Prcis: Aristotles Allegory of the Cave

One might very well title this essay Aristotles Allegory of the Cave because

Platos Cave is, perhaps, the best introduction to the subject. Plato reveals the nature of

intellection by an analogy with sensation. The mind, he says, when it is exposed to what

is beyond its capacity winces; it turns back on itself like the eye does when it is exposed

to too much light. Thus, the mind must progress by stages. It knows elements before

compounds, sensible things before immaterial ones. We, who know first only through

sensation, gazing at the images in the back of the cave, can only by degrees turn with our

minds to the contemplation of being. Plato attempts to show how it is that the mind of

man reaches knowledge of the highest things: being, 1 poetically depicted by the world

outside the cave, and what he calls the Lord of light and the universal author of all

things,2 symbolized by the brightest of all things, the sun. He calls this knowledge of

the principles, dialectic. Today, we call it metaphysics.

Plato anticipates to some degree, with this metaphor, all that has ever been said on

this theme. In mapping out the path to knowledge of the highest things, he first shows

that there is in fact a power beyond sensation, 3 then the distinction between the different

sciences and the kinds of sensation (the famous divided line),4 and finally the order of
1
Republic 7.518c [T]he instrument of knowledge can only by the movement of the whole soul be
turned from the world of becoming into that of being, and learn by degrees to endure the sight of being,
and of the brightest and best of being, or in other words, of the good.
2
Republic 7.517c the universal author of all things beautiful and right, parent of light and of the
lord of light in this visible world, and the immediate source of reason and truth in the intellectual . . .
3
Republic 7.524c [I]f simple unity could be adequately perceived by the sight or by any other
sense, then, as we were saying in the case of the finger, there would be nothing to attract towards being;
but when there is some contradiction always present, and one is the reverse of one and involves the
conception of plurality, then thought begins to be aroused within us, and the soul perplexed and wanting
to arrive at a decision asks What is absolute unity?
4
Republic 6.510b [T]here are two subdivisions, in the lower of which the soul uses the figures
given by the former division [of sensation] as images; the enquiry can only be hypothetical, and instead
of going upwards to a principle descends to the other end; in the higher of the two [dialectic], the soul
passes out of hypotheses, and goes up to a principle which is above hypotheses, making no use of
images as in the former case, but proceeding only in and through the ideas themselves.
learning, which is, of course, consummated with dialectic, or metaphysics, the highest

science and highest of all human knowledge (the Cave Allegory).

From the divided line and the allegory of the cave, Platos division of sensation

and the sciences and his analysis of the order of learning, we can draw some important

conclusions. There seem to be two fundamental principles at work in the shaping of

Plato's ordering of the sciences. First, he says that arithmetic comes first in the order of

learning on objective grounds. The other sciences necessarily partake of number

(392),5 but the pure science of number does not partake of them. In other words, you

cannot do the other sciences without it, their matter would be incomprehensible. If you

cannot count the sides of a tri-angle, you would not know what it is or be able to

distinguish it from a quadri-lateral. Geometrical figures partake of number, but not vice

versa. You can study numbers even if you do not understand geometry.

Among the geometrical sciences coming after the study of number, it is

objectively necessary that solid geometry come before astronomy, but after plane

geometry since astronomy needs solid geometrys conclusions and solid geometry

depends upon the conclusions of plane geometry.6 The subject matter itself of the

sciences dictates a certain, natural order among them. No matter how strong your

intellect is, if you do not know the earlier science you cannot understand the later, just as

arithmetic is incomprehensible if you do not know how to count. You cannot know a

composite (like a word) if you do not know that of which it is composed (its letters).
5
Republic 7.522c something which all the arts use in common, and which every one first has to
learn among the elements of education. . . . the little matter of distinguishing one, two, and threein a
word, number and calculation:do not all arts and sciences necessarily partake of them?
6
Republic 528a-c [W]e have gone wrong in the order of the sciences. . . . After plane geometry, I
said, we proceeded at once to solids in revolution, instead of taking solids in themselves; whereas after
the second dimension the third, which is concerned with cubes and dimensions of depth, ought to have
followed. . . . the ludicrous state of solid geometry, which in natural order, should have followed, made
me pass over this branch and go on to astronomy, or motion of solids.
 Moreover, mathematics is presupposed in Plato's scheme to all scientific

knowledge of nature. For, all of his natural sciences, it seems, are mathematical. Plato's

curriculum or order of learning goes arithmetic, geometry (plane then solid), astronomy,

harmony, and then he concludes the intellectual life with dialectic, the science of first

principles. The dependence of the later sciences on the content of the earlier ones

determines, at least in part, the order of learning the sciences.

However, the most emphatic reason that Plato gives for the order of learning the

sciences is the need to wean the intellect from the use of images. At first, the mind's

knowledge is bound to images and it must be strengthened before it can contemplate

immaterial, unchanging, spiritual reality. The particular sciences come first, not only for

objective reasons, but because the power of the mind is not able at first to rise above

images and hypotheses.7 The mind at first, while still engaged in its first scientific

endeavor, mathematics, is not capable of freeing itself from the use of images and

sensible objects. The order of learning follows the order of distance from the senses .

After sensation and opinion, but before dialectic, the mind is able to turn towards the pure

ideas, but not completely. It has to use images. But, math's images are abstracted from

sensible matter and thus more like the ideas and exemplars. The mind abstracts itself

from images bit by bit. It learn(s) by degrees to endure the sight of being (390).

But, while the particular sciences are unable to rise above images and hypotheses,

dialectic, the highest and final science in the order of learning, rises to the level of the

7
Republic 6.510c-511a [A]lthough they make use of the visible forms and reason about them, they
are thinking not of these, but of the ideals which they resemble . . . the things themselves, which can
only be seen with the eye of the mind. . . . of this kind I spoke as the intelligible, although in the search
after it the soul is compelled to use hypotheses; not ascending to a first principle, because she is unable
to rise above the region of hypothesis, but employing objects of which the shadows below are
resemblances in their turn as images.
first causes, pure intellect, and absolute knowledge of the first principles. Our minds

must be slowly trained to think without images, so we know first what is closer to the

senses and only later what is non-sensible.

Since dialectic deals with the most immaterial things, it follows, according to

Platos thought, that it comes last in the order of learning. He says, let those who still

survive and have distinguished themselves in every branch of knowledge come at last to

their consummation (400). It is only after studying the other sciences that the mind can

turn itself to the consideration of light itself, a purely intellectual vision of what is purely

spiritual and immaterial being. The second, subjective cause for the order of learning

the one that says that the mind must be strengthened bit by bit before it can contemplate

without imagesdetermines that dialectic come last.8

But, the first objective or intrinsic cause of the order of learning also comes into

play: dialectic depends on the content of the other sciences. First, Plato says dialectic

orders the others sciences. What is the nature and what are the divisions of dialectic,

and what are the paths which lead thither . . . the power of dialectic alone can reveal this,

and only to one who is a disciple of the previous sciences (Republic 7.532d-533a).

Ordering the sciences depends upon a knowledge of their contents. Second, dialectic is a

knowledge of being and the universal cause of all things, but we can only attain that

knowledge by studying the content of the other sciences in a comprehensive manner.

The sciences which they learned in their early education will now be brought together . .

. the capacity for such knowledge is the great criterion of dialectical talent: the

8
Republic 7.533d-534a [D]ialectic, and dialectic alone, goes directly to the first principle and is
the only science which does away with hypotheses in order to make her ground secure; the eye of the
soul, which is literally, buried in outlandish slough, is by her gentle aid lifted upwards; and she uses as
handmaids and helpers in the work of conversion, the sciences which we have been discussing
comprehensive mind is always the dialectical (Republic 7.537c, emp. added). 9 It seems

that, perhaps, only by putting the content of the particular sciences together do we arrive

at the universal consideration of dialectic. We have at last arrived at the hymn of

dialectic . . . when a person starts on the discovery of the absolute by the light of reason

only . . . he at last finds himself at the end of the intellectual world, as in the case of sight

at the end of the visible (Republic 7.532a). Dialectic is the farthest from the senses of

all the sciences, and because of this it comes last, and dialectic presupposes a knowledge

of the content of the other sciences.

While their doctrines are different at important points, both Aristotle and Thomas

invoke similar, though much less extensive metaphors in their explanation of the order of

learning.10 Aristotle speaks of our first confused knowledge as the barn door which no

one can miss (Meta. 2.1), while the most perfect knowledge is to our minds as the sun is

to the bats eye. In Thomass Commentary on the Metaphysics, we see the same order as

Platos. Aristotle makes the same move as Plato (from the order in sensation to the order

among the sciences) in Metaphysics 1.1-2. At the outset, Aristotle shows how sensation

and science are distinct. Sense experience tells us that something is so, while science

tells us why. Then, having divided the phases of sensation (external sensation, memory,

and experience), he shows how they are ordered to science and, ultimately, to the highest

science. This is Aristotles Allegory of the Cave. Aristotle divides the sciences in

Metaphysics 6.1 and gives us the principles by which to determine the order of learning
9
Republic 7.537c [T]hey will be able to see the natural relationship of them to one another and to
true being. . . . that is the only kind of knowledge which takes lasting root. And Republic 7.531d,
Now, when all these studies reach the point of inter-communion and connection with one another, and
come to be considered in their mutual affinities, then, I think, but not till then, will the pursuit of them
have a value for our objects [i.e., dialectic]; otherwise there is no profit in them.
10
We have only to look at Aristotle's comparison in Physics 1.1 of understanding and sensation to
understand what the basis of these metaphors is. Both go from potency to act, for example. Aristotle
and Plato are going from the more known, sensation, to the more knowable, understanding.
them (see Meta. 7). The two texts, Republic book 7 and Metaphysics 1.1-2, are in

obvious dialogue. For both Plato and Aristotle, the highest science is that which resolves

to the first cause and explains the first principles, turning the mind to pure being and

abstracting from all images. The order of learning depends upon the division of sensation

and the sciences.

Thomas says both that the mind must develop its powers of thinking abstractly to

do metaphysics, must wean itself of the use of images, and that metaphysics depends on

the content of other sciences. In the Commentary on Boethius' De Trinitate 5.1ad 9,

Thomas claims that metaphysics presupposes a comprehensive knowledge of the other

sciences:

Although divine science is by nature the first of all the sciences, with respect to us

the other sciences come before it. For, as Avicenna says, the position of this

science is that it be learned after the natural sciences, which explain many things

used by metaphysics, such as generation, corruption, motion, and the like. It

should also be learned after mathematics, because to know the separate substances

metaphysics has to know the number and disposition of the heavenly spheres, and

this is impossible without astronomy, which presupposes the whole of

mathematics. Other sciences, such as music, ethics, and the like, contribute to its

fullness of perfection.

Thomas says that metaphysics presupposes the positive content of natural philosophy and

mathematics. He cites the whole content of mathematics and natural philosophy gives it
a knowledge of fundamental terms and a proof of the existence of the first causes.11 The

knowledge of music and ethics give it fullness of perfection.

Whether or not the proof of an immaterial being is necessary for the beginning of

the science of metaphysics is a difficult problem in the text of Aristotle and Thomass

commentary. A solution has to take into account the whole context of Thomass thought

of the order of learning, for isolated texts can be cited in support of both an affirmative

and a negative reply. For example, Thomas teaches that even our first ideas are

metaphysical.

11
[T]he sensible effects on which the demonstrations of natural science are based are more evident
to us in the beginning. But when we come to know the first causes through them, these causes will
reveal to us the reason for the effects, from which they were proved by a demonstration quia. In this
way natural science also contributes something to divine science, and nevertheless it is divine science
that explains its principles. That is why Boethius places divine science last, because it is the last
relative to us. CBT 5.1.ad9, emphasis added
 One might well ask the question: what does metaphysics mean?12 Because, while

Fr. Ashley speaks of metaphysics as a speculative science, the result of necessary

syllogisms resolving conclusions into self-evident first principles through middle terms,

Fr. Dewan speaks of a pre-scientific metaphysics, for which the simple apprehension of

first principles is sufficient. Therefore, distinguishing between these meanings of

metaphysics may resolve part of the disagreement between those who hold that the

proof of an immaterial being is necessary for beginning metaphysics and those who

hold that the immaterial nature of being is self-evident. There is a sense in which

metaphysics can only come to be after the basis of scientific knowledge is formed, and

12
Plato calls metaphysics dialectic. Dialectic, he say, resolves to the first causes and explains the
axioms of all the sciences. Aristotle also recognizes the kinship between dialectic and what he calls
theology. Thomas often calls the same thing wisdom (e.g., in the proemium of his Commentary on the
Metaphysics). Thus, Thomas comments on Aristotle's Metaphysics (n. 1308). [T]his science
[metaphysics] has a connection with dialectics, as was stated above, because both are universal. Hence
the dialectical method is proper to this science, and it is fitting that it should begin with the dialectical
method. This is important for understanding why Plato calls metaphysics dialectic.
Aristotle says that he is going to treat of essence in a way that is chiefly dialectical inasmuch as
he investigates what essence is from the manner of predicating terms of a subject; for this belongs
properly to dialectics. Thomas explains:
[T]here are two kinds of beings: beings of reason and real beings. The expression being of reason
is applied properly to those notions which reason derives from the objects it considers, for
example, the notions of genus, species, and the like, which are not found in reality but are a
natural result of the consideration of reason. And this kind of being, i.e., being of reason,
constitutes the proper subject of logic. But intellectual conceptions of this kind are equal in
extension to real beings, because all real beings fall under the consideration of reason. Hence the
subject of logic extends to all things to which the expression real being is applied. His conclusion
is then that the subject of logic is equal in extension to the subject of philosophy [i.e.,
metaphysics], which is real being. (CM n. 574)
If one did not understand this close kinship between dialectic and metaphysics, one might not
understand why Aristotle insists explicitly on the use of dialectic on numerous conspicuous occasions in
the Metaphysics (2.1, 3.1, etc.) and obviously proceeds in dialectical fashion for much of the work. In
fact, he, like Plato, writes exhortations for the use of dialectic at 2.1 and 3.1. It might be, however, that
Plato's nominal linking of the highest science with the science of logical intentions, and Aristotle's
reluctance to do so, is related to Platos equating of the logical order of second intentions (being in the
mind) and the order of causes or beings simply. In book 7 of the Metaphysics, Aristotle takes this
theory of Plato's apart.
It is interesting that the way one chooses to name the highest science reflects the foundations of
ones whole understanding of reality. Thomas pays close attention to the significance of the names
given to the highest science. Indeed, much of the current investigation hangs upon the explanation that
Thomas gives of the name metaphysics. This is the only name of the science which refers directly to
the order of learning. There are many names given to the highest science and they all refer to the
science that resolves to the highest causes and explains the axioms of the other sciences.
there is a sense in which metaphysics is simultaneous with the formation of that basis.

Confusion about the meanings of terms is a very common source of error.

Metaphysics, in one use of the word, is scientific knowledge, the result of syllogisms;

in another, pre-scientific sense, simple apprehension of principles suffices. How exactly

this distinction may or may not resolve the difference of opinion about the beginning of

metaphysics must be left for another investigation.