Safety Review of the Proposed Onshore

Section of the Corrib Gas Pipeline

- Draft Report
Dr. Mike Acton and Dr. Bob Andrews (Consultants)
Mr. Arwel Griffiths (Executive Director)

© Copyright 2005 Advantica, Inc. (USA Only) and Advantica Ltd. (Outside USA). All rights reserved by the respective owner.
Overview
• Introduction to Advantica
• Company Overview
• Key Personnel
• Safety Review of the Corrib Gas Pipeline
• Background
• Scope of Safety Review
• Safety Review Process
• Draft Report
• Summary of Recommendations and Closing Remarks
What Does Advantica Do?
• Provide engineering, consultancy and
software services to customers across
the hydrocarbon chain…
• …throughout the project lifecycle, from
infrastructure development through to
asset management.
• Approximately 500 highly qualified
scientific and engineering staff, including
internationally renowned experts.
• Complete gas chain coverage.
We are a Global Business

Advantica Clients found in these locations

Award Winning Technology
Key Personnel
• Dr. Mike Acton (Hazard & Risk Management)
• 17 years oil & gas experience at Advantica (formerly British Gas R&T)
• Involved in many large and full scale pipeline tests
• Chairman of PIPESAFE Group of companies
• Extensive experience in the application of pipeline risk assessment
• Experienced incident investigator, including transmission pipeline failures
• Active member of IGEM Committees, and contributed to several IGEM
Codes of Practice and Safety Recommendations
• Dr. Bob Andrews (Integrity Management)
• 20 years experience at The Welding Institute and then Advantica
• Extensive experience of structural integrity issues in components and
structures, particularly pipelines
• Specialist in pipeline integrity and fracture control
• Active member of IGEM and BSI Committees, and contributed to IGEM and
BSI Codes of Practice and Standards
Safety Review of the Corrib Gas Pipeline
Background
• The pipeline industry has a good safety
record, but incidents have occasionally
occurred
• The Corrib onshore pipeline is planned
to operate at high pressure, carrying
untreated gas
• Serious concerns expressed by local
residents over the safety of the pipeline,
especially the consequences of failure
• Safety review commissioned in
response to those concerns
Scope of Safety Review
• Identify and obtain relevant documentation
• Undertake critical review to:
• Confirm completeness and suitability of available documentation in
accordance with application design code(s) and best practice
• Verify pipeline design and risk calculations using Advantica models and
data including consideration of key sources of uncertainty
• Assess whether all reasonably practicable risk reduction measures have
been considered
• Prepare report to:
• Give our independent professional opinion as to whether the proposed
design, construction and operation of the Corrib gas pipeline
• meets applicable standards, COPs, regulations and operating procedures
• is consistent with international best practice
• Will deliver a facility which is “fit for purpose”
• Discuss any deficiencies identified and recommendations as to how they
should be addressed, with guidance on implementation as appropriate
Scope of Safety Review
• Included:
• Review of the health and safety aspects of the proposed pipeline in terms of
engineering design and risk to public safety
• Review of the available documentation for completeness and suitability
• NOT included
• Assessment of environmental impact
• Assessment of the risk to workers during construction
• Review of the onshore terminal, offshore pipeline or subsea equipment
Safety Review Process
• Evaluate initial set of documents supplied by TAG
• Identify and request additional information from Shell
• Meeting with Shell for points of clarification and discussion of project
design selection process
• Documents classified as:
• Technical documents requiring detailed technical review by specialists
• Documents providing background information including project history
• Documents outside the scope of the review
• Site visit to confirm understanding of pipeline route and local conditions
• 2 day oral hearing and opportunity for written submissions to raise
issues of concern and points to be taken into account in the review
• Draft report issued for comment
• Final report
Draft Report
Report Structure
• Executive Summary
• Main Report
1. Introduction
2. The Safety Review Process
3. Overall Project Development Plan
4. Review of Pipeline Design
5. Quantified Risk Assessment
6. Discussion
7. Final Remarks and Recommendations
• Appendices
A. Advantica Personnel
B. Summary of Oral and Written Submissions
C. Geotechnical Analysis
D. Societal Risk Analysis
E. Geotechnical Investigations on Corrib Pipeline Route
F. Comments on Rossport Pipeline Hazard Calculations by DJ Aldridge PhD
Overall Project Development Plan
Overall Project Development Plan
• High level review of constraints relevant to the onshore pipeline
• Assessment of consideration given to safety issues in the design option
selection process for:
• Sub-sea tie-back option
• Landfall and terminal locations
• Proposed onshore pipeline route
• This section considers the process followed
• Not a detailed technical review
• Consideration of alternative design options, terminal locations or
pipeline routes was outside the scope of our work
Overall Project Development Plan
• Terminal location, 9km inland, drives requirement for an onshore
pipeline
• High pressure onshore pipeline required whether gas processed
onshore or offshore
• Onshore processing introduces additional threats that must be
managed
• Public safety was one of many factors in selection process, which also
included:
• Visual impact
• Economic
• Environmental
• Technical
Overall Project Development Plan
• QRA informed design and route selection
• Risk levels within recognised international criteria
• Ireland has no formal risk-based framework in place
• Consideration should be given by the Irish Government to establishing
a risk-based framework for decisions on proposed and existing major
hazard pipelines and related infrastructure
Overall Project Development Plan
• Four route options considered:
• Pollatomish via Dooncarton landfall
• Brandy Point via Brandy Point landfall
• Via Struwaddacon Bay
• Rossport via Dooncarton landfall (preferred)
Overall Project Development Plan
• Initial design based on pressure of 150 bar
• Subsequently adopted more cautious approach
• Wall thickness increased
• Withstand 345 bar theoretical worst case
• Most cautious approach to routing based on consequence distances,
but in practice, rarely practical to avoid all population
• Design codes have more onerous requirements for
• Higher population density
• Proximity to housing (in some cases)
Overall Project Development Plan
• Route through Rossport determined by
• Ground stability
• Avoidance of possible future land development
• Maximising distance from housing
• Nearest building 70m from pipeline
• Justified by QRA
Review of Pipeline Design
Integrity - fatigue
• Failure due to variations in pressure
• Several predictions from flow
simulations
• Stresses around “cut-off” in codes
• Recommend:
• Monitoring of pressure variations
• Check small attachments
200 Edition 4
165Nmm-2 Edition 3

Stress range (Nmm-2)

100
90
80
70
60

50

40
35Nmm-2
30

1000 2 3 4 5 6 7 10000 2 3 4 5 6 100000 2 3 4 5 6 1000000

Cycles
Integrity – impact protection
• Protection at road crossings using concrete slabs is accepted practice
• Concerns with the data supplied:
• Design left to contractor and not location specific
• Slabbing should extend the full width of the route – already addressed
• Distance between slab and pipe may be too shallow
• Support slab from subsoil in peat areas
• Formal safety analysis for 72% SMYS operation at crossings not
documented
• These issues should be addressed to provide “best practice” impact
protection
Integrity – ground movement
• Considered by designers
• Advantica review raised concerns:
• Details of analysis method
• Soil parameters, size of landslip and cases analysed
• “Cherry picking” assessment criterion from DNV code
• We repeated the same cases using our internal software
• Our results satisfied the BS 8010 allowable stress criterion for the same
case at 150 bar internal pressure
Integrity – ground movement
• We also checked other failure modes such as buckling
• We consider other analyses are required to demonstrate integrity:
• Movement parallel to the pipe
• Effect of bends
• Increased depth of cover
• We recommend monitoring of stresses in critical areas
Ground Movement
• Effects of pipeline on ground stability have been considered
• Dooncarton type slide on steep slopes will not affect the route as the
slopes are too shallow
• Shallow slope slide has been addressed by Shell’s consultants
• All recommendations by these consultants should be implemented in
full
Materials
• Pipe material to DNV OS-F101 Grade 485
• This grade (or equivalent) has been widely used for onshore and
offshore projects
• Plate produced by German and Japanese mills and pipe produced in
UK
• Mill certificates examined – requirements satisfied
• Formal fracture control plan not produced, but we have checked the
requirements for the gas composition and consider material is
satisfactory
Internal Corrosion
• Review of internal corrosion analysis:
• Base rate calculation may be low
• Inhibitor effectiveness may be lower than assumed
• Corrosion allowance too low – should be € 3 mm
• We recommend:
• Re-evaluation of the corrosion design and inhibition
• Monitoring as part of the integrity management system
• Extensive experience of multiphase flow lines shows that it is possible
to control corrosion using inhibition
External Corrosion
• Mainline coating specification
generally satisfactory
• We recommend testing to assess
possible long term UV degradation
during storage
• We are concerned with the quality of
field joint coating and recommend a
robust inspection regime during
construction
• Cathodic protection system requires
an insulation joint at the beach to
achieve separation from offshore
system
Construction
• Welding to British Standards
• Toughness requirements exceed BS
• Actual levels above requirements
• Welds meet best practice
Pressure Testing
• We recommend:
• A “high level” pressure test to 105% SMYS should be carried out
• The test pressure should be calculated on nominal wall thickness not
design
• We support the recommendation for a fingerprinting ILI run during
commissioning
Operations & Maintenance
• Procedures were requested from Shell but we were advised that these
had not yet been written and would be prepared prior to operation in
accordance with BS 8010
• An Integrity Management System (IMS) is required and should include
• Inspections
• Management systems and management of change
• Audit and corrective actions
• IMS should be in place from the start of the project
• Frequency of inspections should be updated based on results
• We consider a leak detection system is not sufficient as an integrity
management system
• A formal integrity management system should be established for the
pipeline before construction is allowed to commence
Operations & Maintenance
• We recommend:
• Defect assessment and procedures should be defined in advance so that
anomalies can be sentenced quickly
• Repair procedures should be developed for non-leaking damage
• Procedures are required for safe working in proximity to the pipeline
Future Operation
• We have not considered tie-ins of other fields to this pipeline
• We note the system is designed for sweet gas, ie no H2S
• Monitoring is required to check that H2S is not introduced into the
system
• In the event that additional fields were proposed to be tied in to the
pipeline at any future date, a full review would be required to consider
issues such as extension of the life beyond the initial design life,
changes in the fluids in the pipeline or changes in the operating
pressures
Risk Assessment
HAZard IDentification (HAZID)
• Original HAZID covered main onshore pipeline hazards
• Some additional hazards identified
• Project Hazard Register prepared to track HAZID actions
• Some actions to be addressed in operations and maintenance
procedures (not yet prepared)
• Action to address H2S threat needs to be more robust
• The Project Hazard Register should be maintained and updated and all
HAZID actions addressed
Population Density Analysis
• Area classification in accordance with BS8010, based on 345 bar
• Minimum proximity distance of 170m by extrapolation
• Population density found to be low (Class 1 or “Rural”)
• “Ribbon” development parallel to pipeline
• Anomaly of increasing population density with reducing pressure
• Not enough for Class 2 (Suburban) classification
• Consideration should be given to the nature of ribbon developments
parallel to the pipeline in calculating population density in any future
reassessment of the pipeline classification
Quantified Risk Assessment (QRA)
• Pipeline risk assessment:
• Failure cause
• Failure mode
• Gas outflow
• Ignition Input
Parameters

• Thermal radiation
• Thermal effects Failure cause?
External
interference Fatigue
Ground
movement
Corrosion

• Risk calculations Causes

• Risk reduction measures Risk Transect

Individual
Calculation of
Risk Calculations
Failure Frequency
Societal

FN curve (PLL, EV)

Failure mode?

Thermal Radiation
Outflow Dispersion Ignition
Rupture or Puncture? radiation effects

Consequence calculations
Review of JP Kenny QRA
• Failure frequencies included for:
• Third party interference
• Ground movement
• Inherent and construction defects
• Assumes measures against other threats effective and no H2S
• Inclusion of ground movement inconsistent
• Concluded that Individual Risk levels acceptable at all distances
• The measures to protect the pipeline integrity assumed in the QRA
must be established for the Corrib pipeline, and maintained throughout
its life
• A procedure should be established for monitoring of the gas for H2S,
specifying the actions to be taken and the threshold concentrations
above which action would be required
Review of JP Kenny QRA
• Consequence modelling simplistic
• No recognition of uncertainty at very high pressures
• Low value for ignition probability assumed for rupture case
• Consideration of Individual Risk only
• Risk unexpectedly insensitive to pipeline pressure
Advantica Risk Assessment
• Independent check on QRA results
• PIPESAFE package
• Validated at pressures up to 120 bar
• Assumes proposed measures AND those recommended in this report
• Range of hazard distances given
• Increasing uncertainty with higher pressures recognised
• Individual Risk levels lower than JP Kenny results
• Included Societal Risk analysis
 Individual Risk Analysis
1.00E-06

1.00E-07
Individual Risk (per year)

1.00E-08

1.00E-09

1.00E-10

1.00E-11
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
Distance from Pipeline (m )

144barg 240barg 345barg

Societal Risk Analysis
1 .0 0 E -0 4

1 .0 0 E -0 5

1 .0 0 E -0 6
Frequency of N or More Casualties per Year (F)

1 .0 0 E -0 7

1 .0 0 E -0 8

1 .0 0 E -0 9

1 .0 0 E -1 0

1 .0 0 E -1 1

1 .0 0 E -1 2

1 .0 0 E -1 3
1 10 100 1000
N u m b e r o f C a s u a ltie s (N )

I G E / T D / 1 S o c ie t a l R is k C r it e r io n E n v e lo p e
1 4 4 b a rg
2 4 0 b a rg
3 4 5 b a rg
Risk Reduction Measures
• Risk levels within recognised limits
• Other possible risk reduction options considered
• Third party damage dominates residual risk
• Pipeline wall thickness main defence against failure
• The proposed arrangements for surveillance and landowner liaison
should be specified in the operations and maintenance procedures
Risk Reduction Measures
• Uncertainty increases with increasing pressure
• Highest pressure should be assumed
• Dormant defects may fail when pressure rises
• Limiting pressure reduces failure frequency and consequences
• Limiting design factor to 0.3 or less (~144 bar for Corrib pipeline)
recognised as effective measure to allow pipelines to be routed in
higher population density (Suburban) locations
 UKOOA Decision Framework
Significance of Bases to
Decision Making Process
Means of Calibration Decision Context
Codes & Nothing new or unusual
Codes and Standards Standards ic
e A Well understood risks
t t
en
Established practice
rac
em
No major stakeholder
P g implications
od d
Verification
G
o Ju No significant economic
g implications
rin
nee Business risk or lifecycle

Peer Review ngi QRA

implications
E B Some risk trade-offs/transfer
Some uncertainty
Some deviation from standard
CBA or best practice
Benchmarking Some significant economic
implication

Very novel or challenging

Internal Stakeholder Strong stakeholder views
Consultation Company C and perceptions
Significant risk trade-offs
Values or risk transfer
Large uncertainties
External Stakeholder Perceived lowering of safety
Societal Values standards
Consultation Major economic implications
Risk Reduction Measures
• Risk assessment powerful tool to inform decisions, but not only factor
• Corrib pipeline conventional in that the pipeline wall thickness is
increased to accommodate high design pressure and upstream pipeline
technology is well-established
• BUT:
• It lies outside normal range of application on onshore design codes
• There is uncertainty in the risk analysis at such high pressures
• It gives rise to significant societal concerns
• We therefore recommend that the pressure in the onshore pipeline
should be limited to enable the pipeline to be reclassified as a Class 2
(Suburban) pipeline, with a design factor not exceeding 0.3
Pressure Safety Measures
• Reliability assessment of subsea pressure control systems flawed
• Does not form a basis for selection of options
• A full and technically thorough reliability analysis should be carried out
of the subsea pressure control and isolation systems specified in the
field design
• Additional pressure control measures should be implemented and the
effective limitation of the pressure in the onshore pipeline demonstrated
Discussion
Selection of Design Code
• We consider BS 8010 was an appropriate choice of design code
• Synthesis of accumulated UK experience
• IS 328 closely related
• Better safety levels than US or ISO codes – see later
• Generally accepted practice to keep the original code on long running
projects unless there are reasons for change
• IGE codes allow continued operation to an earlier edition
• Should have considered adopting PD 8010 O&M section
Selection of Design Code
• Withdrawal of BS 8010
• Some observations have been made that BS 8010 was “obsolete”
• This is incorrect, the withdrawal was a consequence of the introduction of
European standards
• BSi paid for the conversion of the BS into a PD so that the guidance was
still available
• UK National Foreword to EN 14161 states:

that a more comprehensive approach to the design of pipelines is possible

through using BS EN 14161 in association with the following Codes of
Practice: — PD 8010-1:2004…
Selection of Design Code
• Code Comparison
• BS 8010 calculates design thickness on minimum, not nominal wall
• BS 8010 allows a higher level hydrotest, giving a more searching test of
integrity
• BS 8010 has minimum proximity distances based on pressure – US and
Canadian codes have no restrictions on proximity except for access
• If the onshore pipeline is reclassified as a Class 2 (Suburban) pipeline,
the pipeline design should be revised in accordance with PD 8010, to
ensure that the pipeline is consistent with current best practice, while
minimising the change required to the existing design
Design Pressure
• High design pressure of 345 bar
• Higher than normal for onshore gas transmission
• Above range of onshore pipeline codes and standards
• Pressures over 100 bar increasingly used for new pipeline designs
• Cautious approach by Shell resulted in a very thick and strong pipe
• Maximum pressure falls steadily as gas extracted
• Advantica recognises the concerns and recommends limiting the
pressure to ~144 bar, consistent with pipeline design factor used for
pipelines in more densely populated suburban areas
Proximity to Housing
• Consequences depend on many factors
• Range in hazard distances depending on scenario
• Reasonable agreement between Advantica and C-FER method
• Nearest buildings within the hazard range for ruptures
• For such thick wall pipe, design codes relax minimum proximity
distance requirements (to 3m) provided that design factor is 0.5 or less
(~240 bar), due to very small probability of failure at low stresses
• Advantica has recommended a more onerous requirement, to limit
pressure to ~144 bar (design factor 0.3)
• Struwaddacon Bay route would allow greater proximity distances
• Significant environmental concerns
• Only reconsider if pressure limitation not practical
Untreated Gas Composition
• Corrib gas has unusually high natural methane content (~94%)
• Typical of methane content of treated gas
• Similar to composition used in validating Advantica models
• Other fluids contained in the gas stream present additional threats:
• Gas is “wet” - combined with CO2 can cause internal corrosion
• Hydrates - can cause blockage
• H2S - not detected, but can be formed during lifetime of a gas field
• Appropriate precautions have been identified to combat these additional
threats
• Must be maintained and effectiveness monitored
• A plan should be in place in case H2S is detected
Ground Stability
• Effects of ground movement on the pipeline
• JP Kenny analysis conservative for straight pipe
• Expected to withstand ground movement loading
• Analysis should be extended to other configurations (e.g. bends)
• If not acceptable, need to consider additional measures
• Techniques to stabilize pipelines in muskeg (similar to peat) used in
Canada
• Effects of pipeline construction on future ground stability
• Raised as an issue in oral hearings
• Obtained advice on Irish peat issues from GSI
• Practical advice from contacts with experience of construction in peat
• Additional information supplied by Shell includes reports by AGEC
• The recommendations made by AGEC should be followed in full and the
proposed construction methods revised accordingly, in order that the
ground stability issues are managed appropriately
Risk Mitigation Options
• Main additional measure identified is pressure limitation for onshore
section
• Scope for further risk reduction limited
• Very important that measures already identified and recommended in
our report are in place not only when pipeline is new but also
throughout the life of the pipeline
• Arrangements should be made for an independent audit of construction
work and an inspection regime established to confirm safe operation of
the pipeline in future
Summary of Recommendations and
Closing Remarks
Summary of Recommendations (1)
1. Consideration should be given by the Irish Government to establishing
a risk-based framework for decisions on proposed and existing major
hazard pipelines and related infrastructure, to ensure transparency and
consistency of the decision-making process
2. A formal integrity management plan should be established prior to
construction, including the operational and maintenance philosophy,
and that an independent audit and inspection regime for both the
construction and operation of the pipeline is established
3. The pressure in the onshore pipeline should be limited to enable the
pipeline to be reclassified as a Class 2 (Suburban) pipeline, with a
design factor not exceeding 0.3, and the pipeline design revised in
accordance with PD 8010
Summary of Recommendations (2)
4. A full and technically thorough reliability analysis should be carried out
of the subsea pressure control and isolation systems specified in the
field design to enable appropriate additional pressure control measures
to be implemented and the effective limitation of the pressure in the
onshore pipeline demonstrated
5. The recommendations made by AGEC should be followed in full and
the proposed construction methods revised accordingly, in order that
the ground stability issues are managed appropriately
6. In the event that additional fields were proposed to be tied in to the
pipeline at any future date, a full review would be required to consider
issues such as extension of the life beyond the initial design life,
changes in the fluids in the pipeline or changes in the operating
pressures
Closing Remarks (1)
• We recognise the real concerns over the safety of the Corrib pipeline
• The review has been undertaken by independent, professional staff with
wide-ranging experience of pipeline safety issues including pipeline
incidents
• We have applied world class risk assessment tools and methodologies
for the assessment of risk from gas pipelines, validated by full scale
experiments and incident data
• In making our recommendations, we have taken into account the
societal concerns and the uncertainty in risk analysis
• Our recommendations are in line with the principles embodied in sound
engineering design standards for pipelines
Closing Remarks (2)
• The fact that a new design is not fully covered by an existing standard
does not make it unsafe, but it does make the requirement to
demonstrate that the design is safe more onerous
• Based on a rigorous assessment of the detailed engineering
documentation, we have identified a number of areas where important
technical issues must be addressed
• Provided that these detailed recommendations are followed, the
pressure is limited effectively as recommended, and a robust integrity
management plan is in place to ensure that safety levels are maintained
throughout the life of the pipeline, we believe that there will be a
substantial safety margin in the pipeline design
Closing Remarks (3)
• We recognise that it is the nature of any review of this type that areas
where problems are identified are given a high profile, whereas much of
the engineering design work is satisfactory and receives little credit
• We would like to recognise the co-operation received from Shell and
their contractors, including responses to requests for information
• We would also like to thank those that made submissions as part of the
process, both written and oral, and in particular the courtesy shown to
us at the oral hearings