G.R. No. 179736, June 26, 2013, SPOUSES BILL AND VICTORIA HING, PETITIONERS, VS. considers as private.
onsiders as private. And as long as his right is recognized by society, other individuals may
ALEXANDER CHOACHUY, SR. AND ALLAN CHOACHUY, RESPONDENTS.

 not infringe on his right to privacy. The CA, therefore, erred in limiting the application of
“In this day and age, video surveillance cameras are installed practically everywhere for the
protection and safety of everyone. The installation of these cameras, however, should not
cover places where there is reasonable expectation of privacy, unless the consent of the
individual, whose right to privacy would be affected, was obtained”
Bill and Victoria, spouses, filed a Complaint for Injunction and Damages with prayer for
issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction against Alexander and Allan. According to them,
they own the lot adjacent to the lots owned by Aldo Development and Resources, where
Alex and Allan are stockholders. The corporation built an auto-shop building on Lot 1900-C
adjacent to the lot owned by Bill and Victoria. In April, 2005, Aldo filed a case for injunction
and damages against Bill and Victoria claiming that they were constructing a fence without a
valid permit and the construction would destroy its building. The court denied the application
by Aldo for preliminary injunction for failure to substantiate its allegations. To gather
evidence against the spouses, Aldo illegally set-up on the building of Aldo two video
surveillance camera facing petitioners party and through their employees and without the
consent of spouses took pictures of their on-going construction; thus it violates their right to
privacy. The spouses prayed that Alexander and Allan be ordered to remove their video-
cameras and stopped from conducting illegal surveillance.
Answering, Alexander and Allan claimed that they did not install the cameras, nor ordered
their employees to take pictures of the spouse’s construction; they also averred that they are
mere stockholders of Aldo;
The Regional Trial Court granted the prayer for temporary restraining order and directed
Alexander and Allan to remove their video cameras and install them elsewhere where the
spouse’s property will no longer be viewed.
Alexander and Allan filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which granted
their petition.
Bill and Victoria therefore elevated the case to the Supreme Court:
“The right to privacy is enshrined in our Constitution and in our laws. It is defined as “the
right to be free from unwarranted exploitation of one’s person or from intrusion into one’s
private activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a person’s ordinary sensibilities.” It
is the right of an individual “to be free from unwarranted publicity, or to live without
unwarranted interference by the public in matters in which the public is not necessarily
concerned.” Simply put, the right to privacy is “the right to be let alone.”
The Bill of Rights guarantees the people’s right to privacy and protects them against the
State’s abuse of power. In this regard, the State recognizes the right of the people to be
secure in their houses. No one, not even the State, except “in case of overriding social need
and then only under the stringent procedural safeguards,” can disturb them in the privacy of
their homes.”
xxx
“Our Code specifically mentions “prying into the privacy of another’s residence.” This does
not mean, however, that only the residence is entitled to privacy, because the law covers
also “similar acts.” A business office is entitled to the same privacy when the public is
excluded therefrom and only such individuals as are allowed to enter may come in. x x x[
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, an individual’s right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code should not be
confined to his house or residence as it may extend to places where he has the right to
exclude the public or deny them access. The phrase “prying into the privacy of another’s
residence,” therefore, covers places, locations, or even situations which an individual
Article 26(1) of the Civil Code only to residences.”
xxx
In ascertaining whether there is a violation of the right to privacy, courts use the “reasonable
expectation of privacy” test. This test determines whether a person has a reasonable
expectation of privacy and whether the expectation has been violated. In Ople v. Torres, we
enunciated that “the reasonableness of a person’s expectation of privacy depends on a two-
part test: (1) whether, by his conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy;
and (2) this expectation is one that society recognizes as reasonable.” Customs, community
norms, and practices may, therefore, limit or extend an individual’s “reasonable expectation
of privacy.” Hence, the reasonableness of a person’s expectation of privacy must be
determined on a case-to-case basis since it depends on the factual circumstances
surrounding the case.
In this day and age, video surveillance cameras are installed practically everywhere for the
protection and safety of everyone. The installation of these cameras, however, should not
cover places where there is reasonable expectation of privacy, unless the consent of the
individual, whose right to privacy would be affected, was obtained. Nor should these
cameras be used to pry into the privacy of another’s residence or business office as it would
be no different from eavesdropping, which is a crime under Republic Act No. 4200 or the
Anti-Wiretapping Law.
“The concept of liberty would be emasculated if it does not likewise compel respect for
[one’s] personality as a unique individual whose claim to privacy and [non]-interference
demands respect.”
Briccio “Ricky” A. Pollo v. Karina Constantino-David, G.R. No. 181881, October 18, 2011
DECISION
(En Banc)
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
I. THE FACTS
[This case involves a search of office computer assigned to a government employee who was
then charged administratively and was eventually dismissed from the service. The
employee’s personal files stored in the computer were used by the government employer as
evidence of his misconduct.]
On January 3, 2007, an anonymous letter-complaint was received by the respondent Civil
Service Commission (CSC) Chairperson alleging that the “chief of the Mamamayan muna
hindi mamaya na division” of Civil Service Commission Regional Office No. IV (CSC-ROIV) has
been lawyering for public officials with pending cases in the CSC. Chairperson David
immediately formed a team with background in information technology and issued a
memorandum directing them “to back up all the files in the computers found in the [CSC-
ROIV] Mamamayan Muna (PALD) and Legal divisions.”
The team proceeded at once to the CSC-ROIV office and backed up all files in the hard disk of
computers at the Public Assistance and Liaison Division (PALD) and the Legal Services
Division. This was witnessed by several employees. At around 10:00 p.m. of the same day,
the investigating team finished their task. The next day, all the computers in the PALD were
sealed and secured. The diskettes containing the back-up files sourced from the hard disk of
PALD and LSD computers were then turned over to Chairperson David. It was found that
most of the files in the 17 diskettes containing files copied from the computer assigned to
and being used by the petitioner, numbering about 40 to 42 documents, were draft pleadings
or letters in connection with administrative cases in the CSC and other tribunals. Chairperson
David thus issued a Show-Cause Order requiring the petitioner to submit his explanation or
counter-affidavit within five days from notice.
Petitioner filed his Comment, denying that he is the person referred to in the anonymous
letter-complaint. He asserted that he had protested the unlawful taking of his computer
done while he was on leave, citing the letter dated January 8, 2007 in which he informed
Director Castillo of CSC-ROIV that the files in his computer were his personal files and those
of his sister, relatives, friends and some associates and that he is not authorizing their
sealing, copying, duplicating and printing as these would violate his constitutional right to
privacy and protection against self-incrimination and warrantless search and seizure. He
pointed out that though government property, the temporary use and ownership of the
computer issued under a Memorandum of Receipt is ceded to the employee who may
exercise all attributes of ownership, including its use for personal purposes. In view of the
illegal search, the files/documents copied from his computer without his consent [are] thus
inadmissible as evidence, being “fruits of a poisonous tree.”
The CSC found prima facie case against the petitioner and charged him with Dishonesty,
Grave Misconduct, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and Violation of
R.A. No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees).
Petitioner then filed an Omnibus Motion (For Reconsideration, to Dismiss and/or to Defer)
assailing the formal charge as without basis having proceeded from an illegal search, which is
beyond the authority of the CSC Chairman, such power pertaining solely to the court. The
CSC denied this omnibus motion.
On March 14, 2007, petitioner filed an Urgent Petition before the Court of Appeals (CA)
assailing both the January 11, 2007 Show-Cause Order and February 26, 2007 Resolution as
having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or total absence of
jurisdiction. On July 24, 2007, the CSC issued a Resolution finding petitioner GUILTY of
Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and
Violation of Republic Act 6713. He is meted the penalty of DISMISSAL FROM THE SERVICE
with all its accessory penalties. This Resolution was also brought to the CA by herein
petitioner.
By a Decision dated October 11, 2007, the CA dismissed the petitioner’s petition for certiorari
after finding no grave abuse of discretion committed by respondents CSC officials. His
motion for reconsideration having been denied by the CA, petitioner brought this appeal
before the Supreme Court.
II. THE ISSUE
Was the search conducted on petitioner’s office computer and the copying of his personal
files without his knowledge and consent – alleged as a transgression on his constitutional
right to privacy – lawful?
III. THE RULING
[The Supreme Court DENIED the petition and AFFIRMED the CA, which in turn upheld the CSC
resolution dismissing the petitioner from service. The High Tribunal held that the search on
petitioner’s office computer and the copying of his personal files were both LAWFUL and DID
NOT VIOLATE his constitutional right to privacy.]
The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in this jurisdiction as a facet of the right
protected by the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure under Section 2, Article
III of the 1987 Constitution. The constitutional guarantee is not a prohibition of all searches
and seizures but only of “unreasonable” searches and seizures.
[The Supreme Court then discussed the American cases that served as jurisprudential bases
for its ruling:
That the Fourth Amendment [of the U.S. Constitution] equally applies to a government
workplace was addressed in the 1987 case of O’Connor v. Ortega. In O’Connor the [U.S.
Supreme] Court recognized that “special needs” authorize warrantless searches involving
public employees for work-related reasons. The [U.S. Supreme] Court thus laid down a
balancing test under which government interests are weighed against the employee’s
reasonable expectation of privacy. This reasonableness test implicates neither probable
cause nor the warrant requirement, which are related to law enforcement.
O’Connor was applied in subsequent cases raising issues on employees’ privacy rights in the
workplace. One of these cases involved a government employer’s search of an office
computer, United States v. Mark L. Simons where the defendant Simons, an employee of a
division of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), was convicted of receiving and possessing
materials containing child pornography. In this case, the US Supreme Court held that the
search remains valid under the O’Connor exception to the warrant requirement because
evidence of the crime was discovered in the course of an otherwise proper administrative
inspection. Simons’ violation of the agency’s Internet policy happened also to be a violation
of criminal law; this does not mean that said employer lost the capacity and interests of an
employer. The warrantless entry into Simons’ office was reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment standard announced in O’Connor because at the inception of the search, the
employer had “reasonable grounds for suspecting” that the hard drive would yield evidence
of misconduct, as the employer was already aware that Simons had misused his Internet
access to download over a thousand pornographic images. The retrieval of the hard drive
was reasonably related to the objective of the search, and the search was not excessively
intrusive. Thus, while Simons had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office, he did not
have such legitimate expectation of privacy with regard to the files in his computer.]
Applying the analysis and principles announced in O’Connor and Simons to the case at bar,
we now address the following questions: (1) Did petitioner have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in his office and computer files?; and (2) Was the search authorized by the CSC Chair,
[which involved] the copying of the contents of the hard drive on petitioner’s computer,
reasonable in its inception and scope?
(1) NO, the petitioner had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his office and computer
files.
Petitioner failed to prove that he had an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy either in
his office or government-issued computer which contained his personal files. Petitioner did
not allege that he had a separate enclosed office which he did not share with anyone, or that
his office was always locked and not open to other employees or visitors. Neither did he
allege that he used passwords or adopted any means to prevent other employees from
accessing his computer files. On the contrary, he submits that being in the public assistance
office of the CSC-ROIV, he normally would have visitors in his office like friends, associates
and even unknown people, whom he even allowed to use his computer which to him seemed
a trivial request. He described his office as “full of people, his friends, unknown people” and
that in the past 22 years he had been discharging his functions at the PALD, he is “personally
assisting incoming clients, receiving documents, drafting cases on appeals, in charge of
accomplishment report, Mamamayan Muna Program, Public Sector Unionism, Correction of
name, accreditation of service, and hardly had any time for himself alone, that in fact he
stays in the office as a paying customer.” Under this scenario, it can hardly be deduced that
petitioner had such expectation of privacy that society would recognize as reasonable.
Moreover, even assuming arguendo, in the absence of allegation or proof of the
aforementioned factual circumstances, that petitioner had at least a subjective expectation
of privacy in his computer as he claims, such is negated by the presence of policy regulating
the use of office computers [CSC Office Memorandum No. 10, S. 2002 “Computer Use Policy
(CUP)”], as in Simons. The CSC in this case had implemented a policy that put its employees
on notice that they have no expectation of privacy in anything they create, store, send or
receive on the office computers, and that the CSC may monitor the use of the computer
resources using both automated or human means. This implies that on-the-spot inspections
may be done to ensure that the computer resources were used only for such legitimate
business purposes.
(2) YES, the search authorized by the respondent CSC Chair, which involved the copying of
the contents of the hard drive on petitioner’s computer, was reasonable in its inception and
scope.
The search of petitioner’s computer files was conducted in connection with investigation of
work-related misconduct prompted by an anonymous letter-complaint addressed to
Chairperson David regarding anomalies in the CSC-ROIV where the head of the Mamamayan
Muna Hindi Mamaya Na division is supposedly “lawyering” for individuals with pending cases
in the CSC. A search by a government employer of an employee’s office is justified at
inception when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that it will turn up evidence that
the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct.
Under the facts obtaining, the search conducted on petitioner’s computer was justified
at its inception and scope. We quote with approval the CSC’s discussion on the
reasonableness of its actions, consistent as it were with the guidelines established by
O’Connor:
Even conceding for a moment that there is no such administrative policy, there is no doubt in
the mind of the Commission that the search of Pollo’s computer has successfully passed the
test of reasonableness for warrantless searches in the workplace as enunciated in the above-
discussed American authorities. It bears emphasis that the Commission pursued the search
in its capacity as a government employer and that it was undertaken in connection with an
investigation involving a work-related misconduct, one of the circumstances exempted from
the warrant requirement. At the inception of the search, a complaint was received
recounting that a certain division chief in the CSCRO No. IV was “lawyering” for parties
having pending cases with the said regional office or in the Commission. The nature of the
imputation was serious, as it was grievously disturbing. If, indeed, a CSC employee was
found to be furtively engaged in the practice of “lawyering” for parties with pending cases
before the Commission would be a highly repugnant scenario, then such a case would have
shattering repercussions. It would undeniably cast clouds of doubt upon the institutional
integrity of the Commission as a quasi-judicial agency, and in the process, render it less
effective in fulfilling its mandate as an impartial and objective dispenser of administrative
justice. It is settled that a court or an administrative tribunal must not only be actually
impartial but must be seen to be so, otherwise the general public would not have any trust
and confidence in it.
Considering the damaging nature of the accusation, the Commission had to act fast, if only to
arrest or limit any possible adverse consequence or fall-out. Thus, on the same date that the
complaint was received, a search was forthwith conducted involving the computer resources
in the concerned regional office. That it was the computers that were subjected to the
search was justified since these furnished the easiest means for an employee to encode and
store documents. Indeed, the computers would be a likely starting point in ferreting out
incriminating evidence. Concomitantly, the ephemeral nature of computer files, that is, they
could easily be destroyed at a click of a button, necessitated drastic and immediate action.
Pointedly, to impose the need to comply with the probable cause requirement would
invariably defeat the purpose of the wok-related investigation.
Thus, petitioner’s claim of violation of his constitutional right to privacy must necessarily fail.
His other argument invoking the privacy of communication and correspondence under
Section 3(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution is also untenable considering the recognition
accorded to certain legitimate intrusions into the privacy of employees in the government
workplace under the aforecited authorities. We likewise find no merit in his contention that
O’Connor and Simons are not relevant because the present case does not involve a criminal
offense like child pornography. As already mentioned, the search of petitioner’s computer
was justified there being reasonable ground for suspecting that the files stored therein would
yield incriminating evidence relevant to the investigation being conducted by CSC as
government employer of such misconduct subject of the anonymous complaint. This
situation clearly falls under the exception to the warrantless requirement in administrative
searches defined in O’Connor.
Rhonda Vivares vs St. Theresa’s College
Political Law – Constitutional Law – Bill of Rights – Right to Privacy – Online Privacy (Social
Media)
Remedial Law – Special Proceedings – Writ of Habeas Data
In January 2012, Angela Tan, a high school student at St. Theresa’s College (STC), uploaded
on Facebook several pictures of her and her classmates (Nenita Daluz and Julienne Suzara)
wearing only their undergarments.
Thereafter, some of their classmates reported said photos to their teacher, Mylene Escudero.
Escudero, through her students, viewed and downloaded said pictures. She showed the said
pictures to STC’s Discipline-in-Charge for appropriate action.
Later, STC found Tan et al to have violated the student’s handbook and banned them from
“marching” in their graduation ceremonies scheduled in March 2012.
The issue went to court but despite a TRO (temporary restraining order) granted by the Cebu
RTC enjoining the school from barring the students in the graduation ceremonies, STC still
barred said students.
Subsequently, Rhonda Vivares, mother of Nenita, and the other mothers filed a petition for
the issuance of the writ of habeas data against the school. They argued, among others, that:
1. The privacy setting of their children’s Facebook accounts was set at “Friends Only.” They,
thus, have a reasonable expectation of privacy which must be respected.
2. The photos accessed belong to the girls and, thus, cannot be used and reproduced
without their consent. Escudero, however, violated their rights by saving digital copies of the
photos and by subsequently showing them to STC’s officials. Thus, the Facebook accounts of
the children were intruded upon;
3. The intrusion into the Facebook accounts, as well as the copying of information, data, and
digital images happened at STC’s Computer Laboratory;
They prayed that STC be ordered to surrender and deposit with the court all soft and printed
copies of the subject data and have such data be declared illegally obtained in violation of
the children’s right to privacy.
The Cebu RTC eventually denied the petition. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for writ of habeas data is proper.
HELD: Yes, it is proper but in this case, it will not prosper.
Contrary to the arguments of STC, the Supreme Court ruled that:
1. The petition for writ of habeas data can be availed of even if this is not a case of extralegal
killing or enforced disappearance; and
2. The writ of habeas data can be availed of against STC even if it is not an entity engaged in
the business of “gathering, collecting, or storing data or information regarding the person,
family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party”.
First, the Rule on Habeas Data does not state that it can be applied only in cases of extralegal
killings or enforced disappearances. Second, nothing in the Rule would suggest that the
habeas data protection shall be available only against abuses of a person or entity engaged in
the business of gathering, storing, and collecting of data.
Right to Privacy on Social Media (Online Networking Sites)
The Supreme Court ruled that if an online networking site (ONS) like Facebook has privacy
tools, and the user makes use of such privacy tools, then he or she has a reasonable
expectation of privacy (right to informational privacy, that is). Thus, such privacy must be
respected and protected.
In this case, however, there is no showing that the students concerned made use of such
privacy tools. Evidence would show that that their post (status) on Facebook were published
as “Public”.
Facebook has the following settings to control as to who can view a user’s posts on his “wall”
(profile page):
(a) Public – the default setting; every Facebook user can view the photo;
(b) Friends of Friends – only the user’s Facebook friends and their friends can view the photo;
(c) Friends – only the user’s Facebook friends can view the photo;
(d) Custom – the photo is made visible only to particular friends and/or networks of the
Facebook user; and
(e) Only Me – the digital image can be viewed only by the user.
The default setting is “Public” and if a user wants to have some privacy, then he must choose
any setting other than “Public”. If it is true that the students concerned did set the posts
subject of this case so much so that only five people can see them (as they claim), then how
come most of their classmates were able to view them. This fact was not refuted by them. In
fact, it was their classmates who informed and showed their teacher, Escudero, of the said
pictures. Therefore, it appears that Tan et al never use the privacy settings of Facebook
hence, they have no reasonable expectation of privacy on the pictures of them scantily clad.
STC did not violate the students’ right to privacy. The manner which the school gathered the
pictures cannot be considered illegal. As it appears, it was the classmates of the students
who showed the picture to their teacher and the latter, being the recipient of said pictures,
merely delivered them to the proper school authority and it was for a legal purpose, that is,
to discipline their students according to the standards of the school (to which the students
and their parents agreed to in the first place because of the fact that they enrolled their
children there).
Some notable foreign jurisprudence used by the Supreme Court in this case:
1. United States v. Gines-Perez: “A person who places a photograph on the Internet precisely
intends to forsake and renounce all privacy rights to such imagery, particularly under
circumstances such as here, where the Defendant did not employ protective measures or
devices that would have controlled access to the Web page or the photograph itself.”
2. United States v. Maxwell: “The more open the method of transmission is, the less privacy arbitrarily deprived. It would be therefore inappropriate to construe the limitations to the
one can reasonably expect. Messages sent to the public at large in the chat room or e-mail right to return to ones country in the same context as those pertaining to the liberty of
that is forwarded from correspondent to correspondent loses any semblance of privacy.” abode and the right to travel.

3. H v. W, (South Africa Case dated January 30, 2013): “The law has to take into account the
changing realities not only technologically but also socially or else it will lose credibility in the
eyes of the people. x x x It is imperative that the courts respond appropriately to changing
times, acting cautiously and with wisdom.”
This case recognized this ability of Facebook users to “customize their privacy settings,” but
did so with this caveat: “Facebook states in its policies that, although it makes every effort to
protect a user’s information, these privacy settings are not foolproof.”
The Bill of rights treats only the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is a well
considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle
of International Law and under our Constitution as part of the law of the land.
The court held that President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in
determining that the return of the Former Pres. Marcos and his family poses a serious threat
to national interest and welfare. President Aquino has determined that the destabilization
caused by the return of the Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved during the past
few years after the Marcos regime.

MARCOS VS. MANGLAPUS [177 SCRA 668; G.R. NO. 88211; 15 SEPT 1989] The return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat and therefore prohibiting their return to
Friday, February 06, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes the Philippines, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: This case involves a petition of mandamus and prohibition asking the court to order
the respondents Secretary of Foreign Affairs, etc. To issue a travel documents to former Pres.
Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the
President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines. Petitioners assert that the right of
the Marcoses to return in the Philippines is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, specifically
Sections 1 and 6. They contended that Pres. Aquino is without power to impair the liberty of
abode of the Marcoses because only a court may do so within the limits prescribed by law.
Nor the President impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so.

They further assert that under international law, their right to return to the Philippines is
guaranteed particularly by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which has been ratified by the Philippines.

Issue: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the constitution, the
President (Aquino) may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.

Held: "It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from
the Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel
would normally connote. Essentially, the right involved in this case at bar is the right to
return to one's country, a distinct right under international law, independent from although
related to the right to travel. Thus, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of movement
and abode within the territory of a state, the right to leave the country, and the right to enter
one's country as separate and distinct rights. What the Declaration speaks of is the "right to
freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state". On the other hand,
the Covenant guarantees the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his
residence and the right to be free to leave any country, including his own. Such rights may
only be restricted by laws protecting the national security, public order, public health or
morals or the separate rights of others. However, right to enter one's country cannot be