Kuroda v.

Jalandoni Digest
Kuroda vs. Jalandoni
G.R. L-2662, March 26, 1949
Ponente: Moran, C.J.

Facts:
1. Petitioner Sheginori Kuroda was the former Lt. General of the Japanese Army and
commanding general of the Japanese forces during the occupation (WWII) in the country. He was
tried before the Philippine Military Commission for War Crimes and other atrocities committed
against military and civilians. The military commission was establish under Executive Order 68.

2. Petitioner assails the validity of EO 68 arguing it is unconstitutional and hence the military
commission did not have the jurisdiction to try him on the following grounds:
- that the Philippines is not a signatory to the Hague Convention (War Crimes)

3. Petitioner likewise assails that the US is not a party of interest in the case hence the 2 US
prosecutors cannot practice law in the Philippines.

Issue: Whether or not EO 68 is constitutional thus the military tribunal jurisdiction is valid

HELD:

1. EO 68 is constitutional hence the tribunal has jurisdiction to try Kuroda. EO 68 was enacted by
the President and was in accordance with Sec. 3, Art. 2 of Constitution which renounces war as
an instrument of national policy. Hence it is in accordance with generally accepted principles of
international law including the Hague Convention and Geneva Convention, and
other international jurisprudence established by the UN, including the principle that all persons
(military or civilian) guilty of plan, preparing, waging a war of aggression and other offenses in
violation of laws and customs of war. The Philippines may not be a signatory to the 2 conventions
at that time but the rules and regulations of both are wholly based on the generally accepted
principles of international law. They were accepted even by the 2 belligerent nations (US and
Japan)

2. As to the participation of the 2 US prosecutors in the case, the US is a party of interest

because its country and people have greatly aggrieved by the crimes which petitioner was being
charged of.

3. Moreover, the Phil. Military Commission is a special military tribunal and rules as to parties and
representation are not governed by the rules of court but the provision of this special law.
Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v Duque III
Facts:
Petition for certiorari seeking to nullify the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations (RIRR)
of E.O. 51 (Milk Code). Petitioner claims that the RIRR is not valid as it contains provisions that
are not constitutional and go beyond what it is supposed to implement. Milk Code was issued by
President Cory Aquino under the Freedom Constitution on Oct.1986. One of the preambular
clauses of the Milk Code states that the law seeks to give effect to Art 11 of the Int’l Code of
Marketing and Breastmilk Substitutes(ICBMS), a code adopted by the World Health
Assembly(WHA). From 1982-2006, The WHA also adopted severe resolutions to the effect that
breastfeeding should be supported, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and health claims
are not permitted for breastmilk substitutes. In 2006, the DOH issued the assailed RIRR.

Issue:
Sub-Issue: W/N the pertinent int’l agreements entered into by the Phil are part of the law of the
land and may be implemented by DOH through the RIRR.

If yes, W/N the RIRR is in accord with int’l agreements

MAIN: W/N the DOH acted w/o or in excess of their jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of excess of jurisdiction and in violation of the Constitution by promulgating the
RIRR.

Held:
Sub-issue:
Yes for ICBMS. Under 1987 Consti, int’l law can become domestic law by transformation (thru
constitutional mechanism such as local legislation) or incorporation (mere constitutional
declaration i.e treaties) The ICBMS and WHA resolutions were not treaties as they have not been
concurred by 2/3 of all members of the Senate as required under Sec, 21, Art 8. However, the
ICBMS had been transformed into domestic law through a local legislation such as the Milk Code.
The Milk Code is almost a verbatim reproduction of ICBMS.

No for WHA Resolutions. The Court ruled that DOH failed to establish that the provisions
pertinent WHA resolutions are customary int’l law that may be deemed part of the law of the land.
For an int’l rule to be considered as customary law, it must be established that such rule is being
followed by states because they consider it as obligatory to comply with such rules (opinion juris).
The WHO resolutions, although signed by most of the member states, were enforced or practiced
by at least a majority of member states. Unlike the ICBMS whereby legislature enacted most of
the provisions into the law via the Milk Code, the WHA Resolutions (specifically providing for
exclusive breastfeeding from 0-6 months, breastfeeding up to 24 Months and absolutely
prohibiting ads for breastmilk substitutes) have not been adopted as domestic law nor are they
followed in our country as well. The Filipinos have the option of how to take care of their babies
as they see fit. WHA Resolutions may be classified as SOFT LAW – non-binding norms,
principles and practices that influence state behavior. Soft law is not part of int’l law.

Main issue:
Yes. Some parts of the RIRR were not in consonance with the Milk Code such as Sec. 4(f) -
>advertising, promotions of formula are prohibited,
Sec 11 -> prohibitions for advertising breastmilk substitutes intended for infants and young
children uo to 24 months
And Sec 46 -> sanctions for advertising .
These provisions are declared null and void. The DOH and respondents are prohibited from
implementing said provisions.
IBP vs. Zamora G.R. No.141284, August 15, 2000
IBP vs. Zamora
G.R. No.141284, August 15, 2000

Facts: Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, the
President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the
proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing
criminal or lawless violence. The President declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-
crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time
when the situation shall have improved. The IBP filed a petition seeking to declare the
deployment of the Philippine Marines null and void and unconstitutional.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not the President’s factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed
forces is subject to judicial review

(2) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols
violates the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian
character of the PNP

Held:
When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. Under Sec.
18, Art. VII of the Constitution, Congress may revoke such proclamation of martial law or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the Court may review the sufficiency
of the factual basis thereof. However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the
revocation or review of the President’s action to call out the armed forces. The distinction places
the calling out power in a different category from the power to declare martial law and power to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution
would have simply lumped together the 3 powers and provided for their revocation and review
without any qualification.

The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said powers highlights the intent to grant the
President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the power to call out because it is
considered as the lesser and more benign power compared to the power to suspend the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial law, both of which involve the
curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms, and thus
necessitating safeguards by Congress and review by the Court.

In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to determine the
necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the
President’s decision is totally bereft of factual basis. The present petition fails to discharge such
heavy burden, as there is no evidence to support the assertion that there exists no justification for
calling out the armed forces.

The Court disagrees to the contention that by the deployment of the Marines, the civilian task of
law enforcement is “militarized” in violation of Sec. 3, Art. II of the Constitution. The deployment of
the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the
Marines constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The local
police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real authority
belonging to the PNP

Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian
character of the police force. The real authority in the operations is lodged with the head of a
civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the military. Since none of the Marines was incorporated
or enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be no appointment to civilian position to speak of.
Hence, the deployment of the Marines in the joint visibility patrols does not destroy the civilian
character of the PNP.