G.R. No.

L-5279 October 31, 1955 limited to the decision of actual cases and controversies and
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF COLLEGES AND the authority to pass on the validity of statutes is incidental
UNIVERSITIES, ETC, petitioner, to the decisions of such cases where conflicting claims under
vs. the constitution and under the legislative act assailed as
SECRETARY OF EDUCATION and the BOARD OF contrary to the constitution but it is legitimate only in the
TEXTBOOKS, respondents. last resort and it must be necessary to determine a real and
vital controversy between litigants. Thus, actions like this
Manuel C. Briones, Vicente G. Sinco, Manuel V. Gallego and are brought for a positive purpose to obtain actual positive
Enrique M. Fernando for petitioner.Office of the Solicitor relief and the court does not sit to adjudicate a mere academic
General Pompeyo Diaz and Assistant Solicitor General question to satisfy scholarly interest therein.
Francisco Carreon for respondents.
The court however, finds the defendant position to be
FACTS: sufficiently sustained and state that the petitioner remedy is
The Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities made to challenge the regulation not to invalidate the law because
a petition that Acts No.2706 otherwise known as the “Act it needs no argument to show that abuse by officials
making the Inspection and Recognition of private schools and entrusted with the execution of the statute does not per se
colleges obligatory for the Secretary of Public Instruction” demonstrate the unconstitutionality of such statute.
and was amended by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act
No. 180 be declared unconstitutional on the grounds that On this phase of the litigation the court conclude that there
has been no undue delegation of legislative power even if the
1) The act deprives the owner of the school and colleges as petitioners appended a list of circulars and memoranda
well as teachers and parents of liberty and property without issued by the Department of Education they fail to indicate
due process of Law; which of such official documents was constitutionally
objectionable for being capricious or pain nuisance.
2) it will also deprive the parents of their Natural Right sand Therefore, the court denied the petition for prohibition.
duty to rear their children for civic efficiency and 3) its
provisions conferred on the Secretary of Education unlimited
powers and discretion to prescribe rules and standards
constitute towards unlawful delegation of Legislative powers.
Section 1 of Act No. 2706 “It shall be the duty of the Secretary
of Public Instruction to maintain a general standard of
efficiency in all private schools and colleges of the Philippines
so that the same shall furnish adequate instruction to the
public, in accordance with the class and grade of instruction
given in them, and for this purpose said Secretary or his duly
authorized representative shall have authority to advise,
inspect, and regulate said schools and colleges in order to
determine the efficiency of instruction given in the same,”
The petitioner also complain that securing a permit to the
Secretary of Education before opening a school is not
originally included in the original Act 2706.

And in support to the first proposition of the petitioners they

contended that the Constitution guaranteed the right of a
citizen to own and operate a school and any law requiring
previous governmental approval or permit before such person
could exercise the said right On the other hand, the
defendant Legal Representative submitted a memorandum
contending that

1) The matters presented no justiciable controversy

exhibiting unavoidable necessity of deciding the
constitutional question;2) Petitioners are in estoppels to
challenge the validity of the said act and 3) the Act is
constitutionally valid. Thus, the petition for prohibition was
dismissed by the court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Act No. 2706 as amended by Act no. 3075 and
Commonwealth Act no. 180 maybe declared void and
unconstitutional?

RATIO DECIDENTI:

The Petitioner suffered no wrong under the terms of law and

needs no relief in the form they seek to obtain. Moreover,
there is no justiciable controversy presented before the court.
It’s an established principle that to entitle a private
individual immediately in danger of sustaining a direct
injury and it is not sufficient that he has merely invoke the
judicial power to determine the validity of executive and
legislative action he must show that he has sustained
common interest to all members of the public.

Furthermore, the power of the courts to declare a law

unconstitutional arises only when the interest of litigant
require the use of judicial authority for their protection
against actual interference. As such, Judicial Power is
CASE DIGEST: MARIANO V. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 118627 07 March 1995FACTS:
Juanito Mariano, a resident of Makati, along with residents
of Taguig suing as taxpayers, assail Sections 2, 51 and 52 of
R.A. No. 7854 (“An Act Converting the Municipality of
Makati into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City
of Makati”). Another petition which contends the
unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7854 was also filed by John H.
Osmena as a senator, taxpayer and concerned citizen.
ISSUES:
Whether Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 delineated the land areas
of the proposed city of Makati violating sections 7 and 450 of
the Local Government Code on specifying metes and bounds
with technical descriptions
Whether Section 51, Article X of R.A. No. 7854 collides with
Section 8, Article X and Section 7, Article VI of the
Constitution stressing that they new city’s acquisition of a
new corporate existence will allow the incumbent mayor to
extend his term to more than two executive terms as allowed
by the Constitution
Whether the addition of another legislative district in Makati
is unconstitutional as the reapportionment cannot be made
by a special law
HELD/RULING:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be
elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unless
otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of
June next following their election.
No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for
more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation
of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as
an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full
term for which he was elected.
This challenge on the controversy cannot be entertained as
the premise on the issue is on the occurrence of many
contingent events. Considering that these events may or may
not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue
which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy.
Moreover, only Mariano among the petitioners is a resident
of Taguig and are not the proper parties to raise this abstract
issue.
Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution clearly provides
that the Congress may be comprised of not more than two
hundred fifty members, unless otherwise provided by law. As
thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress
from increasing its membership by passing a law, other than
a general reapportionment of the law.

Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 states that:

Sec. 2. The City of Makati. — The Municipality of Makati
shall be converted into a highly urbanized city to be known
as the City of Makati, hereinafter referred to as the City,
which shall comprise the present territory of the
Municipality of Makati in Metropolitan Manila Area over
which it has jurisdiction bounded on the northeast by Pasig
River and beyond by the City of Mandaluyong and the
Municipality of Pasig; on the southeast by the municipalities
of Pateros and Taguig; on the southwest by the City of Pasay
and the Municipality of Taguig; and, on the northwest, by the
City of Manila.

Emphasis has been provided in the provision under dispute.

Said delineation did not change even by an inch the land area
previously covered by Makati as a municipality. It must be
noted that the requirement of metes and bounds was meant
merely as a tool in the establishment of LGUs. It is not an
end in itself.

Furthermore, at the time of consideration or R.A. No. 7854,

the territorial dispute between the municipalities of Makati
and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was under court litigation.
Out of becoming a sense of respect to co-equal department of
government, legislators felt that the dispute should be left to
the courts to decide.

Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 provides that:

Sec. 51. Officials of the City of Makati. — The represent
elective officials of the Municipality of Makati shall continue
as the officials of the City of Makati and shall exercise their
powers and functions until such time that a new election is
held and the duly elected officials shall have already qualified
and assume their offices: Provided, The new city will acquire
a new corporate existence. The appointive officials and
employees of the City shall likewise continues exercising
their functions and duties and they shall be automatically
absorbed by the city government of the City of Makati.

Section 8, Article X and section 7, Article VI of the

Constitution provide the following:

Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except

barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be
three years and no such official shall serve for more than
three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office
for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term
for which he was elected.
MONTESCLAROS, ET AL VS. COMELEC, ET AL
G.R. No. 152295 July 9, 2002
Facts:
Petitioners sought to prevent the postponement of the 2002
SK election to a later date since doing so may render them
unqualified to vote or be voted for in view of the age limitation
set by law for those who may participate. The SK elections
was postponed since it was deemed "operationally very
difficult" to hold both SK and Barangay elections
simultaneously in May 2002. Petitioners also sought to enjoin
the lowering of age for membership in the SK.
Issue:
Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction imputable to
respondents.
Held:
The Court held that, in the present case, there was no actual
controversy requiring the exercise of the power of judicial
review.
While seeking to prevent a postponement of the May 6, 2002
SK elections, petitioners are nevertheless amenable to a
resetting of the SK elections to any date not later than July
15, 2002. RA No. 9164 has reset the SK elections to July 15,
2002, a date acceptable to petitioners. Under the same law,
Congress merely restored the age requirement in PD No. 684,
the original charter of the SK, which fixed the maximum age
for membership in the SK to youths less than 18 years old.
Petitioners do not have a vested right to the permanence of
the age requirement under Section 424 of the Local
Government Code of 1991.
RA 9164 which resets and prescribes the qualifications of
candidates and voters for the SK elections was held to be
applicable on the July 15 2002 election. It’s constitutionality
not having been assailed in the first place.
The Court ruled that petitioners had no personal and
substantial interest in maintaining this suit, that the
petition presented no actual justiciable controversy, that
petitioners did not cite any provision of law that is alleged to
be unconstitutional, and that there was no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of public respondents.
The Facts
On 15 September 1993, President Fidel V. Ramos issued EO
No. 125[6] creating the Office of the Presidential Adviser on
the Peace Process and calling for a "comprehensive,
integrated and holistic peace process with Muslim rebels" in
Mindanao. On 28 February 2001, President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo issued EO No. 3[7] which amended EO
No. 125 to reaffirm the government's commitment to achieve
just and lasting peace in the Philippines through a
comprehensive peace process.
Pursuant to EO No. 3, the Government Peace Negotiating
Panel (GPNP) held negotiations with the MILF, an armed,
revolutionary Muslim separatist group based in Mindanao
seeking separation of the Muslim people from the central
government. The negotiations eventually led to the
preparation of the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral
Domain (MOA-AD) on 27 July 2008. However, on 14 October
2008, in the case of Province of North Cotabato v.
Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel
on Ancestral Domain,[8] the Court declared the MOA-AD
unconstitutional.
During the administration of President Benigno S. Aquino
III, the government resumed peace negotiations with the
MILF. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen[9] headed the GPNP and
became the government's chief peace negotiator with the
MILF in July 2010.
On 15 October 2012, a preliminary peace agreement called
the FAB[10] was signed between the government and the
MILF. The FAB called for the creation of an autonomous
political entity named Bangsamoro, replacing the ARMM.
After further negotiations, the following Annexes and
Addendum to the FAB were also signed in Kuala Lumpur,
Malaysia.
n 7 December 2012, Miriam Coronel-Ferrer succeeded Marvic
M.V.F. Leonen as GPNP Chairperson.
On 17 December 2012, President Benigno S. Aquino III
issued EO No. 120,[16] constituting the Bangsamoro
Transition Commission, tasked, among others, to (1) draft
the proposed Bangsamoro Basic Law with provisions
consistent with the FAB, and (2) recommend to Congress or
the people proposed amendments to the 1987 Philippine
Constitution.[17] Under Section 5 of the same EO, the
Bangsamoro Transition Commission shall cease to operate
upon the enactment by Congress of the Bangsamoro Basic
Law.
On 27 March 2014, the Philippine Government, represented
by GPNP Chairperson Miriam Coronel-Ferrer, signed the
CAB,[18] which was an integration of the FAB, the Annexes
and the other agreements[19] previously executed by the
government and the MILF.
On 10 September 2014, a draft of the Bangsamoro Basic Law,
referred to as House Bill (HB) No. 4994,[20] was presented
by President Aquino to the 16th Congress. On 27 May 2015,
in Committee Report No. 747, the Ad Hoc Committee on the
Basic Bangsamoro Law of the House of Representatives
substituted said bill and passed another version known as
House Bill No. 5811.[21] In the Senate, a revised version of
the Bangsamoro Basic Law, known as the Basic Law for the
Bangsamoro Autonomous Region or Senate Bill No. 2894,[22]
was presented on 10 August 2015. However, on 6 June 2016,
the 16th Congress adjourned[23] without passing the
proposed Bangsamoro Basic Law.
Meanwhile, several petitions were filed with this Court
assailing the constitutionality of the CAB, including the FAB,
and its Annexes. G.R. Nos. 204354 and 204355, which were
both filed in 2012, were consolidated pursuant to a
Resolution[24] dated 11 December 2012. Likewise, in a
Resolution[25] dated 23 June 2015, G.R. Nos. 218406 and
218407 were consolidated. In a Resolution[26] dated 12
January 2016, the Court granted the consolidation of G.R.
No. 218761 with G.R. Nos. 218406 and 218407. In a
Resolution dated 22 November 2016, all five petitions were
consolidated.
On 7 November 2016, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte issued
EO No. 08[27] expanding the membership and functions of
the Bangsamoro Transition Commission. EO No. 08 expands
the number of members of the Bangsamoro Transition
Commission from 15 to 21. Section 3 of EO No. 120, as
amended by EO No. 08, provides for the functions of the
Bangsamoro Transition Commission, which include drafting
proposals for a Bangsamoro Basic Law, to be submitted to the
Office of the President for submission to Congress, and
recommending to Congress or the people proposed
amendments to the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
The Issue
The threshold issue in this case is whether the CAB,
including the FAB, is constitutional.
The Court's Ruling
We dismiss the petitions.
Not ripe for adjudication due to non-enactment of the
Bangsamoro Basic Law
Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution spells out what
judicial power is, to wit:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme
Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
Pursuant to this constitutional provision, it is clear that the
Court's judicial review power is limited to actual cases or
controversies. The Court generally declines to issue advisory
opinions or to resolve hypothetical or feigned problems, or
mere academic questions. The limitation of the power of
judicial review to actual cases and controversies assures that
the courts will not intrude into areas specifically confined to
the other branches of government.[28]
An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal
rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of
judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or
abstract difference or dispute.[29] There must be a contrast
of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the
basis of existing law and jurisprudence.[30] The Court can
decide the constitutionality of an act, either by the Executive
or Legislative, only when an actual case between opposing
parties is submitted for judicial determination.[31]
Closely linked to the requirement of an actual case or
controversy is the requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe
for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a
direct adverse effect on the individual or entity challenging
it.[32] For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a
prerequisite that an act had then been accomplished or
performed by either branch of government before a court may
interfere, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an
immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of the
challenged action.[33] Petitioner must show that he has
sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some
direct injury as a result of the act complained of.[34]
In Province of North Cotabato v. GRP (MOA-AD case),[35]
which involved the Memorandum of Agreement on the
Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli
Agreement on Peace of 2001, the Court faced the same issue
of ripeness. There, the Court explained the limits of the
power of judicial review and the prerequisites for the judicial
determination of a case.
In the MOA-AD case, the Court rejected the argument of the
Solicitor General that there was no justiciable controversy
that was ripe for adjudication. The Court disagreed with the
Solicitor General's contention that the initialed but
"unsigned MOA-AD is simply a list of consensus points
subject to further negotiations and legislative enactments as
well as constitutional processes aimed at attaining a final
peaceful agreement. x x x [T]he MOA-AD remains to be a
proposal that does not automatically create legally
demandable rights and obligations until the list of operative
acts required have been duly complied with."[36] The Court
ruled that "[w]hen an act of a branch of government is
seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it
becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary
to settle the dispute."[37] Moreover, in the MOA-AD case, the
Executive was about to sign the initialed MOA-AD with the
MILF in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia in the presence of
representatives of foreign states. Only the prompt issuance
by this Court of a temporary restraining order stopped the
signing, averting the implications that such signing would
have caused.
In the present case, however, the Court agrees with the
Solicitor General that there is no actual case or controversy
requiring a full-blown resolution of the principal issue
presented by petitioners.
In the present case, there is no such guarantee when the CAB
and the FAB were signed. The government gives no
commitment, express or implied, that the Constitution will
be amended or that a law will be passed comprising all the
provisions indicated in the CAB and the FAB. Thus, contrary
to the imagined fear of petitioners, the CAB and the FAB are
not mere reincarnations or disguises of the infirm MOA-AD.
The CAB and the FAB require the enactment of the
Bangsamoro Basic Law for their implementation. It is a
fundamental constitutional principle that Congress has full
discretion to enact the kind of Bangsamoro Basic Law that
Congress, in its wisdom, deems necessary and proper to
promote peace and development in Muslim areas in
Mindanao. Congress is expected to seriously consider the
CAB and the FAB but Congress is not bound by the CAB and
the FAB. Congress is separate, independent, and co-equal of
the Executive branch that alone entered into the CAB and
the FAB. The Executive branch cannot compel Congress to
adopt the CAB and the FAB. Neither can Congress dictate on
Congress the contents of the Bangsamoro Basic Law, or the
proposed amendments to the Constitution that Congress
should submit to the people for ratification.
ATLAS FERTILIZER V. SEC, DAR, G.R. NO. 93100, JUNE
19, 1997
Facts: Petitioner, Atlas Fertilizer engaged in the aquaculture
industry utilizing fishponds and prawn farms. Assailed
Sections 3 (b), 11, 13, 16 (d), 17 and 32 of R.A. 6657
(Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law), as well as the
implementing guidelines and procedures contained in
Administrative Order Nos. 8 and 10 Series of 1988 issued by
public respondent Secretary of the Department of Agrarian
Reform as unconstitutional. They contend that R.A. 6657, by
including the raising of fish and aquaculture operations
including fishponds and prawn ponds, treating them as in the
same class or classification as agriculture or farming violates
the equal protection clause of the Constitution and therefore
void.
Issue: Whether or not RA 6657 is unconstitutional.
Decision: Petition dismissed. R.A. No. 7881 approved by
Congress on 20 February 1995 expressly state that fishponds
and prawn farms are excluded from the coverage of CARL. In
view of the foregoing, the question concerning the
constitutionality of the assailed provisions has become moot
and academic with the passage of R.A. No. 7881.
LACSON V. PEREZ, G.R. NO. 147780, MAY 10, 2001
FACTS:
On May 18, 1995, alleged members of the Kuratong Baleleng
Gang were shot to death. The incident was later
sensationalized as a rub out. This implicated case Panfilo
Lacson, who, at the time of the “rub out” was then the PNP
Chief, among others, as the ones responsible. They were
accused of multiple murder. The case reached the
Sandiganbayan. In 1996, Lacson et al filed separate motions
questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. They aver
that the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Court pursuant to Section 2 (par a and c) of Republic Act No.
7975 also known as “An Act To Strengthen The Functional
And Structural Organization Of The Sandiganbayan,
Amending For That Purpose Presidential Decree 1606, As
Amended”.
They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan to cases where one or more of the “principal
accused” are government officials with Salary Grade (SG) 27
or higher, or PNP officials with the rank of Chief
Superintendent (Brigadier General) or higher. The highest
ranking principal accused in the amended informations has
the rank of only a Chief Inspector, and none has the
equivalent of at least SG 27.
In 1997, Republic Act No. 8249 was passed which basically
expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The law was
authored by Lagman and Neptali Gonzales. Lacson assailed
the law as it was introduced by the authors thereof in bad
faith as it was made to precisely suit the situation in which
Lacson’s cases were in at the Sandiganbayan by restoring
jurisdiction thereover to it, thereby violating his right to
procedural due process and the equal protection clause of the
Constitution. Further, from the way the Sandiganbayan has
foot-dragged for nine (9) months the resolution of a pending
incident involving the transfer of the cases to the Regional
Trial Court, the passage of the law may have been timed to
overtake such resolution to render the issue therein moot,
and frustrate the exercise of petitioner’s vested rights under
the old Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975).
ISSUE: Whether or not the right to equal protection by
Lacson et al has been violated with the passage of RA 8249.
HELD: No. The SC ruled that RA 8249 did not violate the
right of Lacson et al to equal protection. No concrete evidence
and convincing argument were presented to warrant a
declaration of an act of the entire Congress and signed into
law by the highest officer of the co-equal executive
department as unconstitutional. Every classification made by
law is presumed reasonable. Thus, the party who challenges
the law must present proof of arbitrariness. It is an
established precept in constitutional law that the guaranty of
the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation
based on reasonable classification. The classification is
reasonable and not arbitrary when there is concurrence of
four elements, namely:
(1) it must rest on substantial distinction;
(2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only, and
(4) must apply equally to all members of the same class
The classification between those pending cases involving the
concerned public officials whose trial has not yet commenced
and whose cases could have been affected by the amendments
of the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction under R.A. 8249, as
against those cases where trial had already started as of the
approval of the law, rests on substantial distinction that
makes real differences. In the first instance, evidence against
them were not yet presented, whereas in the latter the
parties had already submitted their respective proofs,
examined witness and presented documents. Since it is
within the power of Congress to define the jurisdiction of
courts subject to the constitutional limitations, it can be
reasonably anticipated that an alteration of that jurisdiction
would necessarily affect pending cases, which is why it has to
provide for a remedy in the form of a transitory provision.
Thus, Lacson et al cannot claim that Secs 4 and 7 placed them
under a different category from those similarly situated as
them.
Precisely, par A of Sec 4 provides that it shall apply to “all
cases involving” certain public officials and, under the
transitory provision in Sec 7, to “all cases pending in any
court.” Contrary to petitioner and intervenors’ arguments,
the law is not particularly directed only to the Kuratong
Baleleng cases. The transitory provision does not only cover
cases which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in “any court.”
It just happened that the Kuratong Baleleng cases are one of
those affected by the law. Moreover, those cases where trial
had already begun are not affected by the transitory
provision under Sec 7 of the new law (R.A. 8249).
SANLAKAS V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, G.R. 159085,
FEBRUARY 3, 2004
Facts:
In the wee hours of 27 July 203 some 300 junior officers and
enlisted men of AFP, heavily armed stormed the Oakwood
Premiere in Makati demanding for the resignation of the
President, Secretary of Defence and Chief of the PNP. By
virtue of Proclamation 427 dated 27 July 2003, state of
rebellion was declared and General Order No 4 of the same
date, the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine
National Police were directed to suppress and quell the
rebellion pursuant to Section 18 Article VII of the
Constitution. The soldiers returned to barracks on the same
night and the declaration of state of rebellion was lifted on 1
August 2003 by virtue of Proclamation No 435. In the
interim, several petitions were filed before the Court
challenging the validity of Proclamation No. 427 and General
Order No. 4. Sanlakas contend that Section 18, Article VII of
the Constitution does not require the declaration of a state of
rebellion to call out the armed forces. Because of the cessation
of the Oakwood occupation, there exists no sufficient factual
basis for the proclamation by the President of a state of
rebellion for an indefinite period. Solicitor General argues
that the petitions have been rendered moot by the lifting of
the declaration.
Issue: Whether or not declaring state of rebellion is needed to
declare General order No 4?
Decision: Petitions dismissed. The state of rebellion has
ceased to exist and has rendered the case moot.
Nevertheless, courts will decide a question, otherwise moot,
if it is capable of repetition yet evading review. The case at
bar is one such case. The mere declaration of a state of
rebellion cannot diminish or violate constitutionally
protected rights. Indeed, if a state of martial law does not
suspend the operation of the Constitution or automatically
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, then it is
with more reason that a simple declaration of a state of
rebellion could not bring about these conditions. The
presidential issuances themselves call for the suppression of
the rebellion with due regard to constitutional rights.

PIMENTEL VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
on 7:00 AM in Case Digests, Political Law 0
G.R. No. 164978, Oct. 13, 2005
Power of Appointment
Ad Interim Appointments vs. Temporary Appointments
FACTS:
This case was brought on when President Arroyo through
Executive Secretary Ermita issued appointments to
respondents as acting secretaries of their respective
departments. Several senators filed this petition in Court.
After Congress adjourned on Sept. 22, 2004, President Arroyo
issued ad interim appointments to same respondents, now as
secretaries of the departments to which they were previously
appointed in an acting capacity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not President Arroyo’s appointment of
respondents as acting secretaries without the consent of the
Commission on Appointments while Congress is in session
RULING:
Mootness
The Solicitor General argues that the petition is moot
considering that President Arroyo already extended to
respondents ad interim appointments on Sept. 23, 2004,
immediately after the recess of Congress.
xxx However, as an exception to the rule on mootness, courts
will decide a question otherwise moot if it is capable of
repetition yet evading review.
In the present case, the mootness of the petition does not bar
its resolution. The question of the constitutionality of the
President’s appointment of department secretaries in an
acting capacity while Congress is in session will arise in every
such appointment.
Nature of the power to appoint
The power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and
the legislature may not interfere with the exercise of this
executive power except in those instances when the
Constitution expressly allows it to interfere. Limitations on
the executive power to appoint are construed strictly against
the legislature. The scope of the legislature’s interference in
the executive’s power to appoint is limited to the power to
prescribe the qualifications to an appointive office. Congress
cannot appoint a person to an office in the guise of prescribing
qualifications to that office. Neither may Congress impose on
the President the duty to appoint any particular person to an
office.
However, even if the Commission on Appointments is
composed of members of Congress, the exercise of its power
is executive and not legislative. The Commission on
Appointments does not legislate when it exercises its power
to give or withhold consent to presidential appointments.
Standing of petitioner’s as individual members of Congress
Considering the independence of the Commission on
Appointments from Congress, it is error for petitioners to
claim standing in the present case as members of Congress.
President Arroyo’s issuance of acting appointments while
Congress is in session impairs no power of Congress. Among
the petitioners, only the following are members of the
Commission on Appointments of the 13t Congress: Senator
Enrile as Minority Floor Leader, Senator Lacson as Assistant
Minority Floor Leader, and Senator Angara, Senator
Ejercito-Estrada, and Senator Osmena as members.
Thus, on the impairment of the prerogatives of members of
the Commission on Appointments, only Senators Enrile,
Lacson, Angara, Ejercito-Estrada, and Osmena have
standing in the present petition.
Constitutionality of President Arroyo’s issuance of
appointments to respondents as acting secretaries
The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its
temporary nature. It is a stop-gap measure intended to fill an
office for a limited time until the appointment of a permanent
occupant to the office. In case of vacancy in an office occupied
by an alter ego of the President, such as the office of a
department secretary, the President must necessarily
appoint an alter ego of her choice as acting secretary before
the permanent appointee of her choice could assume office.
Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the President the
obligation to appoint automatically the undersecretary as her
temporary alter ego. An alter ego, whether temporary or
permanent, holds a position of great trust and confidence.
Congress, in the guise of prescribing qualifications to an
office, cannot impose on the President who her alter ego
should be.
The office of a department secretary may become vacant
while Congress is in session. Since a department secretary is
the alter ego of the President, the acting appointee to the
office must necessarily have the President’s confidence. Thus,
by the very nature of the office of a department secretary, the
President must appoint in an acting capacity a person of her
choice even while Congress is in session. That person may or
may not be the permanent appointee, but practical reasons
may make it expedient that the acting appointee will also be
the permanent appointee.
Express provision of law allows President to make acting
appointment
Sec. 17, Chap. 5, Title I, Book III, EO 292 states that “[t]he
President may temporarily designate an officer already in the
government service or any other competent person to perform
the functions of an office in the executive branch.” Thus, the
President may even appoint in an acting capacity a person
not yet in the government service, as long as the President
deems that person competent.
But does Sec. 17 apply to appointments vested in the
President by the Constitution? Petitioners assert that it only
applies to appointments vested in the President by law.
Petitioners forget that Congress is not the only source of law.
“Law” refers to the Constitution, statutes or acts of Congress,
municipal ordinances, implementing rules issued pursuant
to law, and judicial decisions.
Issuance of appointments in an acting capacity is susceptible
to abuse: Petitioners fail to consider that acting
appointments cannot exceed one year. The law has
incorporated this safeguard to prevent abuses, like the use of
acting appointments as a way to circumvent confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments.
Ad interim appointments vs. appointments in an acting
capacity
Ad-interim appointments must be distinguished from
appointments in an acting capacity. Both of them are
effective upon acceptance. But ad-interim appointments are
extended only during a recess of Congress, whereas acting
appointments may be extended any time there is a vacancy.
Moreover ad-interim appointments are submitted to the
Commission on Appointments for confirmation or rejection;
acting appointments are not submitted to the Commission on
Appointments. Acting appointments are a way of temporarily
filling important offices but, if abused, they can also be a way
of circumventing the need for confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments (Bernas, 1987 Constitution: A
commentary (1996))
However, we find no abuse in the present case. The absence
of abuse is readily apparent from President Arroyo’s issuance
of ad interim appointments to respondents immediately upon
the recess of Congress, way before the lapse of one year.
However as an exemption to the rule of mootness, courts will
decide a question otherwise moot if it is capable of repetition
yet evading review.
Joya vs. PCGG
on 7:47 AM in Case Digests, Political Law 1
G.R. No. 96541, Aug. 24, 1993
Requisites for exercise of judicial review: (1) that the question
must be raised by the proper party; (2) that there must be an
actual case or controversy; (3) that the question must be
raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and, (4) that the
decision on the constitutional or legal question must be
necessary to the determination of the case itself.
LEGAL STANDING: a personal and substantial interest in
the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain
direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being
challenged.
EXCEPTIONS TO LEGAL STANDING: Mandamus and
Taxpayer's Suits
REQUISITES FOR MANDAMUS: a writ of mandamus may
be issued to a citizen only when the public right to be enforced
and the concomitant duty of the state are unequivocably set
forth in the Constitution.
WHEN TAXPAYER SUIT MAY PROSPER: A taxpayer's suit
can prosper only if the governmental acts being questioned
involve disbursement of public funds upon the theory that the
expenditure of public funds by an officer of the state for the
purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes
a misapplication of such funds, which may be enjoined at the
request of a taxpayer.
ACTUAL CONTROVERSY: one which involves a conflict of
legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible
of judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or academic
or based on extra-legal or other similar considerations not
cognizable by a court of justice.
FACTS:
The Republic of the Philippines through the PCGG entered
into a Consignment Agreement with Christie’s of New York,
selling 82 Old Masters Paintings and antique silverware
seized from Malacanang and the Metropolitan Museum of
Manila alleged to be part of the ill-gotten wealth of the late
Pres. Marcos, his relatives and cronies. Prior to the auction
sale, COA questioned the Consignment Agreement, there
was already opposition to the auction sale. Nevertheless, it
proceeded as scheduled and the proceeds of $13,302,604.86
were turned over to the Bureau of Treasury.
ISSUE:
Whether or not PCGG has jurisdiction and authority to enter
into an agreement with Christie’s of New York for the sale of
the artworks
RULING:
On jurisdiction of the Court to exercise judicial review
The rule is settled that no question involving the
constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may
be heard and decided by the court unless there is compliance
with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: that the
question must be raised by the proper party; that there must
be an actual case or controversy; that the question must be
raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and, that the
decision on the constitutional or legal question must be
necessary to the determination of the case itself. But the most
important are the first two (2) requisites.
Standing of Petitioners
On the first requisite, we have held that one having no right
or interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the
court as party-plaintiff in an action. This is premised on Sec.
2, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court which provides that every
action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the
real party-in-interest, and that all persons having interest in
the subject of the action and in obtaining the relief demanded
shall be joined as plaintiffs. The Court will exercise its power
of judicial review only if the case is brought before it by a
party who has the legal standing to raise the constitutional
or legal question. "Legal standing" means a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that the party has
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
governmental act that is being challenged. The term
"interest" is material interest, an interest in issue and to be
affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in
the question involved, or a mere incidental interest.
Moreover, the interest of the party plaintiff must be personal
and not one based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional
right of some third and related party.
EXCEPTIONS TO LEGAL STANDING: Mandamus and
Taxpayer’s Suit:
There are certain instances however when this Court has
allowed exceptions to the rule on legal standing, as when a
citizen brings a case for mandamus to procure the
enforcement of a public duty for the fulfillment of a public
right recognized by the Constitution, and when a taxpayer
questions the validity of a governmental act authorizing the
disbursement of public funds.
Petitioners claim that as Filipino citizens, taxpayers and
artists deeply concerned with the preservation and protection
of the country's artistic wealth, they have the legal
personality to restrain respondents Executive Secretary and
PCGG from acting contrary to their public duty to conserve
the artistic creations as mandated by the 1987 Constitution,
particularly Art. XIV, Secs. 14 to 18, on Arts and Culture, and
R.A. 4846 known as "The Cultural Properties Preservation
and Protection Act," governing the preservation and
disposition of national and important cultural properties.
Petitioners also anchor their case on the premise that the
paintings and silverware are public properties collectively
owned by them and by the people in general to view and enjoy
as great works of art. They allege that with the unauthorized
act of PCGG in selling the art pieces, petitioners have been
deprived of their right to public property without due process
of law in violation of the Constitution.
Petitioners' arguments are devoid of merit. They lack basis
in fact and in law. They themselves allege that the paintings
were donated by private persons from different parts of the
world to the Metropolitan Museum of Manila Foundation,
which is a non-profit and non-stock corporations established
to promote non-Philippine arts. The foundation's chairman
was former First Lady Imelda R. Marcos, while its president
was Bienvenido R. Tantoco. On this basis, the ownership of
these paintings legally belongs to the foundation or
corporation or the members thereof, although the public has
been given the opportunity to view and appreciate these
paintings when they were placed on exhibit.
Similarly, as alleged in the petition, the pieces of antique
silverware were given to the Marcos couple as gifts from
friends and dignitaries from foreign countries on their silver
wedding and anniversary, an occasion personal to them.
When the Marcos administration was toppled by the
revolutionary government, these paintings and silverware
were taken from Malacañang and the Metropolitan Museum
of Manila and transferred to the Central Bank Museum. The
confiscation of these properties by the Aquino administration
however should not be understood to mean that the
ownership of these paintings has automatically passed on the
government without complying with constitutional and
statutory requirements of due process and just compensation.
If these properties were already acquired by the government,
any constitutional or statutory defect in their acquisition and
their subsequent disposition must be raised only by the
proper parties — the true owners thereof — whose authority
to recover emanates from their proprietary rights which are
protected by statutes and the Constitution. Having failed to
show that they are the legal owners of the artworks or that
the valued pieces have become publicly owned, petitioners do
not possess any clear legal right whatsoever to question their
alleged unauthorized disposition.
Requisites for a Mandamus Suit
Further, although this action is also one of mandamus filed
by concerned citizens, it does not fulfill the criteria for a
mandamus suit. In Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, this
Court laid down the rule that a writ of mandamus may be
issued to a citizen only when the public right to be enforced
and the concomitant duty of the state are unequivocably set
forth in the Constitution. In the case at bar, petitioners are
not after the fulfillment of a positive duty required of
respondent officials under the 1987 Constitution. What they
seek is the enjoining of an official act because it is
constitutionally infirmed. Moreover, petitioners' claim for the
continued enjoyment and appreciation by the public of the
artworks is at most a privilege and is unenforceable as a
constitutional right in this action for mandamus.
When a Taxpayer's Suit may prosper
Neither can this petition be allowed as a taxpayer's suit. Not
every action filed by a taxpayer can qualify to challenge the
legality of official acts done by the government. A taxpayer's
suit can prosper only if the governmental acts being
questioned involve disbursement of public funds upon the
theory that the expenditure of public funds by an officer of
the state for the purpose of administering an
unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such
funds, which may be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer.
Obviously, petitioners are not challenging any expenditure
involving public funds but the disposition of what they allege
to be public properties. It is worthy to note that petitioners
admit that the paintings and antique silverware were
acquired from private sources and not with public money.
Actual Controversy
For a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must
be an actual case of controversy — one which involves a
conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims
susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not be moot
or academic or based on extra-legal or other similar
considerations not cognizable by a court of justice. A case
becomes moot and academic when its purpose has become
stale, such as the case before us. Since the purpose of this
petition for prohibition is to enjoin respondent public officials
from holding the auction sale of the artworks on a particular
date — 11 January 1991 — which is long past, the issues
raised in the petition have become moot and academic.
At this point, however, we need to emphasize that this Court
has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does not
satisfy the requirements of an actual case or legal standing
when paramount public interest is involved. We find however
that there is no such justification in the petition at bar to
warrant the relaxation of the rule.

AGAN V. PIATCO, G.R. NO. 155001, MAY 5, 2003
FACTS:
On October 5, 1994, AEDC submitted an unsolicited proposal
to the Government through the DOTC/MIAA for the
development of NAIA International Passenger Terminal III
(NAIA IPT III).
DOTC constituted the Prequalification Bids and Awards
Committee (PBAC) for the implementation of the project and
submitted with its endorsement proposal to the NEDA, which
approved the project.
On June 7, 14, and 21, 1996, DOTC/MIAA caused the
publication in two daily newspapers of an invitation for
competitive or comparative proposals on AEDC’s unsolicited
proposal, in accordance with Sec. 4-A of RA 6957, as
amended.
On September 20, 1996, the consortium composed of People’s
Air Cargo and Warehousing Co., Inc. (Paircargo), Phil. Air
and Grounds Services, Inc. (PAGS) and Security Bank Corp.
(Security Bank) (collectively, Paircargo Consortium)
submitted their competitive proposal to the PBAC. PBAC
awarded the project to Paircargo Consortium. Because of
that, it was incorporated into Philippine International
Airport Terminals Co., Inc.
AEDC subsequently protested the alleged undue preference
given to PIATCO and reiterated its objections as regards the
prequalification of PIATCO.
On July 12, 1997, the Government and PIATCO signed the
“Concession Agreement for the Build-Operate-and-Transfer
Arrangement of the NAIA Passenger Terminal III” (1997
Concession Agreement). The Government granted PIATCO
the franchise to operate and maintain the said terminal
during the concession period and to collect the fees, rentals
and other charges in accordance with the rates or schedules
stipulated in the 1997 Concession Agreement. The
Agreement provided that the concession period shall be for
twenty-five (25) years commencing from the in-service date,
and may be renewed at the option of the Government for a
period not exceeding twenty-five (25) years. At the end of the
concession period, PIATCO shall transfer the development
facility to MIAA.
Article XII, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Section 17. In times of national emergency, when the public
interest so requires, the State may, during the emergency
and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily
take over or direct the operation of any privately owned
public utility or business affected with public interest.
The above provision pertains to the right of the State in times
of national emergency, and in the exercise of its police power,
to temporarily take over the operation of any business
affected with public interest. The duration of the emergency
itself is the determining factor as to how long the temporary
takeover by the government would last. The temporary
takeover by the government extends only to the operation of
the business and not to the ownership thereof. As such the
government is not required to compensate the private entity-
owner of the said business as there is no transfer of
ownership, whether permanent or temporary. The private
entity-owner affected by the temporary takeover cannot,
likewise, claim just compensation for the use of the said
business and its properties as the temporary takeover by the
government is in exercise of its police power and not of its
power of eminent domain.
Article XII, section 17 of the 1987 Constitution envisions a
situation wherein the exigencies of the times necessitate the
government to “temporarily take over or direct the operation
of any privately owned public utility or business affected with
public interest.” It is the welfare and interest of the public
which is the paramount consideration in determining
whether or not to temporarily take over a particular business.
Clearly, the State in effecting the temporary takeover is
exercising its police power. Police power is the “most
essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers.” Its exercise
therefore must not be unreasonably hampered nor its
exercise be a source of obligation by the government in the
absence of damage due to arbitrariness of its exercise. Thus,
requiring the government to pay reasonable compensation for
the reasonable use of the property pursuant to the operation
of the business contravenes the Constitution.

Meanwhile, the MIAA which is charged with the

maintenance and operation of the NAIA Terminals I and II,
had existing concession contracts with various service
providers to offer international airline airport services, such
as in-flight catering, passenger handling, ramp and ground
support, aircraft maintenance and provisions, cargo handling
and warehousing, and other services, to several international
airlines at the NAIA.

On September 17, 2002, the workers of the international

airline service providers, claiming that they would lose their
job upon the implementation of the questioned agreements,
filed a petition for prohibition. Several employees of MIAA
likewise filed a petition assailing the legality of the various
agreements.

During the pendency of the cases, PGMA, on her speech,

stated that she will not “honor (PIATCO) contracts which the
Executive Branch’s legal offices have concluded (as) null and
void.”

ISSUE:
Whether or not the State can temporarily take over a
business affected with public interest.

RULING:
Yes. PIATCO cannot, by mere contractual stipulation,
contravene the Constitutional provision on temporary
government takeover and obligate the government to pay
“reasonable cost for the use of the Terminal and/or Terminal
Complex.”
CHREA vs.CHR
G.R. No. 155336
November 25, 2004
FACTS: Congress passed RA 8522, otherwise known as the
General Appropriations Act of 1998. It provided for Special
Provisions Applicable to All Constitutional Offices Enjoying
Fiscal Autonomy. On the strength of these special provisions,
the CHR promulgated Resolution No. A98-047 adopting an
upgrading and reclassification scheme among selected
positions in the Commission.
By virtue of Resolution No. A98-062, the CHR “collapsed” the
vacant positions in the body to provide additional source of
funding for said staffing modification.
The CHR forwarded said staffing modification and upgrading
scheme to the DBM with a request for its approval, but the
then DBM secretary denied the request.
In light of the DBM’s disapproval of the proposed personnel
modification scheme, the CSC-National Capital Region
Office, through a memorandum, recommended to the CSC-
Central Office that the subject appointments be rejected
owing to the DBM’s disapproval of the plantilla
reclassification.
Meanwhile, the officers of petitioner CHR-employees
association (CHREA) in representation of the rank and file
employees of the CHR, requested the CSC-Central Office to
affirm the recommendation of the CSC-Regional Office.
The CSC-Central Office denied CHREA’s request in a
Resolution and reversed the recommendation of the CSC-
Regional Office that the upgrading scheme be censured.
CHREA filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CSC-
Central Office denied the same.
CHREA elevated the matter to the CA, which affirmed the
pronouncement of the CSC-Central Office and upheld the
validity of the upgrading, retitling, and reclassification
scheme in the CHR on the justification that such action is
within the ambit of CHR’s fiscal autonomy.
ISSUE: Can the CHR validly implement an upgrading,
reclassification, creation, and collapsing of plantilla positions
in the Commission without the prior approval of the
Department of Budget and Management?
HELD: the petition is GRANTED, the Decision of the CA and
its are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The ruling CSC-
National Capital Region is REINSTATED. The 3 CHR
Resolutions, without the approval of the DBM are disallowed.
1. RA 6758, An Act Prescribing a Revised Compensation and
Position Classification System in the Government and For
Other Purposes, or the Salary Standardization Law, provides
that it is the DBM that shall establish and administer a
unified Compensation and Position Classification System.
The disputation of the CA that the CHR is exempt from the
long arm of the Salary Standardization Law is flawed
considering that the coverage thereof encompasses the entire
gamut of government offices, sans qualification.
This power to “administer” is not purely ministerial in
character as erroneously held by the CA. The word to
administer means to control or regulate in behalf of others;
to direct or superintend the execution, application or conduct
of; and to manage or conduct public affairs, as to administer
the government of the state.
2. The regulatory power of the DBM on matters of
compensation is encrypted not only in law, but in
jurisprudence as well. In the recent case of PRA v. Buñag,
this Court ruled that compensation, allowances, and other
benefits received by PRA officials and employees without the
requisite approval or authority of the DBM are unauthorized
and irregular
In Victorina Cruz v. CA , we held that the DBM has the sole
power and discretion to administer the compensation and
position classification system of the national government.
In Intia, Jr. v. COA the Court held that although the charter
of the PPC grants it the power to fix the compensation and
benefits of its employees and exempts PPC from the coverage
of the rules and regulations of the Compensation and Position
Classification Office, by virtue of Section 6 of P.D. No. 1597,
the compensation system established by the PPC is,
nonetheless, subject to the review of the DBM.
(It should be emphasized that the review by the DBM of any
PPC resolution affecting the compensation structure of its
personnel should not be interpreted to mean that the DBM
can dictate upon the PPC Board of Directors and deprive the
latter of its discretion on the matter. Rather, the DBM’s
function is merely to ensure that the action taken by the
Board of Directors complies with the requirements of the law,
specifically, that PPC’s compensation system “conforms as
closely as possible with that provided for under R.A. No.
6758.” )
3. As measured by the foregoing legal and jurisprudential
yardsticks, the imprimatur of the DBM must first be sought
prior to implementation of any reclassification or upgrading
of positions in government. This is consonant to the mandate
of the DBM under the RAC of 1987, Section 3, Chapter 1,
Title XVII, to wit:
SEC. 3. Powers and Functions. – The Department of Budget
and Management shall assist the President in the
preparation of a national resources and expenditures budget,
preparation, execution and control of the National Budget,
preparation and maintenance of accounting systems
essential to the budgetary process, achievement of more
economy and efficiency in the management of government
operations, administration of compensation and position
classification systems, assessment of organizational
effectiveness and review and evaluation of legislative
proposals having budgetary or organizational implications.
Irrefragably, it is within the turf of the DBM Secretary to
disallow the upgrading, reclassification, and creation of
additional plantilla positions in the CHR based on its finding
that such scheme lacks legal justification.
Notably, the CHR itself recognizes the authority of the DBM
to deny or approve the proposed reclassification of positions
as evidenced by its three letters to the DBM requesting
approval thereof. As such, it is now estopped from now
claiming that the nod of approval it has previously sought
from the DBM is a superfluity
4. The CA incorrectly relied on the pronouncement of the
CSC-Central Office that the CHR is a constitutional
commission, and as such enjoys fiscal autonomy.
Palpably, the CA’s Decision was based on the mistaken
premise that the CHR belongs to the species of constitutional
commissions. But the Constitution states in no uncertain
terms that only the CSC, the COMELEC, and the COA shall
be tagged as Constitutional Commissions with the
appurtenant right to fiscal autonomy.
Along the same vein, the Administrative Code, on
Distribution of Powers of Government, the constitutional
commissions shall include only the CSC, the COMELEC, and
the COA, which are granted independence and fiscal
autonomy. In contrast, Chapter 5, Section 29 thereof, is silent
on the grant of similar powers to the other bodies including
the CHR. Thus:
SEC. 24. Constitutional Commissions. – The Constitutional
Commissions, which shall be independent, are the Civil
Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the
Commission on Audit.
SEC. 26. Fiscal Autonomy. – The Constitutional
Commissions shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. The approved
annual appropriations shall be automatically and regularly
released.
SEC. 29. Other Bodies. – There shall be in accordance with
the Constitution, an Office of the Ombudsman, a Commission
on Human Rights, and independent central monetary
authority, and a national police commission. Likewise, as
provided in the Constitution, Congress may establish an
independent economic and planning agency.
From the 1987 Constitution and the Administrative Code, it
is abundantly clear that the CHR is not among the class of
Constitutional Commissions. As expressed in the oft-
repeated maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the
express mention of one person, thing, act or consequence
excludes all others. Stated otherwise, expressium facit
cessare tacitum – what is expressed puts an end to what is
implied.
Nor is there any legal basis to support the contention that the
CHR enjoys fiscal autonomy. In essence, fiscal autonomy
entails freedom from outside control and limitations, other
than those provided by law. It is the freedom to allocate and
utilize funds granted by law, in accordance with law, and
pursuant to the wisdom and dispatch its needs may require
from time to time.22 In Blaquera v. Alcala and Bengzon v.
Drilon,23 it is understood that it is only the Judiciary, the
CSC, the COA, the COMELEC, and the Office of the
Ombudsman, which enjoy fiscal autonomy.
Neither does the fact that the CHR was admitted as a
member by the Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group
(CFAG) ipso facto clothed it with fiscal autonomy. Fiscal
autonomy is a constitutional grant, not a tag obtainable by
membership.
We note with interest that the special provision under Rep.
Act No. 8522, while cited under the heading of the CHR, did
not specifically mention CHR as among those offices to which
the special provision to formulate and implement
organizational structures apply, but merely states its
coverage to include Constitutional Commissions and Offices
enjoying fiscal autonomy
All told, the CHR, although admittedly a constitutional
creation is, nonetheless, not included in the genus of offices
accorded fiscal autonomy by constitutional or legislative fiat.
Even assuming en arguendo that the CHR enjoys fiscal
autonomy, we share the stance of the DBM that the grant of
fiscal autonomy notwithstanding, all government offices
must, all the same, kowtow to the Salary Standardization
Law. We are of the same mind with the DBM on its
standpoint, thus-
Being a member of the fiscal autonomy group does not vest
the agency with the authority to reclassify, upgrade, and
create positions without approval of the DBM. While the
members of the Group are authorized to formulate and
implement the organizational structures of their respective
offices and determine the compensation of their personnel,
such authority is not absolute and must be exercised within
the parameters of the Unified Position Classification and
Compensation System established under RA 6758 more
popularly known as the Compensation Standardization Law.
5. The most lucid argument against the stand of respondent,
however, is the provision of Rep. Act No. 8522 “that the
implementation hereof shall be in accordance with salary
rates, allowances and other benefits authorized under
compensation standardization laws.”26
NOTES:
1. Respondent CHR sharply retorts that petitioner has no
locus standi considering that there exists no official written
record in the Commission recognizing petitioner as a bona
fide organization of its employees nor is there anything in the
records to show that its president has the authority to sue the
CHR.
On petitioner’s personality to bring this suit, we held in a
multitude of cases that a proper party is one who has
sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining an injury
as a result of the act complained of. Here, petitioner, which
consists of rank and file employees of respondent CHR,
protests that the upgrading and collapsing of positions
benefited only a select few in the upper level positions in the
Commission resulting to the demoralization of the rank and
file employees. This sufficiently meets the injury test. Indeed,
the CHR’s upgrading scheme, if found to be valid, potentially
entails eating up the Commission’s savings or that portion of
its budgetary pie otherwise allocated for Personnel Services,
from which the benefits of the employees, including those in
the rank and file, are derived.
Further, the personality of petitioner to file this case was
recognized by the CSC when it took cognizance of the
CHREA’s request to affirm the recommendation of the CSC-
National Capital Region Office. CHREA’s personality to
bring the suit was a non-issue in the CA when it passed upon
the merits of this case. Thus, neither should our hands be tied
by this technical concern. Indeed, it is settled jurisprudence
that an issue that was neither raised in the complaint nor in
the court below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal,
as to do so would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play,
justice, and due process.
2. In line with its role to breathe life into the policy behind
the Salary Standardization Law of “providing equal pay for
substantially equal work and to base differences in pay upon
substantive differences in duties and responsibilities, and
qualification requirements of the positions,” the DBM, in the
case under review, made a determination, after a thorough
evaluation, that the reclassification and upgrading scheme
proposed by the CHR lacks legal rationalization.
The DBM expounded that Section 78 of the general
provisions of the General Appropriations Act FY 1998, which
the CHR heavily relies upon to justify its reclassification
scheme, explicitly provides that “no organizational unit or
changes in key positions shall be authorized unless provided
by law or directed by the President.” Here, the DBM
discerned that there is no law authorizing the creation of a
Finance Management Office and a Public Affairs Office in the
CHR. Anent CHR’s proposal to upgrade twelve positions of
Attorney VI, SG-26 to Director IV, SG-28, and four positions
of Director III, SG-27 to Director IV, SG-28, in the Central
Office, the DBM denied the same as this would change the
context from support to substantive without actual change in
functions.
This view of the DBM, as the law’s designated body to
implement and administer a unified compensation system, is
beyond cavil. The interpretation of an administrative
government agency, which is tasked to implement a statute
is accorded great respect and ordinarily controls the
construction of the courts. In Energy Regulatory Board v. CA,
we echoed the basic rule that the courts will not interfere in
matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of
government agencies entrusted with the regulation of
activities coming under the special technical knowledge and
training of such agencies.
AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY WORKERS ALLIANCE V.
ROMULO, G.R. 157509, JAN. 18, 2005
Facts:

Executive Order No. 292 was issued whereby the National

Labor Relations Commission became an agency attached to
the Department of Labor and Employment for policy and
program coordination and for administrative supervision. On
02 March 1989, Article 213 of the Labor Code was expressly
amended by Republic Act No. 6715 declaring that the NLRC
was to be attached to the DOLE for program and policy
coordination only while the administrative supervision was
turned over to the NLRC Chairman. Executive Order No. 185
dated 10 March 2003 supervision of NLRC reverted to the
Sec. of Labor and Employment. Petitioners, composed of ten
labor unions assailed the constitutionality of EO 185 for
allegedly revert the set-up prior to RA 6715 which only
Congress can do. Solicitor General contend that petitioners
have no locus standi to assail the validity of E.O. No. 185, not
even in their capacity as taxpayers, considering that labor
unions are exempt from paying taxes, citing Sec. 30 of the
Tax Reform Act of 1997. Even assuming that their individual
members are taxpayers, respondents maintain that a
taxpayer suit will not prosper as E.O. No. 185 does not
require additional appropriation for its implementation.

Issue:

Whether or not the ten labour unions have legal standing to

assail the constitutionality of EO 185?

Decision:

Petition dismissed for lack of merit. For a citizen to have

standing, he must establish that he has suffered some actual
or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal
conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to
the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed
by a favorable action. Petitioners have not shown that they
have sustained or are in danger of sustaining any personal
injury attributable to the enactment of E.O. No. 185. As labor
unions it cannot be said that E.O. No. 185 will prejudice their
rights and interests considering that the scope of the
authority conferred upon the Secretary of Labor does not
extend to the power to review, reverse, revise or modify the
decisions of the NLRC in the exercise of its quasi-judicial
functions.