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42 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 797

Columbia Human Rights Law Review

Spring, 2011




Valentina S. Vadi [FNa1]

Copyright © 2011 by the Columbia Human Rights Law Review; Valentina S. Vadi

I. INTRODUCTION ........................................................... 798

A. The Notion of Indigeneity ........................................ 803
B. World Cultural Heritage or Indigenous Cultural Heritage? ......... 805
C. The International Protection of Indigenous Cultural Heritage ..... 808
D. Cultural Entitlements as a Fundamental Part of Indigenous
Peoples' Rights ......................................................... 818
III. INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW ......................................... 822
A. Substantive Standards of Protection .............................. 822
B. Investor-State Arbitration ....................................... 825
C. Emerging Issues .................................................. 830
CULTURE ................................................................. 835
V. CASE STUDIES ........................................................... 837
A. Expropriation Claims ............................................. 837
B. Fair and Equitable Treatment ..................................... 844
C. Discrimination ................................................... 847
D. Full Protection and Security ..................................... 853
VI. DE LEGE LATA .......................................................... 855
A. The Applicable Law ............................................... 855
B. Treaty Interpretation ............................................ 865
VII. RENEGOTIATING INVESTMENT TREATIES .................................... 868
B. Cultural Impact Assessments ...................................... 873
C. Moving towards the Cautious Judicialization of the Arbitral
Process ................................................................. 877
VIII. CONCLUSION .......................................................... 886

The protection of cultural heritage has profound significance for human dignity and assumes
particular importance with regard to indigenous peoples. Although the recognition of indigenous
peoples' rights and cultural heritage has gained some momentum in international law since the
adoption of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
(UNDRIP), [FN1] states have interpreted the right to develop "on their own terms" in order
to *799prosper "as they see fit." [FN2] Meanwhile an international economic culturehas emerged
that "cuts across traditional cultural divides" [FN3] and emphasizes productivity and economic
development. [FN4] Development is considered "a transformation of society, a movement
from traditional relations,traditional ways of thinking, traditional ways of dealing with health and
education, traditional methods of production, to more 'modern' ways." [FN5]Conceptualizing
economic progress as "a process of successive upgrading," economists have highlighted the pressures
on societies to adopt a productive economic culture and the "growing convergence around the
productivity paradigm." [FN6]
Because policymakers tend to favor growth, regardless of actual or potential infringement
of cultural entitlements, "existing laws frequently fail to strike a balance between economic
development" and indigenous peoples' rights. [FN7]As a result, indigenous peoples suffer the
consequences of a regime that favors, for example, mining over the environment and
indigenous culture. As one scholar points out, "the incorporation of culture into development
processes remains unclear, and there is no agreed model for describing how this should
occur." [FN8] However, the protection of cultural diversity has profound significance: not only
is cultural diversity conceived of as a "rich asset for individuals and societies" but its
protection *800 and promotion are "an essential requirement for sustainable development." [FN9]
While the clash between economic development and indigenous peoples' rights is by no means
new, [FN10] this Article approaches this well-known theme from a new perspective by *801 focusing
on international investment law and arbitration. This Article explores the way in which international
investment treaties and arbitral tribunals have dealt with indigenous peoples' rights. This research is
timely as in the past decade there has been a boom of investor-state arbitration which is contributing
significantly to the development of international law. [FN11] While the traditional focus of investment
lawyers has been the analysis of the relevant investment law provisions, little, if any, research has
focused on the substantive interplay between indigenous peoples' rights and investor's rights in
international investment law and arbitration. Only recently have legal commentators begun to analyze
and critically assess the substantive interplay between different international law regimes in
investment treaty law and arbitration. [FN12] Among these pioneering works, however, specific focus
on indigenous peoples' rights is missing. This Article aims to fill this existing lacuna in contemporary
legal studies.
The key questions are whether international investment law has embraced a pure international
economic culture or whether it is open to encapsulate non-economic or cultural concerns in its modus
operandi. Until recently, international investment law had developed only limited tools for the
protection of cultural heritage through investment dispute settlement. [FN13] However, recent arbitral
awards have shown an increasing awareness of the need to protect cultural heritage within investment
disputes. Increasingly, arbitrators have not only considered non-investment related values in the
context of investment disputes, but have also balanced the different values at stake. [FN14] Is this
adjudicative model adequate to deal with indigenous peoples' rights?
*802 This Article will proceed as follows. Part II provides a brief description and assessment of
the emergence of international norms protecting indigenous cultural heritage. Part III describes the
investment law framework, investor-state arbitration, and relevant emerging issues. Parts IV and V
scrutinize the conflict of norms protecting indigenous cultural heritage and norms of investment with
reference to relevant cases. Indigenous peoples' rights have played only a marginal role in the context
of investor-state arbitration; affected indigenous peoples have virtually no legal standing in these
procedures and have made use of only limited participatory procedures. Their limited role is inversely
proportional to the number of arbitrations that have involved indigenous peoples' rights.
Parts VI and VII offer recommendations that would better reconcile the different interests at stake
and thereby ensure the protection of indigenous peoples' rights in the context of investor-state
arbitrations. A moderate judicialization of the arbitral process through increased transparency and
openness may ensure better participation in proceedings by indigenous peoples' representatives.
However, an extreme judicialization of the arbitral process is not desirable as it would ultimately
undermine the rationale underlying investor-state arbitration. Under international law, states have the
duty to protect indigenous peoples' rights, and other dispute settlement mechanisms are available
which may ensure indigenous peoples' access to justice. If foreign investors challenge state measures
furthering indigenous peoples' rights before tribunals, human rights considerations cannot be
dismissed by arbitral tribunals as irrelevant. Even where states do not make reference to their human
rights obligations, it may be questioned whether arbitrators could dismiss international public policy in
the context of the proceedings. In the exercise of the judicial function, arbitrators need to take
international law into account. If norms external to international investment law come to the fore, the
arbitrators may take them into account albeit incidenter tantum. Part VIII concludes.


Cultural sovereignty, meaning the freedom of any state to choose its cultural model, has
traditionally fallen within the domestic *803 jurisdiction of the state. [FN15] Nonetheless, in the past
sixty years there has been a gradual erosion of the domain reservé of the states in the cultural
sector, [FN16] due to the emergence and codification of human rights law and international cultural
law. [FN17] This part discusses how and to what extent indigenous cultural heritage is protected
under international law.
This part is organized as follows: first, it investigates the notion of indigeneity; second, it
scrutinizes the notion of cultural heritage in general and the specific notion of indigenous cultural
heritage; third, it examines the international law instruments protecting indigenous cultural heritage;
and fourth, it addresses whether a norm of customary international law requires the protection of
indigenous cultural heritage. The evolution of legal opinion and state practice has led many to
conclude that "some indigenous rights have attained the status of customary international law,
therefore, binding statesregardless of whether they have ratified the relevant treaties." [FN18] Finally,
it concludes that cultural entitlements are a significant component of indigenous peoples' rights and
complement their other human rights.

A. The Notion of Indigeneity

While indigeneity is already "a term of art in the politics and philosophy of cultural rights and the
rights of First Peoples," [FN19] its meaning is unclear. No single definition of indigenous peoples exists
as the existing legal instruments do not share any common approach. *804 Literally, indigeneity
indicates the quality of being indigenous, born in a land or region, native, or belonging to the
region. [FN20] While the UNDRIP does not define indigeneity, two notions of indigeneity are found in
the International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention 169 and in the Martinéz-Cobo Report to the
UN Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination of Minorities (hereinafter Martinéz-Cobo
Report). ILO Convention 169 applies to peoples regarded as indigenous on account of their descent
from the populations that inhabited a country at the time of conquest or colonization who retain some
or all of their social, economic, cultural and political institutions. [FN21] Self-identification of a group
as indigenous or tribal is regarded as a fundamental criterion. [FN22] The Martinez-Cobo Report
provides a slightly different definition, [FN23] but it also emphasizes the importance of objective and
subjective elements of indigeneity.
The objective elements of indigeneity are made up by a historical link with a certain
territory [FN24] and a characteristic social structure. With regard to the former, while ILO Convention
169 refers to descent from the populations that inhabited a country at the time of conquest or
colonization; the Martinez-Cobo Report refers to *805 "a historical continuity with pre-invasion and
pre-colonial societies that developed on their territories." [FN25] With regard to the peculiar social
structure, ILO Convention 169 refers to peoples that "retain some or all of their social, economic,
cultural and political institutions." [FN26] Similarly, the Martinez-Cobo Report mentions specific
"cultural patterns, social institutions and legal systems." [FN27]
The subjective element of indigeneity is made up by the way indigenous peoples define and
consider themselves, i.e. selfidentification of a group as indigenous or tribal. The Martinez-Cobo
Report mentions the fact that indigenous peoples "consider themselves distinct from other sectors of
society"[FN28] and "are determined to preserve, develop and transmit to future generations their
ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their continued existence as
peoples." [FN29] The UNDRIP states that "[i]ndigenous peoples have the right to determine their own
identity or membership in accordance with their customs and traditions." [FN30]

B. World Cultural Heritage or Indigenous Cultural Heritage?

This part scrutinizes cultural heritage and the specific notion of indigenous cultural heritage. It also
addresses whether some elements of indigenous cultural heritage have been considered world
heritage under the 1972 World Heritage Convention (hereinafter WHO, which has been widely adopted
and imposes binding obligations on States Parties. It further discusses whether the elements of
indigenous cultural heritage that do not fulfill the criteria for being considered world heritage (and thus
added to the World Heritage List) [FN31]receive adequate, if any, protection under international
cultural law. This scrutiny is important because arbitral tribunals have made reference to international
cultural law in resolving investor-state disputes. [FN32]
*806 Cultural heritage may be defined as "the totality of cultural objects, traditions, knowledge
and skills that a given nation or community has inherited by way of learning processes from previous
generations and which provides its sense of identity to be transmitted to subsequent
generations." [FN33] The concept of cultural heritage was officially recognized in the
WHC. [FN34] Earlier treaties did not use the term "heritage" but rather the narrower concept of
"cultural property." [FN35] The change was due to the conceptual necessity of bringing together
natural sites and cultural properties of outstanding and universal value. The holistic approach taken by
the WHC was followed by subsequent treaties and international legal instruments, and resulted in a
further conceptual shift. [FN36] The concept of "heritage" is distinguished from that of "property" as it
has a collective and public character, [FN37] and connotes legacy irrespective of ownership. [FN38]
Indigenous cultural heritage is a more specific concept which comprises "all objects, sites and
knowledge the nature of use of which has been transmitted from generation to generation, and which
is regarded as pertaining to a particular people or its
territory." [FN39] *807 Indigenous cultural heritage includes both material manifestations, such as
burial sites and rock and cave paintings, and immaterial elements, including traditional knowledge
andcultural expressions, oral traditions, literature, designs, and visual and performing
arts. [FN40] However, for indigenous peoples the distinction between these two categories of
"cultural heritage" is artificial: "They see the land and the sea, all of the sites they contain and the
knowledge and the laws associated with those sites as a single entity that must be protected as a
whole ...." [FN41] Because of this holistic approach of indigenous peoples, a U.N. study insists that "all
elements of heritage should be managed and protected as a single, interrelated and integrated
whole." [FN42]
Given that "all peoples contribute to the diversity and richness of civilizations and cultures, which
constitute the common heritage of humankind," [FN43]indigenous cultural heritage deserves
protection because it uniquely contributes to cultural diversity. Some indigenous cultural sites are
deemed to have outstanding universal value and have been included in the World Heritage
List.[FN44] For these indigenous cultural sites, the dichotomy global v. local is of no relevance.
However, the overwhelming majority of indigenous cultural heritage is not included in the World
Heritage List. [FN45] In this sense one may wonder whether the dichotomies global v. local and
international v. indigenous create a barrier to the adequate protection of indigenous heritage at the
international law level. Simply because indigenous cultural heritage does not correspond to the
Western vision of beauty or culture or is not publicly disclosed may determine an inappropriate
categorization of indigenous *808 cultural heritage as "irrelevant." [FN46] Only rarely has indigenous
cultural heritage been recognized as world heritage; nonetheless, even in those cases in which
indigenous heritage does not receive protection under international cultural law, other international
instruments demand its protection. The next part will explore the current legal framework which
governs indigenous cultural heritage at the international law level.

C. The International Protection of Indigenous Cultural Heritage

International law does not provide a unified and comprehensive instrument to protect indigenous
cultural heritage. Instead a series of international law instruments provide a fragmented solution to
the need of protecting indigenousculture. Five streams of international law instruments protecting
indigenous cultural heritage can be identified: (1) human rights instruments of general
application, [FN47] (2) environmental law instruments, (3) United Nations Educational, Scientific, and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) instruments protecting cultural heritage and cultural diversity, (4)
specific instruments on indigenous rights, and (5) certain World Bank policies. Whether some of these
norms have been crystallized in customary international law is also discussed, since customary law is
binding upon states irrespective of consent. [FN48]
In general terms, human rights provisions requiring the protection of cultural rights also require
the protection of cultural heritage. [FN49] Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) provides: "In those States in which ethnic, *809 religious or linguistic minorities exist,
persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other
members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to
use their own language." [FN50] The Human Rights Committee [FN51] has interpreted ICCPR Article
27 as protecting indigenous culture. [FN52] In the Lubikon Lake Band case, the failure of the Canadian
government to adequately address the Band's need for a stable land base, in combination with the
granting of large-scale concessions for the exploitation of timber, gas, and oil in the Band's
traditional territory, was found to amount to a violation of Article 27. [FN53] These activities
effectively destroyed the Band's traditional hunting and trapping grounds, thus threatening the Band's
way of life and culture. [FN54] In Länman v. Finland, limited quarrying on the slopes of a mountain
was not deemed to jeopardize the applicant's cultural rights. [FN55] However, it was held that if
mining *810activities were approved on a large scale, they could give rise to a violation of ICCPR
Article 27. [FN56]
Similarly, Article 30 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child provides:
In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities or persons of indigenous origin
exist, a child belonging to such a minority or who is indigenous shall not be denied the right, in
community with other members of his or her group, to enjoy his or her own culture, to profess and
practise his or her own religion, or to use his or her own language. [FN57]
Likewise, in its General Recommendation No. 23 on indigenous peoples,[FN58] the Committee on
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination affirmed that "discrimination against indigenous peoples falls
under the scope of the Convention" [FN59] and called upon States Parties to "[r]ecognize and respect
indigenous distinct culture, history, language and way of life as an enrichment of the State's cultural
identity and to promote its preservation." [FN60]
At the regional level, the Organization of American States (OAS) has taken the lead in elaborating
indigenous peoples' rights and contextualizing them in the broader human rights
framework. [FN61] *811 In Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights held that failure to address indigenous land claims before granting
concessions to exploit natural resources violated the rights of the Mayagna to their property,
recognizing the linkage between indigenous land rights and the Mayagnas' cultural survival. [FN62]
A number of environmental law instruments refer to indigenous peoples' culture. Principle 22 of
the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development provides, inter alia, that "[s]tates should
recognize and duly support their identity, culture and interests and enable their effective participation
in the achievement of sustainable development." [FN63] Agenda 21 [FN64] exhorts governments to
protect indigenous lands from environmentally unsound activities, or activities that indigenous peoples
consider to be culturally inappropriate, [FN65] and to recognize that "traditional and direct
dependence on renewable resources and ecosystems, including sustainable harvesting, continues to
be essential to the cultural, economic and physical well-being of indigenous peoples and their
communities." [FN66] The Convention on Biological Diversity also refers to "traditional cultural
practices." [FN67]
Several UNESCO conventions protect cultural heritage and cultural diversity. First and foremost,
the WHC protects natural and *812 cultural properties of outstanding and universal
value. [FN68] Although a number of indigenous cultural sites are inscribed in the World Heritage List,
a series of criticisms have been raised with regard to the WHC's approach. First, some commentators
criticize it as elitist because the WHC only protects those sites of outstanding, universal value and thus
makes artificial distinctions between local value and universal value. [FN69] It is difficult to draw a line
between what has universal value and what has mere local value. Although certain sites may look
ordinary, they may be extraordinary from a cultural perspective.
Second, the WHC's listing approach generally protects only those sites expressly designated by the
Member States and selected by the World Heritage Committee. While in exceptional circumstances,
the addition of sites to the list depends on the application of objective considerations, [FN70] listing
usually depends on the political willingness of governmental institutions to designate a given area in
for listing. For instance, although the island of Diego Garcia, a U.K. British Indian Territory which hosts
a U.S. military base, might well be included in the World Heritage List because of its naturalistic
features, [FN71]the WHC does not territorially apply to the Chagos archipelago. [FN72] It is
improbable that the status of the *813 archipelago will change in the future, due to defense
reasons. [FN73] The nomination process may also depend upon economic considerations. [FN74] The
controversy which surrounded the listing of the Kakadu National Park in Australia illustrates how
powerful economic interests may endanger indigenous heritage sites. Kakadu was ultimately listed in
the World Heritage List because of its ecological value and scenic beauty, but also for its cultural
significance as it contains Aboriginal rock art and spiritual places. [FN75] The controversy erupted
because sections of the park undergoing the listing process had "valuable mineral
potential." [FN76] Investors attempted to block the listing of these parts of the park, filing suits in the
Federal and High Courts, [FN77] and they were opposed by non-governmental organizations and the
Mirrar Aboriginal people, who wanted to block the mining because it was having an irreversible impact
on Aboriginal cultural heritage. [FN78] In response to international pressure, the federal government
decided not to permit mining in most of the park and to include the entire park on the World Heritage
Third, while Article 12 of the WHC requires Member States to protect those cultural properties
that, although not included on the list, objectively satisfy the conditions and requirements for being
considered as having outstanding and universal value, this provision has been all but ignored in the
concrete application of the Convention. [FN80] The weakness of this provision lies in the fact that it is
up to the states to identify those properties which objectively satisfy the conditions and requirements
for being considered of outstanding*814 and universal value. As Lenzerini points out. "a given
property may actually be of outstanding universal value even in the event that it is not considered as
having such value by the government of the territory in which it is located." [FN81]
Other UNESCO Conventions protecting indigenous cultural heritage are the UNESCO Convention
on Intangible Cultural Heritage [FN82] and the Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the
Diversity of Cultural Expressions.[FN83] The former protects intangible cultural heritage meant as
"the practices, representations, expressions, knowledge, skills--as well as the instruments, objects,
artefacts and cultural spaces associated therewith--that communities, groups and, in some cases,
individuals recognize as part of their culturalheritage." [FN84] The convention acknowledges the
dynamic nature of intangiblecultural heritage [FN85] and protects only that heritage that respects
human rights. [FN86] The Convention on Cultural Diversity conceives cultural diversity as "a
common heritage of humanity" that "should be cherished and preserved for the benefit *815 of all"
and recognizes "the importance of traditionalknowledge as a source of intangible and material
wealth, and in particular the knowledge systems of indigenous peoples, and its positive contribution to
sustainable development, as well as the need for its adequate protection and promotion." [FN87] Both
conventions are of particular significance for the protection of indigenous peoples' intangible cultural
heritage [FN88] and identity.
More specific instruments on indigenous peoples also refer to their cultural heritage. For instance,
ILO Convention 169 requires governments to recognize and respect the special spiritual, cultural, and
economic relationship that indigenous peoples have with their lands and territories. [FN89] The
UNDRIP states that indigenous peoples have "the right to maintain, protect, and have access in
privacy to their religious and cultural sites" [FN90] and the right "to designate and retain their own
names for communities, places and persons."[FN91] Further, it recognizes the dignity and diversity of
indigenous peoples' culture and their right to maintain their distinctive spiritual and material
relationship with the land which they have traditionally owned, occupied, or otherwise used. [FN92]
*816 Even the World Bank has recognized how the lack of adequate protection of indigenous land
may affect such peoples' physical and cultural integrity, [FN93] and it acknowledged that "indigenous
peoples require special attention, as they are particularly vulnerable to negative effects caused by
Bank-funded activities." [FN94] In this sense, it has adopted a number of policy statements in the
attempt to provide safeguards for indigenous peoples. For instance, both Operational Directive 4.20 on
Indigenous Peoples and itssuccessor, Operational Policy 4.10 on Indigenous Peoples, recognize the
need "to ensure that the development process fosters full respect for [indigenous peoples'] dignity,
human rights and cultural uniqueness." [FN95]Notwithstanding the adoption of these instruments,
"internal reviews as well as frequent complaints by indigenous peoples repeatedly demonstrate that
compliance failure rates are far beyond acceptable." [FN96]
In sum, the combined development of human rights law, environmental law, and international
cultural law has contributed to the consolidation of erga omnes obligations, i.e. obligations that are
owed by a state to the international community as a whole rather than to another specific state
according to the traditional reciprocity paradigm of international law. Not only do states owe the
international community the duty to cooperate in the preservation of *817 the environment, but also
the duty to abstain from the destruction in their territory of cultural heritage of great importance for
humanity [FN97] or from preventing religious or cultural minorities from enacting, performing, and
developing their living heritage. [FN98]
As the protection of cultural heritage is now called for by a patchwork of international law
instruments, some authors have argued that an emerging norm of customary law requires states to
protect cultural heritage. [FN99] This argument is also based on the belief that the protection of
cultural heritage is firmly linked to the protection of fundamental human rights. [FN100] Although not
all of the existing legal instruments are formally binding on states, they may contribute to the
formation of the opinio juris. [FN101] However, state practice is far from uniform. The question as to
whether a customary *818 norm requiring the protection of cultural heritage already exists is far from
settled, but it appears such a norm is gradually emerging.
More specifically, with regard to indigenous cultural heritage, the evolution of legal opinion and
state practice has led many to conclude that customary international law already includes a norm
recognizing, inter alia, that indigenous peoples are entitled to maintain and develop their distinct
cultural identity, spirituality, their language, and traditional ways of life. [FN102] As Anaya puts it,
"significant international legal developments provide evidence that customary international law has
accepted the: right of cultural self-determination for indigenous peoples and the consequent
autonomous control necessary to achieve that." [FN103]

D. Cultural Entitlements as a Fundamental Part of Indigenous Peoples' Rights

Cultural entitlements of indigenous peoples are deeply linked to their other human rights,
especially the right of self-determination. [FN104] Self-determination can be defined as the right of
peoples to "freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural
development." [FN105] Following the wave of decolonization, self-determination has been defined as
an erga omnes obligation. [FN106] With regard to indigenous peoples, the *819 recently enacted
U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples enshrines the right of self-determination as its
overarching normative commitment. It declares that "indigenous peoples have the right of self-
determination" and states that "by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and
freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development." [FN107] Although not binding, the
UNDRIP is seen as a landmark development in solidifying the rights of indigenous peoples in
international law. As Scheinin points out, indigenous peoples "are peoples among peoples and hence
entitled to the right of self-determination." [FN108]
While Article 3 of the U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples recognizes indigenous
peoples' full and unqualified right to self-determination,[FN109] Article 46(1) repeats the usual caveat
of territorial integrity. [FN110]This apparent contradiction epitomizes the classic dilemma posed by
self-determination: "Any examination of self-determination runs promptly into the difficulty that while
the concept lends itself to simple formulation in words ... when the time comes to put it into operation
it turns out to be a complex matter hedged by limitations and caveats." [FN111] In *820 other words,
UNDRIP Article 3, when read in conjunction with Article 46(1), has been interpreted to require
indigenous peoples to exercise their right to self-determination through the state legal
systems. [FN112] According to Scheinin, "[t]he right of all peoples to self-determination as a norm of
international law does not entail that every group that constitutes a people would have the right to
establish its own state and unilaterally secede from an existing, possibly multi-ethnic,
state." [FN113] The right of self-determination does not authorize secession and the formation of a
new state unless the existing state fails to respect indigenous peoples' rights [FN114] "under
particular conditions such as military occupation, colonial domination [or] other forms of oppression
that result in the denial of effective participation and other human rights." [FN115]Cassese similarly
concludes that secession as a form of self-determination may be attempted "when it is apparent that
internal self-determination is absolutely beyond reach." [FN116] In the Quebec Secession case, the
Canadian Supreme Court found that "when a people is blocked from the meaningful exercise of its
right to self-determination internally, it is entitled, as a last resort, to exercise it by
secession." [FN117] In this sense, Vrdoljak stresses that "[i]n such cases, the exercise of self-
determination as secession becomes the ultimate mechanism for protecting group identity and the
cultural rights of its members."[FN118]
*821 Cultural entitlements and self-determination are not mutually exclusive but rather reinforce
each other. [FN119] While cultural entitlements and theright to self-determination are conceptually
different, [FN120] cultural entitlements promote self-determination by enabling indigenous people to
"freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development." [FN121]Furthermore, the two
normative concepts may overlap if adequate conditions for the existence and identity of the group as a
whole are not ensured. When addressing the right of indigenous peoples to self-determination, the
Human Rights Committee has emphasized the importance of the right's cultural dimension. [FN122] In
turn, the right to self-determination has been relevant in the interpretation of the provision concerning
cultural rights. [FN123] Thus, in 2006, the Human Rights Committee called on the United States to
take further steps to secure the right of all indigenous peoples under ICCPR Article 1 to exercise
greater decision making on matters affecting culture. [FN124]
The law of foreign investment is one of the oldest and most complex areas of international law.
Over the past forty years, foreign direct investment (FDI) has grown to surpass the capital flows
resulting from trade. [FN125] Therefore, the legal framework needed to govern FDI has gained pre-
eminence in international law. More than three thousand investment treaties govern foreign
investments and provide foreign investors with direct access to international
arbitration.[FN126] Investment treaties provide extensive protection to investor rights[FN127] in
order to encourage FDI and foster economic development.

A. Substantive Standards of Protection

While investment treaties differ in their details, their scope and content have been standardized
over the years, as negotiations have been characterized by an ongoing sharing and borrowing of
concepts. [FN128] Some commentators have noted the development of a common lexicon of
investment treaty law.[FN129] The inclusion of a most favored nation (MFN) clause in most bilateral
investment treaties (BITs) drives convergence in treaty drafting. At the substantive
level, [FN130] investment treaties typically define the scope of FDI and *823 provide protection
against discrimination, fair and equitable treatment, full protection and security, treatment no less
favorable than required by customary international law, and assurances that the host country will
honor its commitments regarding the investment (the so-called "umbrella clause"). [FN131] Other
common provisions in investment treaties concern the repatriation of profits and prohibit currency
controls worse than those originally in place when the treaty was signed. [FN132] Investment treaties
generally guarantee compensation in the event of nationalization, expropriation, or indirect
expropriation, and clarify what level of compensation will be owed in such cases. [FN133] A small
number of investment treaties also include provisions prohibiting certain forms of performance
requirements. [FN134]
*824 Treaty provisions lack precise definition of these standards and their language encompasses
a potentially wide variety of state regulations that may interfere with investors' property rights.
Therefore, a potential tension exists when a State adopts regulatory measures interfering with foreign
investments, as regulation may be deemed to violate substantive standards of treatment under
investment treaties and the foreign investor may demand compensation before arbitral tribunals. For
instance, there is no settled approach in cases where investors allege that certain regulatory measures
constitute a compensable form of expropriation. [FN135] The concept of expropriation is broadly
construed in investment treaties which not only protect foreign assets from direct and full taking of
property but also from de facto or indirect expropriation. [FN136]

*825 B. Investor-State Arbitration

At the procedural level, BITs provide investors direct access to an international arbitral tribunal. In
so doing, BITs create a set of procedural rights for the direct benefit of investors, although individual
investors are not party to the treaties. [FN137] This is a major novelty in international law, as
customarily international law does not provide such a mechanism. Investor-state arbitration has
become a standard feature in international investment treaties since the 1980s. [FN138] The rationale
for internationalizing investor-state disputes lies in the assumed independence and impartiality of
international arbitral tribunals, while national dispute settlement procedures are often perceived as
biased or inadequate. [FN139] Arbitration is also used because of perceived advantages in
confidentiality and effectiveness. [FN140]
*826 The arbitral process in investment arbitration presents some characteristics similar to those
in a typical international commercial arbitration.[FN141] The composition of the tribunal is determined
by the parties who generally choose legal scholars or professionals. Although the right to choose an
arbitrator may be considered the very essence of arbitration, [FN142] this practice may be
problematic from a public policy perspective. [FN143] As one scholar explains, while arbitrators
are expected to be both independent of the party appointing them and impartial ... it is usually
conceded that without violating in any way this theoretical obligation of independence, the arbitrator
may quite acceptably share the nationality, or political or economic philosophy, or "legal culture" of
the party who has nominated him--and may therefore be supposed from the very beginning to be
"sympathetic" to that party's contentions or "favorably disposed" to its positions. [FN144]
Confidentiality is one of the main features of arbitral proceedings as generally hearings are held in
camera and documents submitted by the parties remain confidential in principle. [FN145] Final awards
may not be published, depending on the parties' will. [FN146] Even the names of the parties and
much less the details of the dispute may *827 not be disclosed. [FN147] While confidentiality well
suits commercial disputes, it may be problematic in investor-state arbitration, because arbitral
tribunals can order states to compensate investors for regulations that hurt them. The lack of
transparency may hamper efforts to track investment treaty disputes, monitor their frequency,
determine whether they settled, and to assess the policy implications that flow
therefrom.[FN148] Importantly, as a judge once stated, writing in the context of whether the mere
appearance of impropriety warranted reversal, "it is not merely of some importance but is of
fundamental importance that justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly
be seen to be done." [FN149]
In recent years, efforts to make investment arbitration more transparent have been undertaken in
various fora. In response to calls from civil society groups, the three parties to the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Canada, the United States, and Mexico, have pledged to disclose all
NAFTA arbitrations and open future arbitration hearings to the public. [FN150] Similarly, the
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) requires public disclosure of
dispute proceedings under its auspices. [FN151]Increasingly, investment arbitration tribunals
have *828 allowed public interest groups to present amicus curiae briefs or have access to the
arbitral process.[FN152] ICSID Rules have undergone amendments, and now also grant ICSID
Tribunals discretion to allow interested third parties to make written submissions in arbitral
proceedings. [FN153] These important developments, however, involve the conduct of the
proceedings of a limited number of investment disputes. Indeed, the vast majority of existing treaties
do not mandate such transparency, which means that most of the proceedings are resolved behind
closed doors.
Finally, awards rendered against host states are, in theory, readily enforceable against host state
property worldwide, due to the *829 widespread adoption of the New York [FN154] and Washington
Conventions. [FN155] Under the New York Convention, the recognition and enforcement of the award
may be refused only on limited grounds. [FN156] Arbitration under the ICSID rules is wholly
exempted from the supervision of local courts, with awards subject only to an internal annulment
process. [FN157] If arbitration is sited in a country other than the host state, then there may be no
capacity whatsoever for the host government to challenge the award in its own legal system. [FN158]

*830 C. Emerging Issues

Given the characteristics of the arbitral process, significant issues arise in the context of disputes
involving indigenous cultural heritage. The first issue is whether indigenous cultural heritage and
indigenous peoples' rights can be protected within a framework aimed primarily at protecting private
interests. While arbitration structurally constitutes a private model of adjudication, investment treaty
arbitration can be viewed as public law adjudication. [FN159]Arbitral awards ultimately shape the
relationship between the state, on the one hand, and private individuals on the
other. [FN160] Arbitrators determine matters such as the legality of governmental activity, the degree
to which individuals should be protected from regulation, and the appropriate role of the
state. [FN161] As cultural heritage is a shared interest of humanity, it not only involves the interests
of the parties but also those of the international community as a whole. In cases involving indigenous
cultural heritage, one may wonder whether investment arbitration provides an adequate forum.
The second issue concerns the arbitrators' expertise and their sense of independence. With regard
to expertise, the arbitral community is made up of some of the most reputed scholars. [FN162] Still,
because investor-state arbitration often involves administrative and even constitutional law, public law
expertise is sometimes necessary. *831 Is a specific expertise in indigenous peoples' rights a
desirable criterion for selecting arbitrators in disputes involving indigenous peoples? In the Grand
River case, a dispute concerning taxation of tobacco products and whether the traditional production
of tobacco products by Canadian indigenous tribe can be considered a cultural practice, [FN163] the
United States unsuccessfully challenged the service of an arbitrator, Professor James Anaya, because
of his previous human rights advocacy. [FN164] Besides being Professor of Human Rights Law and
Policy at the University of Arizona, Anaya is one of the top experts in international human rights and
indigenous peoples' law, and currently serves as the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the
situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous peoples.[FN165] Since Professor
Anaya represented or assisted indigenous parties in human rights matters, the U.S. State Department
alleged that this advocacy would raise doubts as to his independence or impartiality in the present
case.[FN166] Professor Anaya subsequently informed ICSID that he viewed his previous work on
indigenous peoples' rights as unrelated to the subject matter of the NAFTA claim and that he would
continue to teach students at the University of Arizona. Ultimately, Ana Palacio, the former ICSID
Secretary General, distinguished his earlier human rights work and current role as a professor of law:
"the former requires advocacy of a position; the latter involves instruction and
mentoring." [FN167] Thus, Professor Anaya was permitted to serve as an arbitrator in the case.
Third, the mere possibility of a dispute with a powerful investor can exert a chilling effect on
government decisions to *832 regulate in the public interest. This is particularly true with regard to
developing countries, which may find it attractive to race to the bottom by lowering their
environmental and cultural protection standards in order to attract foreign investments. For instance,
in 2002, a group of mainly foreign-owned mining companies threatened to commence international
arbitration against the government of Indonesia in response to its ban on open-pit mining in protected
forests. [FN168] Six months later, the Ministry of Forestry agreed to change the forest designation
from protected to production forests. [FN169]
Fourth, investor-state arbitration distinguishes between two types of non-state
actors: [FN170] (1) the investor engaged in foreign direct investment; and (2) indigenous peoples
who are impacted by the FDI. [FN171] While foreign investors have direct access to investor-state
arbitration under the relevant BIT, the affected indigenous peoples do not have direct access to
investor-state arbitration and their participation is only possible through the submission of amicus
curiae briefs. The submission of amicus curiae is not a right, but a mere option that will be considered
by the arbitral tribunal on a case-by-case basis. It is true that indigenous peoples have access to local
courts, but since the resolution of investment disputes is delegated to an international dispute
settlement mechanism, "this delegation undercuts the authority of national courts to deal with [such]
disputes." [FN172] Furthermore, as Professor Francioni highlights, "court decisions in the host state
upholding complaints brought by private parties against a foreign investor may be attacked by the
investor before an arbitral tribunal on the ground that they constitute wrongful interference with the
investment." [FN173]
*833 While multinational corporations have been recognized as "international corporate
citizens" [FN174] and have been afforded procedural rights, [FN175] the procedural rights of the
investment-affected communities, including indigenous peoples, have remained almost
unchanged. [FN176] As Professor Gal-Or points out, "BITs have acknowledged the interests and
concerns of investors, while paying only marginal (albeit increasing) attention to those of non-state
actors who have been impacted by FDI." [FN177] According to Professor Gal-Or,
[f]rom a legal point of view, the status of the investor--which ... is a non state actor--is being
distinguished from, and privileged in comparison to, other actors within the non-state actors category
.... This investor enjoys the benefit of a special [dispute resolution] mechanism, which effectively
shields the investor from any national state's or international court litigation .... From the impacted
non state actors' perspective, the BIT, and notably the BIT's state-investor dispute resolution
mechanism, provides almost a carte blanche for investor human rights abuses. [FN178]
Given the "increasing impact of foreign investment on the social sphere of the host state"
Professor Francioni similarly has asked whether "the principle of access to justice, as successfully
developed for the benefit of investors through the provision of *834 binding arbitration in BITs, ought
to be matched by a corresponding right to remedial process for individuals and groups adversely
affected by the investment in the host state." [FN179] Access to justice systems "is often most
difficult where the need is greatest." [FN180]
As discussed above, while indigenous peoples have been increasingly recognized as actors under
international law, [FN181] they have played only a marginal role in the context of investor-state
arbitration and have made use of only limited participatory procedures. Both foreign investors and
indigenous peoples have clearly defined rights under international law. [FN182] The paradox is that
the foreign company and indigenous peoples lie at the opposite ends of the same spectrum: the
company is characterized by its foreignness; indigenous peoples are characterized by their
indigeneity, [FN183] descending from those who inhabited the area before colonization. Some authors
argue that indigenous peoples, also termed "entrapped peoples" [FN184] or "nations
within," [FN185]are not mere *835 objects of international law, but subjects of the
same.[FN186] State practice recognizing indigenous sovereignty "has today reached a worldwide
dimension and is rather constantly reiterated." [FN187] If we admit that indigenous peoples are
peoples and thus "global citizens," just as are multinational corporations, [FN188] the limits of the
available procedures become clear. [FN189] While the reasons for differentiating procedural remedies
still exist, since BITs are meant to encourage investment, when investment; arbitrations deal with
fundamental policy issues, the reasons for procedural transparency, openness, and cautious
judicialization of the arbitral process become compelling.


Traditionally, international investment law and international cultural law have been considered two
separate branches of public international law. Some authors have carefully scrutinized certain disputes
involving cultural elements but have neglected these elements to focus on more conventional
investment law topics, such as the definition of investment, among others. [FN190] As the number of
investment disputes with cultural elements continues to increase, it is important to reflect on the
method for identifying and characterizing such disputes. Because no two parties will agree that a
dispute is essentially "cultural," [FN191] it seems more appropriate to discuss disputes which have a
cultural component, rather than to *836 characterize a dispute as "cultural." Indeed, the mere
definition of a dispute as a "cultural dispute" may have implications for the outcome of a case. This
neutral approach is based on the consideration that claims involving cultural heritage are rarely, if
ever, raised in isolation of other legal arguments.
Investment disputes with cultural elements are typically characterized by the need to balance the
legitimate interests of a state to protect its cultural heritage and the legitimate interests of foreign
investors to protect their property rights. However, there is no such thing as a typical dispute
involving cultural heritage. Investors may claim that certain forms of regulation constitute an indirect
expropriation or regulatory taking and that compensation has to be paid. If a direct expropriation has
occurred, the dispute may center on the amount of compensation due. In other cases, investors may
claim that a stabilization clause [FN192] has not been respected due to regulatory changes or that
certain regulations amount to prohibited performance requirements. Other claims may concern the
violation of fair and equitable treatment or discrimination. The claims are often linked together and the
respective arguments may overlap.
Increased investment in the extractive industries can damage cultural and natural
heritage. [FN193] Of particular concern is the fact that natural resources extraction is increasingly
taking place in, or very close to, traditional indigenous areas. [FN194] According to one author, "the
peoples in the areas where the resources are located tend to bear a disproportionate share of the
negative impacts of development through reduced access to resources and direct exposure to pollution
and environmental degradation." [FN195] While development analysts *837 point to extractive
projects as anti-poverty measures and international economic organizations similarly advocate for
foreign direct investment as a major catalyst for development, [FN196] some states have adopted a
laissez-faire approach and enabled companies to obtain rights over land without the consent of
indigenous communities. [FN197] This has led to inadequate protection of indigenous heritage and
indigenous peoples' rights. [FN198]

To date several investment disputes have involved indigenous cultural heritage. While it is not
possible to examine all these awards in the context of this contribution, a selection of case studies will
be analytically assessed. Although this case law is not homogeneous, it can be scrutinized according to
the taxonomy of the claims brought by foreign investors, including, inter alia: (1) expropriation, (2)
lack of fair and equitable treatment, (3) discrimination, and (4) lack of full protection and security. The
cultural arguments discussed within each case will be analyzed and critically assessed in light of the
legal framework protecting indigenous cultural heritage at the international law level. The reasoning of
the arbitral tribunals will therefore be evaluated within the context of current human rights law and

A. Expropriation Claims
The clash between indigenous culture and national and international economic culture has been
adjudicated at various levels: (1) administrative and constitutional courts at the national
level, [FN199] (2) human rights bodies at the regional [FN200] and
international *838 level, [FN201] and (3) arbitral tribunals. While scholarly analysis and critical
assessment of the former two are extensive, [FN202] less is known about the emerging case law of
arbitral tribunals dealing with elements of indigenous cultural heritage. Given the impact that arbitral
awards can have on indigenous peoples' life and culture, scrutiny and critical assessment of this
jurisprudence is of the utmost relevance. Several investment treaty arbitrations have dealt with the
question of whether regulation allegedly aimed at protecting indigenous cultural heritage may be
deemed to be an indirect expropriation or a measure tantamount to expropriation.
In the Glamis Gold Case, a Canadian mining company planned to mine gold at the Imperial
Project, on federal land in *839 southeastern California. [FN203]According to the claimant, however,
not only did the U.S. Interior Department fail to promptly approve the project, thus unreasonably
delaying its mining operations, but California's regulation requiring the backfilling of open-pit gold
mines also made its mining operation uneconomical. [FN204] Therefore, the investor claimed inter
alia, that the United States had expropriated its mining rights in violation of Article 1110 of the North
American Free Trade Agreement.[FN205] In its award, the arbitral tribunal held that the complained
measures did not cause a sufficient economic impact to Glamis' investment and thus did not amount
to a regulatory expropriation. [FN206]
If one considers the facts of the case, the area in and around the Imperial Project was "heavily
utilized by pre-contact Native Americans as a travel route."[FN207] Furthermore, the Quechan, a
Native American tribe, opposed the project because it would destroy the Trail of Dreams, a sacred
path still used while performing ceremonial practices. Representatives of the tribe emphasized that the
tribe had allowed other mining operations to "go by," "partly because [they] knew [they] had an area
in reserve ... owned by the public." Thus, the Imperial Project area became the Tribe's "last
stand." [FN208] Because the 2000 environmental impact study indicated that the best option was that
of "no action," the Department of the Interior withdrew the Imperial Project from further mineral entry
for 20 years to protect historic properties. [FN209] In 2002, however, permission for the project was
granted and the State Mining and Geology Board enacted emergency regulations requiring the
backfilling of all open-pit mines to re-create the approximate contours of the land prior to
mining. [FN210]
In response to the federal and state actions, the claimant filed its Notice of Arbitration, arguing
that state and federal measures constituted an indirect expropriation in violation of Article 1110 of
NAFTA. The claimant asserted that respondents deprived its *840 property interests of their
value. [FN211]According to the claimant, the expropriation began with the federal government's
unlawful refusal to approve claimant's plan of operations and continued with the backfilling
requirement. [FN212] In particular, backfilling would be uneconomical and arbitrary since it would not
be rationally related to its stated purpose of protecting cultural resources. [FN213] The claimant
pointed out that "once you take the material out [of] the ground and if there are cultural resources on
the surface, they are destroyed. Putting the dirt back in the pit actually does not protect those
resources" but may lead to the burial of more artifacts and cause greater environmental
degradation. [FN214] Thus, the claimant argued that the California measures aimed to "stop the
Imperial Project from ever proceeding while seeking to avoid payment of compensation it knew to be
required had it processed transparently and directly through eminent domain." [FN215]
In its statement, the United States argued that mining is a highly regulated industry and that any
reasonable investor should have reasonably anticipated the extension of those
regulations. [FN216] The respondent mentioned that, while other states had completely prohibited the
use of all open-pit mining,[FN217] the California legislation did not impede the excavation and mineral
exploitation of the zone: it required backfilling to restore the landscape to the way it was before the
mining operations. The respondent also stressed that in this case the legislature was attempting "to
reconcile competing interests by addressing the threat to Native American sites in the [California
Desert Conservation Area] while recognizing mining companies' rights to mine there."[FN218] On the
one hand, the California measures effectively limited the waste piles that would have obstructed the
view from the Running Man to the Indian Pass. [FN219] On the other hand, the company could still
fully use its property. According to the United States, it would not be disproportionate for a State to
require mining *841 operators to internalize the costs of the environmental damage caused by their
own activities. [FN220]
The arbitral tribunal found the claimant's expropriation argument to be without merit. [FN221] In
order to distinguish a non-compensable regulation and a compensable expropriation, the tribunal
established a two-tiered test, under which it ascertained: (1) the extent to which the measures
interfered with reasonable and investment-backed expectations of a stable regulatory framework, and
(2) the purpose and the character of the governmental actions taken. [FN222] First, the tribunal found
that the California backfilling measures "did not cause a sufficient economic impact to the Imperial
Project to effect an expropriation of Claimant's investment." [FN223] Second, the tribunal deemed the
measures to be rationally related to its stated purpose. [FN224] The tribunal admitted that "some
cultural artifacts will indeed be disturbed, if not buried, in the process of excavating and
backfilling," [FN225] but concluded that, without such legislative measures, the landscape would be
harmed by significant pits and waste piles in the near vicinity. [FN226] Remarkably, the arbitral
tribunal also expressly referred to Article 12 of the World Heritage Convention, [FN227]which requires
States to protect their cultural heritage even if it is not listed in the World Heritage lists. [FN228] This
is rather extraordinary as cultural heritage experts have repeatedly stressed that Article 12 of the
WHC is an often neglected provision. [FN229]
*842 In Grand River v. United States, a claim of expropriation was brought against the host state
by a foreign company controlled by indigenous peoples.[FN230] A Canadian company engaged in
exporting tobacco in the United States argued that its investment had been harmed by the U.S.
Master Settlement Agreement (MSA), [FN231] which requires the contribution of funds from tobacco
companies in order to pay expenses incurred in the treatment of indigent patients suffering from
tobacco-related illnesses. [FN232] In exchange for such payments, the U.S. dropped all lawsuits
against the tobacco industry. [FN233]In general terms, the petitioners argued that the major tobacco
firms conspired to ensure that other firms were covered by the terms of the settlement to force the
smaller companies out of business. [FN234] The claimants argued that such regulation amounted,
inter alia, to indirect expropriation, in violation of NAFTA Article 1110. [FN235] The respondent
contended, however, that regulatory action in the maintenance of public health does not amount to
expropriation, provided that "it is not a clear and discriminatory violation of the law of the state
concerned, and it is not an unreasonable departure from the principles of justice recognized by the
legal systems of the world." [FN236]
*843 The arbitral tribunal rejected the expropriation claim. While the claimant had argued that
the disputed measures were inconsistent with his "legitimate expectation ... not to be subject to MSA-
related regulatory actions" because of his status as a member of one of the First Nations in North
America,[FN237] the tribunal declined to "decide whether or not [the claimant] [wa]s correct on the
underlying domestic legal proposition of immunity from the state regulation." [FN238] Rather, the
tribunal determined that, "[o]rdinarily, reasonable or legitimate expectations of the kind protected by
NAFTA are those that arise through targeted representations or assurances made explicitly or
implicitly by a state party." [FN239] Because "trade in tobacco products has historically been the
subject of close and extensive regulation by U.S. States" the tribunal held that the investor should not
have reasonably expected to engage in large-scale tobacco distribution business without encountering
state regulation. [FN240] Relying on previous NAFTA cases, the tribunal also stated that NAFTA Article
1110 requires "a complete or very substantial deprivation of owners' rights in the totality of the
investment." [FN241] As the claimant's business had remained "profitable," [FN242] the tribunal
concluded that there was no expropriation. [FN243]

*844 B. Fair and Equitable Treatment

Other cases have related to the fair and equitable treatment (FET) standard. This standard
requires that foreign investors be accorded "treatment in accordance with international law, including
fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security." [FN244] As mentioned above, in the
Grand River case, a Canadian company engaged in exporting tobacco to the United States argued that
its investment had been harmed by the Master Settlement Agreement. Besides arguing that the
required payments constitute an expropriation in violation of NAFTA Article 1110, the petitioners
alleged violation of the FET standard. [FN245] As the individual claimants were members of the Six
Nations of the Iroquois Confederacy, they argued that the tobacco business was their traditional
activity, and thus the case involved their intangible cultural heritage:
This arbitration is not about health protection or promotion. It is not about state rights to regulate
in the interests of the public good. And it is not only about the anticompetitive measures being
imposed at the behest of a few large companies in exchange for a share of their profits. This
arbitration concerns and arises out of the Respondent's discrimination against a group of aboriginal
investors, their traditions, businesses and livelihoods, and the expropriation of their markets, all in
violation of their rights under international law. [FN246]
According to the claimants, Article 1105 of NAFTA required respect of international law, including
indigenous peoples' rights. [FN247] They contended that a number of international law instruments,
including, inter alia, the proposed Inter-American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and
various provisions of the ILO Convention 169 and the UNDRIP, "are illustrative of a quickening or
crystallization that has been taking place in customary international *845 law with respect to
protection of the rights of indigenous peoples, both collectively and as individuals." [FN248] More
specifically, the claimants argued that an emerging norm of customary international law requires
states to actively consult with indigenous peoples before taking regulatory action that will substantially
affect their interests. [FN249]
The U.S. State Department insisted, however, that such a norm does not embody customary law,
and that in any case, the United States falls into the category of persistent objectors, [FN250] as the
U.S. government has consistently argued that the U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples does not reflect customary international law. [FN251] In addition, Canada, the home state of
the investor, intervened in the proceedings to reject the argument that ILO Convention 169 and the
UNDRIP fall within the ambit of customary international law. [FN252] In its Counter-Memorial, the
United *846States also argued that the adopted legislation is non-discriminatory and served "to
promote the general welfare by ensuring that tobacco manufacturers internalized the health care costs
caused by their cigarettes." [FN253]
The tribunal, with the exception of one member, found that state legal officers "acted less than
optimally" in working together to discuss and develop the proposed regulatory measures. It also
considered that the "First Nations or tribal governments, particularly those in the United States whose
regulatory authority is or may be implicated by application of the MSA, should have been included in
these discussions." [FN254] Nonetheless, since the tribunal noted that "[t]he notion of specialized
procedural rights protecting some investors, but not others, cannot readily be reconciled with the idea
of a minimum customary standard of treatment due to all investments," [FN255] the tribunal held that
"whatever unfair treatment was rendered to [the claimant] or his business enterprise, it did not rise to
the level of an infraction of the fair and equitable treatment." [FN256] As to the matter of applicable
law, the tribunal stated that "the customary standard of protection of alien investors' investments
does not incorporate other legal protections that may be provided investors or classes of investors
under other sources of law." [FN257] As a matter of interpretation, the tribunal took into account
other rules of international law as required by customary norms of treaty interpretation, [FN258] but
reaffirmed it was a "[t]ribunal of limited jurisdiction" with "no mandate to decide claims based on
treaties other than NAFTA." [FN259]
In Glamis Gold, the claimant contended, inter alia, that the review process of its project violated
the FET standard, [FN260] as *847 "numerous other projects with significant and similar cultural
characteristics were approved ... without complete backfilling and despite severe impacts to their
cultural resources."[FN261] The tribunal, however, noted that other properties did not present such a
significant amount of archaeological or cultural significance. Because the contested California
legislation was of general application and did not target the claimant's investment, [FN262] the
tribunal concluded that the acts of the federal government and the State of California did not violate
the respondents obligations under Article 1105. [FN263] The tribunal noted that the cultural review of
the claimant's plan of operations was undertaken by qualified professionals, who provided reasoned,
substantiated opinions and were not biased. Finally, it held that "it is not the role of this Tribunal, or
any international tribunal, to supplant its own judgment of underlying factual material and support for
that of a qualified domestic agency." [FN264]

C. Discrimination
A crucial element in investment disputes with elements of cultural heritage is the ascertainment of
non-discrimination against the foreign investor. The non-discrimination principle is typically reflected
in two investment treaty provisions: the national treatment (NT) and most-favored nation (MFN)
treatment. [FN265]These two standards do not guarantee a specific level of protection but are relative
standards that require a host country to treat a foreign investor in the same way that a domestic
investor or an investor from another country would be treated. [FN266] The basic purpose of the MFN
and NT clauses is to avoid discrimination and to guarantee equal competitive opportunities for foreign
investors in the host state. [FN267] The key question is whether foreign investments are being
regulated *848 because of public policy goals, or whether they are being regulated by virtue of
foreign ownership. [FN268]
Nowadays it is undoubtedly difficult to spot openly discriminatory language in regulations,
although these characteristics have appeared in investment disputes. For instance, the pending Gallo
v. Canada case is significant because it concerns regulation that even in its title includes reference to
the foreign investment. [FN269] The investment concerned the creation of a landfill on a former open-
pit mine site located in northern Ontario. [FN270] In 2004, the newly elected Ontario provincial
government enacted legislation preventing the project from proceeding. [FN271] Acquisitions of new
lands were not granted to the investor either. [FN272] The investor, a U.S. national, filed an investor-
state arbitration alleging expropriation and violation of the FET standard and requesting
compensation. [FN273]
Canada, inter alia, asserted that the acquisition of some areas was denied because the enterprise
had not fulfilled its duty to consult with relevant Aboriginal communities [FN274] and that
the *849 proposed transfer of land would infringe Aboriginal rights. [FN275] Canada also argued that
the enacted legislation was due to the hydro-geological conditions of the mine. [FN276]Although the
case has yet to be decided, it appears that both arguments presented by the parties--the alleged
discrimination and the alleged justification of the same--will have to be taken into account by the
arbitral tribunal to determine whether there was discrimination and, if this was the case, whether the
difference in treatment was justified by the circumstances of the case.
In John Andre v. Canada, a U.S.-based businessman lodged a Notice of Intent to arbitrate,
alleging losses arisen from legislative measures affecting his caribou-hunting outfitter in Northern
Canada. [FN277] Prior to 2007, the claimant had 360 caribou hunting licenses (called Caribou Quota
Tags) and organized hunting camps for tourists and hunters who would travel from locations outside
Canada to the aboriginal land in Canada's North West Territories (NWT). [FN278] In 2007, the
Government of the NWT decided to grant only seventy-five Caribou quota Tags per
outfitter. [FN279] Outfitters with commitments to clients would be required to buy Caribou Quota Tags
from their competitors. [FN280] The claimant argues that the relevant authorities have cut the
number of hunting licenses in a discriminatory manner. [FN281] Because many of the local outfitters
only used seventy-five to one hundred Caribou Quota Tags or less per year, the claimant alleges that
the Government developed a strategy to minimize the negative effect on local outfitters and maximize
the negative effects on the investor. [FN282] The investor thus claims to have *850 been targeted as
a non-resident of Canada and to have been discriminated against on the basis of his U.S.
nationality. [FN283]
The press has recently reported that while the ban initially included the aboriginal caribou hunt,
the NWT government and the Tlicho aboriginal government have jointly agreed to keep a total hunting
ban only for non-aboriginal hunters and commercial hunting outfitters. [FN284] In other words, while
the sport hunt of caribou remains cancelled, [FN285] the aboriginal subsistence hunt will he
This differential treatment may be justified under human rights law. The fall hunt allows the
indigenous tribes to preserve their traditional culture and to rely on caribou meat in the
winter. [FN286] A number of cases at the international, regional, and national levels provide evidence
of the recognition of indigenous peoples' cultural rights in this sense. In the Kitok case, the Human
Rights Committee stated that reindeer husbandry, as a traditional livelihood of the indigenous Saami
people, is an activity protected under ICCPR Article 27.[FN287] In Jouni Lansman v. Finland, the
Committee found that reindeer herding fits into the definition of cultural activities. [FN288] In
reaching this conclusion, the Committee has recognized that indigenous peoples' subsistence activities
are an integral part of their culture:
With regard to the exercise of the cultural rights protected under Article 27, the Committee
observes that culture manifests itself in many forms, including a particular way of life associated with
the use of land resources, specially [sic] in the case of indigenous peoples. That right may include
suchtraditional activities as fishing or hunting .... The enjoyment of those rights may require positive
legal measures of *851 protection and measures to ensure the effective participation of members of
minority communities in decisions that affect them .... The protection of these rights is directed to
ensure the survival and continued development of the cultural, religious and social identity of the
minorities concerned, thus enriching the fabric of society as a whole. [FN289]
At the national level, in 1999, the High Court of Australia dismissed a charge against a member of
an aboriginal tribe who had caught two young crocodiles in Queensland using a traditional
harpoon. [FN290] Although the appellant did not have a hunting permit, the Court concluded that he
was exempted from the obligation of obtaining a permit, since his act was based on a traditional
aboriginal custom which deems catching young crocodiles of high spiritual significance. [FN291] The
U.S. case of the Makah people who obtained permission to hunt whales also has bearing on competing
cultural and environmental interests in the aboriginal hunting debate. [FN292]
More recently, Canadian Inuit have filed a lawsuit before the European Court of Justice to overturn
an EU regulation [FN293] banning the import of seal products into the European
Union. [FN294] The *852 regulation expressly recognizes that "the hunt is an integral part of the
culture and identity of the members of the Inuit society, and as such is recognized by the
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples." [FN295] Thus, it states that "the
placing on the market of seal products which results from hunts traditionally conducted by Inuit and
other indigenous communities and which contribute to their subsistence should be
allowed." [FN296] Although Inuit are exempt from the ban, they claim they are nevertheless being
affected, [FN297]as the regulation "will likely result in the loss of, inter alia, the market in
infrastructure such as auction houses and tanneries, which are mostly owned by non-Inuit commercial
corporations." [FN298] Furthermore, "since the Inuit people do not export seal products themselves,
the derogation for which regulation No. 1007/2009 provides in favor of the Inuit will remain an 'empty
box."' [FN299]The applicants also claim that the regulation seriously affects their right "to engage in
the commercial exploitation of seal products, which constitutes an important source of their
income." [FN300] In August 2010, the ECJ's General Court accepted a moratorium request by the
indigenous communities, but it is still too early to predict how the dispute will evolve. [FN301] The
case is interesting as it shows that even aboriginal exemptions cannot be enough to sustain cultural
practices, and, in turn, cultural practices may clash with environmental concerns.
An "Aboriginal exemption" is a common feature of natural resource conservation
legislation. [FN302] A number of international environmentaltreaties which protect certain species
include derogations to their main principles to "accommodate the needs of *853 traditional
subsistence users of such species," [FN303] thus protecting traditional hunting practices linked to the
cultural heritage of the communities concerned. For instance, Article VII of the 1957 Convention on
Conservation of North Pacific Fur Seals describes the aboriginal hunting practices that are exempted
by the application of the Convention. [FN304] The 1931 Convention for Regulation of Whaling
expressly allowed aboriginal subsistence whaling. [FN305] The 1946 International Convention for the
Regulation of Whaling, which superseded the 1931 Convention, retains aboriginal rights to subsistence
whaling. [FN306]

D. Full Protection and Security

Most international investment treaties contain clauses requiring "full protection and security" for
foreign direct investment. Traditionally, the primary objective of the standard has been to protect the
investor against the various types of physical violence and adverse effects which may stem from
actions of the host state *854 and its organs, or from third parties. [FN307] In Burlington v. Ecuador,
the claimant sought to hold Ecuador liable for failing to provide physical protection and security for the
company's hydrocarbon concession in the Amazonian rainforest. [FN308] The concession was awarded
in the late 1990s but has always been opposed by the indigenous communities which have inhabited
the remote rainforests of southeastern Ecuador for centuries. [FN309]Burlington lamented, inter alia,
that indigenous tribes' opposition to oil development had impeded its business and that Ecuador's
purported failure to provide physical security violated the standard of full protection and security
under the U.S.- Ecuador BIT. [FN310]
In its Decision on Jurisdiction, the arbitral tribunal dismissed this claim on jurisdictional grounds,
stressing the importance of states being put on notice of disputes so that they have the opportunity to
remedy a possible breach and thereby avoid arbitration proceedings. [FN311] Because Burlington
failed to give clear notice to Ecuador of its claims for denial of physical protection and security,
arbitrators ruled that the treaty's mandatory six-month waiting period before arbitration can be
initiated had not run. Ecuador successfully argued that "there was no dispute in relation to Blocks 23
and 24" because "there was clear collaboration between the parties to solve the issue in the Blocks
concerning indigenous opposition." [FN312] Interestingly, because of the alleged violations by the
state of indigenous peoples' rights, legal claims brought by Sarayaku before both the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights *855 (IACHR) and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights of the
Organization of American States (OAS) continue to move forward. [FN313]


A. The Applicable Law

Investment disputes are to be resolved on the basis of law, unless the parties have expressly
agreed otherwise. [FN314] Several BITs contain a composite choice of law clause, typically including
treaty rules, host state law, and customary international law. For instance, the 2004 U.S. Model
BIT [FN315]provides that in certain cases, "the tribunal shall decide the issues in dispute in
accordance with this Treaty and applicable rules of international law." [FN316]Article 1131 of NAFTA
similarly states that: "[a] tribunal established under this Section shall decide the issues in dispute in
accordance with this Agreement and applicable rules of international law." [FN317] For cases brought
before ICSID, the ICSID Convention provides that a tribunal will apply the law selected by the parties
or, in the absence of such a choice, the law of the host country and such principles of international law
as are applicable. [FN318]
This legal pluralism has raised intense debate among scholars. Some take the view "that
international law is limited to a supplementary and corrective role. It is supplementary in that it may
fill the lacunae of the host country's law, and it is corrective in the *856 sense that it applies if the
host law violates international law." [FN319] However, others have argued that "international law
always applies, as either national law is consistent with it, or if it is not, then international law
supersedes it." [FN320]
Even in the absence of any reference to international law in the compromissory clause, there are
other ways for an international arbitrator to refer to international law. [FN321] First, when the
constitution of the host state opts for monism, public international law applies the law applicable to
the contract. Even in states which adopt the dualist theory and require international law norms to be
"translated" into national ones, arbitrators apply norms of international law, when they apply the
national norms which convey them. As Professor Kreindler points out, "even where the parties have
not agreed, directly or indirectly, to the application of international law 'rules' or 'principles,'
international law may already be internally applicable as part of the domestic law chosen by the
parties." [FN322]
Second, transnational public policy (or ordre public international) is always part of the applicable
law. [FN323] The English House of Lords in 1853 described public policy as "that principle of law which
holds that no subject can lawfully do that which has a tendency to be injurious to the public or against
public good."[FN324] In positive terms, public policy would reflect the fundamental principles of a
given society. [FN325] Transnational public policy refers to "those principles that represent an
international consensus as to universal standards and accepted norms of conduct that must always
apply." [FN326] The concept of "transnational public policy," or "truly international public policy," is
said to comprise fundamental rules of natural law, *857 principles of universal justice possessing an
absolute value or absolute truth [FN327] and covering fundamental laws with higher status than the
ordinary rules of international law (jus cogens). [FN328]
Jus cogens is defined by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) as "a norm
accepted and recognized by the international community of states as a whole as a norm from which no
derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international
law having the same character." [FN329] While this provision establishes a legal framework for how
peremptory norms work, it is like "an empty box," [FN330] as it does not say what norms constitute
jus cogens. [FN331] However, the fact that the notion of peremptory norms is elusive should not lead
us to conclude that jus cogens has no ascertainable basis. [FN332] Although there is no simple
criterion by which to identify a general rule of international law as having the character of jus cogens,
the concept of jus cogens is positive law. [FN333] Generally accepted examples are
the *858 prohibition of slavery, torture, systemic racial discrimination, piracy, and
genocide. [FN334] Given the legal uncertainty surrounding the term, it is up to international
adjudicating bodies to decipher the complex tapestry of international law in determining its meaning.
Whether a norm of international law of jus cogens status requires theprotection of indigenous
cultural heritage is a matter of debate. [FN335]Considering the strict linkage between the protection
of indigenous cultural heritage and human dignity, one can reach the conclusion that systematic
violations of indigenous peoples' culture and cultural identity not only violates their right to self-
determination, but it can ultimately lead to cultural genocide of an indigenous group. [FN336] The
protection of cultural rights and indigenous cultural heritage is a fundamental component of
indigenous peoples' right to self-determination. [FN337] Far from being a
superfluous *859 element,[FN338] culture constitutes the conditio sine qua non of the existence of
indigenous peoples.
Although jus cogens does not yet include the protection of every aspect of indigenous cultural
heritage, it is dynamic and can expand to include the prohibition of cultural genocide. [FN339] Cultural
genocide is a term that lawyer Raphael Lemkin proposed in 1933 as a component to
genocide. [FN340] Some authors have recognized a relationship between cultural genocide and
physical genocide; [FN341] others have considered it as "wanton acts of cultural annihilation in the
wake of, even independently from, genocide." [FN342] The drafters of the 1948 Genocide
Convention [FN343] considered using the term, but decided against it. [FN344] Although the final text
of the UNDRIP does not*860 expressly use the phrase "cultural genocide," [FN345] it substantially
prohibits it, recognizing that "indigenous peoples and individuals have the right not to be subjected to
forced assimilation or destruction of their culture."[FN346] The same provision also identifies some
circumstances that can lead to the destruction of indigenous peoples' culture. [FN347] Of particular
relevance are the first three circumstances:
(2) States shall provide effective mechanisms for prevention of, and redress for:
(a) Any action which has the aim or effect of depriving them of their integrity as distinct peoples,
or of their cultural values or ethnic identities;
(b) Any action which has the aim or effect of dispossessing them of their lands, territories or
(c) Any form of forced population transfer which has the aim or effect of violating or undermining
any of their rights; [ ... [FN348]
While the notion of cultural genocide is not a legal one, significant legal developments clarify the
state's obligations to protect cultural heritage. The preamble of the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court [FN349]recognizes that the cultures of "all peoples are united by common bonds, their
cultures pieced together in a shared heritage" and that "this delicate mosaic may be shattered at any
time." [FN350] As one scholar writes, "[i]n the interpretation of the elements of the crime of genocide,
regard must be taken to these preambular ideas." [FN351] Indeed, international criminal tribunals
have*861 acknowledged the duty to protect cultural heritage as an erga omnes obligation under
international law. For instance, when determining the exact content of the notion of persecution, the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia has included the attempts to erase religious
and education institutions of a particular community from the landscape of a given
zone.[FN352] Further, the systematic destruction of cultural heritage has been accepted as evidence
of the mens rea that is the dolus specificus of the crime of genocide. [FN353] Acts of cultural
destruction have been described as "cultural genocide, ethnocide and likened to acts of segregation,
similar to apartheid."[FN354] As Francioni puts it,
The deliberate destruction of cultural heritage of great importance as the Buddhas of Bamiyan not
only constitutes an intolerable offence against the cultural heritage of humanity, but, when carried out
with a discriminatory intent, it also amounts to an attack on the very identity of the targeted people
and religion, and thus on the dignity and fundamental rights of its members. As the ICTY recently
confirmed, such discriminatory destruction "manifests a nearly pure expression of the notion of 'crimes
against humanity,' for all of humanity is indeed injured." [FN355]
Courts have highlighted the existence of ordre publique culturel. [FN356] For instance, the Swiss
Supreme Court has recognized the existence of an international public order in the field of cultural
property: [FN357]
*862 Lorsque, comme l'espéce, la demande porte sur la restitution d'un bien culturel, le juge de
l'entraide doit veiller à prendre en compte l'intérét public international ... lié à la protection de ces
biens. Ces normes, qui relèvent d'une commune inspiration, constituent autant d'expressions d'un
ordre public international en vigueur ou en formation ... ces normes, qui concrétisent l'impératif d'une
lutte internationale efficace contre le trafic de biens culturels .... [FN358]
"[A] contract that violates foreign rules prohibiting the export of national treasures could be
considered null and void independently of its validity on the basis of the ... substantive law applicable
to the contract." [FN359] For instance, the German Bundesgerichtshof (Supreme Court) has
recognized that an insurance contract subject to German law was null and void because it related to
the illegal export of cultural goods from Nigeria. [FN360]
How have arbitral tribunals dealt with public policy and jus cogens? Public policy has been called
"a very unruly horse, and when once you get astride it you never know where it will carry
you." [FN361] Nevertheless. it has been forcefully asserted in a series of international arbitrations. For
example, in the Maria Luz arbitration, the Czar of Russia, sitting as the sole arbitrator, drew upon
public policy in declaring that Japan "had not breached the general rules of the Law of the Nations" in
freeing the slaves carried on the Peruvian vessel Maria Luz and denying the
subsequent *863 demands for indemnity of the Peruvian citizens. [FN362] More recently, in an ICC
arbitration, Mr. Lagergreen, acting as a sole arbitrator, stated that "it cannot be contested that there
exists a general principle of law recognised by civilised nations that contracts which seriously violate
bonos mores or international public policy are invalid or at least unenforceable and that they cannot
be sanctioned by courts or arbitrators."[FN363]
Similarly, in World Duty Free Company Limited v. The Republic of Kenya,[FN364] the International
Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) tribunal referred to international public
policy and did not allow claims based on bribes or on contracts obtained by
corruption. [FN365] Adopting a similar view, the ICSID Tribunal in the Methanex case asserted that
"as a matter of international constitutional law, a tribunal has an independent duty to apply imperative
principles of law or jus cogens and not to give effect to the parties' choice of law that are inconsistent
with such principles." [FN366] In other cases, as Professor Martin Hunter points out, although
arbitrators "would claim that they have never applied transnational public policy principles in
formulating their awards," they have applied public policy principles, particularly with regard to
environmental goods. [FN367]
Public policy is a flexible and dynamic concept that can be used as a corrective mechanism or as a
tool to balance complex and often conflicting goals. [FN368] Therefore, commentators have
highlighted that "[a]ny tribunalowes an obligation to the international community to apply
international public policy" and that "nothing can acquit a tribunal of its mandate to apply public
policy." [FN369] The *864 principal purpose of international public order is to maintain the integrity of
the fundamental norms of international law. In this sense, public policy concerns a "constitutional"
aspect of public international law[FN370] As the host state where indigenous peoples live "exercise[s]
sovereign authority as [a] fiduciary of the people subject to [its] power[,] ... [it] must comply with jus
cogens" [FN371] and, whenever relevant, refer to its obligations to indigenous peoples in the context
of investor-state arbitration. If the state does not, it is in breach of its international law obligations
towards indigenous peoples, in particular their right to self-determination [FN372] and their cultural
rights. [FN373]
International public policy demands that international arbitrators apply international public policy
as part of the applicable law. [FN374] As the principle of self-determination has been seen as a
"peremptory norm of general international law," [FN375] the argument for taking it into account in
investor-state: arbitration becomes compelling. It is not a question of direct application of non-
investment norms principaliter by arbitral tribunals. Instead, it is a question of whether arbitral
tribunals should refer to international law in evaluating whether state policies are justified, even if
such *865 policies would otherwise be inconsistent with investment treaties. [FN376] In any case,
arbitrators are bound to apply relevant peremptory norms of international law whether or not they
were pleaded by the parties. The question is not whether to add new claims to those articulated by the
parties, but to determine which law is applicable to the dispute. [FN377]
B. Treaty Interpretation
The interplay between cultural heritage protection and the promotion of FDI is not clearly
addressed by the overwhelming majority of investment treaties,[FN378] with some remarkable
exceptions. [FN379] In this fragmented landscape, where arbitral tribunals seem to have the last word
on important themes at the crossroads of culture and economics, treaty interpretation is of
fundamental importance. [FN380]
*866 Customary rules of treaty interpretation, as reflected in the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties, require systemic interpretation and reference to the "relevant rules of international law
applicable in the relations between the parties." [FN381] As the arbitral tribunal in Asian Agricultural
Products Ltd v. Republic of Sri Lanka put it, [FN382] BITs are "not a self-contained closed legal
system" but have to be "envisaged within a wider juridical context in which rules from other sources
are integrated through implied incorporation methods, or by direct reference to certain supplementary
rules whether of international law character or of domestic law nature." [FN383] Furthermore, as
investment treaties typically enshrine investors' rights in "general, open-textured language," "practical
considerations may impel the interpreter to seek guidance from general international law." [FN384]
Arbitral tribunals, however, have often adopted a reductionist or minimalist vision of the arbitral
mandate. [FN385] Arbitral tribunals have rarely addressed law external to investment law, as these
norms are rarely invoked by investors in investment arbitrations. [FN386] Even when non-investment
norms are invoked, the arbitral tribunals have either dismissed them on jurisdictional grounds or failed
to address them at all. [FN387] Even when host states *867relied on human rights considerations to
justify measures with adverse effects on investments, arguing that their measures were in furtherance
of certain international human rights commitments, they have met only little success.[FN388] As
Reiner and Schreuer point out, "[t]hese awards seem to indicate the tribunals' reluctance to take up
matters concerning human rights, preferring to dismiss the issues raised, on a procedural basis, rather
than dealing with the substantive arguments themselves." [FN389]
The unwillingness of arbitral tribunals to apply law external to investment law reflects their lack of
consideration of broader political and social concerns and may weaken the wider effectiveness (and
perceived legitimacy) of investor-state arbitration. [FN390] As seen above, international customary
norms of treaty interpretations require systematic interpretation. Investor-state arbitration is a
creature of international law, with public law elements. The authority of the arbitral tribunal does not
merely depend on the will of the parties, but on an international treaty.
In conclusion, interpretation is not merely an exercise of legal logic; which tools of interpretation a
judge deploys is equally "a matter of harmony with what, for want of a better word, one might term
experience and common sense."[FN391] While the ability of investment arbitration to function is
clearly important, the interest of society in the legitimate exercise of authority and the
maintenance *868 of juridical values is equally important. [FN392] Arbitral tribunals must take more
than economic considerations into account. [FN393]Because investor-state arbitration deals with
important human rights issues, the legal dimension of these disputes cannot be neglected or
dismissed in favor of purely economical considerations.


After having analyzed the ex post approach to cultural heritage protection in the context of arbitral
proceedings, it can be questioned whether an ex ante or legislative approach would be more
effective [FN394] In this sense, the inclusion of cultural exceptions and cultural impact assessment in
investmenttreaties will be considered.

A. Cultural Exceptions in Investment Treaties

Cultural exceptions may provide a useful tool to balance the different interests at
stake [FN395] For instance, the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement, which
establishes a free trade area between Brunei Darussalam, Chile, Singapore and New Zealand
(hereinafter Trans-Pacific SEP), contains an exception to protect items or specific sites of historical or
archaeological value [FN396] The Trans-Pacific SEP recognizes the need to promote cultural policies
aimed at protecting the cultural heritage of the countries involved, both in its tangible dimension
(archaeological and historical*869 sites) and its intangible one (creative arts). [FN397] More
importantly, the Trans-Pacific SEP expressly states that New Zealand can provide more favorable
treatment to Maori in fulfilment of its obligations under the Treaty of Waitangi,[FN398] "provided that
such measures are not used as a means of arbitrary or unjustified discrimination against persons of
the other Parties or as a disguised restriction on trade in goods and services." [FN399] In light of the
constitutional concerns and fundamental issues raised by the implementation of the Treaty of
Waitangi, which is considered to be New Zealand's founding document, the parties' inclusion of an ad
hoc cultural exception excluding New Zealand's efforts to comply with the Treaty's requirements from
the dispute settlement provisions of the Transpacific SEP represents a sensible
approach. [FN400] Canada's new model Foreign Investment Protection Agreement (FIPA) does not
include such an exception in its text, but it includes preferential treatment for aboriginals in its
annex. [FN401] Malaysia has similarly excluded measures designed to promote economic
empowerment of the Bumiputras ethnic group from the scope of BITs.[FN402]
*870 The merit of introducing a cultural exception in investment agreements is further
demonstrated in the recent UPS case, [FN403] which involved debate over the applicability of the
cultural industries clause in a NAFTA claim. [FN404]The United States claimed that Canada's
Publications Assistance Program (PAP)--a policy designed to promote the wider distribution of
Canadian periodicals--was discriminatory to foreign investors. [FN405] The tribunal upheld Canada's
argument that the PAP was exempted from review under NAFTA by virtue of the cultural industries
exception. [FN406]
The lack of careful drafting in investment treaties undermine the police power of the host state to
adopt and implement social programs, such as affirmative actions aimed at promoting economic,
cultural, and social opportunities for disadvantaged aboriginal groups, because such programs may
run afoul of the bans on discrimination and performance requirements included in investment treaties.
For instance, in the immediate post- Apartheid period, South Africaadopted an ambitious social and
economic program to advance the standing of historically disadvantaged persons, the so-called Black
Economic Empowerment Act (hereinafter BEE Act). [FN407] The BEE Act is based on the South African
Constitution, [FN408] which "refers to affirmative action ... as a means to ensure the achievement of
substantive equality." [FN409]
*871 The BEE Act generated much controversy among foreign and domestic investors and was
recently challenged [FN410] before an international arbitral tribunal. [FN411] A number of Italian
investors complained that the Minerals and Petroleum Resources Development Act (hereinafter
MPRDA), [FN412] one of the regulations adopted to further the goals of the BEE Act, which terminated
the common law rules governing ownership of mineral rights and declared the mineral and petroleum
resources of South Africa to be the common heritage of its people, de facto expropriated their mineral
rights without providing prompt, adequate, and effective compensation, thus violating the relevant BIT
provisions. [FN413] In addition, the claimants alleged that they were denied fair and equitable
treatment and national treatment. [FN414] As the MPRDA sets out a series of affirmative action
requirements for the hiring of Black or Historically Disadvantaged managers, as well as the obligation
to sell 26% of its shares to black or historically disadvantaged individuals by 2014, [FN415] the
claimants alleged that these provisions were discriminatory because they required that South Africans
receive a better treatment than foreigners. [FN416]Furthermore, the investors maintained that
their *872 investments were made after the end of the Apartheid regime, and consequently, "the
investors did not benefit from past injustices during the Apartheid era." [FN417] The respondent
argued that neither complete deprivation nor transfer of ownership could be shown in this
case. [FN418] Assuming arguendo that claimants had a valid claim for expropriation of both old order
mineral rights and shares in their companies, the respondent argued that such expropriation was
lawful under the BITs[FN419] and therefore did not breach the BITs' provisions on
expropriation.[FN420] The case was settled, and what is publicly available does not give a clear
picture of how the case would have been adjudicated by the arbitral tribunal.
Nonetheless, this case shows the merit of introducing a specific clause or exception in the context
of investment treaties in order to create a shield for policies of particular cultural or social relevance.
While South African mining legislation is supposedly aimed at fulfilling the "State's obligation under
the Constitution to take legislative or other measures to redress the results of past racial
discrimination," [FN421] foreign investors have generally perceived this scheme as an investment
risk. [FN422] Furthermore, the Italian investors' decision to bring a case could have been emulated by
other foreign investors.[FN423] As a matter of dispute avoidance, the inclusion of a *873 clause
excluding the application of the BEE Act from BIT's prohibitions would have prevented such a dispute.
In this sense, recent South African BITs expressly allow the application of government measures
"designed to promote the achievement of equality or to advance the interests of the previously
disadvantaged." [FN424] For instance, Article 3 of the 1998 Treaty between the Czech Republic and
South Africa provides that the guarantees of non-discrimination for foreign investors
shall not be construed so as to oblige one Party to extend to the investors of the other the benefit
of any treatment, preference or privilege which may be extended by the Former Party by virtue of ...
any law or other measure the purpose of which is to promote the achievement of equality in its
territory, or designed to protect or advance persons, o categories of persons, previously
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination [FN425]
This clause clarifies the willingness of the parties to fulfill the obligations of the BIT and to
maintain a margin of flexibility for protecting the social and cultural rights of disadvantaged groups.

B. Cultural Impact Assessments

A cultural impact assessment is a technical device which identifies the effects of a proposed
activity on cultural values and identifies methods to avoid, remedy, or mitigate adverse
effects. [FN426] A cultural heritage impact assessment is a more specific "process of evaluating the
likely impacts, boththe beneficial and adverse, of a proposed development on the physical
manifestations of a community cultural heritage including sites, structures and remains
of *874 archaeological, architectural, historical, religious, spiritual, cultural, ecological or aesthetic
value or significance." [FN427]
Cultural impact assessments and cultural heritage impact assessments are currently provided for
in certain national systems. For instance, in New Zealand, cultural impact assessments are required
with regard to activities that may affect Maori cultural values and heritage. [FN428] At the
international level, under the Council of Europe Framework Convention on the Value of Cultural
Heritage for Society, the States Parties are required to undertake cultural heritage impact
assessments and adopt mitigation strategies where necessary.[FN429] While investment treaties
rarely, if ever, require such assessment,[FN430] de jure condendo, the introduction of this specific
mechanism might help to reconcile the different interests at stake.
De jure condito, cultural heritage impact assessments may be deemed to be a component of
environmental impact assessments (EIAs). For instance, since 1989 the World Bank has required an
EIA before the approval of any project financing. [FN431] Several projects have *875 been modified
as a result of an EIA; for example, the developers of the Botswana Tuli Blocks Roads project had to
reroute a road in order to preserve an archeological site. [FN432] In this sense, EIA is an appropriate
tool for taking cultural heritage considerations into account. EIAs may also represent a useful method
of dispute avoidance [FN433]by ensuring that relevant cultural implications of decisions are taken into
account before decisions are made.
However, recent investment treaty disputes have questioned the very rationale of imposing an
environmental impact assessment. In Maffezini v. Spain, for instance, Emilio Agustín Maffezini, an
Argentine investor, complained that the Spanish authorities had misinformed him about the costs of
the project; he alleged that they had pressured his company to make the investment before the EIA
process was finalized and before its implications were known. [FN434] Thus, according to the
claimant, the Spanish authorities were responsible for the additional costs resulting from the
EIA. [FN435] The arbitral tribunal dismissed the claims, affirming that "the environmental impact
assessment procedure is basic for adequate protection of the environment and the application of
appropriate environmental measures. This is true not only under Spanish and [European Economic
Community] Law, but also increasingly so under international law." [FN436] In sum, the tribunal held
that Spain was not liable because it had simply required compliance with its environmental laws in a
manner consistent with its investment treaty commitments. [FN437]
In a pending NAFTA case recently initiated against the Government of Canada, the Clayton family
and their U.S. *876 corporation, Bilcon, object to the manner in which an environmental assessment
was conducted. [FN438] Theinvestors proposed to mine basalt in the coastal Canadian province of
Nova Scotia and then ship it by tanker to their New Jersey site. [FN439] A marine terminal was to be
built in order to ship the basalt down through the Bay of Fundy to New Jersey. [FN440] The EIA
recommended rejection of the project because of the significant adverse effects on the core values of
the surrounding communities. [FN441] While the claimants acknowledge that an EIA was required for
their project, they claim that the process was unusually protracted, discretionary, and ultimately
politically motivated, alleging violations of NAFTA Article 1102 (National Treatment), Article 1103
(Most-Favored Nation Treatment) and Article 1105 (Fair and Equitable Treatment). [FN442]
In its Statement of Defense, Canada points out that the project is located in Digby Neck, a narrow
peninsula with an extremely productive ecosystem.[FN443] Its waters are an important breeding and
feeding ground for dolphins and endangered species such as whales and leatherback
turtles. [FN444] In addition, Digby Neck is located within a biosphere reserve designated by UNESCO
in 2001. [FN445] The EIA recommended that the relevant authorities should reject the proposed
project in its entirety due to "the significant adverse environmental effects that [it] would cause to the
... biological and human environment on Digby Neck and in the *877 Bay of Fundy, including on the
'core community values' of the affected communities." [FN446] Canada argued that, because the
regulatory measures complied with the EIA, they did not breach Chapter 11 of NAFTA. [FN447]
As explained above, EIAs have come to the forefront of legal debate in investment disputes. In
abstract terms, detecting the cultural consequences of the project before it is implemented and
ensuring that planned activities are compatible with sustainable development may lower the risk of
damage and promote the reconciliation of private and public interests. However, the disputes
examined above show that project investors must respect the recommendations found in EIAs and
that EIAs must respect international standards of transparency and fairness.

C. Moving towards the Cautious Judicialization of the Arbitral Process

Being a species of international arbitration, investor-state arbitration presents structural features
that distinguish it from judicial proceedings.[FN448] However, as investment arbitrations often have a
public policy dimension, [FN449] some commentators have proposed procedural amendments to make
investor-state arbitration a more structured or judicialized process.[FN450] First, some have
emphasized the need for more transparency, specifically public access to documents relating to the
dispute and even access to the proceedings. [FN451] Second, others have stressed the desirability of
enhanced public participation *878 to the dispute settlement mechanism.[FN452] Third, deeming that
transnational corporations should shoulder responsibilities in addition to the rights they are entitled to
under investment treaties, some authors have proposed the use of the counterclaim mechanism in
investment treaty law and arbitration. [FN453]
This part discusses these proposals and concludes that a cautious judicialization of the arbitral
process may be needed to ensure the respect of participatory rights of indigenous peoples. In
particular, transparency should be a necessary feature as it strengthens the perceived legitimacy of
international arbitral processes. In addition to ensuring public scrutiny, transparency ultimately
increases the quality of the awards. From a systemic perspective, international law can only progress
if scholars and the public at large are able to know and discuss the outcome of
disputes. [FN454] Participation of the affected communities as amici curiae is also a key issue to
further the legitimacy of investment arbitration. Finally, it is argued that states have not only the right
but also the duty to exercise police powers when the protection of fundamental human rights is at
stake. In this sense, the responsibility to represent the interests of the affected communities in the
context of investor-state arbitration rests with the state.
Investor-state arbitration is opaque at various levels: first, the knowledge of the dispute's
existence; second, the access to the *879 process itself; and finally, the access to the resulting
award. [FN455] Beginning with the last element, it is evident that without access to the award, it is
difficult to become aware of the very existence of a given dispute. While the ICSID Secretariat keeps a
registry of all cases filed under its rules and reports awards in its publications, [FN456] most
investment cases under the rules of commercial arbitration institutions, such as the International
Chamber of Commerce (ICC), are confidential. [FN457] The NAFTA countries' decision to disclose all
NAFTA arbitrations [FN458] has to be welcomed. All three NAFTA parties publish online the key
documents of all arbitrations: the submissions of the parties, procedural orders, and
awards. [FN459] Access to documents is subject to the condition that documents can be redacted in
order to withhold confidential business information or privileged information. [FN460] Similar
provisions appear in the new U.S. and Canadian BITs. [FN461]
*880 Some arbitration rules provide limited public access to arbitral hearings, but those are
notable exceptions. Under Article 28(3) of the UNCITRAL Rules, hearings are to be held in camera,
unless the parties agree otherwise. [FN462]Rule 32 of the 2003 ICSID Arbitration Rules required party
consent to non-party attendance to the hearings. [FN463] Rule 32 of the 2006 ICSID Arbitration Rules
provides that "unless either party objects," the tribunal, after consultation with ICSID's Secretary
General, may allow non-parties to attend or observe all or part of the arbitration
hearings. [FN464] Again, the more desirable solution appears in the NAFTA context, where the NAFTA
States Parties have agreed to support open hearings. [FN465] In the Glamis Gold case, the public was
invited to view the proceedings in a separate room via closed circuit television. [FN466] The Quechan
were invited to view the proceedings from a different location with a separate video feed to allow their
viewing of otherwise restricted discussion of cultural locations. [FN467]
The exogenous advantage of openness is that it allows public scrutiny and eventual public
participation. There has been debate as *881 to whether non-parties interested in the arbitration of
an investment dispute should be allowed to make amicus curiae submissions. [FN468] Amici curiae
are not technically parties to the proceeding. Rather they supply the tribunal with information and
legal analysis that may be helpful to achieve a more complete vision of the factual and legal
background of the case. While Article 17(1) of the UNCITRAL Rules, as revised in 2010, allows the
arbitral tribunal "to conduct the arbitration in such a manner it considers appropriate," Article 37(2) of
the ICSID Rules, as amended in 2006, provides that a tribunal may allow a "non-disputing party to file
a written submission with the Tribunal regarding a matter within the scope of the
dispute." [FN469] Therefore, it is up to the tribunal to decide whether to allow amicus curiae
submission, and, while they must be consulted, the parties do not have veto rights. Similar provisions
are now included in the new U.S. and Canadian Model BIT. [FN470] In the NAFTA context, the
Statement of the Free Trade; Commission on Non-Disputing Party Participation provides that "[n]o
provision of the [NAFTA] limits a Tribunal's discretion to accept written submissions from a person or
entity that is not a disputing party (a 'non-disputing party')." [FN471] The NAFTA States Parties
however also recommend that Chapter 11 Tribunals adopt a number of procedures with respect to
such submissions. [FN472]
*882 Amicus curiae briefs are of fundamental relevance to disputes which involve indigenous
peoples' rights. First, submission of amicus curiae briefs by indigenous peoples' representatives may
ensure that arbitral tribunals are aware of their concerns. [FN473] Indigenous peoples are "uniquely
positioned to comment on the impact of the proposed [activities] to cultural resources, cultural
landscape or context." [FN474] Furthermore, their viewpoints may differ from those of the disputing
parties. [FN475]
Second, amicus curiae may help the tribunal by clarifying the applicable rules of international law,
thus contributing to the crosspollination of international law norms and those of investment
law. [FN476] For instance, in the Grand River case, the National Chief of the Assembly of the First
Nation, "which represents the views of First Nations both nationally and internationally," expressed his
support for the claimants' and submitted an amicus curiae brief which referred to a number of
international law instruments. [FN477] Similarly, the amicus curiae briefs submitted by the Quechan
Nation in the Glamis Gold case both referred to the framework for protection of indigenous sacred
sites under domestic and international law. [FN478]
*883 Third, although there is no such thing as binding precedent in investor-state arbitration,
awards dealing with indigenous cultural heritage may have a pivotal role in subsequent
arbitrations. [FN479] This argument; was also put forward by the Quechan Nation when applying for
leave to file a Non-Party Submission in the Glamis Gold Case:
[T]he manner in which this sacred area and the Tribe's interest in it will be portrayed in this
arbitral process is of great concern for native peoples worldwide, who are similarly attempting to
protect their irreplaceable sacred places and ensure religious freedoms .... The Tribe wants to ensure
that the sensitive and serious nature of indigenous sacred areas are properly taken into account in
this, and in all future, international proceedings. [FN480]
Finally, consideration of amicus curiae briefs by arbitral tribunals offers a concrete, feasible way to
solve the sovereignty dilemma of indigenous peoples. As well argued by the Quechan Nation in the
Glamis Gold Case, "[a]s a sovereign nation, the Tribe cannot be said to be adequately represented by
another sovereign ...." [FN481]
Arbitral tribunals have increasingly accepted amicus curiae briefs, [FN482]albeit imposing certain
conditions for their admissibility in *884 order not to overburden the proceeding or cause delay. For
instance, in considering whether to accept and consider the unsolicited letter from the National Chief
of the Assembly of the First Nation, the Grand River arbitral tribunal affirmed its intention to be guided
by the October 7, 2003 Free Trade Commission's Statement. [FN483] In the final award, the
arbitrators expressly noted that the letter "was read and considered by the Tribunal." [FN484] In the
Glamis Gold Case, the Arbitral Tribunal accepted the amicus curiae briefs presented by the Quechan
Indian tribe, after being of the view that the submission "satisfie [d] the principles of the Free Trade
Commission's Statement on non-disputing party participation." [FN485] Despite this trend, the
Statement does present an obstacle to the consideration of indigenous peoples' amicus curiae briefs,
as it provides that that "the granting of leave to file a non-disputing party submission does not require
the Tribunal to address that submission at any point in the arbitration." [FN486] However, for the
reasons explained above, arbitral tribunals should pay due consideration to submissions presented by
indigenous peoples.
Some authors have proposed the use of counterclaims in investor-state
arbitration. [FN487] According to these authors, the host state might bring a counter-claim on behalf
of its citizens against *885 foreign investors for the violation of human rights in the host
country. [FN488] According to Weiler, "it would be better ... if future investment protection
treaties delineated that just as states are obligated to treat foreign investments 'in accordance with
international law,' so too must corporations treat the host state and its citizens in accordance with
international law." [FN489] Indeed, some recent investment treaties specifically allow counterclaims
against investors who initiate the investor-state process. [FN490]
Under investment treaties, an argument can be made that host states already possess the ability
to use human rights arguments as defenses to claims brought by investors. [FN491] For instance, the
High Commissioner for Human Rights has encouraged states to raise their obligations under human
rights law where a decision of a tribunal might affect the enjoyment of human rights nationally or
where the interpretation of a provision in an investment treaty has a possible human rights
dimension. [FN492] *886 Arbitrators may, albeit incidenter tantum, consider non-investment
obligations of the host state.[FN493]
Admitting third parties, such an indigenous persons, to act as parties in the proceeding would take
judicialization too far. and as a matter of procedure, it would be undesirable. When states agree to a
BIT, they accept investor-state arbitration as the dispute settlement mechanism to solve investment
disputes with foreign nationals, not with other parties with widely varying interests. Identification of
which third parties are entitled to participate as parties would present an additional problem.
Furthermore, other international courts and tribunals, such as human rights courts, are procedurally
available to the affected individuals. [FN494] Finally, such an extreme judicialization of the arbitral
process would ultimately re-politicize investment disputes. [FN495] This does not mean, however, that
states should not make reference to the relevant human rights obligations in the context of investor-
state arbitration. [FN496] It also does not mean that such arguments should not be heard through
participatory mechanisms such as amicus curiae submissions.

The effective protection of cultural heritage benefits all humanity. Cultural heritage is a legacy for
everyone as its reveals aspects of a country's history and yields a sense of identity for the present and
future generations. The relevant case law shows that cultural heritage can be endangered by foreign
investment, [FN497] but the *887 impact of foreign investment on indigenous cultural heritage is an
almost unexplored field.
The delegation of investment dispute resolution to international tribunals, "undercuts the authority
of national courts to deal with [such] disputes."[FN498] Furthermore, court decisions in the host state
granting complaints brought by private parties against a foreign investor may be attacked by the
investor before an arbitral tribunal on the ground that they constitute wrongful interference with the
investment. While investor-state arbitration depoliticizes international disputes, it may not be the
most suitable forum to settle disputes involving indigenous cultural entitlements. Investor-state
arbitration distinguishes between two types of non-state actors: (1) the investor engaged in foreign
direct investment and (2) the affected communities, including indigenous peoples impacted by the
investment. While foreign investors have direct access to investor-state arbitration under the relevant
BIT, the affected indigenous peoples do not have direct access, and their participation is only possible
through the submission of amicus curiae briefs. The submission of amicus curiae is not a right, but is
considered by the arbitral tribunal on a case-by-case basis. While the host state generally represents
the affected communities, [FN499] one may wonder whether indigenous peoples need additional
procedural guarantees, due to their special status under international law.
Arbitration rules of procedure are not sufficiently developed to adequately protect indigenous
peoples' rights. Their participation as amici curiae at arbitral proceedings is not automatically granted,
and arbitral proceedings involving cultural heritage are not always open to the public. Only recently
has investment arbitration started *888 to acknowledge its quasi-constitutional role, responding
positively to the requests by public interest groups to make amicus curiae submissions. [FN500] In
doing so, some tribunals have decided that the advantages of public debate outweigh the
disadvantage of any additional costs and procedural complexity. Furthermore, some arbitral
institutions have adopted policies concerning transparency and openness that facilitate public
scrutiny. [FN501]
At a substantive level, as claims involving indigenous cultural heritage and foreign investment
clearly involve fundamental human rights, arbitrators should take international law into account as
part of the applicable law. In this sense, arbitrators can evaluate whether measures adopted by the
host state are in compliance with its international law obligations, albeit incidenter tantum. In any
case, arbitrators are bound to apply relevant peremptory norms of international law norms whether or
not such approach was pleaded by the parties. Furthermore, according to customary rules of treaty
interpretation, international investment law is not a universe unto itself. Accordingly, there should be
a "constitutional" balancing between foreign investors' rights and legitimate state concerns flowing
from international human rights treaties.
As arbitral tribunals may face difficulties in finding an appropriate balance between the different
interests concerned, cultural exceptions should be introduced in the text of BITs. On the one side, this
would provide certainty to foreign investors. On the other, it would adequately protect the cultural
entitlements of indigenous peoples. De jure condendo, procedural mechanisms to *889 ensure that
indigenous peoples can participate as amici curiae and their arguments be taken into account by
arbitral tribunals should be used consistently.
In conclusion, although foreign investment represents a potentially positive force for development,
state policy and practice concerning resource exploitation must be mindful of its human rights
implications. While the notion of indigenous heritage has only recently come to the forefront of legal
debate, it clearly has a direct linkage with the protection of indigenous peoples' rights and human

[FNa1]. Lecturer in international law (Maastricht University), Ph.D. (European University Institute),
M.Jur. (Oxon), M.Res. (EUI), J.D. and M.Pol.Sc. (Siena). She may be contacted at This paper was presented at 2010 Society of Legal Scholars
Conference held at Southampton University on September 15, 2010. The author wishes to thank
Professor Francesco Francioni, Professor Peter Van den Bossche, Professor Colin Reid, Professor
Rosalind Malcolm, Professor Claire Cutler, Professor Ana Filipa Vrdoljak, Achraf Farraj, and the
participants to the conference for their comments.

[FN1]. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007, 46 I.L.M. 1013 (2007)[hereinafter UNDRIP]. The UN General
Assembly adopted the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples on September
13, 2007 with anoverwhelming majority of 14.3 votes in favor, only 4 negative votes ... and 11
abstentions. Press Release, Gen. Assembly Dep't of Pub. Info., General Assembly Adopts Declaration
on Rights of Indigenous Peoples; 'Major Step Forward' Towards Human Rights for All. Says President,
U.N. Press Release GA/10612 (Sept. 13, 2007), available at http:// However, "[s]ince its adoption. Australia, New
Zealand, Canada and the United States have all reversed their positions and now endorse the
Declaration." United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Adopted by the General
Assembly 13 September 2007, U.N. Permanent. Forum on Indigenous Issues, http:// (last visited Feb. 26, 2011). The Declaration was
negotiated for more than 20 years between nation-states and Indigenous Peoples. Id. As Anaya puts
it, "[w]hile the explanatory statements of the four States that voted against adoption of the
Declaration ... showed disagreement with the wording of specific articles or concerns with the process
of adoption, they also expressed a general acceptance of the core principles and values advanced by
the Declaration." Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of
Indigenous People, Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political. Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, including the Right to Development, U.N. Human Rights Council, ¶ 35, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/9/9 (Aug. 11, 2008) (by S. James Anaya), available at
doc.asp?symbol=A/HRC/9/9 [hereinafter Anaya, Promotion and Protection].

[FN2]. Klaus Bosselmann, Introduction to State Sovereignty, Indigenous Governance and International
Law, in Democracy, Ecological Integrity and International Law 116, 116 (J. Ronald Engel et al. eds.,

[FN3]. Michael E. Porter, Attitudes, Values, Beliefs, and the Microeconomics of Prosperity, in Culture
Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress 14, 27 (Samuel P. Huntington & Lawrence E. Harrison
eds., 2000).

[FN4]. Two cultures compete in the global governance of natural resources: the culture of growth and
the culture of limits. See Richard D. Lamm, The Culture of Growth and the Culture of Limits, 9 Soc.
Cont. 163 (1999).

[FN5]. Joseph E. Stiglitz, Senior Vice President & Chief Economist, World Bank, 9th Raul Prebisch
Lecture at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development: Toward a New Paradigm for
Development (Oct. 18, 1998), available at
(emphasis omitted).
[FN6]. Porter, supra note 3, at 20, 26.

[FN7]. Lila Barrera-Hernández, Indigenous Peoples, Human Rights and Natural Resource
Development: Chile's Mapuche Peoples and the Right to Water, 11 Ann. Surv. Int'l & Comp. L. 1, 1

[FN8]. David Throsby, Culture in Sustainable Development: Insights for the Future Implementation of
Article 13 3 (2008), available at http://
(emphasis added).

[FN9]. Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions art. 2,
Oct. 20, 2005, 2440 U.N.T.S. 311 (entered into force Mar. 18, 2007). See UNDRIP, supra note 1,
pmbl. ("respect for indigenous knowledge,cultures and traditional practices contributes to
sustainable and equitable development and proper management of the environment"). Sustainable
development is a normative concept which reflects forms of development that "meet[] the needs of
the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs." G.A.
Res. 42/187, pmbl., U.N. Doc. A/RES/42/187 (Dec. 11, 1987). As an important component of
contemporary international law, sustainable development is composed of three pillars: (1)
international environmental law; (2) international human rights law; and (3) international economic
law. Dominic McGoldrick, Sustainable Development andHuman Rights: An Integrated Conception, 45
Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 796, 796-97 (1996). The literature on sustainable development is extensive. See,
e.g., Daniel B. Magraw & Lisa D. Hawke, Sustainable Development, in The Oxford Handbook of
International Environmental Law 613 (Daniel Bodansky et al. eds., 2007) (examining "the evolution
and content of the concept of 'sustainable development,' its legal status and function, and its
implications for principles and tools of international environmental law"); Marie-Claire Cordonier
Segger & Ashfaq Khalfan, Sustainable Development Law: Principles, Practices and Prospects 129-32
(2004) (discussing the protection of fragile ecosystems inhabited by indigenous communities as an
example of the intersection between the human rights movement and environment protection). On
sustainable development, see Alan Boyle & David Freestone (eds.), Internationa] Law and Sustainable
Development: Past Achievements and Future Challenges (2001).

[FN10]. The literature is extensive. See, e.g., Laura Westra. Environmental Justice and the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples--International & Domestic Perspectives (2008) 17-21 (arguing that the biological
and ecological integrities of indigenous peoples' lands are constantly under attack through the
economic activities of developed countries); Marcos A. Orellana, Int'l Inst. for Env't and Dev.,
Indigenous Peoples, Mining and International Law 3-6 (2002) 'discussing the historical evolution of the
law due to European invasion and indigenous people's resistance to it). For earlier works, see
generally Benedict Kingsbury,Indigenous Peoples in International Law: A Constructivist Approach to
the Asian Controversy, 92 Am. J. Int'l L. 414 (1998) (discussing whether the concept of "indigenous
peoples" formed in regions dominated by European settlement should be applied to Asia); W. Michael
Reisman, Protecting Indigenous Rights in International Adjudication, 89 Am. J. Int'l L. 350
(1995) (discussing the development of "indigenous rights" as recent claims by indigenous peoples for
direct protection by the international community); Dean E. Cycon, When Worlds Collide: Law,
Development, and Indigenous Peoples, 25 New Eng. L. Rev. 761 (1991) (discussing the effects of
development on indigenous people and the need for regulation at the international, rather than
nation-state, level).

[FN11]. On the contribution of international investment law to the development of international law,
see Valentina Vadi, Critical Comparisons: The Role of Comparative Law in Investment Treaty
Arbitration, 39 Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 67 (2010); Andreas Lowenfeld, Investment Agreements and
International Law, 42 Colum. J. Trans. L. 123 (2003).

[FN12]. See generally Human Rights in International Investment Law andArbitration (Pierre-Marie
Dupuy et al. eds., 2009) (discussing the role of human rights in international economic adjudication
and arbitration); Bruno Simma & Theodore Kill, Harmonizing Investment Protection and International
Human Rights: First Steps towards a Methodology, in International Investment Law for the 21st
Century: Essays in Honour of Christoph Shreuer 678, 678-82 (2009).

[FN13]. See Valentina Vadi, Cultural Heritage & International Investment Law: A Stormy Relationship,
15 Int'l J. Cultural Prop. 1, 2 (2008).

[FN14]. See Valentina Vadi, Fragmentation or Cohesion? Investment versus Cultural Protection Rules,
10 J. World Inv. & Trade 573, 593-96 (2009).

[FN15]. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment,
1986 I.C.J. 2, ¶¶ 202-09 (June 2). "[E]ach state is permitted, by the principle of state sovereignty, to
decide freely for example the choice of political, economic, social and cultural system, and formulation
of foreign policy." Id. ¶ 205.

[FN16]. For an account of this evolution, see Francesco Francioni, Culture, Heritage and Human
Rights: An Introduction, in Cultural Human Rights 1--15(Francesco Francioni & Martin Scheinin eds.,

[FN17]. In terms of international cultural law, this Article mainly refers to the treaty and soft law
developed by the UNESCO in the cultural sector.

[FN18]. Fergus MacKay, Universal Rights or a Universe unto Itself? Indigenous Peoples' Human Rights
and the World Bank's Draft Operational Policy 4.10 on Indigenous Peoples, 17 Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. 527,
536-37 (2002). See also Siegfried Wiessner, The Rights and Status of Indigenous Peoples: A Global
Comparative and International Legal Analysis, 12 Harv. Hum. Rights J. 57, 127 (1999) (noting the
crystallization of customary norms protecting indigenous peoples' rights).

[FN19]. Jeremy Waldron, Indigeneity? First Peoples and Last Occupancy, 1 N.Z. Journal of Pub. & Int'l
Law 55, 57 (2003).

[FN20]. As Waldron explains, "indigeneity" is derived from "indigenous," which in turn is derived from
indu, an old Latin root meaning "within" 'like the Greek <fl>, endon) and gignere meaning "to beget."
Id. at 56.

[FN21]. See International Labour Organization Convention 169 ConcerningIndigenous and Tribal
Peoples in Independent Countries art. 1. June 27, 1989, 1650 U.N.T.S. 384 (entered into force May 9,
1991) [hereinafter ILO Convention 169].

[FN22]. Id. art. 1. § 2.

[FN23]. The report identifies indigenous peoples as those who "having a historical continuity with pre-
invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their territories, consider themselves distinct
from other sectors of society now prevailing in those territories or parts of them." Special Rapporteur
on the Rights of Indigenous People, Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous
Populations, Sub-Comm'n on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, U.N. Econ. and
Soe. Council. ¶ 379, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7/Add.4 (1987) (by Jose R. Martinez-Cobo)
[hereinafter Martinéz-Cobo Report]. Indigenous people are said to "form at present non-dominant
sectors of society and are determined to preserve, develop and transmit to future generations their
ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their continued existence as peoples, in
accordance with their own cultural patterns, social institutions and legal systems." Id.

[FN24]. Waldron distinguishes two possible ways of defining objective "indigeneity": "(a) indigenous
peoples are the descendants of the first human inhabitants of a land; and (b) indigenous peoples are
the descendants of those who inhabited the land at the time of European colonization." Waldron, supra
note 21, at 55.

[FN25]. Martinéz-Cobo Report, supra note 23, ¶ 379.

[FN26]. ILO Convention 169, supra note 21, art. 1, § 1, cl. b.

[FN27]. Martinez-Cobo Report, supra note 23, ¶ 379.

[FN28]. Id.
[FN29]. Id.

[FN30]. UNDRIP, supra note 1, art. 33(1). The UNDRIP further provides that "It]his does not impair
the right of indigenous individuals to obtain citizenship of the States in which they live." Id.

[FN31]. See Ben Boer, Article 3: Identification and Delineation of World Heritage Properties, in The
1972 World Heritage Convention: A Commentary 85- 102 (Francesco. Francioni & Federico Lenzerini
eds., 2008).

[FN32]. See infra Part V.

[FN33]. Francioni, supra note 16, at 6.

[FN34]. Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage art. 1. Nov.
16, 1972. 27 U.S.T. 37. 1037 U.N.T.S. 151 (entered into force Dec. 15. 1975) [hereinafter World
Heritage Convention],

[FN35]. See, e.g., Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict
art. 1, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240 (entered into force Aug. 7, 1956) (defining cultural property
as property of "great importance to the cultural heritage of every people," including art, books,
monuments, and buildings used to preserve this property); Convention on the Means of Prohibiting
and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property art. 1, Nov.
14. 1970, 823 U.N.T.S. 231 (entered into force Apr. 24, 1972) (defining cultural property as property
"specifically designated by each State as being of importance" in relation to history, art, and science,
among other things. and falls into a specific category including rare collections, archaeological
findings, and other rare or original items).

[FN36]. For example, the U.N. General Assembly has recognized "the right of members of all
civilizations to preserve and develop their cultural heritage within their own societies." Global Agenda
for Dialogue Among Civilizations G.A. Res. 56/6, art. 3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/6 (Nov. 21, 2001).

[FN37]. See Francioni, supra note 16, at 10-11.

[FN38]. See Dusan Pokorny, Property, Culture, and Cultural Property, 9 (3) Constellations 356, 356

[FN39]. Special Rapporteur, Sub-Comm'n on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities,

Principles and Guidelines for the. Protection of the Heritage of Indigenous Peoples, ¶ 11, at 5, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/31 (Jul. 8, 1994) (by Erica-Irene Daes).

[FN40]. Claire O'Faircheallaigh, Negotiating Cultural Heritage? Aboriginal Mining Company Agreements
in Australia, 39 (1) Dev. & Change 1, 25, 27 (2003).

[FN41]. Id. at 27.

[FN42]. Special Rapporteur, Sub-Comm'n on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities,

Study on the Protection of the Cultural and Intellectual Property of Indigenous Peoples, ¶ 31, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/28 (Jul. 28, 1993) (by Erica-Irene Daes).

[FN43]. UNDRIP, supra note 1, pmbl.

[FN44]. The World Heritage List includes 911 properties. World Heritage List, UNESCO, (last visited Feb. 12, 2011).

[FN45]. See Marina Kuleshova, Cultural Landscapes in the World Heritage List 16 (2007) (asserting
that the "role of Europe in the List is decisive, the overwhelming majority of sites are nominated by
European countries, and [their] cultural heritage is dominant").
[FN46]. See Valentina Vadi et al., The Unique/The Universal, in London Debates 2009: What Role do
Museums Play in the Globalisation of Culture? 5, 5 (2009), available at

[FN47]. The term "general application" refers to human rights instruments not exclusively or
specifically focused on indigenous peoples. The UNDRIP provides that "[i]ndigenous peoples have the
right to the full enjoyment, as a collective or as individuals, of all human rights and fundamental
freedoms as recognized in the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and international human rights law." UNDRIP, supra note 1, art. 1. As a U.N. Special
Rapporteur has clarified, "all general human rights principles and norms apply equally to indigenous
peoples, and are to be interpreted and applied with regard to the specific historical, cultural, social and
economic circumstances of these people." Anaya, Promotion and Protection, supra note 1, 11 20.

[FN48]. See Antonio Cassese, International Law 172 (2001.).

[FN49]. See, e.g., Francioni, supra note 16, at 6-7 (describing the development of the term "cultural
heritage" and the subsequent association of cultural heritage with cultural rights).

[FN50]. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 1, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966,
S. Exec. Doc. E, 95-2, at 31 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 179 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976)
[hereinafter ICCPR].
(c) 2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Wor
(3 screens)


[FN51]. "The Human Rights Committee is the body of independent experts that monitors implementation of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights by its State parties .... The Committee also publishes its interpretation of the content of
human rights provisions, known as general comments on thematic issues ...." Human Rights Committee, Office of the U.N. High
Comm'r for Human Rights, (last visited Feb. 8, 2011).

[FN52]. According to Anaya, the Committee has "advance[d] a broad interpretation of the international norm of cultural integrity in
the context of indigenous peoples, understanding that norm to encompass all aspects of indigenous culture including rights to lands
and resources." Anaya, Promotion and Protection, supra note 1, ¶ 22.

[FN53]. Chief Bernard Ominayak and the Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada, Human Rights Coram, Commc'n. No. 511/1992, ¶ 33, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/38/D/167/1984 (Mar. 26, 1990).

[FN54]. Id. ¶¶ 3.5, 12, 23.2, 27.4.

[FN55]. Lansman v. Finland, Human Rights Comm, Commc'n. No. 511/1992, 1 9.6, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/52/D/511/1992 (Oct. 14,
1993). The authors of the communication, all reindeer breeders of Sami ethnic origin, contended that "[t]he quarrying and
transport of anorthocite would disturb their reindeer herding activities and the complex system of reindeer fences determined by
the natural environment" and observed that "the site of the quarry, mount Etelä-Riutusvaara, is a sacred place of the old Sami
religion, where in old times reindeer were slaughtered." Id. ¶¶ 2.5, 2.6. Thus, they claimed that these activities "violate[d] their
rights under article 27 of the Covenant, in particular their right to enjoy their own culture, which has traditionally been and remains
essentially based on reindeer husbandry." Id. ¶ 3.1. It is worth noting that international legal instruments, including the ICCPR
article 7, do not provide a right to culture, but refer to cultural rights. See Valentina Vadi,Book Review, 21 Eur. J. Int'l L. 1111,
1111 (2010) (reviewing Elsa Stamatopoulou, Cultural Rights in International Law (2007)). The protection of indigenous culture or
cultural heritage--in this case reindeer husbandry--and the protection of sacred places are elements of cultural rights. See
Francioni, supra note 16. at 6-7 (further describing the concept of cultural heritage).

[FN56]. Länsman, supra note 55, ¶ 9.8.

[FN57]. Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 30, opened far signature Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3. 54 (entered into force
Sept. 2. 1990).

[FN58]. U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination [CERD], General Recommendation No. 23: Indigenous Peoples, ¶ 3,
U.N. Doc. A/52/18, Annex V (Aug. 18, 1997).

[FN59]. Id. ¶ 1.

[FN60]. Id. ¶ 4(a).

[FN61]. See, e.g., Megan Mooney, Note, How the Organization of American States Took the Lead: The Development of Indigenous
Peoples' Rights in the Americas, 31 Am. Indian L. Rev. 553, 553 (2006-07) (arguing that the OAS has taken "the most aggressive
approach" to upholding the collective rights of indigenous peoples); Isabel Madariaga Cuneo, The Rights of Indigenous Peoples and
the Inter-American Human Rights System, 22 Ariz, J. Int'l & Comp. L. 53 (2005) (describing the reports of the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights and the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, both autonomous organs of the
OAS, on issues relating to the rights of indigenous persons).

[FN62]. See Mayagna Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79 (2001).

[FN63]. U.N. Conference on Env't and Dev., Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development, Principle 22, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I) Annex 1 (Aug. 12, 1992),
available at lannexl.htm.

[FN64]. U.N. Conference on Env't and Dev., Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Agenda
21, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I) Annex 2 (Aug. 12, 1992) [hereinafter Agenda 21]. Agenda 21 is a "comprehensive
plan of action" to address human activities that impact the environment. Agenda 21, Div. for Sustainable Dev., U.N. Dep't of Econ.
and Soc. Affairs, (last visited Feb. 12, 2011). It was adopted by more than 178
governments at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development. Id.

[FN65]. Agenda 21, supra note 64, art. 26(3)(a)(ii).

[FN66]. Id. art. 26(3)(a)(iv).

[FN67]. Convention on Biological Diversity art. 10(c), opened for signature June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79, 143; 31 I.L.M. 818
(entered into force Dec. 29, 1993).

[FN68]. World Heritage Convention, supra note 34, art. 1.

[FN69]. See, e.g., Peter Fowler, Cultural Landscape: (treat Concept, Pity about the Phrase, in The Cultural Landscape: Planning for
Sustainable Partnership between People and Place 64 (R. Kelly et al. eds., 2001).

[FN70]. In certain unique situations, broader considerations are taken into account. For example, the listing of the Old City of
Jerusalem and its walls was proposed by Jordan because Israel was not a member of the World Heritage Convention at the time).
See World Heritage Committee. UNESCO, Report of the Rapporteur, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. CC/CH/5.10/81/771 (Sept. 30, 1981), available
at While the United States opposed this inscription, as it was not, in conformity with the
letter of the WHC, which is based on territoriality and the consent of the state concerned, the site was inscribed in the Wor ld
Heritage List. Id. ¶¶ 13, 14.

[FN71]. See Richard Black, Troubled History Tinges Marine Plan, BBC News, Mar. 2, 2010, http:// reserve.html (discussing whether the Chagos
archipelago should become a maritime reserve; Peter Sand, The Chagos Archipelago: Footprint of Empire or World Heritage?, 40
Envt'l Pol'y & L. 232, 237 (2010) (arguing that the archipelago "unquestionably deserves recognition and protection as global
natural heritage" and suggesting a "joint nomination of the Chagos by the UK and Mauritius" under the WHC).

[FN72]. The WHC was "ratified by the UK on 25 May 1984, with a declaration extending it to all British overseas territories except
the BIOT [British Indian Ocean Territory]." Sand, supra note 71, ¶ 236.

[FN73]. Id.

[FN74]. See Tiamsoon Sirisrisak & Natsuko Akagawa, Cultural Landscape in the World Heritage List: Understanding on the Gap and
Categorisation, 2 (3) City & Time 11, 11 (2007), available at

[FN75]. See generally Kakadu National Park, UNESCO, http:// (last visited Feb. 13, 2010) (describing
the park's natural and cultural features).

[FN76]. Ben W. Boer, World Heritage Disputes in Australia, 7 J. Envtl. L. & Litig. 247, 271 (1992).

[FN77]. Id.

[FN78]. UNESCO World Heritage Comm., Report on the Mission to Kakadu National Park, Australia 26 October to 1 November 1986,
1, WCH-98/CONF. 203/INF.18 (Nov. 29, 1998), available at http://
[hereinafter Report on the Mission to Kakadu).

[FN79]. Id. at 2-4.

[FN80]. See Federico Lenzerini, Article 12 Protection of Properties Not Inscribed on the World Heritage List, in The 1972 World
Heritage Convention: A Commentary 201 (Francesco Francioni ed., 2008).

[FN81]. Id. at 207.

[FN82]. Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage, Oct. 17, 2003. 2368 U.N.T.S. 3. The Convention was
adopted by UNESCO's General Conference on October 17, 2003. Text of the Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural
Heritage, UNESCO, http:// (last visited Jan. 26, 2011). It entered into
force on April 20, 2006. The States Parties to the Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage, UNESCO, (last visited Jan. 26, 2011). As of January 26, 2011. the
Convention had 134 States Parties. Id.

[FN83]. Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, supra note 9. The Convention was
adopted by the 33rd General Conference of UNESCO on October 20, 2005. entered into force on March 18, 2007. and had 115
States Parties as of February 13, 2011. Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions,
UNESCO, SECTION=201.html #ENTRY (last visited
Feb. 13, 2011).

[FN84]. Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage, supra note 82, art. 2(1).

[FN85]. "This intangible cultural heritage, transmitted from generation to generation, is constantly recreated by communities and
groups in response to their environment, their interaction with nature and their history, and provides them with a sense of identity
and continuity, thus promoting respect for cultural diversity and human creativity." Id.

[FN86]. "For the purposes of this Convention, consideration will be given solely to such intangible cultural heritage as is compatible
with existing international human rights instruments, as well as with the requirements of mutual respect among communities,
groups and individuals, and of sustainable development." Id.

[FN87]. Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions,supra note 9, pmbl.

[FN88]. On indigenous peoples' intangible cultural heritage, see Valentina Vadi, Intangible Heritage:Traditional Medicine and
Knowledge Governance, 2 Journal of Intellectual Property Law and Practice 682 (2007) (discussing the tension between IP
regulation and traditional knowledge with regard to medicinal products); Wend B. Wendland, Intellectual Property and the
Protection ofTraditional Knowledge and Cultural Expressions, in Art and Cultural Heritage: Law, Policy and Practice 327-39
(Barbara T. Hoffman ed., 2006) (discussing the relationship between IP and protection of traditional knowledge and culture with
reference to work taking place at the World Intellectual Property Organization); Hester du Plessis, Culture, Science and Indigenous
Technology, in Art and Cultural Heritage: Law, Policy and Practice, 363-69 (Barbara T. Hoffman ed., 2006) (arguing that
indigenous knowledge of societies must be included in the reinterpretation of culturalconcepts to comply with the relevant issues
of the new technological era); Federico Lenzerini, Indigenous Peoples' Cultural Rights and the Controversy over Commercial Use of
their TraditionalKnowledge, in Cultural Human Rights 119-150 (Francesco Francioni & Martin Scheinin eds., 2008) (discussing the
debate over modern commercial uses of traditional indigenous cultural knowledge).

[FN89]. ILO Convention 169, supra note 21, art. 13.

[FN90]. UNDRIP, supra note 1, art. 12.1.

[FN91]. Id. art. 13.1.

[FN92]. "Control by indigenous peoples over developments affecting them and their lands, territories and resources will enable
them to maintain and strengthen their institutions, cultures and traditions, and to promote their development in accordance with
their aspirations and needs." Id. pmbl. Article 8 of the Declaration also states inter alia that "[i]ndigenous peoples and individuals
have the right not to be subjected to forced assimilation or destruction of their culture" and that "states shall provide effective
mechanisms for the prevention of, and redress for: ... any action which has the aim or the effect of dispossessing them of their
lands, territories or resources ...." Id. art. 8. Article 11 states: "Indigenous peoples have the right to practice and revitalize their
cultural traditions and customs. This includes the right to maintain, protect and develop the past, present and future manifestations
of their cultures, such as archaeological and historical sites, artifacts, designs, ceremonies, technologies and visual and performing
arts and literature." Id. art. 11.

[FN93]. See The World Bank Group, Striking a Better Balance: Final Report of the World Bank Independent Extractive Industries
Review 55 (2003), available at

[FN94]. MacKay, supra note 18, at 538.

[FN95]. See World Bank, Operational Directive 4.20 on Indigenous Peoples, in The World Bank Operational Manual ¶ 6 (1991);
World Bank, Operational Policy 4.10 on Indigenous Peoples, in The World Bank Operational Manual ¶ 1 (2005).

[FN96]. MacKay. supra note 18, at 537. See also Fergus MacKay. The Draft World Bank Operational Policy 4.10 on Indigenous
Peoples: Progress or More of the Same?, 22 Arizona J. Int'l & Comp. Law 65. 66 (2005) (noting the inconsistency of compliance
with OD 4.20).

[FN97]. See UNESCO Declaration Concerning the Intentional Destruction of Cultural Heritage (Oct. 17, 2003), http://

[FN98]. Francioni, supra note 16, at 9.

[FN99]. See Pierre-Marie Dupuy, The Impact of Legal Instruments Adopted by UNESCO on General International Law, in 1 Standard
Setting in UNESCO 351, 358- 62 (Abdulqawi A. Yusuf ed., 2007). See also Francesco Francioni, Au-delà dess traités: l'émergence
d'un nouveau droit coutumier pour la protection du patrimoine culturel (European University Institute, Department of Law, Working
Paper LAW 2008/05, 2008), available at (arguing that despite the dearth of case law on
the matter, customary international law has created core substantive and procedural obligations for the protection of cultural

[FN100]. Francesco Francioni, Beyond State Sovereignty: The Protection of Cultural Heritage as a Shared Interest of Humanity, 25
Mich. J. Int'l L. 1209, 1213 (2004).

[FN101]. A custom is made up by two elements: a consistent practice (usus or diuturnitas) and the understanding that such a
practice reflects existing international law (opinio juris). See Michael Akehurst, Custom as a Source of International Law, 47 Brit.
Y.B. Int'l L. 1 (1975); Michael Byers,Custom, Power and the Power of Rules, 17 Mich. J. Int'l L. 109 (1995); Maurice Mendelson, The
Formation of Customary International Law, in Recuiel des Cours: Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law
155, 187-89 (1998); Anthea E. Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International Law: A Reconciliation, 95
Am. J. Int'l L. 757 (2001); Jorg Kammerhofer, The Uncertainty in the Formal Sources of International Law: Customary International
Law and Some of its Problems 15-3 Eur. J. Int'l L. 523 (2004); Andrew Guzman, Saving Customary International Law, 27 Mich. J.
Int'l L. 115 (2005); Jack Goldsmith & Eric Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law (U. of Chi. L. Sch., John M. Olin Law &
Economics Working Paper No. 63, 1998), available at http:// For earlier
contributions, see Lazare Kopelmanas, Custom as a Means of the Creation of International Law, 18 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 127 (1937);
Josef L. Kunz, The Nature of Customary International Law, 47 Am. J. Int'l L. 662 (1953).

[FN102]. See Wiessner, supra note 18, at 127; Austen Parrish, Changing Territoriality, Fading Sovereignty, and the Development of
Indigenous Rights, 31 Am. Indian L. Rev. 291, 310 (2007)(arguing that customary law also includes the right to self-determination
and the right to participate).

[FN103]. James Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law 242-43 (1996). For a more restrictive approach, see Alexandra
Xanthaki, Indigenous Rights in International Law over the Last 10 Years and Future Developments, 10 Melb. J. Int'l L. 27, 36
(2009) (noting that "viewing the Declaration or substantial parts of it as customary international law may be rather premature").

[FN104]. See U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2, art. 55; ICCPR, supra note 50, art. 1; International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights art. 1, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1.966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter ICESCR].

[FN105]. ICCPR. supra note 50, art. 1, para. 1. The ICCPR also provides that "[a]ll peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose
of their natural wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic co-operation, based
upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international law. In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence."
Id. art. 1, para. 2.

[FN106]. In the East Timor Case, the ICJ upheld Portugal's assertion that the right of peoples to self-determination, as it evolved
from the Charter and from United Nations practice, has an erga omnes character. In the Court's view, Portugal's assertion was
irreproachable. See Case Concerning East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90, ¶ 29 (Jan. 30) [hereinafter Case Concerning East
Timor]. See also Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004
I.C.J. 136, ¶ 88 (July 9) ("The Court also notes that the principle of self-determination of peoples has been enshrined in the United
Nations Charter and reaffirmed by the General Assembly in resolution 2625 (XXV) ...."). The principle of self-determination of
peoples has been recognized by the United Nations Charter and in the jurisprudence of the Court; it is one of the essential
principles of contemporary international law. Case Concerning East Timor, supra, ¶ 26. See Legal Consequences for States of the
Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970),
Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, ¶ 52 (June 21); Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 12, 11 51-70 (Oct. 16).

[FN107]. UNDRIP, supra note 1, art. 3.

[FN108]. Martin Scheinin, The Right of a People to Enjoy Its Culture: Towards a Nordic Saami Convention, in Cultural Human Rights
151, 162 (Francesco Francioni & Martin Scheinin eds., 2008).

[FN109]. UNDRIP, supra note 1, art. 3 ("Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.").

[FN110]. According to article 46(1), nothing in the UNDRIP "may be ... construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which
would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States ..." Id.
art. 46(1).

[FN111]. Rupert Emerson, Self-Determination, 65 Am. J. Int'L. 459, 459 (1971).

[FN112]. See Xanthaki. supra note 103, at 30; Russell A Miller. Collective Discursive Democracy as the Indigenous Right to Self-
Determination, 31 Am. Indian L. Rev. 341, 343 (2007). On the different degrees of self-determination, see Frederic Kirgis,
The Degrees of Self-Determination in the United States Era, 88 Am. J. Int'l L. 304, 306 (1994).

[FN113]. Scheinin, supra note 108, at 163.

[FN114]. See Chairperson of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations, U.N. Comm'n on Human Rights, Explanatory Note
Contenting the Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous, ¶¶ 4-5, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/Add.1 (July 19, 1993) (by
Erica-Irene Daes). See also Erica-Irene Daes,Some Considerations on the Right of Indigenous Peoples to Self-Determination, 3
Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 1, 9 (1993) (arguing "the right of self-determination should ordinarily be interpreted as the right of
the peoples to negotiate freely their political status and representation in the States in which they live").

[FN115]. Scheinin, supra note 108, at 163.

[FN116]. Antonio Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples 120 (1995).

[FN117]. Reference Re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, para. 134 (Can.).

[FN118]. Ana F. Vrdoljak. Self-Determination and Cultural Rights, in Cultural Human Rights 41, 78. (Francesco Francioni & Martin
Scheinin eds., 2008).

[FN119]. See Peter Manus, Sovereignty, Self-Determination, and Environment-Based Cultures: The Emerging Voice of Indigenous
Peoples in International Law, 23 Wis. Int'l L.J. 553, 620 (2005). Some scholars have criticized this approach, contending that
emphasizing the cultural entitlements of indigenous peoples de facto reduces their political rights and limits their claims to self-
determination. According to these authors, overemphasizing culture risks undermining self-determination. See Claire Cutler, The
Globalization of International Law, Indigenous Identity, and the "New Constitutionalism, in Property, Territory, Globalization:
Struggles over Autonomy 29 (William D. Coleman ed., 2011); Cherie Metcalf, Indigenous Rights and the Environment: Evolving
International Law, 35 Ottawa L. Rev. 101, 124 (2003).
[FN120]. Vrdoljak stresses that "the articulation of the legal right to self-determination during the 1960s and 1970s was firmly tied
to development and control of natural resources." Vrdoljak, supra note 118, at 53. Instead, "[t]he conceptualization and promotion
of cultural rights has been tied inextricably to the fluctuating fortunes of minority protection in international law." Id. at 56. This
difference is normatively reflected in the ICCPR, which includes provisions covering self-determination and the cultural rights of
minorities. Id. at 78.

[FN121]. See ICCPR, supra note 50, art. 1; ICESCR, supra note 104, art. 1.

[FN122]. Malcolm Shaw, International Law 292 (5th ed. 2008).

[FN123]. "The provisions of article 1 [the right to self-determination] may be relevant in the interpretation of other rights protected
by the Covenant, in particular Article 27." Apirana Mahuika et al. v. New Zealand, U.N. Human Rights Comm., Communication No.
547/1993, ¶ 9.2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/70/D/547/1993 (Nov. 15, 2000), available at http://

[FN124]. See Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: United
States of America, Concluding Observations, ¶ 37, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/USA/Q/3/CRP.4 (July 28, 2006).

[FN125]. Theodore Cohn. Global Political Economy 280-82 (2008).

[FN126]. Anthony Aust, Handbook of International Law 373 (2005).

[FN127]. Zachary Douglas has argued that only the procedural obligations of investment treaties are owed directly to the investor.
According to Douglas, the substantive obligations are owed to the State and operate as "applicable adjudicative standards for the
claimant's cause rather than binding obligations owed directly to the investor." Zachary Douglas. The International Law
of Investment Claims 35 (2009). According to James Crawford, the Fifth Special Rapporteur on State Responsibility, "lilt is a matter
of interpretation whether the primary obligations (e.g. of fair and equitable treatment) created by such treaties are owed to the
qualified investors directly, or only to the other contracting state(s) ... an interstate treaty may create individual rights, whether or
not they are classified as 'human rights' ...." James Crawford, The ILC's Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts: A Retrospect, 96 Am. J. Int'l L. 874, 887-88 (2002).

[FN128]. See Campbell McLachlan, The Principle of Systemic Integration and Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention, 54 Int'l &
Comp. L. Q. 279, 284 (2005).

[FN129]. See Campbell McLachlan, et al., International Investment Arbitration 6 (2007).

[FN130]. On the substantive standards of protection of foreign direct, investment, see Standards of Investment Protection (August
Reinisch ed., 2008) (analyzing the origins and variations in the wording used in investment agreements and identifying possible
consensus on the interpretation of substantive treatment standards such as full protection and security, most- favored nation,
national treatment, and others); Todd J. Grierson-Weiler & Ian A. Laird, Standards of Treatment, in The Oxford Handbook of
International Investment Law 259 (Peter Muchlinski, et al., eds., 2008) (analyzing the interpretation of non-discrimination and
minimum standard provisions in investment treaty arbitration).

[FN131]. On the umbrella clause, see Jarrod Wong, Umbrella Clauses in Bilateral Investment Treaties: Of Breaches of Contract,
Treaty Violations, and the Divide between Developing and Developed Countries in Foreign Investment Disputes, 14 Geo. Mason L.
Rev. 135 (2006) (discussing the application of umbrella clauses to investor-state contracts and its implication for the exercise of
jurisdiction by BIT tribunals). See also Stephan Schill, Enabling Private Ordering: Function, Scope and Effect of Umbrella Clauses in
International Investment Treaties, 18 Minn. J. Intl. L. 1 (2009)(analyzing the function, scope, and effect of umbrella clauses and
arguing that umbrella clauses stabilize the investor-state relationship).

[FN132]. See Kenneth Vandevelde, The Political Economy of a Bilateral Investment Treaty, 92 Am. J. Int'l L. 621, 631 (1998). For a
more critical assessment of such provisions, see Kevin Gallagher, Trading Away Financial Stability, (May 4, 2010,
4:00 PM),
(arguing that provisions in U.S. trade and investment agreements requiring free transfer of U.S. capital without delay and without
exception can harm emerging economies).

[FN133]. See Vandevelde, supra note 132, at 631-32.

[FN134]. U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev., Foreign Direct Investment and Performance Requirements: New Evidence from Selected
Countries 19 (2003), available at Performance requirements are provisions
that impose certain obligations on investors to act in ways considered beneficial for the host economy. They commonly relate to
using local content, engaging in joint ventures, transferring technology, and employing nationals. Usually these provisions may
appear in contracts between foreign investors and the host state as a means to ensure that FDI in the host state will contribute to
domestic development. Id. at 1-3.

[FN135]. The literature on regulatory expropriation is extensive. See, e.g., Justin Marlles, Public Purpose, Private Losses:
Regulatory Expropriation and Environmental Regulation in International Investment Law, 16 J. Transnat'l L. & Pol'y 275
(2007) (determining the point at which the normal exercise of government regulatory powers becomes compensable regulatory
expropriation!; Surya Subedi, The Challenge of Reconciling the Competing Principles within the Law of Foreign Investment with
Special Reference to the Recent Trend in the Interpretation of the Term "Expropriation," 40 Int'l L. 121 (2006) (arguing for a
balancing of the rights of investors with a state's legitimate concerns for the environment and for human rights); Org. for Econ. Co-
operation and Dev. [OECD], "Indirect Expropriation" and the "Right to Regulate" in International Investment Law (Working Paper on
Int'l Inv. No. 2004/4, 2004), available at (presenting the issues at stake in
regulatory expropriation, reviewing the legal framework, and identifying the criteria for determining whether expropriation
occurred] (hereinafter OECD Investment Paper); Charles N. Brower & Eckhard R. Hellbeck, The Implications of National and
International Environmental Obligations for Foreign Investments Protection Standards, Including Valuation: A Report From the
Front Lines, in International Investments and Protection of the Environment: The Role of Dispute Resolution Mechanisms 19, 21
(2001) (describing developments in environmental regulation and their effect on international investment); Mark Rosenberg &
Michael Cheah, Arbitrating Environmental Disputes, 16 ICSID Rev. Foreign Inv. L. J., 39. 41 (2001) (surveying decisions and
developments in international environmental arbitration).

[FN136]. Expropriation is direct where an investment is nationalized or otherwise directly expropriated through formal transfer of
title or physical seizure. Expropriation is indirect where the host state interferes with the use of property or with the enjoyment of
its benefits even where the property is not seized and the legal title of the property is not affected. The so-called creeping
expropriation--i.e., where the host state effectively expropriates an investment by a series of measures that, over time, deprive the
investor of its use and enjoyment--may constitute a form of indirect expropriation. See OECD Investment Paper, supra note 135, at

[FN137]. See Jan Paulsson, Arbitration Without Privity, 10 ICSID Rev. Foreign Inv. L. J., 232, 233 (1995).

[FN138]. From 1995 to 2004 ICSID registered four times as many claims as in the previous 30 years and the growth rate appears
to be increasing in the last 5 years. The ICSID renaissance is probably due to economic globalization and the proliferation of
investment treaties. There seems to be a parallel growth in other fora, but data is not available because of the confidentiality
requirements. Also, some disputes may be unknown because they were settled before registration. See David Sedlak, ICSID's
Resurgence in International Investment Arbitration: Can the Momentum Hold?, 23 Penn St. Int'l L. Rev. 147 (2004).

[FN139]. See, e.g., Andrew Newcombe & Lluis Paradell, Law and Practice of Investment Treaties 24 (2009) (noting that in the post-
World War II era, foreign investors generally preferred international arbitration to local courts where "decisions might be affected
by bias, corruption and inefficiency"); Mariel Dimsey, The Resolution of International Investment Disputes: Challenges and
Solutions 224 (2008) ("Indeed, one of the original reasons for distancing investment dispute resolution from national courts was
the inevitable and unavoidable perception of bias that would arise if states were subjected to the courts of their own system.");
Augustus A. Agyemang, African Courts, the Settlement of Investment Disputes and the Enforcement of Awards, 33 J. Afr. L., 31, 31
(1989) (discussing the suitability of African courts for settling investment disputes). But see Gus Van Harten, Five Justifications for
Investment Treaties: A Critical Discussion, 2 Trade Law & Dev. 19 (2010) (asserting that rationalizing international investment
tribunals based on the unreliability of domestic courts is both under-inclusive, as access to international adjudication is extended
only to a narrow class of private actors, and over-inclusive, by failing to account for situations in which domestic courts offer justice
to a foreign investor).

[FN140]. See Ibrahim F. I. Shihata, Towards a Greater Depoliticization of Investment Disputes: The Role of ICSID and MIGA, 1
ICSID Rev. Foreign Inv. L. J. 1, 7-10 (1986) (discussing arbitration pursuant to the Washington Convention).

[FN141]. See Nigel Blackaby, Investment Arbitration and Commercial Arbitration (or the Tale of the Dolphin and the Shark), in
Pervasive Problems in International Arbitration 217, 232-33 (Loukas A. Mistelis & Julian D. M. Lew eds., 2006).

[FN142]. See Pierre Lalive, Conclusions, in The Arbitral Process and the Independence of Arbitration 119, 123 (1991).

[FN143]. See, e.g., Vandevelde, supra note 132. at 636 ("States have important interests other than maximizing productivity, such
as ensuring an acceptable distribution of wealth and protecting national security that may necessitate deviations from the liberal

[FN144]. Alan S. Rau, Integrity in Private Judging, 38 S. Tex. L. Rev. 485. 506-07 (1997) (footnotes omitted).

[FN145]. Under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, for example. "[h]earings shall be held in camera unless the parties agree
otherwise." U N. Comm'n on Int'l Trade Law [UNCITRAL], UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules art. 28(3) (2010), available at

[FN146]. For instance, Article 32.5 of the UNCITRAL Rules provides that "[a]n award may be made public with the consent of all
parties or where and to the extent disclosure is required of a party by legal duty, to protect or pursue a legal right or in relation to
legal proceedings before a court or other competent authority. Id. art. 32.5.

[FN147]. See, e.g., Arbitration Inst. of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, Arbitration Rules art. 46 (2007), available at http://
www.sccinstitute.eom/filearchive/3/35894/K4_Skiljedomsregler%20eng%2ARB% 20TRYCK_1_100927.pdf (providing that unless
otherwise agreed by the parties, the SCC Institute and the Arbitral Tribunal shall maintain the confidentiality of the arbitration and
the award).

[FN148]. Because investment disputes are settled using a variety of arbitral rules--and not all of which provide for public disclosure
of claims--there can be no accurate accounting of all such disputes. That some portion of the iceberg remains hidden from view
should be a matter of concern given the public policy implications of such disputes.

[FN149]. R. v. Sussex Justices, [1924] 1 K.B. 256, 260.

[FN150]. See NAFTA Free Trade Comm'n, Statement of the Free Trade Commission on Non-Disputing Party Participation para. A.1
(Oct. 7, 2003), available at
en.pdf [hereinafter Statement on Non-Disputing Party Participation]. Interpretative statements of the NAFTA Free Trade
Commission are binding on tribunals established pursuant to NAFTA Chapter 11. North American Free Trade Agreement art.
1131(2), U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].

[FN151]. See Int'l Centre for the Settlement of Inv. Disputes [ICSID], Administrative and Financial Regulations, reprinted in ICSID
Convention, Regulations and Rules 55, 66 (2006), available at http://
final.pdf. Regulation 22(1) provides: "The Secretary-General shall appropriately publish information about the operation of the
Centre, including the registration of all requests for conciliation or arbitration and in due course an indication of the date and
method of the termination of each proceeding." Id. Regulation 22(2), however, specifically excludes awards, minutes of proceedings
and reports of conciliation commissions unless the parties consent to such disclosure.

[FN152]. On the issue of amicus curiae briefs in investor state arbitration, see Amokura Kawharu, Participation of Non-
Governmental Organizations in Investment Arbitration as Amici Curiae, in The Backlash against: Investment Arbitration:
Perceptions and Reality 275, 279-80 Michael Waibel et al. eds., 2010) (noting acceptance of amicus curiae participation in five
international tribunals since 2001); Nigel Blackaby & Caroline Richards, Amicus Curiae: A Panacea for Legitimacy in Investment
Arbitration?, in The Backlash against Investment Arbitration: Perceptions and Reality 253, 253 (Michael Waibel et al eds., 2010)
(describing acceptance of amicus curiae submissions since 2001 as the principal development in response to criticisms that the
investment arbitration process was inconsistent with public international nature of investment treaty arbitration); Federico Ortino
The Impact of Amicus Curiae Briefs in the Settlement of Trade and Investment Disputes: An Analysis of the Shrimp/Turtle and
Methanex Decisions, in Economic Law as an Economic Good 301, 304-05, 310-11 (K. M. Meessen ed., 2009) (describing decisions
by WTO and NAFTA panels to accept amicus curiae submissions); James Harrison, Human Rights Arguments in Amicus Curiae
Submissions: Promoting Social Justice?, in Human Rights in International Investment Law and Arbitration 396, 401--05 'Pierre-
Marie Dupuy et al. eds., 2009) (explaining the recent acceptance of amici curiae submissions by NAFTA and ICSID arbitral panels).

[FN153]. See ICSID, Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings (Arbitration Rules), reprinted in ICSID Convention, Regulations
and Rules r. 37, at 117 (2006), available at http://
[hereinafter ICSID, Arbitration Rules]. Rule 37(2) empowers the tribunal to "allow a person or entity that is not a party to the
dispute ... to file a written submission with the Tribunal regarding a matter within the scope of the dispute." Id. It also lists criteria
for determining whether to allow such a filing and requires the tribunal to "ensure that the non-disputing party submission does not
disrupt the proceeding or unduly burden or unfairly prejudice either party." Id.

[FN154]. United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, opened for signature June 10,
1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 (entered into force June 7, 1959) [hereinafter New York Convention].

[FN155]. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, opened for
signature Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 entered into force Oct. 14, 1966) [hereinafter Washington Convention].
There are currently 157 signatory States to the ICSID Convention. Of these, 146 States have also deposited their instruments of
ratification, acceptance, or approval of the Convention and have become ICSID Contracting States. List of Contracting States and
Other Signatories to the Convention, ICSID,
requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=ShowDocument&language=English (last visited Feb. 27, 2011).

[FN156]. New York Convention, supra note 154, art. 5.

[FN157]. Washington Convention, supra note 155, art. 52. The ICSID annulment process provides a very limited review. ICSID
annulment committees only have the ability to annul awards and send them back to the tribunal or to a new tribunal for a new
decision, but cannot replace the decision with their own. The grounds for annulment are very narrow and concern due process
issues: thetribunal was not properly constituted, it manifestly exceeded its powers, there was corruption on the part of a member,
there was a fundamental serious departure from a procedural rule, or the award did not state the reasons on which it was based.
For more information on the ICSID annulment process, see Christoph Schreuer, Three Generations of ICSID Annulment
Proceedings, in Annulment of ICSID Awards (Emmanuel Gaillard & Yas Banifatemi eds., 2004); Christoph Schreuer, ICSID
Annulment Revisited, 30 Legal Iss. of Econ. Integration 103-122 (2003); David D. Caron, Reputation and Reality in the ICSID
Annulment Process: Understanding the Distinction between Annulment and Appeal ICSID, Foreign Investment Law J. 7 21-56
(1992). See also Kate Knox, Annulment: A Delaying Tactic for ICSID Respondents?, International Arbitration Newsletter, October
2006 (discussing the ICSID annulment procedure's potential to delay resolution of a dispute).

[FN158]. Luke Eric Peterson, Int'l Inst. for Sustainable Dev., Bilateral Investment Treaties and Development Policy-Making 22

[FN159]. See Gus Van Harten, The Public-Private Distinction in the International Arbitration of Individual Claims Against the State,
56 Int'l & Clomp. L. Q. 371. 372 (2007). See generally, Zachary Douglas The Hybrid Foundations of Investment Treaty Arbitration,
74 Brit. Y.B. of Int'l L. 151 (2003) (asserting that the investment treaty regime for investor/state disputes embodies elements of
both public international law and private international law).

[FN160]. See Gus Van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law 70 (2007); Barnali Choudhuri, Recapturing Public
Power: Is Investment Arbitration's Engagement of the Public Interest Contributing to Democratic Deficit?, 41 Vand. J. Transnat'l L.
775 (2008).

[FN161]. See M. Sornarajah, Simon Reisman Lecture in International Trade Policy at the Norman Paterson School of International
Affairs: The Clash of Globalizations and the International Law on Foreign Investment (Sept. 12, 2002) (on file with the author);
Andrea K. Bjorklund, The Emerging Civilization of Investment Arbitration, 113 Penn St. L. Rev. 1269, 1272 (2009) ("This marriage
of public international law and international commercial arbitration has not always produced harmonious results ....").

[FN162]. See generally Yves Dezalay & Bryant Garth, Dealing in Virtue: International Commercial Arbitration and the Construction
of a Transnational Legal Order (1996) (examining the characteristics and credentials of the people who are recognized as having
authority to handle high-stakes, complicated arbitration disputes).

[FN163]. See infra Part V (examining Grand River in greater detail).

[FN164]. While this case proceeded under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, the challenge was entertained by ICSID officials because
NAFTA designates the Secretary General of the ICSID as the appointing authority for NAFTA arbitrations. See Damon Vis-Dunbar &
Luke Eric Peterson, ICSID Rejects US Challenge to Arbitrator in Grand River NAFTA Case, Int'l Inst. for Sustainable Dev. (Dec. 4,

[FN165]. Professor Anaya has authored several pieces on indigenous people's rights. See, e.g., Anaya, supra note 103, at 4, 6
(outlining "the development of international law and treatment of indigenous peoples over time" and contending that "international
law ... has developed and continues to develop ... to support indigenous peoples' demands").

[FN166]. These matters included advocacy before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, where United States'
compliance with its international obligations vis-à-vis Native Americans was under review.

[FN167]. Letter from Ana Palacio, Secretary General, ICSID, to Professor Anaya (Nov. 28, 2007), available at http:// 07.pdf.

[FN168]. See Stuart Grass, Note, Inordinate Chill: BITs, Non-NAFTA MITs and Host-State Regulatory Freedom--An Indonesian Case
Study, 24 Mich. J. Int'l L. 893, 894 (2003).

[FN169]. Id.

[FN170]. See Philip Alston, The "Not-a-Cat" Syndrome: Can the International Human Rights Regime Accommodate Non-State
Actors?, in Non-State Actors and Human Rights 3, 14-19 (Philip Alston ed., 2005) (discussing various proposed definitions of "non-
state actors").

[FN171]. See Noemi Gal-Or, The Investor and Civil Society as Twin Global Citizens: Proposing a New Interpretation in the
Legitimacy Debate, 32 Suffolk Transnat'l L. Rev. 271, 282-99 (2009).

[FN172]. Francesco Francioni, Access to Justice, Denial of Justice, and International Investment Law, in Human Rights in
International Investment Law and Arbitration 63, 72 (Pierre-Marie Dupuy et al. eds., 2009).

[FN173]. Id.

[FN174]. See Peter T. Muchlinski, Global Bukovina Examined: Viewing the Multinational Enterprise as a Transnational Law Making
Community, in Global Law Without a State 79, 97 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1997).

[FN175]. The foreign investor has evolved from an object of international law to a confident participant in the legal process. See
Rosalyn Higgins, Conceptual Thinking about the Individual in International Law, 24 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 11, 16-18 (1978).

[FN176]. See Catherine W. Brown, Are Indigenous Populations Entitled to International Juridical Personality?, 79 Am. Soc'y Int'l L.
Proc. 189, 190-93, 200-01 (1985) (discussing whether indigenous peoples have gained international legal personality); Judith
Kimerling, Transnational Operations, Bi-National Injustice: ChevronTexaco and Indigenous Huaorani and Kichwa in the Amazon
Rainforest in Ecuador, 31 Am. Indian L. Rev. 445, 506 (2006-2007) (noting that states have to comply with the norms protecting
indigenous peoples but that these norms ultimately "rely on those same state actors to apply and enforce them"; further noting
that both the investor's home state and the host state of FDI can be unable or unwilling to recognize and enforce indigenous
peoples' rights).

[FN177]. Gal-Or, supra note 171, at 284.

[FN178]. Id. at 281-82.

[FN179]. Francioni, supra note 172, at 71.

[FN180]. Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Report on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporation and
Other Business Enterprises, ¶ 26, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/5 (Apr. 7, 2008) (by John Ruggie).

[FN181]. See, e.g., Jérémie Gilbert, Indigenous Peoples' Land Rights under International Law: From Victims to Actors 196 (2006)
("[U]nder recent developments, indigenous peoples have gained access to international law as actors of their own future, as the
development of contemporary human rights law is based on the notion of consent between states and indigenous peoples on
territorial issues."); Anna Meijknecht, The (Re-)Emergence of Indigenous Peoples as Actors in International Law, 10 Tilburg Foreign
L. Rev. 315, 320-21 (2003) (discussing the history of treatment of indigenous peoples in international law, and the role of the
Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues in recognizing the rights of indigenous peoples and overcoming some of the past injustices
against them).

[FN182]. See infra Parts II, III.A.

[FN183]. See Michele Langfield, "Indigenous Peoples are Not Multicultural Minorities": Cultural Diversity, Heritage and Indigenous
Human Rights in Australia, in Cultural Diversity, Heritage and Human Rights: Intersections in Theory and Practice 135, 135-36
(Michele Langfield et al. eds., 2010) (providing several working definitions of "indigeneity").

[FN184]. Parrish, supra note 102, at 298. See also M. E. Turpel, Indigenous Peoples's Rights of Political Participation and Self-
Determination: Recent International Law Developments and the Continuing Struggle for Recognition, 25 Cornell Int'l L. J. 579, 580
(1992) ("Indigenous peoples are entrapped peoples--enclaves with distinct cultural, linguistic, political and spiritual attributes
surrounded by the dominant society .... Indigenous peoples are truly nations within.").

[FN185]. Vine Deloria, Jr. & Clifford M. Lytle, The Nations Within: The Past and Future of American Indian Sovereignty (1984).

[FN186]. See Siegfried Wiessner, Indigenous Sovereignty: A Reassessment in Light of the UN Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, 41 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 1141, 1152-59 (2008).

[FN187]. Federico Lenzerini, Sovereignty Revisited: International Law and Parallel Sovereignty of Indigenous Peoples, 42 Tex. Int'l
L. J. 155, 180 (2007).
[FN188]. "Global citizenship" is admittedly a theoretical tool rather than a legal one. See Diego Valadés, Global Citizenship for the
21st Century, 1 Mexican L. Rev. 150 (2009); Gal-Or, supra note 171, at 293.

[FN189]. On procedural participation, see the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and
Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, opened for signature June 25, 1998, 38 I.L.M. 1999 (entered into force October 30,

[FN190]. See, e.g., Crina Baltag, Precedent on Notion of Investment: ICSID Awards in MHS v. Malaysia, Transnat'l Disp. Mgmt.,
Sept. 2007 (discussing ICSID tribunals' efforts to define investment under the Washington Convention).

[FN191]. See Philippe Sands, Litigating Environmental Disputes: Courts, Tribunals and the Progressive Development of
International Environmental Law, in Law of the Sea, Environmental Law and Settlement of Disputes: Liber Amicorum Judge Thomas
Mensah 315 (Tafsir Ndiaye & Rüdiger Wolfrum eds., 2007).

[FN192]. According to Verhoosel, "[e]ffective stabilization clauses aim to protect contracts from being subject to legislative or
administrative measures occurring after the conclusion of a contract." Gaëtan Verhoosel, Foreign Direct Investment and Legal
Constraints on Domestic Environmental Policies: Striking a "Reasonable" Balance between Stability and Change, 29 Law & Pol'y Int'l
Bus. 451, 455 (1998).

[FN193]. See Kyla Tienhaara, What You Don't Know Can Hurt You: Investor-State Disputes and the Protection of the Environment
in Developing Countries, 6 Global Envtl. Pol. 73, 87-96 (2006)(discussing case study of mining in Indonesia).

[FN194]. See Kristen M. Gast, Environmental Justice and Indigenous Peoples in the United States: An International Human Rights
Analysis, 14 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 253, 255 (2004); L. Barrera-Hernández, Indigenous Peoples, Human Rights and
Natural Resource Development: Chile's Mapuche Peoples and the Right to Water, 11 Ann. Surv. Int'l & Comp. L. 1, 13 (2005).

[FN195]. Lila Barrera-Hernández, supra note 194, at 6.

[FN196]. See, e.g., OECD, Foreign Direct Investment for Development: Maximising Benefits, Minimising Costs 3 (2002), available at
http:// ("Foreign direct investment ... is an integral part of an open and effective
international economic system and a major catalyst to development.").

[FN197]. See Margaret Satterthwaite & Deena Hurwitz, The Right of Indigenous Peoples to Meaningful Consent in Extractive
Industry Projects, 22 Ariz. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 1, 1-2 (2005).

[FN198]. Id. at 3-4.

[FN199]. See, e.g., Ciaran O'Faircheallaigh, Negotiating Cultural Heritage? Aboriginal-Mining Company Agreements in Australia, 39
Dev. and Change 1, 34 (2008) ("The [Australian] High Court ruled that indigenous common law rights in land ('native title') had
survived Britain's colonization of Australia in 1788."); Viniyanka Prasad, The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: A
Flexible Approach to Addressing the Unique Needs of Varying Populations, 9 Chi. J. Int'l L. 297, 305-311 (2008) (discussing several
Australian High Court decisions regarding indigenous rights); Tamzyn Chapman. Corroboree Shield: A Comparative Historical
Analysis of (the Lack of International, National and State Level Indigenous Cultural Heritage Protection, 5 Macquarie J. Int'l &
Comp. Envtl. L. 81, 84. 95 (2008) (identifying several English and Australian High Court decisions focusing on indigenous rights).

[FN200]. See, e.g., Eva Brems, Human Rights as a Framework for Negotiating/Protecting Cultural Differences: An Exploration of the
Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights, in Cultural Diversity and the Law- State Responses from Around the World 663,
667-73, 680-82 (Marie-Claire Foblets et al., eds. 2006) (discussing claims related to cultural heritage, discrimination, and the
protection of minority languages brought before the European Court of Human Rights); Osvaldo Kreimer, Collective Rights
of Indigenous Peoples in the Inter-American Human Rights System, Organization of American States, 94 Am. Soc'y Int'l L. 315
(2000) 'discussing indigenous rights in the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights).

[FN201]. For a discussion of the cases before the Human Rights Committee in the context of the international provisions for the
preservation of culture (Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Politica Rights), see Laura Westra. Indigenous Peoples
and Minorities in International Jurisprudence and the Responsibility of the World Bank, in Environmental Justice & the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples: International & Domestic Legal Perspectives 71 (2008).

[FN202]. See supra notes 199-201. For a discussior of the debate on the illicit traffic of and restitution of indigenous cultural goods
and remains, see Kimberly Alderman, Ethical Issues in Cultural Property Law Pertaining to Indigenous Peoples, 45 Idaho L. Rev.
515 (2009) (discussing ethical challenges in property law pertaining to indigenous peoples); Jason G. Roberts. Comment, The
Protection of Indigenous Populations Cultural Property in Peru. Mexico and the United States, 1 Tulsa J. Comp. & Int'l L. 327 (1997)
(examining "international agreements and national legislation protecting cultural property as a nonrenewable resource for the
indigenous populations".

[FN203]. See Glamis Gold Ltd. v. United States of America, Award, ¶ 10 (NAFTA Arb. Trib. June 8, 2009), available at http:// [hereinafter Glamis Gold, Award].

[FN204]. See id. ¶¶ 325-327.

[FN205]. See id. ¶ 1. For general information about NAFTA, see Patricia Isela Hansen, Judicialization and Globalization in the North
American Free Trade Agreement, 38 Tex. Int'l L.J. 489, 489-90 (2003).

[FN206]. See Glamis Gold, Award, supra note 203, ¶ 536.

[FN207]. Id. ¶¶ 100-01.

[FN208]. Id.

[FN209]. See id. ¶ 149.

[FN210]. See id. ¶ 183.

[FN211]. See id. ¶ 358.

[FN212]. See id. ¶ 321.

[FN213]. See id. ¶ 687.

[FN214]. See id.

[FN215]. Id. ¶ 703.

[FN216]. Id. ¶ 729.

[FN217]. See id.

[FN218]. Id. ¶ 726.

[FN219]. See id. ¶ 720.

[FN220]. See id. ¶ 722.

[FN221]. See id. ¶ 360.

[FN222]. See id. ¶ 356.

[FN223]. Id. ¶ 536.

[FN224]. See id. ¶ 803.

[FN225]. Id. 1 805.

[FN226]. See id.

[FN227]. See id. ¶ 84.

[FN228]. Article 12 of the WHC reads as follows: "The fact that a property belonging to the cultural or natural heritage has not been
included ... shall in no way be construed to mean that it does not have an outstanding universal value for purposes other than
those resulting from inclusion in these lists." World Heritage Convention, supra note 34, art. 12.

[FN229]. See Frederico Lenzerini, Article 12, in The 1972 World Heritage Convention: A Commentary 201, 210-11 (Francesco
Francioni ed., 2008) (noting that the World Heritage Committee has underestimated the significance of Article 12 in implementing
the practice of the Convention). But see Patrick J. O'Keefe, Foreign Investment and the World Heritage Convention, 3 Int'l J. of
Cultural Prop. 259, 263-64 (1994) (referring to an Australian case where Article 12 of the WHC was successfully invoked).

[FN230]. See Grand River Enter. Six Nations, Ltd. v. United States of America. Award, ¶ 2 (NAFTA Art). Trib. Jan. 12, 2011),
available at http:// [hereinafter Grand River, Award).

[FN231]. As scientific evidence mounted that cigarette smoking caused health problems, 46 U.S. States entered into the 1998
Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) with major tobacco firms. See National Association of Attorneys General, Master Settlement
Agreement [MSA] (1998), available at http://
pdf/MSA%20with%20Sig9f20Pages% 20and%20Exhibits.pdf/file_view. The MSA has been characterized by the US Supreme Court
as a "landmark" public health agreement, which addresses tobacco consumption as one of the most troubling public health
problems. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525. 533 (2001).

[FN232]. See Counter-Memorial at 13, Grand River Enter. Six Nations, Ltd. v. United States of America (NAFTA Arb. Trib. Dec 22,
2008), available at http:// [hereinafter Grand River, Counter-Memorial].

[FN233]. See id. at 8.

[FN234]. See Particularized Statement of Claims ¶¶ 62-69, Grand River Enter. Six Nations, Ltd. v. United States of America (NAFTA
Arb. Trib. June 30, 2005) [hereinafter Particularized Statement of Claims].

[FN235]. See id. ¶ 149.

[FN236]. Grand River, Counter-Memorial, supra note 232, ¶ 166 (quoting Louis B. Sohn and R.R. Baxter, Convention on the
International Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens, Final Draft with Explanatory Notes, Art. 10(5), reprinted in 55 Am. J.
Int'l L. 545, 554 (1961)). For in depth commentary, see Valentina Vadi, Trademark Protection, Public Health and International
Investment Law: Strains and Paradoxes, 20 Eur. J. Int'l L. 773 (2009) (exploring the "antinomies and paradoxes" of international
investment law); Valentina Vadi, Reconciling Public Health and Investor Rights: The Case of Tobacco, in Human Rights in
International Investment Law and Arbitration 452-86 (P.M. Dupuy et al. eds., 2009) (offering a case study on protection standards
and specific human rights claims in investor-state arbitration).
[FN237]. Grand River, Award, supra note 230, ¶ 128.

[FN238]. Id. 11 139. The tribunal also "declined to resolve the opposing interpretations of the Jay Treaty in relation to [the
claimant's] commercial activities ....." Id. 1 143. Given that the claimant "assert[ed] an absolute immunity from state regulation for
commercial activities involving cross-border trade at a significant scale, and in doing so relie[d] on an interpretation of the Jay
Treaty that is not plainly supported by the text or easily derived from application of accepted rules of treaty interpretation," his
interpretation did not have "the degree of certainty that might reasonably ground ... a reasonable expectation that [the claimant]
could avoid state application of the MSA measures." Id.

[FN239]. Id. ¶ 141.

[FN240]. Id. ¶¶ 144-45.

[FN241]. Id. ¶ 148.

[FN242]. Id. ¶ 153.

[FN243]. See id. 1 155.

[FN244]. NAFTA, supra note 150, art. 1105.

[FN245]. See Particularized Statement of Claims, supra note 234, ¶ 156.

[FN246]. Statement of Claimants' Claims Arising Directly Out of the Adoption and Implementation of the Allocable Share
Amendments at 1, Grand River Enter. Six Nations, Ltd. v. United States of America (NAFTA Arb. Trib. Nov. 6, 2006). available at

[FN247]. See Particularized Statement of Claims, supra note 234. ¶ 140 ("Within the context of this case, these international norms
elaborate exactly what it means for the Investors, as aboriginal nationals of Canada, to receive 'fair and equitable treatment' from
the United States and its instrumentalities.").

[FN248]. Id. ¶ 139.

[FN249]. See Claimants Memorial, Merits Phase ¶¶ 188-89, Grand River Enter. Six Nations, Ltd. v. United States of America (July
10, 2008), available at

[FN250]. Under the persistent objector doctrine, "if a state persistently objects to the development of a customary international
law, it cannot be held to that law when the custom ripens. Presently, persistent objection is a valid defense unless the customary
international law attains the rare status of a peremptory norm ...." Holning Lau, Rethinking the Persistent Objector Doctrine in
International Human Rights Law, 6 Chi. J. Int'l L. 495, 495 (2005). For further discussion on the use and role of the persistent
objector doctrine, see Ted L. Stein, The Approach of the Different Drummer: The Principle of the Persistent Objector in International
Law 26 Harv. Int'l L. J. 457 (1985) (explaining the role of the persistent objector doctrine in the legal relations between states);
Lynn Loschin, The Persistent Objector and Customary Human Rights Law: A Proposed Analytical Framework 2 U.C. Davis J. Int'l L
and Pol'y 147 (1996) (analyzing the persistent objector doctrine as an element of customary international law). But see Antonio
Cassese, International Law 173 (2003) (arguing that, while the opposition of a powerful state may slow and even impede the
formation of a custom, customary law does not depend on the consent of states; rather, when a custom has crystallized, all
members of the international community are bound to it, including those states that opposed its formation).

[FN251]. See Grand River, Counter-Memorial, supra note 232, at 134.

[FN252]. Canada noted that only 20 of 193 U.N. member states have ratified the ILO Convention, and the UNDRIP is not a legally
binding document. In addition, both Canada and the United States voted against adopting the Declaration. Therefore, Canada
argued that neither instrument forms part of customary international law. See Fernando Cabrera & Damon Vis-Dunbar, Parties File
Memorials in Long-running NAFTA Dispute over U.S. Tobacco Settlements, Investment Treaty News (Jan. 29, 2009), http://
with-opinion-on-customary-international-lawrelated-to-aboriginal-rights/. In the spring of 2010, however, both Canada and the
United States reviewed their positions regarding the Declaration, and they subsequently reversed their position and have indicated
their support for the Declaration. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Permanent Forum on
Indigenous Issues (Sept. 1 3, 2007),

[FN253]. Grand River, Counter-Memorial, supra note 232. at 160-61.

[FN254]. Grand River, Award, supra note 230, ¶ 185.

[FN255]. Id. ¶ 213.

[FN256]. Id. ¶ 187.

[FN257]. Id. ¶ 219.

[FN258]. See id. ¶ 69.

[FN259]. Id. ¶ 71.

[FN260]. See Glamis Gold, Award, supra note 203, ¶ 639

[FN261]. Id. 1 645.

[FN262]. See id. ¶ 765.

[FN263]. See id. ¶ 824.

[FN264]. Id. ¶ 779.

[FN265]. See Federico Ortino, Non-Discriminatory Treatment in Investment Disputes, in Human Rights in International Investment
Law and Arbitration 344, 346-47 (Pierre-Marie Dupuy et al. eds., 2009).

[FN266]. See Paul E. Comeaux & N. Stephan Kinsella, Protecting Foreign Investment under International Law: Legal Aspects of
Political Risk 44, 106 (1997).

[FN267]. See Fernando Gonzalez Rojas, The Notion of Discrimination in Article 1102 of NAFTA 41-42 (Jean Monnet Working Paper,
June 5, 2005).

[FN268]. See id. at 47-52.

[FN269]. See Investors Memorial ¶ 1, Vito G. Gallo v. Gov't of Canada, UNCITRAL (NAFTA) (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2010), available at
http:// ("The Adams Mine
Lake Act ('the AMLA') was a political decision made by a new and inexperienced Government, which would remove, by legislative
fiat, the right of ... [the enterprise] to enjoy the property rights it held in the Adams Site.") [hereinafter Vito, Investor's Memorial].

[FN270]. See Vito, Investor's Memorial, supra note 269, ¶¶ 46-49.

[FN271]. See Notice of Arbitration at 11-12, Vito G. Gallo v. Gov't of Canada, UNCITRAL (NAFTA) (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2007), available
at http:// The notice of intent to
submit a claim to arbitration was received on October 12, 2006. Id. at 1. Subsequently, on March 30, 2007, Canada was served
with a Notice of Arbitration. Id. at 20.

[FN272]. See Vito, Investor's Memorial, supra note 269, 11 8.

[FN273]. See id. ¶ 504.

[FN274]. See Counter Memorial ¶¶ 137-55, Vito G. Gallo v. Gov't of Canada, UNCITRAL (NAFTA) (Perm. Ct. Arb. June 29, 2010;,
available at http:// Counter_Memorial.pdf
[hereinafter Vito. Counter Memorial]. In this regard-- although this is not mentioned in the Counter Memorial, and does not
necessarily reflect the position of Canada--it is worth noting that, at the international law level, human rights treaty bodies have
recommended "that consultations be held ... to seek the free, prior, and informed consent of indigenous peoples in cases of
activities planned in areas of spiritual and cultural significance to them." U.N. High Comm'r for Human Rights. The Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, ¶ 11, Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/10/51 (Jan. 14 2009). available at doc.asp?symbol=A/HRC/10/51. They also "stress the need for consultation prior to large-scale
development projects (such as the establishment of national parks) in indigenous territories and before granting concessions for
economic exploitation on disputed lands or any exploitation of natural resources in indigenous territories." Id. (citations omitted).

[FN275]. Vito, Counter Memorial, supra note 274, ¶ 137.

[FN276]. See Vito G. Gallo v. Gov't of Canada, UNCITRAL (NAFTA), Statement of Defence, ¶ 138 (Sept. 15, 2008).

[FN277]. See John R. Andre v. Gov't of Canada, Notice of Intent to Submit Claim to Arbitration Pursuant to Chapter Eleven of the
North American Free Trade Agreement, ¶ 8 (Mar. 19, 2010), available at http://
commerciaux/assets/pdfs/JohnR_ Andre_FiledNOI.pdf.

[FN278]. See id. ¶ 12.

[FN279]. See id. ¶ 51.

[FN280]. See id.

[FN281]. See id. ¶ 35.

[FN282]. See id. ¶ 51.

[FN283]. See id. ¶ 35.

[FN284]. See New Plan for Canadian Bathurst Caribou Herd Management, Eye on the Arctic (June 2, 2010, 8:25 AM), http:// canadian-bathurst-caribou-herdmanagement.

[FN285]. See Debate over N.W.T. Caribou Hunting does Public, CBC News (Feb. 9, 2010),

[FN286]. See N.W.T. First Nation Cancels Caribou Hunt, CBC News (Sept, 16, 2009),
[FN287]. See Ivan Kitok v. Sweden, Human Rights Comm., Commc'n No. 197/1985, ¶ 4.2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/33/D/197/1985 (July
27, 1988).

[FN288]. See Jouni Länsman v. Finland, Human Rights Comm., Commc'n No. 671/1995, ¶ 10.2. U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/58/D/671/1995
(Nov. 22, 1996).

[FN289]. U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 23: The Rights of Minorities (art. 27), ¶¶ 7, 9, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.5 (Apr. 8, 1994).

[FN290]. See Yanner v. Eaton (1999) 166 ALR 258, 301 (Austl.). For a comprehensive analysis and critical assessment of the
relevant domestic practice, see Federico Lenzerini, The Interplay between Environmental Protection and Human and Peoples' Rights
in International Law, 10 Afr. Y.B. Int'l L. 63 (2002).

[FN291]. Yanner, 166 ALR at 277.

[FN292]. See Diana Wagner, Competing Cultural Interests in the Whaling Debate: An Exception to the Universality of the Right to
Culture, 14 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 831 (2004); Alexander Gillespie, Aboriginal Subsistence Whaling: A Critique of the
Interrelationship between International Law and the International Whaling Commission, 12 Colo. J. Int'L Envtl. L & Pol'y 77 (2001);
Brian T. Hodges, The Cracking Facade of the International Whaling Commission as an Institution of International Law: Norwegian
Small-Type Whaling and the Aboriginal Subsistence Exemption, 15 J. Envtl. L. & Litig. 295 (2000); Anthony Matera, Whale Quotas:
A Market-Based Solution to the Whaling Controversy, 13 Geo. Int'l Envtl. L. Rev. 23 (2000); Lawrence Watters & Connie Dugger
TheHunt for Gray Whales: The Dilemma of Native American Treaty Rights and the International Moratorium on Whaling, 22 Colum.
J. Envtl. L 319 (1997).

[FN293]. Council Regulation 1007/2009, 2009 O.J. (L 286) 36 (EC).

[FN294]. See Case T 18/10 R, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami e.a. v. Parliament and Council, (search
"T-18/10 R" and follow link to the "T-18/10 R" hyperlink, which corresponds with "Order" and "2010-04- 30") [hereinafter Inuit
Tapiriit Kanatami].

[FN295]. Id. at 37.

[FN296]. Id.

[FN297]. Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami, ¶ 97. The governments of Canada and Norway also initiated a formal application for the
establishment of a World Trade Organization dispute settlement panel to address the matter. Request for Consultations by Canada,
European Communities--Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, WT/DS400 (Nov. 2, 2009); Request
for Consultations by Norway, European Communities--Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products,
WT/DS401 (Nov. 5, 2009).

[FN298]. Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami, ¶ 102.

[FN299]. Id. ¶ 10.3.

[FN300]. Id. ¶ 59.

[FN301]. See Canada Welcomes Court Suspension of EU Seal Ban, Reuters (Aug. 19, 2010),

[FN302]. See Edward Mitchell & Randall Reeves, The Alaska Bowhead Problem: A Commentary, 33 Arctic 686, 687.

[FN303]. Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species art. 3, ¶ 5, June 23, 1979, 19 I.L.M. 11.

[FN304]. Interim Convention on Conservation of North Pacific Fur Seals art. 7, Feb. 9, 1957, 314 U.N.T.S. 105 (entered into force
Oct. 14, 1958) (exempting certain indigenous people "who carry on pelagic sealing in canoes not transported by or used in
connection with other vessels, and propelled entirely by oars, paddles, or sails, and manned by not more than five persons ea ch, in
the way hitherto practiced and without the use of firearms"). To prevent circumvention of the Convention, the exemption does not
apply if the hunters are "in the employment of other persons or under contract to deliver the skins to any person." Id.

[FN305]. Article 3 of the Convention for the Regulation of Whaling precluded its application to "aborigines dwelling on the coasts of
the territories of the High Contracting Parties," provided the following conditions were met: "(1) They only use canoes, pirogues or
other exclusively native craft propelled by oars or sails; (2) They do not carry firearms; (3) They are not in the employment of
persons other than aborigines; (4) They are not under contract to deliver the products of their whaling to any third person."
Convention for the Regulation of Whaling art. 3, Sept. 24, 1931, 49 Stat. 3079, 155 L.N.T.S. 349 (entered into force Jan. 16,
1935). Canada, Denmark and the U.S. were parties to this Convention. See id. pmbl.

[FN306]. The International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling permits the taking various baleen whales by aborigines, but
stipulates that "the meat and products of such whales are to be used exclusively for local consumption by the aborigines."
International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling sched. art. III(13)(b), Dec. 2, 1946, 62 Stat. 1716, 161 U.N.T.S. 72
(entered into force Nov. 10, 1946), available at http://

[FN307]. Rudolph Dolzer & Christoph Schreuer. Principles of International Investment Law 149 (2008).

[FN308]. Burlington Resources, Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador. ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶¶27-37 (June 2,
2010), available at
requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC1530_En&caseId=C300 [hereinafter Burlington Resources, Decision on

[FN309]. "The indigenous peoples' opposition to ... Burlington Resources operations in their territories has compelled the companies
to halt their exploration activities and issue declarations of force majeure' ... as specified in their contracts." Chevron (CVX) in the
Amazon--Oil Rights or Human Rights? Texaeo's legacy, Chevron's Responsibility, Amnesty Int'l, http:// id=1101670 (last visited Feb. 26, 2011).

[FN310]. See Burlington Resources, Decision on Jurisdiction. supra note 308, ¶¶ 26, 53.

[FN311]. See id. ¶ 315.

[FN312]. Id. ¶¶ 254, 257.

[FN313]. See Matter of the Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku, Provisional Measures, Order of the Court, "Decides," (Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. Feb. 4, 2010), available at "In May 2004, the IACHR
requested that the Inter-American Court of Human Rights take provisional measures regarding the pending claim." Isabela
Figueroa, Indigenous Peoples v. Oil Companies: Constitutional Control within Resistance, 4 SUR-Int'l J. on Hum. Rts. 51, 59 (2006).
Two months later, "the Court issued a series of decisions in favor of the integrity of Sarayaku and of its right to free circulation." Id.
"[I]n July 2005, the Court took further provisional measures, and reiterated that the state should maintain the previously-adopted
measures." Id. at 60.

[FN314]. See Ole Spiermann, Applicable Law, in The Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law 89, 92 (Peter Muchlinski et
al. eds., 2008).

[FN315]. See Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of [Country] Concerning the
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, available at http://
[hereinafter U.S. Model BIT].

[FN316]. Id. art. 30(1).

[FN317]. NAFTA, supra note 150, art. 1131(1).

[FN318]. See Washington Convention, supra note 155, art. 42.

[FN319]. Raymond D. Bishop et al., Foreign Investment Disputes: Cases, Materials and Commentary 14 (2005).

[FN320]. Id.

[FN321]. See Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Human Rights and International Investment Law, in Human Rights in International Investment
Law and Arbitration 25 (Pierre-Marie Dupuy et al. eds., 2009).

[FN322]. Richard H. Kreindler, The Law Applicable to International Investment Disputes, in Arbitrating Foreign Investment Disputes
401. 412 (Norbert Horn ed., 2004).

[FN323]. See Alexander Orakhelashvili, Peremptory Norms in International Law 492 (2006); Dupuy, supra note 321, at 25.

[FN324]. Egerton v. Brownlow, [1853] 10 Eng. Rep. 359 (H.L.) 437 (appeal taken from Eng.).

[FN325]. Martin Hunter & Gui Conde e Silva, Transnational Public Policy and its Application in Investment Arbitrations, 4 J. World
Inv. 3, 367 (2003).

[FN326]. Audley Sheppard. Public Policy and the Enforcement of Arbitral Awards: Should There Be a Global Standard?, Transnat'l
Disp. Mgmt., Feb. 2004. at 2.

[FN327]. Pierre Mayer, Droit International Privé 22-23 (4th ed. 1991).

[FN328]. Pierre Lalive, Ordre public transnational (ou réellement international) et arbitrage international, 3 Revue de l'arbitrage
329, 342-43 (1986).

[FN329]. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into
force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter Vienna Convention].

[FN330]. Georges Abi-Saab, The Third World and the Future of the International Legal Order, 29 Revue Egyptienne de Droit
International 27, 53 (1973).

[FN331]. Vienna Convention, supra note 329, art. 53.

[FN332]. For some skeptical views, see Mark. W. Janis, Jus Cogens: An Artful Not a Scientific Reality, 3 Conn. J. Int'l L. 370, 370
(1988) (arguing that jus cogens, like many norms of international law, is not a concept with objective scientific reality but only has
the subjective reality assigned to it by its users); Antony D'Amato, It's a Bird, It's a Plane, It's Jus Cogens!, 6 Conn. J. Int'l L. 1, 1
(1991) ("[T]he sheer ephemerality of jus cogens is an asset, enabling any writer to christen any ordinary norm of his or her choice
as a new jus cogens norm, thereby in one stroke investing it with magical power."); Martti Koskenniemi, International Law in
Europe: Between Tradition and Renewal, 16 Eur. J. Int'l L. 113, 122 (2005) (jus cogens and obligations erga omnes "have no clear
reference in this world," and "[i]nstead of a meaning, they invoke a nostalgia for having such a meaning ....").

[FN333]. See Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Some Reflections on Contemporary International Law and the Appeal to Universal Values: A
Response to Martti Koskenniemi, 16 Eur. J. of Int'l L. 131, 136 (2005) ("jus cogens ... is also ... positive law"); Andrea
Binnchi, Human Rights and the Magic of Jus Cogens, 19 Eur. J. Int'l L. 491, 491 (2008) ("Georges Abi-Saab certainly had a good
point when he said that even if the normative category of jus cogens were to be an 'empty box, the category was still useful; for
without the box, it cannot be filled."'); F. A. Mann, The Doctrine of Jus Cogens in International Law, in Further Studies in
International Law 84 (1990).

[FN334]. Brian A. Lichter, The Offences Clause, Due Process, and the Extraterritorial Reach of Federal Criminal Law in Narco-
Terrorism Prosecutions, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1929, 1935 (2009) ("Six offenses are widely considered to have achieved jus cogens
status: piracy, slavery, genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and torture."). See also Evan J. Griddle & Evan Fox-
Decent, A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens, 34 Yale J. Int'l L. 331, 331 (2008) (stating that jus cogens includes, "at a minimum, the
prohibitions against genocide; slavery or slave trade; murder or disappearance of individuals; torture or other cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment or punishment; prolonged arbitrary detention; systematic racial discrimination; and 'the principles of the
United Nations Charter prohibiting the use of force."').

[FN335]. See generally Christopher P. Cline, Note, Pursuing Native American Rights in International Law Venues: A Jus Cogens
Strategy after Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association 42 Hastings L.J. 591 (1991) (arguing that a Supreme
Court decision that upheld the destruction of a forest used for religious ceremonies by Native American tribes was a violation of jus
cogens norms).

[FN336]. See Rebecca Tsotie, Who Controls Native Cultural Heritage?, in Cultural Heritage Issues: The Legacy of Conquest
Colonization and Commerce 3, 14 (James A. R. Nafziger & Ann M. Nicgorski eds., 2009) (noting that federal Indian law enhancing
self-determination also protects culture with the aim of ensuring cultural survival).

[FN337]. The lCJ and most scholars conclude that the right to self-determination is a peremptory norm of international law.
See Case Concerning East Timor (Port. v. Austl.). 1995 I.C.J. 90, ¶ 29 (June 30). See also Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public
International Law 513 (6th ed. 2003) (noting that states must respect non-nationals' right to culture); Karen Parker & Lyn B.
Neylon. Jus Cogens: Compelling the Law of Human Rights, 12 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 411, 440 (1989) (recognizing that
cultural rights, in addition to political and economic rights, are included within norm of self-determination).

[FN338]. Cultural rights have been perceived as less important than other human rights. See Yvonne Donders, A Right to Cultural
Identity in UNESCO, in Cultural Human Rights 317, 318 (Francesco Francioni & Martin Scheinin eds., 2008) (noting that because
culture was often considered an elite concept, states have been reluctant to adopt cultural rights, and that they are thus less
developed than political, economic and social rights).

[FN339]. New peremptory norms may arise and may modify the existing norms. See Vienna Convention, supra note 329, arts. 53,

[FN340]. See Raphael Lemkin, Acts Constituting a General (Transnational) Danger Considered as Offences Against the Law of
Nations, Prevent Genocide International, (last visited Mar. 6,
2011). On Lemkin, see Michael A. MacDonnell & A. Dirk Moses, Raphael Lemkin as Historian of Genocide in the Americas, 7(4) J.
Genocide Res. 501 (2005) (noting modern misinterpretation of Lemkin's work as focused on a mass killing conception of genocide,
when in fact, he originally developed the term with a focus on colonial occupations that did not include mass killing).

[FN341]. See Robert van Krieken, Cultural Genocide Reconsidered, 12 Austl. Indigenous L. Rev. 76, 77 (2008) (noting that the
distinction between cultural and physical genocide is unstable and that continuity exists between the two concepts). See also
Pamela de Condappa, Cultural Genocide: Destroying Material Culture, Destroying Identity, in New Directions in Genocide Research
(Adam Jones ed., forthcoming 2011) (arguing that cultural genocide is a potential precursor to physical genocide).

[FN342]. Daniele Conversi, Genocide, Ethnic Cleansing and Nationalism, in The Sage Handbook of Nations and Nationalism 320,
326 (Gerard Delanty & Krishan Kumar eds., 2006).

[FN343]. Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277
(entered into force Jan. 12, 1951).

[FN344]. See Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, ¶ 576 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Aug. 2,
2001). For an analysis and critical assessment of the travaux préparatoires of the Genocide Convention with respect to the concept
of cultural genocide, see generally Johannes Morsink, Cultural Genocide, the Universal Declaration, and Minority Rights, 21Hu m.
Rts. Q. 1009 (1999).

[FN345]. Article 7 of a 2007 draft of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples used the phrase
"ethnocide." but again the term was dropped in the final declaration. See A. Dirk Moses. Raphael Lemkin, Culture, and the Concept
of Genocide, in The Oxford Handbook of Genocide Studies 19, 39 (Donald Bloxham & A. Dirk Moses eds., 2010).

[FN346]. UNDRIP, supra note 1, art. 8(1).

[FN347]. See id. art. 8(2).

[FN348]. Id.

[FN349]. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, opened for signature July 17, 1998. 37 I.L.M. 999, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90
(entered into force July 1, 2002) [hereinafter ICC Statute]. As of October 12, 2008, 114 countries were States Parties to the ICC
Statute. The States Parties to the Rome Statute, International Criminal Court (Oct. 12. 2010), http://www.icc-

[FN350]. ICC Statute, supra note 349, pmbl.

[FN351]. Marcos A. Orellana, Int'l Inst. for Env't and Dev., Indigenous Peoples, Mining, and International Law 7 (2002).

[FN352]. See Prosecutor v. Kordic & Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Judgment, ¶ 207 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
Feb. 26, 2001); Francioni, supra note 16, at 12-13 (providing commentary on the case).

[FN353]. See Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, ¶ 580 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Aug. 2,
2001), aff'd Case No. IT-98-33-A (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 19, 2004).

[FN354]. Marina Hadjioannou, The International Human Right to Culture: Reclamation of the Cultural Identities of Indigenous
Peoples under International Law, 8 Chap. L. Rev. 201, 201 (2005).

[FN355]. Francesco Francioni & Federico Lenzerini, The Destruction of the Buddhas of Bamiyan and International Law, 14 Eur. J.
Int'l L. 619, 650 (2003) (citation omitted).

[FN356]. See Vittorio Mainetti, Le principe du patrimoine culturel de l'humanité: de la république des arts à un ordre public
international, in La salvaguardia dei beni culturali nel diritto internazionale: atti del convegno Dodicesima Giornata Gentiliana 581,
595-596 (Alberico Gentili ed., 2008).

[FN357]. Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal Supreme Court] Apr. 1, 1997, Arrets du Tribunal Fédéral Suisse [ATF] 123 II 134 (Switz.).
For more information about the case, see Pierre Lalive, Réflexions sur un ordre public culturel, in L'extranétié ou le dépassement de
l'ordre juridique étatique 155 (Eric Wyler & Alain Papaux eds., 1999).

[FN358]. Barbara T. Hoffman, Cultural Rights, Cultural Property, and International Trade, in Art and Cultural Heritage Law, Policy
and Practice 89, 92 (2005) (quoting BGer Apr. 1, 1997, 123 ATF II 134. 143-44 (Switz.)). Author translation:

When, as in this case, the request is for the return of a cultural object, the judge must be careful
to take into account the interest of the international community ... tied to the protection of cultural
property. These provisions are based on a common inspiration and constitute the expression of an
international public order which is in force or in the process of developing. These norms concretize the
imperative of an international struggle against the traffic in cultural property.

[FN359]. Marc-Andre Renold, An Important Swiss Decision Relating to the International Transfer of
Cultural Goods: The Swiss Supreme Court's Decision on the Giant Antique Mogul Gold Coins, 13 Int'l J.
of Cultural Prop 36 1, 365 (2006).

[FN360]. See id. at 368.

[FN361]. Richardson v. Mellish. [1824] 130 Eng. Ren. 294. 303.

[FN362]. Mauro Rubino-Sammartano, International Arbitration Law and Practice 534-35 (2d ed.

[FN363]. Case No. 1110 of 1963, 21 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 47, 61 (ICC Int'l Ct. Arb.).

[FN364]. World Duty Free v. Republic of Kenya, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7, Award (Oct. 4, 2006),
available at http:// (last visited Mar. 16, 2011).

[FN365]. See id. ¶ 157.

[FN366]. Methanex v. United States of America, UNCITRAL (NAFTA), Final Award of the Tribunal on
Jurisdiction and Merits, Part IV, ch. C, ¶ 24 (Aug. 3, 2005).

[FN367]. Hunter & Conde e Silva, supra note 325, at 370.

[FN368]. See id. at 374.

[FN369]. Orakhelashvili, supra note 323, at 493. See also Phillippe Fouchard et al., Applicable Law
Chosen by the Parties, in On International Commercial Arbitration 861 (1999) ("[A]rbitrators have the
right--and even the obligation--to themselves raise the issue of whether disputed contracts or legal
provisions before them satisfy the requirements of international public policy."); Richard H. Kreindler,
Approaches to the Application of Transnational Public Policy by Arbitrators, 4 J. World Investment 239,
244 ("[T]he arbitrator need not apply the agreed or determined governing law if doing so would cause
him to violate international public policy."!; Julian D. M. Lew et al., Comparative International
Commercial Arbitration 93-94 (2003) ("To the extent that human rights protection constitutes a core
part of international or national public policy, human rights aspects must be considered by the

[FN370]. See Orakhelashvili, supra note 323, at 1.

[FN371]. Criddle & Fox-Decent, supra note 334, at 333

[FN372]. As Criddle and Fox-Decent argue, "[i]nternational law also supports indigenous self-
determination and a duty to consult." Id. at 374. The violation of such "autonomy-enabling rights
would breach obligations that many states now recognize as fiduciary in character. Insofar as the
principle of internal self-determination addresses these or other constitutive concerns of the state-
subject fiduciary relation, it deserves to be accorded peremptory force within international law." Id.

[FN373]. See ICESCR, supra note 104, art. 15.

[FN374]. See Lew et al., supra note 369, at 93-94 (arguing that the human rights aspects of
international and national public policy must be considered by the European Court of Human Rights).

[FN375]. Hector Gros Espiell, Self-Determination and Jus Cogens, in UN Law/Fundamental Rights: Two
Topics in International Law 167 (Antonio Cassese ed., 1979).

[FN376]. For an analogous view in the WTO context, see Francesco Francioni, WTO Law in Context:
the Integration of International Human Rights and Environmental Law in the Dispute Settlement
Process, in The WTO at Ten: The Contribution of the Dispute Settlement System 143 (2006)
(discussing the methodology that should be followed when confronted with claims based on norms of
public international law that fall outside the treaty system of the WTO).

[FN377]. The principle of nec ultra petita concerns the arguments raised by the parties but does not
infringe or supersede the mandatory rules eventually applicable to the dispute. See, e.g., Giuditta
Cordero Moss, Is the Arbitral Tribunal Bound by the Parties' Factual and Legal Pleadings?, 3 Stockholm
Int'l Arb. Rev. 1, 12. (2006) (explaining that the rule that the award may not go beyond the factual
scope of the dispute as agreed upon by the parties does not apply to arguments made by the parties).

[FN378]. See Vaughan Lowe, Private Disputes and the Public Interest in International Law, in
International Law and Dispute Settlement: New Problemsand Techniques 3, 9 (Duncan French et al.
eds., 2010) ("There are no provisions directing a tribunal hearing a dispute on how it should ... put
arguments and facts relating to the public interest.").

[FN379]. See infra Part VILA.

[FN380]. On the interpretation of BITs, see, for example: Thomas W. Walde, Interpreting Investment
Treaties: Experiences and Examples, in International Investment Law for the 21st Century: Essays in
Honour of Christoph Schreuer 724, 725 (Christina Binder et al. eds., 2009) (there is "a 'struggle' for
the soul of investment arbitration between international commercial arbitration and (public)
international law bars"); Ian A. Laird, Interpretation in International Investment Arbitration--Through
the Looking Glass, in A Liber Amicorum: Thomas Walde: Law Beyond Conventional Thought 151
(Jacques Werner & Arif Hyder Ali eds., 2009) (discussing Walde's contribution to the theory of
interpretation in investment treaties and arbitration).

[FN381]. Vienna Convention, supra note 329, art. 31(3)(c). For commentary, see Duncan French,
Treaty Interpretation and the Incorporation of Extraneous Legal Rules, 55 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 281
(2006) (discussing mechanisms by which a tribunal may undertake a broader interpretive approach to
treaties): McLachlan,supra note 128 (discussing the importance of Article 31(3)(c) and the process of
operationalizing it in treaty interpretation).

[FN382]. See Asian Agric. Prods. Ltd. v. Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3. Award (June
27, 1990), 4 ICSID Rep. 245 (1997).
[FN383]. Id. ¶ 21, at 257.

[FN384]. McLachlan et at, International Investment Arbitration: Substantive Principles 16 (2008).

[FN385]. See Clara Reiner & Christoph Schreuer. Human Rights and International Investment
Arbitration, in Human Rights in International Investment Law and Arbitration 82, 83 (Pierre-Marie
Dupuy et. al eds., 2009) ("[T]he present role of human rights in the context of investment arbitration
is peripheral at best.").

[FN386]. Id. at 88.

[FN387]. See, e.g., Biloune and Marine Drive Complex Ltd. v. Ghana Investments Centre and the
Government of Ghana, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability. 95 I.L.R. 184 (UNCITRAL ad hoc tribunal
1989), available at http:// (holding that the
tribunal lacked jurisdiction to examine the allegations of human rights violations). See also Patrick
Mitchell v. Dem. Rep. Congo, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/7, Decision on the Application for Annulment of
the Award. ¶ 48 (Nov. 1, 2006), available at
requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC597_En&caseId=C183 (ordering an annulment
of the award on grounds of manifest excess of power and the Arbitral Tribunal's acceptance of
jurisdiction on the basis of the existence of an investment); Reiner & Schreuer, supra note 385, 83--
84 (arguing that although an independent human rights claim may fall outside the scope of the
tribunal, if a human rights violation affects investment, it may become arbitrable).

[FN388]. See CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award, ¶
114 (May 12, 2005), 44 I.L.M. 1205, 1217 (2005).

[FN389]. Reiner & Schreuer, supra note 385, at 90.

[FN390]. With regard to the World Trade Organization context, see Joost Pauwelyn, WTO Compassion
or Superiority Complex? What to Make of the WTO Waiver for "Conflict Diamonds" 24 Mich. J. Int'l L.
1177, 1199 (2003) (arguingagainst the "presumption that whatever is agreed upon outside the WTO
... must still be reconfirmed in the precinct of the WTO itself for it to have any value before WTO
organs, as if other instruments of international law can never add to or override the WTO treaty").

[FN391]. Vaughan Lowe, The Politics of Law-Making: Are the Method and Character of Norm Creation
Changing?, in The Role of Law in International Politics 207, 220 (Michael Byers ed., 2000).

[FN392]. See Thomas Carbonneau, Cases and Materials on the Law and Practice of Arbitration 1205
(3d rev. ed. 2003) ("The development of arbitration has raised questions about the limits and
boundaries of privatized justice and its relationship to and operation within society.").

[FN393]. For a similar conclusion, see Anne van Aaken. Opportunities and Limits to an Economic
Analysis of International Law 30 (U. of St. Gallen Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 2010-09, 2010),
available, at http://

[FN394]. See Barnali Choudhury, Exception Provisions as a Gateway to Incorporating Human Rights
Issues into International Investment Agreements 8-13 (Soc'y of Int'l Econ. Law, Working Paper No.
2010/13, 2010.

[FN395]. See Rostam J. Neuwirth, Cultural Industries in International Trade Law: Insights from the
NAFTA, the WTO, and the EU 17 (2006) (providing examples of efforts to exempt certain goods from
the process of trade liberalization); John Morijin, Reframing Human Rights and Trade: Potential and
Limits of a Human Rights Persective of WTO Law on Cultural and Educational Goods and Services 15

[FN396]. The Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement, Brunei-Chile-Sing.-N.Z., July

18, 2005, available at http://
agreement.pdf [hereinafter Trans-Pacific SEP].
[FN397]. See id. art. 19.1.3 ("For greater certainty, the Parties understand that the measures referred
to in Article XX (f) of GATT 1994 includes measures necessary to protect specific sites of historical and
archaeological value, or to support creative arts of national value.").

[FN398]. Treaty of Waitangi, U.K-N.Z., Feb. 6, 1840, available at http:// Forbackground information, see
Valentina Vadi, Cultural Heritage & International Investment Law: A Stormy Relationship, 15 Int'l J.
Cultural Prop. 1, 15 n.74 (2008).

[FN399]. Trans-Pacific SEP, supra note 396, art. 19.5.1 ("[N]othing in this Agreement shall preclude
the adoption by New Zealand of measures it deems necessary to accord more favorable treatment to
Maori in respect of matters covered by this agreement including in fulfillment of its obligations under
the Treaty of Waitangi."). However, the article excludes measures "used as a means of arbitrary or
unjustified discrimination against persons of the other Parties or a disguised restriction on trade in
goods and services." Id.

[FN400]. See id. art. 19.5.2 (excluding "the interpretation of the Treaty of Waitangi, including as to
the nature of the rights and obligations arising under it," from the Trans-Pacific SEP's dispute
settlement provisions, and instead providing that Brunei Darussalam, Chile or Singapore may request
an arbitral tribunal to determine "whether any measure ... is inconsistent with their rights under this

[FN401]. See Int'l Inst. for Sustainable Dev., Clarification on Aboriginals and Canada's Investment
Treaties, Investment L. and Pol'y Wkly. News Bull, June11, 2004, available at 2004.pdf.

[FN402]. See Howard Mann, Int'l Inst. for Sustainable Dev., International Investment Agreements,
Business and Human Rights: Key Issues and Opportunities 11-12 (2008), available at rights.pdf; M. Sornarajah, The International Law
on Foreign Investment 120-21, 366-67 (2004).

[FN403]. See United Parcel Serv. of Am. v. Gov't of Can., Award on the Merits, ¶ 156 (May 24, 2007),
46 I.L.M. 922 (2007) [hereinafter UPS, Award on the Merits].

[FN404]. The origin of the cultural exemption lies in the negotiation of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade
Agreement (CUFTA) in the 1980s. Canada-United States Free-Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can., art. 2005.
Jan. 2, 1988. 27 I.L.M. 281. The clause has been carried over in NAFTA.

[FN405]. See UPS, Award on the Merits, supra note 403. ¶¶ 156-60.

[FN406]. See NAFTA, supra note 150, Annex 2106 (providing that measuresconcerning "cultural
industries" will be governed, subject to limited exceptions, under the BIT between Canada and the
United States).

[FN407]. South Africa's BEE scheme is an effort to boost the prospects of its black majority, along
with other ethnic minorities, which suffered systemic discrimination under the Apartheid system. See
Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act 53 of 2003 (S. Afr.), available at

[FN408]. S. Afr. Const., 1996, available at http:// The Constitutional Court approved the
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, on December 4, 1996. It took effect on February 4,
1997. Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, S. Afr. Gov't Information (July 21, 2009),

[FN409]. Ockert Dupper, Affirmative Action in South Africa: (M)any Lessons for Europe? (2006) 39
Verfassung und Recht in Übersee (Law and Politics in Africa, Asia and Latin America) 138, 158 (2006),
available at http://
[FN410]. In the case of Agri South Africa v. Minister, Minerals & Energy; Van Rooyen v. Minister,
Minerals & Energy (the AgriSA case), the North and South Gauteng High Court held that it is possible
for the holder of an unused old order right which has ceased to exist by virtue of the operation of the
MPRDA to prove that such right was expropriated and that the mere fact that a holder of an unused
old order right is afforded an opportunity to apply for a "new order" right did not, on its own, mean
that an expropriation had not occurred. See Agri South Africa v Minister of Minerals and Energy; Van
Rooyen v Minister of Minerals and Energy 2009 (1) SA 104 (GNP) at 13 para. 17 (S. Afr.), available at

[FN411]. See Piero Foresti, Laura De Carli and Others v. Republic of S. Afr., ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/07/1, Award (Aug. 4 2010), available at http://
requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&doId=DC1651_En&caseId=C90 [hereinafter Foresti,

[FN412]. Minerals and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002 (S. Afr.), available at [hereinafter MPRDA].

[FN413]. See Foresti, Award, supra note 411, ¶ 66.

[FN414]. See id. ¶ 78.

[FN415]. See id. ¶ 56.

[FN416]. See id. ¶ 66.

[FN417]. Luke Eric Peterson, South African Arbitration may Raise Delicate Human Rights Issues,
Investment Treaty News (Feb. 14, 2007),

[FN418]. See Foresti, Award, supra note 411, ¶ 74.

[FN419]. Because the request for arbitration was filed by seven Italian nationals and a company
incorproated in Luxembourg, the proceedings were brought pursuant to the provisions of two BITs. Id.
¶ 1.

[FN420]. See id. ¶ 67. For the text of the BITs, see Agreement between the Government of the
Republic of South Africa and the Government of the Italian Republic for the Promotion and Protection
of Investments. S. Afr.-It., June 9, 1997; Agreement between the Republic of South Africa and the
Belo-Luxembourg Economic Union on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments art. 5,
August 14, 1998, available at http://

[FN421]. MPRDA, supra note 412, pmbl.

[FN422]. For instance, doubts over reconciling the BEE program with investment treaty standards
have led to a dead lock in negotiations on a free trade agreement between the United States and the
South African Custom Union. See Luke Eric Peterson, US-Southern Africa Negotiations Stall-Race
Based Affirmative Action an Obstacle?, Int'l Inst. for Sustainable Dev. (July 22, 2004),

[FN423]. A number of South African BITs, including those with the United Kingdom, Belgium-
Luxembourg, and the Netherlands lack specific provisions exempting the BEE from the scope of the
treaty. See Luke Eric Peterson, South Africa's Bilateral Investment Treaties: Implications for
Development and Human Rights 11 (2006), available at

[FN424]. Id.

[FN425]. Agreement Between the Czech Republic and the Republic of South Africa for the Promotion
and Reciprocal Protection of Investments art. 3(3)(c), Czech Rep.-S. Afr., Dec. 14, 1998, available at

[FN426]. Cultural impact assessment can be considered to be a species of environmental impact

assessment. On environmental impact assessments, see Valentina Vadi, Environmental Impact
Assessment in Investment Disputes: Method, Governance and Jurisprudence, 31 Polish Y.B. Int'l L.
(forthcoming 2011) (describing cultural elements that may be included in environmental impact

[FN427]. See Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity. Akwé: Kon Voluntary Guidelines for
the Conduct of Cultural Environmental and Social Impact Assessments Regarding Developments
Proposed to Take Place on, or which are Likely to Impact on, Sacred Sites and on Lands and Waters
Traditionally Occupied or Used by Indigenous and Local Communities ¶ 6(b) (2004).

[FN428]. See Frequently Asked Questions about Cultural Impact Assessments,Quality Planning: The
RMA Planning Resource, http://
(last visited Nov. 21, 2010).

[FN429]. Council of Europe Framework Convention on the Value of Cultural Heritage for Society art. 8,
Oct. 27, 2005, C.E.T.S. No. 199, available at

[FN430]. For instance, Articles 2 and 10.7 of the North American Agreement on Environmental
Cooperation mandate environmental impact assessments. See North American Agreement on
Environmental Cooperation arts. 2, 10.7. Sept. 13, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1480, 1483, 1486-87. However, as
Professor Gaines points out, there is no "established mechanism to bridge the gap between
environmental co-operation and investor compensation." Sanford Gaines, Protecting Investors,
Protecting the Environment: The Unexpected Story of NAFTA Chapter 11, in Greening NAFTA: The
North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation 173, 185 (David L. Markell & John H. Knox
eds., 2003).

[FN431]. See World Bank, Environmental Assessment Sourcebook 1991, ch. 1, ¶ 5, (1999), available
at (follow "Chapter 1" hyperlink). See generally, William V.
Kennedy, Environmental Impact Assessment and Multilateral Financial Institutions, in Handbook of
Environmental Impact Assessment 98, 98 (Judith Petts ed., 1999) (commenting on environmental
assessments procedures and the experiences of multilateral financial institutions in attempting to
implement those procedures).

[FN432]. See Andrei Barannik & Valentina Okaru, Harmonization of EA Procedures And Requirements
between the World Bank and Borrowing Countries, in Environmental Assessment (EIA) in Africa: A
WorldBank Commitment, Proceedings of the Durban World Bank Workshop 35, 40 (Robert Goodland
et al., eds., 1996).

[FN433]. See Francesco Francioni, Dispute Avoidance in International Environmental Law, in Economic
Globalization and Compliance with International Environmental Agreements 229, 235-36 (Alexandre
Kiss et al. eds., 2003).

[FN434]. Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Award of the Tribunal, ¶ 44 (Nov.
13, 2000), 5 ICSID Rep. 419 (2002).

[FN435]. See id.

[FN436]. Id. 1 67 (citing 1 Philippe Sands, Principles of InternationalEnvironmental Law 579-95

(Manchester University Press 1995)).

[FN437]. See id. 1 71.

[FN438]. Notice of Arbitration ¶ 9, Clayton/Bilcon v. Gov't of Can., P.C.A. Case No. 2009-04 (Perm.
Ct. Arb. 2008), available at http://
commerciaux/assets/pdfs/BilconNoticeofArbitration.pdf [hereinafter Clayton/Bilcon, Notice of

[FN439]. Statement of Claim ¶ 19, Clayton/Bilcon v. Gov't of Can., P.C.A. Case No. 2009-04 (Perm.
Ct. Arb. 2009). available at http://
commeiciaux/assets/pdfs/BilconStatementClaim+Exhibits.pdf [hereinafter Clayton/Bilcon, Statement
of Claim].

[FN440]. Statement of Defense ¶ 15, Clayton/Bilcon v. Gov't of Can., P.C.A. Case No. 2009-04 (Perm.
Ct. Arb. 2009), available at http://
commerctaux/assets/pdfs/CanadaStatementDefence04May.PDF [hereinafter Clayton/Bilcon,
Statement of Defense].

[FN441]. See Clayton/Bilcon, Statement of Claim, supra note 439, ¶ 21.

[FN442]. See Clayton/Bilcon, Notice of Arbitration, supra note 438, ¶ 12.

[FN443]. See Clayton / Bilcon, Statement of Defense, supra note 440, ¶ 9.

[FN444]. See id. ¶ 9.

[FN445]. See id. ¶ 10. "Biosphere reserves are areas of terrestrial and coastal ecosystems promoting
solutions to reconcile the conservation of biodiversity with its sustainable use." See FAQ--Biosphere
Reserues?, UNESCO, (last visited Oct. 4, 2010).

[FN446]. Clayton/Bilcon, Statement of Defense, supra note 440, ¶ 66.

[FN447]. See id. ¶ 113.

[FN448]. See John Collier & Vaughan Lowe, The Settlement of Disputes in International Law:
Institutions and Procedures 33-34 (1999) (discussing the differences between arbitration and judicial
settlement in the InternationalCourt of Justice or other international tribunals); J.G. Merrills,
International Dispute Settlement 91 (4th ed. 2005) (noting that arbitration "requires the parties
themselves to set up the machinery to handle a dispute, or series of disputes, between them" while
"[j]udicial settlement involves the reference of a dispute to the International Court or some other
standing tribunal").

[FN449]. See Dora Marta Gruner, Note, Accounting for the Public Interest in International Arbitration:
The Need for Procedural and Structural Reform, 41 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 923 (2003).

[FN450]. On the judicialization of NAFTA Chapter 11, see Hansen, supra note 205.

[FN451]. See Joachim Delaney & Daniel Barstow Magraw, Procedural Transparency, in The Oxford
Handbook of International Investment Law 721, 743- 46 (Peter Muchlinski et al. eds., 2008).

[FN452]. See Chris Tollefson, Games Without Frontiers: Investor Claims and Citizen Submissions
Under the NAFTA Regime, 27 Yale J. Int'l L. 141, 184 (2002)("[w]hile a participatory revolution may
have occurred in internationalenvironmental law, so far it has spread slowly to the realm of trade and
investment ...." The protectionist approach to sovereignty "in relation to civil society is anomalous and
unjustified, particularly in light of the far more pressing and substantial threats to sovereignty posed
by the parallel investor claim process."). See also James Harrison, Human Rights Arguments in Amicus
Curiae Submissions: Promoting Social Justice?, in Human Rights in International Investment Law and
Arbitration 396, 405 (Pierre-Marie Dupuy et al. eds., 20091 (describing the use of amicus curiae
submissions in investment treaty arbitration "as a mechanism for allowing participation of those who
are representing broader public interest considerations"!.

[FN453]. See Todd Weiler, Balancing Human Rights and Investor Protection: A New Approach for a
Different Legal Order, 27 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 429, 437-49 (2004).

[FN454]. See Benjamin H. Tahyar, Confidentiality in ICSID Arbitration after Amco Asia v Indonesia:
Watchword or White Elephant?, 10 Fordham Int'l L.J. 93, 117 (1987) (arguing that "ICSID's reputation
as a reliable and independent arbitral institution can best be served by subordinating the requirement
of confidentiality to the publication of arbitral awards").

[FN455]. See Nigel Blackaby, Public Interest and Investment Treaty Arbitration, Transnat'l Disp.
Mgmt., Feb. 2004, at 4.

[FN456]. See ICSID, Arbitration Rules, supra note 153, r. 48(1)(a), at 122. The ICSID Arbitration
Rules of 2006 require that where consensus of the parties is not forthcoming, ICSID must promptly
publish excerpts of the tribunal's legal reasoning. Id. r. 48(4), at 122.

[FN457]. See Delaney & Magraw, supra note 451, at 739 ("One of the main perceived advantages of
ICC arbitration is that the proceedings before the tribunal and the ICC Court are confidential ....").

[FN458]. See NAFTA Free Trade Comm'n, Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions
(July 31, 2001), available at http://
commerciaux/disp-diff/nafta-interpr.aspx?lang=en [hereinafter Notes of Interpretation]. The NAFTA
Free Trade Commission is composed of the trade ministers from each of the NAFTA countries. See
NAFTA, supra note 150, art. 2001(1). The Commission's interpretations of NAFTA are binding on
tribunals formed under NAFTA Chapter 11. Id. art 1131(2).

[FN459]. See NAFTA Investor-State Arbitrations, U.S. Dep't of State, http:// (last visited Mar. 7, 2011). See also Dispute Settlement under the
NAFTA, Foreign Affairs and Int'l Trade Can., http://
accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/nafta-alena/settle.aspx?lang=en (last visited Mar. 7, 2011) (providing
information on where to access the decisions and orders under NAFTA Chapters 19 and 20).

[FN460]. Notes of Interpretation, supra note 458, § A2b (providing exceptions for (i) confidential
business information; (ii) information privileged under law; and (iii) information that must be withheld
pursuant to relevant arbitral rules).

[FN461]. See U.S. Model BIT, supra note 315, art. 19; Agreement Between Canada and [Country] for
the Promotion and Protection of Investments art. 38, available at [hereinafter Canadian Model BIT].

[FN462]. See UNCITRAL, Arbitration Rules art. 28(3) (2010), available at
UNCITRAL was established in 1966 as a subsidiary body of the U.N. General Assembly. Its general
mandate is "to further the progressive harmonization and unification of the law of international trade.
UNCITRAL has since prepared a wide range of conventions, model laws and other instruments dealing
with the substantive law that governs trade transactions ...." FAQ--Origin, Mandate and Composition
of UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL, (last visited Mar.
7, 2011).

[FN463]. See ICSID, Rules of Procedure for Arbitral Proceedings (Arbitration Rules) r. 32 (2003).

[FN464]. See ICSID, Arbitration Rules, supra note 153. r. 32(2), at 115.

[FN465]. Canada released a Statement on Open Hearings in 2003. followed by the U.S. Mexico joined
Canada and the U.S. in 2004. See Press Release, Can. Dep't of Foreign Affairs and Int'l Trade,
Statement of Canada on Open Hearings in NAFTA Chapter Eleven Arbitrations (Oct. 7. 2003). available
at http://
transparency-alena-transparence.aspx?lang=eng; Press release, Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative, NAFTA Commission Announces New-Transparency Measures (Oct. 2003), available at
(c) 2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
(3 screens)

[FN466]. See Glamis Gold Ltd. v. United States of America, Procedural Order No. 11, ¶ 15 (NAFTA Arb. Trib. July 9, 2007),
available at http://

[FN467]. See id. (noting tribal identification was required for admission to the viewing).

[FN468]. See Delaney & Magraw, supra note 451, at 746 (noting that there is a trend in allowing public participation in Chapter 11
arbitration. NAFTA allows the Tribunal to appoint experts, but there is no provision regarding submissions by non-disputing
parties.). See also Andrew P. Tuck, Investor-State Arbitration Revised: A Critical Analysis of the Revisions and Proposed Reforms to
the ICSID and UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, 13 Law & Bus. Rev. Am. 885, 898- 99 (2007) (analyzing the revisions to rule 37 of the
ICSID Rules and the ways in which they allow the Tribunal to accept amicus briefs).

[FN469]. ICSID, Arbitration Rules, supra note 153, r. 37(2) at 117.

[FN470]. See U.S. Model BIT, supra at note 315; Canadian Model BIT, supra note 461, art. 39.

[FN471]. Statement on Non-Disputing Party Participation, supra note 150, para. A.1.

[FN472]. See id. para. B. Any non-disputing party that wishes to file a written submission with the Tribunal will apply for leave from
the Tribunal to file such a submission. The applicant will attach the submission to the application Statement of the Free Trade
Commission on Non-Disputing Party Participation, Para B.1. The application for leave to file a non-disputing party submission, inter
alia, has to be in writing, be no longer than five typed pages, disclose whether or not the applicant has any affiliation, direct or
indirect, with any disputing party, and specify the nature of the interest that the applicant has in the arbitration. Id. para. B.2. The
submission filed by a non-disputing party must be, among other things, concise, "in no case longer than 20 typed pages, including
any appendices" and can "only address matters within the scope of the dispute." Id. para B.3.

[FN473]. See Application for Leave to File a Non-Party Submission, Submission of the Quechan Indian Nation at 3, Glamis Gold Ltd.
v United States of America (NAFTA Arb. Trib. Aug. 19, 2005), available at
http:// ("This tribunal should accept the Tribe's submission because it will assist
the Tribunal in the determination of factual and legal issues by bringing the perspective, particular knowledge and insight that is
unique to American tribal sovereign governments.") [hereinafter Glamis Gold, Quechan Application for Leave].

[FN474]. Id. at 4.

[FN475]. See United States Submission regarding Quechan Indian Nation Application at 2, Glamis Gold Ltd. v. United States of
America (Sept. 15, 2005), available at (encouraging the tribunal to
accept the submission of the Quechan Indian Nation and arguing that the Nation brings a different perspective on the matter).

[FN476]. If we admit jura novit curia, the arbitral tribunal will know the legal relevance and importance of these briefs, according to
their content and source.

[FN477]. Grand River v. United States of America, Amicus Curiae Submission of the Office of the National Chief of the Assembly of
Nations, Mr. Phil Fontaine, to the arbitrators. Mr. Fali S. Nariman, Mr. John R. Crook, and Professor James Anaya, Jan. 19, 2009,
available at http://

[FN478]. See Non-Party Submission of the Quechan Nation at 7-8, Glamis Gold Ltd. v. United States of America (Aug. 19, 2005,
available at http:// Non-Party Supplemental Submission at 1-7, 11-12, Glamis
Gold Ltd. v. United States of America (Oct. 16, 2006), available at

[FN479]. See Valentina Vadi, Towards Arbitral Path Coherence & Judicial Borrowing: Persuasive Precedent in Investment
Arbitration, Transnat'l Disp. Mgmt., May 2008, at 7-10 (noting that arbitral tribunals have relied upon precedent for their persuasive
force, rather than as binding authority).

[FN480]. Glamis Gold, Quechan Application for Leave, supra note 473, at 2.

[FN481]. Id. at 3. The application also clarifies that "the Tribe is recognized as a sovereign government in the United States
Constitution, [and is] one of but three kinds of domestic sovereign governments recognized: the federal government, states and
Indian tribes." Id. (internal citations omitted).

[FN482]. For instance, amicus curiae were admitted in the Methanex, UPS, Biwater Gauff, and Vivendi cases. See Methanex Corp.
v. United States, Decision of the Tribunal on Petitions from Third Persons to Intervene as Amici Curiae, ¶ 53 (NAFTA Arb. Trib. Jan.
15, 2001), available at http://; United Parcel Serv. of Am. v. Gov't of Canada,
Decision of the Tribunal on Petitions for Intervention and Participation as Amici Curiae, ¶ 73 (NAFTA Arb. Trib. Oct.17, 2001),
available at; Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanzania,
ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, Procedural Order No. 5, ¶ 55 (Feb. 2, 2007); Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A., and
Vivendi Universal S.A. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Order in Response to a Petition for Transparency and
Participation as Amicus Curiae in Suez, ¶ 23 (July 30, 2010), available at

[FN483]. See Grand River Ltd. v. United States of America, Letter to the Parties Concerning Amicus Curiae Submission (NAFTA Arb.
Trib. Jan. 27, 2009), available at

[FN484]. Grand River, Award, supra note 230, ¶ 60.

[FN485]. Glamis Gold Ltd. v. United States of America, Decision on Application and Submission by Quechan Indian Nation, ¶ 10
(NAFTA Arb. Trib. Sept. 16, 2005), available at http://

[FN486]. Statement on Non-Disputing Party Participation, supra note 150, ¶ 9.

[FN487]. See Anne K. Hoffmann & Python Schifferli Peter, Counterclaims by the Respondent State in Investment Arbitrations: The
Decision on Jurisdiction Over Respondent's Counterclaim in Saluka Investments B.V. v. Czech Republic, 3 Transnat'l Disp. Mgmt.,
Dec. 2006 at 10 (arguing that if an arbitral tribunal allows a state to make counterclaims, it should apply "the same standards ... as
to those [counterclaims] brought by an investor"); Hege E. Kjos, Counterclaims in Investment Treaty Arbitration, Transnat'l Disp.
Mgmt., July 2007. at 4-6; Hege E. Kjos, Counterclaims by Host States in Investment Dispute Arbitration "Without Privity," in New
Aspects of International Investment Law 597 (T. W. Wälde & Philippe Kahn eds., 2007).

[FN488]. See Todd Weiler, Balancing Human Rights and Investor Protection: A New Approach for a Different Legal Order, 27 B.C.
Int'l & Comp. L.Rev. 429, 450 (2004).

[FN489]. Id. at 449.

[FN490]. See, e.g., Investment Agreement for the COMESA Common Investment Area art. 28.9, May 23, 2007, 33 I.L.M.
1067, available at http://
20CCIA%20FINAL%20_English.pdf (providing that a COMESA member state can raise as a defense or counterclaim against a
complaining investor that the investor "has not fulfilled its obligations under [the] Agreement, including the obligations to comply
with all applicable domestic measures!,] or that it has not taken all reasonable steps to mitigate possible damages").

[FN491]. The limits of this approach are evident. Limiting the prosecution of human rights breaches by investors to counterclaims
does not address the problem that arises where the host state is complicit in the violations. Conferring the right to prosecute only
to the state would potentially imply selective prosecution. Professor Caron argues in favor of a "context sensitive" approach, which
allows "for international procedures to act as a supplement where the state's representation is inadequate. In some measure, this is
what occurs with the recent practice authorizing amicus filings because such filings can bring to the tribunal's attention an y
argument that the State does not wish to raise." See David D. Caron, Investor State Arbitration: Strategic and Tactical Perspectives
on Legitimacy, 32 Suffolk Transnat'l L. Rev. 513, 520 (2009).

[FN492]. High Comm'r for Human Rights, Human Rights, Trade and Investment, 1 57, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/9 (Jul. 2,

[FN493]. See Francesco Francioni, WTO Law in Context: The Integration of International Human Rights and Environmental Late in
the Dispute Settlement Process, in The WTO at Ten 143-54 (G. Sacerdoti et al. eds., 2006).

[FN494]. See Cuneo, supra note 61.

[FN495]. On the "repoliticization of investor protection," the ability of arbitral tribunals "to manage the outbreak of politics." and
"the normative disagreement and contestation about human interests and values." see Ruti Teitel & Robert Howse, Cross-Judging:
Tribunalization in a Fragmented but Interconnected Global Order, 41 Int'l. L. & Pol. 959, 985 (2009) (noting that "a repoliticization
of investor protection has ... gone hand in hand with some countries threatening to withdraw from treaty commitments requiring
arbitration or from arbitration processes altogether").

[FN496]. States must ensure the protection of human rights and the fulfillment of their obligations under human rights law. See
supra Part VI.

[FN497]. See Valentina Vadi, Fragmentation or Cohesion? Investment versus Cultural Protection Rules, 10 J. World Investment and
Trade 573 (2009) (discussing two sub-systems of international law and arguing in favor of unity in international law); Valentina
Vadi, Cultural Heritage and International Investment Law: A Stormy Relationship, 15 Int'l J. Cultural Prop. 1, 2 (2008) (explaining
that cultural rights have been "traditionally neglected for decades"); Valentina Vadi, The Challenge of Reconciling Underwater
Cultural Heritage and Foreign Direct Investment: A Case Study, 17 Italian Y.B. of Int'l L. 143 (Benedetto Conforti et al. eds., 2007)
(analyzing the international legal framework protecting underwater cultural heritage); Valenina Vadi, Investing In Culture:
Underwater Cultural Heritage and International Investment Law 42 Vand. J. of Transnat'l L. 3 (2009) (arguing that synergy
between public and private actors can be found in providing an alternative framework for protection of undersea heritage).

[FN498]. Francioni, supra note 172, at 72.

[FN499]. As Professor Caron puts it, "the question of whether the state adequately represents the investor-impacted community in
a particular proceeding is ultimately a contextual question and depends on the state and community in question". Caron, supra note
491, at 520.

[FN500]. For a detailed analysis of these issues, see Christina Knahr, Transparency, Third Party Participation and Access to
Documents in International Investment Arbitration, 23 Arb. Int'l 327 (2007); Nigel Blackaby & Caroline Richard, Amicus Curiae: A
Panacea for Legitimacy?, in Investment Arbitration?, in The Backlash against Investment Arbitration: Perceptions and Reality 253
(Michael Weibel et al. eds., 2010).

[FN501]. For instance, in Glamis Gold, the parties agreed to make the hearing open to the public, except for those parts which
involved confidential matters. Glamis Gold, Award, supra note 203, ¶¶ 102, 121. The hearing was also broadcasted live at the
World Bank. Press Release, ICSID, Glamis Gold v. United States of America, NAFTA/UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules Proceeding (Aug.
13, 2007), (follow link adjacent to "August 13, 2007"). More
recently, in Pacific Rim Cayman v. Ecuador, a hearing on preliminary objections was transmitted live via internet feed. See Press
Release. ICSID, Pac Rim Cayman LLC v. Republic of El Salvador (ICSID Case No. ARB/09/12)--Public Hearing (May 25. 2010).
available at (follow link adjacent to "May 25, 2010").
(3 layar)
42 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 797

Columbia Tinjauan Hukum Hak Asasi Manusia

Spring, 2011



Valentina S. Vadi [FNa1]

Hak Cipta © 2011 oleh Columbia Hukum Hak Asasi Manusia Tinjauan; Valentina S. Vadi

I. PENDAHULUAN ............................................... ............ 798

A. Notion dari Indigeneity ........................................ 803
B. Warisan Budaya Dunia atau Warisan Budaya Adat? .........805
C. Perlindungan Internasional Warisan Budaya Adat ..... 808
D. Hak Budaya sebagai Bagian Dasar Adat
Hak Rakyat ............................................... .......... 818
III. INTERNASIONAL HUKUM INVESTASI ......................................... 822
A. Standar Substantif Perlindungan .............................. 822
B. Investor-Negara Arbitrase ....................................... 825
Masalah C. Muncul .............................................. .... 830
BUDAYA ................................................. ................ 835
STUDI KASUS V. .............................................. ............. 837
Pengambilalihan A. Klaim ............................................. 837
B. Adil dan Adil Pengobatan ..................................... 844
C. Diskriminasi ............................................... .... 847
D. Perlindungan dan Keamanan Kendali ..................................... 853
VI. DE Lege Lata ............................................... ........... 855
A. Hukum yang Berlaku ............................................. .. 855
B. Interpretasi Perjanjian ............................................ 865
VII. Negosiasi ulang PERJANJIAN INVESTASI .................................... 868
B. Penilaian Dampak Budaya ...................................... 873
C. Bergerak menuju Judicialization hati-hati dari Arbitrase
Proses ................................................. ................ 877
VIII. KESIMPULAN ................................................. ......... 886

Perlindungan warisan budaya memiliki makna mendalam bagi martabat manusia dan menganggap penting berkaitan
dengan masyarakat adat. Meskipun pengakuan hak masyarakat adat dan warisan budaya telah memperoleh
beberapa momentum dalam hukum internasional sejak diadopsinya Deklarasi PBB tentang Hak-Hak Masyarakat
Adat (UNDRIP), [FN1] negara telah menafsirkan hak untuk mengembangkan "sendiri istilah "dalam rangka *
799prosper" seperti yang mereka lihat cocok. "[FN2] Sementara itu suatu culturehas ekonomi internasional muncul
bahwa "melintasi budaya tradisional membagi" [FN3] dan menekankan produktivitas dan pembangunan
ekonomi.[FN4] Pembangunan dianggap "transformasi masyarakat, gerakan dari hubungan tradisional, cara-cara
berpikir tradisional, cara-cara tradisional berurusan dengan kesehatan dan pendidikan, metode tradisional produksi,
untuk lebih 'modern' cara." [FN5] Konseptualisasi kemajuan ekonomi sebagai "proses upgrade berturut-turut,"
ekonom telah menyoroti tekanan pada masyarakat untuk mengadopsi budaya ekonomi produktif dan "konvergensi
tumbuh di sekitar paradigma produktivitas." [FN6]
Karena pembuat kebijakan cenderung mendukung pertumbuhan, terlepas dari pelanggaran aktual atau potensial dari
hak budaya, "hukum yang ada sering gagal untuk keseimbangan antara pembangunan ekonomi" dan hak-hak
masyarakat adat. [FN7] Akibatnya, masyarakat adat menderita konsekuensi dari sebuah rezim yang nikmat,
misalnya, pertambangan terhadap lingkungan dan budaya penduduk asli.Sebagai titik sarjana satu, "tetap
penggabungan budaya ke dalam proses pembangunan tidak jelas, dan tidak ada model yang disepakati untuk
menjelaskan bagaimana ini harus terjadi."[FN8] Namun, perlindungan keragaman budaya memiliki makna yang
mendalam: tidak hanya keragaman budaya dipahami sebagai sebuah "aset yang kaya untuk individu dan
masyarakat" tapi perlindungan * 800 dan promosi "merupakan persyaratan penting bagi pembangunan
berkelanjutan." [FN9]
Sementara bentrokan antara pembangunan ekonomi dan hak-hak masyarakat adat adalah dengan tidak berarti baru,
[FN10] Pasal ini mendekati tema ini terkenal dari perspektif baru dengan * 801 berfokus pada hukum investasi
internasional dan arbitrase. Pasal ini membahas cara di mana perjanjian investasi internasional dan pengadilan
arbitrase telah berurusan dengan hak-hak masyarakat adat. Penelitian ini tepat waktu seperti dalam dekade terakhir
telah terjadi booming investor-negara arbitrase yang memberikan kontribusi signifikan terhadap perkembangan
hukum internasional. [FN11] Meskipun fokus tradisional pengacara investasi telah analisis ketentuan undang-undang
investasi yang relevan, sedikit, jika ada, penelitian telah difokuskan pada interaksi substantif antara hak-hak
masyarakat adat dan hak-hak investor dalam hukum investasi internasional dan arbitrase. Hanya baru-baru ini
komentator hukum mulai menganalisis dan kritis menilai interaksi antara berbagai rezim substantif hukum
internasional dalam hukum perjanjian investasi dan arbitrase. [FN12] Di antara karya-karya perintis, bagaimanapun,
fokus khusus pada hak-hak masyarakat adat hilang. Pasal ini bertujuan untuk mengisi kekosongan yang ada ini
dalam studi hukum kontemporer.
Pertanyaan-pertanyaan kunci adalah apakah hukum investasi internasional telah memeluk budaya ekonomi murni
internasional atau apakah ia terbuka untuk merangkum masalah non-ekonomi atau budaya dalam modus operandi-
nya. Sampai saat ini, hukum investasi internasional telah mengembangkan hanya alat yang terbatas untuk
perlindungan warisan budaya melalui penyelesaian sengketa investasi. [FN13] Namun, putusan arbitrase terbaru
menunjukkan meningkatnya kesadaran akan kebutuhan untuk melindungi warisan budaya dalam perselisihan
investasi. Semakin, arbiter tidak hanya dianggap non-investasi nilai-nilai terkait dalam konteks sengketa investasi,
tetapi juga seimbang nilai yang berbeda dipertaruhkan. [FN14] Apakah model ini adjudicative cukup memadai untuk
menangani hak-hak masyarakat adat?
* 802 Pasal ini akan lanjutkan sebagai berikut. Bagian II menyajikan penjelasan singkat dan penilaian munculnya
norma-norma internasional yang melindungi warisan budaya tradisional.Bagian III menggambarkan kerangka
investasi hukum, investor-negara arbitrase, dan muncul isu yang relevan. Bagian IV dan V meneliti konflik norma
melindungi warisan budaya tradisional dan norma-norma investasi dengan mengacu pada kasus-kasus yang
relevan. Hak-hak masyarakat adat telah memainkan peran marjinal hanya dalam konteks investor-negara arbitrase;
masyarakat adat yang terkena dampak hampir tidak memiliki legal standing dalam prosedur ini dan telah
memanfaatkan hanya prosedur partisipatif terbatas. Peran yang terbatas mereka berbanding terbalik dengan jumlah
arbitrase yang melibatkan hak-hak masyarakat adat.
Bagian VI dan VII menawarkan rekomendasi yang lebih baik akan mendamaikan kepentingan yang berbeda
dipertaruhkan dan dengan demikian menjamin perlindungan hak-hak masyarakat adat dalam konteks investor-
negara arbitrase.Sebuah judicialization moderat proses arbitrase melalui peningkatan transparansi dan keterbukaan
dapat memastikan partisipasi yang lebih baik dalam proses oleh perwakilan masyarakat adat. Namun, judicialization
ekstrim dari proses arbitrase tidak diinginkan karena pada akhirnya akan merusak alasan yang mendasari negara
investor arbitrase. Menurut hukum internasional, negara memiliki kewajiban untuk melindungi hak masyarakat adat,
dan mekanisme penyelesaian sengketa lainnya yang tersedia yang dapat menjamin masyarakat adat akses ke
keadilan. Jika investor asing negara tantangan langkah-langkah memajukan hak-hak masyarakat adat 'sebelum
pengadilan, hak asasi manusia pertimbangan tidak dapat diberhentikan oleh pengadilan arbitrase sebagai tidak
relevan. Bahkan di mana negara bagian tidak membuat referensi terhadap kewajiban hak asasi manusia mereka,
mungkin mempertanyakan apakah arbiter bisa mengabaikan kebijakan publik internasional dalam konteks
proses. Dalam pelaksanaan fungsi yudisial, arbiter perlu mengambil hukum internasional ke rekening. Jika norma-
norma eksternal hukum investasi internasional datang ke depan, para arbiter mungkin membawa mereka ke rekening
meskipun incidenter tantum.Bagian VIII menyimpulkan.
Kedaulatan budaya, yang berarti kebebasan negara apapun untuk memilih model budaya, secara tradisional jatuh
dalam yurisdiksi domestik 803 * negara. [FN15] Meskipun demikian, dalam enam puluh tahun terakhir telah terjadi
erosi bertahap dari domain cadangan negara-negara di sektor budaya, [FN16] karena munculnya dan kodifikasi
hukum hak asasi manusia dan hukum budaya internasional. [FN17] Bagian ini membahas bagaimana dan sampai
sejauh mana warisan budaya adat dilindungi di bawah hukum internasional.
Bagian ini diorganisasikan sebagai berikut: pertama, menyelidiki gagasan indigeneity, kedua, ia mendalami gagasan
warisan budaya pada umumnya dan gagasan spesifik dari warisan budaya tradisional, ketiga, mengkaji instrumen
hukum internasional yang melindungi warisan budaya tradisional, dankeempat, itu alamat apakah norma hukum
kebiasaan internasional membutuhkan perlindungan warisan budaya tradisional. Evolusi pendapat hukum dan
praktek negara telah menyebabkan banyak untuk menyimpulkan bahwa "beberapa hak adat telah mencapai status
hukum internasional adat, oleh karena itu, statesregardless mengikat apakah mereka telah meratifikasi perjanjian
yang relevan." [FN18] Akhirnya, menyimpulkan bahwa hak-hak budaya merupakan komponen penting dari hak-hak
masyarakat adat dan melengkapi hak-hak lain mereka manusia.

A. Notion dari Indigeneity

Sementara indigeneity sudah "istilah seni dalam politik dan filsafat hak-hak budaya dan hak-hak Masyarakat
Pertama," [FN19] maknanya tidak jelas. Tidak ada definisi tunggal masyarakat adat ada sebagai instrumen hukum
yang ada jangan berbagi pendekatan umum. * 804 Secara harfiah, indigeneity menunjukkan kualitas yang asli, yang
lahir di tanah atau wilayah, asli, atau milik daerah. [FN20] Sementara UNDRIP tidak mendefinisikan indigeneity, dua
gagasan indigeneity ditemukan di Organisasi Buruh Internasional (ILO) Konvensi 169 dan dalam Laporan Martinez
Cobo-ke Sub-Komisi PBB tentang Pencegahan Diskriminasi terhadap Kaum Minoritas (selanjutnya Martinez -Cobo
Laporan). Konvensi ILO 169 berlaku bagi masyarakat dianggap sebagai adat pada rekening keturunan mereka dari
populasi yang menghuni suatu negara pada waktu penaklukan atau penjajahan yang mempertahankan sebagian
atau seluruh institusi sosial, ekonomi, budaya dan politik. [FN21] Self-identifikasi sebuah kelompok sebagai adat atau
suku dianggap sebagai kriteria mendasar. [FN22] The Martinez Cobo-Laporan menyediakan definisi yang sedikit
berbeda, [FN23] tetapi juga menekankan pentingnya unsur obyektif dan subyektif indigeneity.
Unsur-unsur Tujuan indigeneity dibuat oleh link sejarah dengan wilayah tertentu [FN24] dan struktur sosial yang
khas. Berkenaan dengan yang pertama, sementara Konvensi ILO 169 mengacu pada keturunan dari populasi yang
menghuni suatu negara pada waktu penaklukan atau penjajahan, Martinez Cobo-Laporan mengacu pada * 805
kontinuitas "sebuah sejarah dengan masyarakat pra-invasi dan pra-kolonial yang dikembangkan di wilayah mereka.
" [FN25] Berkenaan dengan struktur sosial yang aneh, Konvensi ILO 169 mengacu pada masyarakat bahwa
"mempertahankan beberapa atau semua institusi sosial, ekonomi, budaya dan politik." [FN26] Demikian pula,
Laporan Martinez Cobo menyebutkan spesifik-"pola-pola budaya, lembaga sosial dan sistem hukum." [FN27]
Unsur subjektif indigeneity dibuat oleh cara masyarakat adat mendefinisikan dan menganggap diri mereka,
selfidentification yaitu sebuah kelompok adat atau suku sebagai. Martinez Cobo-Laporan menyebutkan fakta bahwa
masyarakat adat "menganggap diri mereka berbeda dari sektor-sektor lain dari masyarakat" [FN28] dan "bertekad
untuk melestarikan, mengembangkan dan mengirimkan kepada generasi mendatang wilayah leluhur mereka, dan
identitas etnik mereka, sebagai dasar keberadaan mereka terus sebagai masyarakat. "[FN29] Para UNDRIP
menyatakan bahwa "[i] ndigenous masyarakat memiliki hak untuk menentukan identitas mereka sendiri atau
keanggotaan sesuai dengan adat dan tradisi mereka." [FN30]

B. Warisan Budaya Dunia atau Warisan Budaya Adat?

Bagian ini mendalami warisan budaya dan konsep spesifik warisan budaya tradisional. Ini juga membahas apakah
beberapa elemen dari warisan budaya tradisional telah dianggap warisan dunia di bawah Konvensi Warisan Dunia
1972 (selanjutnya WHO, yang telah diadopsi secara luas dan membebankan kewajiban yang mengikat pada Negara-
negara Pihak. Lebih lanjut membahas apakah unsur-unsur warisan budaya tradisional yang tidak memenuhi kriteria
untuk dianggap warisan dunia (dan dengan demikian ditambahkan ke dalam Daftar Warisan Dunia) [FN31] terima
yang memadai, jika ada, perlindungan di bawah hukum budaya internasional. pengawasan ini penting karena
pengadilan arbitrase telah membuat referensi untuk hukum budaya internasional dalam menyelesaikan investor-
negara sengketa [FN32].
* 806 warisan budaya dapat didefinisikan sebagai "totalitas benda budaya, tradisi, pengetahuan dan keterampilan
yang diberikan sebuah bangsa atau masyarakat memiliki diwariskan dengan cara proses belajar dari generasi
sebelumnya dan yang memberikan arti identitas untuk ditransmisikan ke generasi berikutnya. " [FN33] Konsep
warisan budaya secara resmi diakui di WHC tersebut. [FN34] perjanjian awal tidak menggunakan "warisan" istilah
melainkan konsep sempit "benda budaya." [FN35] Perubahan itu karena kebutuhan konseptual menyatukan situs
alam dan sifat budaya dari nilai yang luar biasa dan universal. Pendekatan holistik yang diambil oleh WHC itu diikuti
oleh perjanjian berikutnya dan instrumen hukum internasional, dan mengakibatkan pergeseran konseptual lebih
lanjut. [FN36] Konsep "warisan" dibedakan dari yang "properti" karena memiliki karakter kolektif dan publik, [FN37]
dan berkonotasi warisan terlepas dari kepemilikan. [FN38]
Warisan budaya tradisional merupakan konsep yang lebih spesifik yang terdiri dari "semua benda, situs dan
pengetahuan sifat penggunaan yang telah diteruskan dari generasi ke generasi, dan yang dianggap sebagai
berkaitan dengan orang-orang tertentu atau wilayahnya." [FN39] * 807 warisan budaya adat meliputi manifestasi
materi baik, seperti tempat pemakaman dan lukisan batu dan gua, dan elemen material, termasuk ekspresi
pengetahuan tradisional andcultural, tradisi lisan, sastra, desain, dan seni visual dan pertunjukan. [FN40] Namun,
bagi masyarakat adat perbedaan antara kedua kategori "warisan budaya" adalah buatan: "Mereka melihat tanah dan
laut, semua situs yang mereka mengandung dan pengetahuan dan hukum-hukum yang terkait dengan situs-situs
sebagai singleentitas yang harus dilindungi secara keseluruhan ...." [FN41] Karena pendekatan holistik masyarakat
adat, sebuah studi PBB menegaskan bahwa "semua elemen dari warisan harus dikelola dan dilindungi secara
keseluruhan, tunggal saling terkait dan terintegrasi." [FN42]
Mengingat bahwa "semua orang berkontribusi pada keragaman dan kekayaan peradaban dan kebudayaan, yang
merupakan warisan bersama umat manusia," [FN43] warisan budaya tradisional layak perlindungan karena unik
kontribusi terhadap keragaman budaya. Beberapa situs budaya adat dianggap memiliki nilai universal luar biasa dan
telah dimasukkan dalam Daftar Warisan Dunia [FN44]. Untuk situs-situs budaya adat, dikotomi global yang v. lokal
adalah tidak relevan. Namun, mayoritas warisan budaya tradisional tidak termasuk dalam Daftar Warisan
Dunia. [FN45] Dalam pengertian ini seseorang mungkin bertanya-tanya apakah dikotomi global yang ay ay lokal dan
internasional adat menciptakan sebuah penghalang untuk perlindungan yang memadai dari warisan adat pada
tingkat hukum internasional. Hanya karena warisan budaya tradisional tidak sesuai dengan visi Barat keindahan atau
budaya atau tidak diungkapkan kepada publik dapat menentukan kategorisasi yang tidak tepat budaya asli * 808
warisan sebagai "tidak relevan." [FN46] Hanya jarang memiliki warisan budaya tradisional telah diakui sebagai
warisan dunia, tetap, bahkan dalam kasus-kasus di mana warisan adat tidak menerima perlindungan di bawah
hukum budaya internasional, instrumen internasional lainnya permintaan perlindungan. Bagian berikutnya akan
membahas kerangka hukum yang ada yang mengatur warisan budaya masyarakat adat pada tingkat hukum

C. Perlindungan Internasional Warisan Budaya Adat

Hukum internasional tidak memberikan instrumen terpadu dan komprehensif untuk melindungi warisan budaya
tradisional. Alih-alih serangkaian instrumen hukum internasional memberikan solusi terfragmentasi dengan
kebutuhan melindungi indigenousculture. Lima aliran instrumen hukum internasional yang melindungi warisan
budaya tradisional dapat diidentifikasi: (1) instrumen HAM yang berlaku umum, [FN47] (2) instrumen hukum
lingkungan, (3) United Nations Educational, Scientific, dan Budaya Organisasi (UNESCO) instrumen melindungi
warisan budaya dan keanekaragaman budaya, (4) instrumen khusus tentang hak-hak adat, dan (5) kebijakan Bank
Dunia tertentu. Apakah beberapa norma-norma telah mengkristal dalam hukum kebiasaan internasional juga
dibahas, karena hukum adat yang mengikat negara-negara terlepas dari persetujuan. [FN48]
Secara umum, ketentuan hak asasi manusia yang membutuhkan perlindungan hak-hak budaya juga membutuhkan
perlindungan warisan budaya. [FN49] Pasal 27 dari Kovenan Internasional tentang Hak Sipil dan Politik (ICCPR)
menyediakan: "Di negara-negara di mana etnis, * 809 minoritas agama atau bahasa, orang yang tergolong minoritas
tersebut tidak boleh diingkari haknya, dalam masyarakat dengan anggota lain dari kelompok mereka, untuk
menikmati budaya mereka sendiri, untuk menganut dan menjalankan agama mereka sendiri, atau untuk
menggunakan bahasa mereka sendiri. " [FN50] Komite Hak Asasi Manusia [FN51] telah menafsirkan Pasal 27
ICCPR sebagai melindungi budaya asli. [FN52] Dalam kasus Band Danau Lubikon, kegagalan pemerintah Kanada
untuk memadai mengatasi kebutuhan Band itu untuk tanah dasar yang stabil, dalam kombinasi dengan pemberian
skala besar konsesi untuk eksploitasi kayu, gas, dan minyak di wilayah tradisional band, ditemukan berjumlah
pelanggaran Pasal 27. [FN53] Kegiatan-kegiatan ini secara efektif menghancurkan berburu tradisional Band dan
dasar perangkap, sehingga mengancam jalan Band hidup dan budaya. [FN54] Dalam Lanman v. Finlandia, terbatas
penggalian di lereng gunung tidak dianggap membahayakan hak-hak budaya pemohon. [FN55] Namun, ia
menyatakan bahwa jika pertambangan 810activities * disetujui dalam skala besar, mereka dapat menimbulkan
pelanggaran ICCPR Pasal 27. [FN56]
Demikian pula, Pasal 30 Konvensi Hak Anak menyediakan:
Di negara-negara yang memiliki kelompok minoritas etnis, agama atau bahasa atau orang-orang pribumi ada,
seorang anak yang termasuk dalam minoritas tersebut atau pribumi tidak akan diingkari haknya, dalam masyarakat
dengan anggota lain dari-Nya atau kelompok, untuk menikmati nya atau budaya sendiri, untuk menganut dan
menjalankan agama sendiri, atau untuk menggunakan bahasa sendiri. [FN57]
Demikian juga, No Rekomendasi Umum 23 tentang masyarakat adat, [FN58] Komite Penghapusan Diskriminasi
Rasial menegaskan bahwa "diskriminasi terhadap masyarakat adat berada di bawah ruang lingkup Konvensi" [FN59]
dan menyerukan kepada Negara-negara Pihak untuk "[ r] ecognize dan menghargai budaya asli sejarah, yang
berbeda, bahasa dan cara hidup sebagai pengayaan identitas budaya Negara dan untuk mempromosikan
pelestariannya. " [FN60]
Pada tingkat regional, Organisasi Negara Amerika (OAS) telah memimpin dalam mengelaborasi hak-hak masyarakat
adat dan mengontekstualisasikan mereka dalam kerangka kerja hak asasi manusia yang lebih luas. [FN61] * 811
Dalam Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Komunitas v. Nikaragua, Pengadilan Inter-Amerika tentang Hak Asasi Manusia
berpendapat bahwa kegagalan untuk mengatasi klaim tanah adat sebelum memberikan konsesi untuk
mengeksploitasi sumber daya alam melanggar hak Mayagna untuk properti mereka, mengakui hubungan antara hak-
hak tanah adat dan kelangsungan hidup budaya Mayagnas '. [FN62]
Sejumlah instrumen hukum lingkungan mengacu pada kebudayaan masyarakat adat. Prinsip 22 Deklarasi Rio
tentang Lingkungan dan Pembangunan menyediakan, antara lain, bahwa "[s] negara harus mengakui dan
mendukung identitas mereka sepatutnya, budaya dan kepentingan dan memungkinkan partisipasi efektif mereka
dalam pencapaian pembangunan berkelanjutan." [FN63] Agenda 21 [FN64] mendesak pemerintah untuk melindungi
tanah adat dari aktivitas tidak sehat lingkungan, atau kegiatan yang masyarakat adat anggap sebagai budaya yang
tidak tepat, [FN65] dan mengakui bahwa ketergantungan "tradisional dan langsung pada sumber daya terbarukan
dan ekosistem, termasuk berkelanjutanpemanenan, terus menjadi penting bagi budaya, ekonomi dan kesejahteraan
fisik masyarakat adat dan komunitas mereka. "[FN66] Konvensi Keanekaragaman Hayati juga mengacu pada
"praktek-praktek budaya tradisional." [FN67]
Beberapa konvensi UNESCO melindungi warisan budaya dan keanekaragaman budaya. Pertama dan terpenting,
WHC melindungi alam dan * 812 kekayaan budaya nilai luar biasa dan universal. [FN68] Meskipun sejumlah situs
budaya adat tertulis di Daftar Warisan Dunia, serangkaian kritik telah dibangkitkan sehubungan dengan pendekatan
WHC itu. Pertama, beberapa komentator mengkritik sebagai elitis karena WHC hanya melindungi situs-situs yang
beredar, nilai universal dan dengan demikian membuat perbedaan buatan antara nilai lokal dan nilai
universal. [FN69] Sulit untuk menarik garis antara apa yang memiliki nilai universal dan apa yang memiliki nilai lokal
belaka.Meskipun situs-situs tertentu mungkin terlihat biasa, mereka mungkin luar biasa dari perspektif budaya.
Kedua, pendekatan daftar WHC umumnya hanya melindungi situs tersebut secara tegas ditunjuk oleh Negara
Anggota dan dipilih oleh Komite Warisan Dunia. Sementara dalam keadaan luar biasa, penambahan situs untuk
daftar tergantung pada penerapan pertimbangan obyektif, [FN70] daftar biasanya tergantung pada kemauan politik
lembaga-lembaga pemerintah untuk menunjuk daerah tertentu di untuk listing. Misalnya, meskipun pulau Diego
Garcia, Inggris British Indian Territory yang host pangkalan militer AS, mungkin akan dimasukkan dalam Daftar
Warisan Dunia karena fitur-fiturnya naturalistik, [FN71] WHC tidak teritorial berlaku untuk kepulauan Chagos .[FN72]
Hal ini tidak mungkin bahwa status kepulauan 813 * akan berubah di masa depan, karena alasan pertahanan. [FN73]
Proses nominasi mungkin juga tergantung pada pertimbangan ekonomi. [FN74] Kontroversi yang mengelilingi daftar
dari Taman Nasional Kakadu di Australia menggambarkan bagaimana kepentingan ekonomi kuat dapat
membahayakan situs warisan adat. Kakadu akhirnya terdaftar dalam Daftar Warisan Dunia karena nilai ekologi dan
keindahan pemandangan, tetapi juga untuk signifikansi budaya karena mengandung seni cadas Aborigin dan tempat-
tempat rohani.[FN75] Kontroversi meletup karena bagian dari taman menjalani proses daftar telah "potensi mineral
berharga." [FN76] Investor berusaha untuk memblokir daftar bagian-bagian taman, mengajukan tuntutan di
Pengadilan Federal dan Tinggi, [FN77] dan mereka ditentang oleh organisasi non-pemerintah dan orang-orang
Aborigin Mirrar, yang ingin untuk memblokir pertambangan karena itu memiliki dampak ireversibel pada warisan
budaya Aborigin. [FN78] Sebagai tanggapan atas tekanan internasional, pemerintah federal memutuskan untuk tidak
mengizinkan pertambangan di sebagian besar taman dan untuk memasukkan seluruh taman di Daftar Warisan
Dunia. [FN79]
Ketiga, sementara Pasal 12 WHC mengharuskan Negara Anggota untuk melindungi properti-properti budaya yang,
meskipun tidak termasuk dalam daftar, obyektif memenuhi kondisi dan persyaratan untuk dianggap memiliki nilai
yang luar biasa dan universal, ketentuan ini telah semua tapi diabaikan dalam konkrit penerapan Konvensi. [FN80]
Kelemahan ketentuan ini terletak pada kenyataan bahwa itu adalah sampai ke negara-negara untuk mengidentifikasi
properti-properti yang obyektif memenuhi kondisi dan persyaratan untuk dianggap * beredar 814 dan nilai
universal. Sebagai Lenzerini poin keluar."Sebuah properti yang diberikan benar-benar dapat menjadi nilai universal
yang luar biasa bahkan dalam hal itu tidak dianggap sebagai memiliki nilai tersebut oleh pemerintah wilayah di mana
ia berada." [FN81]
Lain Konvensi UNESCO melindungi warisan budaya adat Konvensi UNESCO tentang Warisan Budaya Tak
Berwujud [FN82] dan Konvensi tentang Perlindungan dan Promosi Keanekaragaman Ekspresi Budaya [FN83]. Yang
pertama melindungi warisan budaya tak berwujud dimaksudkan sebagai "representasi praktek,, ekspresi,
pengetahuan, keterampilan - serta instrumen, objek, artefak dan ruang budaya yang terkait dengannya -. bahwa
komunitas, kelompok dan, dalam beberapa kasus, individu mengakui sebagai bagian dari culturalheritage mereka
" [FN84] Konvensi mengakui sifat dinamis warisan intangiblecultural [FN85] dan hanya melindungi bahwa warisan
yang menghormati hak asasi manusia. [FN86] Konvensi Keanekaragaman Budaya conceives keragaman budaya
sebagai "warisan bersama umat manusia" yang "harus dihargai dan dipelihara untuk kepentingan * 815 semua" dan
mengakui "pentingnya traditionalknowledge sebagai sumber tidak berwujud dan kekayaan materi, dan khususnya
sistem pengetahuan masyarakat adat, dan kontribusi positif terhadap pembangunan berkelanjutan, serta kebutuhan
untuk perlindungan yang memadai dan promosi. " [FN87] Kedua konvensi signifikansi khusus untuk perlindungan
warisan budaya tak berwujud masyarakat adat '[FN88] dan identitas.
Instrumen yang lebih spesifik tentang masyarakat adat juga mengacu pada warisan budaya mereka. Misalnya,
Konvensi ILO 169 mengharuskan pemerintah untuk mengakui dan menghormati hubungan spiritual, budaya, dan
ekonomi masyarakat adat khusus yang telah dengan tanah dan wilayah mereka. [FN89] Para UNDRIP menyatakan
bahwa masyarakat adat memiliki "hak untuk mempertahankan, melindungi, dan memiliki akses dalam privasi untuk
situs mereka agama dan budaya" [FN90] dan hak "untuk menunjuk dan mempertahankan nama mereka sendiri
untuk masyarakat, tempat dan orang "[FN91]. Selanjutnya, ia mengakui martabat dan keragaman budaya
masyarakat adat dan hak mereka untuk mempertahankan hubungan khas mereka spiritual dan material dengan
tanah yang mereka miliki secara tradisional dimiliki, diduduki, atau digunakan. [FN92]
* 816 Bahkan Bank Dunia telah mengakui bagaimana kurangnya perlindungan yang memadai dari tanah adat dapat
mempengaruhi integritas masyarakat seperti 'fisik dan budaya, [FN93] dan mengakui bahwa "masyarakat adat
memerlukan perhatian khusus, karena mereka sangat rentan terhadap efek negatif yang disebabkan Bank-kegiatan
yang didanai. " [FN94] Dalam pengertian ini, telah mengadopsi sejumlah pernyataan kebijakan dalam upaya untuk
memberikan perlindungan bagi masyarakat adat. Misalnya, baik Petunjuk Operasional 4.20 mengenai Masyarakat
Adat dan itssuccessor, Kebijakan Operasional 4.10 mengenai Masyarakat Adat, menyadari kebutuhan "untuk
memastikan bahwa proses pembangunan menumbuhkan penghormatan penuh terhadap martabat [masyarakat
adat], hak asasi manusia dan keunikan budaya."[FN95] Meskipun adopsi dari instrumen ini, "tinjauan internal serta
keluhan yang sering oleh masyarakat adat berulang kali menunjukkan bahwa kepatuhan tingkat kegagalan jauh
melampaui diterima." [FN96]
Singkatnya, pengembangan gabungan dari hukum hak asasi manusia, hukum lingkungan, dan hukum budaya
internasional telah memberikan kontribusi bagi konsolidasi erga omnes kewajiban, kewajiban yaitu yang terutang
oleh negara kepada masyarakat internasional secara keseluruhan daripada negara lain tertentu sesuai dengan
paradigma timbal balik tradisional hukum internasional. Tidak hanya negara-negara berutang masyarakat
internasional berkewajiban untuk bekerja sama dalam pelestarian 817 * lingkungan, tetapi juga kewajiban untuk
menjauhkan diri dari kehancuran di wilayah mereka warisan budaya penting bagi manusia [FN97] atau mencegah
agama atau budaya minoritas dari memberlakukan, melakukan, dan mengembangkan warisan hidup mereka. [FN98]
Sebagai perlindungan warisan budaya sekarang disebut oleh tambal sulam instrumen hukum internasional, beberapa
penulis berpendapat bahwa norma yang muncul dari hukum adat mewajibkan negara untuk melindungi warisan
budaya. [FN99] Argumen ini juga didasarkan pada keyakinan bahwa perlindungan warisan budaya tegas terkait
dengan perlindungan hak asasi manusia. [FN100] Meskipun tidak semua instrumen hukum yang ada secara formal
mengikat negara, mereka dapat berkontribusi untuk pembentukan opinio juris. [FN101] Namun, praktek negara jauh
dari seragam. Pertanyaan mengenai apakah * norma adat 818 membutuhkan perlindungan warisan budaya sudah
ada jauh dari selesai, tapi tampaknya seperti sebuah norma secara bertahap muncul.
Lebih khusus, berkaitan dengan warisan budaya tradisional, evolusi pendapat hukum dan praktek negara telah
menyebabkan banyak untuk menyimpulkan bahwa hukum kebiasaan internasional sudah termasuk norma mengakui,
antara lain, bahwa masyarakat adat berhak untuk mempertahankan dan mengembangkan identitas budaya mereka
yang berbeda,spiritualitas, bahasa mereka, dan cara hidup tradisional.[FN102] Sebagai Anaya katakan, "signifikan
perkembangan hukum internasional memberikan bukti bahwa hukum kebiasaan internasional telah menerima:. Hak
budaya penentuan nasib sendiri bagi masyarakat adat dan kontrol otonom konsekuen yang diperlukan untuk
mencapai itu" [FN103]

D. Hak Budaya sebagai Bagian Fundamental Hak Masyarakat Adat

Hak budaya masyarakat adat sangat terkait dengan hak-hak mereka yang lain manusia, khususnya hak penentuan
nasib sendiri. [FN104] Penentuan nasib sendiri dapat didefinisikan sebagai hak masyarakat untuk "secara bebas
menentukan status politik mereka dan bebas mengejar pembangunan ekonomi, sosial dan budaya." [FN105] Setelah
gelombang dekolonisasi, penentuan nasib sendiri telah didefinisikan sebagai erga omnes kewajiban. [FN106]
Berkenaan dengan masyarakat adat, * 819 Deklarasi PBB baru-baru diundangkan pada Hak-Hak Masyarakat Adat
menegaskan hak penentuan nasib sendiri sebagai komitmen normatif yang melingkupi nya.Ini menyatakan bahwa
"masyarakat adat memiliki hak penentuan nasib sendiri" dan menyatakan bahwa "berdasarkan hak tersebut mereka
bebas menentukan status politik mereka dan bebas mengejar pembangunan ekonomi, sosial dan budaya." [FN107]
Meskipun tidak mengikat, UNDRIP ini dilihat sebagai perkembangan penting dalam memperkuat hak-hak masyarakat
adat dalam hukum internasional. Sebagai Scheinin menunjukkan, masyarakat adat "adalah masyarakat di kalangan
masyarakat dan karenanya berhak untuk hak penentuan nasib sendiri." [FN108]
Sementara Pasal 3 dari Deklarasi PBB tentang Hak Masyarakat Adat mengakui hak masyarakat adat penuh dan
memenuhi syarat untuk menentukan nasib sendiri, [FN109] Pasal 46 (1) mengulangi peringatan biasa integritas
teritorial. [FN110] Ini kontradiksi melambangkan dilema klasik yang ditimbulkan oleh penentuan nasib sendiri: "Setiap
pemeriksaan penentuan nasib sendiri segera berjalan ke dalam kesulitan yang sementara konsep cocok untuk
formulasi sederhana dalam kata-kata ... ketika saatnya tiba untuk memasukkannya ke dalam operasi itu ternyata
menjadi masalah yang kompleks dipagari oleh keterbatasan dan peringatan. " [FN111] Dalam * 820 kata lain,
UNDRIP Pasal 3, jika dibaca bersama dengan Pasal 46 (1), telah ditafsirkan untuk meminta masyarakat adat untuk
menggunakan hak mereka untuk menentukan nasib sendiri melalui sistem negara hukum. [FN112] Menurut Scheinin,
"[t] ia hak semua bangsa untuk menentukan nasib sendiri sebagai norma hukum internasional tidak berarti bahwa
setiap kelompok yang merupakan orang-orang akan memiliki hak untuk mendirikan negara sendiri dan memisahkan
diri secara sepihak dari yang ada, mungkin multi-etnis, negara. " [FN113] Hak penentuan nasib sendiri tidak
mengizinkan pemisahan dan pembentukan negara baru kecuali negara yang ada gagal untuk menghormati hak
masyarakat adat [FN114] "dalam kondisi tertentu seperti pendudukan militer, dominasi kolonial [atau] bentuk
lain penindasan yang mengakibatkan pada pengingkaran partisipasi efektif dan hak asasi manusia lainnya. " [FN115]
Cassese juga menyimpulkan bahwa pemisahan diri sebagai bentuk penentuan nasib sendiri mungkin berusaha
"ketika jelas bahwa internal yang menentukan nasib sendiri benar-benar di luar jangkauan." [FN116] Dalam kasus
Suksesi Quebec, Mahkamah Agung Kanada menemukan bahwa "ketika orang diblokir dari pelaksanaan bermakna
hak untuk menentukan nasib sendiri secara internal, berhak, sebagai upaya terakhir, untuk latihan dengan
pemisahan diri." [FN117] Dalam pengertian ini, Vrdoljak menekankan bahwa "[i] n kasus tersebut, pelaksanaan
penentuan nasib sendiri sebagai pemisahan menjadi mekanisme utama untuk melindungi identitas kelompok dan
hak-hak budaya anggotanya." [FN118]
* 821 hak budaya dan penentuan nasib sendiri yang tidak saling eksklusif melainkan saling memperkuat. [FN119]
Sementara hak-hak budaya dan theright untuk menentukan nasib sendiri secara konseptual berbeda, [FN120] hak
budaya mempromosikan penentuan nasib sendiri dengan memungkinkan masyarakat adat untuk "secara bebas
mengejar pembangunan ekonomi, sosial dan budaya." [FN121] Selain itu, dua konsep normatif mungkin tumpang
tindih jika kondisi yang memadai untuk eksistensi dan identitas kelompok secara keseluruhan tidak terjamin. Ketika
menangani hak masyarakat adat untuk menentukan nasib sendiri, Komite Hak Asasi Manusia telah menekankan
pentingnya dimensi budaya kanan.[FN122] Pada gilirannya, hak untuk menentukan nasib sendiri telah relevan dalam
penafsiran ketentuan mengenai hak-hak budaya. [FN123] Dengan demikian, pada tahun 2006, Komite Hak Asasi
Manusia meminta Amerika Serikat untuk mengambil langkah lebih lanjut untuk mengamankan hak semua
masyarakat adat berdasarkan Pasal 1 ICCPR yang lebih besar untuk latihan pengambilan keputusan tentang hal
yang mempengaruhi budaya. [FN124]
Hukum investasi asing adalah salah satu daerah tertua dan paling kompleks dari hukum internasional. Selama empat
puluh tahun terakhir, investasi asing langsung (FDI) telah berkembang melampaui arus modal dihasilkan dari
perdagangan. [FN125] Oleh karena itu, kerangka hukum yang diperlukan untuk mengatur FDI telah memperoleh
keunggulan dalam hukum internasional. Lebih dari tiga ribu perjanjian investasi mengatur investasi asing dan
memberikan investor asing dengan akses langsung ke arbitrase internasional [FN126] perjanjian Investasi
memberikan perlindungan yang luas untuk hak investor. [FN127] dalam rangka untuk mendorong pembangunan FDI
dan mendorong ekonomi.
A. Substantif Standar Perlindungan
Sementara perjanjian investasi berbeda dalam rinciannya, ruang lingkup dan isi telah dibakukan selama bertahun-
tahun, sebagai negosiasi telah ditandai oleh berbagi berkelanjutan dan meminjam konsep-konsep. [FN128] Beberapa
komentator telah mencatat pengembangan leksikon umum hukum perjanjian investasi [FN129]. Dimasukkannya
sebuah bangsa yang paling disukai (MFN) klausul dalam perjanjian investasi bilateral yang paling (BITS) drive
konvergensi dalam penyusunan perjanjian.Pada tingkat substantif, [FN130] perjanjian investasi biasanya
menentukan ruang lingkup FDI dan * 823 memberikan perlindungan terhadap diskriminasi, perlakuan yang adil dan
merata, perlindungan penuh dan keamanan, perlakuan tidak kurang menguntungkan dari yang dibutuhkan oleh
hukum kebiasaan internasional, dan jaminan bahwa host negara akan menghormati komitmen mengenai investasi
(yang disebut "payung klausul"). [FN131] ketentuan umum lainnya dalam perjanjian investasi perhatian repatriasi
keuntungan dan melarang kontrol mata uang lebih buruk daripada yang semula di tempat ketika perjanjian itu
ditandatangani. [FN132] perjanjian Investasi umumnya jaminan ganti rugi dalam hal nasionalisasi, pengambilalihan,
atau pengambilalihan tidak langsung, dan menjelaskan apa tingkat kompensasi akan berutang dalam kasus
tersebut. [FN133] Sejumlah kecil dari perjanjian investasi juga mencakup ketentuan-ketentuan yang melarang
bentuk-bentuk tertentu dari persyaratan kinerja. [FN134]
* 824 ketentuan Perjanjian kurangnya definisi yang tepat dari standar dan bahasa mereka meliputi berbagai macam
berpotensi peraturan negara yang dapat mengganggu hak milik investor. Oleh karena itu, potensi ketegangan terjadi
ketika Negara mengadopsi langkah-langkah pengaturan mengganggu investasi asing, sebagai peraturan dapat
dianggap melanggar standar substantif pengobatan berdasarkan perjanjian investasi dan investor asing dapat
menuntut kompensasi sebelum pengadilan arbitrase. Misalnya, tidak ada pendekatan diselesaikan dalam kasus di
mana investor menyatakan bahwa langkah-langkah pengaturan tertentu merupakan bentuk compensable
pengambilalihan. [FN135] Konsep pengambilalihan secara luas ditafsirkan dalam perjanjian investasi yang tidak
hanya melindungi aset asing dari mengambil langsung dan penuh properti tetapi juga dari de facto atau
pengambilalihan tidak langsung. [FN136]

* 825 B. Investor-Negara Arbitrase

Pada tingkat prosedural, BITS menyediakan investor akses langsung ke pengadilan arbitrase internasional. Dengan
demikian, BITS membuat satu set hak prosedural untuk manfaat langsung dari investor, meskipun investor individu
tidak pihak dalam perjanjian. [FN137] Ini adalah hal baru utama dalam hukum internasional, hukum sebagai lazim
internasional tidak menyediakan mekanisme tersebut. Investor-negara arbitrase telah menjadi fitur standar dalam
perjanjian investasi internasional sejak 1980-an. [FN138] Alasan untuk internasionalisasi sengketa investor-negara
terletak pada independensi dan ketidakberpihakan dari diasumsikan pengadilan arbitrase internasional, sementara
prosedur penyelesaian sengketa nasional sering dianggap sebagai bias atau tidak memadai. [FN139] Arbitrase juga
digunakan karena keuntungan yang dirasakan dalam kerahasiaan dan efektifitas.[FN140]
* 826 Proses arbitrase dalam arbitrase investasi menyajikan beberapa karakteristik yang mirip dengan mereka dalam
arbitrase komersial khas internasional [FN141]. Komposisi pengadilan ditentukan oleh pihak-pihak yang umumnya
memilih sarjana hukum atau profesional. Meskipun hak untuk memilih seorang arbiter dapat dianggap sebagai inti
dari arbitrase, [FN142] praktek ini mungkin bermasalah dari perspektif kebijakan publik. [FN143] Sebagai salah satu
ilmuwan menjelaskan, sedangkan arbiter
diharapkan untuk menjadi independen dari partai menunjuk mereka dan tidak memihak ... biasanya diakui bahwa
tanpa melanggar dengan cara apapun kewajiban ini teoritis kemerdekaan, arbiter dapat cukup bisa diterima berbagi
kebangsaan, atau filsafat politik atau ekonomi, atau "budaya hukum" dari pihak yang telah menominasikan dirinya -
dan karenanya mungkin seharusnya dari awal untuk menjadi "simpatik" untuk perselisihan pihak atau "baik dibuang"
ke posisi. [FN144]
Kerahasiaan merupakan salah satu fitur utama dari proses arbitrase secara umum dengar pendapat yang
diselenggarakan di kamera dan dokumen yang diserahkan oleh para pihak tetap rahasia pada prinsipnya. [FN145]
penghargaan akhir mungkin tidak diterbitkan, tergantung pada pihak 'akan. [FN146] Bahkan nama-nama para pihak
dan jauh lebih sedikit rincian sengketa mungkin * 827 tidak diungkapkan. [FN147] Meskipun kerahasiaan dengan
baik sesuai dengan perselisihan komersial, mungkin menjadi masalah di investor-negara arbitrase, karena arbitrase
dapat memerintahkan pengadilan negara untuk mengkompensasi investor untuk peraturan yang menyakiti
mereka. Kurangnya transparansi dapat menghambat upaya untuk melacak sengketa perjanjian investasi, memonitor
frekuensi mereka, menentukan apakah mereka menetap, dan untuk menilai implikasi kebijakan yang mengalir
darinya [FN148] penting., Sebagai hakim pernah mengatakan, menulis dalam konteks apakah penampilan belaka
pembalikan ketidakpantasan dibenarkan, "itu bukan hanya penting beberapa tapi adalah sangat penting bahwa
keadilan tidak hanya harus dilakukan, tetapi harus nyata dan pasti terlihat harus dilakukan."[FN149]
Dalam beberapa tahun terakhir, upaya untuk membuat investasi yang lebih transparan arbitrase telah dilakukan di
berbagai forum. Dalam menanggapi panggilan dari kelompok-kelompok masyarakat sipil, tiga pihak untuk Perjanjian
Perdagangan Bebas Amerika Utara (NAFTA), Kanada, Amerika Serikat, dan Meksiko, telah berjanji untuk
mengungkapkan semua NAFTA arbitrase dan membuka sidang arbitrase masa depan untuk publik. [FN150]
Demikian pula, Pusat Internasional untuk Penyelesaian Perselisihan Investasi (ICSID) mensyaratkan pengungkapan
publik persidangan sengketa yang bernaung di dalamnya. [FN151] Semakin, investasi pengadilan arbitrase telah *
828 kelompok kepentingan umum diperbolehkan untuk menyajikan celana amicus curiae atau memiliki akses ke
proses arbitrase [FN152]. Aturan ICSID telah mengalami perubahan, dan sekarang juga memberikan keleluasaan
ICSID Pengadilan untuk mengijinkan pihak ketiga tertarik untuk memberikan masukan tertulis dalam proses
arbitrase. [FN153] Perkembangan ini penting, namun, melibatkan pelaksanaan proses dari sejumlah perselisihan
investasi. Memang, sebagian besar perjanjian yang ada tidak mandat transparansi tersebut, yang berarti bahwa
sebagian besar proses diselesaikan di balik pintu tertutup.
Akhirnya, penghargaan diberikan terhadap negara host, dalam teori, mudah dilaksanakan terhadap milik negara tuan
seluruh dunia, karena adopsi 829 * luas dari New York [FN154] dan Washington Konvensi. [FN155] Berdasarkan
Konvensi New York, pengakuan dan penegakan penghargaan dapat ditolak hanya berdasarkan alasan-alasan yang
terbatas. [FN156] Arbitrase ICSID di bawah aturan sepenuhnya dibebaskan dari pengawasan pengadilan lokal,
dengan penghargaan tunduk hanya pada proses pembatalan internal. [FN157] Jika arbitrase yang berlokasi di
negara lain selain negara tuan rumah, maka mungkin tidak ada kapasitas apapun untuk pemerintah tuan rumah
untuk menantang penghargaan dalam sistem hukum sendiri. [FN158]

* 830 C. Muncul Isu

Mengingat karakteristik dari proses arbitrase, isu signifikan muncul dalam konteks sengketa yang melibatkan warisan
budaya tradisional. Masalah pertama adalah apakah warisan budaya adat dan hak-hak masyarakat adat 'dapat
dilindungi dalam kerangka kerja yang ditujukan terutama untuk melindungi kepentingan pribadi. Sementara arbitrase
merupakan model struktural pribadi ajudikasi, investasi perjanjian arbitrase dapat dilihat sebagai putusan hukum
publik. [FN159] penghargaan arbitrase pada akhirnya membentuk hubungan antara negara, di satu pihak, dan
individu di sisi lain. [FN160] Arbiter menentukan hal-hal seperti legalitas kegiatan pemerintah, sejauh mana individu
harus dilindungi dari peraturan, dan peran yang sesuai negara. [FN161] Sebagai warisan budaya adalah kepentingan
bersama umat manusia, tidak hanya melibatkan kepentingan para pihak tetapi juga masyarakat internasional secara
keseluruhan. Dalam kasus yang melibatkan warisan budaya tradisional, seseorang mungkin bertanya-tanya apakah
arbitrase investasi menyediakan forum yang memadai.
Isu kedua menyangkut keahlian arbiter dan rasa kemerdekaan.Berkaitan dengan keahlian, komunitas arbitrase terdiri
dari beberapa ulama yang paling terkenal. [FN162] Namun, karena investor-negara arbitrase sering melibatkan
administrasi dan bahkan hukum konstitusi, keahlian hukum publik kadang-kadang diperlukan. * 831 Apakah keahlian
khusus dalam hak-hak masyarakat adat kriteria yang diinginkan untuk memilih arbiter dalam sengketa yang
melibatkan masyarakat adat? Dalam kasus Sungai Agung, sengketa tentang pajak produk tembakau dan apakah
produksi tradisional produk tembakau oleh suku asli Kanada dapat dianggap sebagai praktek budaya, [FN163]
Amerika Serikat tidak berhasil menantang layanan arbiter, Profesor James Anaya, karena sebelumnya advokasi hak
manusia. [FN164] Selain menjadi Profesor Hukum dan Kebijakan Hak Asasi Manusia di University of Arizona, Anaya
adalah salah satu pakar dalam hak asasi manusia internasional dan hukum masyarakat adat, dan saat ini menjabat
sebagai Pelapor Khusus PBB tentang situasi hak asasi manusia dan kebebasan dasar masyarakat adat [FN165]
Sejak Profesor Anaya. diwakili atau dibantu pihak adat dalam hal hak asasi manusia, Departemen Luar Negeri AS
menuduh bahwa advokasi ini akan menimbulkan keraguan untuk kemerdekaan nya atau imparsialitas dalam kasus
ini [FN166]. Profesor Anayakemudian informasi ICSID bahwa ia memandang pekerjaan sebelumnya pada hak-hak
masyarakat adat tidak ada kaitannya dengan subyek klaim NAFTA dan bahwa ia akan terus untuk mengajar
mahasiswa di University of Arizona. Akhirnya, Ana Palacio, yang mantan Sekretaris Jenderal ICSID, dibedakan karya
sebelumnya HAM yang saat ini dan peran sebagai profesor hukum: "mantan memerlukan advokasi dari suatu posisi,
yang terakhir melibatkan instruksi dan bimbingan."[FN167] Dengan demikian, Profesor Anaya diizinkan untuk
melayani sebagai arbiter dalam kasus ini.
Ketiga, kemungkinan hanya perselisihan dengan investor yang kuat dapat memberikan efek dingin pada keputusan
pemerintah untuk * 832 mengatur kepentingan publik. Hal ini terutama berlaku berkaitan dengan negara-negara
berkembang, yang mungkin menarik bagi perlombaan ke bawah dengan menurunkan standar lingkungan dan
budaya mereka perlindungan dalam rangka menarik investasi asing. Misalnya, pada tahun 2002, sekelompok
perusahaan pertambangan terutama milik asing mengancam untuk memulai arbitrase internasional melawan
pemerintah Indonesia dalam menanggapi larangan pertambangan terbuka di hutan lindung. [FN168] Enam bulan
kemudian, Departemen Kehutanan menyetujui perubahan peruntukan hutan dari hutan lindung untuk
produksi. [FN169]
Keempat, investor-negara arbitrase membedakan antara dua tipe aktor non-negara: [FN170] (1) investor bergerak
dalam bidang investasi asing langsung, dan (2) masyarakat adat yang dipengaruhi oleh FDI. [FN171] Sementara
investor asing memiliki akses langsung kepada investor-negara arbitrase di bawah BIT relevan, masyarakat adat
yang terkena dampak tidak memiliki akses langsung kepada investor-negara arbitrase dan partisipasi mereka hanya
mungkin melalui pengajuan celana amicus curiae. Penyampaian amicus curiae bukan merupakan hak, tetapi hanya
pilihan yang akan dipertimbangkan oleh majelis arbitrase berdasarkan kasus per kasus. Memang benar bahwa
masyarakat adat memiliki akses ke pengadilan lokal, tapi karena penyelesaian sengketa investasi didelegasikan
kepada mekanisme penyelesaian sengketa internasional, "ini memotong delegasi kewenangan pengadilan nasional
untuk menangani [seperti] perselisihan." [FN172] Selain itu, sebagai Profesor Francioni menyoroti, "keputusan
pengadilan di negara tuan menegakkan keluhan yang diajukan oleh pihak swasta terhadap investor asing dapat
diserang oleh investor sebelum pengadilan arbitrase atas dasar bahwa mereka merupakan gangguan salah dengan
investasi." [FN173]
* 833 Sementara perusahaan multinasional telah diakui sebagai "warga korporat internasional" [FN174] dan telah
diberikan hak prosedural, [FN175] hak prosedural dari investasi masyarakat yang terkena dampak, termasuk
masyarakat adat, tetap hampir tidak berubah. [FN176] Sebagai Profesor Gal-Atau menunjukkan, "BITS telah
mengakui kepentingan dan keprihatinan investor, sementara hanya membayar marjinal (meskipun meningkat)
memperhatikan orang-orang dari aktor non-negara yang telah dipengaruhi oleh FDI." [FN177] Menurut Profesor Gal-
[F] rom suatu sudut pandang hukum, status investor - yang ...adalah aktor negara non - sedang dibedakan dari, dan
istimewa dibandingkan dengan, aktor-aktor lain dalam kategori aktor non-negara .... Investor ini memiliki manfaat
khusus [penyelesaian sengketa] mekanisme, yang secara efektif melindungi investor dari negara nasional atau
litigasi pengadilan internasional ....Dari perspektif aktor negara yang terkena dampak non ', BIT, dan terutama
negara-investor sengketa BIT itu mekanisme resolusi, menyediakan hampir blanche carte untuk pelanggaran hak
asasi manusia investor. [FN178]
Mengingat "dampak meningkatnya investasi asing di lingkungan sosial negara tuan" Profesor Francioni juga telah
meminta apakah "prinsip akses keadilan, sebagai berhasil dikembangkan untuk kepentingan investor melalui
penyediaan * 834 arbitrase yang mengikat dalam bit, harus diimbangi dengan hak yang sesuai untuk proses
perbaikan untuk individu dan kelompok terpengaruh oleh investasi di negara tuan rumah. "[FN179] Akses terhadap
keadilan sistem "sering paling sulit mana yang paling membutuhkan." [FN180]
Seperti dibahas di atas, sementara masyarakat adat telah semakin diakui sebagai aktor di bawah hukum
internasional, [FN181] mereka hanya memainkan peran marjinal dalam konteks investor-negara arbitrase dan telah
memanfaatkan hanya prosedur partisipatif terbatas. Kedua investor asing dan masyarakat adat telah jelas hak
berdasarkan hukum internasional. [FN182] Paradoksnya adalah bahwa perusahaan asing dan masyarakat adat
terletak di ujung berlawanan dari spektrum yang sama: perusahaan ini ditandai dengan keterasingan tersebut;
masyarakat adat yang ditandai dengan indigeneity mereka, [FN183] turun dari orang-orang yang mendiami daerah
sebelum kolonisasi. Beberapa penulis berpendapat bahwa masyarakat adat, juga disebut "terjebak masyarakat"
[FN184] atau "bangsa dalam," [FN185] tidak hanya * 835 objek hukum internasional, tetapi subjek yang sama
[FN186]. Praktik Negara mengakui kedaulatan masyarakat adat " hari ini telah mencapai dimensi di seluruh dunia
dan agak terus-menerus menegaskan kembali. " [FN187] Jika kita mengakui bahwa masyarakat adat masyarakat
dan dengan demikian "warga global," seperti yang perusahaan multinasional, [FN188] batas-batas prosedur yang
tersedia menjadi jelas. [FN189] Sementara alasan untuk membedakan solusi prosedural masih ada, karena bit
dimaksudkan untuk mendorong investasi, ketika investasi; arbitrase menangani isu-isu kebijakan dasar, alasan untuk
transparansi prosedural, keterbukaan, dan judicialization hati-hati dari proses arbitrase menjadi menarik.


Secara tradisional, investasi internasional dan hukum budaya internasional telah dianggap dua cabang yang terpisah
dari hukum internasional publik. Beberapa penulis telah hati-hati diteliti sengketa tertentu yang melibatkan unsur-
unsur budaya tetapi telah mengabaikan elemen-elemen ini untuk fokus pada topik investasi yang lebih konvensional
hukum, seperti definisi investasi, antara lain. [FN190] Ketika jumlah sengketa investasi dengan unsur-unsur budaya
terus meningkat, adalah penting untuk mencerminkan pada metode untuk mengidentifikasi dan karakterisasi
perselisihan tersebut. Karena tidak ada dua pihak akan setuju bahwa perselisihan pada dasarnya adalah "budaya,"
[FN191] tampaknya lebih tepat untuk membahas sengketa yang memiliki komponen budaya, bukan untuk * 836
mengkarakterisasi sengketa sebagai "budaya." Memang, definisi hanya perselisihan sebagai "sengketa budaya"
mungkin memiliki implikasi bagi hasil dari kasus. Pendekatan netral ini didasarkan pada pertimbangan bahwa klaim
melibatkan warisan budaya jarang, jika pernah, diangkat dalam isolasi argumen hukum lainnya.
Investasi perselisihan dengan unsur-unsur budaya biasanya ditandai dengan kebutuhan untuk menyeimbangkan
kepentingan yang sah dari negara untuk melindungi warisan budaya dan kepentingan sah investor asing untuk
melindungi hak-hak properti mereka. Namun, tidak ada hal seperti sengketa khas melibatkan warisan
budaya. Investor dapat mengklaim bahwa bentuk-bentuk tertentu dari regulasi merupakan suatu pengambilalihan
tidak langsung atau mengambil peraturan dan kompensasi yang harus dibayar. Jika pengambilalihan langsung telah
terjadi, sengketa dapat berpusat pada jumlah kompensasi yang harus dibayarkan. Dalam kasus lain, investor dapat
mengklaim bahwa klausa stabilisasi [FN192] belum dihormati karena perubahan regulasi atau peraturan bahwa
jumlah tertentu untuk persyaratan kinerja dilarang. Klaim lain mungkin kekhawatiran pelanggaran perlakuan yang adil
dan merata atau diskriminasi. Klaim sering dihubungkan bersama dan argumen masing-masing mungkin tumpang
Peningkatan investasi di industri ekstraktif dapat merusak warisan budaya dan alam. [FN193] Yang paling
memprihatinkan adalah kenyataan bahwa sumber daya alam ekstraksi semakin mengambil tempat, atau sangat
dekat dengan, wilayah adat tradisional. [FN194] Menurut salah satu penulis, "orang-orang di daerah di mana sumber
daya terletak cenderung untuk memikul tidak proporsional dari dampak negatif dari pembangunan melalui akses
pada sumber daya dan paparan langsung polusi dan degradasi lingkungan." [FN195] Sementara analis
pembangunan * 837 titik untuk proyek-proyek ekstraktif sebagai anti-kemiskinan langkah-langkah dan organisasi
ekonomi internasional juga menganjurkan untuk investasi langsung asing sebagai katalis utama untuk
pengembangan, [FN196] beberapa negara telah mengadopsi pendekatan laissez-faire dan perusahaan diaktifkan
untuk memperoleh hak atas tanah tanpa persetujuan dari masyarakat adat. [FN197] Hal ini telah menyebabkan
perlindungan memadai dari warisan adat dan hak-hak masyarakat adat. [FN198]

Sampai saat ini sengketa investasi melibatkan beberapa warisan budaya tradisional. Meskipun tidak mungkin untuk
memeriksa semua penghargaan ini dalam konteks kontribusi ini, pilihan studi kasus akan analitis dinilai. Meskipun ini
kasus hukum tidak homogen, dapat diteliti sesuai dengan taksonomi klaim dibawa oleh investor asing, termasuk,
antara lain: (1) pengambilalihan, (2) kurangnya perlakuan yang adil dan merata, (3) diskriminasi, dan (4) kurangnya
perlindungan penuh dan keamanan. Argumen budaya dibahas dalam setiap kasus akan dianalisis dan dinilai secara
kritis dalam terang kerangka hukum yang melindungi warisan budaya masyarakat adat pada tingkat hukum
internasional. Alasan dari pengadilan arbitrase karena itu akan dievaluasi dalam konteks hukum hak asasi manusia
dan hukum saat ini.

Pengambilalihan A. Klaim
Bentrokan antara budaya adat dan budaya ekonomi nasional dan internasional telah diadili di berbagai tingkatan: (1)
pengadilan administrasi dan konstitusi pada tingkat nasional, [FN199] (2) badan hak asasi manusia di [FN200] tingkat
regional dan internasional * 838 , [FN201] dan (3) pengadilan arbitrase. Sedangkan analisis ilmiah dan penilaian kritis
dari dua mantan yang luas, [FN202] sedikit yang diketahui tentang kasus hukum yang muncul dari pengadilan
arbitrase berurusan dengan unsur-unsur warisan budaya asli. Mengingat dampak yang penghargaan arbitrase dapat
memiliki pada kehidupan masyarakat adat dan budaya, pengawasan dan penilaian kritis terhadap yurisprudensi ini
adalah relevansi penting. Beberapa perjanjian arbitrase investasi telah berurusan dengan pertanyaan apakah
regulasi diduga ditujukan untuk melindungi warisan budaya tradisional dapat dianggap menjadi pengambilalihan tidak
langsung atau ukuran sama dengan pengambilalihan.
Dalam Kasus Emas Glamis, sebuah perusahaan pertambangan Kanada direncanakan untuk menambang emas di
Proyek Imperial, di darat federal di * 839 tenggara California. [FN203] Menurut penggugat, namun, tidak hanya AS
Negeri Departemen gagal untuk segera menyetujui proyek itu, sehingga masuk akal menunda operasi
pertambangan, tapi regulasi California membutuhkan penimbunan open-tambang emas juga membuat operasi
pertambangan tidak ekonomis. [FN204] Oleh karena itu, investor mengklaim inter alia, bahwa Amerika Serikat telah
mengambil alih hak pertambangan yang melanggar Pasal 1110 Perjanjian Perdagangan Bebas Amerika Utara
[FN205] Dalam penghargaan, majelis arbitrase menyatakan bahwa langkah-langkah yang mengeluh
tidak. menimbulkan dampak ekonomi yang cukup untuk investasi Glamis 'dan dengan demikian tidak jumlah untuk
pengambilalihan regulasi. [FN206]
Jika kita menganggap fakta-fakta kasus, daerah di sekitar Proyek Imperial "sangat dimanfaatkan oleh pra-kontak asli
Amerika sebagai rute perjalanan." [FN207] Selain itu, Quechan, suku asli Amerika, menentang proyek karena itu
akan menghancurkan Trail of Dreams, jalan suci masih digunakan ketika melakukan praktek seremonial. Perwakilan
dari suku menekankan bahwa suku telah mengizinkan operasi pertambangan lain untuk "pergi dengan," "sebagian
karena [mereka] tahu [mereka] memiliki luas dalam cadangan ... dimiliki oleh publik." Dengan demikian, wilayah
Proyek Imperial menjadi "pertahanan terakhir." Suku itu [FN208] Karena penelitian dampak lingkungan 2000
menunjukkan bahwa pilihan terbaik adalah bahwa "tidak ada tindakan," menarik Departemen Dalam Negeri Proyek
Imperial dari entry mineral lebih selama 20 tahun untuk melindungi properti bersejarah. [FN209] Pada tahun 2002,
bagaimanapun, izin untuk proyek ini diberikan dan Pertambangan Negara dan Badan Geologi mengundangkan
peraturan darurat yang memerlukan penimbunan semua terbuka tambang untuk menciptakan kembali perkiraan
kontur tanah sebelum penambangan. [FN210]
Dalam menanggapi tindakan federal dan negara, penggugat mengajukan Pemberitahuan atas Arbitrase, menyatakan
bahwa negara bagian dan federal merupakan suatu tindakan pengambilalihan tidak langsung melanggar Pasal 1110
NAFTA.Penuntut menegaskan bahwa responden kehilangan * nya kepentingan properti 840 dari nilai
mereka. [FN211] Menurut penggugat, pengambilalihan dimulai dengan penolakan melanggar hukum pemerintah
federal untuk menyetujui rencana penggugat dari operasi dan dilanjutkan dengan persyaratan penimbunan. [FN212]
Secara khusus, penimbunan akan ekonomis dan sewenang-wenang karena tidak akan rasional terkait dengan tujuan
yang dinyatakan melindungi sumber daya budaya. [FN213] Penggugat menunjukkan bahwa "setelah Anda
mengambil materi keluar [dari] tanah dan jika ada sumber daya budaya di permukaan, mereka menghancurkan
kotoran Menempatkan kembali di pit sebenarnya tidak melindungi sumber daya tersebut." Tetapi
mungkin menyebabkan penguburan artefak lebih dan menyebabkan kerusakan lingkungan yang lebih besar. [FN214]
Dengan demikian, penggugat berpendapat bahwa langkah-langkah California bertujuan untuk "menghentikan Proyek
Imperial dari yang pernah melanjutkan sambil berusaha untuk menghindari pembayaran kompensasi itu tahu akan
diperlukan memilikinya transparan dan diproses langsung melalui eminent domain." [FN215]
Dalam pernyataannya, Amerika Serikat berpendapat bahwa pertambangan adalah industri yang sangat diatur dan
bahwa setiap investor harus memiliki cukup wajar mengantisipasi perluasan peraturan-peraturan tersebut. [FN216]
Responden menyebutkan bahwa, sementara negara-negara lain telah benar-benar melarang penggunaan semua
pertambangan terbuka, [FN217] undang-undang California tidak menghalangi penggalian dan eksploitasi mineral dari
zona: itu diperlukan pengurukan untuk mengembalikan lanskap ke jalan itu sebelum operasi
pertambangan. Responden juga menekankan bahwa dalam kasus ini legislatif itu mencoba [FN218] "untuk
mendamaikan kepentingan-kepentingan yang bersaing dengan mengatasi ancaman ke situs asli Amerika di
[Kawasan Konservasi Gurun California] sementara mengakui hak-hak pertambangan perusahaan untuk menambang
di sana." Di satutangan, California langkah efektif membatasi tumpukan sampah yang akan menghalangi
pemandangan dari Running Man untuk Pass India. [FN219] Di sisi lain, perusahaan masih bisa sepenuhnya
menggunakan properti. Menurut Amerika Serikat, itu tidak akan tidak proporsional bagi suatu Negara untuk
mewajibkan pertambangan * 841 operator untuk menginternalisasi biaya kerusakan lingkungan yang disebabkan
oleh kegiatan mereka sendiri. [FN220]
Majelis arbitrase ditemukan argumen pengambilalihan penggugat untuk menjadi tidak berdasar. [FN221] Dalam
rangka untuk membedakan regulasi non-compensable dan pengambilalihan diganti rugi, pengadilan menetapkan uji
dua-tier, di mana ia dipastikan: (1) sejauh mana langkah-langkah mengganggu ekspektasi yang wajar dan investasi
yang didukung dari kerangka kerja peraturan yang stabil, dan (2) tujuan dan karakter dari tindakan pemerintah yang
diambil.[FN222] Pertama, pengadilan menemukan bahwa tindakan California penimbunan "tidak menyebabkan
dampak ekonomi yang cukup untuk Proyek Imperial untuk efek pengambilalihan investasi Pemohon itu." [FN223]
Kedua, pengadilan dianggap sebagai langkah-langkah untuk secara rasional berkaitan dengan tujuan yang
dinyatakan. [FN224] Pengadilan mengakui bahwa "beberapa artefak budaya memang akan terganggu, jika tidak
dikuburkan, dalam proses penggalian dan pengurukan," [FN225] tetapi menyimpulkan bahwa, tanpa tindakan-
tindakan legislatif tersebut, pemandangannya akan dirugikan oleh lubang signifikan dan tumpukan sampah di sekitar
dekat. [FN226] Hebatnya, sidang arbitrase juga tegas dimaksud dalam Pasal 12 dari Konvensi Warisan Dunia,
[FN227] yang membutuhkan Amerika untuk melindungi warisan budaya mereka bahkan jika tidak terdaftar dalam
daftar Warisan Dunia. [FN228] ini agak luar biasa sebagai ahli warisan budaya telah berulang kali menekankan
bahwa Pasal 12 dari WHC merupakan penyediaan layanan sering diabaikan. [FN229]
* 842 Dalam ay Sungai Agung Amerika Serikat, klaim pengambilalihan dibawa terhadap negara tuan rumah oleh
perusahaan asing dikendalikan oleh masyarakat adat. [FN230] Sebuah perusahaan Kanada yang bergerak dalam
tembakau ekspor di Amerika Serikat berpendapat bahwa investasinya telah dirugikan oleh Perjanjian Penyelesaian
Guru AS (MSA), [FN231] yang memerlukan kontribusi dana dari perusahaan tembakau untuk membayar biaya yang
dikeluarkan dalam pengobatan pasien miskin yang menderita penyakit terkait tembakau. [FN232] Dalam pertukaran
untuk pembayaran tersebut, AS menjatuhkan semua tuntutan hukum terhadap industri tembakau. [FN233] Secara
umum, para pemohon berargumen bahwa perusahaan-perusahaan tembakau besar berkonspirasi untuk memastikan
bahwa perusahaan-perusahaan lain ditutupi oleh ketentuan penyelesaian untuk memaksa perusahaan-perusahaan
kecil keluar dari bisnis.[FN234] Para penggugat berargumen bahwa regulasi tersebut sebesar, antara lain, untuk
pengambilalihan tidak langsung, melanggar NAFTA Pasal 1110. [FN235] Responden berpendapat, bagaimanapun,
bahwa tindakan pengaturan dalam pemeliharaan kesehatan publik tidak sebesar pengambilalihan, asalkan "tidak
jelas pelanggaran dan diskriminatif dari hukum negara yang bersangkutan, dan tidak masuk akal keberangkatan dari
prinsip-prinsip keadilan yang diakui oleh sistem hukum dunia. " [FN236]
* 843 Sidang arbitrase menolak klaim pengambilalihan.Sementara penggugat telah menegaskan bahwa langkah-
langkah yang disengketakan tidak konsisten dengan "harapan yang sah ... untuk tidak tunduk pada MSA-peraturan
terkait tindakan" karena statusnya sebagai anggota salah satu Perserikatan Bangsa Pertama di Amerika Utara,
[FN237]pengadilan menolak untuk "memutuskan apakah atau tidak [penuntut] [wa] s yang benar pada proposisi
hukum yang mendasari domestik kekebalan dari regulasi negara." [FN238] Sebaliknya, pengadilan memutuskan
bahwa, "[o] rdinarily, ekspektasi yang wajar atau sah dari jenis yang dilindungi oleh NAFTA adalah mereka yang
muncul melalui representasi yang ditargetkan atau jaminan dibuat secara eksplisit maupun implisit oleh pihak
negara." [FN239] Karena "perdagangan produk tembakau secara historis menjadi subyek peraturan dekat dan luas
oleh Amerika Serikat" pengadilan berpendapat bahwa investor seharusnya tidak cukup diharapkan untuk terlibat
dalam skala besar bisnis distribusi tembakau tanpa menghadapi peraturan negara. [FN240] Mengandalkan
sebelumnya NAFTA kasus, pengadilan juga menyatakan bahwa NAFTA Pasal 1110 mensyaratkan "perampasan
lengkap atau sangat besar pemilik hak 'dalam totalitas investasi." [FN241] Sebagai bisnis penggugat tetap
"menguntungkan," [FN242] pengadilan menyimpulkan bahwa tidak ada pengambilalihan. [FN243]

844 B. Wajar dan Adil Pengobatan

Kasus lain terkait dengan perlakuan yang adil dan merata (FET) standar. Standar ini mensyaratkan bahwa investor
asing diberikan "pengobatan sesuai dengan hukum internasional, termasuk perlakuan yang adil dan adil dan
perlindungan penuh dan keamanan." [FN244] Seperti disebutkan di atas, dalam kasus Sungai Agung, sebuah
perusahaan Kanada yang bergerak dalam tembakau mengekspor ke Amerika Serikat berpendapat bahwa
investasinya telah dirugikan oleh Perjanjian Penyelesaian Guru. Selain alasan bahwa pembayaran dibutuhkan
merupakan suatu pengambilalihan yang melanggar NAFTA Pasal 1110, pemohon dugaan pelanggaran standar
FET. [FN245] Sebagai pengadu individu anggota dari Enam Bangsa Konfederasi Iroquois, mereka berpendapat
bahwa usaha tembakau kegiatan tradisional mereka, dan dengan demikian kasus ini melibatkan warisan budaya
mereka tidak berwujud:
Arbitrase ini bukan tentang perlindungan kesehatan atau promosi. Ini bukan tentang hak-hak negara untuk mengatur
dalam kepentingan kepentingan publik. Dan bukan hanya tentang tindakan anti persaingan yang dipaksakan atas
perintah dari beberapa perusahaan besar dalam pertukaran untuk berbagi keuntungan mereka. Ini keprihatinan
arbitrase dan timbul diskriminasi Termohon terhadap sekelompok investor asli, tradisi mereka, bisnis dan kehidupan,
dan pengambilalihan pasar mereka, semua yang melanggar hak-hak mereka berdasarkan hukum
internasional. [FN246]
Menurut penggugat, Pasal 1105 menghormati NAFTA diperlukan hukum internasional, termasuk hak-hak masyarakat
adat. [FN247] Mereka berpendapat bahwa sejumlah instrumen hukum internasional, termasuk, inter alia, Deklarasi
Antar-Amerika mengusulkan tentang Hak-hak Masyarakat Adat dan berbagai ketentuan dari Konvensi ILO 169 dan
UNDRIP itu, "adalah gambaran dari percepatan atau kristalisasi yang telah terjadi di kebiasaan internasional * 845
hukum sehubungan dengan perlindungan hak-hak masyarakat adat, baik secara kolektif dan sebagai individu.
" [FN248] Lebih khusus, pengadu berpendapat bahwa suatu norma hukum internasional yang muncul dari adat
mewajibkan negara untuk secara aktif berkonsultasi dengan masyarakat adat sebelum mengambil tindakan
peraturan yang secara substansial akan mempengaruhi kepentingan mereka. [FN249]
Departemen Luar Negeri AS bersikeras, bagaimanapun, bahwa norma tersebut tidak mewujudkan hukum adat, dan
bahwa dalam hal apapun, Amerika Serikat jatuh ke dalam kategori penentang gigih, [FN250] sebagai pemerintah AS
telah secara konsisten berpendapat bahwa Deklarasi PBB tentang Hak-hak Masyarakat Adat tidak mencerminkan
hukum kebiasaan internasional. [FN251] Selain itu, Kanada, negara bagian asal investor, campur tangan dalam
proses untuk menolak argumen bahwa Konvensi ILO 169 dan jatuhnya UNDRIP dalam lingkup hukum internasional
adat. [FN252] Dalam nya Counter-Memorial, * Serikat 846States juga berpendapat bahwa undang-undang yang
diadopsi adalah non-diskriminatif dan dilayani "untuk mempromosikan kesejahteraan umum dengan memastikan
bahwa produsen tembakau menginternalisasi biaya perawatan kesehatan yang disebabkan oleh rokok
Pengadilan, dengan pengecualian satu anggota, menemukan bahwa petugas hukum negara "bertindak kurang dari
optimal" dalam bekerja bersama untuk membahas dan mengembangkan langkah-langkah regulasi yang
diusulkan. Hal ini juga dianggap bahwa "Bangsa Pertama atau pemerintah suku, terutama di Amerika Serikat yang
peraturan otoritas atau mungkin terlibat dengan aplikasi MSA, seharusnya dimasukkan dalam diskusi ini." [FN254]
Meskipun demikian, sejak pengadilan mencatat bahwa "[t] ia gagasan hak prosedural khusus melindungi beberapa
investor, tetapi tidak yang lain, tidak mudah didamaikan dengan gagasan standar adat minimal pengobatan karena
semua investasi," [FN255 ] pengadilan menyatakan bahwa "apapun yang tidak adil pengobatan yang diberikan
kepada [itu] penggugat atau perusahaan bisnis, itu tidak naik ke tingkat suatu pelanggaran dari perlakuan yang adil
dan merata."[FN256] Adapun masalah hukum yang berlaku, pengadilan menyatakan bahwa "standar adat
perlindungan investasi investor asing 'tidak memasukkan perlindungan hukum lainnya yang mungkin disediakan
investor atau kelas investor bawah sumber hukum lainnya." [FN257] Sebagai soal interpretasi, pengadilan
memperhitungkan aturan hukum internasional lainnya seperti yang dipersyaratkan oleh norma-norma adat penafsiran
perjanjian, [FN258] tetapi menegaskan kembali itu adalah "[t] ribunal yurisdiksi terbatas" dengan "tidak ada mandat
untukmemutuskan klaim berdasarkan perjanjian selain NAFTA. "[FN259]
Dalam Glamis Emas, penggugat berpendapat, antara lain, bahwa proses peninjauan proyek melanggar standar FET,
[FN260] sebagai * 847 "proyek lain banyak dengan karakteristik budaya yang signifikan dan disetujui serupa ... tanpa
pengurukan lengkap dan meskipun berat dampak terhadap sumber daya budaya mereka. "[FN261] pengadilan,
bagaimanapun, mencatat bahwa sifat-sifat lainnya tidak hadir seperti sejumlah besar signifikansi arkeologi atau
budaya. Karena undang-undang California diperebutkan adalah aplikasi umum dan tidak menargetkan investasi
penggugat, [FN262] pengadilan menyimpulkan bahwa tindakan pemerintah federal dan negara bagian California
tidak melanggar kewajiban responden dalam Pasal 1105. [FN263] Pengadilan mencatat bahwa kajian budaya
rencana penggugat operasi dilakukan oleh para profesional yang berkualitas, yang memberikan alasan, pendapat
didukung dan tidak bias. Akhirnya, berpendapat bahwa "itu bukan peran dari Pengadilan, atau pengadilan
internasional, untuk menggantikan penilaian sendiri materi faktual yang mendasari dan dukungan untuk itu dari
sebuah agen dalam negeri yang berkualitas." [FN264]

C. Diskriminasi
Unsur penting dalam perselisihan investasi dengan unsur-unsur warisan budaya adalah pemastian non-diskriminasi
terhadap investor asing. Prinsip non-diskriminasi biasanya tercermin dalam dua ketentuan-ketentuan investasi
perjanjian: perlakuan nasional (NT) dan paling disukai bangsa (MFN) pengobatan.[FN265] Kedua standar tidak
menjamin tingkat tertentu perlindungan tetapi standar relatif yang memerlukan negara tuan rumah untuk mengobati
investor asing dengan cara yang sama bahwa investor domestik atau investor dari negara lain akan
diperlakukan. [FN266] Tujuan dasar dari klausul MFN dan NT untuk menghindari diskriminasi dan menjamin
kesempatan yang sama kompetitif bagi investor asing di negara tuan rumah.[FN267] Pertanyaan kunci adalah
apakah investasi asing sedang diatur * 848 karena tujuan kebijakan publik, atau apakah mereka sedang diatur
berdasarkan kepemilikan asing. [FN268]
Saat ini tidak diragukan lagi sulit untuk melihat bahasa secara terbuka diskriminatif dalam peraturan, meskipun
karakteristik ini telah muncul dalam perselisihan investasi. Misalnya, kasus Gallo tertunda v. Kanada adalah penting
karena menyangkut regulasi bahwa bahkan dalam judul meliputi referensi untuk investasi asing. [FN269] investasi itu
menyangkut penciptaan TPA pada situs-lubang tambang terbuka mantan terletak di utara Ontario.[FN270] Pada
tahun 2004, pemerintah Ontario provinsi baru terpilih membuat undang-undang mencegah proyek dari
melanjutkan. [FN271] Akuisisi lahan baru tidak diberikan kepada investor baik. [FN272] Investor, nasional AS,
mengajukan arbitrase investor-negara menuduh pengambilalihan dan pelanggaran standar FET dan meminta
kompensasi. [FN273]
Kanada, antara lain, menegaskan bahwa akuisisi beberapa daerah itu ditolak karena perusahaan belum memenuhi
kewajiban untuk berkonsultasi dengan masyarakat Aborigin yang relevan [FN274] dan bahwa * 849 diusulkan
pengalihan lahan akan melanggar hak-hak Aborigin. [FN275] Kanada juga berpendapat bahwa undang-undang
berlaku disebabkan oleh hidro-geologi kondisi tambang. [FN276] Meskipun kasus ini belum diputuskan, tampak
bahwa kedua argumen yang disajikan oleh pihak - dugaan diskriminasi dan pembenaran dugaan sama - akan harus
diperhitungkan oleh pengadilan arbitrase untuk menentukan apakah ada adalah diskriminasi dan, jika ini terjadi,
apakah perbedaan dalam pengobatan dibenarkan oleh keadaan kasus ini.
Dalam Yohanes Andre v. Kanada, seorang pengusaha yang berbasis di AS mengajukan Pemberitahuan Niat untuk
arbitrase, menyatakan kerugian timbul dari tindakan legislatif yang mempengaruhi nya karibu-berburu pakaian
eceran di Kanada Utara. [FN277] Sebelum tahun 2007, penggugat telah 360 lisensi berburu karibu (disebut Caribou
Tags Kuota) dan kamp berburu terorganisir bagi wisatawan dan pemburu yang akan melakukan perjalanan dari
lokasi di luar Kanada untuk tanah asli di Kanada Barat, Wilayah Utara (NWT). [FN278] Pada tahun 2007, Pemerintah
NWT memutuskan untuk memberikan hanya Tags Caribou tujuh puluh lima kuota per pakaian eceran.[FN279]
Outfitters dengan komitmen untuk klien akan diminta untuk membeli Tags Caribou Kuota dari pesaing
mereka.[FN280] Penggugat berpendapat bahwa pihak berwenang yang relevan telah memotong jumlah lisensi
berburu secara diskriminatif. [FN281] Karena banyak Outfitters lokal hanya digunakan 75-100 Tags Caribou Kuota
atau kurang per tahun, penggugat menuduh bahwa Pemerintah mengembangkan strategi untuk meminimalkan efek
negatif pada Outfitters lokal dan memaksimalkan efek negatif pada investor . [FN282] Investor demikian mengklaim
telah * 850 telah ditargetkan sebagai non-penduduk Kanada dan telah didiskriminasikan atas dasar kebangsaan AS-
nya. [FN283]
Pers baru-baru ini melaporkan bahwa sementara larangan tersebut awalnya termasuk perburuan karibu aborigin,
pemerintahan NWT dan Tlicho pemerintah asli bersama-sama telah sepakat untuk menjaga larangan berburu total
hanya untuk non-aborigin pemburu dan Outfitters perburuan komersial.[FN284] Dengan kata lain, sementara
perburuan olahraga karibu tetap dibatalkan, [FN285] perburuan subsistensi asli akan dia diizinkan.
Perlakuan diferensial dapat dibenarkan di bawah hukum hak asasi manusia. Perburuan jatuh memungkinkan suku-
suku adat untuk melestarikan budaya tradisional mereka dan bergantung pada daging karibu di musim
dingin. [FN286] Sejumlah kasus di tingkat internasional, regional, dan nasional memberikan bukti pengakuan hak-hak
budaya masyarakat adat dalam pengertian ini. Dalam kasus Kitok, Komite Hak Asasi Manusia menyatakan bahwa
peternakan rusa, sebagai mata pencaharian tradisional masyarakat adat Saami, adalah kegiatan yang dilindungi
menurut Pasal 27 ICCPR [FN287] Dalam Jouni Lansman ay Finlandia, Komite menemukan bahwa menggiring rusa
cocok.dalam definisi kegiatan budaya. [FN288] Dalam mencapai kesimpulan ini, Komite telah mengakui bahwa
kegiatan subsisten masyarakat adat merupakan bagian integral dari budaya mereka:
Berkenaan dengan pelaksanaan hak-hak budaya yang dilindungi dalam Pasal 27, Komite mengamati budaya yang
memanifestasikan dirinya dalam berbagai bentuk, termasuk cara tertentu hidup yang terkait dengan penggunaan
sumber daya lahan, khusus [sic] dalam kasus masyarakat adat. Hak yang dapat mencakup kegiatan suchtraditional
sebagai memancing atau berburu .... Pemenuhan hak tersebut memerlukan langkah-langkah hukum positif * 851
perlindungan dan langkah-langkah untuk menjamin partisipasi efektif dari anggota masyarakat minoritas dalam
pengambilan keputusan yang mempengaruhi mereka .... Perlindungan hak-hak diarahkan untuk menjamin
kelangsungan hidup dan pengembangan lanjutan dari identitas budaya, agama dan sosial dari minoritas yang
bersangkutan, sehingga memperkaya struktur masyarakat secara keseluruhan. [FN289]
Pada tingkat nasional, pada tahun 1999, Pengadilan Tinggi Australia menolak tuduhan terhadap anggota suku asli
yang telah menangkap dua buaya muda di Queensland menggunakan tombak tradisional. [FN290] Meskipun
pemohon tidak memiliki izin berburu, Pengadilan menyimpulkan bahwa ia dibebaskan dari kewajiban memperoleh
izin, karena aksinya didasarkan pada kebiasaan tradisional yang dianggap aborigin menangkap buaya muda
signifikansi spiritual yang tinggi. [FN291] Kasus AS dari orang-orang Makah yang mendapat izin untuk berburu ikan
paus juga memiliki bantalan pada kepentingan budaya dan lingkungan bersaing dalam debat berburu asli. [FN292]
Baru-baru ini, Kanada telah mengajukan gugatan Inuit sebelum Pengadilan Eropa untuk membatalkan suatu
peraturan Uni Eropa [FN293] melarang impor produk segel ke Uni Eropa.[FN294] Para * 852 peraturan tegas
mengakui bahwa "berburu merupakan bagian integral dari budaya dan identitas anggota masyarakat Inuit, dan
dengan demikian diakui oleh Deklarasi PBB tentang Hak-Hak Masyarakat Adat." [FN295] Dengan demikian,
menyatakan bahwa "menempatkan di pasar produk segel yang hasil dari perburuan tradisional yang dilakukan oleh
Inuit dan masyarakat adat lain dan yang berkontribusi terhadap subsistensi mereka seharusnya
diperbolehkan." [FN296] Meskipun Inuit dibebaskan dari larangan tersebut, mereka mengklaim mereka tetap
terpengaruh, [FN297] sebagai peraturan yang "mungkin akan mengakibatkan hilangnya, antara lain, pasar di
infrastruktur seperti rumah lelang dan penyamakan kulit, yang sebagian besar dimiliki oleh non-Inuit perusahaan
komersial. " [FN298] Selain itu, "karena orang Inuit tidak mengekspor produk segel sendiri, pengurangan yang
Peraturan No 1007/2009 menyediakan dalam mendukung Inuit akan tetap sebuah 'kotak kosong."' [FN299] Para
pemohon juga mengklaim bahwa peraturan serius mempengaruhi hak mereka "untuk terlibat dalam eksploitasi
komersial dari produk segel, yang merupakan sumber penting pendapatan mereka." [FN300] Pada bulan Agustus
2010, Pengadilan Umum ECJ itu diterima permintaan moratorium oleh masyarakat adat, tetapi masih terlalu dini
untuk memprediksi bagaimana sengketa akan berkembang. [FN301] Kasus ini menarik karena menunjukkan bahwa
bahkan pembebasan aborigin tidak dapat cukup untuk mempertahankan praktek-praktek budaya, dan, pada
gilirannya, praktek-praktek budaya dapat berbenturan dengan masalah lingkungan.
Sebuah "pembebasan Aborigin" adalah fitur umum dari undang-undang konservasi sumber daya alam. [FN302]
Sejumlah environmentaltreaties internasional yang melindungi spesies tertentu termasuk derogations prinsip-prinsip
utama mereka untuk "mengakomodir kebutuhan * 853 pengguna subsisten tradisional spesies tersebut," [FN303]
sehingga melindungi praktek-praktek perburuan tradisional terkait dengan warisan budaya
masyarakat bersangkutan. Misalnya, Pasal VII Konvensi 1957 tentang Konservasi Utara Seal Fur Pasifik
menjelaskan praktik berburu aborigin yang dikecualikan oleh penerapan Konvensi. [FN304] Konvensi 1931 untuk
Peraturan Penangkapan Ikan Paus tegas diperbolehkan subsistensi asli paus. [FN305] Konvensi 1946 Internasional
untuk Peraturan Penangkapan Ikan Paus, yang menggantikan Konvensi 1931, mempertahankan hak aborigin untuk
penangkapan ikan paus subsisten. [FN306]

D. Kendali Perlindungan dan Keamanan

Perjanjian investasi yang paling internasional mengandung klausul yang membutuhkan "perlindungan penuh dan
keamanan" untuk investasi asing langsung. Secara tradisional, tujuan utama dari standar tersebut telah untuk
melindungi investor terhadap berbagai jenis kekerasan fisik dan efek samping yang mungkin berasal dari tindakan-
tindakan dari negara tuan * 854 dan organ, atau dari pihak ketiga. [FN307] Dalam Burlington v. Ekuador, penggugat
berusaha untuk menahan Ekuador bertanggung jawab karena gagal memberikan perlindungan fisik dan keamanan
untuk konsesi hidrokarbon perusahaan di hutan hujan Amazon. [FN308] konsesi itu diberikan pada akhir tahun
1990an namun selalu ditentang oleh masyarakat adat yang telah menghuni hutan hujan terpencil tenggara Ekuador
selama berabad-abad. [FN309] Burlington meratap, antara lain, bahwa suku-suku asli oposisi 'untuk pengembangan
minyak telah menghambat bisnis dan diakui bahwa kegagalan Ekuador untuk memberikan keamanan fisik melanggar
standar perlindungan penuh dan keamanan di bawah BIT AS-Ekuador. [FN310]
Dalam Keputusan pada Yurisdiksi, majelis arbitrase menolak klaim ini atas dasar yurisdiksi, menekankan pentingnya
negara-negara yang diletakkan pemberitahuan sengketa sehingga mereka memiliki kesempatan untuk memperbaiki
kemungkinan pelanggaran dan dengan demikian menghindari proses arbitrase. [FN311] Karena Burlington gagal
untuk memberikan pemberitahuan yang jelas ke Ekuador klaim untuk penolakan perlindungan fisik dan keamanan,
arbiter memutuskan bahwa wajib perjanjian enam bulan masa tunggu sebelum arbitrase dapat dimulai tidak
berjalan. Ekuador berhasil berargumen bahwa "tidak ada sengketa dalam kaitannya dengan Blok 23 dan 24" karena
"ada kerjasama yang jelas antara pihak-pihak untuk memecahkan masalah di Blok oposisi menyangkut
adat."[FN312] Menariknya, karena dugaan pelanggaran oleh negara hak-hak masyarakat adat, klaim hukum yang
dibawa oleh Sarayaku sebelum kedua Komisi Inter-Amerika tentang Hak Asasi Manusia * 855 (IACHR) dan
Pengadilan Inter-Amerika tentang Hak Asasi Manusia Organisasi Negara Amerika (OAS) terus bergerak
maju. [FN313]

VI. DE Lege Lata

A. Hukum yang Berlaku

Perselisihan investasi harus diselesaikan berdasarkan hukum, kecuali para pihak secara tegas diperjanjikan
lain. [FN314] beberapa bit mengandung pilihan komposit klausul hukum, biasanya termasuk aturan perjanjian, hukum
negara tuan rumah, dan hukum kebiasaan internasional. Misalnya, tahun 2004 US Model BIT [FN315] bahwa dalam
kasus tertentu, "pengadilan harus memutuskan isu-isu dalam sengketa sesuai dengan Perjanjian ini dan ketentuan
yang berlaku hukum internasional."[FN316] Pasal 1131 NAFTA sama menyatakan bahwa: ". [A] pengadilan didirikan
sesuai dengan Bagian ini akan menentukan isu-isu dalam sengketa sesuai dengan Perjanjian ini dan ketentuan yang
berlaku hukum internasional" [FN317] Untuk kasus dibawa ke hadapan ICSID, Konvensi ICSID menyatakan bahwa
pengadilan akan menerapkan hukum yang dipilih oleh para pihak atau, dalam ketiadaan pilihan semacam, hukum
negara tuan rumah dan prinsip-prinsip seperti hukum internasional seperti yang berlaku. [FN318]
Pluralisme hukum ini telah menimbulkan perdebatan sengit di kalangan ulama. Beberapa mengambil pandangan
"bahwa hukum internasional adalah terbatas pada tambahan dan peran korektif Ini adalah tambahan dalam hal itu
dapat mengisi kekosongan hukum negara tuan rumah,. Dan itu adalah korektif dalam arti 856 * bahwa hal itu berlaku
jika hukum tuan melanggar hukum internasional. " [FN319] Namun, yang lain berpendapat bahwa "hukum
internasional selalu menerapkan, baik sebagai hukum nasional yang konsisten dengan, atau jika tidak, maka hukum
internasional menggantikan itu." [FN320]
Bahkan dalam tidak adanya referensi hukum internasional dalam klausa compromissory, ada cara lain untuk arbiter
internasional untuk merujuk ke hukum internasional. [FN321] Pertama, ketika konstitusi opts tuan negara untuk
monisme, hukum internasional publik menerapkan hukum yang berlaku untuk kontrak. Bahkan di negara-negara
yang mengadopsi teori dualisme dan memerlukan norma-norma hukum internasional untuk menjadi "diterjemahkan"
ke yang nasional, menerapkan norma-norma arbiter hukum internasional, ketika mereka menerapkan norma-norma
nasional yang menyampaikan mereka. Sebagai Profesor Kreindler menunjukkan, "bahkan di mana para pihak tidak
setuju, secara langsung atau tidak langsung, untuk aplikasi 'aturan' hukum internasional atau 'prinsip,' hukum
internasional mungkin sudah internal diterapkan sebagai bagian dari hukum domestik dipilih oleh para pihak .
Kedua, kebijakan publik transnasional (atau ketertiban umum internasional) selalu menjadi bagian dari hukum yang
berlaku.[FN323] The House of Lords Inggris pada tahun 1853 menggambarkan kebijakan publik sebagai [FN324]
"prinsip hukum yang menyatakan bahwa tidak ada subjek secara sah dapat melakukan yang yang memiliki
kecenderungan untuk merugikan kepentingan publik publik atau melawan." Dalam hal positif , kebijakan publik akan
mencerminkan prinsip-prinsip dasar dari sebuah masyarakat tertentu. [FN325] kebijakan publik Transnasional
mengacu pada "prinsip-prinsip yang mewakili sebuah konsensus internasional untuk standar universal dan norma-
norma perilaku yang diterima harus selalu berlaku." [FN326] Konsep "kebijakan publik transnasional," atau "kebijakan
publik benar-benar internasional," dikatakan terdiri dari aturan-aturan dasar hukum alam, * 857 prinsip-prinsip
keadilan universal memiliki nilai absolut atau kebenaran absolut [FN327] dan mencakup hukum-hukum dasar dengan
status lebih tinggi dari aturan yang biasa hukum internasional (jus cogens).[FN328]
Jus cogens didefinisikan oleh Konvensi Wina tentang Hukum Perjanjian (VCLT) sebagai "norma yang diterima dan
diakui oleh masyarakat internasional negara secara keseluruhan sebagai suatu norma dari penghinaan yang tidak
diperbolehkan dan yang hanya dapat dimodifikasi oleh berikutnya norma hukum internasional yang memiliki karakter
yang sama. "[FN329] Meskipun ketentuan ini menetapkan kerangka hukum untuk bagaimana norma-norma ditaati
bekerja, itu adalah seperti "kotak kosong," [FN330] karena tidak mengatakan apa yang merupakan norma-norma jus
cogens. [FN331] Namun, fakta bahwa gagasan norma ditaati sulit dipahami tidak harus membawa kita untuk
menyimpulkan bahwa jus cogens tidak memiliki dasar dipastikan. [FN332] Meskipun tidak ada kriteria sederhana
untuk mengidentifikasi aturan umum hukum internasional memiliki karakter jus cogens, konsep jus cogens adalah
hukum positif. [FN333] contoh berlaku umum adalah * 858 larangan perbudakan, penyiksaan, diskriminasi rasial
sistemik, pembajakan, dan genosida. [FN334] Mengingat ketidakpastian hukum di sekitar istilah, terserah kepada
badan-badan internasional untuk mengadili menguraikan permadani kompleks hukum internasional dalam
menentukan maknanya.
Apakah norma hukum internasional status jus cogens membutuhkan theprotection warisan budaya asli adalah
masalah perdebatan. [FN335] Menimbang keterkaitan ketat antara perlindungan warisan budaya adat dan martabat
manusia, seseorang dapat mencapai kesimpulan bahwa pelanggaran sistematis budaya masyarakat adat dan
identitas budaya tidak hanya melanggar hak mereka untuk menentukan nasib sendiri, tetapi akhirnya dapat
menyebabkan genosida budaya sebuah kelompok pribumi. [FN336] Perlindungan hak-hak budaya dan warisan
budaya pribumi adalah komponen mendasar dari hak masyarakat adat untuk menentukan nasib sendiri. [FN337]
Jauh dari menjadi berlebihan * 859 elemen, [FN338] budaya merupakan conditio sine qua non keberadaan
masyarakat adat.
Meskipun jus cogens belum termasuk perlindungan dari setiap aspek warisan budaya tradisional, itu adalah dinamis
dan dapat diperluas untuk mencakup larangan genosida budaya. [FN339] genosida budaya adalah istilah yang
pengacara Raphael Lemkin diusulkan pada tahun 1933 sebagai komponen untuk genosida. [FN340] Beberapa
penulis telah mengakui hubungan antara genosida budaya dan genosida fisik; [FN341] orang lain telah dianggap
sebagai "tindakan nakal pemusnahan budaya di belakang, bahkan secara independen dari, genosida." [FN342] Para
perancang Konvensi Genosida 1948 [FN343] dianggap menggunakan istilah, tetapi memutuskan untuk
tidak. [FN344] Meskipun teks akhir dari UNDRIP tidak * 860 tegas menggunakan frase "genosida budaya" [FN345]
secara substansial melarang itu, mengakui bahwa "masyarakat adat dan individu memiliki hak untuk tidak menjadi
sasaran pemaksaan asimilasi atau perusakan budaya mereka "[FN346]. Ketentuan yang sama juga mengidentifikasi
beberapa kondisi yang dapat menyebabkan kehancuran budaya masyarakat adat.[FN347] Dari relevansi khusus
adalah tiga pertama keadaan:
(2) Negara harus menyediakan mekanisme yang efektif untuk pencegahan, dan ganti rugi untuk:
(A) Setiap tindakan yang memiliki tujuan atau efek merampas mereka dari integritas mereka sebagai masyarakat
yang berbeda, atau nilai-nilai budaya atau identitas etnis;
(B) Setiap tindakan yang memiliki tujuan atau efek menghalau mereka dari mereka, wilayah atau sumber daya tanah;
(C) Setiap bentuk pemindahan penduduk paksa yang memiliki tujuan atau efek melanggar atau merongrong setiap
hak-hak mereka; [... [FN348]
Sedangkan pengertian genosida budaya adalah bukan hukum, perkembangan hukum yang signifikan memperjelas
kewajiban negara untuk melindungi warisan budaya. Mukadimah Statuta Roma tentang Mahkamah Pidana
Internasional [FN349] mengakui bahwa budaya "semua bangsa dipersatukan oleh ikatan umum, budaya mereka
disatukan dalam sebuah warisan bersama" dan bahwa "ini mosaik rumit dapat hancur setiap saat. " [FN350] Sebagai
salah satu sarjana menulis, "[i] n interpretasi dari unsur-unsur kejahatan genosida, menganggap harus diambil untuk
ide-ide preambular." [FN351] Memang, pengadilan pidana internasional telah * 861 mengakui kewajiban untuk
melindungi warisan budaya sebagai erga omnes kewajiban berdasarkan hukum internasional. Misalnya, ketika
menentukan isi yang tepat dari gagasan penganiayaan, Pengadilan Pidana Internasional untuk Bekas Yugoslavia
sudah termasuk upaya untuk menghapus lembaga-lembaga keagamaan dan pendidikan dari komunitas tertentu dari
lanskap zona tertentu. [FN352] Selanjutnya, penghancuran sistematis warisan budaya telah diterima sebagai bukti
dari mens rea yang merupakan specificus Dolus kejahatan genosida. [FN353] Kisah penghancuran budaya telah
digambarkan sebagai "genosida budaya, ethnocide dan disamakan dengan tindakan segregasi, mirip dengan
apartheid." [FN354] Sebagai Francioni katakan,
Kerusakan yang disengaja warisan budaya sangat penting sebagai Buddha dari Bamiyan tidak hanya merupakan
kejahatan tertahankan terhadap warisan budaya umat manusia, tapi, ketika dilakukan dengan maksud diskriminatif,
juga jumlah untuk serangan terhadap identitas dari yang ditargetkanmasyarakat dan agama, dan dengan demikian
pada martabat dan hak-hak dasar anggotanya. Sebagai ICTY baru ini dikonfirmasi, kehancuran yang bersifat
diskriminatif itu "memanifestasikan ekspresi hampir murni dari gagasan 'kejahatan terhadap kemanusiaan," bagi
seluruh umat manusia memang terluka. " [FN355]

Pengadilan telah menyoroti adanya ketertiban Culturel publique.[FN356] Misalnya, Mahkamah Agung Swiss telah
mengakui keberadaan ketertiban umum internasional di bidang properti budaya: [FN357]
* 862 Lorsque, comme l'espéce, la demande sur la porte d'un bien restitusi Culturel, le juge de l'entraide doit prendre
en veiller à l'interet Compte publik internasional ... bohong la de ces biens perlindungan. Ces normes, qui d'une
relèvent inspirasi komune, konstituen autant d'un ordre d'ekspresi publik internasional en vigueur ou en formasi
... ces normes, qui l'concrétisent d'une impératif Lutte internationale efficace Contre le traffic de biens culturels
.... [FN358]
"[A] kontrak yang melanggar aturan asing melarang ekspor harta nasional bisa dianggap batal secara independen
dari keabsahan berdasarkan hukum ... substantif berlaku untuk kontrak." [FN359] Misalnya, Bundesgerichtshof
Jerman (Mahkamah Agung) telah mengakui bahwa kontrak asuransi tunduk pada hukum Jerman adalah batal demi
hukum karena terkait dengan ekspor ilegal barang-barang budaya dari Nigeria.[FN360]
Bagaimana pengadilan arbitrase ditangani dengan kebijakan publik dan jus cogens? Kebijakan publik telah disebut
"kuda sangat sulit diatur, dan ketika begitu Anda mendapatkan mengangkang itu Anda tidak pernah tahu di mana itu
akan membawa Anda." [FN361] Namun demikian. telah tegas dinyatakan dalam serangkaian arbitrase
internasional. Misalnya, dalam Maria Luz arbitrase, tsar Rusia, duduk sebagai arbiter tunggal, menarik pada
kebijakan publik dalam menyatakan bahwa Jepang "tidak melanggar aturan umum Hukum Bangsa" membebaskan
budak di dilakukan pada Peru kapal Maria Luz dan menyangkal * 863 berikutnya tuntutan untuk ganti rugi warga
Peru. [FN362] Baru-baru ini, dalam arbitrase ICC, Mr Lagergreen, bertindak sebagai arbiter tunggal, menyatakan
bahwa "tidak dapat diganggu gugat bahwa ada prinsip umum hukum yang diakui oleh bangsa-bangsa beradab yang
melanggar kontrak yang serius adat istiadat bonos atau publik internasional kebijakan valid atau setidaknya tidak
dapat diterapkan dan bahwa mereka tidak dapat disetujui oleh pengadilan atau arbiter. "[FN363]
Demikian pula, di Perusahaan Dunia Duty Free Terbatas v. Republik Kenya, [FN364] Pusat Internasional untuk
Penyelesaian Perselisihan Investasi (ICSID) Pengadilan sebagaimana dimaksud kebijakan publik internasional dan
tidak memungkinkan klaim berdasarkan suap atau kontrak yang diperoleh oleh korupsi . [FN365] Mengadopsi
pandangan yang sama, Pengadilan ICSID dalam kasus Methanex menegaskan bahwa "sebagai masalah hukum
konstitusi internasional, pengadilan memiliki tugas independen untuk menerapkan prinsip-prinsip imperatif hukum
atau jus cogens dan tidak memberikan efek kepada para pihak ' pilihan hukum yang tidak konsisten dengan prinsip-
prinsip seperti itu. " [FN366] Dalam kasus lain, seperti Profesor Martin Hunter menunjukkan, meskipun arbiter "akan
mengklaim bahwa mereka tidak pernah menerapkan prinsip-prinsip transnasional kebijakan publik dalam
merumuskan penghargaan mereka," mereka telah menerapkan prinsip-prinsip kebijakan publik, khususnya berkaitan
dengan barang-barang lingkungan. [FN367]
Kebijakan publik adalah sebuah konsep yang fleksibel dan dinamis yang dapat digunakan sebagai mekanisme
korektif atau sebagai alat untuk menyeimbangkan tujuan rumit dan sering bertentangan. [FN368] Oleh karena itu,
komentator telah menyoroti bahwa "[a] ny tribunalowes kewajiban kepada masyarakat internasional untuk
menerapkan kebijakan publik internasional" dan bahwa "tidak ada yang bisa membebaskan pengadilan dari
mandatnya untuk menerapkan kebijakan publik."[FN369] Para * 864 tujuan utama ketertiban umum internasional
adalah untuk menjaga integritas dari norma-norma dasar dari hukum internasional. Dalam hal ini, kebijakan publik
menyangkut "konstitusional" aspek hukum internasional publik [FN370] Sebagai negara tuan rumah di mana
masyarakat adat tinggal "latihan [s] otoritas yang berdaulat sebagai [a] fidusia rakyat tunduk pada kekuasaan [yang]
[, ] ... [itu] harus sesuai dengan jus cogens "[FN371] dan, jika relevan, lihat kewajibannya untuk masyarakat adat
dalam konteks investor-negara arbitrase. Jika negara tidak, itu melanggar kewajiban internasionalnya terhadap
masyarakat adat, khususnya hak mereka untuk menentukan nasib sendiri [FN372] dan hak budaya mereka. [FN373]
Kebijakan publik internasional menuntut bahwa arbiter internasional menerapkan kebijakan publik internasional
sebagai bagian dari hukum yang berlaku. [FN374] Sebagai prinsip penentuan nasib sendiri telah dipandang sebagai
"norma-norma umum hukum internasional," [FN375] argumen untuk mengambil ke rekening di investor-negara:
arbitrase menjadi menarik. Ini bukan pertanyaan tentang aplikasi langsung non-investasi principaliter norma-norma
oleh pengadilan arbitrase. Sebaliknya, itu adalah pertanyaan apakah pengadilan arbitrase harus mengacu pada
hukum internasional dalam mengevaluasi apakah kebijakan negara dibenarkan, bahkan jika seperti * 865 kebijakan
sebaliknya akan tidak konsisten dengan perjanjian investasi. [FN376] Dalam kasus apapun, arbiter terikat untuk
menerapkan norma-norma ditaati hukum internasional yang relevan apakah atau tidak mereka mengaku oleh para
pihak. Pertanyaannya bukanlah apakah untuk menambahkan klaim baru untuk mereka yang diartikulasikan oleh para
pihak, tetapi untuk menentukan hukum yang berlaku dalam sengketa. [FN377]

B. Interpretasi Perjanjian
Interaksi antara perlindungan warisan budaya dan promosi FDI tidak jelas ditujukan oleh mayoritas perjanjian
investasi, [FN378] dengan beberapa pengecualian yang luar biasa. [FN379] Dalam lanskap terfragmentasi, di mana
pengadilan arbitrase tampaknya memiliki kata terakhir pada tema penting di persimpangan budaya dan ekonomi,
interpretasi perjanjian adalah sangat penting. [FN380]
* 866 aturan Adat penafsiran perjanjian, sebagaimana tercermin dalam Konvensi Wina tentang Hukum Perjanjian,
membutuhkan interpretasi sistemik dan referensi ke "peraturan terkait dari hukum internasional yang berlaku dalam
hubungan antara pihak-pihak." [FN381] Sebagai majelis arbitrase di Asia Ltd Produk Pertanian v. Republik Sri Lanka
mengatakan, [FN382] BITS adalah "bukan sistem hukum mandiri tertutup" tetapi harus "dipertimbangkan dalam
konteks yang lebih luas yuridis dimana aturan dari sumber lain yang terpadu melalui metode penggabungan tersirat,
atau dengan referensi langsung aturan tambahan tertentu apakah karakter hukum internasional atau hukum
domestik alam. " [FN383] Selain itu, karena perjanjian investasi biasanya mengabadikan hak-hak investor dalam
"bahasa umum, bertekstur terbuka," "pertimbangan praktis dapat mendorong penafsir untuk mencari bimbingan dari
hukum internasional umum." [FN384]
Pengadilan arbitrase, bagaimanapun, sering mengadopsi reduksionis atau visi minimalis mandat arbitrase. [FN385]
pengadilan Arbitrase jarang ditujukan hukum eksternal dengan hukum investasi, sebagai norma-norma jarang
dipanggil oleh investor dalam arbitrase investasi. [FN386] Bahkan ketika non-investasi norma dipanggil, pengadilan
arbitrase telah baik membubarkan mereka dengan alasan hukum atau gagal untuk mengatasi mereka sama
sekali. [FN387] Bahkan ketika negara-negara tuan rumah * 867relied pada pertimbangan hak asasi manusia untuk
membenarkan tindakan dengan efek buruk pada investasi, dengan alasan bahwa tindakan mereka sebagai
kelanjutan tertentu komitmen hak asasi manusia internasional, mereka telah bertemu hanya sedikit keberhasilan.
[FN388] Sebagai Reiner dan Schreuer menunjukkan, "tampaknya [t] hese penghargaan untuk menunjukkan
keengganan pengadilan 'untuk mengambil hal-hal mengenai hak asasi manusia, lebih memilih untuk mengabaikan
masalah yang diangkat, secara prosedural, daripada berurusan dengan argumen substantif itu sendiri."[FN389]
Keengganan pengadilan arbitrase untuk menerapkan hukum eksternal untuk undang-undang investasi
mencerminkan kurangnya pertimbangan masalah politik dan sosial yang lebih luas dan dapat melemahkan efektivitas
yang lebih luas (dan legitimasi dianggap) investor-negara arbitrase. [FN390] Seperti yang terlihat di atas, norma-
norma adat internasional interpretasi perjanjian memerlukan penafsiran sistematis. Investor-negara arbitrase adalah
makhluk hukum internasional, dengan unsur-unsur hukum publik. Kewenangan pengadilan arbitrase tidak hanya
tergantung pada kehendak para pihak, tetapi pada perjanjian internasional.
Sebagai kesimpulan, penafsiran tidak hanya merupakan latihan logika hukum; ". Masalah selaras dengan apa,
menginginkan sebuah kata yang lebih baik, orang mungkin pengalaman panjang dan akal sehat" yang alat
penafsiran hakim menyebarkan sama [FN391] Sementara kemampuan arbitrase investasi untuk fungsi jelas penting,
kepentingan masyarakat dalam latihan yang sah otoritas dan pemeliharaan * 868 nilai-nilai yuridis adalah sama
pentingnya. [FN392] pengadilan Arbitrase harus mengambil lebih dari pertimbangan ekonomi ke rekening. [FN393]
Karena penawaran arbitrase investor negara dengan isu-isu penting hak asasi manusia, dimensi hukum perselisihan
ini tidak dapat diabaikan atau diberhentikan mendukung murni pertimbangan ekonomis.


Setelah menganalisis pendekatan ex post untuk perlindungan warisan budaya dalam konteks proses arbitrase, dapat
dipertanyakan apakah ex ante atau pendekatan legislatif akan lebih efektif [FN394] Dalam hal ini, masuknya
pengecualian budaya dan penilaian dampak budaya di investmenttreaties akan dipertimbangkan.

A. Budaya Pengecualian dalam Perjanjian Investasi

Pengecualian budaya dapat memberikan alat yang berguna untuk menyeimbangkan kepentingan yang berbeda
dipertaruhkan [FN395] Misalnya, Trans-Pasifik Perjanjian Kemitraan Strategis Ekonomi, yang menetapkan area
perdagangan bebas antara Brunei Darussalam, Chili, Singapura dan Selandia Baru (selanjutnya disebut Trans-
PasifikSeptember), berisi pengecualian untuk melindungi barang-barang atau situs tertentu nilai sejarah atau
arkeologi [FN396] Trans-Pasifik September mengakui perlunya untuk mempromosikan kebijakan budaya yang
ditujukan untuk melindungi warisan budaya dari negara-negara yang terlibat, baik dalam dimensi nyata nya
(arkeologi dan sejarah * 869 situs) dan satu berwujud nya (seni kreatif). [FN397] Lebih penting lagi, Trans-Pacific
September tegas menyatakan bahwa Selandia Baru dapat memberikan perlakuan yang lebih menguntungkan untuk
Maori dalam pemenuhan kewajibannya berdasarkan Perjanjian Waitangi, [FN398] "asalkan tindakan tersebut tidak
digunakan sebagai sarana sewenang-wenangatau dibenarkan diskriminasi terhadap orang-orang dari Pihak lainnya
atau sebagai pembatasan terselubung pada perdagangan barang dan jasa. " [FN399] Dalam terang keprihatinan
konstitusi dan isu-isu mendasar yang diangkat oleh pelaksanaan Perjanjian Waitangi, yang dianggap dokumen
pendiri Selandia Baru, inklusi pihak 'dari pengecualian ad hoc budaya termasuk upaya Selandia Baru untuk
mematuhipersyaratan perjanjian dari ketentuan penyelesaian sengketa September Transpacific merupakan
pendekatan yang masuk akal. [FN400] model baru Kanada Perjanjian Perlindungan Investasi Asing (FIPA) tidak
termasuk seperti pengecualian dalam teks, tetapi mencakup perlakuan khusus bagi penduduk asli dalam lampiran
nya. [FN401] Malaysia juga dikecualikan tindakan yang dirancang untuk mempromosikan pemberdayaan ekonomi
kelompok etnis bumiputra dari lingkup bit. [FN402]
* 870 Kelebihan memperkenalkan pengecualian budaya dalam perjanjian investasi lebih lanjut ditunjukkan dalam
kasus UPS baru-baru ini, [FN403] mana perdebatan melibatkan lebih dari penerapan klausul industri budaya dalam
klaim NAFTA. [FN404] Amerika Serikat mengklaim bahwa Kanada Publikasi Program Bantuan (PAP) - sebuah
kebijakan yang dirancang untuk mempromosikan distribusi yang lebih luas dari majalah Kanada - adalah diskriminatif
terhadap investor asing. [FN405] Pengadilan ditegakkan argumen Kanada bahwa PAP dibebaskan dari review di
bawah NAFTA berdasarkan pengecualian industri budaya. [FN406]
Kurangnya penyusunan berhati-hati dalam perjanjian investasi melemahkan kekuatan polisi negara tuan rumah untuk
mengadopsi dan melaksanakan program-program sosial, seperti tindakan afirmatif yang bertujuan untuk
meningkatkan peluang ekonomi, budaya, dan sosial untuk kelompok-kelompok aborigin yang kurang beruntung,
karena program tersebut dapat bertabrakan dari larangan diskriminasi dan persyaratan kinerja termasuk dalam
perjanjian investasi. Misalnya, pada periode pasca-Apartheid langsung, Selatan Africaadopted program sosial dan
ekonomi yang ambisius untuk memajukan berdiri orang-orang yang kurang beruntung historis, yang disebut Undang-
Undang Hitam Pemberdayaan Ekonomi (selanjutnya BEE UU). [FN407] UU BEE didasarkan pada Konstitusi Afrika
Selatan, [FN408] yang "mengacu pada tindakan afirmatif ... sebagai sarana untuk menjamin tercapainya kesetaraan
substantif." [FN409]
* 871 Undang-undang BEE dihasilkan banyak kontroversi di kalangan investor asing dan domestik dan baru-baru ini
ditantang [FN410] sebelum pengadilan arbitrase internasional.[FN411] Sejumlah investor Italia mengeluh bahwa
Mineral dan Minyak Sumberdaya Pengembangan Act (selanjutnya MPRDA), [FN412] salah satu peraturan yang
diadopsi untuk memajukan tujuan UU BEE, yang mengakhiri aturan hukum umum yang mengatur kepemilikan hak
mineral dan menyatakan sumber daya mineral dan minyak Afrika Selatan menjadi warisan bersama rakyatnya,
secara de facto mengambil alih hak mineral mereka tanpa memberikan kompensasi yang cepat, memadai, dan
efektif, sehingga melanggar ketentuan BIT relevan. [FN413] Selain itu, pengadu menyatakan bahwa mereka ditolak
perlakuan yang adil dan setara dan perlakuan nasional. [FN414] Sebagai MPRDA menetapkan serangkaian
persyaratan tindakan afirmatif untuk mempekerjakan manajer Hitam atau historis Tertinggal, serta kewajiban untuk
menjual 26% sahamnya kepada individu hitam atau historis dirugikan oleh 2014, [FN415] penuntut menuduh bahwa
ketentuan-ketentuan yang diskriminatif karena mereka memerlukan bahwa Afrika Selatan menerima pengobatan
yang lebih baik daripada orang asing. [FN416] Selain itu, investor menyatakan bahwa mereka 872 * Investasi
tersebut dibuat setelah akhir rezim Apartheid, dan akibatnya, "para investor tidak mendapatkan keuntungan dari
ketidakadilan masa lalu selama era Apartheid." [FN417] responden berpendapat bahwa baik kekurangan maupun
lengkap transfer kepemilikan dapat ditunjukkan dalam kasus ini.[FN418] Dengan asumsi bahwa pengadu arguendo
memiliki klaim yang sah untuk pengambilalihan kedua hak mineral tatanan lama dan saham di perusahaan mereka,
responden berpendapat bahwa pengambilalihan tersebut adalah sah di bawah BITS [FN419] dan karena itu tidak
melanggar ketentuan-ketentuan bit 'pada pengambilalihan [FN420]. Kasus ini diselesaikan, dan apa yang tersedia
untuk umum tidak memberikan gambaran yang jelas tentang bagaimana kasus ini akan diputuskan oleh pengadilan
Meskipun demikian, hal ini menunjukkan kebaikan memperkenalkan klausul khusus atau pengecualian dalam
konteks perjanjian investasi dalam rangka menciptakan perisai untuk kebijakan relevansi budaya atau sosial
tertentu.Sementara undang-undang pertambangan Afrika Selatan ini diduga bertujuan memenuhi "kewajiban Negara
di bawah konstitusi untuk mengambil tindakan legislatif atau lainnya untuk memperbaiki hasil diskriminasi rasial masa
lalu," [FN421] investor asing umumnya dianggap skema ini sebagai risiko investasi. [FN422] Selain itu, keputusan
investor Italia untuk membawa kasus bisa saja ditiru oleh investor asing lainnya. [FN423] Sebagai soal menghindari
perselisihan, dimasukkannya klausul * 873 tidak termasuk penerapan Undang-Undang BEE dari larangan BIT
itu akan mencegah seperti perselisihan. Dalam pengertian ini, BITS Afrika Selatan baru-baru ini jelas memungkinkan
penerapan langkah pemerintah "yang dirancang untuk mempromosikan pencapaian kesetaraan atau untuk
memajukan kepentingan yang sebelumnya kurang beruntung." [FN424] Sebagai contoh, Pasal 3 dari Perjanjian 1998
antara Republik Ceko dan Afrika Selatan menyatakan bahwa jaminan non-diskriminasi bagi investor asing
tidak akan ditafsirkan untuk mewajibkan satu Pihak untuk memperluas ke investor manfaat yang lain dari preferensi,
perawatan atau hak istimewa yang dapat diperpanjang oleh Partai Mantan berdasarkan ... setiap hukum atau
tindakan lain yang tujuannya adalah untuk mempromosikan pencapaian kesetaraan di wilayahnya, atau dirancang
untuk melindungi atau memajukan orang, o kategori orang, yang sebelumnya dirugikan oleh diskriminasi yang tidak
adil [FN425]
Klausul ini menjelaskan kesediaan para pihak untuk memenuhi kewajiban BIT dan untuk mempertahankan margin
fleksibilitas untuk melindungi hak-hak sosial dan budaya kelompok yang kurang beruntung.

B. Penilaian Dampak Budaya

Sebuah penilaian dampak budaya adalah perangkat teknis yang mengidentifikasi efek dari kegiatan yang diusulkan
pada nilai-nilai budaya dan mengidentifikasi metode untuk menghindari, memperbaiki, atau mengurangi efek
samping. [FN426] Sebuah penilaian dampak warisan budaya adalah proses "yang lebih spesifik untuk mengevaluasi
dampak yang mungkin, boththe menguntungkan dan merugikan, dari pembangunan yang diusulkan pada manifestasi
fisik dari warisan budaya masyarakat termasuk situs, struktur dan sisa-sisa * 874 arkeologi, arsitektur , sejarah,
agama, spiritual nilai, budaya, ekologis atau estetika atau arti. " [FN427]
Penilaian dampak budaya dan penilaian dampak warisan budaya yang saat ini disediakan dalam sistem nasional
tertentu.Misalnya, di Selandia Baru, penilaian dampak budaya yang diperlukan berkenaan dengan kegiatan yang
dapat mempengaruhi nilai-nilai kebudayaan Maori dan warisan.[FN428] Pada tingkat internasional, di bawah Dewan
Eropa Kerangka Konvensi tentang Nilai Warisan Budaya bagi Masyarakat, Negara-Negara Pihak diwajibkan untuk
melakukan penilaian dampak warisan budaya dan mengadopsi strategi mitigasi yang diperlukan. [FN429] Sementara
perjanjian investasi jarang, jika pernah, memerlukan penilaian seperti, [FN430] de jure condendo, pengenalan
mekanisme tertentu mungkin membantu untuk mendamaikan kepentingan yang berbeda dipertaruhkan.
De jure condito, penilaian dampak warisan budaya dapat dianggap sebagai komponen penilaian dampak lingkungan
(AMDAL). Sebagai contoh, sejak tahun 1989 Bank Dunia telah meminta AMDAL sebelum persetujuan dari setiap
pembiayaan proyek. [FN431] Beberapa proyek telah * 875 telah dimodifikasi sebagai hasil dari AMDAL, misalnya,
para pengembang proyek Tuli Blok Botswana Jalan harus mengubah rute jalan dalam rangka melestarikan situs
arkeologi. [FN432] Dalam hal ini, AMDAL adalah alat yang tepat untuk mengambil pertimbangan warisan budaya ke
rekening. AMDAL juga mungkin merupakan metode yang berguna untuk menghindari sengketa [FN433] dengan
memastikan bahwa implikasi budaya yang relevan dari keputusan dipertimbangkan sebelum keputusan dibuat.
Namun, sengketa perjanjian investasi baru-baru telah mempertanyakan alasan sangat memaksakan penilaian
dampak lingkungan. Dalam ay Maffezini Spanyol, misalnya, Emilio Agustín Maffezini, investor Argentina, mengeluh
bahwa pihak berwenang Spanyol telah salah informasi kepadanya tentang biaya proyek; ia menuduh bahwa mereka
telah menekan perusahaan untuk melakukan investasi sebelum proses AMDAL diselesaikan dan sebelum
implikasinya dikenal. [FN434] Jadi, menurut penggugat, Pemerintah Spanyol bertanggung jawab untuk biaya
tambahan yang dihasilkan dari AMDAL. [FN435] Sidang arbitrase membantah klaim, menegaskan bahwa "prosedur
penilaian dampak lingkungan dasar untuk perlindungan yang memadai dari lingkungan dan penerapan langkah-
langkah lingkungan yang tepat Hal ini berlaku tidak hanya di bawah Spanyol dan [Masyarakat Ekonomi Eropa]
Hukum,. Namun juga semakin begitu di bawah hukum internasional. " [FN436] Singkatnya, pengadilan menyatakan
bahwa Spanyol tidak bertanggung jawab karena itu hanya diperlukan sesuai dengan hukum lingkungan dengan cara
yang konsisten dengan komitmen perjanjiannya investasi. [FN437]
Dalam kasus baru ini memulai NAFTA tertunda terhadap Pemerintah Kanada, keluarga Clayton dan mereka di AS *
876 perusahaan, Bilcon, objek dengan cara di mana penilaian lingkungan dilakukan. [FN438] Theinvestors diusulkan
untuk tambang basal di provinsi Kanada pesisir Nova Scotia dan kemudian kapal tanker dengan New Jersey ke situs
mereka.[FN439] Terminal laut akan dibangun untuk kapal basal turun melalui Teluk Fundy ke New Jersey. [FN440]
Penolakan AMDAL proyek direkomendasikan karena efek samping yang signifikan pada nilai-nilai inti dari
masyarakat sekitar. [FN441] Sementara pengadu mengakui bahwa AMDAL diperlukan untuk proyek mereka, mereka
mengklaim bahwa proses itu berlarut-larut yang luar biasa, kebijaksanaan, dan akhirnya bermotif politik, menyatakan
pelanggaran NAFTA Pasal 1102 (Nasional Pengobatan), Pasal 1103 (Paling-Favored Nation Perawatan) dan Pasal
1105 (Pengobatan Wajar dan Adil). [FN442]
Dalam Surat Jawaban, Kanada menunjukkan bahwa proyek ini terletak di Leher Digby, semenanjung sempit dengan
ekosistem yang sangat produktif [FN443]. Its perairan merupakan pemuliaan penting dan tanah untuk makan lumba-
lumba dan spesies yang terancam punah seperti paus dan penyu belimbing. [FN444] Selain itu, Digby Leher terletak
dalam cagar biosfer ditunjuk oleh UNESCO pada tahun 2001. [FN445] EIA merekomendasikan otoritas yang relevan
harus menolak proyek yang diusulkan secara keseluruhan karena "efek samping yang signifikan lingkungan [itu]
akan menyebabkan lingkungan ... biologis dan manusia pada Leher Digby dan di * 877 TelukFundy, termasuk pada
'nilai-nilai inti masyarakat' dari masyarakat yang terkena dampak. " [FN446] Kanada berpendapat bahwa, karena
regulasi memenuhi AMDAL, mereka tidak melanggar Bab 11 NAFTA. [FN447]
Seperti dijelaskan di atas, AMDAL telah datang ke garis depan debat hukum dalam perselisihan investasi. Dalam hal
abstrak, mendeteksi konsekuensi budaya proyek sebelum dilaksanakan dan memastikan bahwa kegiatan yang
direncanakan kompatibel dengan pembangunan berkelanjutan dapat menurunkan resiko kerusakan dan
mempromosikan rekonsiliasi kepentingan swasta dan publik. Namun, sengketa diperiksa di atas menunjukkan bahwa
investor proyek harus menghormati rekomendasi yang ditemukan dalam AMDAL dan bahwa AMDAL harus
menghormati standar internasional transparansi dan keadilan.

C. Bergerak menuju Judicialization hati-hati Proses Arbitrase

Menjadi spesies arbitrase internasional, investor-negara arbitrase menyajikan fitur struktural yang membedakannya
dari proses peradilan [FN448] Namun., Sebagai arbitrase investasi seringkali memiliki dimensi kebijakan publik,
[FN449] beberapa komentator telah mengusulkan amandemen prosedural untuk membuat investor-negara arbitrase
proses yang lebih terstruktur atau judicialized [FN450] Pertama., beberapa telah menekankan kebutuhan untuk
transparansi yang lebih, akses khusus publik untuk dokumen yang berhubungan dengan sengketa dan bahkan akses
ke proses. [FN451] Kedua, orang lain telah menekankan keinginan partisipasi publik ditingkatkan * 878 ke
mekanisme penyelesaian sengketa [FN452]. Ketiga, bahwa perusahaan transnasional deeming harus memikul
tanggung jawab di samping hak-hak mereka berhak untuk di bawah perjanjian investasi, beberapa penulis
telah mengusulkan penggunaan mekanisme balasan dalam hukum perjanjian investasi dan arbitrase. [FN453]
Bagian ini membahas usulan-usulan dan menyimpulkan bahwa judicialization hati-hati dari proses arbitrase mungkin
diperlukan untuk memastikan penghormatan hak partisipatif masyarakat adat. Secara khusus, transparansi harus
menjadi fitur yang diperlukan karena memperkuat legitimasi proses arbitrase dirasakan internasional. Selain untuk
memastikan pengawasan publik, transparansi pada akhirnya meningkatkan kualitas penghargaan. Dari perspektif
sistemik, hukum internasional hanya dapat berlangsung jika ulama dan masyarakat luas bisa mengetahui dan
mendiskusikan hasil dari perselisihan. [FN454] Partisipasi masyarakat yang terkena dampak sebagai amici curiae
juga merupakan isu kunci untuk lebih legitimasi arbitrase investasi. Akhirnya, ia berpendapat bahwa negara tidak
hanya hak tetapi juga kewajiban untuk menggunakan kekuasaan polisi ketika perlindungan terhadap hak asasi
manusia yang dipertaruhkan. Dalam pengertian ini, tanggung jawab untuk mewakili kepentingan masyarakat yang
terkena dampak dalam konteks investor-negara arbitrase terletak dengan negara.
Investor-negara arbitrase adalah buram di berbagai tingkatan: pertama, pengetahuan tentang keberadaan sengketa
itu, kedua, akses ke proses 879 * itu sendiri, dan akhirnya, akses ke penghargaan yang dihasilkan. [FN455] Dimulai
dengan elemen terakhir, terbukti bahwa tanpa akses ke penghargaan, sulit untuk menjadi sadar akan adanya
sengketa diberikan sangat.Sementara Sekretariat ICSID menyimpan registri dari semua kasus yang diajukan
berdasarkan peraturan dan penghargaan laporan dalam publikasinya, [FN456] kasus investasi yang paling bawah
aturan lembaga arbitrase komersial, seperti International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), bersifat rahasia.[FN457]
Keputusan NAFTA negara untuk mengungkapkan semua NAFTA arbitrase [FN458] harus disambut. Semua tiga
partai NAFTA mempublikasikan online dokumen kunci dari semua arbitrase: pengajuan dari para pihak, perintah
prosedural, dan penghargaan. [FN459] Akses ke dokumen tunduk pada kondisi bahwa dokumen dapat dihapus
dalam rangka untuk menahan informasi bisnis rahasia atau informasi rahasia. [FN460] ketentuan serupa muncul di
Amerika Serikat baru dan bit Kanada. [FN461]

* 880 Beberapa aturan arbitrase menyediakan akses publik terbatas pada sidang arbitrase, tetapi mereka
pengecualian.Menurut Pasal 28 (3) dari Peraturan UNCITRAL, dengar pendapat yang akan diadakan di kamera,
kecuali para pihak menyetujui lain. [FN462] Peraturan 32 dari Aturan Arbitrase ICSID 2003 diperlukan persetujuan
pihak non-partai pertemuan sidang. [FN463] Aturan 32 tahun 2006 Arbitrase ICSID Aturan menyatakan bahwa
"kecuali salah objek partai," pengadilan, setelah berkonsultasi dengan Sekretaris Jenderal ICSID, dapat
memungkinkan non-partai untuk menghadiri atau mengamati semua atau bagian dari sidang arbitrase. [FN464]
Sekali lagi, solusi yang lebih diinginkan muncul dalam konteks NAFTA, dimana NAFTA Pihak Negara telah sepakat
untuk mendukung sidang terbuka. [FN465] Dalam kasus Emas Glamis, masyarakat diundang untuk melihat proses di
ruang yang terpisah melalui televisi sirkuit tertutup. [FN466] Para Quechan diundang untuk melihat proses dari lokasi
yang berbeda dengan video feed terpisah untuk memungkinkan melihat mereka diskusi lain dibatasi lokasi
budaya. [FN467]
Keuntungan eksogen keterbukaan yang memungkinkan pengawasan publik dan partisipasi publik akhirnya. Telah
ada perdebatan * 881 apakah non-pihak yang berkepentingan dalam arbitrase dari suatu sengketa investasi harus
diperbolehkan untuk memberikan masukan amicus curiae. [FN468] Amici curiae tidak teknis pihak
prosedurnya. Sebaliknya mereka memasok pengadilan dengan informasi dan analisis hukum yang dapat membantu
untuk mencapai visi yang lebih lengkap dari latar belakang fakta dan hukum kasus. Sementara Pasal 17 (1) dari
Peraturan UNCITRAL, yang telah direvisi pada tahun 2010, memungkinkan majelis arbitrase "untuk melakukan
arbitrase sedemikian rupa dianggap sesuai," Pasal 37 (2) dari Peraturan ICSID, sebagaimana telah diubah pada
tahun 2006, menyediakan bahwa pengadilan dapat memungkinkan "non-partai yang bersengketa untuk mengajukan
pengajuan ditulis dengan Pengadilan tentang suatu hal dalam lingkup sengketa."[FN469] Oleh karena itu, sampai ke
pengadilan untuk memutuskan apakah untuk memungkinkan pengiriman amicus curiae, dan, sementara mereka
harus berkonsultasi, para pihak tidak memiliki hak veto. Ketentuan serupa sekarang termasuk di AS baru dan BIT
Model Kanada. [FN470] Dalam konteks NAFTA, Pernyataan dari Perdagangan Bebas, Komisi Non-Membantah
Partisipasi Pihak mengatur bahwa "[n] o penyediaan [NAFTA] batas diskresi suatu Tribunal untuk menerima
pengajuan tertulis dari seseorang atau badan yangbukan partai bersengketa (a 'non-partai yang bersengketa').
"[FN471] Para Negara Pihak Namun NAFTA juga merekomendasikan bahwa Bab 11 Pengadilan mengadopsi
sejumlah prosedur sehubungan dengan pengajuan tersebut.[FN472]
* 882 Amicus curiae celana memiliki relevansi mendasar untuk sengketa yang melibatkan hak-hak masyarakat
adat. Pertama, pengajuan celana amicus curiae oleh perwakilan masyarakat adat dapat memastikan bahwa
pengadilan arbitrase menyadari keprihatinan mereka. [FN473] Masyarakat adat adalah "diposisikan secara unik
untuk mengomentari dampak dari [kegiatan] diusulkan untuk sumber daya budaya, lanskap budaya atau
konteks." [FN474] Selain itu, pandangan mereka mungkin berbeda dari orang-orang dari pihak yang
bersengketa. [FN475]
Kedua, amicus curiae dapat membantu pengadilan dengan memperjelas aturan yang berlaku hukum internasional,
sehingga memberikan kontribusi bagi crosspollination norma-norma hukum internasional dan orang-orang hukum
investasi. [FN476] Misalnya, dalam kasus Sungai Agung, Kepala Nasional Majelis Bangsa Pertama, "yang mewakili
pandangan Bangsa Pertama baik nasional maupun internasional," menyatakan dukungan untuk pengadu dan
mengajukan amicus curiae singkat yang dimaksud sejumlah instrumen hukum internasional. [FN477] Demikian pula,
celana amicus curiae disampaikan oleh Nation Quechan dalam kasus Emas Glamis baik disebut kerangka untuk
perlindungan situs suci adat di bawah hukum domestik dan internasional. [FN478]
* 883 Ketiga, meskipun tidak ada hal seperti preseden yang mengikat di negara investor arbitrase, penghargaan
berurusan dengan warisan budaya adat mungkin memiliki peran penting dalam arbitrase berikutnya. [FN479]
Argumen ini; juga diajukan oleh Nation Quechan ketika mengajukan permohonan cuti ke file Submission Non-Partai
dalam Kasus Emas Glamis:
[T] dia cara di mana daerah ini sakral dan kepentingan Suku di dalamnya akan digambarkan dalam proses arbitrase
menjadi perhatian besar bagi masyarakat pribumi di seluruh dunia, yang sama-sama berusaha untuk melindungi
tempat suci dan tak tergantikan mereka menjamin kebebasan beragama .... Suku ingin memastikan bahwa sifat
sensitif dan serius daerah sakral adat benar diperhitungkan dalam hal ini, dan dalam semua, proses internasional di
masa depan. [FN480]
Akhirnya, pertimbangan celana amicus curiae oleh pengadilan arbitrase menawarkan cara, beton layak untuk
memecahkan dilema kedaulatan masyarakat adat. Serta berargumen oleh Nation Quechan dalam Kasus Emas
Glamis, "[a] sa bangsa yang berdaulat, Suku tidak dapat dikatakan memadai diwakili oleh berdaulat ...." [FN481]
Pengadilan arbitrase telah semakin diterima celana amicus curiae, [FN482] meskipun memaksakan syarat-syarat
tertentu untuk diterimanya mereka di * 884 agar tidak terlalu membebani melanjutkan atau keterlambatan
penyebab. Misalnya, dalam mempertimbangkan apakah akan menerima dan mempertimbangkan surat yang tidak
diminta dari Kepala Nasional Majelis Bangsa Pertama, Grand Sungai arbitrase pengadilan menegaskan niatnya
untuk dibimbing oleh, 7 Oktober 2003 Pernyataan Perdagangan Bebas Komisi. [FN483] Dalam penghargaan akhir,
para arbiter tegas mencatat bahwa huruf "itu dibaca dan dipertimbangkan oleh Pengadilan."[FN484] Dalam Kasus
Emas Glamis, Pengadilan Arbitrase menerima celana curiae amicus disajikan oleh Quechan suku Indian, setelah
berpandangan bahwa pengajuan "satisfie [d] prinsip-prinsip Pernyataan Komisi Perdagangan Bebas di non-
bersengketa pihak partisipasi. " [FN485] Meskipun tren ini, Pernyataan tersebut menyajikan hambatan untuk
pertimbangan celana amicus masyarakat adat curiae, karena menyediakan bahwa "pemberian cuti ke file pengajuan
partai non-bersengketa tidak memerlukan Pengadilan ke alamat tersebut penyerahan pada setiap titik dalam
arbitrase. " [FN486] Namun, karena alasan yang dijelaskan di atas, pengadilan arbitrase harus membayar
pertimbangan pengiriman yang disajikan oleh masyarakat adat.
Beberapa penulis telah mengusulkan penggunaan counterclaims di investor-negara arbitrase. [FN487] Menurut para
penulis ini, negara tuan rumah mungkin membawa counter-klaim atas nama warga terhadap * 885 investor asing
untuk pelanggaran hak asasi manusia di negara tuan rumah. [FN488] Menurut Weiler, "akan lebih baik ... jika
perjanjian perlindungan investasi masa depan digambarkan bahwa sama seperti negara wajib untuk mengobati
investasi asing sesuai dengan hukum internasional," demikian juga harus perusahaan memperlakukan negara tuan
rumah dan warganya sesuai dengan hukum internasional. "[FN489] Memang, beberapa perjanjian investasi baru-
baru khusus memungkinkan counterclaims terhadap investor yang memulai proses investor-negara. [FN490]
Di bawah perjanjian investasi, argumen dapat dibuat bahwa negara-negara host yang telah memiliki kemampuan
untuk menggunakan argumen hak asasi manusia sebagai pertahanan klaim dibawa oleh investor. [FN491] Misalnya,
Komisaris Tinggi Hak Asasi Manusia telah mendorong negara untuk meningkatkan kewajiban mereka sesuai hukum
hak asasi manusia di mana keputusan pengadilan dapat mempengaruhi penikmatan hak asasi manusia nasional
atau di mana penafsiran ketentuan dalam perjanjian investasi memilikimungkin dimensi hak asasi manusia. [FN492] *
886 Arbiter mungkin, meskipun incidenter tantum, pertimbangkan kewajiban non-investasi dari negara tuan rumah
Mengakui pihak ketiga, seperti orang-orang pribumi, untuk bertindak sebagai pihak dalam sidang akan mengambil
judicialization terlalu jauh. dan sebagai masalah prosedur, itu akan diinginkan. Ketika menyatakan setuju untuk BIT,
mereka menerima investor-negara arbitrase sebagai mekanisme penyelesaian sengketa untuk menyelesaikan
sengketa investasi dengan warga negara asing, tidak dengan pihak lain dengan kepentingan sangat
beragam. Identifikasi pihak ketiga yang berhak untuk berpartisipasi sebagai pihak akan menghadirkan masalah
tambahan. Selanjutnya, pengadilan internasional lainnya dan pengadilan, seperti pengadilan hak asasi manusia,
yang secara prosedural tersedia bagi individu yang terkena.[FN494] Akhirnya, seperti judicialization ekstrim dari
proses arbitrase pada akhirnya akan kembali-mempolitisir perselisihan investasi. [FN495] Hal ini tidak berarti,
bagaimanapun, bahwa negara tidak harus membuat referensi terhadap kewajiban hak asasi manusia yang relevan
dalam konteks investor-negara arbitrase. [FN496] Ini juga tidak berarti bahwa argumen tersebut tidak harus didengar
melalui mekanisme partisipatif seperti pengajuan amicus curiae.

Perlindungan efektif dari warisan budaya manfaat seluruh umat manusia. Warisan budaya merupakan warisan bagi
semua orang seperti yang mengungkapkan aspek sejarah suatu negara dan menghasilkan rasa identitas bagi
generasi sekarang dan mendatang. Kasus hukum yang relevan menunjukkan bahwa warisan budaya dapat
terancam oleh investasi asing, [FN497] tapi * 887 dampak investasi asing terhadap warisan budaya pribumi adalah
bidang yang hampir belum diselidiki.
Delegasi resolusi sengketa kepada pengadilan investasi internasional, "memotong kewenangan pengadilan nasional
untuk menangani [seperti] sengketa." [FN498] Selain itu, keputusan pengadilan di negara tuan rumah memberikan
keluhan yang diajukan oleh pihak swasta terhadap investor asing dapat diserang oleh investor sebelum pengadilan
arbitrase atas dasar bahwa mereka merupakan gangguan salah dengan investasi. Sementara investor-negara
depoliticizes arbitrase sengketa internasional, mungkin tidak menjadi forum yang paling cocok untuk menyelesaikan
sengketa yang melibatkan hak-hak budaya asli. Investor-negara arbitrase membedakan antara dua tipe aktor non-
negara: (1) investor yang terlibat dalam investasi langsung asing dan (2) masyarakat yang terkena dampak,
termasuk masyarakat adat terkena dampak investasi. Sementara investor asing memiliki akses langsung kepada
investor-negara arbitrase di bawah BIT relevan, masyarakat adat yang terkena dampak tidak memiliki akses
langsung, dan partisipasi mereka hanya mungkin melalui pengajuan celana amicus curiae. Penyampaian amicus
curiae tidak benar, tetapi dianggap oleh pengadilan arbitrase berdasarkan kasus per kasus. Sementara negara tuan
rumah umumnya merupakan masyarakat yang terkena dampak, [FN499] satu mungkin bertanya-tanya apakah
masyarakat adat perlu tambahan jaminan prosedural, karena status khusus mereka di bawah hukum internasional.
Peraturan prosedur arbitrase tidak cukup dikembangkan untuk cukup melindungi hak-hak masyarakat
adat. Partisipasi mereka sebagai amici curiae pada proses arbitrase tidak secara otomatis diberikan, dan proses
arbitrase yang melibatkan warisan budaya tidak selalu terbuka untuk umum. Hanya baru-baru telah arbitrase
investasi mulai * 888 untuk mengakui kuasi-konstitusional perannya, menanggapi positif permintaan oleh kelompok-
kelompok kepentingan publik untuk memberikan masukan amicus curiae. [FN500] Dengan demikian, beberapa
pengadilan telah memutuskan bahwa keuntungan dari debat publik lebih besar daripada kerugian dari setiap biaya
tambahan dan kompleksitas prosedural. Selanjutnya, beberapa lembaga arbitrase telah mengadopsi kebijakan
tentang transparansi dan keterbukaan yang memfasilitasi pengawasan publik. [FN501]
Pada tingkat substantif, seperti klaim warisan budaya yang melibatkan adat dan investasi asing jelas melibatkan hak
asasi manusia, arbiter harus mempertimbangkan hukum internasional sebagai bagian dari hukum yang
berlaku. Dalam hal ini, arbiter dapat mengevaluasi apakah tindakan yang diadopsi oleh negara tuan rumah sesuai
dengan kewajiban internasionalnya, meskipun incidenter tantum. Dalam kasus apapun, arbiter terikat untuk
menerapkan norma-norma yang relevan ditaati norma-norma hukum internasional apakah pendekatan seperti itu
dimohonkan oleh para pihak. Selanjutnya, sesuai dengan aturan adat penafsiran perjanjian, undang-undang
investasi internasional bukanlah alam semesta tersendiri. Oleh karena itu, harus ada "konstitusional"
menyeimbangkan antara hak investor asing dan keprihatinan negara yang sah yang mengalir dari perjanjian-
perjanjian internasional hak asasi manusia.
Sebagai pengadilan arbitrase dapat menghadapi kesulitan dalam menemukan keseimbangan yang tepat antara
kepentingan yang berbeda yang bersangkutan, pengecualian budaya harus diperkenalkan dalam teks bit. Di satu
sisi, ini akan memberikan kepastian kepada investor asing. Di sisi lain, secara memadai akan melindungi hak-hak
budaya masyarakat adat. De jure condendo, mekanisme prosedural untuk * 889 memastikan bahwa masyarakat adat
dapat berpartisipasi sebagai amici curiae dan argumen mereka akan diperhitungkan oleh pengadilan arbitrase harus
digunakan secara konsisten.
Kesimpulannya, meskipun investasi asing merupakan suatu kekuatan yang berpotensi positif bagi pembangunan,
kebijakan negara dan praktek tentang eksploitasi sumber daya harus memperhatikan implikasi hak asasi
manusia. Sedangkan pengertian warisan adat baru-baru ini datang ke garis depan debat hukum, jelas memiliki
keterkaitan langsung dengan perlindungan hak-hak masyarakat adat dan martabat manusia.

[FNa1]. Dosen hukum internasional (Maastricht University), Ph.D. (European University Institute), M. Jur. (Oxon), M.
Res.(EUI), J.D. dan M.Pol.Sc. (Siena). Dia dapat dihubungi di v.vadi @ Makalah ini
dipresentasikan pada 2010 Masyarakat Konferensi Ulama Hukum diselenggarakan di Universitas Southampton pada
15 September 2010. Penulis mengucapkan terima kasih kepada Profesor Francesco Francioni, Profesor Peter Van
den Bossche, Profesor Colin Reid, Profesor Malcolm Rosalind, Profesor Claire Cutler, Profesor Ana Filipa Vrdoljak,
Achraf Farraj, dan peserta untuk konferensi untuk komentar mereka.