1. AGLIPAY VS.

RUIZ

CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES; RELIGIOUS FREEDOM.—What is guaranteed by

our Constitution is religious liberty, not mere religious toleration. Religious freedom, however, as
a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not a denial of
its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that binds and
elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And, in so far as it instills into the minds the purest
principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated.

ID.; ID.; POSTAGE STAMPS ISSUED UNDER ACT No. 4052.—The respondent Director of
Posts issued the postage stamps in question under the provisions of Act No. 4052 of the Philippine
Legislature which appropriates the sum of sixty thousand pesos for the cost of plates and' printing
of postage stamps with new designs and other expenses incident thereto, and authorizes the
Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to
dispose of the amount appropriated in the manner indicated and "as often as may be deemed
advantageous to the Government."

ID.; ID.; ID.—Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the Director
of Posts is the discretionary power to determine when the issuance of special postage stamps would
be "advantageous to the Government." Of course, the phrase "advantageous to the Government"
does not authorize the violation of the Constitution. It does not authorize the appropriation, use or
application of public money or property for the use, benefit or support of a particular sect or church.
In the present case, however, the issuance of the postage stamps in question by the Director of
Posts and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications was not inspired by any sectarian
feeling to favor a particular church or religious denomination. The stamps were not issued and sold
for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. Nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps
given to that church.

ID.; ID.; ID.—The only purpose in issuing and selling the stamps was "to advertise the Philippines
and attract more tourists to this country." The officials concerned merely took advantage of an
event considered of international importance "to give publicity to the Philippines and its people."
The stamps as actually designed and printed (Exhibit 2), instead of showing a Catholic Church
chalice as originally planned, contains a map of the Philippines and the location of the City of
Manila, and an inscription as follows: "Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7,
1937." What is emphasized is not the Eucharistic Congress itself but Manila, the capital of the
Philippines, as the seat of that congress.

ID.; ID.; ID.—While the issuance and sale of the stamps in question may be said to be inseparably
linked with an event of a religious character, the resulting propaganda, if any, received by the
Roman Catholic Church, was not the aim and purpose of the Government. The Government should
not be embarrassed in its activities simply because of incidental results, more or less religious in
character, if the purpose had in view is one which could legitimately be undertaken by appropriate
legislation. The main purpose should not be frustrated by its subordination to mere incidental
results not contemplated. (Vide Bradfield vs.Roberts, 175 U. S., 295; 20 Sup. Ct. Rep., 121; 44
Law. ed., 168.)
 2. GARCES VS. ESTENZO

Constitutional Law; Barangays; Churches; A resolution of the Barangay Council for soliciting
contributions to buy a statue of the barangay’s patron saint and the use of such fund for said
purpose does not violate the Constitution’s provision prohibiting use of public funds for religious
purposes.—The questioned resolutions do not directly or indirectly establish any religion, nor
abridge religious liberty, nor appropriate public money or property for the benefit of any sect,
priest or clergyman. The image was purchased with private funds, not with tax money. The
construction of a waiting shed is entirely a secular matter.

Same; Same; Same; Same.—Manifestly puerile and flimsy is petitioners’ argument that the
barangay council favored the Catholic religion by using the funds raised by solicitations and
donations for the purchase of the patron saint’s wooden image and making the image available to
the Catholic church.

Same; Same; Same; Same.—The wooden image was purchased in connection with the celebration
of the barrio fiesta honoring the patron saint, San Vicente Ferrer, and not for the purpose of
favoring any religion nor interfering with religious matters or the religious beliefs of the barrio
residents. One of the highlights of the fiesta was the mass. Consequently, the image of the patron
saint had to be placed in the church when the mass was celebrated.

Same; Same; Same; There is nothing unconstitutional in holding fiesta.—If there is nothing
unconstitutional or illegal in holding a fiesta and having a patron saint for the barrio, then any
activity intended to facilitate the worship of the patron saint (such as the acquisition and display
of his image) cannot be branded as illegal. As noted in the first resolution, the barrio fiesta is a
socio-religious affair. Its celebration is an ingrained tradition in rural communities. The fiesta
relieves the monotony and drudgery of the lives of the masses.

Same; Same; Same; Property; The statue having been purchased with the use of barangay funds
belongs to the barangay council not to the parish church.—There can be no question that the image
in question belongs to the barangay council. Father Osmeña’s claim that it belongs to his church
is wrong. The barangay council, as owner of the image, has the right to determine who should have
custody thereof.

Same; Same; Same; There will be nothing unconstitutional for the barangay council to give the
image of St. Ferrer to the Catholic Church.—If it chooses to change its mind and decides to give
the image to the Catholic church, that action would not violate the Constitution because the image
was acquired with private fundsand is its private property.

Same; Same; Same; Not every governmental activity which involves the use of public funds and
which has some religious tint is unconstitutional.—Not every governmental activity which
involves the expenditure of public funds and which has some religious tint is violative of the
constitutional provisions regarding separation of church and state, freedom of worship and banning
the use of public money or property.

3. AMERICAN BIBLE VS. CITY OF MANILA

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; RELIGIOUS FREEDOM;DlSSEMINATION OF RELIGIOUS
INFORMATION, WHEN MAY BE RESTRAINED; PAYMENT OF LlCENSE FEE, IMPAIRS
FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION.—The constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession and worship carries with it the right to disseminate
religious information. Any restraint of such right can only be justified like other restraints
of freedom of expression on the grounds that there is a clear and present danger of any
substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent." (Tañada and Fernando on the
Constitution of the Philippines, Vol. I, 4th ed., p. 297).

In the case at bar, plaintiff is engaged in the distribution and sales of bibles and religious articles.
The City Treasurer of Manila informed the plaintiff that it was conducting the business of general
merchandise without providing itself with the necessary Mayor's permit and municipal license,
in violation of Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, and Ordinance No. 2529, as amended, and
required plaintiff to secure the corresponding permit and license. Plaintiff protested against this
requirement and claimed that it never made any profit from the sale of its bibles.

Held: It is true the price asked for the religious articles was in some instances a little bit higher
than the actual cost of the same, but this cannot mean that plaintiff was engaged in the business or
occupation of selling said "merchandise" for profit. For this reasons, the provisions of City
Ordinance No. 2529, as amended, which requires the payment of license fee for conducting
the business of general merchandise, cannot be applied to plaintiff society, for in doing so, it
would impair its free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and worship, as well
as its rights of dissemination of religious beliefs.

Upon the other hand, City Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, which requires the obtention of the
Mayor's permit before any person can engage in any of the businesses, trades or occupations
enumerated therein, does not impose any charge upon the enjoyment of a right granted by the
Constitution, nor tax the exercise of religious practices. Hence, it cannot be considered
unconstitutional, even if applied to plaintiff Society. But as Ordinance No. 2529 is not applicable
to plaintiff and the City of Manila is powerless to license or tax the business of plaintiff society
involved herein, for the reasons above stated, Ordinance No. 3000 is also inapplicable to said
business, trade or occupation of the plaintiff.

4. IGLESIA NI CRISTO VS. COURT OF APPEALS

Constitutional Law; Freedom of Religion; P.D. 1986 gives the Board the power to screen, review
and examine all television programs.—The law gives the Board the power to screen, review
and examine all “television programs. ” By the clear terms of the law, the Board has the power
to “approve, delete x x x and/or prohibit the x x x exhibition and/or television broadcast of x x x
television programs x x x.” The law also directs the Board to apply “contemporary Filipino cultural
values as standard” to determine those which are objectionable for being “immoral, indecent,
contrary to law and/or good customs, injurious to the prestige of the Republic of the Philippines
and its people, or with a dangerous tendency to encourage the commission of violence or of a
wrong or crime.”
Same; Same; Freedom of religion is designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience,
to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs and to live as he
believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good.— We
reject petitioner’s submission which need not set us adrift in a constitutional voyage towards an
uncharted sea. Freedom of religion has been accorded a preferred status by the framers of our
fundamental laws, past and present. We have affirmed this preferred status well aware that it is
“designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as
his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent
with the liberty of others and with the common good.” We have also laboriously defined in our
jurisprudence the intersecting umbras and penumbras of the right to religious profession and
worship.

Same; Same; The exercise of religious freedom can be regulated by the State when it will bring
about the clear and present danger of some substantial evil which the State is duty bound to
prevent.—We thus reject petitioner’s postulate that its religious program is per se beyond
review by the respondent Board. Its public broadcast on TV of its religious program brings
it out of the bosom of internal belief. Television is a medium that reaches even the eyes and
ears of children. The Court iterates the rule that the exercise of religious freedom can be
regulated by the State when it will bring about the clear and present danger of some
substantive evil which the State is duty bound to prevent, i.e., serious detriment to the more
overriding interest of public health, public morals, or public welfare.

whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear
and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to
prevent.

Presently in the United States, the clear and present danger test is not applied to protect low value
speeches such as obscene speech, commercial speech and defamation. Be that as it may, the test is
still applied to four types of speech: speech that advocates dangerous ideas, speech that provokes
a hostile audience reaction, out of court contempt and release of information that endangers a fair
trial.30