CHAPTER 8 CASE DIGESTS:

TITLE: Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC

CITATION: 248 SCRA 300

FACTS:

Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938, established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte
where she studied and graduated high school in the Holy Infant Academy from 1938 to 1949.
She then pursued her college degree, education, in St. Pauls College now Divine Word
University also in Tacloban. Subsequently, she taught in Leyte Chinese School still in
Tacloban. She went to manila during 1952 to work with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel
Romualdez in his office in the House of Representatives. In 1954, she married late President
Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a Congressman of Ilocos Norte and was registered there
as a voter. When Pres. Marcos was elected as Senator in 1959, they lived together in San
Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965, when Marcos won presidency, they lived
in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel Manila. She served as member
of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila during 1978.

Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of Representative of the First District of
Leyte for the 1995 Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First
District of Leyte and also a candidate for the same position, filed a Petition for Cancellation and
Disqualification" with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the
constitutional requirement for residency. The petitioner, in an honest misrepresentation, wrote
seven months under residency, which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since
childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 29, 1995 and that
"she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. She arrived at the
seven months residency due to the fact that she became a resident of the Municipality of Tolosa
in said months.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1year residency requirement to be eligible in
running as representative of the First District of Leyte.

HELD:

Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes. The court are in favor of
a conclusion supporting petitoners claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District of
Leyte despite her own declaration of 7 months residency in the district for the following reasons:

1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became Imeldas domicile of origin by
operation of law when her father brought them to Leyte;

2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide
intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which
correspond with the purpose. In the absence and concurrence of all these, domicile of origin
should be deemed to continue.

3. A wife does not automatically gain the husbands domicile because the term residence in
Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law. When Imelda married late President
Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home and not
domicilium necessarium.
4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired right to choose
a new one only after the death of Pres. Marcos, her actions upon returning to the country clearly
indicated that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice. To add,
petitioner even obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte while living in her
brothers house, an act, which supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested. She even
kept close ties by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other
important milestones.

WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence

qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the
COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are
hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of
Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of
Leyte.

Aquino vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 120265, September 18, 1995

Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Petitioner Agapito Aquino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of
Representative for the Second District of Makati City. Private respondents Move Makati, a
duly registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Brgy.
Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify petitioner on the ground that the latter lacked
the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman which, under Sec. 6, Art. VI of the
Constitution, should be for a period not less than 1 year immediately preceding the elections.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner lacked the residence qualificationas a candidate for
congressman as mandated by Sec. 6, Art. VI of the Constitution

Held: In order that petitioner could qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second
District of Makati City, he must prove that he has established not just residence but domicile of
choice.

Petitioner, in his certificate of candidacy for the 1992 elections, indicated not only that he was a
resident of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac in 1992 but that he was a resident of the same for 52
years immediately preceding that elections. At that time, his certificate indicated that he was
also a registered voter of the same district. His birth certificate places Concepcion, Tarlac as the
birthplace of his parents. What stands consistently clear and unassailable is that his domicile of
origin of record up to the time of filing of his most recent certificate of candidacy for the 1995
elections was Concepcion, Tarlac.

The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a
condominium unit instead of buying one. While a lease contract may be indicative of petitioners
intention to reside in Makati City, it does not engender the kind of permanency required to prove
abandonment of ones original domicile.
Petitioners assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makati is a bare
assertion which is hardly supported by the facts. To successfully effect a change of domicile,
petitioner must prove an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of
abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which
correspond with the purpose. In the absence of clear and positive proof, the domicile of origin
should be deemed to continue.

People vs. Jalosjos G.R. No. 132875-76, February 3, 2000

Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who

is confined at the national penitentiary while hisconviction for statutory rape and acts of
lasciviousness is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be
allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative
sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a
non-bailable offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and the need for his constituents to be
represented.

Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as member of

House of Representatives

Held: Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However, inspite of its
importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or
restricted by law.

The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of
Representatives arises from a provision of the Constitution. The privilege has always been
granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot
be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by
intendment,implication or equitable considerations.

The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the
operation of Sec. 11, Art. VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel
absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The
confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than
six years is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutionalfoundations. To allow accused-
appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5 days or more in a
week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such
anaberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellants status to that of a special class, it
also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system.

Trillanes vs. Pimentel (G.R. No. 179817)

FACTS:
Petitioner Trillanes IV is on trial for coup detat in relation to the Oakwood Incident. In the 2007
elections, he won a seat in the Senate with a six-year term commencing at noon on June 30,
2007. Petitioner now asks the Court that he be allowed to attend all official functions of the
Senate, alleging mainly that his case is distinct from that of Jalosjos as his case is still pending
resolution whereas that in the Jalosjos case, there was already conviction.

ISSUE:
Whether or not valid classification between petitioner and Jalosjos exists

RULING:
The petition is bereft of merit.

In attempting to strike a distinction between his case and that of Jalosjos, petitioner chiefly
points out that former Rep. Romeo Jalosjos (Jalosjos) was already convicted, albeit his
conviction was pending appeal, when he filed a motion similar to petitioner's Omnibus Motion,
whereas he (petitioner) is a mere detention prisoner. He asserts that he continues to enjoy civil
and political rights since the presumption of innocence is still in his favor.

Further, petitioner illustrates that Jalosjos was charged with crimes involving moral turpitude,
i.e., two counts of statutory rape and six counts of acts of lasciviousness, whereas he is indicted
for coup d'etat which is regarded as a "political offense."

Furthermore, petitioner justifies in his favor the presence of noble causes in expressing
legitimate grievances against the rampant and institutionalized practice of graft and corruption in
the AFP.

xxx

A plain reading of Jalosjos suggests otherwise, however.

The distinctions cited by petitioner were not elemental in the pronouncement in Jalosjos that
election to Congress is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement as the
functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift one from the class of
prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.

It cannot be gainsaid that a person charged with a crime is taken into custody for purposes of
the administration of justice. No less than the Constitution provides:

All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired
even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be
required. (Underscoring supplied)

The Rules also state that no person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is
strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal action.

That the cited provisions apply equally to rape and coup d'etat cases, both being punishable by
reclusion perpetua, is beyond cavil. Within the class of offenses covered by the stated range of
imposable penalties, there is clearly no distinction as to the political complexion of or moral
turpitude involved in the crime charged.

In the present case, it is uncontroverted that petitioner's application for bail and for release on
recognizance was denied. The determination that the evidence of guilt is strong, whether
ascertained in a hearing of an application for bail or imported from a trial court's judgment of
conviction, justifies the detention of an accused as a valid curtailment of his right to provisional
liberty. This accentuates the proviso that the denial of the right to bail in such cases is
"regardless of the stage of the criminal action." Such justification for confinement with its
underlying rationale of public self-defense applies equally to detention prisoners like petitioner
or convicted prisoners-appellants like Jalosjos.

Nicanor Jimenez vs Bartolome Cabangbang

17 SCRA 876 Political Law Freedom of Speech and Debate
Bartolome Cabangbang was a member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of its
Committee on National Defense. In November 1958, Cabangbang caused the publication of an
open letter addressed to the Philippines. Said letter alleged that there have been allegedly three
operational plans under serious study by some ambitious AFP officers, with the aid of some
civilian political strategists. That such strategists have had collusions with communists and that
the Secretary of Defense, Jesus Vargas, was planning a coup dtat to place him as the
president. The planners allegedly have Nicanor Jimenez, among others, under their guise and
that Jimenez et al may or may not be aware that they are being used as a tool to meet such an
end. The letter was said to have been published in newspapers of general circulation. Jimenez
then filed a case against Cabangbang to collect a sum of damages against Cabangbang
alleging that Cabangbangs statement is libelous. Cabangbang petitioned for the case to be
dismissed because he said that as a member of the lower house, he is immune from suit and
that he is covered by the privileged communication rule and that the said letter is not even
libelous.
ISSUE: Whether or not the open letter is covered by privilege communication endowed to
members of Congress.
HELD: No. Article VI, Section 15 of the Constitution provides The Senators and Members of the
House of Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace. Be
privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in going to
and returning from the same; and for any speech or debate therein, they shall not be questioned
in any other place.
The publication of the said letter is not covered by said expression which refers to utterances
made by Congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such as speeches
delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session
as well as bills introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other acts
performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in
the official discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of Congressional Committees
duly authorized to perform its functions as such at the time of the performance of the acts in
question. Congress was not in session when the letter was published and at the same time he,
himself, caused the publication of the said letter. It is obvious that, in thus causing the
communication to be so published, he was not performing his official duty, either as a member
of Congress or as officer of any Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to the finding made by the
lower court the said communication is not absolutely privileged.
OSMENA VS PENDATUN
In June 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmea, Jr. delivered a speech entitled A Message to
Garcia. In the said speech, he disparaged then President Carlos Garcia and his administration.
Subsequently, House Resolution No. 59 was passed by the lower house in order to investigate
the charges made by Osmea during his speech and that if his allegations were found to be
baseless and malicious, he may be subjected to disciplinary actions by the lower house.
Osmea then questioned the validity of the said resolution before the Supreme Court. Osmea
avers that the resolution violates his parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in
Congress. Congressman Salipada Pendatun filed an answer where he averred that the
Supreme Court has not jurisdiction over the matter and Congress has the power to discipline its
members.
ISSUE: Whether or not Osmeas immunity has been violated?
HELD: No. Section 15, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity
upon members of the legislature which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every parliament
in a democratic world. It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without fear
of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum
outside the Hall of Congress. However, it does not protect him from responsibility before the
legislative body whenever his words and conduct are considered disorderly or unbecoming of a
member therein. Therefore, Osmeas petition is dismissed.

ADAZA VS PACANA
Adaza v. Pacana
135 SCRA 431

FACTS:
Adaza is the governor of Misamis Oriental and Pacana is the vice-governor. Their respective
term of office expires on March 3, 1986. Both parties ran in the Batasang Pambansa (BP)
elections in 1984 and respondent lost to petitioner. On July 23, 1984, Pacana took his oath of
office as the governor. Petitioner has brought this petition to exclude respondent therefrom,
claiming to be the lawful occupant of the position.

ISSUE:
1) Whether or not a provincial governor who was elected as Mababatas Pambansa (MP) can
exercise the functions of both simultaneously; and 2) whether or not a vice-governor who ran for
the position of MP but lost, can continue serving as vice governor and subsequently succeed to
the office of governor if said office is vacated.

HELD:
Section 10, Article VIII of the Constitution is clear and unambiguous. A member of the BP may
not hold any other office in the government. A public office is a public trust. A holder thereof is
subject to regulations and conditions as the law may impose and he cannot complain of any
restrictions on his holding of more than one office. The contention that Pacana, as a mere
private citizen, runs afoul of BP Blg. 697 which provides that governors, or members of
sangguniang or barangay officials, upon filing a certificate of candidacy be considered on forced
leave of absence from office. When respondent reassumed the position of vice-governor after
the BP elections, he was acting within the law. Thus, the instant petition is denied.
PUYAT VS DE GUZMAN
n May 1979, Eugenio Puyat and his group were elected as directors of the International Pipe
Industries. The election was subsequently questioned by Eustaquio Acero (Puyats rival)
claiming that the votes were not properly counted hence he filed a quo warranto case before
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on May 25, 1979. Prior to Aceros filing of the
case, Estanislao Fernandez, then a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa purchased ten
shares of stock of IPI from a member of Aceros group. And during a conference held by SEC
Commissioner Sixto de Guzman, Jr. (from May 25-31, 1979) to have the parties confer with
each other, Estanislao Fernandez entered his appearance as counsel for Acero. Puyat objected
as he argued that it is unconstitutional for an assemblyman to appear as counsel (to anyone)
before any administrative body (such as the SEC). This being cleared, Fernandez inhibited
himself from appearing as counsel for Acero. He instead filed an Urgent Motion for Intervention
in the said SEC case for him to intervene, not as a counsel, but as a legal owner of IPI shares
and as a person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation. The SEC Commissioner
granted the motion and in effect granting Fernandez leave to intervene.
ISSUE: Whether or not Fernandez, acting as a stockholder of IPI, can appear and intervene in
the SEC case without violating the constitutional provision that an assemblyman must not
appear as counsel in such courts or bodies?
HELD: No, Fernandez cannot appear before the SEC body under the guise that he is not
appearing as a counsel. Even though he is a stockholder and that he has a legal interest in the
matter in litigation he is still barred from appearing. He bought the stocks before the litigation
took place. During the conference he presented himself as counsel but because it is clearly
stated that he cannot do so under the constitution he instead presented himself as a party of
interest which is clearly a workaround and is clearly an act after the fact. A mere workaround
to get himself involved in the litigation. What could not be done directly could not likewise be
done indirectly.

MABANAG VS LOPEZ
FACTS: Petitioners include 3 senators and 8 representatives. The three senators were
suspended by senate due to election irregularities. The 8 representatives were not allowed to
take their seat in the lower House except in the election of the House Speaker. They argued
that some senators and House Reps were not considered in determining the required vote (of
each house) in order to pass the Resolution (proposing amendments to the Constitution)
which has been considered as an enrolled bill by then. At the same time, the votes were already
entered into the Journals of the respective House. As a result, the Resolution was passed but it
could have been otherwise were they allowed to vote. If these members of Congress had been
counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment would have been short of the
necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress. Petitioners filed or the prohibition of
the furtherance of the said resolution amending the constitution. Respondents argued that the
SC cannot take cognizance of the case because the Court is bound by the conclusiveness of
the enrolled bill or resolution.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court can take cognizance of the issue at bar. Whether or not the
said resolution was duly enacted by Congress.
HELD: As far as looking into the Journals is concerned, even if both the journals from each
House and an authenticated copy of the Act had been presented, the disposal of the issue by
the Court on the basis of the journals does not imply rejection of the enrollment theory, for, as
already stated, the due enactment of a law may be proved in either of the two ways specified in
section 313 of Act No. 190 as amended. The SC found in the journals no signs of irregularity in
the passage of the law and did not bother itself with considering the effects of an authenticated
copy if one had been introduced. It did not do what the opponents of the rule of conclusiveness
advocate, namely, look into the journals behind the enrolled copy in order to determine the
correctness of the latter, and rule such copy out if the two, the journals and the copy, be found
in conflict with each other. No discrepancy appears to have been noted between the two
documents and the court did not say or so much as give to understand that if discrepancy
existed it would give greater weight to the journals, disregarding the explicit provision that duly
certified copies shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due
enactment thereof.

CASO PHIL VS GIMENEZ

Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. (Casco) was engaged in the production of synthetic resin
glues used primarily in the production of plywood. The main components of the said glue
are urea and formaldehyde which are both being imported abroad. Pursuant to a Central Bank
circular, Casco paid the required margin fee for its imported urea and formaldehyde. Casco
however paid in protest as it maintained that urea and formaldehyde are tax exempt
transactions. The Central Bank agreed and it issued vouchers for refund. The said vouchers
were submitted to Pedro Gimenez, the then Auditor General, who denied the tax refund.
Gimenez maintained that urea and formaldehyde, as two separate and distinct components
are not tax exempt; that what is tax exempt is urea formaldehyde (the synthetic resin formed by
combining urea and formaldehyde). Gimenez cited the provision of Sec. 2, par 18 of Republic
Act No. 2609 which provides:
The margin established by the Monetary Board pursuant to the provision of section one
hereof shall not be imposed upon the sale of foreign exchange for the importation of the
following:
xxx xxx xxx
XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardboard when imported by and
for the exclusive use of end-users.
Casco however averred that the term urea formaldehyde appearing in this provision should be
construed as urea and formaldehyde. It further contends that the bill approved in Congress
contained the copulative conjunction and between the terms urea and, formaldehyde, and
that the members of Congress intended to exempt urea and formaldehyde separately as
essential elements in the manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called urea formaldehyde,
not the latter a finished product, citing in support of this view the statements made on the floor of
the Senate, during the consideration of the bill before said House, by members thereof.
The enrolled bill however used the term urea formaldehyde
ISSUE: Whether or not the term urea formaldehyde should be construed as urea and
formaldehyde.
HELD: No. Urea formaldehyde is not a chemical solution. It is the synthetic resin formed as a
condensation product from definite proportions of urea and formaldehyde under certain
conditions relating to temperature, acidity, and time of reaction. Urea formaldehyde is clearly a
finished product, which is patently distinct and different from urea and formaldehyde, as
separate articles used in the manufacture of the synthetic resin known as urea formaldehyde.
The opinions or statements of any member of Congress during the deliberation of the said
law/bill do not represent the entirety of the Congress itself. What is printed in the enrolled bill
would be conclusive upon the courts. The enrolled bill which uses the term urea
formaldehyde instead of urea and formaldehyde is conclusive upon the courts as regards
the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the President. If there has been
any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and
approved by the Executive on which the SC cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the
principle of separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic
system the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree.

**Enrolled Bill that which has been duly introduced, finally passed by both houses, signed by
the proper officers of each, approved by the president and filed by the secretary of state.

Section 313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190), as amended by Act No. 2210,
provides: Official documents may be proved as follows: . . . (2) the proceedings of the
Philippine Commission, or of any legislatives body that may be provided for in the Philippine
Islands, or of Congress, by the journals of those bodies or of either house thereof, or by
published statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk of secretary, or printed by
their order; Provided, That in the case of Acts of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine
Legislature, when there is an existence of a copy signed by the presiding officers and
secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the
due enactment thereof.

The SC is bound by the contents of a duly authenticated resolution (enrolled bill) by the
legislature. In case of conflict, the contents of an enrolled bill shall prevail over those of the
journals.

SAMPAYAN VS DAZA

FACTS:

Petitioners filed a petition seeking to disqualify Daza, then incumbent congressman of their
congressional district in Makati, from continuing to exercise the functions of his office on the
ground that the latter is a greencard holder and a lawful permanent resident of the United
States. They also alleged that Mr. Daza has not by any act or declaration renounced his status
as permanent resident thereby violating the Omnibus Election Code (Section 68) and the 1987
Constitution (section 18, Article III).

Respondent Congressman filed his Comment denying the fact that he is a permanent resident
of the United States as evidenced by a letter order of the US Immigration and Naturalization
Service, Los Angeles, U.S.A, he had long waived his status when he returned to the Philippines
on August 12, 1985.
 ISSUE:

o Whether or not respondent Daza should be disqualified as a member of the House of

Representatives for violation of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code

RULING:

The Supreme Court vote to dismiss the instant case, first, the case is moot and academic for it
is evident from the manifestation filed by petitioners dated April 6, 1992, that they seek to
unseat the respondent from his position as Congressman for the duration of his term of office
commencing June 30, 1987 and ending June 30, 1992. Secondly, jurisdiction of this case
rightfully pertains to the House Electoral Tribunal. Under Section 17 of Article VI of the 1987
Constitution, it is the House Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election returns and qualification of its members.

The petitioners appropriate remedy should have been to file a petition to cancel respondent
Dazas certificate of candidacy before the election or a quo warranto case with the House of
Electoral Tribunal within ten days after Dazas proclamation.