4. SSS v. Moonwalk Development & Housing Corp. G.R. No.

73345, April 7, 1993

FACTS: SSS approved Moonwalk’s application for a loan of 30 Million for the
purpose of developing and constructing a housing project. After settlement of the
loan, SSS issued to Moonwalk the release of Mortgage for Moonwalk’s Mortgaged
properties. In a letter to Moonwalk, SSS alleged that it has committed an honest
mistake in releasing defendant that it still had 12% penalty for failure to pay on time
the amortization found in the penal clause of the contract.

ISSUE: Whether or not the penalty is demandable even after the extinguishment of
the principal obligation.

RULING: Petition is dismissed. A penalty clause is an accessory obligation attached

to a principal obligation for the purpose of ensuring the performance of the
obligation or takes its place in case of breach. Note therefore that an accessory
obligation is dependent for its existence on the existence of a principal obligation. A
principal obligation may exist without an accessory obligation but an accessory
obligation cannot exist without a principal obligation.

62. PCIB v. Franco G.R. No. 180069, March 05, 2014

FACTS: This is an action for damages filed by plaintiff-appellee Arturo P. Franco
against defendant-appellant Philippine Commercial International Bank (PCIB), now
known as Equitable-PCIBank, and Equitable Banking Corp. The complaint
essentially alleges that plaintiff secured from defendant PCIB Trust Indenture
Certificates, that despite demands, defendants refused to return to plaintiff the trust
amounts, plus the stipulated interest. Because of his son’s illness, he was forced to
go to defendants and try to encash his trust indenture certificates but was denied by
defendant bank. In a letter by defendants, through their counsel, informed plaintiff
that the subject TICs are “null and void” because they have already matured and was
not "rolled-over".

ISSUE: Whether or not the TICs where already paid and the obligation is already
extinguished.

RULING: Petition is denied. Jurisprudence abounds that, in civil cases, one who
pleads payment has the burden of proving it. Even where the plaintiff must allege
non-payment, the general rule is that the burden rests on the defendant to prove
payment, rather than on the plaintiff to prove non-payment. When the creditor is in
possession of the document of credit, he need not prove non-payment for it is
presumed. The creditor's possession of the evidence of debt is proof that the debt
has not been discharged by payment. In this case, respondent's possession of the
original copies of the subject TICs strongly supports his claim that petitioner Bank’s
obligation to return the principal plus interest of the money placement has not been
extinguished.
120. SM Land, Inc. v. Bases Conversion and Devl't Authority G.R. No. 203655, August
13, 2014

FACTS: Pursuant to Republic Act No. (RA) 7227 or the “Bases Conversion and
Development Act of 1992,” the BCDA opened for disposition and development its
Bonifacio South Property, a 33.1-hectare expanse located at Taguig City that was
once used as the command center for the country’s military forces. Jumping on the
opportunity, petitioner SM Land, Inc. (SMLI), submitted to the BCDA an unsolicited
proposal for the development of the lot through a public-private joint venture
agreement. However, BCDA gravely abused its discretion in issuing Supplemental
Notice No. 5, in unilaterally aborting the Competitive Challenge, and in subjecting
the development of the project to public bidding.

A: Whether or not the Certification issued by the BCDA and signed by the parties
constituted a contract.

RULING: Petition is granted. By their mutual consent and in signing the Certification,
both parties, in effect, entered into a binding agreement to subject the unsolicited
proposal to the Competitive Challenge. Evidently, the certification partakes of a
contract wherein BCDA committed itself to proceed with the Third Stage of the
process and simultaneously grants SMLI the right to expect that the BCDA will fulfill
its obligations under the same. The preconditions to the conduct of the Competitive
Challenge having been met, what is left, therefore, is to subject the terms agreed
upon to a Competitive Challenge pursuant to Stage Three of the NEDA Joint Venture
Guidelines.

178. Corpus v. CA G.R. No. L-40424, June 30, 1980

FACTS: Corpus was charged administratively by several employee of the Central

Bank Export Department of which he is the director. The defendant was represented
by Atty. Rosauro Alvarez. Accordingly, Corpus asked Atty. Juan T. David's
professional services because Atty. Alvarez had already been disenchanted and
wanted to give up the case. Atty. David then started rendering professional services
to Corpus, the evidence shows that he filed a motion for reconsideration of the order
of dismissal under the joint signatures together with Atty. Alvarez; and representing
Corpus in the subsequent filing of actions in Court. However, Atty. David was not
paid his professional fees by Corpus because allegedly his professional services
were offered and rendered gratuitously.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Juan T. David is entitled to attorney's fees.

RULING: Petition is denied. While there was no express contract between the parties
for the payment of attorney's fees, the fact remains that respondent David rendered
legal services to petitioner Corpus and therefore as aforestated, is entitled to
compensation under the innominate contract of facio ut des. And such being the
case, respondent David is entitled to a reasonable compensation.