promised to secure the courts
Rule 89
Case No. 1
Julita Go Ong vs CA
G.R. No. L-75884 September 24,
1987
Ponente: Paras, J.
FACTS:
Two parcels of land under 1 TCT
are in the name of Alfredo Ong
married to Julita Go Ong. Alfredo
died and Julita Go Ong was
appointed administratrix of her
husbands estate. Julita thereafter
mortgaged 1 lot to Allied Banking
Corp. to secure a loan.
On the loan there was due a sum
and Allied tried to collect it from
Julita.
Hence, the complaint alleging nullity
of the contract for lack of judicial
approval which the bank had
allegedly promised to secure from
the court. In response thereto, the
bank averred that it was Julita who
administration for the payment, say
approval.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE
MORTGAGE CONSTITUTED OVER
THE PARCEL OF LAND UNDER
PETITIONERS ADMINISTRATION
IS NULL AND VOID FOR WANT OF
JUDICIAL APPROVAL.
HELD: Mortgage is valid
Petitioner, asserting that the
mortgage is void for want of judicial
approval, quoted Section 7 of Rule
89 of the Rules of Court . The CA
aptly ruled that Section 7 of Rule 89
of the Rules of Court is not
applicable, since the mortgage was
constituted in her personal capacity
and not in her capacity as
administratrix of the estate of her
husband. Sec. 7, Art. 89 of the Civil
Code applies in a case where judicial
approval has to be sought in
connection with, for instance, the
sale or mortgage of property under
of a conjugal debt, and even here,
the conjugal and hereditary shares of
the wife are excluded from the
requisite judicial approval for the
reason already adverted to
hereinabove, provided of course no
prejudice is caused others, including
the government.
The mortgage constituted on the
property under administration, by
authority of the petitioner is valid,
notwithstanding lack of judicial
approval with respect to her conjugal
share and to her hereditary rights.
The fact that what had been
mortgaged was in custodial legis is
immaterial, insofar as her conjugal
share and hereditary share in the
property is concerned, for after all,
she was the absolute owner thereof.
Sec. 7, Rule 89 of the Rules of Court
cannot adversely affect
the substantive rights of private
respondent to dispose of her ideal
[not inchoate, for the conjugal
partnership ended with her
husbands death and her hereditary
rights accrued from the moment of
the death of the decedent.
Herodotus Acebedo and 7 others were left an estate
consisting of real properties in Quezon City and
Caloocan City. Acebedo became the administrator
pending partition. In the meantime, the property is
owned in common by the heirs.
The case pended for 16 years with the court. Miguel
Acebedo et al (respondents) then filed a Motion for
Approval of Sale for them to sell their shares from the
estate. The court approved the motion. Respondents
were able to find a buyer in the person of Yu Hwa Ping
who agreed to buy the properties for P12 Million. He
paid P6 million as earnest money.
Acebedo assailed the approval of the sale claiming that
the price is quite low. The court ordered Miguel et al to
find a higher bidder within a specified time frame which
was later extended to 7 months but still no other buyer
could provide better terms.
Finally, it was agreed by the parties that respondents
sell their share to the price already agreed upon with
Ping and that Acebedo can negotiate his price with
Ping. But Acebedo still filed a Supplemental Opposition
against the approval of the conditional sale.
The court affirmed the approval of the sale and ordered
Acebedo to sell his share at the same rate that the
other heirs sold their share to Ping.
ISSUE: Whether or not the other heirs can sell their
shares of the estate prior to adjudication.
HELD: Yes. An heir can sell his share without final
adjudication. An heir is a co-owner of the property
(estate) before adjudication.
Although the Rules of Court do not specifically state
that the sale of an immovable property belonging to an
estate of a decedent, in a special proceeding, should be
made with the approval of the court, this authority is
necessarily included in its capacity as a probate court.
Therefore, it is clear that the probate court in the case
at bar, acted within its jurisdiction in issuing the Order
approving the Deed of Conditional Sale.
The right of an heir to dispose of the decedents
property, even if the same is under administration, is
based on the Civil Code provision stating that the
possession of hereditary property is deemed
transmitted to the heir without interruption and from
the moment of the death of the decedent, in case the
inheritance is accepted. Where there are however, two
or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is,
before its partition, owned in common by such heirs.
PAULMITAN V. CA-
Co-ownership of
Property
When a co-owner sells the entire property without consent
from the other co-owners, only his pro indiviso share on the
property is transferred to the buyer.
FACTS:
The dispute covers 2 lots, Lot 757 and Lot 1091, which were
owned by Agatona Paulmitan. She had 2 children, Pascual
and Donato. Pascuals (7) children (Alicio, Elena, Abelino,
Adelina, Anita, Baking, Anito) are the respondents and
Donato and his daughter and son-in-law are petitioners.
Donato executed an Affidavit of Declaration of Heirship,
adjudicating to himself Lot 757 claiming that he is the sole
surviving heir thus the OCT of Agatona was cancelled and a
TCT was issued in his name. He executed a deed of sale of
Lot 1091 in favor of his daughter, Juliana. For non-payment
of taxes, the lot was forfeited and sole at a public to the
Provincial Govt of Negros Occidental, however, Juliana was
able to redeem the property. Upon learning these, the
children of Pascual filed w/ the CFI a complaint against
petitioners to partition the land plus damages. Petitioners
defense was that the action has already prescribed for it was
filed more than 11 years after the issuance of the TCT and
that Juliana has acquired exclusive ownership thru the Deed
of Sale and by redeeming the said property.
The CFI dismissed the complaint and became final and
executory. With respect to Lot 1091, the court decided in
favor of respondents. They are entitled to of Lot 1091, pro
indiviso. The redemption did not in anyway prejudice their
rights. The land was ordered to be partitioned and the
petitioners were ordered to pay the respondents their share
of the fruits and the respondents to pay their share in the
redemption of the land. The CA affirmed the decision thus
the case at bar.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not Pascuals children and Donato and Juliana
were co-owners of their mothers lot
(2) Whether or not Juliana acquired full ownership by
redeeming the property
HELD:
(1) YES: When Agatona died, her estate was still
unpartitioned. Art. 1078 states that Where there are 2 or
more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before its
partition, owned in common by such heirs, subject to the
payment of debts of the deceased. Since Pascual and
Donato were still alive when she died, they are co-owners of
the estate. When Pascual died, his children succeeded him in
the co-ownership of the property.
When Donato sold to his daughter the lot, he was only a co-
owner of the same thus he can only sell his undivided portion
of the property. Art. 493 states that each co-owner shall
have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and
benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate,
assign or mortgage it and even substitute another person in
its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But
the effect of the alienation or mortgage, with respect to the
co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be
allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-
ownership.
Only the rights of the co-owner-seller are transferred making
the buyer (Juliana) a co-owner.
(2) NO: When she redeemed the property, it did not end the
co-ownership. The right of repurchase may be exercised by a
co-owner w/ respect to his/her share alone as stated in Art.
1612. But she may compel them to reimburse her for half of
the repurchase price for a co-owner has the right to compel
other co-owners to contribute to the expenses for the
preservation of the thing and to taxes.
AGUILAR v. CA- Co-
ownership
Any of the Co-owners may demand the sale of the house and
lot at any time and the other cannot object to such demand;
thereafter the proceeds of the sale shall be divided equally
according to their respective interests.
FACTS:
Petitioner Vergilio and respondent Senen bought a house
and lot in Paraaque where their father could spend and
enjoy his remaining years in a peaceful neighborhood. They
initially agreed that Vergilio will get 2/3 and Senen will get
1/3; but later they agreed on equal shares. Senen was left in
the said lot to take care of their father since Vergilios family
was in Cebu. After their fathers death petitioner demanded
from private respondent that the latter vacate the house and
that the property be sold and proceeds thereof divided
among them but the latter refused. Petitioner then filed to
compel the sale of the property. The chunk of the issue
tackled by the courts was regarding the pre-trial.
Respondent filed a motion to cancel Pre-trial since the
counsel had to accompany his wife in Dumaguete City where
she would be a principal sponsor in a wedding. CFI denied the
motion; and the pre-trial proceeded on the scheduled date.
The respondents did not appear thus they were declared in
default. The trial went on ex parte without the respondent
and held that the property should be sold to a third party and
that the proceeds be distributed to the parties; in addition
respondent was made to pay rent from the time the action
was filed. Respondents appealed this and the decision was
reversed by the CA saying that the TC erred in declaring
respondents in default; the case was then remanded to the
trial court. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE:
A) W/N CA erred (1) in holding that the motion of respondent
through counsel to cancel the pre-trial was dilatory in
character and (2) in remanding the case to the trial court for
pre-trial and trial?
ISSUE RELEVANT TO PROPERTY:
B) W/N trial court was correct with regards to the sale and
rent?
RULING:
A) YES, CA erred in granting the respondents motion and
remanding the case. The law is clear that the appearance of
parties at the pretrial is mandatory. A party who fails to
appear at a pre-trial conference may be non-suited or
considered as in default. It is the discretion of the court to
grant the motion if it sees that the reason for the cancelation
of the same would be reasonable. SC found that the reason
for the cancelation of the pre-trial was insufficient and that
the trial court was not in grave abuse of discretion when they
denied it.
B) YES, with a few modification. Petitioner and respondents
are co-owners of subject house and lot in equal shares; either
one of them may demand the sale of the house and lot at any
time and the other cannot object to such demand; thereafter
the proceeds of the sale shall be divided equally according to
their respective interests.
BASIS: Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that no co-
owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership, and
that each co-owner may demand at any time partition of the
thing owned in common insofar as his share is concerned.
Corollary to this rule, Art. 498 of the Code states that
whenever the thing is essentially indivisible and the co-
owners cannot agree that it be allotted to one of them who
shall indemnify the others, it shall be sold and its proceeds
accordingly distributed.
SC held that of the proceeds should go to the petitioner
and the remainder to the respondent (1,200 each.) Also rent
was awarded 1,200 pesos per month with legal interest from
the time the trial court ordered the respondent to vacate, for
the use and enjoyment of the other half of the property.
BASIS: When petitioner filed an action to compel the sale of
the property and the trial court granted the petition and
ordered the ejectment of respondent, the co-ownership was
deemed terminated and the right to enjoy the possession
jointly also ceased.
Pamplona v. Moreto
No. L-33187 March 31, 1980
Facts:
Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega, a
husband and wife, who acquired adjacent lots nos.
1495, 4545, and 1496 of the Calamba Friar Land
Estate covered by certificates of title issued in the
name of Flaviano Moreto married to Monica Maniega.
They had 6 children who left heirs after their death as
well as became co-heirs with respect to the property
owned by Flaviano and Monica. More than 6 yrs after
Monica Maniegas death, Flaviano sold lot 1495 for
P900 to spouses Pamplona without the consent of his
heirs and without any liquidation of the conjugal
partnership. The spouses Pamplona constructed their
house on the eastern part of lot 1496 as it was
pointed out by Flaviano which was a mistake on the
part of both seller and buyer. Flaviano died intestate
on August 12, 1956 and in 1961, the plaintiffs
demanded on the defendants to vacate the premises
where they had their house and piggery on the
ground that Flaviano had no right to sell the lot which
he sold to Pamplona as the same belongs to the
conjugal partnership. The spouses Pamplona refused
to vacate the premises and this suit was instituted by
the heirs of Monica Maniega seeking for the
declaration of nullity of the deed of sale executed in
the formers favor. The RTC ruled in favor of the
plaintiff declaring null and void the sale with respect to
390.5 sq.m. of the total 781 sq.m. of which is rightfully
owned by the plaintiffs. The RTC decision was
affirmed by the CA; hence, this petition was instituted
appealing the decision of the CA.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners are entitled
to the full ownership of the property in litigation,
or only of the same?
Held:
Yes, they are entitled to the full ownership of
the property in litigation because at the time of the
sale, the co-owner (Flaviano) as vendor pointed out
its location and even indicated the boundaries over
which the fences were to be erected without
objection. Despite the fact that at the time of sale,
there was no partition of the subject property between
the co-owners and Flaviano, as vendor, had
ownership of an undetermined portion of the
hereditary estate which he had a perfect and legal
right to dispose of to the Spouse Pamplona.
According to Art. 776, the inheritance which private
respondents may receive from their deceased parents
includes all the property, rights and obligations of a
person which are not extinguished by their parents
death. In addition, under Art. 1311 of the NCC, the
contract of sale executed by Flaviano took effect
between the parties, their assigns and heirs which
includes the private respondents; therefore, they must
comply with said obligation. The petition is affirmed
with modification with respect to the fact that the sale
executed in favor of Spouses Pamplona is legal and
valid in its entirety.
2. G.R. No. L-25014. October 17, 1973.
DOLORES LAHORA VDA. DE CASTRO, ARSENIO DE
CASTRO, JR., WILFREDO DE CASTRO, IRINEO DE CASTRO
and VIRGINIA DE CASTRO ALEJANDRO, in substitution
for the deceased, defendant-appellant, ARSENIO DE
CASTRO, SR.)., petitioners, vs. GREGORIO ATIENZA,
respondent.
FACTS: On January 24, 1956 the brothers Tomas de
Castro and Arsenio de Castro, Sr. leased to plaintiff a
fishpond containing an area of 26 hectares situated in
Polo, Bulacan and forming part of a bigger parcel of
land. The lessors are co-owners in equal shares of the
leased property.
According to the contract of lease, the term of the
lease was for five years from January 24, 1956 at a
rental of P5,000 a year.
In the meantime, Tomas de Castro died.
In the month of November, 1956, plaintiff as lessee
and defendant Arsenio de Castro, Sr. as one of the
lessors, agreed to set aside and annul the contract of
lease and for this purpose an agreement (Exhibit A)
was signed by them.
"Condition No. 2 of Exhibit A reads as follows:
"2. Na sa pamamagitan nito ay pinawawalang
kabuluhan namin and nasabing kasulatan at
nagkasundo kami na ang bawat isa sa amin ni
Arsenio de Castro at Felisa Cruz Vda. de Castro ay
isauli kay GREGORIO ATIENZA ang tig P2,500.00 o
kabuuang halagang P5,000.00 na paunang naibigay
nito alinsunod sa nasabing kasulatan; na ang
nasabing tig P2,500.00 ay isasauli ng bawat isa sa
amin sa o bago dumating ang Dec. 30, 1956.
Felisa Cruz Vda. de Castro refused to sign Exhibit A.
Defendant did not pay the P2,500.00 which under the
above-quoted paragraph of Exhibit A, he should have
paid on December 30, 1956. Demand for payment
was made by plaintiff's counsel on January 7, 1957 but
to no avail, hence the present action."
On the conflicting contentions between the parties as
to who between them would attend to securing the
signature of Mrs. Felisa Cruz Vda. de Castro (widow of
Tomas de Castro) to the agreement of cancellation of
the lease with respondent Atienza, the appellate
court found that "the testimony of the defendant
(Arsenio de Castro, Sr.). . . supports the contention of
the plaintiff (Atienza) "that it was the defendant
Arsenio who was interested and undertook to do so,
citing Arsenio's own declaration that "I agreed to sign
this document (referring to the cancellation) because
of my desire to cancel our original agreement" and
that his purpose in obtaining the cancellation of said
lease agreement with plaintiff Atienza was "(B)ecause
I had the intention of having said fishpond leased to
other persons and I cannot lease it to third parties
unless I can see in the signature of Felisa Vda. de
Castro."
The appellate court thus held in effect that as Arsenio
"was the one interested in cancelling the lease (Exh.
1), it stands to reason that he most probably
undertook to obtain the signature of Mrs. Castro
[widow and successor-in-interest of his brother Tomas]"
and that he could not invoke his own failure to obtain
such signature to elude his own undertaking and
liability to refund respondent (plaintiff) his share of the
rental paid in advance by respondent on the
cancelled lease in the sum of P2,500.00.
The appellate court furthermore correctly held that
the consent or concurrence of Felisa Vda. de Castro
(as co-owner in succession of Tomas) was not an
essential condition to the validity and effectivity of the
agreement of cancellation of the lease (Exhibit A) as
between Arsenio and respondent-lessee, contrary to
petitioners' claim, holding that "(S)ince then specific
provision in Exhibit A supporting defendant's claim, we
are not prepared to supply such condition unless the
same can be deduced from other evidence or unless
the terms of Exhibit A cannot be performed by plaintiff
and defendant without Mrs. Castro being bound as a
party thereto."
ISSUE: Whether Arsenio as co-owner of the fishpond
owned pro-indiviso by him with his brother Tomas
(succeeded by Felisa Vda. de Castro) could validly
lease his half-interest to a third party (respondent
Atienza) independently of his co-owner, and in case
his co-owner also leased his other half interest to the
same third party, whether Arsenio could cancel his
own lease agreement with said third party?
RULING: The Court rejects petitioners' appeal as
without merit and affirms the judgment of the
appellate court. Petitioners' predecessor-in-interest as
co-owner of an undivided one-half interest in the
fishpond could validly lease his interest to a third party,
respondent Atienza, independently of his co-owner
(although said co-owner had also leased his other
undivided one-half interest to the same third party)
and could likewise by mutual agreement
independently cancel his lease agreement with said
third party. Said predecessor-in-interest (and
petitioners who have substituted him as his heirs)
therefore stands liable on his express undertaking to
refund the advance rental paid to him by the lessee
on the cancelled lease and cannot invoke the non-
cancellation of the co-owner's lease to elude such
liability.
The appellate court correctly resolved the issue thus:
"Our view of the contract of lease Exhibit 1 is that
each of the Castro brothers, leased his undivided one-
half interest in the fishpond they owned in common to
the plaintiff.
Could one of them have validly leased his interest
without the other co-owner leasing his own?
The answer to this is given by appellant in his own brief
when he said that it would result in a partnership
between the lessee and the owner of the other
undivided half. If the lease could be entered into
partially by one of the co-owners, insofar as his interest
is concerned, then the lease, Exhibit 1, can also be
cancelled partially as between plaintiff and
defendant. Therefore, we conclude that the consent
of Mrs. Felisa Cruz Vda. de Castro is not essential for
the cancellation of the lease of defendant's one-half
undivided share in the fishpond to plaintiff."

The appellate court's judgment is fully supported by

the Civil Code provisions on the rights and
prerogatives of co-owners, and specifically by Article
493 which expressly provides that:
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership
of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining
thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or
mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its
enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved.
But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with
respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the
portion which may be allotted to him in the division
upon the termination of the co-ownership.