The Inverse Relationship between Secrecy and Privacy

Author(s): Julie E. Cohen

Source: Social Research, Vol. 77, No. 3, Limiting Knowledge in a Democracy (FALL 2010), pp.
883-898
Published by: The New School
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JulieE. Cohen
The Inverse Relationship
between Secrecy and
Privacy

THE INVERSE-RELATIONSHIP NARRATIVE

WITHIN CIVIL LIBERTARIAN DISCOURSE, IT IS COMMONLY HELD
thatthereis an inverserelationship betweengovernment secrecyand
theprivacy ofindividualcitizens.Accordingto thisinverse-relationship
narrative,secrecyenables and perpetuatesprivacyinvasionbyshielding
government pryingfrompublicscrutiny. Absentthe secrecy, or so the
story goes,thepublicwouldcallgovernment toaccountforitsmisdeeds,
afterwhichconstitutionalandstatutory wouldkickinandthe
protections
properbalancebetweenpublicand privatelifewouldbe restored. Ifwe
telltheinverse-relationship
storyoften and
enough indignantly enough,
itcancometo seemas thoughwe mightachievesufficient protectionfor
bothprivacy anddemocracy simply bylimitingofficial
secrecy.
The inverse-relationship
storyofhow privacyis lostand gained
is an appealingone. Storiesthatcastgovernment as thegreatestthreat
to individualwelfare,and thatenvisionindividualwelfareas protected
preciselyto the extentthatgovernment is restrained, have powerful
culturalresonancein Americanpublicdiscourse.One mightsaythat
theyexistin ourpoliticalDNA- in the fundamentally liberalpolitical
philosophy thatanimates our and
politics our markets.

Portionsofthisessayare adaptedfrommyforthcoming theNetworked

book,Configuring
Self:Copyright, and theProductionofNetworked
Surveillance, Space (Yale UniversityPress,
forthcoming).

social research Vol 77 : No 3 : Fall 2010 883

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 In thecase ofprivacy, however,the storyis wrong.Devaluation
ofprivacyis boundup withourpoliticaleconomyand withourpublic
discourseaboutinformation policyin important waysthathave little
or nothingto do withofficialconduct.This devaluationproceedsin
twooppositebut mutuallyreinforcing patterns:byvalorizingprivate
economicarrangements organizedaround tradesecrecyand byelevat-
ing opennessas an ultimategood. Thereis an inverserelationship
betweenprivacyand secrecy, butthereis an equallypowerfulinverse
relationshipbetweenopennessand privacy thatforideologicalreasons
Andtheverysameliberalcommit-
we are inclinedto resistdiscussing.
mentsthatgeneratethe inverse-relationship storypreventus from
understanding whatprivacyoughtto mean.

THE POWER OF SECRECY ACROSS THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE

DIVIDE
In the emergingnetworkedinformation economy,access to personal
information aboutcurrentand potentialcustomersis consideredthe
keyingredientin marketsuccess.The UnitedStateshas becomethe
centerofa largeandgrowingmarketforpersonalinformation, encom-
passingall kindsof data about individualattributes, activities,and
preferences.Trade in some information, such as and health
financial
information, but mostothertypesof
is subjectto legal restrictions,
information flowfreelyamongparticipants, rangingfromlargefinan-
cial institutionsto searchenginesto divorceattorneysand private
detectives.Flowsofdata are facilitatedbycorporatedata brokerslike
ChoicePoint, Experian,and Axciom(Hoofhagle2004: 600-08).To help
companies(andgovernments) makethemostoftheinformation they
purchase,an industry devotedto "datamining"and "behavioraladver-
tising"has arisen;firmsin thisindustry competewithone anotherto
developmoreprofitable methodsofsortingand classifying individual
consumers.
The driverof marketsin personal informationis a kind of
privacy,butit is theprivacyofprivateproperty. Information disclosed
by individualsthroughtheircommercialrelationshipsbecomesthe

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privateproperty ofproviders ofservicesand goods,and thatproperty
itselfis bought,sold,and traded.The ultimateobjectof thistradeis
thecreationofindividualized economiesofattention, in whichwe are
knownby our preferences and habitsand capturedby our loyalties.
Personalization also playsa keyrolein thevisionofthe futureofthe
Internetas a "semanticweb" (Berners-Lee et al. 2001) thatconnects
people, information, and things.The interactivity of the emerging
semanticweb is comprehensively mediatedbyinformation aboutindi-
viduals'preferences and transactional histories.
To be sure,governmentis an importantcustomerof private
sectordataprocessors. In theUnitedStates,a numberoffederalagen-
cies have awardedmultimilliondollar contractsto corporatedata
brokersto supplythemwithpersonalinformation about both citi-
zensand foreign nationals.Privacyrestrictions thatlimittheextentto
whichthe government can itselfcollectpersonalinformation gener-
allydo notapply to such purchases at all (Hoofhagle 2004: 622-23).The
government has deployedsecrecytogreateffect wheretheseinitiatives
are concerned, withtheresultthatwe stillunderstand too littleabout
manyof them.Legalregimespurporting to guaranteeofficialtrans-
parency are in fact indeterminate on how muchopennessto require.
Forexample,thefederalFreedomofInformation Act(FOIA)mandates
far-reaching disclosureofinformation aboutgovernment actionsand
processes,but exemptsclassifiedinformation and information about
law enforcement techniquesand proceduresifsuchdisclosurewould
"riskcircumvention ofthelaw"or createrisksto lifeor physicalsafety
(§552(b)(7)).
Evenso,mostgovernment usesofpersonalinformation, whether
collecteddirectlyor acquired fromprivatecompanies,ultimately
are subjectto transparency requirements, includingthose imposed
by the FOIA, and are
they subject to the supervisionofcourts.In the
UnitedStates,the same requirements do not applyto mostcommer-
cial data-processing operations.The guidelineson fairinformation
practicesadoptedbythe Organization forEconomicCooperationand
Development (OECD)(1980)and enacted as a directive
bytheEuropean

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Union(EU)(1995)requirepartiesthatcollectpersonalinformation to
provide disclosures the
specifying purposes for which the information
willbe usedand anypotentialrecipients otherthantheoriginalcollec-
tor.Theyalso mustafforddata subjectsa meaningfulopportunity to
examineand correctthe information. In the UnitedStates,however,
the OECD guidelinesgenerallyhavenotbeen appliedto mostprivate-
sectoruses and transfers ofpersonaldata; instead,suchactivitiesare
regulated onlybybackground prohibitionsagainstunfairanddeceptive
tradepractices. Mostreputablefirmsthatdeal directly withconsumers
do disclosesome information abouttheir"privacypractices," butthe
incentiveis to formulate disclosures about both purposesand poten-
tialrecipients in themostgeneraltermspossible.Thispracticein turn
shieldssecondaryrecipientsof personaldata, mostofwhomdo not
discloseinformation abouttheiractivities at all.
Even the highlygranularpurpose and recipientdisclosures
requiredundera strictinterpretation ofthe OECD guidelines,more-
over,wouldnotnecessarily shedlighton the operationalsignificance
ofcollectedinformation. Tellingsomeonewhatpiecesofinformation
wereconsideredforthe purposesofmakingdecisionsaboutcreditor
medicalcoverageprovidesno information abouthowthatinformation
mattered.It revealsvery littleabout the other assumptionsused to
construct theoperationalheuristic, nordoes it indicatehow different
information wouldhavechangedtheresult.
Effortsto gain access to operationalinformation aboutprivate-
sectoruses of personal informationrun into the firstof the two
discoursesofinformation policythatI mentionedat the startofthis
essay:the discourseofeconomicsecrecy.Economicregimesoftrade
secrecyhave as theirprincipalpurposesthe protectionofinnovation
and competition. Suchregimesreproduceas a matterofcoursemany
ofthepatternsofnondisclosure thatwe findso threatening whenthey
manifestwithingovernment. Withintradesecrecylaw and practice,
it is notonlynormalbut also and morefundamentally desirablethat
information should be made available onlyto those authorized to
knowit.Although we do nottypically acknowledgethis,tradesecrecy

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and statesecrecyare equallyimportant aspectsofour nationalinfor-
mationpolicy.Government disclosurestypicallyare structuredso as
notto disruptpatternsoftradesecrecy,and thisis legallysanctioned:
theFOIA(§552(b)(4))exemptstradesecretinformation fromdisclosure
in mostcases.
The nexusbetweenstatesecrecyand economicsecrecyhas not
gone unnoticedin information policydebates.Scholarslike Danielle
Citron(2008)havepointedoutthatregimesofeconomicsecrecyforti-
fiedbytheFOIAtradesecrecyexemptionmayoperateto shieldnewly
privatized,formerly publicfunctionssuchas the designofelectronic
votingprocessesfrompublicscrutiny. Citronarguesthatdue process
protectionsagainstarbitrary state action should extendacross the
public/privatedivideto reach the actionsof the nominallyprivate
actorsnow performing suchfunctions. The largerproblem,however,
goes beyond the transferofpublicfunctions acrossthe public/private
divide.The moreimportant is
question why the divide
public/private
shouldpresumptively insulatetheinformation-processing practicesof
otherprivateactorsfrompublicscrutiny. Regimesofsecrecyfortified
byintellectualproperty law operateto denyus accessto largecatego-
riesofdecisionsthathaverealand immediateeffecton everyfacetof
ourday-to-day lives,rangingfromdecisionsaboutaccessto creditand
insuranceto moremundanedecisionsaboutthe information thatwe
are shown.Theyaretherefore a legitimate and urgentsubjectofpublic
concern.

THE IDEOLOGY OF OPENNESS

Theobviousremedyfortoo muchsecrecy, ofcourse,is moreopenness.
So, forexample,some have arguedthatthe bestwayto equalize the
powerdisparitiesresultingfromregimesofstateorcorporatesecrecyis
to giveeveryoneaccessto thesameinformation thatgovernments and
corporations have (Brin1999; Mannet al. 2003). Ifsurveillancefeeds
and searchstringsalikewerepublicproperty, or so theargument goes,
theirabilitytounderwritepublicand privateassertionsofpowerwould
be greatlyreduced.

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 Herewe encounterthesecondofthetwodiscoursesofinforma-
tionpolicythatworkto devalueprivacy. Ifsunlightis thebestdisinfec-
tantandfreeexpression thefoundation ofourdemocracy, thenitseems
onlylogicalto thinkmoresunlightand moreinformation will make
ourpublicdiscoursepurerand moredemocratic. Asforall oftheincon-
venient,embarrassing bitsofinformation thatare suddenlynetworked
and searchable,we shouldall just learnto get pastthe awkwardness
and entera postprivacy era (forexample,Zittrain2008: 228-34).The
alternative - makingdistinctionsamongthe Internet'sinformation
flowsand regulatingsome of them- would threatencherishedfree-
domsofspeechand inquiry.On thatreasoning,secrecyand openness
arecomplementary halvesofa binarythatis thoughtto containwithin
it all ofthepossibleresponsesto information policyproblems.Froma
privacyperspective, neitherargument follows.
First,the information policydiscourseofopennessis extraordi-
narilyresistantto recognizing thatthe "openness"practicedbyordi-
narypeople, both online and off,is a matterofdegree.The designof
mostnetworked information servicesmirrors When
thisinsensitivity.
Facebookannounceda commercialarrangementcalled the Beacon
program, whichwouldnotifymembersoftheirfriends'purchases,it
assumeduserswouldbe delighted.When Googleintroducedits new
networkingservice,Google Buzz, automaticallyenrolledall Gmail
customers,and publiclylisted theirtop Gmail correspondentsas
their"friends," somewonderedwhyanyonewouldobject.The public
backlashthatfollowedeach oftheseincidents, and manyothers,was
entirelyunsurprising. There are many reasons that one mightprefer
not to shareinformation about all of one's purchasesor all of one's
privatecorrespondencewith all of one's friends.The designersof
FacebookBeaconand GoogleBuzz betrayeda fatalinsensitivity to the
finecontextualdistinctions that we make all the time in our interac-
tionswiththeworld,and to ourreasonsformakingthem.
The everyday practiceoflifeinvolvesthe creationand manage-
mentofboundaries betweendifferent and relationships.
activities To an
of
extent,theseprocesses boundarymanagement implicitly are recog-

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nizedinAlanWestin'spathbreaking andinfluential discussionofprivacy
whichidentified
interests, "reserve" as a criticalaspectofprivacy (1967:
37-42).Ultimately, however, reserve is too one-dimensional a notion to
be usefulin characterizing therangeofsocialprocessesthatresultfrom
selective
withholding andselective disclosure.Aricherconceptualization
ofthedifferential controlthatsocialprocessesentailis socialpsycholo-
gistIrwinAltman'smodelofprivacy as a dialecticalprocessofboundary
regulation (1975).WhileWestinpresenteda relatively statictaxonomy
oftypesofinterpersonal separation, Altmancrafteda dynamicmodel
designedto encompassthe rangeofprocessesbywhichprivacyin its
variousforms is createdandmaintained. Altmancharacterized privacy as
"a centralregulatory processbywhicha person(orgroup)makeshimself
moreorlessaccessibleandopento others," andidentified "theconcepts
ofpersonalspace and territorial behavior"as the principalregulatory
mechanisms in theprocess(1975:3). He observedthattheconceptsof
personalspaceandterritorial behaviorinform a rangeofprivacy-regulat-
ingbehaviors; together, thosebehaviors constitute a coherentsystem for
personalboundary management thatrespondsdynamically to changing
circumstances, needs,anddesires.
Importantly, while the term"privacy"carrieswithit specific
culturalbaggage,the processesdescribedby Altmanhave a more
universalcharacter. Although different cultureshavedifferent conven-
tionsaboutpersonalspace and territory, people in everycultureuse
personal space and territory to manage interpersonalboundaries
(Altman1977).Thoseprocessesmediatehumaninteraction bothphysi-
callyand our
conceptually; understandings of selfhood are shapedby
the habitsof boundarymanagementthatwe develop.Widespread,
undifferentiated disclosures threatenourabilityto manageourbound-
aries,withpotentially drasticconsequencesfortheprocessesbywhich
we articulateouridentities, defineourbeliefs,and formulate ourpoli-
tics.As Helen Nissenbaum(2009) explains,such disclosuresdestroy
the contextualintegrity to whichwe have become accustomed.And
as Altman'smodel makes clear,we requiresome abilityto manage
contextual integrity in orderto function in society.

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 Second,the information policydiscourseofopennessis almost
willfully blind to the economies of desirethatexistin information
markets - economiesthat the ideologyof openness itselfhelps to
create.JodiDean (2009)identifies a tensionbetweensecretsand public-
itythatexistsat theheartofourpoliticaleconomy, withinthecoreof
a set ofpracticesthatshe terms"communicative capitalism."Within
communicative capitalism, the economic logics ofinformation markets
are fortified bya media culturethatprizesexposureand an intellec-
tual ethos that assignsthat media cultureindependentnormative
valuebecauseofthegreater"openness"it fosters. Buildingon Dean's
framework, surveillance theoristKirstieBall (2009:641-45)arguesthat
voluntarily disclosedinformation circulatesin twinnedeconomiesof
authenticity and perversity; disclosuresare called forthby manufac-
turednormsofparticipation buttheyalso takeon fetishvalueexactly
becausetheyrepresent slicesofauthenticreality.
Emergingpracticesofself-exposure alignneatlywithprocesses
ofpersonalization thatoperatein information markets,and thatfuel
the emergingsemanticweb. The pointhere is not thatgiantcorpo-
rationsextractinformation fromus againstour will or in waysthat
overtlytelegrapheconomicor politicalsubordination; it is precisely
the opposite. The individualized economies of attention thatcharac-
terizethe emergingnetworkedinformation societydependcritically
on ourwillingparticipation. In thenetworked information society,we
are all in thepersonal-information-processing business.Basicnetwork
economicsdictatesthatplatforms likeFacebookand Googlehavevalue
only to the extent thatenough ofus voluntarilyprovidethemwiththe
rawmaterial.The rubis thatthoseactivitieshave value to Facebook
and Googleonlyto the extentthattheycan be monetized.Flowsof
information withinthe semanticweb constitute an interlinked series
of "surveillantassemblages"(Haggerty and Ericson2000): heteroge-
neous,looselycoupledsetsofinstitutions thatseekto harnesstheraw
powerof information byfixingflowsofinformation cognitively and
spatially.Ofcriticalimportance withinHaggerty and Ericson'sframe-
work, the surveillantassemblageoperatesupon its subjectsnot only

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bythe "normalizedsoul training"ofFoucauldiantheory(614-15),but
alsobyseduction. Thesurveillance societyis nota grimdystopia;to the
contrary,flowsofinformation withinthesurveillant assemblageprom-
ise a cornucopiaofbenefitsand pleasures,includingpricediscounts
and social status.In returnforits pleasures,however,the surveillant
assemblagedemandsfull enrollment,which culturaland political
normsofopennessand "sunlight" helpto elicit.

PRIVACY AND LIBERAL ANXIETIES

Why,though,shouldwe thinkthatanyofthisis a problem?Afterall,
we have chosenit,or so the storygoes, and we choose it again and
again everytimewe buy music,or groceries,or airlinetickets,and
everytimewe shareupdateswithourfriends. Thisis thepointatwhich
thefoundational commitments ofliberalismgetintheway.Theytellus
thatthechoices that individualsmake aboutdisclosinginformationare
definitionallyautonomous and therefore presumptively and
efficient,
thataggregated, accurateinformation promotestruth-discovery.One
can imaginetworeasonsto be skepticaloftheseanswers.One is that
information processingis good forfarless thanwe think.The other
reasonis thatprivacyis good forfarmore.Bothpossibilitieswarrant
ourcareful, criticalattention.
Letus beginwiththe firstpossibility: Whatexactlyis informa-
tion processinggood for?What social goods would protectionfor
privacypreventus fromachieving?The conventional answerhas two
parts:information processing givesus what we want,and information
processing advances the of
pursuit knowledge truth.
and We shouldsee
immediately thatthe firstansweris questionbegging.Wantscan be
manufactured, and can be self-destructive.
A hallmarkof civilization
is precisely
thecapacityforbothindividualand collectivedisciplinein
thefaceofexcessiveand potentially self-destructive
wants.
Perhapssurprisingly, the accountof information processingas
inevitablytruth-enhancing faresno better.Thataccount,whichI have
labeledthe "information-processing imperative" (Cohenforthcoming,
chap.3) comes to us from
directly the Enlightenment; itis groundedin

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a viewofinformation gatheringas knowledgediscovery alonga fixed,
lineartrajectoryofforwardprogress.Withinthe framework defined
bythe information-processing imperative, the interestin gettingand
usingmorecompleteinformation is presumptively rationaland ofthe
utmostimportance. Thetruthvalueoftheinformation is assumedand
elevatedto a level beyondideology;as a result,the otherworkthat
information processingdoesgoesunaddressedand usuallyunacknowl-
edged.
Informationprocessingis not a neutralactivity,however;it
requireschoicesaboutcategoriesandpriorities thatareopentointerro-
gation(Bowker and Star1999).History is rifewith examples- ranging
fromgenocidetoinvidiousdiscrimination tobanaltalesofbureaucratic
-
excess ofthewaysthatprecise,granularinformation aboutindividu-
als and groupscan be turnedto unjustand sometimeshorrific ends
(forexample,Black2001). Imbuedwiththe values ofEnlightenment
rationalism,we tendto regardtheseepisodesas unfortunate anoma-
lies,butwe shouldnot.As Frederick Schauer(2003)explains,opposi-
tionto entrenchedsocietaldiscrimination is hardto reconcilewith
commitment tothetruthvalueofinformation; thelinebetweenuseful
heuristicsand invidiousstereotypes is vanishinglythin.Sortingand
discriminationare synonyms; the one entailsthe other(Gandy2009:
55-74).Privacytheoriststendto thinkthatthe solutionto problems
of invidiousdiscrimination is better(information-based) metricsfor
separatingtheinvidiousframeworks fromthetruthful ones.Thus,for
example,LiorStrahilevitz (2008: 376-81)contrasts valuable "informa-
tion"withwasteful"signals,"and arguesthatprivacypolicyshould
encourageuse oftheformer ratherthanthelatter.Thatseemsreason-
able enough,butitassumesan ontologicaldistinction betweenthetwo
categoriesthatdoes notexist.
Faithin the truthvalue of information reaches its zenithin
processesof riskmanagement,but the relationshipbetweeninfor-
mationprocessingand riskis muchmorecomplicatedthantheinfor-
mation-processing imperativeacknowledges.Eventsin the post-9/11
world reveal a dialecticalrelationshipbetweennew technological

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methodsofmanagingrisksand risksthatnew technological methods
create.Large-scaledata miningand complex,automatedsystemsfor
managingcriticalinfrastructures and activitiesrelyheavilyon algo-
rithmsthatalignand systematize the meaningsofdata aboutpeople
and events.Formally,such systemsapproximatethe requirement
of logicalcompleteness, an approximation thatbecomesstrongeras
moreand moredata are collected.Muchevidencesuggests,however,
thatrelyingon suchtechniquesto the exclusionofhumanjudgment
doesnoteliminatetheriskofsystemfailure,butinsteadmagnifies the
probability thatsystemfailureswillbe largeand catastrophic. So, for
example, the U.S.government's ofa
development profile-based system
forscreeningairlinepassengersinspiredthe "CarnivalBooth"study
(Chakrabarti and Strauss2002)inwhicha pairofMIT-based researchers
demonstrated howa terroristgroupmightdefeatthescreeningsystem
byhidingitsagentswithindesignatedlow-risk groups.The recentand
stillongoingmeltdownoftheglobalfinancialsystemwas precipitated
bythetoxiccombination ofrelianceon automated,logicallycomplete
financialmodelsand regulatory deference to thosemodels(Bamberger
2010).
In debatesaboutprivacyand information processing,we would
benefitfromacknowledgingthatinformation is
processing always-
the
already subject ofsomeone's regulatoryagenda.Thelogicsofinfor-
mationprocessingrequire(and alreadyreceive)externaldiscipline.
Exercising thatdisciplinewithcareforjusticerequiresmakingnorma-
tive decisionsabout the conductof information processingand its
appropriate limits.
Whataboutthesecondpossibility: Whatis privacygoodfor?We
tendtothinkofprivacy as shelteringthefixed,autonomousselfagainst
thevicissitudes oftechnological and socialchange.Thatviewoftheself
derivesfromthetraditionofliberalpoliticaltheory, and it explainsa
greatdeal aboutthewayU.S.legalscholarsand policymakers respond
to information privacyproblems.Ifone takesthe autonomous,ratio-
nal liberalselfas the descriptive and normativebaseline,it becomes
very hard to understand what a generalizedentitlement toprivacy with

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respectto oureveryday behaviorsand transactions mightaccomplish.
Except for information about a handful of concededlysensitivetopics,
it is hardto imaginemeredisclosurealteringtrajectories ofbehavior
thatpresumptively flowfromour freewill. Because the liberalself
existsoutsideofanyparticularcontext,it is hardto understandwhy
changingthecontextofa disclosureshouldchangeitsprivacyimpact.
Some commentators arguethatprivacyservesa dignitary func-
tion- worthpreserving notbecauseit affects ourdecisionsor actions,
butbecauseitsparesourfeelings. Withinourpoliticalculture, however,
dignitary interests areconsideredanemicrelativeto liberty If
interests.
thedisclosures enabledbynewtechnologies arethoughtto serveinter-
estsin marketand expressiveliberty, it is easyto concludethatliberty
interests shouldprevail.Privacycomesto seembothunnecessary and
vaguelyretrograde, a doomedattemptto holdbacktheinexorabletide
ofprogress.
Whatif,though,itis nottheidea ofprivacythatis theproblem?
Whatiftheproblem,instead,is theidea oftheautonomous,rational,
decontextualizedselfthat privacytheoretically protects?Although
legal and policy discourse clingsto it, as a descriptive matterthemodel
of liberal selfhoodis increasinglydiscreditedin most otherareas
of contemporary thought,rangingfromphilosophyto sociologyto
culturalstudiesto cognitivetheory.Formostcontemporary thinkers,
itmakesfarmoresenseto speakofan emergent, relationalsubjectivity
thatis continually shapedand reshapedbyeverything to whichwe are
exposed.Thatunderstanding dovetailswithAltman'smodel(1975)of
privacy as a dialecticalprocessofboundaryregulation bywhichunder-
standings ofselfhoodare constructed overtime.
Ingeneral,U.S.privacy scholarsaredeeplyresistant, evenhostile,
to theidea ofthesociallyconstructed self.AsJeffrey Rosen(2000:166)
putsit, "I'm free to thinkwhatever I like even if thestateorthephone
companyknowswhatI read."Thatargument is a productoftheliberal
conceptionofautonomy, pureand simple;itpositsthatchoicenegates
social shapingand social shapingnegateschoice.Thatunderstanding
of social shapingis fartoo binary,however;social shapingneed not

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entailthe negationof self.Otherscholarsconcludethat"privacy"is
itselfan artifactofliberalpoliticaltheory.Accordingto PeterGalison
andMarthaMinow(2005:277-84),rightsofprivacyareinseparably tied
to the liberalconceptionof the autonomous,prepoliticalself.They
arguethatprivacyas we knowit (in advancedWesternsocieties)ulti-
matelywillnotwithstand thedissolutionofthe liberalselfdiagnosed
bycontemporary socialand culturaltheory.Buttheunderstanding of
privacy as tiedto autonomyrepresents onlyone possibleconceptionof
privacy'srelationto selfhood.
Ifboundaryregulationplaysa criticalrole in processesof self-
constitution,then the relationshipbetween privacyand selfhood
is morecomplexthan eitherliberaloptimismor liberalpessimism
suggests. I havearguedthat

One can chooseto understand theautonomousliberalself

and the dominatedpostmodernist subjectas irreconcil-
able opposites,orone can understand themas two(equally
implausible) endpointson a continuumalongwhichsocial
shapingand individuallibertycombinein varyingpropor-
tions.Takingthe latter,morerealisticperspective, more-
over, it is possibleto meld contemporary critiques the
of
originsand evolutionof subjectivity withthe moretradi-
tionallyliberalconcernsthathave preoccupiedAmerican
privacytheorists. Postmodernist socialand culturaltheory
seeksto cultivatea criticalstancetowardclaimsto knowl-
edgeand self-knowledge. In a societycommitted at leastto
the desirability of the liberalideal of self-determination,
thatperspective shouldbe an appealingone (Cohenforth-
coming,chap.3).

It is preciselyin themalleable,unfixednatureofour subjectivity

that
we can locate the possibilitiesformeaningfulself-actualization
and
social"progress" thattraditionally
havebeenamongliberalism'scardi-
nal aspirations.

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 On this accountof subjectivity,privacyis suddenlyfarmore
important thanwe as a societyhavebeen willingto admit.Thisis so
notbecauseprivacysheltersfixed,autonomousselfhoodfromthepres-
suresof change,but because it does exactlythe opposite:it shelters
emergentsubjectivity fromexternalefforts to renderit orderlyand
predictable.Bypreventing dissolutionoftheboundariesthatseparate
contextsandspacesfromone another, privacycounteractstheinforma-
whichseekto imposea gridof
tionaland spatiallogicsofsurveillance,
fixed,stablemeaningon humanactivity. Privacywidenstheinterstices
amongprocessesof social shaping,furnishing emergentsubjectivity
withroomforplay. This enablesthe developmentofcriticalperspec-
tive,and createstheconditionsforbothpersonaland socialchange.

CONCLUSION
Openaccessto information is an important underpinningofourpoliti-
cal culture,but critical
subjectivityalso is a good thatwe cannotdo
without.If so, thenprivacy - and the necessarypossibilityof limits
on knowledge - shouldnotbe lightlysurrendered. The pursuitofour
liberalaspirationsrequiresthatwe do preciselythatwhichour stron-
forbid:interrogate
gestliberalinstincts regimesofsecrecythatexiston
bothsidesof the public-private and
divide, withequal rigor
scrutinize
ourideologyofopenness.

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