CHARLES GOTARDO vs DIVINA BULING

G.R. No. 165166 August 15, 2012

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On September 6, 1995, respondent Divina Buling filed a complaint with the

Regional Trial Court for compulsory recognition and support pendente lite,
claiming that the petitioner is the father of her child Gliffze.

In his answer, the petitioner denied the imputed paternity of Gliffze. For the
parties’ failure to amicably settle the dispute, the RTC terminated the pre-
trial proceedings.Trial on the merits ensued.

The respondent testified for herself. Evidence for the respondent showed that
she met the petitioner on December 1, 1992 at the Philippine Commercial
and Industrial Bank. where she had been hired as a casual employee, while
the petitioner worked as accounting supervisor.The petitioner started
courting the respondent and they became sweethearts

Sometime in September 1993, the petitioner started intimate sexual

relations with the respondent. The sexual encounters occurred twice a month
and became more frequent in June 1994; eventually, on August 8, 1994, the
respondent found out that she was pregnant. When told of the pregnancy,
the petitioner was happy and made plans to marry the respondent. They in
fact applied for a marriage license. The petitioner even inquired about the
costs of a wedding reception and the bridal gown. Subsequently, however,
the petitioner backed out of the wedding plans.

The respondent responded by filing a complaint with the Municipal Trial Court
for damages against the petitioner for breach of promise to marry. Later,
however, the petitioner and the respondent amicably settled the case.

The respondent gave birth to their son Gliffze on March 9, 1995.19 When the
petitioner did not show up and failed to provide support to Gliffze, the
respondent sent him a letter demanding recognition of and support for their
child. When the petitioner did not answer the demand, the respondent filed
her complaint for compulsory recognition and support pendente lite.

The petitioner took the witness stand and testified for himself. He denied the
imputed paternity, claiming that he first had sexual contact with the
respondent in the first week of August 1994 and she could not have been
pregnant for twelve (12) weeks (or three (3) months) when he was informed
of the pregnancy on September 15, 1994.

During the pendency of the case, the RTC, on the respondent’s motion,
granted a ₱2,000.00 monthly child support, retroactive from March 1995.
THE RTC RULING

The RTC dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence proving

Gliffze’s filiation. It found the respondent’s testimony inconsistent on the
question of when she had her first sexual contact with the petitioner, i.e.,
"September 1993" in her direct testimony while "last week of January 1993"
during her cross-testimony, and her reason for engaging in sexual contact
even after she had refused the petitioner’s initial marriage proposal. It
ordered the respondent to return the amount of support pendente lite
erroneously awarded, and to pay ₱ 10,000.00 as attorney’s fees.

The respondent appealed the RTC ruling to the CA.

THE CA RULING

In its decision, the CA departed from the RTC's appreciation of the

respondent’s testimony, concluding that the latter merely made an honest
mistake in her understanding of the questions of the petitioner’s counsel. It
noted that the petitioner and the respondent had sexual relationship even
before August 1994; that the respondent had only one boyfriend, the
petitioner, from January 1993 to August 1994; and that the petitioner’s
allegation that the respondent had previous relationships with other men
remained unsubstantiated. The CA consequently set aside the RTC decision
and ordered the petitioner to recognize his minor son Gliffze. It also
reinstated the RTC order granting a ₱ 2,000.00 monthly child support.

When the CA denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration,the

petitioner filed the present petition for review on certiorari.

THE CASE FOR THE RESPONDENT

The respondent submits that the CA correctly explained that the

inconsistency in the respondent’s testimony was due to an incorrect
appreciation of the questions asked, and that the record is replete with
evidence proving that the petitioner was her lover and that they had several
intimate sexual encounters during their relationship, resulting in her
pregnancy and Gliffze’s birth on March 9, 1995.

THE ISSUE

The sole issue before us is whether the CA committed a reversible error

when it set aside the RTC’s findings and ordered the petitioner to recognize
and provide legal support to his minor son Gliffze.
SUPREME COURT’S RULING

We do not find any reversible error in the CA’s ruling.

We have recognized that "[f]iliation proceedings are usually filed not just to
adjudicate paternity but also to secure a legal right associated with
paternity, such as citizenship, support (as in this case) or inheritance. [In
paternity cases, the burden of proof] is on the person who alleges that the
putative father is the biological father of the child."

One can prove filiation, either legitimate or illegitimate, through the record of
birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, an admission of
filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed
by the parent concerned, or the open and continuous possession of the
status of a legitimate or illegitimate child, or any other means allowed by the
Rules of Court and special laws.

We have held that such other proof of one's filiation may be a "baptismal
certificate, a judicial admission, a family bible in which his name has been
entered, common reputation respecting [his] pedigree, admission by silence,
the [testimonies] of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

that there are four significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity

action that parties have to face: a prima facie case, affirmative defenses,
presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the putative
father and the child. We explained that a prima facie case exists if a woman
declares — supported by corroborative proof — that she had sexual relations
with the putative father; at this point, the burden of evidence shifts to the
putative father. We explained further that the two affirmative defenses
available to the putative father are: (1) incapability of sexual relations with
the mother due to either physical absence or impotency, or (2) that the
mother had sexual relations with other men at the time of conception.

In this case, the respondent established a prima facie case that the
petitioner is the putative father of Gliffze through testimony that she had
been sexually involved only with one man, the petitioner, at the time of her
conception. Rodulfo corroborated her testimony that the petitioner and the
respondent had intimate relationship.

On the other hand, the petitioner did not deny that he had sexual encounters
with the respondent, only that it occurred on a much later date than the
respondent asserted, such that it was physically impossible for the
respondent to have been three (3) months pregnant already in September
1994 when he was informed of the pregnancy. However, the petitioner failed
to substantiate his allegations of infidelity and insinuations of promiscuity.
His allegations, therefore, cannot be given credence for lack of evidentiary
support. The petitioner’s denial cannot overcome the respondent’s clear and
categorical assertions.

Notes:

Jurisprudence teaches that in assessing the credibility of a witness, his

testimony must be considered in its entirety instead of in truncated parts.
The technique in deciphering a testimony is not to consider only its isolated
parts and to anchor a conclusion based on these parts. "In ascertaining the
facts established by a witness, everything stated by him on direct, cross and
redirect examinations must be calibrated and considered."

Since filiation is beyond question, support follows as a matter of obligation; a

parent is obliged to support his child, whether legitimate or illegitimate.
Support consists of everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling,
clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with
the financial capacity of the family. Thus, the amount of support is variable
and, for this reason, no final judgment on the amount of support is made as
the amount shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and
the necessities of the recipient. It may be reduced or increased
proportionately according to the reduction or increase of the necessities of
the recipient and the resources or means of the person obliged to support.
LZK HOLDINGS and DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
vs.
PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK

G.R. No. 187973 January 20, 2014

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The facts are not disputed.

LZK Holdings obtained a ₱40,000,000.00 loan from Planters Bank on

December 16, 1996 and secured the same with a Real Estate Mortgage over
its lot located in La Union.

On September 21, 1998, the lot was sold at a public auction after Planters
Bank extrajudicially foreclosed the real estate mortgage thereon due to LZK
Holdings' failure to pay its loan. Planters Bank emerged as the highest bidder
during the auction sale and its certificate of sale was registered on March 16,
1999.

LZK Holdings filed before the RTC of Makati City, Branch 150, a complaint for
annulment of extra judicial foreclosure, mortgage contract, promissory note
and damages. LZK Holdings also prayed for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order (TRO) or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the
consolidation of title over the lot by Planters Bank.
On December 27, 1999, Planters Bank filed an ex-parte motion for the
issuance of a writ of possession with the RTC-San Fernando.

On March 13, 2000 or three (3) days before the expiration of LZK Holdings'
redemption period, the RTC-Makati issued a TRO effective for 20 days
enjoining Planters Bank from consolidating its title over the property. On April
3, 2000, the RTC-Makati ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction for the same purpose but the writ was issued only on June 20,
2000 upon LZK Holdings' posting of a ₱40,000.00 bond.

In the meantime, Planters Bank succeeded in consolidating its ownership

over the property on April 24, 2000. However, the proceedings for its ex-
parte motion for the issuance of a writ of possession was suspended by the
RTC-San Fernando in an Order dated May 11, 2000 in view of the TRO and
writ of preliminary injunction issued by the RTC-Makati. Planters Bank moved
for reconsideration but its motion was denied by the RTC-San Fernando in an
Order dated September 1, 2000.

Meanwhile, upon motion of LZK Holdings, the RTC-Makati declared as null

and void the consolidated title of Planters Bank in an Order dated June 2,
2000. Such ruling was affirmed by the CA in a Decision dated February 26,
2004

When the matter reached the Court via G.R. No. 164563, we sustained the
CA's judgment in our Resolution dated September 13, 2004.

Planters Bank also appealed the May 11, 2000 Order of the RTC-San
Fernando which held in abeyance the resolution of its ex parte motion for the
issuance of a writ of possession. This time, Planters Bank was victorious. The
CA granted the appeal and annulled the assailed order of the RTC-San
Fernando.

Aggrieved, LZK Holdings sought recourse with the Court in a petition for
review.

THE ISSUE

Whether or not Planters Bank may apply for and is entitled to a writ of
possession as the purchaser of the property in the foreclosure sale.

SUPREME COURT’S RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the CA's ruling and decreed that Planters Bank
may apply for and is entitled to a writ of possession as the purchaser of the
property in the foreclosure sale.
Planters Bank, as the purchaser in the foreclosure sale, may apply for a writ
of possession during the redemption period. In fact, it did apply for a writ on
December 27, 1999, well within the redemption period.

The San Fernando RTC, given its ministerial duty to issue the writ, therefore,
should have acted on the ex parte petition. The injunction order is of no
moment because it should be understood to have merely stayed the
consolidation of title.

As previously stated, an injunction is not allowed to prohibit the issuance of a

writ of possession. Neither does the pending case for annulment of
foreclosure sale, mortgage contract, promissory notes and damages stay the
issuance of said writ.

Lastly, the trial on the merits has not even started. Until the foreclosure sale
of the property in question is annulled by a court of competent jurisdiction,
petitioner is bereft of valid title and of the right to prevent the issuance of a
writ of possession to [Planters Bank]. Until then, it is the trial court's
ministerial function to grant the possessory writ to [Planters Bank]. "

Under the principle of conclusiveness of judgment, the right of Planter's Bank

to a writ of possession as adjudged in G.R. No. 167998 is binding and
conclusive on the parties.

The doctrine of res judicata by conclusiveness of judgment postulates that

"when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of
competent jurisdiction, or when an opportunity for such trial has been given,
the judgment of the court, as long as it remains unreversed, should be
conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them.

No hearing is required prior to the issuance of a writ of possession. This is

clear from the following disquisitions in Espinoza v. United Overseas Bank
Phils. which reiterates the settled rules on writs of possession, to wit:

The proceeding in a petition for a writ of possession is ex parte and summary

in nature. It is a judicial proceeding brought for the benefit of one party only
and without notice by the court to any person adverse of interest. It is a
proceeding wherein relief is granted without giving the person against whom
the relief is sought an opportunity to be heard.

By its very nature, an ex parte petition for issuance of a writ of possession is

a non-litigious proceeding. It is a judicial proceeding for the enforcement of
one's right of possession as purchaser in a foreclosure sale. It is not an
ordinary suit filed in court, by which one party sues another for the
enforcement of a wrong or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress
of a wrong.
Note:

"A writ of possession is a writ of execution employed to enforce a judgment

to recover the possession of land. It commands the sheriff to enter the land
and give possession of it to the person entitled under the judgment. It may
be issued in case of an extrajudicial foreclosure of a real estate mortgage
under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118.

Under said provision, the writ of possession may be issued to the purchaser
in a foreclosure sale either within the one-year redemption period upon the
filing of a bond, or after the lapse of the redemption period, without need of
a bond.

We have consistently held that the duty of the trial court to grant a writ of
possession is ministerial. Such writ issues as a matter of course upon the
filing of the proper motion and the approval of the corresponding bond. No
discretion is left to the trial court.

Any question regarding the regularity and validity of the sale, as well as the
consequent cancellation of the writ, is to be determined in a subsequent
proceeding as outlined in Section 8 of Act No. 3135. Such question cannot be
raised to oppose the issuance of the writ, since the proceeding is ex parte.
The recourse is available even before the expiration of the redemption period
provided by law and the Rules of Court.

To emphasize the writ's ministerial character, we have in previous cases

disallowed injunction to prohibit its issuance, just as we have held that
issuance of the same may not be stayed by a pending action for annulment
of mortgage or the foreclosure itself.

G.R. No. 165166 August 15, 2012

CHARLES GOTARDO, Petitioner,

vs.
DIVINA BULING, Respondent.

VILLARAMA, JR.,*

DECISION
BRION, J.:

We resolve the petition for review on certiorari, 1 filed by petitioner Charles

Gotardo, to challenge the March 5, 2004 decision2 and the July 27, 2004
resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA GR CV No. 76326. The CA
decision ordered the petitioner to recognize and provide legal support to his
minor son, Gliffze 0. Buling. The CA resolution denied the petitioner's
subsequent motion for reconsideration.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On September 6, 1995, respondent Divina Buling filed a complaint with the

Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Maasin, Southern Leyte, Branch 25, for
compulsory recognition and support pendente lite, claiming that the
petitioner is the father of her child Gliffze.4

In his answer, the petitioner denied the imputed paternity of Gliffze.5 For the
parties’ failure to amicably settle the dispute, the RTC terminated the pre-
trial proceedings.6 Trial on the merits ensued.

The respondent testified for herself and presented Rodulfo Lopez as witness.
Evidence for the respondent showed that she met the petitioner on
December 1, 1992 at the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank, Maasin,
Southern Leyte branch where she had been hired as a casual employee,
while the petitioner worked as accounting supervisor.7 The petitioner started
courting the respondent in the third week of December 1992 and they
became sweethearts in the last week of January 1993.8 The petitioner gave
the respondent greeting cards on special occasions, such as on Valentine’s
Day and her birthday; she reciprocated his love and took care of him when
he was ill.9

Sometime in September 1993, the petitioner started intimate sexual

relations with the respondent in the former’s rented room in the boarding
house managed by Rodulfo, the respondent’s uncle, on Tomas Oppus St.,
Agbao, Maasin, Southern Leyte.10 The petitioner rented the room from
March 1, 1993 to August 30, 1994.11 The sexual encounters occurred twice a
month and became more frequent in June 1994; eventually, on August 8,
1994, the respondent found out that she was pregnant.12 When told of the
pregnancy, the petitioner was happy and made plans to marry the
respondent.13 They in fact applied for a marriage license.14 The petitioner
even inquired about the costs of a wedding reception and the bridal gown.15
Subsequently, however, the petitioner backed out of the wedding plans.16

The respondent responded by filing a complaint with the Municipal Trial Court
of Maasin, Southern Leyte for damages against the petitioner for breach of
promise to marry.17 Later, however, the petitioner and the respondent
amicably settled the case.18

The respondent gave birth to their son Gliffze on March 9, 1995.19 When the
petitioner did not show up and failed to provide support to Gliffze, the
respondent sent him a letter on July 24, 1995 demanding recognition of and
support for their child.20 When the petitioner did not answer the demand,
the respondent filed her complaint for compulsory recognition and support
pendente lite.21

The petitioner took the witness stand and testified for himself. He denied the
imputed paternity,22 claiming that he first had sexual contact with the
respondent in the first week of August 1994 and she could not have been
pregnant for twelve (12) weeks (or three (3) months) when he was informed
of the pregnancy on September 15, 1994.23

During the pendency of the case, the RTC, on the respondent’s motion,24
granted a ₱2,000.00 monthly child support, retroactive from March 1995.25

THE RTC RULING

In its June 25, 2002 decision, the RTC dismissed the complaint for
insufficiency of evidence proving Gliffze’s filiation. It found the respondent’s
testimony inconsistent on the question of when she had her first sexual
contact with the petitioner, i.e., "September 1993" in her direct testimony
while "last week of January 1993" during her cross-testimony, and her reason
for engaging in sexual contact even after she had refused the petitioner’s
initial marriage proposal. It ordered the respondent to return the amount of
support pendente lite erroneously awarded, and to pay ₱ 10,000.00 as
attorney’s fees.26

The respondent appealed the RTC ruling to the CA.27

THE CA RULING

In its March 5, 2004 decision, the CA departed from the RTC's appreciation of
the respondent’s testimony, concluding that the latter merely made an
honest mistake in her understanding of the questions of the petitioner’s
counsel. It noted that the petitioner and the respondent had sexual
relationship even before August 1994; that the respondent had only one
boyfriend, the petitioner, from January 1993 to August 1994; and that the
petitioner’s allegation that the respondent had previous relationships with
other men remained unsubstantiated. The CA consequently set aside the RTC
decision and ordered the petitioner to recognize his minor son Gliffze. It also
reinstated the RTC order granting a ₱ 2,000.00 monthly child support.28
When the CA denied29 the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration,30 the
petitioner filed the present petition for review on certiorari.

THE PETITION

The petitioner argues that the CA committed a reversible error in rejecting

the RTC’s appreciation of the respondent’s testimony, and that the evidence
on record is insufficient to prove paternity.

THE CASE FOR THE RESPONDENT

The respondent submits that the CA correctly explained that the

inconsistency in the respondent’s testimony was due to an incorrect
appreciation of the questions asked, and that the record is replete with
evidence proving that the petitioner was her lover and that they had several
intimate sexual encounters during their relationship, resulting in her
pregnancy and Gliffze’s birth on March 9, 1995.

THE ISSUE

The sole issue before us is whether the CA committed a reversible error

when it set aside the RTC’s findings and ordered the petitioner to recognize
and provide legal support to his minor son Gliffze.

OUR RULING

We do not find any reversible error in the CA’s ruling.

We have recognized that "[f]iliation proceedings are usually filed not just to
adjudicate paternity but also to secure a legal right associated with
paternity, such as citizenship, support (as in this case) or inheritance. [In
paternity cases, the burden of proof] is on the person who alleges that the
putative father is the biological father of the child."31

One can prove filiation, either legitimate or illegitimate, through the record of
birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, an admission of
filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed
by the parent concerned, or the open and continuous possession of the
status of a legitimate or illegitimate child, or any other means allowed by the
Rules of Court and special laws.32 We have held that such other proof of
one's filiation may be a "baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family
bible in which his name has been entered, common reputation respecting
[his] pedigree, admission by silence, the [testimonies] of witnesses, and
other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court."33
In Herrera v. Alba,34 we stressed that there are four significant procedural
aspects of a traditional paternity action that parties have to face: a prima
facie case, affirmative defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and physical
resemblance between the putative father and the child.35 We explained that
a prima facie case exists if a woman declares — supported by corroborative
proof — that she had sexual relations with the putative father; at this point,
the burden of evidence shifts to the putative father.36 We explained further
that the two affirmative defenses available to the putative father are: (1)
incapability of sexual relations with the mother due to either physical
absence or impotency, or (2) that the mother had sexual relations with other
men at the time of conception.37

In this case, the respondent established a prima facie case that the
petitioner is the putative father of Gliffze through testimony that she had
been sexually involved only with one man, the petitioner, at the time of her
conception.38 Rodulfo corroborated her testimony that the petitioner and the
respondent had intimate relationship.39

On the other hand, the petitioner did not deny that he had sexual encounters
with the respondent, only that it occurred on a much later date than the
respondent asserted, such that it was physically impossible for the
respondent to have been three (3) months pregnant already in September
1994 when he was informed of the pregnancy.40 However, the petitioner
failed to substantiate his allegations of infidelity and insinuations of
promiscuity. His allegations, therefore, cannot be given credence for lack of
evidentiary support. The petitioner’s denial cannot overcome the
respondent’s clear and categorical assertions.

The petitioner, as the RTC did, made much of the variance between the
respondent’s direct testimony regarding their first sexual contact as
"sometime in September 1993" and her cross-testimony when she stated
that their first sexual contact was "last week of January 1993," as follows:

ATTY. GO CINCO:

When did the defendant, according to you, start courting you?

A Third week of December 1992.

Q And you accepted him?

A Last week of January 1993.

Q And by October you already had your sexual intercourse?

A Last week of January 1993.

COURT: What do you mean by accepting?

A I accepted his offer of love.41

We find that the contradictions are for the most part more apparent than
real, having resulted from the failure of the respondent to comprehend the
question posed, but this misunderstanding was later corrected and
satisfactorily explained. Indeed, when confronted for her contradictory
statements, the respondent explained that that portion of the transcript of
stenographic notes was incorrect and she had brought it to the attention of
Atty. Josefino Go Cinco (her former counsel) but the latter took no action on
the matter.42

Jurisprudence teaches that in assessing the credibility of a witness, his

testimony must be considered in its entirety instead of in truncated parts.
The technique in deciphering a testimony is not to consider only its isolated
parts and to anchor a conclusion based on these parts. "In ascertaining the
facts established by a witness, everything stated by him on direct, cross and
redirect examinations must be calibrated and considered."43 Evidently, the
totality of the respondent's testimony positively and convincingly shows that
no real inconsistency exists. The respondent has consistently asserted that
she started intimate sexual relations with the petitioner sometime in
September 1993.44

Since filiation is beyond question, support follows as a matter of obligation; a

parent is obliged to support his child, whether legitimate or illegitimate.45
Support consists of everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling,
clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with
the financial capacity of the family.46 Thus, the amount of support is variable
and, for this reason, no final judgment on the amount of support is made as
the amount shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and
the necessities of the recipient.47 It may be reduced or increased
proportionately according to the reduction or increase of the necessities of
the recipient and the resources or means of the person obliged to support.48

In this case, we sustain the award of ₱ 2,000.00 monthly child support,

without prejudice to the filing of the proper motion in the RTC for the
determination of any support in arrears, considering the needs of the child,
Gliffze, during the pendency of this case.

WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the petition for lack of merit. The March 5,
2004 decision and the July 27, 2004 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA
GR CV No. 76326 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 187973 January 20, 2014

LZK HOLDINGS and DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.
PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

REYES, J.:

This resolves the appeal filed by petitioner LZK Holdings and Development
Corporation (LZK Holdings) assailing the Decision1 dated January 27, 2009 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. S.P. No. 103267 affirming the Order 2
dated April 8, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando City
(San Fernando), La Union, Branch 66, which issued a writ of possession in
favor of respondent Planters Development Bank (Planters Bank).

The facts are not disputed.

LZK Holdings obtained a ₱40,000,000.00 loan from Planters Bank on

December 16, 1996 and secured the same with a Real Estate Mortgage over
its lot located in La Union. The lot measures 589 square meters and is
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-45337.

On September 21, 1998, the lot was sold at a public auction after Planters
Bank extrajudicially foreclosed the real estate mortgage thereon due to LZK
Holdings' failure to pay its loan. Planters Bank emerged as the highest bidder
during the auction sale and its certificate of sale was registered on March 16,
1999.

On April 5, 1999, LZK Holdings filed before the RTC of Makati City, Branch
150, a complaint for annulment of extra judicial foreclosure, mortgage
contract, promissory note and damages. LZK Holdings also prayed for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) or writ of preliminary
injunction to enjoin the consolidation of title over the lot by Planters Bank.

On December 27, 1999, Planters Bank filed an ex-parte motion for the
issuance of a writ of possession with the RTC-San Fernando.

On March 13, 2000 or three (3) days before the expiration of LZK Holdings'
redemption period, the RTC-Makati issued a TRO effective for 20 days
enjoining Planters Bank from consolidating its title over the property. On April
3, 2000, the RTC-Makati ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction for the same purpose3 but the writ was issued only on June 20,
2000 upon LZK Holdings' posting of a ₱40,000.00 bond.

In the meantime, Planters Bank succeeded in consolidating its ownership

over the property on April 24, 2000. However, the proceedings for its ex-
parte motion for the issuance of a writ of possession was suspended by the
RTC-San Fernando in an Order dated May 11, 2000 in view of the TRO and
writ of preliminary injunction issued by the RTC-Makati. Planters Bank moved
for reconsideration but its motion was denied by the RTC-San Fernando in an
Order dated September 1, 2000.4

Meanwhile, upon motion of LZK Holdings, the RTC-Makati declared as null

and void the consolidated title of Planters Bank in an Order5 dated June 2,
2000. Such ruling was affirmed by the CA in a Decision6 dated February 26,
2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 59327. When the matter reached the Court via G.R.
No. 164563, we sustained the CA's judgment in our Resolution7 dated
September 13, 2004.

Planters Bank also appealed the May 11, 2000 Order of the RTC-San
Fernando which held in abeyance the resolution of its ex parte motion for the
issuance of a writ of possession. This time, Planters Bank was victorious. The
CA granted the appeal and annulled the assailed order of the RTC-San
Fernando. Aggrieved, LZK Holdings sought recourse with the Court in a
petition for review docketed as G.R. No. 167998.8 In Our Decision dated April
27, 2007, we affirmed the CA's ruling and decreed that Planters Bank may
apply for and is entitled to a writ of possession as the purchaser of the
property in the foreclosure sale, viz:
"A writ of possession is a writ of execution employed to enforce a judgment
to recover the possession of land. It commands the sheriff to enter the land
and give possession of it to the person entitled under the judgment. It may
be issued in case of an extrajudicial foreclosure of a real estate mortgage
under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118.

Under said provision, the writ of possession may be issued to the purchaser
in a foreclosure sale either within the one-year redemption period upon the
filing of a bond, or after the lapse of the redemption period, without need of
a bond.

We have consistently held that the duty of the trial court to grant a writ of
possession is ministerial. Such writ issues as a matter of course upon the
filing of the proper motion and the approval of the corresponding bond. No
discretion is left to the trial court. Any question regarding the regularity and
validity of the sale, as well as the consequent cancellation of the writ, is to
be determined in a subsequent proceeding as outlined in Section 8 of Act No.
3135. Such question cannot be raised to oppose the issuance of the writ,
since the proceeding is ex parte. The recourse is available even before the
expiration of the redemption period provided by law and the Rules of Court.

To emphasize the writ's ministerial character, we have in previous cases

disallowed injunction to prohibit its issuance, just as we have held that
issuance of the same may not be stayed by a pending action for annulment
of mortgage or the foreclosure itself.

xxxx

x x x [Planters Bank], as the purchaser in the foreclosure sale, may apply for
a writ of possession during the redemption period. In fact, it did apply for a
writ on December 27, 1999, well within the redemption period. The San
Fernando RTC, given its ministerial duty to issue the writ, therefore, should
have acted on the ex parte petition. The injunction order is of no moment
because it should be understood to have merely stayed the consolidation of
title. As previously stated, an injunction is not allowed to prohibit the
issuance of a writ of possession. Neither does the pending case for
annulment of foreclosure sale, mortgage contract, promissory notes and
damages stay the issuance of said writ.

Lastly, the trial on the merits has not even started. Until the foreclosure sale
of the property in question is annulled by a court of competent jurisdiction,
petitioner is bereft of valid title and of the right to prevent the issuance of a
writ of possession to [Planters Bank]. Until then, it is the trial court's
ministerial function to grant the possessory writ to [Planters Bank]. "9
(Citations omitted)
Armed with the above ruling, Planters Bank filed before the RTC-San
Fernando a motion to set ex-parte hearing for the issuance of a writ of
possession. LZK Holdings opposed the motion. In an Order dated April 2,
2008, the RTC-San Fernando denied the opposition and set the hearing on
April 14, 2008. On April 8, 2008, the RTC-San Fernando issued another
Order10 declaring the scheduled hearing moot and academic and granting
Planter Bank's ex-parte motion for the issuance of a writ of possession which
was filed as early as December 27, 1999. The decretal portion of the order
reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the pet1t10n is hereby granted, hence

the order setting the case for ex-parte hearing on April 14, 2008 is rendered
moot and academic by this order. Let [a] Writ of Possession issue in favor of
Planters Development Bank and the Deputy Sheriff of this Court is hereby
directed to place Planters Development Bank or any of its authorized
representatives in possession of the subject parcel of land, together with all
the improvements existing thereon, covered by TCT- 45337 of the Register of
Deeds for the province of La Union against LZK HOLDINGS AND
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (referred to as LZK) including all other
persons/occupants who are claiming rights under them and who are
depriving [Planters Bank] of its right to possess the above-described property
upon the filing of bond by (Planters Bank] in the amount of two million pesos
(Php2,000,000.00).

SO ORDERED.11

In its herein assailed Decision12 dated January 27, 2009, the CA affirmed the
foregoing ruling and dismissed LZK Holdings' petition for certiorari docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 103267. The CA likewise denied LZK Holdings' motion for
reconsideration in its Resolution13 dated May 12, 2009.

LZK Holdings then filed a motion before the Court for a 30-day extension
within which to file a petition for review reckoned from the date of its receipt
of the resolution granting such extension. In our Resolution dated July 15,
2009 we granted the motion but we ordered that the 30-day extended period
shall be counted from the expiration of the original reglementary period.14
As such, LZK Holdings had until July 23, 2009 to file its petition and not
August 24, 2009 or the date when the petition was actually filed.

In our Resolution dated August 26, 2009, we denied the petition for being
filed beyond the extended period pursuant to Section 5(a), Rule 56 of the
Rules of Court and for lack of reversible error in the assailed judgment of the
CA.15 LZK Holdings moved for reconsideration16 explaining that it was able
to obtain a copy of the Court's July 15, 2009 Resolution on July 29, 2009
when Lourdes Z. Korshak, LZK Holdings' Chief Executive Officer, went to the
Office of the Clerk of Court of the Third Division and that she still had to
confront and get the case records from the company's previous counsel and
then look for a substitute lawyer. LZK Holdings also claimed that the writ of
possession issued to Planters Bank should be annulled for the following
reasons, to wit:

(a) with the cancellation of Planters Bank's consolidated title, LZK Holdings
remain to be the registered owner of the property and as such, the former
had no right to apply for a writ of possession pursuant to PNB v. Sanao
Marketing Corporation,17 which held that right of possession is based on the
ownership of the subject property by the applicant;

(b) LZK Holdings was deprived of due process because the RTC did not
conduct a hearing on Planter Bank's motion for the issuance of a writ of
possession;

(c) the P.2,000,000.00 bond posted by LZK Holdings does not conform with
Section 7 of Act No. 3135 which mandates that the bond amount shall be
equivalent to "twelve (12) months use of the subject property" which in this
case amounted to P.7,801,4 72.28 at the time the writ was issued.

In a Resolution18 dated October 13, 2010 the Court took a liberal stance on
the late filing of LZK Holdings' petition for review. Accordingly, its motion for
reconsideration was granted and the petition for review reinstated.

However, after a re-examination of the substantive merits of the petition, the

Court finds and stands by its initial determination that the CA committed no
reversible error in affirming the issuance of a writ of possession by the R TC
in favor of Planters Bank.

Under the principle of conclusiveness of judgment, the right of Planter's Bank

to a writ of possession as adjudged in G.R. No. 167998 is binding and
conclusive on the parties.

The doctrine of res judicata by conclusiveness of judgment postulates that

"when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of
competent jurisdiction, or when an opportunity for such trial has been given,
the judgment of the court, as long as it remains unreversed, should be
conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them."19

All the elements of the doctrine are present in this case. The final judgment
in G.R. No. 167998 was rendered by the Court pursuant to its jurisdiction
over the review of decisions and rulings of the CA. It was a judgment on the
merits of Planters Banks's right to apply for and be issued a writ of
possession. Lastly, the parties in G.R. No. 167998 are the same parties
involved in the present case.20
Hence, LZK Holdings can no longer question Planter Bank's right to a writ of
possession over the subject property because the doctrine of conclusiveness
of judgment bars the relitigation of such particular issue.

Moreover, the authority relied upon by LZK Holdings defeats rather than
support its position. The ruling in PNB21 echoes the very same rationale of
the judgment in G.R. No. 167998 that is - the purchaser in foreclosure sale
may take possession of the property even before the expiration of the
redemption period by filing an ex parte motion for such purpose and upon
posting of the necessary bond.22

The pronouncement in PNB that right of possession is based on the

ownership of the subject property by the applicant pertains to applications
for writ of possession after the expiration of the redemption period, a
situation not contemplated within the facts of the present case.

We cannot also uphold the contentions of LZK Holdings that the RTC, in
issuing the writ of possession, transgressed Act No. 3135.23

No hearing is required prior to the issuance of a writ of possession. This is

clear from the following disquisitions in Espinoza v. United Overseas Bank
Phils.24 which reiterates the settled rules on writs of possession, to wit:

The proceeding in a petition for a writ of possession is ex parte and summary

in nature.1âwphi1 It is a judicial proceeding brought for the benefit of one
party only and without notice by the court to any person adverse of interest.
It is a proceeding wherein relief is granted without giving the person against
whom the relief is sought an opportunity to be heard.

By its very nature, an ex parte petition for issuance of a writ of possession is

a non-litigious proceeding. It is a judicial proceeding for the enforcement of
one's right of possession as purchaser in a foreclosure sale. It is not an
ordinary suit filed in court, by which one party sues another for the
enforcement of a wrong or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress
of a wrong.25 (Citations omitted)

Given the ex-parte nature of the proceedings for a writ of possession, the R
TC did not err in cancelling the previously scheduled hearing and in granting
Planters Bank's motion without affording notice to LZK Holdings or allowing it
to participate.

Anent the correct amount of surety bond, it is well to emphasize that our
task in an appeal by petition for review on certiorari is limited, as a
jurisdictional matter, to reviewing errors of law that might have been
committed by the CA.26 The allegations of incorrect computation of the
surety bond involve factual matters within the competence of the trial court
to address as this Court is not a trier of facts. The RTC found the amount of
₱2,000,000.00 to be sufficiently equivalent to the use of the property for a
period of twelve (12) months. We are bound by such factual finding
especially considering the affirmation accorded it by the CA.

In fine, the decision of the CA is in accordance with the law and

jurisprudence on the matter. It correctly sustained the Order of the RTC in
issuing a writ of possession in favor of Planters Bank.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The

Decision dated January 27, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. S.P. No.
103267 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED