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1 Capt.

James Linlor, pro se


1405 S. Fern Street #90341, Arlington, VA 22202
2 (775) 298-1505
3 Secret Service Agent MICHAEL GERARD POLSON,
4 (formerly of TSA) in his individual capacity
817 Carlton Otto Lane #23, Odenton, MD 20120
5 c/o Dontae Sylvertooth, Asst US Attorney
2100 Jamieson Ave, Alexandria, VA 22314
6 (703) 299-3738 ph; (703) 299-3983 fax
7

8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT


EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
9 Alexandria Division
10
) Case No.: 1:17cv13 (AJT/JFA)
CAPT. JAMES LINLOR, pro se )
11 ) PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
Plaintiff, ) JUDGMENT
12 ) Memorandum of Points and Authorities
v. )
13
) Hon. Judge Anthony J. Trenga
14 MICHAEL POLSON, ) Date: filed on Friday, December 15, 2017
in his individual capacity ) Time: n/a
15 ) Per Order of the Court
Defendant )
16
)
17 1. Plaintiff brings this Motion for Summary Judgment based on excessive force by
18 Defendant during a TSA checkpoint search on 10 March 2016, resulting in serious
19 injuries to Plaintiff. Compliance with CivLR 56(b) begins on page 12 herein.

20 2. 3rd Party TSA (Transportation Security Administration) did not comply with either of the
Court’s 16 November, nor 07 December Orders to provide required information to
21
Plaintiff. Defendant Polson also refused to update his evidence to include alleged SSI.
22
3. Plaintiff therefore moves as part of this Motion that Plaintiff should be granted Summary
23
Judgment in addition for good cause as demonstrated, for the intentional, blatant, and
24
contemptuous refusals of TSA and Defendant to follow the Court’s Orders, and to
25 frustrate and impede Plaintiff’s instant filing. TSA was aware of Plaintiff’s required
26 filing date and mailing schedule of cross-country overnight mailing by 11 December for
27 process server delivery by 15 December, and despite Plaintiff’s requests and reminders,
28 TSA also encouraged Defendant not to obey the Orders of this Court!

1
1 4. Given that the Court recognized on 07 December (in reaffirming its 16 Nov Order) that
Plaintiff “has substantial need of the SSI in the preparation of his case and he is unable
2
without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the information by any
3
other means”, Plaintiff contends that Summary Judgment is further warranted because
4
Defendant’s and TSA’s refusals to provide SSI have made it impossible for this case to
5
proceed to trial with TSA and Defendant withholding evidence, and despite Plaintiff’s
6 requests for initial sanctions upon Defendant and TSA, the Court appears to still be
7 inclined to allow Defendant and TSA to file pleadings and use evidence withheld from
8 Plaintiff in violation of the Court’s Orders (emph. added: plural Orders!).

9 5. This Court’s Orders on TSA impact Defendant because (as explained further starting on

10
page 9) because TSA has wrapped itself around Defendant (and 3rd Party Whetsell),
threatening them with prosecution for providing alleged SSI information to Plaintiff, and
11
TSA attorney Bryant (NOT through or via Sylvertooth, as documented on video and
12
audio recordings!) has provided legal counsel to Defendant. If TSA’s counsel is, in daily
13
practice and repeated performance, counsel for individual capacity Defendant as shown,
14
then Plaintiff contends that the Court’s Orders to provide Plaintiff with unredacted
15 information and evidence should apply through TSA to its client, the Defendant!
16 6. Indeed, TSA’s refusal in violation of two Orders of this Court (16 Nov and 07 Dec) to
17 provide evidence that this Court has found to be TSA’s strategy is clearly to withhold

18 excessive force evidence permanently. In a meet-and-confer on 02 November, the partial


transcript of which was filed with the Court in Plaintiff’s Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions
19
for false filing in TSA’s Motion to Quash, TSA stated that even following their “SSI
20
process” was unlikely to permit “access to SSI ” for Plaintiff. TSA’s claim of an SSI-
21
approval process is therefore a smokescreen, and further invidious delay and attempts to
22
frustrate and interfere with production of evidence!
23 TSA is the “fox guarding the hen-house” and does not want to release its excessive force
24 standards, even though they have not been demonstrated to be SSI or any type of
25 “transportation security” which TSA SSI represents – Plaintiff has previously filed

26 recitations from TSA’s own guidance where TSA SSI is not related to “national security.”
Plaintiff is filing separate motions to still compel production which should NOT be moot
27
even if Plaintiff is granted summary judgment, since other, perhaps less-tenacious
28

2
1 Plaintiffs or attorneys than pro se Plaintiff in this case, if injured by rogue TSA
employees, should have the benefit of TSA’s excessive force guidelines and evidence as
2
public record, and for the Court to avoid a repeat of the time and motions of these instant
3
proceedings, for those potential Plaintiffs to be able to evaluate if TSA’s excessive force
4
standards have truly been violated in potential, future cases.
5
7. Even if SSI is provided later to Plaintiff, it will have harmed Plaintiff (and helped
6 Defendant) by not allowing Plaintiff to fully support this instant Motion. Further
7 sanctions are discussed in Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions and Order to Show Cause.
8 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION

9 8. The claim at-bar is for a violation of the 4th Amendment to be free from unreasonable

10
searches, and specifically Excessive Force under color of law, based on the deliberate
indifference and recklessness of Defendant Michael Polson by aggressively striking
11
Plaintiff in the genitals without cause during a TSA search.
12
9. Accordingly, Plaintiff seeks summary judgment that Defendant Polson be found to have
13
used excessive force under the standards set forth in Graham v. Connor, 109 S. Ct. 1865,
14
1871 (1989), in violation of the 4th Amendment, and that judgment in this case should be
15 found for Plaintiff. Additionally, Plaintiff should be granted summary judgment for
16 TSA’s and Defendants repeated contemptuous failures to obey Orders of this Court, to
17 provide Plaintiff with evidence that this Court has found to be in substantial need of, and

18 unavailable via any other means (quoting from the Court’s Order of 07 December 2017).
10. In Terry v. Ohio (392 U.S. 1, 17 (1968)), Justice Warren, writing for the majority, wrote
19
“No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the
20
right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all
21
restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law ...
22
[W]herever an individual may harbor a 'reasonable expectation of privacy, he is entitled
23 to be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.”
24 11. Plaintiff’s Constitutional 4th Amendment right to not be struck with excessive force in his
25 testicles despite being completely compliant, non-threatening, and not in any distracting

26 or exigent situation, is the most basic and (should be) mundane of situations.

27

28

3
1 12. Bivens provides an actionable right as claimed in the Complaint. While Bivens typically
follows Section 1983 requirements, Bivens and Bell v. Hood (from the Complaint) the
2
Plaintiff hereby establishes:
3
a. conduct by a “person”;
4
b. who acted “under color of [state, or in Bivens cases, federal] law”;
5
c. proximately causing;
6 d. a deprivation of a federally protected right.
7 13. Proof of the previous elements: The aggravated sexual battery was conducted by the
8 Defendant (Michael Polson), acting as a TSA screener under color of state and federal

9 law, proximately causing harm from his non-standard and unauthorized use of physical

10
force in striking the Plaintiff, and Defendant’s action being a violation of 4th Amendment
(fundamental right) to be free from unreasonable searches from an aggravated sexual
11
battery as part of a TSA-mandated security pat-down.
12
14. Since Defendant is not a police officer, and there was no arrest or probable cause, nor
13
exigency or “split second decisions,” there were therefore no “reasonableness at the
14
moment” side to striking of Plaintiff genitalia by Defendant.
15 15. Defendant’s striking of Plaintiff clearly exceeds the de minimis use of force described in
16 Ramirez v. Webb (719 F. Supp. 610 (W.D. Mich. 1989)), even beyond the fact that
17 Defendant is not a LEO, this was not a criminal procedure, and no other exigency or

18 reasonableness-at-the-moment ameliorations apply.


16. The Supreme Court held in Carey v. Piphus (435 U.S. 247 (1978)) that actual damages
19
need not be shown in order to prove a constitutional violation under section 1983, or in
20
this case, Bivens. It follows a fortiori that physical injury (though demonstrated below)
21
need not be shown in a Bivens suit. Rather, as the Court explained in Memphis
22
Community School District v. Stachura, (477 U.S. 299 (1986)) the primary purpose of
23 allowing damages in Bivens actions is to compensate for injuries caused by a violation of
24 a plaintiff's constitutional rights as demonstrated herein.
25

26 While Plaintiff later addresses likely Defenses, uncontested facts, and statutory law,
Plaintiff up-front explains “how the Court can assess if excessive force was used by
27
Defendant Polson?”, and how no contravening or impeaching evidence exists:
28

4
1 17. How to assess whether the force was excessive, and therefore a violation of constitutional
rights?
2
a. 21 months after being struck by Defendant, Plaintiff “continues to have severe left-
3
sided pain” (which is the side of Plaintiff’s genitals primarily struck by Defendant)
4
confirmed by a board-certified physician (urologist), who recommends potentially
5
several rounds of surgery to resolve (see Exhibit A). Plaintiff underwent a surgical
6 injection (with Plaintiff blind to actual medication vs. placebo) to attempt to mitigate
7 the constant pain, and the physician affirmed Plaintiff’s resulting abnormally extreme
8 pain and sensitivity Plaintiff still experiences as a result of Defendant’s attack, and

9 results consistent with verifiable pain and only minor, temporary mitigation based on

10
the injection. While writing this Motion, Plaintiff is still experiencing pain daily as a
result of Defendant’s attack, consistent with the physician’s assessment“ of severe
11
injury”, and the reasonable costs for remedy + damages are listed in Exhibit A.
12
b. Multiple videos demonstrate Plaintiff’s reasonable actions and attempts to use the
13
“Pre-check” checkpoint for which Plaintiff was authorized (which would have likely
14
avoided a pat-down and avoided any contact with Defendant altogether), as well as
15 Defendant’s documented aggressive behavior prior to searching Plaintiff, but despite
16 immediately and repeatedly requested litigation holds, all these videos were allowed
17 to be destroyed by Defendant (see Exhibit B)

18 c. The single remaining video still shows Plaintiff being directed to step onto a TSA
security mat, and being directed by Defendant Polson to widen Plaintiff’s stance
19
wider than the footprints despite no bulky clothing or any other interfering body size.
20
d. The single remaining video still shows Plaintiff NOT being directed to pull up
21
Plaintiff’s jeans pants, and that the jeans pants were normal (not baggy). Therefore,
22
since Defendant’s own training indicates that if a passenger’s pants are baggy or too
23 low to properly search a passenger, that the TSA Agent (TSO aka Defendant) should
24 ask the passenger to pull up his/her pants by the belt loops, so that excess fabric does
25 not interfere with the TSO’s search. Since Defendant did not request this of Plaintiff,

26 as proven that Plaintiff would have complied if asked (but that Plaintiff’s pants were
not baggy nor “hanging down,” so there was no reason for Defendant to ask Plaintiff
27
to pull them higher by the belt loops), Defendant had no reason to use additional,
28

5
1 excessive force in searching and harming Plaintiff via ramming/striking Plaintiff’s
genitals as part of Defendant’s search of Plaintiff.
2
e. Ironically, in Defendant’s deposition (through his attorney Sylvertooth) of Plaintiff,
3
Sylvertooth asked Plaintiff what Plaintiff believed would be “a reasonable search.”
4
Plaintiff replied, as an opinion but not knowing factually, that a reasonable TSO
5
would reasonably gently apply pressure, if needed, to a passenger’s groin or genitals,
6 but would err on the side of caution, not use a striking force, and if necessary, with
7 passenger awareness and acceptance, would gently, gradually, and as minimally as
8 necessary increase pressure to be able to search a compliant passenger for contraband.

9 Sylvertooth then showed Plaintiff redacted (non-alleged-SSI) TSA procedures for

10
search training, and asked Plaintiff, under oath, if any of the reasonable “gently
applying pressure” methods Plaintiff had described existed in training. Plaintiff
11
answered, and Defendant (via his agent/counsel Sylvertooth) affirmed on-the-record
12
that no such “reasonable” limited force and non-striking guidance exists in TSA
13
procedures. In other words, striking of passengers, or excessive force are NEVER
14
authorized in TSA’s procedures as provided to Plaintiff and submitted by
15 Defendant as evidence for the Court! Defendant has presented no evidence to
16 the contrary, and (as noted) has failed to obey two Court Orders to disclose all
17 SII requested while treating Plaintiff as a Covered Person under 49 USC 1520.7.

18 f. The single remaining video still shows Plaintiff being searched by Defendant, with
Defendant ramming his hand into Plaintiff’s genitals after search Plaintiff’s left leg.
19
g. On video, Plaintiff immediately and reflexively bent over in pain, moved his hand to
20
cover his genitals, and stepped back off the mat. The video affirms these actions, as
21
did Defendant in discussing the video.
22
h. All of these behaviors were agreed with by Defendant’s TSA supervisor (William
23 Whetsell) in Whetsell’s deposition to be consistent with Plaintiff being struck in the
24 genitalia.
25 i. Plaintiff is on-record, and the MWAA Police report and TSA attestation affirm that

26 Plaintiff initially and merely asked for an apology from Defendant, but that Defendant
refused to apologize (and Defendant and Whetsell both claimed at the time that
27
Defendant’s behavior was intentional, and both laughed at Plaintiff’s injuries and
28

6
1 distress). Plaintiff actually asked for an apology three times from Defendant, as well
as making this plain to the senior TSA manager (“FSD”) Scott Johnson, who also
2
refused to simply apologize, and bragged in Johnson’s attestation that the MWAA
3
police had denied to accept Plaintiff’s citizen’s arrest for felony sexual battery of
4
Defendant Polson (which was against Federal and Commonwealth law, see Exhibit
5
B).
6 j. Due to the one retained video’s defects (claimed as multiple filings by Plaintiff, as
7 apparently altered framerates, a poor viewing angle of Defendant hitting Plaintiff, no
8 chain of custody control of video evidence, partially obstructed views due to other

9 people, and people “magically” appearing and disappearing, indicating flaws in video

10
continuity and reliability of details) which the Court nonetheless accepted from
Defendant for filing in this case, Plaintiff made a similar video (but non-defective
11
video) with an egg being cracked under a doll (in a similar fashion to how Plaintiff
12
was struck). Despite having accepted Defendant’s video, this Court declined to
13
accept for filing Plaintiff’s impeaching video, but this Court suggested that Plaintiff
14
submit that video for consideration for evidence at trial. Since the two copies of that
15 video lodged with the Clerk are unknown if still in the Court’s possession, and
16 Defendant and TSA have both been personally served by a process server with the
17 lodged video, Plaintiff has attached two copies of the lodged video and a de novo

18 request for filing for Plaintiff’s “doll video” to support this instant Motion for
Summary Judgment.
19
k. While other aspects are further discussed in this Motion, Plaintiff contends that that
20
clear striking (despite the one video’s defects), combined with Plaintiff’s “doll video,”
21
Plaintiff’s reaction, Plaintiff’s injuries, and lack of any Defendant or TSA evidence
22
proving that Defendant’s striking was incidental or allowed by the search, that
23 Plaintiff be granted SUMMARY JUDGMENT in this case.
24

25 Responses to likely Defenses

26 18. Qualified immunity, already claimed and denied, but likely to be re-sought under Harlow
v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982), is not available
27
since qualified immunity doctrine protects government officials “from liability for civil
28

7
1 damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” The qualified
2
immunity defense can be overcome at the pleading stage where a complaint contains
3
“sufficient factual allegations to show that the defendant’s conduct violated a
4
constitutional right and that the right was clearly established at the time of the alleged
5
violation.” This Court already recognized that Defendant’s claim that he would not
6 reasonably know that it would be excessive force to forcefully strike cooperative
7 Plaintiff’s testicles without cause, would somehow NOT be clearly established and well-
8 known to any reasonable TSA screener (or any federal employee).

9 19. If Defendant does claim qualified immunity, he must first prove that he was acting within

10
the scope of her discretionary authority when the allegedly wrongful acts occurred. . . .
(Wolk v. Seminole County, 276 Fed. App’x 898, 899 (11th Cir. 2008) Defendant has (to
11
date) not provided any evidence of statutory authority under TSA excessive force
12
guidelines allowing TSA screeners to capriciously and without mitigating or exigent
13
factors, to strike passengers using excessive force in their genitalia.
14
20. Moreover, as previously called out, Defendant under guidance from TSA, as well as TSA
15 itself, have not either provided evidence or updates to previous evidence or disclosures to
16 include SSI redacted from Plaintiff. Since Plaintiff does not have this SSI evidence, but
17 Defendant and TSA do, then Defendant and TSA should be enjoined from submitting

18 pleadings (including for Summary Judgment) since they are in Civil Contempt of Court!
21. Plaintiff’s damages stem from documented likely costs (shown in Exhibit A) from similar
19
medical expenses, as well compensatory damages including embarrassment, humiliation,
20
and hurt feelings of being required to challenge this case in public, where Plaintiff was
21
denied a much more modest suggested settlement, or even as little as an apology from
22
Defendant! Punitive damages follow federal guidelines and are intended not to punish,
23 but to avert repeat behavior by TSA agents. TSA agents have already begun (on 15
24 November 2017, at San Diego Airport, as reported to the Court and TSA) to identify
25 Plaintiff explicitly when Plaintiff’s transits TSA checkpoints (“Oh, YOU”RE Linlor!”) as

26 documented in Plaintiff’s Emergency Motion for non-Retaliation before the Court, and
TSA has filed a number of defamatory and untrue assertions in TSA’s documents in this
27
case. Based on existing harm and the reasonable expectation (including based on TSA’s
28

8
1 refusal to follow Court Orders!) that Plaintiff may continue to incur retribution and
retaliation from TSA, substantial damages are warranted to “put TSA on notice” that
2
significant damages are available to Plaintiffs in excessive force cases.
3
22. Plaintiff notes, however, that as an individual capacity Defendant, Michael Gerard Polson
4
is likely unable to pay more than Plaintiff’s medical costs (and court costs). To enable a
5
more equitable assignment of damages, as well as to still require TSA to disclose the
6 excessive force evidence it is illegally withholding, Plaintiff is filing a Motion for Order
7 to Show Cause for why TSA should not be sanctioned for the other damages for their
8 repeated actions to frustrate and impede justice and Contempt of Court, and to still be

9 required to produce evidence as already Ordered on excessive force standards.

10
23. Defendant’s immediate post-incident and subsequent behaviors, however, point to
repeated attempts by Defendant, and 3rd parties TSA and its employees, and
11
MWAA, to hinder, obstruct, stonewall, mock, frustrate, delay, defame, and TSA and
12
Defendant to violate court rules, and and finally contemptuously refuse to follow
13
two clear Orders of this Court to refuse to disclose evidence clearly required by
14
Plaintiff, despite that evidence being available to and used by Defendant and 3rd
15 Parties TSA and William Whetsell in this case.
16 24. Plaintiff did not want to have to bring this case. While reasonably upset from having
17 been struck in the testicles, and not initially realizing that Plaintiff would sustain the

18 resulting long-term injuries that Plaintiff has, Plaintiff merely sought an apology from
Defendant Polson as documented in the TSA attestation of William Whetsell (Polson’s
19
TSA supervisor at the time, see Exhibit C). While only documented as one request to
20
apologize, Plaintiff actually requested an apology from Defendant at least three times,
21
including after FSD Scott Johnson (the lead supervisor for all TSA at Dulles) showed up.
22
Plaintiff even requested an apology from Johnson, hoping that Plaintiff could de-escalate
23 the situation, while still making it clear that forcefully striking Plaintiff was unacceptable.
24 TSA agents continued to laugh and claim that they “had immunity” and that “there was
25 nothing that Plaintiff could do to them.”

26 25. Plaintiff further attempted to avail himself of the criminal justice system, by requesting to
press charges for felony sexual battery to the two MWAA police officers (Mitchell and
27
Solo), who refused to accept and transport Defendant and Plaintiff with evidence to a
28

9
1 Magistrate for a probable cause hearing (as should have been done, and is listed as an
obligation on local Virginia Loudoun County websites).
2

3
Advisory role of TSA as legal counsel for Defendant, and why the Court’s Orders of
4
16 Nov and 07 Dec should apply to and require Defendant to provide SSI to
5
Plaintiff:
6 26. 3rd party Transportation Security Administration (“TSA”) was Ordered on 16 November
7 2017 to treat Plaintiff as a Covered Person under 49 USC 1520.7.
8 27. TSA and Defendant are both represented by DOJ attorney Sylvertooth.

9 28. In Defendant’s deposition testimony, Defendant was legally advised by 3rd party TSA (not

10
by Sylvertooth, but by TSA attorney Bryant) to NOT answer questions based on SSI by
Bryant interrupting Defendant’s testimony to offer legal instruction on specific questions,
11
which were followed as instructed by Defendant. TSA’s attorney was not merely
12
“shouting in the wind.” TSA’s attorney Bryant, who never registered as co-counsel for
13
Defendant, and explicitly (on video) denied representing Defendant, still gave legal
14
counsel to Defendant, which impacts Plaintiff’s receipt of information from Defendant,
15 and Plaintiff’s ability to respond and properly submit this Motion for Summary
16 Judgment. As such, plus in Defendant’s alleged-SSI redacted answers to
17 Interrogatories/Document requests and a Subpoena, 3rd party TSA has established itself as

18 legally advising Defendant on what is allegedly Sensitive Security Information (“SSI”)


and to accordingly withhold that information from Plaintiff despite Plaintiff’s Court-
19
recognized and demonstrated need for the requested information.
20
29. Plaintiff therefore contends that the Court’s Order to TSA to treat Plaintiff as a Covered
21
Person, extends to all of Defendant’s FRCP 26 and Subpoena filings/responses, as well as
22
deposition testimony. Defendant and TSA should be held in Civil Contempt of Court for
23 refusing to provide updated responses to all of Defendant’s and TSA’s and William
24 Whetsell’s answers in ALL of Defendant’s and TSA’s and William Whetsell’s responses,
25 as well as with already-incurred harm known to Defendant and TSA, due to

26 unavailability to Plaintiff of evidence required by Plaintiff for Plaintiff’s filing of


Summary Judgment within the Court’s Order for timely filing of such.
27
30. For cause and precedent as demonstrated herein, Plaintiff seeks sanctions against
28

10
1 Defendant for intentional withholding of evidence critical to Plaintiff’s case, and
intentional failure to cure despite notice and opportunity, with irreparable harm intended
2
to render Plaintiff’s Summary Judgment motion deficient while bolstering Defendant’s
3
own motion through their non-disclosed to Plaintiff, but confirmed Defendant’s and
4
Defense counsel’s knowledge and access to SSI !
5
31. This blatant and unethical refusal by Defendant, Defense Counsel, and TSA to follow the
6 Court’s Orders supports a finding of Civil Contempt of Court.
7 32. Under FRCP 11 and the Court’s inherent authority, for repeated and clear attempts to
8 frustrate and hinder proceedings, and clear harm caused to Plaintiff, as well as

9 Defendant’s and TSA’s coordinated actions of Civil Contempt meeting the standards and

10
precedent under Colonial Williamsburg Foundation v. Kittinger Co., 792 F. Supp. 1397
(E.D. Va. 1992), sanctions for civil contempt are warranted and appropriate.
11
33. Plaintiff has sought an injunctive Order affirming Civil Contempt by both Defendant and
12
TSA, and that all further filings by Defendant or TSA each be enjoined from acceptance
13
by the Clerk of the Court (including enjoining of any Summary Judgment, or proposed
14
Protective Orders, or any other Motion or Pleading) pending production by Defendant
15 and TSA to Plaintiff of ALL updated responses to ALL of Defendant’s FRCP 26 and
16 Subpoena filings/responses, as well as updates to deposition testimony, to include
17 unredacted alleged SSI, and that this enjoining will extend notwithstanding existing

18 timelines set by the Court, for fourteen days after proof-of-mailing to allow time for
Plaintiff to receive, verify, and contest completeness of any updates responses sent by
19
Defendant and TSA.
20

21
Legal basis related to unreasonable searches and excessive force
22
34. The right to be free from unreasonable searches is well-known and established under
23 Graham v. Connor, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 1871 (1989)., and was recognized by this Court in
24 Hon. James Cacheris’ opinion from this instant case’s Motions Hearing, that “a
25 reasonable federal employee would know that gratuitously striking a passenger in the

26 genitals would be a violation of law.”


35. In Graham, the Court held that the fourth amendment is the constitutional source of
27
protection against excessive force arising during arrest, investigatory stop or other
28

11
1 seizure. (see Graham at 1871)
36. The constitutional standards for permissible force depend entirely upon the custodial
2
status of the alleged victim of force—that is, whether the victim is in some stage of arrest,
3
or a free citizen. A free citizen is protected under the 4th Amendment’s search and
4
seizure standard, and to violate the Constitution an official’s use of force must not be
5
“objectively reasonable.”
6 37. The subjective motivations of the officers (or TSO in this case), whether ill-intended or
7 benevolent, are never a factor in the 4th Amendment’s use-of-force analysis. (See
8 Graham at 397)

9 38. A reading of Graham and other federal court decisions suggests that the constitutional

10
threshold in excessive force claims is met once a judge or jury concludes that an officer's
use of force was objectively unreasonable. In the wake of Graham, however, some
11
federal courts have implicitly rejected this interpretation by requiring a plaintiff to show
12
that he sustained a "significant or meaningful injury" separately from proving that the
13
officer's conduct during arrest was objectively unreasonable. This level of injury is
14
defined in the attached Plaintiff’s specialist’s (urologist’s) report in Exhibit A, redacted as
15 allowed under CivLR with ongoing pain and suggestions made to Plaintiff for surgery
16 including nerve cutting and other actions that might take several operations, and long-
17 term care to resolve potential side-effect complications.

18 39. Plaintiff explicitly, specifically, and with intent stated in his Complaint, and First
Amended Complaint (FAC), that Defendant’s excessive force striking of Plaintiff was
19
done from the deliberate indifference and recklessness of the Defendant Michael Polson,
20
and not “shocks the conscience” or other standards from Lewis v. Sacramento and Glick
21
(Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir.)).
22
40. While Defendant was not a LEO, and the first prong of Glick is different in this case
23 (“deliberate indifference and recklessness”), other jurisdictions have instructed juries to
24 focus on whether the amount of force was justified under the circumstances. A serious
25 injury requirement was not imposed.

26 41. During Defendant’s deposition of Plaintiff, Defense counsel repeatedly yelled at berated
Plaintiff until Plaintiff finally was compelled to interject and state, “Let the record show
27

28

12
1 that Defense Counsel is yelling at and berating Plaintiff,” to which Defense counsel
shouted, “I’m fine with that!”
2
42. There were no recordings to capture Defense counsel’s repeated condescending and
3
unprofessional tones-of-voice.
4
43. There were no such behaviors during Plaintiff’s deposition of Defendant, which was
5
recorded and videotaped.
6

7 Listing of undisputed facts per CivLR 56(b): (items 43-83)


8 44. Plaintiff first attempted to “clear” security via the TSA pre-check lane on the “dirty”

9 (unscreened passenger concourse) side of the checkpoints. (per Defendant’s deposition

10
testimony)
45. Plaintiff and Defendant both agree that videos of this early interaction likely existed. (per
11
Defendant’s deposition testimony)
12
46. Defendant admits that no attempt to preserve this video was made by him despite being
13
requested at the incident by Plaintiff, and that any videos were likely destroyed. (per
14
Defendant’s deposition testimony)
15 47. TSA’s machines (per TSA statements) had technical problems, causing TSA agents to
16 request Plaintiff to move over to the TSA security line that Plaintiff used.
17 48. Plaintiff likely first interacted with Defendant on the “dirty” side of the TSA checkpoint.

18 (per Defendant’s deposition testimony)


49. Plaintiff and Defendant both agree that videos of this interaction likely existed. (per
19
Defendant’s deposition testimony)
20
50. Defendant admits that no attempt to preserve this video was made by him despite being
21
requested at the incident by Plaintiff, and that any videos were likely destroyed. (per
22
Defendant’s deposition testimony)
23 51. Plaintiff initially stepped onto the footprints on the floor mat, and then widened his stance
24 only at Defendant’s instruction, without any reason given by Defendant (per video
25 evidence)

26 52. Plaintiff was not wearing form-fitting, nor baggy jeans, but rather, fairly close-fitting but
“relaxed fit” jeans that did not slide down or provide any obstruction to pat-downs. (per
27
video evidence)
28

13
1 53. Polson did not ask Plaintiff to “pull up Plaintiff’s pants by the beltloops” as indicated in
TSA training if Plaintiff’s pants had been baggy or drooping, indicating that Polson did
2
not belief that any additional space existed in Plaintiff’s genital area that would require
3
additional force to push through. (per Plaintiff’s attestations and video evidence)
4
54. Plaintiff refers to a “reasonable” and “err on the side of too little force instead of too
5
much force” as being likely and normal during TSA pat-downs, but Defendant agrees that
6 while this is possible, that no such “reasonable” and “err on the side of too little force to
7 start” does not exist as guidance in any TSA documents, for which Plaintiff agrees. (per
8 deposition by Defendant/Sylvertooth of Plaintiff)

9 55. The term “excessive force” is not defined nor described in application or avoidance of

10
excessive force in any TSA documents received by Plaintiff, and are unknown of they are
being withheld as SSI, or if Defendant and TSA are simply trying to shield themselves by
11
not provided required evidence to Plaintiff as a Covered Person under 49 USC 1520.7.
12
56. When Defendant’s hand contacted Plaintiff’s genitals, Plaintiff immediately bent over,
13
covered his genitals with his hand, and then stepped back and away from Defendant. (per
14
video evidence)
15 57. Plaintiff attempted to de-escalate the situation by asking Defendant why Defendant had
16 struck Plaintiff, and then at least three times for Defendant to apologize, and stated that if
17 Defendant would just apologize if striking Plaintiff had been an accident, then Plaintiff

18 (though injured) would just walk away after screening and not escalate this further. (per
MWAA police report in Exhibit C, plus attestations from TSA employees)
19
58. Defendant and his manager (including at least FSD Scott Johnson) both stated that
20
Defendant’s actions were not accidental, they were intentional, and that Defendant would
21
not apologize. (per attestations from TSA employees in Exhibit C)
22
59. Plaintiff requested that police be called to assist with the incident. (per attestations from
23 TSA employees in Exhibit C)
24 60. TSA’s William Whetsell confirmed that police were called at Plaintiff’s request. (per
25 attestations from TSA employees in Exhibit C)

26 61. Plaintiff requested to press charges for felony sexual battery. (per MWAA police report
in Exhibit C, plus attestations from TSA employees)
27

28

14
1 62. MWAA police refused to collect videos evidence or witness names to give to Plaintiff,
and refused to file any report of the incident (until Plaintiff later insisted to MWAA that
2
they file a report). (per attestation of Plaintiff, plus from TSA employee William
3
Whetsell)
4
63. Neither Plaintiff nor TSA’s William Whetsell saw MWAA review any video of the
5
incident. (per attestation of Plaintiff, plus from TSA employee William Whetsell)
6 64. After MWAA police refused to arrest Defendant, Plaintiff placed Defendant under
7 citizen’s arrest for felony sexual battery, and requested MWAA police to accept custody
8 of the arrested Defendant Michael Polson. MWAA police refused to accept custody, and

9 instead stated that Defendant Michael Polson was free to leave. (per attestation of

10
Plaintiff, MWAA police report, plus from TSA employee William Whetsell)
65. Plaintiff requested to Defendant, and other TSA and MWAA personnel at the incident, to
11
preserve all videos in the vicinity, including chain-of-custody videos showing MWAA
12
personnel reviewing any videos, but no attempts to retain all videos were made, and all
13
but one video were allowed to be destroyed. (per attestation of Plaintiff, litigation hold
14
fax letters, phone call logs, MWAA police report, plus from TSA employee William
15 Whetsell)
16 66. Plaintiff claims to have been in pain right after Plaintiff claims to have been forcefully
17 struck by Defendant, and Plaintiff immediately contacted a medical provider about an

18 appointment before Plaintiff boarded his flight. (per attestation of Plaintiff and phone
call logs)
19
67. Defendant claims that he believes he has law enforcement officer “qualified immunity”
20
and that he should not be liable for any actions he may have committed. (per Defendant’s
21
deposition testimony, and Defendant’s filings for this case’s Motion’s hearing under
22
FRCP 12(b)(6)).
23 68. Defendant admits that he did not receive any follow-up or additional training or
24 investigation afterwards by TSA, but did receive a cash bonus authorized by FSD Scott
25 Johnson as a direct result of alleged excessive force against Plaintiff during the pat-down.

26 (per Defendant’s FRCP 26 answers, plus subpoena responses)


69. No arrest of Plaintiff occurred in this case, nor was Plaintiff a suspect of any crime;
27
Plaintiff was a free citizen merely cooperatively transiting an airport security checkpoint,
28

15
1 while holding a military ID (which is usually an indicator of good character and non-
threat status) and other government verification cards available for direct inspection. No
2
probable cause, exigency, or quick decision making was evident or required. Plaintiff
3
and Defendant moved slowly and reasonably on video, except for the noted video
4
abnormalities of choppy video, low frame rate, appearing and disappearing people,other
5
TSA and passengers obstructing view of Plaintiff and Defendant, and unknown chain-of-
6 custody and non-modification of the single video retained. On the contrary,Plaintiff was
7 wholly cooperative, and offered his government verification cards for proximate
8 inspection, but was precluded by US Code to permit his verification cards out of his

9 immediate and proximate control (per Plaintiff’s attestations, and TSA attestations and

10
video of Plaintiff being cooperative).
70. Michael Gerard Polson (Defendant) was employed as a TSA screener (aka
11
“Transportation Security Officer” or “TSO”) on 10 March 2016 at Dulles Airport. (per
12
Defendant’s attestation)
13
71. Polson was in his TSA uniform, on-duty, and acting “under color of law” at the time that
14
he struck Plaintiff, by virtue of TSA agent Michael Polson (in his individual capacity),
15 acting outside of proscribed procedures, while in-uniform and on-duty, with deliberate
16 indifference and recklessness (vice simply “careless indifference”). (per Plaintiff’s
17 attestations and Complaint).

18 72. Plaintiff was cooperative, not aggressive, and followed all of Polson’s directions. (per
Plaintiff’s attestations and video evidence)
19
73. Polson directed Plaintiff to spread Plaintiff’s legs and place Plaintiff’s feet in wider
20
stance than the normal footprints on the pat-down mat. (per Plaintiff’s attestations and
21
video evidence)
22
74. Polson claims to not remember why he asked Plaintiff to spread Plaintiff’s stance wider.
23 (per Defendant’s deposition testimony)
24 75. Polson was not a law enforcement officer (“LEO”), even though Polson claimed qualified
25 immunity as a law enforcement officer in Polson’s FRCP 12(b)(6) filing with the Court.

26 76. TSOs are not LEOs, and TSOs or other TSA agents do not have arrest or forcible search
powers (Solomon v. United States (559 F.2d 309 5th Cir. 1977)
27
77. Plaintiff was struck in the genitals by Polson, as shown on the single security video
28

16
1 submitted to the Court by Defendant.
78. The airport police were called at the request/behest of Plaintiff. (per attestations of
2
Defendant and TSA employee William Whetsell)
3
79. The airport police were employed by the Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority
4
(“MWAA”) that manages police and other services at Dulles Airport. (per MWAA
5
website and MWAA attestations)
6 80. Plaintiff requested that all videos in the checkpoint area be preserved, including videos of
7 the MWAA police officers supposedly reviewing the video of the attack. (per Plaintiff’s
8 evidence retention requests, including verbally at the incident, by fax the next day, and by

9 multiple phone calls and emails).

10
81. No attestations of any witness to MWAA officers reviewing the videos exist. (per
attestation of TSA employee William Whetsell)
11
82. A TSA employee attestation of a supervisor responsible for regularly reviewing video
12
(William Whetsell) stated that he did not see the MWAA officers review any video, even
13
though he knew where to look and is familiar with the area.
14
83. No videos of MWAA officers reviewing the video were saved, despite Plaintiff’s requests
15 (with these requests affirmed by TSA employees).
16

17 Further evidence below is relevant to this case, but not included as items of uncontested

18 facts under CivLR 56(b) to be adjudicated for Summary Judgment of Excessive Force
84. The claim stems from the deliberate indifference and recklessness of the Defendant
19
Michael Polson, (per the First Amended Complaint and attestation of Plaintiff)
20
85. From Bivens v. Six Defendants, “the Fourth Amendment operates as a limitation upon the
21
exercise of federal power regardless of whether the State in whose jurisdiction that power
22
is exercised would prohibit or penalize the identical act if engaged in by a private citizen.
23 It guarantees to citizens of the United States the absolute, fundamental right to be free
24 from unreasonable searches and seizures carried out by virtue of federal authority. And
25 "where federally protected rights have been invaded, it has been the rule from the

26 beginning that courts will be alert to adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary
relief." Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S., at 684, see also Bemis Bros. Bag Co. v. United States, 289
27
U.S. 28, 36 (1933) (Cardozo, J.); Western Maid, 257 U.S. 419, 433 (1922) (Holmes, J).
28

17
1 86. Federal employees may become personally liable for constitutional deprivation by direct
participation, failure to remedy wrongs after learning about it, creation of a policy or
2
custom under which constitutional practices occur or gross negligence in managing
3
subordinates who cause violations. (Gallegos v. Haggerty, Northern District of New York,
4
689 F.Supp. 93) Sexual predator (using the same description as is currently being used
5
by news media related to confirmed and similar genital touching by Harvey Weinstein, Al
6 Franken, Dustin Hoffman, and others) Michael Polson is claimed to have become
7 personally liable by his direct participation in the felony sexual battery, his failure to
8 remedy the wrongs by refusing to apologize and simultaneously/concurrently laughing,

9 smiling, and joking disparagingly about the Plaintiff (despite being asked individually by

10
the Plaintiff for the Defendant to apologize, as well as in front of his supervisors). His
managers through specific actions, and not respondeat superior refused to help encourage
11
Defendant to apologize, and they all continued laughing, physically or metaphorically
12
back-slapping each other, and outwardly encouraging a clear violation of excessive force.
13
It is further unconscionable, as Defendant admitted under Subpoena, that TSA paid
14
Defendant a cash bonus of over $400 (specifically authorized by Scott Johnson, who
15 provided a statement in Exhibit B), instead of any investigation, training, or verification
16 of potential excessive force. Defendant also testified that it is not uncommon for TSA to
17 pay out cash bonuses from taxpayer funds to TSA screeners alleged to have used

18 excessive force on passengers! This appears to potentially be a sadistic, TSA-


Management endorsed “game”, which encourages passengers to be struck in their
19
genitals by TSOs using excessive force, and which TSA then covers up (partially by
20
spoliation of evidence, as alleged and demonstrated in this case), while paying out cash
21
awards to TSOs. According to Defendant Polson, no TSA investigation occurred, to
22
evaluation of excessive force or comparison to any alleged (but unproduced ) “excessive
23 force guidelines” that TSA and Defendant continue to withhold.
24 87. An aggravated sexual battery qualifies as an unreasonable search (under Graham v.
25 Connor) and seizure qualifies (under California v. Hodari) for 4th Amendment or other

26 criminal assessment purposes and supportive in stating of a claim in either instance as a


violation of the 4th Amendment under Bivens. Notably, even a lesser touching (“there
27
must be either the application of physical force, however slight“) qualifies as a seizure
28

18
1 (under California v. Hodari), and is especially unreasonable in the context of an
aggravated sexual battery. Regardless, Plaintiff asserts that the felonious aspect of the
2
battery is verifiable through the Plaintiff’s statements, police confirmation of the incident
3
(battery), and via video recordings and comparison in Exhibit C to Virginia statutes for
4
aggravated sexual battery, and proof from Plaintiff that Defendant was arrested under
5
common law for aggravated sexual battery. Similar cases (under Section 1983 instead of
6 Bivens, but dually applicable) have shown Defendants to mistakenly assert a seizure
7 instead of a search, and that seizure only relates to a custodial context, as if the Plaintiff
8 had been detained by the Defendant. Aside from the alerting concern that if the

9 Defendant were to try to claim a seizure in this context, that the Defendant would then be

10
claiming policing powers and while still liable, that Plaintiff pre-emptively would request
to amend this claim for additional criminal consideration and civil charges of the
11
Defendant’s illegal portrayal of a police officer, California v. Hodari pre-emptively
12
corrects the improper conclusion of a touching (however slight) not being a seizure in its
13
own right, and the inapplicability of a custodial seizure requirement to the claims of this
14
case. Whether predicated on a search or a seizure, an aggravated sexual battery is clearly
15 a violation of the 4th Amendment Constitutional rights of the Plaintiff.
16 88. Plaintiff has stated the assertion that Defendant’s behavior showed deliberate indifference
17 and recklessness. These terms are defined in case law. "Deliberate indifference" requires

18 that a deliberate choice be made to do or not to do something. Farmer v. Brennan, Hill


v. DeKalb “Recklessness” is defined as “reckless disregard of, or indifference to” an
19
individual’s rights or safety. Smith v. Wade, 103 S. Ct. 1625 (1983). For "deliberate
20
indifference" to exist, the causal connection between the deprivation of a federal right
21
must be such that the deprivation was a "plainly obvious consequence" of the decision.
22

23 CONCLUSION
24 89. For all good reasons and cause as shown herein, Plaintiff submits and requests that
25 summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff be Ordered and AFFIRMED.

26

27

28

19
1 EXHIBIT A

2 Urologist’s report, by Dr. Philips, a board-certified physician (redacted here, but with full
contact information provided to Defendant and Sylvertooth), with further unredacted
3 report information and medical qualifications provided to Defendant, with a Court Order
4 to protect such information and limit its use only in this case.

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

20
1 Costs to remedy, as also provided to Defendant. Costs listed are particular to cancerous
treatment and related testicular chord surgery as Plaintiff has been advised for treatment
2 of Plaintiff’s injuries with the greatest likelihood of success. While chemotherapy is not
appropriate in this case, other aspects of treatment appear to be involved. No non-
3 cancerous treatment of Plaintiff’s serious injuries, referenceable via an independent
4 source as below, were found.

5 Noteworthy is that costs range $70,518 to $200,000 / treatment. Plaintiff was advised by
Plaintiff’s specialist that multiple rounds of treatment (Plaintiff assumes up to 3 at a
6 maximum of $200k) are possible. Plaintiff has added a single addition round of
7
treatment ($200,000) for long-term care or potential adverse effects not otherwise
anticipated.
8
Total medical costs are estimated to be $800,000 based on these sources and likely
9 course of treatment.
10
Three sources of medical costs were consulted throughout 2017, though current costs
11 (without knowing what will be the medical billing costs and exact procedures) are
problematic to define. Plaintiff has presented best and reasonable efforts to assess below:
12
Reference A:
13
Source:
14 http://www.tc-cancer.com/forum/forum/community-forums/health-insurance-and-
financial-issues/301147-cost-of-testicular-cancer-in-america
15
Total $70,518.
16

17 Reference B:
Source:
18 http://tcrc.acor.org/costs.html
19
Approx. $62000 (year 1), plus subsequent billing of $29,584.12 for an approximate total
20 of $91,500. This was in January 2001; costs are expected to have increased.

21
Reference C: (based on actual costs)
22 Source: http://www.kantrowitz.com/cancer/costs.html
Approx. $175,712.97 ($169,124.97 in 2003, $6,588.00 in 2004).
23
Costs are expected to have increased since 2004.
24

25 COMPENSATORY AND PUNITIVE DAMAGE CALCULATIONS


26 Plaintiff defeats any potential Defendant (or Court-considered) objection of due process,
equal protection, and excessive fines from SCOTUS mandatory precedent in the well-
27 known case of BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996) and its
applications thereof, where SCOTUS and multiple Courts have concluded the punitive
28

21
1 damage awards were not unconstitutional nor violative of due process and in this instant
case, of:
2
Compensatory damages of $10,000,000 for embarrassment, humiliation of having to
3 bring and support this case exposing Plaintiff’s private medical injuries to public scrutiny
and mocking, and putting Plaintiff’s name on the Internet for a private matter that
4 Plaintiff was not allowed to file anonymously or under seal;
5 Punitive damages of $20,000,000 to discourage repeat offenses by Defendant,
Defendant’s co-workers when Plaintiff frequently is required to travel throughout airports
6 with security managed by TSA, and Defendant’s former employer TSA to avoid
7
retaliatory conduct and harm to Plaintiff.
Notable is that as a federal employee, that the US Government is able and frequently pays
8
out damage awards to individual Defendants.
9 In this case, the DOJ and US Navy (Sylvertooth is “on loan” from the US Navy to the
10
DOJ, and has used his US Navy account to hide evidence from Plaintiff. The US Navy
acknowledged but declined to take any action to restrict this activity. The DOJ and US
11 Navy already provided legal advice and assistance from Murley, Sylvertooth, Barghaan,
Boente, and staff at the DOJ – a virtual “dream team” of lawyers against pro se Plaintiff.
12
It is both expected and reasonable that the US will continue to provide such support for
13 Defendant if judgment is awarded against Defendant Polson.
14 However, Plaintiff, in fairness, seeks that TSA be sanctioned for Civil Contempt (see co-
filed Motion for Civil Contempt and Order to Show Cause), and repeated attempts to
15 hinder and frustrate Plaintiff through illegal spoliation contrary to their SOP, and refusing
to comply with two Orders of this Court to provide alleged-SSI evidence to Plaintiff.
16
Plaintiff, while seeking summary judgment against Defendant, would consider accepting
17
satisfaction of judgment for Plaintiff’s medical + Court/travel costs, if the Court affirms
18 (as part of summary judgment) that Defendant was properly arrested for felony sexual
battery, and that Plaintiff may still seek a probable cause hearing with a Virginia Loudoun
19 County Magistrate for criminal consideration as Plaintiff initially sought.
20 The amount of Compensatory and Punitive damages are fair and reasonable, as they are
only a factor of 37.5 over medical costs of $800,000 for the Defendant (this low factor of
21 37.5 being well within federal guidelines under Gore and State Farm). While the
$800,000 is potentially larger-than-average damages, they are appropriate for the true
22
antiticipated costs of medical treatment for the most personal and private of medical
23 injuries maliciously and with reckless intent. inflicted upon Plaintiff by Defendant.

24 As such, the $800,000 is less than 3x more that the $300,000 cap on damages found in §
1981a(b)(3)(D) typically followed by federal courts in assessing reasonableness and caps
25 on damages, and reflects the unknown (as yet) amount of true costs for Plaintiff’s course
of treatment.
26
Furthermore, in looking for case law guidance on pre-emptively defeating any claims of
27 Excessive Fines, the California Supreme Court decided Adams v Murakami (1991) 54
C3d 105, 284 CR 318, holding that "[a] reviewing court cannot make a fully informed
28

22
1 determination of whether an award of punitive damages is excessive unless the record
contains evidence of the defendant’s financial condition." 54 C3d at 110. If summary
2 judgment is Ordered, and in equity, if Plaintiff’s Motion for Civil Contempt and Order to
Show Cause are granted, then the higher compensatory and punitive amounts would not
3 need to be held against the individual capacity Defendant.
4 o Under Gore and State Farm, the most important guidepost for damages is
5 reprehensibility, which this instant case matches one of the Court’s 4
6 exemplary prongs demonstrable through (1) reckless disregard for the rights

7 of the Plaintiff –Gore at 419.


o Furthermore, Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983) provides guidance that
8
punitive damages can be awarded if the Defendant(s) act, "with knowledge
9
that their actions violated federal law or with reckless disregard or callous
10
indifference to the risk that its actions violated federal law." It is
11
unquestionable that Defendant had to know (by common sense and procedural
12
training) that feloniously, aggressively striking a cooperating passenger in the
13 groin for some type of retribution is exactly the harm that many passengers
14 fear, most of frequent fliers required to submit to security screening frequently
15 as part of their jobs to transit airport checkpoints. Punitive damages, intended

16 to punish the Defendant and by consequence, TSA, to explicitly set precedent


so as to avoid repeat transgressions are therefore justified and warranted under
17
Wade.
18

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22

23

24

25

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28

23
1 EXHIBIT B

2 No litigation holds were made by Defendant (see below), no evidence was received under
Rule 26 disclosures of litigation holds, TSA criminally violated their own SOP, and
3 MWAA Police also did not make any litigation holds, as recognized by the Hon. Judge
4 Anderson in this case.

5 Plaintiff had asked for Judicial Notice in this case of spoliation and sanctions, which the
Hon. Judge Anderson denied, and that decision is currently under Appeal by Plaintiff.
6

7
If the one retained video is not conclusive of excessive force, then by definition,
Defendant’s failure to preserve other evidence despite explicit requests to Defendant,
8 TSA, and MWAA support a finding of prejudicial destruction of evidence, and summary
judgment for Plaintiff. TSA also hid the identity (name and address) of Defendant
9 Polson, and so Plaintiff could not further contact and repeat requests for litigation holds
10
beyond those statements by Plaintiff affirmed below at the time of the incident, which
TSA supervisor William Whetsell (who was duty-bound by TSA SOP to preserve ALL
11 evidence, see below), also confirmed that Plaintiff requested that all video evidence be
preserved while standing about 3-10 feet away from Defendant, in Whetsell’s presence
12 also.
13
Evidence of immediate verbal request for ALL videos (plural!) from TSA attestations
14 herein. The specific litigation hold fax was sent the following day (11 March 1026, and
repeated within a year to continue the litigation hold).
15
Next are the cover page and excerpts from TSA’s own Standard Operating Procedures
16

17 Plaintiff followed-up via phone calls to MWAA, since the MWAA Police, and MWAA
Police Internal Affair (Lt. Angela King) in >10 phone calls between 11 March 2016 and
18 10 April 2016, to attempt to retain all videos and other ESI. MWAA initial refused to
even file a report, but eventually Maj. Miller from MWAA ordered the two Lts. Solo and
19
Mitchell to file a report. Despite all these efforts, MWAA (as shown below) filed
20 documents with the Court affirming that MWAA did not attempt ANY ESI or video or
records preservation. In the following testimony, neither did Defendant, or TSA
21 employee William Whetsell, despite the TSA SOP excerpt proving the TSA is in criminal
violation of its own rules for not having retained ALL ESI, ALL videos, and ALL
22
evidence!
23
Despite Plaintiff having an “old copy” (TSA’s words) of the SOP, Plaintiff does not
24 possess the SSI that the Court has ordered Defendant/TSA to provide.
25
Additionally, the SSI Ordered by the Court includes, allegedly, excessive force guidelines
26 that DO NOT EXIST in the SOP! So, if there are any excessive force guidelines, neither
Defendant nor TSA have provided them as of this filing’s date, to Plaintiff.
27

28

24
1 This excerpt is from the TSA SOP. TSA publicly released its SOP onto the internet as part of
a contracting solicitation, and confirmed that the SOP was accurate and complete. The title
2
page is shown, and then specific elements to demonstrate the TSA is required to collect and
3
retain evidence. The title of the person responsible to do this is that held by William
4
Whetsell (who was deposed in this case) and confirmed that he did NOT collect or preserve
5
evidence/ESI as required, despite litigation holds to Defendant, TSA, and MWAA. NOTE
6 item #22, two pages below, where collection of ALL evidence is required by Whetsell !
7

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1
The 2nd page of this Order from Hon. Judge Anderson proves that MWAA did not make any
2
evidence preservation requests. Testimony from Defendant and TSA employee Whetsell
3
affirm that neither of them make any records preservation requests, either.
4

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1 Report as received by MWAA (redacted).

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1
Excerpts from Deposition of Michael G. Polson from 20 October 2017, pages 15-16, from
2
Defendant’s testimony under Oath.
3
Evinced:
4
1. There are likely between 3-50 security cameras in the checkpoint area.
5
2. It was Michael Polson’s decision whether to request preservation of videos for his
6 own defense, and that the many cameras at the checkpoint are there for his protection,
7 as well.
8 3. Mr. Polson was influenced in his decision by a TSA “TSM” who had accompanied

9 the MWAA police officers. Mr. Polson did not know who the TSM was, but TSM

10
Susan Callaghan has stated that the only two TSMs who accompanies MWAA police
officers were TSA TSA’s Susan Callaghan and Carl Johannes.
11

12
BY CAPTAIN LINLOR:
13
Q Do you believe that -- are there -- let's take a step back. Are there -- are there video
14
cameras recording at the security checkpoint?
15 A Yes.
16 Q How many security cameras are there?
17 A I do not have knowledge of that.

18 Q In your opinion, how many security cameras do you think there are?
A Several.
19
Q Several meaning -- can you range in number?
20
A More than 3, which would be few, and less than 50.
21
Q Okay. And I have a -- let me get the right item here. So the likelihood, in your opinion,
22
is that there would be cameras recording on, you're calling the dirty side; correct?
23 A We would have cameras covering a dirty side of the checkpoint, yes.
24 Q Do you believe that the interactions that you and I had on the dirty side should have been
25 captured on camera?

26 A In my opinion, I think every aspect of the checkpoint should be video recorded.


Q That's a reasonable expectation; isn't it?
27
A In my opinion, I would -- I would expect that for my own security as well.
28

31
1 Page 22
BY CAPTAIN LINLOR:
2
Q Do you -- do you recognize that it says, heavily populated with cameras, in that
3
statement?
4
A I recognize that it says that.
5
Q Do you recognize that based on the previous statement, in this occurrence, that Dulles
6 would have at least -- based on these statements, Dulles would have at least as many cameras
7 as Reno?
8 A As my previous statement, I would agree that TSA has several cameras within

9 checkpoints.

10
Q Do you believe in your opinion that Dulles Airport security checkpoints would be
heavily populated with cameras?
11
A I would agree that there are several cameras. Heavily populated is a number I can't make
12
a comment on.
13

14
And continuing on pgs 73-75:
15 BY CAPTAIN LINLOR:
16 Q What obligations to preserve evidence do you believe that you have?
17 MR. SYLVERTOOTH:

18 Form. Are you talking about the incident between you and the March --
CAPTAIN LINLOR:
19
I am.
20
MR. SYLVERTOOTH:
21
I will withdraw form.
22
A For the incident on March 10th, 2015 – 2016, excuse me, when I left that checkpoint on
23 that day, it was my understanding that no crime had been committed because the police had
24 arrived, had -- and I believe they had viewed video. I don't -- I did not see where they went
25 or what they had seen, but they came back, and was told that I had done correctly in my

26 proceedings following the SOP. So I took no steps on that day to preserve any evidence.
BY CAPTAIN LINLOR:
27
Who told you you had done your steps correctly on that date?
28

32
1 A There was a manager present, I don't remember his name, who had come out of the office
with the MWAA police. And he's the one that came directly to me after they left the office,
2
and he's the one that spoke.
3
Q So it sounds like this manager would be pretty important because he's giving you
4
guidance of your innocence or potential guilt; correct?
5
MR. SYLVERTOOTH: Form.
6 A His importance to me would be based on hierarchy of chain.
7 BY CAPTAIN LINLOR:
8 Q Do you have any recollection or possible recollection of who that might have been?

9 A I don't remember his name. I can only describe what he looked like on that day.

10
Page 184
Q Do you feel -- I think you said before, is it correct that you did not feel that you had any
11
personal responsibility to preserve any of this information?
12
A On the day in question, after the police made a statement and my managers told me that I
13
had done correctly, I felt there was no case to be made. There was no more allegations of a
14
charge of any sort.
15

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1
Excerpt from Deposition of William Whetsell from 20 October 2017, from Mr. Whetsell’s
2
testimony under Oath.
3
Evinced:
4
1. William Whetsell’s TSA job is as an STSO.
5
2. Defendant had the ability (posession, custody, or control) to obtain video evidence from
6 TSA and William Whetsell on 10 March 2016, as they worked together for TSA.
7 3. Mr. Whetsell has access to TSA’s SOP, is responsible for its consistent implementation
8 (per the SOP), and for providing access to the SOP to Defendant Polson. Plaintiff claims

9 that both Whetsell and Polson therefore have the SOP in their custody or control to be

10
able to provide a copy for review or to answer a subpoena in their individual capacitis.
4. From SOP: see previously filed TSA Screening Manual, pgs 2-3 through 2-5, inclusive,
11
including on page 2-5, “Duties of STSOs”, paragraph 22: “Manage incidents as they
12
arise until the arrival of an LEO, including the collection of witness information (for
13
example, name, contact information, and statement regarding the incident) and retention
14
of evidence. [emph. Added)
15 5. Mr. Whetsell did not view or try to retain evidence, and Mr Whetsell did not take any
16 steps in response to any requests from Defendant (no good faith efforts to preserve).
17 6. Mr. Whetsell did hear Plaintiff request “that the videos [emph. added] be placed into an

18 evidence chain of custody and that video of MWAA P.D. officers watching a video of the
incident be placed into an evidence chain of custody as well.
19
7. Given the close proximity (3-10 feet listed) of Defendant similar to Mr. Whetsell and
20
Plaintiff, it is extremely likely that Defendant also hear Plaintiff’s request to preserve
21
evidence, which was not done by Defendant (or anyone else, except for the disputed and
22
insufficient single video).
23

24 pg 57
25 Excerpt of Mr. Whetsell, reading from a statement he had written of events of 10 March

26 2016:

27

28

34
1 “Passenger Linlor asked that the videos [emph. added] be placed into an evidence chain of
custody and that video of MWAA P.D. officers watching a video of the incident be placed
2
into an evidence chain of custody as well.”
3
and at the conclusion of Mr. Whetsell’s statement, on page 58:
4
Q Do you believe that your statement as you've written it here is accurate and complete? 6
5
A To the best of my knowledge, yes.
6 Q Is there anything that you would normally include that you upon reflection would have
7 not included?
8 A Not that I'm aware of.

9 Q Based upon your statement, did I ask at the time that the videos be placed into an

10
evidence chain of custody and that the video of MWAA P.D. officers watching the video of
the incident be placed into an evidence chain of custody as well?
11
A It does state in my statement that you requested -- or you asked that the videos be placed
12
into an evidence chain of custody and that the video of the MWAA P.D. officers watching the
13
video of incident be placed into an evidence chain of custody as well.
14
Q Where were you standing when I said that? How far away?
15 A I don't want to speculate. I can't recall exactly.
16 Q Approximately where were you standing in relation to -- I'm not talking about speculate.
17 You must have an opinion. Were you -- were you -- do you think you were about 6 feet

18 away? Do you think you were about 20 feet away?


A To the best of my recollection, again within 15 feet.
19
Q Within 15 feet?
20
A Within 10, 15 feet.
21
Pg 107
22
Q So you consider yourself a supervisor, but not a manager?
23 A I am a supervisory transportation security officer. [ed. note: abbreviated “STSO”]
24

25 For use as framing the testimony immediately following: from TSA’s SOP: see Exhibit B,

26 “Duties of STSOs”, paragraph 22: “Manage incidents as they arise until the arrival of an
LEO, including the collection of witness information (for example, name, contact
27

28

35
1 information, and statement regarding the incident) and retention of evidence. [emph.
added)
2
Pg 102+
3
BY CAPTAIN LINLOR:
4
Q Are the cameras at the security checkpoint where this incident occurred TSA's cameras?
5
A I don't know who they belong to.
6 Q Have you ever had to review or obtain video recordings for any purpose?
7 A I have viewed videos on the -- on the camera system
8 Q In what situation was that?

9 A I reviewed it on a number of instances.

10
Q What incidents triggered you needing to review video recordings?
A Sometimes accusations of theft. That would be one I could think of that I would need to
11
review the camera for.
12
Q How many times since you have been hired by TSA have you gone to look at the video
13
recordings?
14
A I don't know the answer to that.
15 Q Is it a frequent activity?
16 A It occurs fairly regularly, not particularly with incidents.
17 Q Not particularly with what?

18 A Incidents.
Q Incidents, okay. Is the allegation of sexual battery -- felony sexual battery an incident?
19
MR. SYLVERTOOTH:
20
Form.
21
BY CAPTAIN LINLOR:
22
Q Do you -- do you believe that the events surrounding this incident are what you are
23 calling it -- what you're calling an incident?
24 A Yes, I would refer to this as incident.
25 Q Did you review the video from this incident?

26 A I did not.
Q Why did you not review the video from the incident?
27
A It wasn't my place in this incident.
28

36
1 Q Whose place was it to review the video in this incident?
A I don't know the answer to it.
2
Q Did you see anyone else reviewing the video?
3
A I did not see anyone else review the video. [ed. note: This includes MWAA police.]
4

5
Pg 64
6 Q Okay. You could hear my voice at the time. Do you think that anyone else at the same
7 distance would likely be able to hear my voice at that same incident -- at that same time, time
8 and place?

9 A Just for -- to make sure I'm understanding. Would someone at the same distance away that I

10
was –
Q Yes.
11
A -- be able to hear what I heard?
12
Q Yes, in your opinion.
13
A In my opinion, yes.
14
Q Do you think that -- have you known Mr. Polson to have any hearing impediments or
15 difficulties?
16 A Not to my knowledge
17 Q Have you ever had him tell you that he could not hear things that you were saying to him?

18 A Not to my knowledge.
Q Do you believe that Mr. Polson would likely have heard the same things -- likely, have heard
19
the same things that I was saying to you?
20
A Most likely, yes.
21
Q Did I -- did I state that I was placing TSO Polson under citizen's arrest for felony sexual
22
assault?
23 A It's whatever I wrote in my statement. I wrote that you stated that if they would not place --
24 "they" MWAA P.D. -- would not place him under arrest, then you would be placing TSA Polson
25 under citizen's arrest for felony sexual assault.

26

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1
Statement of Defendant Michael Polson (2 pages of narrative plus signature page)
2

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1 Statement of William (Bill) Whetsell, STSO (2nd level supervisor and Defendant Polson’s
supervisor)
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1 Statement of Susan Callaghan, STM (3rd level supervisor and supervisor of William Whetsell,
Defendant Polson’s supervisor)
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1 Statement of Scott Johnson (4th level supervisor, and supervisor of Susan Callaghan, William
Whetsell, and Defendant Polson)
2

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1 EXHIBIT C
Records retention requests to MWAA and Defendant’s employer TSA sent the day after the
2
attack. At this point (10 March 2016), TSA and MWAA were still refusing to release the
3
arrested suspect’s name (Defendant Michael Polson), and repeated on 09 March 2017
4

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1 Evidence from a previous case again MWAA, currently modified and under Appeal with
the 4th Circuit:
2
Third parties TSA and MWAA have been repeatedly compelled and commanded to
3
produce evidence, but have concealed in bad faith their destruction of video and other
4
ESI evidence. The acknowledged lack of any litigation hold for preservation by MWAA,
5
or by Defendant Polson or TSA to ask a hold from MWAA eliminates any good faith
6 exemption under FRCP 37(e) (see Doe v. Norwalk Community College, 2007 U.S. Dist.
7 (D. Conn., July 16, 2007)). The Order below from this EDVA Court demonstrates an
8 approved Motion to Compel to force MWAA and TSA to stop blaming each other for

9 non-production of the single video they produced, but where NEITHER had issued any

10
preservation of records requests internally nor to each other, and then blamed each other.

11

12

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1 Affirming statements of citizen’s arrest claimed by Plaintiff Capt. Linlor for felony sexual
battery by Defendant Michael Polson AND for requests for preservation of video made
2
in Defendant Polson’s presence on 3/10/16, as affirmed by Defendant’s coworkers.
3
Statements are also affirmative of a citizen’s arrest under Defendant’s statements through
4
case law holding that the transfer-of-custody of a demonstrated felony battery suspect
5
must occur after a valid citizen’s arrest. Full statements from Polson, Whetsell, Johnson,
6 and Callaghan follow this summary to demonstrate obligations to preserve evidence by
7 Defendant Michael Polson, and TSA, and MWAA (none of whom issued litigation holds)
8 • Meyers v. Redwood City (9th Cir. 2005) 400 F.3d 765, 772

9 • Kinney v. County of Contra Costa (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d 761, 769


• Wang v. Hartunian (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 744, 750 [“[T]he police were in fact obligated
10
to take custody of Wang merely at the direction of Hartunian, that is, when Hartunian
11
informed the police that he had arrested Wang.”]; Kesmodel v. Rand (2004) 119
12 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1137
13 • Hudson v. Commonwealth, 266 Va. 371, 379 (Va. 2003), the Virginia Supreme Court
14 stated, “At common law, a private citizen may arrest another for a breach of the
peace committed in his presence. See Gustke, 516 S.E.2d at 291-92; see also Carroll v.
15
United States, 267 U.S. 132, 156-57, 69 L. Ed. 543, 45 S. Ct. 280 (1925) (” ‘In cases of
16
misdemeanor [though this instant case concerns a citizen’s arrest for a felony
17 committed in the Plaintiff’s presence], a peace officer like a private person has at
18 common law no power of arresting without a warrant except when a breach of the peace
19 has been committed in his presence . . . .’ ” (quoting Halsbury’s Laws of England 612)).
Plaintiff has alleged in the Complaint that the felony battery occurred not only in his
20
presence, but to his person.
21
Summary of Statements of 10 March 2016 submitted by TSA under Subpoena (copy of
22 these statements in Exhibit B herein):
PERSON ESSENCE OF STATEMENTS MADE UNDER OATH
23 Michael Polson Mr. Linlor asked for police to be called so he could file
(Defendant) charges for sexual assault by Michael Polson.
24
Bill Whetsell called police at Linlor’s request.
25
William (Bill) Whetsell I heard passenger Linlor state that TSO Polson had forcibly
26 STSO (2nd level mgr) hit him in the testicle [sic] during the pat-down.
(Defendant’s supervisor) I asked if the passenger would like to speak with the police
27
as he had stated sexual assault. He said that he would like
28 to speak with the police.

45
1 Passenger Linlor stated that he was placing TSO Polson
under citizen’s arrest for felony sexual assault.
2
Scott Johnson (FSO) Received text message of incident (not previously disclosed
3 (big boss, 4th level mgr) or retained despite specific request to retain ESI)
4 Passenger says TSA agent sexually assaulted him
Passenger said, “I invoke my right to make a citizen’s
5 arrest.”
6 Carl Johannes (TSM) Passenger claims he was sexually assaulted by TSO
7
(3rd level mgr) Michael Polson
Mr. Linlor states, “I need a copy of all video of what
8 happened.”

9 Susan Callaghan (TSM) Passenger claims he was sexually assaulted by Officer


10
(3rd level mgr) Polson
(Obstruction of evidence): Mr. Linlor asked MWAA for the video and they said
11 they did not have it; they viewed TSA’s cameras. (Scott
(TSA FSO complicit in Johnson FSO had arrived at this time.)
12 obstruction of evidence Mr. Linlor indicated to Scott Johnson that Mr. Linlor
= BAD FAITH) requested to make a citizen’s arrest of TSO Polson.
13
STSO William Whetsell said that the passenger had
14 requested police, and that Whetsell had made that request
through the ICC.
15 MWAA officers told Linlor he would have to go to the
courthouse and file a complaint to press charges.
16
(Note that Linlor did this, with Loudoun Magistrate Court coordination three times in
17 Leesburg on the record, and was refused by three Loudoun County Magistrates to accept
a complaint, despite awareness of the Chief Magistrate and his orders that the other
18 Magistrates should accept a complaint from Linlor.)
19
Leila Aksalic (Lead Agent) Linlor claimed he was sexually assaulted during pat-down.
20 Accused TSO Polson of sexual assault.

21 Joseph Hoffman (IAD) Linlor said he had been sexually assaulted.


22
TSOC narrative Passenger claims TSO forcibly hit him in a sensitive area
23 Passenger attempted to claim citizen’s arrest against the
TSO making the pat-down
24
Definition of aggravated sexual battery per VA 18.2-67.3 under which Plaintiff (who is a “special
25
conservator of the peace” with supra-LEO/Police authority when in command of an aircraft,
26 performed a valid Common Law arrest as affirmed by the Virginia Supreme Court as valid for a
felony sexual battery by Defendant upon Plaintiff.
27
Aggravated sexual battery; penalty.
28

46
1
A. An accused shall be guilty of aggravated sexual battery if he or she sexually abuses the
2 complaining witness, and
3 1. The complaining witness is less than 13 years of age, or
4 2. The act is accomplished through the use of the complaining witness's mental incapacity or
physical helplessness, or
5 3. The offense is committed by a parent, step-parent, grandparent, or step-grandparent and the
complaining witness is at least 13 but less than 18years of age, or
6 4. The act is accomplished against the will of the complaining witness by force, threat or
7
intimidation, and
a. The complaining witness is at least 13 but less than 15 years of age, or
8 b. The accused causes serious bodily or mental injury to the complaining witness, or
c. The accused uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon.
9

10
B. Aggravated sexual battery is a felony punishable by confinement in a state correctional
facility for a term of not less than one nor more than 20 years and by a fine of not more than
11 $100,000.

12 Definition of sexual abuse in Virginia’s code:


2006 Code of Virginia § 18.2-67.10 - General definitions
13

14 18.2-67.10. General definitions.


As used in this article:
15 1. "Complaining witness" means the person alleged to have been subjected to rape, forcible
sodomy, inanimate or animate object sexual penetration, marital sexual assault, aggravated
16
sexual battery, or sexual battery.
17 2. "Intimate parts" means the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, or buttocks of any person.
3. "Mental incapacity" means that condition of the complaining witness existing at the time of an
18 offense under this article which prevents the complaining witness from understanding the nature
or consequences of the sexual act involved in such offense and about which the accused knew or
19
should have known.
20 4. "Physical helplessness" means unconsciousness or any other condition existing at the time of
an offense under this article which otherwise rendered the complaining witness physically unable
21 to communicate an unwillingness to act and about which the accused knew or should have
known.
22
5. The complaining witness's "prior sexual conduct" means any sexual conduct on the part of the
23 complaining witness which took place before the conclusion of the trial, excluding the conduct
involved in the offense alleged under this article.
24 6. "Sexual abuse" means an act committed with the intent to sexually molest, arouse, or
gratify any person, where:
25
a. The accused intentionally touches the complaining witness's intimate parts or material
26 directly covering such intimate parts;
b. The accused forces the complaining witness to touch the accused's, the witness's own, or
27 another person's intimate parts or material directly covering such intimate parts;
28

47
1 c. If the complaining witness is under the age of 13, the accused causes or assists the
complaining witness to touch the accused's, the witness's own, or another person's intimate parts
2 or material directly covering such intimate parts; or
d. The accused forces another person to touch the complaining witness's intimate parts or
3 material directly covering such intimate parts.
4

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1 REMINDER FAX SENT TO DEFENDANT AND TSA (SAME ATTORNEY) ASKING
FOR FAX TRANSMITTAL OF SSI FOR THEM TO COMPLY WITH THE COURT’S
2 ORDERS OF 16 NOV, AND 07 DEC.
3 DEFENDANT AND TSA DID NOT COMPLY OR CONTACT PLAINTIFF IN ANY
4 FASHION OR FORM.

5 FAX sent to Sylvertooth on 05 December 2017 at 0827 Eastern Standard Time:


6 Mr. Sylvertooth
7
Based on the Court’s Order #191, with the Order that I be treated as a Covered Person under 49
8 USC 1520.7, and that TSA has failed to timely provide any proposed protective order, I have
requested that the Court Order that ALL withheld SSI be provided to me immediately for
9 inclusion in my upcoming filings.
10
I request updates to all Rule 26 and other requests, with copies of all interrogatories and
11 documents to be updated to include previously withheld information claimed as SSI to be
unredacted and conveyed to me, by fax to my fax # of record, by 06 December 2017, with
12 mailing by certified mail on the same day.
13
Please confirm that you will be doing so.
14
CAPT. Linlor
15

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49
1 SUGGESTED ORDER

2
This Court finds that Defendant Michael Gerard Polson
3
1. Has not complied with the Court’s Order of 16 November 2017 to treat Plaintiff
4
as a Covered Person under 49 USC 1520.7, extended to Defendant through TSA’s
5
legal counsel Bryant and TSA’s restricting of Defendant to produce SSI required
6 for Plaintiff’s case and filings, has not provided unredacted evidence, disclosures,
7 discovery, and updated testimony without redaction; and
8 2. Has further repeatedly taken steps to frustrate and impede discovery and

9 production of relevant evidence to Plaintiff; and

10
3. Has further not complied with the Court’s Order of 07 December 2017 to provide
the same items as listed above; and
11
4. Plaintiff has met the standards and supported a finding of SUMMARY
12
JUDGMENT in favor of Plaintiff.
13
Judgment for Plaintiff is AFFIRMED.
14
The Orders of this Court to treat Plaintiff as a Covered Person under 49 USC 1520.7 will
15 continue to exist as valid beyond this finding for Plaintiff, and TSA and Defendant shall
16 still provide all excessive force and other withheld SSI from Plaintiff to Plaintiff within
17 10 days.

18 Defendant and TSA shall be enjoined from acceptance by the Clerk of the Court of any
Motion or Pleading (including enjoining of any Summary Judgment, or proposed
19
Protective Orders) pending production by Defendant and TSA to Plaintiff of ALL
20
updated responses to ALL of Defendant’s FRCP 26 and Subpoena filings/responses, as
21
well as updates to deposition testimony, to include unredacted alleged SSI, and that this
22
enjoining will extend notwithstanding existing timelines set by the Court, for fourteen
23 days after proof-of-mailing to allow time for Plaintiff to receive, verify, and contest
24 completeness of any updates responses sent by Defendant and TSA.
25

26 It is so ORDERED

27
Hon. ________________________ Date: ___________________________
28

50
1 NO ATTORNEY ASSISTED IN THIS DOCUMENT’S PREPARATION.
I certify under penalty of perjury, that a copy of this document was conveyed to be served
2
on all parties and TSA, via mailing to the Clerk of the Court for filing with the CM/ECF
3
Court Filing System.
4

5
Local Rule 7(E) and 37(E) Certification per Scheduling Order of 06 September 2017:
6 “Pro Se Plaintiff confirms that he has attempted, in good faith, to confer with and to
7 decrease and/or resolve any matters of disagreement related to discovery with
8 Defendant’s Counsel, and to decrease, in every way possible, the filing of unnecessary

9 motions.”

10
Respectfully submitted, and filed with the declaration that all statements in this pleading
are true and correct under penalty of perjury.
11

12
Date __________________ Signed ________(Capt. James Linlor)
13

14
Capt. James Linlor, pro se
15 1405 S. Fern Street #90341, Arlington, VA 22202
(775) 298-1505
16

17 Secret Service Agent MICHAEL GERARD POLSON,


(formerly of TSA) in his individual capacity
18 c/o and including Dontae Sylvertooth, Asst US Attorney
and counsel for Transportation Security Administration (TSA),
19
Nathan Scott Bryant, Counsel for SSI for TSA,
20 2100 Jamieson Ave, Alexandria, VA 22314
(703) 299-3738 ph; (703) 299-3983 fax
21

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