To cite this article: Arend Lijphart , Thomas C. Bruneau , P. Nikiforos Diamandouros &
Richard Gunther (1988) A mediterranean model of democracy? The Southern European
democracies in comparative perspective, West European Politics, 11:1, 7-25, DOI:
10.1080/01402388808424662
Download by: [Aristotle University of Thessaloniki] Date: 31 December 2015, At: 00:52
A Mediterranean Model of Democracy? The
Southern European Democracies in
Comparative Perspective
and these same three countries share a common religious cleavage - unlike
many other European countries, there was never a Catholic-Protestant split
but a powerful and politically very significant clerical-anticlerical cleavage.
The contrast between these similarities in background conditions and the
differences with regard to democratic regime strengthens the theoretical value
of our findings. Do political institutions and the basic rules of the game of
democratic politics have a life of their own or are they merely a 'super-
structure' that grows out of a socio-economic-cultural base? Our findings that
there are substantial differences among the four regimes clearly reveal the
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the period from about 1945 until the end of 1980. In order to strengthen the
empirical basis for our analysis of the new European democracies as much as
possible, we extended our coverage of these three cases to the middle of 1986.
Our starting points were the first regular parliamentary elections after the
termination of authoritarian rule: November 1974 in Greece, April 1976 in
Portugal, and June 1977 in Spain.
The first, executives-parties, dimension of the majoritarian-consensus
contrast comprises the following five variables:
1. Concentration of executive power in single-party majority cabinets versus
executive power-sharing in broad coalitions. In operationalisingthis variable,
we gave predominant weight to the question of whether cabinets are bare-
majority cabinets - 'minimal winning' cabinets in the terminology of the
coalition theorists - or more inclusive 'oversized' cabinets in which one or
more parties are represented that are not necessary to give the cabinet a
parliamentary majority. Minority cabinets form an intermediate category,
and periods under minority cabinet rule (such as in Spain between 1977 and
1982) were divided equally between the other two categories. As Table 1
TABLE 1
BASIC CHARACTERISTICS OF 25 DEMOCRATIC REGIMES (AVERAGES)
AND OF THE DEMOCRATIC REGIMES IN NEW ZEALAND, SWITZERLAND,
ITALY (c. 1945-80), SPAIN, PORTUGAL, AND GREECE (c. 1975-86)
.o-ë OS •s
wage i
:w Zeal
Count
iitzerla
60
shows, New Zealand cabinets were minimal, winning 100 per cent of the time
in the 1945-80 period, whereas the Swiss executive council was always
oversized.
2. Executive dominance versus executive-legislative balance. This variable is
difficult to operationalise, but the best available method is to measure the
average cabinet durability. Cabinets that are durable - those that do not
change frequently in terms of party composition - tend to be much more
powerful vis-à-vis their legislatures than less durable executives. For the few
countries without a straightforward parliamentary government, subjective
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scores were assigned: 60 for a high degree of executive dominance (as in the
French Fifth Republic) and 30 for a balanced executive-legislative relation-
ship (as in the cases of Switzerland where the executive is elected for a fixed
four-year term, and in Portugal which had a strong presidency until 1982).
3. Two-party versus multiparty systems. The best method for operationalising
the number-of-parties variable is the 'effective number of parties' measure
proposed by Markku Laakso and Rein Taagepera.5 It counts the number of
parties weighted by party size. Table 1 presents the average effective number
of parties, based on the parties' shares of legislative seats following each
parliamentary election, for the six countries. New Zealand and Switzerland
with 2.0 and 5.0 effective parties respectively are again clear contrasting
examples.
4. One-dimensional versus multidimensional party systems. In the pure
majoritarian model, the two major parties differ from each other program-
matically on only one dimension: socio-economic policy. The consensus
model assumes differences among the major parties not only on this left-right
issue dimension but also on one or more of the following: the religious,
cultural-ethnic, urban-rural, regime support, foreign policy, and post-
materialist dimensions. We gave one point toa dimension of high salience and
half a point to those of only medium intensity. New Zealand's score is 1.0 (one
issue dimension, socio-economic issues, with high intensity), while the Swiss
score is 3.0 (high salience socio-economic and religious dimensions and
medium-salience cultural-ethnic and urban-rural ones).
5. First-past-the-post elections versus proportional representation. The
plurality or first-past-the-post method is the typical majoritarian electoral
system, whereas PR is the typical method of consensus democracy. In
practice, however, not all plurality (or majority) systems are equally
disproportional and not all PR systems are equally proportional. For this
reason, we measured the actual disproportionality in all elections in the
respective periods, and we defined disproportionality as the average deviation
between the vote and seat shares of the two largest parties in each election. The
New Zealand and Swiss cases again exemplify the contrast very well.
The second, federal-unitary, dimension comprises the following three
variables:
1. Centralised versus decentralised government. We operationalised this
variable as the central government's share of total central and non-central tax
receipts, excluding social security taxes. The data we used were OECD
statistics for the late 1970s and early 1980s for Spain, Portugal and Greece,
and for the mid-1970s for the other countries. New Zealand and Switzerland
A MEDITERRANEAN MODEL OF DEMOCRACY? 11
FIGURE 1
TWENTY-FIVE DEMOCRATIC REGIMES PLOTTED ON THE TWO
MAJORITARIAN-CONSENSUAL DIMENSIONS
II
Eederál-uriitary
dimension
•ISR
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1.5
•UK
1.0
•ICE
•LUX
•POR • .5
•FR4
•FR5
Executives- NOR .SWE
parties —
dimension 1.0 1.5
•ITA
• SPA
• -.5
-1.0
•AUL
•JAP
CAN
-1.5
•swi •US
•GER
Note: AUL means Australia, AUT Austria, FR4 the French Fourth Republic, and FR5 the
French Fifth Republic.
(amendable by a majority but only by means of a referendum), which is
protected by judicial review. Its bicameralism is strong in one respect (the two
chambers have equal powers) but weak in another (the chambers are elected
by similar methods and are virtual carbon copies of each other).
SPAIN
until 1982, but it collapsed in the 1982 elections, and was replaced as the major
party to the right of the Socialists by the Popular Alliance. The highest
effective number of parliamentary parties, 2.9, occurred in th'e 1977 elections,
while a low of 2.3 parties was reached in 1982 when the Socialists won a huge
victory.
Moreover, the Spanish electoral system has produced very disproportional
results in spite of the fact that it is formally a PR system. The main reason is
that PR is applied in small districts - the average district elects fewer than
seven representatives - and that there are no regional or national supplemen-
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tary seats to make the overall seat distribution more proportional. As a result,
the index of disproportionality is much more like those of countries with
plurality and majority systems than those of other PR countries. It is also
worth noting that two of the four Spanish parliamentary elections (in 1982
and 1986) have yielded what Douglas W. Rae calls 'manufactured majorities':
a party winning a majority of the parliamentary seats with only a minority of
the popular votes.8 Such manufactured majorities are quite common in
plurality and majority systems but rare under PR.
While the party and electoral system variables pull Spain in a majoritarian
direction, the fifth variable to be considered - the issue dimensions of partisan
conflict - pulls in the opposite direction. Table 2 shows the issue dimensions in
the party systems of the Southern European democracies and also, as in Table
1, of New Zealand and Switzerland. On this variable, the four Southern
European democracies are actually quite similar to each other; although the
particular dimensions vary from country to country, the total number of issue
dimensions is higher in all four cases than the average in our universe of 25
democratic regimes. Of the basic characteristics of democratic regimes, this is
the most difficult and potentially controversial one to determine. For Spain,
Portugal, and Greece, the difficulty is increased because we have only a short
time-span on which we can base our judgements.
We gave Spain high ratings on the socio-economic, religious and cultural-
ethnic dimensions and a medium rating on foreign policy. The party system
has a clear left-right division.9 Religion presents more of a problem for the
analyst, because Spain differed from the usual continental European pattern
TABLE 2
ISSUE DIMENSIONS OF THE NEW ZEALAND, SWISS, AND ITALIAN PARTY
SYSTEMS (ca. 1945 to 1980) AND OF THE SPANISH, PORTUGUESE, AND GREEK
PARTY SYSTEMS (ca. 1975 to 1986)
giou
ral
mber
UIOU
c
ISg-
-01
.S» >.
ie
ire:
¿se Ss -a a .a ¿s
lie
ES
o o
o S u US 5 25
D •&s
«S £U. g.
Q. CU6 Z-3
New Zealand inHtu tí 1.0
Switzerland H H M M 3.0
Italy H H M M 3.0
Spain H H M 3.5
Portugal H H M H 3.5
Greece H M H M 3.0
Note: H indicates a dimension of high salience; M means a medium salience dimension.
A MEDITERRANEAN MODEL OF DEMOCRACY? 15
in not having an explicit Christian Democratic party (in the period under
consideration, that is, until the middle of 1986). However, the Spanish
Christian Democrats were an identifiable faction within the Union of the
Democratic Centre as well as in the more recent Popular Coalition; following
the June 1986 election, they pulled out of the Popular Coalition, but this
happened after the end of the period we are examining. Several studies,
however, have revealed that the Spanish electorate is divided along religious
lines, and that this division is clearly reflected in the structure of partisan
preferences.10 Moreover, partisan conflict has erupted over religious issues
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government institutions had been created in two regions) it had gone down to
90 per cent, and in 1983 (when the first steps were taken towards founding
regional government institutions in most of the country's 17 Autonomous
Communities) it was less than 83 per cent. Further gradual decreases are likely
in the future, as jurisdiction over numerous government functions are
transferred from the central government to the newly emerging regional
administrative agencies.
A second reason why these figures underestimate the full degree of political
decentralisation in Spain is that they measure the share of revenues collected
at the regional and local level, while Spanish decentralisation most extensively
involves the expenditure side of government activity. With the exception of
Euskadi and Navarra (two regions which do collect their own revenues), most
regional government activities are financed by funds transferred from
revenues collected by the central government. By 1985,24 per cent of the total
state expenditure had been transferred to the various regional communities.12
Thus, if our comparative data had dealt with government spending rather
than taxation, the centralisation figure for Spain would have been substantially
lower than the 86 per cent shown in Table 1.
While the overall level of regional government activity has been evolving
throughout this period, so too has the basic model of the state itself. At the
outset of the démocratisation process, it was widely acknowledged that
autonomy would be promptly granted to those regions with historic claims to
self-government (Catalunya and Euskadi, with the exact status of the partially
Basque province of Navarra open to some question), as well as to Galicia,
which is also culturally and linguistically distinct from the rest of the country
and had made some progress towards the attainment of autonomy before the
civil war of 1936-39. But beyond the widely perceived necessity of restoring
self-government rights to the Basques and the Catalans, there was no
consensus among political elites over what model would be appropriate for
the post-Franco Spanish state. Not even the constitution adopted in 1978
clearly resolves this matter: unlike most federal constitutions, which clearly
delineate the functions to be performed by central and regional government
bodies and which grant equal levels of authority to all of the component states,
the Spanish constitution merely established procedures by which various
regions might secure autonomy, and it lists policy spheres which may be
transferred from central to regional government jurisdiction. The process of
decentralisation was based on the principle of voluntarism; each prospective
region was to initiate the procedures by which it would secure autonomy and
negotiate its own terms of self-government.
A MEDITERRANEAN MODEL OF DEMOCRACY? 17
process through enactment of the Organic Law for the Harmonisation of the
Autonomy Process. While much of this law was invalidated by the
constitutional court in 1983, it represents an important watershed, following
which the Socialists (the ruling party since 1982) have consistently pushed for
a more uniform distribution of self-government rights among the regions.
Their defacto embrace of a federal model for Spain, however, has been firmly
opposed by Basque and Catalan nationalists, who fear that a standardisation
of the decentralisation process would result in a reduction of their own rights
and privileges.
In one respect, the Spanish political structure appears to approximate the
federal model: in the senate, each of the mainland provinces is entitled to equal
representation (four senators) regardless of population size - similar to the
equal representation of the states or cantons in federal Australia, Switzerland,
and the United States. However, as discussed earlier, the senate is a very weak
second chamber, and the new Autonomous Communities have a stronger
claim than the provinces to being regarded as the principal geographical units
of the Spanish state. Unlike the provinces, these Autonomous Communities
have a highly unequal representation in the senate, which is not at all based on
population size.
Is Spain's position on the majoritarian-consensual contrast likely to change
in the near future? Current trends indicate that its positions on both
dimensions are likely to be strengthened. The continuation of the one-party
Socialist majority cabinet as a result of the 1986 elections, the continued
domination of this cabinet over the legislature, and the end of serious foreign
policy disagreements will all make Spain more majoritarian on the first
dimension. On the second dimension, the process of régionalisation is bound
to move Spain in the federal direction. Hence we can conclude that, on the
basis of its first nine democratic years, Spain can be classified as majoritarian
and federal, and that it is likely to become more so.
PORTUGAL
with the Social Democratic party from 1983 to 1985, but even the Democratic
Alliance cabinet from 1980 to 1983 can properly be regarded as a coalition
(mainly of the Social Democrats and the Social Democratic Centre). Because
the Alliance presented a single list of candidates in the 1979 and 1980 elections,
it technically qualifies as one party. However, its unity was neither strong nor
lasting: the Alliance collapsed in late 1982, and its members resumed their
separate partisan identities. The only cabinets that were not minimal-winning
occurred at the beginning and end of our period: a Socialist minority cabinet
from 1976 until late 1977 and a Social Democratic minority cabinet from the
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Christian Democratic party'.15 Linz 's judgement is supported by the fact that
the party's representatives in the European Parliament have joined the
Christian Democratic party group. As in Spain, the abortion question was a
tense partisan issue; the Social Democratic Centre party was strongly opposed
to the law liberalising it. Mainly because of its strong Communist party,
Portugal receives a medium-salience rating on the regime support dimension,
similar to the ratings for France, Italy, and Finland, and a high-salience rating
for foreign policy. The Portuguese Communists oppose NATO, and voted
against entry into the European Community in 1985. Hence, although
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GREECE
Finally, let us take a closer look at our third new democracy, Greece, which, of
course, was chronologically the first of the Southern European new
democracies, and which also experienced a much shorter authoritarian
interlude: a mere seven years, compared with more than a third of a century in
Spain and almost half a century in Portugal. Greece's position on the two-
dimensional majoritarian-consensual contrast of Figure 1 is the most
surprising of the four Southern European democracies because it is literally
the most eccentric. Italy, Spain, and Portugal are all relatively close to the
centre of the graph where roughly half of our cases are located. Greece is not
only one of the outliers but also, after New Zealand and the United Kingdom,
20 WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS
in a relatively short 12-year time span than, as New Zealand did, in the entire
post-war era, but it is worth noting that Greek cabinets were highly
majoritarian before the authoritarian interlude, too. If we focus on the period
from the 1950 elections, the first after the end of the civil war, until the crown's
intervention in party politics in 1965, minimal-winning cabinets governed 92
per cent of the time. The only exceptions were the cabinets of Sophocles
Venizelos and of George Papandreou, which were minority cabinets for a few
months in 1950-51 and 1963 respectively.
Greece has also had very durable cabinets, indicating a high degree of
executive dominance over the legislature. This executive stability and strength
must be explained mainly in terms of the party and electoral systems; very
little can be attributed to the constitution-writers' attempt, inspired by the
French model, to create a strong presidency combined with a cabinet
dependent on the legislature's confidence. The main reason is that they failed
to adopt a vital element of the strong presidency exemplified by France:
popular election. The Greek president was given strong executive powers but
he was elected by parliament instead of the voters. President Constantine
Karamanlis's great personal prestige could compensate only partly for this
lack of popular legitimation. Moreover, a series of constitutional amendments
passed in 1986 eliminated almost all of the special powers of the president -
making the regime unambiguously parliamentary. In fact, the post-1986
Greek presidency looks very much like that of the Fourth French Republic
and unlike that of the Fifth.
The fact that the Greek political system was never genuinely presidential is
also the reason why we do not regard the 'cohabitation' of President
Karamanlis of theNew Democracy party with a Socialist cabinet from 1981 to
1985 as an oversized power-sharing government. Hence this period, like the
entire 1974-86 period, is characterised by a minimal-winning executive. It
cannot be compared with the cohabitation of the much stronger President
Mitterrand with a conservative cabinet after the 1986 election in France -
which does have a close resemblance to executive power-sharing.
Greek party politics has been dominated by New Democracy and the
Socialist PASOK. Other parties, particularly the two major Communist
parties, have played a role of some importance, but they have not been able to
influence the composition of the government. New Democracy and PASOK
have governed with the support of absolute majorities of their own supporters
in Parliament: the former until 1981 and the latter since then. The average of
2.1 effective parties places Greece in the company of the United States, New
Zealand, the United Kingdom, and Austria, which have effective numbers of
A MEDITERRANEAN MODEL OF DEMOCRACY? 21
parliamentary parties between 1.9 and 2.2 - and which are also commonly
described as having two-party systems. In the eight elections from 1950 to
1964, the average effective number of parliamentary parties was 2.7 - higher
than the post-1974 number but still low by comparative standards.
Probably the most important explanation of the emergence of this near-
two-party system is the Greek electoral law. Although it uses a PR formula, it
has produced results that are far from proportional. As Table 1 shows, the
index of disproportionality is a high 7.6 per cent, identical to Spain's. In many
PR countries, supplementary seats are allocated at the regional or national
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level in order to make the overall seat distribution more proportional. Such
seats are available at both of these levels in Greece, but parties have to meet
very high thresholds to qualify for them. Hence only the large parties benefit,
and proportionality is effectively decreased. This system is called 'reinforced
PR', but what is being reinforced is the large parties rather than proportionality.
All four Greek elections have yielded parliamentary majorities for one party;
all but one of these were manufactured majorities. In the eight elections from
1950 to 1964, the electoral disproportionality was an even somewhat higher
7.9 per cent.
Only with regard to the issue dimensions of partisan conflict does Greece
deviate from straight majoritarianism. In addition to the usual left-right
issues, three other issue dimensions are of some importance. On the strength
of its Communist parties, Greece, like Portugal, was given a medium-salience
rating of the regime support dimension. With regard to foreign policy,
PASOK was initially committed to withdrawal from the European Com-
munity and was strongly opposed to NATO, but since its rise to power it has
already softened its stand on both issues a great deal. Finally, the kind of
issues classified as religious in the Spanish and Portuguese cases have played a
role in Greek politics, too, but more as PASOK's emphasis on social renewal,
including equality of men and women, than with any religious connotation;
we classified them under the post-materialist label.
On the federal-unitary dimension, Greece's position is virtually identical to
Portugal's. It is unitary and centralised with a government centralisation
percentage of 96 per cent (compared with 95 per cent for Portugal). It also has
a straightforward unicameral parliament and a completely rigid constitution.
For a while, it seemed likely that the latter characteristic would change:
PASOK intended to make the constitution amendable by a parliamentary
majority vote. However, this proposal ran into such strenuous opposition that
it did not become part of the 1986 constitutional revision.
Can we expect Greece to maintain its strikingly majoritarian style of
government? The variable on which a change appears likely is the number of
issue dimensions. Since PASOK's assumption of government responsibility,
the policy differences between the two main parties have become less sharp.
After the 1985 elections, in particular, foreign policy issues have become less
divisive; hence the high rating on the foreign policy dimension may well have
to be changed to a medium rating in the next few years. Such a change would
move Greece into an even more strongly majoritiarian direction.
22 WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS
CONCLUSION
The four Southern European democracies may share a common geographical
area and several other important background characteristics, but they do not
practise a common form of democracy. Moreover, the changes that seem
likely to occur in Spain, Portugal, and Greece will all have the effect of
reinforcing the majoritarianism of already majoritarian regimes (on either or
both of the dimensions) and, similarly, of reinforcing the consensualism of
already consensual systems (again on one or both of the dimensions). This
means that, in the two-dimensional space of Figure 1, the four countries are
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much more likely to move farther away from each other than to draw
together.
Before trying to explain this absence of a distinctive Southern European
cluster of democracies, we should note two minor qualifications - both having
to do with individual characteristics subsumed under our two majoritarian-
consensual dimensions. One is the relatively large number of issue dimensions
in all four Southern European democracies (see Table 1). For the three new
democracies, this pattern can be explained at least partly by the very newness
of their democratic institutions. As we have already noted, the trend is one of
decreasing partisan differences. Especially the foreign policy and regime
support issues are likely to become less salient as these democracies mature
and as the major parties gain governing experience. Of course, this trend will
also make the Southern European democracies less different from the other
democracies even with regard to this one characteristic - that is, this
qualification is likely to disappear before too long.
The second qualification concerns the high degree of constitutional rigidity
of the four Southern European democracies; in fact, the three new
democracies all have the highest score in this respect (or, in the terms of Table
1, the lowest score on constitutional flexibility). Their emergence from
dictatorial rule accounts for much of this similarity. Of the other democracies,
only seven have equally rigid constitutions and three - Austria, Germany, and
Japan - have similar backgrounds of authoritarian rule.
These two qualifications do not alter the overall pattern of divergence
among the democratic regimes of the Southern European countries, shown in
Figure 1. We shall offer an explanation of this pattern in four steps. In the first
place, it is important to note that, with one major exception, cultural and
regional affinity is not a strong influence for the other democracies either. The
one exception is the set of countries with a strong British cultural heritage: the
United Kingdom, Ireland, New Zealand, Australia, Canada, and the United
States all have high majoritarian scores on the first dimension, but they vary
widely on the second. Two other regional-cultural groups that might be
expected to form cohesive clusters of democracies, the Nordic and the
Benelux countries, turn out to be only weakly connected. Sweden and Norway
are very close to each other, but Denmark is farther away, and Finland and
Iceland are outliers. Belgium and the Netherlands are reasonably close
together, but Luxembourg is at a considerable distance from both of them. If
we ignore Iceland and Luxembourg, the least populous of the Nordic and
Benelux countries, we have a fairly cohesive cluster of the remaining members
of these two groupings combined. However, they are still spread out on the
A MEDITERRANEAN MODEL OF DEMOCRACY? 23
first dimension, and, while they are close together on the second, a few other
countries - notably the French Fifth Republic and Ireland - are equally close.
In other words, since, with the exception of the Anglo-American democracies,
we do not find stong regional-cultural clusters, there is no compelling reason
to expect one for the Southern European countries.
Secondly, we should not exaggerate the similarity of the other background
conditions mentioned in the beginning of this article. To be sure, the new
European democracies have all recently emerged from authoritarian rule and
Italy also has a, more distant, authoritarian past, but, as noted above, so do
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Democracies also found a link between both dimensions on the one hand
and the degree to which the countries are plural societies on the other. Plural
societies are defined as 'societies that are sharply divided along religious,
ideological, linguistic, cultural, ethnic or racial lines into virtually separate
subsocieties with their own political parties, interest groups, and media of
communication', and Democracies used a threefold classification of the
countries into plural, semi-plural, and non-plural societies.18 As we move
from the upper right-hand corner to the lower left-hand corner of Figure 1, we
encounter plural and semi-plural societies with increasing frequency. This is
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again not a perfect relationship, and non-plural Japan and plural Luxembourg
are particularly striking deviant cases (although it is worth pointing out that
they are in the expected positions in terms of their population sizes).
Religiously and ideologically divided Italy, classified as semi-plural in
Democracies, and linguistically plural Spain are, as expected, below and to
the left of non-plural Greece and Portugal.
These explanations do not explain everything. For instance, they do not
account well for the relative positions of Italy and Spain nor for those of
Portugal and Greece. Italy and Spain should have traded places according to
both explanations, and Portugal and Greece's positions should have been
closer according to the plural-societies explanation. Nevertheless, these two
explanations work much better, both for the entire set of democracies and the
Southern European sub-group, than regional and cultural proximity. There is
no distinctive Southern European model of democracy, and the differences
that we find between Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece are differences that, on
the basis of a comparative analysis of democracies elsewhere, we should not
have been surprised to find.
NOTES
This article is part of a larger project which also includes a comparative analysis of Spain,
Portugal, and Greece in our Las Democracias Contemporáneas: Un Análisis Comparativo,
Barcelona, Editorial Ariel, 1987. We should like to thank David Laitin for his helpful comments,
Laura M. Pilkington for her research assistance, and the Committee on Research of the Academic
Senate, University of California, San Diego, the Hoover Institution, and the Ohio State
University Professional Leave Program for their financial support.
1. See, for instance, John H. Herz (ed.), From Dictatorship to Democracy: Coping with the
Legacies of Authoritarianism and Totalitarianism (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982);
Geoffrey Pridham (ed.), Special Issue on 'The New European Democracies: Regime
Transition in Spain, Greece and Portugal', West European Politics, Vol. 7, No. 2 (April
1984); Juan J. Linz, 'Europe's Southern Frontier: Evolving Trends Toward What?'
Daedalus, Vol 108, No. 1 (Winter 1979), pp. 175-209; Giovanni Arrighi(ed.). Semiperipheral
Development: The Politics of Southern Europe in the Twentieth Century (Beverly Hills:
Sage, 1985); and Dudley Seers, Bernard Schaffer, and Marja-Liisa Kiljunen (eds.),
Underdeveloped Europe: Studies in Core-Periphery Relations (Atlantic Highlands, NJ:
Humanities Press, 1979).
2. Geoffrey Pridham, 'Comparative Perspectives on the New Mediterranean Democracies: A
Model of Regime Transition?' West European Politics, Vol. 7, No. 2 (April 1984), p. 10.
Pridham does not endorse this view himself.
3. Arend Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in
A MEDITERRANEAN MODEL OF DEMOCRACY? 25
Twenty-One Countries (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984). For more detailed
analyses of Spanish, Portuguese and Greek politics, see Thomas C. Bruneau, Politics and
Nationhood: Post-Revolutionary Portugal (New York: Praeger, 1984); Thomas C. Bruneau
and Alex Macleod, Politics in Contemporary Portugal: Parties and the Consolidation of
Democracy (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1986): P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, 'Regime
Change and the Prospects for Democracy in Greece: 1974-1983', in Guillermo O'Donnell,
Philippe C. Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead (eds.), Transitionsfrom Authoritarian Rule:
Prospects for Democracy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp. 138-64; P.
Nikiforos Diamandouros, 'Transition to, and Consolidation of, Democratic Politics in
Greece, 1974-83: A Tentative Assessment', West European Politcs, Vol. 7, No. 2 (April
1984), pp. 50-71; and Richard Gunther, Giacomo Sani, and Goldie Shabad, Spain After
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