De Leon v.

Esguerra, 153 SCRA 602, August, 31, 1987

(En Banc), J. Melencio-Herrera

Facts: On May 17, 1982, petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon was elected Barangay Captain
together with the other petitioners as Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores,
Muncipality of Taytay, Province of Rizal in a Barangay election held under Batas Pambansa
Blg. 222, otherwise known as Barangay Election Act of 1982.

On February 9, 1987, petitioner De Leon received a Memorandum antedated December 1,

1986 but signed by respondent OIC Governor Benjamin Esguerra on February 8, 1987
designating respondent Florentino G. Magno as Barangay Captain of Barangay Dolores and
the other respondents as members of Barangay Council of the same Barangay and
Municipality.

Petitoners prayed to the Supreme Court that the subject Memoranda of February 8, 1987
be declared null and void and that respondents be prohibited by taking over their positions
of Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen.

Petitioners maintain that pursuant to Section 3 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982 (BP
Blg. 222), their terms of office shall be six years which shall commence on June 7, 1988 and
shall continue until their successors shall have elected and shall have qualified. It was also
their position that with the ratification of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, respondent OIC
Governor no longer has the authority to replace them and to designate their successors.

On the other hand, respondents contend that the terms of office of elective and appointive
officials were abolished and that petitioners continued in office by virtue of Sec. 2, Art. 3 of
the Provisional Constitution and not because their term of six years had not yet expired;
and that the provision in the Barangay Election Act fixing the term of office of Barangay
officials to six years must be deemed to have been repealed for being inconsistent with Sec.
2, Art. 3 of the Provisional Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not the designation of respondents to replace petitioners was validly
made during the one-year period which ended on Feb 25, 1987.

Ruling: Supreme Court declared that the Memoranda issued by respondent OIC Gov on
Feb 8, 1987 designating respondents as Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen of
Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal has no legal force and effect.

The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on Feb 2, 1987, therefore, the Provisional
Constitution must be deemed to have superseded. Having become inoperative, respondent
OIC Gov could no longer rely on Sec 2, Art 3, thereof to designate respondents to the
elective positions occupied by petitioners. Relevantly, Sec 8, Art 1 of the 1987 Constitution
further provides in part:

"Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall
be determined by law, shall be three years x x x."

Until the term of office of barangay officials has been determined by aw, therefore, the
term of office of 6 years provided for in the Barangay Election Act of 1982 should still
govern.

Ramon Gonzales vs COMELEC

21 SCRA 774 Political Law Amendment to the Constitution Political Question vs Justiciable
Question
In June 1967, Republic Act 4913 was passed. This law provided for the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite for
the proposed amendments to the Constitution. It was provided in the said law that the plebiscite shall be
held on the same day that the general national elections shall be held (November 14, 1967). This was
questioned by Ramon Gonzales and other concerned groups as they argued that this was unlawful as
there would be no proper submission of the proposals to the people who would be more interested in the
issues involved in the general election rather than in the issues involving the plebiscite.
Gonzales also questioned the validity of the procedure adopted by Congress when they came up with
their proposals to amend the Constitution (RA 4913). In this regard, the COMELEC and other
respondents interposed the defense that said act of Congress cannot be reviewed by the courts because
it is a political question.
ISSUE:
I. Whether or not the act of Congress in proposing amendments is a political question.
II. Whether or not a plebiscite may be held simultaneously with a general election.
HELD:
I. No. The issue is a justiciable question. It must be noted that the power to amend as well as the power to
propose amendments to the Constitution is not included in the general grant of legislative powers to
Congress. Such powers are not constitutionally granted to Congress. On the contrary, such powers are
inherent to the people as repository of sovereignty in a republican state. That being, when Congress
makes amendments or proposes amendments, it is not actually doing so as Congress; but rather, it is
sitting as a constituent assembly. Such act is not a legislative act. Since it is not a legislative act, it is
reviewable by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has the final say whether or not such act of the
constituent assembly is within constitutional limitations.
II. Yes. There is no prohibition to the effect that a plebiscite must only be held on a special election. SC
held that there is nothing in this provision of the [1935] Constitution to indicate that the election therein
referred to is a special, not a general election. The circumstance that the previous amendment to the
Constitution had been submitted to the people for ratification in special elections merely shows that
Congress deemed it best to do so under the circumstances then obtaining. It does not negate its authority
to submit proposed amendments for ratification in general elections.
Note: **Justice Sanchez and Justice JBL Reyes dissented. Plebiscite should be scheduled on a special
date so as to facilitate Fair submission, intelligent consent or rejection. They should be able to
compare the original proposition with the amended proposition.

IMBONG VS. COMELEC AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS September 11, 1970

FACTS: On March 1967, Congress acting as a Constituent Assembly passed resolution No.2 which among others
called for a Constitutional Convention to propose constitutional amendments. Before the elections on November
after the resolutions adaptation the Congress as a legislative body enacted RA 4914 implementing the aforesaid
resolution. On June 1969, Congress acting as Constituent Assembly passed resolution No.4 amending the
Resolution no.2 by laying down the apportionment of the delegates in the convention. On August 1970, Congress
acting as a legislative body enacted RA no. 6132 - implementing resolutions nos. 2 and 4 and expressly repealing
RA 4914. Petitioner Gonzales challenged the validity of the entire law while petitioner Imbong challenged certain
provisions only. Hence, the petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 6132 is valid.

HELD: YES. The Court sustained the constitutionality of the enactment of RA 6132 by the Congress, acting as a
legislative body in the exercise of their law-making authority and not as a Constituent Assembly. The grant to
Congress as a Constituent Assembly of such plenary authority to call a constitutional convention includes, by virtue
of the doctrine of necessary implication, all other powers essential to the effective exercise of the principal power
granted, such as the power to fix the qualifications, number, apportionment and compensation of the delegates as
well as the appropriation of the funds. To answer the constitutionality here as follows: Sec.2- the petitioner assails
that the apportionment is not in accordance with proportional representation and therefore violates the
Constitution and the intent of the Law itself, the Court ruled that Congress, sitting as constituent assembly may
constitutionally allocate delegates that they saw will fit the benefits of the convention. Sec.5- the petitioners
attacked this section into which there is an undue deprivation of liberty without due process of law. Sec. 5 seeks to
disqualify any elected delegate from running for any public office in any election or from assuming appointments
until the final adjournment of the Constitutional Convention. The Court held that, the State through its
Constitution or legislative body can create an office and define the qualifications and disqualifications therefor as
well as impose inhibitions on a public officer.

TOLENTINO VS. COMELEC AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS OCTOBER 16, 1971

FACTS: Constitutional convention of 1971 proposed constitutional amendment reducing the voting age from 21 to
18 in the face of Organic Resolution no. 1, thereby, scheduled an advance plebiscite to ratify the said piece of
amendment. Although the rest of the draft of the Constitution under revision was not yet approved the COMELEC
takes the task to hold the said election. The petitioner then filed the petition to declare the Organic res. No. 1 and
other implementing resolutions be null and void, alleging that the proposed amendment in question may not be
presented separately from each and all of the other amendments to be drafted and proposed by the Convention.

ISSUE: Whether or not the act of the Convention to call for a plebiscite on the sole amendment under organic
resolution no. 1 violates the Constitution.

HELD: YES. The Language of the constitutional provision is clear. It says distinctly that the either Congress sitting as
a constituent assembly or a convention called for the purpose may propose amendments to this Constitution.
Thus, placing no limit as to the number of amendments that the Congress or Convention may propose. It shall only
valid when ratified by a majority of votes cast at an election by the people. Therefore, leaving no doubt as to how
many elections or plebiscites may be held to ratify any amendment or amendments. And the law is clear with
words an election which means only one.
SANIDAD VS. COMELEC AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS OCTOBER 12, 1976

FACTS: Former President Ferdinand Marcos issued Presidential Decrees calling for a referendum to resolve among
other things the issues of martial law, declaring the manner of voting and canvass of votes in barangays and the
questions to be submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite. Petitioners challenged the Presidential
Decrees by alleging that the president has no power to propose amendments of the constitution. The Solicitor
General answered in return claimed that the petitioners may not sue because the issue is political in nature,
beyond the cognizance of this Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court may take cognizance of the issue raised by the petitioners.

HELD: YES. The Court disagree with the Solicitor General who claims that the question at bar is a political one. The
amending process both as to proposal and ratification raises a judicial question. This is especially true in cases
where the power of the Presidency to initiate the normally exercised by the legislature, is seriously doubted. The
Supreme Court has the last word in the construction not only of treaties and statutes, but also of the Constitution
itself. The amending, like all other powers organized in the Constitution, is in form a delegated and hence a limited
power, so that the Supreme Court as vested with that authorities to determine whether that power has been
discharged with its limits. Political questions are neatly associated with the wisdom, of the legality of a particular
act. Where the vortex of the controversy refers to the legality or validity of the contested act, is definitely a
justiciable one. If the Constitution provides how it may be amended, the judiciary as the interpreter of that
Constitution, can declare whether the procedure followed or the authority assumed was valid or not.
Occena vs. Commission on Elections
[GR 56350, 2 April 1981]

Facts: The challenge in these two prohibition proceedings against the validity of three Batasang Pambansa
Resolutions proposing constitutional amendments, goes further than merely assailing their alleged constitutional
infirmity. Samuel Occena and Ramon A. Gonzales, both members of the Philippine Bar and former delegates to the
1971 Constitutional Convention that framed the present Constitution, are suing as taxpayers. The rather
unorthodox aspect of these petitions is the assertion that the 1973 Constitution is not the fundamental law, the
Javellana ruling to the contrary notwithstanding.

Issue: Whether the 1973 Constitution was valid, and in force and effect when the Batasang Pambansa resolutions
and the present petitions were promulgated and filed, respectively.

Ruling: It is much too late in the day to deny the force and applicability of the 1973 Constitution. In the dispositive
portion of Javellana v. The Executive Secretary, dismissing petitions for prohibition and mandamus to declare
invalid its ratification, this Court stated that it did so by a vote of six to four. It then concluded: "This being the vote
of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect."
Such a statement served a useful purpose. It could even be said that there was a need for it. It served to clear the
atmosphere. It made manifest that as of 17 January 1973, the present Constitution came into force and effect.
With such a pronouncement by the Supreme Court and with the recognition of the cardinal postulate that what the
Supreme Court says is not only entitled to respect but must also be obeyed, a factor for instability was removed.
Thereafter, as a matter of law, all doubts were resolved. The 1973 Constitution is the fundamental law. It is as
simple as that. What cannot be too strongly stressed is that the function of judicial review has both a positive and a
negative aspect. As was so convincingly demonstrated by Professors Black and Murphy, the Supreme Court can
check as well as legitimate. In declaring what the law is, it may not only nullify the acts of coordinate branches but
may also sustain their validity. In the latter case, there is an affirmation that what was done cannot be stigmatized
as constitutionally deficient. The mere dismissal of a suit of this character suffices. That is the meaning of the
concluding statement in Javellana. Since then, this Court has invariably applied the present Constitution. The latest
case in point is People v. Sola, promulgated barely two weeks ago. During the first year alone of the effectivity of
the present Constitution, at least ten cases may be cited.
DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs. COMELEC
(G.R. No. 127325 - March 19, 1997)

Facts: Private respondent Atty. Jesus Delfin, president of Peoples Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action
(PIRMA), filed with COMELEC a petition to amend the constitution to lift the term limits of elective officials,
through Peoples Initiative. He based this petition on Article XVII, Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which provides
for the right of the people to exercise the power to directly propose amendments to the Constitution.
Subsequently the COMELEC issued an order directing the publication of the petition and of the notice of hearing
and thereafter set the case for hearing. At the hearing, Senator Roco, the IBP, Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang
Konstitusyon, PublicInterest Law Center, and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino appeared as intervenors-oppositors.
Senator Roco filed a motion to dismiss the Delfin petition on the ground that one which is cognizable by the
COMELEC. The petitioners herein Senator Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Isabel Ongpin filed this civil action for
prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against COMELEC and the Delfin petition rising the several
arguments, such as the following: (1) The constitutional provision on peoples initiative to amend the constitution
can only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed; (2) The peoples initiative
is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to revision thereof. Lifting of the term limits constitutes a
revision, therefore it is outside the power of peoples initiative. The Supreme Court granted the Motions for
Intervention.

Issues: (1) Whether or not Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.
(2) Whether or not COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments to
the Constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of specific provisions on the conduct of such
initiative.
(3) Whether the lifting of term limits of elective officials would constitute a revision or an amendment of
the Constitution.

Held: Sec. 2, Art XVII of the Constitution is not self-executory, thus, without implementing legislation the same
cannot operate. Although the Constitution has recognized or granted the right, the people cannot exercise it if
Congress does not provide for its implementation. The portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 which prescribes
rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, is void. It has been an
established rule that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated (potestas delegata non delegari potest). The
delegation of the power to the COMELEC being invalid, the latter cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to
implement the exercise of the right to peoples initiative. The lifting of the term limits was held to be that of a
revision, as it would affect other provisions of the Constitution such as the synchronization of elections, the
constitutional guarantee of equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibiting political dynasties. A
revision cannot be done by initiative. However, considering the Courts decision in the above Issue, the issue of
whether or not the petition is a revision or amendment has become academic.
LAMBINO VS VCOMELEC

[G.R. No. 174153; 25 Oct 2006]

Facts: Petitioners (Lambino group) commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987
constitution, they filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition
under RA 6735. Lambino group alleged that the petition had the support of 6M individuals fulfilling what was
provided by art 17 of the constitution. Their petition changes the 1987 constitution by modifying sections 17 of
Art 6 and sections 14 of Art 7 and by adding Art 18. the proposed changes will shift the present
bicameral presidential form of government to unicameral parliamentary. COMELEC denied the petition due to
lack of enabling law governing initiative petitions and invoked the Santiago Vs. Comelec ruling that RA 6735 is
inadequate to implement the initiative petitions.

Issue: Whether or Not the Lambino Groups initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a peoples initiative.

Whether or Not this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 incomplete, inadequate or
wanting in essential terms and conditions to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the
Constitution.

Whether or Not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the Lambino Groups
petition.

Held: According to the SC the Lambino group failed to comply with the basic requirements for conducting a
peoples initiative. The Court held that the COMELEC did not grave abuse of discretion on dismissing the Lambino
petition.

1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct Proposal by
the People The petitioners failed to show the court that the initiative signer must be informed at the time of the
signing of the nature and effect, failure to do so is deceptive and misleading which renders the initiative void.

2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing Revision through Initiatives The
framers of the constitution intended a clear distinction between amendment and revision, it is intended that
the third mode of stated in sec 2 art 17 of the constitution may propose only amendments to the constitution.
Merging of the legislative and the executive is a radical change, therefore a constitutes a revision.

3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary. Even assuming that RA 6735 is valid, it will not change the
result because the present petition violated Sec 2 Art 17 to be a valid initiative, must first comply with the
constitution before complying with RA 6735

Petition is dismissed.
 MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS GSIS
Self-Executing Provisions of the Constitution Par. 2, Sec. 10, Art. XII
Pursuant to the privatization program of the government, the Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) decided to sell 30-51% of the Manila Hotel Corporation. Two bidders participated, Manila Prince
Hotel (MPH) and the Malaysian Firm Renong Berhad (RB). MPHs bid was at P41.58/per share while
RBs bid was at P44.00/share. RB was the highest bidder hence it was logically considered as the
winning bidder but is yet to be declared so. Pending declaration, MPH matches RBs bid and invoked the
Filipino First Policy enshrined under par. 2, Sec. 10, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution which provides:
Section 10. The Congress shall, upon recommendation of the economic and planning agency, when the
national interest dictates, reserve to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations at least
sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens, or such higher percentage as Congress may
prescribe, certain areas of investments. The Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the
formation and operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos.
In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony,
the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.
The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction and
in accordance with its national goals and priorities.
But GSIS refused to accept said offer. In turn MPH filed a petition for TRO against GSIS to avoid the
perfection/consummation of the sale to RB. TRO was granted.
RB then assailed the TRO issued in favor of MPH arguing among others that:

1. Par. 2, Sec. 10, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution needs an implementing law because it is merely a
statement of principle and policy (not self-executing);
2. Even if said passage is self-executing, Manila Hotel does not fall under national patrimony.

ISSUE: Whether or not RB should be admitted as the highest bidder and hence be proclaimed as the legit
buyer of shares.
HELD: No. MPH should be awarded the sale pursuant to Art 12 of the 1987 Const. This is in light of the
Filipino First Policy.
Par. 2, Sec. 10, Art. 12 of the 1987 Constitution is self executing. The Constitution is the fundamental,
paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract.
Manila Hotel falls under national patrimony. Patrimony in its plain and ordinary meaning pertains to
heritage. When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of
the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources, but also to
the cultural heritage of the Filipinos. It also refers to our intelligence in arts, sciences and letters.
Therefore, we should develop not only our lands, forests, mines and other natural resources but also the
mental ability or faculty of our people. Note that, for more than 8 decades (9 now) Manila Hotel has bore
mute witness to the triumphs and failures, loves and frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is
impressed with public interest; its own historicity associated with our struggle for sovereignty,
independence and nationhood.
Herein resolved as well is the term Qualified Filipinos which not only pertains to individuals but to
corporations as well and other juridical entities/personalities. The term qualified Filipinos simply means
that preference shall be given to those citizens who can make a viable contribution to the common good,
because of credible competence and efficiency. It certainly does NOT mandate the pampering and
preferential treatment to Filipino citizens or organizations that are incompetent or inefficient, since such an
indiscriminate preference would be counter productive and inimical to the common good.
In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and concessions, when a choice has to be made between a
qualified foreigner and a qualified Filipino, the latter shall be chosen over the former.

BASES CONVERSION AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON

AUDIT, respondent.

CARPIO, J p:

Facts:

Congress approved Republic Act (RA) No. 7227 creating the Bases Conversion and Development Authority
(BCDA). The Board adopted a new compensation and benefit scheme which included a P10,000 year-end benefit
granted to each contractual employee, regular permanent employee, and Board member. In a memorandum,
President Ramos approved the new compensation and benefit scheme. the full-time consultants of the BCDA also
received the year-end benefit. BCDA officials and employees received a P30,000 year-end benefit, and, on 1
October 2002, the Board passed Resolution No. 2002-10-193 approving the release of a P30,000 year-end benefit
for 2002.

State Auditor IV Corazon V. Espao of the COA issued Audit Observation Memorandum (AOM) No. 2003-004
stating that the grant of year-end benefit to Board members was contrary to Department of Budget and Management
(DBM) Circular Letter No. 2002-2. In Notice of Disallowance (ND) No. 03-001-BCDA-(02), Director IV Rogelio
D. Tablang (Director Tablang), COA, Legal and Adjudication Office-Corporate, disallowed the grant of year-end
benefit to the Board members and full-time consultants. In Decision, Director Tablang "concurred" with AOM No.
2003-004 and ND No. 03-001-BCDA-(02).

In a letter, BCDA President and Chief Executive Officer Rufo Colayco requested the reconsideration of Decision
No. 2004-013. Director Tablang denied the request. The BCDA filed a notice of appeal with the COA.

the COA affirmed the disallowance of the year-end benefit granted to the Board members and full-time consultants
and held that the presumption of good faith did not apply to them.

Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the denial of year-end benefit to the Board members and full-time consultants violates Section 1,
Article III of the Constitution.

Whether or not the Board members and full-time consultants of the BCDA are entitled to the year-end benefit.

Held:

Every presumption should be indulged in favor of the constitutionality of RA No. 7227 and the burden of
proof is on the BCDA to show that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution.

The BCDA failed to show that RA No. 7227 unreasonably singled out Board members and full-time consultants in
the grant of the year-end benefit. It did not show any clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution. The claim
that there is no difference between regular officials and employees, and Board members and full-time consultants
because both groups "have mouths to feed and stomachs to fill" is fatuous. Surely, persons are not automatically
similarly situated thus, automatically deserving of equal protection of the laws just because they both "have
mouths to feed and stomachs to fill". Otherwise, the existence of a substantial distinction would become forever
highly improbable.

The Board members and full-time consultants of the BCDA are not entitled to the year-end benefit. Section 9
specifies that Board members shall receive a per diem for every board meeting; limits the amount of per diem to not
more than P5,000; and limits the total amount of per diem for one month to not more than four meetings. the
specification of compensation and limitation of the amount of compensation in a statute indicate that Board
members are entitled only to the per diem authorized by law and no other.

Members of the Board of Directors of agencies are not salaried officials of the government. As non-salaried
officials they are not entitled to YEB and retirement benefits unless expressly provided by law." RA No. 7227
does not state that the Board members are entitled to a year-end benefit. ScHADI

The petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Commission on Audit Decision No. 2007-020 dated 12 April 2007 is
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the Board members and full-time consultants of the Bases Conversion
and Development Authority are not required to refund the year-end benefits they have already received.
Oposa vs. Factoran Case Digest (G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993)
FACTS:

The plaintiffs in this case are all minors duly represented and joined by their parents. The first complaint
was filed as a taxpayer's class suit at the Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila), of the Regional Trial Court,
National capital Judicial Region against defendant (respondent) Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Reasources (DENR). Plaintiffs alleged that they are entitled to the full benefit,
use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests. They
further asseverate that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn and asserted
that continued deforestation have caused a distortion and disturbance of the ecological balance and have
resulted in a host of environmental tragedies.

Plaintiffs prayed that judgement be rendered ordering the respondent, his agents, representatives and
other persons acting in his behalf to cancel all existing Timber License Agreement (TLA) in the country
and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new TLAs.

Defendant, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint had no cause of
action against him and that it raises a political question.

The RTC Judge sustained the motion to dismiss, further ruling that granting of the relief prayed for would
result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the Constitution.

Plaintiffs (petitioners) thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari and asked the court to rescind
and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent RTC Judge gravely abused his
discretion in dismissing the action.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not the plaintiffs have a cause of action.

(2) Whether or not the complaint raises a political issue.

(3) Whether or not the original prayer of the plaintiffs result in the impairment of contracts.

RULING:

First Issue: Cause of Action.

Respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by
the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. The Court did not agree with this. The
complaint focuses on one fundamental legal right -- the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which is
incorporated in Section 16 Article II of the Constitution. The said right carries with it the duty to refrain
from impairing the environment and implies, among many other things, the judicious management and
conservation of the country's forests. Section 4 of E.O. 192 expressly mandates the DENR to be the
primary government agency responsible for the governing and supervising the exploration, utilization,
development and conservation of the country's natural resources. The policy declaration of E.O. 192 is
also substantially re-stated in Title XIV Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987. Both E.O. 192 and
Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the bases for policy formation,
and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR. Thus, right of the petitioners (and all those they
represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as DENR's duty to protect and advance the
said right.

A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or
protect or respect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the
TLA, which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balance and
healthful ecology. Hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or
granted.

After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, the Court finds it to be adequate enough to show,
prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights.

Second Issue: Political Issue.

Second paragraph, Section 1 of Article VIII of the constitution provides for the expanded jurisdiction
vested upon the Supreme Court. It allows the Court to rule upon even on the wisdom of the decision of
the Executive and Legislature and to declare their acts as invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because
it is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

Third Issue: Violation of the non-impairment clause.

The Court held that the Timber License Agreement is an instrument by which the state regulates the
utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. It is not a contract
within the purview of the due process clause thus, the non-impairment clause cannot be invoked. It can
be validly withdraw whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case. The granting of
license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights.

Moreover, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limit by the exercise
by the police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, moral and general welfare. In
short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the State.

The instant petition, being impressed with merit, is hereby GRANTED and the RTC decision is SET
ASIDE.

Legaspi vs. Civil Service Commission

No. L-72119
May 29, 1987

Cortes:

Facts: Petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi files for Mandamus to compel respondent Civil Service Commission to release
information on the civil service eligibilities of persons employed as sanitarians (Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano
Agas) in the Health Department of Cebu City.

OSG contends that petitioner has no locus standing as he failed to show his actual interest. The Court ruled
however that the petition on mandamus is anchored upon the right of the people for information on matters of
public concern which is a public right.
1. The petitioner being a citizen (hence, part of the public) warrants standing in his part; and
2. The State and its agents are mandated by the Constitution by virtue of Sec. 7 Article III and Sec. 28,
Article II.

Issue: WON respondent should release the information.

Held: Yes.
The constitutional right to information on matters of public information is grounded on Sec. 7, Article III
and Sec. 28, Article II of the 1987 Constitution. These are self-executory.
In the case at bar, the government agency Civil Service Commission does not have the discretion
to prohibit the access to information sought. It only has the authority to regulate the manner of
examination (e.g. ensuring that the records are not damaged or destroyed).
These constitutional guarantees, however, are not absolute as they are subject to the limitations as may
be provided by law (Art. III Sec. 7 2 nd sentence). The information sought must be not be exempted by
law.
In the case at bar, the information is within the enumerations provided by law. Why/ How?
1. the information sought relates to a public office which can be considered as a legitimate
concern of citizens (public office as public trust);
2. Respondent failed to cite any provision in the Civil Service Law which would limit the
petitioners right to know who are, and who are not civil service eligible; and
3. Civil service exams results are released in the public.

Ratio:
Government agencies such as the Civil Service Commission do not have the discretion in refusing
disclosure of, or access to, information of public concern.

What is within the bounds of the agencies then? They still have the authority to regulate the manner of
examining public records.
The authority to regulate the manner of examining public records does not carry with it the
power to prohibit.
The Court provided a distinction between discretion/ prohibition and authority to regulate.
o Refusal to disclose only the Legislature may impose (Sec. 6, Article III)
 o Authority to regulate the manner of examination done by government agency which
has the custody of public records.

In case of denial by the agency, it must prove that the information is not of public concern or if it
is of public concern, it is within the exemptions (e.g. national security). Further, every denial is
subject to review by courts.

Is the information sought by the petitioner considered public concern/ interest within those mentioned
in the articles? YES!
The constitutional guarantees are not absolute as the law may exempt certain types of
information from public scrutiny such as those affecting national security.
There is no rigid test as the term public concern/ interest is broad. It is for the courts to
determine if the information falls within public concern or public interest.

Legal historical background of the right to public information

Right to information on matters of public concern first gained recognition in the 1973
Constitution (Section 6 of Article IV-Bill of Rights).
This was retained by Article III Section 7 of the 1987 Constitution. Further, such guarantee was
enhanced with the adoption of Section 18, Article II (Policy of Full Public Disclosure).
MAGALLONA VS ERMITA

655 SCRA 476 Political Law National Territory RA 9522 is Constitutional

In March 2009, Republic Act 9522, an act defining the archipelagic baselines of the Philippines was
enacted the law is also known as the Baselines Law. This law was meant to comply with the terms of
the third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), ratified by the Philippines in
February 1984.
Professor Merlin Magallona et al questioned the validity of RA 9522 as they contend, among others, that
the law decreased the national territory of the Philippines hence the law is unconstitutional. Some of their
particular arguments are as follows:
a. the law abandoned the demarcation set by the Treaty of Paris and other ancillary treaties this also
resulted to the exclusion of our claim over Sabah;
b. the law, as well as UNCLOS itself, describes the Philippine waters as archipelagic waters which, in
international law, opens our waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels
(innocent passage) and aircrafts (overflight), undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security,
contravening the countrys nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine resources, in violation of relevant
constitutional provisions;
c. the classification of the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG), as well as the Scarborough Shoal (bajo de
masinloc), as a regime of islands pursuant to UNCLOS results in the loss of a large maritime area but
also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen.
ISSUE: Whether or not the contentions of Magallona et al are tenable.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court emphasized that RA 9522, or UNCLOS, itself is not a means to acquire,
or lose, territory. The treaty and the baseline law has nothing to do with the acquisition, enlargement, or
diminution of the Philippine territory. What controls when it comes to acquisition or loss of territory is the
international law principle on occupation, accretion, cession and prescription and NOT the execution
of multilateral treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to comply with the treatys
terms to delimit maritime zones and continental shelves.
The law did not decrease the demarcation of our territory. In fact it increased it. Under the old law
amended by RA 9522 (RA 3046), we adhered with the rectangular lines enclosing the Philippines. The
area that it covered was 440,994 square nautical miles (sq. na. mi.). But under 9522, and with the
inclusion of the exclusive economic zone, the extent of our maritime was increased to 586,210 sq. na.
mi. (See image below for comparison)
If any, the baselines law is a notice to the international community of the scope of the maritime space and
submarine areas within which States parties exercise treaty-based rights.

REPUBLIC VS VILLASOR
G.R. No. L-30671 54 SCRA 83 November 28, 1973
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. GUILLERMO P. VILLASOR, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch I, THE PROVINCIAL
SHERIFF OF RIZAL, THE SHERIFF OF QUEZON CITY, and THE SHERIFF OF THE CITY OF MANILA, THE
CLERK OF COURT, Court of First Instance of Cebu, P. J. KIENER CO., LTD., GAVINO UNCHUAN, AND
INTERNATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, respondents

Facts:
The case was filed by the Republic of the Philippines requesting to nullify the ruling of The Court of First Instance
in Cebu in garnishing the public funds allocated for the Arm Forces of the Philippines.

A decision was rendered in Special Proceedings in favor of respondents P. J. Kiener Co., Ltd., Gavino Unchuan, and
International Construction Corporation, and against the petitioner herein, confirming the arbitration award in the
amount of P1,712,396.40, subject of Special Proceedings. The respondent Honorable Guillermo P. Villasor, issued
an Order declaring the said decision final and executory, directing the Sheriffs of Rizal Province, Quezon City and
Manila to execute the said decision. The corresponding Alia Writ of Execution was issued. On the strength of the
aforementioned Alias Writ of Execution, the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal served Notices of Garnishment with several
Banks. The funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines on deposit with Philippine Veterans Bank and PNB are
public funds duly appropriated and allocated for the payment of pensions of retirees, pay and allowances of military
and civilian personnel and for maintenance and operations of the AFP.

Petitioner, filed prohibition proceedings against respondent Judge Villasor for acting in excess of jurisdiction with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in granting the issuance of a Writ of Execution against
the properties of the AFP, hence the notices and garnishment are null and void.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the state can be sued without its consent.

2. Whether or not the notice of garnishment issued by Judge Villasor is valid.

Discussions:

1. The provision of Sec 3 Article XVI declares that the State may not be sued without its consent. This provision
is merely a recognition of the sovereign character of the State and express an affirmation of the unwritten rule
insulating it from the jurisdiction of the courts of justice. Another justification is the practical consideration that
the demands and inconveniences of litigation will divert time and resources of the State from the more pressing
matters demanding its attention, to the prejudice of the public welfare.
2. As a general rule, whether the money is deposited by way of general or special deposit, they remain government
funds and are not subject to garnishment. An exception of the rule is a law or ordinance that has been enacted
appropriating a specific amount to pay a valid government obligation.

Rulings:

1. It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristic concept of sovereignty that the state
as well as its government is immune from suit unless it gives its consent. A sovereign is exempt from suit, not
because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be
 no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. A continued adherence to
the doctrine of non-suability is not to be deplored for as against the inconvenience that may cause private
parties, the loss of government efficiency and the obstacle to the performance of its multifarious functions are
far greater is such a fundamental principle were abandoned and the availability of judicial remedy were not thus
restricted.
2. What was done by respondent Judge is not in conformity with the dictates of the Constitution. From a logical
and sound sense from the basic concept of the non-suability of the State, public funds cannot be the object of a
garnishment proceeding even if the consent to be sued had been previously granted and the state liability
adjudged. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by
law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by
the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law

REPUBLIC VS FELICIANO
G.R. No. 70853 148 SCRA 424 March 12, 1987
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner-appellee,
PABLO FELICIANO and INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, respondents-appellants
Facts:
The appeal was filed by 86 settlers of Barrio of Salvacion, representing the Republic of the Philippines to dismiss
the complaint filed by Feliciano, on the ground that the Republic of the Philippines cannot be sued without its
consent.

Prior to this appeal, respondent Pablo Feliciano filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance against the
Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Land Authority, for the recovery of ownership and possession of a
parcel of land consisting of four lots. The trial court rendered a decision declaring Lot No. 1 to be the private
property of Feliciano and the rest of the property, Lots 2, 3 and 4, reverted to the public domain.

The trial court reopened the case due to the filing of a motion to intervene and to set aside the decision of the trial
court by 86 settlers, alleging that they had been in possession of the land for more than 20 years under claim of
ownership. The trial court ordered the settlers to present their evidence but they did not appear at the day of
presentation of evidence. Feliciano, on the other hand, presented additional evidence. Thereafter, the case was
submitted for decision and the trial court ruled in favor of Feliciano.

The settlers immediately filed a motion for reconsideration. The case was reopened to allow them to present their
evidence. But before this motion was acted upon, Feliciano filed a motion for execution with the Appellate Court
but it was denied.

The settlers filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the Republic of the Philippines cannot be sued without its
consent and hence the action cannot prosper. The motion was opposed by Feliciano.

Issue/s:
Whether or not the state can be sued for recovery and possession of a parcel of land.

Discussions:
A suit against the State, under settled jurisprudence is not permitted, except upon a showing that the State has
consented to be sued, either expressly or by implication through the use of statutory language too plain to be
misinterpreted. It may be invoked by the courts sua sponte at any stage of the proceedings.

Waiver of immunity, being a derogation of sovereignty, will not be inferred lightly. but must be construed
in strictissimi juris (of strictest right). Moreover, the Proclamation is not a legislative act. The consent of the State
to be sued must emanate from statutory authority. Waiver of State immunity can only be made by an act of the
legislative body.

Ruling/s:
No. The doctrine of non-suability of the State has proper application in this case. The plaintiff has impleaded the
Republic of the Philippines as defendant in an action for recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land,
bringing the State to court just like any private person who is claimed to be usurping a piece of property. A suit for
the recovery of property is not an action in rem, but an action in personam. It is an action directed against a specific
party or parties, and any judgment therein binds only such party or parties. The complaint filed by plaintiff, the
private respondent herein, is directed against the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Land Authority, a
governmental agency created by Republic Act No. 3844.
The complaint is clearly a suit against the State, which under settled jurisprudence is not permitted, except upon a
showing that the State has consented to be sued, either expressly or by implication through the use of statutory
language too plain to be misinterpreted. There is no such showing in the instant case. Worse, the complaint itself
fails to allege the existence of such consent.

GAUDENCIO RAYO vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BULACAN G.R. No. L-55273-83 December
19, 1981
FACTS: At the height of the infamous typhoon "Kading", the respondent opened simultaneously all the
three floodgates of the Angat Dam which resulted in a sudden, precipitate and simultaneous opening of
said floodgates several towns in Bulacan were inundated. The petitioners filed for damages against the
respondent corporation.
Petitioners opposed the prayer of the respondents forn dismissal of the case and contended that the
respondent corporation is merely performing a propriety functions and that under its own organic act, it
can sue and be sued in court.

ISSUE: W/N the respondent performs governmental functions with respect to the management and
operation of the Angat Dam.

W/N the power of the respondent to sue and be sued under its organic charter includes the power to be
sued for tort.

HELD: The government has organized a private corporation, put money in it and has allowed it to sue and
be sued in any court under its charter.

As a government owned and controlled corporation, it has a personality of its own, distinct and separate
from that of the government. Moreover, the charter provision that it can sue and be sued in any court.

MUNICIPALITY OF SAN FERNANDO VS JUDGE FIRME

G.R. No. L-52179 195 SCRA 692 April 8, 1991
MUNICIPALITY OF SAN FERNANDO, LA UNION, petitioner
vs.
HON. JUDGE ROMEO N. FIRME, JUANA RIMANDO-BANIA, IAUREANO BANIA, JR., SOR MARIETA
BANIA, MONTANO BANIA, ORJA BANIA, AND LYDIA R. BANIA, respondents.
Facts:
The case was filed by petitioner, which is a municipal corporation existing under and in accordance with the laws of
the Republic of the Philippines.

A collision occurred involving a passenger jeepney owned by the Estate of Macario Nieveras, a gravel and sand
truck owned by Tanquilino Velasquez and a dump truck of the Municipality of San Fernando, La Union and driven
by Alfredo Bislig. Due to the impact, several passengers of the jeepney including Laureano Bania Sr. died as a
result of the injuries they sustained and four others suffered varying degrees of physical injuries.

The private respondents instituted a compliant for damages against the Estate of Macario Nieveras and Bernardo
Balagot, owner and driver, respectively, of the passenger jeepney. However, the defendants filed a Third Party
Complaint against the petitioner and the driver of a dump truck of petitioner. Petitioner filed its answer and raised
affirmative defenses such as lack of cause of action, non-suability of the State, prescription of cause of action and
the negligence of the owner and driver of the passenger jeepney as the proximate cause of the collision.

The trial court rendered a decision ordering the petitioner and Bislig to pay the plaintiffs. The owner and driver of
the jeepney were absolved from liability. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was dismissed for
having been filed out of time.

Issues:
Whether or not the respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion when it deferred and failed to resolve the
defense of non-suability of the State amounting to lack of jurisdiction in a motion to dismiss.

Discussions:
The test of liability of the municipality depends on whether or not the driver acting in behalf of the municipality is
performing governmental or proprietary functions. Municipal corporations are suable because their charters grant
them the competence to sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts committed by them in
the discharge of governmental functions and can be held answerable only if it can be shown that they were acting in
a proprietary capacity. In permitting such entities to be sued, the State merely gives the claimant the right to show
that the defendant was not acting in its governmental capacity when the injury was committed or that the case comes
under the exceptions recognized by law. Failing this, the claimant cannot recover.

Rulings:
Yes. In the case at bar, the judge deferred the resolution of the defense of non-suability of the State until trial.
However, the respondent judge failed to resolve such defense, proceeded with the trial and thereafter rendered a
decision against the municipality and its driver.

The respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion when in the exercise of its judgment it arbitrarily
failed to resolve the vital issue of non-suability of the State in the guise of the municipality. However, the judge
acted in excess of his jurisdiction when in his decision, he held the municipality liable for the quasi-delict committed
by its regular employee.

Suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued, liability on the applicable law and the established facts. The
circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it can never be held
liable if it does not first consent to be sued. Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the state has allowed itself
to be sued. When the state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it
can, that the defendant is liable. Anent the issue of whether or not the municipality is liable for the torts committed
by its employee, the test of liability of the municipality depends on whether or not the driver, acting in behalf of the
municipality, is performing governmental or proprietary functions.
DEPT OF AGRICULTURE VS NLRC
G.R. No. 104269 November 11, 1993
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, petitioner,
vs.
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, et al., respondents.

Facts:
The case is regarding money claim against Department of Agriculture (DA) as filed and requested by National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).

Petitioner Department of Agriculture and Sultan Security Agency entered into a contract for security services to be
provided by the latter to the said governmental entity. Pursuant to their arrangements, guards were deployed by
Sultan Security Agency in the various premises of the DA. Thereafter, several guards filed a complaint for
underpayment of wages, non-payment of 13th month pay, uniform allowances, night shift differential pay, holiday
pay, and overtime pay, as well as for damages against the DA and the security agency.
The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding the DA jointly and severally liable with the security agency for the
payment of money claims of the complainant security guards. The DA and the security agency did not appeal the
decision. Thus, the decision became final and executory. The Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution to enforce and
execute the judgment against the property of the DA and the security agency. Thereafter, the City Sheriff levied on
execution the motor vehicles of the DA.

The petitioner charges the NLRC with grave abuse of discretion for refusing to quash the writ of execution. The
petitioner faults the NLRC for assuming jurisdiction over a money claim against the Department, which, it claims,
falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit. More importantly, the petitioner asserts, the
NLRC has disregarded the cardinal rule on the non-suability of the State.

The private respondents, on the other hand, argue that the petitioner has impliedly waived its immunity from suit by
concluding a service contract with Sultan Security Agency.

Issues:
Whether or not the doctrine of non-suability of the State applies in the case.

Discussions:
Act No. 3083, aforecited, gives the consent of the State to be sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability
arising from contract, express or implied. However, the money claim should first be brought to the Commission on
Audit. Act 3083 stands as the general law waiving the States immunity from suit, subject to its general limitation
expressed in Section 7 thereof that no execution shall issue upon any judgment rendered by any Court against the
Government of the (Philippines), and that the conditions provided in Commonwealth Act 327 for filing money
claims against the Government must be strictly observed.

DALE SANDERS, AND A.S. MOREAU, JR vs. HON. REGINO T. VERIDIANO II

FACTS: Petitioner Sanders was the special services director of the U.S. Naval Station. Petitioner Moreau
was the commanding officer of the Subic Naval Base. Private respondent Rossi is an American citizen with
permanent residence in the Philippines. Private respondent Rossi and Wyer were both employed as game
room attendants in the special services department of the NAVSTA.

On October 3, 1975, the private respondents were advised that their employment had been converted
from permanent full-time to permanent part-time. They instituted grievance proceedings to the rules and
regulations of the U.S. Department of Defense. The hearing officer recommended for reinstatement of
their permanent full-time status.

However, in a letter addressed to petitioner Moreau, Sanders disagreed with the hearing officer's report.
The letter contained the statements that: a ) "Mr. Rossi tends to alienate most co-workers and
supervisors;" b) "Messrs. Rossi and Wyers have proven, according to their immediate supervisors, to be
difficult employees to supervise;" and c) "even though the grievants were under oath not to discuss the
case with anyone, (they) placed the records in public places where others not involved in the case could
hear."

Before the start of the grievance hearings, a-letter from petitioner Moreau was sent to the Chief of Naval
Personnel explaining the change of the private respondent's employment status. So, private respondent
filed for damages alleging that the letters contained libelous imputations and that the prejudgment of the
grievance proceedings was an invasion of their personal and proprietary rights.
However, petitioners argued that the acts complained of were performed by them in the discharge of
their official duties and that, consequently, the court had no jurisdiction over them under the doctrine of
state immunity. However, the motion was denied on the main ground that the petitioners had not
presented any evidence that their acts were official in nature.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners were performing their official duties?

RULING: Yes. Sanders, as director of the special services department of NAVSTA, undoubtedly had
supervision over its personnel, including the private respondents. Given the official character of the
letters, the petitioners were being sued as officers of the United States government because they have
acted on behalf of that government and within the scope of their authority. Thus, it is that government
and not the petitioners personally that is responsible for their acts.

It is stressed at the outset that the mere allegation that a government functionary is being sued in his
personal capacity will not automatically remove him from the protection of the law of public officers and,
if appropriate, the doctrine of state immunity. By the same token, the mere invocation of official
character will not suffice to insulate him from suability and liability for an act imputed to him as a
personal tort committed without or in excess of his authority. These well-settled principles are applicable
not only to the officers of the local state but also where the person sued in its courts pertains to the
government of a foreign state, as in the present case.

Assuming that the trial can proceed and it is proved that the claimants have a right to the payment of
damages, such award will have to be satisfied not by the petitioners in their personal capacities but by
the United States government as their principal. This will require that government to perform an
affirmative act to satisfy the judgment, viz, the appropriation of the necessary amount to cover the
damages awarded, thus making the action a suit against that government without its consent.

The practical justification for the doctrine, as Holmes put it, is that "there can be no legal right against
the authority which makes the law on which the right depends. In the case of foreign states, the rule is
derived from the principle of the sovereign equality of states which wisely admonishes that par in parem
non habet imperium and that a contrary attitude would "unduly vex the peace of nations." 17 Our
adherence to this precept is formally expressed in Article II, Section 2, of our Constitution, where we
reiterate from our previous charters that the Philippines "adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
Republic vs. Sandoval 220 SCRA 124

Facts: Farmer-rallyists marched to Malacanang calling for a genuine land reform program.
There was a marchers-police confrontation which resulted in the death of 12 rallyists and
scores were wounded. As a result, then Pres. Aquino issued AO 11 creating the Citizens
Mendiola Commission for the purpose of conducting an investigation. The most
significant recommendation of the Commission was for the heirs of thedeceased and
wounded victims to be compensated by the government. Based on such recommendation,
the victims of Mendiola massacre filed an action for damages against the Republic and the
military/police officers involved in the incident.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not there is a valid waiver of immunity
(2) Whether or not the State is liable for damages

Held: The Court held that there was no valid waiver of immunity as claimed by the
petitioners. The recommendation made by the Commission to indemnify the heirs of
the deceased and the victims does not in any way mean that liability attaches to the State.
AO 11 merely states the purpose of the creation of the Commission and, therefore,
whatever is the finding of the Commission only serves as the basis for a cause of action in
the event any party decides to litigate the same. Thus, the recommendation of the
Commission does not in any way bind the State.

The State cannot be made liable because the military/police officers who allegedly were
responsible for the death and injuries suffered by the marchers acted beyond the scope of
their authority. It is a settled rule that the State as a person can commit no wrong. The
military and police officers who were responsible for the atrocities can be held personally
liable for damages as they exceeded their authority, hence, the acts cannot be considered
official.
AMIGABLE VS CUENCA
G.R. No. L-26400 43 SCRA 487 February 29, 1972

VICTORIA AMIGABLE, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
NICOLAS CUENCA, as Commissioner of Public Highways and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, defendants-
appellees.

Facts:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu in its Civil Case, dismissing the plaintiffs
complaint.

Victoria Amigable, the petitioner is a rightful owner of a lot in Cebu City. Without prior expropriation or negotiated
sale, the government used a portion of said lot for the construction of the Mango and Gorordo Avenues.

Amigables counsel wrote the President of the Philippines, requesting payment of the portion of the said lot. It was
disallowed by the Auditor General in his 9th Endorsement. Petitioner then filed a complaint against the Republic of
the Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca, in his capacity as Commissioner of Public Highways, for the recovery of
ownership and possession of the lot.

Defendants argue that the: (1) that the action was premature, the claim not having been filed first with the Office of
the Auditor General; (2) that the right of action for the recovery had already prescribed; (3) that the action being a
suit against the Government, the claim for moral damages, attorneys fees and costs had no valid basis since the
Government had not given its consent to be sued; and (4) that inasmuch as it was the province of Cebu that
appropriated and used the area involved in the construction of Mango Avenue, plaintiff had no cause of action
against the defendants.

The court rendered its decision holding that it had no jurisdiction over the plaintiffs cause of action for the recovery
of possession and ownership of the lot on the ground that the government cannot be sued without its consent; that it
had neither original nor appellate jurisdiction to hear and decide plaintiffs claim for compensatory damages, being a
money claim against the government; and that it had long prescribed, nor did it have jurisdiction over said claim
because the government had not given its consent to be sued. Accordingly, the complaint was dismissed.

Issues:
Whether or not petitioner Amigable, may properly sue the government under the facts of the case.

Decisions:
The doctrine of immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice to a citizen.
Quoting the decision from Ministerio vs. Court of First Instance of Cebu, Where the government takes away
property from a private landowner for public use without going through the legal process of expropriation or
negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the government without violating the
doctrine of governmental immunity from suit.

Rulings:
Yes. Considering that no annotation in favor of the government appears at the back of her certificate of title and that
she has not executed any deed of conveyance of any portion of her lot to the government, the appellant remains the
owner of the whole lot. As registered owner, she could bring an action to recover possession of the portion of land in
question at any time because possession is one of the attributes of ownership. However, since restoration of
possession of said portion by the government is neither convenient nor feasible at this time because it is now and has
been used for road purposes, the only relief available is for the government to make due compensation which it
could and should have done years ago. To determine the due compensation for the land, the basis should be the price
or value thereof at the time of the taking.

As regards the claim for damages, the plaintiff is entitled thereto in the form of legal interest on the price of the land
from the time it was taken up to the time that payment is made by the government. In addition, the government
should pay for attorneys fees, the amount of which should be fixed by the trial court after hearing
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD
GOVERNMENT), petitioner, vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, BIENVENIDO R. TANTOCO, JR. and DOMINADOR R. SANTIAGO, respondents.

G.R. No. 90478 November 21, 1991

FACTS: The case was commenced on July 21, 1987 by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG)
in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. The complaint which initiated the action was denominated one "for
reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages," and was avowedly filed pursuant to Executive Order
No. 14 of President Corazon C. Aquino. After having been served with summons, Tantoco, Jr. and Santiago, instead
of filing their answer, jointly filed a "Motion to Strike Out Some Portions of the Complaint and For Bill of
Particulars of Other Portions." The PCGG filed an opposition thereto, and the movants, a reply to the opposition.
Tantoco and Santiago then presented a "motion for leave to file interrogatories under Rule 25 of the Rules of Court"
of which the PCGG responded by filing a motion. On March 18, 1988, in compliance with the Order of January 29,
1988, the PCGG filed an Expanded Complaint of which the Sandiganbayan denied with a Resolution. Tantoco and
Santiago then filed an Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim. On July 27, 1989 Tantoco and Santiago filed with
the Sandiganbayan a pleading denominated "Interrogatories to Plaintiff," and on August 2, 1989, an "Amended
Interrogatories to Plaintiff"' as well as a Motion for Production and Inspection of Documents. The Sandiganbayan
admitted the Amended Interrogatories and granted the motion for production and inspection of documents
respectively. PCGG filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of August 25, 1989, it also filed an
opposition to the Amended Interrogatories. Tantoco and Santiago filed a reply and opposition. After hearing, the
Sandiganbayan promulgated two (2) Resolutions. Hence, this present petition.

ISSUES:

1. WON PETITIONER CAN OBJECT TO THE INTERROGATORIES SERVED ON IT IN

ACCORDANCE WITH RULE 25 OF THE RULES OF COURT.
2. WON SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN ORDERING FOR THE PRODUCTION AND INSPECTION
OF SPECIFIED DOCUMENTS AND THINGS ALLEGEDLY IN THE POSSESSION OF PCGG.

HELD:

1. No. The State is, of course, immune from suit in the sense that it cannot, as a rule, be sued without its
consent. But it is axiomatic that in filing an action, it divests itself of its sovereign character and sheds its
immunity from suit, descending to the level of an ordinary litigant. The PCGG cannot claim a superior or
preferred status to the State, even while assuming to represent or act for the State.
2. No. The Court gives short shrift to the argument that some documents sought to be produced and inspected
had already been presented in Court and marked preliminarily as PCGG's exhibits, the movants having in
fact viewed, scrutinized and even offered objections thereto and made comments thereon. Obviously, there
is nothing secret or confidential about these documents. No serious objection can therefore be presented to
the desire of the private respondents to have copies of those documents in order to study them some more
or otherwise use them during the trial for any purpose allowed by law.

MERRIT VS GOVERNMENT
Political Law Non-Suability of the State Waiver of Non-Suability is Not Admission of Liability
The facts of the case took place in the 1910s. E. Merritt was a constructor who was excellent at his work.
One day, while he was riding his motorcycle along Calle Padre Faura, he was bumped by a government
ambulance. The driver of the ambulance was proven to have been negligent. Because of the incident,
Merritt was hospitalized and he was severely injured beyond rehabilitation so much so that he could never
perform his job the way he used to and that he cannot even earn at least half of what he used to earn.
In order for Merritt to recover damages, he sought to sue the government which later authorized Merritt to
sue the government by virtue of Act 2457 enacted by the legislature (An Act authorizing E. Merritt to bring
suit against the Government of the Philippine Islands and authorizing the Attorney-General of said Islands
to appear in said suit). The lower court then determined the amount of damages and ordered the
government to pay the same.
ISSUE: Whether or not the government is liable for the negligent act of the driver of the ambulance.
HELD: No. By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not thereby
concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or extend its liability to any cause
not previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting liability and submits itself to
the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense. It follows therefrom that the
state, by virtue of such provisions of law, is not responsible for the damages suffered by private
individuals in consequence of acts performed by its employees in the discharge of the functions pertaining
to their office, because neither fault nor even negligence can be presumed on the part of the state in the
organization of branches of public service and in the appointment of its agents. The State can only be
liable if it acts through a special agent (and a special agent, in the sense in which these words are
employed, is one who receives a definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the
duties of his office if he is a special official) so that in representation of the state and being bound to act
as an agent thereof, he executes the trust confided to him.
In the case at bar, the ambulance driver was not a special agent nor was a government officer acting as a
special agent hence, there can be no liability from the government. The Government does not undertake
to guarantee to any person the fidelity of the officers or agents whom it employs, since that would involve
it in all its operations in endless embarrassments, difficulties and losses, which would be subversive of the
public interest.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, CAPT. JAMES E. GALLOWAY, WILLIAM I. COLLINS and ROBERT
GOHIER, petitioners,
vs.
HON. V. M. RUIZ, Presiding Judge of Branch XV, Court of First Instance of Rizal and ELIGIO DE GUZMAN &
CO., INC., respondents.

Facts:
This is a petition to review, set aside certain orders and restrain perpetually the proceedings done by Hon. Ruiz for
lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court.

The United States of America had a naval base in Subic, Zambales. The base was one of those provided in the
Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the United States. Sometime in May, 1972, the United States
invited the submission of bids for a couple of repair projects. Eligio de Guzman land Co., Inc. responded to the
invitation and submitted bids. Subsequent thereto, the company received from the US two telegrams requesting it to
confirm its price proposals and for the name of its bonding company. The company construed this as an acceptance
of its offer so they complied with the requests. The company received a letter which was signed by William I.
Collins of Department of the Navy of the United States, also one of the petitioners herein informing that the
company did not qualify to receive an award for the projects because of its previous unsatisfactory performance
rating in repairs, and that the projects were awarded to third parties. For this reason, a suit for specific performance
was filed by him against the US.

Issues:
Whether or not the US naval base in bidding for said contracts exercise governmental functions to be able to invoke
state immunity.

Discussions:
The traditional role of the state immunity exempts a state from being sued in the courts of another state without its
consent or waiver. This rule is necessary consequence of the principle of independence and equality of states.
However, the rules of international law are not petrified; they are continually and evolving and because the activities
of states have multiplied. It has been necessary to distinguish them between sovereign and governmental acts (jure
imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary acts (juregestionis). The result is that State immunity now extends
only to acts jure imperil. The restrictive application of State immunity is now the rule in the United States, the
United Kingdom and other states in western Europe.

THE HOLY SEE vs. THE HON. ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, JR., as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, Branch 61 and STARBRIGHT SALES ENTERPRISES, INC.
G.R. No. 101949 December 1, 1994
FACTS: Petitioner is the Holy See who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City in Rome, Italy, and is
represented in the Philippines by the Papal Nuncio; Private respondent, Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc.,
is a domestic corporation engaged in the real estate business.
This petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land consisting of 6,000 square meters located in
the Municipality of Paranaque registered in the name of petitioner. Said lot was contiguous with two other
lots registered in the name of the Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC).
The three lots were sold to Ramon Licup, through Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., acting as agent to the
sellers. Later, Licup assigned his rights to the sale to private respondent.
In view of the refusal of the squatters to vacate the lots sold to private respondent, a dispute arose as to
who of the parties has the responsibility of evicting and clearing the land of squatters. Complicating the
relations of the parties was the sale by petitioner of Lot 5-A to Tropicana Properties and Development
Corporation (Tropicana).
private respondent filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati, Metro Manila for
annulment of the sale of the three parcels of land, and specific performance and damages against
petitioner, represented by the Papal Nuncio, and three other defendants: namely, Msgr. Domingo A.
Cirilos, Jr., the PRC and Tropicana
petitioner and Msgr. Cirilos separately moved to dismiss the complaint petitioner for lack of
jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity from suit, and Msgr. Cirilos for being an improper party. An
opposition to the motion was filed by private respondent.
the trial court issued an order denying, among others, petitioners motion to dismiss after finding that
petitioner shed off [its] sovereign immunity by entering into the business contract in question Petitioner
forthwith elevated the matter to us. In its petition, petitioner invokes the privilege of sovereign immunity
only on its own behalf and on behalf of its official representative, the Papal Nuncio.
ISSUE:
Whether the Holy See is immune from suit insofar as its business relations regarding selling a lot to a
private entity
RULING:
The Republic of the Philippines has accorded the Holy See the status of a foreign sovereign. The Holy See,
through its Ambassador, the Papal Nuncio, has had diplomatic representations with the Philippine
government since 1957 (Rollo, p. 87). This appears to be the universal practice in international relations.
There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and firmly established.
According to the classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a
respondent in the courts of another sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive theory, the immunity
of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but not with
regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis
If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii,
especially when it is not undertaken for gain or profit.
In the case at bench, if petitioner has bought and sold lands in the ordinary course of a real estate
business, surely the said transaction can be categorized as an act jure gestionis. However, petitioner has
denied that the acquisition and subsequent disposal of Lot 5-A were made for profit but claimed that it
acquired said property for the site of its mission or the Apostolic Nunciature in the Philippines. Private
respondent failed to dispute said claim.
Lot 5-A was acquired by petitioner as a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila. The donation was made
not for commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner to construct thereon the official place of
residence of the Papal Nuncio. The right of a foreign sovereign to acquire property, real or personal, in a
receiving state, necessary for the creation and maintenance of its diplomatic mission, is recognized in the
1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (Arts. 20-22). This treaty was concurred in by the
Philippine Senate and entered into force in the Philippines on November 15, 1965.
The decision to transfer the property and the subsequent disposal thereof are likewise clothed with a
governmental character. Petitioner did not sell Lot 5-A for profit or gain. It merely wanted to dispose off
the same because the squatters living thereon made it almost impossible for petitioner to use it for the
purpose of the donation. The fact that squatters have occupied and are still occupying the lot, and that
they stubbornly refuse to leave the premises, has been admitted by private respondent in its complaint
Private respondent is not left without any legal remedy for the redress of its grievances. Under both Public
International Law and Transnational Law, a person who feels aggrieved by the acts of a foreign sovereign
can ask his own government to espouse his cause through diplomatic channels.
Private respondent can ask the Philippine government, through the Foreign Office, to espouse its claims
against the Holy See. Its first task is to persuade the Philippine government to take up with the Holy See
the validity of its claims. Of course, the Foreign Office shall first make a determination of the impact of its
espousal on the relations between the Philippine government and the Holy See (Young, Remedies of
Private Claimants Against Foreign States, Selected Readings on Protection by Law of Private Foreign
Investments 905, 919 [1964]). Once the Philippine government decides to espouse the claim, the latter
ceases to be a private cause.

PNB VS PABALAN
G.R. No. L-33112 83 SCRA 595 June 15, 1978
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE JAVIER PABALAN, Judge of the Court of First Instance, Branch III, La Union, AGOO TOBACCO
PLANTERS ASSOCIATION, INC., PHILIPPINE VIRGINIA TOBACCO ADMINISTRATION, and PANFILO P.
JIMENEZ, Deputy Sheriff, La Union, respondents.

Facts:
The case was filed by petitioner requesting for certiorari against the writ of execution authorized by the Hon Judge
Pabalan regarding the transfer of funds amounting to P12,724.66 belonging to Philippine Virginia Tobacco
Administration (PVTA).

Philippine National Bank (PNB) of La Union filed an administrative complaint against Judge Pabalan for grave
abuse of discretion, alleging that the latter failed to recognize that the questioned funds are of public character and
therefore may not be garnished, attached or levied upon. The PNB La Union Branch invoked the doctrine of non-
suability, putting a bar on the notice of garnishment.

Issues:

1. Whether or not Philippine National Bank can be sued.

2. Whether or not the notice of garnishment of funds of Philippine Virginia Tobacco deposited with the petitioner
bank is valid.

Discussions:
The consent of the state to be sued may be given expressly or impliedly. In this case, Consent to be sued was given
impliedly when the State enters into a commercial contract. When the State enters into a contract, the State is
deemed to have divested itself of the mantle of sovereign immunity and descended to the level of the ordinary
individual. Hence, Funds of public corporations could properly be made the object of a notice of garnishment.

Rulings:

1. PVTA is also a public corporation with the same attributes, a similar outcome is attributed. The government has
entered with them into a commercial business hence it has abandoned its sovereign capacity and has stepped
down to the level of a corporation. Therefore, it is subject to rules governing ordinary corporations and in effect
can be sued. Therefore, the petition of PNB La Union is denied.
2. The Supreme Court ruled that the funds held by PNB is subject for garnishment. Funds of public corporations
which can sue and be sued are not exempt from garnishment. Thus, the writ of execution be imposed
immediately.

MUNICIPALITY OF SAN MIGUEL BULACAN VS FERNANDEZ

FACTS:
The Court of First Instance of Bulacan rendered a judgment holding petitioner liable to private
respondents and ordering the municipality, among others, to pay private respondents the loss of income
from rentals on subject lots and attorneys fees.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the funds of the Municipality of San Miguel, Bulacan are public funds which are exempt
from execution.

HELD:
YES. It is a well settled doctrine of the law that not only the public property but also the taxes and public
revenues of such [municipal] corporations cannot be seized under execution against them, either in the
treasury or when in transit to it. Judgments rendered for taxes, and the proceeds of such judgments in the
hands of officers of the law, are not subject to execution unless so declared by statute.

Municipality of Makati vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. Nos. 89898-99 October 1, 1990
Facts: Petitioner Municipality of Makati expropriated a portion of land owned by private
respondents, Admiral Finance Creditors Consortium, Inc. After proceedings, the RTC of
Makati determined the cost of the said land which the petitioner must pay to the private
respondents amounting to P5,291,666.00 minus the advanced payment of P338,160.00. It
issued the corresponding writ of execution accompanied with a writ of garnishment of funds
of the petitioner which was deposited in PNB. However, such order was opposed by
petitioner through a motion for reconsideration, contending that its funds at the PNB could
neither be garnished nor levied upon execution, for to do so would result in the
disbursement of public funds without the proper appropriation required under the law, citing
the case of Republic of the Philippines v. Palacio.The RTC dismissed such motion, which was
appealed to the Court of Appeals; the latter affirmed said dismissal and petitioner now filed
this petition for review.

Issue: Whether or not funds of the Municipality of Makati are exempt from garnishment
and levy upon execution.

Held: It is petitioner's main contention that the orders of respondent RTC judge involved the net
amount of P4,965,506.45, wherein the funds garnished by respondent sheriff are in excess of
P99,743.94, which are public fund and thereby are exempted from execution without the proper
appropriation required under the law. There is merit in this contention. In this jurisdiction, well-settled is
the rule that public funds are not subject to levy and execution, unless otherwise provided for by statute.
Municipal revenues derived from taxes, licenses and market fees, and which are intended primarily and
exclusively for the purpose of financing the governmental activities and functions of the municipality, are
exempt from execution. Absent a showing that the municipal council of Makati has passed an ordinance
appropriating the said amount from its public funds deposited in their PNB account, no levy under
execution may be validly effected. However, this court orders petitioner to pay for the said land which
has been in their use already. This Court will not condone petitioner's blatant refusal to settle its legal
obligation arising from expropriation of land they are already enjoying. The State's power of eminent
domain should be exercised within the bounds of fair play and justice.

REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA VS VINZON

G.R. No. 154705 405 SCRA 126 June 26, 2003
THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA, HIS EXCELLENCY AMBASSADOR SOERATMIN, and MINISTER
COUNSELLOR AZHARI KASIM, petitioners,
vs.
JAMES VINZON, doing business under the name and style of VINZON TRADE AND SERVICES, respondent.

Facts:
This is a petition for review of the decision made by Court of Appeals in ruling that the Republic of Indonesia gave
its consent to be sued and voluntarily submitted itself to the laws and jurisdiction of Philippine courts and that
petitioners Ambassador Soeratmin and Minister Counsellor Kasim waived their immunity from suit.

Petitioner, Republic of Indonesia, represented by its Counsellor, Siti Partinah, entered into a Maintenance
Agreement with respondent James Vinzon, sole proprietor of Vinzon Trade and Services. The equipment covered by
the Maintenance Agreement are air conditioning units and was to take effect in a period of four years.

When Indonesian Minister Counsellor Kasim assumed the position of Chief of Administration, he allegedly found
respondents work and services unsatisfactory and not in compliance with the standards set in the Maintenance
Agreement. Hence, the Indonesian Embassy terminated the agreement.

The respondent claims that the aforesaid termination was arbitrary and unlawful. Hence, he filed a complaint against
the petitioners which opposed by invoking immunity from suit.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the Republic of Indonesia can invoke the doctrine of sovereign immunity from suit.
2. Whether or not petitioners Ambassador Soeratmin and Minister Counsellor Kasim may be sued herein in their
private capacities.

Discussions:
The rule that a State may not be sued without its consent is a necessary consequence of the principles of
independence and equality of States. The practical justification for the doctrine of sovereign immunity is that there
can be no legal right against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. In the case of foreign
States, the rule is derived from the principle of the sovereign equality of States, as expressed in the maxim par in
parem non habet imperium. All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another.] A
contrary attitude would unduly vex the peace of nations.

The rules of International Law, however, are not unbending or immune to change. The increasing need of sovereign
States to enter into purely commercial activities remotely connected with the discharge of their governmental
functions brought about a new concept of sovereign immunity. This concept, the restrictive theory, holds that the
immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii (public acts of the
government of a state), but not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis (the commercial activities of a
state.)

Rulings:

1. The Supreme Court ruled that the republic of Indonesia cannot be deemed to have waived its immunity to suit.
The mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party cannot be construed as the ultimate test
of whether or not it is an act juri imperii or juri gestionis. Such act is only the start of the inquiry. There is no
dispute that the establishment of a diplomatic mission is an act juri imperii. The state may enter into contracts
with private entities to maintain the premises, furnishings and equipment of the embassy. The Republic of
 Indonesia is acting in pursuit of a sovereign activity when it entered into a contract with the respondent. The
maintenance agreement was entered into by the Republic of Indonesia in the discharge of its governmental
functions. It cannot be deemed to have waived its immunity from suit.
2. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations provides that a diplomatic agent shall enjoy
immunity from the criminal jurisidiction of the receiving State. He shall also enjoy immunity from its civil and
administrative jurisdiction, except in the case of:
o a real action relating to private immovable property situated in the territory of the receiving State, unless he
holds it on behalf of the sending State for the purposes of the mission;
o an action relating to succession in which the diplomatic agent is involved as executor, administrator, heir or
legatee as a private person and not on behalf of the sending State;
o an action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the
receiving State outside his official functions.

The Solicitor General believes that said act may fall under subparagraph (c) thereof, but said provision clearly
applies only to a situation where the diplomatic agent engages in any professional or commercial activity outside
official functions, which is not the case herein.

International Catholic Migration Commission v. Ferrer-Calleja 190 SCRA 130

Facts: (This is a consolidation of two cases)

GR # 85750- the Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC) case.

ICMC an accredited refugee processing center in Morong Bataan, is a non-profit agency involved in
international humanitarian and voluntary work. It is duly registered with the United Nations Economic and
Social Council (ECOSOC) and enjoys Consultative status II. It has the activities parallel to those of the
International Committee for Migrtion (ICM) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).

On July 14, 1986, Trade Union of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS) filed with the then Ministry
of Labor and Employment a Petition for Certification Election among the rank and file members employed
by the ICMC. The latter opposed the petition on the ground that it enjoys diplomatic immunity. The Med-
Arbiter sustained ICMC and dismissed the petition of TUPAS for lack of jurisdiction. On appeal, The
Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations reversed the Med Arbiters Decisionand ordered the
immediate conduct of a certification election.

GR # 89331- the IRRI case

The International Rice Research Institute was a fruit of memorandum of understanding between the
Philippine government and the Ford and Rochefeller Foundations. It was intended to be an autonomous,
philanthropic tax-free, non-profit, non-stock organization designed to carry out the principal objective of
conducting basic research on the rice plant.

It was organized and registered with the SEC as a private corporation subject to all laws and regulations.
However, by virtue of P.D no. 1620, IRRI was granted the status, prerogatives, privileges and immunities
of an international organization.

The Kapisanan filed a petition for direct certification election with regional office of the Department of
Labor and Employment. IRRI opposed the petition invoking Pres. Decree no.1620 conferring upon it the
status of an international organization and granting it immunity from all civil, criminal, and administrative
proceedings under Philippine laws. The Med-Arbiter upheld the opposition on the basis of PD 1620 and
dismissed the petition for direct certification.

On appeal by BLR Director, set aside the med-arbiters decision and contends that immunities and
privileges granted to IRRI do not include exemption from coverage of our labor laws.

Issue:
W/N the grant of diplomatic privileges and immunities extend to immunity from the application of
Philippine Labor Laws

Held:
The grant of diplomatic privileges and immunities to ICMC and IRRI extends to immunity from the
application of Philippine labor laws, because it is clearly necessitated by their international character and
respective purposes which is to avoid the danger of partiality and interference by the host country in their
internal workings. . The exercise of jurisdiction by the Department of Labor in these instances would
defeat the very purpose of immunity, which is to shield the affairs of international organizations, in
accordance with international practice, from political pressure or control by the host country to the
prejudice of member States of the organization, and to ensure the unhampered performance of their
functions.

Employees are not without recourse whenever there are disputes to be settled because each specialized
agency shall make provision for appropriate modes of settlement of disputes out of contracts or other
disputes of private character to which the specialized agency is a party. Moreover, pursuant to article IV
of memorandum of agreement between the government and ICMC, whenever there is abuse of privilege
by ICMC, the government is free to withdraw the privileges and immunities accorded.

Neither are the employees of IRRI without remedy in case of dispute with management as, in fact, there
had been organized a forum for better management-employee relationship as evidenced by the formation
of the Council of IRRI Employees and Management (CIEM) wherein "both management and employees
were and still are represented for purposes of maintaining mutual and beneficial cooperation between
IRRI and its employees." The existence of this Union factually and tellingly belies the argument that Pres.
Decree No. 1620, which grants to IRRI the status, privileges and immunities of an international
organization, deprives its employees of the right to self-organization.

The immunity granted being "from every form of legal process except in so far as in any particular case
they have expressly waived their immunity," it is inaccurate to state that a certification election is beyond
the scope of that immunity for the reason that it is not a suit against ICMC. A certification election cannot
be viewed as an independent or isolated process. It could tugger off a series of events in the collective
bargaining process together with related incidents and/or concerted activities, which could inevitably
involve ICMC in the "legal process," which includes "any penal, civil and administrative proceedings."
 ICHONG VS HERNANDEZ
Constitutional Law Treaties May Be Superseded by Municipal Laws in the Exercise of Police Power
Lao Ichong is a Chinese businessman who entered the country to take advantage of business
opportunities herein abound (then) particularly in the retail business. For some time he and his fellow
Chinese businessmen enjoyed a monopoly in the local market in Pasay. Until in June 1954 when
Congress passed the RA 1180 or the Retail Trade Nationalization Act the purpose of which is to reserve
to Filipinos the right to engage in the retail business. Ichong then petitioned for the nullification of the said
Act on the ground that it contravened several treaties concluded by the RP which, according to him,
violates the equal protection clause (pacta sund servanda). He said that as a Chinese businessman
engaged in the business here in the country who helps in the income generation of the country he should
be given equal opportunity.
ISSUE: Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted principles.
HELD: Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this case, there is no
conflict at all between the raised generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. The equal protection of
the law clause does not demand absolute equality amongst residents; it merely requires that all persons
shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and
liabilities enforced; and, that the equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only
to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and
reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who
do not.
For the sake of argument, even if it would be assumed that a treaty would be in conflict with a statute then
the statute must be upheld because it represented an exercise of the police power which, being inherent
could not be bargained away or surrendered through the medium of a treaty. Hence, Ichong can no
longer assert his right to operate his market stalls in the Pasay city market.

TAXICAB OPERATORS VS BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION

Police Power
Petitioner Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. (TOMMI) is a domestic corporation composed of
taxicab operators, who are grantees of Certificates of Public Convenience to operate taxicabs within the
City of Manila and to any other place in Luzon accessible to vehicular traffic.
On October 10, 1977, respondent Board of Transportation (BOT) issued Memorandum Circular No. 77-42
which reads:
SUBJECT: Phasing out and Replacement of Old and Dilapidated Taxis
On January 27, 1981, petitioners filed a Petition with the BOT, docketed as Case No. 80-7553, seeking to
nullify MC No. 77-42 or to stop its implementation; to allow the registration and operation in 1981 and
subsequent years of taxicabs of model 1974, as well as those of earlier models which were phased-out,
provided that, at the time of registration, they are roadworthy and fit for operation.
ISSUES:
A. Did BOT and BLT promulgate the questioned memorandum circulars in accord with the manner
required by Presidential Decree No. 101, thereby safeguarding the petitioners constitutional right to
procedural due process?
B. Granting arguendo, that respondents did comply with the procedural requirements imposed by
Presidential Decree No. 101, would the implementation and enforcement of the assailed memorandum
circulars violate the petitioners constitutional rights to.
(1) Equal protection of the law;
(2) Substantive due process; and
(3) Protection against arbitrary and unreasonable classification and standard?
HELD
As enunciated in the preambular clauses of the challenged BOT Circular, the overriding consideration is
the safety and comfort of the riding public from the dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis. The State,
in the exercise of its police power, can prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good
order, safety and general welfare of the people. It can prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety and
welfare of society. It may also regulate property rights. In the language of Chief Justice Enrique M.
Fernando the necessities imposed by public welfare may justify the exercise of governmental authority to
regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded.

Police Power
Petitioner Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. (TOMMI) is a domestic corporation composed of
taxicab operators, who are grantees of Certificates of Public Convenience to operate taxicabs within the
City of Manila and to any other place in Luzon accessible to vehicular traffic.
On October 10, 1977, respondent Board of Transportation (BOT) issued Memorandum Circular No. 77-42
which reads:
SUBJECT: Phasing out and Replacement of Old and Dilapidated Taxis
On January 27, 1981, petitioners filed a Petition with the BOT, docketed as Case No. 80-7553, seeking to
nullify MC No. 77-42 or to stop its implementation; to allow the registration and operation in 1981 and
subsequent years of taxicabs of model 1974, as well as those of earlier models which were phased-out,
provided that, at the time of registration, they are roadworthy and fit for operation.
ISSUES:
A. Did BOT and BLT promulgate the questioned memorandum circulars in accord with the manner
required by Presidential Decree No. 101, thereby safeguarding the petitioners constitutional right to
procedural due process?
B. Granting arguendo, that respondents did comply with the procedural requirements imposed by
Presidential Decree No. 101, would the implementation and enforcement of the assailed memorandum
circulars violate the petitioners constitutional rights to.
(1) Equal protection of the law;
(2) Substantive due process; and
(3) Protection against arbitrary and unreasonable classification and standard?
HELD
As enunciated in the preambular clauses of the challenged BOT Circular, the overriding consideration is
the safety and comfort of the riding public from the dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis. The State,
in the exercise of its police power, can prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good
order, safety and general welfare of the people. It can prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety and
welfare of society. It may also regulate property rights. In the language of Chief Justice Enrique M.
Fernando the necessities imposed by public welfare may justify the exercise of governmental authority to
regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded.
US vs TURIBIO
G.R. No. L-5060 January 26, 1910 THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LUIS TORIBIO,
defendant-appellant.

Facts: Respondent Toribio is an owner of carabao, residing in the town of Carmen in the province of
Bohol. The trial court of Bohol found that the respondent slaughtered or caused to be slaughtered a
carabao without a permit from the municipal treasurer of the municipality wherein it was slaughtered, in
violation of Sections 30 and 33 of Act No. 1147, an Act regulating the registration, branding, and slaughter
of Large Cattle. The act prohibits the slaughter of large cattle fit for agricultural work or other draft
purposes for human consumption.

The respondent counters by stating that what the Act is (1) prohibiting is the slaughter of large cattle in
the municipal slaughter house without a permit given by the municipal treasurer. Furthermore, he
contends that the municipality of Carmen has no slaughter house and that he slaughtered his carabao in
his dwelling, (2) the act constitutes a taking of property for public use in the exercise of the right of
eminent domain without providing for the compensation of owners, and it is an undue and unauthorized
exercise of police power of the state for it deprives them of the enjoyment of their private property.

Issue: Whether or not Act. No. 1147, regulating the registration, branding and slaughter of large cattle, is
an undue and unauthorized exercise of police power.

Held: It is a valid exercise of police power of the state.

Facts: The Supreme court Said sections 30 and 33 of the Act prohibit and penalize the slaughtering or
causing to be slaughtered for human consumption of large cattle at any place without the permit provided
for in section 30
Where the language of a statute is fairly susceptible of two or more constructions, that construction
should be adopted which will most tend to give effect to the manifest intent of the lawmaker and promote
the object for which the statute was enacted, and a construction should be rejected which would tend to
render abortive other provisions of the statute and to defeat the object which the legislator sought to attain
by its enactment

The Supreme Court also said that if they will follow the contention of Toribio it will defeat the purpose of
the law.

The police power rests upon necessity and the right of self-protection and if ever the invasion of private
property by police regulation can be justified, The Supreme Court think that the reasonable restriction
placed upon the use of carabaos by the provision of the law under discussion must be held to be
authorized as a reasonable and proper exercise of that power.

The Supreme Court cited events that happen in the Philippines like an epidemic that wiped 70-100% of
the population of carabaos.. The Supreme Court also said that these animals are vested with public
interest for they are fundamental use for the production of crops. These reasons satisfy the requesites of
a valid exercise of police power

The Supreme court finally said that article 1147 is not an exercise of the inherent power of eminent
domain. The said law does not constitute the taking of caraboes for public purpose; it just serve as a mere
regulation for the consumption of these private properties for the protection of general welfare and public
interest.

MMDA vs Bel Air Village Association (328 SCRA 837)

Posted on June 30, 2013 by winnieclaire

Standard

Facts: Petitioner MMDA is a government agency tasked with the delivery of basic services in Metro
Manila. Respondent Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. (BAVA) is a non-stock, non-profit corporation whose
members are homeowners in Bel-Air Village, a private subdivision in Makati City.
respondent received from petitioner, through its Chairman, a notice requesting respondent to open
Neptune Street to public vehicular traffic. respondent instituted against petitioner before the RTC for
injunction. After due hearing, the trial court denied issuance of a preliminary injunction.[2] Respondent
questioned the denial before the Court of Appeals. The appellate court conducted an ocular inspection of
Neptune Street and it issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the implementation of the MMDAs
proposed action finding that the MMDA has no authority to order the opening of Neptune Street, a private
subdivision road.
Petitioner MMDA claims that it has the authority to open Neptune Street to public traffic because it is an
agent of the state endowed with police power in the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. One of
these basic services is traffic management which involves the regulation of the use of thoroughfares to
insure the safety, convenience and welfare of the general public.

Issue: W/N MMDA exercises police power.

Held: It bears stressing that police power is lodged primarily in the National Legislature. It cannot be
exercised by any group or body of individuals not possessing legislative power. The National Legislature,
however, may delegate this power to the President and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking
bodies of municipal corporations or local government units. A local government is a political subdivision
of a nation or state which is constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs. The Local
Government Code of 1991 defines a local government unit as a body politic and corporate one
endowed with powers as a political subdivision of the National Government and as a corporate entity
representing the inhabitants of its territory. Local government units are the provinces, cities, municipalities
and barangays. They are also the territorial and political subdivisions of the state.

Our Congress delegated police power to the local government units in the Local Government Code of
1991. This delegation is found in Section 16 of the same Code, known as the general welfare clause
Local government units exercise police power through their respective legislative bodies. The legislative
body of the provincial government is the sangguniang panlalawigan, that of the city government is the
sangguniang panlungsod, that of the municipal government is the sangguniang bayan, and that of the
barangay is the sangguniang barangay. The Local Government Code of 1991 empowers the
sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod and sangguniang bayan to enact ordinances,
approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the [province, city or municipality, as
the case may be], and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of the Code and in the proper exercise of the
corporate powers of the [province, city municipality] provided under the Code x x x. The same Code
gives the sangguniang barangay the power to enact ordinances as may be necessary to discharge the
responsibilities conferred upon it by law or ordinance and to promote the general welfare of the
inhabitants thereon.
Metro-wide services are those services which have metro-wide impact and transcend local political
boundaries or entail huge expenditures such that it would not be viable for said services to be provided by
the individual local government units comprising Metro Manila.There are seven (7) basic metro-wide
services and the scope of these services cover the following: (1) development planning; (2) transport and
traffic management; (3) solid waste disposal and management; (4) flood control and sewerage
management; (5) urban renewal, zoning and land use planning, and shelter services; (6) health and
sanitation, urban protection and pollution control; and (7) public safety.
The implementation of the MMDAs plans, programs and projects is undertaken by the local government
units, national government agencies, accredited peoples organizations, non-governmental organizations,
and the private sector as well as by the MMDA itself. For this purpose, the MMDA has the power to enter
into contracts, memoranda of agreement and other cooperative arrangements with these bodies for the
delivery of the required services within Metro Manila
It will be noted that the powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation, coordination,
regulation, implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a
system and administration. There is no syllable in R. A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police
power, let alone legislative power. Even the Metro Manila Council has not been delegated any
legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the local government units, there is no provision
in R. A. No. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or its Council to enact ordinances, approve
resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. The
MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a development authority. It is an agency created for the
purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies,
peoples organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector for the efficient
and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area. All its functions are
administrative in natureIt is thus beyond doubt that the MMDA is not a local government unit or a
public corporation endowed with legislative power. It is not even a special metropolitan political
subdivision as contemplated in Section 11, Article X of the Constitution.
Clearly then, the MMC under P. D. No. 824 is not the same entity as the MMDA under R. A. No. 7924.
Unlike the MMC, the MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community.

MMDA vs Garin GR No. 130230 April 15, 2005 Chico-Nazario, J.

: FACTS: Respondent Garin was issued a traffic violation receipt (TVR) and his drivers license was confiscated for
parking illegally. Garin wrote to then MMDA Chairman Prospero Oreta requesting the return of his license and
expressed his preference for his case to be file in Court. Without an immediate reply from the chairman, Garin filed
for a preliminary injunction assailing among others that Sec 5 (f) of RA 7924 violates the constitutional prohibition
against undue delegation of legislative authority, allowing MMDA to fix and impose unspecified and unlimited fines
and penalties. RTC rule in his favor, directing MMDA to return his license and for the authority to desist from
confiscating drivers license without first giving the driver the opportunity to be heard in an appropriate
proceeding. Thus this petition.

ISSUE: Whether of not Sec 5(f) of RA 7924 which authorizes MMDA to confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers
license in the enforcement of traffic rules and regulations constitutional?

RULING: The MMDA is not vested with police power. It was concluded that MMDA is not a local government unit
of a public corporation endowed with legislative power and it has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of
the community. Police power, as an inherent attribute of sovereignty is the power vested in the legislature to
make, ordain, establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances either with
penalties of without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for good and welfare of the
commonwealth and for subjects of the same. There is no provision in RA 7924 that empowers MMDA or its council
to enact ordinance, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the inhabitants of
Metro Manila. It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the various
national government agencies, Peoples Organizations, NGOs and private sector for the efficient and expeditious
delivery of services. All its functions are administrative in nature.
CASE DIGEST: Republic vs. PLDT
(1969)

FACTS:

Sometime in 1933, the defendant PLDT entered into an agreement with RCA Communications Inc., an
American corporation, whereby telephone messages coming from the US and received by RCAs
domestic station, could automatically be transferred to the lines of PLDT, and vice versa.

The plaintiff through the Bureau of Telecommunications, after having set up its own Government
Telephone System, by utilizing its own appropriation and equipment and by renting trunk lines of the
PLDT, entered into an agreement with RCA for a joint overseas telephone service.

Alleging that plaintiff is in competition with them, PLDT notified the former and receiving no reply,
disconnected the trunk lines being rented by the same; thus, prompting the plaintiff to file a case before
the CFI praying for judgment commanding PLDT to execute a contract with the Bureau for the use of the
facilities of PLDTs telephone system, and for a writ of preliminary injunction against the defendant to
restrain the severance of the existing trunk lines and restore those severed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the defendant PLDT can be compelled to enter into a contract with the plaintiff.

HELD:
 x x x while the Republic may not compel the PLDT to celebrate a contract with it, the Republic may, in
the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain, require the telephone company to permit
interconnection of the government telephone system and that of the PLDT, as the needs of the
government service may require, subject to the payment of just compensation to be determined by the
court.

Republic of the Philippines vs. Carmen M. Vda. De Castellvi, et al.

G.R. No. L-20620 August 15, 1974

Case Digest
FACTS: In 1947, the republic, through the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), entered into a lease agreement
over a land in Pampanga with Castellvi on a year-to-year basis. When Castellvi gave notice to terminate the lease in
1956, the AFP refused because of the permanent installations and other facilities worth almost P500,000.00 that
were erected and already established on the property. She then instituted an ejectment proceeding against the AFP.
In 1959, however, the republic commenced the expropriation proceedings for the land in question.

ISSUE: Whether or not the compensation should be determined as of 1947 or 1959.

RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that the taking should not be reckoned as of 1947, and that just compensation
should not be determined on the basis of the value of the property as of that year.

The requisites for taking are:

1. The expropriator must enter a private property;

2. The entry must be for more than a momentary period;
3. It must be under warrant or color of authorities;
4. The property must be devoted for public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected;
and
5. The utilization of the property for public use must be such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of
beneficial enjoyment of the property.

Only requisites 1, 3, and 4 were present. It is clear, therefore, that the "taking" of Catellvi's property for purposes of
eminent domain cannot be considered to have taken place in 1947 when the Republic commenced to occupy the
property as lessee thereof.

Under Sec. 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, just compensation is to be determined as of the date of the filing of
the complaint. The Supreme Court has ruled that when the taking of the property sought to be expropriated coincides
with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing of the complaint
for eminent domain, the just compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.

In the instant case, it is undisputed that the Republic was placed in possession of the Castellvi property, by authority
of court, on August 10, 1959. The taking of the Castellvi property for the purposes of determining the just
compensation to be paid must, therefore, be reckoned as of June 26, 1959 when the complaint for eminent domain
was filed.

City of Manila vs Chinese Community of Manila

City of Manila vs Chinese Community of Manila , GR 14355 (1D), 31 October 1919

FACTS: Petitioner (City of Manila) filed a petition praying that certain lands be expropriated for the
purpose of constructing a public improvement namely, the extension of Rizal Avenue, Manila and
claiming that such expropriation was necessary.
Herein defendants, on the other hand, alleged (a) that no necessity existed for said expropriation and (b)
that the land in question was a cemetery, which had been used as such for many years, and was covered
with sepulchres and monuments, and that the same should not be converted into a street for public
purposes.

The lower court ruled that there was no necessity for the expropriation of the particular strip of land in
question.
Petitioner therefore assails the decision of the lower court claiming that it (petitioner) has the authority to
expropriate any land it may desire; that the only function of the court in such proceedings is to ascertain
the value of the land in question; that neither the court nor the owners of the land can inquire into the
advisable purpose of the expropriation or ask any questions concerning the necessities therefor; that the
courts are mere appraisers of the land involved in expropriation proceedings, and, when the value of the
land is fixed by the method adopted by the law, to render a judgment in favor of the defendant for its
value.

ISSUE: W/N the courts may inquire into and hear proof upon the necessity of the expropriation?
HELD: Yes. The very foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is a genuine necessity, and that
necessity must be of a public character. The ascertainment of the necessity must precede or accompany,
and not follow, the taking of the land. (Morrison vs. Indianapolis, etc. Ry. Co., 166 Ind., 511;
Stearns vs. Barre, 73 Vt., 281; Wheeling, etc. R. R. Co. vs. Toledo, Ry. etc. Co., 72 Ohio St., 368.)
The general power to exercise the right of eminent domain must not be confused with the right to exercise
it in a particular case. The power of the legislature to confer, upon municipal corporations and other
entities within the State, general authority to exercise the right of eminent domain cannot be questioned
by the courts, but that general authority of municipalities or entities must not be confused with the right to
exercise it in particular instances. The moment the municipal corporation or entity attempts to exercise the
authority conferred, it must comply with the conditions accompanying the authority. The
necessity for conferring the authority upon a municipal corporation to exercise the right of eminent
domain is admittedly within the power of the legislature. But whether or not the municipal corporation or
entity is exercising the right in a particular case under the conditions imposed by the general authority, is
a question which the courts have the right to inquire into.
The conflict in the authorities upon the question whether the necessity for the exercise of the right of
eminent domain is purely legislative and not judicial, arises generally in the wisdom and propriety of the
legislature in authorizing the exercise of the right of eminent domain instead of in the question of the right
to exercise it in a particular case. (Creston Waterworks Co. vs. McGrath, 89 Iowa, 502.)
By the weight of authorities, the courts have the power of restricting the exercise of eminent domain to the
actual reasonable necessities of the case and for the purposes designated by the law. (Fairchild vs. City
of St. Paul. 48 Minn., 540.)
MUNICIPALITY OF PARAAQUE vs. V.M. REALTY CORPORATION
Topic: Eminent Domain (Sec. 19, LGC)
FACTS:
Pursuant to Sangguniang Bayan Resolution (1993), the Municipality of Paraaque filed on a Complaint
for expropriation against Private Respondent V.M. Realty Corporation over two parcels of land (Lots 2-A-2
and 2-B-1 of Subdivision Plan Psd-17917), with a combined area of about 10,000 square meters, located
at Wakas, San Dionisio, Paraaque, Metro Manila Allegedly, the complaint was filed "for the purpose of
alleviating the living conditions of the underprivileged by providing homes for the homeless through a
socialized housing project." Parenthetically, it was also for this stated purpose that petitioner, pursuant to
its Sangguniang Bayan Resolution (1991), previously made an offer to enter into a negotiated sale of the
property with private respondent, which the latter did not accept.
The Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 134, issued an Order authorizing petitioner to take possession
of the subject property upon deposit with its clerk of court of an amount equivalent to 15 percent of its fair
market value based on its current tax declaration.
Trial court nullified its Order and dismissed the case. Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the trial court's
Decision. Hence, this appeal.
Private respondent's contentions:
(a) no cause of action because it was filed pursuant to a resolution and not to an ordinance as required by
RA 7160
(b) the cause of action, if any, was barred by a prior judgment or res judicata
Petitioner's Contentions:
a. resolution approved by the municipal council for the purpose of initiating an expropriation case
"substantially complies with the requirements of the law"; terms "ordinance" and "resolution" are
synonymous
b. cited Article 36, Rule VI of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the LGC - If the LGU fails to
acquire a private property for public use, purpose, or welfare through purchase, the LGU may expropriate
said property through a resolution of the Sanggunian authorizing its chief executive to initiate
expropriation proceedings.
ISSUE: WON petitioner's exercise of the power of ED is valid.
HELD: Not valid (no law or odinance enacted; merely a resolution)
The following essential requisites must concur before an LGU can exercise the power of eminent domain
(Sec. 19, LGC):
1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive to
exercise the power of ED or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private property.
2. exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the landless.
3. payment of just compensation (Section 9, Article III, Constitution)
4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be
expropriated, but said offer was not accepted
In the case at bar, the local chief executive sought to exercise the power of eminent domain pursuant to a
resolution of the municipal council. Thus, there was no compliance with the first requisite that the mayor
be authorized through an ordinance.
The terms "resolution" and "ordinance" are not synonymous. An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is
merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. An ordinance
possesses a general and permanent character, but a resolution is temporary in nature. Additionally, the
two are enacted differently a third reading is necessary for an ordinance, but not for a resolution,
unless decided otherwise by a majority of all the Sanggunian members.
If Congress intended to allow LGUs to exercise eminent domain through a mere resolution, it would have
simply adopted the language of the previous Local Government Code (BP 337). But Congress did not -
Section 19 of RA 7160.
Petitioner relies on Article 36, Rule VI of the Implementing Rules, which requires only a resolution to
authorize an LGU to exercise eminent domain. This is clearly misplaced, because Section 19 of RA 7160,
the law itself, surely prevails over said rule which merely seeks to implement it.
The Court holds that the principle of res judicata (prior judgment), which finds application in generally all
cases and proceedings, cannot bar the right of the State or its agent to expropriate private property. The
very nature of eminent domain, as an inherent power of the State, dictates that the right to exercise the
power be absolute and unfettered even by a prior judgment or res judicata.
 Hacienda Luisita Inc. (HLI) v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC), et al., G.R. No. 171101, July
5, 2011
DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

I. THE FACTS

In 1958, the Spanish owners of Compaia General de Tabacos de Filipinas (Tabacalera) sold
Hacienda Luisita and the Central Azucarera de Tarlac, the sugar mill of the hacienda, to the Tarlac
Development Corporation (Tadeco), then owned and controlled by the Jose Cojuangco Sr. Group. The
Central Bank of the Philippines assisted Tadeco in obtaining a dollar loan from a US bank. Also, the GSIS
extended a PhP5.911 million loan in favor of Tadeco to pay the peso price component of the sale, with
the condition that the lots comprising the Hacienda Luisita be subdivided by the applicant-corporation
and sold at cost to the tenants, should there be any, and whenever conditions should exist warranting
such action under the provisions of the Land Tenure Act. Tadeco however did not comply with this
condition.

On May 7, 1980, the martial law administration filed a suit before the Manila RTC against
Tadeco, et al., for them to surrender Hacienda Luisita to the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR) so
that the land can be distributed to farmers at cost. Responding, Tadeco alleged that Hacienda Luisita
does not have tenants, besides which sugar lands of which the hacienda consisted are not covered by
existing agrarian reform legislations. The Manila RTC rendered judgment ordering Tadeco to surrender
Hacienda Luisita to the MAR. Therefrom, Tadeco appealed to the CA.

On March 17, 1988, during the administration of President Corazon Cojuangco Aquino, the Office
of the Solicitor General moved to withdraw the governments case against Tadeco, et al. The CA
dismissed the case, subject to the PARCs approval of Tadecos proposed stock distribution plan (SDP) in
favor of its farmworkers. [Under EO 229 and later RA 6657, Tadeco had the option of availing stock
distribution as an alternative modality to actual land transfer to the farmworkers.] On August 23,
1988, Tadeco organized a spin-off corporation, herein petitioner HLI, as vehicle to facilitate stock
acquisition by the farmworkers. For this purpose, Tadeco conveyed to HLI the agricultural land portion
(4,915.75 hectares) and other farm-related properties of Hacienda Luisita in exchange for HLI shares of
stock.

On May 9, 1989, some 93% of the then farmworker-beneficiaries (FWBs) complement of

Hacienda Luisita signified in a referendum their acceptance of the proposed HLIs Stock Distribution
Option Plan (SODP). On May 11, 1989, the SDOA was formally entered into by Tadeco, HLI, and the
5,848 qualified FWBs. This attested to by then DAR Secretary Philip Juico. The SDOA embodied the
basis and mechanics of HLIs SDP, which was eventually approved by the PARC after a follow-up
referendum conducted by the DAR on October 14, 1989, in which 5,117 FWBs, out of 5,315 who
participated, opted to receive shares in HLI.

On August 15, 1995, HLI applied for the conversion of 500 hectares of land of the hacienda from
agricultural to industrial use, pursuant to Sec. 65 of RA 6657. The DAR approved the application on
August 14, 1996, subject to payment of three percent (3%) of the gross selling price to the FWBs and to
HLIs continued compliance with its undertakings under the SDP, among other conditions.
 On December 13, 1996, HLI, in exchange for subscription of 12,000,000 shares of stocks of
Centennary Holdings, Inc. (Centennary), ceded 300 hectares of the converted area to the latter.
Subsequently, Centennary sold the entire 300 hectares for PhP750 million to Luisita Industrial Park
Corporation (LIPCO), which used it in developing an industrial complex. From this area was carved out 2
parcels, for which 2 separate titles were issued in the name of LIPCO. Later, LIPCO transferred these 2
parcels to the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) in payment of LIPCOs PhP431,695,732.10
loan obligations to RCBC. LIPCOs titles were cancelled and new ones were issued to RCBC. Apart from
the 500 hectares, another 80.51 hectares were later detached from Hacienda Luisita and acquired by the
government as part of the Subic-Clark-Tarlac Expressway (SCTEX) complex. Thus, 4,335.75 hectares
remained of the original 4,915 hectares Tadeco ceded to HLI.

Such, was the state of things when two separate petitions reached the DAR in the latter part of
2003. The first was filed by the Supervisory Group of HLI (Supervisory Group), praying for a renegotiation
of the SDOA, or, in the alternative, its revocation. The second petition, praying for the revocation and
nullification of the SDOA and the distribution of the lands in the hacienda, was filed by Alyansa ng mga
Manggagawang Bukid ng Hacienda Luisita (AMBALA). The DAR then constituted a Special Task Force
(STF) to attend to issues relating to the SDP of HLI. After investigation and evaluation, the STF found that
HLI has not complied with its obligations under RA 6657 despite the implementation of the SDP. On
December 22, 2005, the PARC issued the assailed Resolution No. 2005-32-01, recalling/revoking the
SDO plan of Tadeco/HLI. It further resolved that the subject lands be forthwith placed under the
compulsory coverage or mandated land acquisition scheme of the CARP.

From the foregoing resolution, HLI sought reconsideration. Its motion notwithstanding, HLI also
filed a petition before the Supreme Court in light of what it considers as the DARs hasty placing of
Hacienda Luisita under CARP even before PARC could rule or even read the motion for reconsideration.
PARC would eventually deny HLIs motion for reconsideration via Resolution No. 2006-34-01 dated May
3, 2006.

II. THE ISSUES

(1) Does the PARC possess jurisdiction to recall or revoke HLIs SDP?

(2) [Issue raised by intervenor FARM (group of farmworkers)] Is Sec. 31 of RA 6657, which allows stock
transfer in lieu of outright land transfer, unconstitutional?

(3) Is the revocation of the HLIs SDP valid? [Did PARC gravely abuse its discretion in revoking the subject
SDP and placing the hacienda under CARPs compulsory acquisition and distribution scheme?]

(4) Should those portions of the converted land within Hacienda Luisita that RCBC and LIPCO acquired by
purchase be excluded from the coverage of the assailed PARC resolution? [Did the PARC gravely abuse
its discretion when it included LIPCOs and RCBCs respective properties that once formed part of
Hacienda Luisita under the CARP compulsory acquisition scheme via the assailed Notice of Coverage?]

III. THE RULING

 [The Court DENIED the petition of HLI and AFFIRMED the PARC resolution placing the lands
subject of HLIs SDP under compulsory coverage on mandated land acquisition scheme of the CARP,
with the MODIFICATION that the original 6,296 qualified FWBs were given the option to remain as
stockholders of HLI. It also excluded from the mandatory CARP coverage that part of Hacienda Luisita
that had been acquired by RCBC and LIPCO.]

(1) YES, the PARC has jurisdiction to revoke HLIs SDP under the doctrine of necessary
implication.

Under Sec. 31 of RA 6657, as implemented by DAO 10, the authority to approve the plan for
stock distribution of the corporate landowner belongs to PARC. Contrary to petitioner HLIs posture,
PARC also has the power to revoke the SDP which it previously approved. It may be, as urged, that RA
6657 or other executive issuances on agrarian reform do not explicitly vest the PARC with the power to
revoke/recall an approved SDP. Such power or authority, however, is deemed possessed by PARC under
the principle of necessary implication, a basic postulate that what is implied in a statute is as much a part
of it as that which is expressed.

Following the doctrine of necessary implication, it may be stated that the conferment of express
power to approve a plan for stock distribution of the agricultural land of corporate owners necessarily
includes the power to revoke or recall the approval of the plan. To deny PARC such revocatory power
would reduce it into a toothless agency of CARP, because the very same agency tasked to ensure
compliance by the corporate landowner with the approved SDP would be without authority to impose
sanctions for non-compliance with it.

(2) NO, Sec. 31 of RA 6657 is not unconstitutional. [The Court actually refused to pass upon the
constitutional question because it was not raised at the earliest opportunity and because the resolution
thereof is not the lis mota of the case. Moreover, the issue has been rendered moot and
academic since SDO is no longer one of the modes of acquisition under RA 9700.]

When the Court is called upon to exercise its power of judicial review over, and pass upon the
constitutionality of, acts of the executive or legislative departments, it does so only when the following
essential requirements are first met, to wit: (1) there is an actual case or controversy; (2) that the
constitutional question is raised at the earliest possible opportunity by a proper party or one with locus
standi; and (3) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

Not all the foregoing requirements are satisfied in the case at bar.

While there is indeed an actual case or controversy, intervenor FARM, composed of a small
minority of 27 farmers, has yet to explain its failure to challenge the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657
as early as November 21, 1989 when PARC approved the SDP of Hacienda Luisita or at least within a
reasonable time thereafter, and why its members received benefits from the SDP without so much of a
protest. It was only on December 4, 2003 or 14 years after approval of the SDP that said plan and
approving resolution were sought to be revoked, but not, to stress, by FARM or any of its members, but
by petitioner AMBALA. Furthermore, the AMBALA petition did NOT question the constitutionality of Sec.
31 of RA 6657, but concentrated on the purported flaws and gaps in the subsequent implementation of
the SDP. Even the public respondents, as represented by the Solicitor General, did not question the
constitutionality of the provision. On the other hand, FARM, whose 27 members formerly belonged to
AMBALA, raised the constitutionality of Sec. 31 only on May 3, 2007 when it filed its Supplemental
Comment with the Court. Thus, it took FARM some eighteen (18) years from November 21, 1989 before it
challenged the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657 which is quite too late in the day. The FARM
members slept on their rights and even accepted benefits from the SDP with nary a complaint on the
alleged unconstitutionality of Sec. 31 upon which the benefits were derived. The Court cannot now be
goaded into resolving a constitutional issue that FARM failed to assail after the lapse of a long period of
time and the occurrence of numerous events and activities which resulted from the application of an
alleged unconstitutional legal provision.

The last but the most important requisite that the constitutional issue must be the very lis mota of
the case does not likewise obtain. The lis mota aspect is not present, the constitutional issue tendered not
being critical to the resolution of the case. The unyielding rule has been to avoid, whenever plausible, an
issue assailing the constitutionality of a statute or governmental act. If some other grounds exist by which
judgment can be made without touching the constitutionality of a law, such recourse is favored.

The lis mota in this case, proceeding from the basic positions originally taken by AMBALA (to
which the FARM members previously belonged) and the Supervisory Group, is the alleged non-
compliance by HLI with the conditions of the SDP to support a plea for its revocation. And before the
Court, the lis mota is whether or not PARC acted in grave abuse of discretion when it ordered the recall of
the SDP for such non-compliance and the fact that the SDP, as couched and implemented, offends
certain constitutional and statutory provisions. To be sure, any of these key issues may be resolved
without plunging into the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657. Moreover, looking deeply into the
underlying petitions of AMBALA, et al., it is not the said section per se that is invalid, but rather it is the
alleged application of the said provision in the SDP that is flawed.

It may be well to note at this juncture that Sec. 5 of RA 9700, amending Sec. 7 of RA 6657, has
all but superseded Sec. 31 of RA 6657 vis--vis the stock distribution component of said Sec. 31. In its
pertinent part, Sec. 5 of RA 9700 provides: [T]hat after June 30, 2009, the modes of acquisition shall
be limited to voluntary offer to sell and compulsory acquisition. Thus, for all intents and purposes,
the stock distribution scheme under Sec. 31 of RA 6657 is no longer an available option under existing
law. The question of whether or not it is unconstitutional should be a moot issue.

(3) YES, the revocation of the HLIs SDP valid. [NO, the PARC did NOT gravely abuse its
discretion in revoking the subject SDP and placing the hacienda under CARPs compulsory
acquisition and distribution scheme.]

The revocation of the approval of the SDP is valid: (1) the mechanics and timelines of HLIs stock
distribution violate DAO 10 because the minimum individual allocation of each original FWB of 18,804.32
shares was diluted as a result of the use of man days and the hiring of additional farmworkers; (2) the
30-year timeframe for HLI-to-FWBs stock transfer is contrary to what Sec. 11 of DAO 10 prescribes.

In our review and analysis of par. 3 of the SDOA on the mechanics and timelines of stock
distribution, We find that it violates two (2) provisions of DAO 10. Par. 3 of the SDOA states:
 3. At the end of each fiscal year, for a period of 30 years, the SECOND PARTY [HLI] shall
arrange with the FIRST PARTY [TDC] the acquisition and distribution to the THIRD PARTY [FWBs] on
the basis of number of days worked and at no cost to them of one-thirtieth (1/30) of 118,391,976.85
shares of the capital stock of the SECOND PARTY that are presently owned and held by the FIRST
PARTY, until such time as the entire block of 118,391,976.85 shares shall have been completely acquired
and distributed to the THIRD PARTY.

[I]t is clear as day that the original 6,296 FWBs, who were qualified beneficiaries at the time of the
approval of the SDP, suffered from watering down of shares. As determined earlier, each original FWB is
entitled to 18,804.32 HLI shares. The original FWBs got less than the guaranteed 18,804.32 HLI shares
per beneficiary, because the acquisition and distribution of the HLI shares were based on man days or
number of days worked by the FWB in a years time. As explained by HLI, a beneficiary needs to work
for at least 37 days in a fiscal year before he or she becomes entitled to HLI shares. If it falls below 37
days, the FWB, unfortunately, does not get any share at year end. The number of HLI shares distributed
varies depending on the number of days the FWBs were allowed to work in one year. Worse, HLI hired
farmworkers in addition to the original 6,296 FWBs, such that, as indicated in the Compliance dated
August 2, 2010 submitted by HLI to the Court, the total number of farmworkers of HLI as of said date
stood at 10,502. All these farmworkers, which include the original 6,296 FWBs, were given shares out of
the 118,931,976.85 HLI shares representing the 33.296% of the total outstanding capital stock of
HLI. Clearly, the minimum individual allocation of each original FWB of 18,804.32 shares was diluted as
a result of the use of man days and the hiring of additional farmworkers.

Going into another but related matter, par. 3 of the SDOA expressly providing for a 30-year
timeframe for HLI-to-FWBs stock transfer is an arrangement contrary to what Sec. 11 of DAO 10
prescribes. Said Sec. 11 provides for the implementation of the approved stock distribution plan within
three (3) months from receipt by the corporate landowner of the approval of the plan by PARC. In fact,
based on the said provision, the transfer of the shares of stock in the names of the qualified FWBs should
be recorded in the stock and transfer books and must be submitted to the SEC within sixty (60) days from
implementation.

To the Court, there is a purpose, which is at once discernible as it is practical, for the three-month
threshold. Remove this timeline and the corporate landowner can veritably evade compliance with
agrarian reform by simply deferring to absurd limits the implementation of the stock distribution scheme.

Evidently, the land transfer beneficiaries are given thirty (30) years within which to pay the cost of
the land thus awarded them to make it less cumbersome for them to pay the government. To be sure, the
reason underpinning the 30-year accommodation does not apply to corporate landowners in distributing
shares of stock to the qualified beneficiaries, as the shares may be issued in a much shorter period of
time.

Taking into account the above discussion, the revocation of the SDP by PARC should be upheld
[because of violations of] DAO 10. It bears stressing that under Sec. 49 of RA 6657, the PARC and the
DAR have the power to issue rules and regulations, substantive or procedural. Being a product of such
rule-making power, DAO 10 has the force and effect of law and must be duly complied with. The PARC is,
therefore, correct in revoking the SDP. Consequently, the PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2 dated November
21, l989 approving the HLIs SDP is nullified and voided.
 (4) YES, those portions of the converted land within Hacienda Luisita that RCBC and
LIPCO acquired by purchase should be excluded from the coverage of the assailed PARC
resolution.

[T]here are two (2) requirements before one may be considered a purchaser in good faith,
namely: (1) that the purchaser buys the property of another without notice that some other person has a
right to or interest in such property; and (2) that the purchaser pays a full and fair price for the property at
the time of such purchase or before he or she has notice of the claim of another.

It can rightfully be said that both LIPCO and RCBC arebased on the above requirements and
with respect to the adverted transactions of the converted land in questionpurchasers in good faith for
value entitled to the benefits arising from such status.

First, at the time LIPCO purchased the entire three hundred (300) hectares of industrial land,
there was no notice of any supposed defect in the title of its transferor, Centennary, or that any other
person has a right to or interest in such property. In fact, at the time LIPCO acquired said parcels of land,
only the following annotations appeared on the TCT in the name of Centennary: the Secretarys
Certificate in favor of Teresita Lopa, the Secretarys Certificate in favor of Shintaro Murai, and the
conversion of the property from agricultural to industrial and residential use.

The same is true with respect to RCBC. At the time it acquired portions of Hacienda Luisita, only
the following general annotations appeared on the TCTs of LIPCO: the Deed of Restrictions, limiting its
use solely as an industrial estate; the Secretarys Certificate in favor of Koji Komai and Kyosuke Hori; and
the Real Estate Mortgage in favor of RCBC to guarantee the payment of PhP 300 million.

To be sure, intervenor RCBC and LIPCO knew that the lots they bought were subjected to CARP
coverage by means of a stock distribution plan, as the DAR conversion order was annotated at the back
of the titles of the lots they acquired. However, they are of the honest belief that the subject lots were
validly converted to commercial or industrial purposes and for which said lots were taken out of the CARP
coverage subject of PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2 and, hence, can be legally and validly acquired by
them. After all, Sec. 65 of RA 6657 explicitly allows conversion and disposition of agricultural lands
previously covered by CARP land acquisition after the lapse of five (5) years from its award when the
land ceases to be economically feasible and sound for agricultural purposes or the locality has become
urbanized and the land will have a greater economic value for residential, commercial or industrial
purposes. Moreover, DAR notified all the affected parties, more particularly the FWBs, and gave them
the opportunity to comment or oppose the proposed conversion. DAR, after going through the necessary
processes, granted the conversion of 500 hectares of Hacienda Luisita pursuant to its primary jurisdiction
under Sec. 50 of RA 6657 to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and its original exclusive
jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform. The DAR conversion order
became final and executory after none of the FWBs interposed an appeal to the CA. In this factual
setting, RCBC and LIPCO purchased the lots in question on their honest and well-founded belief that the
previous registered owners could legally sell and convey the lots though these were previously subject of
CARP coverage. Ergo, RCBC and LIPCO acted in good faith in acquiring the subject lots.

And second, both LIPCO and RCBC purchased portions of Hacienda Luisita for value.
Undeniably, LIPCO acquired 300 hectares of land from Centennary for the amount of PhP750 million
pursuant to a Deed of Sale dated July 30, 1998. On the other hand, in a Deed of Absolute Assignment
dated November 25, 2004, LIPCO conveyed portions of Hacienda Luisita in favor of RCBC by way
of dacion en pago to pay for a loan of PhP431,695,732.10.
 In relying upon the above-mentioned approvals, proclamation and conversion order, both RCBC
and LIPCO cannot be considered at fault for believing that certain portions of Hacienda Luisita are
industrial/commercial lands and are, thus, outside the ambit of CARP. The PARC, and consequently
DAR, gravely abused its discretion when it placed LIPCOs and RCBCs property which once
formed part of Hacienda Luisita under the CARP compulsory acquisition scheme via the assailed
Notice of Coverage.

[The Court went on to apply the operative fact doctrine to determine what should be done in the
aftermath of its disposition of the above-enumerated issues:

While We affirm the revocation of the SDP on Hacienda Luisita subject of PARC Resolution Nos.
2005-32-01 and 2006-34-01, the Court cannot close its eyes to certain operative facts that had occurred
in the interim. Pertinently, the operative fact doctrine realizes that, in declaring a law or executive
action null and void, or, by extension, no longer without force and effect, undue harshness and resulting
unfairness must be avoided. This is as it should realistically be, since rights might have accrued in favor
of natural or juridical persons and obligations justly incurred in the meantime. The actual existence of a
statute or executive act is, prior to such a determination, an operative fact and may have consequences
which cannot justly be ignored; the past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration.

While the assailed PARC resolutions effectively nullifying the Hacienda Luisita SDP are
upheld, the revocation must, by application of the operative fact principle, give way to the right of
the original 6,296 qualified FWBs to choose whether they want to remain as HLI stockholders or
not. The Court cannot turn a blind eye to the fact that in 1989, 93% of the FWBs agreed to the SDOA (or
the MOA), which became the basis of the SDP approved by PARC per its Resolution No. 89-12-2 dated
November 21, 1989. From 1989 to 2005, the FWBs were said to have received from HLI salaries and
cash benefits, hospital and medical benefits, 240-square meter homelots, 3% of the gross produce from
agricultural lands, and 3% of the proceeds of the sale of the 500-hectare converted land and the 80.51-
hectare lot sold to SCTEX. HLI shares totaling 118,391,976.85 were distributed as of April 22, 2005. On
August 6, 20l0, HLI and private respondents submitted a Compromise Agreement, in which HLI gave the
FWBs the option of acquiring a piece of agricultural land or remain as HLI stockholders, and as a matter
of fact, most FWBs indicated their choice of remaining as stockholders. These facts and circumstances
tend to indicate that some, if not all, of the FWBs may actually desire to continue as HLI shareholders. A
matter best left to their own discretion.]

[WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. PARC Resolution No. 2005-32-01 dated
December 22, 2005 and Resolution No. 2006-34-01 dated May 3, 2006, placing the lands subject of HLIs
SDP under compulsory coverage on mandated land acquisition scheme of the CARP, are
hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the original 6,296 qualified FWBs shall have the option
to remain as stockholders of HLI. DAR shall immediately schedule meetings with the said 6,296 FWBs
and explain to them the effects, consequences and legal or practical implications of their choice, after
which the FWBs will be asked to manifest, in secret voting, their choices in the ballot, signing their
signatures or placing their thumbmarks, as the case may be, over their printed names.
Lladoc v CIR (1965)

Lladoc v CIR
GR No L-19201, June 16, 1965

FACTS:
In 1957, MB Estate Inc. of Bacolod City donated P10,000 in cash to Reverend Father Ruiz, then parish priest of
Victorias, Negros Occidental for the construction of a new Catholic Church. Under date of April 29, 1960, the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued an assessment amounting to P 1,370 for donees gift tax against the
Catholic Parish of Victorias. Petitioner lodged a protest to the assessment. CIR denied the protest which was
substantially affirmed by the Court of Tax Appeals. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

1. (1) Whether petitioner should be liable for the assessed donees gift tax on the P10,000 donation;
2. (2) Who should be called upon to pay the tax?

RULING:
(1) The petitioner is liable. What the Collector assessed was a donees gift tax; the assessment was not on the
properties themselves and is thus, not subject to the exemption in the Constitution. It did not rest upon general
ownership; it was an excise upon the use made of the properties, upon the exercise of the privilege of receiving the
properties.
(2) The Head of the Diocese, to which the parish Victorias pertains is liable for the payment thereof.
Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v Marcos (1996)

Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v Marcos GR No 120082, September 11, 1996

FACTS:
Petitioner was created by virtue of RA 6958. Section 1 thereof states that the authority shall be exempt from realty
taxes imposed by the National Government or any of its political subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities.
However, the Treasurer of Cebu City demanded payment for realty taxes from petitioner. Petitioner filed a
declaratory relief before the Regional Trial Court. The trial court dismissed the petitioner ruling that the Local
Government Code withdrew the tax exemption granted to Government owned and controlled corporation.

ISSUE:
Whether the city of Cebu has the power to impose taxes on petitioner

RULING:
Yes. Taxation is the rule and exemption is the exception, the exemption may thus be withdrawn at the pleasure of
the taxing authority. As to tax exemptions or incentives granted to or presently enjoyed by natural or juridical
persons, including government- owned and controlled corporations, section 193 of the LGC prescribes the general
rule, viz, they are withdrawn upon the effectivity of the LGC, except those granted to local water districts,
cooperatives, duly registered under RA 6938, non stock and nonprofit hospitals and educational institutions and
unless otherwise provided in the LGC.
J. CASANOVAS, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
JNO. S. HORD, defendant-appellee.

WILLARD, J.:

FACTS: In 1897, the Spanish Government, in accordance with the provisions of the royal decree of 14 may 1867,
granted J. Casanovas certain mines in the province of Ambos Camarines, of which mines the latter is now the
owner. That these were validly perfected mining concessions granted to prior to 11 April 1899 is conceded. They
were so considered by the Collector of Internal Revenue and were by him said to fall within the provisions of
section 134 of Act No. 1189, known as the Internal Revenue Act. That section is as follows:

SEC. 134. On all valid perfected mining concessions granted prior to April eleventh, eighteen hundred and
ninety-nine, there shall be levied and collected on the after January first, nineteen hundred and five, the
following taxes:

2. (a) On each claim containing an area of sixty thousand square meters, an annual tax of one hundred
pesos; (b) and at the same rate proportionately on each claim containing an area in excess of, or less than,
sixty thousand square meters.

3. On the gross output of each an ad valorem tax equal to three per centum of the actual market value of
such output.

The defendant accordingly imposed upon these properties the tax mentioned in section 134, which tax, as has
before been stated, J. Casanovas paid under protest.

ISSUE: Whether Section 134 of Act 1189 is valid.

HELD: The fact that this concession was made by the Government of Spain, and not by the Government of the
United States, is not important. Our conclusion is that the concessions granted by the Government of Spain to the
plaintiff, constitute contracts between the parties; that section 134 of the Internal Revenue Law impairs the
obligation of these contracts, and is therefore void as to them.

We think that this section is also void because in conflict with section 60 of the act of Congress of July 1, 1902. This
section is as follows:

That nothing in this Act shall be construed to effect the rights of any person, partnership, or corporation,
having a valid, perfected mining concession granted prior to April eleventh, eighteen hundred and ninety-
nine, but all such concessions shall be conducted under the provisions of the law in force at the time they
were granted, subject at all times to cancellation by reason of illegality in the procedure by which they
were obtained, or for failure to comply with the conditions prescribed as requisite to their retention in the
laws under which they were granted: Provided, That the owner or owners of every such concession shall
cause the corners made by its boundaries to be distinctly marked with permanent monuments within six
months after this act has been promulgated in the Philippine Islands, and that any concessions, the
boundaries of which are not so marked within this period shall be free and open to explorations and
purchase under the provisions of this act.2
This section seems to indicate that concessions, like those in question, can be canceled only by reason of illegality
in the procedure by which they were obtained, or for failure to comply with the conditions prescribed as requisite
for their retention in the laws under which they were granted. There is nothing in the section which indicates that
they can be canceled for failure to comply with the conditions prescribed by subsequent legislation. In fact, the
real intention of the act seems to be that such concession should be subject to the former legislation and not to
any subsequent legislation. There is no claim in this case that there was any illegality in the procedure by which
these concessions were obtained, nor is there any claim that the plaintiff has not complied with the conditions
prescribed in the said royal decree of 1867.

The judgment of the court below is reversed, and judgment is ordered in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendant for P9,600, with interest thereon, at 6 per cent, from the 21st day of February, 1906, and the costs of
the Court of First Instance. No costs will be allowed to either party in this court.

KURODA VS JALANDONI
83 Phil. 171 Political Law Generally Accepted Principles of International Law
Shigenori Kuroda was the highest ranking Japanese officer stationed in the Philippines during the
Japanese occupation. He was then charged before the Military Commission, headed by Major General
Rafael Jalandoni, due to the atrocities that were done against non combatant civilians and prisoners
during the war. His trial was in pursuant to Executive Order No. 68 which established the National War
Crimes Office and prescribing rules and regulations governing the trial of accused war criminals. Kuroda
is questioning the legality of the said EO arguing that the same is not provided for in the Constitution. He
further underscores the fact that the Philippines is not a signatory of the Hague Convention on the Rules
and Regulations Covering Land Warfare hence we cannot impose against him any criminal charges
because it has no laws to base on, national or international.
ISSUE: Whether or not Kuroda can be charged in Philippine courts?
HELD: Yes. EO No. 68 is constitutional hence the Philippine courts can take cognizance of the case at
bar. EO No 68 is in pursuant to the constitutional provision that states the Philippines renounces war as
an instrument of national policy, and adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part
of the law of the nation. The Hague Convention and other similar conventions whose principles are
generally accepted are hence considered as part of the law of the land.

AGUSTIN VS EDU
Generally Accepted Principles of International Law Police Power
Agustin is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car. He is assailing the validity of Letter of Instruction No
229 which requires all motor vehicles to have early warning devices particularly to equip them with a pair
of reflectorized triangular early warning devices. Agustin is arguing that this order is unconstitutional,
harsh, cruel and unconscionable to the motoring public. Cars are already equipped with blinking lights
which is already enough to provide warning to other motorists. And that the mandate to compel motorists
to buy a set of reflectorized early warning devices is redundant and would only make manufacturers and
dealers instant millionaires.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said is EO is valid.
HELD: Such early warning device requirement is not an expensive redundancy, nor oppressive, for car
owners whose cars are already equipped with 1) blinking-lights in the fore and aft of said motor vehicles,
2) battery-powered blinking lights inside motor vehicles, 3) built-in reflectorized tapes on front and rear
bumpers of motor vehicles, or 4) well-lighted two (2) petroleum lamps (the Kinke) . . . because: Being
universal among the signatory countries to the said 1968 Vienna Conventions, and visible even under
adverse conditions at a distance of at least 400 meters, any motorist from this country or from any part of
the world, who sees a reflectorized rectangular early warning device installed on the roads, highways or
expressways, will conclude, without thinking, that somewhere along the travelled portion of that road,
highway, or expressway, there is a motor vehicle which is stationary, stalled or disabled which obstructs
or endangers passing traffic. On the other hand, a motorist who sees any of the aforementioned other
built-in warning devices or the petroleum lamps will not immediately get adequate advance warning
because he will still think what that blinking light is all about. Is it an emergency vehicle? Is it a law
enforcement car? Is it an ambulance? Such confusion or uncertainty in the mind of the motorist will thus
increase, rather than decrease, the danger of collision.
On Police Power
The Letter of Instruction in question was issued in the exercise of the police power. That is conceded by
petitioner and is the main reliance of respondents. It is the submission of the former, however, that while
embraced in such a category, it has offended against the due process and equal protection safeguards of
the Constitution, although the latter point was mentioned only in passing. The broad and expansive scope
of the police power which was originally identified by Chief Justice Taney of the American Supreme Court
in an 1847 decision, as nothing more or less than the powers of government inherent in every
sovereignty was stressed in the aforementioned case of Edu v. Ericta thus: Justice Laurel, in the first
leading decision after the Constitution came into force, Calalang v. Williams, identified police power with
state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote
the general welfare. Persons and property could thus be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens
in order to secure the general comfort, health and prosperity of the state. Shortly after independence in
1948, Primicias v. Fugoso reiterated the doctrine, such a competence being referred to as the power to
prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general
welfare of the people. The concept was set forth in negative terms by Justice Malcolm in a pre-
Commonwealth decision as that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all
things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society. In that sense it could be hardly distinguishable
as noted by this Court in Morfe v. Mutuc with the totality of legislative power. It is in the above sense the
greatest and most powerful attribute of government. It is, to quote Justice Malcolm anew, the most
essential, insistent, and at least illimitable powers, extending as Justice Holmes aptly pointed out to all
the great public needs. Its scope, ever expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate
the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to
conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits. In the language of Justice Cardozo:
Needs that were narrow or parochial in the past may be interwoven in the present with the well-being of
the nation. What is critical or urgent changes with the time. The police power is thus a dynamic agency,
suitably vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state
and imposing upon its government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to
enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary
measures calculated to insure communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare.
It was thus a heavy burden to be shouldered by Agustin, compounded by the fact that the particular police
power measure challenged was clearly intended to promote public safety. It would be a rare occurrence
indeed for this Court to invalidate a legislative or executive act of that character. None has been called to
our attention, an indication of its being non-existent. The latest decision in point, Edu v. Ericta, sustained
the validity of the Reflector Law, an enactment conceived with the same end in view. Calalang v.
Williams found nothing objectionable in a statute, the purpose of which was: To promote safe transit
upon, and avoid obstruction on roads and streets designated as national roads . . . As a matter of fact,
the first law sought to be nullified after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, the National Defense
Act, with petitioner failing in his quest, was likewise prompted by the imperative demands of public safety.
 In Re: Garcia

Facts:
Arturo E. Garcia has applied for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines without submitting to
the required bar examinations. In his verified petition, he avers, among others, that he is a Filipino citizen
born in Bacolod City, of Filipino parentage; that he had taken and finished in Spain the course of
"Bachillerato Superior"; that he was approved, selected and qualified by the "Instituto de Cervantes" for
admission to the Central University of Madrid where he studied and finished the law course graduating as
"Licenciado en derecho"; and thereafter he was allowed to practice the law profession in Spain; and that
under the provisions of the Treaty on Academic Degrees and the Exercise of Profession between the RP
and Spain, he is entitled to practice the law profession in the Philippines without submitting to the required
bar examinations.

Issue:
Whether or not the treaty can modify regulations governing admission to the Philippine Bar?

Held:
The court resolved to deny the petition.

Ratio Decidendi:
The provision of the treaty on Academic Degrees and Exercise of Profession between the RP and Spain
cannot be invoked by the applicant. Said treaty was intended to govern Filipino citizens desiring to
practice thair profession in Spain, and the citizens of Spain desiring to practice their profession in the
Philippines. Applicant is a Filipino citizen desiring to practice profession in the Philippines. He is therefore
subject to the laws of his own country and is not entitled to the privileges extended to Spanish nationals
desiring to practice in the Philippines. The privileges provided in the treaty invoked by the applicant are
made expressly subject to the laws and regulations on the contracting state in whose territory it is desired
to exercise the legal profession.

The aforementioned Treaty, concluded between the RP and Spain could not have been intended to
modify the laws and regulations governing admission to the practice of law in the Philippines, for the
reason that the Executive Department may not encroach upon the constitutional prerogative of the
Supreme Court to promulgate rules for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines, the power to
repeal, alter or supplement such rules being reserved only to the Congress of the Philippines.
Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v Duque III
Facts:

Petition for certiorari seeking to nullify the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations (RIRR) of E.O.
51 (Milk Code). Petitioner claims that the RIRR is not valid as it contains provisions that are not
constitutional and go beyond what it is supposed to implement. Milk Code was issued by President Cory
Aquino under the Freedom Constitution on Oct.1986. One of the preambular clauses of the Milk Code
states that the law seeks to give effect to Art 11 of the Intl Code of Marketing and Breastmilk
Substitutes(ICBMS), a code adopted by the World Health Assembly(WHA). From 1982-2006, The WHA
also adopted severe resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should be supported, hence, it should be
ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for breastmilk substitutes. In 2006, the DOH
issued the assailed RIRR.

Issue:
Sub-Issue: W/N the pertinent intl agreements entered into by the Phil are part of the law of the land and
may be implemented by DOH through the RIRR. If yes, W/N the RIRR is in accord with intl agreements

MAIN: W/N the DOH acted w/o or in excess of their jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of excess of jurisdiction and in violation of the Constitution by promulgating the RIRR.

Held:

Sub-issue:

Yes for ICBMS. Under 1987 Consti, intl law can become domestic law by transformation (thru
constitutional mechanism such as local legislation) or incorporation (mere constitutional declaration i.e
treaties) The ICBMS and WHA resolutions were not treaties as they have not been concurred by 2/3 of all
members of the Senate as required under Sec, 21, Art 8. However, the ICBMS had been transformed into
domestic law through a local legislation such as the Milk Code. The Milk Code is almost a verbatim
reproduction of ICBMS.

No for WHA Resolutions. The Court ruled that DOH failed to establish that the provisions pertinent WHA
resolutions are customary intl law that may be deemed part of the law of the land. For an intl rule to be
considered as customary law, it must be established that such rule is being followed by states because
they consider it as obligatory to comply with such rules (opinion juris). The WHO resolutions, although
signed by most of the member states, were enforced or practiced by at least a majority of member states.
Unlike the ICBMS whereby legislature enacted most of the provisions into the law via the Milk Code, the
WHA Resolutions (specifically providing for exclusive breastfeeding from 0-6 months, breastfeeding up to
24 Months and absolutely prohibiting ads for breastmilk substitutes) have not been adopted as domestic
law nor are they followed in our country as well. The Filipinos have the option of how to take care of their
babies as they see fit. WHA Resolutions may be classified as SOFT LAW non-binding norms, principles
and practices that influence state behavior. Soft law is not part of intl law.

Main issue:

Yes. Some parts of the RIRR were not in consonance with the Milk Code such as Sec. 4(f) ->advertising,
promotions of formula are prohibited,

Sec 11 -> prohibitions for advertising breastmilk substitutes intended for infants and young children uo to
24 months

And Sec 46 -> sanctions for advertising .

These provisions are declared null and void. The DOH and respondents are prohibited from implementing
said provisions.
Alih vs. Castro

151 SCRA 279

June 23, 1987

Facts:

Respondents who were members of the Philippine marine and defense forces raided the compound
occupied by petitioner in search of loose firearms, ammunitions and explosives. A shoot-out ensued after
petitioners resisted the intrusion by the respondents, killing a number of men. The following morning, the
petitioners were arrested and subjected to finger printing, paraffin testing and photographing despite
their objection. Several kinds of rifle, grenades and ammunitions were also confiscated.

The petitioners filed an injunction suit with a prayer to have the items illegally seized returned to them and
invoked the provisions on the Bill of Rights

The respondents admitted that the operation was done without a warrant but reasoned that they were
acting under superior orders and that operation was necessary because of the aggravation of the peace
and order problem due to the assassination of the city mayor.

Issue:

Whether or not the seizing of the items and the taking of the fingerprints and photographs of the
petitioners and subjecting them to paraffin testing are violative of the bill of Rights and are inadmissible as
evidence against them.

Held:

The court held that superior orders nor the suspicion that the respondents had against petitioners did not
excuse the former from observing the guaranty provided for by the constitution against unreasonable
searches and seizure. The petitioners were entitled to due process and should be protected from
the arbitrary actions of those tasked to execute the law. Furthermore, there was no showing that the
operation was urgent nor was there any showing of the petitioners as criminals or fugitives of justice to
merit approval by virtue of Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court.

The items seized, having been the fruits of the poisonous tree were held inadmissible as evidence in
any proceedings against the petitioners. The operation by the respondents was done without a warrant
and so the items seized during said operation should not be acknowledged in court as evidence. But said
evidence should remain in the custody of the law (custodia egis).

However, as to the issue on finger-printing, photographing and paraffin-testing as violative of the provision
against self-incrimination, the court held that the prohibition against self-incrimination applies to
testimonial compulsion only. As Justice Holmes put it in Holt v. United States, 18 The prohibition of
compelling a man in a criminal court to be a witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical
or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it
may be material.

PEOPLE VS LAGMAN
66 Phil. 13 Political Law Defense of State
In 1936, Tranquilino Lagman reached the age of 20. He is being compelled by Section 60 of
Commonwealth Act 1 (National Defense Law) to join the military service. Lagman refused to do so
because he has a father to support, has no military leanings and he does not wish to kill or be killed.
Lagman further assailed the constitutionality of the said law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the National Defense Law is constitutional.
HELD: Yes. The duty of the Government to defend the State cannot be performed except through an
army. To leave the organization of an army to the will of the citizens would be to make this duty of the
Government excusable should there be no sufficient men who volunteer to enlist therein. Hence, the
National Defense Law, in so far as it establishes compulsory military service, does not go against this
constitutional provision but is, on the contrary, in faithful compliance therewith. The defense of the State
is a prime duty of government, and in the fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be required by law to
render personal military or civil service.