Adamczyk begins with the intention of showing that Thomas understanding of the formal object of the

intellect is not that far from Scotus, in the light of the fact that many believe Scotus understanding of
being as being as the formal object of the intellect is more consistent with the origin of metaphysics and
the vision of the blessed. If the formal object of the intellect is the quiddity of a material being, as some
suggest Thomas taught, it would make metaphysics and the beatific vision impossible, for while a power
can be reinforced so as to see that which it was not strong enough to see, it cannot even by a miracle be
extended so far as to see that which does not fall within its specifying formal object. It would then become
essentially another power. Both metaphysics and the beatific vision would therefore be impossible for the
human intellect.

The object of an action is the term of the action. Actions in creatures presuppose, however, powers, which
bring about those actions. Therefore, the object of a habit or power is the term of the action of that habit
or power. Objects are divided into per se and per accidens. Per se objects can either be proper or common.

The proper object of a power is its first and per se object.

Id quod est primo et per se cognitum a virtute cognoscitiva, est proprium eius obiectum. ST 1.85 a. 8 c.

For, per se objects are either first or secondary. The first per se object of a power, like the senses, is its
proper object. Secondary per se objects are the common objects of a power like sensation. The per
accidens objects of a power do not move the power, but are attached to objects which do move it, i.e., per
se objects.

Similitudo autem alicuius rei est in sensu tripliciter. Uno modo primo et per se: sicut in visu est similitudo
colorum, et aliorum propriorum senibilium. Alio modo, per se, sed non primo; sicut in visu est similitudo
firgurae vel magnitudinis, et aliorum communium sensibilium. Tertio modo, nec primo nec per se, sed per
accidens; sicut in visu est similitudo hominis, non in quantum est homo, sed in quantum huic colorato
accidit esse hominem. ST. I.17 a.2, c.

Quod autem nullam facit differrentiam circa imutationem sensus dicitur sensibile per accidens. II de Anima,
l. 13, n. 393

So proper objects of sense powers are those per se objects which first move the sense power, as opposed
to the common objects which though they move the sense power per se, do so only secondarily.

The same is true of the intellect. The object which first moves the intellect is its proper object. Id quod
intelligitur primo, est res cuius species intelligibilis est similitudo. 1.50 a. 2, c.

Thus the proper object of a power belongs only to that power, hence it is proper to that power. [Q]uod
sensible proprium est quod ita sentitur uno sensu, quod non potest alio sensu sentiri(II de Anima, l. 13,
n. 384). Moreover, everything a power acts upon is in virtue of its proper object. Proprieillud assignatur
obiectum alicuius potentiaesub cuius ratione omnia referuntur ad potentiam: sicut homo et lapis
referuntur ad visum, in quantum sunt colorata; unde coloratum est proprium obiectum visus (1.1 a.7 c.)
Finally, no power is mistaken about its proper object (1.17 a.3 c.).

The proper object of sight is sometimes referred to as including all colors, and at others, with regard to a
determinate kind of sight, the proper object of that particular power of sight is said to be limited to certain
colors, like the eyes of a bat are said to be limited to colors of low intensity. With regard to the human
intellect, Thomas, similarly, sometimes refers to quiddity simply as its proper objectobiectum proprium
intellectus est quod quid est id est substantia rei (CG III c. 54, 4)and sometimes, in the present life, he
limits it to the quiddity of a material being. Intellectus autem humani, qui est coniunctus corpori, proprium
obiectum est quidditas sive natura in materia corporali existens; et per huiusmodi naturas visibilium rerum
etiam in invisibilium rerum aliqualem congitionem ascendit (1.84 a.7 c.). This suggests a division of proper
objects simply speaking and proper objects relatively speaking. This is also seen in sense powers where
some objects falling under the proper object of a sense power remain beyond the power of that particular
sense organ to perceive. While the proper object of sight includes all color, the eye of the bat cannot
perceive the sun because it exceeds the capacity of its physical organ. This second sense of proper object, is
that part of the simply proper object which is completely proportionate to the determinate sense power in
question, as the eye of the bat is only perceptive of colors of low intensity. Therefore, the relatively proper
object may also be called the proportionate object.

Beyond the proper object of any power, there are the common objects which while they move the sense
power per se, they do so only secondarily, presuming the activity of the proper, primary and per se, object.
In the order of human understanding, immaterial things are known per se but not first, they presume a
knowledge of sensible things through which we arrive at a knowledge of them. In this way, they are like
the common objects of sensation, but with regard to the human intellect.

Common sensible matter is also a common object for the intellect??? Doesnt seem right. Perhaps,
Adamczyk was trying to force his point on the primacy of ens simpliciter.

The per accidens object of the sense powers do not impress themselves at all upon the sense power. Quod
nullam facit differentiam circa immutationem sensus, dicitur sinsibile per accidens (II de Anima, l. 13, n.
393). The per accidens sensible is only sensed insofar as it is in some way bound to a per se sensible, like
the man who is white. White is per se sensible, while man is only per accidens sensible.

The intellect has per accidens objects insofar as things, not intelligible as such, are attached to things which
are intelligible as such. It is in this way that the human intellect knows the singular, which is not as such
intelligible but which contains an intelligible nature. Sed per accidens contingit quod intellectus noster
singulare cognoscit (de Verit., q.2, a.6, c.).

In any intelligible object there is a formal and material element. The two together constitute one single
intelligible object.

p. 21

footnote

In obiecto alicuius potentiae contingit tria considerare: scilicet id quod est formale in obiecto, et id quod est
materiale, et id quod est accidentale; sicut patet in obiecto visus: quia formale in ipso est lumen, quod facit
colorem visibilem actu: materiale ipse color qui est potentia visibillis; accidentale vero, sicut qualitas et alia
huiusmodi, quae colorem comitantur. (III Sent., d. 24, q. 1, a. 1, c.)

Ad obiectumalicuius actus duo concurrunt: unum quod se habet quasi materialiter, et alterum quod est
quasi formale, complens rationem obiecti; sicut ad visibile concurrit lux et color (I Sent., d. 48, q. 1, a. 2, c.)

Si enim aliqua duo ita se habeant quod unum sit ratio intelligendi aliud, unum eorum erit quasi formale, et
aliud quasi materiale; et sic illa duo sunt unum intelligibile, cum ex forma et materia unum constituatur
(de Verit., q. 8, a. 14, ad 6; Cf. de Malo, q. 2, a. 2, ad 11)

In this way, it may be irrelavent if Adamczyk is right that the formal object of the intellect is not the
material quiddity, for it would still remain that the formal object does not by itself constitute what is
intelligible, but only in union with the material object.

The formal object quo is to the formal object quod as form to matter.

The formal object is what specifies the nature of the power.

Is ens simpliciter the formal object quod or the formal object quo of the human intellect???????
Something is intelligible insofar as it is in act.

p. 23

In obiecto consideratur aliquid ut formale, et aliquid ut materiale. Formale autem in obiecto est secundum
quod obiectum refertur ad potentiam vel habitum; materiale autem id in quo hoc fundatur; ut si loquamur
de obiecto potentiae visivae obiectum eius formale est color, vel aliquid huiusmodi; in quantum enim
aliquid coloratum est, in tantum visibile est; sed materiale in obiecto est corpus cui accidit color. De
Caritate, a. 4

There is only one place where Thomas speaks explicitly of the object of a power secundum quod.?????

Is the formal object quod the ratio of the proper object or the individual instances of the proper object, i.e.,
the proper objects themselves?

If the formal object of sight is color, the proper object is the colored thing. The proper object is that in
which the action of the power terminates, while the formal object is the ratio of the proper object, the
reason why it is related to the power.

Et tunc relatio huius obiecti formalis quod ad obiectum proprium bene intelligitur. Obiecto enim formali
quod, quia relate ad potentiam simile valorem habet ac in rebus materialibus forma relate ad materiam,
nunnullae notae ipsius formae applicari possunt. Proinde sicut entia materialia per formam substantialem
in una specie uniuntur, per materiam autem quantitate signatam in unaquaque specie multiplicantur, simili
modo obiecta cuiuslibet potentiae per communem suam formam (rationem formalem) in receptibiliate ab
una eademque poetentia uniuntur, per rationes vero materiales actus et per consequens obiecta huius
potentiae multiplicantur (I, q. 1, a 3, c.; q. 77, a. 3, c., etc.). Deinde sicut in rebus materialibus nec materia
prima nec forma substantiales proprie existit, sed id, quod proprie est, compositum est, ita relate ad
potentiam obiectum quod proprie attingitur non est istud formale, nec materiale, sed aliquid ex eis
compositum. Relate v.g. ad oculum nec ratio coloris nec ratio albi proprie videtur; sed id, quod proprie
videtur, est aliquid compositum ex urtoque, nempe album: Primum visibile est color, quamvis illud quod
proprie videtur sit coloratum (I, q. 45, a. 4, ad 1).

I q. 45 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, cum dicitur, prima rerum creatarum est esse, ly esse non
importat subiectum creatum; sed importat propriam rationem obiecti creationis. Nam ex eo dicitur aliquid
creatum, quod est ens, non ex eo quod est hoc ens, cum creatio sit emanatio totius esse ab ente universali,
ut dictum est. Et est similis modus loquendi, sicut si diceretur quod primum visibile est color, quamvis illud
quod proprie videtur, sit coloratum.

Every power has one only natural object. This is the formal object which unites all of its proper material
objects, as color unites all colored things.

Intellectusquum sit una vis, est eius unum naturale obiectum, cuius per se et naturaliter cognitionem
habet. Hoc autem oportet esse id sub quo comprehenduntur omnia ab intellectu cognita, sicut sub colore
comprehenduntur omnes colores, qui sunt per se (scl. primo et per se) visibiles CG II, c. 83, 14

obiectumestmateria circa quam; et habet quadammodo rationem formae, in quantum dat speciem I-
II, q. 18, a. 2, ad 2 ????

Potest tamen aliqua potentia sensitiva, et apprehensiva et appetitiva, ferri in aliquid universaliter. Sicut
dicimus quod obiectum visus est color secundum genus, non quia visus cognoscat colorem universalem;
sed quia quod color (aliquis singularis) sit cognoscibilis a visu, non convenit colori inquantum est hic color
sed inquantum est color simpliciter. VII Meta., l. 13, n. 1570
Adamczyk insists upon the unicity of the formal object of the human intellect. While many of the greatest
Thomists of the 20th century, including Gerrigrou-Lagrange, Marechal, Gredt, and Mercier, hold that there is
a generic formal object, being as being, and a specific one, being as present in a material thing, Adamczyk
insists that the formal object of the intellect can be only one. You cannot distinguish, he insists, between a
generic and specific formal object of the intellect.
Being is analogous. The being of the physical things which we know first and per se is not the same being of immaterial substances. Being means
something different when applied to each. The being that we know first is primarily physical being. The being which angels and G-d know first is
primarily immaterial substance. We only come to know immaterial things through material things. Angels and G-d knows all things primarily
through their own immaterial essences. If there was a meaning of being which applied univocally to all things, being would be a genus, which is
impossible.

He uses several texts in an attempt to manifest that there can only be a specifying formal object of the
intellect.

Nonquaelibet diversitas actuum fecit differentiam potentiarum at habituum, sed illa tantum, quae est ex
diversitate obiectorumEt similiter obiecta diversa non diversificant actus seecundum speciem, nisi sit
diversitas secundum illam rationem, secundum quam est obiectum. Videre enim albus et nigrum non sunt
diversi actus secundum speciem; quia utrumque est obiectum visus secundum unam rationem Et inde
contingit quod quanto aliqui habitus vel potentiae sunt immaterialiores, tanto sunt universaliores et minus
distinguuntur, quia attendant universaliorem rationem obiecti, sicut quinque sensibus propriis
correspondet unus sensus communis et una imaginatio. D. 33, q. 1, a. 1, q. 1 (sic), c.

Unaquaeque ergo potentia omnia sua obiecta secundum unam rationem formalem cognoscit. Adam

Powers are one, Thomas says, because their objects are unified under one ratio. Therefore, since the
formal object is the ratio of the proper object there can only be one formal object of any power. However,
while this is certainly true, one might still ask if the formal object itself might be divided in its ratio. For
example, the formal objects of the sense powers have a genus, the sensible. They all participate in the
genus of the sensible. Couldnt the formal object of the intellect, be divided into a genus or quasi-genus and
difference?

Cum habitus, potentiae, et actus distinguantur per obiecta, oportet quod virtus, quae habet speciale
obiectum a speciali ratione, quamvis illa specialis ratio circa multas res et omnes poni possit. Contingit enim
eandem rem ad diversas potentias pertinere, sicut colorem ad visum, imaginationem et intellectum, sed
sub diversa ratione. D. 44, q. 2, a. 1, c.

Cum natura semper ordienetur ad unum, unius virtutuis oportebit esse naturaliter unum obiectum, sicut
visus colorem et auditus sonum. Intellectus igitur cum sit una vis, est eius unum naturale obiectum, cuius
per se naturaliter cognitionem habet. Hoc autem oportet esse id, sub quo comprehenduntur omnia ab
intellectu cognita. SCG c. 83.14

Formal object may be one in re but divisible in ratio. If the formal object of a power is to that power as a
substantial form is to its substance, then perhaps just as a substantial form can be divided in its generic and
specific natures so can the formal object of a power. For example, the substantial form of a man has both
rational and animal nature. These are distinct in reason. Similarly, the formal object of sight is color, which
too has a generic and specific nature. Color is, generally, sensible but also, specifically, what moves the eye.

My intention: disprove adamczyks contention that the formal object is not in some way diverse, that it is
only being as being,

The formal object of the intellect is already common to all things, therefore there can be no more universal
object. In a way yes and in a way no ???
Having established that the formal object of a power, and hence of the human intellect, must be one if the
power is to be one, Adamczyk goes on to discuss what the formal object of the human intellect must be.
First he considers the possibility that the formal object is the quiddity of a material being.

The opinion that the formal object of the human intellect, according to Thomas, is the quiddity of a
material thing goes back almost to the time of Thomas himself.

Scotus and Peter of Aureoli thought that the formal object of the human intellect, according to Thomas,
was the quiddity of a material thing.

Iam enim temporibus Scoti et Petri Aureoli viguisse videtur, cum isti eandem pro sententia S. Thomae
habuerint et strenue impugnaverint.

Scotus holds,

Dicunt quidam secundum D. Thomam, quod quidditas rei seinsibilis est obiectum adaequatum intellectus
nostri. De Anima, q. 19, n. 2

What I wrote on de sensu???

Petrus de Palude says,

Ideo est tertia opinio, quod obiectum intellectus coniuncti est quidditas materialis, intellectus vero separati
ens secunundum quod ens. Primum patet per Aristotelem, 3 de Anima item intellectus coniunctus nihil
intellexit nisi per phantasmata repraesentatium vel inde deductum, ergo intelligentem necesse est
phantasmata speculari; sed per illud non repraesentatur nisi aliquid materiale, ergo, etc. Super III Sent., q.
10, op. 2, fol. Pg. 61

Similarly, Suarez held that the formal object of the human intellect is the quiddity of a material being:
intellectui humano secundum statum naturalem suum est res sensibilis seu materialis (IV De Anima, c. 1, n.
5). And John of St. Thomas agrees that the formal object of the human intellect in this lifeunum formale
obiectum proportionatumis the quiddity of a material being: quidditatem sensibilem (Cursus phil. Thom.,
III, pars II, q. 10, a. 3). However, he distinguishes between the formal object for us in this life and when the
soul is separate from the body. The soul in separation from the body has immaterial being as its proper
object.

Many of the greatest modern Thomists, also held that the formal object of the human intellect in this life is
the quiddity of a material being.

Adamczyk lists Mercier, Garrigou-Lagrange, Gredt, Hugon,1 and Marquardt as holding that the formal
object of the human intellect is the quiddity of particular material beings. Marechal, however, he says,
following John of St. Thomas, takes the formal object to be the quiddity of material things, taken
universally.

Per intellectum connaturale est nobis cognoscere naturas, quae quidem non habent esse nisi in materia
individuale; non tamen secundum quod sunt in materia individuali, sed secundum quod abstrahuntur ab ea
per considerationem intellectus. I, q. 12, a. 4, c.

Adamczyk asks if the object of the intellect here described is in fact the formal object, which is the ratio
which unites all the material objects of the power, or merely the proper object, in which the act of the
power terminates. He cites several texts which refer to the quiddity of the material being as the proper
object of the intellect.

1
Metaph. I, pg. 114 s. and 117
Obiectum intellectus nostri, secundum praesentem statum, est quidditas rei materialis quam a
phantasmatibus abstrahit, ut ex praemissis patet. Et quia id quod est primo et per se cognitum a virtute
cognoscotiva est proprium eius obiectum [whence] indivisibile, ut punctus et unitasper posterius
cognosciturquia tale indivisibile habet quandam oppositionem ad rem corporalem, cuius quidditatem
primo et per se intellectus accipit. I, q. 85, a. 8, c.

The first properties of being that we know are the properties of material beings.????

Intellectus .humani, qui est coniunctus corpori, proprium obiectum est quidditas sive natura in materia
corporali existens; De ratione autem huius naturae est quod in aliquo individuo exsistat, quod non est
absque materia corporali; sicut de ratione naturae lapidis est quod sit in hoc lapide, et de ratione naturae
equi est quod sit in hoc equo, et sic de aliis. Unde natura lapidis, vel cuiuscumque materialis rei, cognosci
non potest complete et vere, nisi secundum quod cognoscitur ut in particulari existens. I, q. 84, a. 7, c.

Sic autm se habet [sensus] ad cognoscendum res, in quantum similitude rerum est in sensu. Similitudo
autem alicuius rei est in sensu triplicliter. Uno modo, primo et per se; sicut in visu est similitudo colorum, et
aliorum propriorum sensibilium. Alio modo, per se, sed non primo; sicut in visu est similitudo figurae vel
magnitudinis, et aliorum communium sensibilium. Tertio modo, nec primo nec per se, sed per accidens;
sicut in visu est similitudo hominis, non inquantum est homo, sed inquantum huic colorato accidit esse
hominem. I, q. 17, a. 2

The formal object of the mind is known first and per se. However, being separated from matter, is present
to the mind per se but secondarily. Therefore, being separated from matter is not the formal object of the
mind.

Materialis diversitas obiectorum sufficit ad diversificandum actum secundum numerum; sed secundum
speciem actus (et per consequens et potentiae) non diversificatur nisi diversitate formali obiecti. Formalis
autem obiecti diversitas est secundum illam rationem quam principaliter attendit vel habitus vel potentia;
et ideo videre album et nigrum et propinquum et distans sunt diversae visiones secundum numerum et
diversos modos habent et tamen ad unam visivam poentiam pertinent. III Sent. D. 27, q. 2, a. 4

Obiectum enim formale visus constituit ratio communis omnibus coloribus (t.s.c.), seu color simpliciter (I-
II, q. 29, a. 6, De Carit., a. 4, c.)

Is sight taken generically here. It seems unreasonable to say that the sight of a particular animal which is
unable to perceive whole masses of the spectrum is color as such, and not a particular kind of color.

Ergo etiam singulae quidditates rerum materialium qua tales iuxta doctrinam S. Thomae solummodo
obiectum intellectus nostri materiale huic statui proportionatum, nequaquam autem formale constituere
possunt.

Adamczyk holds that the quiddity of a material being is the material object, or proper object, of the
human intellect, but not the formal object.

Unde Capreolus commentan verba S. Thomae: Intellectushumani qui est coniunctus corpori proprium
obiectum est quidditas sive natura in materia corporali existens (I, q. 84, a. 7, c.)

est materiale obiectum et connaturale ac proportionatum nobis pro hoc statu (Def. theol., in I Sent. D. 2,
a. 1, concl. 3)

Cajetan also holds that the material quiddity is the proportionate object and not the object simply of the
human intellect.

p.57
Quidditatem rei sensibilis obiectum non quodcumque, sed naturaliter proportionatum intensive ponimus
intellectus nostri Quid autem sit obiectum intellectus, id est ratio formalis quod aliquid sit intelligibile,
non est praesentis intentionis, ubi de intelligibili in hoc statu, et non simpliciter est quaestio (Comm. in I, q.
84, a. 7)

Those who hold, Adamczyk says, that the formal object of the intellect is the material quiddity confuse the
formal object with the proper or material object of a power. The proper object is what terminates the act
of the power, while the formal object is the ratio which unites the material objects to the power, i.e., which
makes them objects of the power.

However what is intelligible to the mind, is not strictly speaking the formal object, but the union of the
formal and material objects. Thus, in the de ente et essentia, Thomas explains how since our minds are
dependent on sensation we proceed from the composite wholes presented to us by sensation to the simple
elements which compose those wholes. Thus, what is first known to us is ens, and not essence or the act of
being, for ens is the composite whole which is first presented to us by sensation, being composed of an
essence and existence. Only later by analysis do we arrive at essence and existence.

P 58

Quia tamen nulla extra suum obiectum specificativum, formale, ne per miraculum extendi potest, ergo
obiectum formale intellectus nostri (etiam pro hoc statu) debet esse aliqua ratio, quae sit comjunis non
solum quidditatibus rerum materialium, sed etiam immaterialium, ergo debet esse aliquid maioris
extensionis, quam quidditas rerum materialium universaliter sumpta.

Isnt the beatific vision a miracle???

The being that is first known is a composite, composed, at the very least, of the act of existing (esse) and
essence, and also, for us, of matter and substantial form. It is only later, by analysis, that we come to a
knowledge of these elements which compose the being which is first known. When we say that the first
object of the mind is known first and per se, we dont necessarily mean that it is known first in time before
all other things. What is first known is a composite of different things the elements of which are known as
such only later. The formal object, as the name itself suggests, is one element of the composite intelligible
object. It has also a material element. In our case, the material object of the intellect is the quiddity of a
material being. Together the formal and material or proper, proportionate object constitute what is
knowable to us, first and per se.

Things are known insofar as they are abstracted from matter or immaterial. The intelligible nature comes to
exist immaterially in the intellect. This does not mean however that it is known as immaterial. What is first
known is the nature as it exists in things outside the mind, not the state of the nature within the mind.
From the knowledge of the natures of things existing outside the mind, we reason to a knowledge of things
as they exist within the mind.

Adamczyk holds that the quiddities of material things are the proper, material object of the intellect but
not the formal object, for the formal object is the ratio common to all the objects known by the intellect,
just as color, the formal object of sight, is common to all colored things, the proper, material object of sight.
See Capreolous and Cajetan. The formal object of the intellect must be the ratio common to all the things
known or knowable by it. A argues that since things are knowable insofar as they are abstracted from
matter therefore it is accidental to the proper object of the intellect that the quiddity is found in a material
thing????!!!!!!!!

The designation of being simply as the formal object of the mind seems to refer to the scope that is given to
it both by nature and by being raised through grace. Its formal object considered simply in regard to what is
knowable to it through nature is more precisely designated by the quiddity of a material thing. And even if
one were to designate its natural formal object as being simply, the intelligible object as such is composed
both of the formal and material object. What is first known strictly speaking is not the formal object simply,
but the formal object united to the material object, i.e., the intelligible object. Just as ens, what is first
known by the mind is not simple but is composed, and essence and existence can later be resolved to by
the mind. They are not what is first known by the mind because the composed is prior to the simple in our
knowledge.2

Adamczyk begins with a precise definition of the proper, common, and accidental objects of powers. He
then distinguishes the formal objects quo and quod. Next, he shows how the formal object of a power can
only be one, this in view of refuting the contention there both a natural formal object and one of the
intellect augmented by grace. He then argues that many Thomists confuse the formal and material objects
of the intellect: that is, he argues that the quiddity of a material thing is not the formal object of our
intellect. Ens, he says, according to Thomas, is the formal object of the human intellect. He concludes by
solving a difficulty. If the formal object of all intellects, divine, angelic, and human, is being how are they
different? He says that powers can be distinguished both by their formal objects and by their subjects. The
difference of subject is what distinguishes the divine, angelic, and human intellects, not their formal object,
being.

The sources of A. in Thomas and the scholastic commentary tradition: Scotus, Cajetan, Capreolus, John of
St. Thomas.

The Capreolus article of Dewan, the Scotus article of Noone?? Bertolacci on Albert (Noone), Avicenna and
Averroes.

P. 58

The mind knows all things in potency!

Because things are intelligible insofar as they are immaterial, A. argues that the note which designates
matter in the proper object of the mind is only accidentaly to it, while it is completely absent from the
formal object.

A. insists that the proper object of our intellect cannot be limited to the quiddities of material things.

A. admits that our natural knowledge extends only to material quiddities, but he holds that it nonetheless
has a potency to know even immaterial quiddities. One must assume, probably, that this only takes place
by grace.

p. 68

illapars animae quae non utitur organo corporeo in opere suo, non remanet determinata, sed
quodammodo infinita, in quantum est immaterialis; et sic eius virtute se extendit ad obiectum commune
omnibus entibus. Unde commune obiectus intellectus dicitur esse quod quid est, quod in omnibus
generibus entium invenitur. Unde Philosophus dicit (III De Anima, comm. 18) quod intellectus est quo est
omnia facere, et quo est omnia fieri (XV De Verit., a. 2, c.)

Just as the proper object of sight is the common ratio of color, the communis ratio entis is the proper
object of the intellect, according to A.

Adamczyk admits that Thomas often says that the proper object of our intellect is the quiddity of a material
thing (1.12 a.4, c; 84 a.7, c; 85 a.8, c., 89 a.1, c.; De Verit. 10 a.2, ad7) but he says that Thomas is just
speaking of the intellect as it is in this life. This is the proportionate object, not simply speaking, he says.

2
See de ente proemium
When referring to the proper object simply speaking, he calls it the quiddity of things without any
restriction (I sent. D. 19.5 a.1 ad7, SCG III c. 56.4; 108.3; ST I.17 a.3, c. and ad1; 57, a.1, ad2; 58 a.6 o).

Being is what belongs to all quiddities, he says, therefore being simply is the formal object of the intellect.
However, if we dont know of anything beyond material beings, it would seem that all quiddities are
material. Not until we know there are immaterial beings, do we know that what is common to all quiddities
is not material being.

p. 69

Nec tame nest simpliciter dicendum quod sit alia potentia qua intellectus cognoscit necessaria, et alia
cognoscit contingentia: quia utraque cognoscit secundum eandem rationem obiecti, scilicet secundum
rationem entis veri Contingentia enim et necessaria etsi differant secundum propria genera, conveniunt
tamen in communi ratione entis, quam respicit intellectus, ad quam diversimode se habent secundum
perfectum et imperfectum (I 79.9 ad 3)

p. 71

unde intellectus intelligit voluntatem, et actum eius, et obiectum ipsius, sicut et alia specialia intellect, ut
lapidem aut lignum, quae continentur sub communi ratione entis. I 82.4 ad1

Adam. says that since the intellect knows the will, its knowledge is not limited to material quiddities. But
doesnt it know the will and other immaterial beings only secondarily and through material quiddities? In
this way, it only knows immaterial quiddities as common and not proper objects. A. seems to fail to see the
very distinction which he insisted upon at the beginning of the paper. Immaterial quiddities are only known
in a second moment. We first know material quiddities and reason to the immaterial existence of others
from the material ones. This is true in the case of the will. Just as with the intellect, we first know material
quiddities. only later, by reflecting on the way these material quiddities are present in the mind or will, do
we see that they exist immaterially and therefore the mind or will which receives them must also be
immaterial.

p. 72

Cum natura semper ordinetur ad unum, unius virtutis oportet esse naturaliter unum obiectum; sicut visus
colorem, et auditus sonum. Intellectus igitur, cum sit una vis, est eius unum naturale obiectum, cuius per se
et naturaliter cognitionem habet. Hoc autem oportet esse id sub quo comprehenduntur omnia ab intellectu
cognita, sicut sub colore comprehenduntur omnes colores, qui sunt per se visibiles, quod non est aliud
quam ens. Naturaliter igitur intellectus noster cognoscit ens et ea quae sunt per se entis in quantum
hiusmodi. II SCG c. 83, 14 cf. CNE

However, Obiectum intellectus est comune quoddam, scilicet ens Nec primum obiectum intellectus
nostri, secundum presentem statum, est quodlibet ens; sed ens consideratum in rebus materialibus, ut
dictum est; ex quibus in cognitionem omnium aliorum devenit I 87.3, ad1

p. 71 Hoc enim pro ipso obiecto formali accidentale est.

He based this earlier on the contention that, since the basis of understanding is immateriality, the material
could only be accidental to it.

Adam. after arguing at length that the formal object of the intellect can only be one and that a great part of
his thomist contemporaries divide the formal object of the mind into a universal and specific object, he
himself divides the formal object into a per se and accidental formal object.
p. 73 he holds that the being known in sensible substances is not the formal object of the mind in which
its activity terminates, but rather only the object proportioned to this state of life.

Primo in conceptione intellectus cadit Et sic [ens] est primum intelligibile, sicut sonus est primum audibile.
I 5.2 c

Lagrange held that ens sine restrictione is the formal object of the mind (La Sens Commun, p. 52 s.).

Potency is known from act. Therefore, that something is able to be immaterial is known from something
actually being immaterial?????? What is the act from which we learn that something immaterial is
possible?

He takes a position similar to that of Dewan, he says that: intellectus ergo noster res materiales directe non
cognoscit, nisi sint iam actu, nisi per abstractionem pro suis obiectis propriis solummodo entia actu (in
hoc statu

Expositio Posteriorum, lib. 1 l. 5 n. 7 Sed quarundam propositionum termini sunt tales, quod sunt
in notitia omnium, sicut ens, et unum, et alia quae sunt entis, in quantum ens: nam ens est prima
conceptio intellectus. Unde oportet quod tales propositiones non solum in se, sed etiam quoad
omnes, quasi per se notae habeantur. Sicut quod, non contingit idem esse et non esse; et quod,
totum sit maius sua parte: et similia. Unde et huiusmodi principia omnes scientiae accipiunt a
metaphysica, cuius est considerare ens simpliciter et ea, quae sunt entis.
This passagge from the posterior commentary seem to be saying that the being which is first
known by us is the being which is the subject of metaphsyics, being as being. Hence, the formal
object of the mind would be the subject of metaphysics.
80-1
Thomas says the act of the intellect is not known first by us, but is only known since it falls under
the being which is in fact what is first known by us. This suggests that the being which is first
known by us is not just the being of a material thing?????
p. 90
Truth is the formal object of the mind on the part of the object quo.
92
Just as truth, the formal object quo, extends to material and immaterial quiddities, so does being,
or the formal object quod.
Just because a distinction is not made explicitly, does not mean that it is not assumed. For
example, although Thomas says that being as being is what is first known, what cannot assume
that being as being is one concept or that it is meant univocally because no further distinction is
explicitly made. Thomas assumes that you know that it is analogous as he says elsewhere.
The formal object of the mind cannot be any one being or the mind would not be able to receive
the forms of other things.
Download more BOB!!!!
97
Capreolus says the formal object of the mind is being (as being???).
Si autem loquamur de obiecto formali intellectus ad quod scilicet terminatur intuitus eius, et quod
directe intelligitur, sic formale intellectus est ens: quia ad eius rationem semper in omni intelligibili
terminatur intuitus intellectus et non ad rationem veriSed quidditas rei materialis est obiectum
materiale pro isto statu perfecte cognoscibile: alia vero obiecta sint improportionata. Et isto modo
intelligitur cum dicitur quidditatem materialem esse proprium obiectum intellectus possibilis pro
isto statu; non scilicet proprium, scilicet per adaequationem, sed potius ens et verum; sed
proprium hoc et proportionatum et connaturale et perfecte cognocscibile; ita quod hoc solum
immediate cognoscitur ab intellectus coniuncto, alia vero, isto mediante: istud enim solum movet
intellectum nostrum pro isto statu, et non aliqua res insensibilis. Est ergo primum obiectum
proportionate immediationis et prioritate generationis aut temporis non autem adaequationis,
aut convertibilitatis. Capreolus def. Theol. I sent., d. 2, a. 1, concl. 4
Conceditur quod intellectus potest ferri in oppositum quidditatis materialis quae est obiectumm
proportionatum intellectui coniuncto, non autem super oppositum entis, quod est eius obiectum formale.
(ibid. B, Sol, 2, ad 2)

Cajetan

The whole debate about the nature of science (the object????) in Fr. Gregory

Quiditatem rei materialis obiectum non quodcumque, sed naturaliter proportionatum intensive ponimus
intellectus nostri: quia nihil potest naturaliter intellectus cognoscere quidditative nisi naturas sensibilium
Quid autem sit obiectum intellectus, idest ratio formalis quod aliquid sit intelligibile, non est praesentis
intentionis, ubi de intelligibilii in hoc statu, et non simipliciter est quaestio. Comm. In I, 84, a. 7, n. XI

See the commentary on de ente. Cajetan on what is first known!!!!!!!!

Banez

Obiectum adaequatum intellectus nostri secundum totam suam latitudinem sive obiectum specificans est
ens in communi: obiectum vero proportionatum et connaturale illi pro statu praesentis vitae, est quidditas
rei materialis. Obiectum alicuius potentiae est duplex. Aliud formale, quod nihil aliud est quam id sub
cuius ratione obiectum refertur ad potentiam et id in intellectu est ens sive entitas; omnia enim quae
intellectus intelligit, intelligit sub ratione entis. Aliud est obiectum materiale, id est, id in quo reperitur
ratio formalis obiecti talis potentiae, ut albedo est obiectum materiale visus, et huiiusmodi obiectum, in
quo scilicet principaliter at proportionate reperitur ratio entis, quod est obiectum formale intellectus
nostri, est quidditas rei materialis. Itaque quidditas rei materialis est obiectum materiale intellectus nostri
proportionatum illi pro isto statu. Scholastica comm. In I, 84, a. 7, concl., t. II

Wenzel 18th c. Benedictine

Distinguere oportet duplex obiectum proportionatum: unum quod est tale, proportione solius coaptationis
essentialis; alterum vero quod est tale, proportione tam coaptationis essentialis, quam virtutis proximae.
Illud est, quod potentia oportet attingere quocunque demum modo; unde eius proportio tantum dicit vim
radicalem, et commensurationem inter potentiam et obiectum, praescindentem adhuc ab eo an tale
obiectum viribus propriis vel alienis sit attingibile. Hoc vero est, quod potentia potest attingere, prout in
exercitio occurit; et huius proportione commensurationi essentiali superaddit virtutem proximam, per
quam potentia fit omnino sufficiens ad attingendum suum obiectum, prout hic et nunc occurit. Sicut autem
Ens, prout est obiectum specificativum intellectus humani, secundum se praescindit ab eo, an sit naturales
vel supernaturale; prout vero occurit in exercitio, est determinate vel naturale, vel
supernaturaleControversiae. P. 277, n. 33

In effect, the position is that, when you take into account the potency for the beatific vision, something
which is only possible by a supernatural act, the formal object of the mind is being as being. When you
consider only what is naturally possible for the mind, its proportionate object is the being of a material
thing. Seen in this light, the position of Dewan etc. is like that of DeLubac a confusion of the natural and
supernatural orders.

p. 103

Obiectum ergo intellectus nostri proportionatum proportione coaptationis essentialis, obiectum

specificativum idem pro ordine naturali vel supernaturali, scilicet obiectum formale est Ens, sub quo
etiam Deus intuitive visus continetur, ens qua tale.

Franciscus Sylvium d. 1649

Circa rationem B. Thomae observandum est, quod obiectum formale nostril intellectus, sit ens sive entitas,
sed obiectum material pro hoc statu est quidditas arei materialis, eo quod in ea reperiatur ratio entis
propotioaliter ipsi. Sic enim quatenus est immaterialis habet obiectum immateriale, scilicet quidditatem
seu essentiam; quatenus vero corpori unitur et quodammoso alligatur, habet obiectum materiale Ad I, q.
84, a. 7, t. I

Scotus
The second argument is that no power can know any object under a characteristic more general than that of
its own primary object. This is obvious, first of all, through the characteristic, since then that characteristic
of its primary object would not be adequate to it. It is also obvious through an example. Sight does not
know anything under a characteristic more general than color or light, nor does the imagination know
anything under one more general than the imaginable, which is its primary object. But the intellect knows
something under a characteristic more general than that of a material being, since it knows some-thing
under the characteristic of being in general; otherwise, metaphysics would not be a science for our intellect.

Besides, thirdly, and this comes almost to the same as the second, whatever is intrinsically known by a
cognitive power is either its primary object or is contained under that object. But being, which is more
general than what is sensible, is intrinsically understood by our intellect. Otherwise, metaphysics would not
be a more transcending science than physics. Nothing, therefore, can be the primary object of our intellect
which is more particular than being, because then being in itself would in no way be understood by us. It
seems, then, that there is a false supposition in the said opinion about the primary object, and this is
speaking about the power from its very nature as a power... .

Here Scotus seems to take the opposite position of Aristotle in E.1, etc, that if the existence of an immaterial substance
is false or knowable, then there is no science beyond physics. Scotus claim seems to be that if we are not capable of
metaphysics from our first thought, if our first thought is limited to the quiddities of material things, then there is no
science beyond physics.