Bismarck and The Capitulation of German Liberalism

University of Chicago Press
Bismarck and the "Capitulation" of German Liberalism

Author(s): Gordon R. Mork
Source: The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 43, No. 1 (Mar., 1971), pp. 59-75
Published by: University of Chicago Press
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Bismarck and the "Capitulation" of German Liberalism*
Gordon R. Mork
Purdue University
The German National Liberal party was formed in 1866 and 1867 to
support Bismarck's policy of German unification. For four years the
liberals had been locked in a bitter constitutional conflict with the Prus-
sian government. But suddenly they saw their most strongly desired goal,
kleindeutsch unification, being realized under Bismarck's leadership. "I
am no devotee of Mars . . . ," wrote one liberal after the Prussian victory
over Austria, "but the trophies of war exercise a magic charm upon the
child of peace. One's view is involuntarily chained and one's spirit
goes along with the boundless rows of men who acclaim the god of the
moment-success."'
The Progressive party, which had led the fight against the govern-
ment, split in two. The left wing retained the party name and remained
utterly unreconciled to Bismarck and his policies. But the right wing
declared its willingness to support Bismarck's national policy in spite of
past differences. In combination with many non-Prussian liberals it
founded the National Liberal party, which was to be one of the mainstays
of Bismarck's parliamentary support during the formative years of the
empire.
The birth of the party under these circumstances has led most histo-
rians to see it as the "capitulation" of German liberalism to Bismarckian
power politics. As one distinguished American historian has written,
"The strong secessionist right wing of the Progressives, nucleus of the
National Liberal Party of the empire, abandoned the fight against Prus-
sian authoritarianism in exchange for the achievement of German unity
by blood and iron."2 Conservative German historians have seen the
"capitulation" as the height of Realpolitik.3 Liberal critics of Germany
have agreed that capitulation occurred, but have interpreted it instead
' I wish to express my gratitude for the financial aid of the Social Science
Research Council and the University of Minnesota Alumni Association, which
allowed me to complete the research upon which this article is based.
1 Gustav Mevissen, quoted in Otto Pflanze, Bismarck and the Development of
Germany: The Period of Unificatiot, 1815-1871 (Princeton, N.J., 1963), p. 327.
2Carl E. Schorske, German Social Democracy, 1905-1917 (New York, 1955),
p. 2. Emphasis mine.
3 Adalbert Wahl, Deutsche Geschichte, 4 vols. (Stuttgart, 1926-36), 1:46.
60 Gordon R. Mork
as proof that Germany is without a vigorous and meaningful liberal tra-
dition.4
The purpose of this article is to examine the contention that the
liberals capitulated. We must look closely at the National Liberal party
during the first decade of its existence, noting both the expressed ideals
of the party leaders and the practical policies which the party followed,
in order to see in fact whether or not the formation of the party marked
the capitulation of German liberalism.
Nineteenth-century liberalism in Germany had much in common with
its western European counterparts. But-because of the special political
and socioeconomic situation in the Germanies-it also had unique as-
pects. If one seeks in the German liberal an unbending hostility to the
monarchist state and its army, absolute claims for the sovereignty of the
people, and justification for revolution, one will be disappointed. Instead,
German liberalism was more moderate. It was a movement to change
the state of princely absolutism, of clerical and noble privilege, and of
social and economic restriction, into the Rechtsstaat, by which was meant
a constitutional state of civil equality, of subordination of the govern-
ment to the due process of law, of participation by the people in law-
making and administration, and of individual freedom in spiritual, social,
and economic life. Most liberals accepted the mixed constitution, in
which governmental powers were divided between prince and people,
as the proper mechanism to accomplish this goal.5
During the Prussian constitutional conflict the liberals refused to allow
passage of the annual budget because they disapproved of the govern-
ment's reorganization of the army. Many conservatives believed the lib-
erals had as their goal full parliamentary government, in which the king
would become a mere figurehead. But in truth, the liberals' goals were
far more moderate. It was not parliamentary supremacy which they
desired, but only the division of powers which was proper to the Prussian
constitution of 1850. "The Progressive party," declared the Berlin Volks-
zeitung, "is not the kind of opposition party which is totally opposed
to the regime; neither is it a so-called governmental party, which dis-
4 Friedrich Darmstaedter, Bismarck and the Creation of the Second Reich (Lon-
don, 1948), pp. 309-11; Friedrich C. Sell, Die Tragodie des deutschen Libera-
lismus (Stuttgart, 1953), p. 226; Hans Kohn, The Mind of Germany (New York,
1960), p. 157. This view has been challenged by Werner Conze in The New Cam-
bridge Modern History, 12 vols. (Cambridge, 1957-62), 11:278-79, and by Karl
Born in Bruno Gebhardt, Handbuch der deutschen Geschichte, 4 vols., 8th ed.
(Stuttgart, 1954-60), 3:195-99.
5 Oskar Klein-Hattingen, Geschichte des deutschen Liberalismus,2 vols. (Berlin,
1911-12), 1:3, 45. See also Leonard Krieger, The German Idea of Freedom (Bos-
ton, 1957).
Bismarck and German Liberalismn 61
guises behind its opposition the desire to take over the government
itself."";Separation of powers-a mixed constitution with domination by
neither the parliament nor the king-was the liberal goal.7 Therefore,
an argument which holds that the Prussian Progressives were twentieth-
century liberal democrats who suddenly gave up their demands when
blinded (or, as the conservatives said, awakened) by the brilliance of
Bismarck's policies, is from the first unhistorical.
The rapprochement between Bismarck and the future National Lib-
erals had begun well before the Prussian victory over Austria at Konig-
gratz in July 1866. His low-tariff policies attracted those who believed
strongly in free trade. The victory over Denmark turned the heads of
others.8 Early in 1866 he began construction of golden bridges over
which the moderate liberals might pass to his side. He released a program
calling for the election of a constituent parliament to deliberate on a
constitution for a unified Reich. He let it be known that if the liberals
would support him he was willing to "render them service for service."9
He allowed the rumor to circulate that certain unnamed liberals might
soon be asked to replace the more reactionary members of the Prussian
ministry. He talked personally to Karl Twesten and Hans von Unruh,
leaders of the moderate liberals, and asked them what price they would
demand for an end to the constitutional conflict.10
The victory at K6niggratz strengthened Bismarck's hand immeasur-
6 Volkszeitunig, April 18, 1862, quoted by Heinrich A. Winkler, Preussiscielr
Liberalismus und deulsclier Nationialsiaat . . . 1861-1866 (Tiibingen, 1964), p. 14.
Winkler (p. 21) argues that the liberals did in fact intend to institute parlia-
mentary rule in Prussia and that their frequent claims to the contrary were merely
"tactical."
8 Martin Spahn, "Zur Entstehung der nationalliberalen Partei," Zeitsclirift fuir
Politik 1 ( 1908) :356, documents the nascent liberal support for Bismarck's foreign
policy in 1864 and 1865. In Wilhelm Cahn, ed., Aus Eduard Laskers Nachl/ass:
Erster Teil: Fiinifzehlnl Jablire parl/amenitar-iscijer Gescijichte, 1866-1880 (Berlin,
1902), pp. 35-38, Lasker describes how he moved from his intensely anti-Bismarck
stand to a position very favorably disposed to Bismarck on foreign policy. Cahn
cites several of Lasker's contemporary articles in the Nationial-Zeitunig which indi-
cate that Lasker's memoir is essentially accurate.
9 According to Lasker in a public speech, April 20, 1866, in Cahn, pp. 45-46.
See also Helmut Bohme, Deutscli/anids Weg ,zur Grossmachlt (Cologne, 1966), pp.
186-87, 299; Otto Becker, Bisniarcks Rinigeni um Deutsclh/anidis Gesta/tunig (Heidel-
berg, 1958), p. 197; and Albrecht Patzig, Die niationial/iberale Partei, 1867-1892
(Leipzig, 1892), pp. 7-8.
10 Otto von Bismarck, Die gesammeltenl Werke, 15 vols. (Berlin, 1924-35), 7:
110, 112; Julius Heyderhoff and Paul Wentzcke, Deutsclier Libera/ismnus im Zeit-
alter Bismarceks, 2 vols. (Bonn, 1924-25), 1:497-99; Hans Viktor von Unruh.
aus clem Lebeni (Stuttgart, 1895), pp. 242-50; Karl Twesten to Guls-
Erinnierunl^,Rgen
tav Lipke, in Gustav Lipke, "Bismarck und Carl Twesten," Deutschie Reviue 4
(1880):11-13; Ludwig Dehio, "Die preussische Demokratie und der Krieg von
1866, aus dem Briefwechsel von Karl Rodbertus mit Franz Ziegler," Forsc/hungen
zur brandenburgiscileni umidpreussisciecn Geschiic/hte 39 (1927) :247, 254.
62 Gordon R. Mork
ably. Thereafter, he was in a position to take the first steps toward
unification with or without liberal support. Though conservative forces
wanted the king to refuse all compromises with the liberals, Bismarck
convinced the monarch that he should offer them a way out of the con-
stitutional conflict with a bill of indemnity." The bill would recognize
that theoretically the government had violated the budget rights of the
parliament during the constitutional conflict but would excuse the action
because of the extraordinary circumstances. The liberals could thus
save face but still come to the active support of the government.
The indemnity bill was presented to the Prussian lower house in the
speech from the throne which opened the session. The deputies, under
the leadership of Max von Forckenbeck, a future National Liberal,
responded by drawing up an address of reply. It was cautiously worded
in order to gain the approval of all segments of the house, from the
Progressives to the Conservatives. Expressing the pleasure of the house
at the royal request for indemnity, the address promised to consider the
bill with "dutiful care." "Without the maintenance and the development
of the constitutional rights of the people," it added pointedly, "we will
not be able to count on the homage of the German minds and hearts,
which alone make power firm and enduring."'12
During the debate on the indemnity bill, the division within German
liberalism was clearly demonstrated. Benedikt Waldeck, Rudolf Gneist,
Rudolf Virchow, Hermann Schulze-Delitzsch, and Leopold von Hover-
beck presented the arguments of the Progressive opposition to the bill.
They would not grant the government legal indemnity, they said, until
it had proven its good faith. It would have to cease its harassment of
opposition deputies, present the 1867 budget for the consideration of
the house, and agree to support a law explicitly defining and implement-
ing the legal responsibility of the ministers in the future.13 Speaking for
the bill were Karl Twesten, Otto Michaelis, and Eduard Lasker, men
who would secede from the Progressives and become cofounders of the
National Liberal party. The house was in no position to demand further
concessions or guarantees from the regime, argued Twesten. The govern-
ment could, if it saw fit, dispense with the indemnity and continue as
before. The house had proved powerless to block governmental action
11
Becker, pp. 194-95.
Stenographische Berichte iiber die Verhandlungen des Lanidtages, Haus der
12
Abgeordneten (hereinafter cited as Sten. Ber. Abgeordnieten), 1866-67, 1:82-83.
Forckenbeck was in direct contact with both Bismarck and the crown prince during
this period (Martin Philippson, Max von Forckenbeck [Leipzig, 1898], pp. 152-57).
13 The debate is in Sten. Ber. Abgeordneten, 1866-67, 1:149 ff., and is summa-
rized by Fritz L6wenthal, Der preussische Verfassungsstreit, 1862-1866 (Munich,
1914), pp. 303-8.
Bismarck and German Liberalism 63
in the past; now, after the victory at Koniggratz, the regime was in
a stronger position than ever. "We cannot blame anyone," he continued,
"who puts the question of power in the foreground right now and sug-
gests that questions of freedom can wait, as long as nothing happens
which could permanently prejudice them. We must not abandon develop-
ment toward freedom, but the development of the power of our Father-
land and the unity of Germany-that is the true and greatest foundation
which we can create for the development of freedom."'14
The future National Liberals who supported him based their argu-
ments on two points. First, a nationalist believes that personal freedom
can be realized fully only within a unified national state free of foreign
domination. This view was incipient in Herder and culminated in Wil-
sonian idealism. Second, national unity and strength can provide the
security necessary for liberty within a state. As Eduard Lasker argued,
England was able to develop a free constitution only because it was free
from external attack. When a nation was as insecure against foreign in-
vasion as a disunited Germany had always been, the military establish-
ment necessarily held a disproportionately important place in society.
Only when Germany is unified, he said, could real freedom be attained,
not only for Germany, but for all of Europe.'5 The realization of some
liberal goals might have to be temporarily postponed, therefore, to aid
Bismarck in the creation of the national state. But to postpone such goals
was not to abandon them; indeed, once the national state was firmly es-
tablished, the moderates argued, the liberal program would have a far
greater chance of success.
Just over half of the Prussian liberals voted for the indemnity bill,
which passed overwhelmingly. The constitutional conflict concluded and
the liberals divided into pro- and anti-Bismarck factions. The pro-
Bismarck liberals issued a declaration setting forth their policy goals,
thereby taking the first step in creating the National Liberal party. They
stated that support of the foreign policy of the government, a policy de-
signed to bring about German unification, was their "most holy duty."
Thus, they were justified in ending the constitutional conflict by accepting
the indemnity bill. But, they maintained, they had not capitulated to
the government or given up their goal of a liberal Germany. "The watch-
fulness concerning the constitutional rights of the people may not
be diminished and may not be surrendered," they declared. "In this ses-
sion of parliament it was such watchfulness which bound together the
party of decisive liberalism and which separated it from the other parties.
14 Sten. Ber. A bgeordneten, 1866-67, 1:197-98.
'5Ibid., 1:184.
64 Gordon R. Mork
This binding tie shall remain in the future its hallmark... We feel the
duties of a watchful and loyal opposition rest upon us."t6
The declaration was not empty rhetoric. The future National Liberals
did not yet regard themselves as members of a separate party; they
were just a "new caucus" (Fraktion) within a broadly defined liberal
party, alongside the Progressive and the Left Center caucuses.17 During
the closing sessions of the 1866 Landtag, both Lasker and Twesten
sharply attacked the reactionary policies of the Prussian ministry, dem-
onstrating that they were quite willing to play the role of a watchful
opposition."' During the election campaign for the constituent Reichs-
tag of the North German Federation, members of the new caucus issued
a common electoral manifesto with the Progressives and the Left Center
and cooperated closely with them in issuing campaign literature and
holding rallies.19
When the newly elected deputies gathered in Berlin for the first meet-
ing of the constituent Reichstag in February 1867, party lines were not
yet firmly drawn. Some members of the "new caucus" hoped that a uni-
fied liberal party could be preserved, and several meetings were held in
an attempt to establish a common liberal front on the issues raised by
Bismarck's draft constitution. Even Rudolf von Bennigsen, who had or-
ganized his election campaign in his native Hanover under the name
"National Liberal party," expressed the hope that an abiding division in
liberal ranks could be avoided.2" But it soon became clear that the Prus-
sian "new caucus" and Bennigsen's non-Prussians would caucus sepa-
rately from the Progressives. At a meeting on February 27, 1867 sixty
deputies voted to form the National Liberal party and elected Bennigsen
chairman. Within three weeks seventy-two deputies had signed up as
party members.21
Within the National Liberal party three groups were soon identified.2'
16 Quoted in Ludolf Parisius, Deutschllands politisclie Parteien und das Ministe-
rium Bismarck (Berlin, 1878), pp. 78-79.
17 At the time, the word "party" usually referred to a very loosely organized
group of like-minded individuals rather than a well-defined and well-structured po-
litical organization (see Thomas Nipperdey, Die Organization der deutschlen Par-
teien vtor 1918 [Dusseldorf, 1961], pp. 9-12).
18 For example, Lasker and Twesten in Sten. Ber. Abgeordneten, 1866-67, 2:
783-88, 878-81.
19 Parisius, pp. 83-86.
20 Hermann Oncken, Rudolf von Bennigsen, 2 vols. (Stuttgart, 1910), 2:22-24;
Cahn, pp. 43-45; Ludwig Bamberger, Bismarcks grosses Spiel: Die geheiment Tage-
biiclier Ludwig Bambergers, ed. Ernst Feder (Frankfurt, 1932), p. 89.
21 Oncken, 2:25-26; Werner Schunke, Die preussisclie Freilhdndler und die Ent-
steliung der nationalliberalen Partei, Leipziger historische Abhandlungen no. 41
(Leipzig, 1916), p. 82.
"2 Gustav Freytag, quoted in Oncken, 2:27.
The Prussian members, led by Karl Twesten until his death in 1870, and
then by Eduard Lasker and Max von Forckenbeck, made up the party's
left wing. Their experiences during the constitutional conflict led them to
be suspicious of the government, to work constantly to maximize legal
and constitutional guarantees of personal and political freedom, and to
attempt to increase the powers of parliament. The party's right wing,
epitomized by Heinrich von Treitschke, disapproved of opposing Bis-
marck and the government on any issue and often complained that the
party was too much under the influence of the left. In the middle was a
group led by Rudolf von Bennigsen, the nominal chairman of the party.
Most of them were from non-Prussian areas. They saw in Bismarck and
his government not the former opponents of the constitutional conflict,
but the creators of a unified and powerful nation. They were genuine
liberals in the sense that their ideal was the Rechtsstaat, in which the
representatives of the people would play an important role in govern-
ment. And they were willing to oppose Bismarck on specific issues to
work toward that ideal. But they were unwilling to risk sustained political
opposition to the government. Therefore, they sought to reach their goals
through compromise-even on unfavorable terms.
The platforms issued during the first decade of the party's existence
reflected this threefold division in its ranks. They lauded the steps to-
ward national unity and pledged further support of the government's poli-
cies for unifying and strengthening the nation. But they also called for a
liberalization of the nation through legislation to assure personal free-
doms, equality before the law, laissez-faire economic legislation, and re-
forms to increase the powers of representative institutions on the local
and the national levels.2'
The nationalist side of the National Liberal policies has often been
emphasized and need only be sketched here. National unity was the goal
to which the party, as a whole, was most strongly cominitted. During the
consideration of the constitution of the North German Federation in
1867 and during the creation of the Reich in 1870-71, the National Lib-
erals played an active role, supporting Bismarck not only with their votes
in parliament but also with nationalist agitation throughout Germany.
But even on questions of national unity the party did not support Bis-
marck unequivocally. The party led the fight for a number of liberalizing
amendments to Bismarck's constitution. They succeeded in broadening
and strengthening the powers and privileges of parliament: Reichstag
members were granted legal immunity; the press was guaranteed the right
23 See Felix Salomon, Die deutsclhe??Pazrteiprogr-amme, 2 vols. (Leipzig, 1912),
1:119-24, 144, 2:20-23; Cahn, pp. 158-63; Parisius, pp. 109--11, 152.
66 Gordon R. Mork
to report Reichstag speeches regardless of content without fear of prose-
cution; government officials were allowed to stand for election; a specific
timetable for Reichstag elections following a dissolution was set forth,
and Reichstag ratification of certain types of treaties was required. The
most important amendments they succeeded in having adopted gave the
Reichstag real powers over federal taxing and spending. On the crucial
issue of the inilitary budget they compromised with the government, re-
jecting proposals for an "iron budget" completely beyond parliamentary
control but approving a lump sum budget which would last through
187 1.24
Between 1867 and 1870 the National Liberals put parliamentary pres-
sure on Bismarck to complete the task of unification. Resolutions intro-
duced into the Tariff Union Parliament and the Reichstag called on the
government to incorporate Baden, Wiirttemberg,and Bavaria into the fed-
eration.25After the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War and the begin-
ning of negotiations to bring the three southern states into a unified Ger-
many, Eduard Lasker organized a trip to the southern capitals by several
National Liberals to bring pressure on the governments to enter the
empire. Bismarck found these nationalist pressturesat best to be annoying
and at worst to be intolerable parliamentary tampering in foreign affairs.
Lasker knew very well the pressures were unwelcome to the chancellor.
He believed that if the National Liberals could play an active role in
unification-rather than leave it to cabinet diplomacy or blood and iron
-they could rightfully claim a position of greater influence in the new
Reich.26One of the party's slogans was "German unity and German free-
24 The debates, from the Stenzograpliiscle Berichlte iiber die Verhlanidlunigezldes
Reiclhstags (hereinafter cited as Slen. Ber. Reichlstags), 1867, have been conve-
niently collected by E. Bezold and F. von Holtzendorff, eds., Mater-ialienz der
deutsclhen Reichls-Verafassutng, 4 vols. (Berlin, 1873). For full accounts of the
making of the constitution, see Pflanze, pp. 337-63, and Becker, pp. 211-455.
25Heyderhoff and Wentzcke, 1:391, 413-21, 448-49. 461; Eduard Lasker, "Be-
richt der national-liberalenPartei uber die abgelaufenen Legislaturperioden. .
Annalen des deutsclie,, Reiclies 3 (1870):574-75; Eduard Wilhelm Meyer, "Aus
der Geschichte der nationalliberalen Partei in den Jahren 1868-71," in Deutsclher
Staat unid deutsele Parteieni, ed. Paul Wentzcke (Munich, 1922), pp. 135-39; Sten.
Ber. Reiclhstags, 1870, 1st sess., 1:58-77; Becker, pp. 590-91, 618-19.
26 Oncken, 2:171-86; Friedrich Bbttcher, Eduard Stepliaidi (Leipzig, 1887), p.
110; Philippson, pp. 210-11; Martin Philippson, "Die Zeit um 1870 in parlamen-
tarischer Beleuchtung: Aus Forckenbecks Briefen an seine Gemahlin," Deutsche
Retue 24 (1899):129-45; Heinrich von Poschinger, Fiirst Bismarck unid die Par-
lanetnlarier, 3 vols. (Breslau, 1895-96), 2:134-37, 143-44; Bamberger, pp. 227-
28, 234, 521; Bismarck, 6b:460-62, 594. Lasker prepared his correspondence from
this period with the intention of eventuialpublication;it was published posthumous-
ly in the Deutsclh Rev,ue, vol. 17 (1892), in nine installments. The role of the
National Liberals, and especially of Lasker, in the agitation of 1870 has recently
become the subject of some controversy (see Walter Lipgens, "Bismarck,die offent-
dom should be gained simultaneously and by the same means."27 The
nationalist agitation by the party was designed to realize this goal.
The liberal aspects of the National Liberal policies deserve more at-
tention than they have generally received. In economic affairs the Na-
tional Liberals put forward a program designed to clear away the debris
of centuries of particularist, semifeudal, and mercantilist restrictions.
Debtor's prisons and usury laws were abolished. A legal basis for corpo-
rations was established, and a high court for economic affairs was insti-
tuted at Leipzig. Most restrictions on the free practice of crafts and trades
were removed. Uniform weights and measures and a national monetary
system were created. Most of this legislation met with little resistance
from Bismarck and the government. Still, the National Liberals looked
on this legislation as an important accomplishment. Repeated attempts to
pass similar laws in Prussia and the other states had always met with
massive conservative obstructionism, and had failed.28
Legislative guarantees of personal and civil rights were also passed.
Restrictions on travel within the country were removed. Official permis-
sion to change one's residence or to marry was no longer required. Reli-
gious disabilities were set aside, and special provisions for taking oaths
were instituted for Jews. The principle of the inviolability of the mails
was established. A new criminal code and judicial reforms were passed
which increased the protection of the individual against arbitrary acts of
the state. The freedom of parliamentary debate, the freedom of associa-
tion, and the freedom of the press were broadened.29 Local government
was reformed in the six easternmost provinces of Prussia to replace the
hereditary rule of the Junkers with self-administration by more demo-
cratically chosen officials. This particular reform legislation met with
liche Meinung, und die Annexion von Elsass und Lothringen 1870," Historische
Zeitsclhrift 199 [1964]: 31-112; Lothar Gall, "Zur Frage der Annexion von Elsass
und Lothringen 1870,"Hislorisclie Zeitsclrift 206 [1968]: 265-326; Walter Lipgens,
"Bismarck und die Frage der Annexion 1870: Eine Erwiderung," Histoirischle
Zeitscliiifi 206 [19681: 586-617).
27From the June 1867 program of the party, in Cahn, pp. 158-63.
28Patzig, p. 45; Parisius, p. 121; Lasker, pp. 567-78; Philippson, Forckernbeck,
pp. 199-200; Bottcher, p. 90; B6hme, p. 257; three speeches by Eduard Lasker,
October 27, 1867 in Magdeburg;September 21, 1868 in Possneck; and October 10,
1868 in Magdeburg (Lasker Collection, Brandeis University Library); see also
Gerhard Stoltenberg, Der deutsclhe Reiclistag, 1871-1873 (Dusseldorf, 1955).
29Lasker, pp. 581-86; Patzig, pp. 50-51; Hans Blum, Lebetnserinitnerungeni,2 vols.
(Berlin, 1907-8), 1:297; Parisius, pp. 124-26; Bottcher, pp. 100, 163; Philippson,
Forcketibeck, pp. 207, 278--79; Hans Herzfeld, Jolhantnes von Miquel, 2 vols. (Det-
mold, 1938), 1:124-26; Johannes Ziekursch, Politisclhe Gescliichlte des nieuen
deursclhentKaiserreiches, 3 vols. (Frankfurt am Main, 1925-27), 2:290, 297-98;
Veit Valentin, "Eduard Lasker. or the Tragedy of German Liberalism" (MS in
the Leo Baeck Institute, New York), p. 264.
68 Gordon R. Mork
stubborn opposition by the Conservatives and passed the Prussian 1House
of Lords only after the king created enough new peers to outvote the old
guard.30Because of such opposition by conservative forces, the National
Liberals and their allies often had to compromise on important matters
to see some of their goals accomplished. But all in all, the gains they
made were substantial, and they believed future reforms could be made
within the system.
This period of cooperation and progress, recalled Lasker in his mem-
oirs, was "an idyllic island ... where continuing work was rewarded with
rich successes and . . . where, in the warmth of a short summer, noble
strains were planted and costly fruits ripened and were harvested."31As
a matter of fact, there were severe clashes between the government and
the National Liberals as well as harmonious cooperation and useful com-
promise. National Liberals forthrightly attacked the reactionary policies
of several Prussian ministers, including the justice minister, Count Lippe,
the interior minister Count Eulenburg, Heinrich von Miihler, the minister
for education and religion, and August von der Heydt, the finance min-
ister. The Prussian constitution, of course, did not give the parliamen-
tarians the power to remove ministers by expressing their lack of confi-
dence in the government; but their attacks nevertheless weakened the
political positions of these ministers and contributed to the resignations
of Lippe (1867), Heydt (1869), and Miihler (1872).3 Members of the
National Liberal party, particularly its left wing, proved themselves will-
ing to oppose Bismarck on a number of other issues, including parlia-
mentary free speech,33 remuneration for Reichstag deputies,34 juridical
30 Lasker, pp. 592-94; Heyderhoff and Wentzcke, 1:393, 445, 2:62-68; Oncken,
2:237; Ziekursch, 2:261-63, 266-69; Philippson, Forckenbeck, pp. 192, 201, 236-
37, 245-47; Hellmut K6ster, "Eduard Laskers politische Friihzeit" (diss., Univer-
sity of Leipzig, 1924), pp. 192, 216-18; Reinhard J. Lamer, Der englische Par-
lamentarismus in der deutsclien politischen Theorie im Zeitalter Bismarcks, Histo-
rische Studien no. 387 [Liibeck, 1963], pp. 115-16; Paul Wentzcke, "Nationallibe-
rale Partei" (MS in Deutsches Bundesarchiv,Koblenz), p. 41. For a discussion of
local government reform (the Kreisordnung), see Heinrich Heffter, Die deutsche
Selbstverwaltung im 19. Jahrhundert (Stuttgart, 1950), especially pp. 497-517. and
Robert M. Berdahl, "The Transformation of the Prussian Conservative Party,
1866-1876" (diss., University of Minnesota, 1965), pp. 148-80.
31 Cahn, pp. 63-64.
32 Heyderhoff and Wentzcke, 1:396-99; Poschinger, 2:54-57; Philippson, Forc-
kenbeck, pp. 185-87, 196-98 200, 223; Herzfeld, 1: 112; Koster, pp. 216-17;
Oncken, 2:236; Ziekursch, 2:240-42; Karl Zuschardt,Die Finanzpolitik Bismarcks
und die Parteien im Norddeutschen Bund, Leipziger historische Abhandlungen no.
16 (Leipzig, 1910), pp. 42-43, 70, 73-74; Alexander Bergengrdn, Staatsminister
Freiherr voni der Heydi (Leipzig, 1908), pp. 352-55.
33 Sten. Ber. Abgeordnzeten, 1867-68, 1:39, 77-110, 133-56; and Sten. Ber.
Reichstags, 1868, 1:77-89; 1870, 1:222-33.
34Stent. Ber. Reichstags, 1868, 1:48-60; 1869, 2:819-21; 1870, 1:139 ff.
responsibility for Reich officials,35and taxing and budgetary policies for
the Reich.:36One of the most bitter clashes of the period took place when
Lasker unveiled a scandal over the awarding of rail concessions by the
Prussian government and demanded a parliamentary investigation. This
confrontation signaled that the days of the "idyllic island" were over, and
relations between Bismarck and the left wing of the party were marked
thereafter by open distrust and even hostility.37
During this same period, however, Bismarck and the National Lib-
erals cooperated in the Kulturkampf. The liberals looked upon that con-
flict between the German state and the Catholic church as a struggle for
modern culture against medieval superstition and intellectual obscuran-
tism; some of the Kulturkampf legislation-like that establishing civil
marriage and secular control of education-was similar to the anticlerical
legislation supported by liberal parties throughout Europe. But on the
whole, the Kulturkampf tended to weaken the liberal position of the party.
Bismarck skillfully played on the anticlericalism of the liberals, bind-
ing them closely to his policy, wlhich was directed less at weakening the
ancient privileges of the church than at destroying the power of a poten-
tially dissident element in the Reich. Under Bismarck's skillful manipu-
lation, the Kulturkampf divided the Reichstag into factions of "friends
of the Reich" and "enemies of the Reich," a far different division from
the previous one of liberals and conservatives. Many National Liberals
dared not come into conflict with the regime at all, lest they be accused
of being "enemies of the Reich."38
Even more debilitating to the National Liberals' position was the char-
acter of most of the Kulturkampf legislation. Overshadowing the liberal
anticlerical laws were the very illiberal laws limiting the civil and politi-
cal rights of Catholics. The "chancel paragraph" placed severe penalties
on clerics who used the pulpit for political pronouncements. The "Jesuit
law" dissolved the order in Germany and restricted the freedom of do-
:5 H. Schulthess, Europiiischer Geschlichtskalender 10 (1869): 66-75; 13 (1872):
152; Sten. Ber. Reichstags, 1869, pp. 389-413; 1872, 1 and 2:913-25.
36Sten. Ber. Reiclistags, 1868, 1:141-64; 1871, 1:929; 1871-72, 2:851 ff., 875-
78; 1872, 1 and 2:59, 514; Zuschardt, pp. 37-55, 64-71; Heyderhoff and Wentzcke,
1:429-31; Otto Pflanze, "Die Krise von 1869 in der Innenpolitik Bismarcks: Ein
unbekanntes Dokument aus dem Friedrichsruher Archiv," Historische Zeitschrift
201 (1965):359-64.
37Sterz. Ber. Abgeordneten, 1872--73, 1:536-39, 582, 2:730, 1043-50; Oncken,
2:288-89; Albrecht von Roon, Denkiirdigkeiten, 3 vols. (Berlin, 1905), 3:348-50;
Veit Valentin, "Bismarck and Lasker," Journial of Central Eur-opean Affairs 3
(1943-44):400-415. Bismarck's hostility to Lasker contributed to an international
incident which resulted in the recall of the American ambassador in Berlill (see
Louis L. Snyder, "Bismarck and the Lasker Resolution, 1884," Review of Politics
29 119671:41,-64).
38 Heyderhoff and Wentzcke, 2:99-100; Steni. Ber. Reichlstags, 1874, 2:757.
70 Gordon R. Mork
micile for German Jesuits. As the struggle became more bitter, legislation
aimed at ending Catholic resistance became even more restrictive. Again
and again the party found itself supporting the bureaucratic state over the
rights of the individual, thus weakening apparent constitutional guaran-
tees and undermining the Rechtsstaat.9
The military budget was probably the single most difficult and crucial
issue for the National Liberals. Though they never demanded parlia-
mentary supremacy in the state, they did believe that in order to main-
tain the proper division of powers between executive and legislative, the
parliament must have the power to control the purse strings of the gov-
ernment. Because more than 90 percent of the federal budget went for
military expenditures, the budget right of the Reichstag would have been
virtually meaningless if the conservatives and the military establishment
had attained their goal of an iron military budget, one entirely beyond
parliamentary control. The National Liberal party, led by its left wing,
opposed the iron budget. But no one in the party was committed to an-
nual military budgets; a biennial or triennial review of the military budget
would have been acceptable. And none of the National Liberals wished
to be so inflexible on the issue as to repeat the constitutional conflict of
the 1860s. Those unpleasant days, and the ultimate victory of the gov-
ernment, were too clear in everyone's memory.
Thus, there was a possibility of a compromise if the government was
willing to bargain. Bismarck did seem willing, and his authority could
bring the king, and finally the military, to agree. In 1867, during the
writing of the constitution, the military settled for a four-year budget; in
1871, while German troops were still in France, a three-year extension
was granted.
In 1874, therefore, the military budget came before the Reichstag
again. This time the regime was prepared to press for the iron budget
which it had previously failed to get. Bismarck was ill, so the burden of
presenting the government arguments in the Reichstag lay upon the Prus-
sian war minister, Georg von Kameke, and Field Marshal von Moltke,
the hero of 1866 and 1870. They demanded a peacetime army of in-
creased size financed by a budget beyond parliamentary control. Thus,
Germany would be protected not only against external enemies, they
argued, but against "internal enemies" as well.40
The military bill was sent to committee for consideration. The com-
mittee, chaired by Bennigsen and containing a majority of National Lib-
:9 Cahn, pp. 74, 81-82; Richard W. Dill, "Der Parlamentarier Eduard Lasker"
(diss., University of Erlangen, 1956; privately printed), pp. 92-93; Parisius, p. 145;
Wentzcke, "Nationalliberale," p. 128; Poschinger, 2:231.
40 Steni. Ber. Reichlstags, 1874, 2:793-94.
erals and Progressives, rejected the iron budget by a vote of twenty-two
to six. The committee was too badly split, however, to offer an alterna-
tive. The Progressives and Lasker wanted annual budgets, as did the
Center party; most of the rest of the committee, though opposed to a per-
petual budget, preferred to compromise on one of several years duration.
The next move, apparently, was up to the government. The Reichstag
recessed for the Easter holidays.41
The government, rather than make motions toward a new compromise,
took quite another course. The emperor, speaking to a group of military
officers who called upon him on his birthday, said that a new crisis with
the Reichstag was at hand. He had hoped to establish a lasting basis for
German military power, but now the Reichstag blocked his way. The
crisis was troubling the evening of his life. When his words were made
public his bitterness against the liberals was turned into a potent political
weapon. Several days later two Free Conservative deputies paid a call on
Bismarck. From his sickbed the chancellor complained angrily about the
opposition of the National Liberals to the iron military budget. He de-
nounced them, saying plainly that many of them had been elected because
of their promises to support him and his policy for the German Reich. He
was even more incensed at "the Progressives and those among the Na-
tional Liberals who go along with them." The chancellor's press organ,
the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, published the interview with the
additional comment that, because of the opposition to the military finance
policy of the government, "the chancellor has come to the conclusion
that the only course is to call upon the electorate." The paper predicted
that Bismarck would pick up some fifty to sixty seats from the opposition
in a new election.42
Though there were some parliamentarians who believed they would
profit from an election on the issue of the military bill, the National Lib-
erals saw that a dissolution might destroy their party altogether. They had
made great gains in the most recent elections, their caucus growing from
119 to 152 members; a new election on this issue would bring division
and defeat.43 Lasker tried to win press support for the National Liberal
opposition to the bill through the use of his newsletter, the Berliner auto-
graphische Korrespondenz. But his attempts were inundated in the storm
of critical press commentary inspired by Bismarck's interview with the
two Free Conservatives. Even liberal papers like the National Zeitung
turned on the left wing of the party, labeling any opposition to the mili-
41 Poschinger, 2:192; Parisius, pp. 185-90; Ziekursch, 2:295; Oncken, 2:258.
42 Lucius von Ballhausen, Bisniarck-Eriinaerunigeni (Stuttgart, 1921), pp. 44-5 1;
Poschinger, 2:193-96; Heyderhoff and Wentzcke, 2:100-101.
43 Oncken, 2:259; Parisius, pp. 191-93; Bbttcher, pp. 140-41.
72 Gordon R. Mork
tary bill as "service to the Alsatians, to the Ultramontanes, and the other
enemies of the Reich." In the midst of the campaign Wilhelm Wehr-
enpfennig, a right wing National Liberal who, as editor of the Spenersche
Zeitung, had long been open to Bismarck's influence, founded the Na-
tionalliberale Korrespondenz, a newsletter to rival Lasker's and to sup-
port Bismarck's attack on the left wing of the party. Public meetings, first
in Hamburg, then in Leipzig and Cologne, and then throughout Germany,
called upon the Reichstag to accept the demands of the regime and avoid
a new military conflict.44
The propaganda campaign took its toll. "It is unbelievable," wrote
Lasker to a colleague on the party's left, "what misrepresentations the
press can accomplish, and how cleverly conceived the semiofficial attacks
are." He confided that "only a small minority" of the National Liberals
in the Reichstag would sppport his position if the government pressed its
demands. He admitted he would be willing to accept a four-year budget
if it were necessary to preserve the party; but he would do so only after
exhausting all other possibilities. If the regime refused all compromises,
Lasker would vote against the bill and perhaps resign from the party.45
When the Reichstag members reassembled in Berlin after the holidays,
a period of intensive negotiation and caucusing began. Any vote on the
iron budget at that point would have been very close. The government
could count on the Conservatives, the Free Conservatives, and the right
wing National Liberals. The opposition could count on the Center party,
the left wing National Liberals, and-it was assumed-the Progressives.
The Alsatians and several smaller disaffected groups might also vote with
the opposition, but they could not be absolutely depended upon. After
taking stock, Lasker decided the solid opposition of the Progressives was
necessary to turn back the iron budget; if the Progressive ranks broke, he
felt he must lead the left wing National Liberals into support of a com-
promise budget of several years' duration. Otherwise, the Reichstag's
budgetary powers would be irretrievably truncated by the victory of the
iron budget. Just one hour before the crucial caucus of the National Lib-
erals, the Progressives met. The situation was explained to them and a
vote taken. To the surprise and dismay of the Progressive leadership, five
members refused to give assurance of their absolute opposition to the iron
budget! The disturbing news was relayed to Lasker. In the National Lib-
eral caucus the adherents and opponents of the iron budget clashed vigor-
ously with one another. Lasker must have kept the news of the division
in the Progressive party strictly to himself, because the adherents of the
44 Heyderhoff and Wentzcke, 2:101-2; Poschinger, 2:156-57; Steln. Ber. Reich-
stags, 1874, 2:756, 767; Bottcher, pp. 141-42; Schulthess, 15 (1874):102.
4 Heyderhoff and Wentzcke, 2:102-6; Philippson, Forckenbeck, pp. 252-58.
iron budget, though they had a majority in the caucus, admitted that they
would be hard put to assemble a majority in the Reichstag. After long
and acrimonious debate the party agreed nearly unanimously to offer the
government its support for a seven-year budget-the so-called Septennat.
Bennigsen was authorized to undertake the necessary negotiations with
Bismarck.46
The next day a number of National Liberals were sitting at dinner in
one of their favorite restaurants, when one of Bismarck's aides arrived
with the news that the chancellor and the emperor had agreed to the
Septennat. "Unprecedented jubilation!" jotted one National Liberal in
his diary. "Running here and there . .. we were overjoyed."47 Lasker and
the left wing of the party could hardly have been so enthusiastic when
they heard the news. A military budget of such long duration was a bitter
pill for them. But they too were relieved by the compromise. The gov-
ernment might well have gotten a majority for the iron budget if Bismarck
had chosen to throw his full weight behind the proposal.48The National
Liberals had compromised again, and on Bismarck's terms. But they
had successfully blocked acceptance of the iron budget.
Between 1874 and 1880, the year the left wing finally seceded from
the party, forming the Liberal Union, the party continued very much as
it had in the first seven years of its existence. The left wing, under
Lasker's leadership, prevailed upon the majority to demand concessions
from the government. The government was drawn in a liberal direction-
sometimes more, sometimes less-but its policy was always different from
that which it would have followed had the National Liberals not existed.
46Oncken, 2:260-61; Eugen Richter, Im alteni Reiclistag, 2 vols. (Berlin, 1894-
96), 1:86-87, 92; Ludolf Parisius, Leopold Freilherr von Hoverbeck, 2 vols. (Ber-
lin, 1897-1900), vol. 2, pt. 2, p. 294. For a contrasting interpretation, see James
F. Harris, "Eduard Lasker and Compromise Liberalism," Jourtnal of Modern His-
tory 42 (1970): 352-53.
4- Bbttcher, pp. 142-43.
48 Gordon Craig maintains that the government would have been defeated had
not Bismarck agreed to the compromise with the National Liberals (The Politics
of the Prussian Army [New York, 1955, 1964], p. 222). Bennigsen might have
agreed; an estimate in his papers (Oncken, 2:258) said that nineteen National
Liberals could have been expected to vote "no" with Lasker on the iron budget and
listed ten more as possible "no" votes. If these figures are correct, and if Lasker
could have been able to muster all of the rest of the potential "no" votes outside
the National Liberal party, he could have.had the satisfaction of seeing the Reichs-
tag turn down the iron budget. In that case, however, it is hardly likely that the
government would meekly have accepted the Reichstag vote as the final word (see
Ziekursch, 2:295-96). Conservative circles were convinced at the time that the
iron budget could have been passed one way or another if Bismarck had remained
adamant (see Bottcher, pp. 142-43; Heyderhoff and Wentzcke, 2:106; Poschinger,
2:196-97). Parisius, a Progressive deputy, agreed that Bismarck could have forced
it through (Deutschlands Parteien, p. 203).
74 Gordon R. Mork
In 1877 Bismarck negotiated with Bennigsen in an attempt to get the
support of the center and the right wing National Liberals for a revision
of the tax system of the Reich. But the weight of the party's left wing,
and Bennigsen's unwillingness to see the party irreparably divided, led to
demands by the National Liberals for the establishment of some kind of
responsible ministry, at least in financial matters. This Bismarck was un-
willing to concede, and the negotiations with Bennigsen came to noth-
ing.49'By exploiting the two assassination attempts on the emperor in
1878 and the resulting popular indignation against the socialists, Bis-
marck was able to inflict two severe defeats on the National Liberals. One
was at the polls, where they lost more than one-fifth of their Reichstag
seats. The other was on a matter of political principle; the party was
brought to accept the antisocialist laws, and thus take another step away
from its liberal defense of the Rechtsstaat.5"In 1879 Bismarck ended his
alliance with the National Liberals by working out an agreement on tax
reforms with the Center party. Though the Lasker wing had been steadily
losing its strength in the party, the movement of the National Liberals to
the right had been insufficient to please the chancellor. In 1880 he finally
had the satisfaction of seeing the left wing resign from the party. But his
victory was a hollow one. He had hoped to form a stable and loyal
Reichstag majority consisting of the National Liberals and the two con-
servative parties. But during the early 1880s the National Liberal party
lost so many seats that the combination held only a minority in the
Reichstag, and Bismarck still had to look elsewhere for support on cru-
cial votes.51
Let us return to our original question: Did the men who left the Pro-
gressives "abandon the fight against Prussian authoritarianism" and ca-
pitulate to Bismarck when they joined in founding the National Liberal
party? We have seen that they did not. They had never been committed
to full parliamentary democracy, but only to a constitutional monarchy
with powers divided between king and parliament and to a program of
liberal legislation. When they declared they would support Bismarck's
national policy they also said they would continue to strive for internal
49 Heyderhoff and Wentzcke, 2:187; Oncken, 2:326-27, 345, 354-58; Poschinger,
2:268-70; Bismarck, 15:368-71.
50 Heyderhoff and Wentzcke, 2:201-2; Oncken, 2:360-61, 375, 378, 397-98;
Horst Kohl, ed., Bismarck-Jahirbuchl (1894), 1:100; Bottcher, p. 226; Ziekursch,
2:322-23.
51 Heyderhoff and Wentzcke, 2:323-57; Oncken, 2:428, 433-38, 446-50; Her-
mann Block, Die parlamentarisclhe Krisis der nationalliberalen Partei 1879-1880
(Munster, 1930); Ludwig Bamberger, "Die Sezession," in his Gesammelte Schrift-
eni, 5 vols. (Berlin, 1894-[1898]), pp. 39-134.
liberal reforms. This twofold policy-both national and liberal-re-
mained the basis of their actions.
But this twofold policy had inherent weaknesses. Traditionally, Ger-
mans had seen liberty and unity as but two sides of the same coin (even
as some still do today). Thus, the National Liberals refused to recognize
that the two goals could stand in opposition to one another. They said
they would support Bismarck's national policy, if he, in return, would
support their liberal program. In moments of crisis, however, they were
even more anxious to see the national policy pursued than was Bismarck.
Instead of being able to demand concessions from him on liberal matters,
therefore, they were willing to grant concessions to him. The National
Liberals did have some success attaining liberal goals-in economic life,
in civil and political rights, in restricting the ancient privileges of the
Church, in maintaining parliamentary budgetary rights. Where Bismarck
adamantly opposed their program, however, they had to compromise on
his terms. They needed him too much to risk alienation from the govern-
ment. Instead of becoming Bismarck's partners, they sometimes seemed
to have become his captives.
Nevertheless, he needed them as well. They gained his acquiescence
for liberal policies which he would otherwise have opposed. Usually it
was the party's left wing-those onetime Progressives so frequently ac-
cused of capitulation-which made him give way on important points.
The National Liberal party, prior to 1880, was never his docile tool;
at most it was a difficult ally which often caused him much discomfort.
To argue that the National Liberal party was completely successful,
or that it was without internal weaknesses, would be fatuous. But neither
can it be maintained that German liberalism, in forming the party in
1866/67, abandoned its liberal goals in exchange for the Bismarckian
national state. Only gradually, in the ferment of political battle, did it
become apparent that the compromises with the government begun in
1866 subordinated liberty to other goals. Had the National Liberal party
not existed, or had it not contained the virile and influential element
which had left the Prussian Progressive party, the liberals would have
been far less effectively represented, and would have accomplished much
less, in the formative years of the German empire.

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