaedrus, Diotima uses vague expressions and poetic language
that remind Socrates audience of the first five speeches of the dialogue.
The phrase quoted above (gennsantev pantoan retn, giving birth
to all kinds of virtue: 209e23) recalls language used in two earlier pas-
sages. Socrates referred to Agathons encomium, in which there were many
falsehoods, as a beautiful and variegated speech (kaln . . . ka panto-
dapn lgon: 198b3), and Eryximachus used the phrase manifold and
variegated (poll ka pantodap: 193e67) to characterize the speech
of his rival, Aristophanes.102 Moreover, the spiritual children of those who
are pregnant in soul are said to include the poems of Homer and Hesiod,
and the laws of Lycurgus and Solon, but philosophical discourses are not
mentioned (209d17). Indeed, Diotima in this passage, like the first five
speakers, appeals to poetic and mythological tradition without subjecting
this tradition to critical examination. She mentions Homer and Hesiod
(209d1), refers to the mythological figures Alcestis, Achilles and Patroclus,
who were also mentioned by previous speakers (208d23), and she echoes
Archilochus in calling intercourse of a man and a woman the divine thing
(qeon t prgma: 206c6).103 Diotima alludes to poetic sources unknown
to us in quoting a hexameter at 208c56, and in referring to the most
great and deceitful eros (dolerv rwv: 205d23).104 This last reference,
to a deceitful eros, is especially striking, containing, like Socrates earlier
quotation of Euripides Hippolytus (above 3.3.1), a hint that some of what
the speaker says about Eros might itself be deceitful.
It has been argued that the emphasis on poetry and laws in this part
of Diotimas teachings is due, at least in part, to the fact that she is here
discussing the Lesser Mysteries. At this stage, people are inspired by eros
in the generic sense of a desire for good things, as well as by eros in a
specific sense that has a sexual component (205d18), but not by love of
wisdom (philosophia).105 Accordingly, in this part of her teachings, Diotima
emphasizes love of honor (philotimia: 208c3) and desire for glory (208d2
e1), and she praises poets and lawgivers.106 One problem with this view,
however, is that Diotima does not explain how the poems of Homer and
Hesiod could be even a first step toward philosophy. To do so, she would
need to discuss in more detail her inclusion of these poems in the vague
category of all kinds of virtue, and to explain how their authors exhibit
the recognition of their lack of wisdom that Diotima attributes to the
philosopher-daimon Eros.
102 On 198b3 see Chapter 4 at 4.3 with n.34.

103 Archilochus, frag. 196a.15 West 19891992: t qeon crma (noted by Dover 1980, on 206c5).
104 For the hexameter see Bury 1932 and Sier 1997: 250. On deceitful eros see Bury 1932, who compares
Sappho 1.12: %frdita . . . dolploke, and Sier 1997: 212, who notes that the meter was probably
iambic tetrameter.
105 On generic and specific eros see Introduction at I.2.
106 See Ferrari 1992: 2556; Sheffield 2001: esp. 34 and 10, and Sier 1997: 125. A positive interpretation
of Diotimas emphasis on honor and fame is provided by Nichols 2009: 6470, who argues that in
so doing she places humans within the context of the political community.
Another problem in this passage is how to interpret Diotimas strange and
comic metaphor of male pregnancy. Plato frequently uses sexual imagery to
characterize a passionate desire for wisdom (see Introduction at I.2). The
metaphor in the Symposium in particular has stimulated Platos readers
to produce many fruitful philosophical ideas of their own.107 It does not,
however, accord with the basic facts of biology. Males do not become
pregnant or give birth, and sexual intercourse is not the same as giving
birth, as 206c56 appears to state, but precedes parturition.108 Moreover,
as scholars have noted, the verb kuo used at 206c1 (quoted above, beginning
of 3.3.3) usually refers to female conception or pregnancy, in contrast to
tiktein and gennan, that can be used of both sexes.109
Socrates audience at the symposium would have found the idea of male
pregnancy to be comic as well as strange. In Euripides Bacchae, Teiresias
asks Pentheus if he laughs (diagelv: 286) at the story of Dionysus double
birth. According to the myth recounted by the Chorus, Zeus killed Semele
with a thunderbolt when she was pregnant with the god. Zeus then fastened
the fetus into his own thigh in order to hide it from Hera and eventually
gave birth (teken: 99) to Dionysus (Bacch. 88103). What really happened,
Teiresias punningly explains, is that Zeus broke off (xav) a piece of the
ether that surrounds the earth and gave it to Hera as a hostage (mhron).
In time, people twisted the words around and came to say that the child
was sewn into the thigh (afnai . . . mhr) of Zeus (Bacch. 28697). Not
only is Teiresias story highly sophistical, as E. R. Dodds comments: The
thigh-birth lent itself too easily to ribald humor.110
In other contexts, the idea of male pregnancy was not only comic,
but also offensive to the Greeks. To suggest that a man in a homoerotic
relationship was pregnant was a serious insult, attributing to him the
passive, feminine role in intercourse, considered to be disgraceful for males.
Whether or not the incident actually occurred, Plutarchs story of Periander
107 For example, Irwin 1995: 309, holds that generation in beauty refers to propagation of the valuable
aspects of myself in a person who will exist in the future. Kosman 1976: 65 and n.29, writes that
the meaning of birth in beauty is that love calls the other to be his true self. According to
Price 1989, all love is a kind of pregnancy, whose goal is the creation of another life that will be an
extension of the lovers (227, cf. 259).
108 There is little agreement among scholars about how to interpret Diotimas views on reproduction.
Discussions include those of Burnyeat 1977; Halperin 1985: 1802 and 1990: 13941; Hobbs 2006;
Morrison 1964: 515; Pender 1992; Plass 1978; Pradeau 2007; Reeve 2006a: 1289; Rowe 1999a;
Santas 1988: 379; Sheffield 2001 and 2006a: 75111; Vlastos 1973: 1922. The strangeness of her
account is well brought out by Konstan 1999: 2645.
109 Noted by Dover 1980: 147; Hobbs 2006: 264; and Sheffield 2001: 1415.
110 Dodds 1960, on Bacch. 28697, citing Lucian, Dialogi Deorum 9 and the Old Comedy poet
Polyzelus, author of The Births of Dionysus [frag. 5, Kassel and Austin 19832001].
is a good indication of Greek attitudes. When the sixth-century tyrant asked
his eromenos: Arent you pregnant yet? the young man was so angry that he
killed Periander.111 Diotimas idea that it is the erastes who is pregnant could
be seen as even more offensive, for it casts in a ridiculous and humiliating
light the active partner in the relationship that is idealized by Diotima
herself, as well as by the symposiasts, who not only praise but participate in
such relationships. Moreover, the metaphor might be taken as specifically
ridiculing Pausanias and his eromenos Agathon (193b6c2), the tragedian
who might be said to be pregnant with poetry, like Homer, Hesiod
and the other good poets (poietas . . . agathous: 209d12), mentioned by
Diotima.112 Diotimas comic metaphor is playful, then, but it also comes
close to the division, often difficult to demarcate in Greek society, between
harmless laughter and aggressive, hubristic mockery.113
We cannot, then, fully appreciate Socrates use of this metaphor without
acknowledging and attempting to explain its comic aspects. Why, in the
metaphor of the pregnant lover, is eros represented ambiguously, as both the
source of our highest aspiration and as involving absurdities greater than
those associated with Aristophanes half-people, who at first reproduced
in the earth by means of genitals attached to their buttocks? The comic
aspects of Diotimas metaphor serve, like her laughter at Socrates, as a form
of self-mockery, directed against those who claim, as Socrates might be
thought to be doing in presenting the teachings of this authority, to have
more wisdom than they are in fact able to obtain. At the same time, this
striking image invites Socrates audience, and Platos readers, to examine
and question ideas that are based, in large part, on Greek erotic-educational
conventions. It therefore helps to induce recognition of their own lack of
wisdom about eros, and the desire to obtain as much of this wisdom as they
can.
The Greater Mysteries (209e5212a7)

The account of the Greater Mysteries given by Socrates Diotima is also
constructed so as to stimulate desire for wisdom, while disclaiming author-
itative knowledge. When she teaches Socrates about the stages necessary
111 Plutarch, Amatorius 768f, cited by Dover 1989: 107 n.101 and Plass 1978: 51. That this story is
also cited by Aristotle, Pol. 1311a39b2, shows that it was current in Platos time (David Leitao, in
correspondence).
112 For the pun on Agathons name see Chapter 4 at 4.3. I disagree with Hobbs 2006: 267, who
writes that Alcibiades is the only character in the Symposium who might find the metaphor of male
pregnancy offensive.
113 On this distinction within Greek society generally, see Halliwell 2008: 1938, and, in the case of
Platos Socrates in particular: 276302.
for initiation into the Greater Mysteries of eros (t d tlea ka poptik:
210a1), Diotima uses the metaphor of climbing a ladder (211c3) to describe
the ascent from lower to higher objects of eros. The lover goes from eros
for one beautiful body, to eros for all beautiful bodies, to love for beautiful
souls, then to beautiful practices and laws, next to beautiful sciences, and
finally to a vision of divine beauty itself (211e3). Diotimas description of
the lovers ascent raises important questions about the nature of love, the
soul, metaphysics and epistemology. Socrates does not, however, represent
it as providing definitive answers to these questions.
One reason for believing that Socrates does not represent himself as
accepting Diotimas account as conveying authoritative truth is the fact
that the comic image of male pregnancy is retained throughout, from the
lowest to the highest level. The Lesser Mysteries are said to be for the sake
of, that is, preparatory to, the Greater Mysteries (210a12). This, together
with the birth terminology in both passages, indicates that the lover in the
Greater Mysteries passage is, like the lover of the earlier passage, a pregnant
male. We are now asked to imagine that pregnant men climb the ladder of
eros, balancing their ungainly bodies on its steps, while having intercourse
with various partners and giving birth to various offspring. Terms for giving
birth are used throughout. The lover is said to generate (gennn) beautiful
discourse in a beautiful body (210a78), to give birth to (tktein: 210c1)
discourse in a beautiful soul and to give birth (tkt) within boundless
philosophy (210d36).114 Diotimas language even suggests that, at the
highest rung of the ladder, the lover has sexual intercourse with the highest
form of beauty: he gives birth (tktein, teknti), not to images of virtue,
but to true things, because he touches what is true (212a37).115 If this literal
interpretation is rejected as absurd, what is it that is supposed to happen at
the top of the ladder? Diotima, like the initiates in the Eleusinian Mysteries,
whose images this passage borrows,116 keeps the secret. The sexual imagery
is also puzzling at the lower rungs of the ladder, where Diotima states that
the lover must become a lover of all beautiful bodies (210b45). If she
114 Cf. plai kei tktei ka genn: 209c3. A good discussion of the meaning of the phrase n
filosof fqn (in boundless philosophy) is provided by Gregory and Levin 1998, although
I do not agree with all of their conclusions.
115 Pender 1992: 812 argues that the image is of the lover having intercourse with the Forms. This
idea might find some support from the fact that, according to one source, the Eleusinian Mysteries
included a sacred marriage between hierophant and priestess: see Burkert 1983: 284. As Nightingale
2004: 115 notes, a similar metaphor is used in Resp. 490ab. There, however, the metaphor does
not occur within the context of an extensive and detailed discussion of eros and reproduction that
itself invites questions.
116 See Riedweg 1987: 229.
is advising the lover to become sexually promiscuous, the Socrates of the
Symposium does not appear to have followed her advice.117
Another reason to believe that Socrates presents Diotimas account in
such a way as to raise stimulating questions without providing authori-
tative answers is the fact that the Greater Mysteries passage fails to give
sufficient information about the negative attitudes it emphasizes. In Dio-
timas account of the Lesser Mysteries of love, ugliness, which makes the
lover frown, feel pain, shrivel, turn away and roll up without generating
(206d57), is contrasted with beauty, which produces the opposite effect.
In the Greater Mysteries passage, however, negative attitudes and reactions
are an important aspect of desire, for eros for each new object involves
a corresponding disdain for inferior objects.118 When the lover learns to
love all beautiful bodies, he relaxes intense love for one beautiful body,
disdaining and thinking this love to be of little worth (katafronsanta
ka smikrn ghsmenon: 210b56). Then, when he progresses to love for
beauty of soul, he thinks this kind of beauty to be of more worth than phys-
ical beauty (timiteron gsasqai to n t smati: 210b7). Next, the
lover loves beautiful practices and laws and, compared to them, thinks little
of physical beauty (t per t sma kaln smikrn ti gshtai enai:
210c36). When the lover goes on to contemplate the great sea of beauty
(210d4) he is no longer, like a worthless slave, attached to the beauty of
one person or one practice (sper okthv . . . doulewn falov ka
smikrolgov: 210c7d6). This statement implies that the object loved by
the slavish lover is itself inferior and worthy of disdain in relation to the
great sea of beauty. Finally, the lover who associates with divine beauty
itself will not give birth to images of virtue, because he is not touching
an image (212a4). It is clear that love of higher beauty involves disdain for
inferior objects. Diotima does not, however, specify exactly what disdain
involves: complete rejection or a proper valuation in relation to higher
things?119
Most notoriously, the Greater Mysteries passage raises without answering
the question about whether or not the disdain felt by the ascending lover
is compatible with interpersonal love. Only at the bottom of the ladder is
the lover said to experience eros in the specific sense of love for a particular
117 Promiscuity: Nussbaum 2001: 4901.
118 Noted by Moravcsik 1972: 289. On the use of negatives in this passage see Sier 1997: 2824.
119 The phrase at 210b56 (disdaining and thinking this love to be of little worth; cf. 210c56) is
interpreted as scorn by Gagarin 1977: 312, as putting in its place, not turning out of doors by
Price 1989: 44, and as keeping the former interests and adding to these newer ones by Moravcsik
1972: 293. Pakaluk 2004 has helpful remarks on the close association between contempt and
virtue in other dialogues of Plato.
individual. The references to pederasty (211b56), to beautiful boys and
youths (211d4), and to boyfriends (211d6) imply that the relationship in
question at the early stages of the ascent resembles the erotic-educational
relationship between two males of different ages that is depicted in Pausa-
nias speech.120 The erastes of Diotimas account loves one beautiful body
(210a7), and he loves and cares for (kdesqai) a beloved with a beautiful
soul, whom he attempts to educate by giving birth to and seeking those
words that make the young man better (210b8c3). Diotimas main concern,
however, is not with interpersonal love, but with a very different kind of
eros: love for beauty itself. Moreover, her teachings about the Greater Mys-
teries contain no reference to reciprocal philia between lover and beloved
of the kind said to be shared by those initiated into the Lesser Mysteries
(209c27), although the lover initiated into the Greater Mysteries is once
said to care for the person who has beauty of soul (210c1). Aside from
Diotimas address to Socrates as dear (fle: 211d1), phil- words occur only
twice: philosophia (210d6) and theophilei (god-loved: 212a6). The lover
has philia for wisdom and in turn is loved by the gods. Nor is anything said,
even in the account of the lowest steps on the ladder, about the physical
contact between lover and beloved that led, in the Lesser Mysteries passage,
to generation (209c23).121 Diotima uses sexual vocabulary (being with,
giving birth and touching: sunntov, tktein, faptomn: 212a25)
to characterize the lovers contact with divine beauty instead of with a
human beloved, and we are not told what role, if any, interpersonal love
has at the top of the ladder, where all of the lovers emotions appear to be
directed toward higher objects.
Further confusion is added by the fact that the Lesser Mysteries, in
which interpersonal love has a very positive role, are said to be for the sake
of the Greater Mysteries (210a12). Moreover, the ascent up the ladder
in the Greater Mysteries passage is said to proceed by means of correct
pederasty (211b56). Love for one body and for one soul, however, are
said to characterize only the lower stages of the ascent up the ladder of
love, and these lower stages are said to be for the sake of the final vision
of true beauty (210e56). It would appear, then, that unless the lover first
experiences passionate desire for another person, the lover will not be able
to progress up the ladder. Yet, in order to progress, the lover must acquire
120 See Introduction at I.2, especially n.29.

121 Moravcsik 1972: 291 and Patterson 1991: 197 argue that the ascent begins at a stage beyond that of
mere sexual desire. This is one possible interpretation, but it is not supported by explicit statements
in the text.
disdain for love of one body (210b56) and no longer be enslaved to one
boy and one human being (210d13).
Socrates Diotima, then, does not provide a clear and unambiguous
account of the role played by interpersonal love in the ascent. In interpreting
her statements, scholars have tended to emphasize either the positive or
the negative statements about interpersonal love, while downplaying the
importance of other apparently inconsistent statements.122 The fact is,
however, that the text simply does not supply clear and explicit information
about such important issues as whether or not the lover discards lower
objects, whether sexual relationships continue after the lover turns to beauty
of soul, or what prompts the lover to turn from bodies to souls.123 On the
other hand, precisely because it is not represented as containing a body of
authoritative teachings, the Greater Mysteries passage, like the metaphor of
pregnancy in the Lesser Mysteries passage, leads the audience to recognize
their own ignorance and to desire wisdom about eros and its object, beauty.
This is one way in which his speech, like Socrates himself in the Apology,
is wiser than the other speeches: it recognizes its own lack of wisdom.
Indeed, Diotimas characterization of Eros as a philosopher who desires
beauty and wisdom because he realizes that he lacks these good things
is consistent with a general principle in the Greater Mysteries passage,
if not with specific steps on a ladder. As noted in Chapter 2 at 2.2.3,
loving or liking (eran or philein) is a necessary condition for desiring
and searching for wisdom about the objects one loves or likes. When we
love something and recognize that we do not possess it, we ask questions
about this object and attempt to find out how to acquire it. That is,
loving leads people to like wisdom: philo-sophein. Similarly, in the Greater
Mysteries passage, love for one beautiful object leads the lover to desire and
search for as much wisdom about beauty as he can acquire, and to love
other beautiful objects as he comes to understand them.124 This process
culminates in philosophia (210d6), a state in which we desire to grasp the
truth about the beauty we love (212a25), including what it is to love this
122 Those who stress the negative statements about interpersonal love in Diotimas account include
Ferrari 1992: 258; Kahn 1996: 25864; Nussbaum 1986: 17684; Rutherford 1995: 1937; Santas
1988: 44; and Vlastos 1973. Others argue that the account of ascent up the ladder is compatible
with interpersonal love: Irwin 1995: 31011; Kosman 1976; Nye 1990; Patterson 1991: esp. 205 n.8;
Price 1989: 459; Rowe 1998: 7 and 195, on 210c2; and Sheffield 2006a: 15482. Gill 1990 argues
that some of the disagreement is due to mistaken assumptions about Platos concept of what it is
to be a person.
123 Noted by Nehamas 2007b: 11415 and 1223, who shows an unusual awareness of the ways in which
this passage fails to give a clear account of interpersonal love and other matters.
124 Note the cognitive terms used throughout this passage: katanosai: 210a8; nnosanta: 210b4;
ghsmenon: 210b6; gsasqai: 210b7; gshtai: 210c6.
beauty. As Alexander Nehamas notes: love and beauty are inseparable
from the effort to understand what we love or what is the same to
understand why we love it. As long as love persists, no answer will ever
be complete . . . This forward-looking element in the perception of beauty,
the sense that beautiful things are constantly drawing us forward, is the
deep truth in the lovers ascent in the Symposium.125
More specifically, the Greater Mysteries passage can be interpreted as a
mythical account of initiation into Socratic eros. When guided correctly, a
passionate young man can progress from ordinary eros for physical beauty
(see 210a47) to Socratic eros for true beauty and wisdom (see 210d3e1).
Like the myth of the charioteer and horses in the Phaedrus, the story of
the ascent up the ladder of love is a mythical hymn to Socrates master,
Eros, a not entirely unpersuasive speech, that contains some truth (Phdr.
265b6c3).
3.4 i am persuaded and i try to persuade others

Even though Socrates represents himself as questioning many of Diotimas
teachings, he nevertheless concludes his speech by saying that he has been
persuaded by this wise woman:
Diotima spoke, and I am persuaded [ppeismai d g]. Being persuaded I attempt
to persuade others also that one could not easily acquire a better co-worker for
human nature in acquiring this possession126 than Eros. And so [di] I say that
every man should honor Eros, and I myself honor ta erotika and am especially
devoted [diaferntwv sk] to these matters, and I urge [parakeleomai] others
to be so also. Both now and always I praise the power [dnamin] and courage of
Eros as much as I am able. (212b18)127
When Socrates says that he has been persuaded, he cannot mean, like the
Socrates of the Crito, that he has been persuaded by arguments.128 With the
exception of the elenchus she is reported as having given Socrates when he
expressed views similar to those of Agathon (201e27), Diotimas teachings
are unsupported by arguments. Socrates means, instead, that he has been
125 Nehamas 2007b, 120. Cf. Scott and Welton 2008: 93: desire prompts one to think of the desired
object.
126 That is, in becoming as god-loved and immortal as it is possible for a mortal to be (see 212a57). I
follow the interpretation of Dover 1980 and Rowe 1998, both on 212b34.
127 diaferntwv can mean especially or differently. That the latter sense might be applicable here
was suggested to me by Sandra Peterson.
128 Not now for the first time, but always, I am the sort of man who is persuaded by nothing in me
except the argument that seems best to me when I reason: Cri. 46b46. Insightful discussions
about Socrates use of persuasion in the Crito and other dialogues are given by Moore 2008.
given true beliefs about those matters that are also the concern of his own
erotic art.
The Symposium contains five important sources of information that,
taken together, provide a consistent account of what Socrates finds persua-
sive in Diotimas teachings: (source 1) the passage just quoted (212b18);
(source 2) Socrates conversation with Agathon (199c3201c9), and his
summary at 201d5e7 of conclusions agreed upon by Agathon, Socrates
and Diotima; (source 3) his questions and answers during his conversation
with Diotima; (source 4) the views he expresses before his conversation
with Agathon; and (source 5) other aspects of Platos characterization of
Socrates.
In the passage just quoted (source 1), Socrates says that he has been
persuaded that Eros is the best co-worker for human nature, that he himself
is devoted to Eros, that he urges others to be similarly devoted, and that
he praises the power and courage of Eros. These statements, obviously
referring to the Eros of Diotimas speech, indicate that Socrates agrees with
at least some of her account of the nature of Eros, and of his deeds, that
is, his usefulness to humans.129 Further information is given in Socrates
summary (source 2) of the conclusions about which he, Agathon and
Diotima agree (201d5e7).130 All three agree that Eros is eros of 131 beauty
(201e5, referring back to 201a9), and that Eros lacks beauty and other good
things (201e7, referring back to 201b4 and 201c45). Before his conversation
with Agathon also (source 4), Socrates implies that he believes Eros to be
neither beautiful nor good, when he criticizes the symposiasts disregard
for the truth in their attempt to present Eros as the most beautiful and
the best (198d8199a2). In his summary (source 2), Socrates also questions
the idea that Eros is a great god when he links this idea to the view, refuted
by Diotima, that Eros is beautiful and good (201e57). Because Diotimas
later statement that Eros is a daimon (202d13) is consistent with the idea
that he is not a god, it is reasonable to suppose that Socrates agrees with
this idea also.
129 These two aspects of Eros are mentioned at 199c5, 201d8e2 and 204c8.
130 As noted above 3.3.1 and n.74, Socrates statement at 201c89, that it is not hard to refute Socrates,
suggests that there may be flaws in his previous arguments. The specific ideas I discuss here,
however, are stated repeatedly in the dialogue and are never questioned.
131 Or, perhaps more accurately, concerning (per). Diotima will later claim that eros is not love of
beauty, but of generation in beauty (206e25), and for this reason she states that Eros is concerning
(per) beauty (203c4, 204b3), attributing the view that Eros is of beauty to Socrates (204d3). These
distinctions do not affect my main point here. As Rowe notes (1998, on 206e23), if the good is
also beautiful, then in a way eros is still of beauty.
Socrates responses to Diotima (source 3) give further information about
what Socrates agrees with. In answer to Socrates question about the power
(dnamin: 202e2) of Eros, Diotima characterizes him as a courageous and
clever hunter after the beautiful and the good (203d48), a being in a state
between wisdom and lack of understanding, who philosophizes and desires
to become wise because he realizes that he lacks these things (203e4204a7).
Socrates indicates that he agrees with this account of the power and courage
of Eros by saying: You speak well (204c7), and by his repetition of the
words power and courage (212b8) at the end of his speech (source 1).
That he also agrees with Diotimas account of generic eros as the desire for
good things and for happiness (205d13), and as the desire to possess good
things forever (206a1112) is indicated by his responses (source 3) at 205c3,
c10, d9 (You speak the truth) and 206a13 (You speak most truly).
Moreover, Socrates criticism of the symposiasts disregard for truth
(198d8199a2) just before his conversation with Agathon (source 4), and
his positive responses (source 3) to Diotimas characterization of Eros as
lacking beauty and goodness make it reasonable to infer that he agrees with
Diotima in characterizing Eros as unlike anything described by the literary
sources who are cited as authorities by the first five speakers. Diotima
does not attack these authorities directly, but her use of them is revealing.
As noted above 3.3.3, in the Lesser Mysteries passage she, like the first
five speakers, uses examples that occur in literary works without explicitly
examining and questioning them. Her use of these sources, however, differs
in several ways from that of the other speakers. First, she does not quote
selectively, leaving out passages that might support opposing points of view.
Some might question her interpretations, for example, the extent to which
Alcestis and Achilles are represented in literary sources as motivated to die
for those they love by the desire for immortal fame (208d1e1). Whatever
the motivations of these characters, however, it is undeniable that they do
in fact achieve glory in Euripides Alcestis (e.g., 43554 and 9951005) and
Homers Iliad. Second, Diotima never suggests that poets and prose writers
are authorities on Eros. She begins by teaching Socrates about the birds and
the beasts, that have, she claims, the same natural desire for immortality
that humans have (207a5d6). Nature, she implies, has more to teach us
than literature.
Finally, the Greater Mysteries section of her teachings characterizes
beauty itself by giving examples of what it is not. Beauty, she says, nei-
ther comes to be nor passes away, nor is it beautiful in one respect, ugly in
another. It does not appear like a face or hands, or anything that partici-
pates in body, nor is it any particular discourse or kind of knowledge. The
negative particles ou, oude or oute occur fifteen times within the space of
eight lines (211a18). Diotima goes on to tell Socrates that true beauty will
not seem to him to be like gold or clothes or the beautiful boys and youths
at whose sight he now experiences intense emotion (211d38), that it is not
full of human flesh and colors and much other mortal nonsense (211e23),
and that the person who associates with it will not give birth to images of
virtue because he is not touching an image (212a24). These negatives make
it clear that the lover who is initiated into the Greater Mysteries has an
experience unlike any in the literary tradition. Moreover, Diotima avoids
any quotation from or explicit mention of literary sources in this part of
her teachings. Although her characterization of beauty in negative terms
recalls the language and thought of Parmenides, she presents the views as
her own, without citing him as an authority, leaving it to the audience to
notice literary parallels.132
Platos characterization of Socrates in other respects (source 5) is itself
the most compelling reason for believing that Socrates has been persuaded
by Diotimas account of Eros as a philosopher-daimon, unlike anything
in the literary tradition, who is the greatest helper for human nature.
This is because her Eros personifies the erotic art that Socrates himself is
represented as possessing.
The Socrates of the Symposium is represented as possessing erotic art in
that he, like Eros, is devoted to ta erotika: the wisdom, beauty and other
good things that are the objects of eros (component (1) of the erotic art). Like
Eros, Socrates realizes that he lacks these good things, and especially wisdom
(component (2): 175e24, 219a12). That Socrates, like Eros, also desires
passionately to acquire this divine (204a12) possession (component (3)) is
evident from the constant search for wisdom that leads him, for example,
to stand thinking about something for a day and a night (220c1d5). Like
Eros (203d48), Socrates is marvelously skilled in seeking to attain as much
wisdom as he can (component (4)), by, for example, becoming Diotimas
student over a long period of time (206b56, 207a56), and by skillfully
questioning others and engaging them in dialectic (194d14). Socrates also
helps to create in others a desire for divine wisdom, in particular by leading
them to understand that they lack it (component (5)), both by general
exhortations, like the one at the end of his speech (212b18, quoted above
beginning of 3.4), and in more specific ways, for example in his elenchus of
Agathon at 199c3201c9 and in the conversations reported by Alcibiades
132 Sier 1997: 284 quotes Parmenides DK 28 B8. Solmsens (1971) argument that this passage is indebted
to Parmenides was anticipated by many German scholars: see Palmer 1999: 3 n.1, who also cites
numerous later studies.
(for example, at 216a4b5). In thus initiating others into the erotic art,
Socrates resembles the daimon who helps mortals to commune with the
gods to the extent that they can (202e3203a8), and who is of use to mortals
(204c8) in leading them to desire the good (205d13). Socrates marvelous
skill in urging others to devote themselves to ta erotika is apparent in his
strong effects on others throughout this dialogue.133 When he claims to
know nothing other than ta erotika (177d78, 198d12), then, Socrates
refers to his lack of knowledge and to his art, both of which are erotic and
Erotic.134
The speech in which Socrates reports his conversations with Diotima
is an especially powerful demonstration of component (5) of the erotic
art. Just as, in the Phaedrus, Socrates uses his erotic art to create poetic
language that can help to turn Phaedrus toward eros together with philo-
sophical words (257a3b6), so, in the Symposium, Socrates creates a speech
that appeals to each member of his audience of symposiasts. Diotimas dis-
cussion of love of honor would appeal to Phaedrus, whose speech empha-
sized the role of eros in producing this kind of love (philotimia: 178d12,
e6; 208c3); her emphasis on education would resonate with Pausanias,
who discussed the lovers ability to educate the beloved (padeusin: 184e1;
paideein: 209c2). In representing Eros as facilitating prophecy and the
communion of humans with gods (202e3203a8) Diotimas teachings recall
Eryximachus representation of Eros as governing prophecy and allowing
gods and humans to commune with and be friends of one another (188b6
d9).135 Moreover, her mention of craftsmen (209a5) recalls Eryximachus
description of physicians as craftsmen (186d5). Diotimas characterization
of Eros as lacking good and beautiful things interests Aristophanes, and the
comic elements in her teachings would appeal to him also.136 The solemn
language of the Greater Mysteries passage is of a style that would impress
the tragic poet Agathon, as would her inclusion of poets among those
who give birth to wisdom (phronesis) and virtue (209a34). Thus, in mak-
ing a speech that contains both comic and solemn (or tragic) elements,
Socrates demonstrates in practice what he will later prove by argument:
that the man who creates by means of techne, that is, erotic art, is able to
create both comedy and tragedy (223c4d6).
133 See Introduction to Part II and Chapter 4.

134 On Socrates resemblance to Eros see further Chapter 4 at 4.6 and Introduction at I.1.
135 On this parallel see McPherran 2006.
136 At 212c46, Aristophanes is about to mention his own view that love is desire for the whole
(192e10193a1), criticized by Diotima at 205d10206a1.
Socrates speech is also persuasive because, when Diotima discusses those
who are pregnant in soul, she describes people who resemble the symposi-
asts. Those pregnant in soul, she says, give birth to wisdom [phronesis] and
the other virtues137 that are generated by all the poets and those craftsmen
who are said to be inventors. And far the greatest . . . and the most beautiful
part of wisdom is that concerning the governance of cities and households,
whose name is moderation and justice (209a38). In creating a character
who emphasizes the areas in which each speaker claims expertise political
virtue, poetry, craftsmanship within the context of the conventional love
of erastes for eromenos that each praises, Platos Socrates uses his erotic art
to attempt to persuade the symposiasts to devote themselves to another
kind of eros and another kind of art.138 And in winning their praise (212c4),
Socrates shows himself to be at least partly successful.
Before going to Agathons symposium, Socrates dresses himself up so
that he can go as a beautiful man to visit a beautiful man (174a39). In a
similar way, Socrates dresses up his beliefs about his erotic art with mythical
and poetic elements that help to make them beautiful and persuasive to his
audience. Plato appeals to his own audience in a similar way, by writing a
passage that has been one of the most influential in the entire history of
Western thought.139
137 frnhsn te ka tn llhn retn; cf. Pausanias 184d7e1: frnhsin ka tn llhn retn.
138 Parallels between the symposiasts and those pregnant in soul are noted by Rowe 1998, on 209a34
and a45, and Sheffield 2001: 10 and n.10.
139 Sier 1997, 147 and Nehamas 2007b: 133. Good accounts of the influence of the Symposium are
provided by Clay 2006 and Lesher 2006.
ch a p ter 4
You are hubristic: Socrates, Alcibiades

and Agathon
4.1 alcibiades silenus-statues

Chapter 3 discussed Socrates uses of the erotic art to persuade his fellow
symposiasts to devote themselves to Eros. I focus in Chapter 4 on Socrates
interactions with two young men in particular, Alcibiades and Agathon, as
he attempts to initiate them into this art. Both men greatly admire Socrates,
but both also tell him: You are hubristic (bristv e: Agathon at 175e7,
and Alcibiades at 215b7). As noted in the Introduction to Part II, Socrates is
portrayed by the narrators of Platos Symposium as having a puzzling variety
of characteristics, some of which appear to be incompatible. Especially in
Alcibiades speech, he is represented as both hubristic and virtuous, comic
and serious. In order to understand this outlandish (atopos) figure, it is
necessary to examine these apparent inconsistencies.
One suggestion about how to understand Socrates is given by Alcibiades
in his representation of Socrates by means of comic images that have the
serious purpose of revealing the truth (215a46). Socrates, he says, resembles
the hollow statues of sileni (or satyrs)1 that open up to reveal images of
the gods (215a6b3, 216e5217a1). He looks like a ridiculous, hubristic and
lustful satyr, but he also, like the satyr Marsyas, plays divine tunes on the
aulos (pipe: 215b3c6, 216d26). Socrates words, like the man himself,
appear laughable, like the skin of an hubristic satyr, but when opened
up these words are most divine and contain the most images of virtue
(221d7222a6). As evidence that his comic image represents the truth about
Socrates, Alcibiades tells a story about how the philosopher exhibited both
hybris and virtue in his relations with Alcibiades by resisting the young
mans sexual attractions.
Modern scholars often take Alcibiades image to represent what Plato
considered to be the truth about his Socrates: that the outer satyr is a
1 The terms satyr and silenus were used interchangeably at this period: Seaford 1988b: 6. On
Socrates as satyr see also Chapter 6 at 6.3.
161
deceptive appearance concealing the inner truth.2 This is a plausible inter-
pretation of the views of Platos character, Alcibiades. However, the dialogue
gives the reader many reasons for believing that Alcibiades, who admits
that Socrates reduces him to perplexity (proun: 219e3), and who was not
present during Socrates speech, may not fully understand the philosopher.
The image of the silenus-statue itself requires opening up by the reader,
who has more information about Socrates than its inventor does.
Alcibiades portrait of Socrates can be better understood in light of
the philosophers complementary, but less often studied, interactions with
Agathon.3 Agathon, like Alcibiades, attributes to Socrates a superior wis-
dom that the young man seeks to acquire by touch (175c7d2; cf. 218c7d5)
and, like Alcibiades, Agathon accuses Socrates of hybris after failing in this
attempt (175e7; cf. 215b7, 219c5222a8). Alcibiades and Agathon, however,
react differently to the similar treatment they receive from Socrates. When
he listens to Socrates, Alcibiades experiences such shame and other painful
emotions that he holds his ears and runs away (215e1216b3). Agathon, on
the other hand, submits gracefully to Socrates criticisms and, at the end of
the dialogue, gets up to sit beside the philosopher in order to receive more
of the same treatment (223a35). Thus, Socrates success in using his erotic
art depends in large part on the characters of his interlocutors. Agathon is
in some ways an ideal interlocutor, who can be led by Socrates to acquire
component (2) of the erotic art by recognizing his own lack of wisdom,
without experiencing the shame and painful conflicts that Alcibiades suf-
fers. However, Agathons less passionate nature makes him less able to
acquire the other components of the erotic art, and in particular, Socrates
own passionate desire for wisdom and other good things (component (3)).
By comparing the interactions between Socrates and each of the two
men, we can also arrive at a better understanding of the truth that lies
behind Alcibiades image of the silenus-statues. Socrates outer and
inner characteristics are only apparently inconsistent, for Socrates, like
Diotimas philosopher-daimon Eros, resembles both the satyr and the inner,
divine images. Socrates resembles a satyr in behaving in a disdainful and
unconventional way toward possessions that Agathon and Alcibiades each
value highly. At the same time, however, he reveals the divine images
2 For example, North 1994: 923; Fisher 1992: 462; Gagarin 1977: 30; Scott and Welton 2008: 200;
Sheffield 2006a: 18891; Usher 2002: 21719. This interpretation has a long history: see Erasmus
(d. 1536), Praise of Folly (19742008, vol. 27: 1023) and The Sileni of Alcibiades (vol. 34: 26282);
Thomas More (1515), Erasmus The Sileni of Alcibiades (1999: 16991). Against this interpretation
see Blundell 1992: 1289.
3 Scott and Welton 2008: 434 note the importance in the dialogue of Socrates relationship with each
of these two men, although their analysis differs significantly from my own.
You are hubristic: Socrates, Alcibiades and Agathon 163
he contains in that he acts as he does in order to help these men recog-
nize their own lack of understanding (amathia), and not, as the hubristic
person does, in order to get pleasure by harming others and showing his
own superiority. Socrates satyr-like characteristics, then, are also divine
images, and both are manifestations of his daimonic art.
4.2 disdain, hybris and satyrs

Alcibiades accuses Socrates of both hybris and disdain: He disdained and
laughed at my beauty, and committed hybris against it (katefrnhsen
ka kateglasen tv mv rav ka brisen: 219c45). Disdain (kata-
phronesis) is linked with hybris in Greek thought generally, as it is in this
passage. A survey of the Greek concepts of slighting, hybris and disdain will
give us a better understanding of how Socrates behavior in Platos dialogue
might have appeared to a Greek audience.
A key text for an understanding of these concepts is Aristotles Rhetoric
2.2. After defining anger (orge) as desire, accompanied by pain, for retali-
ation because of what appears to be slighting [ligwran] (1378a3031),
Aristotle defines slighting as an expression of an opinion about some-
thing as apparently of no account (1378b11).4 He then lists three kinds of
slighting: disdain (kataphronesis), spite (phreasmv), which is not rele-
vant for present purposes, and hybris (1378b1415). Aristotle explains why
disdain is a form of slighting: The person who disdains slights. For people
disdain things they think are worth nothing, and they slight things that
are worth nothing (1378b1517). His account of hybris is more detailed:
The man committing hybris also slights: for hybris is doing and saying things
at which the victim incurs shame, not in order that one may achieve anything
other than what is done but simply to get pleasure from it. For those who act in
return for something do not commit hybris, they avenge themselves. The cause
of the pleasure for those committing hybris is that by harming people they think
themselves to be superior (that is why the young and the rich are hybristai; they
think they are superior when committing hybris).5
Aristotle goes on to explain that slighting causes anger when those slighted
think they ought to be highly esteemed by those who are inferior in
whatever respect they themselves are far superior, for example, in birth,
power, virtue, wealth, ability to speak well or to rule. They are also angry
at slights from those by whom they think they have a right to be treated
well, for example, those whom they have benefited or desire to benefit
4 Trans. Grimaldi 1988, on 1378b10. 5 Rh. 1378b2329. Trans. Fisher 1992: 8.
(1378b351379a9). Aristotle also writes that people are angry at those who
laugh at, mock or make fun of them, for these people are committing
hybris (1379a3032). David Konstan gives a good account of the connection
between slighting, anger and the desire for revenge: Aristotle envisages
a world in which self-esteem depends on social interaction: the moment
someones negative opinion of your worth is actualized publicly in the form
of a slight, you have lost credit, and the only recourse is a compensatory
act that restores your social position. Anger is precisely the desire to adjust
the record in this way.6
Aristotles passage supports the view of Nicholas Fisher and Douglas
Cairns that there is a close connection in Greek thought between hybris
and dishonor. According to Fisher, hybris is essentially the serious assault
on the honour of another, which is likely to cause shame, and lead to
anger and attempts at revenge, and it involves the committing of acts of
intentional insult, of acts which deliberately inflict shame and dishonour
on others.7 Cairns differs from Fisher in putting a greater emphasis on
the disposition of the agent who commits hybris, and he contests Fishers
view that Platos usage is a departure from tradition. Like Fisher, however,
Cairns stresses the association of hybris with dishonor, arguing that the
most fundamental of all significances of hybris, [is] the idea that hybris
involves a disposition in the agent which overvalues self and undervalues
others.8 The person who commits hybris shames another and is himself
shameless.9
Socrates behavior in the Symposium meets Aristotles criteria for slight-
ing (Rh. 1378b11, quoted above) in that he is represented by the narra-
tors as showing disdain (a form of slighting) for things that appear to
him to be worth nothing, even if these things are highly valued by those
who possess them.10 According to Alcibiades, Socrates words and deeds
show that he disdains Alcibiades beauty, wealth and honors (216d7e2,
219c4). Alcibiades also notes that Socrates fellow soldiers look askance
at him, thinking he is showing disdain for them (pblepon atn v
katafrononta sfn) when he walks barefoot on ice more easily than
they do shod (220b6c1). In his first encounter with Agathon (175e17),
and in his elenchus of the poet (199c3201c9), Socrates also shows that he
6 Konstan 2006: 745. 7 Fisher 1992: 1 and 148. 8 Cairns 1996: 26.
9 Fisher 1992: 11213 notes that hybris is opposed to aidos [reverence] as well as to sophrosyne [mod-
eration] and linked to the performance of what is shameful, aischron. Cf. Cairns 1996: 2631, on
hybris in Plato, citing, for example, Phdr. 250e (p. 26) and Laws 649cd (p. 28).
10 Cf. Tht. 175b46, where philosophers are said to appear arrogant (perhfnwv) to the many because
they do not value what others honor.
thinks little of the kind of wisdom Agathon values highly: the ability to
speak pleasingly before a crowd.
Socrates acts disdainfully, then, but does he also commit hybris, a more
serious form of slighting? And are the accusations of hybris made by
Agathon and Alcibiades represented as humourously exaggerated, or as
seriously intended?11 The analysis just given of hybris, disdain and slighting
can help to answer these questions.
Socrates behavior toward Agathon and Alcibiades meets some of the
criteria for hybris in Fishers definition: the serious assault on the honour
of another, which is likely to cause shame, and lead to anger and attempts
at revenge.12 That Socrates says and does things because of which the
victim incurs shame (Rh. 1378b24) is clear from Alcibiades admission that
Socrates makes him ashamed of himself (216a8b3). Moreover, Alcibiades
threatens revenge when he first says that he will punish Socrates (213d8),
and then in effect brings him to trial when he refers to the symposiasts as
jurymen (219c56). Agathon makes similar threats when he says that he
and Socrates will be judged by Dionysus (175e79). I will argue that Socrates
does not, however, make a serious assault on the honour of another, even
though he slights and shows disdain for the things others value. Nor does
Socrates meet other important criteria for hybris, according to Aristotles
account, for he does not slight others in order to get pleasure from harming
people and demonstrating his own superiority (Rh. 1378b2329). Indeed,
Socrates does not disdain other people at all, as Alcibiades charges (216e2
4). When Socrates shows Agathon and Alcibiades that they lack the good
things they claim to have, he does not want to get pleasure from dishonoring
them, but to benefit them by using his erotic art to remove their amathia,
thus helping them to desire what is truly worthy of honor: wisdom. Agathon
and Alcibiades are annoyed by Socrates disdainful behavior toward the
possessions they value. At the same time, their positive reactions indicate
that they do not believe that he intends to harm them. In charging him
with hybris, then, his interlocutors playfully exaggerate while at the same
time calling attention to behavior that is in fact disdainful.
11 Humourously exaggerated: Fisher 1992: 454. Similar views are expressed by Dover 1980, on 175e7
and 219c5; Hug 1876: 182 n.7; Hunter 2004: 13; Rowe 1998, on 175e8, and 206, on 215a5222b7. The
charges are taken seriously by Anton 1974: 291; Duncan 1977: 2878; Gagarin 1977; Mason 1980:
1224; Nightingale 1995: 11417; Penwill 1978: 159 and 1668; Rosen 1987: 208 and 1965: 45659;
G. A. Scott 2000: 1405. Halliwell 2008: 2958, discusses evidence for a similar debate in antiquity
about whether or not Socrates commits hybris.
12 Fisher 1992: 1. This is Fishers definition of the central meaning of the Greek concept of hybris, of
which, he believes, Aristotles account in the Rhetoric is an essentially accurate representation (7).
Alcibiades image is of interest not only because it charges Socrates
with hybris, but also because it compares him specifically to an hubristic
satyr: And I say, moreover, that he is like the satyr Marsyas. That you are
like these things [sc. silenus-statues and Marsyas] in appearance, at least,
Socrates, not even you would contest. Next, listen to how you resemble
them in other respects also. You are hubristic, arent you? If you dont
agree, Ill furnish witnesses (215b37). In myth, the satyr Marsyas was
hubristic in challenging Apollo to an aulos contest, a crime for which he
was flayed.13 There is a suggestion that Socrates rivals the gods at 214d24,
where Alcibiades says that Socrates will not allow him to praise anyone,
god or human, other than Socrates himself. Moreover, as Helen North
points out, the idea of opening the silenus-statue recalls the flaying of
Marsyas.14 However, not only is this aspect of the myth never explicitly
mentioned, Alcibiades statement that Socrates words resemble the skin of
some hubristic satyr (221e24) suggests that he thinks Socrates is satyr-like
in a more general way.
Satyrs are typically represented as shameless creatures, who violate and
invert social norms.15 The very appearance of these half-human, half-bestial
creatures is transgressive. Satyrs are often represented as drinking exces-
sively and in other ways violating sympotic norms.16 Their sexual behavior
is also unconventional. Far from observing the conventions for the behav-
ior of erastai (lovers) that were intended to avoid dishonoring eromenoi
(beloveds), satyrs frequently commit such sexual offenses as attempted
rape, a particularly salient example of hybris that dishonors another.17 In
transgressing social norms in this and other respects, satyrs are hubristic
in that they put gratification of their own desires ahead of the honor of
others.18 Satyrs also arouse laughter, a characteristic notably exploited in
the satyr play. Satyrs are themselves objects of laughter, but they may also
hubristically direct laughter at others. Indeed, mockery is a form of hybris
in Greek culture, and to make someone an object of laughter is to shame
and dishonor that person. Conversely, to dishonor someone is to make
that person an object of laughter. For example, after Homers Odysseus
gives Thersites dishonoring blows (Il. 2.264), all the other men laugh
13 Flaying: Solon frag. 33.7 (West 19891992), Herodotus 7.26, Pl. Euthydemus 285c9d1.
14 North 1994: 95; cf. Gagarin 1977: 31, who connects Socrates hybris with that of Marsyas.
15 Lissarrague 1990a: 2345 and 1993: 220; Seaford 1988b: 30.
16 Examples: Lissarrague 1990b: esp. 1314 and 91.
17 Norms of behavior: Golden 1984. Satyrs attempting rape and committing other transgressive sexual
acts: Lissarrague 1990c and Dover 1989: 97. Rape as hybris: Fisher 1992: 10511 and passim.
18 Satyrs represented as hubristic: Fisher 1992: 121 n.248 and 505 n.55.
at Thersites (270).19 Someone who commits hybris often does things that
appear ridiculous, as Conon does when he crows like a cock over his victim
(Demosthenes 54 [Against Conon] 9), but it is the victim who is the real
object of laughter. Similarly, in behaving transgressively and violating the
honor of others, satyrs make their victims the objects of laughter.
Alcibiades Socrates is satyr-like in that he transgresses social norms
in some of the ways that satyrs do. He violates convention in physical
appearance, for he looks like a satyr (215b36, 216d4), and in behavior,
when, for example, he disdains Alcibiades beauty (219c2d2). Alcibiades
Socrates is also silenus-like in having an erotic nature (216d24), and he
violates sexual conventions in appearing to play the role of both erastes
and eromenos toward the same people (222b34), roles that are normally
separated.
Socrates also resembles a satyr in arousing laughter.20 According to Alci-
biades, he laughs at (kateglasen) Alcibiades beauty (219c45).21 How-
ever, Socrates himself is also an object of laughter. Alcibiades says that he
will praise Socrates instead of Eros (214d28), and then asks if he should
attack and punish Socrates in his speech (214e13). Socrates replies: What
do you have in mind? To make a joke in praising me? (p t geloiter
me painsai: 214e45). Alcibiades speech in fact turns out to be a satyric
and silenic drama (222d34) that arouses laughter (glwta: 222c1). The
silenus image is itself laughable, and Alcibiades states that an inexperienced
and foolish person would laugh at (katagelseien) Socrates words, which
at first appear ridiculous (gelooi), like the skin of an hubristic satyr, being
concerned with such subjects as pack-asses and tanners (221e1222a1).
When Alcibiades first arrives at the symposium, he also makes percep-
tive remarks about Socrates as an object of laughter. Alcibiades accuses the
19 Mockery: Arist. Rh. 1379a3034 and Top. 144a57, discussed by Fisher 1992: 1112. On the aggressive
quality of laughter in the Greek shame culture see Arnould 1990: 3150; de Vries 1985; Halliwell
2008: 1938; Kullmann 1995; Stewart 1994. Hybris and the ridiculous are closely linked in Pl. Cra.
426b6 (bristik . . . ka geloa), Prt. 355c8 and Hp. mai. 286c5e2. Hybris, laughter and sex are
associated in Pindar Pyth. 10.36: He laughs, seeing the upright hybris of the beasts (gel q rn
brin rqan knwdlwn), where hybris refers to the erections of donkeys: Cairns 1996: 24 and Race
1997a: 3623 n.1.
20 As Clay notes (2000: 1423), Socrates throughout the dialogues resembles a character from Attic
comedy in being a figure of lower class status, who often provokes laughter. Philosophers are said to
be objects of ridicule to the many in Tht. 175b45 and Grg. 485a67 (cf. Resp. 516e7517a2, 517d46
and Grg. 474a1, 485a47). On the philosopher as an object of laughter see Mader 1977: 3640.
Patterson 1982 provides an excellent discussion of Socrates and the comic in Symp., and Halliwell
2008: 276302, gives an insightful analysis of laughter and Platos Socrates. On Socrates as satyr see
also Clay 2000: 6976 and Sheffield 2006a: 196201.
21 In other dialogues also, Socrates, or a Socrates-like questioner, laughs at those whom he refutes: Prt.
355c8, Hp. mai. 286c5e2, 291e5292a4, Tht. 200a12b1, Grg. 509a47. This is consistent with the
idea in Phlb. 48c449c7 that what is truly laughable is the pretense of wisdom.
philosopher of ambushing him (213b9), and suggests that Socrates would
most appropriately sit beside Aristophanes or someone else who is ridicu-
lous [geloov] and wants to be so (213c24). Within the context of the
self-mockery in which Socrates engages in the Symposium (see Chapter 3
at 3.3.2), this statement suggests that Socrates not only appears ridiculous
to others, but also that he invites their laughter, and laughs at himself.
Socrates willingness to do so places him in the same category as those
he laughs at, and thus helps to mitigate any abusive qualities his laughter
might otherwise have.
Thus, although Alcibiades does not completely understand Socrates, his
comic image of the philosopher as hubristic satyr captures an important
aspect of the truth about Socrates interactions, not only with Alcibiades
himself, but also with Agathon. The very hybris of which Socrates is
accused helps both of his interlocutors begin to acquire the erotic art, by,
in the first place, recognizing that they lack wisdom (component (2)). Each
man, however, arrives at this recognition in a different way.
4.3 agathon
Unlike Alcibiades, Agathon does not experience shame and painful aporia
(216a8c3, 219e3) in response to Socrates. Instead, he shows by his words and
actions throughout the dialogue that he is able to benefit, by recognizing
that he lacks wisdom, from the treatment he calls hybris in his first
encounter with Socrates. In portraying the gentle and good poet in this
way, Plato represents him as an ideal interlocutor in many respects.
The reason for the symposium is significant for an understanding of
Socrates behavior there. On the previous day, Agathon, who won first
prize in a tragic competition, sacrificed together with the chorus in honor
of the occasion (173a57). Now he has invited a few friends to a celebratory
dinner and symposium. Because of his victory, Agathon has every reason
to think he is superior in his ability to speak well and every reason to
expect praise and good will from his friends, especially since he has invited
them to dinner. Agathon would, then, according to Aristotles account (Rh.
1378b351379a9), be ready to see any suggestion that he lacks the ability to
speak well as a slight on the part of these friends (above 4.2).
Socrates unconventional treatment of Agathon shows that he does
indeed slight Agathons ability to speak well, especially in his role as play-
wright. Socrates manner of arrival and his first conversation with Agathon
(174a2175e10) slight his host, as does his conversation with Agathon just
before the poets speech (194a1e3). Socrates also slights Agathon in the
remarks he makes to the symposiasts after this speech (198a1199c2), and
in the elenchus of Agathon that immediately follows these remarks (199c3
201c9).
In the first place, the philosopher is a very rude guest at Agathons
celebratory party.22 Although, contrary to his usual custom, Socrates has
bathed and put on shoes in honor of the occasion (174a34), he nevertheless
brings along an uninvited guest, Aristodemus, who is always unshod
(173b2).23 Socrates then allows this uninvited and inappropriately dressed
follower to arrive alone, while he himself stops along the way in order to
think about something (174d47). Worse, he ignores his hosts requests
to arrive in time for dinner. After asking Aristodemus where Socrates is,
Agathon sends a slave to bring Socrates to his house. When the slave
reports that Socrates is standing in a neighbors porch and refuses to leave,
Agathon calls this behavior outlandish (atopon: 175a10), and tells the
slave to return to Socrates and take no refusal.24 However, the uninvited
guest, Aristodemus, countermands his hosts order, telling the slave to leave
Socrates alone (174e12175b3). Repeatedly (pollkiv), Agathon attempts
to send his slave to fetch Socrates and is prevented from doing so by the
uninvited follower of Socrates. Not until the middle of dinner does the
philosopher finally arrive (175c26). Socrates behavior is not only rude
to Agathon, it also puts Aristodemus in the embarrassing and ridiculous
(174e2) position of arriving at the party uninvited by his host and without
the guest who invited him.25
Socrates rude behavior as guest is highlighted by Agathons contrast-
ing behavior as the model host.26 Agathon tells Aristodemus that he had
intended to invite Aristodemus (174e48), and he asks Socrates to sit beside
him when the philosopher finally arrives: Come here . . . and recline beside
me, Socrates, so that I can also benefit, by touching you, from the piece of
wisdom [tou sophou] that came to you in the porch. Youve clearly found it
and have it. Otherwise you wouldnt have gone away (175c7d2). Socrates,
instead of responding to his hosts request and apologizing for being late,
replies:
22 Cf. Plochmann 1972: 330; Rosen 1987: 278; and Scott and Welton 2008: 34.
23 Blondell 2006: 148 writes: by bringing along an uninvited guest [Socrates] challenges symposiastic
exclusivity and decorum. Cf. Arieti 1991: 97. That the traditional symposium is alien to Socrates is
noted by Tecusan 1990: 2412.
24 On Socrates outlandishness (atopia), see Chapter 1 n.21.
25 On Aristodemus position as uninvited guest see Introduction to Part II.
26 Agathons courtesy is noted by Blanckenhagen 1992: 60; Bury 1932: xxxivxxxv; Dover 1980, on
174e56; and Leveque 1955: 42.
It would be a good thing, Agathon, if wisdom [sophia] were the kind of thing that
flows from the fuller to the emptier of us, if we touch one another, just as water
flows through a piece of wool from fuller to emptier cups. If wisdom also is like
that, I place a high value on reclining beside you. For in that case, I think, I will be
filled with your great and beautiful wisdom. My own wisdom may be something
inferior or questionable, like a dream, but yours is brilliant and growing rapidly.
Though you are young, it shone out so intensely and clearly the other day, before
more than thirty thousand Greek witnesses. (175d3e6)
Socrates words are disdainful, according to Aristotles criteria, for they
indicate that Socrates thinks little of his hosts wisdom.27 He makes a joke
of Agathons idea that wisdom can be transmitted by touch, and suggests
that the young poet has greater wisdom than his own because it shone
brightly before a crowd of thirty thousand people. Coming from Socrates,
who told Aristodemus that he stayed away from Agathons victory party
on the day before because he feared the crowd (174a67), this is not praise
of Agathons wisdom, but disdain. Socrates mention of Agathons youth
(175e5) may also be a disdainful allusion to Agathons lack of the mental
insight (dianoav yiv) that, as Socrates tells Alcibiades, comes with age
(219a24). In behaving in this way, Socrates slights the ability to speak well
of which Agathon thinks highly. His disdainful words are not what a host
would normally expect from a guest, and they might be expected to cause
shame and to lead to attempts at revenge.28 Agathons reply is an expression,
playfully exaggerated, but with serious overtones, of the desire for revenge
he would be justified in feeling in response to this kind of slighting: You
are hubristic, Socrates . . . As for that, a little later you and I will go on trial
concerning wisdom [sophia], with Dionysus as judge (175e79).
Socrates also slights Agathons ability to speak well in his conversation
just before the poets speech (194a1e3). After Socrates says that he fears
he will be at a disadvantage after Agathons encomium, Agathon responds
that Socrates is trying to bewitch (farmttein) and disturb him before
he speaks (194a17).29 Socrates then expresses surprise that Agathon could
be disturbed at the thought of speaking before a few people when he was
not at all frightened before the crowd in the theater (194a8b5). Agathon
replies that it is more terrifying to speak before a few who have sense than
before a crowd of the foolish (194b68). Socrates then replies: I know well
that if you should meet any people you consider to be wise [sophous], youd
be more concerned about them than about the many. But I suspect that we
27 Disdain: Rh. 1378b1517: see above 4.2. 28 See Fisher 1992: 1, discussed above 4.2.
29 Dover 1980, on 194a5 farmttein, notes that excessive praise or over-confident prediction was felt
to incur the jealously of supernatural forces, citing Phd. 95b.
are not those wise people for we were present there [sc. at the theater] and
were among the many (194c25). In saying this, Socrates slights Agathons
wisdom by implicitly accepting the latters statement that the audience
applauding Agathon at the theater was made up of fools. By including the
symposiasts among this crowd of fools, he slights their wisdom also.
Socrates then begins to question Agathon, who agrees that he would be
ashamed before wise [sophoi] people if he thought he were doing something
shameful (194c58). Socrates then asks him if he would not be ashamed
before the many if he thought he were doing something shameful (194c9
10). At this point, however, Phaedrus prevents Agathon from replying,
telling him to give his encomium of Eros before conversing with Socrates
(194d18). Agathon complies, saying: Nothing prevents me from speaking.
Ill often be able to converse with Socrates again (194e13). In this way,
Agathon accepts the invitation of his audience, represented by Phaedrus,
to speak beautiful and pleasing words about eros instead of examining his
own behavior and joining with Socrates in a common search for wisdom.
The cross-examination, however, is merely postponed; it resumes after
Agathons speech. Moreover, the text invites the reader to fill in the gaps
in the argument, after considering how Socrates line of questioning could
have led Agathon to admit even greater lack of wisdom than he actually
does. I fill in the gaps below, indicating in italics what Socrates and Agathon
might have said.
s o c r a t e s : Wouldnt you be ashamed before the many if you thought you were
doing something shameful? (194c910)
a g a t h o n : Certainly I would, Socrates.
s o c r a t e s : Do you consider it shameful to claim to know things that you dont know?
a g a t h o n : Yes, I do.
s o c r a t e s : Then you would be ashamed to speak before the many and the few,
claiming that you know about things you in fact know nothing about?
a g a t h o n : Yes, I would.
s o c r a t e s : Well, Agathon, do you know something about Eros?
a g a t h o n : Certainly I do.
s o c r a t e s : And do you speak about this topic before the many?
a g a t h o n : Yes, I do, Socrates, when my plays are performed. My poetry is full of this
subject.30
s o c r a t e s : Come, then, Agathon. Tell me what Eros is like.
a g a t h o n : Well, thats just what Im going to do. Heres my encomium.
30 The very scanty evidence for Agathons tragedies is assessed by Leveque 1955: 85114. Agathons
characterization in the Symposium and the title of his tragedy, The Flower, suggest that erotic
motifs figured prominently in at least some of his plays.
[Agathon makes his speech (194e4197e8), and Socrates, after some general remarks
to the symposiasts (198a1199c2), resumes questioning, this time completing his
elenchus (199c3201c9).]
s o c r a t e s : Come, then, tell me this about Eros. (199c6d1)
[In response to Socrates questioning at 199d1201b8, Agathon agrees that Eros
lacks beauty, and that what lacks beauty is not beautiful (200b48).]
s o c r a t e s : Do you still agree that Eros is beautiful, if these things are so (201b9
10)?
a g a t h o n : It seems likely, Socrates, that I didnt know anything I was talking
about then. (201b1112)
s o c r a t e s : Yet, when you presented your plays you spoke about this topic before the
many, thereby claiming to know something about it. Not only that, but just now
you made a speech about Eros to us few, claiming knowledge before us also.
a g a t h o n : Yes, youre right, Socrates.
s o c r a t e s : But didnt you just now agree that you would be ashamed to speak before
the many and the few, claiming that you knew things you in fact knew nothing
about?
a g a t h o n : I did.
s o c r a t e s : Then it follows that you should be ashamed of your poetry about Eros
and of the encomium you gave just now.
As can be seen from the steps in the elenchus that I have filled in above, the
text implies that Socrates convicts Agathon of doing something Agathon
himself considers shameful, and thus demonstrates that the young man
ought to be ashamed of himself.31 He thereby slights Agathons wisdom,
showing that the achievement of which he is most proud his ability to
make speeches that appear beautiful to the many is actually something
shameful. When he leads Agathon to admit his ignorance (201b1112) and
his inability to refute Socrates (201c67), Socrates wins a very public victory
over his host, at the poets own victory celebration, in the trial concerning
wisdom that Agathon earlier said would take place (175e79).
Socrates remarks to the symposiasts at 198a1199c2, immediately after
Agathons speech and before the elenchus, also indicate disdain for the poets
ability to speak well.32 Like his praise for Agathons wisdom in their first
encounter, Socrates applause after Agathons speech and his extravagant
praise, when he remarks, for example, on the marvelous beauty of the
last part of the speech (198b35), express disdain rather than approval.33
Indeed, after joining all (pntav: 198a1) the other symposiasts in applaud-
ing Agathons speech, Socrates proceeds to criticize that very speech, thereby
31 Cf. Anton 1996: 21516 (quoting Cobb 1993: 68); Rowe 1998, on 194d12; and Scott and Welton
2008: 72.
32 On this passage see also Chapter 3 at 3.3.1.
33 On Socrates use of extravagant praise see Nightingale 1995: 11319.
implying that the audience of symposiasts was, like the theater crowd,
foolish to applaud an ignorant speaker. Socrates employs mock-solemnity
in addressing Eryximachus as child of Akoumenos, and he parodies
Agathons rhetorical style, with its alliterations like those of the sophist
Gorgias, when he asks the physician if he, Socrates, feared a fearless fear
(dev . . . dov dedinai) in being afraid to speak after Agathon (198a5).
The phrase head of Gorgias (Gorgou kefaln: 198c3), punning on
Gorgons head, also parodies Agathons style, as do the words to speak in
the speech (lgein n t lg: 198c4). Socrates statement that Agathons
speech was beautiful and variegated (kaln . . . ka pantodapn: 198b3)
is also a form of criticism.34 Moreover, in adapting Euripides famous line
my tongue swore but not my heart (199a56, Hippolytus 612) Socrates
casts doubt on Agathons characterization of Eros by alluding to notorious
counter-examples to the gentleness and justice Agathon attributed to Eros
in his speech: Phaedras disastrous passion for her stepson and the deceptive
nature of promises in erotic contexts. When he states that apparently it
makes no difference to the symposiasts whether an encomium is true or
false (198e12), Socrates implies once more that Agathon did not tell the
truth.
In many ways, then, Socrates shows disdain for Agathons wisdom in
speaking. Nevertheless, Agathons interactions with Socrates in their first
conversation, when the poet asks to share Socrates wisdom (sophia: 175a6
e10), his admission of error after Socrates elenchus (201b1112), and his
readiness, at the end of the dialogue, to undergo an experience that is very
similar to his first encounter with Socrates indicate that he learns, in the
course of the dialogue, that what he at first calls hybris is in fact beneficial,
for it helps him to overcome his own amathia. His ability to admit error
is consistent with the view, discussed in Chapter 3 at 3.2.6, that Agathons
amathia is less serious than that of the other first five speakers.
As a guest of Agathon, Socrates acts in an outlandish, unconventional,
way (atopon: 175a10), arriving late and allowing Aristodemus to precede
him. However, Agathons unfailing courtesy and his request to share
Socrates wisdom (tou sophou: 175c8) show that he does not believe that
Socrates acts in this way because the philosopher enjoys, as a hubristic per-
son would, dishonoring his host and putting Aristodemus, the uninvited
guest, in an embarrassing situation, but because Socrates is deeply engaged
in thought (see 174d45), which he values more highly than obeying social
34 These examples of parody and mock-solemnity are given by Bury 1932, on 198ac. On mockery
as a form of hybris see above 4.2 and n.19. Eryximachus uses the phrase poll ka pantodap
(many and variegated) to characterize the speech of his rival, Aristophanes, at 193e67.
conventions. In fact, Socrates reply to Agathons request differs from that
of an hubristic person in that it slights his own wisdom as well as Agathons.
In saying that his own wisdom is inferior, or questionable, like a dream
(175e24),35 Socrates engages in the self-mockery that he displays elsewhere
in the dialogue. When Agathon accuses Socrates of hybris, then, he shows
that he is annoyed, and does not fully understand the philosopher. How-
ever, Agathon is not seriously angry with Socrates, partly because he is
a gentle person and partly because the sympotic occasion is friendly and
playful.36
Socrates interactions with Agathon before the poet gives his encomium
(194a1e3) demonstrate more clearly his respect for Agathon and his desire
to benefit him by helping him to recognize his own deficiencies. When
Agathon says that it is more terrifying to speak before a few who have
sense than before a crowd of the foolish (194b68), Socrates reply, I
certainly wouldnt be acting nobly, Agathon, if I thought you were at all
boorish (194c12), indicates genuine respect for the young poet. And, just
as he slighted his own wisdom in their first conversation, so Socrates
includes himself among the fools at the theater (194c27), thus tem-
pering his criticism with self-mockery. After Agathon makes his speech,
Socrates, like a good teacher, prefaces his elenchus with praise: Indeed,
dear Agathon, it seemed to me that you began your speech well, say-
ing that it is first necessary to demonstrate what characteristics Eros has,
and after that to discuss his deeds. I very much admire this beginning
(199c36). That this praise is sincere, unlike Socrates previous extravagant
praise of Agathons speech (198b15), is shown by his explicit statement
that Agathon has followed the correct procedure when he made his speech
(201d8e2).
The interaction between Socrates and Agathon at the end of the elenchus
provides further evidence that Socrates benefits Agathon in slighting his
wisdom and, moreover, that Agathon has come to realize this:
And Agathon said, It seems likely, Socrates, that I didnt know anything I was
talking about then [that is, when he made his speech].
But indeed you spoke beautifully, Agathon, he said. But tell me one little
thing more. Dont good things [tagatha] seem to you to be beautiful also?
They do.
35 Cf. Sts. 277d23, where the Stranger says: Its likely that each of us knows everything as if in a
dream.
36 Konstan 2006: 74 cites Aristotle, Rh. 2.3.1380b25 for the idea that people are not inclined to
anger when they are in certain states, for example, when enjoying themselves at parties or feeling
prosperous.
If, then, Eros is deficient in beautiful things [as Agathon agreed at 201b4], and
good things are beautiful, he would also be deficient in good things [ton agathon
endees].
I wouldnt be able to contradict you, Socrates, he said, but let it be just as
you say.
You arent able to contradict the truth, beloved37 Agathon, he said, but its
not difficult to contradict Socrates. (201b11c9)
This exchange ends in a remarkably friendly way. Agathon does not
react to the elenchus as so many of Socrates interlocutors do, by becoming
angry with Socrates, nor does he repeat his earlier charge of hybris. Instead,
he readily acknowledges his own lack of wisdom and agrees with Socrates
conclusion. Agathon admits that he cannot contradict Socrates (so ok n
dunamhn ntilgein: 201c6), just as Alcibiades does (ntilgein mn o
dunamn: 216b3). However, unlike Alcibiades (216b56), Agathon does
not run away.
Socrates implicitly acknowledges the young mans ability to benefit from
Socrates treatment when he addresses Agathon as beloved (201c8), and
goes on to recount his own interactions with Diotima, in which he himself
was refuted after saying things about Eros similar to those Agathon has
just asserted (201e37).38 Moreover, in the passage just quoted, Socrates
concludes his elenchus with a punning compliment to Agathon. The young
poet had portrayed Eros in his own image, as most beautiful (195a7),
most delicate (paltatov: 196a1, 195e8, cf. 195d1), living among the
softest things (n malakwttoiv tn malakwttwn: 195e8, cf. 195d7, e3,
e7), and producing friendship, gentleness and good will among humans
(197d15).39 In punning references to his own name, Agathon said that Eros
is good (agathos: 197d5), a good poet (poietes . . . agathos: 196e4), and a
god who takes care of the good (epimeles agathon: 197d78).40 The same
pun was introduced at the beginning of the dialogue, when Socrates, on
his way to Agathons house, quoted the proverb: The good [agathoi] go of
their own accord to the feasts of the good [agathon] (gaqn p datav
asin atmatoi gaqo: 174b45).41 In the context of these precedents,
37 Reading filomene, defended by Dover 1980, on 201c9, and (with caution) Rowe 1998, on 201c89.
38 Socrates also addresses Agathon as dear (fle) at 222d5. Socrates tact is noted by Bury 1932:
xxxix; Cornford 1971b: 122; and Warner 1992: 170.
39 Ancient sources attribute these characteristics to the historical Agathon himself: Leveque 1955: 3548.
40 The last pun is noted by Rowe 1998, on 197d8.
41 Reading gaqn of the manuscripts with most modern editors. Burnet 19001907 prints Lach-
manns %gqwn. On this passage see Bury 1932: 89; Hug 1876: 1213; Lowenstam 1985: 867; and
Rowe 1998, on 174b3c5. The pun was well established in antiquity, to judge from Aristophanes,
Frogs 84, where Agathon is referred to as a good poet [agathos poietes] and longed for by his friends
(gaqv poihtv ka poqeinv tov floiv).
when Socrates says that Eros is deficient in (or needs) good things (ton
agathon endees: 201c5), he is simultaneously refuting Agathon and paying
him a compliment, by stating that Eros is in need of Agathon. This pun
also helps to explain why Socrates addresses Agathon as beloved. In
identifying him with the things Eros needs, Socrates casts Agathon in the
role of beloved, a role that Agathons speech already gave to his soft and
delicate Eros (see 204c15). Agathons response, I wouldnt be able to
contradict you, Socrates . . . but let it be just as you say (201c67), shows
that he accepts the compliment as gracefully as the refutation. In addition
to being a good host and poet, Agathon is a good interlocutor, in that he
learns from his mistakes.42
That Agathon has learned from his interactions with Socrates is also
apparent in the final scene of the Symposium. When he enthusiastically
accepts Socrates invitation to sit beside him, in order to be praised by
the philosopher (223a34), Agathon is about to put himself, literally and
figuratively, in the same position he occupied in his first encounter with
Socrates (175c6e10). On that occasion, Agathon called Socrates hubristic
after the philosopher mockingly praised the poets ability to speak well at
the theater. In being eager to receive Socrates praise once again, even
though he has learned that it is mixed with criticism, Agathon shows that
be believes this criticism to be helpful rather than hubristic.
In showing disdain for Agathons wisdom, then, Socrates uses his erotic
art to produce a beneficial humility and awareness of lack of wisdom that
is a necessary condition for a passionate desire to acquire as much wisdom
as one can. Socrates treats Agathon just as he does Lysis (Lysis 210d4
e5) and Alcibiades (Alcibiades I, Symposium 216a4b5), inducing humility
as an antidote to amathia. Agathons speech and his pride in his recent
victory indicate that he lacks understanding in that he believes that fine-
sounding rhetoric and the praises of thousands are in themselves good
things. In showing Agathon that he does not know what he thinks he
knows, Socrates applies the lesson he will later say he himself learned from
Diotima. She says (204a47) that amathia is harmful because it leads one
to think that one is noble, good and wise (phronimos) without being so,
and because people desire what they lack only if they recognize that they
42 Corrigan and Glazov-Corrigan 2004: 87 correctly note that Agathon is remarkably open-minded.
The negative assessment of Sedley 2006: 51, that Agathon functions as an unwitting and passive
conduit of ideas preparatory to Socrates own, is too harsh. Closer to the truth about Agathons
defects is Sier 1997: 3 n.2, who remarks that Agathon, in contrast to Socrates, does not go on to ask
further questions, thereby revealing his failure to attain self-knowledge. I argue below 4.5, that what
Agathon lacks is the passion that could help him to become a lover of wisdom.
are deficient (ndev). Just as Socrates leads Alcibiades to admit that he is
very deficient (pollo ndev: 216a5), so he shows Agathon that he lacks
the beauty of speech he thought he had. He thus attempts to produce in
the poet a passionate desire to become able to speak words that are truly
beautiful because they are true.
4.4 alcibiades
According to Alcibiades story, Socrates also shows disdain in his inter-
actions with Alcibiades. Socrates never contradicts Alcibiades statements,
although he is invited to do so (214e10215a1). In telling of his own previ-
ous attempted seduction of Socrates, Alcibiades describes a situation that
is, in some respects, very similar to the philosophers first encounter with
Agathon. Just as Agathon wants to sit next to Socrates in order to share his
wisdom, so Alcibiades wants to use sexual intimacy in order to get a share
of Socrates wisdom.43 When Alcibiades offers his own physical beauty, of
which he is marvelously proud (217a56), in exchange for help in becoming
as good as possible (218c7d5), Socrates replies, very eironikos, and very
much in his accustomed manner (218d67):44
You must see in me some extraordinary beauty, and entirely superior to your own
fine form. If you do see this and are trying to get a share of it, exchanging beauty
for beauty, you intend to cheat me not a little. Youre trying to pay for true beauty
with its appearance, and what you really have in mind is an exchange of gold for
bronze. But, my good friend, take a better look, so that you dont fail to notice
whether Im worth nothing. (218e2219a2)
Just as Socrates disdains Agathons ability to speak beautifully, so he disdains
that of which Alcibiades is most proud: his physical beauty. And just as
Socrates tells Agathon that physical proximity cannot convey wisdom, so
he does not accept Alcibiades offer to enter into a conventional erotic-
educational relationship by giving sexual favors in exchange for wisdom.
The philosopher not only shows that he thinks little of Alcibiades physical
beauty, he also suggests that Alcibiades is trying to cheat him by exchanging
his bronze for Socrates gold, and that the young man is so lacking in
mental insight that he cannot see that Socrates may be lacking in beauty
of mind. Like Agathon, Alcibiades does not understand the self-mockery
that is contained in Socrates suggestion that he, Socrates, may be worth
43 Cf. Babut 1980: 17. Tarrant 1958 suggests that Plato appeals to a common belief in influence by
touch.
44 On the meaning of eironikos, often translated as ironically, see below 4.6, and n.62.
nothing. Socrates disdainful behavior leads Alcibiades, like Agathon, to
accuse Socrates of hybris (bristv e: 215b7), and just as Agathon says
that he and Socrates will be judged by Dionysus (175e79), so Alcibiades
brings Socrates to trial before a jury of the symposiasts (219c26).
Alcibiades accuses Socrates of hybris in large part because of the sexual
humiliation he believes that the philosopher inflicts.45 The young man
behaves like both the lover and the beloved of convention in his attempted
seduction of Socrates, and is frustrated in both roles. In Alcibiades story, he
challenges (proukalomhn: 217c146 ), attacks (piqeton: 217c5), and plots
against (piboulewn) Socrates just as a lover plots against a beloved
(217c78; cf. 217d3). Alcibiades also acts like the beloved, however, in
attempting to wound Socrates when he offers his sexual favors (219b3
4), and in thinking that Socrates cares seriously about his beauty and will,
in exchange for sex, tell him all that he knows (217a25). Moreover, he
refers to Socrates as his erastes, who can help him to become as good
as possible, and he tells Socrates that he is ready to gratify him sexu-
ally (carzesqai: 218c7d5). Socrates, however, does not respond to the
young mans advances, but, by refusing the role of the conventional erastes,
reduces him to a state of slavery (219e35). Alcibiades experiences aporia
(ote . . . hproun: 219d8e1; proun: 219e3) in his interactions with
Socrates, for he thinks himself dishonored, but also admires Socrates: he
can neither be angry with Socrates nor win him over (219d3e1). Humili-
ated by the philosophers resistance to his beauty, Alcibiades concludes that
although Socrates appears to have eros for beautiful young men, and to be
stunned by them (rwtikv dikeitai tn kaln . . . ka kpplhktai:
216d23), he really disdains (katafrone: 216d7e1) their beauty. Alcibi-
ades thought that Socrates was serious (spoudaknai) about Alcibiades
beauty (217a23), but it turned out that the philosopher instead disdained
it (katefrnhsen: 219c45). Indeed, according to Alcibiades, Socrates has
disdain not only for physical beauty, but also for wealth and honor, and he
thinks that all these possessions are worth nothing and that we are noth-
ing (216d7e4). In response to these slights, Alcibiades accuses Socrates
of dishonoring him (219d4), and says that the philosopher disdained and
laughed at his beauty, and committed hybris (219c45).
Alcibiades also tells how, on many other occasions, the philosopher
leads him to agree that although he, Alcibiades, is very deficient (pollo
ndev n), he neglects himself, and instead takes care of the affairs of the
45 Fisher 1992: 31 remarks on the consistent expression of hybris . . . in sexual humiliation.

46 Challenge: Dover 1980, on 217c7.
Athenians (216a46). Socrates, moreover, produces in Alcibiades some-
thing of which no one would have thought him capable: shame (216a8b3).
Alcibiades shame produces painful aporia similar to that he experienced on
the occasion when Socrates rejected his physical beauty (219d8e1, 219e3).
Like Agathon (201c67), Alcibiades is not able to contradict Socrates. How-
ever, instead of continuing to listen to the philosopher, as Agathon does,
Alcibiades holds his ears and flees like a runaway slave, overcome by desire
for honor from the many, only to feel shame when he sees the philosopher
again (216a6b6). As a result, Alcibiades often wishes that Socrates were
dead. He realizes, however, that this would cause him even more pain, and
he concludes: I dont know what to do with this man (216c13).
At the end of the Alcibiades I, Alcibiades says that he will exchange roles
with Socrates and become his pedagogue (135d710). Alcibiades charges
Socrates with another, less positive, kind of role reversal at the end of
his speech in the Symposium. He first tells the symposiasts that he has
given Socrates praise mixed with blame in his speech, by recounting the
ways in which Socrates treated him with hybris. Furthermore, he says,
Socrates has done the same thing to very many others, deceiving them
into thinking that Socrates is a lover, while turning out to be a beloved
instead. Alcibiades specifically warns Agathon against suffering this same
experience: So I tell you also, Agathon, not to be deceived by this man,
but to watch out, learning from my experiences. Dont, as the proverb
says, learn like a fool by suffering (222a7b7). The experience to which
Alcibiades alludes is that recounted in his story of the attempted seduction:
according to Alcibiades, Socrates seems to play the role of lover (216d23),
but in rejecting Alcibiades sexual advances he acts more like an eromenos
than an erastes.
Alcibiades aporia results in part from his admiration for what he refers
to as Socrates virtues. After recounting the story of his attempted seduc-
tion of Socrates, Alcibiades says that Socrates has moderation (sophrosyne),
courage, wisdom (phronesis) and endurance (karteria) (219d57).47 His
courage is shown by his fearless actions in war (220d5221c1), and his
endurance is attested by his extraordinary resistance to pleasure and pain.
Socrates resists the effects of wine (220a46, confirmed by Eryximachus at
176c35), the need for sleep (220c3d5, confirmed at 223d612), the temp-
tations of money (219e12), and the effects of hunger (219e8220a1) and
cold (220a6c1). His moderation is evidenced by his remarkable ability to
47 The term arete is used at 222a4. Rowe 1998: 206 notes that the traditional virtue of justice is not
included in this list because Alcibiades charges Socrates with hybris.
spend the night in Alcibiades willing arms without having sexual relations
with the beautiful youth (219b3d2). Above all, Alcibiades attributes to
Socrates an exceptional wisdom (phronesis: 219d6) that he himself wants to
acquire (217a25, 218d13). Alcibiades also acknowledges Socrates intellec-
tual superiority when he says that he cannot contradict Socrates (216b34).
Moreover, according to Alcibiades, Socrates uses his virtues to benefit
Alcibiades. His courageous acts save the life of the young man, along with
his weapons, and he gives up to Alcibiades the prize for valor that he,
Socrates, deserves (220d6e4). That Socrates moderation benefits Alcibi-
ades, even though the young man characterizes it as a form of hybris (219c5),
is suggested by the latters statement that Socrates relations with him are
like those of a father or older brother (219c7d2).48 Indeed, in the Apology,
as Platos readers will recall, Socrates neglects his own affairs, going around
to each man in private like a father or an older brother, persuading the
Athenians to take care of virtue (31b35). The philosopher does not share
his wisdom with Alcibiades as a conventional lover imparts wisdom to a
beloved but, according to Alcibiades story, he uses wisdom in caring for
the young man as a friend. Like the Socrates of the Alcibiades I, Socrates
in the Symposium compels Alcibiades to agree that he is neglecting himself
while engaging in political affairs (216a46; cf. Alc. I 113b7c7, 118b68). In
so doing, Socrates would have conversed frequently with the young man.
Indeed, according to Alcibiades, Socrates converses with Alcibiades and
spends the day with him (217b67), converses with him far into the night
(217d4), and shares meals with Alcibiades at Potidaea (219e7). He also offers
to consider with him the best course of action when Alcibiades proposes
to exchange his sexual favors for Socrates wisdom (219a8b2). The shame
that Alcibiades feels as a result of his many conversations with Socrates is
beneficial in that it leads him, at least temporarily, to recognize his own
deficiencies and to want to change his way of life (215e7216a6).49 Just as he
does in the Alcibiades I, Socrates uses his daimonic art to help Alcibiades
acquire this art, by recognizing that he lacks wisdom. However, Alcibi-
ades recognition, unlike that of Agathon, is arrived at by means of intense
shame, and it is a temporary state involving continued, painful conflict.
4.5 three men on a couch

Important additional information about Socrates relationships with
Agathon and Alcibiades is provided by two comic scenes that frame
Alcibiades speech. In the first scene (213a3e6), just before Alcibiades
48 Cf. Nails 2006: 195. 49 On the shame aroused by Socrates, see Chapter 1 at 1.2 and n.23.
speech, Alcibiades and Socrates play on Greek conventions in exchanging
accusations about each others erotic relationships with Agathon, while
in the second (222c1223b2), just after the speech, Alcibiades acknowl-
edges defeat in an erotic contest over Agathon. In both scenes, all three
men recline together on the same couch. A more detailed analysis of
these scenes reveals that Alcibiades aporia, and his passionate responses
to Socrates, make him, in some ways, better able than Agathon to benefit
from Socrates erotic art. He, unlike the beloved poet, has qualities, like
those of the Alcibiades in the Alcibiades I, that could enable him to become
a passionate lover of wisdom.
In the first scene (213a3e6), Alcibiades arrives, drunk, and is about to
sit on Socrates, whom he does not notice, when the philosopher moves
over to make room for him between himself and Agathon (213a3b2).
After Agathon calls his attention to Socrates presence (213b45), Alcibi-
ades accuses the philosopher of ambushing him (213b9), and exclaims that
Socrates always contrives to sit beside the most beautiful person (that is,
Agathon). He asks Socrates why he does not instead sit beside Aristophanes
or anyone else who is ridiculous [geloov] and wants to be so (213c3
5). Socrates responds in kind: Ever since I came to love him [rsqhn:
213d1], he says, he has greatly feared Alcibiades, whose jealousy, madness
and affection for his lover (philerastia: 213d6)50 will not allow Socrates to
look at or converse with any other beautiful person, and who, moreover,
reviles Socrates and can scarcely keep his hands off him (213c6d6). Alcib-
iades will later state that the truth is just the opposite of what Socrates has
said: Socrates can hardly keep his hands off Alcibiades if the latter praises
anyone, whether god or human, except Socrates (214d14). Socrates asks
Agathon to defend him against Alcibiades if the latter tries to commit
violence against him (bizesqai: 213d5). Alcibiades replies that there is
no truce between himself and Socrates, but that he will take vengeance
another time (213d78). The young mans vengeance will take the form of
his speech about Socrates, in which praise and blame are mixed (222a78).
In contrast to the passionate, if comically exaggerated, outbursts of
Alcibiades and Socrates, Agathon, the object of their dispute, is remarkably
calm, taking no part in the erotic banter. Moreover, after silently accepting
a victory crown from Alcibiades (213b3), he makes no comment when
Alcibiades later takes part of it away and gives it to Socrates (213d8e6).
50 Following Hug 1876: 1612 n.8, I take totou rwv to nqrpou (213c7) to refer to Socrates
love for Alcibiades, while tn totou . . . filerastan (213d6) characterizes Alcibiades affection
for Socrates.
In the second scene (222c1223b2), which immediately follows Alcibi-
ades speech, Socrates and Alcibiades again play with Greek conventions
when they engage in an erotic contest over Agathon. Socrates states that
Alcibiades real purpose in giving his speech about Socrates was to make
trouble between Agathon and Socrates by giving the young poet the warn-
ing against Socrates alleged role reversals with which the speech concluded.
What Alcibiades really wants, says Socrates, is for Socrates to love Alcibiades
alone, and for Agathon to be loved by Alcibiades alone (222c4d3). Socrates
then calls on Agathon to see to it that Alcibiades does not succeed in set-
ting Socrates and Agathon at variance (diabllein: 222d1, 222d46). These
statements recall the earlier framing scene, in which Alcibiades resented
Socrates for sitting beside Agathon, the most beautiful person in the room
(213c45), and Socrates claimed that Alcibiades was jealous if Socrates so
much as looked at or spoke to any other beautiful person (213d12). In that
scene also, Socrates called upon Agathon for help (213d45).
Agathon plays a role in the second scene that is more active in a literal
sense, by initiating a game of musical chairs. In response to Socrates
call for help, he accuses Alcibiades of attempting to separate him from
Socrates by sitting between them. Agathon then offers to come and sit
beside Socrates, who invites him to do so (222d7e5). Agathon, Alcibiades
and Socrates have been reclining on the same couch, in that order. In
the new arrangement, the order would be: Alcibiades, Socrates, Agathon.
Alcibiades reacts passionately, exclaiming that Socrates intends to get the
better of him in every way, and suggesting that Agathon instead sit between
them. Socrates, however, objects on the grounds that he needs to sit to the
left of Agathon in order to praise him, something he very much wants
to do. Agathon, delighted at the prospect of being praised by Socrates,
gets up to sit beside him.51 In his last words in the dialogue, Alcibiades
admits defeat in the contest over Agathon, saying that no one else can get
a share of the beautiful men when Socrates is present, so resourceful is he
in inventing persuasive words. Agathon then gets up in order to sit beside
Socrates (222e6223b2).
Socrates, then, accuses Alcibiades of being jealous in this second scene,
just as he did in the first framing scene. He now makes it clearer, however,
that Alcibiades is jealous for two reasons. Like a conventional eromenos,
he is jealous of Socrates alleged erotic attentions to Agathon, and like
a conventional erastes, he is jealous of Agathons acceptance of Socrates
favors. Just as he did in the story recounted in his speech, Alcibiades behaves
51 On the seating arrangement and the order of the speeches, see Bury 1932, on 222e.
as both lover and beloved, and is frustrated in both roles (see above 4.4). In
contrast to the passionate Alcibiades, Agathon remains calm throughout
this scene. Far from resenting Socrates mocking praise of his wisdom that
led him to charge the philosopher with hybris in their first conversation
(175d3e7), he is eager to put himself in a position to receive more of the
same treatment.
Just as Socrates cross-examination of Agathon was interrupted by Phae-
drus (194d18), now Socrates is prevented from praising Agathon by the
arrival of a crowd of revelers, who compel the symposiasts to drink much
wine (223b26). As a result, instead of praising Agathon, as he said he
was going to do, Socrates is shown to be victorious in the trial concerning
wisdom, to be judged by Dionysus, to which Agathon referred at 175e79.
Indeed, Socrates shows his superiority in three Dionysian activities: eros,
drinking and drama. Before the interruption, Socrates demonstrated the
superiority of his erotic art by persuading Agathon, the most beautiful
man present, to sit beside him (222e10223b2). After the revelers arrive
(223b2d12), Socrates drinks all the rest of the symposiasts under the table,
demonstrating the truth of Alcibiades statement that the present occasion
would be a test (elenchus) of Socrates ability to withstand the effects of
wine (220a46). Socrates also shows his superiority in dramatic skill when
he compels Agathon and Aristophanes to agree that the man who is able
to compose tragedies by means of skill (tcnh) is also able to compose
comedies (223d36). They, who compose in only one dramatic genre, do
not do so by means of skill; it is instead Socrates who is able to combine
the comic with the serious.52 He does so by means of his erotic art, which
uses laughter for the serious purpose of leading people to recognize their
own lack of wisdom. Once again, then, Socrates not only slights Agathons
ability to speak well, but also demonstrates his own superior skill in per-
suasive speaking. Far from resenting this defeat, however, Agathon shows
that he still desires to benefit from conversing with Socrates. After many
of the others have left (223b68), and first Aristodemus (223b8c1) and
then Aristophanes (223d78) have fallen asleep, it is Agathon who remains
conversing with Socrates until dawn (223d7).
Agathon, then, is characterized in this final scene, as he is in the rest of the
dialogue, as a soft and compliant young man, who is proud of his success
at the theater, but also ready to admit his own lack of wisdom. Socrates
interactions with Agathon throughout the dialogue show that he thinks
that the young poet is worthy of his philosophical attention. Significantly,
52 Noted by Rowe 1998, on 223d25.

Agathon is the only one of the symposiasts with whom he engages, however
briefly, in dialectic. On the other hand, the fact that Agathon responds so
mildly, without expressing passion or conflict, suggests that he shares less
than does Alcibiades in the philosophical madness and Bacchic frenzy
that, according to Alcibiades, characterizes a philosopher (218b34) who is
a passionate lover of wisdom. Agathon is portrayed throughout not as a
lover, but as a beloved. Agathon, then, comes to recognize his own lack of
wisdom (component (2) of the erotic art), but lacks the more passionate
nature that could lead him from the ordinary eros that is the concern of
his tragedies to Socratic eros for wisdom (component (3)). This may be
one reason why Socrates, who, in the Alcibiades I, loves Alcibiades in part
because the young man has a passionate desire to acquire the greatest power,
does not claim to be in love with Agathon, but instead treats him with
friendly affection.
That Alcibiades, in contrast, has a passionate nature, is indicated by
his own vivid descriptions of his reactions to Socrates (especially at 215d1
216c3). He represents himself as experiencing a wide range of emotions: a
state of enchantment and being stunned (215d56), shame (216b26), desire
for revenge for insults (213d8, 219c26), admiration (219d4), confusion and
pain (215e6), and, not least, ordinary eros. He acts like a jealous lover in the
two scenes that frame the speech in which he admits to acting like a lover
of Socrates (217c78). Moreover, the narrators of the dialogue say that he
still seems to be in love with Socrates (222c23).
Even though Alcibiades has the passionate nature that could help him
to acquire Socratic eros for wisdom, and even though he recognizes his own
lack of wisdom, Alcibiades notoriously fails to benefit permanently from
his association with Socrates. Scholars have held widely differing views
about why this is so, and about whether Alcibiades or Socrates bears more
responsibility for the failure.53 Although there is no suggestion in the text of
either the Symposium or the Alcibiades I that the two dialogues are comple-
mentary, the stories they tell are not incompatible. One interpretation of
what happens in the Symposium, then, is that this story begins where that of
53 Those who condemn the philosopher as lover or teacher include Anton 1974; Blanckenhagen 1992:
667; Gagarin 1977; Lear 1998: 14866; Nussbaum 1986: 18499; and Penwill 1978: 1638. Vlastos
influential statement that Socrates is guilty of a failure in love (1971: 16; cf. 1973: esp. 304) is
retracted in 1991 (44 n. 82), where Vlastos gives a more positive account of Socrates treatment of
Alcibiades (414). The defenders of Socrates include: Arieti 1991: 11011; Blundell 1992: 1245; Bury
1932: lxlxv; Gill 1990: 81; Nails 2006; Price 1991: 2948; Rowe 1998: 67 and 2056; Schein 1974:
166; G. A. Scott 2000: 11957; Szlezak 1985: 26270 and 1999: 913.
the Alcibiades I leaves off.54 According to this interpretation, Socrates is at
first a lover of Alcibiades soul, in part because of the young mans passion-
ate desire for the greatest power. By means of this love and his erotic art,
Socrates leads the Alcibiades of the Symposium, like the Alcibiades of the
Alcibiades I, to recognize his own lack of wisdom and to desire to improve,
thus acquiring, at least temporarily and to some extent, components (2)
and (3) of the erotic art. The young man, however, does not remain with
Socrates, which is what he promises to do at the end of the Alcibiades I, but
instead runs away, and, as Socrates feared then, is overcome by desire for
honor from the many (Alc. I 135e68; Symp. 216b5). This pattern, Alcibi-
ades indicates in his speech, is often repeated (pollkiv: 215e7). Thus, by
fleeing Socrates, Alcibiades returns to the position of the Alcibiades of the
Alcibiades I, who recognizes his own deficiencies, but does not heed his
lovers advice to care for himself (123d7e2: see Chapter 1 at 1.2, stage iii).55
However, Socrates erotic art has only temporary and limited success
in the Symposium, not only because Alcibiades is overcome by love of the
demos, as Socrates fears in the Alcibiades I, but also because Alcibiades
fails to remain with Socrates long enough to know and understand him.
Alcibiades, of course, arrives after Socrates speech, and thus does not
hear, as do the other symposiasts, Diotimas account of the kind of eros
to which Socrates is devoted and in the service of which he attempts to
enlist Alcibiades. There are many other indications that Alcibiades fails
to listen or pay attention to Socrates. He gives no detailed account of
the philosophical discussions that he has had with Socrates, or of the
arguments the philosopher used to show him his deficiencies (216a46),
no example of the words of Socrates that appear laughable but contain
divine images of virtue when opened up (221d7222a6). The only words
of Socrates that Alcibiades reports are those he does not heed, in which
Socrates warns Alcibiades, who offers to exchange sexual favors for virtue,
that he, Socrates, may be worth nothing (218d7219a4).
Most importantly, Alcibiades deliberately refuses to listen to Socrates,
because he experiences intense and painful conflict (aporia) about him
(219e3). Aporia can lead to an awareness of ones own lack of wisdom that
is necessary to the search for wisdom (see Chapter 2 at 2.1). Alcibiades,
54 Scholars dispute the relationship between the two dialogues, often within the context of a debate
about the authenticity of the Alcibiades I. The similarities are emphasized by Friedlander 1923: esp.
268 and 1964: 2423; Motte 1961: 278. Those who stress the differences include Johnson 1999:
12; Smith 2004: 1005; and Weil 1964: 81.
55 On the relationship between the two dialogues cf. Scott and Welton 2008: 1689.
however, attempts to resolve conflict by force rather than reason. Even
now, he tells the symposiasts, he would experience shame and be forced
(nagkzei) to acknowledge his deficiencies if he were to listen to Socrates.
He therefore forcibly (b) holds his ears and runs away (216a27). Alci-
biades also prefers force to persuasion in the scene of attempted seduc-
tion. When the young man asks Socrates to be a helper in his attempt to
become as good as he is able to become (218d13), and offers sexual favors
in return, the philosopher warns Alcibiades that he may be mistaken if
he thinks that Socrates has within him an extraordinary beauty (218d7
219a4). In the future, Socrates says, after consideration, we will do
whatever appears best to us, about these and about other matters (219a8
b2). Alcibiades does not reply, but acts: [H]aving shot my weapons, I
thought I had wounded him. Getting up, without allowing him to say
anything more, I wrapped my thick cloak around him for it was winter
and lay down under his short cloak. Throwing my arms around this
truly daimonic and amazing man, I lay beside him for the entire night
(219b3c2). This time, Alcibiades does not apply force to his own ears,
but to Socrates. He thus justifies Socrates earlier statement that Alci-
biades can scarcely keep his hands off Socrates, and Socrates fears that
the young man will use force (bizesqai) against him (213d35, discussed
above).
Alcibiades painful conflict concerning Socrates is clearly indicated in the
text, as are the friendly relations between Socrates and Agathon. Socrates
feelings toward Alcibiades, however, are much more difficult to determine.
There are some suggestions that Socrates loves, or once loved, Alcibiades,
whose passionate nature and desires are necessary conditions for Socrates
love in the Alcibiades I (104e6105a1). According to Alcibiades, Socrates
appears to be erotically disposed toward the beautiful (216d2), and both
Diotima (211d35) and Alcibiades (216d23) state that he is stunned by
beautiful young men. Socrates suggests that he once loved the beautiful
Alcibiades in particular, and implies that he still does so when he says:
from the time when I came to love him (213c7d1). Moreover, even after
Alcibiades offers his sexual favors to Socrates, the philosopher never explic-
itly denies that he loves Alcibiades. The fact that Socrates is accustomed to
converse and spend the day with Alcibiades (217b57) also suggests that he
has a preference for Alcibiades that is consistent with love. On the other
hand, except for the single statement made within the context of a comic
scene (213c7d1, quoted above), Socrates does not explicitly state that he
ever loved Alcibiades, as he does in the Alcibiades I, and he does in fact
refrain from having sexual relations with him.
Here again, comparison with the story in the Alcibiades I can help us
to arrive at some plausible conclusions. If, in the Symposium, as in the
Alcibiades I, Socrates continuing love for Alcibiades soul depends on
this souls becoming more beautiful, rather than being overcome by the
power of the many (Alc. I 131e10132a3), by the time of the Symposium,
Socrates love will have been weakened or destroyed not only because
Alcibiades is overcome by love of honor from the many, but also because the
young man refuses to listen to Socrates. This refusal, which has overtones
of force, has a counterpart in the opening scene of the Republic. When
Polemarchus threatens to use force to make Socrates remain with him and
his companions, the philosopher asks if it would not instead be possible for
Socrates to persuade them to let him go. Polemarchus replies that it is not
possible to persuade those who wont listen (Resp. 1.327c914). Alcibiades,
then, belongs to this category of people who cannot be persuaded because
they will not listen. It is Alcibiades who, in refusing to listen to Socrates, is
guilty of a failure in love.56
4.6 socrates as daim on and satyr

Just as Socrates produces aporia in Alcibiades, who says that he does not
know what to do with this man (216c3), so the Socrates of the Symposium
provokes in the reader aporia that is at the same time a source of plea-
sure and an instigation to further examination.57 However else modern
scholars may disagree about the Socrates of the Symposium, most agree
with Alcibiades about one thing: the philosopher is so unique and out-
landish (atopia: 215a2, 221d2) as to be unlike any other human model,
ancient or modern (221c4d6). Socrates cannot be compared to Achilles,
Nestor or Antenor (221c68), and he is much more invulnerable than Ajax
(219e12). Alcibiades Socrates is also superior to everyone in his ability
to play the aulos. This instrument was banished at the beginning of the
Symposium, when Eryximachus proposed sending the aulos-player away
(176e67), but it is heard again in the background when Alcibiades arrives
(212c8).58 Now Alcibiades not only returns the aulos to the symposium,
he also gives it to the Socrates of his comic image. When the young man
56 See above n.53.

57 Similarly, as Griffith 1990: 200 notes, two different, even incompatible, versions of a story are
frequently a source of pleasure in poetry.
58 On the banishment and return of the aulos cf. Corrigan and Glazov-Corrigan 2004: 39; Friedlander
1969: 28; and Reeve 2006b: 306.
compares Socrates to the satyr Marsyas, he hastens to add that the philoso-
pher is a much more marvelous aulos-player (215b8), for the enchantment
that Marsyas produced by means of musical instruments is produced by
Socrates with bare words (yilov lgoiv: 215c7), that is, words without
musical accompaniment.59 With his own unaccompanied words Socrates
affects Alcibiades much more strongly than Pericles and other good orators
(215e4216a2). In describing Socrates behavior, Alcibiades quotes Aristo-
phanes, whose Socrates walks swaggering and casting his eyes about.60
The fact that Aristophanes verse is a description of Socrates himself indi-
cates that the philosopher does indeed resemble Achilles and Ajax in one
respect: he has been immortalized in poetry. Alcibiades quotation helps to
show that Socrates sets his own standards and makes his own traditions.
The outlandish man of Alcibiades speech disdains the things others
value: beauty, wealth, honor (216d7e4). However, he also employs self-
mockery in slighting his own wisdom and virtue (218d7219a2). In rejecting
a prize he deserves for valor in battle and allowing it to be given to Alcibi-
ades instead (220e27), Socrates might be said to deny that he has courage;
he certainly shows that he himself does not desire honor. According to
Alcibiades, Socrates claims to be ignorant of everything and to know noth-
ing (216d24). Socrates himself recounts Diotimas slighting remarks about
his ability to understand (204b1, 207c24, 209e5210a4). He refers slight-
ingly to Agathons wisdom (sophia: 175e2) when he praises it extravagantly,
but he also calls his own wisdom inferior or doubtful (175d3e6). When
Socrates denies that Agathons audience was made up of wise people, he
includes himself in the number of fools (194c15). Moreover, the superior
insight of maturity to which he alludes in his conversation with Alcibiades
is that of knowing ones own worthlessness (219a14). Socrates may also be
said to disclaim the virtue of moderation when he states that Alcibiades,
in offering his sexual favors, may be trying to exchange bronze for gold
(218e3219a1). If Alcibiades beauty is mere bronze, Socrates suggests, there
is little virtue in resisting it.
How, then, are we to understand this outlandish and unique persona?
According to Alcibiades, the outlandishness of Socrates and his words can
only be captured in the images of the sileni and satyrs (221d16), which
59 Bury 1932, on 215c, cites Laws 669d in interpreting yilov lgoiv to mean in prose, devoid of
metrical form as well as of musical accompaniment. However, England 1921, on 669d7, argues that
the words at Laws 669d mean without music (or tune) rather than without meter, and this sense
fits the Symposium passage well.
60 brenqumenov ka tfqalm parabllwn (Symp. 221b3) adapts Clouds 362: You swagger . . . and
cast your eyes about (brenqei t n tasin dov ka tfqalm parablleiv).
represent the philosopher as having a deceptive (xapatn: 222b3) outer,
hubristic, satyr-like aspect, and a true, inner aspect that consists of divine
images of virtue. According to him, in order to understand Socrates,
we must open him up in order to see the inner beauty (216e5217a2).
As Melissa Lane notes, Alcibiades image suggests that Socrates conceals
his inner attributes by feigning to have the outer attributes.61 She argues
convincingly that Alcibiades also charges Socrates with concealing by
feigning when he says that the philosopher deceives people into thinking
that he is a lover (222b34), while actually being a beloved, and when he
uses cognates of eironeia (a noun often translated as irony) in saying that
Socrates spends his life eironeuomenos (216e45), and that the philosopher
speaks very eironikos (218d6) in saying that he, Socrates, may really be
worth nothing (218d7219a4). To speak eironikos, she contends, does not
mean to speak ironically in the sense of saying something with the intent
to convey a different meaning, but to conceal by feigning.62
Alcibiades view that Socrates conceals his virtues by feigning to have
other, satyr-like characteristics must itself be opened up and examined.
Indeed, the dialogue gives the reader good reasons for questioning his
understanding of Socrates, although not the fact that the incidents he
reports actually occurred.63 Alcibiades says that he is telling the truth
(214e6, 215a6), and he frequently challenges Socrates to correct him if he
is wrong (214e10, 217b23, 219c2, 220e4), something that Socrates never
does. When Alcibiades says that he is in a state of aporia about Socrates,
then, he is telling the truth, based on his own real experiences of Socrates
words and deeds. Just as the perplexity of Socrates interlocutors in other
dialogues is the result of an inability to reconcile apparent inconsistencies,
so Alcibiades aporia results from the failure to understand the combination
of apparently hubristic and apparently virtuous behavior that he observes in
Socrates. In comparing Socrates to a silenus-statue that opens up to reveal
divine images, Alcibiades grasps part of the truth. His audience within the
dialogue, however, and Platos readers, who, unlike Alcibiades, have heard
Socrates speech about Eros, are in a better position than is Alcibiades
61 Lane 2006: 72. See also North 1994 and the scholars cited above, n.2.
62 Lane 2006: esp. 717. The interpretation of eironeia as irony is defended most notably by Vlastos
1991: 2144.
63 I agree with Lane 2007: 47 that Platos text encourages his readers to adopt a hermeneutic of
suspicion towards Alcibiades interpretation of Socrates, but not towards the veracity of the incidents
that he recounts. Cf. Nightingale 1995: 123: Since Alcibiades character distorts his perceptions,
we must be especially wary when he claims to reveal the inner Socrates. I have now revised the
views about Alcibiades reliability expressed in Belfiore 1984.
himself to understand the way in which the image of the silenus-statue
represents the truth about Socrates.
Alcibiades image has long puzzled readers.64 No examples of the silenus-
statues have survived.65 Another question concerns the identity of the
gods Alcibiades says are inside the silenus-statue (215b3, 216e6217a1). Two
candidates are prominent in the dialogue. As the god of the symposium
and of the theater, Dionysus presides over the symposium in honor of
Agathons theatrical victory. This god is invoked as judge by Agathon
(175e9), and Socrates says that Aristophanes entire occupation concerns
Dionysus and Aphrodite (177e12). Moreover, the followers of Dionysus
are satyrs.66 Another divinity, however, is much more important in the
Symposium: Eros, the subject of the first six speeches in the dialogue. Eros
is also appropriate in this context because Alcibiades, instead of praising
Eros like the other speakers, makes Socrates the subject of his encomium
(214d610), within which the philosopher is characterized as an erotic
figure. It is a plausible inference, then, that Alcibiades intends his audience
to identify one of the gods within the statue as Eros.
The symposiasts, who, unlike Alcibiades, heard Socrates speech, have
still other reasons for identifying one of the figures inside the silenus-statue
with an Eros whom the Socrates portrayed by Alcibiades resembles.67 As
has often been noted, Alcibiades Socrates has much in common with
Eros in the speech attributed to Diotima.68 Both are daimonion,69 lack
beauty,70 are unshod,71 and live outside and in doorways.72 Socrates and
Eros both contrive plots so as to associate with the beautiful.73 Both
are courageous74 and resourceful,75 and both are characterized as magi-
cians and spellbinders.76 Diotimas Eros, with his absurd birth story
(203b1d8), is a figure from comedy,77 while Socrates satyr-like physi-
cal appearance (215b46, 216d4) is comic, and his words arouse laughter
64 One intriguing recent account is that of Reeve 2006a: 128, who argues that Alcibiades imagines
Socrates as pregnant with embryonic virtue.
65 Dover 1980, on 215b23.
66 Eisner 1982: 114 argues that Dionysus is one of the gods within the statue.
67 See Szlezak 1985: 2634 on the symposiasts superior knowledge.
68 See also above, Introduction to Part II, and n.6.
69 Eros: 202d13, Socrates: 219c1. 70 Eros: 203c67, Socrates: 215b46 and 216d4.
71 Eros: 203d1, Socrates: 220b6; cf. 174a4. 72 Eros: 203d13, Socrates: 220c3d4; cf. 175a79.
73 Eros: 203d6 (plkwn mhcanv), Socrates: 213c4 (diemhcansw) and 223a69.
74 Eros: 203d5; cf. 212b8, Socrates: 219d5 and 220d6221c1.
75 Eros: 203d7 (primov), Socrates: 223a8 (eprwv).
76 Eros: 203d8 (deinv ghv ka farmakev), Socrates: 215c1 (klei) and 215d56 (kpeplhgmnoi
smn ka katecmeqa); cf. 194a5 (farmttein).
77 Penia, the mother of Eros in Diotimas story, was personified in Aristophanes Plutus, produced in
388, shortly before Plato wrote the Symposium (Dover 1980, on 203b4).
(221e1222a1).78 Moreover, just as eros causes people to desire what they
lack (205a57, with 204a67), so Socrates causes Alcibiades to desire to
remedy his deficiencies (215e7216a6, 218c7d5).
The symposiasts, however, would also have recognized differences, of
which Alcibiades himself cannot be aware, between Socrates as portrayed
by Alcibiades and Diotimas Eros. According to Diotima, Eros is not the
eromenos but the lover (204c16). He is a daimon and not a god, and he
therefore lacks not only beauty, but also the wisdom (sophia) and goodness
that the gods are said to have (202c4d5, 203e4204a7). It is true that
Eros is characterized by Diotima as courageous (ndreov: 203d5), but
in this passage the term does not refer to true virtue, a good thing that
Eros lacks, but, as the words immediately following show, means energetic
and impetuous (thv ka sntonov).79 Eros is only courageous in that
he goes after beauty, just as the lover goes toward (nai: 210a45) and
pursues (dikein: 210b2) beauty.80 That Diotimas Eros lacks virtue is
shown, above all, by his characterization as a philosopher, someone who
is between wisdom (sophia) and amathia, and who recognizes his own
deficiencies (203d7204b5). In contrast, Alcibiades says that Socrates is
not the lover, but the eromenos (222b34; cf. c23), who contains very
beautiful (pgkala: 217a1) images of virtue (retv: 222a4). Alcibiades
attributes to Socrates the god-like virtues of extraordinary courage (219d5,
220d6221c1), endurance (219d7, 220a1), wisdom (phronesis: 219d6) and
moderation (219b3d2, d5).
When he characterizes the inner Socrates as beautiful and virtuous,
then, Alcibiades, who was not present when Socrates recounted Diotimas
characterization of Eros as the lover instead of the beloved, shows that he
misunderstands the Socrates to whom he attributes erotic characteristics.
According to Socrates own account, including his words as reported by
Alcibiades, Socrates resembles Diotimas Eros, in being neither virtuous
or wise, and in lacking the extraordinary beauty (218e2) that belongs
to an eromenos. He is instead in a state between virtue and vice, wisdom
and amathia. One thing that Socrates means when he says that he knows
nothing except ta erotika (177d78), is that, like Eros, he knows that he is
deficient (175e24, 219a2).81 Socrates, like Eros, is a philosopher (218a2b2),
78 See above n.19. 79 The courageous are also said to be energetic (tav) at Prt. 349e23.
80 Cf. Bury 1932, on 203d.
81 Cf., among many others, Gould 1963: 445; Osborne 1994: 934; Rowe 1998, on 177d7e1; and Scott
and Welton 2008. Indeed, if virtue is knowledge, Socrates cannot be virtuous if he lacks knowledge:
Guthrie 1971: 146; Brickhouse and Smith 1994: vivii, 60 and 12336; Nightingale 1995: 1239, esp.
129: [I]f Socrates is like Eros, then he too must be lacking in virtue and wisdom; he too must be
whose recognition that he lacks wisdom is a necessary condition for his
desiring and seeking to acquire as much of it as he can. What Alcibiades
calls Socrates ignorance (gnoe), then, is not merely a schema (216d34),
a deceptive outer covering, but an essential component of his daimonic art.
Although Alcibiades mistakenly attributes to Socrates the virtues that
only a god could have, he does grasp an important part of the truth about
Socrates. Just as the philosopher has an inferior (falh) and doubtful kind
of wisdom (sophia: 175e24), so he possesses other inferior, distinctively
human kinds of virtues.82 Socrates has the kind of courage that Diotimas
daimon Eros has, in that he desires and pursues the beautiful and good,
thinking little of other things, including conventions and physical danger.
He has endurance in that his disdain for inferior objects leads him to resist
the pleasures and pains associated with them. Socrates also has human
wisdom in that he recognizes his own lack of the kind of wisdom only a
god could have, and encourages others to recognize their own deficiencies.
He has moderation in that he has little regard for physical beauty compared
to wisdom and beauty of soul.
There is reason to believe, then, that Alcibiades intends his audience to
identify one of the figures within the silenus-statues with an Eros whom
Socrates resembles. However, Alcibiades is mistaken about the nature of
both Eros and Socrates when he attributes to Socrates the beauties of an
eromenos, and the virtues of a god. Socrates instead resembles Eros in being a
philosopher who is neither wise nor lacking in understanding. Alcibiades
mistakes about Socrates are apparent in his narration of the attempted
seduction (see above 4.4). When the young man asks Socrates to be a
helper (sullptora) in his attempt to become as good as he is able to
become (218d13), and offers sexual favors in return, the philosopher replies
that Alcibiades may be mistaken if he thinks that Socrates has within him
an extraordinary beauty (218e2), and offers to consider these matters with
him (219a8b2). Because he mistakes the erastes of wisdom and beauty for
the virtuous and beautiful eromenos, Alcibiades fails to recognize that this
shared search for wisdom is in fact the very help he has asked for.83 Indeed,
in the exhortation Alcibiades did not hear, Socrates explained that Eros is
a co-worker (sunergn: 212b3) of humans in their search for the object
situated somewhere between ignorance and knowledge, vice and virtue. On the vexed question
of Socrates disclaimers of knowledge in Platos dialogues see Introduction at I.3 and nn.3940, on
knowledge of ta erotika.
82 Cf. Lane 2007: 45.
83 On the idea of the shared search see Gill, 1996: esp. 28396 and 2002: esp. 14953. See Chapter 2
n.47.
of their desires (212b24). In offering to consider erotic and other matters
with Alcibiades, then, Socrates acts like Eros the co-worker and offers to
assist the young man by means of his erotic art. Alcibiades, however, refuses
to listen to Socrates (above 4.5).
In contrast to his lack of specificity about the identity of the gods
within the statue, Alcibiades explicitly identifies the outer Socrates with
a satyr or silenus and, in particular, with the satyr Marsyas. Socrates, he
says, resembles the satyr Marsyas (215b34), in being hubristic (215b67;
cf. 221e34), and in being an aulos-player who enchants people, invents
tunes and teaches them to others (215b8d1). Alcibiades also links Socrates
satyr-like characteristics to his erotic nature and his ignorance: You see
that Socrates is erotically disposed toward the beautiful, and that he is
always around them and stunned by them, and again that he is ignorant
of everything and knows nothing, as far as his appearance goes. Isnt this
silenus-like?84 Punctuated in this way, with a full stop after v t scma
ato (as far as his appearance goes) instead of after odn oden (knows
nothing), the phrase v t scma ato (as far as his appearance goes)
is a commentary on what precedes: as far as his appearance goes, Socrates is
erotic and ignorant. The phrase toto o silhndev; (Isnt this silenus-
like?) characterizes as silenus-like Socrates physical appearance that marks
him as both erotic and ignorant. With this punctuation, Alcibiades can
be interpreted as making a statement about Socrates satyr-like physical
appearance (scma), which, according to Greek theories of physiognomy,
is an indication of stupidity (or ignorance [gnoe: 216d3] in Alcibiades
account), and lechery.85 In contrast, physical beauty is associated with
wisdom and virtue in Greek thought.86
In characterizing Socrates as satyr-like in outward appearance, however,
Alcibiades once again grasps only part of the truth. The young man, who
missed Socrates speech, cannot recognize that the same satyr-like traits he
84 216d24. I translate the text and punctuation of Bury 1932 and Rowe 1998: rte gr ti Swkrthv
rwtikv dikeitai tn kaln ka e per totouv st ka kpplhktai, ka a gnoe pnta
ka odn oden, v t scma ato. toto o silhndev; Burnet 19001907 punctuates with
full stop after oden (knows [nothing]).
85 The evidence relevant to the physiognomist Zopyrus is collected by Rossetti 1980, who quotes
(185: frag. 6) Cicero, De fato 10, where Socrates appearance is said to indicate that he is stupidum
and mulierosum. On Socrates physical appearance see Blondell 2002: 73 (and 5862 on ancient
physiognomy); Kahn 1996: 11; Zanker 1995: 329. For characteristics like those attributed to Socrates
cf. Arist. [Phgn.] 807b1921 (a fleshy neck is a sign of dullness of sense), 811b2 (a snub nose indicates
lechery), 811b23 (protruding eyes signify imbecility). See further Chapter 6 at 6.3.
86 Alain 1932: 6970; Blondell 2006: 167; Nehamas 2007b: 97107; Patterson 1991: 199202, citing
Resp. 400d401a.
attributes to Socrates also characterize Diotimas Eros.87 Like Eros (202d13)
and Alcibiades Socrates (219c1), a satyr is commonly represented as a
daimon.88 All daimones, according to Diotima, mediate between mortals
and gods (202e3203a8), for example, by means of initiations (teletas) and
enchantments, and Eros in particular provides initiation into his own
Mysteries. According to Alcibiades, Socrates resembles Marsyas in playing
tunes that enchant and point out those who require the gods and initiations
(teleton: 215b8d1). Furthermore, according to Alcibiades, Socrates silenus-
like appearance indicates that he is erotic and knows nothing (216d24),
and Eros lacks wisdom, being in a state between amathia and wisdom
(sophia: 203e5). Eros lacks beauty (203c67), and so do the satyrs that
Socrates resembles. Socrates words appear laughable, like a satyrs skin
(221e1222a1), and Diotimas Eros is a comic figure (203b1d8). Eros is
a resourceful contriver (primov: 203d7), and Socrates is resourceful in
speaking persuasive words (eprwv: 223a8), and, like the satyr Marsyas,
in inventing tunes (215c23).89 Eros is shoeless, homeless and sleeps out of
doors (203d12), and Alcibiades Socrates is shoeless and spends an unusual
amount of time outside (220b6, c3d4). These are also essential traits of
satyrs, halfbestial creatures who have hooves instead of feet and who live
in the wild.90 Diotimas Eros is a bold, impetuous, clever hunter who
plots and contrives against the beautiful and good (203d46), and satyrs
are bold pursuers of sexual objects.91 Socrates, according to Alcibiades, is
also a pursuer of the beautiful (213c45, 216d23, 223a69). Furthermore,
according to Alcibiades, Socrates is also satyr-like in being hubristic (215b6
7). Although his alleged hybris differs from that of satyrs in that it shows
itself in a disdain for physical beauty (219c35), rather than in taking
pleasure in dishonoring another, it resembles the disdain for the beauty of
one body experienced by Diotimas lover as he ascends the ladder (210b5
6). Because the daimon Eros is identified with the lover (t rn: 204c16),
it is consistent with Diotimas account for him to experience this disdain
in his pursuit of beauty.92
Alcibiades audience and Platos readers, then, are able to recognize
what Alcibiades cannot, that the satyr of Alcibiades image does not in
87 As far as I know, satyrs are not associated elsewhere with Eros, who, unlike them, is never represented
with an erection: see Lissarrague 1993: 214, citing Greifenhagen 1957, a work that contains numerous
illustrations of an eromenos-like Eros.
88 Seaford 1988b: 32 and 197 on Eur. Cyc. 495502. On the daimonic qualities of satyrs see further
Chapter 6 at 6.3.
89 Satyrs as inventors: Seaford 1988b: 367 and Lissarrague 1993: 21819.
90 Seaford 1988b: 30. 91 Lissarrague 1993: 214.
92 On the role of disdain in Diotimas account of the Greater Mysteries see Chapter 3 at 3.3.3.
fact differ from the gods inside the statue. Socrates resembles both Eros
and Marsyas, daimon and satyr, because he is a philosopher, who has the
erotic, daimonic art. His devotion to Eros (component (1)) leads him to
resemble this daimon. Socrates recognition of his own lack of beauty and
wisdom (component (2)) leads him to desire these things passionately
(component (3)). He is, moreover, resourceful and energetic in pursuing
them (component (4)), with a satyr-like disregard for convention, and a
disdain for such inferior objects as Alcibiades physical beauty, the rhetorical
beauty of Agathons speech and Socrates own inferior and doubtful kind
of wisdom and virtue. This disdain leads Alcibiades to charge him with
hybris (219c5) and to compare him to an hubristic satyr (215b67). Finally,
because Socrates, like Eros and Marsyas, has daimonic characteristics, he
is marvelously skilled at helping others to attain as much wisdom as they
can (component (5)).
One particularly significant way in which Alcibiades Socrates resembles
both Eros and Marsyas is in being a magician.93 The philosopher uses
binding spells (katecmeqa: 215d6, cf. 218a57) to enslave (215e67, 219e3
5), give pain (218a25) and produce shame (216a8b3). More specifically,
Socrates words are a kind of love magic; they seek to create, in a young
mans soul that has natural ability (nou yucv m fuov: 218a6), not
ordinary eros for an individual but Socratic eros for wisdom and virtue.94
When Alcibiades listens to Socrates, he falls under the philosophers spell
and thinks that his present life is not worth living (215e1216a2). In thus
recognizing his own deficiencies (pollo ndev n: 216a5), a lesson rein-
forced by what Alcibiades later calls Socrates hybris, Alcibiades himself
comes to resemble, for a time, the philosopher-daimon Eros, whose recog-
nition that he is deficient (ndev enai: 204a6) makes it possible for him
to desire to become as wise as he can.
Socrates love magic, however, can also produce another result in those
who fail to understand him: ordinary eros for a Socrates who is thought to
be wise and virtuous. The philosopher has many lovers in the Symposium.
Alcibiades seems to be still in love with Socrates (222c23); Aristodemus
is very much a lover (erastes) of Socrates (173b34) and according to
Alcibiades account, Charmides, Glaucon, Euthydemus, Diocles, and very
many others have thought Socrates to be a beloved (222b14). There is
93 Eros 203d8, Marsyas and Socrates: 215c1d1. On Socrates as a magician see Belfiore 1980 and Gellrich
1994. Sheffield 2006a: 191 n.21 points out that the magician was a prominent character in satyr-plays.
94 On love magic and binding spells see Faraone 1999, who notes (12, 10, 157) the portrayal by
Xenophon of Socrates as a practitioner of love magic. On Socrates erotic pedagogy cf. Renaud
2002: 197.
no indication that any of these people love Socrates for the true beauty of
soul he possesses, including, in the first place, his recognition of his own
lack of wisdom.
Alcibiades warns Agathon not to be deceived by Socrates (222b47).
It is Alcibiades own story, however, that contains the deceptive image of
Socrates as wise and virtuous eromenos. Neither Agathon nor anyone else
at the symposium attempts to examine this image critically: Alcibiades
speech is followed by laughter (222c12), not analysis. It is left for Platos
readers to experience an aporia, like that of Alcibiades, concerning the
puzzling portrayal of Socrates in the Symposium, and as a result to desire to
open up the image of the silenus-statues. By leading us to aporia without
satisfying our desire to resolve the issues it raises, the dialogue suggests that
if we do open up Alcibiades image we may, perhaps, arrive at a better
understanding of the philosopher than is provided by the symposiasts in
the story, or by Apollodorus and Aristodemus, the narrators who tell that
story.
part iii
Love and Friendship in the Phaedrus

Introduction to Part III: the erotic art in the
Phaedrus and Symposium
The first part of the Phaedrus contains three speeches: one delivered by
Phaedrus, who attributes it to Lysias, and two by Socrates. At the end of
his second speech, Socrates claims to have been given erotike techne by
Eros. One way in which this second speech demonstrates Socrates erotic
art is by means of a vivid, mythical representation of the initiation of
a lover into this art. In contrast, the first two speeches represent lovers
and self-proclaimed non-lovers who lack this art. All three speeches help
to illuminate the nature of the erotic art, especially by emphasizing the
friendship that the common search for wisdom and beauty (component
(5)) helps to create between lover and beloved, and between those who, like
Socrates and Phaedrus, share Socratic eros for wisdom without being lovers
of each other. That Socrates himself has erotic art is also shown by his
relationship with Phaedrus, whom he persuades to dedicate his life to eros
together with philosophical words (257b56). These topics are discussed
in Chapters 5 and 6. The Introduction to Part III compares the erotic
skill Socrates is represented as practicing in the Symposium with the erotike
techne he explicitly claims to have in the Phaedrus (257a78). I argue that
erotike techne in the Phaedrus differs from the techne of the philosopher
who has craft-knowledge, and from the practice without art used for
sexual seduction by the lovers and non-lovers of the first two speeches.
One especially important aspect of this art is the ability to combine eros
with friendship.
At the end of his second speech in the Phaedrus, in which he recants
his impious characterization of the lover as someone who desires only
physical beauty, Socrates prays to Eros: Be kind and gracious, and do
not in anger take away or weaken the erotic art [erotike techne] that you
gave me (257a78). In this dialogue, as in the Symposium, Socrates is
represented as someone who has erotic art in that he (1) is devoted to Eros
and to ta erotika, (2) recognizes his own lack of wisdom and other good
things, (3) passionately desires the good things he recognizes that he lacks,
198
The erotic art in the Phaedrus and Symposium 199
is (4) marvelously skilled in the search for as much wisdom and other good
things as he can attain, and (5) is marvelously skilled in helping others to
acquire the erotic art. Just as he does in the Symposium, Socrates makes
speeches about eros in a competitive context, and he addresses a beautiful
young man (243e9) with whom he engages in erotic banter. Moreover, as
in the Symposium, he argues that eros is the cause of the greatest good for
humans.
In the Phaedrus, Socrates devotion to Eros is especially evident in his
prayer to Eros, whom he calls his master (265c2), addresses as dear
(257a3), and from whom he claims to have received erotic skill. In this
dialogue, Socrates explicitly represents himself as under the patronage of
Eros. He is also devoted to ta erotika in that he has an erotic nature that
shows itself above all in his love for words. At the beginning of the dialogue,
Phaedrus remarks that Lysias speech is appropriate to Socrates because it is
erotic (227c35). Socrates refers to himself as a friend of words (filolg:
236e5), as a man [love-]sick for hearing words (t nosonti per lgwn
kon: 228b67), as a lover of words (to tn lgwn rasto: 228c12)
and of the collections and divisions (266b34) that facilitate discourse.
He even compares his enthusiasm for words to that of a celebrant of the
rites of the Corybantes (228b6c1).
Just as the Socrates of the Symposium claims to have only an inferior kind
of wisdom (175e24), so, in the Phaedrus, he shows awareness of his own
lack of wisdom. Socrates says that he has no time for the allegorical study
of myth because he is not able to know himself; he therefore studies himself
rather than the monsters of myth (229e4230a6). Socrates also states that
it is fitting to call only a god wise (sophos), while a human should instead
be called a wisdom-liker (philosophos: 278d36; cf. Symp. 204a12, Lys.
218a24). However, the Socrates of the Phaedrus, unlike the Socrates of
the Symposium, does not claim to have even as much human wisdom as a
philosopher (278b24, with 266b37 and 278d36). Recognition of human
limitations is also apparent in Socrates second speech, in which he says
that lovers imitate a god to the extent that this is possible for humans
(253a15), and that they make their beloveds as similar as possible to this
god (253a7b1).
Socrates also says in the Phaedrus that he knows his own amathia
(ignorance1 ) about the love matters that are discussed by the poets (235c2
8). His first speech, he claims, was a false tale (244a3) derived from the
1 Because Socrates says that he is aware of his amathia, the term means ignorance in this passage
and does not, as in Symp. 204a46 and Lys. 218a2b3, refer to lack of awareness of ignorance.
200 Part III Love and Friendship in the Phaedrus
Muses (237a7b1) or from some other source outside himself (235c8d1),
and he is aware that he erred against divinity in giving it (242b8c6). Even
in his second speech, composed by means of the erotike techne given him
by Eros (257a78), Socrates does not claim to tell a true story, or to
have knowledge of the truth about love, any more than he does in the
Symposium.2 Instead, he tells a story that, like the myths told to children
in Republic 2 and 3, is as much like the truth as he can make it. In the
Republic, Socrates says that people can create stories (mythologia) that are
useful, even if they are false in a literal sense, by likening what is false
as much as possible to the truth, because we dont know the truth about
ancient things (2.382d14). That is, stories can be useful if they convey
true beliefs about moral and religious matters, for example, that the gods
are the cause of good things only (2.380c710).3 A similar distinction helps
to explain Socrates statements about Eros and the soul in the Phaedrus.
His story does not tell what the soul is, which would be the task of a divine
and lengthy narrative, but only what it is like (246a36). When Socrates
says that no poet in this world ever will hymn adequately the things in
heaven, he means, among other things, that no human can know the truth
about these things. Nevertheless, Socrates says, one must dare to speak
what is true, especially when one is speaking about the truth (247c36).
Such a story, that is, must convey true beliefs about Eros, who, because he
is either a god or something divine, cannot be evil (242e23). A similar kind
of distinction between knowledge of the truth and true belief is suggested
at 252b4c2, where Socrates says that one may or may not believe what
some poets claim, that the divinity called Eros by mortals is called Pteros
(Winged One) by the gods. Nevertheless, he affirms that the experience
of the lover happens to be this very thing that he has just described in
his mythical account. Later in the dialogue Socrates explicitly refers to his
myth of the charioteer and horses as a kind of game (265c89) that may
nevertheless grasp some of the truth:
We created a likeness of erotic passion, perhaps grasping something true, but maybe
also carried off in another direction. Mixing together a not entirely unpersuasive
speech, we played a mythical hymn in reverent measure to my master and yours,
Phaedrus, Eros. (265b6c2)
Socrates story, then, is not represented as expressing knowledge of the
truth, but instead as giving a plausible account, based on god-given true
beliefs, of Eros and the psychology of the lover. For example, it is a myth
2 Cf. Dorter 2006: 271. 3 I discuss these ideas in detail in Belfiore 1985.
that illustrates, as does another mythical hymn Diotimas metaphor of
the ladder of love the general principle that desire, eran or philein, is a
necessary condition for seeking wisdom.4
It might be objected that Socrates, according to the account he himself
gives in the second half of the dialogue (262a5b1, 273d46), cannot know
what is like the truth if he does not know the truth.5 However, in the
Phaedrus, as in other dialogues, Socrates can consistently claim to have
true beliefs, given him by a god, while still disclaiming knowledge of the
kind that only a god can have. The erotic skill given him by Eros (257a39)
allows Socrates to express some true beliefs in telling his story about what
Eros and the soul are like (246a36). Similarly, in the Lysis, Socrates claims
to have the ability, given by a god, to recognize lover and beloved (204c12),
and, in the Theaetetus, to have the art of midwifery (techne: 149a4, 150c1),
given by a god (150c78, d8e1), that allows him to test that which others
bring to birth, without himself giving birth to wisdom (sophia: 150c47).6
In the Phaedrus, as in the Symposium, Socrates passionately desires the
good things he recognizes that he lacks. After describing, in his second
speech, a former life in which human souls obtained a glimpse of the truth
(248a1c2), Socrates says that he spoke at length about this because of his
own longing (pq) for the former life (250c78). His desire for the good
things he lacks is also suggested by his statements that the best life and
nature are those of philosophers (248d23, 249a15, 252e23, 256a7b7,
278d36), and by his self-description as a lover of learning (filmaqv:
230d3) and of words (228b67, 236e5, 266b35), that is, philosophical
words. Socrates skill in searching for the wisdom he recognizes that he
lacks is shown, as it is in the Symposium, by his continual questioning and
examining of ideas and speeches, his own as well as those of others. The
Phaedrus also resembles the Symposium in focusing on the fifth characteristic
of Socrates erotic art: his marvelous skill in helping others to acquire his
own erotic art. In the Symposium, Socrates helps Agathon and Alcibiades
to recognize their own lack of wisdom, and he helps many others to desire
passionately to attain as much wisdom as they can. In the Phaedrus, Socrates
persuades Phaedrus to desire to attain as much wisdom as he can, and to
devote his life to Eros. He also exhorts the young man to persuade others,
especially Lysias, to do these same things.
In other respects, however, the Socrates of the Phaedrus differs, or has
been thought to differ, from the Socrates of the Symposium. First, he narrates
4 See Chapter 3 at end of 3.3.3. 5 This problem was called to my attention by Christopher Moore.
6 On Socrates god-given true beliefs see Chapter 2 at 2.3.3 and n.85.
stories that have been interpreted as containing incompatible views about
interpersonal love. As noted in Chapter 3 at 3.3.3, Diotimas account in the
Greater Mysteries passage of the Symposium appears to make interpersonal
love a necessary condition for beginning the ascent up the ladder of love,
while also requiring, for continuing the ascent, that the lover come to feel
disdain for this kind of love and its objects. Socrates second speech in
the Phaedrus, however, not only represents interpersonal love as conducive
to the highest kind of eros the love of beauty and truth but, as I
will argue in Chapter 5, it never suggests that the lover must advance
beyond interpersonal love in order to attain this highest kind of eros.
Indeed, according to many scholars, the Phaedrus represents a revision
of the ideas presented in the Symposium, to allow, for example, greater
scope for interpersonal love.7 However, as I argued in Chapter 3 (3.3.2 and
3.3.3), Diotima does not in fact give a clear and unambiguous account
of the role of interpersonal love in the Greater Mysteries, and, moreover,
Socrates distances himself from her teachings. We cannot conclude that
either Platos Socrates or Plato himself holds different views in the two
dialogues. Any apparent differences in the accounts of interpersonal love
can be plausibly explained by differences in the dramatic aspects of the
dialogues. In the Symposium, Socrates is concerned with creating a speech
that appeals to five different men, each of whom claims to be an expert
on eros, according to the skills of his own profession. Interpersonal love
is only one of many concerns in this speech. In the Phaedrus, however,
Socrates attempts to persuade a single, friendly interlocutor, within the
context of a dialogue that emphasizes friendship. Accordingly, he provides
in the Phaedrus an account of interpersonal love that is more detailed, but
not necessarily incompatible with the views expressed by his Diotima in
the Symposium.
A second difference between the two dialogues lies in the characterization
of Socrates. In the Symposium, Socrates disdains those things of which his
interlocutors are most proud, and he is accused of hybris by Agathon and
Alcibiades. In the Phaedrus, however, Socrates consistently acts in a much
more gentle and friendly way toward Phaedrus, who never charges him with
hybris. This difference in characterization can also be plausibly explained
7 See, for example, Nussbaum 1986: 20033 and Price 1989: 55102. The view that the Phaedrus revises
some ideas in the Symposium is opposed by Dorter 1996: 2913; Ferrari 1992: 268 and 1987: 132;
Griswold 1986: 19; Irwin 1995: 310 and 390 n.31. Robin 1908 argues that the Phaedrus represents
progress over the thoughts of the Symposium (53), without mentioning interpersonal love, and he
provides a detailed analysis of the chronology of the Lysis, Symposium and Phaedrus (53120). In
contrast, Moore 1973 argues that the Symposium is a correction of ideas in the Phaedrus.
by differences in the dramatic aspects of the two dialogues their narrative
formats, settings, emphases and interlocutors.
Even though the events of the Symposium take place in a private setting,
Socrates words and actions are observed and reported by multiple narra-
tors, and he interacts with many people. Moreover, competition, however
friendly and playful, is emphasized throughout the Symposium, in which
Socrates competes with others in making speeches.8 In contrast, the Phae-
drus emphasizes in a number of ways the more complete solitude of the two
interlocutors. In the first place, it consists entirely of dramatic dialogue,
without narration, between two people.9 Second, the Phaedrus has no audi-
ence, not even that of an unnamed narrator. Third, the unusual setting, in
the countryside, calls attention to the fact that Socrates is removed from his
usual audience of interlocutors and bystanders, and from the competitive
atmosphere they foster.10 One consequence of this solitude is that Phaedrus
is not subject to the influence of an audience and the competition it encour-
ages. Because he does not need to defend his views before an audience,
Phaedrus can more easily be persuaded to change them. Competition with
others is also minimized in another way. While Socrates at first competes
with Lysias in making speeches about love, Lysias is represented only by
a written text that cannot be humiliated by defeat in the way in which
a living speaker can lose face before an audience. Socrates interlocutors
are also very different in the two dialogues. Unlike Alcibiades, who thinks
highly of his physical beauty, and Agathon, who is proud of his ability
to speak well, Phaedrus is portrayed as a lover of speeches who is already
conscious of his need to learn more about them. He has spent a great deal
of time listening to Lysias and memorizing his speech (228a5b5), but he is
also eager to hear a better speech from Socrates (235d4e1). Moreover, the
friendship between the two men is emphasized throughout the dialogue.11
These features of the Phaedrus the absence of a narrative frame and of
an audience, and the unassuming and friendly character of Socrates inter-
locutor help to create the conditions in which Socrates, like the god who
has given him erotic skill, can be kind and gracious (emenv ka lewv:
257a7) toward Phaedrus.12
Another important difference between the Socrates of the Phaedrus and
the Socrates of the Symposium is related to the fact that the Phaedrus,
8 Competition: Symp. 175e79, 177e35, 189b3c1, 193e3194a7. See Chapter 3 at 3.1.
9 Ferrari 1987: 23. On these differences in narrative style among Platos dialogues and on the narrative
structure of the Symposium in particular, see Halperin 1992.
10 On the role of the audience in Platos dialogues see Rossetti 2000: esp. 2578.
11 See Chapter 5 at 5.4.
12 On the role of Phaedrus see Coventry 1990: 18496 and Rutherford 1995: 2627.
unlike the Symposium, is deeply concerned with the theory and practice of
rhetoric. In the Symposium, Socrates claims to know (epistasthai) nothing
except ta erotika (177d78), and to be marvelously skilled (deinos) in these
matters (198d12), but he never claims to have a techne. In the Phaedrus,
however, Socrates explicitly claims to have what he calls an erotike techne
(257a78). This claim is especially significant because of the emphasis on
techne in the second half of the dialogue. Specifically, in this second half,
Socrates contrasts a true techne (etymos techne) of speaking with what he
refers to as a practice without art (atechnos diatribe: 260e27) and as a
practice and expertise (tribe . . . kai empeiria: 270b56). This practice is
used by Lysias and other orators and speech-writers (266c17, 278b7d1).
In both the first and the second half of the dialogue (234e5235a8, 264c7
e2), Socrates criticizes the lack of rhetorical techne (t htorik: 235a1;
that is, the true techne of speaking) in the speech Phaedrus attributes
to Lysias. He thus implies that this speech in particular is an example
of the practice without art. When Socrates refers to his own erotike techne,
then, he implicitly contrasts his own possession of techne with Lysias lack
of art.
If erotike techne differs from the practice without art, neither is it the
same as the true techne of speaking, for Socrates denies that he possesses
the latter when he states: I have no share in any art of speaking: 262d56
(cf. 264b56, 266b3c1, 278b24). Instead, Socrates has an erotic art like
that of the person possessed by divine love (266a7) in his own second
speech, who is represented as acquiring all five components of this art. Not
only Lysias, but also the lovers and self-proclaimed non-lovers, whose
words are reported in the speech attributed to Lysias and in Socrates own
first speech, lack this erotic art. One way in which the dialogue is unified,
then, is by means of a contrast among Socrates erotike techne, the true
techne of speaking, and the practice without art.13
In order to understand the erotic art Socrates claims to possess in this
dialogue, then, we must examine how it differs from the true techne
and from the practice without art. After contrasting a true techne of
speaking with a practice without art (atechnos diatribe: 260e46), Socrates
says that the true techne of speaking is a rhetorical techne (261a7), which
is identical with or at least makes use of, the dialectical techne, the techne
(265d1) of using the method of collection and division to define the whole
13 Another way in which the dialogue is unified is, as Rowe points out (2009: 145), supplied by Socrates
himself: his way of loving is precisely through logoi [words]. Recent surveys of opinions on the
vexed issue of unity are those of Dorter 2006: 25960 and Werner 2007.
and divide it into parts (265c8266c5).14 Socrates also claims that the person
who uses the dialectical techne (276e56) is called a philosopher (278d36).
The relationships among the true or rhetorike techne, dialektike techne and
philosophy are not clearly defined in the text.15 However, at least by the
end of the second half of the dialogue, they are so closely related that it is
difficult to distinguish among them.16 In the following pages I use the terms
rhetorical techne, true techne and dialectical techne interchangeably.
Most important for present purposes is the fact that Socrates denies that
he has a true techne of speaking.17 His second speech, he says, expressed
the principles of collection and division by chance and not by techne
(265c8d1). Instead, Socrates prays to become the kind of person who has
the dialectical techne (278b24).18 When, shortly after his prayer, Socrates
says that it is most fitting to call the person with this techne a philosopher
(278d36), he strongly suggests that he himself is not a philosopher of this
kind.19
As Socrates claims suggest, the philosopher in the Phaedrus, who has
knowledge, differs considerably from those who are said to philosophize in
the Symposium (204a17, b45) and the Lysis (218a2b3) precisely because
they recognize that they lack the wisdom and knowledge they desire. In the
Phaedrus, philosophers, in the sense of those who have dialectical techne,
are said to know the truth20 about the things they discuss, to be able to
come to the aid of their spoken or written words by submitting them
to cross-examination (278c47), and to be able to teach what necessarily
causes different speeches to persuade different souls (271b45). Philosophers
with dialectical techne are also able to practice collection and division. In
addition, they are able to understand the nature of the soul, and to discover
which kind of speech is suitable to which kind of soul (270c1272b4, 273d2
274a5, 277b5c6). Those who become philosophers with rhetorical techne
need to have a rhetorical nature, and they need to acquire, in addition,
14 Techne of words or speaking: 260d4e7, 262d56, 266c23, 267d78, 272b4; rhetorike techne: 261a7,
263b6, 266d14, 269c9d1; dialectike techne: 276e56; cf. 266b8c8.
15 On these controversial relationships see, for example, the debate between Heath (1989) and Rowe
(1986 and 1989).
16 Nehamas and Woodruff 1995: xli; Gill 1992: 1678; and Piccone 1992: 262.
17 See above. The fact that Socrates does not claim to be a philosopher who has dialectical techne is
strong evidence against the view of Griswold 1986: 116 and 21415 that his erotike techne is the same
as dialectike techne.
18 On Socrates philosophical prayers in the Phaedrus see Jackson 1971: 2330.
19 Gill 1992: 167 notes that Socrates does not present himself even as a sub-divine dialectical
philosophos.
20 eduan t lhqv: 259e46; cf. 262b5c3, 273d2e4, 277b5c6, 278c45.
knowledge (episteme) and practice (269d45).21 Like other craftsmen, they
are able to teach their skill to others.22 That is, these philosophers meet
the criteria for techne that are set out in other dialogues, for they are able
to understand their subject as a unified whole, to give an account of why
they do what they do, and to teach this skill to others.23
In the Phaedrus, however, the kind of knowledge that the philosopher
with the true techne of speaking possesses is not the wisdom that only a
god can have (278d34). It is instead a kind of human craft-knowledge
that Socrates compares to the techne of medicine. Just as medicine needs to
understand by means of techne the nature of the body, and what kinds of
foods and medicines to apply to it so as to produce health and strength, so
the true rhetorician needs to understand the nature of the soul by techne,
and to know which words to apply to it so as to produce persuasion and
virtue (270b19). In the Phaedrus, then, the philosopher with true techne
does not merely love the wisdom he recognizes that he lacks, as he does in
the Symposium and the Lysis. He has already acquired some wisdom, in the
form of craft-knowledge. However, in the Phaedrus, not only does Socrates
deny that the philosopher with dialectical techne has divine knowledge,
he also suggests that human craft-knowledge of this kind may not in fact
be attainable: the philosopher may be only an ideal.24 Socrates says that
he himself is only a lover of collection and division, and that if he finds
someone able to practice the dialectical techne he follows him as if he
were a god (266b3c1). When Phaedrus remarks that the techne concerning
words (273d7) is a fine thing, if anyone should able to acquire it (274a6
7), Socrates replies: It is a fine thing for someone even to attempt fine
things, and to experience whatever happens as a result (274a8b1), that
is, whether one succeeds or fails.25 In other ways also, Socrates shows
an awareness of human limitations. He remarks, for example, that the
rhetorician has techne only to the extent that this person is able to acquire
it.26 A person can become technikos only as far as possible (271c68), and
as much as is possible for a human being (273e34, 277a34). He is able
to please the gods only as much as he is able (273e68).
21 On these three requirements and their relationship to Pericles (269e12) see the analysis of Brisson
1992.
22 Ability to teach: 266c25, 268b34, 269b3, c68, 270d17, 271b15.
23 These are the criteria given by Annas 2001: 2435, discussed in Introduction I.3 with nn.3336.
24 A good discussion of these issues is provided by Gill 1992.
25 Success or failure: Hackforth 1952: 154 n.5.
26 o prteron dunatn tcnh sesqai kaq son pfuke metaceirisqnai t lgwn gnov: 277c3
5, taking pfuke to refer to the nature of the dialectician (Hackforth 1952: 161: within human limits)
rather than to the nature of speeches (de Vries 1969, on 277c36). De Vries, on 277c36 notes that
the consciousness of human limitations is given especially strong expression in the Phaedrus.
A distinction between the philosopher with dialectical techne and the
person who has erotic techne is not explicitly made in the first half of the
Phaedrus. Such a distinction, however, is consistent with the account, in
Socrates second speech, of the process by means of which mad lovers attain
erotic art. All lovers who experience divine erotic madness are able, at least
to some extent, to acquire the erotic art by means of which they can capture
their beloveds. However, only some of these lovers have other characteristics
that enable them to become winged and return to the divine realm most
quickly. They must, to the extent that they are able, always have memory of
divine things, be able to use these reminders correctly (249c48), and live
a philosophical life (249a15, cf. 256a7b7). The correct use of reminders
involves, as the passage immediately preceding 249c48 indicates,27 the
ability to make accurate use of the method of collection, which is said,
in the second half of the dialogue, to require the techne of dialectic that
the philosopher possesses. All humans, says Socrates, are able to practice
collection to some extent (249b6c4), but only the philosophical mind is
able to do so correctly (249c48), that is, as we learn in the second half
of the dialogue, by techne (265c8e3; 266b3c1). Thus, Socrates second
speech suggests that only those lovers who succeed in living a philosophical
life together with their beloveds (256a7b7) acquire the dialectical techne
that is said, in the second half of the dialogue, to be possessed by the
philosopher. Those who, like Socrates, acquire erotike techne strive to live
a philosophical life and to resemble the philosophical lover, but have not
necessarily achieved this goal. In denying that he is a philosopher with
craft-knowledge, then, Socrates in the Phaedrus nevertheless maintains
that he, like those who philosophize in the Symposium and the Lysis, has a
passionate desire to attain as much as he is able of the wisdom he recognizes
that he lacks.
Even though Socrates erotic art does not require craft-knowledge, it
is not merely the practice without art used by contemporary orators and
speech-writers. It differs in having the goals of pleasing a god instead of
fellow-slaves (273e9274a2; cf. 257a3b6), and of striving to attain craft-
knowledge as a lover of words (228c12) and as a lover of collection and
division (266b34). Socrates also differs from speech-writers like Lysias in
recognizing his own lack of wisdom. Above all, in the Phaedrus, Socrates is
portrayed as possessing erotike techne in that he uses his art to help others
acquire it also. His prayer to Eros, at the end of his second speech, tells us
27 Passage 249b6c4, discussing collection, is linked to the passage about memory by the connecting
di (wherefore) at c4.
explicitly that this techne allows him to be honored by the beautiful (257a9),
and it implies that he uses his techne to strive to accomplish the goal for
which he prays: turning Phaedrus to a life dedicated to Eros together with
philosophical words. The prayer also implies that Socrates has used his
erotike techne for this purpose in the recantation speech he has just made.
In helping others to acquire this art, Socrates helps them to go on, in turn,
to help still others. This is apparent at the end of the dialogue, when he says
that he will convey a message to Isocrates about the topics he and Phaedrus
have discussed, and asks Phaedrus to do the same for Lysias (279b13). In
helping others to acquire and pass on the erotic art, Socrates resembles
the man with dialectical techne whom he prays to become (278b24). This
man sows in another soul words accompanied by knowledge, that can in
turn be passed on to still others. He is thus immortal to the extent that this
is humanly possible (276e4277a4). In Socrates own case, erotike techne
is god-given and thus, as noted above, can provide him with some true
beliefs.
In all of these respects, Socrates erotic art differs from the practice
without art used by Lysias the speech-writer. It also differs from this same
practice used by the self-proclaimed non-lover, whose attempt to seduce
a beautiful boy is reported in the speech attributed to Lysias, and in the first
speech of Socrates, that was inspired by Lysias (257b2). These non-lovers
blame lovers for desiring only physical beauty (232e35, 238b7c4), and
for acting as enemies rather than friends in harming the objects of their
lust. The speeches allow us to infer, however, that the non-lovers in fact
have the same desires as the lovers they criticize, and that they are even
more harmful to the objects of their desire. They thus show that they, like
the lovers whom they criticize, lack the erotic art that creates friendship
between lover and beloved. In contrast, those possessed by divine love in
Socrates second speech have a passion so intense that it is characterized as
a kind of madness. Instead of ordinary eros for physical beauty, these lovers
have Socratic eros for the divine beauty of which they are reminded by the
beauty of the beloved. They use erotic art in seeking to obtain as much of
this true beauty as they can, in part by persuading their beloveds to join
in the same search and to reciprocate their friendship. Thus, the Phaedrus,
like the Lysis, demonstrates the essential connection between erotic art and
the friendly feelings that are a necessary condition for the common search
for wisdom, beauty and other good things that are the objects of Socratic
eros. As previously discussed (Introduction at I.1 and Chapter 2 at 2.2.3),
the question and answer method (dialectic) by means of which one seeks
wisdom is a mutually beneficial activity that requires, and helps to create,
friendly relationships among interlocutors.
The Phaedrus does not, like the Lysis, contain any theoretical discussion
of what the friend is. However, friendship plays a significant role through-
out the Phaedrus. In the first two speeches, a non-lover falsely claims
to have friendship for his beloved, whereas, in Socrates second speech,
lover and beloved combine mutual interpersonal eros with mutual friend-
ship. Friendship is also dramatized in the relationship between Socrates
and Phaedrus. This emphasis on friendship within an erotic context
is an especially important way in which the Phaedrus differs from the
Symposium.
Lysias speech and the first speech of Socrates divorce interpersonal eros
from friendship by arguing that it is better for a boy to have an erotic
relationship with someone who is not in love than for him to yield to
a lover. In Lysias speech, a man who claims not to be in love argues
against a lovers claim that those who have eros have most friendship.
The self-proclaimed non-lover contends instead that the boy is more
likely to acquire enmity than friendship from a relationship with the lover
(231b7c7, 232d14). The non-lover in Lysias speech claims that sexual
relationships with non-lovers who were friends before they had these
relationships will, in contrast, increase friendship between the pair (232d7
e2, 233a14). In Socrates first speech, made, in response to Phaedrus
request, on the same subject as Lysias speech (235d4e1), friendship is
explicitly said to be the most important consideration. The speaker, a man
who claims not to be in love, states at the beginning of his address to a
boy: Since the question lying before you and me is whether one should
enter into friendship with lover or non-lover (237c68). This non-lover,
like the one in Lysias speech, argues that a lover cannot also be a friend.
In both speeches, however, the non-lover claims to be a good friend
but gives no evidence that he acts as one. The only people who act as
friends in these speeches are kin and others who do not have an erotic
relationship with the object of their affections. Both Lysias speech and
Socrates first speech, then, far from being primarily exercises in rhetoric
for its own sake, raise important substantive questions about whether or
not any erotic relationship is compatible with friendship.28
28 Many analyses of the first two speeches emphasize rhetoric: Brown and Coulter 1971; de Vries 1969:
234; Robin 1994: xlxli; Rutherford 1995: 2434; Sinaiko 1965: 2630; Thompson 1868: xivxxii.
Those who argue that the speeches have serious philosophical content include Ferrari 1987: 86112
and Griswold 1986: 4573.
Socrates second speech is an explicit recantation of his first speech. He
now rejects the idea that a lover cannot be a friend and shows, instead,
how a particular kind of interpersonal eros is not only compatible with, but
necessary to, the greatest and best kind of friendship. The ideal partners
are not only lover and beloved (erastes and eromenos), but also friend and
befriended (flou . . . filhqnti: 253c5). Socrates speech indicates that
this lover is able to be a friend because he is also a lover and friend
of beauty and truth. This interpersonal erotic relationship is unlike the
conventional, asymmetrical erastes-eromenos relationship represented in the
first two speeches in that the partners are also friends who share goods
higher than pleasure and material gain, and who acquire erotic techne by
imitating the same god.
Like the lover of his own second speech, Socrates is portrayed as having an
erotic art that makes it possible for him to be both lover and friend. Socrates
love is not for speeches of the kind Lysias writes, but for philosophical
words, and he shows his friendship for Phaedrus by using his erotic techne
to turn the young man toward these kinds of words (257b46). The idea
that eros can be combined with friendship by someone who has erotic art is
reflected, then, in the relationship between Socrates and Phaedrus, who, as
I will argue in Chapter 5, are friends in part because they are lovers, not of
each other, but of philosophical words. Just as in the Lysis and the Alcibiades
I, mutual eros for a higher good helps to create love and friendship.29
29 Cf. Rosen 1988: 81, and, on friendship based on mutual eros for the good in the Lysis, Gonzalez
2003: 33. On eros as desire for the good see above, especially Chapter 1 n.9 and Chapter 2 n.68.
ch a p ter 5
The lovers friendship
5.1 lysias speech

Socrates criticizes the speech Phaedrus attributes to Lysias (230e6234c5)
as having little rhetorical merit, claiming that it says the same thing two
or three times (235a4) and that its parts do not fit together appropriately
(264c2e1, 264c5). He also claims that Lysias, like other contemporary
speech-writers and orators, lacks the true techne of speaking, and has
only a practice without art (260e5: see Introduction to Part III). Modern
scholars have often agreed with Socrates negative evaluation, stating, for
example: This tedious piece of rhetoric deserves little comment.1 How-
ever, to focus exclusively on the rhetorical defects of the speech and on the
question of authorship (Plato or Lysias) is to ignore the evidence in the text
that these very defects, as well as the subject and arguments of the speech
make a positive contribution to the discussions of eros within the dialogue.2
The detailed analyses in this chapter demonstrate how this, and the two
speeches of Socrates, are carefully constructed so as to be rhetorically and
philosophically effective within the dialogue.
As Phaedrus notes, eros is a fitting topic for its audience, Socrates (227c3
5). Socrates, who claims that he was paying attention only to the rhetorical
elements in Lysias speech (235a12), nevertheless acknowledges that the
subject of eros is important to him when he states that he has heard better
things spoken about love from Sappho, Anacreon or prose writers (235b1
c4).3 He further demonstrates that his concerns are philosophical as well
as rhetorical by making not just one but two speeches about eros. The
specific arguments in Lysias speech also have important rhetorical and
philosophical functions within the dialogue, for they help to strengthen
1 Hackforth 1952: 31. Rowe 1988: 144 characterizes it as a plaything, not to be taken too seriously.
2 Cf. White 1993: 24.
3 Pender 2007: 1, argues that Plato names and praises Sappho and Anacreon . . . in order to acknowl-
edge their influence on his thought on love. Cf. Fortenbaugh 1966. Poetic language has an especially
important function in Socrates second speech, on which see further Chapter 6.
211
arguments made in Socrates second speech. Socrates states that any speech
in favor of gratifying a non-lover rather than a lover must necessarily
(236a1) assume, as does the speech attributed to Lysias, that the lover is
without sense. When he agrees to make his first speech and argues in favor
of the non-lover, Socrates yields to Phaedrus request to say more and
better things starting from this same assumption (235d4236b4). Socrates
second speech will then be able to defeat the strongest case that can be
made against the lover.4
Lysias speech also makes a positive contribution to another topic dis-
cussed in the dialogue in that it exemplifies a lack not only of the true
techne of speaking, but also of erotike techne. Instead of Socratic eros for
wisdom and true beauty, both the non-lover who speaks and the lover he
criticizes have only ordinary eros, in the sense of sexual passion. In particu-
lar, these men both show that they lack the ability, possessed by the person
who has erotic skill, to create friendship between lover and beloved.
In the speech attributed to Lysias, the speaker is a man claiming not
to be in love, who urges a boy to yield to him sexually rather than to a
lover, stating that the lover is sick, rather than sound-minded (231d23).
The lovers sickness, he says, makes him a bad friend. According to the
self-proclaimed non-lover, the lovers claim to have most friendship for
the beloved (231b7c2) is false, because the lover does not treat the beloved
as a friend during the love affair, and because his friendship ceases when
his desire does.
It is difficult for any kind of friendship to last (232b56), according to
Lysias non-lover, and the friendship of the lover is especially transient.
The lover desires the body before he knows the character of the beloved, so
that it is unclear whether or not he will still want friendship when desire
ceases (232e36). Lovers enjoy the youth and beauty of the beloved (234a1
2), but are in earnest for a short time only (234a56). Their desire ceases
(234a7) when the beloved loses this bloom of youth (234a2, 8), or even
before, if the lovers turn to other beloveds (231c45). At that time, they
repent of the things they did while in love (231a23; 231d46). When lovers
turn to a new beloved they will treat the former beloved badly (231c6), and
when their desire ceases they will seek a pretext for enmity (234a78).
The non-lover concedes in a general way that the lover confers benefits
(231a2, 231a8) as long as love lasts. He admits that lovers, like other people
in need, feel affection (gapsousin)5 for those who gratify them, that
4 A similar point is made by Friedlander 1969: 225.
5 Rowes translation, treat . . . fondly (1988), is preferable to that of de Vries, appreciate (1969, on
233e3). That this verb implies affection here is supported by parallels in Symp. 180b2 and 210d2.
The lovers friendship 213
they are grateful, and that they pray for the beloved to have many good
things (233e15). Lovers are themselves ready to gratify the beloved by
hating other people and by treating their former beloveds badly (231c27).
It is left vague what actual benefits are conferred, although the statement
that lovers care for their own interests badly (231a7) might imply that they
spend more money on the beloved than they can afford.
According to the non-lover in Lysias speech, however, the harm the
lover does greatly outweighs any benefits he provides. He acts more like an
enemy than a friend in treating the boy badly after love ceases and in doing
damage even while the relationship lasts. The lover harms the reputation
of the beloved because he boasts of his conquest (231e3232a4) and because
he is suspected of satisfying his desire any time he is seen with the beloved
(232a6b2). It is probably because of the power the lover has to damage
the beloveds reputation that quarrels with lovers are said to be especially
harmful to the beloved (232b5c3).6 A lover also harms his beloved by
praising and flattering him inordinately, fearing that he will otherwise be
hated by the beloved (233a57). Lovers also act like enemies in being ready
to quarrel with their beloveds. They are disturbed by many things that
cause no pain to others, for example, by the beloveds association with rich
or educated men (232c38, 233b23). They even quarrel with the beloved
if he considers his own interests (232d34). Small things arouse strong
enmities in lovers (233c23), especially when their desire ceases (234a7
8). Lovers also incur enmities with others in order to gratify the beloved
(231c24). They quarrel with their relatives (implied by 231b25) and they
are admonished and blamed by friends and relations, who try to dissuade
them from doing wrong (234b23). Lovers not only fail to act as friends to
the beloved, they also deprive him of other sources of friendship. They have
ill will toward those who associate with the beloved (implied by 232d5).
The lovers jealousy, moreover, leads him to turn the beloved away from
anyone who might be superior to the lover in some respect, depriving the
beloved of friends and making him an object of hatred to them (232c4
d2). The beloved, then, loses friends and acquires enemies as a result of his
relationship with the lover.
The non-lover of Lysias speech claims that he, unlike the lover, has
lasting friendship for the boy. The pair were already friends before the
sexual relationship began, and the good things they get from the affair will
increase their friendship (233a14). Non-lover and boy will be friends
6 The reputation of the beloved was at stake because a male suspected of prostitution risked losing his
citizenship: Dover 1989: 1034; Fisher 1992: 10911.
throughout life (234a67), and the non-lover will show his virtue when
the boys bloom ceases (234a8b1). The non-lover argues that eros is not
necessary for strong friendship, citing as examples the friendship between
parents and children, and between faithful friends, all of whom become
friends not because of desire (epithumia), but because of other pursuits
(233c6d4).
Lysias non-lover makes the general claim that he will provide more
benefits to the boy than the lover. He begins by saying, You have heard that
I think this benefits us (230e67) and concludes with the statement that
profit comes to both (234c34). The non-lover looks to future profit, not
just present pleasure (233b6c1). He does good willingly and not because
of the necessity of eros (231a46); he does what pleases the boy (231b6
7), and he pays back favors (233e7). Little is said, however, beyond these
generalities. The non-lover claims that he improves the boy more than
does the lover, who flatters him (233a4b1), but he does not say how he
will make his partner better.7 Only one specific benefit is mentioned: he
will share his goods (gaqn), that is, his wealth,8 when the boy is older
(234a23). Other specific benefits mentioned are actually absences of harm.
The non-lover is said to be less likely to damage the boys reputation than
is the lover (232b25, 234a45); he is less likely to quarrel (233c25), and
to deprive the boy of his other friends (232d4e2); he does not repent, for
love has not impaired his ability to care for his own interests well (231a3
6), and his kin do not blame him for making bad judgments about his
own interests because of love (234b35).9 It is significant, however, that the
non-lover never claims to have the affection he attributes to the needy
lover (233e3). Moreover, non-lovers, like lovers, have an unfriendly state
of mind toward third parties. They, however, unlike jealous lovers, hate
those who do not wish to associate with the boy, thinking that they are
looked down on by these people (232d67).
In what way, then, are the boy and the non-lover friends? The two
are said to be friends before the sexual relationship begins, and, accord-
ing to the non-lover, it is not likely that the benefits they share will
lessen their friendship (233a14). However, the non-lover gives the boy
no reason to believe that a sexual relationship will strengthen friendship.
Indeed, the non-lover does not even examine the nature of friendship.
The relationship is based on a transaction in which the boy exchanges sexual
favors for wealth, and, although the non-lover portrays this as a mutually
advantageous exchange (230e7, 234c34), he appears to believe that the
7 Cf. Hackforth 1952: 31. 8 Wealth: LSJ, s.v. gaqv, II.4, on the plural.
9 In translating because of love I follow Scully 2003.
advantage is all his own. Just as happens in a relationship with a lover, the
boy gives up what he values most (232c1), that is, his chastity, and he risks
his reputation if the affair is discovered. In exchange, the non-lover gives
material goods (231a56, 234a23). The commercial nature of this trans-
action reduces the non-lovers expression of friendship to the giving of
money.10 The non-lover claims that he achieves his goal of establishing a
sexual relationship because of his own virtue (232d45), and says that he is
worthy of the friendship and sexual favors given him (231e12, 234a1), but
he provides no proof of his virtue and worthiness. Furthermore, he must
be lying when he says that he is not a lover (erastes), for the only reason he
could have for seeking a sexual relationship is eros, in the sense of sexual
desire, or lust.11 In misrepresenting his motives and in getting more advan-
tages than he confers, the non-lover does not act as a true friend. Nor
does he give any evidence of having the affection of a friend. His speech
gives the boy no reason to give up what he values most and to risk his
reputation by sexually gratifying the non-lover instead of cultivating his
non-sexual relationships with kin and friends, including the non-lover,
who claims to be a friend before the relationship begins (233a1).
What the speech attributed to Lysias actually suggests, then, is that an
erotic relationship is incompatible with friendship, since neither the lover
nor the self-proclaimed non-lover, who must in fact really feel ordinary
eros, has friendship for the boy. The lover has affection (233e3) for the
short time his love lasts, but he does not treat the boy as a friend even
during this period. The non-lover is even worse. Like the lover, he is
motivated by sexual desire, but, unlike the lover, who is at least honest,
he deceives the boy about this fact. Moreover, the non-lover is never
said to feel affection. The conclusion that the audience of Lysias speech
might be expected to draw is that friendship is necessarily absent from
all kinds of erotic relationships. Indeed, in this speech, the conventional
erotic-educational relationship praised by Pausanias in the Symposium is
portrayed as a sordid exchange of money for sex.
5.2 socrates first speech

Socrates first speech (237b7241d1) also represents the conventional rela-
tionship between erastes and eromenos in a very negative light. In this speech
also, lover and self-proclaimed non-lover desire only the physical beauty
10 Ferrari 1987: 923 notes the commercial nature of the proposed transaction and the absence of a
discussion of friendship. Cf. Rosen 1988: 8990.
11 This point is made by Griswold 1986: 48; Rosen 1988: 8990; and Rowe 1988, on 230e6. Note that
the speaker in Socrates first speech is in fact a lover who has persuaded his beloved that he is not in
love (237b35). See further below 5.2.
that is the object of ordinary eros. They lack Socratic eros for true beauty
and wisdom, and erotic skill in creating the friendship that is essential to
the common search for these good things.
Indeed, the two speeches have much else in common. In both, a man
who claims not to be in love makes a speech that attempts to persuade a
boy to gratify him sexually instead of a lover. This man, who is really a lover
pretending not to be in love (237b35), bases his arguments on the same
premise as that of the non-lover in Lysias speech, namely, that the lover is
sick (236a8b1), and he makes many points about the relationship between
eros and friendship that are similar to those made by Lysias non-lover. In
both speeches, arguments for and against a sexual relationship are based on
a calculation of benefit as opposed to harm.12 In Socrates speech, the boy
is explicitly asked to consider whether a relationship with the lover or the
non-lover brings benefit or harm (237d23; cf. 238e12, 239e1). The non-
lover claims that the lover is not profitable (239c1) to the beloved and is
instead harmful to his possessions, to his body and to his soul (summarized
at 241c35). Like Lysias non-lover, the non-lover in Socrates speech
argues that love does not last (240e89), that the lover desires only the
beautiful body of the beloved (238c2), and that the lover fails to keep his
promises (240e8241b5). Just as Lysias lover is said to deprive the beloved
of friends, so the lover in Socrates speech is said to wish the beloved to
be deprived of kin and friends (239e2240a2). Moreover, this lover, like
the lover in Lysias speech, is guilty of jealousy, suspicion, excessive praise
(240e24) and ill will (239a7, 240a5).
Unlike the non-lover in Lysias speech, Socrates non-lover says noth-
ing about the damage to the reputation of the boy caused by the lover, or
about neglect of the lovers own interests, or about quarrels while the rela-
tionship lasts. In most respects, however, the lover in Socrates speech is
even more harmful than the one in Lysias speech.
In the first place, the lover is said to be concerned only with his own
physical pleasure. The non-lover in Socrates speech first defines hybris:
When desire [epithumia] draws us without reason to pleasures and rules
in us, its rule is given the name of hybris (238a12). He then defines
eros as that kind of hybris that draws us toward the pleasure of enjoying
physical beauty, having conquered judgment that moves us toward what
is right (238b7c4). Socrates will later condemn this kind of eros as slavish
(243c8) and inferior (266a36). There is no suggestion that this hubristic
eros can, like the hubristic tendencies of the black horse in Socrates second
12 Noted by Rowe 1988, on 238d8241d1.

speech, be tamed and harnessed so as to pursue the good (see Chapter 6).
The hubristic desire for pleasure of the lover in Socrates first speech is
innate (237d7) and irrational (238a1), ineradicably tied to the body and
opposed to wisdom-liking (philosophia: 239b4). Indeed, the lovers desire
for pleasure is emphasized throughout. The lover is said to be an egoist,
wanting only what is most pleasant to himself (238e4). He cares only for
present enjoyment, to the extent of taking pleasure in the inferiorities of the
beloved that increase his own sexual opportunities (239a17). He takes his
pleasure at the expense of the pleasure of the beloved, who finds the lover
extremely unpleasant (240b5c1), is forced to look at an older man and to
do things for him that are unpleasant even to hear about (240d6e2).
A second way in which the lover described in Socrates first speech does
more harm than the lover in Lysias speech is that he confers no benefits,
even of a material kind, in the present. The beloved is led to accept the
association only because he hopes for goods, that is, wealth,13 in the future
(241a12). Yet, when that future arrives, he is compelled to pursue his
former lover, entreating the return of favors (241a5) that the lover no longer
wants to give (241b35).
Third, the lover in Socrates speech deprives the beloved of more than
does the lover in Lysias speech. The greatest harm he does is to keep
the beloved from the divine philosophy by means of which he could
become most sensible (phronimotatos) and thus come to despise his lover
(239b15), who himself lacks sense (235e7236a1).14 He also prefers a soft
and beautiful body, suited to giving sexual pleasure, to a body hardened
by physical training. The lover, that is, desires a beloved whose physical
condition, in times of war and danger, gives courage to his enemies and
creates fear in his friends and lovers (239c3d7). The lover in Lysias speech
merely wishes the beloved to be deprived of the family and friends he
already has (232d2). The lover in Socrates speech, in addition to wishing
the beloved to lose father and mother, wants him to remain unmarried,
without children or household of his own (239e2240a8).15
Finally, the lover in Socrates speech has more power to inflict harm,
for he has authority over the boy (239c1, c4), and the two spend the day
together (240b6). He abuses this authority, however, by guarding the boy
suspiciously, and giving him excessive and inappropriate praise and blame
(240e25).
13 See above n.8 for this meaning of gaqn.
14 This play on sense (or wisdom) is noted by Rowe 1988, on 239b34.
15 Cf. Sinaiko 1965: 27, who notes that Socrates speech treats family and friends as more valued
possessions than does that of Lysias.
At the beginning of Socrates first speech, the non-lover asks the boy
to consider whether he will enter into friendship with lover or non-lover
(237c68). As far as it concerns friendship with the lover, however, the
question is misleading, for it turns out that there can be no real friendship
between lover and beloved. If, as the non-lover says, equality in age and
pleasure creates friendship (240c13), the younger boy cannot be a friend
of the unpleasant, older lover. Moreover, in inflicting harm, the lover acts
more like an enemy than the friends with whom he is contrasted (239d6,
239e2240a2). As noted above, the lover deprives the boy of present goods
and fails to give him the future goods he promised. He is also untrustworthy,
irritable, jealous, unpleasant, and harmful to the boys property, to his body
and to his soul (241c25). In sum, the friendship of the lover is without
good will (eunoia: 241c78), in contrast to that of the beloveds kin, who
have most good will (239e4).16 It resembles the friendship a person has
for food, or the affection the wolf has for the lamb (241c7d1).17 The
friendship of the lover is like the love people feel for the inanimate objects
they use for their own satisfaction without expecting love in return.18
In Socrates first speech, then, just as in Lysias speech, a relationship
between lover and beloved is portrayed as lacking in friendship on both
sides. The lover does not treat the boy as a friend, but as an object for which
he feels no affection, and from which he desires only sexual pleasure. The
boy, for his part, makes a commercial transaction, in which he accepts an
unpleasant association for the sake of future gain, which he never receives.
What about the other half of the question asked by the non-lover
(237c68)? Can there be friendship between the non-lover and the boy
of his speech? Unlike Lysias, Socrates does not praise the non-lover in his
speech and, when questioned by Phaedrus about this, he merely says that
the non-lover has all the good qualities that are opposite to the bad ones
the lover has (241e56). We are asked to infer, then, that the non-lover
is sound-minded (sophron) rather than sick and hubristic, being ruled by
judgment that draws us toward what is best, by means of reason . . . whose
name is sophrosyne (237e23). Presumably, the non-lover will do the
opposite of the lover in following the good instead of pleasure (239c45),
thereby making the boy as good as possible, rather than most pleasant to
himself (238e4). He will want the boy to be superior in mind and body,
16 In Socrates second speech, good will also characterizes the inspired lover who is also a friend (255b4).
17 v lkoi rnav gapsi, v pada filosin rasta: 241d1.
18 Cf. Robin 1994: lxxxix: une amitie sans reciprocite. In arguing that friendship is reciprocal (NE
8.1155b2731), Aristotle writes that people who have a fondness for inanimate objects, wine, for
example, are not said to have friendship for these objects.
wealthy and surrounded by family and friends. The non-lover will also
be opposite to the lover in having friendship accompanied by good will
(241c78), and in being trustworthy, good-tempered, without jealousy,
pleasant and beneficial to the beloved (241c23).
The text, however, casts doubt on these inferences. The non-lover
states that non-lovers as well as lovers desire physical beauty (237d45),
thereby suggesting that both are motivated by lust, and before he makes
the speech, Socrates calls this non-lover wily (amlov: 237b4).19 Worst
of all, Socrates tells Phaedrus that the speaker is lying when he pretends
not to be in love (237b45). Indeed, someone who does not feel eros, in
the sense of lust, would have no reason to wish to enter into a sexual
relationship in the first place.20 It would seem, then, that the non-lover,
in addition to having all the defects of the lover, is false and deceptive. Even
if we accept at face value the statements of the non-lover, his argument
that the lover is unpleasant to the beloved also applies to the non-lover
himself (240b5e7). If the non-lover does the opposite of the lover, he
will not praise and blame unseasonably, but in other respects it will be
just as unpleasant for the boy to gratify the one as the other. In both
cases the boy will have to look at the unpleasant sight of an older man,
and will have the distasteful task of gratifying him sexually (240d6e2).
Even if friendship of some kind is produced by the benefits given to the
boy by the non-lover, the friendship that comes from equality of age
and pleasures will be lacking (240c13). Why should the boy accept the
unpleasantness of a sexual relationship with an older man if he already has
what the non-lover himself calls possessions most dear, with most good
will, and most divine, that is, father and mother and kin, and friends
(239e36)? This high praise for the friends with whom the boy does not
have sexual relationships suggests that non-erotic friendships benefit the
boy much more than does any erotic relationship.
The logical conclusion of Socrates first speech, then, like that of Lysias
speech, is that the boy has no reason to enter into an erotic relationship
with either lover or non-lover, a relationship that will be unpleasant as
well as harmful in other ways. He would instead do best to cultivate his
non-erotic friendships. The lover is not friendly but hostile to the best
19 The word amlov excludes any idea of good will, according to Brown and Coulter 1971: 41819,
who argue against the view of Hackforth 1952: 40, that the non-lover is a true, Socratic lover
in disguise, who has real concern for the boys welfare. Hackforth is followed by de Vries 1969,
on 237b45. Others who argue that Socrates non-lover is morally superior to his counterpart in
Lysias speech include Ferrari 1987: 99 and Sinaiko 1965: 31.
20 See above 5.1 and n.11.
interests of the beloved, and the boy can have no friendship for him that
is based on anything other than material interests. On the other hand, the
non-lover, who is actually a lover in disguise, combines deception with
the other disadvantages of the openly avowed lover. The non-lover of
Socrates first speech, then, argues more persuasively than does the non-
lover of Lysias speech that the lover is sick and therefore cannot be a
friend to the beloved. However, the arguments of the speech are skillfully
constructed so as to persuade a perceptive audience that, contrary to the
claims of the non-lover, he himself is even more harmful than the lover
he condemns.
The fact that the parts of Socrates speech fit together appropriately also
helps to make it more persuasive than that of Lysias, especially to a lover of
speeches like Phaedrus. When Socrates compares his own first speech with
that of Lysias (262c5264e2), he states that a good speaker must (1) first
define disputed terms, and then (2) narrate the rest of his speech in accord
with this definition (263d8e2), (3) giving it a clear beginning, middle and
end (264c25). Lysias, who did none of these things, is without techne
(atechon: 262e5) in this respect. Of his own speech, Socrates merely says
that it defined love (263d14), but it can also be seen to meet the other
two criteria for a good speech. After (1) defining love as a kind of hybris
(238b7c4, d89: see above beginning of 5.2), Socrates non-lover goes on
to (2) discuss the profit or harm that is likely to result from gratifying the
man who loves, according to this definition of love (238d9e2). Socrates
speech also has (3) a clear beginning, middle and end. The speaker first
considers the harm the lover does to the boy while his love lasts, narrating,
in order, harm to the mind (239a4c2), to the body (239c3d7), and to
possessions (239d8240a8), and the unpleasantness of the lover himself
(240a9e7). The non-lover then discusses the harm the boy will suffer
when love ceases (240e8241c1), and concludes with a summary of his
argument (241c1d1).
Although Socrates speech is better constructed and more persuasive
than that of Lysias according to rhetorical criteria, Socrates himself claims
to have no share of the techne of speaking (262d56; cf. 264b56), which
requires knowledge of the truth.21 Socrates also disclaims this techne when,
after giving this speech, he makes it clear that it does not represent his own
views, but was instead the result of the influence of Phaedrus: Socrates was
drugged by Phaedrus, and it was Phaedrus speech that came through
21 See Introduction to Part III with n.20.
his mouth (242d11e1). Many other features of the dialogue also serve to
distance Socrates from the ideas expressed in his first speech. For example,
he invokes the Muses before speaking (237a7b1); he interrupts his speech
to say that he risks being possessed by the Nymphs as he continues to speak
(238c9d2, 241e35), and to claim that while speaking he has already had
what he calls a divine experience (238c56), that is, something caused by
a force outside himself.22 At the end of his recantation, Socrates calls Lysias
the father of the speech (257b2), thus indicating that his first speech was
inspired by Lysias. Socrates also distances himself from the views expressed
in his first speech when he begins to speak with his head covered out of
shame (237a45), and when he says, after the speech, that the divine sign
prevents him from departing before he has purified himself after having
wronged the divine (242b8c9). Moreover, Socrates says that both he and
Lysias spoke impiously and falsely in attributing evil to Eros, who is a god
or something divine (242d7e4).23
Socrates first speech, then, is not constructed by means of the true
techne of speaking that requires knowledge of the truth. This does not
mean, however, that it is made by a practice without art, as was the
speech attributed to Lysias. Socrates shows that his speech, unlike that of
Lysias, is the product of erotic art by the use he makes of it. Within both
Lysias speech and Socrates first speech the speaker attempts to persuade
a boy to give him sexual favors. However, Socrates speech has a func-
tion within the dialogue as a whole that Lysias speech does not, for it
contributes to the attempt to persuade Phaedrus to turn his life toward
eros together with philosophical words. This speech appeals to the strong
interest in ordinary eros that the young man already has. It also presents
in an extremely unattractive light the lust divorced from philosophy and
friendship that characterizes both lover and non-lover in Lysias speech.
Moreover, Socrates explicitly calls attention to the false and impious nature
of the views about eros represented in his speech. Specifically, Socrates
says that both his speech and that of Lysias erred in stating that lovers
create great enmities because of small things, and are jealous and harmful
to beloveds (243c56). Accordingly, we expect that Socrates recantation
speech will not only argue more generally that a lover benefits a beloved
but also, in particular, that lover and beloved are friends. This is in fact
what happens.
22 On this distancing effect of inspiration cf. Dixon 2008.
23 Calvo 1992: 4750 makes an intriguing, but unconvincing, argument that Socrates first speech is
not impious.
5.3 socrates second speech

Socrates second speech (243e9257b6) adapts Greek erotic-educational
conventions in portraying a lover, who, in contrast to the lover and non-
lover of the first two speeches, is also a friend to his beloved. In 5.3, I
discuss in detail specific ways in which this skillfully constructed second
speech represents a lover as acquiring the five components of the erotike
techne that Socrates shows himself to possess in creating this speech to
persuade Phaedrus. First (5.3.1), Socrates portrays eros as a kind of divine
madness and enthusiasm, as a result of which the lover has an experi-
ence like that of sexual arousal. In becoming aroused, the lover becomes
devoted to ta erotika (component (1)); realizes that he has lost the beauty
and other good things that he once glimpsed (component (2)), and pas-
sionately desires to regain as much of these things as he is able (compo-
nent (3)). Next (5.3.2), Socrates addresses the relationship between lover
and beloved, recounting how the aroused lover becomes skilled in seek-
ing beauty and truth (component (4)), together with his beloved, whom
he helps to acquire his own erotic art (component (5)). This last skill
involves, in particular, the ability to create friendship between himself
and his beloved. Socrates uses the striking image of an interactive mirror
to illustrate the way in which the friends and lovers share in the com-
mon search for beauty and truth. Throughout this speech, Socrates uses
Mystery terminology and imagery to represent the search as an initiation
into erotic art.
5.3.1 Divine madness and the arousal of the lover (249d4252c2)

Socrates begins his second speech by stating: This story is not true that
says that when a lover is present one should gratify a non-lover instead,
because the lover is mad, but the non-lover is sound-minded (244a35).
Socrates argues that a beloved should gratify a lover because some kinds
of madness are divine gifts and the cause of the greatest goods for us
(244a68, c3, 249d4e4, 256b57). Erotic madness gives us the greatest
good of all: the ability to practice eros for boys together with philosophy
(paiderastsantov met filosofav: 249a12) in such a way that lover
and beloved are friends of each other as well as lovers of truth and beauty.
This inspired lover (nqusizwn: 249d2; cf. 249e1, 253a3) is also an inspired
friend (nqeon flon: 255b67). Erotic madness is, paradoxically, also the
most rational of human activities, because it is necessary to the search for
beauty and wisdom in which lover and beloved engage together.
Socrates gives his account of divine madness within the context of a
myth comparing three elements in the soul to a charioteer and two horses,
one of which is good, beautiful and white, and the other is ugly, disobedient
and black (245a6b3, 253c7e5). In a previous existence, Socrates says, each
human soul was winged and traveled in the heavens, following one of the
gods in initiation rites that he compares to a cosmic dance.24 The best souls
were carried highest, and their charioteers saw, although with difficulty, the
things in the heavens (248a15), while the other souls saw only some things,
or were not able to raise themselves at all (248a5b1). The souls who did
not rise at all must be those who are incarnated as animals (see 249b35),
for Socrates later states that all humans have seen something of the truth
(249b56, 249e4250a1). All souls, Socrates says, eventually lost their wings
and fell to earth (248c58). After the fall, each of the best souls, those who
had seen most, was incarnated as a philosopher, or lover of beauty, or some
musical and erotic person (248d24). Scholars are divided about whether
or not all of these characteristics belong to the same person.25
Socrates account of the philosopher in this myth also raises other ques-
tions. In the second half of the dialogue, he restricts the name philosopher
to someone who has acquired the craft-knowledge of dialectic (278d36),
and he denies that he himself is such a person (278b24). In the first half
of the Phaedrus, however, Socrates includes himself among those who are
followers of Zeus (250b7: we) because they have a philosophical nature
(252e13). These two accounts are not inconsistent, however, for Socrates
states, in the second half of the dialogue (269d45), that knowledge and
practice are needed in addition to the rhetorical nature possessed by the
philosopher. Someone who has a philosophical nature may, like Socrates,
still lack these other two requirements.
Moreover, the distinctions among the followers of different gods made
in the first half of the dialogue are consistent with the distinction (discussed
in Introduction to Part III) made in the second half between the philoso-
pher with techne and the person with erotic skill. All human souls, Socrates
says, share to some extent in the desire for seeing the plain of truth by
means of which the wing is nourished (248b5c2), and all have some ability
to recollect what they have seen in a former existence (249b5c4). Socrates
also says that the followers not only of Zeus, but also of other gods
Hera (253b1), Apollo (253b3), Ares (252c4), or some other god (253b3) can
24 See further Chapter 6 at 6.4.
25 Hackforth 1952: 83, followed by de Vries 1969, on 248d34, holds that all characteristics belong
to the same person. Nehamas and Woodruff 1995: 35 n.81, hold that they designate three different
groups.
achieve the happiness of someone who is truly in love (253c26). Some mad
lovers, however, are able to become winged and return to the heavens more
quickly than others. Those who are able to do so most quickly include
those who practice philosophy without guile [dlwv]26 or combine
the love of boys with philosophy (249a15), and those who lead a philo-
sophical life together with their beloveds (256a7b7). These people have a
philosophical mind (dianoia), are always (e) as close to divine things
as memory allows them to be, and they use reminders of these things
correctly (249c48). They are among the few who have sufficient mem-
ory of the things seen previously (250a5) because initiation is still fresh
in them, and because they have seen much in a previous existence.27 The
correct use of reminders involves the ability to make accurate use of the
method of collection (249b6c4) which, together with that of division, is
said, in the second half of the dialogue, to require the techne of dialectic
that the philosopher possesses (265c8266b7). Socrates thus suggests that
all humans are capable, through a series of reincarnations, of returning to
the heavens, because all share, to some extent, in the erotic madness that
most strongly possesses the followers of Zeus, who have a philosophical
nature.28 All humans, then, are capable of acquiring erotic skill at least to
some extent, although only a few can acquire the philosphers techne.
Madness begins, according to Socrates, when humans see beauty in this
world, and are thereby reminded of the true beauty they once saw. They
then start to become winged again and want to fly away, but are unable to
do so. Because they then care nothing for the things below, they are said to
be mad (249d4e4). The madness of these lovers is a form of enthusiasm
(249d2, e1), possession by a god, a state in which the soul remembers and
longs for the divine chorus in which it formerly danced. Once they become
possessed, this passage indicates, lovers have already acquired the first three
components of the erotic art: being devoted to ta erotika to the extent
of being enthusiastic and possessed (component (1)); realizing that they
have lost the beauty and truth they once glimpsed (component (2)), and
passionately desiring to regain them (component (3)).
Divine madness, unlike human insanity, is in accord with reason. Mad
lovers are capable of recollection (anamnesis: 249c2). That is, they are able
26 Contrast this philosopher without guile with the wily (amlov: 237b4) non-lover of Socrates
first speech.
27 d rtitelv, tn tte poluqemwn: 251a12; cf. newly initiated (neotelv: 250e1). On these
terms see Riedweg 1987: 42.
28 Cf. Sinaiko 1965: 82. Dyson 1982 provides a good survey of many of the difficulties presented by the
association of Zeus with philosophy. He concludes that Socrates account is less consistent than I
hold it to be.
to comprehend what is said universally, arising from many sensations and
being collected together into one through reasoning.29 Recollection is a
rational process, but it is set in motion by the strong emotions aroused by
the beautiful objects in this world that remind us of true beauty. According
to Socrates, when lovers see some likeness of the things there [sc. in the
heavens], they are stunned and no longer in control of themselves (250a6
7). This is especially true in the case of beauty, which alone of realities we
saw clearly in our journey through the heavens (250b16, c8d1), and whose
images we now see most clearly by means of the clearest and keenest of
our bodily senses (250d2, 4). When we see earthly images of beauty and
recollect (249d6) true beauty, we experience erotic madness (249d4e4). If,
Socrates states, the images of wisdom (phronesis) could be seen through the
bodily senses, they would produce marvelous loves (deinov . . . rwtav)
in us, as would the images of the other things that are lovable (sa
rast). As it is, beauty alone can be seen through the senses, and as a
result it is most clear and most lovable [rasmitaton] (250d3e1).30
According to Socrates, then, the reasoning process involved in recollection
is set in motion by a strong emotional reaction to beautiful objects, and
recollection itself produces eros for true beauty. It follows from this account
that emotion is necessary to set the reasoning process in motion and that
eros is an essential part of what Socrates will later call the philosophical art
of dialectic. Thus, just as in the Symposium, eran (loving) is a necessary
condition for philosophizing.
After providing a general account of erotic madness, Socrates gives a
long and detailed description of the way in which the sight of the physical
beauty of the beloved reminds the lover of divine beauty, and thereby
nourishes the wings of his soul, which raise him toward the divine realm
(251a1252c2). This passage makes use of the imagery and vocabulary of
erotic poetry to describe a lover quite unlike the hubristic lover in Socrates
first speech who pursues only physical pleasure. Even though the inspired
lover reacts physically to physical beauty, the arousal Socrates describes
takes place primarily in his soul, and he desires divine more than physical
beauty.
29 249b6c1: Rowes translation, 1988, who explains (on 249c12): [W]e perceive many things, which
through reasoning or calculation . . . we bring together into a unity, i.e. as belonging to the same
class or type; and this process (of bringing the many together into one), whenever it occurs, is a
matter of recollecting or being reminded (by the things perceived) of the things which our soul once
saw.
30 Good accounts of the importance of sensible beauty in Phdr. are provided by Lear 2006: 11718 and
Nightingale 2004: 15768.
The arousal of the lover is marked out in an explicit sequence and
described by means of graphic sexual imagery. In particular, Socrates image
of the wing recalls, throughout his second speech, the images of winged
phalloi frequently represented in Greek art and graffiti.31 It also recalls
the experience of the initiand, who shudders with eros for the mystic
rite.32 (1) When the lover sees the beloved, he first (prton) shudders
and experiences fear (frixe, deimtwn: 251a14). (2) Then (eta) he feels
reverence (sbetai) for the boy as for a god (251a47). (3) Next (d ), he
is seized by sweat and fever (drv ka qermthv) and, receiving a flood
of beauty coming through his eyes, he is warmed (qermnqh) by the
beauty that waters his wings (251a7b3). (4) Then (d), the shafts of his
feathers melt (tkh: 251b35). (5) Next (d), when nourishment flows in,
the shafts of his feathers swell ( dhse) and begin to grow beneath the
entire soul (251b57).33 (6) Finally (on), the whole soul boils and throbs
violently (ze . . . ka nakhkei), having an experience (pqov) like that
of teething, which causes itching and irritation (knsiv, gankthsiv).
At this last stage of arousal, Socrates reemphasizes, the whole soul boils,
and is irritated and tickled as the feathers grow (ze te ka ganakte ka
gargalzetai fousa t prer: 251c15).34
Socrates goes on to describe in more detail the pleasure mixed with
pain (251d7) experienced by the aroused lover (251c5252a1). The lover has
pleasure in seeing the beloved and in remembering him (gghqen: 251d1,
7), but in his absence suffers anguish from unsatisfied desire. When the
lover is away from the beloved, the shoots of the lovers feathers, which
are shut up inside his soul together with desire (mrou), leap like beating
pulses (phdsa oon t sfzonta) and prick (gcrei) at the opening,
so that the whole soul, being goaded (kentoumnh) all around, is stung and
pained (ostr ka duntai: 251d16). The soul of the lover is in anguish
(dhmone), mad (lutt, mmanv) and at a loss (porosa) because of
the strangeness of the experience (pqouv), and is unable to rest due to
its longing (poqosa). When it sees the beauty of the beloved, the lovers
soul, drawing into itself the stream of desire, releases what was shut up
before, and gets a respite from the goads and birth pangs (kntrwn te
31 See Arrowsmith 1973: 1647, with illustrations.

32 Seaford 1994: 2845, citing Aeschylus frag. 387, and other passages, including Phdr. 251a. The telestic
connotations of frssw (shudder) are also noted by Riedweg 1987: 423 and 607.
33 This passage describes the growth of feathers rather than wings: Ferrari 1987: 154 and 265 n.20.
34 The evocation of Sappho 31 in this passage is discussed by Ferrari 1987: 1534; Pender 2007: 3746;
and Foley 1998: esp. 467.
ka dnwn), enjoying the sweetest pleasure (251d7252a1).35 In addition
to experiencing emotions like those attributed to the erastes in Greek love
poetry, Socrates mad and possessed lover acts like this erastes. He forgets
family and friends, neglects his possessions, is ready to be a slave and sleep as
close as possible to the object of his longing (pqou), who is the physician
for his greatest labors (pnwn) (252a1b1).36
This graphic description is, of course, part of the poetic language of a
speech calculated to appeal to Phaedrus (257a56). However, the imagery
also has important philosophical implications. Instead of stressing that the
body is a hindrance to the soul, as he does in the Phaedo, Socrates in
the Phaedrus attributes to the soul a capacity for the same kind of arousal
experienced by the body, and he characterizes this arousal in positive terms,
as being the result of divine erotic madness.37 Thus, he does not reject but
appropriates and embraces an eros that is described in physical terms.
Arousal results from a vision of physical beauty, and it has an effect on
the lovers soul that resembles physical arousal. In fact, although we are
not explicitly told anything about the lovers body, Socrates imagery leaves
no doubt that it also is aroused. The mad lover is not only a lover of the
kind of beauty that is grasped by the soul, he is also a creature of flesh
and blood, who responds to physical beauty as other men do. The imagery
of arousal, in which the distinction between body and soul is blurred,
helps to prepare the audience for the idea, expressed later in the speech,
at 254e5255a1, that all of the three elements in the soul, represented by
the charioteer and the two horses, can work together toward a common
goal. Socrates description of the arousal of the mad lover, then, reinforces
the idea of harmony and friendship between body and soul. Socrates will
35 The image of drawing the stream into oneself (literally, irrigating oneself with it: poceteusamnh:
251e3, on which see Thompson 1868: 65) is opposite to that of normal male sexual release. The
release referred to at 251e3 is that of the shoots of the feathers, whose continued growth represents
increased excitement. Ferrari 1987: 1569 argues convincingly that orgasm is absent from Socrates
story. On the image of the stream see Lebeck 1972: 2746.
36 An excellent survey of Platos use of themes from poetry in Socrates second speech is that of
Pender 2007: 1955. On Platos use of love poetry in Phdr. see also Nightingale 1995: 15862 and
Fortenbaugh 1966. Specifically, Socrates description of the lovers symptoms contains many words
and ideas characteristic of erotic literature: longing (pqov, on which see Calame 1999: 301 and
n.36, citing Archilochus 196 and 193 West, Sappho 22.11ff. and 48 Voigt); madness (Calame 1999:
18, quoting Anacreon 428 Page; Pender 2007: 1920); desire (merov: Calame 1999: 302, citing
Archilochus 188 West, Sappho 31.5ff. and 96.15ff. Voigt); goad (Padel 1992: 118, citing Eur. Hipp.
39 and 1303); sting (ostrov: Padel 1992: 1212, citing Eur. Hipp. 1300); lying in doorways (Phdr.
252a67, cf. Symp. 183a6, Headlam 1966, on Herodas, Mime 2.347, citing Ar. Eccl. 963).
37 Phaedo 64c69e. Foley 1998: esp. 578 and Nussbaum 1986: 21323, also note the importance of the
body and physical desire in Phdr. On Nussbaums views see further Chapter 6 at 6.1
further blur the distinction between body and soul when he goes on to
state that the lover is attracted not only by physical beauty, but also to a
beloved whose soul has a particular nature (252e15, discussed below 5.3.2,
passage A).
5.3.2 Lover and beloved

After becoming aroused, and acquiring the first three components of the
erotic art, the lover in Socrates story becomes marvelously skilled in seeking
the true beauty that he recognizes he has lost (component (4)), in the
company of the beloved whom he helps to acquire his own erotic art
(component (5)). In the process of acquiring these skills, the lover first
establishes friendship among the three elements in his own soul, and
then creates friendship between himself and his beloved. The relationship
between this lover with erotic skill and his beloved is one of mutual eros
and mutual friendship, in which happiness is given by the friend who is
maddened by eros to the one befriended (p to di rwta manntov
flou t filhqnti: 253c45). This pair, then, are not only erastes and
eromenos, but also friend and befriended.
In this section, I discuss the ways in which, according to Socrates myth,
a lover and beloved acquire erotic skill, and become both lovers and friends
of each other. I first discuss lines 252c3253c6 (hereafter, passage A), in
which lover and beloved renew together the initiation in rites in which
they once danced in the heavens, following one of the gods. Next, I analyze
lines 255a1256e2 (hereafter, passage C), in which Socrates first discusses the
way in which the beloved is persuaded to enter into an erotic relationship
with the lover, and then considers two possible kinds of erotic relationships,
one between a pair that strictly follows a philosophical life, and a second,
inferior relationship between partners who are more vulgar and honor-
loving. In Chapter 6, I focus on lines 253c7255a1 (hereafter, passage B),
which describes the struggle within the soul of the lover.38
I depart from the order of Socrates narration by first discussing two non-
consecutive passages, A and C, both of which are concerned with the erotic
relationship between lover and beloved. Passage B is best treated separately,
within the context of the psychological and religious ideas expressed by
the myth of the charioteer and horses. Before discussing the ideas in these
passages, however, it is important to note carefully the way in which
Socrates complex narrative is constructed.
38 I borrow the phrase struggle in the soul from Ferrari 1987: esp. 185203.
Socrates begins, in passage A, by narrating the ways in which lover and
beloved renew their initiation (telet: 253c3) together. This passage con-
cludes, however, with the statement that the initiation just described occurs
if the beloved is captured (253c46). This implies that at least some of
the events recounted in passage A cannot occur until after the capture.
Indeed, this capture is explicitly mentioned, but not discussed, earlier in
passage A, at 253b5 (when they capture [him], tan ktswntai: 253b5).
Moreover, immediately after saying: if the beloved is captured (253c5
6), Socrates states, in the last sentence of passage A: the one captured
is caught in this way (253c6). This statement at first appears to be an
introduction to an immediately following detailed description of a cap-
ture in which the lover persuades the beloved to participate in an erotic
relationship. What actually follows this statement, however, is a narration
of a struggle within the soul of the lover, by means of which he establishes
harmony within his own soul, in particular, by taming his black horse
(passage B). The narration of the way in which the lover persuades the
beloved to associate with him does not occur until passage C, beginning at
255a1.
In constructing his speech in this way, Socrates does not, as might
at first appear, interrupt his narrative of the capture of the beloved,
but instead emphasizes that this capture itself has two steps, the first
of which begins within the soul of the lover. Only when the lover has
established friendship within his own soul (the first step of the capture)
can he enter into a relationship with the beloved in which eros is com-
bined with friendship (the second step in the capture). In placing his
description of the struggle within the lovers soul (passage B) between two
passages (A and C) that discuss the erotic relationship between lover and
beloved, Socrates emphasizes the fact that victory in this struggle within
the lovers soul is a precondition for a friendly relationship between lover
and beloved.39 If the lover does not succeed in creating friendship within
his own soul, especially by taming his black horse so that the whole soul
will be able to follow the beloved with reverence and fear (254e8255a1,
at the end of passage B), he will not be able to serve him as he would
serve a god, as he does at the beginning of passage C (255a12).40 Pas-
sage C then begins by narrating the second step in the capture of the
beloved.
39 On this precondition cf. Griswold 1986: 133 and Sinaiko 1965: 52.
40 I take this service (qerapea) to refer to specific actions, in contrast to the passive reverence (sbetai)
that takes place at first sight of the beloved (251a57).
The search for remembered beauty (passage A: 252c3253c6)
In passage A, Socrates first notes that each lover imitates (mimoumenos:
252d2) that god whom he followed in his previous existence (252c3e1),
and then gives a detailed account of the stages, listed below, by means of
which lover and beloved renew their initiation together, thus becoming
skilled at seeking the true beauty they have lost.
(1) Passage A, at 252e13. The lover begins by searching (zhtosi: 252e2;
cf. 253b2, b4) for a beloved whose soul (252e2) has a nature like that of
the god previously followed by the lover himself. Socrates portrays a new
kind of relationship, different in three main respects from those described
in the first two speeches, and by the poets whom he mentioned before his
first speech. First, in his narrative, love does not come as an irrational force
from outside but is instead deliberately and rationally sought.41 Second,
lover and beloved have the same nature (fsin: 252e3, 253a1, pefuknai:
253b4), one that corresponds to the nature of the god whom both once
followed. Third, the idea that the lover loves a beloved who shares with
him a psychic nature like that of a god (252e12) indicates that the beauty
to which the lover is attracted is not merely the physical beauty that is the
object of ordinary eros, as was suggested in Socrates earlier reference to
sensible beauty (250c8d4). It is instead Socratic eros for divine beauty that
is grasped by the soul, and of which the physical and psychic beauty of the
beloved are images.
(2) Passage A, at 252e4. When they find their beloveds, the lovers fall
in love (rasqsin: 252e4). At this stage, we may assume that the lovers
experience the erotic reactions described at 251a1252b1 (above 5.3.1). It is
now clear that they do so in response to beloveds who share their own
natures.
(3) Passage A, at 252e45. Next, the lover captures the beloved. Socrates
does not explicitly state that this happens. Instead, he says that lovers
do everything in order to make the beloved similar to the god both
follow. This brief statement alludes to the imitative process described more
fully in stage (5) below. Equally important, however, it implies that the
capture of the beloved has already taken place, for a lover can only do
everything in order to make the beloved similar if his beloved cooperates
with him as an accepted lover. Indeed, the capture is explicitly mentioned
at stage (5) below (when they capture [him]: 253b5). As noted above, the
capture itself has two steps: the creation of harmony within the lovers
41 On the poets portrayal of eros as a force coming from outside see Cyrino 1995: esp. 2, 89, 46, 56,
912, 142.
soul (narrated in passage B), and the persuasion of the beloved (described in
passage C).
(4) Passage A, at 252e5253a6. If they have not already done so before
(252e5), the lovers search within themselves for the nature of their own god
(252e6253a1). In contrast to their previous lack of resources (porosa)
in response to eros (251d8), they now have many resources (eporosin)
for discovering the nature of their god, for, being compelled to look
toward the god eagerly, they grasp him in memory, and in their enthusiasm
[nqousintev] they take their habits and manner of life from him, to
the extent that it is possible for a human to share in god (253a15). That
is, the lovers imitate the god (253b5: stage (5) below). They believe that
the beloved is responsible for this experience, and so they feel still more
affection for him (gapsi: 253a56).
(5) Passage A, at 253a6c6. Finally, lovers, like possessed Bacchantes, draw
inspiration from their god and pour it onto the soul of the beloved, making
him as similar as possible (v dunatn moitaton) to their god (253a6
b1; cf. 252e45 in stage (3) above).42 That is, When they capture [him],
imitating [mimoumenoi] the god themselves, they lead the beloved into the
manner and type of life [pitdeuma ka dan] of the god, persuading [the
beloved] and harmonizing [uqmzontev] him [with this manner of life].43
They do not act grudgingly (phthonoi) or with illiberal ill will (neleuqr
dusmene), but try to make their beloved like themselves and like their
god (253b5c2).44 By this stage, the lover who is mad with love is also a
friend to his beloved (flou t filhqnti: 253c5). This passage describes
in poetic fashion the lovers use of his erotic skill to help the beloved to
acquire this same art.
In passage A, then, lovers learn to acquire component (4) of the erotic
art, which enables them to seek true beauty. They do so by (1) searching
for a beloved who shares with them the nature of a god, (2) falling in
love with this particular beloved, (3) capturing the beloved, and (4)
searching for the nature of their own god, and imitating this god. The
lover also learns to become skilled in helping the beloved to acquire erotic
art (component (5)) when he (5) helps the beloved to imitate the same
god.
[Passage B: 253c7255a1, discussed in Chapter 6 at 6.2.]
42 Cf. Plato, Ion 534a45.

43 Thompson 1868: 70, on 253b, explains uqmzontev (harmonizing) as shaping or conforming
them to the mode of life and the moral standard proper to the god they serve. The verb captures
the idea of ethical education by means of the dance, on which see Chapter 6 at 6.4.
44 On the absence of phthonos in a philosophical life cf. Symp. 210d6.
Persuasion, love and friendship (passage C: 255a1256e2)
After describing the ways in which lover and beloved renew their initiation
together (passage A), Socrates tells the story of the struggle in the lovers
soul (passage B), a struggle that is in fact the first step in the capture
of the beloved. In passage C, Socrates returns to the erotic relationship
between lover and beloved. He first recounts the way in which the beloved
is persuaded to enter into an erotic relationship with the lover, thereby
describing the second step in the capture of the beloved. It is noteworthy
that in the lover eros precedes and helps to create friendship, while in
the beloved, the process is reversed: friendship comes before and helps to
produce eros. In both partners, however, eros is not different in kind from
friendship, but is itself the best and greatest friendship.
Socrates account of the way in which the lover persuades the beloved
to enter into an erotic relationship with him begins when the lover has
both eros and friendship for the boy. The persuasion of the beloved has five
clearly defined stages.
(1) Passage C, at 255a16. The lover, after having attained victory in the
struggle within his soul (passage B), serves the boy, who is by nature a
friend to the one who serves him (atv n fsei flov t qerapeonti:
255a34).45 In this context, the statement does not mean that a person who
is served will naturally be a friend to the one who serves him, but that this
particular beloved is a friend to this particular lover, because they share the
same nature: both are followers of the same god (252e13).46 As a friend by
nature, the boy has the potential to reciprocate the lovers friendship, even
though he may at first, influenced by his companions, repulse the lover
(255a46).
(2) Passage C, at 255a6b2. Because lover and beloved are both good
(gaqn . . . gaq), that is, capable of striving to imitate their god, it is
necessary and fated (cren . . . emartai) that the two will become friends
as time passes and the boy matures (lika) into his own nature.47 At stage
(2), the boy reciprocates friendship by associating (milan) with the lover.
(3) Passage C, at 255b37. When the beloved associates and speaks with
the lover, the lovers good will (eunoia; cf. 256a3) comes close and stuns
(kplttei) the beloved, who recognizes that all his other friends and
relations put together have no friendship like that given him by his inspired
friend (nqeon flon). Thus, the good will that was lacking in the lover
45 I follow almost all editors in omitting, after flov, the words that are missing from some manuscripts:
ev taton gei tn filan: see de Vries 1969, on 255a34.
46 I disagree with de Vries 1969, on 255a34, who takes t to be generic.
47 I follow the account of maturity given by Ferrari 1987: 1745.
in Socrates first speech (241c78) plays an extremely important role in the
relationship between the partners of his second speech. Significantly, in
characterizing its powerful effect on the beloved, Socrates uses the same
verb, stun (kplttei: 255b4) that he used earlier, in his narration of the
lovers arousal, to characterize the effect of the sight of beauty on lovers
(kpltontai: 250a6). As a result of the lovers good will, the boy now
realizes that the lover is not just one friend among others, but that he has
an extraordinary degree of friendship. He recognizes, that is, that the lover
has the excess of friendship for one person that Aristotle calls eros.48 In
realizing this, and in continuing to reciprocate friendship by associating
with the lover, the beloved has himself taken a step toward reciprocating
the extraordinary friendship that is eros.
(4) Passage C, at 255b7c7. As time goes on, the lover comes still closer
to the beloved. Now the two not only associate with, but also touch each
other (255b78). This physical closeness allows the stream of beauty that
flows from the boy to enter the lover, to overflow, and to be carried back
to the beloved.
(5) Passage C, at 255c7e3. When it enters the boy, the stream of beauty
causes the feathers of his soul to grow, and it fills him with eros. The boy
loves, but is at a loss (pore) to say whom he loves, not realizing that he
sees himself in the lover, as though in a mirror: 255d6).49 The beloved now
has a counterlove (anteros), an image (eidolon) of eros that he calls not eros,
but friendship. He now desires, although less strongly, the same kind of
physical contact that the lover also desires; that is, he desires to see, touch,
kiss and lie down together with his lover. The boy calls what he experiences
friendship, not because he is still influenced by convention, but because
this kind of divine madness really is indistinguishable from the greatest
friendship.50
In stage (5) of passage C, Socrates uses an image of a mirror to portray a
kind of friendship in which each partner helps the other to know himself,
and to become a better, and more divine, self.51 In some respects, then, they
are like those friends that Aristotle calls other selves.52 Socrates states:
48 NE 1158a1013 and 1171a1112; cf. Pl. Laws 837a69. I thank Eugene Garver for calling my attention
to the importance of the parallel in Aristotle.
49 Cf. the lovers aporia at 251d8. 50 Convention: Ferrari 1987: 178.
51 Good accounts of this process are given by Price 1989: 86 and Ferrari 1987: 173.
52 Cf. Arist. [Mag. mor.] 1213a2024: Just as when we wish to see our own face we see it by looking
into a mirror, in the same way, when we want to know ourselves we could do so by looking at a
friend. For the friend is, as we say, another self. The phrase other self also occurs at NE 1166a312,
1170b67, EE 1245a2930, 345. On this concept see Belfiore 2001: 11826.
[T]he stream of that flood, which Zeus, in love with Ganymede, called desire,
is carried with great force toward the lover. Some of it enters him, while the rest,
when he is filled to the brim, overflows outside. And just as a wind or some echo
rebounding from smooth and hard objects is carried back again whence it rushed
forth, so the flood of beauty enters the beautiful one again through the eyes, by
which means it naturally goes to the soul. Arriving and giving new wings to the
soul, it waters the roots of its feathers, stirs it to grow feathers and fills the soul of
the beloved in turn with love. Indeed he loves, but is at a loss about what he loves.
He neither knows what he has experienced, nor can he tell, but, like someone who
has caught a disease of the eyes from another and cannot say what the cause of
it is, he does not know that he sees himself in the lover as if in a mirror [sper
d n katptr n t rnti autn rn llhqen]. When his lover is present
his pain ceases, just as the lovers does, and when the lover is absent, the beloved,
just like the lover, longs and is longed for, having a counterlove that is an image of
love [edwlon rwtov ntrwta cwn]. He calls this, however, and believes it to
be, not love but friendship. (255c1e2)
As Socrates had previously stated, the flood of beauty that flows from
the eyes of the beloved causes the feathers of the lovers soul to sprout and
grow (251b17). The beauty in question is physical, perceived by the bodily
senses (250c8d4), but there is good reason to believe that it is also beauty
of soul, perceived by the soul, that resembles (mowma: 250a6, b3) the
divine beauty of the god followed by both lover and beloved. According
to the passage just quoted, that part of the flood that cannot be absorbed
by the lover is turned back from his eyes as light is reflected from a mirror.
In this mirror, the eyes of the lover that are the entrance to the soul (255c6
7), the beloved sees himself, and from this mirror he absorbs the reflection
of his own beauty that is a reflection of divine beauty. The beloved then
loves in turn, with a love that he calls friendship, and he, like the lover,
sprouts feathers. Socrates mirror image implies that there is not just a single
reflection, but an infinite series of reflections. For if the reflected stream of
beauty is not merely seen by the beloved, but also waters the feathers of
his soul, it will make him still more beautiful in soul, thus increasing the
stream of beauty he sends out. This in turn will increase the reflection of
beauty that the beloved receives back from the lover. The reflected stream
of beauty nourishes the soul of the beloved, helping to create a new and
more beautiful self, which, in turn, nourishes the soul of the lover. Lover
and beloved are thus defined and created by the love they create in each
other.
The stream of beauty not only helps to create a new self in lover and
beloved, it also increases their love for one another. This mutual interper-
sonal love cannot be separated from love for divine things, but is itself a
form of Socratic eros.53 As each partner inspires the other to remember and
imitate their god, each loves the other still more (see 253a56), so that each
is yet more inspired. Moreover, as lover and beloved imitate their god, they
become more divine, more lovable, and more able to inspire one another
to imitate the god. Finally, as they imitate the same god, lover and beloved
become still more like each other and therefore love each other more.
The image of the mirror differs in an important respect from that of the
man with dialectical techne who sows in another soul words accompanied
by knowledge that can in turn be passed on to another soul (276e4277a4).
In the mirror image, and in the imitative process it illustrates, there is no
suggestion that a way of life is transmitted from lover to beloved, who
in turn will transmit it to his own beloved.54 Instead, according to my
interpretation, the beloved is an active partner, who affects the lover as
much as the lover affects him. The process is thus interactive, like the
soul-gazing that is compared to looking into a mirror in the Alcibiades I. In
both dialogues, moreover, the partners gain self-knowledge and knowledge
of the divine.55 In the Alcibiades I, Socrates claims that, just as an eye sees
itself by looking into another eye as if into a mirror, so a soul, by looking
into the most divine part of another soul, might know not only itself, but
also god and wisdom (132e2133c6). Similarly, in the Phaedrus, each partner
gains self-knowledge as he gazes into the other as into a mirror. By seeing
his reflection in the lovers eyes, the boy comes to know his own beauty
and to see that it is a reflection of divine beauty. He also comes to know
the lover, for he recognizes that the lover loves not merely physical beauty
but also divine beauty, which is within the lover, as well as within the boy.
In the same way, the lover comes to know his own beauty of soul by gazing
at the beautiful beloved, whose nature resembles his own and that of the
god both imitate.
The mirror in the Phaedrus, then, is an image of a relationship in which
lover and beloved interact with each other in such a way as to become
more beautiful in soul, as each imitates the divine beauty he sees reflected
in the other. Moreover, as each partner takes into himself (that is, imitates)
what is most beautiful in the other, namely, the beauty that is derived from
the god whom both follow, each imitates (mimoumenoi: 253b6) this god.
53 I disagree with Gooch 1992: 311 and Pradeau 2007: 153, 1656, who argue that interpersonal love in
Socrates myth is merely instrumental to love for higher things.
54 On the idea of transmission of lives see Price 1989: 2535 (on Symp.), 95102, 2268, criticized by
Ferrari 1991, to whom Price (1997) replies.
55 See Chapter 1 at 1.4 for a discussion of Alc. I 132a6133c17 and for a comparison of the passages in
the two dialogues. One notable difference is that in Alc. I soul-gazing leads to knowledge of the
ugliness as well as the beauty of ones soul.
The mirror image in passage C uses a visual image to convey the ideas that
were expressed in passage A, at 252e5253c6 (above, stage (4)): the lover
uses his erotic skill to imitate his god, that is, to search for true beauty,
and to help his beloved do so also. This earlier passage uses metaphors of
exchange of liquids to express the idea of imitation: the lovers draw drafts
of inspiration (rtwsin: 253a6) from their gods and pour them onto the
soul of the beloved (pantlontev: 253a7). Similarly, in the mirror passage,
the flood of beauty waters the roots of the feathers in the soul of the beloved
(255c6d1). In the mirror image, however, there is good reason to believe
that this exchange is interactive, unlike the passive transfer of wisdom like
water through a siphon (Symp. 175d37). Reflection and re-reflection in the
mirror is an image of mutual imitation, which is also imitation of a god.
In summary, then, according to Socrates account of the beginnings of
the erotic relationship (passage C, stages (1)(5)), interpersonal eros and the
greatest kind of friendship are not only compatible with, but also necessary
to one another. Moreover, this interpersonal eros is also Socratic eros for
the divine beauty that is reflected in the physical and psychic beauty of the
beloved, and in the psychic beauty of the lover. The lovers eros leads him
to have friendship for the beloved, after having first established friendship
within his own soul so that his hubristic tendencies are tamed, and he
follows the beloved with reverence (passage B, at 254e5255a1), serving him
as he would serve a god (passage C, at 255a12). The fact that the boy and
the lover have the same nature predisposes the boy to reciprocate the lovers
friendship. The boy begins to do so when he associates with the lover,
increases this association (passage C: milan: 255b1, b3; milaiv: 255b8),
and permits physical closeness (passage C: ggqen: 255b3, plhsizh:
255b7). This proximity allows the boy to perceive and be powerfully affected
by the extraordinary nature of the lovers friendship and good will, to
reciprocate it still more, and finally to acquire from the lover the eros that
is an excess of friendship. The idea of reciprocal eros is certainly significant
in this passage.56 Equally important, however, is the concept of reciprocal
friendship within an erotic relationship.
Friendship with the lover plays an important role in helping the boy to
acquire erotic skill. As discussed in the previous paragraph, it is the lovers
friendship that creates eros in the beloved. Just as the arousal of the lover
is described in terms of the growth of feathers (5.3.1), so, when the stream
of beauty enters the soul of the beloved boy and fills him with eros, this
56 Halperins view that eros is reciprocal (1986 and 1990: 1312, citing [n.119] Foucault 1985: 23940) is
challenged unconvincingly by Calame 1999: 18990. Price 1989: 867, notes the difficulties involved
in interpreting Socrates account.
stream is also said to cause the feathers of his wings to grow (255c5d3).
We may infer, then, that the aroused beloved, like the aroused lover, has
acquired the components of erotic skill that lead him to be devoted to ta
erotika (component (1)), and to desire passionately to attain as much as he
can of the true beauty that he realizes he lacks (components (2) and (3)).
Because of his friendship with the lover, moreover, the beloved is receptive
to the older mans guidance in the search for true beauty.
After discussing the persuasion of the beloved (passage C, stages (1)(5)),
Socrates next relates what happens after the beloved has been persuaded to
enter into an erotic relationship with the lover whose eros he returns (stages
(6) and (7)). After first narrating the preliminary reactions of lover and
beloved, Socrates discusses the two possible kinds of lives that they may go
on to live.
(6) Passage C, at 255e4256a6. The partners now act on their desires,
doing what the beloved desired in stage (5) of passage C (at 255e23).
That is, they look at, touch and kiss each other, and lie down together.
Socrates language leaves no doubt that the boy, like the older man, feels
sexual desire. The black horse of the boys soul, swelling and being at an
impasse [porn], embraces and kisses [file] the lover, and is ready to
gratify him if he asks for this (256a15). A struggle in the souls of both
lover and beloved now takes place, as the charioteer and white horse resist
with reverence and reason the desires of the black horse (256a56). The
struggle in the soul described in this passage is a second one, subsequent to
the first struggle in the lovers soul described at length in passage B. This
new struggle is more difficult than the first. Once the beloved comes to
feel eros and permits physical contact, the lovers black horse once again
attempts to seize control, asking the charioteer to allow it some enjoyment
in exchange for the many pains it endured during the previous struggle
(255e4256a1). In this new struggle, however, the lovers black horse has an
ally in the black horse of the beloved and the lover must not only control
his own black horse but also help the beloved to control his. If he has not
gained control over his black horse in the first struggle he will not be able to
do this. This passage, then, like passage B (see pollkiv: 254e6), suggests
that the struggle in the soul is frequently renewed, and that the human
soul requires continual re-education.
(7) Passage C, at 256a7e2. At this point, two outcomes are possible. If
the forces for good win the struggle, the partners live an ordered and philo-
sophical life, one that is blessed and characterized by concord. Throughout
their lives, these partners are orderly and self-controlled, having enslaved
that by means of which evil of soul attempted to enter, and when they
die they are winged (256a7b7). However, if the partners lead a more vul-
gar, unphilosophical and honor-loving life (256b7c1), the black horses
take control of their souls when they are drunk or neglectful for some
other reason, and they commit the sexual act. These honor-loving part-
ners continue to have sex, although they do so rarely, because they do
what is not approved by their whole mind. They live as friends (flw),
although they are friends to a lesser degree than the philosophical partners.
Their friendship lasts as long as interpersonal eros does, and continues
even after eros ends, for the love-pledges they have received prevent them
from becoming enemies. After death, they leave their bodies without yet
being winged, but with the desire to become winged. They travel together
in the journey under the heavens, and when they do become winged,
their feathers are alike (moptrouv) because of their love for one another
(256b7e2).57
The philosophical pair and the honor-loving pair have more in common
than is often realized.58 Up to the point at which the beloved comes to
feel a counter-eros, philosophical and honor-loving partners have had the
same experiences: the inspired lovers have tamed their black horses and
captured their beloveds. In so doing, they have acquired erotic skill. One
way in which the honor-lovers differ from the philosophical pair is that they
let their guard down on occasion (span: 256c6). That is, we may infer,
they do not always retain the memory of divine things, to the extent of
their ability, nor use the reminders of these things correctly (249c48), nor
do they pass their lives in philosophizing without guile, and in combining
boy-loving with philosophy (249a15, 256a7b7). That is, the honor-lovers
have not acquired what Socrates later characterizes as the craft-knowledge
of dialectic that allows them to know the truth. They do, however, desire to
become winged (256d4), and will eventually achieve this goal, even though
they cannot do so in this life (256d6e2). In desiring to become winged,
they may be said, like Socrates (278b24, with 278d36), to pray to become
philosophers.
Another difference is that philosophical lovers have greater friendship
than do the honor-lovers because they have greater concord (monohtikn:
256b1). Each partner of this philosophical pair has concord within his own
soul, being self-controlled and orderly (256b12), and lover and beloved
57 The fact that these partners are characterized by love of honor (philotimia) suggests that the white
horse is dominant in them. See Chapter 6 at 6.2.
58 I disagree with Robins view that the honor-lovers share an erotic madness in which philosophy
has no part (1994: cxxv).
have concord with each other, agreeing that this is the best kind of life.
Each member of the honor-loving pair, in contrast, lacks complete inner
concord, and hence these partners occasionally do things that their whole
minds do not agree to. We may thus infer that they also lack complete
concord with one another. Socrates account of the two possible lives
could also be taken to imply that the honor-loving partners have less eros
than do the philosophical partners, for Socrates says that the eros of the
former eventually ceases (256d1: ka xw genomnw). Indeed, the eros of
the philosophical partners need not, like that of the honor-loving partners,
cease when the boys beauty fades. The physical beauty of the boy will
fade, but, as the boy recollects the true beauty he saw in a former life,
his beauty of soul will increase, thus increasing his attractiveness to the
lover. The Socratic eros that all lovers and beloveds have for the true
beauty they once saw contributes to the eros each has for the beautiful
soul of the other. This eros for the soul is likely to be stronger and more
lasting in the philosophical partners than in the honor-lovers. The fact
that Socrates does not explicitly tell us whether or not the philosophical
partners continue to have eros for each other is, however, significant. His
myth about erotic madness ends not with eros, but with friendship, thus
emphasizing, as have all three speeches in the Phaedrus, the importance of
friendship within an erotic relationship. In concluding his second speech
with a discussion of friendship, Socrates also creates an effective link to the
prayer that immediately follows (257a3b6). Here also, Socrates emphasizes
friendship, for he asks dear [phile] Eros to turn Socrates friend, Phaedrus,
to a life that combines philosophical (literally, wisdom-liking) words with
eros.
5.4 socrates and phaedrus

I have argued that Socrates demonstrates his own erotic art in the Phaedrus
by making two speeches that help to persuade Phaedrus to become devoted
to eros together with philosophical words. In persuading Phaedrus, Socrates
helps to establish with his interlocutor a friendly relationship that reflects,
in some respects, the relationship between lover and beloved in Socrates
second speech, who share a mutual eros for true beauty. Similarly, Socrates
and Phaedrus come to share, in the course of the dialogue, a friendship that
is based, in part, on mutual devotion to eros together with philosophical
words.59
59 See Introduction to Part III n.29.
There are many indications that Socrates appeal to Phaedrus is that of a
friend rather than a lover.60 This is apparent from the use made of terms for
friendship throughout the dialogue, and from the absence of indications
of a love relationship between the two men.61 Significantly, the first words
of the dialogue are dear Phaedrus ( W fle Fadre: 227a1), and it ends
with the statement that friends have possessions in common (koin gr t
tn flwn: 279c67). During their conversation, the two friends, Socrates
and Phaedrus, have created the possession they now have in common a
devotion to eros together with philosophical words which they will go on
to share with their respective beloveds, Lysias and Isocrates (279b13).
The last word of the dialogue is Socrates statement: Let us go ( Iwmen:
279c8). Socrates does not merely address Phaedrus as friend (fle), as he
frequently addresses interlocutors in other dialogues.62 He also tells him,
You are most dear (fltatov e: 235e2), calls him dear one ( filthv:
228d6), dear head (flh kefal: 264a8), and says that he likes Phaedrus
very much (g se pnu fil: 228e1). In turn, Phaedrus addresses Socrates
as dear Socrates ( fle Skratev: 259e7, fle: 236b9) and appeals
to Zeus, god of friendship (prv Div filou: 234e2) in addressing him.
That these two are friends rather than lovers is also made clear by the fact
that each has a beloved. According to Socrates, Phaedrus is the erastes
of Lysias (236b5, 257b45, 279b13), while Socrates own boyfriend is
Isocrates (279b12). All of this is evidence against the view of some scholars
that an erotic relationship between Socrates and Phaedrus is alluded to in
the passage, immediately preceding Socrates second speech, in which he
asks for the boy to whom I was speaking, and Phaedrus replies: Here,
beside you (243e48).63
Just as, in Socrates second speech, the friendship of the lover with
erotic skill arouses the beloved so that he becomes devoted to ta erotika
(component (1) of the erotic art), and desires passionately to attain as much
as he can of the true beauty he realizes that he lacks (components (2) and
(3)), so the friendship of Socrates, who has erotic skill, arouses in Phaedrus
the same devotion and desire. Moreover, just as the lover in Socrates speech
60 Gooch 1992 argues cogently that the relationship between Socrates and Phaedrus is predominantely
one of friendship, not love, as Nussbaum claims (1986: esp. 211 and 229). Others who characterize
Socrates and Phaedrus as lover and beloved include Asmis 1986: 159 and 163; Coventry 1990: 1856;
Lebeck 1972: 2803; Rutherford 1995: 245 and 262. Partridge 1999 argues that Socrates begins as
lover and then changes roles.
61 Cf. Gooch 1992: 310.
62 Socrates addresses Phaedrus as fle at 227a1, 229e5, 230c5, 238c5, 243a3, 271b7, 275b5, 276e4, 279a9.
On Socrates use of this term in other dialogues see Chapter 2 n.78.
63 Good arguments against this interpretation of the passage are given by de Vries 1969, on 243e78.
leads the beloved to imitate the god whose nature both share (253b5c2), so
Socrates leads Phaedrus to imitate the god both men are by nature suited to
follow: Zeus, the god of philosophers (250b7, with 252e13) and of friends
(Div filou: 234e2).64 Socrates and Phaedrus strive to imitate this god as
they engage together in philosophical discourse, especially in the second
half of the dialogue. To the extent that they succeed, they become skilled
in searching for beauty and wisdom, and in helping each other to do so
also (components (4) and (5)).
In the first half of the dialogue, Socrates persuades Phaedrus by making
a poetical, mythical speech that appeals to him emotionally as well as intel-
lectually. When he discusses rhetoric in the second half of the dialogue,
Socrates uses instead a more purely rational means of persuasion. There
is still another way in which Socrates persuades Phaedrus to dedicate his
life wholly to eros combined with philosophical words: he enacts the role
of another self (see 228a56, 236c45), that is, a second Phaedrus who
is attracted to shameful, Lysianic words, and who must, in consequence,
undergo purification. Socrates plays this role of another self in his interac-
tions with Phaedrus throughout the first half of the dialogue. He claims that
his first, shameless (243c1) and impious (242d7) speech was really spoken
by Phaedrus, through Socrates mouth (242d11e1). Afterwards, Socrates
gives his second speech, a recantation that serves as a purification for those
who have erred concerning story-telling (mythologia: 243a4) about Eros
(243a2b7). These people who need purification include Phaedrus, Lysias
and Socrates himself, as the speaker of his first, impious speech.65
Socrates role-playing, however, is not merely a pretense, for he, like
Phaedrus, is a lover of words (228b6c2, 236e5), who really has been and
still is tempted by non-philosophical words, especially when he meets a
fellow enthusiast, and who therefore frequently needs to renew the harmony
within his soul.66 He does not, after all, claim to be the philosopher who
has dialectical techne, but only prays to become like such a man (278b2
4). Socrates thus enacts, partly in play and partly seriously, a role that is
not entirely alien to him.
64 I take we at 250b7 (We, following after Zeus) to allude to Socrates, and not to Plato, as Hackforth
suggests (1952: 93 n.2). Socrates includes Isocrates in this category when he says that this man has by
nature . . . a certain philosophia (279a910). When he prays that Phaedrus may be turned entirely
toward philosophy (257b16), Socrates implies that this young man also has a nature suited to
philosophy.
65 Cf. Nichols 2009: 956, who also notes that the historical Phaedrus was exiled on charges of impiety.
66 I disagree with Asmis 1986 and Schenker 2006: 72, who see (mere) role-playing in Socrates madness
and expressions of enthusiasm for Lysias speech.
Socrates role as another Phaedrus is introduced at the beginning of
the dialogue, where both men are represented as lovers of words. When
Socrates meets Phaedrus, the conversation immediately turns to a speech of
Lysias that Phaedrus has heard. Socrates, eager to hear this speech, says he
knows that Phaedrus has not only memorized it, but has also borrowed the
scroll on which it is written. Socrates prefaces these remarks by stating: If
I dont know Phaedrus, I have forgotten myself (228a56), thus referring
to Phaedrus as a second self, with whom Socrates shares a passion for words
(228b67).67 Phaedrus reciprocates this sentiment when he urges Socrates
to make a speech, saying: If I dont know Socrates, I dont know myself
(236c45). Phaedrus love of words is not limited to passive enjoyment, but
is active and creative. According to Socrates, Phaedrus has caused more
words his own and those of others to come into being than almost
anyone else in his time (242a7b5). These words are the children he has
begotten (261a3).68 Within the Phaedrus, he is the cause of both Socrates
first speech (242d11e1) and of his second (242b45). The young mans
fertile eros for words shows itself in comic fashion when he hides the scroll
containing Lysias speech under this cloak. Socrates remarks on this, asking
him, like the Socrates character in Aristophanes Clouds, to show what you
have in your left hand under your cloak.69
Although the two men share eros for words, they love different kinds
of words. Phaedrus, who admires the speeches of Lysias, is said to be
the lover of Lysias (257b15; cf. 236b5, 279b23), while Socrates claims
to be attracted to the words of Isocrates (278e4279b3), whom he calls
his boyfriend (279b2). These two writers are associated in the dialogue
with different kinds of words. Lysias not only lacks technical skill (235a18,
263d5264e3), he also speaks shamelessly (243c1) in making a false and
impious speech (242d7243a2). Lysias therefore does what is shameful and
deserving of reproach (258d45, 277d1e3). On the other hand, Socrates
says that Isocrates is capable of better things because his mind has by nature
67 Noted by Ferrari 1987: 67. On Socrates passion for words see beginning of Introduction to
Part III.
68 On this interpretation of kallpaid te Fadron see de Vries 1969, on 261a3 n.2. In Symp. 177d5
also Phaedrus is called father of the speech. Cf. Symp. 209d13, where the words of Homer and
Hesiod are said to be their offspring.
69 t ra n t rister ceiv p t mat: 228d67. Cf. Aristophanes, Clouds, 7334, where
Socrates asks Strepsiades, who is wrapped up in bed, what he is holding. Strepsiades replies,
Nothing but my penis in my right hand. In Lysistrata 98292 jokes are made about the erection of
the Spartan messenger, which he tries to hide under his clothing, and which he claims is a messenger
stick (skutla: 991, on which see Sommerstein 1990). Svenbro 1988: 2201 discusses some erotic
connotations of the Phaedrus passage.
a certain philosophical impulse (279a3b3).70 Neither Lysias nor Isocrates
has dialectical techne (276e4277a4). Isocrates, however, appears to have a
philosophical nature, and is therefore attractive to Socrates, who is devoted
to philosophical words.
Love of shameful words leads Phaedrus to do shameful things in the
first part of the dialogue. The shameful nature of his love for Lysianic
words is graphically represented by his hiding the scroll under his cloak.
The young mans eros for words is shameful partly because it leads to
threats of violence, as is apparent in his manipulation of Socrates.71 Instead
of examining Lysias speech with Socrates, he attempts to force Socrates
to compete with Lysias.72 Phaedrus first tries bribery (235d8e1), and then
suggests that he will use physical force (236c8d3). Finally, Phaedrus resorts
to threats, saying that if Socrates does not speak, Phaedrus will never again
make a speech in his presence (236e13).
Phaedrus, however, is also susceptible to love for philosophical words, as
evidenced by his favorable reaction to Socrates second speech (257b7c2).
As a result, he is at odds with himself (pamfoterzh: 257b5). In some
respects, then, the relationship between Socrates and Phaedrus resembles
that between Socrates and Alcibiades in the Alcibiades I. In both relation-
ships, Socrates builds on the eros a young man already has in order to lead
him to love the same objects loved by Socrates himself.
At the beginning of the dialogue, Socrates plays the role, that is partly
his own, of someone who, like Phaedrus, is at odds with himself because
he is attracted to two different kinds of words: shameless, Lysianic words,
and philosophical words. He says that he is eager to listen to the Lysias
speech (227d25), and when Phaedrus threatens not to report any more
speeches to him, Socrates says that Phaedrus has found a way to compel
a lover of words to do whatever he orders (236e18). In playing the role
of someone who loves even shameful words, Socrates, like Phaedrus, does
shameful things. He gives a speech of which he is so ashamed that he covers
his head while speaking (237a45). He also threatens not to let Phaedrus go
until he recites Lysias speech (228c69), and he forces the young man to
reveal the scroll hidden beneath his cloak (228d6e2). In fact, this Socrates,
who is lovesick (nosonti: 228b6) for words, resembles the sick (nosonti:
238e4) lover in his own first speech. When he yields to Phaedrus and gives
his first speech, Socrates plays the role of this lover who is ruled, contrary
70 Hackforth (1952: 168) argues convincingly for taking the praise seriously. Others find irony (Robin
1908: 1026, following Raeder 1905: 2748; Rowe 1988, on 278e5ff.), or sarcasm (de Vries 1969 on
279a9).
71 Ferrari 1987: 10312, calls this a manipulative affair. 72 Competition: Coventry 1990: 1934.
to reason, by the desire for pleasure which, according to the definition of
Socrates first speech, is a kind of hybris (238a12). In being a lover of words
(fillog: 236e5), then, Socrates resembles the man ruled by gluttony,
drunkenness or lust (238a1c4) in his first speech, or the untamed hubristic
black horse in his second speech.73
Unlike Phaedrus, however, Socrates is aware of the shameful nature of
the attraction to inferior words that he and Phaedrus both experience, and
he recognizes, moreover, that these words are attractive to him now in large
part because of the influence of Phaedrus. He thus resembles the lover in
his second speech, who has been victorious in the struggle within his soul
(passage B, discussed in Chapter 6 at 6.2), but must undergo a new internal
struggle after capturing the beloved (passage C: 255e4256a6). Socrates fre-
quently calls his own self-awareness to Phaedrus attention. After Phaedrus
reads Lysias speech, Socrates remarks that he was stunned (me kplagnai:
234d1), not by the speech itself, for which he has a very low regard (234e1
235b9, 262e1264e3), but by Phaedrus enthusiasm: I experienced this
because of you, Phaedrus, when I looked at you, for you seemed to me to
glow with delight because of the speech while you were reading it . . . and
following along, I joined in the Corybantic rites [sunebkceusa] together
with your divine self (234d26).74 Phaedrus, whom Socrates calls divine
and marvelous concerning words (242a78), compels Socrates to speak
(237a910, 242d5). Socrates represents himself to Phaedrus as someone
who makes a shameful speech because he is drugged (katafarmakeuqn-
tov: 242e1; cf. frmakon: 230d6).75 However, unlike most people who are
drugged, Socrates appears to be fully aware of the nature of the drug and
how it affects him. He criticizes Lysias speech immediately after hearing it
(234e5235a8), and he says that he is ashamed of his own first speech even
before he makes it (237a45). Socrates further distances himself from this
speech by breaking off in the middle to call attention to its dithyrambic
qualities and to state that he is afraid of being possessed by the Nymphs
(238c9d3). After the speech he says that these Nymphs will lead him to
speak not just dithyrambically, but also enthusiastically if he continues
(241e15). Socrates self-awareness is particularly evident in his statement
that his accustomed sign did not allow him to depart without purify-
ing himself, after having wronged the divine (242b8d2). In these ways,
Socrates shows that he differs from Phaedrus and the lover in the first two
73 Dorter 1971: 283 sees part of the truth when he characterizes Socrates as hubristic.
74 On the ecstatic Corybantic rites see Chapter 6 at 6.4.
75 The poisonous drug to which he is susceptible is not that of physical pleasure, as Ferrari claims
(1987: 112) but the drug of inferior words, combined with the influence of Phaedrus enthusiasm.
speeches in being aware of his own deficiencies. Thus, he has already made
an important step toward overcoming his shameful impulses.
Socrates second speech enacts, partly in play and partly seriously, the
purification needed by the person who is attracted to shameful and impious
words, and who therefore has a soul that is not in harmony with itself. Just
as the lover of beautiful boys must repeatedly tame his black horse in order
to bring his soul into harmony with itself, so the lover of Lysianic words
must undergo purification in order to bring his eros under the control
of reason. Accordingly, in giving his second speech, Socrates demonstrates
how eros for words can be used for philosophical purposes, and he concludes
this speech with a prayer that Phaedrus may devote his life entirely to
eros combined with philosophical words. Socrates also prays on his own
behalf to be forgiven for his first speech, and he dedicates his recantation
speech to Eros (257a3b6). He thus suggests that his second speech was a
purification that has restored harmony and friendship to his own soul. At
the end of the dialogue Socrates makes another prayer, this time to Pan, the
god he resembles, to make him beautiful within, and to create friendship
between his inner and outer qualities (279b8c3).76 Although the sense of
inner and outer is disputed, this prayer also suggests the idea of psychic
harmony.77
In addition to restoring harmony to his own soul, Socrates creates
greater friendship between himself and Phaedrus. Beginning with his sec-
ond speech, he uses persuasion instead of the threats and force he earlier
used (228c69, d6e2) to get Phaedrus to recite or read Lysias speech,
and he shows his friendship by leading Phaedrus in a gentle way to see
the defects of the Lysianic words he loves, without subjecting the young
man to the harsh elenchus. Phaedrus, in turn, shows his agreement with
Socrates, and his new lack of ambivalence, by joining in the older mans
prayers (sunecomai: 257b7, sunecou: 279c6) and remarking that friends
hold their possessions in common (279c67). The Phaedrus, then, ends in
prayer instead of aporia, and, instead of hostility or avoidance, in friend-
ship and cooperation between the interlocutors who share the passionate
devotion to eros together with philosophical words that characterizes the
person who has erotic skill.
Chapter 5 has shown that even though the gentle and friendly side
of Socrates predominates in the Phaedrus, the dialogue contains sugges-
tions that this complex persona has another, more hubristic, aspect that is
76 As Motte 1992: 3223 notes, prayers occur at important moments throughout the dialogue. On the
connections between Socrates and Pan see Chapter 6 at 6.3.
77 Insightful interpretations of this difficult passage are provided by Clay 1979 and Gaiser 1989.
more prominent in the Symposium. In making his first, shameless speech,
Socrates plays the role of the shameless, hubristic lover of Lysianic words.
A second suggestion appears in the middle of Socrates second speech,
when he sketches a little self-portrait in describing the black horse, who
is a companion of hybris, as snub-nosed and short-necked (253e15).
Chapter 6 analyzes this self-portrait within the context of the psychol-
ogy represented throughout Socrates second speech, and especially in the
image of charioteer and horses.
c h a p ter 6
The lovers dance: charioteer and horses
6.1 introduction
Socrates second speech in the Phaedrus contains a powerful image in which
the soul is compared to a winged team and charioteer (246a7). The horses
of the gods souls are good and obedient, while mortals have one horse
that is beautiful, good and white, and one that is ugly, unruly and black.1
The charioteers of the gods drive around the vault of heaven and see divine
sights, and in a previous existence, mortals followed them as initiates in
the rites of the gods. After a time, however, the charioteers of mortals
were unable to control their horses, and in the confusion that followed,
mortal souls lost their wings and fell to earth. According to Socrates, they
can become winged once more and return to the rites of the gods if their
charioteers succeed in the difficult task of controlling their ill-matched
teams while the soul is under the influence of erotic madness.
This myth of charioteer and horses contains a vivid representation of
the way in which a lover, in the process of acquiring erotic art, creates
friendship within his own soul. After becoming aroused and maddened by
the sight of beauty, the lover acquires the first three components of erotic
skill, becoming devoted to ta erotika (component (1)), realizing that he has
lost the beauty, wisdom and other good things he glimpsed in a former life
(component (2)), and passionately desiring to regain as much of these good
things as he can (component (3)). After this, the lover is ready to acquire
skill in searching for beauty and truth (component (4)), together with his
beloved, whom he helps to acquire the erotic art (component (5)). Before
he can engage in this common search, however, the lover must capture
the beloved. The first step in this capture is the creating of harmony
within his own soul, while the second step is the persuasion of the beloved
1 Commentators correctly note that Socrates does not explicitly state that the gods souls have two
horses: Finamore 2005: 48; Hackforth 1952: 69 n.3, followed by de Vries 1969, on 246a7; Rowe 1988,
on 246a67.
247
to enter into an erotic relationship. The lovers struggle to create agreement
among the three elements within his soul charioteer and two horses is
the subject of Phaedrus 253c7255a1 (hereafter, passage B).2
Socrates image has been the subject of much controversy, especially con-
cerning the role of the black horse. According to some scholars, this horse
represents an ineradicable evil in the soul, the cause of the original fall from
the heavens to earth, and an impediment to the souls return to the gods.3
However, this interpretation fails to account for the fact that it is always the
black horse who initiates movement (254a56, 254d47: see below, 6.2).
Other scholars attribute some good qualities to the black horse, but do not
give a sufficiently clear and detailed analysis of the nature of these qualities
and their functioning within the soul.4 Martha Nussbaum, for example,
argues that the black horse represents the independent motivational and
cognitive role of emotion and appetite: The role of emotion and appetite
as guides is motivational: they move the whole person towards the good.
But it is also cognitive: for they give the whole person information as to
where goodness and beauty are, searching out and selecting, themselves,
the beautiful objects.5 However, it should be noted that information about
beauty does not come from the horses but from the charioteer, who first
sees the beloved object on earth (253e5), and who alone is reminded by it
of the beauty he has previously seen in the heavens (254b57).6 Moreover,
the black horse does not move the soul towards the good. His desire,
before being tamed, is for physical pleasure (254a57, d56), and he has no
conception of any good apart from this. The most illuminating analysis of
this difficult passage is given by John Ferrari, who argues that the chario-
teers task is not to repress or eradicate the desires represented by the black
horse, but rather to learn from them and to integrate the whole soul by
allowing these desires to find their proper place within it.7
I build on Ferraris interpretation to argue that two aspects of Socrates
second speech the imagery of the dance and the satyr-like character-
istics given to the black horse can help to elucidate both the kind of
integration of the soul toward which the charioteer strives, and the roles
of the two horses in this process. When Socrates describes the black horse as
2 The arousal of the lover is discussed in Chapter 5 at 5.3.1; his relationship with the beloved in 5.3.2,
on 252c3253c6 (passage A) and 255a1256e2 (passage C).
3 For example, Hackforth 1952: 1078; Lebeck 1972: 2778; McGibbon 1964: 601; Robinson 1970:
117, 122; Rowe 1990: 234, 241 and 2009: 146; White 1993: 1045, 1601.
4 See Bluck 1958: 1578; Burger 1980: 656; Griswold 1986: 121, 136; Stoeber 1992: 277; Thompson
1868: 73.
5 Nussbaum 1986: 215. 6 Rowe 1990: 2367, makes similar objections to Nussbaums views.
7 Ferrari 1987: 185203, esp. 194. On integration, cf. Griswold 1986: 135.
The lovers dance: charioteer and horses 249
having a number of satyr-like characteristics (253e14), he does not merely
characterize it as bestial and ugly, but also suggests that it shares in the
daimonic qualities of satyrs. This horse is not purely evil, but resembles a
satyr in being a mixture of the bestial and the divine, with an important
role in helping the soul return to the rites of the gods. My interpretation
is supported by the fact that the satyr-like black horse has characteristics
of Socrates himself, for example, a snub nose and short neck (253e15). In
portraying the black horse as a caricature of himself, Socrates uses poetic
language to create a playful self-portrait that appeals emotionally to Phae-
drus, while also conveying important information about his own daimonic
art. In this self-portrait, Socrates represents himself as a man who, like the
lover in his myth, has the erotic skill that includes a recognition of his
own deficiencies. Like this lover, Socrates has a black horse, and therefore
needs to repeat the struggle again and again in order to tame the unruly
aspects of his own soul, for example, his love for Lysianic words. Finally,
in portraying himself as a satyr-like black horse, Socrates calls attention to
the daimonic, satyr-like characteristics that are essential to component (5)
of the erotic art that includes the ability to lead others to recognize their
own deficiencies.
The dance imagery in Socrates second speech also supports the view that
the black horse plays a positive role within the soul. When he characterizes
the rites of the gods as initiatory dances (qeou coro: 247a7, teletn:
250a8), Socrates suggests that the task of the charioteer is to guide both
horses in the orderly movements of a dance inspired by the gods. In so
doing, the charioteer produces in the soul an equilibrium between the
opposing tendencies of restraint, represented by the white horse, and bold
movement, represented by the black horse. Each of these tendencies is
harmful when excessive and lacking proper guidance, but necessary and
useful to the soul when properly trained and balanced by the opposing
extreme. The story in passage B of how the charioteer learns to guide the
two horses so that they move in orderly fashion represents the psychic
education, mediated by eros, of the entire soul. This education is character-
ized as an initiation that produces within the soul a rhythm and harmony
derived from the gods.8 Similar concepts of psychic equilibrium appear
throughout Platos dialogues and are explained in especially helpful detail
in the account, given in the Laws, of education by means of the dance.
In learning to dance, then, the lover maddened by eros acquires erotic
8 For the Neoplatonic view that that the horses represent movement, irregular in itself, that can be
regulated by intellect so as to become movement around a center, see Robin 1908: 1634.
skill that he uses to control the disparate elements in his own soul. After
creating harmony within his own soul in this way, he becomes able to help
his beloved to attain psychic equilibrium also.
I first analyze the psychology expressed in allegorical form in the myth
of the charioteer and horses in Socrates second speech (6.2). Next, I
discuss the satyr-like characteristics of the black horse (6.3), and examine
the imagery of the dance in the Phaedrus, arguing that it is based on
psychological principles similar to those explained in more detail in the
Laws (6.4).
6.2 charioteer and horses (passage b: 253c7255a1)

Even before passage B, Socrates characterizes all three elements in the souls
of humans as having a combination of good and evil qualities. When
he introduces the image of the charioteer and horses, Socrates says that
the soul is a compound of three different capacities (sumft dunmei:
246a67), represented respectively by the charioteer and the two horses.
Socrates does not explain what these capacities are, nor does he give many
details about how they differ from one another until passage B. Before
passage B, however, he characterizes the entire mortal soul as a mixture of
good and evil, in which all three capacities have a divine, winged element,
and all three are to blame for the loss of this element and for the evil that
subsequently fills the entire soul. Of all bodily things, Socrates says, the
wing is that which most shares in what is divine: that is, what is beautiful,
wise and good (246d6e1). Now the entire mortal soul was once winged
(251b7), and after it has lost its wings and fallen to earth (248c8), eros causes
feathers to grow again under the whole form of the soul (251b67), that
is, under every part of it. Socrates statements imply that all three capacities
of the soul, including that represented by the black horse, originally shared,
and are capable of coming to share again, in the divine qualities beauty,
wisdom and the good associated with the wing. All mortal souls, Socrates
says, are also deficient (psai . . . telev: 248b4), and in all of them the
differences between the two horses makes driving difficult (246b14). In
even the best soul, the charioteer has difficulty seeing the things that are,
because he is disturbed by both of the horses (248a15).9 The fall, therefore,
is also caused by the bad driving of the charioteers (248b2), who are not
sufficiently competent to control the horses. The soul falls when these
defects in horses and drivers are combined with some misfortune that
9 The plural at 248a46 is noted by Price 1989: 83 and 1995: 779.
weighs the soul down with forgetfulness, fills it with evil, and causes it to
lose its wings (248c58).
When Socrates returns to the image of the charioteer and horses in
passage B, each of the three capacities in the soul continues to be repre-
sented as having both positive and negative characteristics. The charioteer
is, at first, unable to drive the horses so that they pull the chariot toward
the beloved in orderly fashion. Instead of providing proper guidance, he
sometimes yields to the black horse (254b3), and at other times punishes it
severely (254d7e5). Indeed, the charioteer, as Ferrari has shown, not only
uses the violence of whip and goad (253e4, 254a34) on the horses, he is
also characterized in equine terms, as feeling the goad of desire (254a1) and
rearing back (254b8) like a horse.10 Moreover, although the charioteer has
the ability to remember the beauty seen in a previous existence (254b5
7), he cannot, without the help of the horses, approach the object that
reminds him of it.11 The horses were previously said to represent capacities
in the soul that are opposed to each other (246b3), and the black horse
was simply characterized as opposite to the white horse, who was said to
be beautiful and good (246b23). Socrates now provides a more detailed
characterization. Before being tamed, the black horse is licentious (liter-
ally, unpunished, klastov: 255e5) and a companion of hybris (253e3),
having a tendency to move forward and cry out without order. He pulls
the chariot toward the beloved (254a46, 254d47), leaping (254a4) and
neighing (254d4). Even before being tamed, however, as Ferrari points out,
the black horse uses and is amenable to reason, and is capable of coming to
an agreement with the white horse and charioteer (mologsante: 254b3,
mologan: 254d1, sunechrsen: 254d2).12 Moreover, his tendencies to
leap about have positive aspects, for it is always the black horse who pulls
the chariot toward the beloved, allowing the soul to approach beauty.13
The black horse is said to be licentious, not because he is ineradicably
vicious, but because his shameless tendencies are unpunished, like those
of a child. The punishment he receives is severe and bloody, but a necessary
part of his education.14
10 Ferrari 1987: 18690. 11 Cf. Dorter 2006: 265 and Nichols 2009: 11415.
12 Ferrari 1987: 1869. See also Nichols 2009: 11415 and Nightingale 1995: 1423.
13 Noted by Ferrari 1987: 192; Burger 1980: 656; and Stoeber 1992: 277. Rowe 1990: 241 objects that
it is the wings, not the horses, that carry the chariot forward and that the black horse contributes
nothing but trouble. This interpretation does not take into account the clear indications in passage
B that the black horse initiates movement: see further below.
14 Punishment is described, for example, at 254e25. The charioteer presumably uses a bit hardened
by spikes or wheels: Xen. On Horsemanship 10.611; Vigneron 1968, vol. i: 6276; and Delebecque
1950: 1737. According to Pl. Grg., akolasia, the state of being unpunished, is the greatest of evils
The white horse also has a mixture of positive and negative qualities
throughout Socrates second speech. He is said to be noble and good at
246b23, and at 253d6e1 he is characterized in apparently positive terms,
as obedient and as a lover of honor together with sophrosyne and aidos
(moderation and reverence). There are, however, clear indications that he
also has significant defects, including, in particular, a tendency toward
excessive love of honor (timv rastv: 253d6) when he is not properly
trained. In even the best souls, both horses cause trouble to the driver
before the fall.15 The most inferior souls, those that cannot raise themselves
at all, act like animals, trampling and running into one another (248a8),
and they are also characterized as engaging in activities associated with
excessive love of honor: wanting to be first, and engaging in competition
and struggle (248a8b2). Love of honor is certainly better than hybris, but
it is significant that Socrates second speech attributes it to the second-
best partners, those who are more vulgar, less philosophical and more
honor-loving (filotm d crswntai: 256c1) than are the philosophical
pair.16 The white horse, moreover, has the hubristic desire to leap upon
the beloved, but he restrains this desire by force (biazmenov: 254a13)
rather than reason. Another potentially negative characteristic of the white
horse is a tendency toward restraint that can, when excessive, prevent the
movement that is necessary for the dance.17 Indeed, the white horse holds
himself back (254a23), pulls against the black horse (254a7), and only
moves forward when compelled by the black horse (254a5, 254d5). The fact
that the white horse, as well as the black, has defects means that the driver
must work to control both horses and not only the black.18
This characterization of all three capacities as mixtures of good and evil
suggests that the image of charioteer and horses is based on a more holistic
(477e), and just punishment is beneficial (476a477a, 505b, 507de). On this idea, in Grg. and other
dialogues, see Mackenzie 1981: esp. 179206.
15 See above n.9.
16 The connection between the honor-loving pair and the white horse is noted by Nichols 2009: 119.
On the honor-lovers see Chapter 5 at 5.3.2, stage (7) of passage C, at 256a7e2. In the Republic
also, honor-lovers are said to be less than fully virtuous. They are educated by force rather than
persuasion and philosophy, take pleasures in secret (8.548b4c2), love honor, victory and war, are
obedient to rulers (548d8549b7), and are influenced by both reason and desire (550b13). Rowe
1988: 189, on 256b7e2 notes the connection between the second-best partners and the honor-lover
of the Republic. Sheffield 2001: 10 and 2006a: 913 observes that the lovers in the Lesser Mysteries
passage in Platos Symposium (208c3) are also honor-lovers. On the connection between love of
honor and injustice in Platos dialogues see Pakaluk 2004: 111.
17 As Statesman 310d10e3 makes clear, there can be too much aidos in the soul.
18 The charioteer and white horse are not one in purpose and function (Hackforth 1952: 107) nor is
the white horse a mere foil to the other two, who learns nothing from his experience (Ferrari 1987:
192 and 194).
view of the soul than are passages in other dialogues in the Phaedo, for
example.19 All three capacities, and not only a rational part of the soul,
are given an essential and positive role in striving toward the good and
the beautiful, and each capacity is represented as having certain defects.
Although the three capacities have some similarity to the three parts of the
soul in Republic 4 reason, appetite and spirit it is debatable to what
extent they should be equated with these parts, and I prefer to characterize
them differently.20 The charioteer represents a guiding principle in the
soul, with desires of its own. The black horse represents an impulse to
move in bold and disorderly fashion toward erotic objects, while the white
horse represents the impulse to stand still and to resist these objects. Both
horses are able to use and to follow reason, and are therefore capable of
being trained by the charioteer, who must also train himself to guide the
horses without imposing excessive restraint or yielding to the impulse to
move forward without any restraint. In this image, all three capacities of
the human soul have divine, winged qualities, and all three also have bestial
characteristics. The black horse, then, is not innately evil, but can be a force
for good if he is properly trained. Without the guidance of the charioteer,
the black horse moves in shameless and disorderly fashion, bending his
head, stretching out his tail, taking the bit in his teeth, and dragging the
chariot shamelessly forward in pursuit of an erotic object (254d67). After
he is tamed, however, the black horse helps to move the chariot toward the
beloved in an orderly way, that is, with reverence and fear (adoumnhn te
ka dediuan: 254e9).
In Socrates narrative of the struggle in the soul (passage B), eros sets the
chariot in motion by activating all three capacities of the soul. Under the
influence of eros, the black horse at first moves in disorderly fashion toward
the object of desire, unrestrained by fear or the law (254a3b1), while the
white horse forcibly restrains himself from leaping upon the object of desire
(254a13). The charioteer, seeing the beloved, remembers true beauty, and
experiences fear and reverence (254b58). As a result of the charioteers
vision, the soul becomes aroused, acquiring divine erotic madness and
enthusiasm (249d4e4: see Chapter 5 at 5.3.1). The lover then attempts
(passage A, discussed in Chapter 5 at 5.3.2) to rejoin the gods, by imitating
19 On Phd. 64c69e, where the body and its desires are said to hinder the soul from attaining wisdom
and virtue, see Introduction at I.5.
20 It has often been claimed that the charioteer and horses correspond to the three parts of the soul in
Resp. 4. See, for example, Dorter 2006: 264 and n.10; Finamore 2005; Hackforth 1952: 72; Robin
1994: cxxxix; Rowe 1988, on 246b13; Thompson 1868: 45. Ferrari 1987: 185203 and White 1993:
8993 argue against too exact a correspondence.
the god he used to follow in the dance (252d1), and by helping the beloved
to follow the rhythm of the same dance (253b57). In order to succeed in
these endeavors, the charioteer, guided by the rhythm and harmony of the
god he imitates, must temper, with the restraint of the white horse, the
tendency of the black horse to make disordered movements. If he does so,
the whole soul will follow the beloved with fear and aidos (254e8255a1).21
This state of soul is one of equilibrium, in which the impulse to move in
disorderly fashion is opposed by an impulse toward restraint.
My interpretation of the psychology upon which the myth of the char-
ioteer and horses is based finds support in the fact that similar ideas are
expressed in other dialogues as well. As noted in Chapter 3 at 3.2.4, the
physician Eryximachus in the Symposium supports his misguided medical
views by misquoting and misinterpreting a passage in Heraclitus that in
fact attributes harmony to the balance of opposites. Psychic equilibrium of
this kind is described in more detail in the Republic. According to Republic
3.410b10412a7, a correct mixture of music with gymnastics in educa-
tion softens the spirited part of our nature and hardens the philosophical
nature in order to produce a soul that is both moderate and courageous
(410e10411a1). The Statesman also stresses the need for correct education
of different dispositions so as to counteract any tendencies toward harm-
ful extremes. If the courageous soul receives a good education, it is made
gentle; if not, it inclines toward the bestial nature. Good education makes
the orderly nature moderate and wise, but lack of education renders it
simple-minded (309d10e8). According to the Statesman, the right kinds
of marriages also help to produce a correct mixture in the dispositions of
children. Over many generations, intermarriage among people who have
dispositions that are courageous, without any admixture of the moderate
nature, produces madness. On the other hand, the race that is too filled
with aidos becomes dull and is crippled (310d6e3). Similar views about
marriage are expressed in Laws 6. In a well-ordered state, people who are
too eager and hasty should marry those who are slower (773a7c8). This
mixture of different dispositions is compared to the krasis (mixture) of
wine with water: a city should be mixed like a wine bowl, in which mad
wine boils when poured in, but when it is punished by another sober god
[sc. water] and joins in a good combination, makes a fine and measured
drink (773c8d4). As I will show in 6.4, the idea of psychic equilibrium
is especially prominent in Platos Laws.22
21 Price 1995: 789, incorrectly attributes the fear to the black horse and the reverence to the white
horse. Socrates point is that all three capacities in the soul learn to experience these emotions.
22 Similar ideas about psychic equilibrium are expressed in Laws 5.731b3d5 and in the passages cited
by des Places 1951, on Laws 5.728e: Resp. 6.503cd, Tht. 144ab, Sts. 306c308b, Epin. 989bc.
The preceding analysis makes it easier to understand what happens in
the different stages of the process by means of which the lovers soul is said,
in passage B, to achieve equilibrium.
(1) The process begins when the charioteer sees the beloved and causes a
sensation of heat to suffuse the entire soul, which is filled with tickling and
desire (253e5254a1).23 Although the stimulus comes first to the charioteer,
this passage implies that all three parts of the soul have the same emotional
response, characterized earlier as a boiling and tickling (251c45), resulting
from the growth of the feathers, which affects the entire soul (251b67).
(2) The three parts of the soul react differently in response to the same
emotional stimulus. The white horse compelled then and always by aidos,
restrains himself from leaping upon the beloved (254a13). The black
horse, however, is himself carried away by force and in turn compels
(254a5, b1) the white horse and the charioteer to approach the beloved and
to mention the pleasures of sex (254a37). They at first resist (254a7b1).
Finally, however, the white horse and charioteer yield and agree to do what
the black horse orders, and they approach the beloved (254b14).
(3) When forced to draw near to the beloved, the charioteer sees his
beauty and remembers the true beauty he saw in a previous existence
(254b47). That is, he once again has the experience that was said earlier
(249d4e4) to be the madness and enthusiasm of the lover, who, seeing
beauty here, is reminded of beauty in the heavens. As a result of this vision,
the charioteer experiences reverence and fear (254b78).24
(4) Approach is followed by retreat. The charioteer is now compelled by
his reverence and fear to pull back strongly on the reins, so that both horses
sit back on their haunches. The white horse obeys willingly and without
resisting; the black horse obeys, but much against his will. The two horses
then retreat (254b8c4).
(5) The two horses react differently after the retreat. The white horse
experiences shame and terror, and it waters the whole soul with sweat
(254c45). This horse experiences not aidos, the good kind of shame that
restrains him from leaping upon the beloved, but aischyne, shame at having
done wrong in yielding to the black horse.25 When the black horse recovers
from the pain caused by the bit and the fall backwards, he becomes angry
and abusive, and tries, without success, to force the others to approach the
beloved again. Finally, the black horse grudgingly agrees with the others to
23 My translation of 253e56 (causes . . . soul) follows Hackforth 1952: 103 n.3, and de Vries 1969, on
253e6.
24 An excellent account of the charioteers vision of the beautiful boy and subsequent experiences is
provided by Nightingale 2004: 1608.
25 Noted by de Vries 1969: 16970 and Price 1995: 789.
postpone a second approach (254c5d2). This stage of the conflict ends in
a temporary truce.
(6) The whole process of approach and retreat is repeated a second
time (254d2e5) and many times (pollkiv: 254e6) thereafter. The black
horse again compels the others to approach, pulling shamelessly toward
the beloved, and the charioteer again pulls back on the reins. On these
subsequent occasions, however, the charioteers experience of reverence
and fear before the vision of beauty is more powerful (ti mllon: 254e1),
and he pulls more strongly on the reins of the hubristic horse (ti mllon:
254e2). The white horse is not mentioned.
(7) At last the black horse is tamed (tapeinwqev). He ceases from hybris
and obeys the charioteer, feeling extreme fear at the sight of the beloved
(254e68).
(8) At the end of the process, the whole soul of the lover follows the
beloved with aidos and fear (254e8255a1). This process results not only
in the taming of the black horse, but also in a permanent or at least
semi-permanent agreement of all three parts of the soul. The charioteer
is in command and the two horses obey willingly. The whole soul now
experiences both the aidos that was at first a characteristic of the white horse
alone, and the fear (254e9) that the charioteer originally experienced when
he was reminded of true beauty by the sight of the beloved (254b7), and
that the black horse experienced while being tamed (254e8). The motion
toward the beloved that the black horse once forced upon the others has
now been imparted to the whole soul so that it follows the beloved in
orderly fashion. In this way, the lover, having transformed disorder into
order in his soul, creates inner friendship and begins to follow his god.
In creating his story of the horses and charioteer, Socrates exhibits his
erotic skill in two important ways. First, as just discussed, he creates a myth
about a lover who, in the process of acquiring erotic skill, creates harmony
within his own soul. Second, Socrates uses poetic language in order to
persuade Phaedrus to dedicate his life to eros together with philosophi-
cal words (257a46, b46). Because the addressee is Phaedrus, a lover of
speeches who responds to them with the enthusiasm of the Corybantes or
the Bacchantes (228b6c2, 234d16), Socrates uses the emotionally charged
language of poetry to appeal to him (257a56).26 Socrates myth also has
emotional appeal because it tells a story in which the personification of the
parts of the soul and conflict among them provide dramatic interest. In the
26 Rowe 1988, on 257a56 notes that poetry is the language of emotion, citing Resp. 603bff. and Arist.
Rh. 1408b10ff. Cf. Yunis 2005: 112.
rest of this chapter I analyze two important aspects of the poetic imagery in
Socrates myth: that of horses and satyrs (6.3), and that of the dance (6.4).
6.3 horses, satyrs and socrates

The horse is an erotic symbol in Greek literature, representing both lover
and beloved. For example, in a poem of Ibycus, paraphrased in Platos
Parmenides, the lover compares himself to an aged race horse forced to
compete against his will.27 Greek literature, as Jacqueline de Romilly has
shown, also contains many images of a combat between charioteer and
horses.28 She calls attention to some striking verbal parallels between the
description of the runaway horses that cause their masters death in Euripi-
des Hippolytus and the story of the struggle in the soul of the Phaedrus.29
My account below elaborates on her ideas.
In Euripides play, Hippolytus refuses to honor Aphrodite, who pun-
ishes him by causing Phaedra, Hippolytus stepmother, to fall in love with
him. When Hippolytus discovers that she loves him and reacts with horror,
Phaedra kills herself after writing a letter to Theseus accusing his son of
rape. Theseus exiles Hippolytus, calling on his father Poseidon to punish
the supposed adulterer. Poseidon does this in a particularly appropriate
way. Hippolytus, whose name means one who unbinds, or unharnesses,
horses,30 and who is devoted to horses (Phaedra calls him the son of
the horse-loving Amazon, filppou . . . Ipplutov: 58184), is killed by
these same horses. As Hippolytus drives a chariot on his way to exile,
Poseidon sends a bull from the sea (121348). This bull strikes terrible
fear (deinv . . . fbov: 1218) into the horses, maddening with fear the
four-horse chariot (fb ttrwron kmanwn con: 1229). Hippolytus
grasps the reins with his hands and pulls them as a sailor pulls an oar, let-
ting his body hang backwards on the reins [lkei . . . msin v topisqen
rtsav dmav]. But the horses, biting . . . onto the bits [ndakosai
27 Ibycus frag. 287 (Page 1962), paraphrased in Plato, Prm. 136e137a. The beloved is compared to a
horse in Theognis 124952 and 126770, and in Anacreon frags. 360 and 417. An excellent, recent
survey of Platos use of images of horses drawn from lyric poetry (including the passages just cited)
is that of Pender 2007: 207, who also discusses earlier studies. Young girls about to be married are
often compared to horses that need to be tamed: Calame 1997: 23844; OBrien 1993: 1848; and
Seaford 1988a.
28 Romilly 1982: 10812, citing Hom. Il. 23, Soph. El. 680763, Aes. Cho. 1021ff., and Isocrates, To
Demonicus 32.
29 Romilly 1982, who notes (109) the following verbal parallels in Hipp: lkei (1221), iv topisqen
(1222), ndakosai stmia (1223), b frousin (1224).
30 On Hippolytus name see Burkert 1979: 11213.
stmia] forged in fire, carry him away by force [b frousin] (1220
4). The horses pay no attention to their master, but race on until the bull
brings down and overturns (sfhle knecatisen: 1232) the chariot. At this
point everything is confounded together (1234) and the man is dragged
by the reins, breaking his flesh (qrawn te srkav: 1239), although
he calls out to the horses, who were reared in his stables, not to destroy
him.
The story of the struggle in the lovers soul in the Phaedrus also rep-
resents a driver trying to control unruly horses. The black horse, under
the influence of eros, is carried away by force (b fretai: 254a4) and
approaches the beloved. The charioteer is afraid (deise: 254b7) and falls
backwards (npesen pta: 254b8), being compelled to pull back on the
reins (ev topsw lksai tv nav: 254b8c1) so strongly that the horses
sit back on their haunches. After an interval, the black horse once again
bites the bit (ndakn tn calinn: 254d7), and the charioteer once again
falls back (napesn) and pulls the bit by force from the horses teeth
(254e13). At last the driver controls the black horse, who dies with fear
(fb dillutai: 254e8) whenever he sees the beloved. The verbal echoes
and the striking image of the charioteer bending backwards as he pulls the
horses down to the ground with the reins strongly suggest that Plato had
Euripides passage in mind when he wrote the Phaedrus.31 He has, however,
modified it for his own purposes. The god-sent madness that causes the
trouble is not destructive, as it is in the tragedy, but beneficial. Fear, in
the myth recounted by Socrates, is not felt by the horses in response to the
vision of a monster, but is induced in them after first being experienced by
the charioteer (254b7) when he remembers true beauty. (See above 6.2 for
the stages in this process). Most important, as de Romilly notes, the char-
ioteer gains control of the horses rather than being destroyed by them.32
There is indeed a crash, when the horses of many souls trample and run
into each other, and the charioteers drive badly (248a6b3). All of this
causes many souls to have their wings broken (pter qraontai: 248b3,
cf. qrawn te srkav: Hipp. 1239), and eventually all souls fall to earth
(248c68). In Socrates myth, however, the charioteer is able to recover
from the fall, under the influence of eros. The charioteer does just what
Hippolytus does, bending backward to pull on the reins but he, unlike
Hippolytus, gains control of his horses. Socrates story of the struggle in
31 Romilly 1982: 106 notes that the gesture of bending backwards while pulling on the reins also occurs
in Xenophon, The Cavalry Commander 3.14 [ptouv napeptwktav lanein], but that the
gesture in Phdr. of pulling the horses to the ground is without parallel.
32 Romilly 1982: 11213.
the soul, then, uses the language and imagery of poetry and alludes to
poetic precedents, but it describes a process in which eros is not destructive
but controlled by reason.33
Socrates myth contains allusions to comic, as well as tragic, precedents.
The description of the growth of the lovers feathers (251b1d7) and the pun-
ning etymology Eros/Pteros (Love/Winged One: 252b89) are humorous.34
Moreover, the explicit sexual imagery resembles the obscenity of Old Com-
edy, while the description of the relationship between lover and beloved
(255a1256e2), which emphasizes interpersonal love, has a romantic inter-
est like that of New Comedy. Still another comic element is provided by
the outlandish figure of the black horse. Scholars have not noticed, as
far as I know, that the black horse resembles a satyr or silenus, a hybrid
creature with human form and horses tail, ears and sometimes hooves.35
This allusion is apparent from Socrates description: The other [horse]
is crooked, big, with limbs put together at random, strong-necked, short-
necked, snub-nosed, black, with gray and bloodshot eyes, companion of
hybris and boastfulness, shaggy around the ears, deaf, barely yielding to the
whip together with the goad (253e15). Descriptions of satyrs are rare in
extant literature, but images abound in the visual arts.36 They are typically
represented as big, misshapen creatures, with snub noses, high foreheads,
shaggy hair, thick, short necks, large eyes, and large, erect phalluses.37 The
black horse not only looks but also acts like a satyr, being characterized by
hybris and lack of restraint, especially in sexual matters, and in failing to
achieve his sexual goals.38 Just as satyrs are usually represented in motion,
so the black horse leaps about and pulls the chariot forward.39 The chariot
pulled by the satyr-like black horse also has parallels in vase-paintings, a
number of which represent two satyrs harnessed to chariots.40 Of particular
33 Cf. Pender 2007: 4654. Insightful comments on the compatibility of rationality and eros in Phdr.
are also provided by Nehamas and Woodruff 1995: xxxxvi.
34 On the winged phallus see Chapter 5 at 5.3.1 and n.31. That Socrates speech has comic aspects is
noted by Coventry 1990: 1878; Rowe 1988: 810; and on 251c5 and 252b24; Rutherford 1995: 265.
35 On the satyr/silenus see Brommer 1937; Lissarrague 1990a and 1993; Kuhnert 1992; Seaford 1988b.
Because little distinction is made between satyr and silenus at this period (Seaford 1988b: 6), I use
the term satyr generically, to refer to horse-human hybrids. On satyrs see also Chapter 4 at 4.2
and 4.6.
36 Kuhnert 1992: 4445 and Belfiore 2006: fig.1.
37 That horse-ears, high foreheads and snub noses were sufficient to designate a satyr is apparent from
the fact that the Pronomos vase (ARV2 1336) represents these features on the masks worn by actors
in a satyr play. See Lissarrague 1990a: 2289.
38 Hybris: Phdr. 253e3, 254c3, 254e2, e6; failure to achieve sexual goals: 254b8c3, 254e25. On satyrs
lack of restraint and frustration in sexual matters see Lissarrague 1993: 214 and Seaford 1988b: 389.
39 Black horse: Phdr. 254a36, 254d67; satyrs in motion: Lissarrague 1993: 212.
40 Satyr chariots: Lissarrague 1987: 115 and Carpenter 1997: 258, with illustration, plate 6B. See Belfiore
2006: fig. 2.
interest is a cup discussed by Thomas Carpenter which represents, on the
inside, Zeus mounting a chariot, while a chariot pulled by satyrs is depicted
on the outside. According to Carpenter, this satyr-chariot is a parody of
the gods chariot represented on the inside of the same cup.41 Similarly, in
the Phaedrus, the chariot with the satyr-like horse can be seen as a comic
counterpart of the winged chariots of the gods (246e247e).
Satyrs are not merely comic hybrids of human and animal, however:
they also, like the daimones in Platos Symposium, have a status intermedi-
ate between mortals and gods.42 The idea that satyrs are superior to humans
is illustrated by the story of Midas capture of a satyr in order to acquire
his more than human wisdom.43 Yet, satyrs are not fully equal to the gods.
They accompany Dionysus as subordinates rather than equals,44 and are
frequently separated from him. In the only extant satyr play, Euripides
Cyclops, the chorus of satyrs, after being captured, separated from their god
and made to serve a harsh master, are liberated and reunited with Dionysus.
This theme of captivity, servitude and temporary separation from Diony-
sus, followed by liberation, was characteristic of satyr plays.45 In another
story illustrating the ambiguous status of satyrs, the satyr Marsyas, to whom
Socrates is compared in the Symposium, challenges Apollo to an aulos con-
test, something no mortal would dare to do, and is punished in a way no
god could be, by being flayed.46 Like the daimones in the Symposium, satyrs
mediate between humans and gods.47 One important way in which they
do so, as Richard Seaford has shown, is through their role in initiation.48
Seaford cites Laws 815c, where Plato discusses Bacchic dances and the like,
which (the dancers allege) are an imitation of drunken persons they call
Nymphs and Pans and Sileni and Satyrs, and which are performed during
purifications and initiations [teletv tinav potelontwn].49 Although
other literary evidence is relatively late, support for an association of satyrs
with initiation prior to Plato is provided by representations on black-figure
vases of satyrs in ritual contexts.50
41 Carpenter 1997: 256 with plates 4A and 4B. See Belfiore 2006: figs. 3A and 3B.
42 Seaford 1988b: 32 and 197, on Eur. Cyc. 495502. In Symp. the daimonion is a being between god
and mortal (202d13e1). On satyrs as daimones see Chapter 4 at 4.6.
43 Seaford 1988b: 7, citing Herod. 8.138 and Arist. frag. 44 Rose. On this story and satyric imagery in
Symp. see Usher 2002.
44 Lissarrague 1993: 214. 45 Seaford 1988b: 336 and Ussher 1977: 2914.
46 On the flaying of Marsyas see Chapter 4 at 4.2 with nn. 1314.
47 In Symp. 202e203a the daimonion is said to make possible many kinds of interactions between gods
and mortals, including prophecy and initiation (teletv: 202e8).
48 Seaford 1976 and 1988b: 89.
49 Laws 815c25, cited by Seaford 1988b: 8; trans.: Saunders 1970, adapted. The text presents major
difficulties but the general sense is clear.
50 Hedreen 1992: 16870.
The association of the satyr with initiation rites makes the image of the
satyr-like black horse especially appropriate in the myth of charioteer and
horses in the Phaedrus. In narrating the way in which the soul-chariots of
mortals attempt to return to the choruses of the gods in which they danced
as initiates (250b6c1) before falling to earth and becoming deficient,
or uninitiated (ateleis: 248b4), Socrates recounts a story similar to the
motif in satyr plays of separation from Dionysus followed by reunion.
He also makes extensive use of terminology used in connection with the
Mystery rites celebrated in Eleusis and elsewhere.51 The combination of
Mystery and satyric imagery in Socrates myth of charioteer and horses
supports the view that the black horse, who resembles a satyr physically,
and who acts like a lustful satyr, also has the daimonic characteristics of a
satyr. This horse is ugly and bestial like a satyr, but he also has the divine,
winged element shared by all three capacities of the soul. Moreover, it is his
impulse to move toward erotic objects that forces (nagkzei: 254a5; cf.
b1) the charioteer to approach near enough to the beloved to be reminded
of divine beauty seated on the throne together with moderation (254b37).
Like a satyr, then, the black horse mediates between the human and the
divine.
Not only is the black horse satyr-like, he also resembles Socrates.52 As
noted above, satyrs are big, misshapen creatures, with snub noses, high
foreheads, shaggy hair, thick, short necks, large eyes, and large, erect phal-
luses. Except for this last feature, they look like visual representations
of Socrates. Paul Zanker, comparing a bust of Socrates and an image of
a satyr on a coin, writes that portraits of Socrates all follow the basic
analogy with Silenus iconography, especially in the flat, strangely con-
stricted face, the very broad, short, and deep-set nose, the high-set ears and
bald head, and the long hair descending from the temples over the ears
and the nape of the neck.53 In these images, Socrates appears big-bellied
and ungainly, with a short, thick neck, a snub nose, and long hair falling
about his ears.54 Similarly, the black horse is big (polv) and ungainly
(skoliv, ek sumpeforhmnov), with a strong and short neck (kra-
terachn, bracutrchlov); he has a snub nose (simoprswpov), and
51 Mystery terminology occurs at Phdr. 250b6c4, quoted below 6.4, and throughout Socrates second
speech: see Riedweg 1987: 3069 and Seaford 1994.
52 Other scholars sometimes note that the black horse looks like Socrates (e.g., Arieti 1991: 192; Dorter
1971: 284; and Burger 1980: 65) but no one else, to my knowledge, has analyzed the broader
implications of this resemblance for an interpretation of the myth of charioteer and horses. On
Socrates as satyr in Symp., see Chapter 4 at 4.2 and 4.6.
53 Zanker 1995: 34. See Belfiore 2006: figs. 4 and 5. Richter 1965: 10919, provides a comprehensive
survey of the visual representations of Socrates. Lapatin 2006 is also useful.
54 See Belfiore 2006: fig. 6.
is shaggy about the ears (per ta lsiov: 253e14). Literary descrip-
tions of Socrates also give him satyr-like characteristics, many of which
correspond to the features of the black horse in the Phaedrus. Socrates
looks like a satyr (Plato, Symp. 215a6b6, 216d4; Xen. Symp. 4.19, 5.7). He
has a big belly (Xen. Symp. 2.19) and is so ungainly that everyone laughs at
him when he says that he will dance (Xen. Symp. 2.17). He is thick-necked
(Cicero, De fato 10), and has a snub nose (Plato, Tht. 143e89, 209c1; Meno
80a56; Xen. Symp. 5.6; scholiast on Aristophanes Clouds 223).55 According
to Alcibiades in Platos Symposium, Socrates, in addition to looking like
a satyr, resembles the satyr Marsyas in being hubristic (215b7, 221e34).
Hybris is also characteristic of the black horse (brewv . . . tarov: 253e3,
bristo ppou: 254e2).56
Why would Socrates give the black horse features characteristic not
only of satyrs but also of himself? In portraying himself as a satyr-like
black horse, Socrates calls attention to the hubristic, satyr-like qualities
explicitly attributed to him by Alcibiades in the Symposium (for example,
215b3d1, 216d24), and suggested by his portrayal in the Phaedrus, where
Socrates is characterized as erotic (227c35), plays the role of a shameless
lover, ruled by hybris, and criticizes Phaedrus boyfriend, Lysias. These
qualities have comic aspects, but they also have a serious role in Socrates
activities as a man with daimonic skill. They enable him, like a satyr, to
desire passionately to attain as much as he can of beauty and the other good
things he recognizes that he lacks (component (3)). Moreover, Socrates, like
a daimonic satyr, mediates between the human and the divine, by seeking
to acquire for himself as much divine beauty as he can (component (4)),
and by helping others also to desire and strive to attain as much divine
beauty as they can (component (5)). He does so, in the first place, by
making others aware of their own deficiencies, in ways that can lead to
charges of hybris. Finally, Socrates self-portrait playfully mocks himself,
thus showing his recognition of his own deficiencies.
Socrates satyr-like qualities are also closely linked to his erotic charac-
teristics. In the Symposium (see Chapter 4 at 4.6), Alcibiades contrasts the
philosophers satyr-like exterior with the divine things within his soul. He
fails to understand, however, that both inner and outer characteristics
are essential aspects of the person who has daimonic art, and that Socrates
resembles both the satyr Marsyas, and Eros, a daimon who is neither god
nor mortal, but in between both, and who therefore mediates between gods
55 The literary descriptions of Socrates are collected by Bury 1932, on Symp. 215b; and Richter 1965:
109.
56 The hubristic tendencies of the black horse differ from the hybris of the non-lover of Socrates first
speech (Chapter 5 at 5.2) in that they can be tamed.
and mortals (202d13203a8). Eros in the Symposium is neither beautiful nor
ugly, neither wise nor lacking in understanding, but a philosopher, who
desires wisdom because he knows that he lacks it (203d4204c6). In the
Phaedrus also, as Diskin Clay has shown, Socrates is represented as a dai-
monic and erotic figure, who, like Eros in the Symposium, has both a higher
and a lower nature.57 That Socrates is associated with Eros is apparent from
his prayer at the end of his second speech in the Phaedrus (Dear Eros:
257a3). After arguing, in his first speech, that the non-lover is superior to
the lover, Socrates was prompted to recant by his inner daimonion (242b8
c3) and by his fear of offending Eros (243d4). Socrates now prays that Eros
will not take away the erotic skill he has given him, beseeching the god
to accept his recantation and to forgive him for what he said in his first
speech (257a38).
Clay argues that Socrates is also associated with Pan, whose presence is
felt throughout the Phaedrus. Pan, like Eros in the Symposium, is a daimonic
and erotic figure, a divinity who is satyr-like in having both human and
animal characteristics.58 He is mentioned at 263d56, in connection with
the Nymphs, and he was thought to produce a panic fear at the noon hour
(e.g., Theocritus, Idyll 1.1518), the very time at which Socrates daimonion
and his fear of Eros prevent him from leaving before giving his recantation
speech. Moreover, Socrates address to Pan at the end of the Phaedrus
(Dear Pan: 279b8) echoes his earlier prayer to Eros. Just as he prayed to
Eros to make him still more honored by the beautiful (257a9), so Socrates,
who is not physically beautiful, prays to Pan, the god he resembles, for
inner beauty (279b8c3).59 The prayer to Pan also echoes the prayer to
Eros in alluding to love of wisdom: May I consider the wise man [sophos]
to be rich (279c1). With these words, as B. Darrell Jackson notes, Socrates
asks not to seem wise or to be wise but to value the wise man. The prayer
to Pan, he argues, is thus in effect a prayer to be the philosopher to whom
Socrates referred at 278d36, a man who cannot, like a god, be called wise,
but only a lover of wisdom (philo-sophos).60 Socrates, then, is associated
with all three figures Eros, Pan and the satyr-like black horse because
Socrates, like them, has daimonic qualities. The image of the charioteer
and horses indicates, moreover, that daimonic qualities are present to some
extent in every human soul, and are necessary to the psychic harmony that
allows mortals to acquire daimonic skill and to return to the region of the
gods.
57 Clay 1979: esp. 34651.
58 Clay 1979: 347 quotes Pl. Cra. 408d1, where Pan is called difuv (double-formed), having a
smooth upper body and rough, goat-like lower limbs.
59 The resemblance of Socrates to Pan is noted by Friedlander 1969: 240. 60 Jackson 1971: 29.
The satyr-like characteristics of the black horse, then, play an important
role in Socrates portrait of the lovers soul. The complex ambiguity of the
satyr, a being with characteristics like those of beasts, humans and gods,
makes it an appropriate image of one capacity of the soul. The satyr-like
aspects of the human soul, if they are not tamed and trained, can drag
us down to bestiality, wrecking the chariot of the soul, just as the horses
destroy Hippolytus in Euripides tragedy. When yoked to the sophrosyne
and aidos of the white horse, however, and given proper guidance by the
charioteer, these same aspects in the soul have beneficial effects. In urging
us to pursue erotic objects, the capacity of the soul represented by the
satyr-like black horse can help us to rejoin the chorus of the gods. This
essential role of the black horse is clearer within the context of the imagery
of the dance in Socrates myth of the charioteer and horses in the Phaedrus.
6.4 dancing with the gods

Choral imagery and terminology figure prominently in the myth of the
charioteer and horses. With the exception of Hestia, goddess of the hearth,
who stays home, Zeus, along with each of the other principal gods, leads
the soul-chariots of other gods and daimones in one of eleven companies
(246e4247a4).61 Each of the principal gods is a leader in a divine chorus
(qeou coro: 247a7), moving through the heavens in an orderly choral
arrangement (kat txin: 247a3).62 Before it fell to earth, the soul-chariot
of every human was a dancer (coreutv: 252d1) in a chorus (cor: 250b6)
led by one of the gods. The mortal lover attempts to rejoin this chorus
in which he used to dance, imitating his own god and educating his
beloved to follow the rhythm (uqmzontev) of the same god (253b56).
Socrates statement that Hestia remains home (247a12) while the other
gods move around her in a circle (247d45) reflects the common idea that
the stars are gods moving in a circular cosmic dance around a center.63
61 247a1: kat ndeka mrh. Eleven, not twelve, gods lead the companies, because the twelfth,
Hestia, remains at home: Guthrie 1975: 403; Nehamas and Woodruff 1995: 32 n.71; Robin 1994,
Notice: c.
62 txiv can be used of the arrangement of a chorus (e.g., Aes. PV 128, cited LSJ, I.4). See Calame
1997: 389. In late sources, leader (gemn: 246e4, gontai: 247a3) can mean choral leader:
LSJ, s.v. gemn, II.b; Calame 1997: 44.
63 Hestia: Hackforth 1952: 734. corew means to dance a round dance: LSJ, s.v. corew. On the
chorus as a circle around a center and the circular form of the lyric chorus and the dithyramb,
see Calame 1997: 346. The movement of the stars is called corea in Platos Ti. 40c3 and Epin.
982e36, and the stars are said to be gods in Resp. 508a4. The cosmic dance is referred to in many
passages in Greek literature, including Soph. Ant. 11468, Eur. Ion 107881 and El. 468, Lucian,
The Dance 7. In Platos Statesman 269d5e5, circular motion is said to be the most divine. England
Indeed, many of the words used by Socrates in this passage have astral
connotations.64
More specifically, the dances performed by the soul-chariots are similar in
many respects to one particular circular dance: the dithyramb.65 Socrates
playful remarks in his first speech, that he is speaking in dithyrambic
language (238d3, 241e2), prepare the reader for the serious use made of
this poetic genre in his second speech. From the archaic period to the mid
fifth-century b.c.e. dithyrambs were circular dances led by an exarchos, and
danced and sung by a chorus of fifty men or boys to orgiastic, Phyrgian
flute music.66 These dances had a Dionysiac character, as evidenced, for
example, by the invocation of Dionysus as Dithyrambos in Euripides
Bacchae 526. There is also evidence that the dithyramb was performed
in satyr costume on some occasions.67 Moreover, it is possible that the
poet who won a dithyrambic victory was escorted home in a chariot.68
There may also be a dithyrambic parallel to the principal twelve gods (the
eleven who lead companies and Hestia, who remains at home) alluded to
in Phaedrus 247a23. In what may well be a reference to the altar of the
twelve gods in the Athenian agora, a fragment of a dithyramb by Pindar
invites the gods to attend the chorus, addressing them as the gods who
come to the Athenian agora.69
This choral imagery has important religious implications, for the dance
in ancient Greece was an important part of initiation rites. In Platos
Euthydemus 277d69, initiation into the ecstatic Corybantic rites is said
to involve choreia (dance and song), and in the Laws, the rites of the
Corybantes involve dancing (790d791a). In fact, according to Lucian, all
ancient initiations included dancing.70 In the myth of the Phaedrus, initia-
tion and the dance are closely linked. In their previous existence, the human
followers of the choruses of the gods experienced initiation (telonto
tn teletn . . . rgizomen . . . muomenoi) and saw a blessed sight
1921, on Laws 716a1, notes that the scholiast says that the circle is a kind of immortality. Helpful
discussions of the cosmic dance include Boyance 1952; Koster 1951; and Lawler 1960.
64 Astral terminology includes: rotation (perid: 247d5), arrangement (txin: 247a3), pathways
(dixodoi: 247a4), revolves (pistrfetai: 247a5), revolution (perifor: 247d45, 248a4). Cf.
Laws 809c5d2.
65 Phdr. 238d3, 241e2. For the suggestion that these dances are dithyrambs, I am indebted to an
anonymous reader for AJPh of an earlier draft of Belfiore 2006.
66 Pickard-Cambridge 1962: 312. 67 Ibid. 47, 20, 335.
68 Ibid. 367, citing (15) Simonides reference to Nkav glan rm (the bright chariot of Victory)
in frag. 145 Bergk 4th edn., 79 Diehl. Cf. rma (chariot) in Phdr. 246e5.
69 Pickard-Cambridge 1962: 38, with 21, where he quotes Pindar frag. 63 Bowra, 75 Snell. Cf. Race
1997b: 311 n.1.
70 The Dance, 15: teletn odeman rcaan stin eren neu rcsewv, quoted with other evidence
for the connection between dance and initiation by Riedweg 1987: 58. See also Calame 1997.
(makaran yin . . . popteontev n ag kaqar: 250b6c4). Divine
erotic madness allows humans on this earth to participate, to the extent
that mortals can, in the rites celebrated by the choruses of the gods. When
the human soul sees beauty in this world, and remembers the beauty it
saw in a previous existence (249ce), it is once again initiated into these
rites (telet: 253c371 ), enthusiastic (249d2, e1; 253a3), mad (249d2, d8; cf.
251d8, 253c5) and possessed (255b6) by a particular god, from whom, like
the Bacchantes, it draws its inspiration (253a6). These passages clearly indi-
cate that the philosopher is and remains mad: madness leads to recollection
(249d56), an essential activity of the philosopher. However, this madness,
unlike the ordinary kind, is inspiration that involves rational control (see
above 6.2 and 6.3). His enthusiasm allows the lover to imitate his god and
to educate his beloved, persuading him to follow the rhythm of this same
god (253b56). The dances in the myth of charioteer and horses, then, are
characterized so as to evoke initiation rites. To drive ones chariot skillfully
is to attempt to return to the choruses of the gods, remembering, in a
renewed initiation here, the initiation one received in a former existence.
The dance imagery in the Phaedrus is also significant for an understand-
ing of the psychology dramatized in the story of the struggle in the soul
(passage B). I argued above (6.2), that the charioteer strives to produce an
equilibrium between opposing tendencies. This idea of psychic balance,
mentioned in other passages throughout Platos dialogues (see above, 6.2),
is explained in detail in the account of the dance given in his Laws. The
use of the Laws to elucidate the psychology of the dance in the Phaedrus
is also justified because the later dialogue reflects the Greek idea, generally
accepted from archaic times on, that the dance plays an essential role in
education and acculturation. Claude Calame cites the Laws in arguing
that chorus members were given a true education, with the aim of mak-
ing the chorus participants not only good dancers and singers, but also
accomplished men and women. The Laws also reflects the view, held by
the Greek tradition generally, that the chorus of the gods is the model for
human choruses. As Calame notes, the ideas about the role of the dance in
education that are expressed in the Laws are of particular interest, because
they are based on Cretan and Lacedaimonian realities.72 Calame cites evi-
dence from Crete, Sparta, fifth-century Athens and Lesbos that choral
71 Most editors follow corr. Par. 1808 in reading telet. On the textual question see de Vries 1969:
164. teleut (BT) is defended, with some hesitation, by Rowe 1988, on 253c3. telet finds support
in the Mystery terminology used in the rest of Socrates second speech: Riedweg 1987: 44.
72 Calame 1997: 2223; quotation: 222. On choral training as a form of acculturation see also Ford
2002: 1978. Armstrong 2004: 1789 discusses the close connection between cosmology and the
Muses in the Laws.
activity taught specific rules of behavior embodied in myth, and that it
prepared boys for war and girls for marriage.73 Although Calame does not
adduce any parallels to the psychic equilibrium said to be taught by choreia
in Platos dialogues, he does note that in Sparta the mimetic value of the
dances accompanying the songs gave the citizen-soldiers a sense of order,
discipline, and harmony.74 There are good reasons, then, for believing
that the choruses led by the gods in the Phaedrus are intended to have an
educational role, similar in some respects to that found in actual Greek
society and reflected in the Laws, for the human souls who join them.
According to the Laws, the dance provides training for the soul as well
as the body. Choreia, which includes both singing and dancing (2.664e8
665a3), involves the imposition of ordered movements, derived from the
gods, upon disordered movement in body and soul. This principle is evi-
dent in Platos account of three very different kinds of choreia: Corybantic
dances, the musical education of children and the re-education of older
adults at symposia.75 Platos account of all three kinds of choreia depends
on psychological principles similar to those expressed in the myth of the
Phaedrus. In the Laws, dancers need to have a sense of order, derived, as is
the charioteers recollection of true beauty, from the gods. When they move
in the rhythm of the dance, the dancers use this sense of order to achieve an
equilibrium between an impulse toward movement, like that of the black
horse, and an impulse toward restraint, like that of the white horse. These
orderly physical movements help to produce movements in the dancers
souls that also attain equilibrium between opposing tendencies.
Those officiating in the rites of the Corybantes are said to perform actions
like the cures of the mad Bacchantes, that make use of . . . motion, together
with dance and music (7.790e24).76 In the Corybantic rites, internal,
mad movement (manikn knhsin: 791a3) is calmed by the application from
outside of ordered movement:
When someone applies a shaking from outside to these kinds of emotions, the
motion applied from outside masters the internal fearful and mad motion. When
it has gained mastery, the motion makes apparent in the soul a peaceful calming,
something entirely desirable, of the hard pounding of the heart in each person.
The motion makes some sleep, and it makes those who are awake dance and play
the aulos with the gods to whom each sacrifices with good omens, giving them
sane dispositions instead of mad. (Laws 790e8791b1)
73 Calame 1997: 22238. 74 Ibid. 1997: 234.

75 I restrict my discussion to this function of the symposia without analyzing their equally important
role as tests of dispositions (1.649d4650b4).
76 My translation follows the reading of Linforth 1946: 1312.
In these rites, an evil disposition of the soul (xin falhn tv yucv:
790e9) that produces disordered internal movement is cured by the ordered
movement of the dance.77 Plato appears to have taken the Corybantic rites
seriously and to have had a positive opinion of them. He refers to the rites
in a number of other passages throughout the dialogues, including the
Phaedrus, where Socrates says that Phaedrus saw in him a fellow partici-
pant in these rites (sugkorubantinta: 228b7). In the Symposium, after
comparing Socrates to the aulos-playing satyr Marsyas (215c13), Alcibiades
says that when people listen to Socrates, they are affected like the partici-
pants in the Corybantic rites (215e13).78 In none of the dialogues is there a
suggestion that the rites were themselves the cause of the disease that they
were thought to cure.79
Choreia not only cures diseased souls, it is also essential to the emo-
tional and ethical education of normal children. In the Laws, the Athenian
Stranger defines first education (paideia) as the production of that part of
virtue, correct training concerning pleasures and pains, of which children
are capable before they are able to reason (2.653a5c4). Choreia is the whole
of education (672e56, cf. 654a9b1) because it leads children to take plea-
sure in what is good and to hate what is not good (654cd).80 According to
the psychology of the Laws, choreia is educational because it has the power
to impose upon disordered movements rhythm and harmony derived from
the gods:
Every young thing . . . is unable to keep calm in body or in voice but always
seeks to move and cry out, some springing and leaping, as though dancing with
pleasure and playing together, others crying out with every kind of sound. The
other animals do not have perception of order (txewn) or disorder (taxin) in
movement, the name of which is rhythm and harmony. But the gods whom we
said were given to us as fellow-dancers are the ones who have given us pleasurable
perception of rhythm and harmony. By means of this, they move us and lead us
in dances (corhgen). (Laws 653d7654a3)81
77 Verdenius 1962: 137 compares this process, by means of which internal movements are dominated
and calmed by external motion, to that in which streams of beauty from the beloved penetrate the
eyes of the lover in Phdr. 251b and 255cd.
78 Linforth 1946: 12144 discusses these passages and Platos Euthydemus 277de, Crito 54d, Ion 533e
534b and 536c.
79 Linforth 1946: 144.
80 Helpful discussions are provided by Moutsopoulos 1959: 97156 and Morrow 1960: 30218. Socrates
has a similar concept of musical education in Resp. 3: The best education is given by music,
for rhythm and harmony sink most deeply into the interior of the soul and most strongly attach
themselves to it, bringing grace and making it graceful also, if someone is brought up correctly
(401d4e1).
81 Cf. 672c16 and 673c9d5. At 664e3665a6, the gods are also said to be fellow-dancers
(qeov . . . sugcoreutv) and choral leaders (corhgov).
The mad dispositions and fiery natures (manetai: 672c4, mman . . .
xin: 666a7, dipurov: 664e4) of children lead them to desire to move
about and cry out. Children, that is, have shameless tendencies, like those
of the black horse.82 Just as the black horse of the Phaedrus leaps (skirtn:
254a4), neighs (cremetzwn: 254d4), and shamelessly pulls the chariot
forward (254d7), so the children in the Laws leap about (llmena ka
skirtnta: 653e12), and make disordered movements and cries (fqg-
goito d e tktwv ka phd: 664e6). In the Laws, these tendencies
of young children to move and cry out are far from being an ineradicable
evil. They are a necessary condition for education because they provide the
impetus that allows children to move in rhythm and sing in harmony, once
they have learned to use their god-given perception of order and disorder.83
A third kind of choreia that practiced by older adults in a renewal of
the education they received as children also involves the imposition of
order upon disorder.84 According to the Laws, people become moderate by
combating (diamacmenon) the pleasures and desires that incite them to
shamelessness (1.647c7d7). Wine arouses shameless desires and for that
very reason helps people to practice combating shamelessness (649a650b)
when they drink in carefully controlled symposia. That is why the sym-
posium is a safeguard for education (2.652b3653a3). Young people under
eighteen should not drink wine at all because they have naturally fiery
dispositions (666a37). Older people, having lost this natural fire, have
become dry, despondent and stiff (666b5c1); as a result, their education
in pleasure and pain is weakened and corrupted (653c79). The older and
more moderate they are, the more ashamed they become to participate in
the choreia (665d9e3), in which the whole city must join (665c27). To
remedy this, Dionysus provides initiations and play for older people (tn
tn presbutrwn teletn ma ka paidan: 666b45) that make them
less ashamed to sing (tton ascunmenov: 666c4). His gift of wine is a
medicine (pharmakon) that temporarily gives older people the mad and
fiery disposition of the young, and thus makes them more easily molded
(666b7c2) by a wise and sober symposiarch (1.640d47). That is, wine
82 The Athenian Stranger does not explicitly say that children are shameless, but this is the clear
implication of his statement that the lawgiver should guard against the mad disposition of the
young and not pour fire into fire by allowing them to drink the wine (666a37) that increases
shamelessness (649a1b6).
83 Similar ideas are expressed in Pl. Ti. 43b15, where young children are said to make disordered
movements, and 47b5c4, where sight is said to enable us to use the rotations in heaven to regulate
the rotations within us. This dialogue also shares with Phdr. the concept of a soul-chariot (41d8e2).
84 My account here is similar to that of Belfiore 1986, although I would now characterize the desires
and emotions aroused by wine as shameless rather than anti-rational.
gives older people a temporary and artificial disorder in the soul, upon
which, under the guidance of the sober symposiarch, they can impose order.
It thus makes it possible for them to repeat the process by means of which
they learned choreia as children. Wine, then, is a medicine to produce aidos
in the soul (2.672d78) by, paradoxically, first creating shamelessness.85 It
thus helps to produce in the soul tendencies to make shameless movements,
like those made by the untamed black horse in the Phaedrus. These tenden-
cies counteract the opposing tendencies toward restraint that characterize
both older people in the Laws and the white horse of the Phaedrus. Just as
the charioteer controls both horses so that they move toward the beloved
with aidos (Phdr. 254e8255a1), so the symposiarch guides the drinkers as
they combat the renewed shamelessness in their souls.
According to the Laws, then, all three kinds of choreia help to produce
in the soul a proper balance between an impulse toward movement, like
that represented by the black horse of the Phaedrus, and an impulse toward
restraint, like that of the white horse. To learn to dance is to impose order
upon disorder, creating a psychic equilibrium like that represented in the
myth of the charioteer and horses in the Phaedrus.
6.5 conclusion
In the second half of the Phaedrus, Socrates says that this myth is in part
a game (265c89). When he concludes his second speech with his prayer
to Eros (257a3b6), however, Socrates reveals the serious purpose of this
playful recantation speech offered to the god. His second speech itself
shows that he has the erotic skill he prays to retain. Socrates demonstrates
his understanding of erotic skill when he creates the myth of charioteer and
horses. In this vivid dramatization, the lover of true beauty strives to create
friendship, in the form of a harmonious equilibrium of opposites, within
his own soul. This inner friendship is essential to the lovers skill in searching
for beauty and truth (component (4) of the erotic art). It is also a necessary
condition for helping his beloved to acquire the erotic art (component
(5)), and for engaging with him in a common search for divine beauty and
truth. In representing this search as an initiation, mediated by eros for divine
beauty, Socrates places the relationship between lover and beloved within a
cosmic context, far transcending the narrow confines of the conventional
Greek erotic-educational relationship. Moreover, in representing himself as
85 Aidos is the fear of wrong-doing that opposes shamelessness (1.647a4b1) and wine provides practice
in resisting shameless impulses by first arousing them (649a1d2).
the daimonic, satyr-like black horse, Platos Socrates suggests that his own
erotic impulses are not, like those of the Socrates of Zopyrus, weaknesses
that he has overcome by means of philosophy, but strengths that he has
harnessed in the service of philosophy.86
Socrates also demonstrates erotic skill by using the poetic language
that is most persuasive to Phaedrus (257a56), and that exhibits, in a
virtuoso performance, the many literary manifestations of Eros. The image
of the horse is associated with erotic lyric poetry, while the story of the
driver attempting to control unruly horses alludes to a scene in Euripides
Hippolytus, a well-known tragic example of the destructive power of Eros.
Like many Greek comedies, Socrates story of the lover who captures his
beloved ends in a kind of marriage.87 Graphic sexual imagery in Socrates
account of the arousal of the lover recalls the obscenity of Old Comedy,
while the emphasis on interpersonal love reminds the audience of New
Comedy. The satyr-play is alluded to in the description of the physical and
ethical attributes of the lustful, satyr-like black horse. Socrates also makes
extensive use of language associated with Greek choral poetry, especially
dithyrambic poetry. Just as Eros reveals himself in a wide variety of forms,
each of which can lead the soul to true beauty, so Socrates uses all of the
resources of language and imagery to persuade Phaedrus, his fellow erastes
of words (228b6c2), to use the beautiful words of his second speech as a
reminder of the beauty of the other world. The fact that Phaedrus joins
Socrates prayer (Sunecomai), and says that he marvels at the beauty of
Socrates speech (257b7c2) suggests that the prayer has been answered.88
86 Zopyrus is discussed in Introduction at I.1 and n.3.
87 Noted by Nichols 2009: 116. 88 Pace Coventry 1990: 193.
Conclusion
This study has argued that Socrates is characterized in four Platonic dia-
logues as practicing an art or skill that is erotic, or daimonic, not in
a narrowly sexual sense, but because it shares characteristics attributed to
the philosopher-daimon Eros in the Symposium. As the chapters of this
book have demonstrated, a focus on this aspect of Platos characterization
of Socrates helps to illuminate many significant philosophical and literary
issues in each of the four dialogues. I also hope to have shown that Plato
accomplishes several important philosophical purposes in the quartet as a
whole. First, he provides his own, unique, version of the theme, common in
the Socratic writings, of Socrates deep concern with eros. Platos Socrates
is an erotic figure not because he has ordinary eros for beautiful young
men, but because he has marvelous skill in searching for the objects of
Socratic eros: wisdom, beauty and other good things. Plato also appeals to
his audience and provides dramatic interest, just as his Socrates does within
the dialogues, by representing Socrates as practicing the erotic art within
the context of the Greek convention of erotic-educational relationships
between older and young males. Platos adaptations of this convention also
serve an important apologetic purpose. Instead of exchanging wisdom for
sexual favors, as the conventional erastes claims to do, Socrates helps his
interlocutors to become skilled in searching for the wisdom they recognize
that they lack. The four dialogues represent this educational process as an
initiation of passionate young men, at the beginning of their lives, into the
mysteries of Socratic eros.
By demonstrating that Socrates successful use of his art is dependent on
the characteristics of his interlocutors, and on external circumstances, the
quartet also helps to explain why Socrates did not achieve greater success,
even among friends in his own city. Sometimes, external forces interrupt
or threaten to put an end to his conversations. At the end of the Lysis,
the discussion is forcibly interrupted by drunken, barbarian slaves (223a1
b3), and the conversation at the end of the Symposium is stopped by the
272
Conclusion 273
arrival of revelers, who force the symposiasts to drink too much (223b26).
Ominously, the Alcibiades I ends with Socrates expression of his fears about
the power of the demos (135e68), which will, in historical fact, corrupt
Alcibiades and silence Socrates by means of death. In the Symposium, the
shame that Socrates induces in Alcibiades has only temporary effects, in
part because the young man refuses to listen. Alcibiades blocks his ears and
runs away instead of listening to the arguments he is unable to contradict
(216a4c3). Even the Phaedrus, which ends on a note of agreement between
friends, contains suggestions that this concord is contingent on the unusual
setting of the dialogue: it takes place outside the walls of Athens, where
Socrates seldom goes and where he is very much out of place (230c6e4).
As he speaks the last word of the dialogue, Let us go ( Iwmen: 279c8),
Socrates sets out to return to the city, where agreement may be more
difficult, in part because of the competitive atmosphere fostered in Athens.
This last word, however, also resonates with Platos audience, for whom it
has more positive implications. As Alcibiades says, if we listen to Socrates
words, even if reported by an inferior speaker, we too, whether we are
women, men or young people, become stunned and possessed (Symp.
215d36). If we listen long and attentively, without covering our ears and
running away, like Alcibiades, we can, like Socrates himself, become pos-
sessed by eros for the wisdom we recognize that we lack, and skilled in
searching for it together with others who share our love.
Glossary
aidos: reverence
amathia: lack of understanding; failure to recognize ones own ignorance
aporein: to be at an impasse, at a loss, without resources, perplexed
aporia: state of being at an impasse
arete: excellence
atopos: out of place, strange, outlandish
atopia: state of being atopos
aulos: pipe
daimon: a being with a status between god and mortal
elenchus: cross-examination, refutation, test
epithumein: to desire
epithumia: desire
eran: to love
erastes (pl. erastai): lover
eristic: contentious (adj.); contentious speech (n.)
eromenos (pl. eromenoi): beloved
eros: love, passionate desire
erotike techne: erotic art or skill
hybris: violence, lust, dishonor, insolence
oikeion: kindred
philein: to like
philia: friendship, kinship
philos (masc. sing.; pl. philoi; neut. sing. philon): the friend, the dear (n.);
dear (adj.)
philosophein: literally, to like wisdom; to philosophize
philosophia: philosophy; literally, love or liking for wisdom
phronesis: wisdom
phronimos: wise, sensible
physis: nature
sophia: wisdom
274
Glossary 275
sophos: (masc.; fem. sophe): wise
sophrosyne: moderation, sound-mindedness
ta erotika: erotic matters; matters with which the daimon Eros is
concerned
techne: art, skill
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Index
Achilles and speeches in Symp. 11822, 137, 138; passim

as beloved, in Symp. 123 ch. 3
and desire for glory 148, 157 ambiguity
and Socrates 25, 187, 188 in Diotimas speech 154, 202
Adkins, Arthur 76 of eros, in Diotimas speech 150
Aeschines, Alcibiades of, on eros 1 linguistic 746, 85
Aeschylus, term eros in Aga. of 9 of persona of Socrates 111n3, 1613, 167,
Agathon (see also amathia, elenchus, shame, 189
symposium) in status of satyrs 260, 264
character in Symp. 20, 23, 11719, 1347, 162, Anacreon, and eros 211
16877 Annas, Julia 14, 16
compared with character Alcibiades (in Alc. I) Aphrodite
176; (in Symp.) 162, 168, 1768, 179, and Dionysus 118, 190
1807 in Eur. Hipp. 257
historical figure 134, 135, 171 mother of Eros 1257
aidos (reverence) see also Homer
in Laws 270 Apollo and Delphi
opposed to hybris 164n9 in Alc. I 43, 48, 567, 59
in Phdr. 229, 236, 237, 252, 2534, 2556, in Ap. 24
264 and Marsyas 166, 260
in Statesman 254 in Phdr. 223
Ajax, and Socrates 187, 188 Apollodorus 11016, 196
Alcibiades Apology (Ap.)
character in Alc. I passim ch. 1 characterization of Socrates in 245, 63, 145,
character in Symp. 1612, 17796; passim 154, 180
ch. 4 daimonion in 245; see also daimonion
historical figure 105 and erotic dialogues 245
see also Agathon, Alc. I, amathia, aporia, imitators of Socrates in 115
atopia, beauty, elenchus, honor, Lysis, see also Apollo, Athens
shame aporia (impasse)
Alcibiades I (Alc. I) passim ch. 1 of Alcibiades 39, 40, 41, 6970, 162, 168,
authenticity of 31, 31n1 1789, 181, 1856, 187, 189
term eros in 10 in Lys. 5, 17, 6874, 106, 108; passim ch. 2
see also Alcibiades, Athens, gods, hybris in Phdr. 231, 233, 237, 245
Alcidamas 134 of Platos readers 70, 187, 190, 196
Alcmaeon 130 Platos use of xii, 6970
amathia (lack of understanding) see also Meno
of Agathon 136, 163, 165, 173, 176 Archilochus, on eros 148
of Alcibiades 39, 163, 165 Aristodemus 11016, 169, 173, 196
meaning of term 119, 119n4, 199, 199n1 Aristophanes
of Socrates 199 character in Symp. 11718, 1314
297
298 Index
Aristophanes (cont.) imitation of gods in 62, 199, 210, 2234,
historical figure 188 2306, 2401, 249, 253, 256, 2646
Socrates in Clouds of 242, 262 interpretations of 248
Aristotle and satyrs 2489, 25964
on eros, in NE 92, 93, 233 Socrates self-portrait in 246, 249, 2612
on friendship, in ethical works 233, 233n52 souls of gods in 247
on hybris, disdain and slighting, in Rhet. taming of black horse in 2378, 245, 251,
1635, 168, 170 2536, 2589
on mirrors, in On Dreams 58, 58n65 three capacities of soul in 24856
art (techne) and true belief 2001
as craft-knowledge, criteria for 14, 206 two lives in 2379, 252
of medicine 13, 206 see also aidos, beauty, honor, hybris, initiation,
see also erotic art; rhetoric, theory and practice interpersonal love, Phdr., shame,
of sophrosyne
Athena Charmides (Chrm.), eros in 61
and aulos 138, 139 children and childhood
and courage 124 education of 83, 200, 2669
Athens in Platos dialogues 4, 85, 89, 90, 94, 97, 107,
in Alc. I 42, 44, 47, 48, 52, 63, 67 254
in Ap. 63 see also madness, shame
and setting of Phdr. 19, 273 Cicero, Socrates in De fato of 262
atopia (outlandishness) Clay, Diskin 263
of Alcibiades 39 collection and division 14, 199, 2047, 224
of Socrates 367, 161, 169, 173, 187, 188 comedy, Greek 259, 271
aulos (flute) see also Aristophanes, tragedy
at Agathons symposium 19, 120, 121, 187 comic elements
and Corybantic rites 267 in Greek art 25960
in Greek art and literature 1389 in Greek literature 14950
and Marsyas 166, 188, 193, 194, 260, 268 in Platos dialogues 118, 130, 1313, 1803,
and Socrates 122, 138, 1878, 193, 194, 268 242
in Platos portrayal of Socrates 110, 161, 190
beauty use of, by Socrates 42, 1445, 14952, 159,
of Alcibiades 47, 546, 60, 624, 66, 1779, 25960, 262
187, 188 see also laughter and ridicule
creates eros 3, 3n9, 23, 546, 634, 225, 2335 Corybantes 199, 244, 256, 265, 2678
in Diotimas speech 141, 1515, 194 Cratylus (Cra.), daimones in 1718
Greek attitudes toward 99, 193 Crete, and the dance 266
in myth of charioteer and horses 612, 2248, Crito
2306; passim ch. 6 and erotic dialogues 267
of Socrates 55, 60, 64, 160, 177, 186, 189, 191, and persuasion by arguments 155
192, 196
Benson, Hugh 105 daimon, daimones 1718
Beversluis, John xiv see also Cratylus, Eros, satyrs
Bordt, Michael 878 daimonic art see erotic art
Brunschwig, Jacques 57 daimonion
Burkert, Walter 91 as characteristic of Socrates 8, 190
and Socrates divine sign 24, 36, 96, 221, 244,
Cairns, Douglas 164 263
Calame, Claude 2667 dance see charioteer and horses, Corybantes,
Carpenter, Thomas 260 Zeus
charioteer and horses, myth of, in Phdr. 22339; Davidson, James 8
passim ch. 6 Demosthenes, on hybris, in Against Conon 167
and the dance 223, 224, 228, 24950, 254, Denyer, Nicholas 37, 55, 58
26470 dialectic
and Greek art and literature 25760 absence of, in Symp. 11213, 184
Index 299
as art (techne), in Phdr. 2048, 223, 224, 225, Socratic 3, 57, 910, 223, 24, 28, 33, 516,
235, 238, 241, 243 67, 70, 106, 155, 184, 195, 198, 208, 212,
and erotic art 7, 43, 44, 5665, 71, 834, 86, 216, 230, 2356, 272
98, 99, 100, 103, 107, 108, 158 in Socratic dialogues 12
see also rhetoric see also ambiguity, beauty, Diotima, Eros,
dialogue form see Plato erotic art, friendship, hybris, initiation,
Dionysus interpersonal love, madness, philosophia,
god of drama 117, 165, 170, 178, 183, 190 shame, and specific authors and works
god of wine and symposium 183, 190, Eros, the god or daimon passim ch. 3
26970 as daimon xi, 38, 1718, 28, 90, 141, 144, 146,
and satyrs 138, 190, 260, 261, 265 156, 1915, 2623
see also Aphrodite, Euripides in Diotimas speech 141, 15460, 1904
Diotima 14060 in first five speeches of Symp. 11737, 172,
defines eros 89, 144, 157 175
as prophet 140, 142, 144, 145, 146 and Socrates 1, 34, 68, 901, 146, 1556,
as teacher of Socrates 34, 11920, 1406, 1589, 162, 18795, 198201, 239, 2623
15560, 175, 176, 188 Socrates praise of, in Symp. 11920
as woman 142 see also Aphrodite, eros, erotic art, Hesiod,
see also ambiguity, beauty, Eros, honor, magic, Phaedrus, satyrs, sophrosyne,
interpersonal love, sophists tragedy
dithyramb erotic art (erotike techne)
in Greek culture 265 and characters of interlocutors 4, 1821, 23,
and Socrates first speech in Phdr. 244, 845, 162, 181, 1836, 203, 2723
265 components of 67
Dodds, E. R. 149 contrasted with art (techne) in sense of
Dugas, Ludovic 84 craft-knowledge 1318, 98, 198, 2047,
212, 221
eironeia (irony) 177, 189 contrasted with practice without art 198,
elenchus (cross-examination) 2079, 221
of Agathon 19, 113, 117, 136, 137, 13940, 158, daimonic qualities of xixiii, 713, 1718, 21,
164, 169, 1717 28, 73, 8896, 112, 1456, 163, 192, 195,
of Alcibiades 40 249, 262
in Platos dialogues 21, 115, 116, 142, 245 and Eros 1, 37, 94, 112, 146, 15860, 198,
of Socrates 155, 183 2623
see also dialectic in erotic dialogues, overview of passim Preface,
equilibrium of opposites Introduction, Conclusion; (in Alc. I)
in medicine 12931 356; (in Lys.) 69, 723; (in Phdr.) 1989,
in soul 24950, 2546, 26670 222, 2478, 2567, 2701; (in Symp.) 112,
see also Alcmaeon, Heraclitus 11920, 15860, 195
eros and friendship passim ch. 2; 7, 17, 1821, 24,
and the gaze 48, 5665, 235 41, 63, 71, 73, 828, 912, 968, 108, 198,
and Greek art 226 20810, 216, 222, 23945, 247
and Greek conventions 1013, 22, 323, 122, and true belief 17, 94, 146, 156, 2001,
125, 131, 14750, 153, 160, 17782, 210, 208
215, 222, 270, 272 see also dialectic, shame
in Greek linguistic usage 810 erotic dialogues, compared and contrasted
in Greek literature 52, 64, 1202, 127, 1356, overview 1823, 2723
2579, 271 Alc. I and Phdr. 612, 63, 667, 235, 243
in Platos trial and death dialogues 218 Lys. and Alc. I. 71, 84, 93, 1057
and questioning (erotan) 16, 37n18, 378, 44, Lys., Alc. I and Phdr. 36, 867
47, 97, 97n93, 101 Lys. and Symp. 901
reciprocal 323, 556, 657, 93, 147, 228, 233, Phdr. and Symp. 147, 155, 159, 198210, 236,
2346 254, 2623
and sex 2, 812, 125, 1323, 14754, 209, Symp. and Alc. I 17987
21219, 227, 2378, 255, 259, 272 see also erotic art, in erotic dialogues
300 Index
Euripides Halliwell, Stephen 1456
chariot and horses in Hipp. of 2579, 264, Hera, in Phdr. 223
271 Heraclitus 12931, 254
Cyclops of 260 Hesiod
desire for glory in Alc. I of 157 Aphrodite, in Th. of 1267
Dionysus in Bacch. of 149, 265 daimones, in Op. of 17, 17n48
on eros 134 on Eros 136
eros and friendship in Alc. I of 124 Eros, in Theog. of 123
eros in Hipp. of 121, 136, 139, 148, 173 on friendship 85
Euthydemus as poet 148
initiation in 265 Hestia, in Phdr. 264
setting of 18 Hippothales, as lover 4, 71, 856, 92, 95, 96,
Euthyphro 98103
and erotic dialogues 256 Homer
setting of 18 Aphrodite, in Il. of 126
Aphrodite and Ares, in Ody. of 133
Ferrari, John 248, 251 courage, in Il. of 1234
Fisher, Nicholas 164, 165 and the term daimon 17
Forms, Platos theory of 142 use of term eros by 9
Frede, Michael xii Giants in 133
Friedlander, Paul 62, 95 Gorgon, in Ody. of 137
friendship (philia) passim ch. 2 as poet 148
within family 77, 79, 84, 107, 209, 21415, and Socrates 1378
216, 21719 Thersites, in Il. of 166
and interpersonal love 7, 1213, 67, 73, 845, use of, by Agathon 1345
128, 130, 147, 153, 198, 20810, 21239 see also Achilles
between Socrates and Phaedrus 202, 203, 209, honor and renown, love of
23945 by Alcibiades 43, 50, 52, 179, 185, 187
within soul passim ch. 6, 228, 229, 230, 2389, in Diotimas speech in Symp. 148, 159
241, 245, 24750, 256, 263, 270 in myth of charioteer and horses 228, 2389,
see also erotic art 252
Frontisi-Ducroux, Francoise 138 in Phaedruss speech in Symp. 1223, 125
and Socrates 6
Gill, Christopher 5960 see also Euripides
god(s) horse, in Greek literature 2578, 271
competition with 166, 260 see also charioteer and horses
gifts to Socrates of 1, 34, 17, 53, 72, 73, 90, hybris
936, 146, 1989, 201 and black horse, in myth of charioteer and
as guardian of Socrates, in Alc. I 36, 37, 43, 53, horses 251, 256, 262
59, 60, 67 and eros 121, 125, 1278, 21617, 2205
images of, in Alcibiades speech in Symp. Greek concept of 1634
1612, 18996 and laughter 150, 164, 1667
Socrates devotion to 4, 6, 13, 246 and shame 1635, 166
and the soul, in Alc. I 5665 and Socrates, in Phdr. 202, 244, 2456, 262
wisdom of 15, 24, 28, 34, 48, 90, 134, 145, 146, Socrates charged with, in Alc. I 18, 39
191, 199, 206 Socrates charged with, in Symp. 201, 111,
see also charioteer and horses, daimonion, 16170, 1734, 175, 176, 17880, 183, 189,
Phdr., specific gods 193, 1945
good will (eunoia), of lover 218, 219, 2323, 236 see also Aristotle, aidos, Demosthenes, satyrs
Gorgias (Grg.)
experience (empeiria) in 16 Ibycus, on eros 257
Socrates as lover of Alcibiades in 67 impasse see aporia
Gorgias (the sophist) 113, 1378, 173 initiation
Gorgon, and Socrates 117, 13740, 173 and eros, in Platos erotic dialogues 22, 272
see also Homer, Pindar in Greek ritual 260
Index 301
in Laws 260, 265, 269 first friend (proton philon) in 78, 878
in Lys. 99, 108 genuine lover in 71, 86, 95, 989, 103, 107
in Phdr. 198, 222, 223, 224, 226, 22831, 249, interpretations of 689
261, 2656, 270 oikeion (the kindred) in 812, 878, 95
in Platos trial and death dialogues 234, 278 see also aporia, Lysis, Hippothales
in Symp. 141, 1434, 14655, 158, 194
see also Euthydemus, Lucian Mackenzie, M. M. 69n5
interpersonal love passim ch. 1 madness
and desire for the good see also Lysis 868, 103, of children 269
106 and eros 2
in erotic dialogues, overview of 1013 of Hippothales 99
in first two speeches of Phdr. 21121 of lover, in Phdr. 12, 207, 208, 2227, 228, 231,
in myth of charioteer and horses 2012, 239, 247, 253, 255, 258, 266
22839, 259 philosophical 19, 11314, 115, 184, 266
role of, in Diotimas speech 147, 1524, 2012 in ritual 22, 267
see also eros, friendship, Hippothales, Socrates magic
Isocrates, in Phdr. 240, 2423 and Socrates 170, 190, 195
and Eros 190, 194, 195
Jackson, Darrell B. 263 Marsyas 166
Johnson, David 62 see also Apollo, aulos, satyrs
Meno
Kahn, Charles 141 aporia in 69
Kirk, G. S., J. E. Raven, and M. Schofield Socrates described in 262
12930 Midas 260
Konstan, David 76, 164 Mikkos 100, 101
mirror
Landfester, Manfred 75 and Greek theories of vision 579
Lane, Melissa 189 image of, in Alc. I and Phdr. 48, 5765, 222,
laughter and ridicule 2336
in Greek literature 1667 moderation see sophrosyne
Socrates as object of 68, 143, 1678, 185, 194 Muses 200, 221
by Socrates, at others 101, 163, 16970 Mysteries see initiation
by Socrates, at self 1456, 150, 168, 174, 177, myth passim ch. 6
188 and allegory 199, 250
in Symp. 114, 116, 131, 196 conveys true belief 200
see also comic elements, hybris and Diotimas speech 155
Laws and Socrates long speech in Alc. I 41
eros in 2, 9 and Socrates recantation, in Phdr. 241
psychology in 83, 24950, 26670 see also charioteer and horses, myth of;
see also aidos, initiation, Phdr. Republic
love see eros, interpersonal love
Lucian, on initiation 265 Nails, Debra xii, 142
Ludwig, Paul 9 Nehamas, Alexander 155
Lycurgus 148 Nightingale, Andrea 70n9
Lysias North, Helen 166
as orator 204, 207, 208, 211 Nussbaum, Martha 248
and Phaedrus 201, 2405, 262 Nymphs 221, 244, 260, 263
speech attributed to, in Phdr. 198, 203, 2089,
21115, 2415 OConnor, David 54
Lysis Olympiodorus 55
as beloved 956, 1038
compared with Alcibiades 1057, 176 Pan 20, 245, 260, 263
philosophia of 75, 86, 106 Parmenides 136, 158
Lysis passim ch. 2 Parmenides 257
desire in 5, 72, 7980, 812, 8991 Pericles 188
302 Index
Penner, Terry and Christopher Rowe 812, 878 in Lys. 85, 99, 101
Persia 412, 63 Socrates use of, in Phdr. 199, 200, 211, 2257,
Phaedo, Socrates in Zopyrus of 12, 271 230, 231, 241, 249, 2569, 265, 271
Phaedo Socrates use of, in Symp. 1379, 14750,
eros in 2, 10, 278 1578, 159, 160
and erotic dialogues 278 see also eros, specific poets
initiation in 234, 278 Protagoras, on poetry 122
psychology in 278, 253
see also Phaedrus reproduction
Phaedrus Greek terms for 149, 151, 153
characterization of, in Phaedrus 203, 23945 imagery of 1412, 1445, 14655, 160, 201, 226,
in Symposium 1224 235
see also friendship, Lysias, Phaedrus see also women
Phaedrus (Phdr.) passim Part III Republic (Resp.)
compared with Laws 254, 26670 eros in 2, 9, 10
compared with Phaedo 2278, 253 force and persuasion in 187
compared with Resp. 253, 254 imitators of Socrates in 115
compared with Sts. 254 likers of listening in 106
psychology in 200, 22239, 24750, 2534, myth in 200
26670; passim ch. 6 psychology in 253, 254
recollection in 2235, 225n29 on superior natures 104
Socrates prayer to Eros in 1, 3, 94, 198, 205, see also Phaedrus, philosophia
2078, 239, 245, 263, 270, 271 reverence see aidos
see also charioteer and horses, dialectic, erotic rhetoric
dialogues; compared and contrasted, in Socrates first speech, in Phdr. 2201
Phaedrus, rhetoric, specific topics in speech attributed to Lysias, in Phdr. 204,
phil-terms 21115
in Greek usage 68n2, 91 theory and practice of, in Phdr. 13, 2049,
in Lys. 713, 7488 220, 241
in Symp. 153 see also dialectic
see also philosophia, philosophos Romilly, Jacqueline de 257, 258
philia see friendship Rowe, Christopher 225n29
philosophia passim Introduction Rudebusch, George 88
and eros, in erotic dialogues 34, 5, 73, 148,
153, 154, 217 Sappho, on eros 64, 211
in Resp. 10 satyr play 166, 167, 260, 261, 271
see also Lysis satyrs and sileni
philosophos, meaning of term 75, 91, 91n76, 199, Alcibiades statues of, in Symp. 1613, 166,
2057, 2234, 263 18896, 2623; passim ch. 4
Pindar as daimones 8, 194, 249, 2601
gods of agora in 265 and Eros 1935, 2623
Gorgons in 1389 in Greek art and literature 25960
Plato and hybris 161, 1668, 193, 25962
beliefs of, and dialogues xii, 142, 202 and sex 166, 194, 259
dialogues of, as dramatic works xii, 1821, and Socrates 8, 21, 138, 1613, 1668, 18795,
701, 73, 75, 11016, 131, 2023, 2289, 249, 2613
2701 see also ambiguity, charioteer and horses,
as narrator 110 Dionysus, Marsyas, Zeus
philosophical purposes of 228, 2723 Schleiermacher, Friedrich 41
works of see specific dialogues Scott, G. A. and W. A. Welton 7n15, 7n17
Plutarch, on Periander 14950 Seaford, Richard 260
poets and poetry shame and the shameful
Alcibiades use of, in Symp. 188 and Agathon 168, 1712
in Alc. I 42, 64 and Alcibiades 11, 3841, 42, 434, 47, 50, 62,
and first five speeches in Symp. 23, 12037 70, 162, 165, 179, 180, 184, 186
Index 303
and black horse in Phdr. 251, 253, 256 sophrosyne (moderation)
and children 269 and beauty, in Phdr. 261
and eros 1223, 1256, 1289, 132 definition of, in Phdr. 218
and erotic art 3841, 100 of Eros 128, 134
and Lysis 70 opposed to hybris 164n9
and Phaedrus in Phdr. 241, 2423 and self-knowledge 46, 4950
and Socrates 21, 26, 53, 221, 241, 2435, 246, of Socrates 110, 179, 188, 191, 192
262 and the symposium 269
and Socratic shame 40n23, 401 and white horse, in Phdr. 252, 264
and the symposium 26970 Sparta
and white horse in Phdr. 255 in Alc. I 412
see also hybris and the dance 2667
Sheffield, Frisbee 143 Statesman (Sts.)
Sier, Kurt 142 eros in 10
skill see art madness in 254
Slings, S. R. 69 psychology in 254
Socrates symposium
as beloved, in Alc. I 11, 20, 323, 45, 47, 501, of Agathon 110, 117, 160, 16870
64, 657 competition at 121
as beloved, in Symp. 19, 114, 11516, 179, 184, imagery of 138
189, 1912, 1956 as renewal of education 267, 26970
characterization of, in erotic dialogues see also aulos, Dionysus, shame, sophrosyne
xiiixiv, 46, 1821, 31, 2723 Symposium (Symp.) passim Part II
characterization of, in Phdr. 2024, 21112, influence of 160
23946 interpretations of 1416, 1612, 1845
characterization of, in trial and death narrative structure of 11011, 11416
dialogues 248 puns in 1756
characterization of self, in Lys. 723, subject of 11112
8998 see also specific topics
as competitor 112, 11720, 172, 183, 199, 203,
243 Taylor, A. E. 58
disclaims wisdom (in erotic dialogues) techne see art
xiixiii, 6, 11, 1418; (in trial and death Theaetetus (Tht.)
dialogues) 245, 26, 28; (in Alc. I) 34, 48; eros in 10
(in Lys.) 69, 89; (in Phdr.) 198, 199, 201, midwifery in 96, 201
207, 220, 249, 262; (in Symp.) 111, 1436, Socrates described in 262
1505, 170, 174, 188, 1912, 195, 196 Theocritus, Pan in Idylls of 263
and human virtue 192, 199 Timaeus
as lover 5, 7, 1113, 44, 923, 178, 179, 1817, eros in 2
189, 240, 262; passim ch. 1 theory of vision in 578
physical characteristics of 2612 tragedy
portrayal of, by Alcibiades in Symp. and comedy, composition of 117, 159,
17796 183
portrayal of, by narrators within Symp. Eros in 121
11016, 161, 196 see also Aeschylus, Agathon, Euripides,
see also specific topics Sophocles
Solon 148
sophists Vlastos, Gregory xiixiii
absence of, from erotic dialogues 18, 23
contrasted with Socrates 6, 100 women
and Diotima 143, 145 in Alc. I 42
see also Gorgias Greek attitudes toward 149
Sophocles in Symp. 120, 147
on eros, in Ant. 121 see also Diotima, reproduction
Thyestes of 134 Woodruff, Paul 40n23
304 Index
Xenophon, Socrates in Symp. of 262 in Eur. Bacch. 149
of friendship 41, 240
Zanker, Paul 261 and Ganymede 234
Zeus and philosophers 223, 224, 241
in Aristophanes speech in Symp. 131, 132, 133 and satyr chariot, in visual arts 260
and the dance 264 Zopyrus see Phaedo

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S O C R AT E S D AI M O N I C A RT

Despite increasing interest in the figure of Socrates and in love in

e l i z a b e t h s . b e l f i o r e is Professor Emerita of Classics at the

ELIZ ABETH S. BELFIORE

c Elizabeth S. Belfiore 2012

This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception

First published 2012

Printed in the United Kingdom at the University Press, Cambridge

Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication data

isbn 978-1-107-00758-1 Hardback

Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or

Introduction: overview of the erotic dialogues 1

part i socrates and two young men

2 In love with acquiring friends: Socrates in the Lysis 68

part ii er os and hybris in the symposium

4 You are hubristic: Socrates, Alcibiades and Agathon 161

6 The lovers dance: charioteer and horses 247

This study examines Platos characterization of Socrates in four dialogues:

12 Vlastos 1971: 2, quoted by Beversluis 2000: 5. 13 Vlastos 1971: 1617.

ARV 2 Attic Red-Figure Vase-Painters, ed. J. D. Beazley (Oxford, 1963,

1.1 er os and philosophia

Diotima spoke and I am persuaded. Being persuaded I attempt to persuade others

In this passage, Socrates claims to be especially devoted both to Eros, the

1.2 er os , sex and interpersonal love

31 I am indebted to Eugene Garver for pointing this out.

32 On these distinctions see further Introduction to Part III.

1.4 setting and characterization

50 Symp. 203d48: Rowes translation, 1998, adapted.

1.5 the erotic dialogues in context

60 For examples see Preface nn.1215.

Socrates and Two Young Men

Your love and mine: eros and self-knowledge in

1.1 puzzles about er os

1.2 acquiring the greatest power

Socrates use of the erotic art in Alcibiades I

In answer to Socrates questions Alcibiades says that he intends to counsel

24 The text and interpretation of 119c5 are discussed below 1.3.

29 Denyer 2001, on 124b7126a4.

1.3 er os for the greatest power and interpersonal er os

40 sper gr s lpdav ceiv n t plei, otw kg par so lpzw mgiston dun-

53 Codicil T. Cf. Codicil B: ganakt pr te to so ka to mauto rwtov (I am vexed on

1.4 the eye and the soul

57 See 130d8e6, with 132d1133c17, discussed further below 1.4.

62 Taylor 1928: 2867. A similar theory of mirrors is given at Soph. 266b9c4.

69 Gill 2007: 109. 70 Cf. Goldin 1993: 1416.

1.5 er os the stork

In love with acquiring friends: Socrates

2.1 impasse as success

2.2 linguistic and conceptual issues

2.2.1 Greek friendship terms

17 Examples: t filomenon ra t filonti flon stin (212e6); t filon n eh flon to

2.2.2 Philos and philein in the Lysis

32 See below 2.2.2 and n.35.

34 Cf. Glidden 1981: 43.

36 Noted by Narcy 1997: 215.

2.2.3 To like wisdom (philo-sophein)

2.3 socrates daimonic art

2.3.1 I am inferior and useless

2.3.2 I am in love with acquiring friends

72 Cf. Dorion 2004: 199. 73 Burkert 1960: 1723.

2.3.3 This has been given to me by god

2.3.4 This is how one should converse with ones beloved

2.4 socrates and his interlocutors

17 Examples: t filomenon ra t filonti flon stin (212e6); t filon n eh flon to