People v.

Dimaano September 14, 2005

FACTS: Maricar Dimaano charged her father, Edgardo Dimaano with 2 counts of rape and 1 count
of attempted rape. The first incident happened when Maricar was still 10 years old. While inside
their house in Sucat, Paraaque, appellant entered her room and laid down beside her. He removed
her clothes and asked her to lie face down then inserted his penis into her anus. Complainant cried
and felt so much pain, but she kept the incident to herself as her father might hurt her.

She was again ravished by her father after a few days. This time, her father inserted his
penis into her vagina. On December 29, 1995, her father sexually assaulted her again. The last
sexual assault happened in the afternoon of January 1, 1996. Appellant stopped only when he
heard the arrival of his wife.

The Medico-Legal Officer at the PNP Crime Laboratory examined complainant and found
her to have suffered deep healed hymenal lacerations and was in a non-virgin state. Appellant
denied the accusations stating that he was always in the office from 7:00am until 9:00pm waiting to
be dispatched to another assignment overseas. He claimed it was impossible for him to rape his
daughter on December 29, 1995 or January 1, 1996 because there were other people in the house.

He argued that had he raped complainant, then she would not have accompanied him to the
Paraaque Police Station and Barangay Hall of San Antonio to apply for police clearance and
barangay I.D., and to Uniwide Shopping Center at Sucat, Paraaque, where they applied for
membership at the Video City Club.

The trial court convicted Edgardo and disregarded the Compromise Agreement and the
Salaysay sa Pag-uurong ng Sumbong since the complainant was not assisted by a lawyer when
she signed the same. CA affirmed the decision.

ISSUE:a.) WON the evidence adduced by the prosecution has overcome the presumption of
innocence of the accused. - YES

b.) WON the voluntary and due execution of the affidavit of desistance by the private
complainant should have been duly considered as a factor which put to doubt the reasons behind
the filing of the criminal charges of rape against the accused. NO

c.) WON the complaint for attempted Rape was valid - NO

HELD: A.) - This credibility given by the trial court to the rape victim is an important aspect of
evidence which appellate courts can rely on because of its unique opportunity to observe the
witnesses, particularly their demeanor, conduct and attitude during direct and cross-examination by
counsel. Absent any showing that the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some
facts or circumstances of weight which would affect the result of the case, his assessment of
credibility deserves the appellate court's highest respect.

It is likewise well established that the testimony of a rape victim is generally given full weight and
credit, more so if she is a minor. The revelation of an innocent child whose chastity has been
abused deserves full credit, as her willingness to undergo the trouble and the humiliation of a public
trial is an eloquent testament to the truth of her complaint. In so testifying, she could only have been
impelled to tell the truth, especially in the absence of proof of ill motive. · The delay of more than
two years is not an indication that the charges were fabricated for complainant's reactions were
consistent with reason. Her complete obedience to appellant, her lack of struggle and the studied
silence she kept about her ordeal were all brought about by genuine fear posed by her own father
against her.
B.) - The court attaches no persuasive value to a desistance, especially when executed as an
afterthought. The unreliable character of this document is shown by the fact that it is quite incredible
that a victim, after going through the trouble of having the appellant arrested by the police, positively
identifying him as the person who raped her, enduring the humiliation of a physical examination of
her private parts, repeating her accusations in open court and recounting her anguish in detail, will
suddenly turn around and declare that she is no longer interested in pursuing the case. · Too,
complainant repudiated the affidavit of desistance in open court by stating that no lawyer assisted
her when she affixed her signature and had shown her resolve to continue with the prosecution of
the cases. Besides, the trial court is not bound to dismiss the cases, as it is still within its discretion
whether or not to proceed with the prosecution, considering that the compromise agreement and the
affidavit of desistance were executed long after the cases have been filed in court.

SYLLABUS ISSUE: The complaint for attempted rape in Criminal Case No. 96-151 is again quoted
as follows: That on or about the 1st day of January 1996, in the Municipality of Paranaque, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
try and attempt to rape one Maricar Dimaano y Victoria, thus commencing the commission of the
crime of Rape, directly by overt acts, but nevertheless did not perform all the acts of execution
which would produce it, as a consequence by reason of cause other than his spontaneous
desistance that is due to the timely arrival of the complainant's mother.

The Court held that: For complaint or information to be sufficient,

 it must state the name of the accused;

 the designation of the offense given by the statute;
 the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense;
 the name of the offended party;
 the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and
 the place wherein the offense was committed.

What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the designation of the offense charged or
the particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being mere conclusions of law made by
the prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and the particular facts therein
recited.

The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable a
person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged, and enable the
court to pronounce proper judgment. No information for a crime will be sufficient if it does not
accurately and clearly allege the elements of the crime charged. Every element of the offense must
be stated in the information. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be included therein
must be determined by reference to the definitions and essentials of the specified crimes. The
requirement of alleging the elements of a crime in the information is to inform the accused of the
nature of the accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare his defense. The
presumption is that the accused has no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the
offense. Â

Notably, the above-cited complaint upon which the appellant was arraigned does not allege specific
acts or omission constituting the elements of the crime of rape. Neither does it constitute sufficient
allegation of elements for crimes other than rape, i.e., Acts of Lasciviousness. The allegation therein
that the appellant 'tried and attempted to rape the complainant does not satisfy the test of
sufficiency of a complaint or information, but is merely a conclusion of law by the one who drafted
the complaint. This insufficiency therefore prevents this Court from rendering a judgment of
conviction; otherwise we would be violating the right of the appellant to be informed of the nature of
the accusation against him.
Sasot v. People June 29, 2005 FACTS: · The case subject of the present special civil action for
certiorari is a criminal prosecution against petitioners for unfair competition under Article 189 of the
RPC, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. · In May 1997, the NBI conducted an
investigation pursuant to a complaint by the NBA properties Inc. against petitioners for possible
violation of Art. 189 of the RPC on Unfair Competition. It was found out that petitioners were using
the logos of NBA properties on their garment products. Hence, NBI recommended the petitioners
prosecution under Art. 189. · In an SPA, Rick Welts, President of NBA Properties Inc. constituted
the law firm of Ortega, Del Castillo, Bacorro, Odulio, Calma & Carbonell, as the companys attorney-
in-fact, and to act for and on behalf of the company, in the filing of criminal, civil and administrative
complaints, among others. The Special Power of Attorney was notarized by Nicole Brown of New
York County and certified by Norman Goodman, County Clerk and Clerk of the Supreme Court of
the State of New York. Consul Cecilia B. Rebong of the Consulate General of the Philippines, New
York, authenticated the certification. Welts also executed a Complaint-Affidavit on February 12,
1998, before Notary Public Nicole J. Brown of the State of New York. · Prosecution Attorney
Aileen Marie S. Gutierrez recommended the filing of an Information against petitioners for violation
of Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code. · Before arraignment, petitioners filed a Motion to Quash
the Information on the grounds that the facts charged do not constitute an offense and that the court
had no jurisdiction over the offense charged or the person of the accused. · Petitioners argue that
the fiscal should have dismissed Weltss complaint because under the rules, the complaint must be
sworn to before the prosecutor and the copy on record appears to be only a fax transmittal.[9] They
also contend that complainant is a foreign corporation not doing business in the Philippines, and
cannot be protected by Philippine patent laws since it is not a registered patentee. · The Trial
Court sustained the arguments of the prosecution and denied the petitioner†™s motion to quash.
· Petitioners filed a special civil action for Certiorari with the CA which was also dismissed as it
was not the proper remedy in assailing a denial of a motion to quash. Petitioners sought the
reconsideration which was also denied by the CA. · Hence, petitioners filed a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 before the SC. ISSUE: WON the case should have been dismissed by the
fiscal because it should have been personally sworn by the complainant before the investigating
prosecutor †“ NO HELD: · The Court has consistently held that a special civil action for certiorari
is not the proper remedy to assail the denial of a motion to quash an information. The proper
procedure in such a case is for the accused to enter a plea, go to trial without prejudice on his part
to present the special defenses he had invoked in his motion to quash and, if after trial on the
merits, an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law. Thus,
petitioners should not have forthwith filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA and instead,
they should have gone to trial and reiterate the special defenses contained in their motion to quash.
There are no special or exceptional circumstances in the present case such that immediate resort to
a filing of a petition for certiorari should be permitted. Clearly, the CA did not commit any grave
abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition. · The Court does not find any justification for the
quashal of the Information filed against petitioners. Nowhere in sec. 3 Rule 117 of the Rules of Crim.
Pro. is there any mention of the defect in the complaint filed before the fiscal and the complainants
capacity to sue as grounds for a motion to quash. · For another, under Section 3, Rule 112 of the
1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, a complaint is substantially sufficient if it states the known
address of the respondent, it is accompanied by complainants affidavit and his witnesses and
supporting documents, and the affidavits are sworn to before any fiscal, state prosecutor or
government official authorized to administer oath, or in their absence or unavailability, a notary
public who must certify that he personally examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that they
voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits. All these have been duly satisfied in the
complaint filed before Prosecution Attorney Aileen Marie S. Gutierrez. It must be noted that even the
absence of an oath in the complaint does not necessarily render it invalid. Want of oath is a mere
defect of form, which does not affect the substantial rights of the defendant on the merits. ·  If
prosecution follows after the completion of the preliminary investigation being conducted by the
Special Prosecutor the information shall be in the name of the People of the Philippines and no
longer the petitioner which is only an aggrieved party since a criminal offense is essentially an act
against the State. It is the latter which is principally the injured party although there is a private right
violated. Petitioner's capacity to sue would become, therefore, of not much significance in the main
case. · In upholding the right of the petitioner to maintain the present suit before our courts for
unfair competition or infringement of trademarks of a foreign corporation, we are moreover
recognizing our duties and the rights of foreign states under the Paris Convention for the Protection
of Industrial Property to which the Philippines and France are parties.Â

Lasoy v. Zenarosa April 12, 2005 FACTS: · In an Information filed by Assistant City Prosecutor
Evelyn Dimaculangan-Querijero dated 03 July 1996, accused Marcelo Lasoy and Felix Banisa were
charged as follows: · That on or about the 2nd day of July, 1996, in Quezon City, Philippines, the
above-named accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping each other, not
having been authorized by law to sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any prohibited drug,
did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully sell or offer for sale a total of 42.410 grams of dried
marijuana fruiting tops, a prohibited drug, in violation of said law. · Upon arraignment, both
accused pleaded guilty. Both accused applied for probation under Presidential Decree No. 968. ·
People of the Philippines, thru Assistant City Prosecutor Ma. Aurora Escasa-Ramos, filed two
separate motions, first, to admit amended Information, and second, to set aside the arraignment of
the accused, as well as the decision of the trial court dated 16 July 1996. In plaintiffs motion to admit
amended information. It stated that the Information indicated that the accused were carrying 42.410
grams when in truth they were caught carrying 45 pieces of dried marijuana fruiting tops weighing
42.410 kilos from La Trinidad to Metro Manila. · The Trial Court denied the Motion to Admit
Amended Information. However, the same court GRANTED the amending of the Information. This
information was assigned to Branch 76 of RTC-QC presided by Judge Monina Zenarosa. · Both
accused filed a Motion to Quash which was opposed by the People in its Comment/Opposition filed
before the trial court. Subsequently, while the motion to quash before the RTC was as yet
unresolved, both accused filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari which they later
moved to withdraw to pave the way for Branch 76 of the RTC of Quezon City to act judiciously on
their motion to quash. The Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated 15 November 1996 noted the
motion and considered the petition withdrawn. · In its now assailed resolution dated 14 February
1997, the trial court denied accused†™s motion to quash, and scheduled the arraignment of the
accused under the amended information. Accused†™s Motion for Reconsideration, duly opposed
by the prosecution, was denied by the trial court in its Order dated 16 April 1997. Hence, the instant
Petition for Certiorari with prayer for injunction and temporary restraining order. ISSUE: WON the
first information is valid †“ YES. HELD: · An information is valid as long as it distinctly states the
statutory designation of the offense and the acts or omissions constitutive thereof. · In other words,
if the offense is stated in such a way that a person of ordinary intelligence may immediately know
what is meant, and the court can decide the matter according to law, the inevitable conclusion is
that the information is valid. It is not necessary to follow the language of the statute in the
information. The information will be sufficient if it describes the crime defined by law. · Applying the
foregoing, the inescapable conclusion is that the first information is valid inasmuch as it sufficiently
alleges the manner by which the crime was committed. Verily the purpose of the law, that is, to
apprise the accused of the nature of the charge against them, is reasonably complied with. · the
first information, applying Rule 110, Section 6, shows on its face that it is valid. · Section 6.
Sufficiency of complaint or information. A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name
of the accused; the designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the commission of
the offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed. · SECOND, and with respect
specifically to the trial courts point of view that the accused cannot claim their right against double
jeopardy because they participated/acquiesced to the tampering, we hold that while this may not be
far-fetched, there is actually no hard evidence thereof. Worse, we cannot overlook the fact that
accused were arraigned, entered a plea of guilty and convicted under the first information.

People v. Batin November 28, 2007 FACTS: · Castor and Neil Batin was convicted of murder for
shooting Eugenio Refugio while Eugenio was leaning against a mango tree near his house in
Novaliches, QC. · The prosecution presented the statements of Josephine Refugio (wife of
Eugenio) their neighbors and the medico-legal officer of the PNP Crime lab. In her statement,
Josephine stated that Neil went to one of the parked cars, opened its door, and took a gun from
inside. She next noticed Castor going towards Neil as the latter stood at the side of the car and
shouting: Huwag! Castor grabbed the gun from Neil. After the gun was taken from him, Neil just
proceeded towards the right rear of the car. Castor followed Neil and handed the gun back to him.
· Josephine heard Castor ordering his son: Sige, banatan mo na. Neil responded by drawing the
gun from his waistline, raising and aiming it at her and her husband, and firing twice from his eye-
level. Both Josephine and Eugenio fell to the ground, the former, backwards, and the latter landing
on top of her. As they tried to get up, Eugenio uttered to her: Nanay, may tama ako. She then pulled
her husband by the shoulder of his shirt so that she could take him to their house as he was already
slumped to the right. She later rushed her husband to the Quezon City General Hospital, where he
underwent surgery, but later expired. · Neil stated that he accidentally pulled the trigger of the gun.
· The Trial Court convicted Castor and Neil Batin guilty of Murder. CA affirmed the conviction.
However, on 13 November 2000, accused Neil Batin filed an Urgent Motion to Withdraw Appeal.
ISSUE: WON treachery was specifically alleged in the Information †“ YES HELD: · The fact that
the qualifying circumstances were recited in the second paragraph and not in the first paragraph of
the Information, as commonly done, is a matter of form or style for which the prosecution should not
be faulted. That the Provincial Prosecutor decided to write the Information differently did not impair
its sufficiency. Nothing in the law prohibits the prosecutor from adopting such a form or style. As
long as the requirements of the law are observed, the Information will pass judicial scrutiny. · The
test of sufficiency of Information is whether it enables a person of common understanding to know
the charge against him, and the court to render judgment properly. The rule is that qualifying
circumstances must be properly pleaded in the Information in order not to violate the accused†™s
constitutional right to be properly informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
The purpose is to allow the accused to fully prepare for his defense, precluding surprises during the
trial. Significantly, the appellant never claimed that he was deprived of his right to be fully apprised
of the nature of the charges against him because of the style or form adopted in the Information.

People v. Cachapero May 20, 2004 FACTS: · The RTC of Camiling, Tarlac found Larry Cachapero
guilty of committing rape against Anna Toledo, 7 years old. CA affirmed. · Sometime in March
1998, Anna Toledo, who was seven (7) years old, went to play with Lorena Cachapero and Dino
Cachapero at a nearby house in Barrio Bancay 1st, Camiling, Tarlac. · "During that occasion,
appellant Larry Cachapero, brother of Lorena, made her lie down and removed her shorts and
panty. He inserted his penis into her sexual organ and she felt pain. Larry told her not to tell her
parents because he might be scolded. · "On September 2, 1998, witness Conchita Donato was
conducting a remedial class in Reading to her Grade I and II students. While they were reading the
word †˜ tagtuyot†™ or †˜ saluyot,†™ one of her students Jocelyn Meneses told her that Anna
was sexually abused by †˜ Manong Larry.†™ · "She then ordered the students to leave the
room and asked Jocelyn and Anna to stay behind. She confronted Anna and asked her the truth.
Anna covered her face with her two hands, cried, and said yes. The teachers had a conference,
after which they decided to report the matter to the parents of Anna. · Accused Larry Cachapero
testified that at the time of the alleged incident, he was in their house together with his father and
mother. He denied seeing the private complainant on that day. He alleged the case was filed
against [him] because of the long standing feud between his mother and the mother of the private
complainant. · The information stated: · †œThat sometime in March 1998, in the Municipality of
Camiling, Province of Tarlac, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously by means of force and
intimidation succeed in having sexual intercourse with Anna Laurence Toledo, a 7-year old
minor.†• ISSUE: WON the Information was sufficient as there was no time that was indicated
†“ YES HELD: · The time of occurrence is not an essential element of rape. This being so, its
precise date and hour need not be alleged in the complaint or information. Section 11 of Rule 110 of
the Rules of Court provides: · "SEC. 11. Date of commission of the offense. †“ It is not
necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise date the offense was committed
except when it is a material ingredient of the offense. The offense may be alleged to have been
committed on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its commission." · The Information in
this case alleged that the crime was committed "sometime in March 1998" which, according to
private complainant, was more or less at the closing of the school year. Being reasonably definite
and certain, this approximation sufficiently meets the requirement of the law. After all, Section 6 of
Rule 110 of the Rules of Court merely requires that the information must state, among others, the
approximate time of the commission of the offense. · Moreover, objections as to the form of the
complaint or information cannot be made for the first time on appeal. If the present appellant found
the Information insufficient, he should have moved before arraignment either for a bill of particulars,
for him to be properly informed of the exact date of the alleged rape; or for the quashal of the
Information, on the ground that it did not conform with the prescribed form. Having failed to pursue
either remedy, he is deemed to have waived objection to any formal defect in the Information. ·
Furthermore, the defense never objected to the presentation of the prosecution evidence proving
that the offense had been committed in March 1998. Appellant has not shown that he was deprived
of a proper defense, for he was in fact able to foist an alibi. It cannot be said, therefore, that his
constitutionally protected right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him
has been violated. Bacasmas v. Sandiganbayan July 10, 2013 FACTS: · All the petitioners work
for the City Government of Cebu. Benilda B. Bacasmas (Bacasmas), the Cash Division Chief, Alan
C. Gaviola (Gaviola), the City Administrator, Eustaquio B. Cesa (Cesa), the City Treasurer. By virtue
of their positions, they are involved in the process of approving and releasing cash advances for the
City. · The process is as follows: · Gonzales (paymaster) makes a request for cash advance ↠’
Bacasmas (Cash Div. Chief) for approval ↠’ Cesa (City Treasurer) [By signing, Bacasmas and
Cesa certify that the expense or cash advance is necessary, lawful, and incurred under their direct
supervision.] · ↠’ Jaca (City Accountant) for processing pre-audit ↠’ Accountant†™s advice
[She also signs the voucher to certify that there is adequate available funding/budgetary allotment]
· This Advice is returned with the voucher to the Chief Cashier for the preparation of the check.
After it has been prepared, she affixes her initials to the check Cesa then signs. · ↠’ Gaviola
(City Administrator) approves the voucher and countersigns the check. · A report of those cash
advances liquidated by Gonzales is called a Report of Disbursement (RD). An RD must contain the
audit voucher number, the names of the local government employees who were paid using the
money from the cash advance, the amount for each employee, as well as the receipts. The RDs are
examined and verified by the City Auditor and are thereafter submitted to the Cash Division for
recording in the official cash book · A COA team conducted a surprise cash count and revealed a
shortage of P9,810,752.60 from 20 September 1995 to 5 March 1998 from the cash and accounts
of Gonzales. · The team found that Bacasmas, Gaviola, Cesa, and Jaca failed to follow the above-
mentioned procedure, thus facilitating the loss of more than nine million pesos on the part of the city
government. Specifically, the team said in its report that there were irregularities in the grant,
utilization, and liquidation of cash advances; shortages were concealed; and inaccurate and
misleading pieces of information were included in the financial statements. · The report stated that
Bacasmas, Gaviola, Cesa, and Jaca not only signed, certified, and approved the cash advance
vouchers, but also signed and countersigned the checks despite the deficiencies, which amounted
to a violation of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 7160; Presidential Decree No. (P.D.) 1445; and the circulars
issued by the Commission on Audit (COA), specifically COA Circular Nos. 90-331, 92-382 and 97-
002. · Hence an Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan against Bacasmas, Gaviola, Cesa
and Jaca. · Cesa and Gaviola question the sufficiency of the Information on three grounds: first, it
did not specify a reasonable time frame within which the offense was committed, in violation of their
right to be informed of the charge against them; second, not all of the accused were named, as
Gonzales was not charged in the Information; and third, the Information did not specify an offense,
because negligence and conspiracy cannot co-exist in a crime. · ISSUE: WON the Information
was sufficient †“ YES HELD: · First, it is not necessary to state the precise date when the
offense was committed, except when it is a material ingredient thereof. The offense may be alleged
to have been committed on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its commission. Here,
the date is not a material ingredient of the crime, not having been committed on one day alone, but
rather within a period of time ranging from 20 September 1995 to 5 March 1998. Hence, stating the
exact dates of the commission of the crime is not only unnecessary, but impossible as well. · Cesa
contends that Gonzales should have been included in the Information, because the latter incurred
cash shortages and allegedly had unliquidated cash advances. Cesa is wrong. The Information
seeks to hold petitioners accountable for their actions, which allowed Gonzales to obtain cash
advances, and paved the way for her to incur cash shortages, leading to a loss of over nine million
pesos. Thus, the Information correctly excluded her because her alleged acts did not fall under the
crime charged in the Information. · The Information is sufficient, because it adequately describes
the nature and cause of the accusation against petitioners, namely the violation of the
aforementioned law. The use of the three phrases †“ "manifest partiality," "evident bad faith" and
"inexcusable negligence" in the same Information does not mean that three distinct offenses were
thereby charged but only implied that the offense charged may have been committed through any of
the modes provided by the law. In addition, there was no inconsistency in alleging both the
presence of conspiracy and gross inexcusable negligence, because the latter was not simple
negligence. Rather, the negligence involved a willful, intentional, and conscious indifference to the
consequences of one†™s actions or omissions Saludaga v. Sandiganbayan April 23, 2010
FACTS: · Mayor Quintin Saludaga of Lavezares, Northern Samar and SPO2 Fiel Genio entered
into a Pakyaw Contract for the construction of Barangay Day Care Centers without conducting a
competitive public bidding as required by law, which caused damage and prejudice to the
government. An information was filed for violation of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019Â by causing undue injury
to the Government. · The information was quashed for failure to prove the actual damage caused
to the government, hence a new information was filed, now for violation of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019Â
by giving unwarranted benefit to a private person. The accused moved for a new preliminary
investigation to be conducted on the ground that there is substitution and/or substantial amendment
of the first information. · Sandiganbayan denied the motion for preliminary investigation. Hence,
petitioners filed a petition for Certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: WON the two (2) ways of violating section 3(e) of Republic Act 3019, namely: (a) by causing
undue injury to any party, including the Government; or (b) by giving any private party any
unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference constitute two distinct and separate offenses that
would warrant a new or another preliminary investigation. †“ NO HELD: · While there are two
ways of committing the offense, This does not however indicate that each mode constitutes a
distinct offense, but rather, that an accused may be charged under either mode or under both. ·
There is no substituted information. Only the mode of commission was modified. While
jurisprudence provides that there are two (2) acts or modes of committing the offense, thus: a) by
causing any undue injury to any party, including the government; or b) by giving any private party
any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference, it does not mean that each act or mode
constitutes a distinct offense. An accused may be charged under either mode or under both should
both modes concur. Pacoy v. Cajigal September 28, 2007 FACTS: · SSGT. Jose Pacoy seeks to
annul the order of Presiding Judge Afable Cajigal of RTC 68 of Camiling Tarlac. · On July 4, 2002,
an information for Homicide was filed in the RTC against petitioner for shooting and killing his
commanding officer, 2Lt. Frederick Esquita with an armalite rifle. Upon arraignment, petitioner
pleaded not guilty. · However, on the same day and after the arraignment, the respondent judge
issued another Order, likewise dated September 12, 2002, directing the trial prosecutor to correct
and amend the Information to Murder in view of the aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank
alleged in the Information which public respondent registered as having qualified the crime to
Murder. · The prosecutor entered his amendment by crossing out the word Homicide and instead
wrote the word Murder in the caption and in the opening paragraph of the Information. The
accusatory portion remained exactly the same as that of the original Information for Homicide, with
the correction of the spelling of the victims name from Escuita to Escueta. · Petitioner was to be
re-arraigned for the crime of Murder. Counsel for petitioner objected on the ground that the latter
would be placed in double jeopardy, considering that his Homicide case had been terminated
without his express consent, resulting in the dismissal of the case. As petitioner refused to enter his
plea on the amended Information for Murder, the public respondent entered for him a plea of not
guilty. · Respondent judge denied the Motion to Quash. The MR was likewise denied. Thus,
petitioner went straight to SC and filed a petition for certiorari. ISSUE: WON respondent judge erred
in amending the Information after petitioner had already entered in plea to the charge of information
for homicide †“ NO HELD: · In the present case, the change of the offense charged from
Homicide to Murder is merely a formal amendment and not a substantial amendment or a
substitution as defined in Teehankee. · While the amended Information was for Murder, a reading
of the Information shows that the only change made was in the caption of the case; and in the
opening paragraph or preamble of the Information, with the crossing out of word Homicide and its
replacement by the word Murder. There was no change in the recital of facts constituting the offense
charged or in the determination of the jurisdiction of the court. The averments in the amended
Information for Murder are exactly the same as those already alleged in the original Information for
Homicide, as there was not at all any change in the act imputed to petitioner, i.e., the killing of 2Lt.
Escueta without any qualifying circumstance. Thus, we find that the amendment made in the caption
and preamble from Homicide to Murder as purely formal. · Section 14, Rule 110 also provides that
in allowing formal amendments in cases in which the accused has already pleaded, it is necessary
that the amendments do not prejudice the rights of the accused. The test of whether the rights of an
accused are prejudiced by the amendment of a complaint or information is whether a defense under
the complaint or information, as it originally stood, would no longer be available after the
amendment is made; and when any evidence the accused might have would be inapplicable to the
complaint or information. Since the facts alleged in the accusatory portion of the amended
Information are identical with those of the original Information for Homicide, there could not be any
effect on the prosecution's theory of the case; neither would there be any possible prejudice to the
rights or defense of petitioner. Amendment Substitution · May involve either formal or substantial
changes · Necessarily involves a substantial change from the original charge · Amendment
before plea has been entered can be effected without leave of court · substitution of information
must be with leave of court as the original information has to be dismissed · Where the
amendment is only as to form, there is no need for another preliminary investigation and the
retaking of the plea of the accused; · In substitution of information, another preliminary
investigation is entailed and the accused has to plead anew to the new information · An amended
information refers to the same offense charged in the original information or to an offense which
necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the original charge, hence substantial
amendments to the information after the plea has been taken cannot be made over the objection of
the accused, for if the original information would be withdrawn, the accused could invoke double
jeopardy · Substitution requires or presupposes that the new information involves a different
offense which does not include or is not necessarily included in the original charge, hence the
accused cannot claim double jeopardy Cabo v. Sandiganbayan FACTS: · On June 24, 2000, Cabo
and Bonifacio Balahay, Mayor of Barobo, Surigao del Sur, were charged for violation of Section 3(b)
of RA 3019. In the information, it was alleged that Mayor Balahay received from Cabo the amount of
P104,000, and that said mayor †œintervened in the undertaking by Cabo†™s company (OIDCI)
for consultancy services with the Municipality of Barobo†•. · Cabo claimed that she was
deprived of her right to preliminary investigation so she filed a motion for reinvestigation. The
Sandiganbayan (SB) granted her motion and directed the Special Prosecutor to conduct one. ·
Meanwhile, Cabo filed another motion seeking permission to travel abroad for a family vacation. The
SB granted it in an order dated May 2004, which stated that, in light of the case still being under
reinvestigation, and considering that she had not yet been arraigned, Cabo expressly consented to
the order that she be arraigned conditionally. [CONDITIONS:] If it is found that there is no probable
cause to proceed against her, the arraignment will have no effect. However, if there is a need to
amend the present information, then Cabo would have then waived her right to object under Section
14, Rule 110 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure as well as her constitutional right against
double jeopardy. · When she was arraigned, she was duly assisted by her counsel and pleaded
NOT GUILTY to the offense charged. She also duly affixed her signature in the minutes to signify
her conformity to the conditional arraignment and the legal consequence thereof. · Thereafter, the
Special Prosecutor concluded his reinvestigation and found probable cause to charge her with the
violation of RA 3019. The SB then set a new schedule for arraignment in October 2004. On the day
before arraignment, Cabo filed a motion (†œreiterate-not-guilty motion†•) praying that she be
allowed to reiterate her previous plea in the conditional arraignment so that she may be excused
from attending the arraignment the next day. SB, however, did not act on her said motion. ·
Balahay, on the other hand, filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the same did
not charge any offense. It failed to allege that Balahay had to intervene in the said contract under
the law, in his official capacity as mayor. · The SB sustained Balahay†™s contention that the
information was defective for lack of necessary facts, but it did not immediately quash the complaint.
Instead, the court, in accordance with Section 4, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, ordered only the
amendment of the information and ordered the prosecution to correct the defect. The amended
information was filed in February 2005 containing all the necessary elements of the crime charged.
· Cabo was notified of her re-arraignment in April 2005, but she filed a Motion to Cancel Second
Arraignment on the ground that she could no longer be re-arraigned on the amended information
since amendment of the information based on the substance is not allowed after the plea has been
made. · SB denied petitioner†™s motion. It held that her arraignment on the original information
was only conditional in nature to accommodate her request to travel abroad so that she could be
tried in absentia. She agreed to the condition that should the information be amended, she is
deemed to waive her right to object to the amendment and to waive her constitutional protection
against double jeopardy. She was considered estopped from raising her objection to the amended
complaint. Petitioner filed an MR on the ground that double jeopardy had set in. She asserted that
her conditional arraignment had been confirmed by her October motion (†œreiterate-not-guilty
motion†•) reiterating her plea of not guilty. Thus, her arraignment on the original information was
no longer conditional, and double jeopardy must consequently attach. SB denied her resolution.
This prompted her to file the petition for review on certiorari. ISSUE: WON double jeopardy had
attached on the basis of the †œNOT GUILTY†• plea †“ NO. DJ did not attach. HELD: · The
SB was declared to have unequivocally laid down petitioner†™s conditions for arraignment.
Among those specified was that if there was a need to amend the original information, she forfeits
her right to object and her RIGHT TO DOUBLE JEOPARDY†•. She was assisted by counsel and
thereby informed of the legal consequences of such conditions. · With regard to her formal
manifestation reiterating her not guilty plea (†œreiterate-not-guilty motion†•), there was no
showing that Sandiganbayan affirmed her motion. Section 1(b), Rule 116 of the Rules of Court
explicitly requires the accused to be present at arraignment and personally enter his plea. With
respect to the applicability of double jeopardy to the case, two requisites were absent: The first
requisite of double jeopardy was not present since the original information failed to allege the
essential elements for the violations allegedly committed by petitioner and her co-accused. There
was also NO DISMISSAL OR TERMINATION OF THE CASE AGAINST PETITIONER (fourth
requisite). The SB merely ordered an AMENDMENT. According to Section 4, Rule 117, the
prosecution is given an opportunity to amend the defective information if the facts charged do not
constitute an offense. It is only when the prosecution fails to properly amend the information that the
motion to quash be granted. · Contrary to petitioner†™s submission, the original information can
be cured by amendment even after she had pleaded thereto, since the amendments ordered by the
court below were only as to matters of form and not of substance (Section 14, Rule 110) Nester
Mendoza