surmised.
By the 1960s, the nuclear mission
was standard and pilots were flying an
aircraft purpose-built for it, the F-105
Thunderchief.
The “Thud” gained glory in its ex-
ploits in combat over Vietnam. How-
ever, when Republic Aviation started
its program for the F-105 nuclear
fighter-bomber in 1951, the idea was
to replace the F-84 with a faster fighter
specifically designed to be a tactical
nuclear workhorse. The first prototype
of the F-105 flew in 1955 and USAF
took deliveries of production aircraft
beginning in 1958.
Key to the design of the F-105 was
An F-84 carries a 30-inch nuclear weapon. The newly miniaturized nukes weighed the 15-foot-long internal weapons bay
just 1,680 pounds, far lighter than the weapons designed to be carried on bombers. for a nuclear bomb. Its Pratt and Whit-
60 AIR FORCE Magazine / March 2011
ney J75 engine gave it an impressive
26,500 pounds of thrust. McPeak’s Life on Victor Alert
Speed was a Thud virtue. In 1959,
an F-105B flown by Lt. Gen. Joseph In 1962, Capt. Tony McPeak was pulling Victor Alert in the F-100 at RAF
Moore set a world speed record and Station Woodbridge in England.
claimed the prestigious Bendix Trophy. “My first Victor Alert (VA) target is the airfield at Peenemünde, on the
“Nothing in the world could outrun her Baltic—the site of Germany’s rocket-development effort during World War
at low altitude,” praised F-105 pilot II and, at the moment, home station for an East German fighter regiment,”
Don Henry. Merrill A. McPeak, who went on to become Air Force Chief of Staff, writes
Bases like Osan in South Korea and in The Aerial View, a forthcoming book.
on Okinawa in Japan also became prime “We keep a bulky target folder, which includes all these details, locked in
a safe at the VA facility. In the event of a launch order, we’ll grab this folder
sites for F-105s on nuclear alert. Rotat- and take it with us as we run to the aircraft. But at night or in bad weather,
ing squadrons of F-105s provided quick an F-100 pilot would find it quite impossible to give much attention to maps,
reaction at Osan. Their targets included target photographs, checklists, and the like. Incapable of sustaining any-
locations in North Korea, China, and thing longer than momentary hands-off flight, the plane requires constant
the Soviet Union. “My target was a attention. In theory, if you memorized every detail of the planned flight, you
North Korean airfield. I studied that could concentrate on flying the aircraft and just might find the target. At
same target for three years,” recalled least, that’s the premise.
former USAF Capt. Charles G. Hofe- “The target folder also contains a Moshe Dayan–style eye patch. As we
lich in an October 2010 interview with strap in and crank up the airplane, we’re supposed to put the patch on under
the Charlotte Sun newspaper of Port our crash helmet, covering one eye. It’s tough enough navigating with two
eyes but, inbound to the target, nuclear bombs will be going off all around
Charlotte, Fla. Time on alert was called us, with a real risk of flash blindness. Using the patch, we’ll protect one eye,
“the pad” and pilots grew accustomed giving us two shots at getting there. ...
to the 72-hour alert cycles. Hofelich, “All aircrews must participate in the so-called Human Reliability Program,
who was stationed on Okinawa, had a documentation nightmare with enough tricky paperwork to guarantee tech-
few qualms about it. “I’d rather be in nical noncompliance. It’s supposed to ensure the mental and psychological
the air delivering a nuclear bomb than fitness of anyone with access to nuclear weapons. ...
receiving one,” he said. “We all drink too much and many are uncivilized to the point of clinical
American pilots and NATO allies certifiability,” McPeak continues.
were not the only ones mastering tacti- “None of this is disqualifying under the HRP. Paradoxically, were we to admit
cal nuclear procedures. Beginning with any (quite sensible) reservations about the benefits of launching an F-100
into the night and gloom to make one-eyed vertical delivery maneuvers over
the Su-7, the Soviet Union equipped a designated ground zero, we’d be debarred and removed from the rolls.”
its Frontal Aviation (tactical air force)
fighters with nuclear bombs, too.
As both East and West piled up
nuclear arsenals, the tension between The F-111 wings in England in the Yet by the 1970s, new questions
the Quick Reaction Alert forces ratch- 1970s were tasked with quickly launch- emerged about the tactics of nuclear
eted up. By the late 1970s, the US had ing up to 60 aircraft under certain war fighters. The sheer number of fighters on
1,000 aircraft—not including USAF plans. F-111s could carry multiple B61 Quick Reaction Alert made analysts and
B-52s—capable of carrying tactical warheads. diplomats nervous. A 1974 Brookings
nuclear weapons. As many as 324 F-4s The B61 was an external weapon Institution book advocated terminating
and 156 F-111s were in Western Europe, designed in the 1960s to withstand Quick Reaction Alert, “which many
while two Navy carriers added nuclear- the stress of fighter maneuvers such as analysts believe increases the possi-
capable A-6s and A-7s on the flanks. supersonic flight, low-level ingress, and bility of a nuclear exchange because
A 1977 report from the Congressional pop-ups prior to weapons release. During systems kept on QRA constitute a
Budget Office elaborated on the new exercises, as many as three squadrons standing invitation to pre-emption.”
pressures. “NATO must be seen to have of F-111s had to be started from carts The reaction from the Warsaw Pact
the capability and determination to use at once. Black clouds of smoke rose proved Victor Alert must have been
these forces if necessary,” said the CBO. over the airfield as the F-111s taxied at working: Soviet negotiators expressed
Enough NATO theater nuclear weapons 15-second launch intervals. great interest in limiting nuclear-capa-
must be able to survive a Soviet attack, ble tactical aircraft as arms control talks
and be able to threaten an appropriate A Changing Strategic Context got under way in the 1970s.
response, CBO added. Of course, fighters weren’t the only With new Ground Launched Cruise
Secretary of Defense Harold Brown nuclear platforms. By the 1970s, NATO Missiles in development, strategists,
left no doubt the nuclear fighter bases in bristled with a vast array of tactical too, debated the continuing role for
the West were targets for Soviet attack. nuclear weapons. Systems included Quick Reaction Alert. Ultimately,
“We would expect them to try, at the the Nike Hercules air defense missile, NATO would not back away from the
outset of an attack, to hit targets such as Honest John surface-to-surface mis- flexibility offered by QRA.
command centers, nuclear storage sites, sile, 155 mm and eight-inch nuclear “A strong argument can be made that
airfields supporting nuclear delivery howitzer shells, anti-submarine warfare the USAF merits a ‘well done’ for this
aircraft,” Brown testified in 1979. weapons, plus nuclear land mines and mission, particularly if one bases that
This meant NATO’s nuclear fight- dual-capable aircraft gravity bombs. It evaluation on the ambiguous metric of
ers—now primarily the F-111 and all added up to what NATO strategists deterred enemy attacks,” wrote Lt. Col.
F-4—had to get off their airfields fast. called “flexible response.” Richard L. Hodgkinson in a 1981 article
AIR FORCE Magazine / March 2011 61
for Air University Review. Hodgkinson the aircraft and airborne in less than An F-111 takes off for a mission over
cited the new questions about Quick 15 minutes. West Germany. The F-111s could carry
Reaction Alert. The F-16s on Victor Alert exercised multiple B61 tactical nuclear bombs.
The strategic context for NATO was the capability in two ways. First was
changing. the scramble, under firm rules. Pilots in hopes of deterring escalation to all-out
Tactics, doctrine, and equipment put scrambled into the cockpit, powered up nuclear exchange.
the emphasis on strengthening conven- the aircraft, and copied down the target- As the Cold War entered its last de-
tional forces in the 1980s. High-level ing message sent from headquarters. cade, the alert culture was still deeply
talk ran to the possibility of fighting a The firm rule was never to taxi with embedded in the tactical forces provid-
war without use of nuclear weapons. the nuclear weapons loaded. Usually ing extended deterrence. Even a minor
In the end, the high-level debate on a security forces member or vehicle failure led to the immediate firing of the
theater forces in nuclear strategy had blocked the jet aircraft in its shelter just wing commander.
little impact on USAF airmen. They were to be sure. Everything about a Victor The mission continued. In 1988,
still entrusted with the alert mission. Alert scramble was intense, from the USAF began work on new software
From 1982 onward, the new F-16 picked security forces with sidearms to the to certify the F-15E to carry nuclear
up additional duties as a nuclear fighter- live ammunition on the F-16s. A single weapons. Ultimately, nuclear-capable
bomber. F-16 squadrons with a nuclear mistake could cause the entire fighter F-15Es joined the 48th Wing at RAF
mission were known as “triple doc” wing to be decertified. Lakenheath in England.
squadrons since they also maintained Tactical nuclear weapons for premier
proficiency in air-to-air and conventional As Long as There Are Nukes fighters remain a source of military
air-to-ground missions. These F-16s sat After the scramble, there was still a strength even in the changed and ex-
Victor Alert at bases including Ramstein mission profile to fly. Weapons loaders panded NATO of the 21st century. US
Air Base in Germany. removed the nuclear weapons and se- Air Forces in Europe pilots no longer sit
Under NATO’s quick response man- curity forces returned them to storage. Victor Alert. However, F-16s and F-15Es
dates, two aircraft from each squadron Once the weapons were secured, pilots do retain the ability to move back to an
in a wing of three squadrons might be would return to fly the nuclear mission alert posture and arm up with nuclear
on alert, with B61s loaded, at all times. profile—without the weapons loaded. weapons if necessary.
The aircrews had to demonstrate they One refinement was the tasking of In time, the F-35 will take over the
could take off within 15 minutes of an selective response aircraft. role. As Secretary of State Hillary Rod-
alert order. Under the selective response mission, ham Clinton said in April last year, “We
The fighter wings also trained for air fighters would have retaliatory targets should recognize that as long as nuclear
defense and conventional attack roles. to hit after a Soviet attack. These small, weapons exist, NATO will remain a
Aircrews preferred the weekend alert selective nuclear strikes were envisioned nuclear alliance.” n
missions—so as not to miss regular
flying during the week. The rules Rebecca Grant is president of IRIS Independent Research. She has written ex-
allowed alert aircrew to move about tensively on airpower and serves as director, Mitchell Institute, for AFA. Her most
on base and even dine at the officers recent article for Air Force Magazine, “The Evolution of Airpower Under Gates,”
club, as long as they could get back to appeared in the February issue.
62 AIR FORCE Magazine / March 2011