1
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 175768 December 11, 2013
METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY, Petitioner,
vs.
SPOUSES EDGARDO M. CRISTOBAL and MA. TERESITA S. CRISTOBAL, Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
This is a Rule 45 appeal1 dated 26 December 2006 assailing the Decision2 and Resolution3 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 80874, which affirmed the Decision4 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 13, Malolos, Bulacan in LRC Case No. P-65-2003, denying the Petition for
Issuance of a Writ of Possession filed by the Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company (petitioner).
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On 14 September 1998, respondents Spouses Edgardo M. Cristobal and Ma. Teresita S. Cristobal
obtained a loan from petitioner Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company in the amount of
₱4,500,000.00. The loan was secured by two real estate mortgages and its three amendments,
which respondents executed in favor of petitioner.5
Despite demand, respondents failed to pay their loan, resulting in the extrajudicial foreclosure and
auction sale of their mortgaged properties (subject properties). In the auction sale, petitioner
emerged as the highest bidder, so a Certificate of Sale was issued in its name. This certificate was
duly registered in the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan on 11 September 2002.6
Consequently, petitioner demanded that respondents vacate the properties covered by the
mortgage. However, this went unheeded, forcing petitioner to file with the trial court a petition
seeking a Writ of Possession over the foreclosed properties.7
On 30 June 2003, the RTC issued an Order8 to wit:
It is uncontroverted that the 12 month redemption period has not yet expired hence it is incumbent
upon the petitioner bank to post bond in an amount equivalent to the use of the property for a period
of twelve months. However, petitioner did not proffer any evidence from whence the Court could
base the bond required under Section 7 of Act 3135.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the application is DENIED.
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis in the original)
In disposing of the application, the lower court ruled that petitioner did not submit sufficient evidence
from which it could base the amount of bond required in an application for a writ of possession done
within the 12 month redemption period.9
Petitioner seasonably moved to reconsider the judgment,10 but this was also denied in an Order11
dated 22 September 2003, herein quoted as follows:
Acting on the "Ex-Parte Motion for Reconsideration (to the Decision dated June 30, 2003) with
Motion for Leave of Court to Recall Petitioner’s Witness" and taking note that the 12-month period
for redemption in this case has already expired as of September 11, 2003, the Court finds no useful
purpose nor compelling reason to reconsider its decision dated June 30, 2003, the motion is
DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed via a Petition for Certiorari on 4 December 2003.12 Petition argued
that "granting arguendo that petitioner should have presented evidence for the purpose of fixing the
bond, the redemption period already expired on September 11, 2003; hence, posting of a bond is no
longer necessary."13 This appeal was however dismissed by the CA in a Decision dated 10 August
2006, the relevant portion of which is herein quoted as follows:14
Indeed, while the posting of a bond is no longer necessary upon the expiration of the redemption
period, it is however required that ownership over the property be consolidated with the purchaser of
the foreclosed property. Verily, the presentation of a transfer certificate of title in the name of the
purchaser is a condition sine qua non for the issuance of a writ of possession.
We have examined the record vis-à-vis petitioner’s insistence on its entitlement to the writ and found
that the claim is premature. The record is bereft of any indication that petitioner bank has
consolidated its ownership over the subject parcels of land. x x x.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
In affirming the RTC, the CA explained that in accordance with Section 7 of Act 3135, the trial court
has the duty to issue a writ of possession before the lapse of the 12-month redemption period; but
this is qualified by the receipt of an ex-parte application and the posting of the required bond.15 In
this case, the trial court denied the application because petitioner failed to discharge its burden of
providing ample information upon which the amount of the bond could be based.16
Moreover, even if the 12-month redemption period had already expired and the need for a bond
already dispensed with, possession could not yet be given to petitioner until the ownership is
consolidated and a new transfer certificate of title issued in its name.17
On 24 August 2006, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,18 arguing that "the grounds upon
which We [the CA] anchored the denial of the petition has [sic] since disappeared in light of the
consolidation of titles over the subject properties by the petitioner."19 In a Resolution promulgated
on 6 December 2006,20 the CA denied petitioner’s Motion in the following wise:
x x x Anent the claims of a supervening event, petitioner should be minded that it is not precluded
from re-filing the petition for a writ of possession in the Court a quo especially so since it now meets
the grounds for the issuance of the said writ.
ACCORDINGLY, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED.
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis in the original)
Hence, the instant Petition.
This Court noted the following pleadings: (a) respondent’s Comment dated 21 March 2007;21 (b)
petitioner’s Reply dated 10 July 2007;22 (c) respondent’s Memorandum dated 20 November
2007;23 and (d) petitioner’s Memorandum dated 24 November 2007.24
ISSUE
Considering that the 12-month redemption period has already lapsed and the need for a bond
already dispensed with, we reduce the issue to whether or not consolidation of title is necessary
before possession may be automatically given to petitioner.
THE COURT’S RULING
2
Petitioner insists that a review of Act 3135 will reveal that there is "absolutely nothing therein which
provides that consolidation of ownership over the foreclosed property is required before a writ of
possession may be issued."25 Moreover, even assuming that consolidation is indeed required,
petitioner faults the CA for refusing to recognize the fact that it had already consolidated its
ownership over the subject properties, resulting in the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-
432045 (M) and T-432046 (M) in its name on 6 April 2004.26
On the other hand, respondent alleges that the consolidated titles under petitioner’s name were not
submitted in the trial court. As such, petitioner cannot raise it as an issue for the first time in
appeal.27
We rule that a remand of this case to the trial court is necessary for the reception of evidence to
determine if consolidation has taken place, this being a necessary requisite to the issuance of a writ
of possession.
Petitioner can only demand
possession after the consolidation of
ownership in his name and the
issuance to him of a new transfer
certificate of title.
Jurisprudence articulates that "[t]he purchaser can demand possession at any time following the
consolidation of ownership in his name and the issuance to him of a new transfer certificate of title.
After the consolidation of title in the buyer’s name for failure of the mortgagor to redeem the
property, the writ of possession becomes a matter of right."28 In fact, in Sps. Edralin v. Philippine
Veterans Bank,29 we have held that:
Consequently, the purchaser, who has a right to possession after the expiration of the redemption
period, becomes the absolute owner of the property when no redemption is made. In this regard, the
bond is no longer needed. The purchaser can demand possession at any time following the
consolidation of ownership in his name and the issuance to him of a new TCT. After consolidation of
title in the purchaser’s name for failure of the mortgagor to redeem the property, the purchaser’s
right to possession ripens into the absolute right of a confirmed owner.1âwphi1 At that point, the
issuance of a writ of possession, upon proper application and proof of title becomes merely a
ministerial function. Effectively, the court cannot exercise its discretion.
Hence, for petitioner to be issued a writ of possession, it must first clearly show that it has
consolidated ownership of the subject properties in its name. It is only at this point that issuance of
the writ becomes a ministerial function of the courts.
The issue of whether or not
petitioner has consolidated
ownership in its name is a question
of fact best left to the determination
of the lower court.
On this score, petitioner insists that we must take cognizance of a supervening event –that it has
already consolidated the property’s title in its name, as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title
Nos. T-432045 (M) and T-432046 (M).[30]] While the Court has "ample authority to review and
resolve matters not assigned and specified as errors by either of the parties in the appeal if it finds
the consideration and determination of the same essential and indispensable in order to arrive at a
just decision in the case,"31 we agree with the respondents that the Court cannot automatically
accede to the alleged consolidation, for the matter is essentially a question of fact best left to the
determination of the lower court. In Republic v. Malabanan, 32 we held that:
[T]his Court has differentiated a question of law from a question of fact. A question of law arises
when there is doubt as to what the law is. on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact
when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one oflaw,
the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the
litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the
given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented,
the question posed is one of fact. Thus, the test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is not
the appellation given to such question by the party raising the same; rather, it is whether the
appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in
which case, it is a question of law; otherwise it is a question of fact.
Here, no question of law is involved, for it is clear that petitioner has the right to possession once it
has established that ownership has been consolidated in its name. Consolidation is essentially
factual in nature, as it requires the presentation of evidence.33
Consequently, and in the interest of substantial justice, a remand of this case to the lower court is
necessary to receive evidence if indeed consolidation has taken place, for the issuance of a writ of
possession.
WHEREFORE, this case is hereby REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 13, Malolos,
Bulacan, for further proceedings in accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 127997 August 7, 1998]
FELIX VILLANUEVA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALMARIO GO MANUEL,
respondents.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
For the Courts resolution is the petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV 39731 entitled Almario Go Manuel v. Felix Villanueva[1] dated January 30, 1996, involving an
action for sum of money.
In 1991, private respondent, Almario Go Manuel filed a civil action for sum of money with damages
before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 8 against petitioner, Felix Villanueva and his
wife Melchora. The subject matter of the action involved a check dated June 30, 1991 in the amount
of P167,600.00 issued by petitioner in favor of private respondent. The check supposedly
represented payment of loans previously obtained by petitioner from private respondent as capital
for the formers mining and fertilizer business. The check when duly represented for payment was
dishonored due to insufficiency of funds. A demand was made upon petitioner to make good the
check but he failed to do so. Private respondent then filed a criminal complaint for violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22[2] before the Cebu City Prosecutors Office and the subject civil complaint for
sum of money. Petitioner, on the other hand, avers that his principal obligation only amounts to
P23,420.00.
On July 27, 1992, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of private respondent, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against
co-defendant Felix Villanueva, directing the latter to pay the former P167,600.00, the dismissal of
this case with respect to co-defendant Melchora Villanueva, and finally with costs against the
husband.
SO ORDERED.[3]
3
Apparently aggrieved, both parties appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. Petitioner prayed
for the reversal of the trial courts decision and contended that his principal obligation is only
P23,420.00, while private respondent sought interest of ten percent (10%) of the principal obligation;
twenty-five percent (25%) as attorneys fees, as well as moral and exemplary damages.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and affirmed the decision of the trial court subject to the
modification that petitioner was directed to additionally pay private respondent attorneys fees and
litigation expenses in the amount of ten (10%) percent of P167,600.00, and the entire obligation to
earn interest at six (6%) percent per annum from the filing of the complaint.[4] Petitioner now comes
before this Court basically alleging the same issues raised before the Court of Appeals as follows:
(a) the Court of Appeals erred in not ruling that the five (5%) and ten (10%) percent interest imposed
is not enforceable due to absence of such stipulation in writing; (b) the Court of Appeals erred in not
finding that petitioner is only liable for the amount P23,420.00; and (c) the Court of Appeals erred in
not declaring that the Central Bank and Monetary Board has no power or authority to repeal the
usury law.[5]
The petition should be denied.
Time and again it has been ruled that the jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought to it from the
Court of Appeals is limited to the review and revision of errors of law allegedly committed by the
appellate court, as its findings of fact are deemed conclusive. As such, this Court is not duty-bound
to analyze and weigh all over again the evidence already considered in the proceedings below.[6]
The rule, however, admits of the following exceptions: (1) when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (3) when the finding is
grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the Court of
Appeals is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings are conflicting; (6) when the
Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is
contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings of the Court of
Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the Court of Appeals manifestly
overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered,
would justify a different conclusion; and (10) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are
premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record.[7]
After a review of the case at bar, we consider petitioner to have failed to raise issues which would
constitute sufficient ground to warrant the reversal of the findings of the trial and appellate courts.
As regards the matter of legal interest, this Court, in the case of Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court
of Appeals[8] laid down the following guidelines:
I. When an obligation, regardless of its source, i.e., law, contracts, quasi-contracts, delicts or quasi-
delicts is breached, the contravenor can be held liable for damages. The provisions under Title XVII
on Damages of the Civil Code govern in determining the measure of recoverable damages.
II. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual and compensatory
damages, the rate of interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is imposed, as follows:
1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan or
forbearance of money, the interest due is that which may have been stipulated in writing.
Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In
the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 12% per annum to be computed from default,
i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the
Civil Code.
2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an interest on
the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per
annum. x x x.
3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory, the rate
of legal interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall be 12% per
annum from such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by then an
equivalent to a forbearance of credit.
Applying the foregoing rules, since the principal obligation in the amount of P167,600.00 is a loan,
the same should earn legal interest at the rate of 12% per annum computed from the time the
complaint was filed until the finality of this decision. On the other hand, if the total obligation is not
satisfied it shall further earn legal interest at the rate of 12% per annum computed from the finality of
the decision until payment thereof, the interim period being deemed to be a forbearance of credit.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV 39731
dated January 30, 1996 is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the rate of legal interest
to be paid is TWELVE PERCENT (12%) per annum of the amount due computed from the time the
complaint was filed until the finality of this decision. After this decision becomes final and executory,
the rate of TWELVE PERCENT (12%) per annum shall be additionally imposed on the total
obligation until payment thereof is satisfied. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 121422. February 23, 1999]
NOEL CRUZ y DIGMA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE COURT OF APPEALS
and THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT BRANCH VI, MANILA, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The case before us is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals[1] denying for lack
of merit the petition for certiorari filed by the accused to annul the following orders issued by the
Regional Trial Court, Manila[2] in Criminal Case No. 90-85059, to wit:
(a) The order dated January 18, 1993, made in open court admitting the formal offer of evidence of
the prosecution;
(b) The order dated December 20, 1993, denying the petitioners demurrer to evidence;
(c) The order dated July 8, 1994, denying the petitioners motion for reconsideration.
On June 19, 1990, police officers arrested petitioner without warrant for illegal possession of a .38
caliber revolver with six (6) rounds of ammunition while waiting outside the Manila Pavilion Hotel
along U.N. Ave., Manila.
On June 25, 1990, Assistant Prosecutor Tranquil P. Salvador, Jr. filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Manila, an information[3] against the accused for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866[4], the
accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about June 19, 1990, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and
there willfully and unlawfully have in his possession and under his custody and control one (1)
firearm .38 cal. Colt revolver bearing Serial Number 376420 with six (6) live ammunitions, without
first having secured the necessary license or permit therefor from the proper authorities.
On June 26, 1990, before the arraignment of the accused, his parents, Timoteo and Ana Cruz, filed
with the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, a petition[5] for habeas corpus in his behalf. Thereafter,
the accused was arraigned in the Manila court and pleaded not guilty to the charge.
4
The trial court proceeded to try the case. After the prosecution presented and formally offered its
evidence, the trial court issued an order[6] dated January 18, 1993, admitting in evidence the gun
and ammunition seized from the accused, over his objections. After the prosecution had rested its
case, petitioner, on motion and upon leave of court, filed a demurrer to evidence. On December 20,
1993, the trial court denied the demurrer, and ordered the accused to present his evidence.[7]
Instead, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which the trial court denied in an order[8]
dated July 8, 1994.
On October 27, 1994, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari to annul the
three (3) orders, namely: the order admitting the prosecutions formal offer of evidence; the order
denying his demurrer to evidence; and the order denying petitioners motion for reconsideration, for
being issued capriciously, arbitrarily and whimsically, in utter disregard of controlling law and
jurisprudence, and with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
On November 7, 1994, the Court of Appeals gave due course to the petition and ordered the trial
court to temporarily refrain from further proceeding with the trial of Criminal Case No. 90-85059.
On August 8, 1995, the Court of Appeals rendered decision[9] denying the petition for lack of merit.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the assailed orders were interlocutory in nature and not reviewable
by certiorari. Petitioner should wait until the trial court has decided the case on its merits and if
aggrieved, appeal from his conviction. The Court of Appeals held that the trial courts order admitting
the allegedly inadmissible evidence involved questions of facts, which are not reviewable in petitions
for certiorari. There being no error in jurisdiction, whatever error in judgment committed by the trial
court can not be corrected by certiorari.
Hence, this petition for review.
Petitioner avers that the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the trial courts order admitting in
evidence the gun and ammunition, which are allegedly inadmissible for being the fruits of an illegal
warrantless arrest and search. He further claims that the prosecutions evidence is insufficient to
sustain a conviction. Petitioner contends that the questioned orders, while admittedly interlocutory in
nature, are no longer subject to amendment or correction by the trial court, hence, a review thereof
is warranted to prevent extreme prejudice to petitioner. Petitioner prays for a temporary restraining
order (TRO) to restrain the trial court from proceeding with the criminal case pending this petition; a
writ of preliminary injunction after the expiration of the TRO; and to reverse the questioned resolution
of the Court of Appeals.
We resolve to deny the petition.
We find no reversible error in the decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing the petition for
certiorari. The rulings of the trial court on procedural questions and on admissibility of evidence
during the course of a trial are interlocutory in nature and may not be the subject of a separate
appeal or review on certiorari, but may be assigned as errors and reviewed in the appeal properly
taken from the decision rendered by the trial court on the merits of the case.[10] When the court has
jurisdiction over the case and person of the accused, any error in the application of the law and the
appreciation of evidence committed by a court after it has acquired jurisdiction over a case, may be
corrected only by appeal.[11]
Regarding the denial of the demurrer to evidence, we have likewise ruled that the question of
whether the evidence presented by the prosecution is sufficient to convince the court that the
defendant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt rests entirely within the sound discretion of the trial
court. The error, if any, in the denial of the demurrer to evidence may be corrected only by appeal.
The appellate court will not review in such special civil action the prosecutions evidence and decide
in advance that such evidence has or has not established the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. The orderly procedure prescribed by the Revised Rules of Court is for the
accused to present his evidence, after which the trial court, on its own assessment of the evidence
submitted, will then properly render its judgment of acquittal or conviction.[12] If judgment is
rendered adversely against the accused, he may appeal the judgment and raise the same defenses
and objections for review by the appellate court.[13]
Admittedly, the general rule that the extraordinary writ of certiorari is not available to challenge
interlocutory orders of the trial court may be subject to exceptions. When the assailed interlocutory
orders are patently erroneous[14] or issued with grave abuse of discretion,[15] the remedy of
certiorari lies.
Petitioner insists that he falls within the above exceptions, warranting a review of the denial of his
petition for certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals. Petitioner stresses that he was illegally arrested,
and consequently any evidence taken after the subsequent search on his person is inadmissible in
evidence. He points to alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses to
show that he was illegally arrested. He maintains that the evidence presented is insufficient to
sustain a conviction due to the inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses. He likewise claims
that the prosecution has failed to establish that the gun and ammunition presented during the trial
were the same items confiscated from him.
We disagree. The trial court, in resolving petitioners motion for reconsideration, squarely addressed
the above contentions. The trial court ruled that the seized evidence was admissible, and that the
evidence presented was sufficient to sustain a conviction, if the accused presented no contrary
evidence.
We find neither error nor patent abuse of discretion in the rulings of the trial court on these issues.
Thus, upon the denial of petitioners demurrer to evidence, he may present his evidence.[16] After
trial on the merits, and the court issues a verdict of conviction, petitioner may seasonably appeal
such decision, raising once again his defenses and objections.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court hereby DENIES the petition. We order the trial court to continue with the
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 90-85059, with deliberate dispatch.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 140679. January 14, 2004]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. MANNY A. DOMINGCIL, appellant.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
For the sale and delivery of one (1) kilo of marijuana to a poseur-buyer, the appellant Manny
Domingcil was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 16, for violation of
Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425 in an Information, the accusatory portion of which
reads:
That on or about the 12th day of August, 1994, in the City of Laoag, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, not authorized by law, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver mixed dried marijuana leaves, tops and seeds in
brick form, wrapped with paper placed in a plastic bag, a prohibited drug, weighing 800 grams, to a
poseur-buyer in a buy-bust operation conducted by Police Officers of Laoag City, in violation of the
aforesaid law.[1]
Upon arraignment on August 29, 1994, the appellant, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the
offense charged.[2] The case thereafter proceeded to trial.
The Case for the Prosecution
5
On August 12, 1994, at around 11:00 a.m., Belrey Oliver, an employee of Ferds Upholstery Shop
located in Barangay 2, Laoag City, arrived at the Laoag Police Station. He reported to Chief
Investigator SPO4 Rodrigo Ventura that the appellant went to their shop looking for a buyer of
marijuana. Oliver recounted telling the appellant that he knew of someone who was interested and
ready to buy marijuana, and instructing him to bring one (1) kilo of the substance to a store located
in front of the Divine Word College of Laoag at General Segundo Avenue, Laoag City at around 1:30
p.m. of that same day.[3]
Acting on the said report, SPO4 Ventura formed a team to conduct a buy-bust operation against the
appellant. He assigned SPO1 Orlando Dalusong as the poseur-buyer, and SPO2 Marlin Ramos,
SPO2 Warlito Maruquin, SPO1 Rovimanuel Balolong, SPO1 Loreto Ancheta, and SPO2 Rosemarie
Agustin, all assigned at the Investigation Section of the Laoag Police Station as back-up. The
marked buy-money consisting of one P500-bill bearing Serial No. G-242745 was recorded in the
police blotter in accordance with standard operating procedure.[4]
Except for SPO1 Dalusong and Oliver, the rest of the team left the precinct on board two (2) owner-
type jeeps and posted themselves near the Macmac Store, across the gate of the Divine Word
College. Five minutes later, SPO1 Dalusong and Oliver arrived at General Segundo Avenue.[5]
Oliver immediately approached the appellant, who was then standing between the Macmac Store
and a xerox center, and introduced poseur-buyer SPO1 Dalusong, who was sporting casual clothes
and slippers: Pare, daytoy tay gumatangen (Friend, this is the buyer). At this point, the appellant
who was carrying an orange plastic bag, brought out a brick-like item wrapped in newspaper. He
handed the item to SPO1 Dalusong, who forthwith checked the same by making a small hole
through it. Convinced that the brick-like item was indeed marijuana, SPO1 Dalusong handed the
P500 bill to the appellant. He thereupon scratched his head, a signal to the back-up men that the
transaction had been consummated.[6] Momentarily, the back-up officers, who had earlier positioned
themselves separately in different strategic locations near the poseur-buyer, rushed to the scene
and arrested the appellant. SPO1 Dalusong then handed the orange plastic bag containing the
suspected marijuana to SPO4 Ventura. SPO2 Ramos frisked the appellant and recovered the buy-
money from the latters pocket. Thereafter, the appellant was brought to the headquarters where he
was booked, and the incident was recorded in the police blotter.[7] The suspected marijuana was
brought to and initially examined by Dr. Joseph Adaya, an accredited physician of the Dangerous
Drugs Board (DDB), who certified that the item comprised of three genuine mixture of marijuana
leaves with seeds.[8]
On September 5, 1994, SPO4 Ventura sent a letter to the Commanding Officer of the PNP Crime
Laboratory Service, Camp Diego Silang, San Fernando, La Union, requesting for the examination of
samples of the suspected marijuana taken from the appellant.[9] On September 6, 1998, SPO1
Loreto Ancheta, evidence custodian of the Laoag City, PNP, delivered the orange plastic bag
containing the suspected marijuana to the PNP provincial crime laboratory service in Camp Juan,
Laoag City. The bag, together with SPO4 Venturas letter-request, was received by SPO3 Diosdado
Mamotos.[10] On September 8, 1994, SPO3 Mamotos forwarded the laboratory request and the
confiscated item, and were duly received by SPO4 Tampos.[11] The latter, in turn, handed the item
to Police Superintendent Theresa Ann B. Cid, Forensic Chemist of the Crime Laboratory Center,
Region I, Camp Diego Silang, Carlatan, San Fernando, La Union, who conducted an examination of
representative samples extracted from the suspected marijuana confiscated from the appellant.[12]
On the basis of her examination, Superintendent Cid issued Chemistry Report No. D-074-94 with
the following findings:
SPECIMEN SUBMITTED :
One (1) block of suspected marijuana fruiting tops weighing eight hundred grams (800) wrapped
with newspaper pages contained in an orange plastic bag.
...
PURPOSE OF LABORATORY EXAMINATION :
To determine the presence of marijuana on the above-mentioned specimen.
FINDINGS:
Qualitative examination conducted on the above-mentioned specimen prove POSITIVE result to the
test for marijuana, a prohibited drug.[13]
The Case for the Appellant
The appellant interposed the twin defenses of denial and alibi. He testified that sometime in the first
week of August 1994, he and Ernesto Gamiao went to the City of Laoag to canvass the price for the
repair of the upholstery of a passenger jeepney. On that occasion, they befriended a certain Belrey
Oliver who was an employee of the Ferds Upholstery Shop. In the course of their conversation,
Oliver asked the appellant where he came from and what his occupation was. Upon being told that
he helped in harvesting mangoes in Cagayan, Oliver immediately offered refreshments to Gamiao
and the appellant. While taking their snacks, Oliver inquired whether they wanted to back up the
promotion of certain policemen who, in the future, might be able to return the favor to them. When
the appellant asked in what way they could extend help, Oliver suggested that they look for
somebody in Cagayan from whom they could buy one (1) kilo of marijuana. He agreed to Olivers
suggestion. The latter handed to him the amount of P700.00 to cover the purchase of the marijuana.
The appellant immediately went to the terminal bound for Cagayan to look for somebody from that
province who could be of help. When he could not find anyone, he decided to personally take the
trip. He then instructed Gamiao to just go home to Vintar and inform his mother that he was going to
Cagayan.
The appellant thereafter took a bus bound for Tuguegarao, Cagayan. After three (3) days, he was
able to buy one kilo of marijuana for P300.00. When he returned to Laoag City on August 12, 1994,
he went to Ferds Upholstery Shop at 11:30 a.m. to inform Oliver that he had procured the order.
After seeing the marijuana, Oliver instructed him to take it and meet him at about 12:30 p.m. of the
same day in front of the Divine Word College where they would hand over the marijuana to the
policemen they intended to help.
At about 12:00 noon, the appellant arrived at Macmacs Store and took his merienda. Momentarily,
Oliver arrived alone on a tricycle. Oliver summoned him and they walked southward, away from the
Macmacs Store, looking for the policemen to whom they would deliver the marijuana. They walked
back northward, at which point they encountered an owner-type jeep which suddenly stopped. He
was nonplussed when Oliver grabbed him by the neck, seized his knapsack containing the
marijuana, and pushed him inside the jeep. He was made to sit beside the driver with another
policeman, while Oliver seated himself at the back seat with another policeman. The jeep they were
riding was followed by a patrol car. Still dazed at the sudden turn of events, he asked Oliver four
times, Why is it that this is now happening to me(?), but Oliver did not respond. At the police station,
he was immediately locked up. That afternoon, SPO4 Ventura and SPO2 Ramos, accompanied by
Oliver, brought him to the City Fiscals Office. He was later brought to the provincial hospital where
he was subjected to a physical check-up. That was the last time he saw or heard of Oliver.[14]
On July 9, 1999, the court a quo rendered judgment,[15] the dispositive portion of which reads :
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court is morally convinced beyond reasonable doubt that
the accused Manny Domingcil is GUILTY under Sec. 4 of Art. II, RA No. 6425, as amended,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. The quantity of marijuana involved is more
than 750 grams; hence, in accordance with Sec. 20, the penalty provided for in Sec. 4, shall be
applied. The accused is hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua with all its accessory penalties and
to pay the costs.
Hence, the present appeal.
The appellant submits the following assignment of errors:
1. The lower Court erred in finding that the accused was not instigated in looking for marijuana and
bringing it to Laoag.
2. The lower Court erred in finding that the accused received the FIVE HUNDRED PESO bill,
despite his denial that he received the same and that his denial cannot prevail over the positive
testimony of the police officers who are presumed to be regularly performing their official duties,
there being no improper motive attributed to them.
3. The lower Court erred in convicting the accused.[16]
6
a No, sir.
The appellant contends that contrary to the collective testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, q How did you know his face then?
Oliver instigated him to buy marijuana. The trial court erred in not giving credence and probative a Belrey Oliver, the informant, informed me that the person is Manny Domingcil.
weight to his testimony and in considering the testimonies of the witnesses of the prosecution. q So, what you are saying is: when you arrived at the scene where the transaction would take place,
The appeal has no merit. Manny Domingcil was already there and that Belrey Oliver pointed him to you?
Time and again, this Court has ruled that the evaluation by the trial court of the credibility of a Yes, sir.
witnesses is entitled to the highest respect and will not be disturbed on appeal unless certain facts of q After that, what did you do with Belrey Oliver?
substance and value were overlooked which, if considered, might affect the result of the case. The a We went near Manny Domingcil, sir.
reason for this rule is that the trial court is in a better position to decide thereon, having personally q And after or as soon as you were near him, what happened next?
heard the witnesses and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial.[17] a Belrey Oliver introduced Manny Domingcil to me as the buyer, sir.
After a thorough and careful review of the records of this case, we find that the guilt of the appellant q What did Oliver say?
was sufficiently established by the evidence, and the trial courts judgment is well-supported by law a Pare, daytoy tay gumatangen, (which when translated into english[sic] means): Pare, this is the
and jurisprudence. buyer.
What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the sale q And so, what was the reaction of Manny Domingcil?
actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence.[18] In a Before that I asked Manny Domingcil if he has the stuff that was ordered.
this case, the prosecution adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant sold one (1) q And what did he say?
kilo of marijuana to poseur-buyer SPO1 Orlando Dalusong in the entrapment operation. a Manny Domingcil said: There is, Pare.
q How has the case involving drug or marijuana involving the accused brought to your attention or to q By the way, who ordered the stuff from Manny Domingcil?
your office, for that matter? a Belrey Oliver, sir.
a Our informant by the name of Belrey Oliver tipped of (sic) to us that he met Manny Domingcil at q Did you ask Oliver where he ordered that from Manny Domingcil?
the Upholstery Shop along Ablan Avenue and he also informed us that he ordered P500.00 worth of a Yes, sir.
marijuana. q Where?
q Who ordered from whom? a At the Upholstery Shop at Ablan Avenue, sir.
a Belrey Oliver from Manny Domingcil, sir. q That was what Oliver told you when he ordered the stuff?
q By the way, who was the chief of the Intelligence Section of Laoag City PNP, at that time? a Yes, sir.
a SPO4 Ventura, sir. q When Manny Domingcil said: There is, pare, what transpired next, if any?
q Was he present when the informant Belrey Oliver tipped you of (sic) about this matter? a I told him: Can I look at it and he brought out a wrapped brick-type form wrapped in a newspaper
a Yes, sir. inside an orange plastic bag.
q And because of that information from Belrey Oliver, what did your Chief, SPO4 Ventura do? q And after he had brought out the said thing, what did you do with it?
a SPO4 Ventura made or designed a plan purposely to conduct a buy-bust operation, sir. a I checked the contents if it is real marijuana, sir.
q Where will the operation take place? q You said the thing was wrapped with newspaper and you said you checked its contents?
a In front of Macmac Store, particularly, in front of the Divine Word College of Laoag, sir. a Yes, sir, I opened the wrapper, by making a small hole at the side.
q And did you have any participation in that operation? q And what was the result of your inspection?
a Yes, sir, I acted as the poseur buy (sic). a I found out that it was real marijuana, sir.
q At what time was the operation scheduled to be executed? q And, so what did you do then?
a 1:30 P.M. of August 12, 1994, sir. a After I found out that it was marijuana I handed to Manny Domingcil the P500 peso bill, sir.
q For the said operation, what preparations, if any, did your group take? q And as soon as you have handed the P500.00 bill, what did you do next?
a Our Chief of Intelligence made a plan, sir. a I gave the signal to my companions, sir.
q What was the plan? q And what did your companions do when you gave the signal?
a To conduct the buy-bust operation, sir. a They apprehended Manny Domingcil, sir.
q And you said that you were to act as poseur buyer, anything was given to you in connection with q What was your signal?
your specific participation? a I scratched my head, sir.
a I was given the buy-bust money in the amount of P500.00, sir. q And, what was your attire at that time you bought the brick-type marijuana from Manny Domingcil?
q And what will you do with that P500.00? a Ordinary clothes, sir, wearing slippers.
a The Chief of Intelligence, SPO4 Ventura directed me to reflect the serial number of the money in q And all the time during your transaction with Manny Domingcil, where was Belrey Oliver?
the police blotter, the P500.00 to be used as marked money. a At my side, sir.
q And after the serial number was entered in the police blotter, what next did you do? q And during the transaction, did Belrey Oliver say anything?
a Before we went out of the station, the team or companions of SPO4 Ventura went ahead to the a None, sir.
place where the transaction will take place, sir. q And after giving your signal to your companion police officers who were nearby and they rushed to
q And who were the companions of SPO4 Ventura who went ahead? your place where you were, what happened?
a Rosemarie Agustin, SPO2 Marlin Ramos and SPO4 Balolong, sir, while Oliver and myself were a They apprehended Manny Domingcil, sir.
the ones who went together. q And what about the marijuana which you said Manny Domingcil sold to you?
q Who went ahead to the place where the sale will take place? a I handed it to SPO4 Rodrigo Ventura, sir.
a The team of SPO4 Ventura, sir. q And what about the P500 peso bill, do you know what happened to it?
q And did you reach the place where the transaction will take place? a SPO2 Marlin Ramos recovered the P500 peso bill from the pocket of Manny Domingcil.
a Yes, sir. q And after arresting Manny Domingcil where did your group go?
q Before you started to the place where the transaction will take place in front of the Divine Word a To the police station, sir.
College of Laoag, did you know then the face of Manny Domingcil? q Do you know if any records were made to your police station when you returned or arrived there?
7
a Yes, sir.
q What for example?
a They made a request ... we reflected in the police blotter the apprehension of Manny Domingcil,
the confiscation of the marijuana and the recovery of the marked money in the amount of P500.00.
q Was the serial number of the P500 bill you recovered from the pocket of Manny Domingcil
recorded?
a Yes, sir.
q And do you know what happened to the stuff later on after you returned to the police station?
a They made a request to Dr. Adaya to conduct an initial examination on the confiscated marijuana,
sir.[19]
The foregoing testimony of SPO1 Orlando Dalusong was corroborated on material points by SPO4
Rodrigo Ventura, then Chief of the Intelligence Section of the PNP of Laoag City who organized and
conducted the operation and was part of the buy-bust team itself.[20] SPO4 Ventura remained
steadfast and unwavering on cross-examination despite intense grilling by the defense counsel.[21]
Police Superintendent Theresa Ann Cid, the Forensic Chemist assigned at the PNP Crime
Laboratory Center at San Fernando, La Union, confirmed[22] Dr. Joseph Adayas initial finding[23]
that the substance seized from the appellant was indeed marijuana, a prohibited drug.
It was also fairly established by SPO3 Diosdado Mamotos[24] and SPO1 Loreto Ancheta[25] that
the confiscated marijuana was the same substance examined by the forensic chemist and later
presented as evidence in court.
The testimonies of the principal prosecution witnesses complement each other, giving a complete
picture of how the appellants illegal sale of the prohibited drug transpired, and how the sale led to
his apprehension in flagrante delicto. Their testimonies establish beyond doubt that dangerous
drugs were in the possession of the appellant who had no authority to possess or sell the same.
More importantly, all the persons who obtained and received the confiscated stuff did so in the
performance of their official duties. Unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the members
of the buy-bust team were inspired by any improper motive or were not properly performing their
duty, their testimonies on the buy-bust operation deserve full faith and credit.[26]
The appellants bare denial of the crime charged and his barefaced claim that he was merely
instigated by Oliver into procuring the marijuana cannot prevail over the straightforward and positive
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. It is incredible that the appellant, who had just met Belrey
Oliver in the course of his canvass for the upholstery of his brothers jeepney, would readily leave his
errand behind and allow a stranger to talk him into buying a prohibited drug, a known criminal
activity for which he could be prosecuted, and if convicted, sentenced to reclusion perpetua. All this
he was willing to risk, in exchange for an empty promise of alleged future favors from another who
was also unknown to the appellant. The appellant supposedly traveled to and spent almost three
days in Tuguegarao, Cagayan, just to be able to accommodate a newly found acquaintance, who
handed the appellant the meager sum of P700.00 for the intended purpose. The Court cannot give
credence to such a preposterous stance as advanced by the appellant and confirmed by his
supposed corroborative witness, Ernesto Gamiao.
It is axiomatic that for testimonial evidence to be believed, it must not only proceed from the mouth
of a credible witness but must also be credible in itself such that common experience and
observation of mankind lead to the inference of its probability under the circumstances. In criminal
prosecution, the court is always guided by evidence that is tangible, verifiable and in harmony with
the usual course of human experience and not by mere conjecture or speculation. Testimonies that
do not adhere to this standard are necessarily accorded little weight or credence.[27] Besides,
instigation, or the appellants claim of a frame-up, is a defense that has been invariably viewed by
this Court with disfavor because the same can easily be concocted and is a common standard
defense ploy in most prosecutions for violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act.[28] Thus, in People vs.
Bongalon,[29] the Court held:
As we have earlier stated, the appellants denial cannot prevail over the positive testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses. We are not unaware of the perception that, in some instances, law enforcers
resort to the practice of planting evidence to extract information or even to harass civilians. However,
like alibi, frame-up is a defense that has been viewed by the Court with disfavor as it can easily be,
concocted, hence, commonly used as a standard line of defense in most prosecutions arising from
violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act. We realize the disastrous consequences on the enforcement
of law and order, not to mention the well-being of society, if the courts, solely on the basis of the
policemens alleged rotten reputation, accept in every instance this form of defense which can be so
easily fabricated. It is precisely for this reason that the legal presumption that official duty has been
regularly performed exists.
The failure of the prosecution to present Oliver, the police informant, does not enfeeble the case for
the prosecution. Informants are almost always never presented in court because of the need to
preserve their invaluable service to the police. Their testimony or identity may be dispensed with
inasmuch as his or her narration would be merely corroborative, especially so in this case, when the
poseur-buyer himself testified on the sale of the illegal drug.[30]
The appellants claim that the prosecution offered in evidence a mere xerox copy of the P500.00 buy
money and did not account for its failure to adduce in evidence the original copy thereof is not
supported by the records. The records show that the original, and not merely a xerox copy of the
marked money, was in fact offered in evidence by the prosecution.[31] The appellant would surely
have objected if the prosecution had offered in evidence a mere xerox copy of the bill. The appellant
did not do so. The only ground for his objection to the admission of the marked money was that it
was self-serving.
Even if the xerox copy of the P500.00 bill was erroneously admitted in evidence by the trial court,
the absence of the original of the marked money is inconsequential. The marked money used in the
buy-bust operation is not indispensable in drug cases;[32] it is merely corroborative evidence.
Moreover, the appellant was charged not only for the sale of marijuana but also for the delivery
thereof, which is committed by the mere delivery or transfer of the prohibited drug. The consideration
for the transaction is of no moment.[33]
The law defines deliver as a persons act of knowingly passing a dangerous drug to another with or
without consideration.[34] Considering that the appellant was charged with the sale and the delivery
of prohibited drugs, the consummation of the crime of delivery of marijuana may be sufficiently
established even in the absence of the marked money. The erasures and alterations in the Joint
Affidavit of the policemen involved in the buy-bust operation did not debilitate the case of the
prosecution. First. The Joint Affidavit of the policemen was not admitted in evidence for any party.
Second. The investigator who prepared the Joint Affidavit erroneously stated that the two P500.00
bills were used by the policemen who conducted the buy-bust operation bearing Serial Numbers
AA823675 and G242745. As shown by the prosecutions evidence the policemen used only the
P500.00 bill bearing Serial No. G242745 for the purchase of the drug. Hence, the Joint Affidavit of
the policemen had to be corrected to reflect the truth.
All told, the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty is, in this case, uncontradicted by
evidence to the contrary and, therefore, stands. This is bolstered by the fact that the prosecutions
evidence fully shows and confirms such regularity. Accordingly, there exists no cogent reason to
reverse or even modify the findings of the trial court giving credence to the evidence of the
prosecution.
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City,
Branch 16, in Criminal Case No. 7079, finding the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 127240 March 27, 2000
ONG CHIA, petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
8
This is a petition for review of the decision1 of the Court of Appeals reversing the decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Koronadal, South Cotabato2 admitting petitioner Ong Chia to
Philippine citizenship.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner was born on January 1, 1923 in Amoy, China. In 1932, as a nine-year old boy, he arrived
at the port of Manila on board the vessel "Angking." Since then, he has stayed in the Philippines
where he found employment and eventually started his own business, married a Filipina, with whom
he had four children. On July 4, 1989, at the age of 66, he filed a verified petition to be admitted as a
Filipino citizen under C.A. No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, as
amended. Petitioner, after stating his qualifications as required in §2, and lack of the disqualifications
enumerated in §3 of the law, stated —
17. That he has heretofore made (a) petition for citizenship under the provisions of Letter of
Instruction No. 270 with the Special Committee on Naturalization, Office of the Solicitor General,
Manila, docketed as SCN Case No. 031776, but the same was not acted upon owing to the fact that
the said Special Committee on Naturalization was not reconstituted after the February, 1986
revolution such that processing of petitions for naturalization by administrative process was
suspended;
During the hearings, petitioner testified as to his qualifications and presented three witnesses to
corroborate his testimony. So impressed was Prosecutor Isaac Alvero V. Moran with the testimony of
petitioner that, upon being asked by the court whether the State intended to present any witness
present any witness against him, he remarked:
Actually, Your Honor, with the testimony of the petitioner himself which is rather surprising, in the
sense that he seems to be well-versed with the major portion of the history of the Philippines, so, on
our part, we are convinced, Your Honor Please, that petitioner really deserves to be admitted as a
citizen of the Philippines. And for this reason, we do not wish to present any evidence to counteract
or refute the testimony of the witnesses for the petitioner, as well as the petitioner himself.3
Accordingly, on August 25, 1999, the trial court granted the petition and admitted petitioner to
Philippine citizenship. The State, however, through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed all
the names by which he is or had been known; (2) failed to state all his former placer of residence in
violation of C.A. No. 473, §7; (3) failed to conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable manner
during his entire stay in the Philippines, in violation of §2; (4) has no known lucrative trade or
occupation and his previous incomes have been insufficient or misdeclared, also in contravention of
§2; and (5) failed to support his petition with the appropriate documentary evidence.4
Annexed to the State's appellant's brief was a copy of a 1977 petition for naturalization filed by
petitioner with the Special Committee on Naturalization in SCN Case No. 031767,5 in which
petitioner stated that in addition to his name of "Ong Chia," he had likewise been known since
childhood as "Loreto Chia Ong." As petitioner, however, failed to state this other name in his 1989
petition for naturalization, it was contended that his petition must fail.6 The state also annexed
income tax returns7 allegedly filed by petitioner from 1973 to 1977 to show that his net income could
hardly support himself and his family. To prove that petitioner failed to conduct himself in a proper
and irreproachable manner during his stay in the Philippines, the State contended that, although
petitioner claimed that he and Ramona Villaruel had been married twice, once before a judge in
1953, and then again in church in 1977, petitioner actually lived with his wife without the benefit of
marriage from 1953 until they were married in 1977. It was alleged that petitioner failed to present
his 1953 marriage contract, if there be any. The State also annexed a copy of petitioner's 1977
marriage contract8 and a Joint-Affidavit9 executed by petitioner and his wife. These documents
show that when petitioner married Ramona Villaruel on February 23, 1977, no marriage license had
been required in accordance with Art. 76 of the Civil Code because petitioner and Ramona Villaruel
had been living together as husband and wife since 1953 without the benefit of marriage. This,
according to the State, belies his claim that when he started living with his wife in 1953, they had
already been married.
The State also argued that, as shown by petitioner's Immigrant Certificate of Residence, 10
petitioner resided at "J.M. Basa Street, Iloilo," but he did not include said address in the petition.
On November 15, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision which, as already noted,
reversed the trial court and denied petitioner's application for naturalization. It ruled that due to the
importance naturalization cases, the State is not precluded from raising questions not presented in
the lower court and brought up for the first time on appeal. 11 The appellate court held:
As correctly observed by the Office of the Solicitor General, petitioner Ong Chia failed to state in this
present petition for naturalization his other name, "LORETO CHIA ONG," which name appeared in
his previous application under Letter of Instruction No. 270. Names and pseudonyms must be stated
in the petition for naturalization and failure to include the same militates against a decision in his
favor. . . This is a mandatory requirement to allow those persons who know (petitioner) by those
other names to come forward and inform the authorities of any legal objection which might adversely
affect his application for citizenship.
Furthermore, Ong Chia failed to disclose in his petition for naturalization that he formerly resided in
"J.M. Basa St., Iloilo" and "Alimodian, Iloilo." Section 7 of the Revised Naturalization Law requires
the applicant to state in his petition "his present and former places of residence." This requirement is
mandatory and failure of the petitioner to comply with it is fatal to the petition. As explained by the
Court, the reason for the provision is to give the public, as well as the investigating agencies of the
government, upon the publication of the petition, an opportunity to be informed thereof and voice
their objections against the petitioner. By failing to comply with this provision, the petitioner is
depriving the public and said agencies of such opportunity, thus defeating the purpose of the law. . .
Ong Chia had not also conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner when he lived-in
with his wife for several years, and sired four children out of wedlock. It has been the consistent
ruling that the "applicant's 8-year cohabitation with his wife without the benefit of clergy and
begetting by her three children out of wedlock is a conduct far from being proper and irreproachable
as required by the Revised Naturalization Law", and therefore disqualifies him from becoming a
citizen of the Philippines by naturalization . . .
Lastly, petitioner Ong Chia's alleged annual income in 1961 of P5,000.00, exclusive of bonuses,
commissions and allowances, is not lucrative income. His failure to file an income tax return
"because he is not liable for income tax yet" confirms that his income is low. . . "It is not only that the
person having the employment gets enough for his ordinary necessities in life. It must be shown that
the employment gives one an income such that there is an appreciable margin of his income over
expenses as to be able to provide for an adequate support in the event of unemployment, sickness,
or disability to work and thus avoid one's becoming the object of charity or public charge." . . . Now
that they are in their old age, petitioner Ong Chia and his wife are living on the allowance given to
them by their children. The monthly pension given by the elder children of the applicant cannot be
added to his income to make it lucrative because like bonuses, commissions and allowances, said
pensions are contingent, speculative and precarious. . .
Hence, this petition based on the following assignment of errors:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN RULING THAT IN
NATURALIZATION CASES, THE APPELLATE COURT CAN DENY AN APPLICATION FOR
PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP ON THE BASIS OF DOCUMENTS NOT PRESENTED BEFORE THE
TRIAL COURT AND NOT FORMING PART OF THE RECORDS OF THE CASE.
II. THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE PETITIONER HAS BEEN KNOWN BY
SOME OTHER NAME NOT STATED IN HIS PETITION IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE
ON RECORD.
III. CONTRARY TO THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE PETITIONER STATED IN
HIS PETITION AND ITS ANNEXES HIS PRESENT AND FORMER PLACES OF RESIDENCE.
9
IV. THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE PETITIONER FAILED TO CONDUCT
HIMSELF IN A PROPER AND IRREPROACHABLE MANNER IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE
EVIDENCE ON RECORD.
Petitioner's principal contention is that the appellate court erred in considering the documents which
had merely been annexed by the State to its appellant's brief and, on the basis of which, justified the
reversal of the trial court's decision. Not having been presented and formally offered as evidence,
they are mere "scrap(s) of paper devoid of any evidentiary value," 12 so it was argued, because
under Rule 132, §34 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, the court shall consider no evidence which
has not been formally offered.
The contention has no merit. Petitioner failed to note Rule 143 13 of the Rules of Court which
provides that —
These rules shall not apply to land registration, cadastral and election cases, naturalization and
insolvency proceedings, and other cases not herein provided for, except by analogy or in a
suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient. (Emphasis added).
Prescinding from the above, the rule on formal offer of evidence (Rule 132, §34) now being invoked
by petitioner is clearly not applicable to the present case involving a petition for naturalization. The
only instance when said rules may be applied by analogy or suppletorily in such cases is when it is
"practicable and convenient." That is not the case here, since reliance upon the documents
presented by the State for the first time on appeal, in fact, appears to be the more practical and
convenient course of action considering that decisions in naturalization proceedings are not covered
by the rule on res judicata. 14 Consequently, a final favorable judgment does not preclude the State
from later on moving for a revocation of the grant of naturalization on the basis of the same
documents.
Petitioner claims that as a result of the failure of the State to present and formally offer its
documentary evidence before the trial court, he was denied the right to object against their
authenticity, effectively depriving him of his fundamental right to procedural due process. 15 We are
not persuaded. Indeed, the reason for the rule prohibiting the admission of evidence which has not
been formally offered is to afford the opposite party the chance to object to their admissibility. 16
Petitioner cannot claim that he was deprived of the right to object to the authenticity of the
documents submitted to the appellate court by the State. He could have included his objections, as
he, in fact, did, in the brief he filed with the Court of Appeals. thus:
The authenticity of the alleged petition for naturalization (SCN Case No. 031767) which was
supposedly filed by Ong Chia under LOI 270 has not been established. In fact, the case number of
the alleged petition for naturalization. . . is 031767 while the case number of the petition actually filed
by the appellee is 031776. Thus, said document is totally unreliable and should not be considered
by the Honorable Court in resolving the instant appeal. 17
Indeed, the objection is flimsy as the alleged discrepancy is trivial, and, at most, can be accounted
for as a typographical error on the part of petitioner himself. That "SCN Case No. 031767," a copy of
which was annexed to the petition, is the correct case number is confirmed by the Evaluation Sheet
18 of the Special Committee on Naturalization which was also docketed as "SCN Case No. 031767."
Other than this, petitioner offered no evidence to disprove the authenticity of the documents
presented by the State.
Furthermore, the Court notes that these documents — namely, the petition in SCN Case No.
031767, petitioner's marriage contract, the joint affidavit executed by him and his wife, and
petitioner's income tax returns — are all public documents. As such, they have been executed under
oath. They are thus reliable. Since petitioner failed to make a satisfactory showing of any flaw or
irregularity that may cast doubt on the authenticity of these documents, it is our conclusion that the
appellate court did not err in relying upon them.
One last point. The above discussion would have been enough to dispose of this case, but to settle
all the issues raised, we shall briefly discuss the effect of petitioner's failure to include the address
"J.M. Basa St., Iloilo" in his petition, in accordance with §7, C.A. No. 473. This address appears on
petitioner's Immigrant Certificate of Residence, a document which forms part of the records as
Annex A of his 1989 petition for naturalization. Petitioner admits that he failed to mention said
address in his petition, but argues that since the Immigrant Certificate of Residence containing it had
been fully published, 19 with the petition and the other annexes, such publication constitutes
substantial compliance with §7. 20 This is allegedly because the publication effectively satisfied the
objective sought to be achieved by such requirement, i.e., to give investigating agencies of the
government the opportunity to check on the background of the applicant and prevent suppression of
information regarding any possible misbehavior on his part in any community where he may have
lived at one time or another. 21 It is settled, however, that naturalization laws should be rigidly
enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government and against the applicant. 22 As noted by
the State, C.A. No. 473, §7 clearly provides that the applicant for naturalization shall set forth in the
petition his present and former places of residence. 23 This provision and the rule of strict
application of the law in naturalization cases defeat petitioner's argument of "substantial compliance"
with the requirement under the Revised Naturalization Law. On this ground alone, the instant petition
ought to be denied.1âwphi1.nêt
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED and the instant petition is hereby
DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
MEROPE ENRIQUEZ VDA. DE CATALAN,
Petitioner,
- versus -
LOUELLA A. CATALAN-LEE,
Respondent.
G. R. No. 183622
February 8, 2012
SERENO, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision[1] and Resolution[2]
regarding the issuance of letters of administration of the intestate estate of Orlando B. Catalan.
The facts are as follows:
Orlando B. Catalan was a naturalized American citizen. After allegedly obtaining a divorce in the
United States from his first wife, Felicitas Amor, he contracted a second marriage with petitioner
herein.
On 18 November 2004, Orlando died intestate in the Philippines.
10
Thereafter, on 28 February 2005, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City
a Petition for the issuance of letters of administration for her appointment as administratrix of the
intestate estate of Orlando. The case was docketed as Special Proceedings (Spec. Proc.) No. 228.
On 3 March 2005, while Spec. Proc. No. 228 was pending, respondent Louella A. Catalan-Lee, one
of the children of Orlando from his first marriage, filed a similar petition with the RTC docketed as
Spec. Proc. No. 232.
The two cases were subsequently consolidated.
Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of Spec. Proc. No. 232 on the ground of litis pendentia,
considering that Spec. Proc. No. 228 covering the same estate was already pending.
On the other hand, respondent alleged that petitioner was not considered an interested person
qualified to file a petition for the issuance of letters of administration of the estate of Orlando. In
support of her contention, respondent alleged that a criminal case for bigamy was filed against
petitioner before Branch 54 of the RTC of Alaminos, Pangasinan, and docketed as Crim. Case No.
2699-A.
Apparently, Felicitas Amor filed a Complaint for bigamy, alleging that petitioner contracted a second
marriage to Orlando despite having been married to one Eusebio Bristol on 12 December 1959.
On 6 August 1998, the RTC had acquitted petitioner of bigamy.[3] The trial court ruled that since the
deceased was a divorced American citizen, and since that divorce was not recognized under
Philippine jurisdiction, the marriage between him and petitioner was not valid.
Furthermore, it took note of the action for declaration of nullity then pending action with the trial court
in Dagupan City filed by Felicitas Amor against the deceased and petitioner. It considered the
pending action to be a prejudicial question in determining the guilt of petitioner for the crime of
bigamy.
Finally, the trial court found that, in the first place, petitioner had never been married to Eusebio
Bristol.
On 26 June 2006, Branch 70 of the RTC of Burgos, Pangasinan dismissed the Petition for the
issuance of letters of administration filed by petitioner and granted that of private respondent.
Contrary to its findings in Crim. Case No. 2699-A, the RTC held that the marriage between petitioner
and Eusebio Bristol was valid and subsisting when she married Orlando. Without expounding, it
reasoned further that her acquittal in the previous bigamy case was fatal to her cause. Thus, the trial
court held that petitioner was not an interested party who may file a petition for the issuance of
letters of administration.[4]
After the subsequent denial of her Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner elevated the matter to the
Court of Appeals (CA) via her Petition for Certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the RTC in dismissing her Petition for the issuance of letters of administration.
Petitioner reiterated before the CA that the Petition filed by respondent should have been dismissed
on the ground of litis pendentia. She also insisted that, while a petition for letters of administration
may have been filed by an uninterested person, the defect was cured by the appearance of a real
party-in-interest. Thus, she insisted that, to determine who has a better right to administer the
decedents properties, the RTC should have first required the parties to present their evidence before
it ruled on the matter.
On 18 October 2007, the CA promulgated the assailed Decision. First, it held that petitioner
undertook the wrong remedy. She should have instead filed a petition for review rather than a
petition for certiorari. Nevertheless, since the Petition for Certiorari was filed within the fifteen-day
reglementary period for filing a petition for review under Sec. 4 of Rule 43, the CA allowed the
Petition and continued to decide on the merits of the case. Thus, it ruled in this wise:
As to the issue of litis pendentia, we find it not applicable in the case. For litis pendentia to be a
ground for the dismissal of an action, there must be: (a) identity of the parties or at least such as to
represent the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the
relief being founded on the same acts, and (c) the identity in the two cases should be such that the
judgment which may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to
res judicata in the other. A petition for letters of administration is a special proceeding. A special
proceeding is an application or proceeding to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular
fact. And, in contrast to an ordinary civil action, a special proceeding involves no defendant or
respondent. The only party in this kind of proceeding is the petitioner of the applicant. Considering
its nature, a subsequent petition for letters of administration can hardly be barred by a similar
pending petition involving the estate of the same decedent unless both petitions are filed by the
same person. In the case at bar, the petitioner was not a party to the petition filed by the private
respondent, in the same manner that the latter was not made a party to the petition filed by the
former. The first element of litis pendentia is wanting. The contention of the petitioner must perforce
fail.
Moreover, to yield to the contention of the petitioner would render nugatory the provision of the
Rules requiring a petitioner for letters of administration to be an interested party, inasmuch as any
person, for that matter, regardless of whether he has valid interest in the estate sought to be
administered, could be appointed as administrator for as long as he files his petition ahead of any
other person, in derogation of the rights of those specifically mentioned in the order of preference in
the appointment of administrator under Rule 78, Section 6 of the Revised Rules of Court, which
provides:
xxx xxx xxx
The petitioner, armed with a marriage certificate, filed her petition for letters of administration. As a
spouse, the petitioner would have been preferred to administer the estate of Orlando B. Catalan.
However, a marriage certificate, like any other public document, is only prima facie evidence of the
facts stated therein. The fact that the petitioner had been charged with bigamy and was acquitted
has not been disputed by the petitioner. Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a
second or subsequent marriage before the first marriage has been dissolved or before the absent
spouse has been declared presumptively dead by a judgment rendered in a proper proceedings.
The deduction of the trial court that the acquittal of the petitioner in the said case negates the validity
of her subsequent marriage with Orlando B. Catalan has not been disproved by her. There was not
even an attempt from the petitioner to deny the findings of the trial court. There is therefore no basis
for us to make a contrary finding. Thus, not being an interested party and a stranger to the estate of
Orlando B. Catalan, the dismissal of her petition for letters of administration by the trial court is in
place.
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[5] (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of this Decision.[6] She alleged that the reasoning of the CA
was illogical in stating, on the one hand, that she was acquitted of bigamy, while, on the other hand,
still holding that her marriage with Orlando was invalid. She insists that with her acquittal of the
crime of bigamy, the marriage enjoys the presumption of validity.
On 20 June 2008, the CA denied her motion.
Hence, this Petition.
11
At the outset, it seems that the RTC in the special proceedings failed to appreciate the finding of the
RTC in Crim. Case No. 2699-A that petitioner was never married to Eusebio Bristol. Thus, the trial
court concluded that, because petitioner was acquitted of bigamy, it follows that the first marriage
with Bristol still existed and was valid. By failing to take note of the findings of fact on the
nonexistence of the marriage between petitioner and Bristol, both the RTC and CA held that
petitioner was not an interested party in the estate of Orlando.
Second, it is imperative to note that at the time the bigamy case in Crim. Case No. 2699-A was
dismissed, we had already ruled that under the principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a
valid divorce obtained by a spouse of foreign nationality. This doctrine was established as early as
1985 in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[7] wherein we said:
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces[,] the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to
their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage
from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. xxx
We reiterated this principle in Llorente v. Court of Appeals,[8] to wit:
In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. we held that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of
the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces, the
same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. In the same case, the
Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to their
national law.
Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of Appeals, that once proven that
respondent was no longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce from petitioner, the ruling
in Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could very well lose her right to inherit from
him.
In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, we recognized the divorce obtained by the respondent in his country, the
Federal Republic of Germany. There, we stated that divorce and its legal effects may be recognized
in the Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil
law on the status of persons.
For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of Appeals must be reversed. We hold
that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized
in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity. xxx
Nonetheless, the fact of divorce must still first be proven as we have enunciated in Garcia v. Recio,
[9] to wit:
Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary
value, the document must first be presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is
proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself.
The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign
country.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven as
a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof
attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the
Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record
is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one issued
by an Australian family court. However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the
aforementioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.
Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in
evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not
been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City. The trial court ruled that it was
admissible, subject to petitioner's qualification. Hence, it was admitted in evidence and accorded
weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioner's failure to object properly rendered the divorce decree
admissible as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia.
Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary;
respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship
in 1992. Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the political and civil
rights belonging to a citizen. Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak of their former
states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent severed
his allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine personal laws.
Burden of Proving Australian Law
Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law falls upon petitioner, because
she is the party challenging the validity of a foreign judgment. He contends that petitioner was
satisfied with the original of the divorce decree and was cognizant of the marital laws of Australia,
because she had lived and worked in that country for quite a long time. Besides, the Australian
divorce law is allegedly known by Philippine courts; thus, judges may take judicial notice of foreign
laws in the exercise of sound discretion.
We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with the party who alleges the existence of a fact or
thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action. In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden
of proving the material allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the answer; and
defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer when they introduce
new matters. Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the burden of proving the
pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any
other facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not among those matters
that judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function. The power of judicial notice
must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in
the negative. (Emphasis supplied)
It appears that the trial court no longer required petitioner to prove the validity of Orlandos divorce
under the laws of the United States and the marriage between petitioner and the deceased. Thus,
there is a need to remand the proceedings to the trial court for further reception of evidence to
establish the fact of divorce.
Should petitioner prove the validity of the divorce and the subsequent marriage, she has the
preferential right to be issued the letters of administration over the estate. Otherwise, letters of
administration may be issued to respondent, who is undisputedly the daughter or next of kin of the
deceased, in accordance with Sec. 6 of Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court.
This is consistent with our ruling in San Luis v. San Luis,[10] in which we said:
Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee
which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal
personality to file the present petition as Felicisimo's surviving spouse. However, the records show
that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well
as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, the
Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments.
It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity
and due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document
may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or
(2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not
kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
With regard to respondent's marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A., she
submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text of the Family Law Act of
12
California which purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance with the said law. As
stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be
alleged and proved.
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the
divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo. (Emphasis
supplied)
Thus, it is imperative for the trial court to first determine the validity of the divorce to ascertain the
rightful party to be issued the letters of administration over the estate of Orlando B. Catalan.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision
dated 18 October 2007 and the Resolution dated 20 June 2008 of the Court of Appeals are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let this case be REMANDED to Branch 70 of the Regional Trial Court
of Burgos, Pangasinan for further proceedings in accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
May 31, 2011
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
At 2:00 a.m. of June 26, 2006, armed men abducted Sherlyn Cadapan (Sherlyn), Karen Empeo
(Karen) and Manuel Merino (Merino) from a house in San Miguel, Hagonoy, Bulacan. The three
were herded onto a jeep bearing license plate RTF 597 that sped towards an undisclosed location.
Having thereafter heard nothing from Sherlyn, Karen and Merino, their respective families scoured
nearby police precincts and military camps in the hope of finding them but the same yielded nothing.
On July 17, 2006, spouses Asher and Erlinda Cadapan and Concepcion Empeo filed a petition for
habeas corpus[1] before the Court, docketed as G.R. No. 173228, impleading then Generals Romeo
Tolentino and Jovito Palparan (Gen. Palparan), Lt. Col. Rogelio Boac (Lt. Col. Boac), Arnel Enriquez
and Lt. Francis Mirabelle Samson (Lt. Mirabelle) as respondents. By Resolution of July 19, 2006,[2]
the Court issued a writ of habeas corpus, returnable to the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals.

The habeas corpus petition was docketed at the appellate court as CA-G.R. SP No. 95303.

By Return of the Writ dated July 21, 2006,[3] the respondents in the habeas corpus petition denied
EN BANC that Sherlyn, Karen and Merino are in the custody of the military. To the Return were attached
affidavits from the respondents, except Enriquez, who all attested that they do not know Sherlyn,
Karen and Merino; that they had inquired from their subordinates about the reported abduction and
LT. COL. ROGELIO BOAC, LT. COL. FELIPE ANOTADO AND LT. FRANCIS MIRABELLE SAMSON, disappearance of the three but their inquiry yielded nothing; and that the military does not own nor
Petitioners, possess a stainless steel jeep with plate number RTF 597. Also appended to the Return was a
- versus - certification from the Land Transportation Office (LTO) that plate number RTF 597 had not yet been
ERLINDA T. CADAPAN AND CONCEPCION E. EMPEO, manufactured as of July 26, 2006.
Respondents.

Trial thereupon ensued at the appellate court.

x-------------------------------x
ERLINDA T. CADAPAN AND CONCEPCION E. EMPEO,
Petitioners, Witness Wilfredo Ramos, owner of the house where the three were abducted, recounted that on
- versus - June 26, 2006, while he was inside his house in Hagonoy, he witnessed armed men wearing
GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, P/DIR.GEN. AVELINO RAZON, (RET.) GEN. ROMEO bonnets abduct Sherlyn and Karen from his house and also abduct Merino on their way out; and that
TOLENTINO, (RET.) GEN. JOVITO PALPARAN, LT. COL. ROGELIO BOAC, LT. COL. FELIPE tied and blindfolded, the three were boarded on a jeep and taken towards Iba in Hagonoy.[4]
ANOTADO, ET AL.,
Respondents. Witness Alberto Ramirez (Ramirez) recalled that on June 28, 2006, while he was sleeping in his
x------------------------------------x house, he was awakened by Merino who, in the company of a group of unidentified armed men,
repaired to his house; that onboard a stainless jeep bearing plate number RTF 597, he (Ramirez)
ERLINDA T. CADAPAN AND CONCEPCION E. EMPEO, was taken to a place in Mercado, Hagonoy and was asked by one Enriquez if he knew Sierra,
Petitioners, Tanya, Vincent and Lisa; and that Enriquez described the appearance of two ladies which matched
- versus - those of Sherlyn and Karen, whom he was familiar with as the two had previously slept in his house.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, P/DIR.GEN. AVELINO [5]
RAZON, (RET.) GEN. ROMEO TOLENTINO, (RET.) GEN. JOVITO PALPARAN, LT. COL. ROGELIO
BOAC, LT. COL. FELIPE ANOTADO, DONALD CAIGAS, A.K.A. ALAN OR ALVIN, ARNEL Another witness, Oscar Leuterio, who was himself previously abducted by armed men and detained
ENRIQUEZ AND LT. FRANCIS MIRABELLE SAMSON, for five months, testified that when he was detained in Fort Magsaysay in Nueva Ecija, he saw two
Respondents. women fitting the descriptions of Sherlyn and Karen, and also saw Merino, his kumpare.[6]

G.R. Nos. 184461-62 Lt. Col. Boac, the then commander of Task Force Malolos, a special operations team tasked to
G.R. No. 184495 neutralize the intelligence network of communists and other armed groups, declared that he
G.R. No. 187109
13
conducted an inquiry on the abduction of Sherlyn, Karen and Merino but his subordinates denied appropriate actions as may be warranted by their findings and to furnish the Court with their
knowledge thereof.[7] separate reports on the outcome of their investigations and the actions taken thereon.

While he denied having received any order from Gen. Palparan to investigate the disappearance of
Sherlyn, Karen and Merino, his assistance in locating the missing persons was sought by the mayor
of Hagonoy.
Major Dominador Dingle, the then division adjutant of the Philippine Armys 7th Infantry Division in
Fort Magsaysay, denied that a certain Arnel Enriquez is a member of his infantry as in fact his name
did not appear in the roster of troops.[8]
Roberto Se, a supervisor of the Equipment, Plate Number and Supply Units of the LTO, denied that
his office manufactured and issued a plate number bearing number RTF 597.[9]
On rebuttal, Lt. Mirabelle, Lt. Col. Boac and Gen. Palparan took the witness stand as hostile
witnesses.
Lt. Mirabelle testified that she did not receive any report on the abduction of Sherlyn, Karen and
Merino nor any order to investigate the matter. And she denied knowing anything about the
abduction of Ramirez nor who were Ka Tanya or Ka Lisa.[10]
Let copies of this decision be furnished the Commission on Human Rights, the National Bureau of
Investigation and the Philippine National Police for their appropriate actions.
SO ORDERED. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Petitioners in CA-G.R. SP No. 95303 moved for a reconsideration of the appellate courts decision.
They also moved to present newly discovered evidence consisting of the testimonies of Adoracion
Paulino, Sherlyns mother-in-law who was allegedly threatened by soldiers; and Raymond Manalo
who allegedly met Sherlyn, Karen and Merino in the course of his detention at a military camp.
During the pendency of the motion for reconsideration in CA-G.R. SP No. 95303, Erlinda Cadapan
and Concepcion Empeo filed before this Court a Petition for Writ of Amparo[14] With Prayers for
Inspection of Place and Production of Documents dated October 24, 2007, docketed as G.R. No.
179994. The petition impleaded the same respondents in the habeas corpus petition, with the
addition of then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, then Armed Forces of the Phil. (AFP) Chief of
Staff Hermogenes Esperon Jr., then Phil. National Police (PNP) Chief Gen. Avelino Razon (Gen.
Razon), Lt. Col. Felipe Anotado (Lt. Col. Anotado) and Donald Caigas.

Then President Arroyo was eventually dropped as respondent in light of her immunity from suit while
Gen. Palparan testified that during a debate in a televised program, he mentioned the names of Ka
in office.
Lisa and Ka Tanya as the ones involved in revolutionary tax activities; and that he ordered Lt. Col.
Boac to conduct an investigation on the disappearance of Sherlyn, Karen and Merino.[11] When
pressed to elaborate, he stated: I said that I got the report that it stated that it was Ka Tanya and Ka Petitioners in G.R. No. 179994 also prayed that they be allowed to inspect the detention areas of the
Lisa that, I mean, that incident happened in Hagonoy, Bulacan was the abduction of Ka Lisa and Ka following places:
Tanya, Your Honor, and another one. That was the report coming from the people in the area.[12]
1. 7th Infantry Division at Fort Magsaysay, Laur, Nueva Ecija
By Decision of March 29, 2007,[13] the Court of Appeals dismissed the habeas corpus petition in
this wise:
2. 24th Infantry Batallion at Limay, Bataan

As Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeo and Manuel Merino are indeed missing, the present petition for
3. Army Detachment inside Valmocina Farm, Pinaod, San Ildefonso, Bulacan
habeas corpus is not the appropriate remedy since the main office or function of the habeas corpus
is to inquire into the legality of ones detention which presupposes that respondents have actual
custody of the persons subject of the petition. The reason therefor is that the courts have limited 4. Camp Tecson, San Miguel, Bulacan
powers, means and resources to conduct an investigation. x x x.
5. The Resthouse of Donald Caigas alias Allan or Alvin of the 24th Infantry Batallion at
It being the situation, the proper remedy is not a habeas corpus proceeding but criminal proceedings Barangay Banog, Bolinao, Pangasinan
by initiating criminal suit for abduction or kidnapping as a crime punishable by law. In the case of
Martinez v. Mendoza, supra, the Supreme Court restated the doctrine that habeas corpus may not 6. 56th Infantry Batallion Headquarters at Iba, Hagonoy, Bulacan
be used as a means of obtaining evidence on the whereabouts of a person, or as a means of finding
out who has specifically abducted or caused the disappearance of a certain person. (emphasis and
underscoring supplied) 7. Army Detachment at Barangay Mercado, Hagonoy, Bulacan

Thus the appellate court disposed:
WHEREFORE, the petition for habeas corpus is hereby DISMISSED, there being no strong
evidence that the missing persons are in the custody of the respondents.
The Court, however, further resolves to refer the case to the Commission on Human Rights, the
National Bureau of Investigation and the Philippine National Police for separate investigations and
8. Beach House [at] Iba, Zambales used as a safehouse with a retired military personnel as a
caretaker;
By Resolution of October 25, 2007, the Court issued in G.R. No. 179994 a writ of amparo returnable
to the Special Former Eleventh Division of the appellate court, and ordered the consolidation of the
amparo petition with the pending habeas corpus petition.
14
Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 002, respondents in the amparo case, through the Solicitor General,
filed their Return of the Writ on November 6, 2007.[15] In the Return, Gen. Palparan, Lt. Col. Boac
and Lt. Mirabelle reiterated their earlier narrations in the habeas corpus case.
Gen. Hermogenes Esperon Jr. stated in the Return that he immediately caused to investigate and
verify the identities of the missing persons and was aware of the earlier decision of the appellate
court ordering the police, the Commission on Human Rights and the National Bureau of
Investigation to take further action on the matter.[16]
Lt. Col. Felipe Anotado, the then battalion commander of the 24th Infantry Battalion based in
Balanga City, Bataan, denied any involvement in the abduction. While the 24th Infantry Battalion
detachment was reported to be a detention site of the missing persons, Lt. Col. Anotado claimed
that he found no untoward incident when he visited said detachment. He also claimed that there was
no report of the death of Merino per his inquiry with the local police.[17]
Police Director General Avelino Razon narrated that he ordered the compilation of pertinent records,
papers and other documents of the PNP on the abduction of the three, and that the police
exhausted all possible actions available under the circumstances.[18]
In addition to the witnesses already presented in the habeas corpus case, petitioners called on
Adoracion Paulino and Raymond Manalo to testify during the trial.
Adoracion Paulino recalled that her daughter-in-law Sherlyn showed up at home on April 11, 2007,
accompanied by two men and three women whom she believed were soldiers. She averred that she
did not report the incident to the police nor inform Sherlyns mother about the visit.[19]
Raymond Manalo (Manalo) claimed that he met the three abducted persons when he was illegally
detained by military men in Camp Tecson in San Miguel, Bulacan. His group was later taken to a
camp in Limay, Bataan. He recalled that Lt. Col. Anotado was the one who interrogated him while in
detention.[20]
In his Sinumpaang Salaysay,[21] Manalo recounted:
xxxx
59. Saan ka dinala mula sa Sapang?
Pagkalipas ng humigit kumulang 3 buwan sa Sapang, dinala ako sa Camp Tecson sa ilalim ng 24th
IB.
xxxx
Sa loob ng barracks ko nakilala si Sherlyn Cadapan, isang estudyante ng UP.
Ipinapalinis din sa akin ang loob ng barracks. Sa isang kwarto sa loob ng barracks, may nakita
akong babae na nakakadena[.] Noong una, pinagbawalan akong makipag-usap sa kanya. Sa ikatlo
o ikaapat na araw, nakausap ko yung babaeng nagngangalang Sherlyn. Binigyan ko siya ng
pagkain. Sinabi niya sa akin na dinukot si[ya] sa Hagonoy, Bulacan at matindi ang tortyur na
dinaranas niya. Sabi niya gusto niyang umuwi at makasama ang kanyang magulang. Umiiyak siya.
Sabi niya sa akin ang buong pangalan niya ay Sherlyn Cadapan, mula sa Laguna. Sa araw
tinatanggal ang kanyang kadena at inuutusan si Sherlyn na maglaba.
x x x x.
61. Sino ang mga nakilala mo sa Camp Tecson?
Dito sa Camp Tecson naming nakilala si Allan Alvin (maya-maya nalaman naming na siya pala si
Donald Caigas), ng 24th IB, na tinatawag na master o commander ng kanyang mga tauhan.
Pagkalipas ng 2 araw matapos dalhin si Reynaldo sa Camp Tecson dumating sina Karen Empeo at
Manuel Merino na mga bihag din. Inilagay si Karen at Manuel sa kwarto ni Allan[.] Kami naman ni
Reynaldo ay nasa katabing kwarto, kasama si Sherlyn.
xxxx
62. xxxx
Kaming mga lalake (ako, si Reynaldo at si Manuel) ay ginawang utusan, habang sina Sherlyn at
Karen ay ginawang labandera.
Si Sherlyn ang pinahirapan nina Mickey, Donald at Billy. Sabi ni Sherlyn sa akin na siyay ginahasa.
xxxx
63. xxxx
xxxx
Kaming lima (ako, si Reynaldo, si Sherlyn, si Karen at si [Merino]) ang dinala sa Limay. Sinakay ako,
si Reynaldo, si Sherlyn at si [Merino] sa isang stainless na jeep. Si Karen ay isinakay sa itim na
sasakyan ni Donald Caigas. x x x x
xxxx
66. Saan pa kayo dinala mula sa Limay, Bataan?
Mula sa Limay, kaming 5 (ako, si Reynaldo, si Sherlyn, Si Karen at si Manuel) ay dinala sa isang
safehouse sa Zambales, tabi ng dagat. x x x x (underscoring supplied; italics and emphasis in the
original)
On rebuttal, Lt. Col. Anotado and Col. Eduardo Boyles Davalan were called to the witness stand.
Lt. Col. Anotado denied seeing or meeting Manalo. He posited that Manalo recognized him because
he was very active in conducting lectures in Bataan and even appeared on television regarding an
incident involving the 24th Infantry Batallion. He contended that it was impossible for Manalo,
Sherlyn, Karen and Merino to be detained in the Limay detachment which had no detention area.
Col. Eduardo Boyles Davalan, the then chief of staff of the First Scout Ranger Regiment in Camp
Tecson, testified that the camp is not a detention facility, nor does it conduct military operations as it
15
only serves as a training facility for scout rangers. He averred that his regiment does not have any
command relation with either the 7th Infantry Division or the 24th Infantry Battalion.[22]
By Decision of September 17, 2008,[23] the appellate court granted the Motion for Reconsideration
in CA-G.R. SP No. 95303 (the habeas corpus case) and ordered the immediate release of Sherlyn,
Karen and Merino in CA-G.R. SP No. 00002 (the amparo case). Thus it disposed:
WHEREFORE, in CA-G.R. SP NO. 95303 (Habeas Corpus case), the Motion for Reconsideration is
GRANTED.
Accordingly, in both CA-G.R. SP NO. 95303 (Habeas Corpus case) and in CA-G.R. SP NO. 00002
(Amparo case), the respondents are thereby ordered to immediately RELEASE, or cause the
release, from detention the persons of Sher[lyn] Cadapan, Karen Empeo and Manuel Merino.
Respondent Director General Avelino Razon is hereby ordered to resume [the] PNPs unfinished
investigation so that the truth will be fully ascertained and appropriate charges filed against those
truly responsible.
SO ORDERED.
In reconsidering its earlier Decision in the habeas corpus case, the appellate court relied heavily on
the testimony of Manalo in this wise:
With the additional testimony of Raymond Manalo, the petitioners have been able to convincingly
prove the fact of their detention by some elements in the military. His testimony is a first hand
account that military and civilian personnel under the 7th Infantry Division were responsible for the
abduction of Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeo and Manuel Merino. He also confirmed the claim of
Oscar Leuterio that the latter was detained in Fort Magsaysay. It was there where he (Leuterio) saw
Manuel Merino.
His testimony that Leuterio saw Manuel Merino in Fort Magsaysay may be hearsay but not with
respect to his meeting with, and talking to, the three desaparecidos. His testimony on those points
was no hearsay. Raymond Manalo saw the three with his very own eyes as they were detained and
tortured together. In fact, he claimed to be a witness to the burning of Manuel Merino. In the
absence of confirmatory proof, however, the Court will presume that he is still alive.
The testimony of Raymond Manalo can no longer be ignored and brushed aside. His narration and
those of the earlier witnesses, taken together, constitute more than substantial evidence warranting
an order that the three be released from detention if they are not being held for a lawful cause. They
may be moved from place to place but still they are considered under detention and custody of the
respondents.
His testimony was clear, consistent and convincing. x x x.
xxxx
The additional testimonies of Lt. Col. Felipe Anotado and Col. Eduardo Boyles Davalan were of no
help either. Again, their averments were the same negative ones which cannot prevail over those of
Raymond Manalo. Indeed, Camp Tecson has been utilized as a training camp for army scout
rangers. Even Raymond Manalo noticed it but the camps use for purposes other than training
cannot be discounted.
xxxx
In view of the foregoing, there is now a clear and credible evidence that the three missing persons,
[Sherlyn, Karen and Merino], are being detained in military camps and bases under the 7th Infantry
Division. Being not held for a lawful cause, they should be immediately released from detention.
(italic in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Meanwhile, in the amparo case, the appellate court deemed it a superfluity to issue any inspection
order or production order in light of the release order. As it earlier ruled in the habeas corpus case, it
found that the three detainees right to life, liberty and security was being violated, hence, the need to
immediately release them, or cause their release. The appellate court went on to direct the PNP to
proceed further with its investigation since there were enough leads as indicated in the records to
ascertain the truth and file the appropriate charges against those responsible for the abduction and
detention of the three.
Lt. Col. Rogelio Boac, et al. challenged before this Court, via petition for review, the September 17,
2008 Decision of the appellate court. This was docketed as G.R. Nos. 184461-62, the first above-
captioned case- subject of the present Decision.
Erlinda Cadapan and Concepcion Empeo, on the other hand, filed their own petition for review also
challenging the same September 17, 2008 Decision of the appellate court only insofar as the
amparo aspect is concerned. Their petition, docketed as G.R. No. 179994, was redocketed as G.R.
No. 184495, the second above-captioned case.
By Resolution of June 15, 2010, the Court ordered the consolidation of G.R. No. 184495 with G.R.
Nos. 1844461-62.[24]
Meanwhile, Erlinda Cadapan and Concepcion Empeo filed before the appellate court a Motion to
Cite Respondents in Contempt of Court for failure of the respondents in the amparo and habeas
corpus cases to comply with the directive of the appellate court to immediately release the three
missing persons. By Resolution of March 5, 2009,[25] the appellate court denied the motion,
ratiocinating thus:
While the Court, in the dispositive portion, ordered the respondents to immediately RELEASE, or
cause the release, from detention the persons of Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeo and Manuel
Merino, the decision is not ipso facto executory. The use of the term immediately does not mean that
that it is automatically executory. There is nothing in the Rule on the Writ of Amparo which states
that a decision rendered is immediately executory. x x x.
Neither did the decision become final and executory considering that both parties questioned the
Decision/Resolution before the Supreme Court. x x x.
Besides, the Court has no basis. The petitioners did not file a motion for execution pending appeal
under Section 2 of Rule 39. There being no motion, the Court could not have issued, and did not
issue, a writ of execution. x x x. (underscoring supplied)
Via a petition for certiorari filed on March 30, 2009 before this Court, Erlinda Cadapan and
Concepcion Empeo challenged the appellate courts March 5, 2009 Resolution denying their motion
to cite respondents in contempt. The petition was docketed as G.R. No. 187109, the last above-
captioned case subject of the present Decision.
16
Only Lt. Col. Anotado and Lt. Mirabelle remained of the original respondents in the amparo and
habeas corpus cases as the other respondents had retired from government service.[26] The AFP
has denied that Arnel Enriquez was a member of the Philippine Army.[27] The whereabouts of
Donald Caigas remain unknown.[28]
In G.R. Nos. 184461-62, petitioners posit as follows:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS GROSSLY MISAPPRECIATED THE VALUE OF THE TESTIMONY OF
RAYMOND MANALO.
II
THE PETITION[S] FOR HABEAS CORPUS AND WRIT OF AMPARO SHOULD BE DISMISSED
BECAUSE RESPONDENTS FAILED TO PROVE BY THE REQUIRED QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE
THAT PETITIONERS HAVE SHERLYN CADAPAN, KAREN EMPEO AND MANUEL MERINO ARE
IN THEIR CUSTODY.
III
PETITIONERS DENIALS PER SE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN TAKEN AGAINST THEM BECAUSE
THEY DID NOT REALLY HAVE ANY INVOLVEMENT IN THE ALLEGED ABDUCTION;
MOREOVER, THE SUPPOSED INCONSISTENCIES IN THEIR TESTIMONIES ARE ON POINTS
IRRELEVANT TO THE PETITION.
IV
THE DISPOSITIVE PORTION OF THE ASSAILED DECISION IS VAGUE AND INCONGRUENT
WITH THE FINDINGS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS.
V he claimed to have been detained along with Sherlyn, Karen and Merino. They underscore that
THE COURT OF APPEALS IGNORED AND FAILED TO RULE UPON THE FATAL PROCEDURAL
INFIRMITIES IN THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF AMPARO.[29]
In G.R. No. 184495, petitioners posit as follows:
5. The Court of Appeals erred in not granting the Interim Relief for Inspection of Places;
6. The Court of Appeals erred in not granting the Interim Relief for Production of Documents;
7. The Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the Police Director Gen. Avelino Razon did
not make extraordinary diligence in investigating the enforced disappearance of the aggrieved
parties
8. The Court of Appeals erred in not finding that this was not the command coming from the
highest echelon of powers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Philippine Army and the Seventh
Infantry Division of the Philippine Army to enforcibly disappear [sic] the aggrieved parties
9. The Court of Appeals erred in dropping President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as party
respondent in this case;
10. The Court of Appeals erred in not finding that President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo had
command responsibility in the enforced disappearance and continued detention of the three
aggrieved parties
11. The Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the Armed Forces Chief of Staff then
Hermogenes Esperon and the Present Chief of Staff as having command responsibility in the
enforced disappearance and continued detention of the three aggrieved parties[30]
In G.R. No. 187109, petitioners raise the following issues:
[1] Whether the decision in the Court of Appeals has become final and executory[.]
[2] Whetherthere is a need to file a motion for execution in a Habeas Corpus decision or in an
Amparo decision[.]
[3] Whetheran appeal can stay the decision of a Habeas Corpus [case] [or] an Amparo case[.][31]
Essentially, the consolidated petitions present three primary issues, viz: a) whether the testimony of
Raymond Manalo is credible; b) whether the chief of the AFP, the commanding general of the
Philippine Army, as well as the heads of the concerned units had command responsibility over the
abduction and detention of Sherlyn, Karen and Merino; and c) whether there is a need to file a
motion for execution to cause the release of the aggrieved parties.
G.R. Nos. 184461-62
Petitioners Lt. Col. Boac, et al. contend that the appellate court erred in giving full credence to the
testimony of Manalo who could not even accurately describe the structures of Camp Tecson where
Camp Tecson is not under the jurisdiction of the 24th Infantry Batallion and that Manalos testimony
is incredible and full of inconsistencies.[32]
In Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo,[33] an original petition for Prohibition, Injunction and
Temporary Restraining Order which was treated as a petition under the Amparo Rule, said Rule
having taken effect during the pendency of the petition, the Court ruled on the truthfulness and
veracity of the personal account of Manalo which included his encounter with Sherlyn, Kara and
Merino while on detention. Thus it held:
We affirm the factual findings of the appellate court, largely based on respondent Raymond Manalos
affidavit and testimony, viz:
x x x x.
We reject the claim of petitioners that respondent Raymond Manalos statements were not
corroborated by other independent and credible pieces of evidence. Raymonds affidavit and
testimony were corroborated by the affidavit of respondent Reynaldo Manalo. The testimony and
medical reports prepared by forensic specialist Dr. Molino, and the pictures of the scars left by the
physical injuries inflicted on respondents, also corroborate respondents accounts of the torture they
endured while in detention. Respondent Raymond Manalos familiarity with the facilities in Fort
Magsaysay such as the DTU, as shown in his testimony and confirmed by Lt. Col. Jimenez to be the
17
Division Training Unit, firms up respondents story that they were detained for some time in said
military facility. (citations omitted; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
On Manalos having allegedly encountered Sherlyn, Karen and Merino while on detention, the Court
in the immediately cited case synthesized his tale as follows:
The next day, Raymonds chains were removed and he was ordered to clean outside the barracks. It
was then he learned that he was in a detachment of the Rangers. There were many soldiers,
hundreds of them were training. He was also ordered to clean inside the barracks. In one of the
rooms therein, he met Sherlyn Cadapan from Laguna. She told him that she was a student of the
University of the Philippines and was abducted in Hagonoy, Bulacan. She confided that she had
been subjected to severe torture and raped. She was crying and longing to go home and be with her
parents. During the day, her chains were removed and she was made to do the laundry.
After a week, Reynaldo was also brought to Camp Tecson. Two days from his arrival, two other
captives, Karen Empeo and Manuel Merino, arrived. Karen and Manuel were put in the room with
Allan whose name they later came to know as Donald Caigas, called master or commander by his
men in the 24th Infantry Battalion. Raymond and Reynaldo were put in the adjoining room. At times,
Raymond and Reynaldo were threatened, and Reynaldo was beaten up. In the daytime, their chains
were removed, but were put back on at night. They were threatened that if they escaped, their
families would all be killed.
On or about October 6, 2006, Hilario arrived in Camp Tecson. He told the detainees that they should
be thankful they were still alive and should continue along their renewed life. Before the hearing of
November 6 or 8, 2006, respondents were brought to their parents to instruct them not to attend the
hearing. However, their parents had already left for Manila. Respondents were brought back to
Camp Tecson. They stayed in that camp from September 2006 to November 2006, and Raymond
was instructed to continue using the name Oscar and holding himself out as a military trainee. He
got acquainted with soldiers of the 24th Infantry Battalion whose names and descriptions he stated
in his affidavit.
On November 22, 2006, respondents, along with Sherlyn, Karen, and Manuel, were transferred to a
camp of the 24th Infantry Battalion in Limay, Bataan. There were many huts in the camp. They
stayed in that camp until May 8, 2007. Some soldiers of the battalion stayed with them. While there,
battalion soldiers whom Raymond knew as Mar and Billy beat him up and hit him in the stomach
with their guns. Sherlyn and Karen also suffered enormous torture in the camp. They were all made
to clean, cook, and help in raising livestock.
Raymond recalled that when Operation Lubog was launched, Caigas and some other soldiers
brought him and Manuel with them to take and kill all sympathizers of the NPA. They were brought
to Barangay Bayan-bayanan, Bataan where he witnessed the killing of an old man doing kaingin.
The soldiers said he was killed because he had a son who was a member of the NPA and he
coddled NPA members in his house. Another time, in another Operation Lubog, Raymond was
brought to Barangay Orion in a house where NPA men stayed. When they arrived, only the old man
of the house who was sick was there. They spared him and killed only his son right before
Raymonds eyes.
From Limay, Raymond, Reynaldo, Sherlyn, Karen, and Manuel were transferred to Zambales, in a
safehouse near the sea. Caigas and some of his men stayed with them. A retired army soldier was
in charge of the house. Like in Limay, the five detainees were made to do errands and chores. They
stayed in Zambales from May 8 or 9, 2007 until June 2007.
In June 2007, Caigas brought the five back to the camp in Limay. Raymond, Reynaldo, and Manuel
were tasked to bring food to detainees brought to the camp. Raymond narrated what he witnessed
and experienced in the camp, viz:
x x x x.[34] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The Court takes judicial notice of its Decision in the just cited Secretary of National Defense v.
Manalo[35] which assessed the account of Manalo to be a candid and forthright narrative of his and
his brother Reynaldos abduction by the military in 2006; and of the corroborative testimonies, in the
same case, of Manalos brother Reynaldo and a forensic specialist, as well as Manalos graphic
description of the detention area. There is thus no compelling reason for the Court, in the present
case, to disturb its appreciation in Manalos testimony. The outright denial of petitioners Lt. Col.
Boac, et al. thus crumbles.
Petitioners go on to point out that the assailed Decision of the appellate court is vague and
incongruent with [its] findings for, so they contend, while the appellate court referred to the
perpetrators as misguided and self-righteous civilian and military elements of the 7th Infantry
Division, it failed to identify who these perpetrators are. Moreover, petitioners assert that Donald
Caigas and Arnel Enriquez are not members of the AFP. They furthermore point out that their co-
petitioners Generals Esperon, Tolentino and Palparan have already retired from the service and thus
have no more control of any military camp or base in the country.[36]
There is nothing vague and/or incongruent about the categorical order of the appellate court for
petitioners to release Sherlyn, Karen and Merino. In its discourse, the appellate court merely
referred to a few misguided self-righteous people who resort to the extrajudicial process of
neutralizing those who disagree with the countrys democratic system of government. Nowhere did it
specifically refer to the members of the 7th Infantry Division as the misguided self-righteous ones.
Petitioners finally point out that the parents of Sherlyn and Karen do not have the requisite standing
to file the amparo petition on behalf of Merino. They call attention to the fact that in the amparo
petition, the parents of Sherlyn and Karen merely indicated that they were concerned with Manuel
Merino as basis for filing the petition on his behalf.[37]
Section 2 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo[38] provides:
The petition may be filed by the aggrieved party or by any qualified person or entity in the following
order:
(a) Any member of the immediate family, namely: the spouse, children and parents of the aggrieved
party;
(b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved party within the fourth civil
degree of consanguinity or affinity, in default of those mentioned in the preceding paragraph; or
(c) Any concerned citizen, organization, association or institution, if there is no known member of the
immediate family or relative of the aggrieved party.
Indeed, the parents of Sherlyn and Karen failed to allege that there were no known members of the
immediate family or relatives of Merino. The exclusive and successive order mandated by the
above-quoted provision must be followed. The order of priority is not without reasonto prevent the
indiscriminate and groundless filing of petitions for amparo which may even prejudice the right to life,
liberty or security of the aggrieved party.[39]
18
The Court notes that the parents of Sherlyn and Karen also filed the petition for habeas corpus on
Merinos behalf. No objection was raised therein for, in a habeas corpus proceeding, any person may
apply for the writ on behalf of the aggrieved party.[40]
It is thus only with respect to the amparo petition that the parents of Sherlyn and Karen are
precluded from filing the application on Merinos behalf as they are not authorized parties under the
Rule.
G.R. No. 184495
Preliminarily, the Court finds the appellate courts dismissal of the petitions against then President
Arroyo well-taken, owing to her immunity from suit at the time the habeas corpus and amparo
petitions were filed.[41]
Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not
be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law.
It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged
into court litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any
form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his
official duties and functions. Unlike the legislative and judicial branch, only one constitutes the
executive branch and anything which impairs his usefulness in the discharge of the many great and
important duties imposed upon him by the Constitution necessarily impairs the operation of the
Government. x x x [42]
Parenthetically, the petitions are bereft of any allegation that then President Arroyo permitted,
condoned or performed any wrongdoing against the three missing persons.
On the issue of whether a military commander may be held liable for the acts of his subordinates in
an amparo proceeding, a brief discussion of the concept of command responsibility and its
application insofar as amparo cases already decided by the Court is in order.
Rubrico v. Macapagal Arroyo[43] expounded on the concept of command responsibility as follows:
The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine finds its context in the development of laws of
war and armed combats. According to Fr. Bernas, "command responsibility," in its simplest terms,
means the "responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the
armed forces or other persons subject to their control in international wars or domestic conflict." In
this sense, command responsibility is properly a form of criminal complicity. The Hague Conventions
of 1907 adopted the doctrine of command responsibility, foreshadowing the present-day precept of
holding a superior accountable for the atrocities committed by his subordinates should he be remiss
in his duty of control over them. As then formulated, command responsibility is "an omission mode of
individual criminal liability," whereby the superior is made responsible for crimes committed by his
subordinates for failing to prevent or punish the perpetrators (as opposed to crimes he ordered).
(citations omitted; emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)[44]
It bears stressing that command responsibility is properly a form of criminal complicity,[45] and thus
a substantive rule that points to criminal or administrative liability.
An amparo proceeding is not criminal in nature nor does it ascertain the criminal liability of
individuals or entities involved. Neither does it partake of a civil or administrative suit.[46] Rather, it is
a remedial measure designed to direct specified courses of action to government agencies to
safeguard the constitutional right to life, liberty and security of aggrieved individuals.[47]
Thus Razon Jr. v. Tagitis [48] enlightens:
[An amparo proceeding] does nor determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the
disappearance [threats thereof or extrajudicial killings]; it determines responsibility, or at least
accountability, for the enforced disappearancefor purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies to
address the disappearance[49] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Further, Tagitis defines what constitutes responsibility and accountability, viz:
x x x. Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by substantial evidence to
have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a
measure of the remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the directive to file the appropriate
criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in the proper courts. Accountability, on the
other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those who exhibited
involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level
of responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced
disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to
discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance.
In all these cases, the issuance of the Writ of Amparo is justified by our primary goal of addressing
the disappearance, so that the life of the victim is preserved and his liberty and security are restored.
[50] (emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)
Rubrico categorically denies the application of command responsibility in amparo cases to
determine criminal liability.[51] The Court maintains its adherence to this pronouncement as far as
amparo cases are concerned.
Rubrico, however, recognizes a preliminary yet limited application of command responsibility in
amparo cases to instances of determining the responsible or accountable individuals or entities that
are duty-bound to abate any transgression on the life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party.
If command responsibility were to be invoked and applied to these proceedings, it should, at most,
be only to determine the author who, at the first instance, is accountable for, and has the duty to
address, the disappearance and harassments complained of, so as to enable the Court to devise
remedial measures that may be appropriate under the premises to protect rights covered by the writ
of amparo. As intimated earlier, however, the determination should not be pursued to fix criminal
liability on respondents preparatory to criminal prosecution, or as a prelude to administrative
disciplinary proceedings under existing administrative issuances, if there be any.[52] (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
In other words, command responsibility may be loosely applied in amparo cases in order to identify
those accountable individuals that have the power to effectively implement whatever processes an
amparo court would issue.[53] In such application, the amparo court does not impute criminal
responsibility but merely pinpoint the superiors it considers to be in the best position to protect the
rights of the aggrieved party.
Such identification of the responsible and accountable superiors may well be a preliminary
determination of criminal liability which, of course, is still subject to further investigation by the
appropriate government agency.
19
Relatedly, the legislature came up with Republic Act No. 9851[54] (RA 9851) to include command Respondents Lt. Col. Felipe Anotado, Lt. Francis Mirabelle Samson, Gen. Jovito Palparan, Lt. Col.
responsibility as a form of criminal complicity in crimes against international humanitarian law, Rogelio Boac, Arnel Enriquez and Donald Caigas shall remain personally impleaded in the petitions
genocide and other crimes.[55] RA 9851 is thus the substantive law that definitively imputes criminal to answer for any responsibilities and/or accountabilities they may have incurred during their
liability to those superiors who, despite their position, still fail to take all necessary and reasonable incumbencies.
measures within their power to prevent or repress the commission of illegal acts or to submit these
matters to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution. Let copies of this Decision and the records of these cases be furnished the Department of Justice
(DOJ), the Philippine National Police (PNP) and the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) for
The Court finds that the appellate court erred when it did not specifically name the respondents that further investigation to determine the respective criminal and administrative liabilities of respondents.
it found to be responsible for the abduction and continued detention of Sherlyn, Karen and Merino.
For, from the records, it appears that the responsible and accountable individuals are Lt. Col.
All the present petitions are REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action, directed at
Anotado, Lt. Mirabelle, Gen. Palparan, Lt. Col. Boac, Arnel Enriquez and Donald Caigas. They
monitoring of the DOJ, PNP and AFP investigations and the validation of their results.
should thus be made to comply with the September 17, 2008 Decision of the appellate court to
IMMEDIATELY RELEASE Sherlyn, Karen and Merino.
The petitions against Generals Esperon, Razon and Tolentino should be dismissed for lack of merit SO ORDERED.
as there is no showing that they were even remotely accountable and responsible for the abduction
and continued detention of Sherlyn, Karen and Merino.

G.R. No. 187109.

THIRD DIVISION
Contrary to the ruling of the appellate court, there is no need to file a motion for execution for an
amparo or habeas corpus decision. Since the right to life, liberty and security of a person is at stake,
G.R. No. 178551 October 11, 2010
the proceedings should not be delayed and execution of any decision thereon must be expedited as
soon as possible since any form of delay, even for a day, may jeopardize the very rights that these
ATCI OVERSEAS CORPORATION, AMALIA G. IKDAL and MINISTRY OF PUBLIC HEALTH-
writs seek to immediately protect.
KUWAIT Petitioners,
vs.
The Solicitor Generals argument that the Rules of Court supplement the Rule on the Writ of Amparo MA. JOSEFA ECHIN, Respondent.
is misplaced. The Rules of Court only find suppletory application in an amparo proceeding if the
Rules strengthen, rather than weaken, the procedural efficacy of the writ. As it is, the Rule dispenses DECISION
with dilatory motions in view of the urgency in securing the life, liberty or security of the aggrieved
party. Suffice it to state that a motion for execution is inconsistent with the extraordinary and CARPIO MORALES, J.:
expeditious remedy being offered by an amparo proceeding.
Josefina Echin (respondent) was hired by petitioner ATCI Overseas Corporation in behalf of its
principal-co-petitioner, the Ministry of Public Health of Kuwait (the Ministry), for the position of
In fine, the appellate court erred in ruling that its directive to immediately release Sherlyn, Karen and
medical technologist under a two-year contract, denominated as a Memorandum of Agreement
Merino was not automatically executory. For that would defeat the very purpose of having summary
(MOA), with a monthly salary of US$1,200.00.
proceedings[56] in amparo petitions. Summary proceedings, it bears emphasis, are immediately
executory without prejudice to further appeals that may be taken therefrom.[57]
Under the MOA,1 all newly-hired employees undergo a probationary period of one (1) year and are
covered by Kuwait’s Civil Service Board Employment Contract No. 2.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing discussions, the Court renders the following judgment:
Respondent was deployed on February 17, 2000 but was terminated from employment on February
1. The Petitions in G.R. Nos. 184461-62 and G.R. No. 184495 are DISMISSED. The Decision of the 11, 2001, she not having allegedly passed the probationary period.
Court of Appeals dated September 17, 2008 is AFFIRMED with modification in that respondents in
G.R. No. 184495, namely Lt. Col. Felipe Anotado, Lt. Francis Mirabelle Samson, Gen. Jovito As the Ministry denied respondent’s request for reconsideration, she returned to the Philippines on
Palparan, Lt. Col. Rogelio Boac, Arnel Enriquez and Donald Caigas are ordered to immediately March 17, 2001, shouldering her own air fare.
release Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeo and Manuel Merino from detention.
On July 27, 2001, respondent filed with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a
complaint2 for illegal dismissal against petitioner ATCI as the local recruitment agency, represented
The petitions against Generals Esperon, Razon and Tolentino are DISMISSED. by petitioner, Amalia Ikdal (Ikdal), and the Ministry, as the foreign principal.

2. The petition in G.R. No. 187109 is GRANTED. The named respondents are directed to forthwith
comply with the September 17, 2008 Decision of the appellate court. Owing to the retirement and/or
reassignment to other places of assignment of some of the respondents herein and in G.R. No.
184495, the incumbent commanding general of the 7th Infantry Division and the incumbent battalion
commander of the 24th Infantry Battalion, both of the Philippine Army, are enjoined to fully ensure
the release of Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeo and Manuel Merino from detention.
By Decision3 of November 29, 2002, the Labor Arbiter, finding that petitioners neither showed that
there was just cause to warrant respondent’s dismissal nor that she failed to qualify as a regular
employee, held that respondent was illegally dismissed and accordingly ordered petitioners to pay
her US$3,600.00, representing her salary for the three months unexpired portion of her contract.
On appeal of petitioners ATCI and Ikdal, the NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s decision by
Resolution4 of January 26, 2004. Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration having been denied by
Resolution5 of April 22, 2004, they appealed to the Court of Appeals, contending that their principal,
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the Ministry, being a foreign government agency, is immune from suit and, as such, the immunity
extended to them; and that respondent was validly dismissed for her failure to meet the performance
rating within the one-year period as required under Kuwait’s Civil Service Laws. Petitioners further
contended that Ikdal should not be liable as an officer of petitioner ATCI.
By Decision6 of March 30, 2007, the appellate court affirmed the NLRC Resolution.
In brushing aside petitioners’ contention that they only acted as agent of the Ministry and that they
cannot be held jointly and solidarily liable with it, the appellate court noted that under the law, a
private employment agency shall assume all responsibilities for the implementation of the contract of
employment of an overseas worker, hence, it can be sued jointly and severally with the foreign
principal for any violation of the recruitment agreement or contract of employment.
As to Ikdal’s liability, the appellate court held that under Sec. 10 of Republic Act No. 8042, the
"Migrant and Overseas Filipinos’ Act of 1995," corporate officers, directors and partners of a
recruitment agency may themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the recruitment agency for
money claims and damages awarded to overseas workers.
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court by Resolution7 of
June 27, 2007, the present petition for review on certiorari was filed.
Petitioners maintain that they should not be held liable because respondent’s employment contract
specifically stipulates that her employment shall be governed by the Civil Service Law and
Regulations of Kuwait. They thus conclude that it was patent error for the labor tribunals and the
appellate court to apply the Labor Code provisions governing probationary employment in deciding
the present case.
Further, petitioners argue that even the Philippine Overseas Employment Act (POEA) Rules relative
to master employment contracts (Part III, Sec. 2 of the POEA Rules and Regulations) accord
respect to the "customs, practices, company policies and labor laws and legislation of the host
country."
Finally, petitioners posit that assuming arguendo that Philippine labor laws are applicable, given that
the foreign principal is a government agency which is immune from suit, as in fact it did not sign any
document agreeing to be held jointly and solidarily liable, petitioner ATCI cannot likewise be held
liable, more so since the Ministry’s liability had not been judicially determined as jurisdiction was not
acquired over it.
The petition fails.
Petitioner ATCI, as a private recruitment agency, cannot evade responsibility for the money claims of
Overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) which it deploys abroad by the mere expediency of claiming that
its foreign principal is a government agency clothed with immunity from suit, or that such foreign
principal’s liability must first be established before it, as agent, can be held jointly and solidarily
liable.
In providing for the joint and solidary liability of private recruitment agencies with their foreign
principals, Republic Act No. 8042 precisely affords the OFWs with a recourse and assures them of
immediate and sufficient payment of what is due them. Skippers United Pacific v. Maguad8 explains:
. . . [T]he obligations covenanted in the recruitment agreement entered into by and between the local
agent and its foreign principal are not coterminous with the term of such agreement so that if either
or both of the parties decide to end the agreement, the responsibilities of such parties towards the
contracted employees under the agreement do not at all end, but the same extends up to and until
the expiration of the employment contracts of the employees recruited and employed pursuant to the
said recruitment agreement. Otherwise, this will render nugatory the very purpose for which the law
governing the employment of workers for foreign jobs abroad was enacted. (emphasis supplied)
The imposition of joint and solidary liability is in line with the policy of the state to protect and
alleviate the plight of the working class.9 Verily, to allow petitioners to simply invoke the immunity
from suit of its foreign principal or to wait for the judicial determination of the foreign principal’s
liability before petitioner can be held liable renders the law on joint and solidary liability inutile.
As to petitioners’ contentions that Philippine labor laws on probationary employment are not
applicable since it was expressly provided in respondent’s employment contract, which she
voluntarily entered into, that the terms of her engagement shall be governed by prevailing Kuwaiti
Civil Service Laws and Regulations as in fact POEA Rules accord respect to such rules, customs
and practices of the host country, the same was not substantiated.
Indeed, a contract freely entered into is considered the law between the parties who can establish
stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, including the laws which
they wish to govern their respective obligations, as long as they are not contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order or public policy.
It is hornbook principle, however, that the party invoking the application of a foreign law has the
burden of proving the law, under the doctrine of processual presumption which, in this case,
petitioners failed to discharge. The Court’s ruling in EDI-Staffbuilders Int’l., v. NLRC10 illuminates:
In the present case, the employment contract signed by Gran specifically states that Saudi Labor
Laws will govern matters not provided for in the contract (e.g. specific causes for termination,
termination procedures, etc.). Being the law intended by the parties (lex loci intentiones) to apply to
the contract, Saudi Labor Laws should govern all matters relating to the termination of the
employment of Gran.
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the
burden of proving the foreign law. The foreign law is treated as a question of fact to be properly
pleaded and proved as the judge or labor arbiter cannot take judicial notice of a foreign law. He is
presumed to know only domestic or forum law.
Unfortunately for petitioner, it did not prove the pertinent Saudi laws on the matter; thus, the
International Law doctrine of presumed-identity approach or processual presumption comes into
play. Where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is that
foreign law is the same as ours. Thus, we apply Philippine labor laws in determining the issues
presented before us. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The Philippines does not take judicial notice of foreign laws, hence, they must not only be alleged;
they must be proven. To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and
comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court which reads:
SEC. 24. Proof of official record. — The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of
Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or
by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the
custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made
by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or
by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. (emphasis supplied)
SEC. 25. What attestation of copy must state. — Whenever a copy of a document or record is
attested for the purpose of the evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a
correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be
under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a
seal, under the seal of such court.
To prove the Kuwaiti law, petitioners submitted the following: MOA between respondent and the
Ministry, as represented by ATCI, which provides that the employee is subject to a probationary
21
period of one (1) year and that the host country’s Civil Service Laws and Regulations apply; a
translated copy11 (Arabic to English) of the termination letter to respondent stating that she did not
pass the probation terms, without specifying the grounds therefor, and a translated copy of the
certificate of termination,12 both of which documents were certified by Mr. Mustapha Alawi, Head of
the Department of Foreign Affairs-Office of Consular Affairs Inslamic Certification and Translation
Unit; and respondent’s letter13 of reconsideration to the Ministry, wherein she noted that in her first
eight (8) months of employment, she was given a rating of "Excellent" albeit it changed due to
changes in her shift of work schedule.

These documents, whether taken singly or as a whole, do not sufficiently prove that respondent was
validly terminated as a probationary employee under Kuwaiti civil service laws. Instead of submitting
a copy of the pertinent Kuwaiti labor laws duly authenticated and translated by Embassy officials
thereat, as required under the Rules, what petitioners submitted were mere certifications attesting
only to the correctness of the translations of the MOA and the termination letter which does not
prove at all that Kuwaiti civil service laws differ from Philippine laws and that under such Kuwaiti
laws, respondent was validly terminated. Thus the subject certifications read:

xxxx

This is to certify that the herein attached translation/s from Arabic to English/Tagalog and or vice
versa was/were presented to this Office for review and certification and the same was/were found to
be in order. This Office, however, assumes no responsibility as to the contents of the document/s.

This certification is being issued upon request of the interested party for whatever legal purpose it
may serve. (emphasis supplied)1avvphi1

Respecting Ikdal’s joint and solidary liability as a corporate officer, the same is in order too following
the express provision of R.A. 8042 on money claims, viz:

SEC. 10. Money Claims.—Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the Labor Arbiters of
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction
to hear and decide, within ninety (90) calendar days after the filing of the complaint, the claims
arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino
workers for overseas deployment including claims for actual moral, exemplary and other forms of
damages.

The liability of the principal/employer and the recruitment/placement agency for any and all claims
under this section shall be joint and several. This provision shall be incorporated in the contract for
overseas employment and shall be a condition precedent for its approval. The performance bond to
be filed by the recruitment/placement agency, as provided by law, shall be answerable for all money
claims or damages that may be awarded to the workers. If the recruitment/placement agency is a
juridical being, the corporate officers and directors and partners as the case may be, shall
themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation or partnership for the aforesaid claims
and damages. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.