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Tannis McNabb

PHIL 260 Term Paper


Due Date: December 15th, 2017

Half In-Love with Oblivion


A commentary on the pursuit of higher happiness and the unethical actions we execute to achieve it.

On the 15th of May, 2006, sometime early in the black Himalayan morning, English

Mountaineer David Sharp crouched freezing and exhausted in Green Boots Cave after

summiting Mount Everest earlier that evening. It is said in the time it took for him to sit

down and freeze to death, over forty climbers crossed his path.

Sharps death spread controversy across the globe, warranting comment from even

that of Everests first conqueror, Sir Edmund Hillary, I think the whole attitude towards

climbing Mt Everest has become rather horrifying. The people just want to get to the top.

They don't give a damn for anybody else who may be in distress and it doesn't impress me

at all that they leave someone lying under a rock to die. (Serena, 2017) Comments varied

from that of climbers who thought the dying man was already dead, one of the multitudes

of landmark bodies in the death-zone (Altitude after 20,000 feet), too far gone to save, or

simply out of sight. Various climbing groups, the expedition company, and individuals on

the mountain that day, were all blamed for David Sharps demise. However, we must also

consider the individual who first placed him at risk to begin with: David Sharp himself.

Tragic, awful, unnecessary, terrifying; the last moments of his life was all this and

more. I do not seek to spit on a dead mans grave. I intend only to present his situation as a

means of questioning the ethical transgressions which occurred and were subsequently

criticized. Certainly, it was his choice to be alone and oxygen-less some 29,000 feet above
sea level. His pursuit of the summit was not a unique goal. Had it been for self-satisfaction,

for accomplishment, spirituality, bragging-rights or otherwise, he had been seeking a

higher happiness.

John Stuart Mills utilitarian ethics state, Utility would enjoin first, that laws and

social arrangements should place the happiness, or, (speaking practically it may be called)

the interest of every individual, as nearly as possible in harmony with the interest of the

whole (Shafer-Landau, 2013)

Through this logic, David Sharp may have climbed most ethically out of every single

person who takes up high-altitude mountaineering. He ascended Everest as a lone man. No

radio, no oxygen, and no climbing team. Did he expect to be rescued in the event of an

emergency? This I cannot say for sure. Yet, to maximize ones success of standing atop the

world, one must know the mountain. One must know how and what and when and where

to climb. A Mechanical Engineer from England, however many mountains hed climbed in

his life, did not, on his own, know the mountain. In this, he had placed himself in such a

high-risk scenario, one could rightly conclude that he knew there was a much larger chance

that he wouldnt survive his expedition. Thus, I can think of this as the only scenario where

a mountaineer has maximized individual pursuit of pleasure and minimized collective pain,

simply by taking others out of the equation. He had no fellow climbers to endanger with his

actions. The risk of life was none other than his own. This said, Mountaineering is far and

few with people like David Sharp.

HA (High-Altitude) mountaineering is however, only occupied by those who have a

fundamental understanding of the inherent risk of death. There is no one person who goes

where the oxygen is thin, where green things dont grow, to walk over the corpses of the
fallen, who doesnt understand that this barren place is not for life. What makes the sport

so unethical is this understanding. Mountaineering is a selfish act in and of itself. Recall

Hillarys quote: People just want to get to the top. Whatever sacrifice or tragedy befalls

these climbers, it can easily be justified as such by the ruthless and baseless need to reach

the apex of these tall slabs of stone.

Imagine walking down the street on a cold winter night. You and a group of friends

are on your way to a concert youve been looking forward to seeing for a long time, and that

youve all spent lots of money on. Along this cold street, you happen upon a man dressed in

expensive clothes, knees to his chest, sitting up against a building as the snow falls around

him. When your group stops to ask him if he is okay, he is unresponsive. Now take a morbid

view on this scenario momentarily, and think to yourself how crushed you would be that

helping this man would surely mean missing this long anticipated concert. Would you still

go, leaving the man in the snow, hoping someone else would find and help him? Could you

enjoy the concert knowing youd left this man without help? It is almost without hesitation

that we would seek to prevent further pain to a fellow human being. He who saves a fellow

creature from drowning does what is morally right, whether his motive be duty, or the

hope of being paid for his trouble. (Shafer-Landau, 2013) Our actions, although selfish, are

still morally correct in this event. Do we help our fellow man in hope of payment, be it

emotional reward, or rather our own avoidance of pain? Perhaps. As I have stated, the

pursuit of your goals in light of the pain of someone else comes with a steep price that the

vast majority of us are not willing to pay: the guilt of allowing the suffering of another. The

majority of good actions are intended, not for the benefit of the world, but that of

individuals. (Shafer-Landau, 2013) So why, in so many extreme situations, do we suddenly


throw this fear out the window? Why does it become correct and allowable for suffering to

become the price of satisfaction?

Every person will have a differing concept of what their ideal and ultimate

happiness is, and what they are willing to do to obtain it. There exists no moral system

which there do not arise unequivocal cases of conflicting obligation. These are the real

difficulties, the knotty points both in the theory of ethics, and in the conscientious guidance

of personal conduct. (Shafer-Landau, 2013) Simply, not every person on that mountain

will come out on top because no two people hold the same moral code.

Not every person who places themselves in high-risk situations has malicious

intentions. For many climbers, the understanding that everyone on the mountain has

placed themselves in harms way has now created a code that essentially readjusts the par

for the course we have become accustomed to. We are no longer walking along the street,

our warm safe houses mere miles away. Death now holds a careful watch of all those

present, waiting for the slightest opportunity. These mountains, high above the line of life,

are an easy place to die. People not only see this, but understand this and accept it. It is not

the fault of any creed, but the complicated nature of human affairs, that rules of conduct

cannot be framed as to require no exceptions, and that hardly any kind of action can safely

be laid down as either always obligatory or always condemnable. (Shafer-Landau, 2013)

In this scenario, the rules of conduct have been framed in a place where death very often

plays a part in the journey. The exception to the rule comes in the form of a guiltless

selfishness that says They knew what they signed up for. They knew they might die. Why

shouldnt I reach my goal just because they didnt?


Certainly, in dangerous scenarios, we must alter our behavior in a way we would not

in our day to day lives. So the question becomes: is it justified in extreme cases to readjust

our morals to meet the environment?

Right and wrong does not suddenly disappear in the midst of an extreme situation.

The people who actively choose to risk their own lives as well as others are acutely aware

of this, and yet selfishly choose to serve their own desires. Moral and ethical reasoning in

such scenarios cannot actively find comfort in a return value system such as utilitarianism.

No two ideals of happiness will be the same, and neither will be the evaluated cost of

achieving such goals. Think back to David Sharp, whose evaluated cost of his goals were his

own life- unimaginable to some of us here safely on the ground.

Through this, we can conclude that every single person has their own relative set of

morals. A code of ethics is impossible to achieve within the context of mountaineering in

light of this. Is utility the only creed which is able to furnish us with excuses for evil

doing, and means of creating our own conscience? (Shafer-Landau, 2013)

To this, I say yes. Utilitarianism, seemingly with a strict code of morals and values,

cannot justify the wrongdoings of those who would harm others in pursuit of happiness. A

happiness that has been given value based on each individuals cost-benefit calculation.

Surely in this light, utilitarianism cannot accurately bring validation to the inherently

immoral acts of the masses.

For people like David Sharp- for anyone who chooses to, against every single piece

of evidence, venture into deaths playground, on some level understands the hurt they

cause. This understanding not only disqualifies them from being a utilitarian, but brings to

light the fact that utilitarianism is no justification for inherent wrongdoings, even those
under an extreme environment. In conclusion, I can safely say, that HA mountaineering,

along with any other deadly situation caused by sport, is an unethical action in every single

light.

Those who travel to mountain-tops are half in love with themselves, and half in love with
oblivion.
Robert Macfarlane, Mountains of the Mind, 2004
Sources:

Macfarlane, Robert. Mountains of the mind- adventures in reaching the summit. New-York:
Vintage Books (a division of Random House, Inc.), 2004.

Serena, Katie. "Bodies Of Dead Climbers On Everest Are Serving As Guideposts." All That Is
Interesting. November 16, 2017. Accessed December 12, 2017. http://all-that-is-
interesting.com/mount-everest-bodies.

Shafer-Landau, Russ. Ethical Theory an Anthology. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013.

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