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Efficiency Gap 2

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AN ANALYSIS AND MODIFICATION OF THE EFFICIENCY GAP

RAY J. WALLIN

important role in framing the Gill v Whitford gerrymandering case decided in

Wisconsin and soon to be heard by the US Supreme Court. The story of the

efficiency gap is captivating as it frames all votes it deems unnecessary as

wasted votes, and it is the sum of these wasted votes that determines whether

the outcome of an election is fair.

The first part of this paper uses two tables presented to the district court in the

Gill v Whitford and shows that such tables can be heavily manipulated,

gerrymandered in ways that the efficiency gap does not measure. The wasted

votes in the tables will be shown to be biased toward districts with higher voter

turnout, and under further scrutiny, it will be shown that wasted votes are not

needed, nor are tables, as the table calculations can be represented in a two-

variable equation, which when comparing redistricting plans, will boil down to

a one-variable equation that provides little insight into gerrymandering.

The second part of this paper derives a corrected efficiency gap equation, the

equal districts efficiency gap equation, which produces a more precise

efficiency gap measure. The equal districts efficiency gap will show that to date,

efficiency gap calculations in literature have been biased, including those

presented to the courts, and that a gerrymandering calculation that uses numbers

Ray J Wallin has been active in local politics in Saint Paul and Minneapolis, MN,

writing and providing research to local campaigns. He has an engineering degree and an

MBA, and initially became interested in the efficiency gap when reading an article

concerning the Wisconsin case in MinnPost, a local online newspaper. He noticed flaws

in the efficiency gap method that did not reconcile and could not help but pull at the

threads.

2 Equal Districts Efficiency Gap

biased.

But the main purpose of this paper is a clarification of what seems to be general

confusion in the literature as to what a vote is and what a seat (or a district) is

in gerrymandering calculations. It is shown that, as a fundamental principle, all

equations concerning gerrymandering should be written in reference to seats

(districts), not votes.

As an aside, the spark for this paper did not light until late spring 2017 and upon

completion, the author had two options. The first was run this paper through the

peer-review process to be published in a journal, a process that takes upwards

of a year. The second option was to have the results available to the US Supreme

Court prior to arguments in the Whitford v Gill case in the fall of 2017. The

author felt the latter option was more important and will leave it up to outside

sources to provide scrutiny where needed. It is a tight article, few if any

assumptions are made, the math is simple, and the concepts are easy to

understand.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................... 3

CALCULATING THE EFFICIENCY GAP USING TABLES ......................................... 4

MANIPULATING DISTRICTS ................................................................................. 6

THE CHARISMATIC POLITICIAN MODEL ........................................................... 9

THE EFFICIENCY GAP EQUATION ...................................................................... 11

AN EFFICIENCY GAP EQUATION EQUIVALENT TO THE TABLES ....................... 12

THE EQUAL DISTRICTS EFFICIENCY GAP .......................................................... 15

A MINI-STATE LIGHTS THE WAY ...................................................................... 16

CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................... 18

3 Equal Districts Efficiency Gap

INTRODUCTION

In the fall of 2017, the US Supreme Court will hear arguments in the Gill v

Whitford case to decide whether parts of the Wisconsin States redistricting

plan of 2011 rise above a threshold to be considered gerrymandered. In the

opinion of the lower court, the term Efficiency Gap, EG, is referenced over

two-hundred fifty times1 as the term has framed many facets of the trial. The

purpose of the EG is to calculate whether an elections outcome is fair, a term

also referenced in the opinion.

The efficiency gap is found by summing a states wasted votes district by

district and then dividing by the total statewide votes. The gap measures the

distance between the actual number of seats won by a party and the fair

number of seats the party should have won given the statewide vote count.

One can also look at the EG as measuring how efficiently a party converts its

votes to elected seats, or how few wasted votes a party accumulates statewide.

This paper has two parts. The first half attempts to understand the EG, its

strengths, its limitations, and whether it performs as a bellwether of

gerrymandered districting plans. The analysis is done with the help of two

tables presented to the district court2 in a report by Professor Ken Mayer, an

expert testifying for the plaintiffs in the Gill v Whitford trial. Table 8 from his

report, reproduced in this paper as Table 1, calculates the EG for Wisconsins

Act 43, a redistricting plan enacted by the Wisconsin state legislature in 2011.

Act 43 has a high EG, which, according to the theory, indicates

gerrymandering. Mayer then alters Wisconsins district lines to establish a more

fair districting plan which he calls his demonstration plan. Mayers

demonstration plan is Table 7 in his report and is reproduced in this paper as

Table 2.

The second part of this paper looks at the EG equation, how it is derived, and

shows that wasted votes introduce bias and should not be used. Along the way,

two new EG equations are derived, including the equal districts efficiency gap

equation, the correct equation to use when calculating an efficiency gap.

Finally, a mini-state example brings the thoughts of this paper together.

The main takeaway from this paper should have less to do with the EG methods

than the assumptions made when deriving them. In the United States, each

citizen is guaranteed the right to vote and each vote is treated individually. But

a gerrymandering analysis is a different animal as individual districts (in this

1

Gill vs. Whitford Complaint and Exhibits: US District Court for the Western District

of Wisconsin, Case: 3:15-cv-00421-bbc Document #: 166 Filed: 11/21/16

2

Analysis of the efficiency gaps of Wisconsin's Current Legislative District Plan and

Plaintiffs' Demonstration Plan, contains Mayers Tables 7 and 8: (some redundant

columns in Mayers table have not been reproduced) Gill vs. Whitford Complaint and

Exhibits: US District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin, Case: 3:15-cv-

00421-bbc Document #: 1-2 Filed: 07/08/15

4 Equal Districts Efficiency Gap

case) make up a state. It is the district, not the individual vote that needs to stay

whole. Therefore, common statements such as Party X won 55% of the

statewide vote but only 45% of the seats, are close, but biased.

Table 1 calculates the EG for Wisconsins Act 433 by summing the wasted

votes in the 99 Wisconsin Assembly races of the 2012 election. In the table,

Democrats receive 51.138% of the statewide vote but elect Assembly members

to only 42, 42.424%, of the 99 seats. According to the EG, if a party wins over

50% of the statewide vote, fairness dictates that the party should win over

50% of the Assembly seats. This clearly did not happen under Act 43.

Democrats were inefficient at converting their votes to wins and wasted a

good share of their votes along the way. As a result, Table 1 shows an EG (total

wasted votes as a percentage of statewide votes) of 11.690% favoring

Republicans.

An EG above +7% or below -7% is considered suspect,4 so the gap of 11.690%

in Table 1 shows that the state of Wisconsin under Act 43 was very likely

gerrymandered according to the theory. To show how Wisconsin can be

redistricted fairly under federal and state requirements, Mayer introduces a

demonstration plan. Table 2 shows this demonstration plan. Democrats still

have 51.145% of the vote, very near what they did in Table 1, but they now

have 51 Assembly seats, or 51.515% of the total seats, a much fairer result.

This fairness is supported by far fewer total wasted votes and an EG of 2.195%,

still favoring Republicans, but well within the +/- 7% margin.

3

https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/2011/related/acts/43

4

Gill vs. Whitford Complaint and Exhibits: US District Court for the Western District

of Wisconsin, Case: 3:15-cv-00421-bbc Document #: 166 Filed: 11/21/16

5 Equal Districts Efficiency Gap

Partial Table 1 . Mayer's Efficiency Gap Calculation for Wisconsin's Act 43 (see Appendix 2 for full table)

Assembly Democratic Republican Winning Democratic Republican Wasted District Democratic

District Votes Votes Party Votes Votes Votes Votes Vote

20 16,066 12,856 D 1,605 12,856 -11,251 28,922 55.55%

21 12,566 15,324 R 12,566 1,379 11,187 27,890 45.06%

22 11,290 22,958 R 11,290 5,834 5,456 34,248 32.97%

23 14,260 21,633 R 14,260 3,687 10,574 35,893 39.73%

24 13,885 20,335 R 13,885 3,225 10,660 34,220 40.58%

Total Total

Democratic Democratic Efficiency

Vote: Seats: Gap:

51.138% 42 11.690%

Assembly Democratic Republican Winning Democratic Republican Wasted District Democratic

District Votes Votes Party Votes Votes Votes Votes Vote

20 14,118 12,901 D 609 12,901 -12,293 27,019 52.25%

21 12,257 16,911 R 12,257 2,327 9,930 29,168 42.02%

22 18,335 14,831 D 1,752 14,831 -13,079 33,166 55.28%

23 10,922 25,459 R 10,922 7,269 3,654 36,381 30.02%

24 8,667 25,868 R 8,667 8,601 67 34,535 25.10%

Total Total

Democratic Democratic Efficiency

Vote: Seats Gap:

51.145% 51 2.195%

6 Equal Districts Efficiency Gap

This paper will use Democratic numbers to compute the EG though either party

can be used. Following Professor Mayers lead, this paper uses a positive EG to

represent a Republican advantage and a negative EG to represent a Democratic

advantage. For brevitys sake, the tables presented within the body of this paper

show representative districts 19-24 instead of all 99 districts in the tables. The

complete tables are included in Appendix 2.

There may be some confusion with Table 1, as it calculates a 42-57 seat

makeup while in the actual 2012 Assembly election there was a 39-60 seat

makeup. Mayer factored in incumbency into the Democratic and Republican

district votes, and since we are only looking at the differences between Tables 1

and 2, as he states, the substantive inferences are identical.5

The low EG calculated in Table 2 seems to indicate a fair election, but the EG

measures wasted votes not the fairness of how district lines are drawn. In fact,

the makeup of the individual districts barely comes into play in such

calculations and this makeup can be manipulated if simple rules are met.

MANIPULATING DISTRICTS6

In Table 2, the slightly over 50% Democratic seat share aligns with the slightly

over 50% Democratic vote share. This seems fair and is confirmed by the low

EG. Table 3 manipulates the vote makeup of the districts to get lopsided

districts that are either nearly 100% Democratic or 100% Republican. Table 4

manipulates the districts to where each race is close to a 50-50 margin. The EG

remains at 2.195% even though both scenarios are unnatural.

Say a redistricter wants a plan that produces lopsided, packed, districts. As long

as the seats-votes criteria is met, that is, the percentage of statewide seats won

by each party and the percentage of statewide votes won by each party remains

constant, the EG will remain constant. This is demonstrated in Table 3 where

all districts are packed but the EG does not change.

Between Tables 2 and 3, there is no difference between the total number of

votes per district, the total wasted votes, the total lost Republican votes, the

total lost Democratic votes, the seat count, or the EG. Each district has retained

its representative, so no seat-flipping has occurred, and the total number of

wasted votes is the same. But each district in Table 3 has been reconfigured to

be so lopsided that each candidate either wins or loses by nearly a 100%

margin. Under this redistricting plan, seats will flip only under the most

5

Rebuttal Report: Response to Expert Reports of Sean Trende and Nicholas Goedert.

Gill vs. Whitford Complaint and Exhibits: US District Court for the Western District of

Wisconsin, Case: 3:15-cv-00421-bbc Document #: 64 Filed: 01/25/16

6

Wendy K. Tam Cho recently published a similar analysis: Tam Cho, Wendy K.

(2017) "Measuring Partisan Fairness: How Well Does the Efficiency Gap Guard

Against Sophisticated as well as Simple-Minded Modes of Partisan Discrimination?,"

University of Pennsylvania Law Review Online: Vol. 166 : Iss. 1 , Article 2.

7 Equal Districts Efficiency Gap

extreme circumstances. Surely packing is involved. Surely this state has been

gerrymandered. But according to the EG of 2.195% the state has been

redistricted in a very fair manner.

Citizens may complain that the lopsided districts of Table 3 are not practical,

that they want to see close, competitive districts. By keeping the seat and vote

shares constant, the redistricter can again move votes around to get evened out

districts, where each race is competitive. The result is shown in Table 4.

Partial Table 3. Efficiency Gap Calculation for Demonstration Plan with Votes Shifted to Create Packed Districts

Assembly Democratic Republican Winning Democratic Republican Wasted District Democratic

District Votes Votes Party Votes Votes Votes Votes Vote

20 27,019 0 D 13,510 0 13,510 27,019 100.00%

21 622 28,546 R 622 13,962 -13,340 29,168 2.13%

22 33,166 0 D 16,583 0 16,583 33,166 100.00%

23 622 35,759 R 622 17,569 -16,947 36,381 1.71%

24 622 33,913 R 622 16,646 -16,024 34,535 1.80%

Total Total

Democratic Democratic Efficiency

Vote: Seats Gap:

51.145% 51 2.195%

8 Equal Districts Efficiency Gap

Partial Table 4. Efficiency Gap Calculation for Demonstration Plan with Votes Shifted to Create 50-50 Districts

Assembly Democratic Republican Winning Democratic Republican Wasted District Democratic

District Votes Votes Party Votes Votes Votes Votes Vote

20 14,137 12,882 D 627 12,882 -12,255 27,019 52.32%

21 14,573 14,595 R 14,573 11 14,562 29,168 49.96%

22 17,354 15,812 D 771 15,812 -15,042 33,166 52.32%

23 18,180 18,201 R 18,180 11 18,170 36,381 49.97%

24 17,257 17,278 R 17,257 11 17,247 34,535 49.97%

Total Total

Democratic Democratic Efficiency

Vote: Seats Gap:

51.145% 51 2.195%

Table 4 shows a state that has been redistricted so each race is very close to 50-

50. Compared to Table 2, the demonstration plan, we have the same number of

wasted votes, votes per district, lost Republican votes, lost Democratic votes,

the same election results, and the same EG. No districts have been flipped and

the total number of wasted votes remains the same. Since this plan produces a

tight race in each district, its makeup is surely fair. The EG of 2.195% agrees.

We have produced a very fair state.

But what happens next cycle? What if there is a slight shift and Democrats pick

up votes across the state? According to Table 4, if Democrats pick up 1

percentage point in each district, they will win every race in the state, a gain of

51 seats and the new EG will calculate close to -50%, its maximum, far beyond

the -7% threshold. How can a measurement tool jump from near zero to its

maximum with such a small change in input?

Of course, all districts will never be packed with either 100% Democratic or

Republican votes. But some could, and when they are, the EG will not measure

it. All districts will never be evened out to produce 50-50 races, but if they are,

the EG will not measure it. Between these two extremes, packed districts and

evened districts, the redistricter can manipulate the votes as long as the seats-

votes criteria is met. One must ask what exactly the EG is measuring. It is not

measuring gerrymandering.

9 Equal Districts Efficiency Gap

gubernatorial candidate sways voters towards her partys Assembly members.

In terms of numbers, we will take Table 2, flip votes from Democratic to

Republican, and vice-versa.

In Table 2, the total Democratic vote is 51.15% of the statewide vote. If 287

voters per district flip their votes from the Democratic to the Republican

candidate, 3 seats flip to the Republican side, the Democratic vote share lowers

to 50.15%, a 1 percentage point drop, and the EG rises from 2.195% to 3.149%.

Conversely, starting at 51.15%, if 287 Republican votes flip per district, 5 seats

flip to the Democratic side, and the Democratic vote share rises 1 percentage

point to 52.15%. The EG then lowers from 2.195% to -0.868%, the negative

sign indicating the plan now favors Democrats.

The fact that the EG is asymmetrical, that it picked up 1 percentage point in one

direction and lost 3 points in the other is not outside the norm. What is

unnatural is the jumpiness of the EG. Figure 1 plots the EG vs Democratic

vote share. We see that a 51.15% share corresponds to an EG of 2.195%.

Moving left, votes are flipped, one by one to the Republican side, until we

reach a Democratic vote share of 50.15% and an EG of 3.149%. Moving right

of our starting point, we reach 52.15%, and an EG of -0.868%. The

computations are simple, but the path up and down the graph shows an

uncertain measurement.

in the Demonstration Plan

10

8

(Positive favors Republicans)

Efficiency Gap Percentage

0

48

49

50

51

52

53

-2

Percentage of Statewide Democratic Vote

10 Equal Districts Efficiency Gap

In Figure 1, one by one, votes are flipped until that critical vote is cast and a

seat flips, causing the EG to jump. Each jump is from one vote, in one district,

in a sea of tens of thousands. No theory should be so sensitive as to produce a

one percent jump from one vote.

When several seats flip in a narrow vote share range, the EG can jump by even

larger margins. The EG in Figure 1 is 9.7% at a 49.0% share and 2.3% at a

49.7% share, a jump of 7.4 percentage points from a change in input of only 0.7

percentage points. If a charismatic governor or president caused the

Democratic vote share to shift those 0.7 percentage points from one election to

the next, it could produce that 7.4 point jump in the EG, larger than the 7%

threshold offered as a cutoff for gerrymandering. A state can be deemed well

under the 7% threshold one election cycle and well above the next. The

question becomes, where do we presume the EG is valid? Is it at 2.3%, or is it

at 9.7%? Again, what is the EG actually measuring? It cannot be measuring

gerrymandering with such swings in output.

A smooth method of measurement is possible. Figure 2 uses the same input

data as Figure 1 but shows a result of this authors forthcoming paper that

addresses a fundamental flaw in the EG theory (not included in and not

necessary for this paper) by using Gaussian distributions as the basis of

analysis. The results are similar but there are no jumps or discontinuities in the

Figure 2 results.

in the Demonstration Plan

10

(Positive favors Republicans)

8

Gap Percentage

0

48

49

50

51

52

53

11 Equal Districts Efficiency Gap

When all districts have an equal number of votes, the EG table calculations

reduce to a simple equation given by the authors of the EG7 and presented by

Mayer to the District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin.8

Equation 1: The Standard Seats-Votes Efficiency Gap Equation

Considering the negative sign at the beginning of Equation 1, some authors use

Democratic wasted votes minus Republican wasted votes to reach total wasted

votes. Others use Republican wasted votes minus Democratic wasted votes.

Only the sign of Equation 1 changes between the two methods. The sign of

Equation 1 matches results from the tables.

With 99 seats in the Wisconsin Assembly, each seat contributes 1/99,

approximately 1 percentage point to the percentage of seats in Equation 1. This

corresponds to the one percentage point jump in Figure 1 each time a seat flips.

Between jumps in Figure 1, the slope of the line is 2, from the 2x relationship

between seats and votes in Equation 1.

In the Wisconsin Assembly, a flipped seat results in a one percentage point

jump but the EG has been used to calculate bias in congressional redistricting

plans where a state may have only a half-dozen to a dozen districts. Wisconsin,

for example, has 8 congressional districts and each seat flip will cause the EG

to jump by 1/8, or 12.5 percentage points, far more than the 7% threshold.

Equation 1 also explains the majority of the 8.5 percentage point drop in the EG

from Table 1 to Table 2. Democrats won 8 more seats in Table 2 than in Table

1. This 8.1 percentage point seat difference in Equation 1 moves the efficiency

gap by 8.1 percentage points, nearly all of the 8.5 percentage point drop

between the two plans. Any effort put into re-drawing district lines to

compensate for cracking, packing, or fairness had little effect on the EG in

Table 2 as the EG calculations saw only the seats flipping.

7

Eric McGhee and Nicholas Stephanopoulos. Partisan gerrymandering and the

efficiency gap. 82 University of Chicago Law Review, 831, 2015. 70 pages. U of

Chicago, Public Law working Paper No. 493. Available at SSRN:

https://ssrn.com/abstract=2457468.

8

Analysis of the Efficiency Gaps of Wisconsin's Current Legislative District Plan and

Plaintiffs' Demonstration Plan. Gill vs. Whitford Complaint and Exhibits: US District

Court for the Western District of Wisconsin, Case: 3:15-cv-00421-bbc Document #: 1-2

Filed: 07/08/15

12 Equal Districts Efficiency Gap

In a gubernatorial election, it does not matter if one district has more votes than

another, what part of the state votes come from, or if a Democrat or Republican

wins an Assembly seat in this district or that. All that matters is the final

statewide vote percentages. In an Assembly election, it does not matter how

many voters show up in a district or who wins the governorship. All that

matters is which candidate has more votes in that district. These may be simple

statements but they contain subtleties overlooked in many analyses.

The fundamental question when forming a basis for analyzing gerrymandering

is, are seats or votes being measured? Seats are measured by district and votes

are independent of district, which means both seats and votes cannot be used in

the same equation as they have different bases. Seats and votes are used in

Equation 1, so it is valid only when all districts have the same number of votes,

that is, when all districts are equivalent, just as all seats are equivalent.

Table calculations use total wasted votes which are calculated differently

depending on which party wins a district. When these calculations are

combined and added statewide, the result keeps both seats and votes

information. Appendix 1 begins with the general formulas for wasted votes

used in the tables, combines them into total wasted votes, and hones them down

to a simple equation, our second EG equation.

Equation 2: The Seats-Votes Efficiency Gap with Percentage of Weighted Seats

Equation 2 is equivalent to the wasted votes calculations in the tables, and the

only difference from Equation 1 is that seats has been replaced with weighted

seats. In Table 2, Democrats won 51 districts and each seat has a value of 1, so

the Democrats won 51 seats. But, in Equation 2, if one district has 50% more

votes than the statewide district average, its seat has a value of 1.5 as it

represents more votes. A seat no longer represents a district, it represents the

total votes in that district, so both terms in Equation 2 come from the same

basis. In Table 2, Democratic-won districts have 2.756% fewer votes than

average, diluting the power of their seats, making them less efficient, and when

their seats are weighted, we find there are 2.756% fewer seats than the 51 actual

seats, which is 49.594 seats, or 50.095% of the 99 total seats. Equation 2

becomes,

2.195% = ( 50.095% 50% ) 2 ( 51.145% 50% ) ,

Now we are able to understand why the EG did not change between Tables 2,

3, and 4. Seats in Equation 2 are weighted by the district vote total. Votes were

moved inside districts and since each districts vote total remained constant, the

weighting of each seat remained constant, and the EG did not change. The

13 Equal Districts Efficiency Gap

weighted seats also show why the jumps in Figure 1 are non-uniform as they

mimic their corresponding district size.

One can now understand the importance of finding representative numbers for

uncontested districts, both as a percentage and to the extent that all votes

contribute to the district total which is the weight of its seat in Equation 2.

In the same way that seats are weighted in Equation 2, wasted votes are

weighted by the district vote total. Consider that a district can contribute a

maximum of half its votes to the states total wasted votes. If one district has

50% more votes than average, its number of possible wasted votes is 1.5 times

the average and that district has more influence over the statewide wasted votes.

Both the weighted seats of Equation 2 and the wasted votes of the tables

unfairly bias the EG toward larger districts, skewing the results. And in the

demonstration plan, where more voters turn out in Republican districts, the

results are skewed unfairly against Republicans.

To exploit this disparity, in Table 5 we decrease both the Republican and

Democratic votes by 20% in Democratic-won districts and increase both the

Republican and Democratic votes by 20% in Republican-won districts. The

Democratic vote share has dropped below 50% but Democrats still hold more

than 50% of the seats. This is not fair and the EG should reflect this with a

negative value, showing the plan favors Democrats. But the EG in Table 5 has

actually jumped in the positive direction to 7.73%, above the 7% threshold,

indicating the state surely has been gerrymandered to favor Republicans. This

result is terribly wrong, showing again how wasted votes can be skewed.

Expressing this in terms of Equation 2, the total weighted seats in this example

comes in at 39.8 seats, far less than the 51 seats actually won.

14 Equal Districts Efficiency Gap

Partial Table 5. Efficiency Gap Calculation for Demonstration Plan with Votes Shifted to Give Lower Turnout in

Democratic-Won Districts

Assembly Democratic Republican Winning Democratic Republican Wasted District Democratic

District Votes Votes Party Votes Votes Votes Votes Vote

20 11,294 10,321 D 487 10,321 -9,834 21,615 52.25%

21 14,717 20,305 R 14,717 2,794 11,923 35,022 42.02%

22 14,668 11,865 D 1,402 11,865 -10,463 26,533 55.28%

23 13,114 30,569 R 13,114 8,727 4,387 43,683 30.02%

24 10,406 31,060 R 10,406 10,327 80 41,466 25.10%

Total Total

Democratic Democratic Efficiency

Vote: Seats Gap:

48.904% 51 7.730%

explain the error in the efficiency gap. When wasted votes are used to calculate

the efficiency gap, districts are not treated as whole units, votes are. Again,

equal votes are proper when electing a governor, but when evaluating a

redistricting plan that elects one representative per one district, all districts must

be treated as one.

When using Equation 2 to compare redistricting plans, the statewide

Democratic vote share remains constant while the seat count varies, making the

EG a one-variable analysis. And if this is the case, using the EG to gauge how

well a redistricting plan works is to regulate how many seats a party can have

given their statewide vote share and we arrive at proportional representation.

If we do decide to use the EG equation, that is, use proportional representation,

why not reduce the 2x slope of the seats-votes curve to 1x? That would be more

fair. Yes, historically, the seats-votes curve has shown close to a 2x slope, but

who said this ratio is fair? By eliminating the biased 2x seats-votes relationship,

the EG equation becomes Efficiency Gap = Percentage of Seats Percentage of

Votes, which is simple and perhaps fairer than equations that contain the 2x

relationship between seats and votes.

In this section we have learned that wasted votes are not needed, that Equation

2 can be used in lieu of the tables, and Equation 2 provides better understanding

of what is being measured. But that does not do the user much good since the

results of Equation 2 is the same as using the tables and is skewed in the same

way. So what is the answer?

15 Equal Districts Efficiency Gap

Though we do not need wasted votes anymore, a solution has been included in

the final column of the tables, in the percentage of the Democratic vote per

district. By using this percentage, all districts are normalized to a vote total of

100 (100%), giving all districts equal weight. A third EG equation is derived in

Appendix 1 that uses whole districts as its basis, and is shown here.

Equal Districts Efficiency Gap = - [ ( Percentage of Seats - 50% ) + 2 ( Average Percentage of Vote - 50% ) ]

Equation 3: The Equal Districts Efficiency Gap with Average Percentage of Vote

The average percentage of vote in Equation 3 is the average of the final column

in the tables, the district percentage of votes, which is not influenced by district

size. From Table 2, the demonstration plan yields a 51.781% average district

vote, and Equation 3 gives us,

2.046% = ( 51.515% 50% ) 2 ( 51.781% 50% ) .

The equal districts efficiency gap accurately captures the gap between election

results and what is considered fair. A key to understanding the fundamentals of

this or any gerrymandering analysis is to understand why the Democratic share

of votes is 51.781% and not the 51.145% used in the tables. Granted, in the

Wisconsin Assembly case, it is a subtle change, but the reasoning behind it has

deep implications.

As shown in Appendix 1, Equation 2 is defined classically as the total wasted

votes over the total statewide votes,

99

=1

= = ,

99

=1

where the district wasted votes, Wk, and total district votes, Tk, are summed

separately. Equation 3 is defined as the average number of wasted votes per

district over the total number of districts,

99

=1

= ,

where STOT in our case is 99, the total number of seats in the state. Notice that

the original efficiency gap is defined by state vote totals divided by state vote

totals and the equal districts efficiency gap is defined by district averages

divided by districts. Are we focusing on votes or districts? The equal districts

efficiency gap (EDEG) normalizes each districts wasted votes and each district

has equal influence on the statewide EG. The EG becomes equal to the equal

districts efficiency gap when all Tks are equal.

16 Equal Districts Efficiency Gap

Again, when looking at election results, then, yes, votes take center stage. But

when looking at gerrymandering, we want to understand how individual

districts influence a state. Theories that use a partys statewide votes are biasing

their results. Theories that use district percentages often seem unaware that

these percentages properly weight the votes by district and cannot be used with

statewide vote totals.

Candidate Candidate Votes Candidate Candidate

District X 4 5 9 District X 44% 56%

District Y 10 8 18 District Y 56% 44%

Total Votes 14 13 27 Average Percent of Vote 50% 50%

This mini-state has two districts. District X elected a Republican and district Y

elected a Democrat, so the states seats are split evenly between the parties.

From the vote totals on the bottom of Table 6, we see that the state leans

slightly Democratic, 14 to 13. But, from the percentages in the right columns,

we see that the state is split evenly between the parties. Which is correct? Is the

state more Democratic or is it a wash? Should the EG favor Republicans,

Democrats, or come out even?

And that is the crux of the problem. Is one vote, one vote? Or is one district one

district? If a voter moves from district Y to district X, suddenly his vote carries

more weight. This is accounted for in Equation 3 but not in Equation 2. And, if

the district Y seat flips, it will have more impact on Equation 2 than if district X

flips. Why should one seat flipping have more sway on a redistricting analysis

than another seat flipping? Equation 3 treats all flipping seats equally, as should

be the case.

We can now understand why the three equations give such different results.

[ ( 50% 50%) 2 (51.852% 50%) ] = 3.704 (. 1)

17 Equal Districts Efficiency Gap

difference in percentage of weighted seats and actual seats, 66.667% -

50.000%. The difference between Equations 1 and 3, 3.704 percentage points,

is the difference in statewide vote share and average percentage of vote,

51.852% - 50.000%, = 1.852, times two. And the difference between Equations

2 and 3 is 16.667 3.704 = 12.963.

Equation 1 sees that the seats are even but the Democrats have more statewide

votes, so it shows our mini-state is biased in the Republicans favor. But this

equation uses actual seats and Democratic statewide votes, two different bases,

so it cannot be used. One must choose between seats or votes.

Equation 2 sees votes and the -12.963 gap tells us that our mini-state is heavily

biased in the Democrats favor, which is grossly untrue. The state is not heavily

biased in any partys favor. The reasons for this error can be revealed either by

using Equation 2 or wasted votes. Equation 2 sees that district Y has twice the

votes of district X and weights its Democratic seat twice as heavily. Thus, the

Democratic district is seen to win two-thirds of the seats and the mini-state is

biased in the Democrats favor. Calculating the EG using wasted votes, we find

that district X contributes 3.5 wasted votes to the state total while district Y,

twice as large, contributes -7 wasted votes. Combining the two, we have a total

of -3.5 wasted votes, or -12.963% of the statewide votes. Using either wasted

votes or weighted seats, the larger district Y pulls the result in its direction.

Equation 3 sees the truth, that each district is equal, that each candidate is

elected by an identical margin and that the state is politically neutral.

To summarize, the terms in Equation 2 are weighted to represent votes equally.

The terms in Equation 3 represent districts equally. Equation 1 is a mixture.

Equations 1 and 2 produce the same result as Equation 3 when all districts have

the same number of votes. When considering gerrymandering, the question

returns to what is being measured. We are measuring individual districts that

make up a state, therefore, the equal districts efficiency gap is the correct

method to calculate the EG. When the total number of votes in a states districts

are close, Equations 2 and 3 should be similar as the errors in the terms in

Equation 2 tend to cancel. Where districts have unequal total votes, as in Table

5, Equation 2 will veer off course while Equation 3 remains true.

Even after all the work put into providing a proper understanding and basis for

this analysis, the equal districts efficiency gap of Equation 3 can be

manipulated in the same way as the wasted votes are in Tables 3 and 4. As

much as we would like a nice, compact method, the equal districts efficiency

gap does not measure gerrymandering, it is a seats-votes measure and we have

18 Equal Districts Efficiency Gap

come full circle all the way back to Tuftes seminal work of 19739 where he

presented the equation,

Percentage Seats for a Political party = b (Percentage Votes for that Party) + c

Equation 4. Tuftes Seats-Votes Equation

and 3 have neither corrected the efficiency gap nor the wasted votes. Each

equation has only altered Tuftes oft-cited equation by changing the basis of its

variables to seats or votes. And if that is true, this papers Appendix 1 was not

needed and the table calculations using wasted votes are but modifications of

Equation 4. Tuftes equation also tells us that the 2x votes multiplier is not set

in stone and may be adjusted, perhaps to 1x?

CONCLUSION

The efficiency gap has helped raise public awareness of gerrymandering issues,

and the story behind it, of wasted votes verses no wasted votes, is compelling.

The popularity of the efficiency gap underscores the publics and the courts

need for a way to understand gerrymandering from a mathematical point of

view. The efficiency gap is a positive addition to the literature but the structure

behind the method and its results are not nearly dependable enough to be

presented as evidence in a trial. When it is required, the equal districts

efficiency gap provides more accurate results, but even these results can be

skewed if not watched closely.

We have established a foundation to build on, but even if the concerns

presented in this paper were rectified, tables and equations will not solve the

problem. More comprehensive methods are needed, perhaps several methods

that work together. It is amazing that we can be shown pictures of obscenely

carved out political districts but somehow we desire a number to point to and

say hah, there it is. When we vote for an official, especially at the state house

level, our decision affects those around us most. Each of us is part of a local

community. It would be difficult not to support a geographically based measure

that would stop redistricters from cutting up neighborhoods to look like swiss

cheese, visual proof that our communities are being torn apart for political gain.

After all, what is the purpose of politics if it is not to enhance our communities?

The efficiency gap offers a step in the right direction in understanding

gerrymandering but broader methods must continue the work.

9

E. R. Tufte. The relationship between seats and votes in two-party systems. The

American Political Science Review, 67(2):540554, 1973.

19 Equal Districts Efficiency Gap

APPENDIX 1

The three EG equations used in the paper are derived here. The integer

subscripts i, j, and k will correspond to Democratic districts, Republican

districts, and all districts.

Dividing the state of Wisconsin into two columns, column i containing all

Democratic-won districts, and column j containing all Republican-won

districts, let S be the total number of seats won by Democratic candidates, and

in Wisconsin, (99 - S) is the number of seats won by Republican candidates.

The total number of wasted votes in the state is the total from all Democratic-

won districts plus the total from all Republican-won districts,

99

= + ,

=1 =+1

where the first summation is of column i, and the second, column j. WTOT is the

total number of wasted votes in the state, and Wi is the total number of wasted

votes in district i.

In a Democratic-won district, the number of wasted votes is,

= ,

2

where Di is the number of Democratic votes in district i, and Ri is the number of

Republican votes. In a Republican-won District, the number of wasted votes is,

=

2

Combining the above three equations, the total number of wasted votes in the

state becomes

99

= [ ] + [ ] ,

2 2

=1 =+1

which simplifies to

99 99

= + 2 ,

2

=1 =1 =1

possible and dividing both sides by TTOT, the total number of votes in the state,

we arrive at the definition of the efficiency gap,

20 Equal Districts Efficiency Gap

1

= +2 ,

2

=1

where the summation term sums votes in Democratic-won districts and DTOT is

the total Democratic votes in the state. We can further simplify this to,

where a weighted seat no longer has a value of one but is weighted by the

number of votes in the district. This is Equation 2 in the paper.

To isolate the bias term, we use Ti = TTOT/99 i, where TTOT/99 is the average

district vote total, and i is the deviation of a districts vote total from that

average. Our equation becomes,

1 1

= +2 + .

99 2

=1

the papers Table 1 and Table 2, the summation term is positive and the

efficiency gap is unfairly skewed toward the Republican side. When all districts

in the state have the same number of votes, all is go to zero, and we arrive at

1

= +2 ,

99 2

which is,

ESTABLISHING A BASIS

The above analysis was done in relation to the efficiency gap as it is presented

in the literature. Here, we tweak the initial assumptions about where the EG

should come from to help solidify a fundamentally sound basis for analyzing a

gerrymander.

The efficiency gap is defined as,

= = ,

but, as stated in the paper, this method unknowingly weights wasted votes by

that districts vote total. To even the field and treat each district equally, the

efficiency gap needs to be written,

21 Equal Districts Efficiency Gap

1

= = ,

99

Where STOT is the total number of seats, 99 in our case, and Wk/Tk is the percent

of wasted votes in district k. Notice how the efficiency gap is defined as

statewide wasted votes divided by the total number of votes in the state while

the equal districts efficiency gap is defined by a sum of district averages

divided by the total number of districts in the state. One focuses on votes, the

other on districts. Our equal districts equation reduces to,

99

2 1

= + ,

99 99 2

=1

where the summation term sums the percent of Democratic votes, district by

district. This reduces to Equation 3 in the paper,

Equal Districts Efficiency Gap = - ( Percent of Seats - 50% ) + 2 ( Average Percent of Vote - 50% )

where the average percent of vote is simply the average of the percent of the

Democratic vote in each district.

APPENDIX 2

TABLES ONE THROUGH FIVE

Assembly Democratic Republican Winning Democratic Republican Wasted District Democratic

District Votes Votes Party Votes Votes Votes Votes Vote

2 12,398 16,357 R 12,398 1,980 10,419 28,755 43.12%

3 12,623 16,636 R 12,623 2,007 10,617 29,259 43.14%

4 13,926 15,576 R 13,926 825 13,101 29,502 47.20%

5 12,710 16,017 R 12,710 1,654 11,057 28,727 44.24%

6 10,929 14,938 R 10,929 2,005 8,925 25,867 42.25%

7 13,793 11,778 D 1,008 11,778 -10,771 25,571 53.94%

8 7,342 1,738 D 2,802 1,738 1,064 9,080 80.86%

9 10,023 4,533 D 2,745 4,533 -1,788 14,556 68.86%

10 25,306 2,897 D 11,205 2,897 8,308 28,203 89.73%

11 21,698 3,368 D 9,165 3,368 5,797 25,066 86.56%

12 19,700 5,222 D 7,239 5,222 2,017 24,922 79.05%

13 13,345 20,358 R 13,345 3,507 9,839 33,703 39.60%

14 14,499 21,025 R 14,499 3,263 11,236 35,524 40.81%

15 13,006 17,310 R 13,006 2,152 10,854 30,316 42.90%

16 22,293 2,342 D 9,976 2,342 7,634 24,635 90.49%

17 24,088 4,047 D 10,021 4,047 5,974 28,135 85.62%

18 22,204 2,692 D 9,756 2,692 7,064 24,896 89.19%

19 22,759 10,364 D 6,198 10,364 -4,167 33,123 68.71%

20 16,066 12,856 D 1,605 12,856 -11,251 28,922 55.55%

21 12,566 15,324 R 12,566 1,379 11,187 27,890 45.06%

22 11,290 22,958 R 11,290 5,834 5,456 34,248 32.97%

23 14,260 21,633 R 14,260 3,687 10,574 35,893 39.73%

24 13,885 20,335 R 13,885 3,225 10,660 34,220 40.58%

25 12,032 15,933 R 12,032 1,951 10,082 27,965 43.03%

26 13,639 15,559 R 13,639 960 12,679 29,198 46.71%

27 14,709 16,360 R 14,709 826 13,884 31,069 47.34%

28 12,719 15,302 R 12,719 1,292 11,428 28,021 45.39%

29 12,909 14,662 R 12,909 877 12,033 27,571 46.82%

30 14,019 16,951 R 14,019 1,466 12,553 30,970 45.27%

31 13,273 15,615 R 13,273 1,171 12,102 28,888 45.95%

32 11,255 15,359 R 11,255 2,052 9,203 26,614 42.29%

33 11,226 18,298 R 11,226 3,536 7,690 29,524 38.02%

34 12,445 19,355 R 12,445 3,455 8,990 31,800 39.14%

35 12,270 15,525 R 12,270 1,628 10,643 27,795 44.14%

36 11,403 15,672 R 11,403 2,135 9,269 27,075 42.12%

37 12,707 16,202 R 12,707 1,748 10,960 28,909 43.96%

38 12,668 19,129 R 12,668 3,231 9,438 31,797 39.84%

39 11,491 17,211 R 11,491 2,860 8,631 28,702 40.04%

40 11,485 13,597 R 11,485 1,056 10,429 25,082 45.79%

23 Equal Districts Efficiency Gap

42 13,705 15,462 R 13,705 879 12,827 29,167 46.99%

43 17,380 13,075 D 2,153 13,075 -10,923 30,455 57.07%

44 16,680 10,304 D 3,188 10,304 -7,116 26,984 61.81%

45 15,153 9,691 D 2,731 9,691 -6,960 24,844 60.99%

46 19,173 11,534 D 3,820 11,534 -7,715 30,707 62.44%

47 21,609 9,340 D 6,135 9,340 -3,206 30,949 69.82%

48 24,517 7,635 D 8,441 7,635 806 32,152 76.25%

49 12,307 13,621 R 12,307 657 11,650 25,928 47.47%

50 12,467 12,326 D 71 12,326 -12,256 24,793 50.28%

51 14,173 13,048 D 563 13,048 -12,486 27,221 52.07%

52 11,294 15,656 R 11,294 2,181 9,113 26,950 41.91%

53 9,875 16,753 R 9,875 3,439 6,436 26,628 37.09%

54 15,180 12,882 D 1,149 12,882 -11,733 28,062 54.09%

55 12,634 16,971 R 12,634 2,169 10,466 29,605 42.68%

56 12,564 18,576 R 12,564 3,006 9,558 31,140 40.35%

57 14,387 11,676 D 1,356 11,676 -10,321 26,063 55.20%

58 8,843 22,417 R 8,843 6,787 2,056 31,260 28.29%

59 8,784 21,725 R 8,784 6,471 2,314 30,509 28.79%

60 9,848 23,989 R 9,848 7,071 2,778 33,837 29.10%

61 13,145 16,481 R 13,145 1,668 11,477 29,626 44.37%

62 14,828 17,309 R 14,828 1,241 13,588 32,137 46.14%

63 13,233 16,830 R 13,233 1,799 11,435 30,063 44.02%

64 15,702 11,307 D 2,198 11,307 -9,110 27,009 58.14%

65 15,105 7,929 D 3,588 7,929 -4,341 23,034 65.58%

66 16,162 5,472 D 5,345 5,472 -127 21,634 74.71%

67 13,769 14,674 R 13,769 453 13,317 28,443 48.41%

68 13,663 13,005 D 329 13,005 -12,676 26,668 51.23%

69 11,083 14,347 R 11,083 1,632 9,451 25,430 43.58%

70 12,211 14,387 R 12,211 1,088 11,123 26,598 45.91%

71 17,614 11,383 D 3,116 11,383 -8,268 28,997 60.74%

72 14,294 13,895 D 200 13,895 -13,696 28,189 50.71%

73 17,353 10,784 D 3,285 10,784 -7,500 28,137 61.67%

74 17,095 13,772 D 1,662 13,772 -12,111 30,867 55.38%

75 15,000 13,418 D 791 13,418 -12,627 28,418 52.78%

76 30,939 6,805 D 12,067 6,805 5,262 37,744 81.97%

77 26,925 6,041 D 10,442 6,041 4,401 32,966 81.68%

78 24,163 9,857 D 7,153 9,857 -2,704 34,020 71.03%

79 20,753 13,975 D 3,389 13,975 -10,586 34,728 59.76%

80 20,369 12,604 D 3,883 12,604 -8,722 32,973 61.77%

81 16,310 12,356 D 1,977 12,356 -10,379 28,666 56.90%

82 12,168 18,085 R 12,168 2,959 9,210 30,253 40.22%

83 10,186 23,755 R 10,186 6,785 3,402 33,941 30.01%

84 12,503 18,765 R 12,503 3,131 9,372 31,268 39.99%

85 13,613 12,925 D 344 12,925 -12,581 26,538 51.30%

86 13,425 17,152 R 13,425 1,864 11,562 30,577 43.91%

87 11,780 15,118 R 11,780 1,669 10,111 26,898 43.80%

88 13,141 14,380 R 13,141 620 12,522 27,521 47.75%

89 11,610 15,516 R 11,610 1,953 9,657 27,126 42.80%

90 12,080 7,309 D 2,386 7,309 -4,924 19,389 62.30%

91 17,942 11,769 D 3,087 11,769 -8,683 29,711 60.39%

92 14,285 11,441 D 1,422 11,441 -10,019 25,726 55.53%

93 15,268 15,393 R 15,268 63 15,206 30,661 49.80%

94 17,408 12,954 D 2,227 12,954 -10,727 30,362 57.33%

24 Equal Districts Efficiency Gap

96 10,950 14,873 R 10,950 1,962 8,989 25,823 42.40%

97 10,826 18,042 R 10,826 3,608 7,218 28,868 37.50%

98 10,182 21,855 R 10,182 5,837 4,346 32,037 31.78%

99 8,346 25,535 R 8,346 8,595 -249 33,881 24.63%

TOTALS 1,454,719 1,389,960 877,446 544,894 332,553 2,844,679

Total Total

Democratic Democratic Efficiency

Vote: Seats: Gap:

51.138% 42 11.690%

25 Equal Districts Efficiency Gap

Assembly Democratic Republican Winning Democratic Republican Wasted District Democratic

District Votes Votes Party Votes Votes Votes Votes Vote

2 11,805 10,025 D 890 10,025 -9,135 21,830 54.08%

3 11,243 17,807 R 11,243 3,282 7,961 29,050 38.70%

4 10,881 12,790 R 10,881 955 9,927 23,671 45.97%

5 13,497 13,845 R 13,497 174 13,323 27,342 49.36%

6 11,045 17,627 R 11,045 3,291 7,754 28,672 38.52%

7 22,822 10,214 D 6,304 10,214 -3,910 33,036 69.08%

8 7,192 1,695 D 2,749 1,695 1,054 8,887 80.93%

9 10,497 5,635 D 2,431 5,635 -3,204 16,132 65.07%

10 25,348 3,270 D 11,039 3,270 7,769 28,618 88.57%

11 22,374 4,855 D 8,760 4,855 3,905 27,229 82.17%

12 20,041 4,039 D 8,001 4,039 3,962 24,080 83.23%

13 15,950 16,510 R 15,950 280 15,670 32,460 49.14%

14 13,575 13,799 R 13,575 112 13,463 27,374 49.59%

15 13,412 14,901 R 13,412 745 12,668 28,313 47.37%

16 21,234 2,856 D 9,189 2,856 6,333 24,090 88.14%

17 21,769 3,569 D 9,100 3,569 5,531 25,338 85.91%

18 23,817 4,954 D 9,432 4,954 4,478 28,771 82.78%

19 15,160 10,904 D 2,128 10,904 -8,776 26,064 58.16%

20 14,118 12,901 D 609 12,901 -12,293 27,019 52.25%

21 12,257 16,911 R 12,257 2,327 9,930 29,168 42.02%

22 18,335 14,831 D 1,752 14,831 -13,079 33,166 55.28%

23 10,922 25,459 R 10,922 7,269 3,654 36,381 30.02%

24 8,667 25,868 R 8,667 8,601 67 34,535 25.10%

25 12,179 18,248 R 12,179 3,035 9,145 30,427 40.03%

26 13,251 14,527 R 13,251 638 12,613 27,778 47.70%

27 14,935 11,755 D 1,590 11,755 -10,165 26,690 55.96%

28 12,617 15,591 R 12,617 1,487 11,130 28,208 44.73%

29 14,180 12,954 D 613 12,954 -12,341 27,134 52.26%

30 11,308 15,165 R 11,308 1,929 9,380 26,473 42.72%

31 11,304 16,117 R 11,304 2,407 8,898 27,421 41.22%

32 12,685 13,787 R 12,685 551 12,134 26,472 47.92%

33 14,609 10,151 D 2,229 10,151 -7,922 24,760 59.00%

34 13,139 15,690 R 13,139 1,276 11,864 28,829 45.58%

35 11,288 16,503 R 11,288 2,608 8,681 27,791 40.62%

36 11,516 14,997 R 11,516 1,741 9,776 26,513 43.44%

37 9,222 22,240 R 9,222 6,509 2,713 31,462 29.31%

38 9,710 25,021 R 9,710 7,656 2,055 34,731 27.96%

39 10,747 17,526 R 10,747 3,390 7,358 28,273 38.01%

40 15,061 13,947 D 557 13,947 -13,390 29,008 51.92%

41 16,784 13,120 D 1,832 13,120 -11,288 29,904 56.13%

42 13,254 12,282 D 486 12,282 -11,796 25,536 51.90%

43 12,658 13,606 R 12,658 474 12,184 26,264 48.20%

44 16,477 10,886 D 2,796 10,886 -8,091 27,363 60.22%

45 16,352 13,589 D 1,382 13,589 -12,208 29,941 54.61%

26 Equal Districts Efficiency Gap

47 20,208 9,888 D 5,160 9,888 -4,728 30,096 67.15%

48 24,457 8,840 D 7,809 8,840 -1,032 33,297 73.45%

49 13,625 13,477 D 74 13,477 -13,403 27,102 50.27%

50 12,289 13,709 R 12,289 710 11,579 25,998 47.27%

51 14,760 13,323 D 719 13,323 -12,605 28,083 52.56%

52 12,376 19,416 R 12,376 3,520 8,856 31,792 38.93%

53 12,388 13,362 R 12,388 487 11,901 25,750 48.11%

54 14,032 12,240 D 896 12,240 -11,344 26,272 53.41%

55 13,565 15,300 R 13,565 868 12,698 28,865 46.99%

56 12,553 14,518 R 12,553 983 11,571 27,071 46.37%

57 14,897 13,016 D 941 13,016 -12,076 27,913 53.37%

58 9,325 21,180 R 9,325 5,928 3,398 30,505 30.57%

59 11,565 21,984 R 11,565 5,210 6,356 33,549 34.47%

60 8,756 22,415 R 8,756 6,830 1,927 31,171 28.09%

61 12,933 16,576 R 12,933 1,822 11,112 29,509 43.83%

62 15,181 9,999 D 2,591 9,999 -7,408 25,180 60.29%

63 15,640 9,902 D 2,869 9,902 -7,033 25,542 61.23%

64 15,089 13,470 D 810 13,470 -12,661 28,559 52.83%

65 12,721 19,816 R 12,721 3,548 9,174 32,537 39.10%

66 16,286 6,362 D 4,962 6,362 -1,400 22,648 71.91%

67 15,321 14,226 D 548 14,226 -13,679 29,547 51.85%

68 11,958 12,124 R 11,958 83 11,875 24,082 49.66%

69 17,902 12,022 D 2,940 12,022 -9,082 29,924 59.82%

70 18,661 12,266 D 3,198 12,266 -9,069 30,927 60.34%

71 15,081 13,884 D 599 13,884 -13,286 28,965 52.07%

72 11,180 16,542 R 11,180 2,681 8,499 27,722 40.33%

73 17,137 10,785 D 3,176 10,785 -7,609 27,922 61.37%

74 17,712 14,219 D 1,747 14,219 -12,473 31,931 55.47%

75 13,902 17,700 R 13,902 1,899 12,003 31,602 43.99%

76 30,929 6,811 D 12,059 6,811 5,248 37,740 81.95%

77 26,708 6,059 D 10,325 6,059 4,266 32,767 81.51%

78 24,413 9,847 D 7,283 9,847 -2,564 34,260 71.26%

79 20,439 13,294 D 3,573 13,294 -9,722 33,733 60.59%

80 20,179 11,644 D 4,268 11,644 -7,377 31,823 63.41%

81 13,703 12,741 D 481 12,741 -12,260 26,444 51.82%

82 9,871 21,201 R 9,871 5,665 4,206 31,072 31.77%

83 9,241 23,075 R 9,241 6,917 2,324 32,316 28.60%

84 11,990 22,700 R 11,990 5,355 6,635 34,690 34.56%

85 10,028 13,190 R 10,028 1,581 8,447 23,218 43.19%

86 13,853 13,494 D 180 13,494 -13,315 27,347 50.66%

87 11,358 17,003 R 11,358 2,823 8,536 28,361 40.05%

88 14,209 11,142 D 1,534 11,142 -9,609 25,351 56.05%

89 13,374 15,771 R 13,374 1,199 12,176 29,145 45.89%

90 11,349 17,468 R 11,349 3,060 8,290 28,817 39.38%

91 14,807 13,845 D 481 13,845 -13,364 28,652 51.68%

92 14,907 14,594 D 157 14,594 -14,438 29,501 50.53%

93 12,441 18,057 R 12,441 2,808 9,633 30,498 40.79%

94 16,171 11,759 D 2,206 11,759 -9,553 27,930 57.90%

95 19,769 9,949 D 4,910 9,949 -5,039 29,718 66.52%

96 14,665 13,836 D 415 13,836 -13,422 28,501 51.45%

97 11,492 24,222 R 11,492 6,365 5,127 35,714 32.18%

98 9,864 24,773 R 9,864 7,455 2,410 34,637 28.48%

27 Equal Districts Efficiency Gap

TOTALS 1,454,122 1,388,995 741,986 679,573 62,414 2,843,117

Total Total

Democratic Democratic Efficiency

Vote: Seats Gap:

51.145% 51 2.195%

28 Equal Districts Efficiency Gap

Table 3. Efficiency Gap Calculation for Demonstration Plan with Votes Shifted to Create Packed Districts

Assembly Democratic Republican Winning Democratic Republican Wasted District Democratic

District Votes Votes Party Votes Votes Votes Votes Vote

2 21,830 0 D 10,915 0 10,915 21,830 100.00%

3 622 28,428 R 622 13,903 -13,281 29,050 2.14%

4 622 23,049 R 622 11,214 -10,592 23,671 2.63%

5 622 26,720 R 622 13,049 -12,427 27,342 2.27%

6 622 28,050 R 622 13,714 -13,092 28,672 2.17%

7 33,036 0 D 16,518 0 16,518 33,036 100.00%

8 8,887 0 D 4,444 0 4,444 8,887 100.00%

9 16,132 0 D 8,066 0 8,066 16,132 100.00%

10 28,618 0 D 14,309 0 14,309 28,618 100.00%

11 27,229 0 D 13,615 0 13,615 27,229 100.00%

12 24,080 0 D 12,040 0 12,040 24,080 100.00%

13 622 31,838 R 622 15,608 -14,986 32,460 1.92%

14 622 26,752 R 622 13,065 -12,443 27,374 2.27%

15 622 27,691 R 622 13,535 -12,913 28,313 2.20%

16 24,090 0 D 12,045 0 12,045 24,090 100.00%

17 25,338 0 D 12,669 0 12,669 25,338 100.00%

18 28,771 0 D 14,386 0 14,386 28,771 100.00%

19 26,064 0 D 13,032 0 13,032 26,064 100.00%

20 27,019 0 D 13,510 0 13,510 27,019 100.00%

21 622 28,546 R 622 13,962 -13,340 29,168 2.13%

22 33,166 0 D 16,583 0 16,583 33,166 100.00%

23 622 35,759 R 622 17,569 -16,947 36,381 1.71%

24 622 33,913 R 622 16,646 -16,024 34,535 1.80%

25 622 29,805 R 622 14,592 -13,970 30,427 2.04%

26 622 27,156 R 622 13,267 -12,645 27,778 2.24%

27 26,690 0 D 13,345 0 13,345 26,690 100.00%

28 622 27,586 R 622 13,482 -12,860 28,208 2.20%

29 27,134 0 D 13,567 0 13,567 27,134 100.00%

30 622 25,851 R 622 12,615 -11,993 26,473 2.35%

31 622 26,799 R 622 13,089 -12,467 27,421 2.27%

32 622 25,850 R 622 12,614 -11,992 26,472 2.35%

33 24,760 0 D 12,380 0 12,380 24,760 100.00%

34 622 28,207 R 622 13,793 -13,171 28,829 2.16%

35 622 27,169 R 622 13,274 -12,652 27,791 2.24%

36 622 25,891 R 622 12,635 -12,013 26,513 2.35%

37 622 30,840 R 622 15,109 -14,487 31,462 1.98%

38 622 34,109 R 622 16,744 -16,122 34,731 1.79%

39 622 27,651 R 622 13,515 -12,893 28,273 2.20%

40 29,008 0 D 14,504 0 14,504 29,008 100.00%

41 29,904 0 D 14,952 0 14,952 29,904 100.00%

42 25,536 0 D 12,768 0 12,768 25,536 100.00%

43 622 25,642 R 622 12,510 -11,888 26,264 2.37%

44 27,363 0 D 13,682 0 13,682 27,363 100.00%

45 29,941 0 D 14,971 0 14,971 29,941 100.00%

29 Equal Districts Efficiency Gap

47 30,096 0 D 15,048 0 15,048 30,096 100.00%

48 33,297 0 D 16,649 0 16,649 33,297 100.00%

49 27,102 0 D 13,551 0 13,551 27,102 100.00%

50 622 25,376 R 622 12,377 -11,755 25,998 2.39%

51 28,083 0 D 14,042 0 14,042 28,083 100.00%

52 622 31,170 R 622 15,274 -14,652 31,792 1.96%

53 622 25,128 R 622 12,253 -11,631 25,750 2.42%

54 26,272 0 D 13,136 0 13,136 26,272 100.00%

55 622 28,243 R 622 13,811 -13,189 28,865 2.15%

56 622 26,449 R 622 12,914 -12,292 27,071 2.30%

57 27,913 0 D 13,957 0 13,957 27,913 100.00%

58 622 29,883 R 622 14,631 -14,009 30,505 2.04%

59 622 32,927 R 622 16,153 -15,531 33,549 1.85%

60 622 30,549 R 622 14,964 -14,342 31,171 2.00%

61 622 28,887 R 622 14,133 -13,511 29,509 2.11%

62 25,180 0 D 12,590 0 12,590 25,180 100.00%

63 25,542 0 D 12,771 0 12,771 25,542 100.00%

64 28,559 0 D 14,280 0 14,280 28,559 100.00%

65 622 31,915 R 622 15,647 -15,025 32,537 1.91%

66 22,648 0 D 11,324 0 11,324 22,648 100.00%

67 29,547 0 D 14,774 0 14,774 29,547 100.00%

68 622 23,460 R 622 11,419 -10,797 24,082 2.58%

69 29,924 0 D 14,962 0 14,962 29,924 100.00%

70 30,927 0 D 15,464 0 15,464 30,927 100.00%

71 28,965 0 D 14,483 0 14,483 28,965 100.00%

72 622 27,100 R 622 13,239 -12,617 27,722 2.24%

73 27,922 0 D 13,961 0 13,961 27,922 100.00%

74 31,931 0 D 15,966 0 15,966 31,931 100.00%

75 622 30,980 R 622 15,179 -14,557 31,602 1.97%

76 37,740 0 D 18,870 0 18,870 37,740 100.00%

77 32,767 0 D 16,384 0 16,384 32,767 100.00%

78 34,260 0 D 17,130 0 17,130 34,260 100.00%

79 33,733 0 D 16,867 0 16,867 33,733 100.00%

80 31,823 0 D 15,912 0 15,912 31,823 100.00%

81 26,444 0 D 13,222 0 13,222 26,444 100.00%

82 622 30,450 R 622 14,914 -14,292 31,072 2.00%

83 622 31,694 R 622 15,536 -14,914 32,316 1.92%

84 622 34,068 R 622 16,723 -16,101 34,690 1.79%

85 622 22,596 R 622 10,987 -10,365 23,218 2.68%

86 27,347 0 D 13,674 0 13,674 27,347 100.00%

87 622 27,739 R 622 13,559 -12,937 28,361 2.19%

88 25,351 0 D 12,676 0 12,676 25,351 100.00%

89 622 28,523 R 622 13,951 -13,329 29,145 2.13%

90 622 28,195 R 622 13,787 -13,165 28,817 2.16%

91 28,652 0 D 14,326 0 14,326 28,652 100.00%

92 29,501 0 D 14,751 0 14,751 29,501 100.00%

93 622 29,876 R 622 14,627 -14,005 30,498 2.04%

94 27,930 0 D 13,965 0 13,965 27,930 100.00%

95 29,718 0 D 14,859 0 14,859 29,718 100.00%

96 28,501 0 D 14,251 0 14,251 28,501 100.00%

97 622 35,092 R 622 17,235 -16,613 35,714 1.74%

98 622 34,015 R 622 16,697 -16,075 34,637 1.80%

30 Equal Districts Efficiency Gap

TOTALS 1,454,123 1,388,994 741,987 679,571 62,416 2,843,117

Total Total

Democratic Democratic Efficiency

Vote: Seats Gap:

51.145% 51 2.195%

31 Equal Districts Efficiency Gap

Table 4. Efficiency Gap Calculation for Demonstration Plan with Votes Shifted to Create 50-50 Districts

Assembly Democratic Republican Winning Democratic Republican Wasted District Democratic

District Votes Votes Party Votes Votes Votes Votes Vote

2 11,422 10,408 D 507 10,408 -9,901 21,830 52.32%

3 14,514 14,536 R 14,514 11 14,503 29,050 49.96%

4 11,825 11,846 R 11,825 11 11,815 23,671 49.96%

5 13,660 13,682 R 13,660 11 13,649 27,342 49.96%

6 14,325 14,347 R 14,325 11 14,314 28,672 49.96%

7 17,286 15,750 D 768 15,750 -14,983 33,036 52.32%

8 4,649 4,238 D 206 4,238 -4,032 8,887 52.32%

9 8,441 7,691 D 375 7,691 -7,316 16,132 52.32%

10 14,974 13,644 D 665 13,644 -12,979 28,618 52.32%

11 14,247 12,982 D 632 12,982 -12,350 27,229 52.32%

12 12,599 11,481 D 559 11,481 -10,921 24,080 52.32%

13 16,219 16,241 R 16,219 11 16,208 32,460 49.97%

14 13,676 13,698 R 13,676 11 13,665 27,374 49.96%

15 14,146 14,167 R 14,146 11 14,136 28,313 49.96%

16 12,605 11,485 D 560 11,485 -10,926 24,090 52.32%

17 13,258 12,080 D 589 12,080 -11,492 25,338 52.32%

18 15,053 13,718 D 668 13,718 -13,050 28,771 52.32%

19 13,638 12,426 D 606 12,426 -11,821 26,064 52.32%

20 14,137 12,882 D 627 12,882 -12,255 27,019 52.32%

21 14,573 14,595 R 14,573 11 14,562 29,168 49.96%

22 17,354 15,812 D 771 15,812 -15,042 33,166 52.32%

23 18,180 18,201 R 18,180 11 18,170 36,381 49.97%

24 17,257 17,278 R 17,257 11 17,247 34,535 49.97%

25 15,203 15,224 R 15,203 11 15,193 30,427 49.97%

26 13,878 13,900 R 13,878 11 13,867 27,778 49.96%

27 13,965 12,725 D 620 12,725 -12,105 26,690 52.32%

28 14,093 14,115 R 14,093 11 14,082 28,208 49.96%

29 14,197 12,937 D 630 12,937 -12,306 27,134 52.32%

30 13,226 13,247 R 13,226 11 13,216 26,473 49.96%

31 13,700 13,721 R 13,700 11 13,690 27,421 49.96%

32 13,225 13,247 R 13,225 11 13,214 26,472 49.96%

33 12,955 11,805 D 575 11,805 -11,229 24,760 52.32%

34 14,404 14,425 R 14,404 11 14,394 28,829 49.96%

35 13,885 13,906 R 13,885 11 13,875 27,791 49.96%

36 13,246 13,267 R 13,246 11 13,236 26,513 49.96%

37 15,720 15,742 R 15,720 11 15,709 31,462 49.97%

38 17,355 17,376 R 17,355 11 17,345 34,731 49.97%

39 14,126 14,147 R 14,126 11 14,116 28,273 49.96%

40 15,178 13,830 D 674 13,830 -13,156 29,008 52.32%

41 15,647 14,257 D 695 14,257 -13,562 29,904 52.32%

42 13,361 12,175 D 593 12,175 -11,581 25,536 52.32%

43 13,121 13,143 R 13,121 11 13,110 26,264 49.96%

44 14,317 13,046 D 635 13,046 -12,411 27,363 52.32%

45 15,666 14,275 D 695 14,275 -13,580 29,941 52.32%

32 Equal Districts Efficiency Gap

47 15,747 14,349 D 699 14,349 -13,649 30,096 52.32%

48 17,422 15,875 D 773 15,875 -15,102 33,297 52.32%

49 14,181 12,921 D 630 12,921 -12,292 27,102 52.32%

50 12,988 13,010 R 12,988 11 12,977 25,998 49.96%

51 14,693 13,390 D 652 13,390 -12,738 28,083 52.32%

52 15,885 15,907 R 15,885 11 15,874 31,792 49.97%

53 12,864 12,886 R 12,864 11 12,853 25,750 49.96%

54 13,746 12,526 D 610 12,526 -11,915 26,272 52.32%

55 14,422 14,443 R 14,422 11 14,412 28,865 49.96%

56 13,525 13,546 R 13,525 11 13,515 27,071 49.96%

57 14,605 13,308 D 648 13,308 -12,660 27,913 52.32%

58 15,242 15,263 R 15,242 11 15,232 30,505 49.97%

59 16,764 16,785 R 16,764 11 16,754 33,549 49.97%

60 15,575 15,596 R 15,575 11 15,565 31,171 49.97%

61 14,744 14,765 R 14,744 11 14,734 29,509 49.96%

62 13,175 12,005 D 585 12,005 -11,420 25,180 52.32%

63 13,364 12,178 D 593 12,178 -11,584 25,542 52.32%

64 14,943 13,616 D 663 13,616 -12,953 28,559 52.32%

65 16,258 16,279 R 16,258 11 16,248 32,537 49.97%

66 11,850 10,798 D 526 10,798 -10,272 22,648 52.32%

67 15,460 14,087 D 686 14,087 -13,401 29,547 52.32%

68 12,030 12,052 R 12,030 11 12,019 24,082 49.95%

69 15,657 14,267 D 695 14,267 -13,571 29,924 52.32%

70 16,182 14,745 D 718 14,745 -14,027 30,927 52.32%

71 15,155 13,810 D 672 13,810 -13,138 28,965 52.32%

72 13,850 13,872 R 13,850 11 13,839 27,722 49.96%

73 14,610 13,312 D 649 13,312 -12,663 27,922 52.32%

74 16,707 15,224 D 741 15,224 -14,483 31,931 52.32%

75 15,790 15,812 R 15,790 11 15,779 31,602 49.97%

76 19,747 17,993 D 877 17,993 -17,116 37,740 52.32%

77 17,144 15,623 D 761 15,623 -14,862 32,767 52.32%

78 17,926 16,334 D 796 16,334 -15,538 34,260 52.32%

79 17,650 16,083 D 783 16,083 -15,300 33,733 52.32%

80 16,650 15,173 D 739 15,173 -14,434 31,823 52.32%

81 13,836 12,608 D 614 12,608 -11,993 26,444 52.32%

82 15,525 15,547 R 15,525 11 15,514 31,072 49.96%

83 16,147 16,169 R 16,147 11 16,136 32,316 49.97%

84 17,334 17,356 R 17,334 11 17,323 34,690 49.97%

85 11,598 11,620 R 11,598 11 11,587 23,218 49.95%

86 14,308 13,039 D 635 13,039 -12,404 27,347 52.32%

87 14,170 14,191 R 14,170 11 14,160 28,361 49.96%

88 13,264 12,087 D 589 12,087 -11,498 25,351 52.32%

89 14,562 14,583 R 14,562 11 14,552 29,145 49.96%

90 14,398 14,419 R 14,398 11 14,388 28,817 49.96%

91 14,992 13,660 D 666 13,660 -12,995 28,652 52.32%

92 15,435 14,066 D 685 14,066 -13,381 29,501 52.32%

93 15,238 15,260 R 15,238 11 15,227 30,498 49.96%

94 14,614 13,316 D 649 13,316 -12,667 27,930 52.32%

95 15,549 14,169 D 690 14,169 -13,478 29,718 52.32%

96 14,912 13,589 D 662 13,589 -12,927 28,501 52.32%

97 17,846 17,868 R 17,846 11 17,835 35,714 49.97%

98 17,308 17,329 R 17,308 11 17,298 34,637 49.97%

33 Equal Districts Efficiency Gap

TOTALS 1,454,124 1,388,993 741,988 679,570 62,418 2,843,117

Total Total

Democratic Democratic Efficiency

Vote: Seats Gap:

51.145% 51 2.195%

34 Equal Districts Efficiency Gap

Table 5. Efficiency Gap Calculation for Demonstration Plan with Votes Shifted to Give Lower Turnout in

Democratic-Won Districts

Assembly Democratic Republican Winning Democratic Republican Wasted District Democratic

District Votes Votes Party Votes Votes Votes Votes Vote

2 9,444 8,020 D 712 8,020 -7,308 17,464 54.08%

3 13,499 21,381 R 13,499 3,941 9,559 34,880 38.70%

4 13,065 15,357 R 13,065 1,146 11,919 28,422 45.97%

5 16,206 16,624 R 16,206 209 15,997 32,830 49.36%

6 13,262 21,165 R 13,262 3,952 9,310 34,426 38.52%

7 18,258 8,171 D 5,043 8,171 -3,128 26,429 69.08%

8 5,754 1,356 D 2,199 1,356 843 7,110 80.93%

9 8,398 4,508 D 1,945 4,508 -2,563 12,906 65.07%

10 20,278 2,616 D 8,831 2,616 6,215 22,894 88.57%

11 17,899 3,884 D 7,008 3,884 3,124 21,783 82.17%

12 16,033 3,231 D 6,401 3,231 3,170 19,264 83.23%

13 19,151 19,824 R 19,151 336 18,815 38,975 49.14%

14 16,300 16,568 R 16,300 134 16,165 32,868 49.59%

15 16,104 17,892 R 16,104 894 15,210 33,995 47.37%

16 16,987 2,285 D 7,351 2,285 5,066 19,272 88.14%

17 17,415 2,855 D 7,280 2,855 4,425 20,270 85.91%

18 19,054 3,963 D 7,545 3,963 3,582 23,017 82.78%

19 12,128 8,723 D 1,702 8,723 -7,021 20,851 58.16%

20 11,294 10,321 D 487 10,321 -9,834 21,615 52.25%

21 14,717 20,305 R 14,717 2,794 11,923 35,022 42.02%

22 14,668 11,865 D 1,402 11,865 -10,463 26,533 55.28%

23 13,114 30,569 R 13,114 8,727 4,387 43,683 30.02%

24 10,406 31,060 R 10,406 10,327 80 41,466 25.10%

25 14,623 21,910 R 14,623 3,644 10,980 36,534 40.03%

26 15,910 17,443 R 15,910 766 15,144 33,353 47.70%

27 11,948 9,404 D 1,272 9,404 -8,132 21,352 55.96%

28 15,149 18,720 R 15,149 1,785 13,364 33,869 44.73%

29 11,344 10,363 D 490 10,363 -9,873 21,707 52.26%

30 13,578 18,209 R 13,578 2,316 11,262 31,786 42.72%

31 13,573 19,352 R 13,573 2,889 10,683 32,924 41.22%

32 15,231 16,554 R 15,231 662 14,569 31,785 47.92%

33 11,687 8,121 D 1,783 8,121 -6,338 19,808 59.00%

34 15,776 18,839 R 15,776 1,531 14,245 34,615 45.58%

35 13,554 19,815 R 13,554 3,131 10,423 33,369 40.62%

36 13,827 18,007 R 13,827 2,090 11,737 31,834 43.44%

37 11,073 26,704 R 11,073 7,815 3,257 37,776 29.31%

38 11,659 30,043 R 11,659 9,192 2,467 41,702 27.96%

39 12,904 21,043 R 12,904 4,070 8,834 33,947 38.01%

40 12,049 11,158 D 446 11,158 -10,712 23,206 51.92%

41 13,427 10,496 D 1,466 10,496 -9,030 23,923 56.13%

42 10,603 9,826 D 389 9,826 -9,437 20,429 51.90%

43 15,198 16,337 R 15,198 569 14,629 31,535 48.20%

44 13,182 8,709 D 2,236 8,709 -6,472 21,890 60.22%

35 Equal Districts Efficiency Gap

46 16,466 9,134 D 3,666 9,134 -5,468 25,601 64.32%

47 16,166 7,910 D 4,128 7,910 -3,782 24,077 67.15%

48 19,566 7,072 D 6,247 7,072 -825 26,638 73.45%

49 10,900 10,782 D 59 10,782 -10,722 21,682 50.27%

50 14,755 16,460 R 14,755 852 13,903 31,216 47.27%

51 11,808 10,658 D 575 10,658 -10,084 22,466 52.56%

52 14,860 23,313 R 14,860 4,226 10,633 38,173 38.93%

53 14,874 16,044 R 14,874 585 14,290 30,918 48.11%

54 11,226 9,792 D 717 9,792 -9,075 21,018 53.41%

55 16,287 18,371 R 16,287 1,042 15,246 34,658 46.99%

56 15,072 17,432 R 15,072 1,180 13,893 32,504 46.37%

57 11,918 10,413 D 752 10,413 -9,660 22,330 53.37%

58 11,197 25,431 R 11,197 7,117 4,079 36,627 30.57%

59 13,886 26,396 R 13,886 6,255 7,631 40,282 34.47%

60 10,513 26,914 R 10,513 8,200 2,313 37,427 28.09%

61 15,529 19,903 R 15,529 2,187 13,342 35,431 43.83%

62 12,145 7,999 D 2,073 7,999 -5,926 20,144 60.29%

63 12,512 7,922 D 2,295 7,922 -5,626 20,434 61.23%

64 12,071 10,776 D 648 10,776 -10,128 22,847 52.83%

65 15,274 23,793 R 15,274 4,259 11,015 39,067 39.10%

66 13,029 5,090 D 3,970 5,090 -1,120 18,118 71.91%

67 12,257 11,381 D 438 11,381 -10,943 23,638 51.85%

68 14,358 14,557 R 14,358 100 14,258 28,915 49.66%

69 14,322 9,618 D 2,352 9,618 -7,266 23,939 59.82%

70 14,929 9,813 D 2,558 9,813 -7,255 24,742 60.34%

71 12,065 11,107 D 479 11,107 -10,628 23,172 52.07%

72 13,424 19,862 R 13,424 3,219 10,205 33,286 40.33%

73 13,710 8,628 D 2,541 8,628 -6,087 22,338 61.37%

74 14,170 11,375 D 1,397 11,375 -9,978 25,545 55.47%

75 16,692 21,252 R 16,692 2,280 14,412 37,945 43.99%

76 24,743 5,449 D 9,647 5,449 4,198 30,192 81.95%

77 21,366 4,847 D 8,260 4,847 3,412 26,214 81.51%

78 19,530 7,878 D 5,826 7,878 -2,051 27,408 71.26%

79 16,351 10,635 D 2,858 10,635 -7,777 26,986 60.59%

80 16,143 9,315 D 3,414 9,315 -5,901 25,458 63.41%

81 10,962 10,193 D 385 10,193 -9,808 21,155 51.82%

82 11,852 25,456 R 11,852 6,802 5,050 37,308 31.77%

83 11,096 27,706 R 11,096 8,305 2,790 38,802 28.60%

84 14,396 27,256 R 14,396 6,430 7,967 41,652 34.56%

85 12,041 15,837 R 12,041 1,898 10,142 27,878 43.19%

86 11,082 10,795 D 144 10,795 -10,652 21,878 50.66%

87 13,638 20,416 R 13,638 3,389 10,249 34,053 40.05%

88 11,367 8,914 D 1,227 8,914 -7,687 20,281 56.05%

89 16,058 18,936 R 16,058 1,439 14,619 34,994 45.89%

90 13,627 20,974 R 13,627 3,674 9,953 34,601 39.38%

91 11,846 11,076 D 385 11,076 -10,691 22,922 51.68%

92 11,926 11,675 D 125 11,675 -11,550 23,601 50.53%

93 14,938 21,681 R 14,938 3,372 11,566 36,619 40.79%

94 12,937 9,407 D 1,765 9,407 -7,642 22,344 57.90%

95 15,815 7,959 D 3,928 7,959 -4,031 23,774 66.52%

96 11,732 11,069 D 332 11,069 -10,737 22,801 51.45%

97 13,798 29,083 R 13,798 7,642 6,156 42,882 32.18%

98 11,844 29,745 R 11,844 8,951 2,893 41,589 28.48%

36 Equal Districts Efficiency Gap

TOTALS 1,390,348 1,452,677 820,639 600,873 219,766 2,843,025

Total Total

Democratic Democratic Efficiency

Vote: Seats Gap:

48.904% 51 7.730%

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