CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION (cases # 7-10)

People vs Lugnasin, February 24, 2016 GR No. 208404

http://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2016februarydecisions.php?id=192

Gist: The allegations of the accused that their warrantless arrest was illegal should have been
raised before arraignment, otherwise they are deemed waived. Allegations that they were not
informed of their Constitutional rights at the time of their arrest and their rights under
Section 2 and 3 of Republic Act No. 7438 are relevant and material only to cases in which
an extrajudicial admission or confession extracted from the accused becomes the basis for
their conviction.

Facts: Vicente Lugnasin, Devincio Guerrero, accused appellants, and nine other individuals
were charged with the crime of kidnapping for ransom under Article 267 of the Revised Penal
Code. When arraigned, the accused appellants pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. The lone
issue in the Regional Trial Court was whether or not the identification of the kidnapped victim,
Nicassius Cordero, of the accused appellants as among his kidnappers is reliable. The trial court
convicted the accused and held that Cordero was a careful, truthful, and candid witness whose
story was supported by the evidence submitted. Cordero was able to identify both accused as he
was able to see their faces before being blindfolded. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
conviction but modified the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua without possibility of
parole.

Issues:

1. WON the court a quo erred in not finding Devincio’s warrantless arrest illegal.

2. WON the court a quo erred in not finding that Devinicio’s rights under Republic Act No. 7438
(An Act Defining Certain Rights of Persons Arrested, Detained or Under Custodial Investigation
as well as the Duties of the Arresting, Detaining and Investigating Officers, and Providing
Penalties for Violations thereof) were violated.

Ruling:

1. No. All questions involving the validity of an arrest should be made before arraignment;
otherwise it shall be deemed waived.
2. No. Aside from the bare faced claim of the accused, he has offered no evidence to sustain
such claim; and appellant Devinicio (or Vicente for that matter), has not executed an
extrajudicial confession or admission. As stated in People vs Buluran and Valenzuela,
there is no violation of the constitutional rights of the accused during custodial
investigation since neither one executed an extrajudicial confession. Any allegations of
violation of rights under custodial investigation are relevant and material only to
 cases in which an extrajudicial admission or confession extracted from the accused
becomes the basis for their conviction.

Aparis v People, February 17, 2010 GR No. 169195

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/169195.htm

Gist: A claim that the accused was not informed of his constitutional rights cannot prevail over
the testimonies of the buy bust team as the latter are given full faith and credit in the
absence of clear and convincing evidence that the members of the buy bust team were
inspired by any improper motive or were not properly performing their duty.

Facts: Petitioner, Francisco Aparis, and co-accused, Edilberto Campos, were charged with
violation of Section 15, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drug Act of 1972) and
were arrested through a buy bust operation. Both pleaded not guilty to the offense. Petitioner
denied the occurrence of the buy bust operation and alleged that he was simply framed up. The
RTC acquitted Campos but convicted Petitioner. The CA affirmed the RTC with modifications
on the penalty imposed (from six to twelve years to six to eight years and eight months)

Issue: WON the fundamental rights of the petitioner were violated when he was allegedly
arrested by the police officers as he was not properly apprised of the same.

Ruling: No. A claim that the accused was not informed of his constitutional rights cannot prevail
over the testimonies of the buy bust team as the latter are given full faith and credit in the
absence of clear and convincing evidence that the members of the buy bust team were
inspired by any improper motive or were not properly performing their duty.

Notes: To secure a conviction for illegal sale of shabu, the following essential elements must be
established: (1) the identity of buyer and the seller, the object of the sale and the consideration;
and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment thereof.

Prior surveillance is not required before a buy bust operation may be conducted especially when
the police are accompanied by their informant during the entrapment.

People vs Usman, February 17, 2010 GR No. 169195

http://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2015februarydecisions.php?id=97

Gist: The claim of accused-appellant that he was not apprised of the rights of a person taken
into custody under R. A. No. 7438, which claim was raised only during appeal and not before
he was arraigned, is deemed waived.
Facts: Accused is charged with violating RA No. 9165 and was arrested during a buy bust
operation. Accused alleged that he is a victim of a frame up. He was convicted by the RTC. On
appeal, the accused contended that his arrest was invalid and the evidence presented against him
were also inadmissible for being products of an invalid search and seizure. The accused also
claims that his rights under RA No. 7438 were violated when he was not apprised of
Constitutional rights. The CA affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC.

Issue: WON the court a quo erred in not finding that accused-appellants’ rights under Republic
Act No. 7438 (AN ACT DEFINING CERTAIN RIGHTS OF PERSON ARRESTED,
DETAINED OR UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION AS WELL AS THE DUTIES OF
THE ARRESTING, DETAINING AND INVESTIGATING OFFICERS, AND PROVIDING
PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS THEREOF) were violated.

Ruling: No, the claim of accused-appellant that he was not apprised of the rights of a person
taken into custody under R. A. No. 7438, which claim was raised only during appeal and not
before he was arraigned, is deemed waived.

Lumanog vs People, September 7, 2010 G.R. No. 182555

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/september2010/182555.htm

Gist: The Supreme Court upholds the constitutional mandate protecting the rights of persons
under custodial investigation. But while we strike down the extrajudicial confession extracted
in violation of constitutionally enshrined rights and declare it inadmissible in evidence,
appellants are not entitled to an acquittal because their conviction was not based on the
evidence obtained during such custodial investigation.

Facts: Appellants are charged for the crime of murder of a certain Rolando Abadilla. Evidence
consists of, among others, the extrajudicial confession of one of the alleged perpetrators of the
crime, Joel de Jesus.

Issue: WON the rights of the appellants under custodial investigation were violated.

Ruling: The rights of persons under custodial investigation are enshrined in Article III, Section
12 of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:

Sec. 12 (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an

offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person
cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
 (2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means
which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places,
solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or section 17

hereof (right against self-incrimination) shall be inadmissible in evidence against
him.

(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violation of this
section as well as compensation for the rehabilitation of victims of tortures or
similar practices, and their families.

Extrajudicial Confession
of Joel de Jesus Not Valid

Custodial investigation refers to the critical pre-trial stage when the investigation is no
longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime, but has begun to focus on a particular person as
a suspect. Police officers claimed that appellants were apprehended as a result of hot pursuit
activities on the days following the ambush-slay of Abadilla. There is no question, however, that
when appellants were arrested they were already considered suspects.

R.A. No. 7438 read:

SEC. 2. Rights of Persons Arrested, Detained or under Custodial

Investigation; Duties of Public Officers.

a. Any person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation shall at

all times be assisted by counsel.

b. Any public officer or employee, or anyone acting under his order or his
place, who arrests, detains or investigates any person for the commission of
an offense shall inform the latter, in a language known to and understood by him,
of his rights to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel,
preferably of his own choice, who shall at all times be allowed to confer private
with the person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation. If such person
cannot afford the services of his own counsel, he must be provided by with a
competent and independent counsel.

xxxx

f. As used in this Act, custodial investigation shall include the practice of

issuing an invitation to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense
he is suspected to have committed, without prejudice to the liability of the inviting
officer for any violation of law.
 Police officers claimed that upon arresting Joel, they informed him of his constitutional
rights to remain silent, that any information he would give could be used against him, and that he
had the right to a competent and independent counsel, preferably, of his own choice, and if he
cannot afford the services of counsel he will be provided with one (1). However, since these
rights can only be waived in writing and with the assistance of counsel, there could not have
been such a valid waiver by Joel, who was presented to Atty. Sansano at the IBP Office, Quezon
City Hall only the following day and stayed overnight at the police station before he was brought
to said counsel.

P/Insp. Castillo admitted that the initial questioning of Joel began in the morning of June
20, 1996, the first time said suspect was presented to him at the CPDC station, even before he
was brought to the IBP Office for the taking of his formal statement. Thus, the possibility of
appellant Joel having been subjected to intimidation or violence in the hands of police
investigators as he claims, cannot be discounted. The constitutional requirement obviously had
not been observed. Settled is the rule that the moment a police officer tries to elicit admissions or
confessions or even plain information from a suspect, the latter should, at that juncture, be
assisted by counsel, unless he waives this right in writing and in the presence of counsel. The
purpose of providing counsel to a person under custodial investigation is to curb the police-state
practice of extracting a confession that leads appellant to make self-incriminating statements.

Extrajudicial confessions must conform to constitutional requirements. A confession is not

valid and not admissible in evidence when it is obtained in violation of any of the rights of
persons under custodial investigation.

Since Joel was provided with a lawyer secured by CPDC investigators from the IBP-
Quezon City chapter, it cannot be said that his right to a counsel preferably of his own choice
was not complied with, particularly as he never objected to Atty. Sansano when the latter was
presented to him to be his counsel for the taking down of his statement. While the choice of a
lawyer in cases where the person under custodial interrogation cannot afford the services of
counsel or where the preferred lawyer is not available is naturally lodged in the police
investigators, the suspect has the final choice, as he may reject the counsel chosen for him and
ask for another one.

The question really is whether or not Atty. Sansano was an independent and competent
counsel as to satisfy the constitutional requirement. We held that the modifier competent and
independent in the 1987 Constitution is not an empty rhetoric. It stresses the need to accord the
accused, under the uniquely stressful conditions of a custodial investigation, an informed
judgment on the choices explained to him by a diligent and capable lawyer. An effective and
vigilant counsel necessarily and logically requires that the lawyer be present and able to advise
and assist his client from the time the confessant answers the first question asked by the
investigating officer until the signing of the extrajudicial confession. Moreover, the lawyer
should ascertain that the confession is made voluntarily and that the person under investigation
fully understands the nature and the consequence of his extrajudicial confession in relation to his
constitutional rights. A contrary rule would undoubtedly be antagonistic to the constitutional
rights to remain silent, to counsel and to be presumed innocent.

Atty. Sansano, who supposedly interviewed Joel and assisted the latter while responding to
questions propounded by SPO2 Garcia, Jr., did not testify on whether he had properly discharged
his duties to said client. While SPO2 Garcia, Jr. testified that Atty. Sansano had asked Joel if he
understood his answers to the questions of the investigating officer and sometimes stopped Joel
from answering certain questions, SPO2 Garcia, Jr. did not say if Atty. Sansano, in the first
place, verified from them the date and time of Joels arrest and the circumstances thereof, or any
previous information elicited from him by the investigators at the station, and if said counsel
inspected Joels body for any sign or mark of physical torture.

The lawyers role cannot be reduced to being that of a mere witness to the signing of a
pre-prepared confession, even if it indicated compliance with the constitutional rights of the
accused. Where the prosecution failed to discharge the States burden of proving with clear and
convincing evidence that the accused had enjoyed effective and vigilant counsel before he
extrajudicially admitted his guilt, the extrajudicial confession cannot be given any probative
value.

However, they cannot simply rely on those violations of constitutional rights during
custodial investigation, which are relevant only when the conviction of the accused by the trial
court is based on the evidence obtained during such investigation. As for the matters stated in the
extrajudicial confession of appellant Joel, these were not the basis for appellants conviction. It
has to be stressed further that no confession or statement by appellants Fortuna, Lumanog,
Augusto and Rameses was used as evidence by the prosecution at the trial.

We hold that there exists sufficient evidence on record to sustain appellants conviction
even without the extrajudicial confession of appellant Joel de Jesus.

Allegations of Torture and

Intimidation
 The CHR found prima facie evidence that respondent police officers could have violated
R.A. No. 7438, particularly on visitorial rights and the right to counsel, including the law on
arbitrary detention, and accordingly forwarded its resolution together with records of the case to
the Secretary of Justice, Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government, the PNP
Director General and the Ombudsman to file the appropriate criminal and/or administrative
actions against the person or persons responsible for violating the human rights of the suspects as
the evidence may warrant. As of July 2007, the case before the Ombudsman was still pending
preliminary investigation.

Right to Speedy Disposition of

Cases

Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that all persons shall have the
right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative
bodies affording broader protection than Section 14(2), which guarantees merely the right to a
speedy trial. It is consistent with delays and depends upon the circumstances. What the
Constitution prohibits are unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive delays, which render rights
nugatory.

It must be stressed that in the determination of whether the right to speedy disposition of
cases has been violated, particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar
to each case. A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved would not be sufficient.
Under the circumstances, we hold that the delay of (4) four years during which the case remained
pending with the CA and this Court was not unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive.

INQUEST (cases # 1-2)

People vs Panayangan, February 16, 2015 G.R. No. 195850

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2015/feb2015/gr_195850_2015.html

Gist: The issue of violation of fundamental rights cannot be raised for the first time on appeal
without offending the basic rules of f air play, justice and due process. The infractions of the
Miranda rights render inadmissible only the extrajudicial confession during custodial
investigation.

Facts: The appellant was charged with violations of Sections 5 (illegal sale of dangerous drugs)
and 11 (illegal possession of dangerous drugs) of RA 9165 and was arrested through a buy bust
operation. He was then subjected to an inquest. In the RTC, he interposed the defense of denial
and extortion. He was convicted. On appeal, he questioned the validity of the inquest
proceedings claiming that he was not afforded a counsel.

Issue: WON there is a violation of the appellant’s fundamental right to due process as he was
allegedly not assisted by counsel during the investigation and inquest proceedings.

Ruling: No, this issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal without offending the basic
rules of f air play, justice and due process. Besides, the fact that he was not assisted by counsel
during the investigation and inquest proceedings does not in any way affect his culpability. It has
already been held that "the infractions of the so-called Miranda rights render inadmissible only
the extrajudicial confession or admission made during custodial investigation." Here, appellant's
conviction was based not on his alleged uncounseled confession or admission but on the
testimony of the prosecution witness.

Leviste vs Alameda, August 3, 2010 G.R. No. 182677

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/august2010/182677.htm

Gist: In cases where the private complainant is allowed to intervene by counsel in the
criminal action, and is granted the authority to prosecute, the private complainant, by
counsel and with the conformity of the public prosecutor, can file a motion for
reinvestigation.

Facts: Petitioner (Leviste) was charged with homicide for the death of Rafael de las Alas. After
posting a bond, petitioner was released and his arraignment was set. The private complainants
(heirs of de las Alas) filed with the conformity of the public prosecutor an Urgent Omnibus
Motion praying for the deferment of the proceedings to allow the public prosecutor to re-
examine the evidence on record or to conduct a reinvestigation to determine the proper offense to
be charged.

Issue: WON the private complainants (heirs) have the right to cause the reinvestigation of the
criminal case when the criminal information had already been filed with the lower court.

Ruling: Yes. The Court holds that the private complainant can move for reinvestigation, subject
to and in light of the ensuing disquisition.

All criminal actions commenced by a complaint or information shall be prosecuted under

the direction and control of the public prosecutor. The private complainant in a criminal case is
merely a witness and not a party to the case and cannot, by himself, ask for the reinvestigation of
the case after the information had been filed in court, the proper party for that being the public
prosecutor who has the control of the prosecution of the case. Thus, in cases where the private
complainant is allowed to intervene by counsel in the criminal action, and is granted the
authority to prosecute, the private complainant, by counsel and with the conformity of the public
prosecutor, can file a motion for reinvestigation.

PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION (cases # 1-13)

Estrada vs Office of the Ombudsman, January 21, 2015, GR No. 212140-41

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2015/jan2015/gr_212140_2015.html

Gist: There is no law or rule requiring the investigating officer to furnish the respondent
with copies of the affidavits of his co-respondents.

It is a fundamental principle that the accused in a preliminary investigation has no right to

cross-examine the witnesses which the complainant may present. Section 3, Rule 112 of the
Rules of Court expressly provides that the respondent shall only have the right to submit a
counter-affidavit, to examine all other evidence submitted by the complainant and, where
the fiscal sets a hearing to propound clarificatory questions to the parties or their witnesses, to be
afforded an opportunity to be present but without the right to examine or cross-examine.

Facts: A complaint for plunder was filed against Sen. Estrada under RA No. 7080 and for
violation of RA No. 3019. After filing his counter-affidavit, Estrada requested to be furnished
copies of the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents based on his right ‘to examine the evidence
submitted by the complainant which he may not have been furnished’. The OMB denied the
request. The OMB held that the rules only provide that Estrada be furnished copies only of the
complaint and the supporting documents, not the counter-affidavits of the other respondents.

Issue: WON petitioner is entitled to be furnished copies of the counter-affidavits of his co-
respondents.

Ruling: The Ombudsman, in furnishing Sen. Estrada a copy of the complaint and its supporting
affidavits and documents, fully complied with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure, and Section 4, Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman, Administrative Order No. 7. Neither of these Rules require the investigating officer
to furnish the respondent with copies of the affidavits of his co-respondents. The right of the
respondent is only "to examine the evidence submitted by the complainant," as expressly stated
in Section 3(b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. This Court has
unequivocally ruled in Paderanga that "Section 3, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure expressly provides that the respondent shall only have the right to submit a counter-
affidavit, to examine all other evidence submitted by the complainant and, where the fiscal sets a
hearing to propound clarificatory questions to the parties or their witnesses, to be afforded an
opportunity to be present but without the right to examine or cross-examine."

The constitutional due process requirements mandated in Ang Tibay, as amplified in

GSIS, are not applicable to preliminary investigations which are creations of statutory law giving
rise to mere statutory rights. A law can abolish preliminary investigations without running afoul
with the constitutional requirements of dueprocess as prescribed in Ang Tibay, as amplified in
GSIS. The present procedures for preliminary investigations do not comply, and were never
intended to comply, with Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS. Preliminary investigations do not
adjudicate with finality rights and obligations of parties, while administrative investigations
governed by Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, so adjudicate. Ang Tibay,as amplified in GSIS,
requires substantial evidencefor a decision against the respondent in the administrative case.In
preliminary investigations, only likelihood or probability of guiltis required. To apply Ang
Tibay,as amplified in GSIS,to preliminary investigations will change the quantum of evidence
required to establish probable cause. The respondent in an administrative case governed by Ang
Tibay,as amplified in GSIS,has the right to an actual hearing and to cross-examine the witnesses
against him. In preliminary investigations, the respondent has no such rights.

Also, in an administrative case governed by Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, the hearing
officer must be impartial and cannot be the fact-finder, investigator, and hearing officer atthe
same time. In preliminary investigations, the same public officer may be the investigator and
hearing officer at the same time, or the fact-finder, investigator and hearing officer may be under
the control and supervisionof the same public officer, like the Ombudsman or Secretary of
Justice. This explains why Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, does not apply to preliminary
investigations. To now declare that the guidelines in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, are
fundamental and essential requirements in preliminary investigations will render all past and
present preliminary investigations invalid for violation of constitutional due process.

Salapuddin vs Court of Appeals, February 25, 2013, GR No. 184681

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_184681_2013.html

Gist: The prosecutor’s call on the existence or absence of probable cause is further subject to
the review of the Secretary of Justice who exercises the power of control over prosecutors. This
action is not subject to the review of courts unless there is a showing that the Secretary of
Justice has committed a grave abuse of his discretion amounting to an excess or lack of
jurisdiction in issuing the challenged resolution.

Facts: On November 13, 2007, shortly after the adjournment of the day's session in Congress, a
bomb exploded near the entrance of the South Wing lobby of the House of Representatives
(HOR) in the Batasan Complex. The blast led to the death of Representative Wahab Akbar and
several others. The explosion was caused by an improvised bomb planted on a motorcycle that
was parked near the entrance stairs of the South Wing lobby.

Acting on a confidential information, the police raided an alleged ASG safe house located in
Payatas, Quezon City, leading to the arrest of several persons, one of which was Ikram Indama,
who was the driver of petitioner Gerry Salapuddin. In one of the affidavits executed by Ikram, he
said that he heard Salapuddin ordering Redwan to kill Rep. Akbar of Basilan.

The prosecution later on included Salapuddin in the complaint for murder and multiple
frustrated murder based on the affidavits of Ikram. Later on, the Secretary of Justice
issued a resolution excluding Salapuddin from the charges.

Issue: WON the determination of probable cause of the SOJ may be overturned by the appellate
court.

Ruling: The determination of probable cause is, under our criminal justice system, an executive
function that the courts cannot interfere with in the absence of grave abuse of
discretion. Otherwise, a violation of the basic principle of separation of powers will ensue. The
Executive Branch, through its prosecutors, is, thus, given ample latitude to determine the
propriety of filing a criminal charge against a person.

This broad authority of prosecutors, however, is circumscribed by the requirement of a

conscientious conduct of a preliminary investigation for offenses where the penalty prescribed by
law is at least 4 years, 2 months and 1 day. This rule is intended to guarantee the right of every
person to be free from "the inconvenience, expense, ignominy and stress of defending
himself/herself in the course of a formal trial, until the reasonable probability of his or her guilt
has been passed upon" and to guard the State against the "burden of unnecessary expense and
effort in prosecuting alleged offenses and in holding trials arising from false, frivolous or
groundless charges."

The prosecutor’s call on the existence or absence of probable cause is further subject to the
review of the Secretary of Justice who exercises the power of control over prosecutors. This
much is clear in Ledesma v. Court of Appeals: Thus, pursuant to the last paragraph of Section 4,
Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, if the Secretary of Justice reverses or modifies the resolution of
the investigating prosecutor(s), he or she can direct the prosecutor(s) concerned "to dismiss or
move for dismissal of the complaint or information with notice to the parties." This action is not
subject to the review of courts unless there is a showing that the Secretary of Justice has
committed a grave abuse of his discretion amounting to an excess or lack of jurisdiction in
issuing the challenged resolution. Here, there is no showing of such abuse of discretion.

Note: An extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant. It cannot be admitted

against his or her co-accused and is considered as hearsay against them.

Ampatuan vs Leila de Lima, April 3, 2013, GR No. 197291

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_184681_2013.html

Gist: In matters involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, mandamus cannot be
used to direct the manner or the particular way the judgment and discretion are to be
exercised. Consequently, the Secretary of Justice may be compelled by writ of mandamus to
act on a letter-request or a motion to include a person in the information, but may not be
compelled by writ of mandamus to act in a certain way, i.e., to grant or deny such letter-
request or motion.
Facts: After conducting a preliminary investigation, the DOJ resolved to file informations for
murder against the petitioner for the death of 57 innocent civilians. The Panel of Prosecutors
charged 196 individuals with multiple murder in relation to the Maguindanao massacre. It
appears that the Panel of Prosecutors partly relied on the twin affidavits of one Kenny Dalandag.
Dalandag was admitted into the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ.

Petitioner, through counsel, wrote to respondent Secretary of Justice Leila De Lima and
Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Richard Fadullon to request the inclusion of Dalandag in the
informations for murder considering that Dalandag had already confessed his participation in the
massacre through his two sworn declarations.By her letter however, Secretary De Lima denied
petitioner’s request.

Petitioner brought a petition for mandamus in the RTC in Manila seeking to compel respondents
to charge Dalandag as another accused in the various murder cases undergoing trial in the QC
RTC.

Issue: WON respondents may be compelled by writ of mandamus to charge Dalandag as an

accused for multiple murder in relation to the Maguindanao massacre despite his admission to
the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ

Ruling: The prosecution of crimes pertains to the Executive Department. The Court deems it a
sound judicial policy not to interfere in the conduct of preliminary investigations, and to allow
the Executive Department, through the Department of Justice, exclusively to determine what
constitutes sufficient evidence to establish probable cause for the prosecution of supposed
offenders. By way of exception, however, judicial review may be allowed where it is clearly
established that the public prosecutor committed grave abuse of discretion.

Dalandag’s exclusion as an accused from the informations did not at all amount to grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the Panel of Prosecutors whose procedure in excluding
Dalandag as an accused was far from arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic. Section
2, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, which requires that "the complaint or information shall be xxx
against all persons who appear to be responsible for the offense involved," albeit a mandatory
provision, may be subject of some exceptions, one of which is when a participant in the
commission of a crime becomes a state witness.

The admission of Dalandag into the Witness Protection Program of the Government as a state
witness since August 13, 2010 was warranted by the absolute necessity of his testimony to the
successful prosecution of the criminal charges. Apparently, all the conditions prescribed by
Republic Act No. 6981 were met in his case. That he admitted his participation in the
commission of the Maguindanao massacre was no hindrance to his admission into the
Witness Protection Program as a state witness, for all that was necessary was for him to
appear not the most guilty.

Mandamus shall issue when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act that the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an
office, trust, or station. It is proper when the act against which it is directed is one addressed to
the discretion of the tribunal or officer. In matters involving the exercise of judgment and
discretion, mandamus may only be resorted to in order to compel respondent tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person to take action, but it cannot be used to direct the manner or
the particular way discretion is to be exercised, or to compel the retraction or reversal of an
action already taken in the exercise of judgment or discretion.

As such, respondent Secretary of Justice may be compelled to act on the letter-request of

petitioner, but may not be compelled to act in a certain way, i.e., to grant or deny such
letter-request. Considering that respondent Secretary of Justice already denied the letter-
request, mandamus was no longer available as petitioner's recourse.

Notes: The two modes by which a participant in the commission of a crime may become a state
witness are, namely: (a) by discharge from the criminal case pursuant to Section 17 of Rule 119
of the Rules of Court; and (b) by the approval of his application for admission into the Witness
Protection Program of the DOJ in accordance with Republic Act No. 6981 (The Witness
Protection, Security and Benefit Act). .

Under Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, the discharge by the trial court of one or more
of several accused with their consent so that they can be witnesses for the State is made upon
motion by the Prosecution before resting its case. The trial court shall require the Prosecution to
present evidence and the sworn statements of the proposed witnesses at a hearing in support of
the discharge. The trial court must ascertain if the following conditions fixed by Section 17 of
Rule 119 are complied with, namely: (a) there is absolute necessity for the testimony of the
accused whose discharge is requested; (b) there is no other direct evidence available for the
proper prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of said accused; (c) the
testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material points; (d) said
accused does not appear to be most guilty; and (e) said accused has not at any time been
convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.

On the other hand, Section 10 of Republic Act No. 6981 provides:

Section 10. State Witness. — Any person who has participated in the commission of a crime and
desires to be a witness for the State, can apply and, if qualified as determined in this Act and by
the Department, shall be admitted into the Program whenever the following circumstances are
present:

a. the offense in which his testimony will be used is a grave felony as defined under the Revised
Penal Code or its equivalent under special laws;

b. there is absolute necessity for his testimony;

c. there is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed;

d. his testimony can be substantially corroborated on its material points;

e. he does not appear to be most guilty; and

f. he has not at any time been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude.

An accused discharged from an information or criminal complaint by the court in order that he
may be a State Witness pursuant to Section 9 and 10 of Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court
may upon his petition be admitted to the Program if he complies with the other requirements of
this Act. Nothing in this Act shall prevent the discharge of an accused, so that he can be used
as a State Witness under Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Worth noting is that an accused discharged from an information by the trial court pursuant to
Section 17 of Rule 119 may also be admitted to the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ
provided he complies with the requirements of Republic Act No. 6981.

A participant in the commission of the crime, to be discharged to become a state witness

pursuant to Rule 119, must be one charged as an accused in the criminal case. The discharge
operates as an acquittal of the discharged accused and shall be a bar to his future prosecution
for the same offense, unless he fails or refuses to testify against his co-accused in accordance
with his sworn statement constituting the basis for his discharge. The discharge is expressly left
to the sound discretion of the trial court, which has the exclusive responsibility to see to it that
the conditions prescribed by the rules for that purpose exist, such discretion is not absolute and
may not be exercised arbitrarily, but with due regard to the proper administration of justice.

On the other hand, there is no requirement under Republic Act No. 6981 for the Prosecution to
first charge a person in court as one of the accused in order for him to qualify for admission into
the Witness Protection Program. The admission as a state witness under Republic Act No. 6981
also operates as an acquittal, and said witness cannot subsequently be included in the criminal
information except when he fails or refuses to testify. The immunity for the state witness is
granted by the DOJ, not by the trial court. Should such witness be meanwhile charged in court
as an accused, the public prosecutor, upon presentation to him of the certification of admission
into the Witness Protection Program, shall petition the trial court for the discharge of the
witness. The Court shall then order the discharge and exclusion of said accused from the
information.

Claridad vs Esteban, March 20, 2013, GR No. 191567

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/mar2013/gr_191567_2013.html

Gist: The determination of probable cause to file a criminal complaint or information in court is
exclusively within the competence of the Executive Department, through the Secretary of
Justice. The courts cannot interfere in such determination, except upon a clear showing that the
Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.

The circumstantial evidence sufficient to support a determination of probable cause

must be established by competent evidence required by the rules in preliminary
investigation.
Facts: The petitioner filed a complaint against the respondents for the death of her son, Cheasare
Armani Claridad who was last seen alive with the respondent less than an hour before the
discovery of the former’s lifeless body. The Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City
dismissed the complaint for lack of evidence, motive, and circumstantial evidence sufficient to
charge Philip with homicide, much less murder. On petition for review, the Secretary of Justice
affirmed the dismissal. The petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via petition for
review under Rule 43. The CA dismissed the petition for review. The motion for reconsideration
by the petitioner was likewise denied for lack of merit.

Issue: WON the circumstantial evidence presented is sufficient to establish probable cause.

Ruling: No. To start with, the petitioner resorted to a wrong mode of appeal which warrants
automatic dismissal of the petition. Secondly, the CA correctly concluded that the Secretary of
Justice did not abuse his discretion in passing upon and affirming the finding of probable cause
by the OCP.

A preliminary investigation is "an inquiry or proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient

ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is
probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial." The role and object of preliminary
investigation were "to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious, and oppressive prosecutions,
and to protect him from open and public accusation of crime, from the trouble, expenses and
anxiety of a public trial, and also to protect the State from useless and expensive prosecutions."

The determination of the existence of probable cause lies within the discretion of the public
prosecutor after conducting a preliminary investigation upon the complaint of an offended party.
A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a
crime has been committed, and that it was committed by the accused. Probable cause, although it
requires less than evidence justifying a conviction, demands more than bare suspicion.

The determination of existence of a probable cause is the function of the public prosecutor.
Consistent with this policy, courts do not reverse the Secretary of Justice’s findings and
conclusions on the matter of probable cause except in clear cases of grave abuse of
discretion. By way of exception, however, judicial review is permitted where the respondent in
the preliminary investigation clearly establishes that the public prosecutor committed grave
abuse of discretion, that is, when the public prosecutor has exercised his discretion in an
arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility,
patent and gross enough as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law.

For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all the circumstances must
be consistent with one another and must constitute an unbroken chain leading to one fair and
reasonable conclusion that a crime has been committed and that the respondents are probably
guilty thereof. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient, therefore, if: (a) there is more than one
circumstance, (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived have been proven, and (c) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
The records show that the circumstantial evidence linking Philip to the killing of Chase derived
from the bare recollections of Ariane (sister of Chase), and of Guray and Corpus (respectively,
the househelp and nanny in the household of a resident of the subdivision) about seeing Chase
board the white Honda Civic at around 7:00 p.m. of February 27, 2007, and about Philip being
the driver of the Honda Civic. To be sure, some of the affidavits were unsworn. The lack of the
requisite certifications from the affidavits of most of the other witnesses was in violation of
Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, which pertinently provides thusly:

Section 3. Procedure. — The preliminary investigation shall be conducted in the following

manner:

(a) The complaint shall state the address of the respondent and shall be accompanied by the
affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, as well as other supporting documents to
establish probable cause. They shall be in such number of copies as there are respondents, plus
two (2) copies for the official file. The affidavits shall be subscribed and sworn to before any
prosecutor or government official authorized to administer oath, or, in their absence or
unavailability, before a notary public, each of who must certify that he personally
examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood
their affidavits.

xxxx

The CA explained that the requirement for the certifications under the aforecited rule was
designed to avoid self-serving and unreliable evidence from being considered for purposes
of the preliminary investigation, the present rules for which do not require a confrontation
between the parties and their witnesses; hence, the certifications were mandatory.

It has been held that unsworn statements or declarations are self-serving and self-serving
declarations are not admissible in evidence as proof of the facts asserted, whether they arose by
implication from acts and conduct or were made orally or reduced in writing. The vital objection
to the admission to this kind of evidence is its hearsay character.

Unilever vs Tan, January 29, 2014, GR No. 179367

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2014/jan2014/gr_179367_2014.html

Gist: The determination of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more
likely than not, a crime has been committed and there is enough reason to believe that it was
committed by the accused. It need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt,
neither on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt.

Facts: A complaint was filed against respondent for violation of RA No. 8293, specifically
section 168 (unfair competition). The State prosecutor dismissed the criminal complaint on the
ground of insufficiency of evidence. The Acting Secretary of Justice affirmed the dismissal. The
petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals imputing grave abuse of
discretion on the Acting SOJ. The CA dismissed the petition on the ground that the petitioner
failed to establish facts and circumstances that would constitute acts of unfair competition under
R.A. No. 8293. It also ruled that the Acting Secretary of Justice did not gravely abuse her
discretion when she affirmed the State Prosecutor’s resolution dismissing the petitioner’s
complaint for insufficiency of evidence to establish probable cause.

The petitioner sought reconsideration of the aforementioned decision rendered by the CA but its
motion was denied.

Issue: WON the CA erred in upholding the dismissal by the Acting SOJ of the information
against the respondent.

Ruling: Yes. The prosecutor and the Secretary of Justice have wide latitude of discretion in the
conduct of preliminary investigation; and their findings with respect to the existence or non-
existence of probable cause are generally not subject to review by the Court. Courts can neither
override their determination nor substitute their own judgment for that of the latter.
Nevertheless, this policy of non-interference is not without exception. The Constitution
itself allows (and even directs) court action where executive discretion has been gravely
abused. In other words, the court may intervene in the executive determination of probable
cause, review the findings and conclusions, and ultimately resolve the existence or non-
existence of probable cause by examining the records of the preliminary investigation when
necessary for the orderly administration of justice.

To justify judicial intervention, the abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount
to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act
at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion or hostility.

An examination of the decisions of the State Prosecutor and of the DOJ shows that the
complaint’s dismissal was anchored on the insufficiency of evidence to establish the
respondent’s direct, personal or actual participation in the offense charged. A careful analysis of
the lower courts’ rulings and the records, however, reveals that substantial facts and
circumstances that could affect the result of the case have been overlooked. While the ownership
of the warehouse on Camia Street, Marikina City, was not proven, sufficient evidence to prove
the existence of probable cause nevertheless exists. These pieces of evidence consist of: (1) the
result of the NBI agents’ search of the office and of the warehouse; (2) Elmer Cadano’s
complaint-affidavit; (3) Rene Baltazar’s affidavit; (4) Unilever’s representatives’ claim that all
the laborers present at the warehouse confirmed that it was operated by Probest International
Trading; (5) other object evidence found and seized at the respondent’s office and warehouse; (6)
the NBI operatives’ Joint Affidavit; (7) the subsequent seizure of counterfeit Unilever products
from the respondent’s warehouse in Antipolo City; and (8) other photographs and documents
relative to the counterfeit products.

These pieces of evidence, to our mind, are sufficient to form a reasonable ground to believe that
the crime of unfair competition was committed and that the respondent was its author.
The failure to prove that the respondent is the owner of the warehouse located on Camia St.,
Marikina City, does not automatically free him from liability. Proof of the warehouse’s
ownership is not crucial to the finding of probable cause. In fact, ownership of the establishment
where the counterfeit products were found is not even an element of unfair competition. What is
material to a finding of probable cause is the commission of acts constituting unfair competition,
the presence of all its elements and the reasonable belief, based on evidence, that the respondent
had committed it.

In Lee v. KBC Bank N.V.,18 citing Andres v. Justice Secretary Cuevas,19 we held that:

[A preliminary investigation] is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of [the
prosecution’s] evidence. The presence or absence of the elements of the crime is evidentiary in
nature and is a matter of defense that may be passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits.

The determination of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more
likely than not, a crime has been committed and there is enough reason to believe that it
was committed by the accused. It need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of
guilt, neither on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. What is merely required is
"probability of guilt." We find that the CA gravely erred in sustaining the Acting Secretary of
Justice’s finding that there was no probable cause to indict the respondent for unfair competition.
The dismissal of the complaint, despite ample evidence to support a finding of probable cause,
clearly constitutes grave error that warrants judicial intervention and correction.

Ocampo vs Abando, February 11, 2014, GR No. 176830

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2014/feb2014/gr_176830_2014.html

Gist: In the context of a preliminary investigation, the right to due process of law entails
the opportunity to be heard. It serves to accord an opportunity for the presentation of the
respondent’s side with regard to the accusation. Afterwards, the investigating officer shall decide
whether the allegations and defenses lead to a reasonable belief that a crime has been committed,
and that it was the respondent who committed it. Otherwise, the investigating officer is bound to
dismiss the complaint. Thus, one who has been afforded a chance to present one’s own side of
the story cannot claim denial of due process.

Facts: Complaint affidavits for murder were filed against herein petitioners along with several
unnamed members after the discovery of a mass grave that contained what were believed to be
the skeletal remains of the victims of Operation Venereal Disease launched by members of the
CPP/NPA/NDFP to purge their ranks of suspected military informers. An information for
multiple murder was filed against petitioner and respondent Judge affirmed the finding of
probable cause and issued a warrant of arrest for the apprehension of Ocampo. Petitioner filed a
special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with the SC contending that a case for rebellion
against him was then pending before the RTC of Makati and put forward the political offense
doctrine (common crimes are absorbed by rebellion when committed as a necessary means, in
connection with and in furtherance of rebellion). During the oral arguments, the remedy of
prohibition was questioned as to its propriety and, granting that it is, whether or not the petitioner
was denied due process during the PI.

Issue: WON petitioners were denied due process during preliminary investigation and in the
issuance of the warrants of arrest.

Ruling: No. In the context of a preliminary investigation, the right to due process of law
entails the opportunity to be heard. It serves to accord an opportunity for the presentation of
the respondent’s side with regard to the accusation. Afterwards, the investigating officer shall
decide whether the allegations and defenses lead to a reasonable belief that a crime has been
committed, and that it was the respondent who committed it. Otherwise, the investigating officer
is bound to dismiss the complaint. Thus, one who has been afforded a chance to present one’s
own side of the story cannot claim denial of due process.

According to Prosecutor Vivero’s Resolution, the respondents were issued and served with
Subpoena at their last known address for them to submit their counter-affidavits and that of their
witnesses.

Majority of the respondents did not submit their counter-affidavits because they could no longer
be found in their last known address, per return of the subpoenas. Section 3(d), Rule 112 of
the Rules of Court, allows Prosecutor Vivero to resolve the complaint based on the
evidence before him if a respondent could not be subpoenaed. As long as efforts to reach a
respondent were made, and he was given an opportunity to present countervailing evidence, the
preliminary investigation remains valid. The rule was put in place in order to foil underhanded
attempts of a respondent to delay the prosecution of offenses.

This is sufficient for due process.

As to his claim that he was denied the right to file a motion for reconsideration or to appeal the
Resolution of Prosecutor Vivero due to the 19-day delay in the service of the Resolution, it must
be pointed out that the period for filing a motion for reconsideration or an appeal to the
Secretary of Justice is reckoned from the date of receipt of the resolution of the prosecutor,
not from the date of the resolution.

Marcelo vs Villordon, December 15, 2010, GR No. 173081

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/dec2010/gr_173081_2010.html

Gist: The determination of probable cause for the filing of an information is discretionary on the
prosecutor and cannot be compelled by mandamus.

Facts: Petitioners filed a criminal complaint against their former employer (Eduardo Dee) for
non-payment of wages. The case was repeatedly set for PI owing to the non-appearance of Dee.
The case was submitted for resolution but Dee filed a motion to reopen the case attaching his
counter-affidavit. Hearings were set, but again, Dee failed to appear. Petitioners filed a case
against herein respondent for violation of RA 3019 which the OMB dismissed. Meanwhile,
petitioners filed a mandamus case against Villordon with the RTC of Quezon City. The RTC
dismissed the petition for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The MR was likewise
denied by the RTC for lack of merit.

Issue: Whether or not petitioners are entitled to the extraordinary writ of mandamus.

Ruling: No. A preliminary investigation is conducted before an accused is placed on trial to

secure the innocent against hasty, malicious, and oppressive prosecution; to protect him from an
open and public accusation of a crime, as well as from the trouble, expenses, and anxiety of a
public trial. It is not a mere formal or technical right but is a substantive right.

The function of determining whether there is sufficient ground for the filing of the information is
executive in nature and rests with the prosecutor. It is the prosecutor alone who has the quasi-
judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court.

Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court states that mandamus will lie if (1) any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the
law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station; or unlawfully excludes another
from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled; and (2) there is no
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law other than the remedy of
mandamus being invoked.

We held that the remedy of mandamus, as an extraordinary writ, lies only to compel an officer
to perform a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one. Mandamus will not issue to control the
exercise of discretion by a public officer where the law imposes upon him the duty to exercise
his judgment in reference to any manner in which he is required to act, because it is his judgment
that is to be exercised and not that of the court. The only time the discretion of the prosecutor
will stand review by mandamus is when the prosecutor gravely abuses his discretion.

Here, due to the non-appearance of Dee on several hearings and the non-submission of the reply-
affidavit by petitioners, Villordon cannot be faulted if he is still not convinced that a criminal
information should be filed against Dee. Villordon may need to consider more evidence material
to the complaint and is giving both parties the chance to submit their supporting documents.

Also, the assertion of petitioners that the evidence against Dee is strong, amounting to grave
abuse of discretion on Villordon’s part in not filing the criminal information, has not been clearly
established. The records show that aside from petitioners’ bare declarations, no other proof was
submitted.

Moreover, petitioners were not able to sufficiently demonstrate that they had no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in order to be entitled to mandamus. A more expeditious and
effective recourse could have been simply to submit their reply-affidavit in order for Villordon to
make the proper determination whether there was sufficient ground to hold Dee for trial. Instead,
petitioners resorted to filing cases in different fora like the OMB and the RTC to compel
Villordon to file the criminal information against Dee immediately.
In sum, since the institution of a criminal action involves the exercise of sound discretion by the
prosecutor and there being other plain, speedy and adequate remedies available to petitioners, the
resort to the extraordinary writ of mandamus must fail.

Aguinaldo vs Ventus, March 11, 2015, GR No. 176033

http://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2015marchdecisions.php?id=252

Gist: Petitioners are wrong in arguing that the Information filed, without affording the
respondent his right to file a motion for reconsideration of an adverse DOJ resolution, is
fatally premature. Petitioners in this case were afforded their right to move for reconsideration
of the adverse resolution in a preliminary investigation when they filed their “Motion for
Reconsideration and Motion for the Withdrawal of Information Prematurely Filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, City of Manila,” pursuant to Section 3 of the 2000 National
Prosecution Service (NPS Rule on Appeal) and Section 56 of the Manual for Prosecutors.

Facts: Respondents filed a case for estafa against petitioners. An information was filed by the
Assistance City Prosecutor for estafa against the petitioners with the RTC of Manila. The case
was raffled to public respondent. After his arrest, Perez (one of the petitioners) filed a motion for
reduction of bail which the public respondent granted. Petitioners repeatedly filed a motion to
suspend the proceedings alleging that the Resolution has not yet attained finality and that they
intended to file a motion for reconsideration and eventually a petition for review with the DOJ.
The petition for review was denied. The public respondent issued an Order granting the Motion
to Reinstate Case and to Issue Warrant of Arrest. An MR was filed with and subsequently denied
by the public respondent holding that the Rules only allow a 60-day period suspension for the
arraignment. Petitioners brought the case to the CA on certiorari attributing grave abuse of
discretion to the DOJ. The same was denied.

Issue: WON the preliminary investigation has been completed.

Ruling: Yes. Petitioners contend that even before they could receive a copy of the DOJ
resolution denying their petition for review, the Information in had already been filed with the
RTC. The Court is unconvinced by petitioners' argument that the precipitate filing of the
Information and the issuance of a warrant of arrest put petitioners at the risk of incarceration
without the preliminary investigation having been completed because they were not afforded
their right to file a motion for reconsideration of the DOJ resolution.

Petitioners are wrong in arguing that the Information filed, without affording the
respondent his right to file a motion for reconsideration of an adverse DOJ resolution, is
fatally premature. Petitioners in this case were afforded their right to move for reconsideration
of the adverse resolution in a preliminary investigation when they filed their “Motion for
Reconsideration and Motion for the Withdrawal of Information Prematurely Filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, City of Manila,” pursuant to Section 3 of the 2000 National
Prosecution Service (NPS Rule on Appeal) and Section 56 of the Manual for Prosecutors.

With the Information for estafa against petitioners having been filed the public respondent
cannot be faulted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the Order denying their motion to
quash warrant of arrest, and setting their arraignment, pending the final resolution of their
petition for review by the DOJ. The Court believes that the period of almost one (1) year and
seven (7) months from the time petitioners filed their petition for review with the DOJ on
February 27, 2004 to September 14, 2005 when the trial court finally set their arraignment, was
more than ample time to give petitioners the opportunity to obtain a resolution of their petition.

On whether petitioners were accorded their right to a complete preliminary investigation as part
of their right to due process, the Court rules in the affirmative. After all, “[d]ue process simply
demands an opportunity to be heard. Where an opportunity to be heard either through oral
arguments or through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process.”

Notes: Judges are reminded that the pendency of a motion for reconsideration, motion for
reinvestigation, or petition for review is not a cause for the quashal of a warrant of arrest
previously issued because the quashal of a warrant of arrest may only take place upon the
finding that no probable cause exists. Moreover, judges should take note of the following:

1. If there is a pending motion for reconsideration or motion for reinvestigation of the

resolution of the public prosecutor, the court may suspend the proceedings upon motion
by the parties. However, the court should set the arraignment of the accused and direct
the public prosecutor to submit the resolution disposing of the motion on or before the
period fixed by the court, which in no instance could be more than the period fixed by the
court counted from the granting of the motion to suspend arraignment, otherwise the
court will proceed with the arraignment as scheduled and without further delay.

2. If there is a pending petition for review before the DOJ, the court may suspend the
proceedings upon motion by the parties. However, the court should set the arraignment
of the accused and direct the DOJ to submit the resolution disposing of the petition on or
before the period fixed by the Rules which, in no instance, could be more than sixty (60)
days from the filing of the Petition for Review before the DOJ, otherwise, the court will
proceed with the arraignment as scheduled and without further delay.

Shu vs Dee, April 23, 2014, GR No. 182573

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2014/apr2014/gr_182573_2014.html

Facts: Petitioner (President of 3A Apparel Corporation) filed a complaint for falsification of

deeds of real estate mortgage against respondents, such deeds allegedly bearing petitioner’s
signature. On the basis of these deeds, Metrobank, wherein respondents were allegedly
employed, foreclosed two properties to secure 3A’s loan. After investigation, the NBI filed a
complaint with the City Prosecutor of Makati charging the respondents with the crime of forgery
and falsification of public documents. The respondents, in their counter-affidavits, argued that
they were denied due process when they were not required to submit samples of signatures of the
petitioner in their possession and the only samples used as basis for the filing of the complaint
are those unilaterally submitted by the petitioner. The City Prosecutor dismissed the complaint
holding that the samples which were not made available to the NBI and submitted by the
respondents are similar to the signatures on the deeds of REM. On appeal, the SOJ reversed the
findings of the City Prosecutor holding that the findings of the NBI are entitled to full faith and
credit in the absence of proof of irregularity in the performance of the experts’ duties. The MR
with the SOJ was denied. The respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the CA alleging
grave abuse of discretion. The CA granted the petition holding that the right to due process of the
respondents was violated during the proceedings before the NBI. The CA denied the petitioner’s
MR.

Issue: WON the respondents were denied due process.

Ruling: No. The essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be heard. What the law
prohibits is not the absence of previous notice but its absolute absence and lack of opportunity to
be heard. Sufficient compliance with the requirements of due process exists when a party is
given a chance to be heard through his motion for reconsideration.

Here, respondents filed with the Secretary of Justice a motion for reconsideration of her
resolution. Therefore, any initial defect in due process was cured by the remedy the respondents
availed of.

They were also not denied due process during the NBI investigation which functions only as
an investigatory and informational body incapable of granting any relief to any party. It
cannot even determine probable cause. The NBI’s findings were merely recommendatory.
Hence, there was no denial of the respondents’ right to due process. The SOJ and the City
prosecutor had an opportunity examine the signatures not made available to the NBI.

To arrive at a finding of probable cause, the elements of the crime charged should be present.
The elements of falsification of public documents are as follows: (1) the offender is a private
individual or a public officer or employee who did not take advantage of his official position; (2)
he committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171 of the RPC; and (3) the
falsification was committed in a public, official or commercial document.

The findings of the Secretary of Justice are more in accord with the duty to determine the
existence of probable cause than the findings of the city prosecutor.

The findings of the city prosecutor are not proper in a preliminary investigation but should be
threshed out in a full-blown trial. This is contrary to the well-settled rule that the validity and
merits of a party’s defense and accusation, as well as admissibility of testimonies and
evidence, are better ventilated during trial proper than at the preliminary investigation
level. The respondents' defense that there are striking similarities in the specimen signatures
they submitted and those of the questioned deeds is a matter of evidence whose consideration is
proper only in a full-blown trial.

The determination of probable cause is essentially an executive function, lodged in the first
place on the prosecutor who conducted the preliminary investigation. The prosecutor's ruling is
reviewable by the Secretary who, as the final determinative authority on the matter, has the
power to reverse, modify or affirm the prosecutor's determination.

It is well-settled that the findings of the Secretary of Justice are not subject to interference
by the courts, save only when he acts with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction; Contrary to the findings of the CA, we find that the Secretary of Justice
did not gravely abuse the exercise of her discretion in reversing the findings of the city
prosecutor.

Encinas vs Agustin, April 11, 2013, GR No. 187317

http://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2013aprildecisions.php?id=319

Gist: There is no res judicata when the dismissal is rendered by a body merely performing a
preliminary investigation (merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means of discovering the
persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime and to enable the fiscal to prepare his
complaint or information), hence forum shopping is unavailing. Res judicata applies only to
judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, preliminary investigation is purely administrative.

Facts: Respondents were holding positions as Fire Officer I in Nueva Ecija. Petitioner
(Provincial Fire Marshall) told them to pay him an amount of five thousand pesos, otherwise the
respondents would be transferred to far flung area. Upon failure of respondents to pay the full
amount, petitioner arranged for their transfer.

Respondents filed with the Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP) a letter-complaint for illegal transfer
of personnel under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6975 or the Department of Interior and Local
Government (DILG) Act of 1990. The record is not clear as to why this Complaint was later
docketed by the BFP for preliminary investigation for violation of R.A. No. 3019 or the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

Respondents likewise filed with the CSC Regional Office in San Fernando, Pampanga (CSCRO),
as well as with the CSC Field Office in Cabanatuan City, their Joint Affidavit/Complaint
(CSCRO Complaint). They accused petitioner of violation of Section 4(c) of R.A. No. 6713 or
the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.

After a fact-finding investigation was conducted in connection with his alleged extortion
activities, petitioner was formally charged with dishonesty, grave misconduct, and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of service. The CSCRO found the petitioner guilty of grave
misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service, and ordered his dismissal from
service. Petitioner filed an MR which was subsequently denied. Hence, petitioner filed an Appeal
Memorandum with the CSC main office alleging that respondents were guilty of forum shopping
or having filed two (2) separate administrative Complaints before the CSCRO on the one hand,
and before the BFP/DILG on the other. CSCRO argued that there was no forum-shopping,
considering that the BFP Complaint was based on a different cause of action. The Complaint,
which pertained to the alleged illegal transfer of personnel under R.A. No. 6975, was docketed
for preliminary investigation of the alleged violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
or R.A. No. 3019. The CSC also held that respondents were not guilty of forum shopping.

Issue: WON the respondents are guilty of forum shopping.

Ruling: No. Forum-shopping exists when the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a
final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another. Litis pendentia requires the
concurrence of the following requisites: (1) identity of parties, or at least such parties as those
representing the same interests in both actions; (2) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed
for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts; and (3) identity with respect to the two
preceding particulars in the two cases, such that any judgment that may be rendered in the
pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other
case.

We rule that the dismissal of the BFP Complaint does not constitute res judicata in relation to the
CSCRO Complaint. Res judicata means "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or
decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment." In order that res judicata may bar the institution
of a subsequent action, the following requisites must concur: (a) the former judgment must be
final; (b) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and
the parties; (c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be between the first and
the second actions (i) identity of parties, (ii) identity of subject matter, and (iii) identity of cause
of action.

A judgment is one rendered on the merits "when it determines the rights and liabilities of the
parties based on the disclosed facts, irrespective of formal, technical or dilatory objections.

In this case, there is no "judgment on the merits". The dismissal of the BFP Complaint was the
result of a fact-finding investigation for purposes of determining whether a formal charge for an
administrative offense should be filed.

The CA was correct in ruling that the doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-
judicial proceedings, and not to the exercise of administrative powers. In this case, an analysis of
the proceedings before the BFP yields the conclusion that they were purely administrative in
nature and constituted a fact-finding investigation for purposes of determining whether a formal
charge for an administrative offense should be filed against petitioner. Preliminary investigation
is very different from other quasi-judicial proceedings. A quasi-judicial body has been defined as
"an organ of government other than a court and other than a legislature which affects the rights
of private parties through either adjudication or rule-making." This Court clearly reiterated that a
public prosecutor, in conducting a preliminary investigation, is not exercising a quasi-judicial
function. In a preliminary investigation, the public prosecutor inspects the records and premises,
investigates the activities of persons or entities coming under the formers' jurisdiction, or secures
or requires the disclosure of information by means of accounts, records, reports, statements,
testimony of witnesses, and production of documents.

With the above disquisition, we rule that the dismissal of the BFP Complaint cannot operate as
res judicata. Therefore, forum-shopping is unavailing in this case.

Jamaca vs People, July 27, 2015, GR No. 183681

http://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2015julydecisions.php?id=586

Gist: There is no res judicata/double jeopardy during the preliminary investigation stage of the
proceedings.

Facts: Atty. Emilie Bangot filed a complaint for Grave Threats against petitioner with the Office
of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military. He likewise filed a similar complaint before the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City.

The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military dismissed the complaint on the ground
that the accusation against petitioner was unfounded, based solely on the statement of one
Rustom Roxas that there were no threatening words uttered by petitioner. A petition
for certiorari was filed with this Court to assail said ruling of the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for the Military, but the same was dismissed.

On the other hand, private complainant's complaint before the Office of the City Prosecutor
prospered and led to the filing of an Information against petitioner. He was charged with grave
threats defined and penalized under paragraph 1 of Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code.

Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty and trial then ensued. The trial court ruled that
the evidence clearly established the guilt of petitioner.

The trial court's Decision was appealed to the CA and the CA promulgated a Decision
affirming in toto petitioner's conviction for the crime of Grave Threats. Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration was denied.

Petitioner then filed his Petition for Review on Certiorari and a Supplemental Petition for
Review on Certiorari with this Court. The only issue presented in the original petition is whether
the CA should have dismissed the petition outright and ruled that the RTC had no jurisdiction
to take cognizance of the case because private complainant was guilty of forum shopping,
having filed similar complaints before both the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman and the Office
of the City Prosecutor.

Issue: WON the CA erred in not applying the doctrine of Res Judicata as the conviction of the
accused petitioner for the crime of grave threats by the trial court had long been dismissed by the
OMB.
Ruling: No. It should be borne in mind that for a claim of double jeopardy to prosper, petitioner
has to prove that a first jeopardy has attached prior to the second. "[T]he first jeopardy attaches
only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c ) after arraignment; (d) when a
valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the accused was acquitted or convicted, or the case was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent." In this case, the complaint
before the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military was dismissed as early as the
preliminary investigation stage, thus, there was as yet, no indictment to speak of. No complaint
or Information has been brought before a competent court. Hence, none of the aforementioned
events has transpired for the first jeopardy to have attached.

Note: the question of forum shopping cannot be raised in the CA and in the Supreme Court,
since such an issue must be raised at the earliest opportunity in a motion to dismiss or a
similar pleading. The high court even warned that [i]nvoking it in the later stages of the
proceedings or on appeal may result in the dismissal of the action x x x.

Maza vs Turla, Februar 15, 2017, GR No. 187094

http://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2017februarydecisions.php?id=115

Gist:

Facts:

Issue:

Ruling:

Cam vs Casimiro, June 29, 2015, GR No. 184130

http://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2015junedecisions.php?id=400

Gist:

Facts:

Issue:

Ruling: