COMPANIA MARITIMA, petitioner,

vs.
ERNESTA CABAGNOT VDA. DE HIO, for herself and as Guardian-ad-litem of her minor children, DIONISIO, JR., ERNESTO, RAUL, and
ESTER, all surnamed HIO, and PABLO VELEZ WATCHMEN'S AGENCY,respondents.

Issue: Whether or not the deceased was an employee of the Compaia Maritima, entitled to compensation under the Workmen's
Compensation Act; and whether or not the deceased was intoxicated while performing his duty as watchman at the time of his death.

Held: The petitioner claims that it never had any employer-employee relationship with the deceased. The claim is without merit. While
it is true that no written employment contract between the petitioner and the deceased was presented in evidence, it is not disputed
that the petitioner company owns the vessel where the deceased was assigned as gangwayman, and it was found by the Commission
that the salary of the deceased was paid directly from the funds of petitioner. From these circumstances, it would the appear that at
the time of the accident the deceased was under petitioner's employ.

There is nothing to the contention that the deceased was but a casual employee whose services were engaged only for the duration of
the strike and, not entitled to compensation. The section of the law cited by the petitioner in support of this contention reads:

SEC. 39 (b). "Laborer" is used as a synonym of "employee" and means every person who has entered the employment of, or works
under a service or apprenticeship contract for an employer. It does not include a person whose employment is purely casual and is not
for the purpose of the occupation or business of the employer. . . .

It is clear from the above that for an employee to be excluded from the term "laborer" or "employee" under the Act, his employment
must be "purely casual and is not for the purpose of the occupation or business of the employer". In a case (Cajes vs. Philippine
Manufacturing Co., 40 Off. Gaz., p. 1251), where this Court had occasion to interpret the above-quoted section, it was held that the
casual service that the law speaks of must be construed, interpreted and concluded by the circumstance of whether or not the
aforesaid service is related with the occupation of business of the employer. We have reason to believe that the work of the deceased
in the case at bar was in connection with the business of petitioner. It has been shown that it was not only during the strike that the
Compaia Maritima needed the services of watchmen. In fact, the petitioner admitted having its own permanently employed
watchmen doing the same duties as that of the deceased. The duties referred to must be that of giving security not only to the cargo of
the vessel but also to the lives of its officers and crew, and they are, undoubtedly, in connection with the business of the petitioner.
Without security, any shipping company could not possibly go on with its maritime business.

In disclaiming liability, the petitioner further insists that the deceased was intoxicated while performing his duty as gangwayman in the
early morning of September 5, 1954. The Workmen's Compensation Commission, however, upon examination of the evidence on this
point, noted serious contradictions in the testimony of the witnesses. While one witness for the Pablo Velez Watchmen's Agency
testified that after the alleged drinking spree at the house of the Chief Engineer of the M/V BASILAN the deceased together with his
companions proceeded to their respective posts at Pier 8, another witness averred that they went to other night spots in Pasay City.
On the other hand, the testimony of the claimant widow that the deceased never got drunk while on duty, and the autopsy report and
testimony of Dr. Cabreira of the Manila Police Department to the effect that there were no indications of alcohol in the body of the
deceased would show that the deceased was not drunk at the time of his death. There is authority to the effect that where the
testimony or evidence shows a conflict in the testimony as to whether or not the deceased was intoxicated at the time of the injury, it
is not error to fail to find that the deceased was intoxicated, for such ruling is necessarily included in a finding that the accident arose
out of the employment (Napoleon vs. McCullough, 89 N.J.L. 716; 99 Atl. 385, cited in Labor Laws by Francisco, Vol. 2, p. 156). The
defense of drunkenness in workmen's compensation cases must be supported by clear and convincing proof to the effect that such
intoxication or drunkenness rendered the employee incapable of doing his work so that he could not be said to be engaged in his
employment. The accident or injury must be shown to have arisen out of his drunken condition and not out of the work. No such
evidence was adduced in the present case.

It is worthy to note that the witnesses who testified on the alleged drunkenness of the deceased were witnesses for the Pablo Velez
Watchmen's Agency, and not for petitioner. The latter could have presented as witness its Chief Engineer to bolster its defense of
drunkenness, but it failed to do so. It has been ruled that the burden of establishing intoxication and that it caused the injury is on the
employer (Ruprecht vs. Red Lumber Co., 2 Cal. Ind. Acc. Comm. 860; 12 N.C.C.A. 79, cited in The Workmen's Compensation Law by
Morabe and Inton, p 115). Having failed in this case to prove that the deceased died in a state of drunkenness, the petitioner is not
excused from its obligation as employer to pay compensation to the widow and children of the deceased.
Pampanga Bus Company vs. Pambusco Employees Union
G.R. No. 46739
September 23, 1939

Issue:

Whether or not the right of the employer to select its employees was violated.

Held:

Yes.We hold that the court has no authority to issue such compulsory order. The general right to make a
contract in relation to one's business is an essential part of the liberty of the citizens protected by the
due-process clause of the Constitution. The right of the laborer to sell his labor to such person as he may
choose is, in its essence, the same as the right of an employer to purchase labor from any person whom
it chooses. The employer and the employee have thus an equality of right guaranteed by the
Constitution. "If the employer can compel the employee to work against the latter's will, this is
servitude. If the employee can compel the employer to give him work against the employer's will, this is
oppression." (Mills vs. United States Printing Co., 99 App. Div., 605; 91 N.Y.S., 185, 189-192.) chanrobles
virtual law library.

Section of Commonwealth Act No. 213 confers upon labor organizations the right "to collective
bargaining with employers for the purpose of seeking better working and living conditions, fair wages,
and shorter working hours for laborers, and, in general, to promote the material, social and moral well-
being of their members." The term "collective bargaining" denotes, in common usage as well as in legal
terminology, negotiations looking toward a collective agreement. This provision in granting to labor
unions merely the right of collective bargaining, impliedly recognizes the employer's liberty to enter or
not into collective agreements with them. Indeed, we know of no provision of the law compelling such
agreements. Such a fundamental curtailment of freedom, if ever intended by law upon grounds of public
policy, should be effected in a manner that is beyond all possibility of doubt. The supreme mandates of
the Constitution should not be loosely brushed aside. As held by the Supreme Court of the United States
in Hitchman Coal & Co. vs. Mitchell (245 U. S., 229; 62 Law. ed., 260, 276):

. . . Whatever may be the advantages of "collective bargaining," it is not bargaining at all, in any just
sense, unless it is voluntary on both sides. The same liberty which enables men to form unions, and
through the union to enter into agreements with employers willing to agree, entitles other men to
remain independent of the union, and other employers to agree with them to employ no man who owes
any allegiance or obligation to the union. In the latter case, as in the former, the parties are entitled to
be protected by the law in the enjoyment of the benefits of any unlawful agreements they make. This
court repeatedly has held that the employer is as free to make non-membership in a union a condition
or employment, as the working man is free to join the union, and that this is a part of the constitutional
rights of personal liberty and private property, not to be taken away by legislation, unless through some
proper exercise of the paramount police power.
Viana vs Al Lagadan
ISSUE:

Whether or not the mere fact that a persons share in the understanding could be recko
ned in terms of money, sufficed to characterize him as an employee of another.

HELD:

No, the Court did not share with the Trial Referee and Commissions view. However, pe
titioners theory to the effect that the deceased was his partner, not an employee, simply
because he (the deceased) shared in the profits, not in the losses cannot be accepted. In
determining the existence of employer-
employee relationship, the following elements are generally considered, namely:(1) the s
election and engagement of the employee; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power of dis
missal;(4) the power to control the employees conduct
although the latter is the most important element (35 Am. Jur. 445). Assuming that the
share received by the deceased could partake of the nature of wages and that the second
element, therefore, exists in the case at bar, the record does not contain any specific data
regarding the third and fourth elements.

Furthermore, the report contained that the patron selects and engages the crew, and als
o, that the members thereof are subject to his control and may be dismissed by him. To
put it differently, the literal import of said report is open to the conclusion that the crew
has a contractual relation, not with the owner of the vessel, but with the patron, and that
the latter, not the former, is either their employer or their partner.

The case was remanded to the Workmens Compensation Commission, for further proce
edings in conformity with the decision of the Supreme Court.
GERONIMO DE LOS REYES, vs. GREGORIO ESPINELI

Issue: Whether the relationship is that of agricultural share tenancy (as averred by the respondents) or that of farm employer and
agricultural laborer (as asserted by the petitioner).

Held: hence the relationship between farm employer and agricultural laborer is that of employer and employee, the decisive factor is
the control exercised by the former over the latter. On the other hand, the landholder has the "right to require the tenant to follow
those proven farm practices which have been found to contribute towards increased agricultural production and to use fertilizer of the
kind or kinds shown by proven farm practices to be adapted to the requirements of the land." This is but the right of a partner to
protect his interest, not the control exercised by an employer. If landholder and tenant disagree as to farm practices, the former may
not dismiss the latter. It is the court that shall settle the conflict according to the best interests of both parties. The record is devoid of
evidentiary support for the notion that the respondents are farm laborers. They do not observe set hours of work. The petitioner has
not laid down regulations under which they are supposed to do their work. The argument tendered is that they are guards. However, it
does not appear that they are under obligation to report for duty to the petitioner or his agent. They do not work in shifts. Nor has the
petitioner prescribed the manner by which the respondents were and are to perform their duties as guards. We do not find here that
degree of control and supervision evincive of an employer-employee relationship. Furthermore, if the respondents are guards, then
they are not agricultural laborers, because the duties and functions of a guard are not agricultural in nature. It is the Industrial Court
that has jurisdiction over any dispute that might arise between employer and employee. Yet, the petitioner filed his complaint against
the respondents in the Court of Agrarian Relations.

We now proceed to determine if there are present here the salient characteristics of an agricultural share tenancy contract. The
subject-matter is coconut land, which is considered agricultural land under both the Agricultural Land Tenancy ACT and the Agricultural
Land Reform Code. The purpose of the contract is the production of coconuts; the respondents would receive 1/7 of the harvest. The
petitioner is the landholder of the coconut plantation.

The crucial factors are that the tenant must have physical possession of the land for the purpose of production and he must personally
cultivate the land. If the tenant does not cultivate the land personally he cannot be considered a tenant even if he is so designated in
the written agreement of the parties.

"Cultivation" is not limited to the plowing and harrowing of the land. It includes the various phrases of farm labor described and
provided by law, the maintenance, repair and weeding of dikes, paddies and irrigation canals in the holding. Moreover, it covers
attending to the care of the growing plants. Where the parties agreed that they would "operate a citrus nursery upon the condition
that they would divide the budded citrus in the proportion of 1/3 share of respondents and 2/3 as share of petitioner," and that the
"petitioner would furnish all the necessary seedlings and seeds, as well as the technical know-how in the care, cultivation, budding and
balling of the budded citrus, while respondents would furnish the land necessary for the nursery, the farm labor that may be needed to
plant and cultivate, and all the chemicals, fertilizers, and bud tapes that may be necessary for such cultivation," then "the tenancy
agreement entered into between the parties has relation to the possession of agricultural land to be devoted to the production of
agricultural products thru the labor of one of the parties, and as such comes within the purview of the term 'agricultural tenancy' as
defined in section 3 of Republic Act No. 1199 as amended."

In one instance, the landholder claimed that his caretaker was not an agricultural tenant because he "does not till or cultivate the land
in order to grow the fruit bearing trees because they are already full grown," and "he does not even do the actual gathering of the
fruits" but "merely supervises the gathering, and after deducting the expenses, he gives one-half of the fruits to plaintiff all in
consideration of his stay in the land." This Court's answer was to the point:

Anyone who has had fruit trees in his yard will disagree with the above description of the relationship. He knows the caretaker, must
water the trees, even fertilize them for better production, uproot weeds and turn the soil, sometimes fumigate to eliminate plant
pests, etc. Those chores obviously mean "working or cultivating" the land. Besides, it seems that defendant planted other crops, [i.e.,
cultivated the lot] giving the landowner his corresponding share.

The Court of Appeals made some essential findings of fact. The respondents were called "kasama." They have plowing implements. The
respondent Pedro Amante even used to have a carabao which he subsequently exchanged for a horse. Almost all of the respondents
have banana plantations on the land. They live in the landholding. They are charge with the obligation to clean their respective
landholdings. Certain portions of the land are planted to palay.
These factual findings may not be reviewed by the Supreme Court. Furthermore, the said facts are supported by the testimony of the
petitioner himself, who admitted that the respondents are his "kasama," although he tried to minimize the effect of this admission by
alleging that although called "kasama," the respondents "do not perform the work of a "kasama," and that in Quezon the "kasama"
plow the land, they plant rice, but here in Laguna, they do not do anything." The appellate court was correct in concluding that
"kasama" means "tenant," not worker or laborer, which is translated into our national language as "manggagawa." Respecting farm
implements, the petitioner admitted that "they have the implements," but again he tried to minimize the significance of his statement
by adding that "they have not used it in the farm." However, the report of the CAR clerk of court, based on his ocular inspection,
pertinently states that he found "certain portions planted with palay."

The petitioner cannot deny that the respondents were all living in the landholding and that "all of them have banana plantation, small
or big, "though he averred," not one single banana was given to me as my share."

Undeniably, the petitioner considers it one of the duties of the respondents to clear and clean the land. Additionally, in his complaint
the petitioner claimed that "the defendants have abandoned their posts at the plaintiff's plantation and have likewise failed and
refused to comply with their contractual obligation with the plaintiff to keep the areas respectively assigned to them clean and clear of
undergrowths and cogonal grass at all times, with the result that it is now impossible for the plaintiff to harvest the mature coconuts as
these would only be lost amid the undergrowth and cogonal which have now grown to unreasonable heights, thereby causing further
damage and prejudice to the plaintiff." (Emphasis supplied).

The petitioner clearly expected the respondents to perform the duties of a tenant, especially, to maintain the land clean and clear "at
all times," which not only would facilitate harvesting but, more importantly, would necessarily result in greater production. As found by
the CAR clerk of court during the ocular inspection,

the planting of palay has a direct effect on the growing of the coconuts because in the places he found planted with palay, the coconut
trees displayed white leaves gray in color with plenty of nuts or fruits, compared to the portion in the hacienda where we encountered
cogon grasses, under brushes and ipil-ipil tress, there is a need for thorough cleaning, especially the ipil-ipil trees which are growing
high for years already in-between the rows of coconut trees.

Therefore, the parties to the contract understood, in sum and substance, that the respondents were to "cultivate" the land. Whether
the latter had been remiss in the performance of their contractual obligations, does not affect the nature of the contract which the
appellate court analyzed and found to be that of share tenancy. It is the principal features and stipulations which determine the true
essence of a contract. Considering then that the respondents are duty bound to cultivate their respective holdings (of which they have
possession), and that they share in the harvest, the Court of Appeals' conclusion must be upheld. This, especially in the light of the facts
that the respondents raise secondary crops and have their homes in their respective holdings.

The petitioner having entered into a share tenancy contract with the respondents, it certainly cannot be seriously claimed that the
relationship of landlord and tenant is unjustifiably being imposed on him without due process of law. It was the petitioner himself who
voluntarily entered the relationship, and, therefore, should shoulder the consequences thereof, one of which is that the tenants must
be given, as they are entitled to, a 30% share in the produce.
SMC Employees union ptgwo vs Bersamira

Issue: Whether or not respondent Court correctly assumed jurisdiction over the present controversy and
properly issued the Writ of Preliminary Injunction to the resolution of that question, is the matter of
whether, or not the case at bar involves, or is in connection with, or relates to a labor dispute.

Held: e find the Petition of a meritorious character.

A "labor dispute" as defined in Article 212 (1) of the Labor Code includes "any controversy or matter
concerning terms and conditions of employment or the association or representation of persons in
negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or arranging the terms and conditions of employment,
regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee."

While it is SanMig's submission that no employer-employee relationship exists between itself, on the
one hand, and the contractual workers of Lipercon and D'Rite on the other, a labor dispute can
nevertheless exist "regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relationship of
employer and employee" (Article 212 [1], Labor Code, supra) provided the controversy concerns, among
others, the terms and conditions of employment or a "change" or "arrangement" thereof (ibid). Put
differently, and as defined by law, the existence of a labor dispute is not negative by the fact that the
plaintiffs and defendants do not stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee.

That a labor dispute, as defined by the law, does exist herein is evident. At bottom, what the Union
seeks is to regularize the status of the employees contracted by Lipercon and D'Rite in effect, that they
be absorbed into the working unit of SanMig. This matter definitely dwells on the working relationship
between said employees vis-a-vis SanMig. Terms, tenure and conditions of their employment and the
arrangement of those terms are thus involved bringing the matter within the purview of a labor dispute.
Further, the Union also seeks to represent those workers, who have signed up for Union membership,
for the purpose of collective bargaining. SanMig, for its part, resists that Union demand on the ground
that there is no employer-employee relationship between it and those workers and because the
demand violates the terms of their CBA. Obvious then is that representation and association, for the
purpose of negotiating the conditions of employment are also involved. In fact, the injunction sought by
SanMig was precisely also to prevent such representation. Again, the matter of representation falls
within the scope of a labor dispute. Neither can it be denied that the controversy below is directly
connected with the labor dispute already taken cognizance of by the NCMB-DOLE (NCMB-NCR- NS-01-
021-89; NCMB NCR NS-01-093-83).

Whether or not the Union demands are valid; whether or not SanMig's contracts with Lipercon and
D'Rite constitute "labor-only" contracting and, therefore, a regular employer-employee relationship
may, in fact, be said to exist; whether or not the Union can lawfully represent the workers of Lipercon
and D'Rite in their demands against SanMig in the light of the existing CBA; whether or not the notice of
strike was valid and the strike itself legal when it was allegedly instigated to compel the employer to hire
strangers outside the working unit; those are issues the resolution of which call for the application of
labor laws, and SanMig's cause's of action in the Court below are inextricably linked with those issues.
The precedent in Layno vs. de la Cruz (G.R. No. L-29636, 30 April 1965, 13 SCRA 738) relied upon by
SanMig is not controlling as in that case there was no controversy over terms, tenure or conditions, of
employment or the representation of employees that called for the application of labor laws. In that
case, what the petitioning union demanded was not a change in working terms and conditions, or the
representation of the employees, but that its members be hired as stevedores in the place of the
members of a rival union, which petitioners wanted discharged notwithstanding the existing contract of
the arrastre company with the latter union. Hence, the ruling therein, on the basis of those facts unique
to that case, that such a demand could hardly be considered a labor dispute.

As the case is indisputably linked with a labor dispute, jurisdiction belongs to the labor tribunals. As
explicitly provided for in Article 217 of the Labor Code, prior to its amendment by R.A. No. 6715 on 21
March 1989, since the suit below was instituted on 6 March 1989, Labor Arbiters have original and
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases involving all workers including "1. unfair
labor practice cases; 2. those that workers may file involving wages, hours of work and other terms and
conditions of employment; ... and 5. cases arising from any violation of Article 265 of this Code,
including questions involving the legality of striker and lockouts. ..." Article 217 lays down the plain
command of the law.

The claim of SanMig that the action below is for damages under Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code
would not suffice to keep the case within the jurisdictional boundaries of regular Courts. That claim for
damages is interwoven with a labor dispute existing between the parties and would have to be
ventilated before the administrative machinery established for the expeditious settlement of those
disputes. To allow the action filed below to prosper would bring about "split jurisdiction" which is
obnoxious to the orderly administration of justice (Philippine Communications, Electronics and
Electricity Workers Federation vs. Hon. Nolasco, L-24984, 29 July 1968, 24 SCRA 321).

We recognize the proprietary right of SanMig to exercise an inherent management prerogative and its
best business judgment to determine whether it should contract out the performance of some of its
work to independent contractors. However, the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective
bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance
with law (Section 3, Article XIII, 1987 Constitution) equally call for recognition and protection. Those
contending interests must be placed in proper perspective and equilibrium.

WHEREFORE, the Writ of certiorari is GRANTED and the Orders of respondent Judge of 25 March 1989
and 29 March 1989 are SET ASIDE. The Writ of Prohibition is GRANTED and respondent Judge is enjoined
from taking any further action in Civil Case No. 57055 except for the purpose of dismissing it. The status
quo ante declaration of strike ordered by the Court on 24 May 1989 shall be observed pending the
proceedings in the National Conciliation Mediation Board-Department of Labor and Employment