AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTI
1 and 3 be
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-28196 November 9, 1967
RAMON A. GONZALES, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, DIRECTOR OF
PRINTING and AUDITOR GENERAL, respondents.
G.R. No. L-28224 November 9, 1967
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION
(PHILCONSA), petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
No. 28196:
Ramon A. Gonzales for and in his own behalf as petitioner.
Juan T. David as amicus curiae
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.
No. 28224:
Salvador Araneta for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
G. R. No. L-28196 is an original action for prohibition, with
preliminary injunction.
Petitioner therein prays for judgment:
1) Restraining: (a) the Commission on Elections from
enforcing Republic Act No. 4913, or from performing any act
that will result in the holding of the plebiscite for the
ratification of the constitutional amendments proposed in
Joint Resolutions Nos. 1 and 3 of the two Houses of Congress
of the Philippines, approved on March 16, 1967; (b) the
Director of Printing from printing ballots, pursuant to said
Act and Resolutions; and (c) the Auditor General from
passing in audit any disbursement from the appropriation of
funds made in said Republic Act No. 4913; and
2) declaring said Act unconstitutional and void.
The main facts are not disputed. On March 16, 1967, the
Senate and the House of Representatives passed the
following resolutions:
1. R. B. H. (Resolution of Both Houses) No. 1, proposing
that Section 5, Article VI, of the Constitution of the
Philippines, be amended so as to increase the membership of
the House of Representatives from a maximum of 120, as
provided in the present Constitution, to a maximum of 180,
to be apportioned among the several provinces as nearly as
may be according to the number of their respective
inhabitants, although each province shall have, at least, one
(1) member;
2. R. B. H. No. 2, calling a convention to propose
amendments to said Constitution, the convention to be
composed of two (2) elective delegates from each
representative district, to be "elected in the general elections
to be held on the second Tuesday of November, 1971;" and
3. R. B. H. No. 3, proposing that Section 16, Article VI,
of the same Constitution, be amended so as to authorize
Senators and members of the House of Representatives to
become delegates to the aforementioned constitutional
convention, without forfeiting their respective seats in
Congress.
Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which, upon approval
by the President, on June 17, 1967, became Republic Act No.
4913, providing that the amendments to the Constitution
proposed in the aforementioned Resolutions No.
submitted, for approval by the people, at the general elections
which shall be held on November 14, 1967.
The petition in L-28196 was filed on October 21, 1967. At the
hearing thereof, on October 28, 1967, the Solicitor General
appeared on behalf of respondents. Moreover, Atty. Juan T.
David and counsel for the Philippine Constitution
Association — hereinafter referred to as the PHILCONSA —
were allowed to argue as amici curiae. Said counsel for the
PHILCONSA, Dr. Salvador Araneta, likewise prayed that
the decision in this case be deferred until after a substantially
identical case brought by said organization before the
Commission on Elections,1 which was expected to decide it
any time, and whose decision would, in all probability, be
appealed to this Court — had been submitted thereto for final
determination, for a joint decision on the identical issues
raised in both cases. In fact, on October 31, 1967, the
PHILCONSA filed with this Court the petition in G. R. No.
L-28224, for review by certiorari of the resolution of the
Commission on Elections2 dismissing the petition therein.
The two (2) cases were deemed submitted for decision on
November 8, 1967, upon the filing of the answer of
respondent, the memorandum of the petitioner and the reply
memorandum of respondent in L-28224.
Ramon A. Gonzales, the petitioner in L-28196, is admittedly
a Filipino citizen, a taxpayer, and a voter. He claims to have
instituted case L-28196 as a class unit, for and in behalf of all
citizens, taxpayers, and voters similarly situated. Although
respondents and the Solicitor General have filed an answer
denying the truth of this allegation, upon the ground that
they have no knowledge or information to form a belief as to
the truth thereof, such denial would appear to be a
perfunctory one. In fact, at the hearing of case L-28196, the
Solicitor General expressed himself in favor of a judicial
determination of the merits of the issued raised in said case.
The PHILCONSA, petitioner in L-28224, is admittedly a
corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the
Philippines, and a civic, non-profit and non-partisan
organization the objective of which is to uphold the rule of
law in the Philippines and to defend its Constitution against
erosions or onslaughts from whatever source. Despite his
aforementioned statement in L-28196, in his answer in L-
28224 the Solicitor General maintains that this Court has no
jurisdiction over the subject-matter of L-28224, upon the
ground that the same is "merely political" as held in Mabanag
vs. Lopez Vito.3 Senator Arturo M. Tolentino, who appeared
before the Commission on Elections and filed an opposition
to the PHILCONSA petition therein, was allowed to appear
before this Court and objected to said petition upon the
ground: a) that the Court has no jurisdiction either to grant
the relief sought in the petition, or to pass upon the legality
of the composition of the House of Representatives; b) that
the petition, if granted, would, in effect, render in operational
the legislative department; and c) that "the failure of
Congress to enact a valid reapportionment law . . . does not
have the legal effect of rendering illegal the House of
Representatives elected thereafter, nor of rendering its acts
null and void."
JURISDICTION
As early as Angara vs. Electoral Commission,4 this Court —
speaking through one of the leading members of the
Constitutional Convention and a respected professor of
Constitutional Law, Dr. Jose P. Laurel — declared that "the
judicial department is the only constitutional organ which
can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of
powers between the several departments and among the
integral or constituent units thereof." It is true that in
Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito,5 this Court characterizing the issue
submitted thereto as a political one, declined to pass upon the
question whether or not a given number of votes cast in
Congress in favor of a proposed amendment to the
Constitution — which was being submitted to the people for
1
ratification — satisfied the three-fourths vote requirement of
the fundamental law. The force of this precedent has been
weakened, however, by Suanes vs. Chief Accountant of the
Senate,6 Avelino vs. Cuenco,7 Tañada vs. Cuenco,8 and
Macias vs. Commission on Elections.9 In the first, we held
that the officers and employees of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal are under its supervision and control, not of that of
the Senate President, as claimed by the latter; in the second,
this Court proceeded to determine the number of Senators
necessary for a quorum in the Senate; in the third, we
nullified the election, by Senators belonging to the party
having the largest number of votes in said chamber,
purporting to act on behalf of the party having the second
largest number of votes therein, of two (2) Senators belonging
to the first party, as members, for the second party, of the,
Senate Electoral Tribunal; and in the fourth, we declared
unconstitutional an act of Congress purporting to apportion
the representative districts for the House of Representatives,
upon the ground that the apportionment had not been made
as may be possible according to the number of inhabitants of
each province. Thus we rejected the theory, advanced in these
four (4) cases, that the issues therein raised were political
questions the determination of which is beyond judicial
review.
Indeed, the power to amend the Constitution or to propose
amendments thereto is not included in the general grant of
legislative powers to Congress.10 It is part of the inherent
powers of the people — as the repository of sovereignty in a
republican state, such as ours11 — to make, and, hence, to
amend their own Fundamental Law. Congress may propose
amendments to the Constitution merely because the same
explicitly grants such power.12 Hence, when exercising the
same, it is said that Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives act, not as members of Congress, but as
component elements of a constituent assembly. When acting
as such, the members of Congress derive their authority from
the Constitution, unlike the people, when performing the
same function,13 for their authority does not emanate from
the Constitution — they are the very source of all powers of
government, including the Constitution itself .
Since, when proposing, as a constituent assembly,
amendments to the Constitution, the members of Congress
derive their authority from the Fundamental Law, it follows,
necessarily, that they do not have the final say on whether or
not their acts are within or beyond constitutional limits.
Otherwise, they could brush aside and set the same at
naught, contrary to the basic tenet that ours is a government
of laws, not of men, and to the rigid nature of our
Constitution. Such rigidity is stressed by the fact that, the
Constitution expressly confers upon the Supreme Court,14
the power to declare a treaty unconstitutional,15 despite the
eminently political character of treaty-making power.
In short, the issue whether or not a Resolution of Congress —
acting as a constituent assembly — violates the Constitution
essentially justiciable, not political, and, hence, subject to
judicial review, and, to the extent that this view may be
inconsistent with the stand taken in Mabanag vs. Lopez
Vito,16 the latter should be deemed modified accordingly.
The Members of the Court are unanimous on this point.
THE MERITS
Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution, as amended,
reads:
The Congress in joint session assembled by a vote of three-
fourths of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives voting separately, may propose
amendments to this Constitution or call a convention for that
purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as part of this
Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast
at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the
people for their ratification.
Pursuant to this provision, amendments to the Constitution
may be proposed, either by Congress, or by a convention
called by Congress for that purpose. In either case, the vote
of "three-fourths of all the members of the Senate and of the
House of Representatives voting separately" is necessary.
And, "such amendments shall be valid as part of" the
"Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast
at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the
people for their ratification."
In the cases at bar, it is conceded that the R. B. H. Nos. 1 and
3 have been approved by a vote of three-fourths of all the
members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives
voting separately. This, notwithstanding, it is urged that said
resolutions are null and void because:
1. The Members of Congress, which approved the
proposed amendments, as well as the resolution calling a
convention to propose amendments, are, at best, de facto
Congressmen;
2. Congress may adopt either one of two alternatives
propose — amendments or call a convention therefore but
may not avail of both — that is to say, propose amendment
and call a convention — at the same time;
3. The election, in which proposals for amendment to
the Constitution shall be submitted for ratification, must be
a special election, not a general election, in which officers of
the national and local governments — such as the elections
scheduled to be held on November 14, 1967 — will be chosen;
and
4. The spirit of the Constitution demands that the
election, in which proposals for amendment shall be
submitted to the people for ratification, must be held under
such conditions — which, allegedly, do not exist — as to give
the people a reasonable opportunity to have a fair grasp of
the nature and implications of said amendments.
Legality of Congress and Legal Status of the Congressmen
The first objection is based upon Section 5, Article VI, of the
Constitution, which provides:
The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more
than one hundred and twenty Members who shall be
apportioned among the several provinces as nearly as may be
according to the number of their respective inhabitants, but
each province shall have at least one Member. The Congress
shall by law make an apportionment within three years after
the return of every enumeration, and not otherwise. Until
such apportionment shall have been made, the House of
Representatives shall have the same number of Members as
that fixed by law for the National Assembly, who shall be
elected by the qualified electors from the present Assembly
districts. Each representative district shall comprise, as far
as practicable, contiguous and compact territory.
It is urged that the last enumeration or census took place in
1960; that, no apportionment having been made within three
(3) years thereafter, the Congress of the Philippines and/or
the election of its Members became illegal; that Congress and
its Members, likewise, became a de facto Congress and/or de
facto congressmen, respectively; and that, consequently, the
disputed Resolutions, proposing amendments to the
Constitution, as well as Republic Act No. 4913, are null and
void.
It is not true, however, that Congress has not made an
apportionment within three years after the enumeration or
census made in 1960. It did actually pass a bill, which became
Republic Act No. 3040,17 purporting to make said
apportionment. This Act was, however, declared
unconstitutional, upon the ground that the apportionment
therein undertaken had not been made according to the
2
number of inhabitants of the different provinces of the
Philippines.18
Moreover, we are unable to agree with the theory that, in
view of the failure of Congress to make a valid apportionment
within the period stated in the Constitution, Congress
became an "unconstitutional Congress" and that, in
consequence thereof, the Members of its House of
Representatives are de facto officers. The major premise of
this process of reasoning is that the constitutional provision
on "apportionment within three years after the return of
every enumeration, and not otherwise," is mandatory. The
fact that Congress is under legal obligation to make said
apportionment does not justify, however, the conclusion that
failure to comply with such obligation rendered Congress
illegal or unconstitutional, or that its Members have become
de facto officers.
It is conceded that, since the adoption of the Constitution in
1935, Congress has not made a valid apportionment as
required in said fundamental law. The effect of this omission
has been envisioned in the Constitution, pursuant to which:
. . . Until such apportionment shall have been made, the
House of Representatives shall have the same number of
Members as that fixed by law for the National Assembly, who
shall be elected by the qualified electors from the present
Assembly districts. . . . .
The provision does not support the view that, upon the
expiration of the period to make the apportionment, a
Congress which fails to make it is dissolved or becomes
illegal. On the contrary, it implies necessarily that Congress
shall continue to function with the representative districts
existing at the time of the expiration of said period.
It is argued that the above-quoted provision refers only to the
elections held in 1935. This theory assumes that an
apportionment had to be made necessarily before the first
elections to be held after the inauguration of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines, or in 1938.19 The
assumption, is, however, unwarranted, for there had been no
enumeration in 1935, and nobody could foretell when it would
be made. Those who drafted and adopted the Constitution in
1935 could be certain, therefore, that the three-year period,
after the earliest possible enumeration, would expire after
the elections in 1938.
What is more, considering that several provisions of the
Constitution, particularly those on the legislative
department, were amended in 1940, by establishing a
bicameral Congress, those who drafted and adopted said
amendment, incorporating therein the provision of the
original Constitution regarding the apportionment of the
districts for representatives, must have known that the
three-year period therefor would expire after the elections
scheduled to be held and actually held in 1941.
Thus, the events contemporaneous with the framing and
ratification of the original Constitution in 1935 and of the
amendment thereof in 1940 strongly indicate that the
provision concerning said apportionment and the effect of the
failure to make it were expected to be applied to conditions
obtaining after the elections in 1935 and 1938, and even after
subsequent elections.
Then again, since the report of the Director of the Census on
the last enumeration was submitted to the President on
November 30, 1960, it follows that the three-year period to
make the apportionment did not expire until 1963, or after
the Presidential elections in 1961. There can be no question,
therefore, that the Senate and the House of Representatives
organized or constituted on December 30, 1961, were de jure
bodies, and that the Members thereof were de jure officers.
Pursuant to the theory of petitioners herein, upon expiration
of said period of three years, or late in 1963, Congress became
illegal and its Members, or at least, those of the House of
Representatives, became illegal holder of their respective
offices, and were de facto officers.
Petitioners do not allege that the expiration of said three-
year period without a reapportionment, had the effect of
abrogating or repealing the legal provision creating
Congress, or, at least, the House of Representatives, and are
not aware of any rule or principle of law that would warrant
such conclusion. Neither do they allege that the term of office
of the members of said House automatically expired or that
they ipso facto forfeited their seats in Congress, upon the
lapse of said period for reapportionment. In fact, neither our
political law, nor our law on public officers, in particular,
supports the view that failure to discharge a mandatory duty,
whatever it may be, would automatically result in the
forfeiture of an office, in the absence of a statute to this effect.
Similarly, it would seem obvious that the provision of our
Election Law relative to the election of Members of Congress
in 1965 were not repealed in consequence of the failure of said
body to make an apportionment within three (3) years after
the census of 1960. Inasmuch as the general elections in 1965
were presumably held in conformity with said Election Law,
and the legal provisions creating Congress — with a House of
Representatives composed of members elected by qualified
voters of representative districts as they existed at the time
of said elections — remained in force, we can not see how said
Members of the House of Representatives can be regarded as
de facto officers owing to the failure of their predecessors in
office to make a reapportionment within the period
aforementioned.
Upon the other hand, the Constitution authorizes the
impeachment of the President, the Vice-President, the
Justices of the Supreme Court and the Auditor General for,
inter alia, culpable violation of the Constitution,20 the
enforcement of which is, not only their mandatory duty, but
also, their main function. This provision indicates that,
despite the violation of such mandatory duty, the title to their
respective offices remains unimpaired, until dismissal or
ouster pursuant to a judgment of conviction rendered in
accordance with Article IX of the Constitution. In short, the
loss of office or the extinction of title thereto is not automatic.
Even if we assumed, however, that the present Members of
Congress are merely de facto officers, it would not follow that
the contested resolutions and Republic Act No. 4913 are null
and void. In fact, the main reasons for the existence of the de
facto doctrine is that public interest demands that acts of
persons holding, under color of title, an office created by a
valid statute be, likewise, deemed valid insofar as the public
— as distinguished from the officer in question — is
concerned.21 Indeed, otherwise, those dealing with officers
and employees of the Government would be entitled to
demand from them satisfactory proof of their title to the
positions they hold, before dealing with them, or before
recognizing their authority or obeying their commands, even
if they should act within the limits of the authority vested in
their respective offices, positions or employments.22 One can
imagine this great inconvenience, hardships and evils that
would result in the absence of the de facto doctrine.
As a consequence, the title of a de facto officer cannot be
assailed collaterally.23 It may not be contested except
directly, by quo warranto proceedings. Neither may the
validity of his acts be questioned upon the ground that he is
merely a de facto officer.24 And the reasons are obvious: (1)
it would be an indirect inquiry into the title to the office; and
(2) the acts of a de facto officer, if within the competence of
his office, are valid, insofar as the public is concerned.
It is argued that the foregoing rules do not apply to the cases
at bar because the acts therein involved have not been
completed and petitioners herein are not third parties. This
pretense is untenable. It is inconsistent with Tayko vs.
Capistrano.25 In that case, one of the parties to a suit being
heard before Judge Capistrano objected to his continuing to
3
hear the case, for the reason that, meanwhile, he had reached
the age of retirement. This Court held that the objection could
not be entertained, because the Judge was at least, a de facto
Judge, whose title can not be assailed collaterally. It should
be noted that Tayko was not a third party insofar as the
Judge was concerned. Tayko was one of the parties in the
aforementioned suit. Moreover, Judge Capistrano had not, as
yet, finished hearing the case, much less rendered decision
therein. No rights had vested in favor of the parties, in
consequence of the acts of said Judge. Yet, Tayko's objection
was overruled. Needless to say, insofar as Congress is
concerned, its acts, as regards the Resolutions herein
contested and Republic Act No. 4913, are complete. Congress
has nothing else to do in connection therewith.
The Court is, also, unanimous in holding that the objection
under consideration is untenable.
Available Alternatives to Congress
Atty. Juan T. David, as amicus curiae, maintains that
Congress may either propose amendments to the
Constitution or call a convention for that purpose, but it can
not do both, at the same time. This theory is based upon the
fact that the two (2) alternatives are connected in the
Constitution by the disjunctive "or." Such basis is, however,
a weak one, in the absence of other circumstances — and
none has brought to our attention — supporting the
conclusion drawn by the amicus curiae. In fact, the term "or"
has, oftentimes, been held to mean "and," or vice-versa, when
the spirit or context of the law warrants it.26
It is, also, noteworthy that R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3 propose
amendments to the constitutional provision on Congress, to
be submitted to the people for ratification on November 14,
1967, whereas R. B. H. No. 2 calls for a convention in 1971,
to consider proposals for amendment to the Constitution, in
general. In other words, the subject-matter of R. B. H. No. 2
is different from that of R B. H. Nos. 1 and 3. Moreover, the
amendments proposed under R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3, will be
submitted for ratification several years before those that may
be proposed by the constitutional convention called in R. B.
H. No. 2. Again, although the three (3) resolutions were
passed on the same date, they were taken up and put to a
vote separately, or one after the other. In other words, they
were not passed at the same time.
In any event, we do not find, either in the Constitution, or in
the history thereof anything that would negate the authority
of different Congresses to approve the contested Resolutions,
or of the same Congress to pass the same in, different
sessions or different days of the same congressional session.
And, neither has any plausible reason been advanced to
justify the denial of authority to adopt said resolutions on the
same day.
Counsel ask: Since Congress has decided to call a
constitutional convention to propose amendments, why not
let the whole thing be submitted to said convention, instead
of, likewise, proposing some specific amendments, to be
submitted for ratification before said convention is held? The
force of this argument must be conceded. but the same
impugns the wisdom of the action taken by Congress, not its
authority to take it. One seeming purpose thereof to permit
Members of Congress to run for election as delegates to the
constitutional convention and participate in the proceedings
therein, without forfeiting their seats in Congress. Whether
or not this should be done is a political question, not subject
to review by the courts of justice.
On this question there is no disagreement among the
members of the Court.
May Constitutional Amendments Be Submitted for
Ratification in a General Election?
Article XV of the Constitution provides:
. . . The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of
three-fourths of all the Members of the Senate and of the
House of Representatives voting separately, may propose
amendments to this Constitution or call a contention for that
purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as part of this
Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast
at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the
people for their ratification.
There is in this provision nothing to indicate that the
"election" therein referred to is a "special," not a general,
election. The circumstance that three previous amendments
to the Constitution had been submitted to the people for
ratification in special elections merely shows that Congress
deemed it best to do so under the circumstances then
obtaining. It does not negate its authority to submit proposed
amendments for ratification in general elections.
It would be better, from the viewpoint of a thorough
discussion of the proposed amendments, that the same be
submitted to the people's approval independently of the
election of public officials. And there is no denying the fact
that an adequate appraisal of the merits and demerits
proposed amendments is likely to be overshadowed by the
great attention usually commanded by the choice of
personalities involved in general elections, particularly when
provincial and municipal officials are to be chosen. But, then,
these considerations are addressed to the wisdom of holding
a plebiscite simultaneously with the election of public officer.
They do not deny the authority of Congress to choose either
alternative, as implied in the term "election" used, without
qualification, in the abovequoted provision of the
Constitution. Such authority becomes even more patent
when we consider: (1) that the term "election," normally
refers to the choice or selection of candidates to public office
by popular vote; and (2) that the word used in Article V of the
Constitution, concerning the grant of suffrage to women is,
not "election," but "plebiscite."
Petitioners maintain that the term "election," as used in
Section 1 of Art. XV of the Constitution, should be construed
as meaning a special election. Some members of the Court
even feel that said term ("election") refers to a "plebiscite,"
without any "election," general or special, of public officers.
They opine that constitutional amendments are, in general,
if not always, of such important, if not transcendental and
vital nature as to demand that the attention of the people be
focused exclusively on the subject-matter thereof, so that
their votes thereon may reflect no more than their intelligent,
impartial and considered view on the merits of the proposed
amendments, unimpaired, or, at least, undiluted by
extraneous, if not insidious factors, let alone the partisan
political considerations that are likely to affect the selection
of elective officials.
This, certainly, is a situation to be hoped for. It is a goal the
attainment of which should be promoted. The ideal
conditions are, however, one thing. The question whether the
Constitution forbids the submission of proposals for
amendment to the people except under such conditions, is
another thing. Much as the writer and those who concur in
this opinion admire the contrary view, they find themselves
unable to subscribe thereto without, in effect, reading into
the Constitution what they believe is not written thereon and
can not fairly be deduced from the letter thereof, since the
spirit of the law should not be a matter of sheer speculation.
The majority view — although the votes in favor thereof are
insufficient to declare Republic Act No. 4913 unconstitutional
— as ably set forth in the opinion penned by Mr. Justice
Sanchez, is, however, otherwise.
Would the Submission now of the Contested Amendments to
the People Violate the Spirit of the Constitution?
4
It should be noted that the contested Resolutions were
approved on March 16, 1967, so that, by November 14, 1967,
our citizenry shall have had practically eight (8) months to be
informed on the amendments in question. Then again,
Section 2 of Republic Act No. 4913 provides:
(1) that "the amendments shall be published in three
consecutive issues of the Official Gazette, at least twenty
days prior to the election;"
(2) that "a printed copy of the proposed amendments
shall be posted in a conspicuous place in every municipality,
city and provincial office building and in every polling place
not later than October 14, 1967," and that said copy "shall
remain posted therein until after the election;"
(3) that "at least five copies of said amendment shall be
kept in each polling place, to be made available for
examination by the qualified electors during election day;"
(4) that "when practicable, copies in the principal native
languages, as may be determined by the Commission on
Elections, shall be kept in each polling place;"
(5) that "the Commission on Elections shall make
available copies of said amendments in English, Spanish and,
whenever practicable, in the principal native languages, for
free distributing:" and
(6) that the contested Resolutions "shall be printed in
full" on the back of the ballots which shall be used on
November 14, 1967.
We are not prepared to say that the foregoing measures are
palpably inadequate to comply with the constitutional
requirement that proposals for amendment be "submitted to
the people for their ratification," and that said measures are
manifestly insufficient, from a constitutional viewpoint, to
inform the people of the amendment sought to be made.
These were substantially the same means availed of to
inform the people of the subject submitted to them for
ratification, from the original Constitution down to the Parity
Amendment. Thus, referring to the original Constitution,
Section 1 of Act No. 4200, provides:
Said Constitution, with the Ordinance appended thereto,
shall be published in the Official Gazette, in English and in
Spanish, for three consecutive issues at least fifteen days
prior to said election, and a printed copy of said Constitution,
with the Ordinance appended thereto, shall be posted in a
conspicuous place in each municipal and provincial
government office building and in each polling place not later
than the twenty-second day of April, nineteen hundred and
thirty-five, and shall remain posted therein continually until
after the termination of the election. At least ten copies of the
Constitution with the Ordinance appended thereto, in
English and in Spanish, shall be kept at each polling place
available for examination by the qualified electors during
election day. Whenever practicable, copies in the principal
local dialects as may be determined by the Secretary of the
Interior shall also be kept in each polling place.
The provision concerning woman's suffrage is Section 1 of
Commonwealth Act No. 34, reading:
Said Article V of the Constitution shall be published in the
Official Gazette, in English and in Spanish, for three
consecutive issues at least fifteen days prior to said election,
and the said Article V shall be posted in a conspicuous place
in each municipal and provincial office building and in each
polling place not later than the twenty-second day of April,
nineteen and thirty-seven, and shall remain posted therein
continually until after the termination of the plebiscite. At
least ten copies of said Article V of the Constitution, in
English and in Spanish, shall be kept at each polling place
available for examination by the qualified electors during the
plebiscite. Whenever practicable, copies in the principal
native languages, as may be determined by the Secretary of
the Interior, shall also be kept in each polling place.
Similarly, Section 2, Commonwealth Act No. 517, referring to
the 1940 amendments, is of the following tenor:
The said amendments shall be published in English and
Spanish in three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette at
least twenty days prior to the election. A printed copy thereof
shall be posted in a conspicuous place in every municipal,
city, and provincial government office building and in every
polling place not later than May eighteen, nineteen hundred
and forty, and shall remain posted therein until after the
election. At least ten copies of said amendments shall be kept
in each polling place to be made available for examination by
the qualified electors during election day. When practicable,
copies in the principal native languages, as may be
determined by the Secretary of the Interior, shall also be kept
therein.
As regards the Parity Amendment, Section 2 of Republic Act
No. 73 is to the effect that:
The said amendment shall be published in English and
Spanish in three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette at
least twenty days prior to the election. A printed copy thereof
shall be posted in a conspicuous place in every municipal,
city, and provincial government office building and in every
polling place not later than February eleven, nineteen
hundred and forty-seven, and shall remain posted therein
until after the election. At least, ten copies of the said
amendment shall be kept in each polling place to be made
available for examination by the qualified electors during
election day. When practicable, copies in the principal native
languages, as may be determined by the Commission on
Elections, shall also be kept in each polling place.
The main difference between the present situation and that
obtaining in connection with the former proposals does not
arise from the law enacted therefor. The difference springs
from the circumstance that the major political parties had
taken sides on previous amendments to the Constitution —
except, perhaps, the woman's suffrage — and, consequently,
debated thereon at some length before the plebiscite took
place. Upon the other hand, said political parties have not
seemingly made an issue on the amendments now being
contested and have, accordingly, refrained from discussing
the same in the current political campaign. Such debates or
polemics as may have taken place — on a rather limited scale
— on the latest proposals for amendment, have been due
principally to the initiative of a few civic organizations and
some militant members of our citizenry who have voiced their
opinion thereon. A legislation cannot, however, be nullified
by reason of the failure of certain sectors of the community to
discuss it sufficiently. Its constitutionality or
unconstitutionality depends upon no other factors than those
existing at the time of the enactment thereof, unaffected by
the acts or omissions of law enforcing agencies, particularly
those that take place subsequently to the passage or approval
of the law.
Referring particularly to the contested proposals for
amendment, the sufficiency or insufficiency, from a
constitutional angle, of the submission thereof for ratification
to the people on November 14, 1967, depends — in the view
of those who concur in this opinion, and who, insofar as this
phase of the case, constitute the minority — upon whether
the provisions of Republic Act No. 4913 are such as to fairly
apprise the people of the gist, the main idea or the substance
of said proposals, which is — under R. B. H. No. 1 — the
increase of the maximum number of seats in the House of
Representatives, from 120 to 180, and — under R. B. H. No.
3 — the authority given to the members of Congress to run
for delegates to the Constitutional Convention and, if elected
thereto, to discharge the duties of such delegates, without
forfeiting their seats in Congress. We — who constitute the
5
minority — believe that Republic Act No. 4913 satisfies such
requirement and that said Act is, accordingly, constitutional.
A considerable portion of the people may not know how over
160 of the proposed maximum of representative districts are
actually apportioned by R. B. H. No. 1 among the provinces
in the Philippines. It is not improbable, however, that they
are not interested in the details of the apportionment, or that
a careful reading thereof may tend in their simple minds, to
impair a clear vision thereof. Upon the other hand, those who
are more sophisticated, may enlighten themselves
sufficiently by reading the copies of the proposed
amendments posted in public places, the copies kept in the
polling places and the text of contested resolutions, as printed
in full on the back of the ballots they will use.
It is, likewise, conceivable that as many people, if not more,
may fail to realize or envisage the effect of R. B. H. No. 3 upon
the work of the Constitutional Convention or upon the future
of our Republic. But, then, nobody can foretell such effect
with certainty. From our viewpoint, the provisions of Article
XV of the Constitution are satisfied so long as the electorate
knows that R. B. H. No. 3 permits Congressmen to retain
their seats as legislators, even if they should run for and
assume the functions of delegates to the Convention.
We are impressed by the factors considered by our
distinguished and esteemed brethren, who opine otherwise,
but, we feel that such factors affect the wisdom of Republic
Act No. 4913 and that of R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3, not the
authority of Congress to approve the same.
The system of checks and balances underlying the judicial
power to strike down acts of the Executive or of Congress
transcending the confines set forth in the fundamental laws
is not in derogation of the principle of separation of powers,
pursuant to which each department is supreme within its
own sphere. The determination of the conditions under which
the proposed amendments shall be submitted to the people is
concededly a matter which falls within the legislative sphere.
We do not believe it has been satisfactorily shown that
Congress has exceeded the limits thereof in enacting
Republic Act No. 4913. Presumably, it could have done
something better to enlighten the people on the subject-
matter thereof. But, then, no law is perfect. No product of
human endeavor is beyond improvement. Otherwise, no
legislation would be constitutional and valid. Six (6)
Members of this Court believe, however, said Act and R. B.
H. Nos. 1 and 3 violate the spirit of the Constitution.
Inasmuch as there are less than eight (8) votes in favor of
declaring Republic Act 4913 and R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3
unconstitutional and invalid, the petitions in these two (2)
cases must be, as they are hereby, dismiss and the writs
therein prayed for denied, without special pronouncement as
to costs. It is so ordered.
Makalintal and Bengzon, J.P., JJ., concur.
Fernando, J., concurs fully with the above opinion, adding a
few words on the question of jurisdiction.
Separate Opinions
MAKALINTAL, J., concurring:
I concur in the foregoing opinion of the Chief Justice. I would
make some additional observations in connection with my
concurrence. Sections 2 and 4 of Republic Act No. 4913
provide:
Sec. 2. The amendments shall be published in three
consecutive issues of the Official Gazette at least twenty days
prior to the election. A printed copy thereof shall be posted in
a conspicuous place in every municipality, city and provincial
office building and in every polling place not later than
October fourteen, nineteen hundred and sixty-seven, and
shall remain posted therein until after the election. At least
five copies of the said amendments shall be kept in each
polling place to be made available for examination by the
qualified electors during election day. When practicable,
copies in the principal native languages, as may be
determined by the Commission on Elections, shall be kept in
each polling place. The Commission on Elections shall make
available copies of each amendments in English, Spanish
and, whenever practicable, in the principal native languages,
for free distribution.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 4. The ballots which shall be used in the election for
the approval of said amendments shall be printed in English
and Pilipino and shall be in the size and form prescribed by
the Commission on Elections: Provided, however, That at the
back of said ballot there shall be printed in full Resolutions
of both Houses of Congress Numbered One and Three, both
adopted on March sixteen, nineteen hundred and sixty-seven,
proposing the amendments: Provided, further, That the
questionnaire appearing on the face of the ballot shall be as
follows:
Are you in favor of the proposed amendment to Section five
of Article VI of our Constitution printed at the back of this
ballot?
Are you in favor of the proposed amendment to section
sixteen of Article VI of our Constitution printed at the back
of this ballot?
To vote for the approval of the proposed amendments, the
voter shall write the word "yes" or its equivalent in Pilipino
or in the local dialect in the blank space after each question;
to vote for the rejection thereof, he shall write the word "No"
or its equivalent in Pilipino or in the local dialect.
I believe that intrinsically, that is, considered in itself and
without reference to extraneous factors and circumstances,
the manner prescribed in the aforesaid provisions is
sufficient for the purpose of having the proposed
amendments submitted to the people for their ratification, as
enjoined in Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution. I am at
a loss to say what else should have been required by the Act
to make it adhere more closely to the constitutional
requirement. Certainly it would have been out of place to
provide, for instance, that government officials and
employees should go out and explain the amendments to the
people, or that they should be the subject of any particular
means or form of public discussion.
The objection of some members of the Court to Republic Act
No. 4913 seems to me predicated on the fact that there are so
many other issues at stake in the coming general election
that the attention of the electorate, cannot be entirely focused
on the proposed amendments, such that there is a failure to
properly submit them for ratification within the intendment
of the Constitution. If that is so, then the defect is not
intrinsic in the law but in its implementation. The same
manner of submitting the proposed amendments to the
people for ratification may, in a different setting, be sufficient
for the purpose. Yet I cannot conceive that the
constitutionality or unconstitutionality of a law may be made
to depend willy-nilly on factors not inherent in its provisions.
For a law to be struck down as unconstitutional it must be so
by reason of some irreconcilable conflict between it and the
Constitution. Otherwise a law may be either valid or invalid,
according to circumstances not found in its provisions, such
as the zeal with which they are carried out. To such a thesis
I cannot agree. The criterion would be too broad and relative,
and dependent upon individual opinions that at best are
subjective. What one may regard as sufficient compliance
with the requirement of submission to the people, within the
context of the same law, may not be so to another. The
question is susceptible of as many views as there are viewers;
and I do not think this Court would be justified in saying that
6
its own view on the matter is the correct one, to the exclusion
of the opinions of others.
On the other hand, I reject the argument that the ratification
must necessarily be in a special election or plebiscite called
for that purpose alone. While such procedure is highly to be
preferred, the Constitution speaks simply of "an election at
which the amendments are submitted to the people for their
ratification," and I do not subscribe to the restrictive
interpretation that the petitioners would place on this
provision, namely, that it means only a special election.
BENGZON, J.P., J., concurring:
It is the glory of our institutions that they are founded upon
law, that no one can exercise any authority over the rights
and interests of others except pursuant to and in the manner
authorized by law.1 Based upon this principle, petitioners
Ramon A. Gonzales and Philippine Constitution Association
(PHILCONSA) come to this Court in separate petitions.
Petitioner Gonzales, as taxpayer, voter and citizen, and
allegedly in representation thru class suit of all citizens of
this country, filed this suit for prohibition with preliminary
injunction to restrain the Commission on Elections, Director
of Printing and Auditor General from implementing and/or
complying with Republic Act 4913, assailing said law as
unconstitutional.
Petitioner PHILCONSA, as a civic, non-profit and non-
partisan corporation, assails the constitutionality not only of
Republic Act 4913 but also of Resolutions of Both Houses Nos.
1 and 3 of March 16, 1967.
Republic Act 4913, effective June 17, 1967, is an Act
submitting to the Filipino people for approval the
amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines proposed
by the Congress of the Philippines in Resolutions of Both
Houses Numbered 1 and 3, adopted on March 16, 1967. Said
Republic Act fixes the date and manner of the election at
which the aforesaid proposed amendments shall be voted
upon by the people, and appropriates funds for said election.
Resolutions of Both Houses Nos. 1 and 3 propose two
amendments to the Constitution: the first, to amend Sec. 5,
Art. VI, by increasing the maximum membership of the
House of Representatives from 120 to 180, apportioning 160
of said 180 seats and eliminating the provision that Congress
shall by law make an apportionment within three years after
the return of every enumeration; the second, to amend Sec.
16, Art. VI, by allowing Senators and Representatives to be
delegates to a constitutional convention without forfeiting
their seats.
Since both petitions relate to the proposed amendments, they
are considered together herein.
Specifically and briefly, petitioner Gonzales' objections are as
follows: (1) Republic Act 4913 violates Sec. 1, Art. XV of the
Constitution, in submitting the proposed amendments to the
Constitution, to the people for approval, at the general
election of 1967 instead of at a special election solely for that
purpose; (2) Republic Act 4913 violates Sec. 1, Art. XV of the
Constitution, since it was not passed with the 3/4 vote in joint
session required when Congress proposes amendments to the
Constitution, said Republic Act being a step in or part of the
process of proposing amendments to the Constitution; and (3)
Republic Act 4913 violates the due process clause of the
Constitution (Sec. 1, Subsec. 1, Art. III), in not requiring that
the substance of the proposed amendments be stated on the
face of the ballot or otherwise rendering clear the import of
the proposed amendments, such as by stating the provisions
before and after said amendments, instead of printing at the
back of the ballot only the proposed amendments.
Since observance of Constitutional provisions on the
procedure for amending the Constitution is concerned, the
issue is cognizable by this Court under its powers to review
an Act of Congress to determine its conformity to the
fundamental law. For though the Constitution leaves
Congress free to propose whatever Constitutional
amendment it deems fit, so that the substance or content of
said proposed amendment is a matter of policy and wisdom
and thus a political question, the Constitution nevertheless
imposes requisites as to the manner or procedure of
proposing such amendments, e.g., the three-fourths vote
requirement. Said procedure or manner, therefore, from
being left to the discretion of Congress, as a matter of policy
and wisdom, is fixed by the Constitution. And to that extent,
all questions bearing on whether Congress in proposing
amendments followed the procedure required by the
Constitution, is perforce justiciable, it not being a matter of
policy or wisdom.
Turning then to petitioner Gonzales' first objection, Sec. 1,
Art. XV clearly does not bear him on the point. It nowhere
requires that the ratification be thru an election solely for
that purpose. It only requires that it be at "an election at
which the amendments are submitted to the people for their
ratification." To join it with an election for candidates to
public office, that is, to make it concurrent with such election,
does not render it any less an election at which the proposed
amendments are submitted to the people for their
ratification. To prohibition being found in the plain terms of
the Constitution, none should be inferred. Had the framers of
requiring Constitution thought of requiring a special election
for the purpose only of the proposed amendments, they could
have said so, by qualifying the phrase with some word such
as "special" or "solely" or "exclusively". They did not.
It is not herein decided that such concurrence of election is
wise, or that it would not have been better to provide for a
separate election exclusively for the ratification of the
proposed amendments. The point however is that such
separate and exclusive election, even if it may be better or
wiser, which again, is not for this Court to decide, is not
included in the procedure required by the Constitution to
amend the same. The function of the Judiciary is "not to pass
upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of
legislation".2 It is limited to determining whether the action
taken by the Legislative Department has violated the
Constitution or not. On this score, I am of the opinion that it
has not.
Petitioner Gonzales' second point is that Republic Act 4913 is
deficient for not having been passed by Congress in joint
session by 3/4 vote.
Sec. 1, Art. XV of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 1. The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of
three-fourths of all the members of the Senate and of the
House of Representatives voting separately, may propose
amendments to this Constitution or call a convention for that
purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as part of this
Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast
at an election to which the amendments are submitted to the
people for their ratification.
Does Republic Act 4913 propose amendments to the
Constitution? If by the term "propose amendment" is meant
to determine WHAT said amendment shall be, then Republic
Act 4913 does not; Resolutions of Both Houses 1 and 3
already did that. If, on the other hand, it means, or also
means, to provide for how, when, and by what means the
amendments shall be submitted to the people for approval,
then it does.
A careful reading of Sec. 1, Art. XV shows that the first sense.
is the one intended. Said Section has two sentences: in the
first, it requires the 3/4 voting in joint session, for Congress
to "propose amendments". And then in the second sentence,
it provides that "such amendments . . . shall be submitted to
the people for their ratification". This clearly indicates that
7
by the term "propose amendments" in the first sentence is
meant to frame the substance or the content or the WHAT-
element of the amendments; for it is this and this alone that
is submitted to the people for their ratification. The details of
when the election shall be held for approval or rejection of the
proposed amendments, or the manner of holding it, are not
submitted for ratification to form part of the Constitution.
Stated differently, the plain language of Section 1, Art. XV,
shows that the act of proposing amendments is distinct from
— albeit related to — that of submitting the amendments to
the people for their ratification; and that the 3/4 voting
requirement applies only to the first step, not to the second
one.
It follows that the submission of proposed amendments can
be done thru an ordinary statute passed by Congress. The
Constitution does not expressly state by whom the
submission shall be undertaken; the rule is that a power not
lodged elsewhere under the Constitution is deemed to reside
with the legislative body, under the doctrine of residuary
powers. Congress therefore validly enacted Republic Act 4913
to fix the details of the date and manner of submitting the
proposed amendments to the people for their ratification.
Since it does not "propose amendments" in the sense referred
to by Sec. 1, Art. XV of the Constitution, but merely provides
for how and when the amendments, already proposed, are
going to be voted upon, the same does not need the 3/4 vote
in joint session required in Sec. 1, Art. XV of the Constitution.
Furthermore, Republic Act 4913 is an appropriation
measure. Sec. 6 thereof appropriates P1,000,000 for carrying
out its provisions. Sec. 18, Art. VI of the Constitution states
that "All appropriation . . . bills shall originate exclusively in
the House of Representatives". Republic Act 4913, therefore,
could not have been validly adopted in a joint session,
reinforcing the view that Sec. 1, Art. XV does not apply to
such a measure providing for the holding of the election to
ratify the proposed amendments, which must perforce
appropriate funds for its purpose.
Petitioner Gonzales contends, thirdly, that Republic Act 4913
offends against substantive due process. An examination of
the provisions of the law shows no violation of the due process
clause of the Constitution. The publication in the Official
Gazette at least 20 days before the election, the posting of
notices in public buildings not later than October 14, 1967, to
remain posted until after the elections, the placing of copies
of the proposed amendments in the polling places, aside from
printing the same at the back of the ballot, provide sufficient
opportunity to the voters to cast an intelligent vote on the
proposal. Due process refers only to providing fair
opportunity; it does not guarantee that the opportunity given
will in fact be availed of; that is the look-out of the voter and
the responsibility of the citizen. As long as fair and
reasonable opportunity to be informed is given, and it is, the
due process clause is not infringed.
Non-printing of the provisions to be amended as they now
stand, and the printing of the full proposed amendments at
the back of the ballot instead of the substance thereof at the
face of the ballot, do not deprive the voter of fair opportunity
to be informed. The present wording of the Constitution is not
being veiled or suppressed from him; he is conclusively
presumed to know them and they are available should he
want to check on what he is conclusively presumed to know.
Should the voters choose to remain ignorant of the present
Constitution, the fault does not lie with Congress. For
opportunity to familiarize oneself with the Constitution as it
stands has been available thru all these years. Perhaps it
would have been more convenient for the voters if the present
wording of the provisions were also to be printed on the
ballot. The same however is a matter of policy. As long as the
method adopted provides sufficiently reasonable chance to
intelligently vote on the amendments, and I think it does in
this case, it is not constitutionally defective.
Petitioner Gonzales' other arguments touch on the merits or
wisdom of the proposed amendments. These are for the
people in their sovereign capacity to decide, not for this
Court.
Two arguments were further advanced: first, that Congress
cannot both call a convention and propose amendments;
second, that the present Congress is a de facto one, since no
apportionment law was adopted within three years from the
last census of 1960, so that the Representatives elected in
1961 are de facto officers only. Not being de jure, they cannot
propose amendments, it is argued.
As to the first point, Sec. 1 of Art. XV states that Congress
"may propose amendments or call a convention for that
purpose". The term "or", however, is frequently used as
having the same meaning as "and" particularly in
permissive, affirmative sentences so that the interpretation
of the word "or" as "and" in the Constitution in such use will
not change its meaning (Vicksburg S. & P. R. Co. v.
Goodenough, 32 So. 404, 411, 108 La, 442). And it should be
pointed out that the resolutions proposing amendments
(R.B.H. Nos. 1 and 3) are different from that calling for a
convention (R.B.H. No. 2). Surely, if Congress deems it better
or wise to amend the Constitution before a convention called
for is elected, it should not be fettered from doing so. For our
purposes in this case, suffice it to note that the Constitution
does not prohibit it from doing so.
As to the second argument, it is also true that Sec. 5 of Art.
VI of the Constitution provides in part that "The Congress
shall by law make an apportionment within three years after
the return of every enumeration, and not otherwise". It
however further states in the next sentence: "Until such
apportionment shall have been made, the House of
Representatives shall have the same number of Members as
that fixed by law for the National Assembly, who shall be
elected by the qualified electors from the present assembly
districts." The failure of Congress, therefore, to pass a valid
redistricting law since the time the above provision was
adopted, does not render the present districting illegal or
unconstitutional. For the Constitution itself provides for its
continuance in such case, rendering legal and de jure the
status quo.
For the above reasons, I vote to uphold the constitutionality
of Republic Act 4913, and fully concur with the opinion of the
Chief Justice.
FERNANDO, J., concurring:
At the outset, we are faced with a question of jurisdiction.
The opinion prepared by the Chief Justice discusses the
matter with a fullness that erases doubts and misgivings and
clarifies the applicable principles. A few words may however
be added.
We start from the premise that only where it can be shown
that the question is to be solved by public opinion or where
the matter has been left by the Constitution to the sole
discretion of any of the political branches, as was so clearly
stated by the then Justice Concepcion in Tañada v. Cuenco,1
may this Court avoid passing on the issue before it. Whatever
may be said about the present question, it is hard to speak
with certitude considering Article XV, that Congress may be
entrusted with the full and uncontrolled discretion on the
procedure leading to proposals for an amendment of the
Constitution.
It may be said however that in Mabanag v. Lopez Vito,2 this
Court through Justice Tuason followed Coleman v. Miller,3
in its holding that certain aspects of the amending process
may be considered political. His opinion quoted with approval
the view of Justice Black, to which three other members of
the United States Supreme Court agreed, that the process
itself is political in its entirety, "from submission until an
amendment becomes part of the Constitution, and is not
subject to judicial guidance, control or interference at any
8
point." In a sense that would solve the matter neatly. The
judiciary would be spared the at times arduous and in every
case soul-searching process of determining whether the
procedure for amendments required by the Constitution has
been followed.
At the same time, without impugning the motives of
Congress, which cannot be judicially inquired into at any
rate, it is not beyond the realm of possibility that a failure to
observe the requirements of Article XV would occur. In the
event that judicial intervention is sought, to rely
automatically on the theory of political question to avoid
passing on such a matter of delicacy might under certain
circumstances be considered, and rightly so, as nothing less
than judicial abdication or surrender.
What appears regrettable is that a major opinion of an
esteemed jurist, the late Justice Tuason, would no longer be
controlling. There is comfort in the thought that the view that
then prevailed was itself a product of the times. It could very
well be that considering the circumstances existing in 1947
as well as the particular amendment sought to be
incorporated in the Constitution, the parity rights ordinance,
the better part of wisdom in view of the grave economic
situation then confronting the country would be to avoid the
existence of any obstacle to its being submitted for
ratification. Moreover, the Republic being less than a year
old, American Supreme Court opinions on constitutional
questions were-invariably accorded uncritical acceptance.
Thus the approach followed by Justice Tuason is not difficult
to understand. It may be said that there is less propensity
now, which is all to the good, for this Court to accord that
much deference to constitutional views coming from the
quarter.
Nor is this mode of viewing the opinion of Justice Tuason to
do injustice to his memory. For as he stated in another major
opinion in Araneta v. Dinglasan,4 in ascertaining the
meaning to be given the Emergency Powers Act,5 one should
not ignore what would ensue if a particular mode of
construction were followed. As he so emphatically stated, "We
test a rule by its results."
The consequences of a judicial veto on the then proposed
amendment on the economic survival of the country, an
erroneous appraisal it turned out later, constituted an
effective argument for its submission. Why not then consider
the question political and let the people decide? That
assumption could have been indulged in. It could very well be
the inarticulate major premise. For many it did bear the
stamp of judicial statesmanship.
The opinion of Chief Justice Concepcion renders crystal-clear
why as of this date and in the foreseeable future judicial
inquiry to assure the utmost compliance with the
constitutional requirement would be a more appropriate
response.
SANCHEZ, J., in separate opinion:
Right at the outset, the writer expresses his deep
appreciation to Mr. Justice Calixto O. Zaldivar and Mr.
Justice Fred Ruiz Castro for their invaluable contribution to
the substance and form of the opinion which follows.
Directly under attack in this, a petition for prohibition, is the
constitutionality of Republic Act 4913, approved on June 17,
1967. This Act seeks to implement Resolutions 1 and 3
adopted by the Senate and the House of Representatives on
March 16, 1967 with the end in view of amending vital
portions of the Constitution.
Since the problem here presented has its roots in the
resolutions aforesaid of both houses of Congress, it may just
as well be that we recite in brief the salient features thereof.
Resolution No. 1 increases the membership of the House of
Representatives from 120 to 180 members, and immediately
apportions 160 seats. A companion resolution is Resolution
No. 3 which permits Senators and Congressmen — without
forfeiting their seats in Congress — to be members of the
Constitutional Convention1 to be convened, as provided in
another resolution — Resolution No. 2. Parenthetically, two
of these proposed amendments to the Constitution
(Resolutions I and 3) are to be submitted to the people for
their ratification next November 14, 1967. Resolution No. 2
just adverted to calls for a constitutional convention also to
propose amendments to the Constitution. The delegates
thereto are to be elected on the second Tuesday of November
1970; the convention to sit on June 1, 1971; and the
amendments proposed by the convention to be submitted to
the people thereafter for their ratification.
Of importance now are the proposed amendments increasing
the number of members of the House of representatives
under Resolution No. 1, and that in Resolution No. 3 which
gives Senators and Congressmen the right to sit as members
of the constitutional convention to be convened on June 1,
1971. Because, these are the two amendments to be
submitted to the people in the general elections soon to be
held on November 14, 1967, upon the provisions of Section 1,
Republic Act 4913, which reads:
The amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines
proposed by the Congress of the Philippines in Resolutions of
both Houses Numbered One and Three, both adopted on
March sixteen, nineteen hundred and sixty- seven, shall be
submitted to the people for approval at the general election
which shall be held on November fourteen, nineteen hundred
and sixty- seven, in accordance with the provisions of this
Act.
Republic Act 4913 projects the basic angle of the problem
thrust upon us — the manner in which the amendments
proposed by Congress just adverted to be brought to the
people's attention.
First, to the controlling constitutional precept. In order that
proposed amendments to the Constitution may become
effective, Section 1, Article XV thereof commands that such
amendments must be "approved by a majority of the votes
cast at an election at which amendments are submitted to the
people for their ratification."2 The accent is on two words
complementing each other, namely, "submitted" and
"ratification."
1. We are forced to take a long hard look at the core of
the problem facing us. And this, because the amendments
submitted are transcendental and encompassing. The ceiling
of the number of Congressmen is sought to be elevated from
120 to 180 members; and Senators and Congressmen may
run in constitutional conventions without forfeiting their
seats. These certainly affect the people as a whole. The
increase in the number of Congressmen has its proportional
increase in the people's tax burdens. They may not look at
this with favor, what with the constitutional provision
(Section 5, Article VI) that Congress "shall by law make an
apportionment", without the necessity of disturbing the
present constitutionally provided number of Congressmen.
People in Quezon City, for instance, may balk at the specific
apportionment of the 160 seats set forth in Resolution No. 1,
and ask for a Congressman of their own, on the theory of
equal representation. And then, people may question the
propriety of permitting the increased 180 Congressmen from
taking part in the forthcoming constitutional convention and
future conventions for fear that they may dominate its
proceedings. They may entertain the belief that, if at all,
increase in the number of Congressmen should be a proper
topic for deliberation in a constitutional convention which,
anyway, will soon take place. They probably would ask: Why
the hurry? These ponderables require the people's close
scrutiny.
9
2. With these as backdrop, we perforce go into the
philosophy behind the constitutional directive that
constitutional amendments be submitted to the people for
their ratification.
A constitutional amendment is not a temporary expedient.
Unlike a statute which may suffer amendments three or
more times in the same year, it is intended to stand the test
of time. It is an expression of the people's sovereign will.
And so, our approach to the problem of the mechanics of
submission for ratification of amendments is that reasoning
on the basis of the spirit of the Constitution is just as
important as reasoning by a strict adherence to the
phraseology thereof. We underscore this, because it is within
the realm of possibility that a Constitution maybe
overhauled. Supposing three-fourths of the Constitution is to
be amended. Or, the proposal is to eliminate the all
important; Bill of Rights in its entirety. We believe it to be
beyond debate that in some such situations the amendments
ought to call for a constitutional convention rather than a
legislative proposal. And yet, nothing there is in the books or
in the Constitution itself. which would require such
amendments to be adopted by a constitutional convention.
And then, too, the spirit of the supreme enactment, we are
sure, forbids that proposals therefor be initiated by Congress
and thereafter presented to the people for their ratification.
In the context just adverted to, we take the view that the
words "submitted to the people for their ratification", if
construed in the light of the nature of the Constitution — a
fundamental charter that is legislation direct from the
people, an — expression of their sovereign will — is that it
can only be amended by the people expressing themselves
according to the procedure ordained by the Constitution.
Therefore, amendments must be fairly laid before the people
for their blessing or spurning. The people are not to be mere
rubber stamps. They are not to vote blindly. They must be
afforded ample opportunity to mull over the original
provisions compare them with the proposed amendments,
and try to reach a conclusion as the dictates of their
conscience suggest, free from the incubus of extraneous or
possibly in insidious influences. We believe, the word
"submitted" can only mean that the government, within its
maximum capabilities, should strain every effort to inform
very citizen of the provisions to be amended, and the
proposed amendments and the meaning, nature and effects
thereof. By this, we are not to be understood as saying that,
if one citizen or 100 citizens or 1,000 citizens cannot be
reached, then there is no submission within the meaning of
the word as intended by the framers of the Constitution.
What the Constitution in effect directs is that the
government, in submitting an amendment for ratification,
should put every instrumentality or agency within its
structural framework to enlighten the people, educate them
with respect to their act of ratification or rejection. For, as we
have earlier stated, one thing is submission and another is
ratification. There must be fair submission, intelligent,
consent or rejection. If with all these safeguards the people
still approve the amendment no matter how prejudicial it is
to them, then so be it. For, the people decree their own fate.
Aptly had it been said:
. . . The great men who builded the structure of our state in
this respect had the mental vision of a good Constitution
voiced by Judge Cooley, who has said "A good Constitution
should beyond the reach of temporary excitement and
popular caprice or passion. It is needed for stability and
steadiness; it must yield to the thought of the people; not to
the whim of the people, or the thought evolved the excitement
or hot blood, but the sober second thought, which alone, if the
government is to be safe, can be allowed efficiency. . . .
Changes in government are to be feared unless the benefit is
certain. As Montaign says: "All great mutations shake and
disorder a state. Good does not necessarily succeed evil;
another evil may succeed and a worse." Am. Law Rev. 1889,
p. 3113
3. Tersely put, the issue before us funnels down to this
proposition: If the people are not sufficiently informed of the
amendments to be voted upon, to conscientiously deliberate
thereon, to express their will in a genuine manner can it be
said that in accordance with the constitutional mandate, "the
amendments are submitted to the people for their
ratification?" Our answer is "No".
We examine Republic Act 4913, approved on June 17, 1967
— the statute that submits to the people the constitutional
amendments proposed by Congress in Resolutions 1 and 3.
Section 2 of the Act provides the manner of propagation of the
nature of the amendments throughout the country. There are
five parts in said Section 2, viz:
(1) The amendment shall be published in three
consecutive issues of the Official Gazette at least twenty days
prior to the election.
(2) A printed copy thereof shall be posted in a
conspicuous place in every municipality, city and provincial
office building and in every polling place not later than
October fourteen, nineteen hundred and sixty-seven, and
shall remain posted therein until after the election.
(3) At least five copies of the said amendments shall be
kept in each polling place to be made available for
examination by the qualified electors during election day.
(4) When practicable, copies in the principal native
languages, as may be determined by the Commission on
Elections, shall be kept in each polling place.
(5) The Commission on Elections shall make available
copies of said amendments in English, Spanish and,
whenever practicable, in the principal native languages, for
free distribution.
A question that comes to mind is whether the procedure for
dissemination of information regarding the amendments
effectively brings the matter to the people. A dissection of the
mechanics yields disturbing thoughts. First, the Official
Gazette is not widely read. It does not reach the barrios. And
even if it reaches the barrios, is it available to all? And if it
is, would all under stand English? Second, it should be
conceded that many citizens, especially those in the outlying
barrios, do not go to municipal, city and/or provincial office
buildings, except on special occasions like paying taxes or
responding to court summonses. And if they do, will they
notice the printed amendments posted on the bulletin board?
And if they do notice, such copy again is in English (sample
submitted to this Court by the Solicitor General) for, anyway,
the statute does not require that it be in any other language
or dialect. Third, it would not help any if at least five copies
are kept in the polling place for examination by qualified
electors during election day. As petitioner puts it, voting time
is not study time. And then, who can enter the polling place,
except those who are about to vote? Fourth, copies in the
principal native languages shall be kept in each polling place.
But this is not, as Section 2 itself implies, in the nature of a
command because such copies shall be kept therein only
"when practicable" and "as may be determined by the
Commission on Elections." Even if it be said that these are
available before election, a citizen may not intrude into the
school building where the polling places are usually located
without disturbing the school classes being held there. Fifth,
it is true that the Comelec is directed to make available copies
of such amendments in English, Spanish or whenever
practicable, in the principal native languages, for free
distribution. However, Comelec is not required to actively
distribute them to the people. This is significant as to people
in the provinces, especially those in the far-flung barrios who
are completely unmindful of the discussions that go on now
and then in the cities and centers of population on the merits
10
and demerits of the amendments. Rather, Comelec, in this
case, is but a passive agency which may hold copies available,
but which copies may not be distributed at all. Finally, it is
of common knowledge that Comelec has more than its hands
full in these pre-election days. They cannot possibly make
extensive distribution.
Voters will soon go to the polls to say "yes" or "no". But even
the official sample ballot submitted to this Court would show
that only the amendments are printed at the back. And this,
in pursuance to Republic Act 4913 itself.
Surely enough, the voters do not have the benefit of proper
notice of the proposed amendments thru dissemination by
publication in extenso. People do not have at hand the
necessary data on which to base their stand on the merits and
demerits of said amendments.
We, therefore, hold that there is no proper submission of the
proposed constitutional amendments within the meaning
and intendment of Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution.
4. Contemporary history is witness to the fact that
during the present election campaign the focus is on the
election of candidates. The constitutional amendments are
crowded out. Candidates on the homestretch, and their
leaders as well as the voters, gear their undivided efforts to
the election of officials; the constitutional amendments cut no
ice with them. The truth is that even in the ballot itself, the
space accorded to the casting of "yes" or "no" vote would give
one the impression that the constitutional amendments are
but a bootstrap to the electoral ballot. Worse still, the
fortunes of many elective officials, on the national and local
levels, are inextricably intertwined with the results of the
votes on the plebiscite. In a clash between votes for a
candidate and conscience on the merits and demerits of the
constitutional amendments, we are quite certain that it is the
latter that will be dented.
Constitution requires (Art. XV) a three-fourths (3/4) vote of
all the members of each legislative chamber, the highest
majority ever demanded by the fundamental charter, one
higher even than that required in order to declare war (Sec.
24, Article VI), with all its dire consequences. If such an
overwhelming majority, that was evidently exacted in order
to impress upon all and sundry the seriousness of every
constitutional amendment, is asked for a proposal to amend
the Constitution, I find it impossible to believe that it was
ever intended by its framers that such amendment should be
submitted and ratified by just "a majority of the votes cast at
an election at which the amendments are submitted to the
people for their ratification", if the concentration of the
people's attention thereon to be diverted by other extraneous
issues, such as the choice of local and national officials. The
framers of the Constitution, aware of the fundamental
character thereof, and of the need of giving it as much
stability as is practicable, could have only meant that any
amendments thereto should be debated, considered and voted
upon at an election wherein the people could devote
undivided attention to the subject. That this was the
intention and the spirit of the provision is corroborated in the
case of all other constitutional amendments in the past, that
were submitted to and approved in special elections
exclusively devoted to the issue whether the legislature's
amendatory proposals should be ratified or not.
Dizon, Angeles, Zaldivar and Castro, JJ., concur.

5. That proper submission of amendments to the

people to enable them to equally ratify them properly is the
meat of the constitutional requirement, is reflected in the
sequence of uniform past practices. The Constitution had
been amended thrice — in 1939, 1940 and 1947. In each case,
the amendments were embodied in resolutions adopted by
the Legislature, which thereafter fixed the dates at which the
proposed amendments were to be ratified or rejected. These
plebiscites have been referred to either as an "election" or
"general election". At no time, however, was the vote for the
amendments of the Constitution held simultaneously with
the election officials, national or local. Even with regard to
the 1947 parity amendment; the record shows that the sole
issue was the 1947 parity amendment; and the special
elections simultaneously held in only three provinces, Iloilo,
Pangasinan and Bukidnon, were merely incidental thereto.

In the end we say that the people are the last ramparts that
guard against indiscriminate changes in the Constitution
that is theirs. Is it too much to ask that reasonable guarantee
be made that in the matter of the alterations of the law of the
land, their true voice be heard? The answer perhaps is best
expressed in the following thoughts: "It must be remembered
that the Constitution is the people's enactment. No proposed
change can become effective unless they will it so through the
compelling force of need of it and desire for it."4

For the reasons given, our vote is that Republic Act 4913
must be stricken down as in violation of the Constitution.

Zaldivar and Castro, JJ., concur.

Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon and Angeles, JJ., concur in the result.

REYES, J.B.L., J., concurring:

I concur in the result with the opinion penned by Mr. Justice

Sanchez. To approve a mere proposal to amend the
11
 demands special attention, as this system of initiative was
unknown to the people of this country, except perhaps to a
few scholars, before the drafting of the 1987 Constitution.
The 1986 Constitutional Commission itself, through the
original proponent1 and the main sponsor2 of the proposed
Article on Amendments or Revision of the Constitution,
characterized this system as "innovative".3 Indeed it is, for
both under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, only two
methods of proposing amendments to, or revision of, the
Constitution were recognized, viz., (1) by Congress upon a
vote of three-fourths of all its members and (2) by a
constitutional convention.4 For this and the other reasons
hereafter discussed, we resolved to give due course to this
petition.

On 6 December 1996, private respondent Atty. Jesus S.

Delfin filed with public respondent Commission on Elections
(hereafter, COMELEC) a "Petition to Amend the
Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by
People's Initiative" (hereafter, Delfin Petition)5 wherein
Delfin asked the COMELEC for an order

1. Fixing the time and dates for signature gathering all

over the country;

2. Causing the necessary publications of said Order

and the attached "Petition for Initiative on the 1987
Constitution, in newspapers of general and local circulation;

3. Instructing Municipal Election Registrars in all

Regions of the Philippines, to assist Petitioners and
volunteers, in establishing signing stations at the time and
on the dates designated for the purpose.

Delfin alleged in his petition that he is a founding member of

the Movement for People's Initiative,6 a group of citizens
desirous to avail of the system intended to institutionalize
people power; that he and the members of the Movement and
other volunteers intend to exercise the power to directly
propose amendments to the Constitution granted under
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution; that the exercise
of that power shall be conducted in proceedings under the
control and supervision of the COMELEC; that, as required
in COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, signature stations shall
be established all over the country, with the assistance of
municipal election registrars, who shall verify the signatures
affixed by individual signatories; that before the Movement
SUPREME COURT and other volunteers can gather signatures, it is necessary
Manila that the time and dates to be designated for the purpose be
first fixed in an order to be issued by the COMELEC; and
EN BANC that to adequately inform the people of the electoral process
G.R. No. 127325 March 19, 1997 involved, it is likewise necessary that the said order, as well
as the Petition on which the signatures shall be affixed, be
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, ALEXANDER published in newspapers of general and local circulation,
PADILLA, and MARIA ISABEL ONGPIN, petitioners, under the control and supervision of the COMELEC.
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JESUS DELFIN, The Delfin Petition further alleged that the provisions sought
ALBERTO PEDROSA & CARMEN PEDROSA, in their to be amended are Sections 4 and 7 of Article VI,7 Section 4
capacities as founding members of the People's Initiative for of Article VII,8 and Section 8 of Article X9 of the Constitution.
Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA), respondents. Attached to the petition is a copy of a "Petition for Initiative
on the 1987 Constitution" 10 embodying the proposed
SENATOR RAUL S. ROCO, DEMOKRASYA- amendments which consist in the deletion from the aforecited
IPAGTANGGOL ANG KONSTITUSYON (DIK), sections of the provisions concerning term limits, and with
MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD the following proposition:
INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI),
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP), and DO YOU APPROVE OF LIFTING THE TERM LIMITS OF
LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LABAN), ALL ELECTIVE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, AMENDING
petitioners-intervenors. FOR THE PURPOSE SECTIONS 4 AND 7 OF ARTICLE VI,
SECTION 4 OF ARTICLE VII, AND SECTION 8 OF
ARTICLE X OF THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION?
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
According to Delfin, the said Petition for Initiative will first
The heart of this controversy brought to us by way of a be submitted to the people, and after it is signed by at least
petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is twelve per cent of the total number of registered voters in the
the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the country it will be formally filed with the COMELEC.
Constitution through the system of initiative under Section 2
of Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution. Undoubtedly, this
12
Upon the filing of the Delfin Petition, which was forthwith
given the number UND 96-037 (INITIATIVE), the
COMELEC, through its Chairman, issued an Order 11 (a)
directing Delfin "to cause the publication of the petition,
together with the attached Petition for Initiative on the 1987
Constitution (including the proposal, proposed constitutional
amendment, and the signature form), and the notice of
hearing in three (3) daily newspapers of general circulation
at his own expense" not later than 9 December 1996; and (b)
setting the case for hearing on 12 December 1996 at 10:00
a.m.
At the hearing of the Delfin Petition on 12 December 1996,
the following appeared: Delfin and Atty. Pete Q. Quadra;
representatives of the People's Initiative for Reforms,
Modernization and Action (PIRMA); intervenor-oppositor
Senator Raul S. Roco, together with his two other lawyers,
and representatives of, or counsel for, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP), Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang
Konstitusyon (DIK), Public Interest Law Center, and Laban
ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LABAN). 12 Senator Roco, on
that same day, filed a Motion to Dismiss the Delfin Petition
on the ground that it is not the initiatory petition properly
cognizable by the COMELEC.
After hearing their arguments, the COMELEC directed
Delfin and the oppositors to file their "memoranda and/or
oppositions/memoranda" within five days. 13
On 18 December 1996, the petitioners herein — Senator
Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria
Isabel Ongpin — filed this special civil action for prohibition
raising the following arguments:
(1) The constitutional provision on people's initiative to
amend the Constitution can only be implemented by law to
be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed; in fact,
Senate Bill No. 1290 entitled An Act Prescribing and
Regulating Constitution Amendments by People's Initiative,
which petitioner Senator Santiago filed on 24 November
1995, is still pending before the Senate Committee on
Constitutional Amendments.
(2) It is true that R.A. No. 6735 provides for three
systems of initiative, namely, initiative on the Constitution,
on statutes, and on local legislation. However, it failed to
provide any subtitle on initiative on the Constitution, unlike
in the other modes of initiative, which are specifically
provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III. This deliberate
omission indicates that the matter of people's initiative to
amend the Constitution was left to some future law. Former
Senator Arturo Tolentino stressed this deficiency in the law
in his privilege speech delivered before the Senate in 1994:
"There is not a single word in that law which can be
considered as implementing [the provision on constitutional
initiative]. Such implementing provisions have been
obviously left to a separate law.
(3) Republic Act No. 6735 provides for the effectivity of
the law after publication in print media. This indicates that
the Act covers only laws and not constitutional amendments
because the latter take effect only upon ratification and not
after publication.
(4) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, adopted on 16
January 1991 to govern "the conduct of initiative on the
Constitution and initiative and referendum on national and
local laws, is ultra vires insofar as initiative on amendments
to the Constitution is concerned, since the COMELEC has no
power to provide rules and regulations for the exercise of the
right of initiative to amend the Constitution. Only Congress
is authorized by the Constitution to pass the implementing
law.
(5) The people's initiative is limited to amendments to
the Constitution, not to revision thereof. Extending or lifting
of term limits constitutes a revision and is, therefore, outside
the power of the people's initiative.
(6) Finally, Congress has not yet appropriated funds for
people's initiative; neither the COMELEC nor any other
government department, agency, or office has realigned
funds for the purpose.
To justify their recourse to us via the special civil action for
prohibition, the petitioners allege that in the event the
COMELEC grants the Delfin Petition, the people's initiative
spearheaded by PIRMA would entail expenses to the national
treasury for general re-registration of voters amounting to at
least P180 million, not to mention the millions of additional
pesos in expenses which would be incurred in the conduct of
the initiative itself. Hence, the transcendental importance to
the public and the nation of the issues raised demands that
this petition for prohibition be settled promptly and
definitely, brushing aside technicalities of procedure and
calling for the admission of a taxpayer's and legislator's suit.
14 Besides, there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.
On 19 December 1996, this Court (a) required the
respondents to comment on the petition within a non-
extendible period of ten days from notice; and (b) issued a
temporary restraining order, effective immediately and
continuing until further orders, enjoining public respondent
COMELEC from proceeding with the Delfin Petition, and
private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa from
conducting a signature drive for people's initiative to amend
the Constitution.
On 2 January 1997, private respondents, through Atty
Quadra, filed their Comment 15 on the petition. They argue
therein that:
1. IT IS NOT TRUE THAT "IT WOULD ENTAIL
EXPENSES TO THE NATIONAL TREASURY FOR
GENERAL REGISTRATION OF VOTERS AMOUNTING
TO AT LEAST PESOS: ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY MILLION
(P180,000,000.00)" IF THE "COMELEC GRANTS THE
PETITION FILED BY RESPONDENT DELFIN BEFORE
THE COMELEC.
2. NOT A SINGLE CENTAVO WOULD BE SPENT BY
THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT IF THE COMELEC
GRANTS THE PETITION OF RESPONDENT DELFIN.
ALL EXPENSES IN THE SIGNATURE GATHERING ARE
ALL FOR THE ACCOUNT OF RESPONDENT DELFIN
AND HIS VOLUNTEERS PER THEIR PROGRAM OF
ACTIVITIES AND EXPENDITURES SUBMITTED TO THE
COMELEC. THE ESTIMATED COST OF THE DAILY PER
DIEM OF THE SUPERVISING SCHOOL TEACHERS IN
THE SIGNATURE GATHERING TO BE DEPOSITED and
TO BE PAID BY DELFIN AND HIS VOLUNTEERS IS
P2,571,200.00;
3. THE PENDING PETITION BEFORE THE
COMELEC IS ONLY ON THE SIGNATURE GATHERING
WHICH BY LAW COMELEC IS DUTY BOUND "TO
SUPERVISE CLOSELY" PURSUANT TO ITS
"INITIATORY JURISDICTION" UPHELD BY THE
HONORABLE COURT IN ITS RECENT SEPTEMBER 26,
1996 DECISION IN THE CASE OF SUBIC BAY
METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY VS. COMELEC, ET AL.
G.R. NO. 125416;
4. REP. ACT NO. 6735 APPROVED ON AUGUST 4,
1989 IS THE ENABLING LAW IMPLEMENTING THE
POWER OF PEOPLE INITIATIVE TO PROPOSE
AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION. SENATOR
DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO'S SENATE BILL NO. 1290 IS A
DUPLICATION OF WHAT ARE ALREADY PROVIDED
FOR IN REP. ACT NO. 6735;
13
5. COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300
PROMULGATED ON JANUARY 16, 1991 PURSUANT TO
REP. ACT 6735 WAS UPHELD BY THE HONORABLE
COURT IN THE RECENT SEPTEMBER 26, 1996
DECISION IN THE CASE OF SUBIC BAY
METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY VS. COMELEC, ET AL.
G.R. NO. 125416 WHERE THE HONORABLE COURT
SAID: "THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS CAN DO NO
LESS BY SEASONABLY AND JUDICIOUSLY
PROMULGATING GUIDELINES AND RULES FOR BOTH
NATIONAL AND LOCAL USE, IN IMPLEMENTING OF
THESE LAWS."
6. EVEN SENATOR DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO'S
SENATE BILL NO. 1290 CONTAINS A PROVISION
DELEGATING TO THE COMELEC THE POWER TO
"PROMULGATE SUCH RULES AND REGULATIONS AS
MAY BE NECESSARY TO CARRY OUT THE PURPOSES
OF THIS ACT." (SEC. 12, S.B. NO. 1290, ENCLOSED AS
ANNEX E, PETITION);
7. THE LIFTING OF THE LIMITATION ON THE
TERM OF OFFICE OF ELECTIVE OFFICIALS PROVIDED
UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION IS NOT A "REVISION"
OF THE CONSTITUTION. IT IS ONLY AN AMENDMENT.
"AMENDMENT ENVISAGES AN ALTERATION OF ONE
OR A FEW SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF THE
CONSTITUTION. REVISION CONTEMPLATES A RE-
EXAMINATION OF THE ENTIRE DOCUMENT TO
DETERMINE HOW AND TO WHAT EXTENT IT SHOULD
BE ALTERED." (PP. 412-413, 2ND. ED. 1992, 1097 PHIL.
CONSTITUTION, BY JOAQUIN G. BERNAS, S.J.).
Also on 2 January 1997, private respondent Delfin filed in his
own behalf a Comment 16 which starts off with an assertion
that the instant petition is a "knee-jerk reaction to a draft
'Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution'. . . which is
not formally filed yet." What he filed on 6 December 1996 was
an "Initiatory Pleading" or "Initiatory Petition," which was
legally necessary to start the signature campaign to amend
the Constitution or to put the movement to gather signatures
under COMELEC power and function. On the substantive
allegations of the petitioners, Delfin maintains as follows:
(1) Contrary to the claim of the petitioners, there is a
law, R.A. No. 6735, which governs the conduct of initiative to
amend the Constitution. The absence therein of a subtitle for
such initiative is not fatal, since subtitles are not
requirements for the validity or sufficiency of laws.
(2) Section 9(b) of R.A. No. 6735 specifically provides
that the proposition in an initiative to amend the
Constitution approved by the majority of the votes cast in the
plebiscite shall become effective as of the day of the plebiscite.
(3) The claim that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is
ultra vires is contradicted by (a) Section 2, Article IX-C of the
Constitution, which grants the COMELEC the power to
enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to
the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum,
and recall; and (b) Section 20 of R.A. 6735, which empowers
the COMELEC to promulgate such rules and regulations as
may be necessary to carry out the purposes of the Act.
(4) The proposed initiative does not involve a revision
of, but mere amendment to, the Constitution because it seeks
to alter only a few specific provisions of the Constitution, or
more specifically, only those which lay term limits. It does not
seek to reexamine or overhaul the entire document.
As to the public expenditures for registration of voters, Delfin
considers petitioners' estimate of P180 million as unreliable,
for only the COMELEC can give the exact figure. Besides, if
there will be a plebiscite it will be simultaneous with the 1997
Barangay Elections. In any event, fund requirements for
initiative will be a priority government expense because it
will be for the exercise of the sovereign power of the people.
In the Comment 17 for the public respondent COMELEC,
filed also on 2 January 1997, the Office of the Solicitor
General contends that:
(1) R.A. No. 6735 deals with, inter alia, people's
initiative to amend the Constitution. Its Section 2 on
Statement of Policy explicitly affirms, recognizes, and
guarantees that power; and its Section 3, which enumerates
the three systems of initiative, includes initiative on the
Constitution and defines the same as the power to propose
amendments to the Constitution. Likewise, its Section 5
repeatedly mentions initiative on the Constitution.
(2) A separate subtitle on initiative on the Constitution
is not necessary in R.A. No. 6735 because, being national in
scope, that system of initiative is deemed included in the
subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum; and Senator
Tolentino simply overlooked pertinent provisions of the law
when he claimed that nothing therein was provided for
initiative on the Constitution.
(3) Senate Bill No. 1290 is neither a competent nor a
material proof that R.A. No. 6735 does not deal with initiative
on the Constitution.
(4) Extension of term limits of elected officials
constitutes a mere amendment to the Constitution, not a
revision thereof.
(5) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 was validly issued
under Section 20 of R.A. No. 6735 and under the Omnibus
Election Code. The rule-making power of the COMELEC to
implement the provisions of R.A. No. 6735 was in fact upheld
by this Court in Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority vs.
COMELEC.
On 14 January 1997, this Court (a) confirmed nunc pro tunc
the temporary restraining order; (b) noted the
aforementioned Comments and the Motion to Lift Temporary
Restraining Order filed by private respondents through Atty.
Quadra, as well as the latter's Manifestation stating that he
is the counsel for private respondents Alberto and Carmen
Pedrosa only and the Comment he filed was for the Pedrosas;
and (c) granted the Motion for Intervention filed on 6 January
1997 by Senator Raul Roco and allowed him to file his
Petition in Intervention not later than 20 January 1997; and
(d) set the case for hearing on 23 January 1997 at 9:30 a.m.
On 17 January 1997, the Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang
Konstitusyon (DIK) and the Movement of Attorneys for
Brotherhood Integrity and Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI), filed
a Motion for Intervention. Attached to the motion was their
Petition in Intervention, which was later replaced by an
Amended Petition in Intervention wherein they contend that:
(1) The Delfin proposal does not involve a mere
amendment to, but a revision of, the Constitution because, in
the words of Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J., 18 it would involve a
change from a political philosophy that rejects unlimited
tenure to one that accepts unlimited tenure; and although the
change might appear to be an isolated one, it can affect other
provisions, such as, on synchronization of elections and on
the State policy of guaranteeing equal access to opportunities
for public service and prohibiting political dynasties. 19 A
revision cannot be done by initiative which, by express
provision of Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution, is
limited to amendments.
(2) The prohibition against reelection of the President
and the limits provided for all other national and local
elective officials are based on the philosophy of governance,
"to open up the political arena to as many as there are
Filipinos qualified to handle the demands of leadership, to
break the concentration of political and economic powers in
the hands of a few, and to promote effective proper
empowerment for participation in policy and decision-making
14
for the common good"; hence, to remove the term limits is to
negate and nullify the noble vision of the 1987 Constitution.
(3) The Delfin proposal runs counter to the purpose of
initiative, particularly in a conflict-of-interest situation.
Initiative is intended as a fallback position that may be
availed of by the people only if they are dissatisfied with the
performance of their elective officials, but not as a premium
for good performance. 20
(4) R.A. No. 6735 is deficient and inadequate in itself to
be called the enabling law that implements the people's
initiative on amendments to the Constitution. It fails to state
(a) the proper parties who may file the petition, (b) the
appropriate agency before whom the petition is to be filed, (c)
the contents of the petition, (d) the publication of the same,
(e) the ways and means of gathering the signatures of the
voters nationwide and 3% per legislative district, (f) the
proper parties who may oppose or question the veracity of the
signatures, (g) the role of the COMELEC in the verification
of the signatures and the sufficiency of the petition, (h) the
appeal from any decision of the COMELEC, (I) the holding of
a plebiscite, and (g) the appropriation of funds for such
people's initiative. Accordingly, there being no enabling law,
the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to hear Delfin's petition.
(5) The deficiency of R.A. No. 6735 cannot be rectified or
remedied by COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, since the
COMELEC is without authority to legislate the procedure for
a people's initiative under Section 2 of Article XVII of the
Constitution. That function exclusively pertains to Congress.
Section 20 of R.A. No. 6735 does not constitute a legal basis
for the Resolution, as the former does not set a sufficient
standard for a valid delegation of power.
On 20 January 1997, Senator Raul Roco filed his Petition in
Intervention. 21 He avers that R.A. No. 6735 is the enabling
law that implements the people's right to initiate
constitutional amendments. This law is a consolidation of
Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505; he co-authored
the House Bill and even delivered a sponsorship speech
thereon. He likewise submits that the COMELEC was
empowered under Section 20 of that law to promulgate
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300. Nevertheless, he contends
that the respondent Commission is without jurisdiction to
take cognizance of the Delfin Petition and to order its
publication because the said petition is not the initiatory
pleading contemplated under the Constitution, Republic Act
No. 6735, and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300. What vests
jurisdiction upon the COMELEC in an initiative on the
Constitution is the filing of a petition for initiative which is
signed by the required number of registered voters. He also
submits that the proponents of a constitutional amendment
cannot avail of the authority and resources of the COMELEC
to assist them is securing the required number of signatures,
as the COMELEC's role in an initiative on the Constitution
is limited to the determination of the sufficiency of the
initiative petition and the call and supervision of a plebiscite,
if warranted.
On 20 January 1997, LABAN filed a Motion for Leave to
Intervene.
The following day, the IBP filed a Motion for Intervention to
which it attached a Petition in Intervention raising the
following arguments:
(1) Congress has failed to enact an enabling law
mandated under Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987
Constitution.
(2) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 cannot substitute
for the required implementing law on the initiative to amend
the Constitution.
(3) The Petition for Initiative suffers from a fatal defect
in that it does not have the required number of signatures.
(4) The petition seeks, in effect a revision of the
Constitution, which can be proposed only by Congress or a
constitutional convention. 22
On 21 January 1997, we promulgated a Resolution (a)
granting the Motions for Intervention filed by the DIK and
MABINI and by the IBP, as well as the Motion for Leave to
Intervene filed by LABAN; (b) admitting the Amended
Petition in Intervention of DIK and MABINI, and the
Petitions in Intervention of Senator Roco and of the IBP; (c)
requiring the respondents to file within a nonextendible
period of five days their Consolidated Comments on the
aforesaid Petitions in Intervention; and (d) requiring LABAN
to file its Petition in Intervention within a nonextendible
period of three days from notice, and the respondents to
comment thereon within a nonextendible period of five days
from receipt of the said Petition in Intervention.
At the hearing of the case on 23 January 1997, the parties
argued on the following pivotal issues, which the Court
formulated in light of the allegations and arguments raised
in the pleadings so far filed:
1. Whether R.A. No. 6735, entitled An Act Providing
for a System of Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating
Funds Therefor, was intended to include or cover initiative
on amendments to the Constitution; and if so, whether the
Act, as worded, adequately covers such initiative.
2. Whether that portion of COMELEC Resolution No.
2300 (In re: Rules and Regulations Governing the Conduct of
Initiative on the Constitution, and Initiative and Referendum
on National and Local Laws) regarding the conduct of
initiative on amendments to the Constitution is valid,
considering the absence in the law of specific provisions on
the conduct of such initiative.
3. Whether the lifting of term limits of elective national
and local officials, as proposed in the draft "Petition for
Initiative on the 1987 Constitution," would constitute a
revision of, or an amendment to, the Constitution.
4. Whether the COMELEC can take cognizance of, or
has jurisdiction over, a petition solely intended to obtain an
order (a) fixing the time and dates for signature gathering;
(b) instructing municipal election officers to assist Delfin's
movement and volunteers in establishing signature stations;
and (c) directing or causing the publication of, inter alia, the
unsigned proposed Petition for Initiative on the 1987
Constitution.
5. Whether it is proper for the Supreme Court to take
cognizance of the petition when there is a pending case before
the COMELEC.
After hearing them on the issues, we required the parties to
submit simultaneously their respective memoranda within
twenty days and requested intervenor Senator Roco to
submit copies of the deliberations on House Bill No. 21505.
On 27 January 1997, LABAN filed its Petition in
Intervention wherein it adopts the allegations and
arguments in the main Petition. It further submits that the
COMELEC should have dismissed the Delfin Petition for
failure to state a sufficient cause of action and that the
Commission's failure or refusal to do so constituted grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
On 28 January 1997, Senator Roco submitted copies of
portions of both the Journal and the Record of the House of
Representatives relating to the deliberations of House Bill
No. 21505, as well as the transcripts of stenographic notes on
the proceedings of the Bicameral Conference Committee,
Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms, of 6 June 1989
on House Bill No. 21505 and Senate Bill No. 17.
15
Private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa filed their
Consolidated Comments on the Petitions in Intervention of
Senator Roco, DIK and MABINI, and IBP. 23 The parties
thereafter filed, in due time, their separate memoranda. 24
As we stated in the beginning, we resolved to give due course
to this special civil action.
For a more logical discussion of the formulated issues, we
shall first take up the fifth issue which appears to pose a
prejudicial procedural question.
I his Memorandum, this Court may brush aside technicalities
THE INSTANT PETITION IS VIABLE DESPITE THE
PENDENCY IN THE COMELEC OF THE DELFIN
PETITION.
Except for the petitioners and intervenor Roco, the parties
paid no serious attention to the fifth issue, i.e., whether it is
proper for this Court to take cognizance of this special civil
action when there is a pending case before the COMELEC.
The petitioners provide an affirmative answer. Thus:
28. The Comelec has no jurisdiction to take cognizance
of the petition filed by private respondent Delfin. This being
so, it becomes imperative to stop the Comelec from
proceeding any further, and under the Rules of Court, Rule
65, Section 2, a petition for prohibition is the proper remedy.
29. The writ of prohibition is an extraordinary judicial
writ issuing out of a court of superior jurisdiction and
directed to an inferior court, for the purpose of preventing the
inferior tribunal from usurping a jurisdiction with which it is
not legally vested. (People v. Vera, supra., p. 84). In this case
the writ is an urgent necessity, in view of the highly divisive
and adverse environmental consequences on the body politic
of the questioned Comelec order. The consequent climate of
legal confusion and political instability begs for judicial
statesmanship.
30. In the final analysis, when the system of
constitutional law is threatened by the political ambitions of
man, only the Supreme Court
can save a nation in peril and uphold the paramount majesty
of the Constitution. 25
It must be recalled that intervenor Roco filed with the
COMELEC a motion to dismiss the Delfin Petition on the
ground that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction or authority
to entertain the petition. 26 The COMELEC made no ruling
thereon evidently because after having heard the arguments
of Delfin and the oppositors at the hearing on 12 December
1996, it required them to submit within five days their
memoranda or oppositions/memoranda. 27 Earlier, or
specifically on 6 December 1996, it practically gave due
course to the Delfin Petition by ordering Delfin to cause the
publication of the petition, together with the attached
Petition for Initiative, the signature form, and the notice of
hearing; and by setting the case for hearing. The
COMELEC's failure to act on Roco's motion to dismiss and its
insistence to hold on to the petition rendered ripe and viable
the instant petition under Section 2 of Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, which provides:
Sec. 2. Petition for prohibition. — Where the proceedings of
any tribunal, corporation, board, or person, whether
exercising functions judicial or ministerial, are without or in
excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper
court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered commanding the defendant to desist
from further proceedings in the action or matter specified
therein.
It must also be noted that intervenor Roco claims that the
COMELEC has no jurisdiction over the Delfin Petition
because the said petition is not supported by the required
minimum number of signatures of registered voters. LABAN
also asserts that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion
in refusing to dismiss the Delfin Petition, which does not
contain the required number of signatures. In light of these
claims, the instant case may likewise be treated as a special
civil action for certiorari under Section I of Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court.
In any event, as correctly pointed out by intervenor Roco in
of procedure in
cases of transcendental importance. As we stated in
Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, Jr. 28
A party's standing before this Court is a procedural
technicality which it may, in the exercise of its discretion, set
aside in view of the importance of issues raised. In the
landmark Emergency Powers Cases, this Court brushed
aside this technicality because the transcendental
importance to the public of these cases demands that they be
settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must,
technicalities of procedure.
II
R.A. NO. 6735 INTENDED TO INCLUDE THE SYSTEM OF
INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION, BUT IS, UNFORTUNATELY,
INADEQUATE TO COVER THAT SYSTEM.
Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be
directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of
registered voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum of the registered
voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be
authorized within five years following the ratification of this
Constitution nor oftener than once every five years
thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the
exercise of this right.
This provision is not self-executory. In his book, 29 Joaquin
Bernas, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission,
stated:
Without implementing legislation Section 2 cannot operate.
Thus, although this mode of amending the Constitution is a
mode of amendment which bypasses congressional action, in
the last analysis it still is dependent on congressional action.
Bluntly stated, the right of the people to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution through the system of
initiative would remain entombed in the cold niche of the
Constitution until Congress provides for its implementation.
Stated otherwise, while the Constitution has recognized or
granted that right, the people cannot exercise it if Congress,
for whatever reason, does not provide for its implementation.
This system of initiative was originally included in Section 1
of the draft Article on Amendment or Revision proposed by
the Committee on Amendments and Transitory Provisions of
the 1986 Constitutional Commission in its Committee Report
No. 7 (Proposed Resolution No. 332). 30 That section reads as
follows:
Sec. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution
may be proposed:
(a) by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-
fourths of all its members; or
16
(b) by a constitutional convention; or
(c) directly by the people themselves thru initiative as
provided for in Article___ Section ___of the Constitution. 31
After several interpellations, but before the period of
amendments, the Committee submitted a new formulation of
the concept of initiative which it denominated as Section 2;
thus:
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you, Madam President. May we
respectfully call attention of the Members of the Commission
that pursuant to the mandate given to us last night, we
submitted this afternoon a complete Committee Report No. 7
which embodies the proposed provision governing the matter
of initiative. This is now covered by Section 2 of the complete
committee report. With the permission of the Members, may
I quote Section 2:
The people may, after five years from the date of the last
plebiscite held, directly propose amendments to this
Constitution thru initiative upon petition of at least ten
percent of the registered voters.
This completes the blanks appearing in the original
Committee Report No. 7. 32
The interpellations on Section 2 showed that the details for
carrying out Section 2 are left to the legislature. Thus:
FR. BERNAS. Madam President, just two simple,
clarificatory questions.
First, on Section 1 on the matter of initiative upon petition of
at least 10 percent, there are no details in the provision on
how to carry this out. Do we understand, therefore, that we
are leaving this matter to the legislature?
MR. SUAREZ. That is right, Madam President.
FR. BERNAS. And do we also understand, therefore, that
for as long as the legislature does not pass the necessary
implementing law on this, this will not operate?
MR. SUAREZ. That matter was also taken up during the
committee hearing, especially with respect to the budget
appropriations which would have to be legislated so that the
plebiscite could be called. We deemed it best that this matter
be left to the legislature. The Gentleman is right. In any
event, as envisioned, no amendment through the power of
initiative can be called until after five years from the date of
the ratification of this Constitution. Therefore, the first
amendment that could be proposed through the exercise of
this initiative power would be after five years. It is
reasonably expected that within that five-year period, the
National Assembly can come up with the appropriate rules
governing the exercise of this power.
FR. BERNAS. Since the matter is left to the legislature —
the details on how this is to be carried out — is it possible
that, in effect, what will be presented to the people for
ratification is the work of the legislature rather than of the
people? Does this provision exclude that possibility?
MR. SUAREZ. No, it does not exclude that possibility
because even the legislature itself as a body could propose
that amendment, maybe individually or collectively, if it fails
to muster the three-fourths vote in order to constitute itself
as a constituent assembly and submit that proposal to the
people for ratification through the process of an initiative.
xxx xxx xxx
MS. AQUINO. Do I understand from the sponsor that the
intention in the proposal is to vest constituent power in the
people to amend the Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. That is absolutely correct, Madam
President.
MS. AQUINO. I fully concur with the underlying precept
of the proposal in terms of institutionalizing popular
participation in the drafting of the Constitution or in the
amendment thereof, but I would have a lot of difficulties in
terms of accepting the draft of Section 2, as written. Would
the sponsor agree with me that in the hierarchy of legal
mandate, constituent power has primacy over all other legal
mandates?
MR. SUAREZ. The Commissioner is right, Madam
President.
MS. AQUINO. And would the sponsor agree with me that
in the hierarchy of legal values, the Constitution is source of
all legal mandates and that therefore we require a great deal
of circumspection in the drafting and in the amendments of
the Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. That proposition is nondebatable.
MS. AQUINO. Such that in order to underscore the
primacy of constituent power we have a separate article in
the constitution that would specifically cover the process and
the modes of amending the Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. That is right, Madam President.
MS. AQUINO. Therefore, is the sponsor inclined, as the
provisions are drafted now, to again concede to the
legislature the process or the requirement of determining the
mechanics of amending the Constitution by people's
initiative?
MR. SUAREZ. The matter of implementing this could very
well be placed in the hands of the National Assembly, not
unless we can incorporate into this provision the mechanics
that would adequately cover all the conceivable situations. 33
It was made clear during the interpellations that the
aforementioned Section 2 is limited to proposals to AMEND
— not to REVISE — the Constitution; thus:
MR. SUAREZ. . . . This proposal was suggested on the
theory that this matter of initiative, which came about
because of the extraordinary developments this year, has to
be separated from the traditional modes of amending the
Constitution as embodied in Section 1. The committee
members felt that this system of initiative should not extend
to the revision of the entire Constitution, so we removed it
from the operation of Section 1 of the proposed Article on
Amendment or Revision. 34
xxx xxx xxx
MS. AQUINO. In which case, I am seriously bothered by
providing this process of initiative as a separate section in the
Article on Amendment. Would the sponsor be amenable to
accepting an amendment in terms of realigning Section 2 as
another subparagraph (c) of Section 1, instead of setting it up
as another separate section as if it were a self-executing
provision?
MR. SUAREZ. We would be amenable except that, as we
clarified a while ago, this process of initiative is limited to the
matter of amendment and should not expand into a revision
which contemplates a total overhaul of the Constitution. That
was the sense that was conveyed by the Committee.
MS. AQUINO. In other words, the Committee was
attempting to distinguish the coverage of modes (a) and (b) in
Section 1 to include the process of revision; whereas the
process of initiation to amend, which is given to the public,
would only apply to amendments?
17

MR. SUAREZ. That is right. Those were the terms
envisioned in the Committee. 35
Amendments to the proposed Section 2 were thereafter
introduced by then Commissioner Hilario G. Davide, Jr.,
which the Committee accepted. Thus:
MR. DAVIDE. Thank you Madam President. I propose to
substitute the entire Section 2 with the following:
MR. DAVIDE. Madam President, I have modified the
proposed amendment after taking into account the
modifications submitted by the sponsor himself and the
honorable Commissioners Guingona, Monsod, Rama, Ople,
de los Reyes and Romulo. The modified amendment in
substitution of the proposed Section 2 will now read as
follows: "SECTION 2. — AMENDMENTS TO THIS
CONSTITUTION MAY LIKEWISE BE DIRECTLY
PROPOSED BY THE PEOPLE THROUGH INITIATIVE
UPON A PETITION OF AT LEAST TWELVE PERCENT OF
THE TOTAL NUMBER Of REGISTERED VOTERS, OF
WHICH EVERY LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT MUST BE
REPRESENTED BY AT LEAST THREE PERCENT OF THE
REGISTERED VOTERS THEREOF. NO AMENDMENT
UNDER THIS SECTION SHALL BE AUTHORIZED
WITHIN FIVE YEARS FOLLOWING THE RATIFICATION
OF THIS CONSTITUTION NOR OFTENER THAN ONCE
EVERY FIVE YEARS THEREAFTER.
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BY LAW PROVIDE
FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EXERCISE OF
THIS RIGHT.
MR. SUAREZ. Madam President, considering that the
proposed amendment is reflective of the sense contained in
Section 2 of our completed Committee Report No. 7, we accept
the proposed amendment. 36
The interpellations which ensued on the proposed modified
amendment to Section 2 clearly showed that it was a
legislative act which must implement the exercise of the
right. Thus:
MR. ROMULO. Under Commissioner Davide's amendment,
is it possible for the legislature to set forth certain procedures
to carry out the initiative. . .?
MR. DAVIDE. It can.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. ROMULO. But the Commissioner's amendment does
not prevent the legislature from asking another body to set
the proposition in proper form.
MR. DAVIDE. The Commissioner is correct. In other
words, the implementation of this particular right would be
subject to legislation, provided the legislature cannot
determine anymore the percentage of the requirement.
MR. ROMULO. But the procedures, including the
determination of the proper form for submission to the
people, may be subject to legislation.
MR. DAVIDE. As long as it will not destroy the
substantive right to initiate. In other words, none of the
procedures to be proposed by the legislative body must
diminish or impair the right conceded here.
MR. ROMULO. In that provision of the Constitution can the
procedures which I have discussed be legislated?
MR. DAVIDE. Yes. 37
Commissioner Davide also reaffirmed that his modified
amendment strictly confines initiative to AMENDMENTS to
— NOT REVISION of — the Constitution. Thus:
MR. DAVIDE. With pleasure, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG. My first question: Commissioner
Davide's proposed amendment on line 1 refers to
"amendment." Does it not cover the word "revision" as
defined by Commissioner Padilla when he made the
distinction between the words "amendments" and "revision"?
MR. DAVIDE. No, it does not, because "amendments" and
"revision" should be covered by Section 1. So insofar as
initiative is concerned, it can only relate to "amendments" not
"revision." 38
Commissioner Davide further emphasized that the process of
proposing amendments through initiative must be more
rigorous and difficult than the initiative on legislation. Thus:
MR. DAVIDE. A distinction has to be made that under this
proposal, what is involved is an amendment to the
Constitution. To amend a Constitution would ordinarily
require a proposal by the National Assembly by a vote of
three-fourths; and to call a constitutional convention would
require a higher number. Moreover, just to submit the issue
of calling a constitutional convention, a majority of the
National Assembly is required, the import being that the
process of amendment must be made more rigorous and
difficult than probably initiating an ordinary legislation or
putting an end to a law proposed by the National Assembly
by way of a referendum. I cannot agree to reducing the
requirement approved by the Committee on the Legislative
because it would require another voting by the Committee,
and the voting as precisely based on a requirement of 10
percent. Perhaps, I might present such a proposal, by way of
an amendment, when the Commission shall take up the
Article on the Legislative or on the National Assembly on
plenary sessions. 39
The Davide modified amendments to Section 2 were
subjected to amendments, and the final version, which the
Commission approved by a vote of 31 in favor and 3 against,
reads as follows:
MR. DAVIDE. Thank you Madam President. Section 2, as
amended, reads as follows: "AMENDMENT TO THIS
CONSTITUTION MAY LIKEWISE BE DIRECTLY
PROPOSED BY THE PEOPLE THROUGH INITIATIVE
UPON A PETITION OF AT LEAST TWELVE PERCENT OF
THE TOTAL NUMBER OF REGISTERED VOTERS, OF
WHICH EVERY LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT MUST BE
REPRESENTED BY AT LEAST THREE PERCENT OF THE
REGISTERED VOTERS THEREOF. NO AMENDMENT
UNDER THIS SECTION SHALL BE AUTHORIZED
WITHIN FIVE YEARS FOLLOWING THE RATIFICATION
OF THIS CONSTITUTION NOR OFTENER THAN ONCE
EVERY FIVE YEARS THEREAFTER.
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BY LAW PROVIDE
FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EXERCISE OF
THIS RIGHT. 40
The entire proposed Article on Amendments or Revisions was
approved on second reading on 9 July 1986. 41 Thereafter,
upon his motion for reconsideration, Commissioner Gascon
was allowed to introduce an amendment to Section 2 which,
nevertheless, was withdrawn. In view thereof, the Article
was again approved on Second and Third Readings on 1
August 1986. 42
However, the Committee on Style recommended that the
approved Section 2 be amended by changing "percent" to "per
centum" and "thereof" to "therein" and deleting the phrase
"by law" in the second paragraph so that said paragraph
reads: The Congress 43 shall provide for the implementation
18
of the exercise of this right. 44 This amendment was
approved and is the text of the present second paragraph of
Section 2.
The conclusion then is inevitable that, indeed, the system of
initiative on the Constitution under Section 2 of Article XVII
of the Constitution is not self-executory.
Has Congress "provided" for the implementation of the
exercise of this right? Those who answer the question in the
affirmative, like the private respondents and intervenor
Senator Roco, point to us R.A. No. 6735.
There is, of course, no other better way for Congress to
implement the exercise of the right than through the passage
of a statute or legislative act. This is the essence or rationale
of the last minute amendment by the Constitutional
Commission to substitute the last paragraph of Section 2 of
Article XVII then reading:
The Congress 45 shall by law provide for the implementation
of the exercise of this right.
with
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the
exercise of this right.
This substitute amendment was an investiture on Congress
of a power to provide for the rules implementing the exercise
of the right. The "rules" means "the details on how [the right]
is to be carried out." 46
We agree that R.A. No. 6735 was, as its history reveals,
intended to cover initiative to propose amendments to the
Constitution. The Act is a consolidation of House Bill No.
21505 and Senate Bill No. 17. The former was prepared by
the Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms of the
House of Representatives on the basis of two House Bills
referred to it, viz., (a) House Bill No. 497, 47 which dealt with
the initiative and referendum mentioned
in Sections 1 and 32 of Article VI of the Constitution; and (b)
House Bill No. 988, 48 which dealt with the subject matter of
House Bill No. 497, as well as with initiative and referendum
under Section 3 of Article X (Local Government) and
initiative provided for in Section 2 of Article XVII of the
Constitution. Senate Bill No. 17 49 solely dealt with initiative
and referendum concerning ordinances or resolutions of local
government units. The Bicameral Conference Committee
consolidated Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505 into
a draft bill, which was subsequently approved on 8 June 1989
by the Senate 50 and by the House of Representatives. 51
This approved bill is now R.A. No. 6735.
But is R.A. No. 6735 a full compliance with the power and
duty of Congress to "provide for the implementation of the
exercise of the right?"
A careful scrutiny of the Act yields a negative answer.
First. Contrary to the assertion of public respondent
COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act does not suggest an initiative
on amendments to the Constitution. The said section reads:
Sec. 2. Statement and Policy. — The power of the people
under a system of initiative and referendum to directly
propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the
Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any
legislative body upon compliance with the requirements of
this Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and guaranteed.
(Emphasis supplied).
The inclusion of the word "Constitution" therein was a
delayed afterthought. That word is neither germane nor
relevant to said section, which exclusively relates to initiative
and referendum on national laws and local laws, ordinances,
and resolutions. That section is silent as to amendments on
the Constitution. As pointed out earlier, initiative on the
Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND. The
people are not accorded the power to "directly propose, enact,
approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution"
through the system of initiative. They can only do so with
respect to "laws, ordinances, or resolutions."
The foregoing conclusion is further buttressed by the fact
that this section was lifted from Section 1 of Senate Bill No.
17, which solely referred to a statement of policy on local
initiative and referendum and appropriately used the
phrases "propose and enact," "approve or reject" and "in
whole or in part." 52
Second. It is true that Section 3 (Definition of Terms) of the
Act defines initiative on amendments to the Constitution and
mentions it as one of the three systems of initiative, and that
Section 5 (Requirements) restates the constitutional
requirements as to the percentage of the registered voters
who must submit the proposal. But unlike in the case of the
other systems of initiative, the Act does not provide for the
contents of a petition for initiative on the Constitution.
Section 5, paragraph (c) requires, among other things,
statement of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved
or rejected, amended or repealed, as the case may be. It does
not include, as among the contents of the petition, the
provisions of the Constitution sought to be amended, in the
case of initiative on the Constitution. Said paragraph (c)
reads in full as follows:
(c) The petition shall state the following:
c.1 contents or text of the proposed law sought to be
enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as the
case may be;
c.2 the proposition;
c.3 the reason or reasons therefor;
c.4 that it is not one of the exceptions provided therein;
c.5 signatures of the petitioners or registered voters;
and
c.6 an abstract or summary proposition is not more than
one hundred (100) words which shall be legibly written or
printed at the top of every page of the petition. (Emphasis
supplied).
The use of the clause "proposed laws sought to be enacted,
approved or rejected, amended or repealed" only strengthens
the conclusion that Section 2, quoted earlier, excludes
initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
Third. While the Act provides subtitles for National
Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle II) and for Local
Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle is
provided for initiative on the Constitution. This conspicuous
silence as to the latter simply means that the main thrust of
the Act is initiative and referendum on national and local
laws. If Congress intended R.A. No. 6735 to fully provide for
the implementation of the initiative on amendments to the
Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle therefor,
considering that in the order of things, the primacy of
interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the people to
directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far more
important than the initiative on national and local laws.
We cannot accept the argument that the initiative on
amendments to the Constitution is subsumed under the
subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum because it is
national in scope. Our reading of Subtitle II (National
Initiative and Referendum) and Subtitle III (Local Initiative
and Referendum) leaves no room for doubt that the
classification is not based on the scope of the initiative
involved, but on its nature and character. It is "national
19
initiative," if what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is a
national law, or a law which only Congress can pass. It is
"local initiative" if what is proposed to be adopted or enacted
is a law, ordinance, or resolution which only the legislative
bodies of the governments of the autonomous regions,
provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays can pass.
This classification of initiative into national and local is
actually based on Section 3 of the Act, which we quote for
emphasis and clearer understanding:
Sec. 3. Definition of terms —
xxx xxx xxx
There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:
a.1 Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a
petition proposing amendments to the Constitution;
a.2 Initiative on Statutes which refers to a petition
proposing to enact a national legislation; and
a.3 Initiative on local legislation which refers to a
petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial, city,
municipal, or barangay law, resolution or ordinance.
(Emphasis supplied).
Hence, to complete the classification under subtitles there
should have been a subtitle on initiative on amendments to
the Constitution. 53
A further examination of the Act even reveals that the
subtitling is not accurate. Provisions not germane to the
subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum are placed
therein, like (1) paragraphs (b) and (c) of Section 9, which
reads:
(b) The proposition in an initiative on the Constitution
approved by the majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite
shall become effective as to the day of the plebiscite.
(c) A national or local initiative proposition approved by
majority of the votes cast in an election called for the purpose
shall become effective fifteen (15) days after certification and
proclamation of the Commission. (Emphasis supplied).
(2) that portion of Section 11 (Indirect Initiative)
referring to indirect initiative with the legislative bodies of
local governments; thus:
Sec. 11. Indirect Initiative. — Any duly accredited people's
organization, as defined by law, may file a petition for
indirect initiative with the House of Representatives, and
other legislative bodies. . . .
and (3) Section 12 on Appeal, since it applies to decisions of
the COMELEC on the findings of sufficiency or insufficiency
of the petition for initiative or referendum, which could be
petitions for both national and local initiative and
referendum.
Upon the other hand, Section 18 on "Authority of Courts"
under subtitle III on Local Initiative and Referendum is
misplaced, 54 since the provision therein applies to both
national and local initiative and referendum. It reads:
Sec. 18. Authority of Courts. — Nothing in this Act shall
prevent or preclude the proper courts from declaring null and
void any proposition approved pursuant to this Act for
violation of the Constitution or want of capacity of the local
legislative body to enact the said measure.
Curiously, too, while R.A. No. 6735 exerted utmost diligence
and care in providing for the details in the implementation of
initiative and referendum on national and local legislation
thereby giving them special attention, it failed, rather
intentionally, to do so on the system of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution. Anent the initiative on
national legislation, the Act provides for the following:
(a) The required percentage of registered voters to sign
the petition and the contents of the petition;
(b) The conduct and date of the initiative;
(c) The submission to the electorate of the proposition
and the required number of votes for its approval;
(d) The certification by the COMELEC of the approval
of the proposition;
(e) The publication of the approved proposition in the
Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in
the Philippines; and
(f) The effects of the approval or rejection of the
proposition. 55
As regards local initiative, the Act provides for the following:
(a) The preliminary requirement as to the number of
signatures of registered voters for the petition;
(b) The submission of the petition to the local legislative
body concerned;
(c) The effect of the legislative body's failure to
favorably act thereon, and the invocation of the power of
initiative as a consequence thereof;
(d) The formulation of the proposition;
(e) The period within which to gather the signatures;
(f) The persons before whom the petition shall be
signed;
(g) The issuance of a certification by the COMELEC
through its official in the local government unit concerned as
to whether the required number of signatures have been
obtained;
(h) The setting of a date by the COMELEC for the
submission of the proposition to the registered voters for
their approval, which must be within the period specified
therein;
(i) The issuance of a certification of the result;
(j) The date of effectivity of the approved proposition;
(k) The limitations on local initiative; and
(l) The limitations upon local legislative bodies. 56
Upon the other hand, as to initiative on amendments to the
Constitution, R.A. No. 6735, in all of its twenty-three
sections, merely (a) mentions, the word "Constitution" in
Section 2; (b) defines "initiative on the Constitution" and
includes it in the enumeration of the three systems of
initiative in Section 3; (c) speaks of "plebiscite" as the process
by which the proposition in an initiative on the Constitution
may be approved or rejected by the people; (d) reiterates the
constitutional requirements as to the number of voters who
should sign the petition; and (e) provides for the date of
effectivity of the approved proposition.
There was, therefore, an obvious downgrading of the more
important or the paramount system of initiative. RA. No.
6735 thus delivered a humiliating blow to the system of
initiative on amendments to the Constitution by merely
paying it a reluctant lip service. 57
20
The foregoing brings us to the conclusion that R.A. No. 6735
is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and
conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the
Constitution is concerned. Its lacunae on this substantive
matter are fatal and cannot be cured by "empowering" the
COMELEC "to promulgate such rules and regulations as may
be necessary to carry out the purposes of [the] Act. 58
The rule is that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated
or as expressed in a Latin maxim: potestas delegata non
delegari potest. 59 The recognized exceptions to the rule are
as follows:
(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under
Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution;
(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President
under Section 23(2) of Article VI of the Constitution;
(3) Delegation to the people at large;
(4) Delegation to local governments; and
(5) Delegation to administrative bodies. 60
Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body
exercising quasi-judicial functions, to promulgate rules and
regulations is a form of delegation of legislative authority
under no. 5 above. However, in every case of permissible
delegation, there must be a showing that the delegation itself
is valid. It is valid only if the law (a) is complete in itself,
setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or
implemented by the delegate; and (b) fixes a standard — the
limits of which are sufficiently determinate and determinable
— to which the delegate must conform in the performance of
his functions. 61 A sufficient standard is one which defines
legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries
and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the
circumstances under which the legislative command is to be
effected. 62
Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the
Constitution is concerned, R.A. No. 6735 miserably failed to
satisfy both requirements in subordinate legislation. The
delegation of the power to the COMELEC is then invalid.
III
COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300, INSOFAR AS IT
PRESCRIBES RULES AND REGULATIONS ON THE
CONDUCT OF INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION, IS VOID.
It logically follows that the COMELEC cannot validly
promulgate rules and regulations to implement the exercise
of the right of the people to directly propose amendments to
the Constitution through the system of initiative. It does not
have that power under R.A. No. 6735. Reliance on the
COMELEC's power under Section 2(1) of Article IX-C of the
Constitution is misplaced, for the laws and regulations
referred to therein are those promulgated by the COMELEC
under (a) Section 3 of Article IX-C of the Constitution, or (b)
a law where subordinate legislation is authorized and which
satisfies the "completeness" and the "sufficient standard"
tests.
IV
COMELEC ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ENTERTAINING
THE DELFIN PETITION.
Even if it be conceded ex gratia that R.A. No. 6735 is a full
compliance with the power of Congress to implement the
right to initiate constitutional amendments, or that it has
validly vested upon the COMELEC the power of subordinate
legislation and that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is valid,
the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion in entertaining the Delfin Petition.
Under Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution and
Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 6735, a petition for initiative on the
Constitution must be signed by at least 12% of the total
number of registered voters of which every legislative district
is represented by at least 3% of the registered voters therein.
The Delfin Petition does not contain signatures of the
required number of voters. Delfin himself admits that he has
not yet gathered signatures and that the purpose of his
petition is primarily to obtain assistance in his drive to
gather signatures. Without the required signatures, the
petition cannot be deemed validly initiated.
The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for
initiative only after its filing. The petition then is the
initiatory pleading. Nothing before its filing is cognizable by
the COMELEC, sitting en banc. The only participation of the
COMELEC or its personnel before the filing of such petition
are (1) to prescribe the form of the petition; 63 (2) to issue
through its Election Records and Statistics Office a certificate
on the total number of registered voters in each legislative
district; 64 (3) to assist, through its election registrars, in the
establishment of signature stations; 65 and (4) to verify,
through its election registrars, the signatures on the basis of
the registry list of voters, voters' affidavits, and voters'
identification cards used in the immediately preceding
election. 66
Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under
R.A. No. 6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, it cannot
be entertained or given cognizance of by the COMELEC. The
respondent Commission must have known that the petition
does not fall under any of the actions or proceedings under
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure or under Resolution No.
2300, for which reason it did not assign to the petition a
docket number. Hence, the said petition was merely entered
as UND, meaning, undocketed. That petition was nothing
more than a mere scrap of paper, which should not have been
dignified by the Order of 6 December 1996, the hearing on 12
December 1996, and the order directing Delfin and the
oppositors to file their memoranda or oppositions. In so
dignifying it, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion and merely wasted its time,
energy, and resources.
The foregoing considered, further discussion on the issue of
whether the proposal to lift the term limits of elective
national and local officials is an amendment to, and not a
revision of, the Constitution is rendered unnecessary, if not
academic.
CONCLUSION
This petition must then be granted, and the COMELEC
should be permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking
cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to
the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly
enacted to provide for the implementation of the system.
We feel, however, that the system of initiative to propose
amendments to the Constitution should no longer be kept in
the cold; it should be given flesh and blood, energy and
strength. Congress should not tarry any longer in complying
with the constitutional mandate to provide for the
implementation of the right of the people under that system.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
a) GRANTING the instant petition;
b) DECLARING R.A. No. 6735 inadequate to cover the
system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, and
to have failed to provide sufficient standard for subordinate
legislation;
21
c) DECLARING void those parts of Resolution No.
2300 of the Commission on Elections prescribing rules and
regulations on the conduct of initiative or amendments to the
Constitution; and
d) ORDERING the Commission on Elections to
forthwith DISMISS the DELFIN petition (UND-96-037).
The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 18 December
1996 is made permanent as against the Commission on
Elections, but is LIFTED as against private respondents.
Resolution on the matter of contempt is hereby reserved.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Kapunan,
Hermosisima, Jr. and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., took no part.
Separate Opinions
PUNO, J., concurring and dissenting:
I join the ground-breaking ponencia of our esteemed
colleague, Mr. Justice Davide insofar as it orders the
COMELEC to dismiss the Delfin petition. I regret, however,
I cannot share the view that R.A. No. 5735 and COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300 are legally defective and cannot
implement the people's initiative to amend the Constitution.
I likewise submit that the petition with respect to the
Pedrosas has no leg to stand on and should be dismissed.
With due respect:
I of initiative and referendum under Philippine Law. He cited
First, I submit that R.A. No. 6735 sufficiently implements the
right of the people to initiate amendments to the Constitution
thru initiative. Our effort to discover the meaning of R.A. No.
6735 should start with the search of the intent of our
lawmakers. A knowledge of this intent is critical for the
intent of the legislature is the law and the controlling factor
in its interpretation.1 Stated otherwise, intent is the essence
of the law, the spirit which gives life to its enactment.2
Significantly, the majority decision concedes that ". . . R.A.
No. 6735 was intended to cover initiative to propose
amendments to the Constitution." It ought to be so for this
intent is crystal clear from the history of the law which was
a consolidation of House Bill No. 215053 and Senate Bill No.
17.4 Senate Bill No. 17 was entitled "An Act Providing for a
System of Initiative and Referendum and the Exception
Therefrom, Whereby People in Local Government Units Can
Directly Propose and Enact Resolutions and Ordinances or
Approve or Reject any Ordinance or Resolution Passed by the
Local Legislative Body." Beyond doubt, Senate Bill No. 17 did
not include people's initiative to propose amendments to the
Constitution. In checkered contrast, House Bill No. 21505 5
expressly included people's initiative to amend the
Constitution. Congressman (now Senator) Raul Roco
emphasized in his sponsorship remarks:6
xxx xxx xxx
SPONSORSHIP REMARKS OF MR. ROCO
At the outset, Mr. Roco provided the following backgrounder
on the constitutional basis of the proposed measure.
1. As cited in Vera vs. Avelino (1946), the presidential
system which was introduced by the 1935 Constitution saw
the application of the principle of separation of powers.
2. While under the parliamentary system of the 1973
Constitution the principle remained applicable, the 1981
amendments to the Constitution of 1973 ensured presidential
dominance over the Batasang Pambansa.
Constitutional history then saw the shifting and sharing of
legislative powers between the Legislature and the Executive
departments. Transcending changes in the exercise of
legislative power is the declaration in the Philippine
Constitution that the Philippines is a republican state where
sovereignty resides in the people and all sovereignty
emanates from them.
3. Under the 1987 Constitution, the lawmaking power
is still preserved in Congress; however, to institutionalize
direct action of the people as exemplified in the 1986
Revolution, the Constitution recognizes the power of the
people, through the system of initiative and referendum.
As cited in Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution,
Congress does not have plenary powers since reserve powers
are given to the people expressly. Section 32 of the same
Article mandates Congress to pass at the soonest possible
time, a bill on referendum and initiative, and to share its
legislative powers with the people.
Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution, on the other
hand, vests in the people the power to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution through initiative, upon
petition of at least 12 percent of the total number of
registered voters.
Stating that House Bill No. 21505 is the Committee's
response to the duty imposed on Congress to implement the
exercise by the people of the right to initiative and
referendum, Mr. Roco recalled the beginnings of the system
Section 99 of the Local Government Code which vests in the
barangay assembly the power to initiate legislative
processes, decide the holding of plebiscite and hear reports of
the Sangguniang Barangay, all of which are variations of the
power of initiative and referendum. He added that the
holding of barangay plebiscites and referendum are likewise
provided in Sections 100 and 101 of the same Code.
Thereupon, for the sake of brevity, Mr. Roco moved that
pertinent quotation on the subject which he will later submit
to the Secretary of the House be incorporated as part of his
sponsorship speech.
He then cited examples of initiative and referendum similar
to those contained in the instant Bill among which are the
constitutions of states in the United States which recognize
the right of registered voters to initiate the enactment of any
statute or to project any existing law or parts thereof in a
referendum. These states, he said, are Alaska, Alabama,
Montana, Massachusets, Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, and
practically all other states.
Mr. Roco explained that in certain American states, the kind
of laws to which initiative and referendum apply is also
without limitation, except for emergency measures, which
are likewise incorporated in House Bill No. 21505. He added
that the procedure provided by the Bill from the filing of the
petition, the requirements of a certain percentage of
supporters to present a proposition, to the submission to
electors are substantially similar to the provisions in
American laws. Although an infant in Philippine political
structure, the system of initiative and referendum, he said,
is a tried and tested system in other jurisdictions, and the
Bill is patterned after American experience.
22
He further explained that the bill has only 12 sections, and
recalled that the Constitutional Commissioners saw the
system of the initiative and referendum as an instrument
which can be used should the legislature show itself to be
indifferent to the needs of the people. This is the reason, he
claimed, why now is an opportune time to pass the Bill even
as he noted the felt necessity of the times to pass laws which
are necessary to safeguard individual rights and liberties.
At this juncture Mr. Roco explained the process of initiative
and referendum as advocated in House Bill No. 21505. He
stated that:
1. Initiative means that the people, on their own
political judgment, submit a Bill for the consideration of the
general electorate.
2. The instant Bill provides three kinds of initiative,
namely; the initiative to amend the Constitution once every
five years; the initiative to amend statutes approved by
Congress; and the initiative to amend local ordinances.
3. The instant Bill gives a definite procedure and
allows the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to define
rules and regulations on the power of initiative.
4. Referendum means that the legislators seek the
consent of the people on measures that they have approved.
5. Under Section 4 of the Bill the people can initiate a
referendum which is a mode of plebiscite by presenting a
petition therefor, but under certain limitations, such as the
signing of said petition by at least 10 percent of the total of
registered voters at which every legislative district is
represented by at least three percent of the registered voters
thereof. Within 30 days after receipt of the petition, the
COMELEC shall determine the sufficiency of the petition,
publish the same, and set the date of the referendum within
45 to 90-day period.
6. When the matter under referendum or initiative is
approved by the required number of votes, it shall become
effective 15 days following the completion of its publication
in the Official Gazette.
In concluding his sponsorship remarks, Mr. Roco stressed
that the Members cannot ignore the people's call for initiative
and referendum and urged the Body to approve House Bill
No. 21505.
At this juncture, Mr. Roco also requested that the prepared
text of his speech together with the footnotes be reproduced
as part of the Congressional Records.
The same sentiment as to the bill's intent to implement
people's initiative to amend the Constitution was stressed by
then Congressman (now Secretary of Agriculture) Salvador
Escudero III in his sponsorship remarks, viz:7
xxx xxx xxx
SPONSORSHIP REMARKS OF MR. ESCUDERO
Mr. Escudero first pointed out that the people have been
clamoring for a truly popular democracy ever since, especially
in the so-called parliament of the streets. A substantial
segment of the population feels, he said, that the form of
democracy is there, but not the reality or substance of it
because of the increasingly elitist approach of their
representatives to the country's problem.
Whereupon, Mr. Escudero pointed out that the Constitution
has provided a means whereby the people can exercise the
reserved power of initiative to propose amendments to the
Constitution, and requested that Sections 1 and 32, Article
VI; Section 3, Article X; and Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution be made part of his sponsorship remarks.
Mr. Escudero also stressed that an implementing law is
needed for the aforecited Constitutional provisions. While the
enactment of the Bill will give way to strong competition
among cause-oriented and sectoral groups, he continued, it
will hasten the politization of the citizenry, aid the
government in forming an enlightened public opinion, and
produce more responsive legislation. The passage of the Bill
will also give street parliamentarians the opportunity to
articulate their ideas in a democratic forum, he added.
Mr. Escudero stated that he and Mr. Roco hoped for the early
approval of the Bill so that it can be initially used for the
Agrarian Reform Law. He said that the passage of House Bill
No. 21505 will show that the Members can set aside their
personal and political consideration for the greater good of
the people.
The disagreeing provisions in Senate Bill No. 17 and House
Bill No. 21505 were threshed out in a Bicameral Conference
Committee.8 In the meeting of the Committee on June 6,
1989,9 the members agreed that the two (2) bills should be
consolidated and that the consolidated version should include
people's initiative to amend the Constitution as contemplated
by House Bill No. 21505. The transcript of the meeting states:
xxx xxx xxx
CHAIRMAN GONZALES. But at any rate, as I have
said, because this is new in our political system, the Senate
decided on a more cautious approach and limiting it only to
the local government units because even with that stage
where . . . at least this has been quite popular, ano? It has
been attempted on a national basis. Alright. There has not
been a single attempt. Now, so, kami limitado doon. And,
second, we consider also that it is only fair that the local
legislative body should be given a chance to adopt the
legislation bill proposed, right? Iyong sinasabing indirect
system of initiative. If after all, the local legislative assembly
or body is willing to adopt it in full or in toto, there ought to
be any reason for initiative, ano for initiative. And, number
3, we feel that there should be some limitation on the
frequency with which it should be applied. Number 4, na the
people, thru initiative, cannot enact any ordinance that is
beyond the scope of authority of the local legislative body,
otherwise, my God, mag-aassume sila ng power that is
broader and greater than the grant of legislative power to the
Sanggunians. And Number 5, because of that, then a
proposition which has been the result of a successful
initiative can only carry the force and effect of an ordinance
and therefore that should not deprive the court of its
jurisdiction to declare it null and void for want of authority.
Ha, di ba? I mean it is beyond powers of local government
units to enact. Iyon ang main essence namin, so we
concentrated on that. And that is why . . . so ang sa inyo
naman includes iyon sa Constitution, amendment to the
Constitution eh . . . national laws. Sa amin, if you insist on
that, alright, although we feel na it will in effect become a
dead statute. Alright, and we can agree, we can agree. So ang
mangyayari dito, and magiging basic nito, let us not discuss
anymore kung alin and magiging basic bill, ano, whether it is
the Senate Bill or whether it is the House bill. Logically it
should be ours sapagkat una iyong sa amin eh. It is one of the
first bills approved by the Senate kaya ang number niyan,
makikita mo, 17, eh. Huwag na nating pagusapan. Now, if
you insist, really iyong features ng national at saka
constitutional, okay. ____ gagawin na natin na consolidation
of both bills.
HON. ROCO. Yes, we shall consolidate.
CHAIRMAN GONZALES. Consolidation of the
Senate and House Bill No. so and so. 10
When the consolidated bill was presented to the House for
approval, then Congressman Roco upon interpellation by
Congressman Rodolfo Albano, again confirmed that it
23
covered people's initiative to amend the Constitution. The
record of the House Representative states: 11
xxx xxx xxx
THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. The Gentleman from
Camarines Sur is recognized.
MR. ROCO. On the Conference Committee Report on
the disagreeing provisions between Senate Bill No. 21505
which refers to the system providing for the initiative and
referendum, fundamentally, Mr. Speaker, we consolidated
the Senate and the House versions, so both versions are
totally intact in the bill. The Senators ironically provided for
local initiative and referendum and the House
Representatives correctly provided for initiative and
referendum on the Constitution and on national legislation.
I move that we approve the consolidated bill.
MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker.
THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. What is the pleasure of
the Minority Floor Leader?
MR. ALBANO. Will the distinguished sponsor answer just
a few questions?
THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. The Gentlemen will
please proceed.
MR. ALBANO. I heard the sponsor say that the only
difference in the two bills was that in the Senate version
there was a provision for local initiative and referendum,
whereas the House version has none.
MR. ROCO. In fact, the Senate version provide purely
for local initiative and referendum, whereas in the House
version, we provided purely for national and constitutional
legislation.
MR. ALBANO. Is it our understanding therefore, that the
two provisions were incorporated?
MR. ROCO. Yes, Mr. Speaker.
MR. ALBANO. So that we will now have a complete
initiative and referendum both in the constitutional
amendment and national legislation.
MR. ROCO. That is correct.
MR. ALBANO. And provincial as well as municipal
resolutions?
MR. ROCO. Down to barangay, Mr. Speaker.
MR. ALBANO. And this initiative and referendum is in
consonance with the provision of the Constitution whereby it
mandates this Congress to enact the enabling law, so that we
shall have a system which can be done every five years. Is it
five years in the provision of the Constitution?
MR. ROCO. That is correct, Mr. Speaker. For
constitutional amendments in the 1987 Constitution, it is
every five years.
MR. ALBANO. For every five years, Mr. Speaker?
MR. ROCO. Within five years, we cannot have multiple
initiatives and referenda.
MR. ALBANO. Therefore, basically, there was no
substantial difference between the two versions?
MR. ROCO. The gaps in our bill were filled by the
Senate which, as I said earlier, ironically was about local,
provincial and municipal legislation.
MR. ALBANO. And the two bills were consolidated?
MR. ROCO. Yes, Mr. Speaker.
MR. ALBANO. Thank you, Mr. Speaker.
APPROVAL OF C.C.R.
ON S.B. NO. 17 AND H.B. NO. 21505
(The Initiative and Referendum Act)
THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. There was a motion to
approve this consolidated bill on Senate Bill No. 17 and
House Bill No. 21505.
Is there any objection? (Silence. The Chair hears none; the
motion is approved.
Since it is crystalline that the intent of R.A. No. 6735 is to
implement the people's initiative to amend the Constitution,
it is our bounden duty to interpret the law as it was intended
by the legislature. We have ruled that once intent is
ascertained, it must be enforced even if it may not be
consistent with the strict letter of the law and this ruling is
as old as the mountain. We have also held that where a law
is susceptible of more than one interpretation, that
interpretation which will most tend to effectuate the
manifest intent of the legislature will be adopted. 12
The text of R.A. No. 6735 should therefore be reasonably
construed to effectuate its intent to implement the people's
initiative to amend the Constitution. To be sure, we need not
torture the text of said law to reach the conclusion that it
implements people's initiative to amend the Constitution.
R.A. No. 6735 is replete with references to this prerogative of
the people.
First, the policy statement declares:
Sec. 2. Statement of Policy. — The power of the people
under a system of initiative and referendum to directly
propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the
Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any
legislative body upon compliance with the requirements of
this Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and guaranteed.
(emphasis supplied)
Second, the law defines "initiative" as "the power of the
people to propose amendments to the constitution or to
propose and enact legislations through an election called for
the purpose," and "plebiscite" as "the electoral process by
which an initiative on the Constitution is approved or
rejected by the people.
Third, the law provides the requirements for a petition for
initiative to amend the Constitution. Section 5(b) states that
"(a) petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must
have at least twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of
registered voters as signatories, of which every legislative
district must be represented by at least three per centum
(3%) of the registered voters therein." It also states that
"(i)nitiative on the Constitution may be exercised only after
five (5) years from the ratification of the 1987 Constitution
and only once every five (5) years thereafter.
Finally, R.A. No. 6735 fixes the effectivity date of the
amendment. Section 9(b) states that "(t)he proposition in an
initiative on the Constitution approved by a majority of the
votes cast in the plebiscite shall become effective as to the day
of the plebiscite.
It is unfortunate that the majority decision resorts to a
strained interpretation of R.A. No. 6735 to defeat its intent
which it itself concedes is to implement people's initiative to
24
propose amendments to the Constitution. Thus, it laments
that the word "Constitution" is neither germane nor relevant
to the policy thrust of section 2 and that the statute's
subtitling is not accurate. These lapses are to be expected for
laws are not always written in impeccable English. Rightly,
the Constitution does not require our legislators to be word-
smiths with the ability to write bills with poetic commas like
Jose Garcia Villa or in lyrical prose like Winston Churchill.
But it has always been our good policy not to refuse to
effectuate the intent of a law on the ground that it is badly
written. As the distinguished Vicente Francisco 13 reminds
us: "Many laws contain words which have not been used
accurately. But the use of inapt or inaccurate language or
words, will not vitiate the statute if the legislative intention
can be ascertained. The same is equally true with reference
to awkward, slovenly, or ungrammatical expressions, that is,
such expressions and words will be construed as carrying the
meaning the legislature intended that they bear, although
such a construction necessitates a departure from the literal
meaning of the words used.
In the same vein, the argument that R.A. No. 7535 does not
include people's initiative to amend the Constitution simply
because it lacks a sub-title on the subject should be given the
weight of helium. Again, the hoary rule in statutory
construction is that headings prefixed to titles, chapters and
sections of a statute may be consulted in aid of interpretation,
but inferences drawn therefrom are entitled to very little
weight, and they can never control the plain terms of the
enacting clauses. 14
All said, it is difficult to agree with the majority decision that
refuses to enforce the manifest intent or spirit of R.A. No.
6735 to implement the people's initiative to amend the
Constitution. It blatantly disregards the rule cast in concrete
that the letter of the law must yield to its spirit for the letter
of the law is its body but its spirit is its soul. 15
II
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, 16 promulgated under the
stewardship of Commissioner Haydee Yorac, then its Acting
Chairman, spelled out the procedure on how to exercise the
people's initiative to amend the Constitution. This is in
accord with the delegated power granted by section 20 of R.A.
No. 6735 to the COMELEC which expressly states: "The
Commission is hereby empowered to promulgate such rules
and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the
purposes of this Act." By no means can this delegation of
power be assailed as infirmed. In the benchmark case of
Pelaez v. Auditor General, 17 this Court, thru former Chief
Justice Roberto Concepcion laid down the test to determine
whether there is undue delegation of legislative power, viz:
xxx xxx xxx
Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the
Government the power to fill details in the execution,
enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to
forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers,
that said law: (a) be complete in itself — it must set forth
therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented
by the delegate — and (b) to fix standard — the limits of
which are sufficiently determinate or determinable — to
which the delegate must conform in the performance of his
functions. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy,
which is the essence of every law, and, without the
aforementioned standard, there would be no means to
determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate
has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority. Hence,
he could thereby arrogate upon himself the power, not only
to make the law, but, also — and this is worse — to unmake
it, by adopting measures inconsistent with the end sought to
be attained by the Act of Congress, thus nullifying the
principle of separation of powers and the system of checks
and balances, and, consequently, undermining the very
foundation of our republican system.
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet
these well-settled requirements for a valid delegation of the
power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It does
not enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by
the President. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently
precise to avoid the evil effects above referred to.
R.A. No. 6735 sufficiently states the policy and the standards
to guide the COMELEC in promulgating the law's
implementing rules and regulations of the law. As
aforestated, section 2 spells out the policy of the law; viz: "The
power of the people under a system of initiative and
referendum to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in
whole or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or
resolutions passed by any legislative body upon compliance
with the requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed,
recognized and guaranteed." Spread out all over R.A. No.
6735 are the standards to canalize the delegated power to the
COMELEC to promulgate rules and regulations from
overflowing. Thus, the law states the number of signatures
necessary to start a people's initiative, 18 directs how
initiative proceeding is commenced, 19 what the COMELEC
should do upon filing of the petition for initiative, 20 how a
proposition is approved, 21 when a plebiscite may be held, 22
when the amendment takes effect 23 and what matters may
not be the subject of any initiative. 24 By any measure, these
standards are adequate.
Former Justice Isagani A. Cruz, similarly elucidated that "a
sufficient standard is intended to map out the boundaries of
the delegates' authority by defining the legislative policy and
indicating the circumstances under which it is to be pursued
and effected. The purpose of the sufficient standard is to
prevent a total transference of legislative power from the
lawmaking body to the delegate." 25 In enacting R.A. No.
6735, it cannot be said that Congress totally transferred its
power to enact the law implementing people's initiative to
COMELEC. A close look at COMELEC Resolution No. 2300
will show that it merely provided the procedure to effectuate
the policy of R.A. No. 6735 giving life to the people's initiative
to amend the Constitution. The debates 26 in the
Constitutional Commission make it clear that the rules of
procedure to enforce the people's initiative can be delegated,
thus:
MR. ROMULO. Under Commissioner Davide's amendment,
it is possible for the legislature to set forth certain procedures
to carry out the initiative. . . ?
MR. DAVIDE. It can.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. ROMULO. But the Commissioner's amendment does
not prevent the legislature from asking another body to set
the proposition in proper form.
MR. DAVIDE. The Commissioner is correct. In other
words, the implementation of this particular right would be
subject to legislation, provided the legislature cannot
determine anymore the percentage of the requirement.
MR. DAVIDE. As long as it will not destroy the
substantive right to initiate. In other words, none of the
procedures to be proposed by the legislative body must
diminish or impair the right conceded here.
MR. ROMULO. In that provision of the Constitution can the
procedures which I have discussed be legislated?
MR. DAVIDE. Yes.
In his book, The Intent of the 1986 Constitution Writers, 27
Father Bernas likewise affirmed: "In response to questions of
Commissioner Romulo, Davide explained the extent of the
power of the legislature over the process: it could for instance,
25
prescribe the 'proper form before (the amendment) is
submitted to the people,' it could authorize another body to
check the proper form. It could also authorize the COMELEC,
for instance, to check the authenticity of the signatures of
petitioners. Davide concluded: 'As long as it will not destroy
the substantive right to initiate. In other words, none of the
procedures to be proposed by the legislative body must
diminish or impair the right conceded here.'" Quite clearly,
the prohibition against the legislature is to impair the
substantive right of the people to initiate amendments to the
Constitution. It is not, however, prohibited from legislating
the procedure to enforce the people's right of initiative or to
delegate it to another body like the COMELEC with proper
standard.
A survey of our case law will show that this Court has
prudentially refrained from invalidating administrative
rules on the ground of lack of adequate legislative standard
to guide their promulgation. As aptly perceived by former
Justice Cruz, "even if the law itself does not expressly
pinpoint the standard, the courts will bend backward to
locate the same elsewhere in order to spare the statute, if it
can, from constitutional infirmity." 28 He cited the ruling in
Hirabayashi v. United States, 29 viz:
xxx xxx xxx
It is true that the Act does not in terms establish a particular
standard to which orders of the military commander are to
conform, or require findings to be made as a prerequisite to
any order. But the Executive Order, the Proclamations and
the statute are not to be read in isolation from each other.
They were parts of a single program and must be judged as
such. The Act of March 21, 1942, was an adoption by
Congress of the Executive Order and of the Proclamations.
The Proclamations themselves followed a standard
authorized by the Executive Order — the necessity of
protecting military resources in the designated areas against
espionage and sabotage.
In the case at bar, the policy and the standards are bright-
lined in R.A. No. 6735. A 20-20 look at the law cannot miss
them. They were not written by our legislators in invisible
ink. The policy and standards can also be found in no less
than section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on
Amendments or Revisions. There is thus no reason to hold
that the standards provided for in R.A. No. 6735 are
insufficient for in other cases we have upheld as adequate
more general standards such as "simplicity and dignity," 30
"public interest," 31 "public welfare," 32 "interest of law and
order," 33 "justice and equity,"34 "adequate and efficient
instruction," 35 "public safety," 36 "public policy", 37 "greater
national interest", 38 "protect the local consumer by
stabilizing and subsidizing domestic pump rates", 39 and
"promote simplicity, economy and efficiency in government."
40 A due regard and respect to the legislature, a co-equal and
coordinate branch of government, should counsel this Court
to refrain from refusing to effectuate laws unless they are
clearly unconstitutional.
III
It is also respectfully submitted that the petition should he
dismissed with respect to the Pedrosas. The inclusion of the
Pedrosas in the petition is utterly baseless. The records show
that the case at bar started when respondent Delfin alone
and by himself filed with the COMELEC a Petition to Amend
the Constitution to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials by
People's Initiative. The Pedrosas did not join the petition. It
was Senator Roco who moved to intervene and was allowed
to do so by the COMELEC. The petition was heard and before
the COMELEC could resolve the Delfin petition, the case at
bar was filed by the petitioners with this Court. Petitioners
sued the COMELEC. Jesus Delfin, Alberto Pedrosa and
Carmen Pedrosa in their capacities as founding members of
the People's Initiative for Reform, Modernization and Action
(PIRMA). The suit is an original action for prohibition with
prayer for temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction.
The petition on its face states no cause of action against the
Pedrosas. The only allegation against the Pedrosas is that
they are founding members of the PIRMA which proposes to
undertake the signature drive for people's initiative to amend
the Constitution. Strangely, the PIRMA itself as an
organization was not impleaded as a respondent. Petitioners
then prayed that we order the Pedrosas ". . . to desist from
conducting a signature drive for a people's initiative to amend
the Constitution." On December 19, 1996, we temporarily
enjoined the Pedrosas ". . . from conducting a signature drive
for people's initiative to amend the Constitution." It is not
enough for the majority to lift the temporary restraining
order against the Pedrosas. It should dismiss the petition and
all motions for contempt against them without equivocation.
One need not draw a picture to impart the proposition that
in soliciting signatures to start a people's initiative to amend
the Constitution the Pedrosas are not engaged in any
criminal act. Their solicitation of signatures is a right
guaranteed in black and white by section 2 of Article XVII of
the Constitution which provides that ". . . amendments to this
Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people
through initiative. . ." This right springs from the principle
proclaimed in section 1, Article II of the Constitution that in
a democratic and republican state "sovereignty resides in the
people and all government authority emanates from them."
The Pedrosas are part of the people and their voice is part of
the voice of the people. They may constitute but a particle of
our sovereignty but no power can trivialize them for
sovereignty is indivisible.
But this is not all. Section 16 of Article XIII of the
Constitution provides: "The right of the people and their
organizations to effective and reasonable participation at all
levels of social, political and economic decision-making shall
not be abridged. The State shall by law, facilitate the
establishment of adequate consultation mechanisms." This is
another novel provision of the 1987 Constitution
strengthening the sinews of the sovereignty of our people. In
soliciting signatures to amend the Constitution, the Pedrosas
are participating in the political decision-making process of
our people. The Constitution says their right cannot be
abridged without any ifs and buts. We cannot put a question
mark on their right.
Over and above these new provisions, the Pedrosas'
campaign to amend the Constitution is an exercise of their
freedom of speech and expression and their right to petition
the government for redress of grievances. We have
memorialized this universal right in all our fundamental
laws from the Malolos Constitution to the 1987 Constitution.
We have iterated and reiterated in our rulings that freedom
of speech is a preferred right, the matrix of other important
rights of our people. Undeniably, freedom of speech enervates
the essence of the democratic creed of think and let think. For
this reason, the Constitution encourages speech even if it
protects the speechless.
It is thus evident that the right of the Pedrosas to solicit
signatures to start a people's initiative to amend the
Constitution does not depend on any law, much less on R.A.
6735 or COMELEC Resolution No. 2300. No law, no
Constitution can chain the people to an undesirable status
quo. To be sure, there are no irrepealable laws just as there
are no irrepealable Constitutions. Change is the predicate of
progress and we should not fear change. Mankind has long
recognized the truism that the only constant in life is change
and so should the majority.
IV
In a stream of cases, this Court has rhapsodized people power
as expanded in the 1987 Constitution. On October 5, 1993,
we observed that people's might is no longer a myth but an
26
article of faith in our Constitution. 41 On September 30,
1994, we postulated that people power can be trusted to check
excesses of government and that any effort to trivialize the
effectiveness of people's initiatives ought to be rejected. 42 On
September 26, 1996, we pledged that ". . . this Court as a
matter of policy and doctrine will exert every effort to
nurture, protect and promote their legitimate exercise." 43
Just a few days ago, or on March 11, 1997, by a unanimous
decision, 44 we allowed a recall election in Caloocan City
involving the mayor and ordered that he submits his right to
continue in office to the judgment of the tribunal of the
people. Thus far, we have succeeded in transforming people
power from an opaque abstraction to a robust reality. The
Constitution calls us to encourage people empowerment to
blossom in full. The Court cannot halt any and all signature
campaigns to amend the Constitution without setting back
the flowering of people empowerment. More important, the
Court cannot seal the lips of people who are pro-change but
not those who are anti-change without concerting the debate
on charter change into a sterile talkaton. Democracy is
enlivened by a dialogue and not by a monologue for in a
democracy nobody can claim any infallibility.
Melo and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
VITUG, J., concurring and dissenting:
The COMELEC should have dismissed, outrightly, the Delfin
Petition.
It does seem to me that there is no real exigency on the part
of the Court to engross, let alone to commit, itself on all the
issues raised and debated upon by the parties. What is
essential at this time would only be to resolve whether or not
the petition filed with the COMELEC, signed by Atty. Jesus
S. Delfin in his capacity as a "founding member of the
Movement for People's Initiative" and seeking through a
people initiative certain modifications on the 1987
Constitution, can properly be regarded and given its due
course. The Constitution, relative to any proposed
amendment under this method, is explicit. Section 2, Article
XVII, thereof provides:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be
directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of
registered voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum of the registered
voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be
authorized within five years following the ratification of this
Constitution nor oftener than once every five years
thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the
exercise of this right.
The Delfin petition is thus utterly deficient. Instead of
complying with the constitutional imperatives, the petition
would rather have much of its burden passed on, in effect, to
the COMELEC. The petition would require COMELEC to
schedule "signature gathering all over the country," to cause
the necessary publication of the petition "in newspapers of
general and local circulation," and to instruct "Municipal
Election Registrars in all Regions of the Philippines to assist
petitioners and volunteers in establishing signing stations at
the time and on the dates designated for the purpose.
I submit, even then, that the TRO earlier issued by the Court
which, consequentially, is made permanent under the
ponencia should be held to cover only the Delfin petition and
must not be so understood as having intended or
contemplated to embrace the signature drive of the Pedrosas.
The grant of such a right is clearly implicit in the
constitutional mandate on people initiative.
The distinct greatness of a democratic society is that those
who reign are the governed themselves. The postulate is no
longer lightly taken as just a perceived myth but a veritable
reality. The past has taught us that the vitality of
government lies not so much in the strength of those who lead
as in the consent of those who are led. The role of free speech
is pivotal but it can only have its true meaning if it comes
with the correlative end of being heard.
Pending a petition for a people's initiative that is sufficient in
form and substance, it behooves the Court, I most
respectfully submit, to yet refrain from resolving the question
of whether or not Republic Act No. 6735 has effectively and
sufficiently implemented the Constitutional provision on
right of the people to directly propose constitutional
amendments. Any opinion or view formulated by the Court
at this point would at best be only a non-binding, albeit
possibly persuasive, obiter dictum.
I vote for granting the instant petition before the Court and
for clarifying that the TRO earlier issued by the Court did not
prescribe the exercise by the Pedrosas of their right to
campaign for constitutional amendments.
FRANCISCO, J., dissenting and concurring:
There is no question that my esteemed colleague Mr. Justice
Davide has prepared a scholarly and well-written ponencia.
Nonetheless, I cannot fully subscribe to his view that R. A.
No. 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution.
To begin with, sovereignty under the constitution, resides in
the people and all government authority emanates from
them.1 Unlike our previous constitutions, the present 1987
Constitution has given more significance to this declaration
of principle for the people are now vested with power not only
to propose, enact or reject any act or law passed by Congress
or by the local legislative body, but to propose amendments
to the constitution as well.2 To implement these
constitutional edicts, Congress in 1989 enacted Republic Act
No. 6735, otherwise known as "The initiative and
Referendum Act". This law, to my mind, amply covers an
initiative on the constitution. The contrary view maintained
by petitioners is based principally on the alleged lack of sub-
title in the law on initiative to amend the constitution and on
their allegation that:
Republic Act No. 6735 provides for the effectivity of the law
after publication in print media. [And] [t]his indicates that
Republic Act No. 6735 covers only laws and not constitutional
amendments, because constitutional amendments take effect
upon ratification not after publication.3
which allegation manifests petitioners' selective
interpretation of the law, for under Section 9 of Republic Act
No. 6735 on the Effectivity of Initiative or Referendum
Proposition paragraph (b) thereof is clear in providing that:
The proposition in an initiative on the constitution approved
by a majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite shall become
effective as to the day of the plebiscite.
It is a rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted
with reference the context, i.e., that every part of the statute
must be construed together with the other parts and kept
subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. 4
Thus, the provisions of Republic Act No. 6735 may not be
interpreted in isolation. The legislative intent behind every
law is to be extracted from the statute as a whole.5
In its definition of terms, Republic Act No. 6735 defines
initiative as "the power of the people to propose amendments
to the constitution or to propose and enact legislations
through an election called for the purpose".6 The same
27
section, in enumerating the three systems of initiative,
included an "initiative on the constitution which refers to a
petition proposing amendments to the constitution"7
Paragraph (e) again of Section 3 defines "plebiscite" as "the
electoral process by which an initiative on the constitution is
approved or rejected by the people" And as to the material
requirements for an initiative on the Constitution, Section
5(b) distinctly enumerates the following:
A petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must
have at least twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of
the registered voters as signatories, of which every legislative
district must be represented by at least three per centum
(3%) of the registered voters therein. Initiative on the
constitution may be exercised only after five (5) years from
the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and only once every
five years thereafter.
These provisions were inserted, on purpose, by Congress the
intent being to provide for the implementation of the right to
propose an amendment to the Constitution by way of
initiative. "A legal provision", the Court has previously said,
"must not be construed as to be a useless surplusage, and
accordingly, meaningless, in the sense of adding nothing to
the law or having no effect whatsoever thereon". 8 That this
is the legislative intent is further shown by the deliberations
in Congress, thus:
. . . More significantly, in the course of the consideration of
the Conference Committee Report on the disagreeing
provisions of Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505, it
was noted:
MR. ROCO. On the Conference Committee Report on
the disagreeing provisions between Senate Bill No. 17 and
the consolidated House Bill No. 21505 which refers to the
system providing for the initiative and referendum,
fundamentally, Mr. Speaker, we consolidated the Senate and
the House versions, so both versions are totally intact in the
bill. The Senators ironically provided for local initiative and
referendum and the House of Representatives correctly
provided for initiative and referendum an the Constitution
and on national legislation.
I move that we approve the consolidated bill.
MR. ALBANO, Mr. Speaker.
THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. What is the pleasure of
the Minority Floor Leader?
MR. ALBANO. Will the distinguished sponsor answer just
a few questions?
THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. What does the sponsor
say?
MR. ROCO. Willingly, Mr. Speaker.
THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. The Gentleman will
please proceed.
MR. ALBANO. I heard the sponsor say that the only
difference in the two bills was that in the Senate version
there was a provision for local initiative and referendum,
whereas the House version has none.
MR. ROCO. In fact, the Senate version provided purely
for local initiative and referendum, whereas in the House
version, we provided purely for national and constitutional
legislation.
MR. ALBANO. Is it our understanding, therefore, that the
two provisions were incorporated?
MR. ROCO. Yes, Mr. Speaker.
MR. ALBANO. So that we will now have a complete
initiative and referendum both in the constitutional
amendment and national legislation.
MR. ROCO. That is correct.
MR. ALBANO. And provincial as well as municipal
resolutions?
MR. ROCO. Down to barangay, Mr. Speaker.
MR. ALBANO. And this initiative and referendum is in
consonance with the provision of the Constitution to enact
the enabling law, so that we shall have a system which can
be done every five years. Is it five years in the provision of the
Constitution?
MR. ROCO. That is correct, Mr. Speaker. For
constitutional amendments to the 1987 Constitution, it is
every five years." (Id. [Journal and Record of the House of
Representatives], Vol. VIII, 8 June 1989, p. 960; quoted in
Garcia v. Comelec, 237 SCRA 279, 292-293 [1994]; emphasis
supplied)
. . . The Senate version of the Bill may not have
comprehended initiatives on the Constitution. When
consolidated, though, with the House version of the Bill and
as approved and enacted into law, the proposal included
initiative on both the Constitution and ordinary laws.9
Clearly then, Republic Act No. 6735 covers an initiative on
the constitution. Any other construction as what petitioners
foist upon the Court constitute a betrayal of the intent and
spirit behind the enactment.
At any rate, I agree with the ponencia that the Commission
on Elections, at present, cannot take any action (such as
those contained in the Commission's orders dated December
6, 9, and 12, 1996 [Annexes B, C and B-1]) indicative of its
having already assumed jurisdiction over private
respondents' petition. This is so because from the tenor of
Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 6735 it would appear that proof of
procurement of the required percentage of registered voters
at the time the petition for initiative is filed, is a
jurisdictional requirement.
Thus:
A petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must
have at least twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of
registered voters as signatories, of which every legislative
district must be represented by at least three per centum
(3%) of the registered voters therein. Initiative on the
Constitution may be exercised only after five (5) years from
the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and only once every
five (5) years thereafter.
Here private respondents' petition is unaccompanied by the
required signatures. This defect notwithstanding, it is
without prejudice to the refiling of their petition once
compliance with the required percentage is satisfactorily
shown by private respondents. In the absence, therefore, of
an appropriate petition before the Commission on Elections,
any determination of whether private respondents' proposal
constitutes an amendment or revision is premature.
ACCORDINGLY, I take exception to the conclusion reached
in the ponencia that R.A. No. 6735 is an "inadequate"
legislation to cover a people's initiative to propose
amendments to the Constitution. I, however, register my
concurrence with the dismissal, in the meantime, of private
respondents' petition for initiative before public respondent
Commission on Elections until the same be supported by
proof of strict compliance with Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 6735.
Melo and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
28

PANGANIBAN, J., concurring and dissenting:
Our distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide
Jr., writing for the majority, holds that:
(1) The Comelec acted without jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the "initiatory"
Delfin Petition.
(2) While the Constitution allows amendments to "be
directly proposed by the people through initiative," there is
no implementing law for the purpose. RA 6735 is "incomplete,
inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions
insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is
concerned."
(3) Comelec Resolution No. 2330, "insofar as it
prescribes rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative
on amendments to the Constitution, is void."
I concur with the first item above. Until and unless an
initiatory petition can show the required number of
signatures — in this case, 12% of all the registered voters in
the Philippines with at least 3% in every legislative district
— no public funds may be spent and no government resources
may be used in an initiative to amend the Constitution.
Verily, the Comelec cannot even entertain any petition
absent such signatures. However, I dissent most respectfully
from the majority's two other rulings. Let me explain.
Under the above restrictive holdings espoused by the Court's
majority, the Constitution cannot be amended at all through
a people's initiative. Not by Delfin, not by Pirma, not by
anyone, not even by all the voters of the country acting
together. This decision will effectively but unnecessarily
curtail, nullify, abrogate and render inutile the people's right
to change the basic law. At the very least, the majority holds
the right hostage to congressional discretion on whether to
pass a new law to implement it, when there is already one
existing at present. This right to amend through initiative, it
bears stressing, is guaranteed by Section 2, Article XVII of
the Constitution, as follows:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be
directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of
registered voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum of the registered
voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be
authorized within five years following the ratification of this
Constitution nor oftener than once every five years
thereafter.
With all due respect, I find the majority's position all too
sweeping and all too extremist. It is equivalent to burning the
whole house to exterminate the rats, and to killing the
patient to relieve him of pain. What Citizen Delfin wants the
Comelec to do we should reject. But we should not thereby
preempt any future effort to exercise the right of initiative
correctly and judiciously. The fact that the Delfin Petition
proposes a misuse of initiative does not justify a ban against
its proper use. Indeed, there is a right way to do the right
thing at the right time and for the right reason.
Taken Together and Interpreted Properly, the Constitution,
RA 6735 and Comelec Resolution 2300 Are Sufficient to
Implement Constitutional Initiatives
While RA 6735 may not be a perfect law, it was — as the
majority openly concedes — intended by the legislature to
cover and, I respectfully submit, it contains enough
provisions to effectuate an initiative on the Constitution.1 I
completely agree with the inspired and inspiring opinions of
Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno and Mr. Justice Ricardo J.
Francisco that RA 6735, the Roco law on initiative,
sufficiently implements the right of the people to initiate
amendments to the Constitution. Such views, which I shall
no longer repeat nor elaborate on, are thoroughly consistent
with this Court's unanimous en banc rulings in Subic Bay
Metropolitan Authority vs. Commission on Elections, 2 that
"provisions for initiative . . . are (to be) liberally construed to
effectuate their purposes, to facilitate and not hamper the
exercise by the voters of the rights granted thereby"; and in
Garcia vs. Comelec, 3 that any "effort to trivialize the
effectiveness of people's initiatives ought to be rejected."
No law can completely and absolutely cover all
administrative details. In recognition of this, RA 6735 wisely
empowered 4 the Commission on Election "to promulgate
such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out
the purposes of this Act." And pursuant thereto, the Comelec
issued its Resolution 2300 on 16 January 1991. Such
Resolution, by its very words, was promulgated "to govern the
conduct of initiative on the Constitution and initiative and
referendum on national and local laws," not by the incumbent
Commission on Elections but by one then composed of Acting
Chairperson Haydee B. Yorac, Comms. Alfredo E. Abueg Jr.,
Leopoldo L. Africa, Andres R. Flores, Dario C. Rama and
Magdara B. Dimaampao. All of these Commissioners who
signed Resolution 2300 have retired from the Commission,
and thus we cannot ascribe any vile motive unto them, other
than an honest, sincere and exemplary effort to give life to a
cherished right of our people.
The majority argues that while Resolution 2300 is valid in
regard to national laws and local legislations, it is void in
reference to constitutional amendments. There is no basis for
such differentiation. The source of and authority for the
Resolution is the same law, RA 6735.
I respectfully submit that taken together and interpreted
properly and liberally, the Constitution (particularly Art.
XVII, Sec. 2), R4 6735 and Comelec Resolution 2300 provide
more than sufficient authority to implement, effectuate and
realize our people's power to amend the Constitution.
Petitioner Delfin and the Pedrosa
Spouses Should Not Be Muzzled
I am glad the majority decided to heed our plea to lift the
temporary restraining order issued by this Court on 18
December 1996 insofar as it prohibited Petitioner Delfin and
the Spouses Pedrosa from exercising their right of initiative.
In fact, I believe that such restraining order as against
private respondents should not have been issued, in the first
place. While I agree that the Comelec should be stopped from
using public funds and government resources to help them
gather signatures, I firmly believe that this Court has no
power to restrain them from exercising their right of
initiative. The right to propose amendments to the
Constitution is really a species of the right of free speech and
free assembly. And certainly, it would be tyrannical and
despotic to stop anyone from speaking freely and persuading
others to conform to his/her beliefs. As the eminent Voltaire
once said, "I may disagree with what you say, but I will
defend to the death your right to say it." After all, freedom is
not really for the thought we agree with, but as Justice
Holmes wrote, "freedom for the thought that we hate."5
Epilogue
By way of epilogue, let me stress the guiding tenet of my
Separate Opinion. Initiative, like referendum and recall, is a
new and treasured feature of the Filipino constitutional
system. All three are institutionalized legacies of the world-
admired EDSA people power. Like elections and plebiscites,
they are hallowed expressions of popular sovereignty. They
are sacred democratic rights of our people to be used as their
final weapons against political excesses, opportunism,
inaction, oppression and misgovernance; as well as their
reserved instruments to exact transparency, accountability
and faithfulness from their chosen leaders. While on the one
29
hand, their misuse and abuse must be resolutely struck
down, on the other, their legitimate exercise should be
carefully nurtured and zealously protected.
WHEREFORE, I vote to GRANT the petition of Sen. Miriam
D. Santiago et al. and to DIRECT Respondent Commission
on Elections to DISMISS the Delfin Petition on the ground of
prematurity, but not on the other grounds relied upon by the
majority. I also vote to LIFT the temporary restraining order
issued on 18 December 1996 insofar as it prohibits Jesus
Delfin, Alberto Pedrosa and Carmen Pedrosa from exercising
their right to free speech in proposing amendments to the
Constitution.
Melo and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
PUNO, J., concurring and dissenting:
I join the ground-breaking ponencia of our esteemed
colleague, Mr. Justice Davide insofar as it orders the
COMELEC to dismiss the Delfin petition. I regret, however,
I cannot share the view that R.A. No. 5735 and COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300 are legally defective and cannot
implement the people's initiative to amend the Constitution.
I likewise submit that the petition with respect to the
Pedrosas has no leg to stand on and should be dismissed.
With due respect:
I barangay assembly the power to initiate legislative
First, I submit that R.A. No. 6735 sufficiently implements the
right of the people to initiate amendments to the Constitution
thru initiative. Our effort to discover the meaning of R.A. No.
6735 should start with the search of the intent of our
lawmakers. A knowledge of this intent is critical for the
intent of the legislature is the law and the controlling factor
in its interpretation.1 Stated otherwise, intent is the essence
of the law, the spirit which gives life to its enactment.2
Significantly, the majority decision concedes that ". . . R.A.
No. 6735 was intended to cover initiative to propose
amendments to the Constitution." It ought to be so for this
intent is crystal clear from the history of the law which was
a consolidation of House Bill No. 215053 and Senate Bill No.
17.4 Senate Bill No. 17 was entitled "An Act Providing for a
System of Initiative and Referendum and the Exception
Therefrom, Whereby People in Local Government Units Can
Directly Propose and Enact Resolutions and Ordinances or
Approve or Reject any Ordinance or Resolution Passed by the
Local Legislative Body." Beyond doubt, Senate Bill No. 17 did
not include people's initiative to propose amendments to the
Constitution. In checkered contrast, House Bill No. 21505 5
expressly included people's initiative to amend the
Constitution. Congressman (now Senator) Raul Roco
emphasized in his sponsorship remarks:6
xxx xxx xxx
SPONSORSHIP REMARKS OF MR. ROCO
At the outset, Mr. Roco provided the following backgrounder
on the constitutional basis of the proposed measure.
1. As cited in Vera vs. Avelino (1946), the presidential
system which was introduced by the 1935 Constitution saw
the application of the principle of separation of powers.
2. While under the parliamentary system of the 1973
Constitution the principle remained applicable, the 1981
amendments to the Constitution of 1973 ensured presidential
dominance over the Batasang Pambansa.
Constitutional history then saw the shifting and sharing of
legislative powers between the Legislature and the Executive
departments. Transcending changes in the exercise of
legislative power is the declaration in the Philippine
Constitution that the Philippines is a republican state where
sovereignty resides in the people and all sovereignty
emanates from them.
3. Under the 1987 Constitution, the lawmaking power
is still preserved in Congress; however, to institutionalize
direct action of the people as exemplified in the 1986
Revolution, the Constitution recognizes the power of the
people, through the system of initiative and referendum.
As cited in Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution,
Congress does not have plenary powers since reserve powers
are given to the people expressly. Section 32 of the same
Article mandates Congress to pass at the soonest possible
time, a bill on referendum and initiative, and to share its
legislative powers with the people.
Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution, on the other
hand, vests in the people the power to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution through initiative, upon
petition of at least 12 percent of the total number of
registered voters.
Stating that House Bill No. 21505 is the Committee's
response to the duty imposed on Congress to implement the
exercise by the people of the right to initiative and
referendum, Mr. Roco recalled the beginnings of the system
of initiative and referendum under Philippine Law. He cited
Section 99 of the Local Government Code which vests in the
processes, decide the holding of plebiscite and hear reports of
the Sangguniang Barangay, all of which are variations of the
power of initiative and referendum. He added that the
holding of barangay plebiscites and referendum are likewise
provided in Sections 100 and 101 of the same Code.
Thereupon, for the sake of brevity, Mr. Roco moved that
pertinent quotation on the subject which he will later submit
to the Secretary of the House be incorporated as part of his
sponsorship speech.
He then cited examples of initiative and referendum similar
to those contained in the instant Bill among which are the
constitutions of states in the United States which recognize
the right of registered voters to initiate the enactment of any
statute or to project any existing law or parts thereof in a
referendum. These states, he said, are Alaska, Alabama,
Montana, Massachusets, Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, and
practically all other states.
Mr. Roco explained that in certain American states, the kind
of laws to which initiative and referendum apply is also
without limitation, except for emergency measures, which
are likewise incorporated in House Bill No. 21505. He added
that the procedure provided by the Bill from the filing of the
petition, the requirements of a certain percentage of
supporters to present a proposition, to the submission to
electors are substantially similar to the provisions in
American laws. Although an infant in Philippine political
structure, the system of initiative and referendum, he said,
is a tried and tested system in other jurisdictions, and the
Bill is patterned after American experience.
He further explained that the bill has only 12 sections, and
recalled that the Constitutional Commissioners saw the
system of the initiative and referendum as an instrument
which can be used should the legislature show itself to be
indifferent to the needs of the people. This is the reason, he
claimed, why now is an opportune time to pass the Bill even
as he noted the felt necessity of the times to pass laws which
are necessary to safeguard individual rights and liberties.
At this juncture Mr. Roco explained the process of initiative
and referendum as advocated in House Bill No. 21505. He
stated that:
30

1. Initiative means that the people, on their own
political judgment, submit a Bill for the consideration of the
general electorate.
2. The instant Bill provides three kinds of initiative,
namely; the initiative to amend the Constitution once every
five years; the initiative to amend statutes approved by
Congress; and the initiative to amend local ordinances.
3. The instant Bill gives a definite procedure and
allows the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to define
rules and regulations on the power of initiative.
4. Referendum means that the legislators seek the
consent of the people on measures that they have approved.
5. Under Section 4 of the Bill the people can initiate a
referendum which is a mode of plebiscite by presenting a
petition therefor, but under certain limitations, such as the
signing of said petition by at least 10 percent of the total of
registered voters at which every legislative district is
represented by at least three percent of the registered voters
thereof. Within 30 days after receipt of the petition, the
COMELEC shall determine the sufficiency of the petition,
publish the same, and set the date of the referendum within
45 to 90-day period.
6. When the matter under referendum or initiative is
approved by the required number of votes, it shall become
effective 15 days following the completion of its publication
in the Official Gazette.
In concluding his sponsorship remarks, Mr. Roco stressed
that the Members cannot ignore the people's call for initiative
and referendum and urged the Body to approve House Bill
No. 21505.
At this juncture, Mr. Roco also requested that the prepared
text of his speech together with the footnotes be reproduced
as part of the Congressional Records.
The same sentiment as to the bill's intent to implement
people's initiative to amend the Constitution was stressed by
then Congressman (now Secretary of Agriculture) Salvador
Escudero III in his sponsorship remarks, viz:7
xxx xxx xxx
SPONSORSHIP REMARKS OF MR. ESCUDERO
Mr. Escudero first pointed out that the people have been
clamoring for a truly popular democracy ever since, especially
in the so-called parliament of the streets. A substantial
segment of the population feels, he said, that the form of
democracy is there, but not the reality or substance of it
because of the increasingly elitist approach of their
representatives to the country's problem.
Whereupon, Mr. Escudero pointed out that the Constitution
has provided a means whereby the people can exercise the
reserved power of initiative to propose amendments to the
Constitution, and requested that Sections 1 and 32, Article
VI; Section 3, Article X; and Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution be made part of his sponsorship remarks.
Mr. Escudero also stressed that an implementing law is
needed for the aforecited Constitutional provisions. While the
enactment of the Bill will give way to strong competition
among cause-oriented and sectoral groups, he continued, it
will hasten the politization of the citizenry, aid the
government in forming an enlightened public opinion, and
produce more responsive legislation. The passage of the Bill
will also give street parliamentarians the opportunity to
articulate their ideas in a democratic forum, he added.
Mr. Escudero stated that he and Mr. Roco hoped for the early
approval of the Bill so that it can be initially used for the
Agrarian Reform Law. He said that the passage of House Bill
No. 21505 will show that the Members can set aside their
personal and political consideration for the greater good of
the people.
The disagreeing provisions in Senate Bill No. 17 and House
Bill No. 21505 were threshed out in a Bicameral Conference
Committee.8 In the meeting of the Committee on June 6,
1989,9 the members agreed that the two (2) bills should be
consolidated and that the consolidated version should include
people's initiative to amend the Constitution as contemplated
by House Bill No. 21505. The transcript of the meeting states:
xxx xxx xxx
CHAIRMAN GONZALES. But at any rate, as I have
said, because this is new in our political system, the Senate
decided on a more cautious approach and limiting it only to
the local government units because even with that stage
where . . . at least this has been quite popular, ano? It has
been attempted on a national basis. Alright. There has not
been a single attempt. Now, so, kami limitado doon. And,
second, we consider also that it is only fair that the local
legislative body should be given a chance to adopt the
legislation bill proposed, right? Iyong sinasabing indirect
system of initiative. If after all, the local legislative assembly
or body is willing to adopt it in full or in toto, there ought to
be any reason for initiative, ano for initiative. And, number
3, we feel that there should be some limitation on the
frequency with which it should be applied. Number 4, na the
people, thru initiative, cannot enact any ordinance that is
beyond the scope of authority of the local legislative body,
otherwise, my God, mag-aassume sila ng power that is
broader and greater than the grant of legislative power to the
Sanggunians. And Number 5, because of that, then a
proposition which has been the result of a successful
initiative can only carry the force and effect of an ordinance
and therefore that should not deprive the court of its
jurisdiction to declare it null and void for want of authority.
Ha, di ba? I mean it is beyond powers of local government
units to enact. Iyon ang main essence namin, so we
concentrated on that. And that is why . . . so ang sa inyo
naman includes iyon sa Constitution, amendment to the
Constitution eh . . . national laws. Sa amin, if you insist on
that, alright, although we feel na it will in effect become a
dead statute. Alright, and we can agree, we can agree. So ang
mangyayari dito, and magiging basic nito, let us not discuss
anymore kung alin and magiging basic bill, ano, whether it is
the Senate Bill or whether it is the House bill. Logically it
should be ours sapagkat una iyong sa amin eh. It is one of the
first bills approved by the Senate kaya ang number niyan,
makikita mo, 17, eh. Huwag na nating pagusapan. Now, if
you insist, really iyong features ng national at saka
constitutional, okay. ____ gagawin na natin na consolidation
of both bills.
HON. ROCO. Yes, we shall consolidate.
CHAIRMAN GONZALES. Consolidation of the
Senate and House Bill No. so and so. 10
When the consolidated bill was presented to the House for
approval, then Congressman Roco upon interpellation by
Congressman Rodolfo Albano, again confirmed that it
covered people's initiative to amend the Constitution. The
record of the House Representative states: 11
xxx xxx xxx
THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. The Gentleman from
Camarines Sur is recognized.
MR. ROCO. On the Conference Committee Report on
the disagreeing provisions between Senate Bill No. 21505
which refers to the system providing for the initiative and
31
referendum, fundamentally, Mr. Speaker, we consolidated
the Senate and the House versions, so both versions are
totally intact in the bill. The Senators ironically provided for
local initiative and referendum and the House
Representatives correctly provided for initiative and
referendum on the Constitution and on national legislation.
I move that we approve the consolidated bill.
MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker.
THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. What is the pleasure of
the Minority Floor Leader?
MR. ALBANO. Will the distinguished sponsor answer just
a few questions?
THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. The Gentlemen will
please proceed.
MR. ALBANO. I heard the sponsor say that the only
difference in the two bills was that in the Senate version
there was a provision for local initiative and referendum,
whereas the House version has none.
MR. ROCO. In fact, the Senate version provide purely
for local initiative and referendum, whereas in the House
version, we provided purely for national and constitutional
legislation.
MR. ALBANO. Is it our understanding therefore, that the
two provisions were incorporated?
MR. ROCO. Yes, Mr. Speaker.
MR. ALBANO. So that we will now have a complete
initiative and referendum both in the constitutional
amendment and national legislation.
MR. ROCO. That is correct.
MR. ALBANO. And provincial as well as municipal
resolutions?
MR. ROCO. Down to barangay, Mr. Speaker.
MR. ALBANO. And this initiative and referendum is in
consonance with the provision of the Constitution whereby it
mandates this Congress to enact the enabling law, so that we
shall have a system which can be done every five years. Is it
five years in the provision of the Constitution?
MR. ROCO. That is correct, Mr. Speaker. For
constitutional amendments in the 1987 Constitution, it is
every five years.
MR. ALBANO. For every five years, Mr. Speaker?
MR. ROCO. Within five years, we cannot have multiple
initiatives and referenda.
MR. ALBANO. Therefore, basically, there was no
substantial difference between the two versions?
MR. ROCO. The gaps in our bill were filled by the
Senate which, as I said earlier, ironically was about local,
provincial and municipal legislation.
MR. ALBANO. And the two bills were consolidated?
MR. ROCO. Yes, Mr. Speaker.
MR. ALBANO. Thank you, Mr. Speaker.
APPROVAL OF C.C.R.
ON S.B. NO. 17 AND H.B. NO. 21505
(The Initiative and Referendum Act)
THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. There was a motion to
approve this consolidated bill on Senate Bill No. 17 and
House Bill No. 21505.
Is there any objection? (Silence. The Chair hears none; the
motion is approved.
Since it is crystalline that the intent of R.A. No. 6735 is to
implement the people's initiative to amend the Constitution,
it is our bounden duty to interpret the law as it was intended
by the legislature. We have ruled that once intent is
ascertained, it must be enforced even if it may not be
consistent with the strict letter of the law and this ruling is
as old as the mountain. We have also held that where a law
is susceptible of more than one interpretation, that
interpretation which will most tend to effectuate the
manifest intent of the legislature will be adopted. 12
The text of R.A. No. 6735 should therefore be reasonably
construed to effectuate its intent to implement the people's
initiative to amend the Constitution. To be sure, we need not
torture the text of said law to reach the conclusion that it
implements people's initiative to amend the Constitution.
R.A. No. 6735 is replete with references to this prerogative of
the people.
First, the policy statement declares:
Sec. 2. Statement of Policy. — The power of the people
under a system of initiative and referendum to directly
propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the
Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any
legislative body upon compliance with the requirements of
this Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and guaranteed.
(emphasis supplied)
Second, the law defines "initiative" as "the power of the
people to propose amendments to the constitution or to
propose and enact legislations through an election called for
the purpose," and "plebiscite" as "the electoral process by
which an initiative on the Constitution is approved or
rejected by the people.
Third, the law provides the requirements for a petition for
initiative to amend the Constitution. Section 5(b) states that
"(a) petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must
have at least twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of
registered voters as signatories, of which every legislative
district must be represented by at least three per centum
(3%) of the registered voters therein." It also states that
"(i)nitiative on the Constitution may be exercised only after
five (5) years from the ratification of the 1987 Constitution
and only once every five (5) years thereafter.
Finally, R.A. No. 6735 fixes the effectivity date of the
amendment. Section 9(b) states that "(t)he proposition in an
initiative on the Constitution approved by a majority of the
votes cast in the plebiscite shall become effective as to the day
of the plebiscite.
It is unfortunate that the majority decision resorts to a
strained interpretation of R.A. No. 6735 to defeat its intent
which it itself concedes is to implement people's initiative to
propose amendments to the Constitution. Thus, it laments
that the word "Constitution" is neither germane nor relevant
to the policy thrust of section 2 and that the statute's
subtitling is not accurate. These lapses are to be expected for
laws are not always written in impeccable English. Rightly,
the Constitution does not require our legislators to be word-
smiths with the ability to write bills with poetic commas like
Jose Garcia Villa or in lyrical prose like Winston Churchill.
But it has always been our good policy not to refuse to
effectuate the intent of a law on the ground that it is badly
written. As the distinguished Vicente Francisco 13 reminds
us: "Many laws contain words which have not been used
accurately. But the use of inapt or inaccurate language or
32
words, will not vitiate the statute if the legislative intention
can be ascertained. The same is equally true with reference
to awkward, slovenly, or ungrammatical expressions, that is,
such expressions and words will be construed as carrying the
meaning the legislature intended that they bear, although
such a construction necessitates a departure from the literal
meaning of the words used.
In the same vein, the argument that R.A. No. 7535 does not
include people's initiative to amend the Constitution simply
because it lacks a sub-title on the subject should be given the
weight of helium. Again, the hoary rule in statutory
construction is that headings prefixed to titles, chapters and
sections of a statute may be consulted in aid of interpretation,
but inferences drawn therefrom are entitled to very little
weight, and they can never control the plain terms of the
enacting clauses. 14
All said, it is difficult to agree with the majority decision that
refuses to enforce the manifest intent or spirit of R.A. No.
6735 to implement the people's initiative to amend the
Constitution. It blatantly disregards the rule cast in concrete
that the letter of the law must yield to its spirit for the letter
of the law is its body but its spirit is its soul. 15
II
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, 16 promulgated under the
stewardship of Commissioner Haydee Yorac, then its Acting
Chairman, spelled out the procedure on how to exercise the
people's initiative to amend the Constitution. This is in
accord with the delegated power granted by section 20 of R.A.
No. 6735 to the COMELEC which expressly states: "The
Commission is hereby empowered to promulgate such rules
and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the
purposes of this Act." By no means can this delegation of
power be assailed as infirmed. In the benchmark case of
Pelaez v. Auditor General, 17 this Court, thru former Chief
Justice Roberto Concepcion laid down the test to determine
whether there is undue delegation of legislative power, viz:
xxx xxx xxx
Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the
Government the power to fill details in the execution,
enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to
forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers,
that said law: (a) be complete in itself — it must set forth
therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented
by the delegate — and (b) to fix standard — the limits of
which are sufficiently determinate or determinable — to
which the delegate must conform in the performance of his
functions. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy,
which is the essence of every law, and, without the
aforementioned standard, there would be no means to
determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate
has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority. Hence,
he could thereby arrogate upon himself the power, not only
to make the law, but, also — and this is worse — to unmake
it, by adopting measures inconsistent with the end sought to
be attained by the Act of Congress, thus nullifying the
principle of separation of powers and the system of checks
and balances, and, consequently, undermining the very
foundation of our republican system.
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet
these well-settled requirements for a valid delegation of the
power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It does
not enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by
the President. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently
precise to avoid the evil effects above referred to.
R.A. No. 6735 sufficiently states the policy and the standards
to guide the COMELEC in promulgating the law's
implementing rules and regulations of the law. As
aforestated, section 2 spells out the policy of the law; viz: "The
power of the people under a system of initiative and
referendum to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in
whole or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or
resolutions passed by any legislative body upon compliance
with the requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed,
recognized and guaranteed." Spread out all over R.A. No.
6735 are the standards to canalize the delegated power to the
COMELEC to promulgate rules and regulations from
overflowing. Thus, the law states the number of signatures
necessary to start a people's initiative, 18 directs how
initiative proceeding is commenced, 19 what the COMELEC
should do upon filing of the petition for initiative, 20 how a
proposition is approved, 21 when a plebiscite may be held, 22
when the amendment takes effect 23 and what matters may
not be the subject of any initiative. 24 By any measure, these
standards are adequate.
Former Justice Isagani A. Cruz, similarly elucidated that "a
sufficient standard is intended to map out the boundaries of
the delegates' authority by defining the legislative policy and
indicating the circumstances under which it is to be pursued
and effected. The purpose of the sufficient standard is to
prevent a total transference of legislative power from the
lawmaking body to the delegate." 25 In enacting R.A. No.
6735, it cannot be said that Congress totally transferred its
power to enact the law implementing people's initiative to
COMELEC. A close look at COMELEC Resolution No. 2300
will show that it merely provided the procedure to effectuate
the policy of R.A. No. 6735 giving life to the people's initiative
to amend the Constitution. The debates 26 in the
Constitutional Commission make it clear that the rules of
procedure to enforce the people's initiative can be delegated,
thus:
MR. ROMULO. Under Commissioner Davide's amendment,
it is possible for the legislature to set forth certain procedures
to carry out the initiative. . . ?
MR. DAVIDE. It can.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. ROMULO. But the Commissioner's amendment does
not prevent the legislature from asking another body to set
the proposition in proper form.
MR. DAVIDE. The Commissioner is correct. In other
words, the implementation of this particular right would be
subject to legislation, provided the legislature cannot
determine anymore the percentage of the requirement.
MR. DAVIDE. As long as it will not destroy the
substantive right to initiate. In other words, none of the
procedures to be proposed by the legislative body must
diminish or impair the right conceded here.
MR. ROMULO. In that provision of the Constitution can the
procedures which I have discussed be legislated?
MR. DAVIDE. Yes.
In his book, The Intent of the 1986 Constitution Writers, 27
Father Bernas likewise affirmed: "In response to questions of
Commissioner Romulo, Davide explained the extent of the
power of the legislature over the process: it could for instance,
prescribe the 'proper form before (the amendment) is
submitted to the people,' it could authorize another body to
check the proper form. It could also authorize the COMELEC,
for instance, to check the authenticity of the signatures of
petitioners. Davide concluded: 'As long as it will not destroy
the substantive right to initiate. In other words, none of the
procedures to be proposed by the legislative body must
diminish or impair the right conceded here.'" Quite clearly,
the prohibition against the legislature is to impair the
substantive right of the people to initiate amendments to the
Constitution. It is not, however, prohibited from legislating
the procedure to enforce the people's right of initiative or to
33
delegate it to another body like the COMELEC with proper
standard.
A survey of our case law will show that this Court has
prudentially refrained from invalidating administrative
rules on the ground of lack of adequate legislative standard
to guide their promulgation. As aptly perceived by former
Justice Cruz, "even if the law itself does not expressly
pinpoint the standard, the courts will bend backward to
locate the same elsewhere in order to spare the statute, if it
can, from constitutional infirmity." 28 He cited the ruling in
Hirabayashi v. United States, 29 viz:
xxx xxx xxx
It is true that the Act does not in terms establish a particular
standard to which orders of the military commander are to
conform, or require findings to be made as a prerequisite to
any order. But the Executive Order, the Proclamations and
the statute are not to be read in isolation from each other.
They were parts of a single program and must be judged as
such. The Act of March 21, 1942, was an adoption by
Congress of the Executive Order and of the Proclamations.
The Proclamations themselves followed a standard
authorized by the Executive Order — the necessity of
protecting military resources in the designated areas against
espionage and sabotage.
In the case at bar, the policy and the standards are bright-
lined in R.A. No. 6735. A 20-20 look at the law cannot miss
them. They were not written by our legislators in invisible
ink. The policy and standards can also be found in no less
than section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on
Amendments or Revisions. There is thus no reason to hold
that the standards provided for in R.A. No. 6735 are
insufficient for in other cases we have upheld as adequate
more general standards such as "simplicity and dignity," 30
"public interest," 31 "public welfare," 32 "interest of law and
order," 33 "justice and equity,"34 "adequate and efficient
instruction," 35 "public safety," 36 "public policy", 37 "greater
national interest", 38 "protect the local consumer by
stabilizing and subsidizing domestic pump rates", 39 and
"promote simplicity, economy and efficiency in government."
40 A due regard and respect to the legislature, a co-equal and
coordinate branch of government, should counsel this Court
to refrain from refusing to effectuate laws unless they are
clearly unconstitutional.
III
It is also respectfully submitted that the petition should he
dismissed with respect to the Pedrosas. The inclusion of the
Pedrosas in the petition is utterly baseless. The records show
that the case at bar started when respondent Delfin alone
and by himself filed with the COMELEC a Petition to Amend
the Constitution to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials by
People's Initiative. The Pedrosas did not join the petition. It
was Senator Roco who moved to intervene and was allowed
to do so by the COMELEC. The petition was heard and before
the COMELEC could resolve the Delfin petition, the case at
bar was filed by the petitioners with this Court. Petitioners
sued the COMELEC. Jesus Delfin, Alberto Pedrosa and
Carmen Pedrosa in their capacities as founding members of
the People's Initiative for Reform, Modernization and Action
(PIRMA). The suit is an original action for prohibition with
prayer for temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction.
The petition on its face states no cause of action against the
Pedrosas. The only allegation against the Pedrosas is that
they are founding members of the PIRMA which proposes to
undertake the signature drive for people's initiative to amend
the Constitution. Strangely, the PIRMA itself as an
organization was not impleaded as a respondent. Petitioners
then prayed that we order the Pedrosas ". . . to desist from
conducting a signature drive for a people's initiative to amend
the Constitution." On December 19, 1996, we temporarily
enjoined the Pedrosas ". . . from conducting a signature drive
for people's initiative to amend the Constitution." It is not
enough for the majority to lift the temporary restraining
order against the Pedrosas. It should dismiss the petition and
all motions for contempt against them without equivocation.
One need not draw a picture to impart the proposition that
in soliciting signatures to start a people's initiative to amend
the Constitution the Pedrosas are not engaged in any
criminal act. Their solicitation of signatures is a right
guaranteed in black and white by section 2 of Article XVII of
the Constitution which provides that ". . . amendments to this
Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people
through initiative. . ." This right springs from the principle
proclaimed in section 1, Article II of the Constitution that in
a democratic and republican state "sovereignty resides in the
people and all government authority emanates from them."
The Pedrosas are part of the people and their voice is part of
the voice of the people. They may constitute but a particle of
our sovereignty but no power can trivialize them for
sovereignty is indivisible.
But this is not all. Section 16 of Article XIII of the
Constitution provides: "The right of the people and their
organizations to effective and reasonable participation at all
levels of social, political and economic decision-making shall
not be abridged. The State shall by law, facilitate the
establishment of adequate consultation mechanisms." This is
another novel provision of the 1987 Constitution
strengthening the sinews of the sovereignty of our people. In
soliciting signatures to amend the Constitution, the Pedrosas
are participating in the political decision-making process of
our people. The Constitution says their right cannot be
abridged without any ifs and buts. We cannot put a question
mark on their right.
Over and above these new provisions, the Pedrosas'
campaign to amend the Constitution is an exercise of their
freedom of speech and expression and their right to petition
the government for redress of grievances. We have
memorialized this universal right in all our fundamental
laws from the Malolos Constitution to the 1987 Constitution.
We have iterated and reiterated in our rulings that freedom
of speech is a preferred right, the matrix of other important
rights of our people. Undeniably, freedom of speech enervates
the essence of the democratic creed of think and let think. For
this reason, the Constitution encourages speech even if it
protects the speechless.
It is thus evident that the right of the Pedrosas to solicit
signatures to start a people's initiative to amend the
Constitution does not depend on any law, much less on R.A.
6735 or COMELEC Resolution No. 2300. No law, no
Constitution can chain the people to an undesirable status
quo. To be sure, there are no irrepealable laws just as there
are no irrepealable Constitutions. Change is the predicate of
progress and we should not fear change. Mankind has long
recognized the truism that the only constant in life is change
and so should the majority.
IV
In a stream of cases, this Court has rhapsodized people power
as expanded in the 1987 Constitution. On October 5, 1993,
we observed that people's might is no longer a myth but an
article of faith in our Constitution. 41 On September 30,
1994, we postulated that people power can be trusted to check
excesses of government and that any effort to trivialize the
effectiveness of people's initiatives ought to be rejected. 42 On
September 26, 1996, we pledged that ". . . this Court as a
matter of policy and doctrine will exert every effort to
nurture, protect and promote their legitimate exercise." 43
Just a few days ago, or on March 11, 1997, by a unanimous
decision, 44 we allowed a recall election in Caloocan City
involving the mayor and ordered that he submits his right to
continue in office to the judgment of the tribunal of the
people. Thus far, we have succeeded in transforming people
34
power from an opaque abstraction to a robust reality. The
Constitution calls us to encourage people empowerment to
blossom in full. The Court cannot halt any and all signature
campaigns to amend the Constitution without setting back
the flowering of people empowerment. More important, the
Court cannot seal the lips of people who are pro-change but
not those who are anti-change without concerting the debate
on charter change into a sterile talkaton. Democracy is
enlivened by a dialogue and not by a monologue for in a
democracy nobody can claim any infallibility.
Melo and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
VITUG, J., concurring and dissenting:
The COMELEC should have dismissed, outrightly, the Delfin
Petition.
It does seem to me that there is no real exigency on the part
of the Court to engross, let alone to commit, itself on all the
issues raised and debated upon by the parties. What is
essential at this time would only be to resolve whether or not
the petition filed with the COMELEC, signed by Atty. Jesus
S. Delfin in his capacity as a "founding member of the
Movement for People's Initiative" and seeking through a
people initiative certain modifications on the 1987
Constitution, can properly be regarded and given its due
course. The Constitution, relative to any proposed
amendment under this method, is explicit. Section 2, Article
XVII, thereof provides:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be
directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of
registered voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum of the registered
voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be
authorized within five years following the ratification of this
Constitution nor oftener than once every five years
thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the
exercise of this right.
The Delfin petition is thus utterly deficient. Instead of
complying with the constitutional imperatives, the petition
would rather have much of its burden passed on, in effect, to
the COMELEC. The petition would require COMELEC to
schedule "signature gathering all over the country," to cause
the necessary publication of the petition "in newspapers of
general and local circulation," and to instruct "Municipal
Election Registrars in all Regions of the Philippines to assist
petitioners and volunteers in establishing signing stations at
the time and on the dates designated for the purpose.
I submit, even then, that the TRO earlier issued by the Court
which, consequentially, is made permanent under the
ponencia should be held to cover only the Delfin petition and
must not be so understood as having intended or
contemplated to embrace the signature drive of the Pedrosas.
The grant of such a right is clearly implicit in the
constitutional mandate on people initiative.
The distinct greatness of a democratic society is that those
who reign are the governed themselves. The postulate is no
longer lightly taken as just a perceived myth but a veritable
reality. The past has taught us that the vitality of
government lies not so much in the strength of those who lead
as in the consent of those who are led. The role of free speech
is pivotal but it can only have its true meaning if it comes
with the correlative end of being heard.
Pending a petition for a people's initiative that is sufficient in
form and substance, it behooves the Court, I most
respectfully submit, to yet refrain from resolving the question
of whether or not Republic Act No. 6735 has effectively and
sufficiently implemented the Constitutional provision on
right of the people to directly propose constitutional
amendments. Any opinion or view formulated by the Court
at this point would at best be only a non-binding, albeit
possibly persuasive, obiter dictum.
I vote for granting the instant petition before the Court and
for clarifying that the TRO earlier issued by the Court did not
prescribe the exercise by the Pedrosas of their right to
campaign for constitutional amendments.
FRANCISCO, J., dissenting and concurring:
There is no question that my esteemed colleague Mr. Justice
Davide has prepared a scholarly and well-written ponencia.
Nonetheless, I cannot fully subscribe to his view that R. A.
No. 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution.
To begin with, sovereignty under the constitution, resides in
the people and all government authority emanates from
them.1 Unlike our previous constitutions, the present 1987
Constitution has given more significance to this declaration
of principle for the people are now vested with power not only
to propose, enact or reject any act or law passed by Congress
or by the local legislative body, but to propose amendments
to the constitution as well.2 To implement these
constitutional edicts, Congress in 1989 enacted Republic Act
No. 6735, otherwise known as "The initiative and
Referendum Act". This law, to my mind, amply covers an
initiative on the constitution. The contrary view maintained
by petitioners is based principally on the alleged lack of sub-
title in the law on initiative to amend the constitution and on
their allegation that:
Republic Act No. 6735 provides for the effectivity of the law
after publication in print media. [And] [t]his indicates that
Republic Act No. 6735 covers only laws and not constitutional
amendments, because constitutional amendments take effect
upon ratification not after publication.3
which allegation manifests petitioners' selective
interpretation of the law, for under Section 9 of Republic Act
No. 6735 on the Effectivity of Initiative or Referendum
Proposition paragraph (b) thereof is clear in providing that:
The proposition in an initiative on the constitution approved
by a majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite shall become
effective as to the day of the plebiscite.
It is a rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted
with reference the context, i.e., that every part of the statute
must be construed together with the other parts and kept
subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. 4
Thus, the provisions of Republic Act No. 6735 may not be
interpreted in isolation. The legislative intent behind every
law is to be extracted from the statute as a whole.5
In its definition of terms, Republic Act No. 6735 defines
initiative as "the power of the people to propose amendments
to the constitution or to propose and enact legislations
through an election called for the purpose".6 The same
section, in enumerating the three systems of initiative,
included an "initiative on the constitution which refers to a
petition proposing amendments to the constitution"7
Paragraph (e) again of Section 3 defines "plebiscite" as "the
electoral process by which an initiative on the constitution is
approved or rejected by the people" And as to the material
requirements for an initiative on the Constitution, Section
5(b) distinctly enumerates the following:
A petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must
have at least twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of
the registered voters as signatories, of which every legislative
35
district must be represented by at least three per centum
(3%) of the registered voters therein. Initiative on the
constitution may be exercised only after five (5) years from
the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and only once every
five years thereafter.
These provisions were inserted, on purpose, by Congress the
intent being to provide for the implementation of the right to
propose an amendment to the Constitution by way of
initiative. "A legal provision", the Court has previously said,
"must not be construed as to be a useless surplusage, and
accordingly, meaningless, in the sense of adding nothing to
the law or having no effect whatsoever thereon". 8 That this
is the legislative intent is further shown by the deliberations
in Congress, thus:
. . . More significantly, in the course of the consideration of
the Conference Committee Report on the disagreeing
provisions of Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505, it
was noted:
MR. ROCO. On the Conference Committee Report on
the disagreeing provisions between Senate Bill No. 17 and
the consolidated House Bill No. 21505 which refers to the
system providing for the initiative and referendum,
fundamentally, Mr. Speaker, we consolidated the Senate and
the House versions, so both versions are totally intact in the
bill. The Senators ironically provided for local initiative and
referendum and the House of Representatives correctly
provided for initiative and referendum an the Constitution
and on national legislation.
I move that we approve the consolidated bill.
MR. ALBANO, Mr. Speaker.
THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. What is the pleasure of
the Minority Floor Leader?
MR. ALBANO. Will the distinguished sponsor answer just
a few questions?
THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. What does the sponsor
say?
MR. ROCO. Willingly, Mr. Speaker.
THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. The Gentleman will
please proceed.
MR. ALBANO. I heard the sponsor say that the only
difference in the two bills was that in the Senate version
there was a provision for local initiative and referendum,
whereas the House version has none.
MR. ROCO. In fact, the Senate version provided purely
for local initiative and referendum, whereas in the House
version, we provided purely for national and constitutional
legislation.
MR. ALBANO. Is it our understanding, therefore, that the
two provisions were incorporated?
MR. ROCO. Yes, Mr. Speaker.
MR. ALBANO. So that we will now have a complete
initiative and referendum both in the constitutional
amendment and national legislation.
MR. ROCO. That is correct.
MR. ALBANO. And provincial as well as municipal
resolutions?
MR. ROCO. Down to barangay, Mr. Speaker.
MR. ALBANO. And this initiative and referendum is in
consonance with the provision of the Constitution to enact
the enabling law, so that we shall have a system which can
be done every five years. Is it five years in the provision of the
Constitution?
MR. ROCO. That is correct, Mr. Speaker. For
constitutional amendments to the 1987 Constitution, it is
every five years." (Id. [Journal and Record of the House of
Representatives], Vol. VIII, 8 June 1989, p. 960; quoted in
Garcia v. Comelec, 237 SCRA 279, 292-293 [1994]; emphasis
supplied)
. . . The Senate version of the Bill may not have
comprehended initiatives on the Constitution. When
consolidated, though, with the House version of the Bill and
as approved and enacted into law, the proposal included
initiative on both the Constitution and ordinary laws.9
Clearly then, Republic Act No. 6735 covers an initiative on
the constitution. Any other construction as what petitioners
foist upon the Court constitute a betrayal of the intent and
spirit behind the enactment.
At any rate, I agree with the ponencia that the Commission
on Elections, at present, cannot take any action (such as
those contained in the Commission's orders dated December
6, 9, and 12, 1996 [Annexes B, C and B-1]) indicative of its
having already assumed jurisdiction over private
respondents' petition. This is so because from the tenor of
Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 6735 it would appear that proof of
procurement of the required percentage of registered voters
at the time the petition for initiative is filed, is a
jurisdictional requirement.
Thus:
A petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must
have at least twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of
registered voters as signatories, of which every legislative
district must be represented by at least three per centum
(3%) of the registered voters therein. Initiative on the
Constitution may be exercised only after five (5) years from
the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and only once every
five (5) years thereafter.
Here private respondents' petition is unaccompanied by the
required signatures. This defect notwithstanding, it is
without prejudice to the refiling of their petition once
compliance with the required percentage is satisfactorily
shown by private respondents. In the absence, therefore, of
an appropriate petition before the Commission on Elections,
any determination of whether private respondents' proposal
constitutes an amendment or revision is premature.
ACCORDINGLY, I take exception to the conclusion reached
in the ponencia that R.A. No. 6735 is an "inadequate"
legislation to cover a people's initiative to propose
amendments to the Constitution. I, however, register my
concurrence with the dismissal, in the meantime, of private
respondents' petition for initiative before public respondent
Commission on Elections until the same be supported by
proof of strict compliance with Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 6735.
Melo and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
PANGANIBAN, J., concurring and dissenting:
Our distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide
Jr., writing for the majority, holds that:
(1) The Comelec acted without jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the "initiatory"
Delfin Petition.
36
(2) While the Constitution allows amendments to "be
directly proposed by the people through initiative," there is
no implementing law for the purpose. RA 6735 is "incomplete,
inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions
insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is
concerned."
(3) Comelec Resolution No. 2330, "insofar as it
prescribes rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative
on amendments to the Constitution, is void."
I concur with the first item above. Until and unless an
initiatory petition can show the required number of
signatures — in this case, 12% of all the registered voters in
the Philippines with at least 3% in every legislative district
— no public funds may be spent and no government resources
may be used in an initiative to amend the Constitution.
Verily, the Comelec cannot even entertain any petition
absent such signatures. However, I dissent most respectfully
from the majority's two other rulings. Let me explain.
Under the above restrictive holdings espoused by the Court's
majority, the Constitution cannot be amended at all through
a people's initiative. Not by Delfin, not by Pirma, not by
anyone, not even by all the voters of the country acting
together. This decision will effectively but unnecessarily
curtail, nullify, abrogate and render inutile the people's right
to change the basic law. At the very least, the majority holds
the right hostage to congressional discretion on whether to
pass a new law to implement it, when there is already one
existing at present. This right to amend through initiative, it
bears stressing, is guaranteed by Section 2, Article XVII of
the Constitution, as follows:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be
directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of
registered voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum of the registered
voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be
authorized within five years following the ratification of this
Constitution nor oftener than once every five years
thereafter.
With all due respect, I find the majority's position all too
sweeping and all too extremist. It is equivalent to burning the
whole house to exterminate the rats, and to killing the
patient to relieve him of pain. What Citizen Delfin wants the
Comelec to do we should reject. But we should not thereby
preempt any future effort to exercise the right of initiative
correctly and judiciously. The fact that the Delfin Petition
proposes a misuse of initiative does not justify a ban against
its proper use. Indeed, there is a right way to do the right
thing at the right time and for the right reason.
Taken Together and Interpreted Properly, the Constitution,
RA 6735 and Comelec Resolution 2300 Are Sufficient to
Implement Constitutional Initiatives
While RA 6735 may not be a perfect law, it was — as the
majority openly concedes — intended by the legislature to
cover and, I respectfully submit, it contains enough
provisions to effectuate an initiative on the Constitution.1 I
completely agree with the inspired and inspiring opinions of
Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno and Mr. Justice Ricardo J.
Francisco that RA 6735, the Roco law on initiative,
sufficiently implements the right of the people to initiate
amendments to the Constitution. Such views, which I shall
no longer repeat nor elaborate on, are thoroughly consistent
with this Court's unanimous en banc rulings in Subic Bay
Metropolitan Authority vs. Commission on Elections, 2 that
"provisions for initiative . . . are (to be) liberally construed to
effectuate their purposes, to facilitate and not hamper the
exercise by the voters of the rights granted thereby"; and in
Garcia vs. Comelec, 3 that any "effort to trivialize the
effectiveness of people's initiatives ought to be rejected."
No law can completely and absolutely cover all
administrative details. In recognition of this, RA 6735 wisely
empowered 4 the Commission on Election "to promulgate
such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out
the purposes of this Act." And pursuant thereto, the Comelec
issued its Resolution 2300 on 16 January 1991. Such
Resolution, by its very words, was promulgated "to govern the
conduct of initiative on the Constitution and initiative and
referendum on national and local laws," not by the incumbent
Commission on Elections but by one then composed of Acting
Chairperson Haydee B. Yorac, Comms. Alfredo E. Abueg Jr.,
Leopoldo L. Africa, Andres R. Flores, Dario C. Rama and
Magdara B. Dimaampao. All of these Commissioners who
signed Resolution 2300 have retired from the Commission,
and thus we cannot ascribe any vile motive unto them, other
than an honest, sincere and exemplary effort to give life to a
cherished right of our people.
The majority argues that while Resolution 2300 is valid in
regard to national laws and local legislations, it is void in
reference to constitutional amendments. There is no basis for
such differentiation. The source of and authority for the
Resolution is the same law, RA 6735.
I respectfully submit that taken together and interpreted
properly and liberally, the Constitution (particularly Art.
XVII, Sec. 2), R4 6735 and Comelec Resolution 2300 provide
more than sufficient authority to implement, effectuate and
realize our people's power to amend the Constitution.
Petitioner Delfin and the Pedrosa
Spouses Should Not Be Muzzled
I am glad the majority decided to heed our plea to lift the
temporary restraining order issued by this Court on 18
December 1996 insofar as it prohibited Petitioner Delfin and
the Spouses Pedrosa from exercising their right of initiative.
In fact, I believe that such restraining order as against
private respondents should not have been issued, in the first
place. While I agree that the Comelec should be stopped from
using public funds and government resources to help them
gather signatures, I firmly believe that this Court has no
power to restrain them from exercising their right of
initiative. The right to propose amendments to the
Constitution is really a species of the right of free speech and
free assembly. And certainly, it would be tyrannical and
despotic to stop anyone from speaking freely and persuading
others to conform to his/her beliefs. As the eminent Voltaire
once said, "I may disagree with what you say, but I will
defend to the death your right to say it." After all, freedom is
not really for the thought we agree with, but as Justice
Holmes wrote, "freedom for the thought that we hate."5
Epilogue
By way of epilogue, let me stress the guiding tenet of my
Separate Opinion. Initiative, like referendum and recall, is a
new and treasured feature of the Filipino constitutional
system. All three are institutionalized legacies of the world-
admired EDSA people power. Like elections and plebiscites,
they are hallowed expressions of popular sovereignty. They
are sacred democratic rights of our people to be used as their
final weapons against political excesses, opportunism,
inaction, oppression and misgovernance; as well as their
reserved instruments to exact transparency, accountability
and faithfulness from their chosen leaders. While on the one
hand, their misuse and abuse must be resolutely struck
down, on the other, their legitimate exercise should be
carefully nurtured and zealously protected.
WHEREFORE, I vote to GRANT the petition of Sen. Miriam
D. Santiago et al. and to DIRECT Respondent Commission
on Elections to DISMISS the Delfin Petition on the ground of
prematurity, but not on the other grounds relied upon by the
majority. I also vote to LIFT the temporary restraining order
issued on 18 December 1996 insofar as it prohibits Jesus
Delfin, Alberto Pedrosa and Carmen Pedrosa from exercising
37
their right to free speech in proposing amendments to the
Constitution.

Melo and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

38

EN BANC
G.R. No. 174153 October 25, 2006
RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO,
TOGETHER WITH 6,327,952 REGISTERED VOTERS,
Petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x--------------------------------------------------------x
ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC., Intervenor.
x ------------------------------------------------------ x
ONEVOICE INC., CHRISTIAN S.MONSOD, RENE B.
AZURIN, MANUEL L. QUEZON III, BENJAMIN T.
TOLOSA, JR., SUSAN V. OPLE, and CARLOS P. MEDINA,
JR., Intervenors.
x------------------------------------------------------ x
ATTY. PETE QUIRINO QUADRA, Intervenor.
x--------------------------------------------------------x
BAYAN represented by its Chairperson Dr. Carolina
Pagaduan-Araullo, BAYAN MUNA represented by its
Chairperson Dr. Reynaldo Lesaca, KILUSANG MAYO UNO
represented by its Secretary General Joel Maglunsod, HEAD
represented by its Secretary General Dr. Gene Alzona
Nisperos, ECUMENICAL BISHOPS FORUM represented by
Fr. Dionito Cabillas, MIGRANTE represented by its
Chairperson Concepcion Bragas-Regalado, GABRIELA
represented by its Secretary General Emerenciana de Jesus,
GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY represented by Sec. Gen.
Cristina Palabay, ANAKBAYAN represented by Chairperson
Eleanor de Guzman, LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS
represented by Chair Vencer Crisostomo Palabay, JOJO
PINEDA of the League of Concerned Professionals and
Businessmen, DR. DARBY SANTIAGO of the Solidarity of
Health Against Charter Change, DR. REGINALD
PAMUGAS of Health Action for Human Rights, Intervenors.
x--------------------------------------------------------x
LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, MARIO JOYO AGUJA, and
ANA THERESA HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, Intervenors.
x--------------------------------------------------------x
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO, Intervenor.
x ------------------------------------------------------- x
TRADE UNION CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Intervenor.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
LUWALHATI RICASA ANTONINO, Intervenor.
x ------------------------------------------------------- x
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION
(PHILCONSA), CONRADO F. ESTRELLA, TOMAS C.
TOLEDO, MARIANO M. TAJON, FROILAN M.
BACUNGAN, JOAQUIN T. VENUS, JR., FORTUNATO P.
AGUAS, and AMADO GAT INCIONG, Intervenors.
x ------------------------------------------------------- x
RONALD L. ADAMAT, ROLANDO MANUEL RIVERA, and
RUELO BAYA, Intervenors.
x -------------------------------------------------------- x
PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT AND GENERAL WORKERS
ORGANIZATION (PTGWO) and MR. VICTORINO F.
BALAIS, Intervenors.
x -------------------------------------------------------- x
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its
President, MANUEL VILLAR, JR., Intervenor.
x ------------------------------------------------------- x
SULONG BAYAN MOVEMENT FOUNDATION, INC.,
Intervenor.
x ------------------------------------------------------- x
JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, BYRON D. BOCAR, MA.
TANYA KARINA A. LAT, ANTONIO L. SALVADOR, and
RANDALL TABAYOYONG, Intervenors.
x -------------------------------------------------------- x
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, CEBU CITY
AND CEBU PROVINCE CHAPTERS, Intervenors.
x --------------------------------------------------------x
SENATE MINORITY LEADER AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL,
JR. and SENATORS SERGIO R. OSMENA III, JAMBY
MADRIGAL, JINGGOY ESTRADA, ALFREDO S. LIM and
PANFILO LACSON, Intervenors.
x -----------------------------------------------------x
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA and PWERSA NG
MASANG PILIPINO, Intervenors.
x -----------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 174299 October 25, 2006
MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR.,
and RENE A.V. SAGUISAG, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, represented by Chairman
BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, SR., and Commissioners
RESURRECCION Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A. TUASON,
JR., ROMEO A. BRAWNER, RENE V. SARMIENTO,
NICODEMO T. FERRER, and John Doe and Peter Doe,,
Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
These are consolidated petitions on the Resolution dated 31
August 2006 of the Commission on Elections ("COMELEC")
denying due course to an initiative petition to amend the
1987 Constitution.
Antecedent Facts
On 15 February 2006, petitioners in G.R. No. 174153, namely
Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado ("Lambino
Group"), with other groups1 and individuals, commenced
gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the
1987 Constitution. On 25 August 2006, the Lambino Group
filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that
will ratify their initiative petition under Section 5(b) and (c)2
39
and Section 73 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and
Referendum Act ("RA 6735").
The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the
support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at least twelve
per centum (12%) of all registered voters, with each
legislative district represented by at least three per centum
(3%) of its registered voters. The Lambino Group also claimed
that COMELEC election registrars had verified the
signatures of the 6.3 million individuals.
The Lambino Group's initiative petition changes the 1987
Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI
(Legislative Department)4 and Sections 1-4 of Article VII
(Executive Department)5 and by adding Article XVIII
entitled "Transitory Provisions."6 These proposed changes
will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a
Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government. The
Lambino Group prayed that after due publication of their
petition, the COMELEC should submit the following
proposition in a plebiscite for the voters' ratification:
DO YOU APPROVE THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI
AND VII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, CHANGING THE
FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT
BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL TO A UNICAMERAL-
PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM, AND PROVIDING ARTICLE
XVIII AS TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE
ORDERLY SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM TO THE OTHER?
On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended
Petition with the COMELEC indicating modifications in the
proposed Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of their
initiative.7
The Ruling of the COMELEC
On 31 August 2006, the COMELEC issued its Resolution
denying due course to the Lambino Group's petition for lack
of an enabling law governing initiative petitions to amend the
Constitution. The COMELEC invoked this Court's ruling in
Santiago v. Commission on Elections8 declaring RA 6735
inadequate to implement the initiative clause on proposals to
amend the Constitution.9
In G.R. No. 174153, the Lambino Group prays for the
issuance of the writs of certiorari and mandamus to set aside
the COMELEC Resolution of 31 August 2006 and to compel
the COMELEC to give due course to their initiative petition.
The Lambino Group contends that the COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to their
petition since Santiago is not a binding precedent.
Alternatively, the Lambino Group claims that Santiago binds
only the parties to that case, and their petition deserves
cognizance as an expression of the "will of the sovereign
people."
In G.R. No. 174299, petitioners ("Binay Group") pray that the
Court require respondent COMELEC Commissioners to
show cause why they should not be cited in contempt for the
COMELEC's verification of signatures and for "entertaining"
the Lambino Group's petition despite the permanent
injunction in Santiago. The Court treated the Binay Group's
petition as an opposition-in-intervention.
In his Comment to the Lambino Group's petition, the
Solicitor General joined causes with the petitioners, urging
the Court to grant the petition despite the Santiago ruling.
The Solicitor General proposed that the Court treat RA 6735
and its implementing rules "as temporary devises to
implement the system of initiative."
Various groups and individuals sought intervention, filing
pleadings supporting or opposing the Lambino Group's
petition. The supporting intervenors10 uniformly hold the
view that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion in relying on Santiago. On the other hand, the
opposing intervenors11 hold the contrary view and maintain
that Santiago is a binding precedent. The opposing
intervenors also challenged (1) the Lambino Group's
standing to file the petition; (2) the validity of the signature
gathering and verification process; (3) the Lambino Group's
compliance with the minimum requirement for the
percentage of voters supporting an initiative petition under
Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution;12 (4) the
nature of the proposed changes as revisions and not mere
amendments as provided under Section 2, Article XVII of the
1987 Constitution; and (5) the Lambino Group's compliance
with the requirement in Section 10(a) of RA 6735 limiting
initiative petitions to only one subject.
The Court heard the parties and intervenors in oral
arguments on 26 September 2006. After receiving the parties'
memoranda, the Court considered the case submitted for
resolution.
The Issues
The petitions raise the following issues:
1. Whether the Lambino Group's initiative petition complies
with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on
amendments to the Constitution through a people's
initiative;
2. Whether this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago
declaring RA 6735 "incomplete, inadequate or wanting in
essential terms and conditions" to implement the initiative
clause on proposals to amend the Constitution; and
3. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion in denying due course to the Lambino Group's
petition.
The Ruling of the Court
There is no merit to the petition.
The Lambino Group miserably failed to comply with the basic
requirements of the Constitution for conducting a people's
initiative. Thus, there is even no need to revisit Santiago, as
the present petition warrants dismissal based alone on the
Lambino Group's glaring failure to comply with the basic
requirements of the Constitution. For following the Court's
ruling in Santiago, no grave abuse of discretion is
attributable to the Commision on Elections.
1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct Proposal by the
People
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing
constitutional provision that allows a people's initiative to
propose amendments to the Constitution. This section states:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be
directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of
registered voters of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum of the registered
voters therein. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission vividly
explain the meaning of an amendment "directly proposed by
the people through initiative upon a petition," thus:
MR. RODRIGO: Let us look at the mechanics. Let us say
some voters want to propose a constitutional amendment. Is
the draft of the proposed constitutional amendment ready to
be shown to the people when they are asked to sign?
MR. SUAREZ: That can be reasonably assumed, Madam
President.
40
MR. RODRIGO: What does the sponsor mean? The draft is
ready and shown to them before they sign. Now, who
prepares the draft?
MR. SUAREZ: The people themselves, Madam President.
MR. RODRIGO: No, because before they sign there is already
a draft shown to them and they are asked whether or not they
want to propose this constitutional amendment.
MR. SUAREZ: As it is envisioned, any Filipino can prepare
that proposal and pass it around for signature.13 (Emphasis
supplied)
Clearly, the framers of the Constitution intended that the
"draft of the proposed constitutional amendment" should be
"ready and shown" to the people "before" they sign such
proposal. The framers plainly stated that "before they sign
there is already a draft shown to them." The framers also
"envisioned" that the people should sign on the proposal itself
because the proponents must "prepare that proposal and pass
it around for signature."
The essence of amendments "directly proposed by the people
through initiative upon a petition" is that the entire proposal
on its face is a petition by the people. This means two
essential elements must be present. First, the people must
author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or
representative can sign on their behalf. Second, as an
initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in
a petition.
These essential elements are present only if the full text of
the proposed amendments is first shown to the people who
express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a
petition. Thus, an amendment is "directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon a petition" only if the people
sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed
amendments.
The full text of the proposed amendments may be either
written on the face of the petition, or attached to it. If so
attached, the petition must state the fact of such attachment.
This is an assurance that every one of the several millions of
signatories to the petition had seen the full text of the
proposed amendments before signing. Otherwise, it is
physically impossible, given the time constraint, to prove that
every one of the millions of signatories had seen the full text
of the proposed amendments before signing.
The framers of the Constitution directly borrowed14 the
concept of people's initiative from the United States where
various State constitutions incorporate an initiative clause.
In almost all States15 which allow initiative petitions, the
unbending requirement is that the people must first see the
full text of the proposed amendments before they sign to
signify their assent, and that the people must sign on an
initiative petition that contains the full text of the proposed
amendments.16
The rationale for this requirement has been repeatedly
explained in several decisions of various courts. Thus, in
Capezzuto v. State Ballot Commission, the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts, affirmed by the First Circuit Court of
Appeals, declared:
[A] signature requirement would be meaningless if the
person supplying the signature has not first seen what it is
that he or she is signing. Further, and more importantly,
loose interpretation of the subscription requirement can pose
a significant potential for fraud. A person permitted to
describe orally the contents of an initiative petition to a
potential signer, without the signer having actually
examined the petition, could easily mislead the signer by, for
example, omitting, downplaying, or even flatly
misrepresenting, portions of the petition that might not be to
the signer's liking. This danger seems particularly acute
when, in this case, the person giving the description is the
drafter of the petition, who obviously has a vested interest in
seeing that it gets the requisite signatures to qualify for the
ballot.17 (Boldfacing and underscoring supplied)
Likewise, in Kerr v. Bradbury,18 the Court of Appeals of
Oregon explained:
The purposes of "full text" provisions that apply to
amendments by initiative commonly are described in similar
terms. x x x (The purpose of the full text requirement is to
provide sufficient information so that registered voters can
intelligently evaluate whether to sign the initiative
petition."); x x x (publication of full text of amended
constitutional provision required because it is "essential for
the elector to have x x x the section which is proposed to be
added to or subtracted from. If he is to vote intelligently, he
must have this knowledge. Otherwise in many instances he
would be required to vote in the dark.") (Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, "an initiative signer must be informed at the time
of signing of the nature and effect of that which is proposed"
and failure to do so is "deceptive and misleading" which
renders the initiative void.19
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution does not expressly
state that the petition must set forth the full text of the
proposed amendments. However, the deliberations of the
framers of our Constitution clearly show that the framers
intended to adopt the relevant American jurisprudence on
people's initiative. In particular, the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission explicitly reveal that the framers
intended that the people must first see the full text of the
proposed amendments before they sign, and that the people
must sign on a petition containing such full text. Indeed,
Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 6735, the Initiative and
Referendum Act that the Lambino Group invokes as valid,
requires that the people must sign the "petition x x x as
signatories."
The proponents of the initiative secure the signatures from
the people. The proponents secure the signatures in their
private capacity and not as public officials. The proponents
are not disinterested parties who can impartially explain the
advantages and disadvantages of the proposed amendments
to the people. The proponents present favorably their
proposal to the people and do not present the arguments
against their proposal. The proponents, or their supporters,
often pay those who gather the signatures.
Thus, there is no presumption that the proponents observed
the constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures.
The proponents bear the burden of proving that they
complied with the constitutional requirements in gathering
the signatures - that the petition contained, or incorporated
by attachment, the full text of the proposed amendments.
The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition
with this Court a copy of the paper that the people signed as
their initiative petition. The Lambino Group submitted to
this Court a copy of a signature sheet20 after the oral
arguments of 26 September 2006 when they filed their
Memorandum on 11 October 2006. The signature sheet with
this Court during the oral arguments was the signature sheet
attached21 to the opposition in intervention filed on 7
September 2006 by intervenor Atty. Pete Quirino-Quadra.
The signature sheet attached to Atty. Quadra's opposition
and the signature sheet attached to the Lambino Group's
Memorandum are the same. We reproduce below the
signature sheet in full:
Province: City/Municipality: No. of
Legislative Barangay: Verified
District: Signatures:
41
PROPOSITION: "DO YOU APPROVE OF THE
AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION, CHANGING THE FORM OF
GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT BICAMERAL-
PRESIDENTIAL TO A UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY
SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT, IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE
GREATER EFFICIENCY, SIMPLICITY AND ECONOMY
IN GOVERNMENT; AND PROVIDING AN ARTICLE XVIII
AS TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY
SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM TO ANOTHER?"
I hereby APPROVE the proposed amendment to the 1987
Constitution. My signature herein which shall form part of
the petition for initiative to amend the Constitution signifies
my support for the filing thereof.
There is not a single word, phrase, or sentence of text of the
Lambino Group's proposed changes in the signature sheet.
Neither does the signature sheet state that the text of the
proposed changes is attached to it. Petitioner Atty. Raul
Lambino admitted this during the oral arguments before this
Court on 26 September 2006.
The signature sheet merely asks a question whether the
people approve a shift from the Bicameral-Presidential to the
Unicameral-Parliamentary system of government. The
signature sheet does not show to the people the draft of the
proposed changes before they are asked to sign the signature
sheet. Clearly, the signature sheet is not the "petition" that
the framers of the Constitution envisioned when they
formulated the initiative clause in Section 2, Article XVII of
the Constitution.
Petitioner Atty. Lambino, however, explained that during the
signature-gathering from February to August 2006, the
Lambino Group circulated, together with the signature
sheets, printed copies of the Lambino Group's draft petition
which they later filed on 25 August 2006 with the
COMELEC. When asked if his group also circulated the draft
of their amended petition filed on 30 August 2006 with the
COMELEC, Atty. Lambino initially replied that they
circulated both. However, Atty. Lambino changed his answer
and stated that what his group circulated was the draft of the
30 August 2006 amended petition, not the draft of the 25
August 2006 petition.
The Lambino Group would have this Court believe that they
prepared the draft of the 30 August 2006 amended petition
almost seven months earlier in February 2006 when they
started gathering signatures. Petitioner Erico B.
Aumentado's "Verification/Certification" of the 25 August
2006 petition, as well as of the 30 August 2006 amended
petition, filed with the COMELEC, states as follows:
I have caused the preparation of the foregoing [Amended]
Petition in my personal capacity as a registered voter, for and
on behalf of the Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines,
as shown by ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 hereto attached,
and as representative of the mass of signatories hereto.
(Emphasis supplied)
The Lambino Group failed to attach a copy of ULAP
Resolution No. 2006-02 to the present petition. However, the
"Official Website of the Union of Local Authorities of the
Philippines"22 has posted the full text of Resolution No.
2006-02, which provides:
RESOLUTION NO. 2006-02
RESOLUTION SUPPORTING THE PROPOSALS OF THE
PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION ON CHARTER
CHANGE THROUGH PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE AND
REFERENDUM AS A MODE OF AMENDING THE 1987
CONSTITUTION
WHEREAS, there is a need for the Union of Local Authorities
of the Philippines (ULAP) to adopt a common stand on the
approach to support the proposals of the People's
Consultative Commission on Charter Change;
WHEREAS, ULAP maintains its unqualified support to the
agenda of Her Excellency President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo for constitutional reforms as embodied in the ULAP
Joint Declaration for Constitutional Reforms signed by the
members of the ULAP and the majority coalition of the House
of Representatives in Manila Hotel sometime in October
2005;
WHEREAS, the People's Consultative Commission on
Charter Change created by Her Excellency to recommend
amendments to the 1987 Constitution has submitted its final
report sometime in December 2005;
WHEREAS, the ULAP is mindful of the current political
developments in Congress which militates against the use of
the expeditious form of amending the 1987 Constitution;
WHEREAS, subject to the ratification of its institutional
members and the failure of Congress to amend the
Constitution as a constituent assembly, ULAP has
unanimously agreed to pursue the constitutional reform
agenda through People's Initiative and Referendum without
prejudice to other pragmatic means to pursue the same;
WHEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED AS IT IS HEREBY
RESOLVED, THAT ALL THE MEMBER-LEAGUES OF
THE UNION OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES OF THE
PHILIPPINES (ULAP) SUPPORT THE PORPOSALS (SIC)
OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULATATIVE (SIC)
COMMISSION ON CHARTER CHANGE THROUGH
PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM AS A MODE
OF AMENDING THE 1987 CONSTITUTION;
DONE, during the ULAP National Executive Board special
meeting held on 14 January 2006 at the Century Park Hotel,
Manila.23 (Underscoring supplied)
ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 does not authorize petitioner
Aumentado to prepare the 25 August 2006 petition, or the 30
August 2006 amended petition, filed with the COMELEC.
ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 "support(s) the porposals (sic)
of the Consulatative (sic) Commission on Charter Change
through people's initiative and referendum as a mode of
amending the 1987 Constitution." The proposals of the
Consultative Commission24 are vastly different from the
proposed changes of the Lambino Group in the 25 August
2006 petition or 30 August 2006 amended petition filed with
the COMELEC.
For example, the proposed revisions of the Consultative
Commission affect all provisions of the existing Constitution,
from the Preamble to the Transitory Provisions. The
proposed revisions have profound impact on the Judiciary
and the National Patrimony provisions of the existing
Constitution, provisions that the Lambino Group's proposed
changes do not touch. The Lambino Group's proposed
changes purport to affect only Articles VI and VII of the
42
existing Constitution, including the introduction of new
Transitory Provisions.
The ULAP adopted Resolution No. 2006-02 on 14 January
2006 or more than six months before the filing of the 25
August 2006 petition or the 30 August 2006 amended petition
with the COMELEC. However, ULAP Resolution No. 2006-
02 does not establish that ULAP or the Lambino Group
caused the circulation of the draft petition, together with the
signature sheets, six months before the filing with the
COMELEC. On the contrary, ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02
casts grave doubt on the Lambino Group's claim that they
circulated the draft petition together with the signature
sheets. ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 does not refer at all to
the draft petition or to the Lambino Group's proposed
changes.
In their Manifestation explaining their amended petition
before the COMELEC, the Lambino Group declared:
After the Petition was filed, Petitioners belatedly realized
that the proposed amendments alleged in the Petition, more
specifically, paragraph 3 of Section 4 and paragraph 2 of
Section 5 of the Transitory Provisions were inaccurately
stated and failed to correctly reflect their proposed
amendments.
The Lambino Group did not allege that they were amending
the petition because the amended petition was what they had
shown to the people during the February to August 2006
signature-gathering. Instead, the Lambino Group alleged
that the petition of 25 August 2006 "inaccurately stated and
failed to correctly reflect their proposed amendments."
The Lambino Group never alleged in the 25 August 2006
petition or the 30 August 2006 amended petition with the
COMELEC that they circulated printed copies of the draft
petition together with the signature sheets. Likewise, the
Lambino Group did not allege in their present petition before
this Court that they circulated printed copies of the draft
petition together with the signature sheets. The signature
sheets do not also contain any indication that the draft
petition is attached to, or circulated with, the signature
sheets.
It is only in their Consolidated Reply to the Opposition-in-
Interventions that the Lambino Group first claimed that they
circulated the "petition for initiative filed with the
COMELEC," thus:
[T]here is persuasive authority to the effect that "(w)here
there is not (sic) fraud, a signer who did not read the measure
attached to a referendum petition cannot question his
signature on the ground that he did not understand the
nature of the act." [82 C.J.S. S128h. Mo. State v. Sullivan,
224, S.W. 327, 283 Mo. 546.] Thus, the registered voters who
signed the signature sheets circulated together with the
petition for initiative filed with the COMELEC below, are
presumed to have understood the proposition contained in
the petition. (Emphasis supplied)
The Lambino Group's statement that they circulated to the
people "the petition for initiative filed with the COMELEC"
appears an afterthought, made after the intervenors
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (Cebu City Chapter and
Cebu Province Chapters) and Atty. Quadra had pointed out
that the signature sheets did not contain the text of the
proposed changes. In their Consolidated Reply, the Lambino
Group alleged that they circulated "the petition for initiative"
but failed to mention the amended petition. This contradicts
what Atty. Lambino finally stated during the oral arguments
that what they circulated was the draft of the amended
petition of 30 August 2006.
The Lambino Group cites as authority Corpus Juris
Secundum, stating that "a signer who did not read the
measure attached to a referendum petition cannot question
his signature on the ground that he did not understand the
nature of the act." The Lambino Group quotes an authority
that cites a proposed change attached to the petition signed
by the people. Even the authority the Lambino Group quotes
requires that the proposed change must be attached to the
petition. The same authority the Lambino Group quotes
requires the people to sign on the petition itself.
Indeed, it is basic in American jurisprudence that the
proposed amendment must be incorporated with, or attached
to, the initiative petition signed by the people. In the present
initiative, the Lambino Group's proposed changes were not
incorporated with, or attached to, the signature sheets. The
Lambino Group's citation of Corpus Juris Secundum pulls
the rug from under their feet.
It is extremely doubtful that the Lambino Group prepared,
printed, circulated, from February to August 2006 during the
signature-gathering period, the draft of the petition or
amended petition they filed later with the COMELEC. The
Lambino Group are less than candid with this Court in their
belated claim that they printed and circulated, together with
the signature sheets, the petition or amended petition.
Nevertheless, even assuming the Lambino Group circulated
the amended petition during the signature-gathering period,
the Lambino Group admitted circulating only very limited
copies of the petition.
During the oral arguments, Atty. Lambino expressly
admitted that they printed only 100,000 copies of the draft
petition they filed more than six months later with the
COMELEC. Atty. Lambino added that he also asked other
supporters to print additional copies of the draft petition but
he could not state with certainty how many additional copies
the other supporters printed. Atty. Lambino could only
assure this Court of the printing of 100,000 copies because he
himself caused the printing of these 100,000 copies.
Likewise, in the Lambino Group's Memorandum filed on 11
October 2006, the Lambino Group expressly admits that
"petitioner Lambino initiated the printing and reproduction
of 100,000 copies of the petition for initiative x x x."25 This
admission binds the Lambino Group and establishes beyond
any doubt that the Lambino Group failed to show the full text
of the proposed changes to the great majority of the people
who signed the signature sheets.
Thus, of the 6.3 million signatories, only 100,000 signatories
could have received with certainty one copy each of the
petition, assuming a 100 percent distribution with no
wastage. If Atty. Lambino and company attached one copy of
the petition to each signature sheet, only 100,000 signature
sheets could have circulated with the petition. Each
signature sheet contains space for ten signatures. Assuming
ten people signed each of these 100,000 signature sheets with
the attached petition, the maximum number of people who
saw the petition before they signed the signature sheets
would not exceed 1,000,000.
With only 100,000 printed copies of the petition, it would be
physically impossible for all or a great majority of the 6.3
million signatories to have seen the petition before they
signed the signature sheets. The inescapable conclusion is
that the Lambino Group failed to show to the 6.3 million
signatories the full text of the proposed changes. If ever, not
more than one million signatories saw the petition before
they signed the signature sheets.
In any event, the Lambino Group's signature sheets do not
contain the full text of the proposed changes, either on the
face of the signature sheets, or as attachment with an
indication in the signature sheet of such attachment.
Petitioner Atty. Lambino admitted this during the oral
arguments, and this admission binds the Lambino Group.
This fact is also obvious from a mere reading of the signature
sheet. This omission is fatal. The failure to so include the text
of the proposed changes in the signature sheets renders the
43
initiative void for non-compliance with the constitutional
requirement that the amendment must be "directly proposed
by the people through initiative upon a petition." The
signature sheet is not the "petition" envisioned in the
initiative clause of the Constitution.
For sure, the great majority of the 6.3 million people who
signed the signature sheets did not see the full text of the
proposed changes before signing. They could not have known
the nature and effect of the proposed changes, among which
are:
1. The term limits on members of the legislature will be lifted
and thus members of Parliament can be re-elected
indefinitely;26
2. The interim Parliament can continue to function
indefinitely until its members, who are almost all the present
members of Congress, decide to call for new parliamentary
elections. Thus, the members of the interim Parliament will
determine the expiration of their own term of office; 27
3. Within 45 days from the ratification of the proposed
changes, the interim Parliament shall convene to propose
further amendments or revisions to the Constitution.28
These three specific amendments are not stated or even
indicated in the Lambino Group's signature sheets. The
people who signed the signature sheets had no idea that they
were proposing these amendments. These three proposed
changes are highly controversial. The people could not have
inferred or divined these proposed changes merely from a
reading or rereading of the contents of the signature sheets.
During the oral arguments, petitioner Atty. Lambino stated
that he and his group assured the people during the
signature-gathering that the elections for the regular
Parliament would be held during the 2007 local elections if
the proposed changes were ratified before the 2007 local
elections. However, the text of the proposed changes belies
this.
The proposed Section 5(2), Article XVIII on Transitory
Provisions, as found in the amended petition, states:
Section 5(2). The interim Parliament shall provide for the
election of the members of Parliament, which shall be
synchronized and held simultaneously with the election of all
local government officials. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Section 5(2) does not state that the elections for the regular
Parliament will be held simultaneously with the 2007 local
elections. This section merely requires that the elections for
the regular Parliament shall be held simultaneously with the
local elections without specifying the year.
Petitioner Atty. Lambino, who claims to be the principal
drafter of the proposed changes, could have easily written the
word "next" before the phrase "election of all local
government officials." This would have insured that the
elections for the regular Parliament would be held in the next
local elections following the ratification of the proposed
changes. However, the absence of the word "next" allows the
interim Parliament to schedule the elections for the regular
Parliament simultaneously with any future local elections.
Thus, the members of the interim Parliament will decide the
expiration of their own term of office. This allows incumbent
members of the House of Representatives to hold office
beyond their current three-year term of office, and possibly
even beyond the five-year term of office of regular members
of the Parliament. Certainly, this is contrary to the
representations of Atty. Lambino and his group to the 6.3
million people who signed the signature sheets. Atty.
Lambino and his group deceived the 6.3 million signatories,
and even the entire nation.
This lucidly shows the absolute need for the people to sign an
initiative petition that contains the full text of the proposed
amendments to avoid fraud or misrepresentation. In the
present initiative, the 6.3 million signatories had to rely on
the verbal representations of Atty. Lambino and his group
because the signature sheets did not contain the full text of
the proposed changes. The result is a grand deception on the
6.3 million signatories who were led to believe that the
proposed changes would require the holding in 2007 of
elections for the regular Parliament simultaneously with the
local elections.
The Lambino Group's initiative springs another surprise on
the people who signed the signature sheets. The proposed
changes mandate the interim Parliament to make further
amendments or revisions to the Constitution. The proposed
Section 4(4), Article XVIII on Transitory Provisions, provides:
Section 4(4). Within forty-five days from ratification of these
amendments, the interim Parliament shall convene to
propose amendments to, or revisions of, this Constitution
consistent with the principles of local autonomy,
decentralization and a strong bureaucracy. (Emphasis
supplied)
During the oral arguments, Atty. Lambino stated that this
provision is a "surplusage" and the Court and the people
should simply ignore it. Far from being a surplusage, this
provision invalidates the Lambino Group's initiative.
Section 4(4) is a subject matter totally unrelated to the shift
from the Bicameral-Presidential to the Unicameral-
Parliamentary system. American jurisprudence on
initiatives outlaws this as logrolling - when the initiative
petition incorporates an unrelated subject matter in the same
petition. This puts the people in a dilemma since they can
answer only either yes or no to the entire proposition, forcing
them to sign a petition that effectively contains two
propositions, one of which they may find unacceptable.
Under American jurisprudence, the effect of logrolling is to
nullify the entire proposition and not only the unrelated
subject matter. Thus, in Fine v. Firestone,29 the Supreme
Court of Florida declared:
Combining multiple propositions into one proposal
constitutes "logrolling," which, if our judicial responsibility is
to mean anything, we cannot permit. The very broadness of
the proposed amendment amounts to logrolling because the
electorate cannot know what it is voting on - the
amendment's proponents' simplistic explanation reveals only
the tip of the iceberg. x x x x The ballot must give the
electorate fair notice of the proposed amendment being voted
on. x x x x The ballot language in the instant case fails to do
that. The very broadness of the proposal makes it impossible
to state what it will affect and effect and violates the
requirement that proposed amendments embrace only one
subject. (Emphasis supplied)
Logrolling confuses and even deceives the people. In Yute Air
Alaska v. McAlpine,30 the Supreme Court of Alaska warned
against "inadvertence, stealth and fraud" in logrolling:
Whenever a bill becomes law through the initiative process,
all of the problems that the single-subject rule was enacted
to prevent are exacerbated. There is a greater danger of
logrolling, or the deliberate intermingling of issues to
increase the likelihood of an initiative's passage, and there is
a greater opportunity for "inadvertence, stealth and fraud" in
the enactment-by-initiative process. The drafters of an
initiative operate independently of any structured or
supervised process. They often emphasize particular
provisions of their proposition, while remaining silent on
other (more complex or less appealing) provisions, when
communicating to the public. x x x Indeed, initiative
promoters typically use simplistic advertising to present
their initiative to potential petition-signers and eventual
44
voters. Many voters will never read the full text of the
initiative before the election. More importantly, there is no
process for amending or splitting the several provisions in an
initiative proposal. These difficulties clearly distinguish the
initiative from the legislative process. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the present initiative appears merely a preliminary
step for further amendments or revisions to be undertaken
by the interim Parliament as a constituent assembly. The
people who signed the signature sheets could not have known
that their signatures would be used to propose an
amendment mandating the interim Parliament to propose
further amendments or revisions to the Constitution.
Apparently, the Lambino Group inserted the proposed
Section 4(4) to compel the interim Parliament to amend or
revise again the Constitution within 45 days from ratification
of the proposed changes, or before the May 2007 elections. In
the absence of the proposed Section 4(4), the interim
Parliament has the discretion whether to amend or revise
again the Constitution. With the proposed Section 4(4), the
initiative proponents want the interim Parliament mandated
to immediately amend or revise again the Constitution.
However, the signature sheets do not explain the reason for
this rush in amending or revising again so soon the
Constitution. The signature sheets do not also explain what
specific amendments or revisions the initiative proponents
want the interim Parliament to make, and why there is a
need for such further amendments or revisions. The people
are again left in the dark to fathom the nature and effect of
the proposed changes. Certainly, such an initiative is not
"directly proposed by the people" because the people do not
even know the nature and effect of the proposed changes.
There is another intriguing provision inserted in the
Lambino Group's amended petition of 30 August 2006. The
proposed Section 4(3) of the Transitory Provisions states:
Section 4(3). Senators whose term of office ends in 2010 shall
be members of Parliament until noon of the thirtieth day of
June 2010.
After 30 June 2010, not one of the present Senators will
remain as member of Parliament if the interim Parliament
does not schedule elections for the regular Parliament by 30
June 2010. However, there is no counterpart provision for the
present members of the House of Representatives even if
their term of office will all end on 30 June 2007, three years
earlier than that of half of the present Senators. Thus, all the
present members of the House will remain members of the
interim Parliament after 30 June 2010.
The term of the incumbent President ends on 30 June 2010.
Thereafter, the Prime Minister exercises all the powers of the
President. If the interim Parliament does not schedule
elections for the regular Parliament by 30 June 2010, the
Prime Minister will come only from the present members of
the House of Representatives to the exclusion of the present
Senators.
The signature sheets do not explain this discrimination
against the Senators. The 6.3 million people who signed the
signature sheets could not have known that their signatures
would be used to discriminate against the Senators. They
could not have known that their signatures would be used to
limit, after 30 June 2010, the interim Parliament's choice of
Prime Minister only to members of the existing House of
Representatives.
An initiative that gathers signatures from the people without
first showing to the people the full text of the proposed
amendments is most likely a deception, and can operate as a
gigantic fraud on the people. That is why the Constitution
requires that an initiative must be "directly proposed by the
people x x x in a petition" - meaning that the people must sign
on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed
amendments. On so vital an issue as amending the nation's
fundamental law, the writing of the text of the proposed
amendments cannot be hidden from the people under a
general or special power of attorney to unnamed, faceless,
and unelected individuals.
The Constitution entrusts to the people the power to directly
propose amendments to the Constitution. This Court trusts
the wisdom of the people even if the members of this Court
do not personally know the people who sign the petition.
However, this trust emanates from a fundamental
assumption: the full text of the proposed amendment is first
shown to the people before they sign the petition, not after
they have signed the petition.
In short, the Lambino Group's initiative is void and
unconstitutional because it dismally fails to comply with the
requirement of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution
that the initiative must be "directly proposed by the people
through initiative upon a petition."
2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution Disallowing Revision through Initiatives
A people's initiative to change the Constitution applies only
to an amendment of the Constitution and not to its revision.
In contrast, Congress or a constitutional convention can
propose both amendments and revisions to the Constitution.
Article XVII of the Constitution provides:
ARTICLE XVII
AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS
Sec. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution
may be proposed by:
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its
Members, or
(2) A constitutional convention.
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be
directly proposed by the people through initiative x x x.
(Emphasis supplied)
Article XVII of the Constitution speaks of three modes of
amending the Constitution. The first mode is through
Congress upon three-fourths vote of all its Members. The
second mode is through a constitutional convention. The
third mode is through a people's initiative.
Section 1 of Article XVII, referring to the first and second
modes, applies to "[A]ny amendment to, or revision of, this
Constitution." In contrast, Section 2 of Article XVII, referring
to the third mode, applies only to "[A]mendments to this
Constitution." This distinction was intentional as shown by
the following deliberations of the Constitutional Commission:
MR. SUAREZ: Thank you, Madam President.
May we respectfully call the attention of the Members of the
Commission that pursuant to the mandate given to us last
night, we submitted this afternoon a complete Committee
Report No. 7 which embodies the proposed provision
governing the matter of initiative. This is now covered by
Section 2 of the complete committee report. With the
permission of the Members, may I quote Section 2:
The people may, after five years from the date of the last
plebiscite held, directly propose amendments to this
Constitution thru initiative upon petition of at least ten
percent of the registered voters.
This completes the blanks appearing in the original
Committee Report No. 7. This proposal was suggested on the
theory that this matter of initiative, which came about
because of the extraordinary developments this year, has to
45
be separated from the traditional modes of amending the
Constitution as embodied in Section 1. The committee
members felt that this system of initiative should be limited
to amendments to the Constitution and should not extend to
the revision of the entire Constitution, so we removed it from
the operation of Section 1 of the proposed Article on
Amendment or Revision. x x x x
xxxx
MS. AQUINO: [I] am seriously bothered by providing this
process of initiative as a separate section in the Article on
Amendment. Would the sponsor be amenable to accepting an
amendment in terms of realigning Section 2 as another
subparagraph (c) of Section 1, instead of setting it up as
another separate section as if it were a self-executing
provision?
MR. SUAREZ: We would be amenable except that, as we
clarified a while ago, this process of initiative is limited to the
matter of amendment and should not expand into a revision
which contemplates a total overhaul of the Constitution. That
was the sense that was conveyed by the Committee.
MS. AQUINO: In other words, the Committee was
attempting to distinguish the coverage of modes (a) and (b) in
Section 1 to include the process of revision; whereas, the
process of initiation to amend, which is given to the public,
would only apply to amendments?
MR. SUAREZ: That is right. Those were the terms envisioned
in the Committee.
MS. AQUINO: I thank the sponsor; and thank you, Madam
President.
xxxx
MR. MAAMBONG: My first question: Commissioner
Davide's proposed amendment on line 1 refers to
"amendments." Does it not cover the word "revision" as
defined by Commissioner Padilla when he made the
distinction between the words "amendments" and "revision"?
MR. DAVIDE: No, it does not, because "amendments" and
"revision" should be covered by Section 1. So insofar as
initiative is concerned, it can only relate to "amendments" not
"revision."
MR. MAAMBONG: Thank you.31 (Emphasis supplied)
There can be no mistake about it. The framers of the
Constitution intended, and wrote, a clear distinction between
"amendment" and "revision" of the Constitution. The framers
intended, and wrote, that only Congress or a constitutional
convention may propose revisions to the Constitution. The
framers intended, and wrote, that a people's initiative may
propose only amendments to the Constitution. Where the
intent and language of the Constitution clearly withhold from
the people the power to propose revisions to the Constitution,
the people cannot propose revisions even as they are
empowered to propose amendments.
This has been the consistent ruling of state supreme courts
in the United States. Thus, in McFadden v. Jordan,32 the
Supreme Court of California ruled:
The initiative power reserved by the people by amendment to
the Constitution x x x applies only to the proposing and the
adopting or rejecting of 'laws and amendments to the
Constitution' and does not purport to extend to a
constitutional revision. x x x x It is thus clear that a revision
of the Constitution may be accomplished only through
ratification by the people of a revised constitution proposed
by a convention called for that purpose as outlined
hereinabove. Consequently if the scope of the proposed
initiative measure (hereinafter termed 'the measure') now
before us is so broad that if such measure became law a
substantial revision of our present state Constitution would
be effected, then the measure may not properly be submitted
to the electorate until and unless it is first agreed upon by a
constitutional convention, and the writ sought by petitioner
should issue. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Likewise, the Supreme Court of Oregon ruled in Holmes v.
Appling:33
It is well established that when a constitution specifies the
manner in which it may be amended or revised, it can be
altered by those who favor amendments, revision, or other
change only through the use of one of the specified means.
The constitution itself recognizes that there is a difference
between an amendment and a revision; and it is obvious from
an examination of the measure here in question that it is not
an amendment as that term is generally understood and as
it is used in Article IV, Section 1. The document appears to
be based in large part on the revision of the constitution
drafted by the 'Commission for Constitutional Revision'
authorized by the 1961 Legislative Assembly, x x x and
submitted to the 1963 Legislative Assembly. It failed to
receive in the Assembly the two-third's majority vote of both
houses required by Article XVII, Section 2, and hence failed
of adoption, x x x.
While differing from that document in material respects, the
measure sponsored by the plaintiffs is, nevertheless, a
thorough overhauling of the present constitution x x x.
To call it an amendment is a misnomer.
Whether it be a revision or a new constitution, it is not such
a measure as can be submitted to the people through the
initiative. If a revision, it is subject to the requirements of
Article XVII, Section 2(1); if a new constitution, it can only be
proposed at a convention called in the manner provided in
Article XVII, Section 1. x x x x
Similarly, in this jurisdiction there can be no dispute that a
people's initiative can only propose amendments to the
Constitution since the Constitution itself limits initiatives to
amendments. There can be no deviation from the
constitutionally prescribed modes of revising the
Constitution. A popular clamor, even one backed by 6.3
million signatures, cannot justify a deviation from the
specific modes prescribed in the Constitution itself.
As the Supreme Court of Oklahoma ruled in In re Initiative
Petition No. 364:34
It is a fundamental principle that a constitution can only be
revised or amended in the manner prescribed by the
instrument itself, and that any attempt to revise a
constitution in a manner other than the one provided in the
instrument is almost invariably treated as extra-
constitutional and revolutionary. x x x x "While it is
universally conceded that the people are sovereign and that
they have power to adopt a constitution and to change their
own work at will, they must, in doing so, act in an orderly
manner and according to the settled principles of
constitutional law. And where the people, in adopting a
constitution, have prescribed the method by which the people
may alter or amend it, an attempt to change the fundamental
law in violation of the self-imposed restrictions, is
unconstitutional." x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
This Court, whose members are sworn to defend and protect
the Constitution, cannot shirk from its solemn oath and duty
to insure compliance with the clear command of the
Constitution ― that a people's initiative may only amend,
never revise, the Constitution.
The question is, does the Lambino Group's initiative
constitute an amendment or revision of the Constitution? If
the Lambino Group's initiative constitutes a revision, then
46
the present petition should be dismissed for being outside the
scope of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.
Courts have long recognized the distinction between an
amendment and a revision of a constitution. One of the
earliest cases that recognized the distinction described the
fundamental difference in this manner:
[T]he very term "constitution" implies an instrument of a
permanent and abiding nature, and the provisions contained
therein for its revision indicate the will of the people that the
underlying principles upon which it rests, as well as the
substantial entirety of the instrument, shall be of a like
permanent and abiding nature. On the other hand, the
significance of the term "amendment" implies such an
addition or change within the lines of the original instrument
as will effect an improvement, or better carry out the purpose
for which it was framed.35 (Emphasis supplied)
Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic
principle in the constitution, like altering the principle of
separation of powers or the system of checks-and-balances.
There is also revision if the change alters the substantial
entirety of the constitution, as when the change affects
substantial provisions of the constitution. On the other hand,
amendment broadly refers to a change that adds, reduces, or
deletes without altering the basic principle involved.
Revision generally affects several provisions of the
constitution, while amendment generally affects only the
specific provision being amended.
In California where the initiative clause allows amendments
but not revisions to the constitution just like in our
Constitution, courts have developed a two-part test: the
quantitative test and the qualitative test. The quantitative
test asks whether the proposed change is "so extensive in its
provisions as to change directly the 'substantial entirety' of
the constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous
existing provisions."36 The court examines only the number
of provisions affected and does not consider the degree of the
change.
The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the
proposed change in the constitution. The main inquiry is
whether the change will "accomplish such far reaching
changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to
amount to a revision."37 Whether there is an alteration in
the structure of government is a proper subject of inquiry.
Thus, "a change in the nature of [the] basic governmental
plan" includes "change in its fundamental framework or the
fundamental powers of its Branches."38 A change in the
nature of the basic governmental plan also includes changes
that "jeopardize the traditional form of government and the
system of check and balances."39
Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the
Lambino Group's initiative is a revision and not merely an
amendment. Quantitatively, the Lambino Group's proposed
changes overhaul two articles - Article VI on the Legislature
and Article VII on the Executive - affecting a total of 105
provisions in the entire Constitution.40 Qualitatively, the
proposed changes alter substantially the basic plan of
government, from presidential to parliamentary, and from a
bicameral to a unicameral legislature.
A change in the structure of government is a revision of the
Constitution, as when the three great co-equal branches of
government in the present Constitution are reduced into two.
This alters the separation of powers in the Constitution. A
shift from the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a
Unicameral-Parliamentary system is a revision of the
Constitution. Merging the legislative and executive branches
is a radical change in the structure of government.
The abolition alone of the Office of the President as the locus
of Executive Power alters the separation of powers and thus
constitutes a revision of the Constitution. Likewise, the
abolition alone of one chamber of Congress alters the system
of checks-and-balances within the legislature and constitutes
a revision of the Constitution.
By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a shift from a
Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-Parliamentary
system, involving the abolition of the Office of the President
and the abolition of one chamber of Congress, is beyond doubt
a revision, not a mere amendment. On the face alone of the
Lambino Group's proposed changes, it is readily apparent
that the changes will radically alter the framework of
government as set forth in the Constitution. Father Joaquin
Bernas, S.J., a leading member of the Constitutional
Commission, writes:
An amendment envisages an alteration of one or a few
specific and separable provisions. The guiding original
intention of an amendment is to improve specific parts or to
add new provisions deemed necessary to meet new conditions
or to suppress specific portions that may have become
obsolete or that are judged to be dangerous. In revision,
however, the guiding original intention and plan
contemplates a re-examination of the entire document, or of
provisions of the document which have over-all implications
for the entire document, to determine how and to what extent
they should be altered. Thus, for instance a switch from the
presidential system to a parliamentary system would be a
revision because of its over-all impact on the entire
constitutional structure. So would a switch from a bicameral
system to a unicameral system be because of its effect on
other important provisions of the Constitution.41 (Emphasis
supplied)
In Adams v. Gunter,42 an initiative petition proposed the
amendment of the Florida State constitution to shift from a
bicameral to a unicameral legislature. The issue turned on
whether the initiative "was defective and unauthorized
where [the] proposed amendment would x x x affect several
other provisions of [the] Constitution." The Supreme Court of
Florida, striking down the initiative as outside the scope of
the initiative clause, ruled as follows:
The proposal here to amend Section 1 of Article III of the 1968
Constitution to provide for a Unicameral Legislature affects
not only many other provisions of the Constitution but
provides for a change in the form of the legislative branch of
government, which has been in existence in the United States
Congress and in all of the states of the nation, except one,
since the earliest days. It would be difficult to visualize a
more revolutionary change. The concept of a House and a
Senate is basic in the American form of government. It would
not only radically change the whole pattern of government in
this state and tear apart the whole fabric of the Constitution,
but would even affect the physical facilities necessary to
carry on government.
xxxx
We conclude with the observation that if such proposed
amendment were adopted by the people at the General
Election and if the Legislature at its next session should fail
to submit further amendments to revise and clarify the
numerous inconsistencies and conflicts which would result,
or if after submission of appropriate amendments the people
should refuse to adopt them, simple chaos would prevail in
the government of this State. The same result would obtain
from an amendment, for instance, of Section 1 of Article V, to
provide for only a Supreme Court and Circuit Courts-and
there could be other examples too numerous to detail. These
examples point unerringly to the answer.
The purpose of the long and arduous work of the hundreds of
men and women and many sessions of the Legislature in
bringing about the Constitution of 1968 was to eliminate
inconsistencies and conflicts and to give the State a workable,
accordant, homogenous and up-to-date document. All of this
could disappear very quickly if we were to hold that it could
47
be amended in the manner proposed in the initiative petition
here.43 (Emphasis supplied)
The rationale of the Adams decision applies with greater
force to the present petition. The Lambino Group's initiative
not only seeks a shift from a bicameral to a unicameral
legislature, it also seeks to merge the executive and
legislative departments. The initiative in Adams did not even
touch the executive department.
In Adams, the Supreme Court of Florida enumerated 18
sections of the Florida Constitution that would be affected by
the shift from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature. In the
Lambino Group's present initiative, no less than 105
provisions of the Constitution would be affected based on the
count of Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr.44 There is no
doubt that the Lambino Group's present initiative seeks far
more radical changes in the structure of government than the
initiative in Adams.
The Lambino Group theorizes that the difference between
"amendment" and "revision" is only one of procedure, not of
substance. The Lambino Group posits that when a
deliberative body drafts and proposes changes to the
Constitution, substantive changes are called "revisions"
because members of the deliberative body work full-time on
the changes. However, the same substantive changes, when
proposed through an initiative, are called "amendments"
because the changes are made by ordinary people who do not
make an "occupation, profession, or vocation" out of such
endeavor.
Thus, the Lambino Group makes the following exposition of
their theory in their Memorandum:
99. With this distinction in mind, we note that the
constitutional provisions expressly provide for both
"amendment" and "revision" when it speaks of legislators and
constitutional delegates, while the same provisions expressly
provide only for "amendment" when it speaks of the people.
It would seem that the apparent distinction is based on the
actual experience of the people, that on one hand the common
people in general are not expected to work full-time on the
matter of correcting the constitution because that is not their
occupation, profession or vocation; while on the other hand,
the legislators and constitutional convention delegates are
expected to work full-time on the same matter because that
is their occupation, profession or vocation. Thus, the
difference between the words "revision" and "amendment"
pertain only to the process or procedure of coming up with the
corrections, for purposes of interpreting the constitutional
provisions.
100. Stated otherwise, the difference between "amendment"
and "revision" cannot reasonably be in the substance or
extent of the correction. x x x x (Underlining in the original;
boldfacing supplied)
The Lambino Group in effect argues that if Congress or a
constitutional convention had drafted the same proposed
changes that the Lambino Group wrote in the present
initiative, the changes would constitute a revision of the
Constitution. Thus, the Lambino Group concedes that the
proposed changes in the present initiative constitute a
revision if Congress or a constitutional convention had
drafted the changes. However, since the Lambino Group as
private individuals drafted the proposed changes, the
changes are merely amendments to the Constitution. The
Lambino Group trivializes the serious matter of changing the
fundamental law of the land.
The express intent of the framers and the plain language of
the Constitution contradict the Lambino Group's theory.
Where the intent of the framers and the language of the
Constitution are clear and plainly stated, courts do not
deviate from such categorical intent and language.45 Any
theory espousing a construction contrary to such intent and
language deserves scant consideration. More so, if such
theory wreaks havoc by creating inconsistencies in the form
of government established in the Constitution. Such a theory,
devoid of any jurisprudential mooring and inviting
inconsistencies in the Constitution, only exposes the
flimsiness of the Lambino Group's position. Any theory
advocating that a proposed change involving a radical
structural change in government does not constitute a
revision justly deserves rejection.
The Lambino Group simply recycles a theory that initiative
proponents in American jurisdictions have attempted to
advance without any success. In Lowe v. Keisling,46 the
Supreme Court of Oregon rejected this theory, thus:
Mabon argues that Article XVII, section 2, does not apply to
changes to the constitution proposed by initiative. His theory
is that Article XVII, section 2 merely provides a procedure by
which the legislature can propose a revision of the
constitution, but it does not affect proposed revisions
initiated by the people.
Plaintiffs argue that the proposed ballot measure constitutes
a wholesale change to the constitution that cannot be enacted
through the initiative process. They assert that the
distinction between amendment and revision is determined
by reviewing the scope and subject matter of the proposed
enactment, and that revisions are not limited to "a formal
overhauling of the constitution." They argue that this ballot
measure proposes far reaching changes outside the lines of
the original instrument, including profound impacts on
existing fundamental rights and radical restructuring of the
government's relationship with a defined group of citizens.
Plaintiffs assert that, because the proposed ballot measure
"will refashion the most basic principles of Oregon
constitutional law," the trial court correctly held that it
violated Article XVII, section 2, and cannot appear on the
ballot without the prior approval of the legislature.
We first address Mabon's argument that Article XVII, section
2(1), does not prohibit revisions instituted by initiative. In
Holmes v. Appling, x x x, the Supreme Court concluded that
a revision of the constitution may not be accomplished by
initiative, because of the provisions of Article XVII, section 2.
After reviewing Article XVII, section1, relating to proposed
amendments, the court said:
"From the foregoing it appears that Article IV, Section 1,
authorizes the use of the initiative as a means of amending
the Oregon Constitution, but it contains no similar sanction
for its use as a means of revising the constitution." x x x x
It then reviewed Article XVII, section 2, relating to revisions,
and said: "It is the only section of the constitution which
provides the means for constitutional revision and it excludes
the idea that an individual, through the initiative, may place
such a measure before the electorate." x x x x
Accordingly, we reject Mabon's argument that Article XVII,
section 2, does not apply to constitutional revisions proposed
by initiative. (Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, this Court must reject the Lambino Group's theory
which negates the express intent of the framers and the plain
language of the Constitution.
We can visualize amendments and revisions as a spectrum,
at one end green for amendments and at the other end red for
revisions. Towards the middle of the spectrum, colors fuse
and difficulties arise in determining whether there is an
amendment or revision. The present initiative is indisputably
located at the far end of the red spectrum where revision
begins. The present initiative seeks a radical overhaul of the
existing separation of powers among the three co-equal
departments of government, requiring far-reaching
amendments in several sections and articles of the
Constitution.
48

Where the proposed change applies only to a specific
provision of the Constitution without affecting any other
section or article, the change may generally be considered an
amendment and not a revision. For example, a change
reducing the voting age from 18 years to 15 years47 is an
amendment and not a revision. Similarly, a change reducing
Filipino ownership of mass media companies from 100
percent to 60 percent is an amendment and not a revision.48
Also, a change requiring a college degree as an additional
qualification for election to the Presidency is an amendment
and not a revision.49
The changes in these examples do not entail any modification
of sections or articles of the Constitution other than the
specific provision being amended. These changes do not also
affect the structure of government or the system of checks-
and-balances among or within the three branches. These
three examples are located at the far green end of the
spectrum, opposite the far red end where the revision sought
by the present petition is located.
However, there can be no fixed rule on whether a change is
an amendment or a revision. A change in a single word of one
sentence of the Constitution may be a revision and not an
amendment. For example, the substitution of the word
"republican" with "monarchic" or "theocratic" in Section 1,
Article II50 of the Constitution radically overhauls the entire
structure of government and the fundamental ideological
basis of the Constitution. Thus, each specific change will have
to be examined case-by-case, depending on how it affects
other provisions, as well as how it affects the structure of
government, the carefully crafted system of checks-and-
balances, and the underlying ideological basis of the existing
Constitution.
Since a revision of a constitution affects basic principles, or
several provisions of a constitution, a deliberative body with
recorded proceedings is best suited to undertake a revision.
A revision requires harmonizing not only several provisions,
but also the altered principles with those that remain
unaltered. Thus, constitutions normally authorize
deliberative bodies like constituent assemblies or
constitutional conventions to undertake revisions. On the
other hand, constitutions allow people's initiatives, which do
not have fixed and identifiable deliberative bodies or recorded
proceedings, to undertake only amendments and not
revisions.
In the present initiative, the Lambino Group's proposed
Section 2 of the Transitory Provisions states:
Section 2. Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent
President and Vice President, with the exception of Sections
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
which shall hereby be amended and Sections 18 and 24 which
shall be deleted, all other Sections of Article VI are hereby
retained and renumbered sequentially as Section 2, ad
seriatim up to 26, unless they are inconsistent with the
Parliamentary system of government, in which case, they
shall be amended to conform with a unicameral
parliamentary form of government; x x x x (Emphasis
supplied)
The basic rule in statutory construction is that if a later law
is irreconcilably inconsistent with a prior law, the later law
prevails. This rule also applies to construction of
constitutions. However, the Lambino Group's draft of Section
2 of the Transitory Provisions turns on its head this rule of
construction by stating that in case of such irreconcilable
inconsistency, the earlier provision "shall be amended to
conform with a unicameral parliamentary form of
government." The effect is to freeze the two irreconcilable
provisions until the earlier one "shall be amended," which
requires a future separate constitutional amendment.
Realizing the absurdity of the need for such an amendment,
petitioner Atty. Lambino readily conceded during the oral
arguments that the requirement of a future amendment is a
"surplusage." In short, Atty. Lambino wants to reinstate the
rule of statutory construction so that the later provision
automatically prevails in case of irreconcilable inconsistency.
However, it is not as simple as that.
The irreconcilable inconsistency envisioned in the proposed
Section 2 of the Transitory Provisions is not between a
provision in Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and a
provision in the proposed changes. The inconsistency is
between a provision in Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
and the "Parliamentary system of government," and the
inconsistency shall be resolved in favor of a "unicameral
parliamentary form of government."
Now, what "unicameral parliamentary form of government"
do the Lambino Group's proposed changes refer to ― the
Bangladeshi, Singaporean, Israeli, or New Zealand models,
which are among the few countries with unicameral
parliaments? The proposed changes could not possibly refer
to the traditional and well-known parliamentary forms of
government ― the British, French, Spanish, German, Italian,
Canadian, Australian, or Malaysian models, which have all
bicameral parliaments. Did the people who signed the
signature sheets realize that they were adopting the
Bangladeshi, Singaporean, Israeli, or New Zealand
parliamentary form of government?
This drives home the point that the people's initiative is not
meant for revisions of the Constitution but only for
amendments. A shift from the present Bicameral-
Presidential to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system requires
harmonizing several provisions in many articles of the
Constitution. Revision of the Constitution through a people's
initiative will only result in gross absurdities in the
Constitution.
In sum, there is no doubt whatsoever that the Lambino
Group's initiative is a revision and not an amendment. Thus,
the present initiative is void and unconstitutional because it
violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution limiting
the scope of a people's initiative to "[A]mendments to this
Constitution."
3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary
The present petition warrants dismissal for failure to comply
with the basic requirements of Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution on the conduct and scope of a people's initiative
to amend the Constitution. There is no need to revisit this
Court's ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 "incomplete,
inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions" to
cover the system of initiative to amend the Constitution. An
affirmation or reversal of Santiago will not change the
outcome of the present petition. Thus, this Court must
decline to revisit Santiago which effectively ruled that RA
6735 does not comply with the requirements of the
Constitution to implement the initiative clause on
amendments to the Constitution.
This Court must avoid revisiting a ruling involving the
constitutionality of a statute if the case before the Court can
be resolved on some other grounds. Such avoidance is a
logical consequence of the well-settled doctrine that courts
will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute if the case
can be resolved on some other grounds.51
Nevertheless, even assuming that RA 6735 is valid to
implement the constitutional provision on initiatives to
amend the Constitution, this will not change the result here
because the present petition violates Section 2, Article XVII
of the Constitution. To be a valid initiative, the present
initiative must first comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution even before complying with RA 6735.
49
Even then, the present initiative violates Section 5(b) of RA
6735 which requires that the "petition for an initiative on the
1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per centum
(12%) of the total number of registered voters as signatories."
Section 5(b) of RA 6735 requires that the people must sign
the "petition x x x as signatories."
The 6.3 million signatories did not sign the petition of 25
August 2006 or the amended petition of 30 August 2006 filed
with the COMELEC. Only Atty. Lambino, Atty.
Demosthenes B. Donato, and Atty. Alberto C. Agra signed the
petition and amended petition as counsels for "Raul L.
Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado, Petitioners." In the
COMELEC, the Lambino Group, claiming to act "together
with" the 6.3 million signatories, merely attached the
signature sheets to the petition and amended petition. Thus,
the petition and amended petition filed with the COMELEC
did not even comply with the basic requirement of RA 6735
that the Lambino Group claims as valid.
The Lambino Group's logrolling initiative also violates
Section 10(a) of RA 6735 stating, "No petition embracing
more than one (1) subject shall be submitted to the electorate;
x x x." The proposed Section 4(4) of the Transitory Provisions,
mandating the interim Parliament to propose further
amendments or revisions to the Constitution, is a subject
matter totally unrelated to the shift in the form of
government. Since the present initiative embraces more than
one subject matter, RA 6735 prohibits submission of the
initiative petition to the electorate. Thus, even if RA 6735 is
valid, the Lambino Group's initiative will still fail.
4. The COMELEC Did Not Commit Grave Abuse of
Discretion in Dismissing the Lambino Group's Initiative
In dismissing the Lambino Group's initiative petition, the
COMELEC en banc merely followed this Court's ruling in
Santiago and People's Initiative for Reform, Modernization
and Action (PIRMA) v. COMELEC.52 For following this
Court's ruling, no grave abuse of discretion is attributable to
the COMELEC. On this ground alone, the present petition
warrants outright dismissal. Thus, this Court should
reiterate its unanimous ruling in PIRMA:
The Court ruled, first, by a unanimous vote, that no grave
abuse of discretion could be attributed to the public
respondent COMELEC in dismissing the petition filed by
PIRMA therein, it appearing that it only complied with the
dispositions in the Decisions of this Court in G.R. No. 127325,
promulgated on March 19, 1997, and its Resolution of June
10, 1997.
5. Conclusion
The Constitution, as the fundamental law of the land,
deserves the utmost respect and obedience of all the citizens
of this nation. No one can trivialize the Constitution by
cavalierly amending or revising it in blatant violation of the
clearly specified modes of amendment and revision laid down
in the Constitution itself.
To allow such change in the fundamental law is to set adrift
the Constitution in unchartered waters, to be tossed and
turned by every dominant political group of the day. If this
Court allows today a cavalier change in the Constitution
outside the constitutionally prescribed modes, tomorrow the
new dominant political group that comes will demand its own
set of changes in the same cavalier and unconstitutional
fashion. A revolving-door constitution does not augur well for
the rule of law in this country.
An overwhelming majority − 16,622,111 voters comprising
76.3 percent of the total votes cast53 − approved our
Constitution in a national plebiscite held on 11 February
1987. That approval is the unmistakable voice of the people,
the full expression of the people's sovereign will. That
approval included the prescribed modes for amending or
revising the Constitution.
No amount of signatures, not even the 6,327,952 million
signatures gathered by the Lambino Group, can change our
Constitution contrary to the specific modes that the people,
in their sovereign capacity, prescribed when they ratified the
Constitution. The alternative is an extra-constitutional
change, which means subverting the people's sovereign will
and discarding the Constitution. This is one act the Court
cannot and should never do. As the ultimate guardian of the
Constitution, this Court is sworn to perform its solemn duty
to defend and protect the Constitution, which embodies the
real sovereign will of the people.
Incantations of "people's voice," "people's sovereign will," or
"let the people decide" cannot override the specific modes of
changing the Constitution as prescribed in the Constitution
itself. Otherwise, the Constitution ― the people's
fundamental covenant that provides enduring stability to our
society ― becomes easily susceptible to manipulative changes
by political groups gathering signatures through false
promises. Then, the Constitution ceases to be the bedrock of
the nation's stability.
The Lambino Group claims that their initiative is the
"people's voice." However, the Lambino Group unabashedly
states in ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02, in the verification of
their petition with the COMELEC, that "ULAP maintains its
unqualified support to the agenda of Her Excellency
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo for constitutional
reforms." The Lambino Group thus admits that their
"people's" initiative is an "unqualified support to the agenda"
of the incumbent President to change the Constitution. This
forewarns the Court to be wary of incantations of "people's
voice" or "sovereign will" in the present initiative.
This Court cannot betray its primordial duty to defend and
protect the Constitution. The Constitution, which embodies
the people's sovereign will, is the bible of this Court. This
Court exists to defend and protect the Constitution. To allow
this constitutionally infirm initiative, propelled by
deceptively gathered signatures, to alter basic principles in
the Constitution is to allow a desecration of the Constitution.
To allow such alteration and desecration is to lose this
Court's raison d'etre.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition in G.R. No. 174153.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J., Puno, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio
Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Garcia,
and Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.
____________________
EN BANC
G.R. No. 174153 October 25, 2006
RAUL L. LAMBINO AND ERICO B. AUMENTADO,
TOGETHER WITH 6,327,952 REGISTERED VOTERS V.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS ET AL.
SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION
PANGANIBAN, CJ.:
Without the rule of law, there can be no lasting prosperity
and certainly no liberty.
Beverley McLachlin 1
Chief Justice of Canada
50
After a deep reflection on the issues raised and a careful
evaluation of the parties' respective arguments -- both oral
and written -- as well as the enlightened and enlightening
Opinions submitted by my esteemed colleagues, I am fully
convinced that the present Petition must be dismissed.
I write, however, to show that my present disposition is
completely consistent with my previous Opinions and votes
on the two extant Supreme Court cases involving an
initiative to change the Constitution.
In my Separate Opinion in Santiago v. Comelec,2 I opined
"that taken together and interpreted properly and liberally,
the Constitution (particularly Art. XVII, Sec. 2), Republic Act
6735 and Comelec Resolution 2300 provide more than
sufficient
__________________
'SEC. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be
directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of
registered voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum of the registered
voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be
authorized within five years following the ratification of this
Constitution nor oftener than once every five years
thereafter.'
"With all due respect, I find the majority's position all too
sweeping and all too extremist. It is equivalent to burning the
whole house to exterminate the rats, and to killing the
patient to relieve him of pain. What Citizen Delfin wants the
Comelec to do we should reject. But we should not thereby
preempt any future effort to exercise the right of initiative
correctly and judiciously. The fact that the Delfin Petition
proposes a misuse of initiative does not justify a ban against
its proper use. Indeed, there is a right way to do the right
thing at the right time and for the right reason.
Taken Together and Interpreted Properly,
the Constitution, R.A. 6735 and Comelec Resolution
2300 Are Sufficient to Implement Constitutional Initiatives
"While R.A. 6735 may not be a perfect law, it was — as the
majority openly concedes — intended by the legislature to
cover and, I respectfully submit, it contains enough
provisions to effectuate an initiative on the Constitution. I
completely agree with the inspired and inspiring opinions of
Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno and Mr. Justice Ricardo J.
Francisco that RA 6735, the Roco law on initiative,
sufficiently implements the right of the people to initiate
amendments to the Constitution. Such views, which I shall
no longer repeat nor elaborate on, are thoroughly consistent
with this Court's unanimous en banc rulings in Subic Bay
Metropolitan Authority vs. Commission on Elections, that
"provisions for initiative . . . are (to be) liberally construed to
effectuate their purposes, to facilitate and not hamper the
exercise by the voters of the rights granted thereby"; and in
Garcia vs. Comelec, that any "effort to trivialize the
effectiveness of people's initiatives ought to be rejected."
"No law can completely and absolutely cover all
administrative details. In recognition of this, R.A. 6735
wisely empowered the Commission on Election "to
promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary
to carry out the purposes of this Act." And pursuant thereto,
the Comelec issued its Resolution 2300 on 16 January 1991.
Such Resolution, by its very words, was promulgated "to
govern the conduct of initiative on the Constitution and
initiative and referendum on national and local laws," not by
the incumbent Commission on Elections but by one then
composed of Acting Chairperson Haydee B. Yorac, Comms.
Alfredo
authority to implement, effectuate and realize our people's
power to amend the Constitution."
__________________
E. Abueg, Jr., Leopoldo L. Africa, Andres R. Flores, Dario C.
Rama and Magdara B. Dimaampao. All of these
Commissioners who signed Resolution 2300 have retired
from the Commission, and thus we cannot ascribe any vile
motive unto them, other than an honest, sincere and
exemplary effort to give life to a cherished right of our people.
"The majority argues that while Resolution 2300 is valid in
regard to national laws and local legislations, it is void in
reference to constitutional amendments. There is no basis for
such differentiation. The source of and authority for the
Resolution is the same law, R.A. 6735.
"I respectfully submit that taken together and interpreted
properly and liberally, the Constitution (particularly Art.
XVII, Sec. 2), R.A. 6735 and Comelec Resolution 2300 provide
more than sufficient authority to implement, effectuate and
realize our people's power to amend the Constitution.
Petitioner Delfin and the Pedrosa
Spouses Should Not Be Muzzled
"I am glad the majority decided to heed our plea to lift the
temporary restraining order issued by this Court on 18
December 1996 insofar as it prohibited Petitioner Delfin and
the Spouses Pedrosa from exercising their right of initiative.
In fact, I believe that such restraining order as against
private respondents should not have been issued, in the first
place. While I agree that the Comelec should be stopped from
using public funds and government resources to help them
gather signatures, I firmly believe that this Court has no
power to restrain them from exercising their right of
initiative. The right to propose amendments to the
Constitution is really a species of the right of free speech and
free assembly. And certainly, it would be tyrannical and
despotic to stop anyone from speaking freely and persuading
others to conform to his/her beliefs. As the eminent Voltaire
once said, 'I may disagree with what you say, but I will defend
to the death your right to say it.' After all, freedom is not
really for the thought we agree with, but as Justice Holmes
wrote, 'freedom for the thought that we hate.'
Epilogue
"By way of epilogue, let me stress the guiding tenet of my
Separate Opinion. Initiative, like referendum and recall, is a
new and treasured feature of the Filipino constitutional
system. All three are institutionalized legacies of the world-
admired EDSA people power. Like elections and plebiscites,
they are hallowed expressions of popular sovereignty. They
are sacred democratic rights of our people to be used as
Six months after, in my Separate Opinion in People's
Initiative for Reform, Modernization and Action (PIRMA) v.
Comelec,3 I joined the rest of the members of the Court in
ruling "by a unanimous vote, that no grave abuse of
discretion could be attributed to the Comelec in dismissing
the petition filed by
__________________
Constitution x x x." While concededly, petitioners in this case
were not direct parties in Santiago, nonetheless the Court's
injunction against the Comelec covered ANY petition, not
just the Delfin petition which was the immediate subject of
said case. As a dissenter in Santiago, I believed, and still do,
that the majority gravely erred in rendering such a sweeping
injunction, but I cannot fault the Comelec for complying with
the ruling even if it, too, disagreed with said decision's ratio
decidendi. Respondent Comelec was directly enjoined by the
highest Court of the land. It had no choice but to obey. Its
obedience cannot constitute grave abuse of discretion.
Refusal to act on the PIRMA petition was the only recourse
open to the Comelec. Any other mode of action would have
51
constituted defiance of the Court and would have been struck
down as grave abuse of discretion and contumacious
disregard of this Court's supremacy as the final arbiter of
justiciable controversies.
Second Issue:
Sufficiency of RA 6735
"I repeat my firm legal position that RA 6735 is adequate to
cover initiatives on the Constitution, and that whatever
administrative details may have been omitted in said law are
satisfactorily provided by Comelec Resolution 2300. The
promulgation of Resolution 2300 is sanctioned by Section 2,
Article IX-C of the Constitution, which vests upon the
Comelec the power to "enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite,
initiative, referendum and recall." The Omnibus Election
Code likewise empowers the electoral body to "promulgate
rules and regulations implementing the provisions of this
Code or other laws which the Commission is required to
enforce and administer x x x." Finally and most relevantly,
Section 20 of Ra 6735 specifically authorizes Comelec "to
promulgate rules and regulations as may be necessary to
carry out the purposes of this Act."
"In my dissent in Santiago, I wrote that "there is a right way
to do the right thing at the right time and for the right
reason." Let me explain further.
The Right Thing
"A people's initiative is direct democracy in action. It is the
right thing that citizens may avail themselves of to articulate
their will. It is a new and treasured feature of the Filipino
constitutional system. Even the majority implicitly conceded
its value and worth in our legal firmament when it implored
Congress "not to tarry any longer in complying with the
constitutional mandate to provide for implementation of the
right (of initiative) of the people x x x." Hence, in the en banc
case of Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority vs. Comelec, [G.R.
No. 125416, September 26, 1996], this Court unanimously
held that "(l)ike elections, initiative and referendum are
powerful and valuable modes of expressing popular
PIRMA therein," since the Commission had "only complied"
with the Santiago Decision.
__________________
sovereignty. And this Court as a matter of policy and doctrine
will exert every effort to nurture, protect and promote their
legitimate exercise."
The Right Way
"From the outset, I have already maintained the view that
"taken together and interpreted properly and liberally, the
Constitution (particularly Art. XVII, Sec. 2), RA 6735 and
Comelec Resolution 2300 provide more than sufficient
authority to implement, effectuate and realize our people's
power to amend the Constitution." Let me now demonstrate
the adequacy of RA 6735 by outlining, in concrete terms, the
steps to be taken – the right way – to amend the Constitution
through a people's initiative.
"Pursuant to Section 3(f) of the law, the Comelec shall
prescribe the form of the petition which shall contain the
proposition and the required number of signatories. Under
Sec. 5(c) thereof, the petition shall state the following:
'c.1 contents or text of the [provision or provisions] sought to
be x x x amended, x x x;
c.2 the proposition [in full text];
c.3 the reason or reasons therefor [fully and clearly
explained];
c.4 that it is not one of exceptions provided herein;
c.5 signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and
c.6 an abstract or summary proposition in not more than one
hundred (100) words which shall be legibly written or printed
at the top of every page of the petition.'
"Section 8(f) of Comelec Resolution 2300 additionally
requires that the petition include a formal designation of the
duly authorized representatives of the signatories.
"Being a constitutional requirement, the number of
signatures becomes a condition precedent to the filing of the
petition, and is jurisdictional. Without such requisite
signatures, the Commission shall motu proprio reject the
petition.
"Where the initiators have substantially complied with the
above requirements, they may thence file the petition with
the Comelec which is tasked to determine the sufficiency
thereof and to verify the signatures on the basis of the
registry list of voters, voters' affidavits and voters'
identification cards. In deciding whether the petition is
sufficient, the Comelec shall also determine if the proposition
is proper for an initiative, i.e., if it consists of an amendment,
not a revision, of the Constitution. Any decision of the
electoral body may be appealed to the Supreme Court within
thirty (30) days from notice.
I added "that my position upholding the adequacy of RA 6735
and the validity of Comelec Resolution 2300 will not ipso
__________________
"Within thirty (30) days from receipt of the petition, and after
the determination of its sufficiency, the Comelec shall
publish the same in Filipino and English at least twice in
newspapers of general and local circulation, and set the date
of the plebiscite. The conduct of the plebiscite should not be
earlier than sixty (60) days, but not later than ninety (90)
days after certification by the Comelec of the sufficiency of
the petition. The proposition, if approved by a majority of the
votes cast in the plebiscite, becomes effective as of the day of
the plebiscite.
"From the foregoing, it should be clear that my position
upholding the adequacy of RA 6735 and the validity of
Comelec Resolution 2300 will not ipso facto validate the
PIRMA petition and automatically lead to a plebiscite to
amend the Constitution. Far from it. Among others, PIRMA
must still satisfactorily hurdle the following searching issues:
1. Does the proposed change – the lifting of the term limits of
elective officials -- constitute a mere amendment and not a
revision of the Constitution?
2. Which registry of voters will be used to verify the
signatures in the petition? This question is relevant
considering that under RA 8189, the old registry of voters
used in the 1995 national elections was voided after the
barangay elections on May 12, 1997, while the new list may
be used starting only in the elections of May 1998.
3. Does the clamor for the proposed change in the
Constitution really emanate from the people who signed the
petition for initiative? Or it is the beneficiaries of term
extension who are in fact orchestrating such move to advance
their own political self-interest?
4. Are the six million signatures genuine and verifiable? Do
they really belong to qualified warm bodies comprising at
least 12% of the registered voters nationwide, of which every
legislative district is represented by at least 3% of the
registered voters therein?
52
"I shall expound on the third question in the next section, The
Right Reason. Question Nos. 1 and 2 above, while important,
are basically legal in character and can be determined by
argumentation and memoranda. However, Question No. 4
involves not only legal issues but gargantuan hurdles of
factual determination. This to my mind is the crucible, the
litmus test, of a people's petition for initiative. If herein
petitioners, led by PIRMA, succeed in proving -- not just
alleging -- that six million voters of this country indeed want
to amend the Constitution, what power on earth can stop
them? Not this Court, not the Comelec, not even the
President or Congress.
facto validate the PIRMA petition and automatically lead to
a plebiscite to amend the Constitution. Far from it." I
stressed that PIRMA must show the following, among others:
__________________
"It took only one million people to stage a peaceful revolution
at EDSA, and the very rafters and foundations of the martial
law society trembled, quaked and crumbled. On the other
hand, PIRMA and its co-petitioners are claiming that they
have gathered six million signatures. If, as claimed by many,
these six million signatures are fraudulent, then let them be
exposed and damned for all history in a signature-verification
process conducted under our open system of legal advocacy.
"More than anything else, it is the truth that I, as a member
of this Court and as a citizen of this country, would like to
seek: Are these six million signatures real? By insisting on
an entirely new doctrine of statutory inadequacy, the
majority effectively suppressed the quest for that truth.
The Right Reason
"As mentioned, the third question that must be answered,
even if the adequacy of RA 6735 and the validity of Comelec
Resolution 2300 were upheld by the majority is: Does the
clamor for the proposed change to the Constitution really
emanate from the people who signed the petition for
initiative? Or is it the beneficiaries of term extension who are
in fact orchestrating such move to advance their own political
self-interests? In other words, is PIRMA's exercise of the
right to initiative being done in accordance with our
Constitution and our laws? Is such attempted exercise
legitimate?
"In Garcia vs. Commission on Elections, we described
initiative, along with referendum, as the 'ultimate weapon of
the people to negate government malfeasance and
misfeasance.' In Subic Bay, we specified that 'initiative is
entirely the work of the electorate x x x a process of
lawmaking by the people themselves without the
participation and against the wishes of their elected
representatives.' As ponente of Subic Bay, I stand foursquare
on this principle: The right to amend through initiative
belongs only to the people – not to the government and its
minions. This principle finds clear support from utterances of
many constitutional commissioners like those quoted below:
"[Initiative is] a reserve power of the sovereign people, when
they are dissatisfied with the National Assembly x x x [and]
precisely a fallback position of the people in the event that
they are dissatisfied." -- Commissioner Ople
"[Initiative is] a check on a legislative that is not responsive
[and resorted to] only if the legislature is not as responsive to
the vital and urgent needs of people." -- Commissioner
Gascon
(1) The proposed change -- the lifting of term limits of elective
officials -- "constitute[s] a mere amendment and not a
revision of the Constitution."
_________________
"[Initiative is an] extraordinary power given to the people
[and] reserved for the people [which] should not be frivolously
resorted to." -- Commissioner Romulo
"Indeed, if the powers-that-be desire to amend the
Constitution, or even to revise it, our Charter itself provides
them other ways of doing so, namely, by calling a
constitutional convention or constituting Congress into a
constituent assembly. These are officialdom's weapons. But
initiative belongs to the people.
"In the present case, are PIRMA and its co-petitioners
legitimate people's organizations or are they merely fronts for
incumbents who want to extend their terms? This is a factual
question which, unfortunately, cannot be judicially answered
anymore, because the Supreme Court majority ruled that the
law that implements it, RA 6735, is inadequate or insufficient
insofar as initiatives to the Constitutions are concerned. With
such ruling, the majority effectively abrogated a
constitutional right of our people. That is why in my Separate
Opinion in Santiago, I exclaimed that such precipitate action
"is equivalent to burning the whole house to exterminate the
rats, and to killing the patient to relieve him of pain." I firmly
maintain that to defeat PIRMA's effort, there is no need to
"burn" the constitutional right to initiative. If PIRMA's
exercise is not "legitimate," it can be exposed as such in the
ways I have discussed – short of abrogating the right itself.
On the other hand, if PIRMA's position is proven to be
legitimate – if it hurdles the four issues I outlined earlier –
by all means, we should allow and encourage it. But the
majority's theory of statutory inadequacy has pre-empted –
unnecessarily and invalidly, in my view – any judicial
determination of such legitimacy or illegitimacy. It has
silenced the quest for truth into the interstices of the PIRMA
petition.
The Right Time
"The Constitution itself sets a time limitation on when
changes thereto may be proposed. Section 2 of Article XVII
precludes amendments "within five years following [its]
ratification x x x nor oftener than once every five years
thereafter." Since its ratification, the 1987 Constitution has
never been amended. Hence, the five-year prohibition is now
inoperative and amendments may theoretically be proposed
at any time.
"Be that as it may, I believe – given the present
circumstances – that there is no more time to lift term limits
to enable incumbents to seek reelection in the May 11, 1998
polls. Between today and the next national
(2) The "six million signatures are genuine and verifiable";
and they "really belong to qualified warm bodies comprising
at
__________________
elections, less than eight (8) months remain. Santiago, where
the single issue of the sufficiency of RA 6735 was resolved,
took this Court three (3) months, and another two (2) months
to decide the motion for reconsideration. The instant case,
where the same issue is also raised by the petitioners, took
two months, not counting a possible motion for
reconsideration. These time spans could not be abbreviated
any further, because due process requires that all parties be
given sufficient time to file their pleadings.
"Thus, even if the Court were to rule now in favor of the
adequacy of RA 6735 – as I believe it should – and allow the
Comelec to act on the PIRMA petition, such eight-month
period will not be enough to tackle the four weighty issues I
mentioned earlier, considering that two of them involve
tedious factual questions. The Comelec's decision on any of
these issues can still be elevated to this Court for review, and
reconsiderations on our decisions on each of those issues may
again be sought.
53

"Comelec's herculean task alone of verifying each of the six
million signatures is enormously time-consuming,
considering that any person may question the authenticity of
each and every signature, initially before the election
registrar, then before the Comelec on appeal and finally,
before this Court in a separate proceeding. Moreover, the
plebiscite itself – assuming such stage can be reached – may
be scheduled only after sixty (60) but not more than ninety
(90) days, from the time the Comelec and this Court, on
appeal, finally declare the petition to be sufficient.
"Meanwhile, under Comelec Resolution 2946, political
parties, groups organizations or coalitions may start
selecting their official candidates for President, Vice
President and Senators on November 27, 1997; the period for
filing certificates of candidacy is from January 11 to February
9, 1998; the election period and campaign for national
officials start on February 10, 1998, while the campaign
period for other elective officials, on March 17, 1998. This
means, by the time PIRMA's proposition is ready – if ever –
for submission directly to the voters at large, it will have been
overcome by the elections. Time will simply run out on
PIRMA, if the intention is to lift term limits in time for the
1998 elections.
"That term limits may no longer be lifted prior to the 1998
elections via a people's initiative does not detract one whit
from (1) my firm conviction that RA 6735 is sufficient and
adequate to implement this constitutional right and, more
important, (2) my faith in the power of the people to initiate
changes in local and national laws and the Constitution. In
fact, I think the Court can deliberate on these two items even
more serenely and wisely now that the debates will be free
from the din and distraction of the 1998 elections. After all,
jurisprudence is not merely for the here and now but, more
so, for the hereafter and the morrow. Let me therefore stress,
by way of epilogue, my unbending credo in favor of our
people's right to initiative.
least 12% of the registered voters nationwide, of which every
legislative district is represented by at least 3% of the
registered voters therein."
__________________
Epilogue
"I believe in democracy – in our people's natural right to
determine our own destiny.
"I believe in the process of initiative as a democratic method
of enabling our people to express their will and chart their
history. Initiative is an alternative to bloody revolution,
internal chaos and civil strife. It is an inherent right of the
people – as basic as the right to elect, the right to self-
determination and the right to individual liberties. I believe
that Filipinos have the ability and the capacity to rise above
themselves, to use this right of initiative wisely and
maturely, and to choose what is best for themselves and their
posterity.
"Such beliefs, however, should not be equated with a desire
to perpetuate a particular official or group of officials in
power. Far from it. Such perpetuation is anathema to
democracy. My firm conviction that there is an adequate law
implementing the constitutional right of initiative does not
ipso facto result in the victory of the PIRMA petition or of any
proposed constitutional change. There are, after all,
sufficient safeguards to guarantee the proper use of such
constitutional right and to forestall its misuse and abuse.
First, initiative cannot be used to revise the Constitution,
only to amend it. Second, the petitioners' signatures must be
validated against an existing list of voters and/or voters'
identification cards. Third, initiative is a reverse power of
and by the people, not of incumbent officials and their
machinators. Fourth and most important of all, the
signatures must be verified as real and genuine; not
concocted, fictitious or fabricated. The only legal way to do
this is to enable the Commission on Elections to conduct a
nationwide verification process as mandated by the
Constitution and the law. Such verification, it bears
stressing, is subject to review by this Court.
"There were, by the most generous estimate, only a million
people who gathered at EDSA in 1986, and yet they changed
the history of our country. PIRMA claims six times that
number, not just from the National Capital Region but from
all over the country. Is this claim through the invention of its
novel theory of statutory insufficiency, the Court's majority
has stifled the only legal method of determining whether
PIRMA is real or not, whether there is indeed a popular
clamor to lift term limits of elected officials, and whether six
million voters want to initiate amendments to their most
basic law. In suppressing a judicial answer to such questions,
the Court may have unwittingly yielded to PIRMA the
benefit of the legal presumption of legality and regularity. In
its misplaced zeal to exterminate the rats, it burned down the
whole house. It unceremoniously divested the people of a
basic constitutional right.
In both Opinions, I concluded that we must implement "the
right thing [initiative] in the right way at the right time and
for the right reason."
In the present case, I steadfastly stand by my foregoing
Opinions in Santiago and PIRMA. Tested against them, the
present Petition of Raul Lambino and Erico Aumentado must
be DISMISSED. Unfortunately, the right thing is being
rushed in the wrong way and for the wrong reasons. Let me
explain.
No Grave Abuse
of Discretion by Comelec
As in PIRMA, I find no grave abuse of discretion in Comelec's
dismissal of the Lambino Petition. After all, the Commission
merely followed the holding in Santiago permanently
____________________
"In the ultimate, the mission of the judiciary is to discover
truth and to make it prevail. This mission is undertaken not
only to resolve the vagaries of present events but also to build
the pathways of tomorrow. The sum total of the entire process
of adversarial litigation is the verity of facts and the
application of law thereto. By the majority cop-out in this
mission of discovery, our country and our people have been
deprived not only of a basic constitutional right, as earlier
noted, but also of the judicial opportunity to verify the truth."
enjoining the poll body "from entertaining or taking
cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to
the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly
enacted to provide for the implementation of the system."
Indeed, the Comelec did not violate the Constitution, the laws
or any jurisprudence.4 Neither can whim, caprice,
arbitrariness or personal bias be attributed to the
Commission.5 Quite the contrary, it prudently followed this
Court's jurisprudence in Santiago and PIRMA. Even
assuming arguendo that Comelec erred in ruling on a very
difficult and unsettled question of law, this Court still cannot
attribute grave abuse of discretion to the poll body with
respect to that action.6
The present Lambino Petition is in exactly the same situation
as that of PIRMA in 1997. The differences pointed out by
Justice Reynato S. Puno are, with due respect, superficial. It
is argued that, unlike the present Lambino Petition, PIRMA
did not contain verified signatures. These are distinctions
that do not make a difference. Precisely, Justice Puno is
urging a remand, because the verification issue is
54
"contentious" and remains unproven by petitioners. Clearly,
both the PIRMA and the Lambino Petitions contain
unverified signatures. Therefore, they both deserve the same
treatment: DISMISSAL.
Besides, the only reason given in the unanimous Resolution
on PIRMA v. Comelec was that the Commission had "only
complied" with this Court's Decision in Santiago, the same
reason given by Comelec in this case. The Separate Opinions
in PIRMA gave no other reason. No one argued, even
remotely, that the PIRMA Petition should have been
dismissed because the signatures were unverified.
To stress, I adhere to my Opinion in PIRMA that, "[b]eing a
constitutional requirement, the number of signatures
becomes a condition precedent to the filing of the petition,
and is jurisdictional.7 Without those signatures, the Comelec
shall motu proprio reject the petition."
So, until and unless Santiago is revisited and changed by this
Court or the legal moorings of the exercise of the right are
substantially changed, the Comelec cannot be faulted for
acting in accord with this Court's pronouncements.
Respondent Commission has no discretion, under any guise,
to refuse enforcement of any final decision of this Court.8 The
refusal of the poll body to act on the Lambino Petition was its
only recourse. Any other mode of action would appear not
only presumptuous, but also contemptuous. It would have
constituted defiance of the Court and would have surely been
struck down as grave abuse of discretion and contumacious
disregard of the supremacy of this Court as the final arbiter
of justiciable controversies.
Even assuming further that this Court rules, as I believe it
should (for the reasons given in my Opinions in Santiago and
PIRMA), that Republic Act 6735 is indeed sufficient to
implement an initiative to amend the Constitution, still, no
grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to the Comelec for
merely following prevailing jurisprudence extant at the time
it rendered its ruling in question.
Only Amendments,
Not Revisions
I reiterate that only amendments, not revisions, may be the
proper subject of an initiative to change the Constitution.
This principle is crystal clear from even a layperson's reading
of the basic law.9
I submit that changing the system of government from
presidential to parliamentary and the form of the legislature
from bicameral to unicameral contemplates an overhaul of
the structure of government. The ponencia has amply
demonstrated that the merger of the legislative and the
executive branches under a unicameral-parliamentary
system, "[b]y any legal test and under any jurisdiction," will
"radically alter the framework of government as set forth in
the Constitution." Indeed, the proposed changes have an
overall implication on the entire Constitution; they
effectively rewrite its most important and basic provisions.
The prolixity and complexity of the changes cannot be
categorized, even by semantic generosity, as "amendments."
In addition, may I say that of the three modes of changing the
Constitution, revisions (or amendments) may be proposed
only through the first two: by Congress or by a constitutional
convention. Under the third mode -- people's initiative -- only
amendments are allowed. Many of the justices' Opinions
have cited the historical, philosophical and jurisprudential
bases of their respective positions. I will not add to the woes
of the reader by reiterating them here.
Suffice it to say that, to me, the practical test to differentiate
an amendment from a revision is found in the Constitution
itself: a revision may be done only when the proposed change
can be drafted, defined, articulated, discussed and agreed
upon after a mature and democratic debate in a deliberative
body like Congress or a Convention. The changes proposed
must necessarily be scrutinized, as their adoption or non-
adoption must result from an informed judgment.
Indeed, the constitutional bodies that drafted the 1935, the
1972 and the 1987 Constitutions had to spend many months
of purposeful discussions, democratic debates and rounds of
voting before they could agree on the wordings covering the
philosophy, the underlying principles, and the structure of
government of our Republic.
Verily, even bills creating or changing the administrative
structure of local governments take several weeks or even
months of drafting, reading, and debating before Congress
can approve them. How much more when it comes to
constitutional changes?
A change in the form of government of our country from
presidential-bicameral to parliamentary-unicameral is
monumental. Even the initiative proponents admit this fact.
So, why should a revision be rammed down our people's
throats without the benefit of intelligent discussion in a
deliberative assembly?
Added to the constitutional mandate barring revisions is the
provision of RA 6735 expressly prohibiting petitions for
initiative from "embracing more than one subject matter."10
The present initiative covers at least two subjects: (1) the
shift from a presidential to a parliamentary form of
government; and (2) the change from a bicameral to a
unicameral legislature.11 Thus, even under Republic Act
6735 -- the law that Justice Puno and I hold to be sufficient
and valid -- the Lambino Petition deserves dismissal.
12 Percent and 3 Percent Thresholds
Not Proven by Petitioners
The litmus test of a people's petition for initiative is its ability
to muster the constitutional requirement that it be supported
by at least 12 percent of the registered voters nationwide, of
which at least 3 percent of the registered voters in every
legislative district must be represented. As pointed out by
Intervenors One Voice, Inc., et al., however, records show
that there was a failure to meet the minimum percentages
required.12
Even Justice Puno concedes that the 12 percent and 3 percent
constitutional requirements involve "contentious facts,"
which have not been proven by the Lambino Petition. Thus,
he is urging a remand to the Comelec.
But a remand is both imprudent and futile. It is imprudent
because the Constitution itself mandates the said requisites
of an initiative petition. In other words, a petition that does
not show the required percentages is fatally defective and
must be dismissed, as the Delfin Petition was, in Santiago.
Furthermore, as the ponencia had discussed extensively, the
present Petition is void and unconstitutional. It points out
that the Petition dismally fails to comply with the
constitutional requirement that an initiative must be directly
proposed by the people. Specifically, the ponencia has amply
established that petitioners were unable to show that the
Lambino Petition contained, or incorporated by attachment,
the full text of the proposed changes.
So, too, a remand is futile. Even if the required percentages
are proven before the Commission, the Petition must still be
dismissed for proposing a revision, not an amendment, in
gross violation of the Constitution. At the very least, it
proposes more than one subject, in violation of Republic Act
6735.
Summation
55
Petitioners plead with this Court to hear the voice of the
people because, in the words of Justice Puno who supports
them, the "people's voice is sovereign in a democracy."
I, too, believe in heeding the people's voice. I reiterate my
Separate Opinion in PIRMA that "initiative is a democratic
method of enabling our people to express their will and chart
their history. x x x. I believe that Filipinos have the ability
and the capacity to rise above themselves, to use this right of
initiative wisely and maturely, and to choose what is best for
themselves and their posterity."
This belief will not, however, automatically and blindly result
in an initiative to change the Constitution, because the
present Petition violates the following:
· The Constitution (specifically Article XVII, which allows
only amendments, not revisions, and requires definite
percentages of verified signatures)
· The law (specifically, Republic Act 6735, which prohibits
petitions containing more than one subject)
· Jurisprudence (specifically, PIRMA v. Comelec, which
dismissed the Petition then under consideration on the
ground that, by following the Santiago ruling, the Comelec
had not gravely abused its discretion).
I submit further that a remand of the Lambino Petition is
both imprudent and futile. More tellingly, it is a cop-out, a
hand-washing already discredited 2000 years ago. Instead of
finger-pointing, I believe we must confront the issues head
on, because the people expect no less from this august and
venerable institution of supreme justice.
Epilogue
At bottom, the issue in this case is simply the Rule of Law.13
Initiative, like referendum and recall, is a treasured feature
of the Filipino constitutional system. It was born out of our
world-admired and often-imitated People Power, but its
misuse and abuse must be resolutely rejected. Democracy
must be cherished, but mob rule vanquished.
The Constitution is a sacred social compact, forged between
the government and the people, between each individual and
the rest of the citizenry. Through it, the people have solemnly
expressed their will that all of them shall be governed by
laws, and their rights limited by agreed-upon covenants to
promote the common good. If we are to uphold the Rule of
Law and reject the rule of the mob, we must faithfully abide
by the processes the Constitution has ordained in order to
bring about a peaceful, just and humane society. Assuming
arguendo that six million people allegedly gave their assent
to the proposed changes in the Constitution, they are
nevertheless still bound by the social covenant -- the present
Constitution -- which was ratified by a far greater majority
almost twenty years ago.14 I do not denigrate the majesty of
the sovereign will; rather, I elevate our society to the loftiest
perch, because our government must remain as one of laws
and not of men.
Upon assuming office, each of the justices of the Supreme
Court took a solemn oath to uphold the Constitution. Being
the protectors of the fundamental law as the highest
expression of the sovereign will, they must subject to the
strictest scrutiny any attempt to change it, lest it be
trivialized and degraded by the assaults of the mob and of ill-
conceived designs. The Court must single-mindedly defend
the Constitution from bogus efforts falsely attributed to the
sovereign people.
The judiciary may be the weakest branch of government.
Nonetheless, when ranged against incessant voices from the
more powerful branches of government, it should never cower
in submission. On the other hand, I daresay that the same
weakness of the Court becomes its strength when it speaks
independently through decisions that rightfully uphold the
supremacy of the Constitution and the Rule of Law. The
strength of the judiciary lies not in its lack of brute power,
but in its moral courage to perform its constitutional duty at
all times against all odds. Its might is in its being right.15
During the past weeks, media outfits have been ablaze with
reports and innuendoes about alleged carrots offered and
sticks drawn by those interested in the outcome of this
case.16 There being no judicial proof of these allegations, I
shall not comment on them for the nonce, except to quote the
Good Book, which says, "There is nothing hidden that will not
be revealed, and nothing secret that will not be known and
come to light."17
Verily, the Supreme Court is now on the crossroads of
history. By its decision, the Court and each of its members
shall be judged by posterity. Ten years, fifty years, a hundred
years -- or even a thousand years -- from now, what the Court
did here, and how each justice opined and voted, will still be
talked about, either in shame or in pride. Indeed, the hand-
washing of Pontius Pilate, the abomination of Dred Scott, and
the loathing of Javellana still linger and haunt to this day.
Let not this case fall into the same damnation. Rather, let
this Court be known throughout the nation and the world for
its independence, integrity, industry and intelligence.
WHEREFORE, I vote to DISMISS the Petition.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
____________________
EN BANC
G.R. No. 174153 October 25, 2006
RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO, together
with 6,327,952 REGISTERED VOTERS, Petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET AL.,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 174299 October 25, 2006
MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR.
and RENE A. Q. SAGUISAG, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, represented by Chairman
BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, JR. and Commissioners
RESURRECCION Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A. TUASON,
JR., ROMEO A. BRAWNER, RENE V. SARMIENTO, and
John Doe and Peter Doe, Respondents.
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------- x
SEPARATE OPINION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
I agree with the opinion of our esteemed colleague, Justice
Reynato Puno, that the Court's ruling in Santiago v.
COMELEC1 is not a binding precedent. However, it is my
position that even if Santiago were reversed and Republic Act
No. 6735 (R.A. 6735) be held as sufficient law for the purpose
of people's initiative to amend the Constitution, the petition
for initiative in this case must nonetheless be dismissed.
There is absolutely no showing here that petitioners complied
with R.A. 6735, even as they blindly invoke the said law to
justify their alleged people's initiative. Section 5(b) of R.A.
6735 requires that "[a] petition for an initiative on the 1987
Constitution must have at least twelve per centum (12%) of
the total number of registered voters as signatories, of which
56
every legislative district must be represented by at least
three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein." On
the other hand, Section 5(c)2 of the same law requires that
the petition should state, among others, the proposition3 or
the "contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted,
approved or rejected, amended or repealed." If we were to
apply Section 5(c) to an initiative to amend the Constitution,
as petitioners submit, the petition for initiative signed by the
required number of voters should incorporate therein a text
of the proposed changes to the Constitution. However, such
requirement was not followed in the case at bar.
During the oral arguments, petitioner Lambino admitted
that they printed a mere 100,000 copies of the text of the
proposed changes to the Constitution. According to him,
these were subsequently distributed to their agents all over
the country, for attachment to the sheets of paper on which
the signatures were to be affixed. Upon being asked, however,
if he in fact knew whether the text was actually attached to
the signature sheets which were distributed for signing, he
said that he merely assumed that they were. In other words,
he could not tell the Court for certain whether their
representatives complied with this requirement.
The petition filed with the COMELEC, as well as that which
was shown to this Court, indubitably establish that the full
text of the proposed changes was not attached to the
signature sheets. All that the signature sheets contained was
the general proposition and abstract, which falls short of the
full text requirement of R.A. 6735.
The necessity of setting forth the text of the proposed
constitutional changes in the petition for initiative to be
signed by the people cannot be seriously disputed. To begin
with, Article XVII, Section 2 of the Constitution
unequivocally states that "[a]mendments to this Constitution
may likewise be directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the
total number of registered voters, of which every legislative
district must be represented by at least three per centum of
the registered voters therein." Evidently, for the people to
propose amendments to the Constitution, they must, in the
first instance, know exactly what they are proposing. It is not
enough that they merely possess a general idea of the
proposed changes, as the Constitution speaks of a "direct"
proposal by the people.
Although the framers of the Constitution left the matter of
implementing the constitutional right of initiative to
Congress, it might be noted that they themselves reasonably
assumed that the draft of the proposed constitutional
amendments would be shown to the people during the process
of signature gathering. Thus –
MR. RODRIGO. Section 2 of the complete committee report
provides: "upon petition of at least 10 percent of the
registered voters." How will we determine that 10 percent
has been achieved? How will the voters manifest their desire,
is it by signature?
MR. SUAREZ. Yes, by signatures.
MR. RODRIGO. Let us look at the mechanics. Let us say
some voters want to propose a constitutional amendment. Is
the draft of the proposed constitutional amendment ready to
be shown to the people when they are asked to sign?
MR. SUAREZ. That can be reasonably assumed, Madam
President.
MR. RODRIGO: What does the sponsor mean? The draft is
ready and shown to them before they sign. Now, who
prepares the draft?
MR. SUAREZ: The people themselves, Madam President.4
It may thus be logically assumed that even without Section
5(c) of R.A. 6735, the full text of the proposed changes must
necessarily be stated in or attached to the initiative petition.
The signatories to the petition must be given an opportunity
to fully comprehend the meaning and effect of the proposed
changes to enable them to make a free, intelligent and well-
informed choice on the matter.
Needless to say, the requirement of setting forth the complete
text of the proposed changes in the petition for initiative is a
safeguard against fraud and deception. If the whole text of
the proposed changes is contained in or attached to the
petition, intercalations and riders may be duly avoided. Only
then can we be assured that the proposed changes are truly
of the people and that the signatories have been fully
apprised of its implications.
If a statutory provision is essential to guard against fraud,
corruption or deception in the initiative and referendum
process, such provision must be viewed as an indispensable
requirement and failure to substantially comply therewith is
fatal.5 The failure of petitioners in this case to comply with
the full text requirement resultantly rendered their petition
for initiative fatally defective.
The petition for initiative is likewise irretrievably infirm
because it violates the one subject rule under Section 10(a) of
R.A. 6735:
SEC. 10. Prohibited Measures.— The following cannot be the
subject of an initiative or referendum petition:
(a) No petition embracing more than one subject shall be
submitted to the electorate; x x x
The one subject rule, as relating to an initiative to amend the
Constitution, has the same object and purpose as the one
subject-one bill rule embodied in Article VI, Section 26(1)6 of
the Constitution.7 To elaborate, the one subject-one bill rule
was designed to do away with the practice of inserting two or
more unrelated provisions in one bill, so that those favoring
one provision would be compelled to adopt the others. By this
process of log-rolling, the adoption of both provisions could be
accomplished and ensured, when neither, if standing alone,
could succeed on its own merits.
As applied to the initiative process, the one subject rule is
essentially designed to prevent surprise and fraud on the
electorate. It is meant to safeguard the integrity of the
initiative process by ensuring that no unrelated riders are
concealed within the terms of the proposed amendment. This
in turn guarantees that the signatories are fully aware of the
nature, scope and purpose of the proposed amendment.
Petitioners insist that the proposed changes embodied in
their petition for initiative relate only to one subject matter,
that is – the shift from presidential to a parliamentary
system of government. According to petitioners, all of the
other proposed changes are merely incidental to this main
proposal and are reasonably germane and necessary
thereto.8 An examination of the text of the proposed changes
reveals, however, that this is not the case.
The proposed changes to the Constitution cover other
subjects that are beyond the main proposal espoused by the
petitioners. Apart from a shift from the presidential to a
parliamentary form of government, the proposed changes
include the abolition of one House of Congress,9 and the
convening of a constituent assembly to propose additional
amendments to the Constitution.10 Also included within its
terms is an omnibus declaration that those constitutional
provisions under Articles VI and VII, which are inconsistent
with the unicameral-parliamentary form of government,
shall be deemed amended to conform thereto.
It is not difficult to see that while the proposed changes
appear to relate only to a shift in the form of government, it
57
actually seeks to affect other subjects that are not reasonably
germane to the constitutional alteration that is purportedly
sought. For one, a shift to a parliamentary system of
government does not necessarily result in the adoption of a
unicameral legislature. A parliamentary system can exist in
many different "hybrid" forms of government, which may or
may not embrace unicameralism.11 In other words, the shift
from presidential to parliamentary structure and from a
bicameral to a unicameral legislature is neither the cause nor
effect of the other.
I also fail to see the relation of convening a constituent
assembly with the proposed change in our system of
government. As a subject matter, the convening of a
constituent assembly to amend the Constitution presents a
range of issues that is far removed from the subject of a shift
in government. Besides, the constituent assembly is
supposed to convene and propose amendments to the
Constitution after the proposed change in the system of
government has already taken place. This only goes to show
that the convening of the constituent assembly is not
necessary to effectuate a change to a parliamentary system
of government.
The omnibus statement that all provisions under Articles VI
and VII which are inconsistent with a unicameral-
parliamentary system of government shall be deemed
amended is equally bothersome. The statement does not
specify what these inconsistencies and amendments may be,
such that everyone is left to guess the provisions that could
eventually be affected by the proposed changes. The subject
and scope of these automatic amendments cannot even be
spelled out with certainty. There is thus no reasonable
measure of its impact on the other constitutional provisions.
The foregoing proposed changes cannot be the subject of a
people's initiative under Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution. Taken together, the proposed changes indicate
that the intendment is not simply to effect substantial
amendments to the Constitution, but a revision thereof. The
distinction between an amendment and revision was
explained by Dean Vicente G. Sinco, as follows:
"Strictly speaking, the act of revising a constitution involves
alterations of different portions of the entire document. It
may result in the rewriting either of the whole constitution,
or the greater portion of it, or perhaps only some of its
important provisions. But whatever results the revision may
produce, the factor that characterizes it as an act of revision
is the original intention and plan authorized to be carried out.
That intention and plan must contemplate a consideration of
all the provisions of the constitution to determine which one
should be altered or suppressed or whether the whole
document should be replaced with an entirely new one.
The act of amending a constitution, on the other hand,
envisages a change of only a few specific provisions. The
intention of an act to amend is not to consider the advisability
of changing the entire constitution or of considering that
possibility. The intention rather is to improve specific parts
of the existing constitution or to add to it provisions deemed
essential on account of changed conditions or to suppress
portions of it that seem obsolete, or dangerous, or misleading
in their effect."12
The foregoing traditional exposition of the difference between
amendment and revision has indeed guided us throughout
our constitutional history. However, the distinction between
the two terms is not, to my mind, as significant in the context
of our past constitutions, as it should be now under the 1987
Constitution. The reason for this is apparent. Under our past
constitutions, it was Congress alone, acting either as a
constituent assembly or by calling out a constitutional
convention, that exercised authority to either amend or
revise the Constitution through the procedures therein
described. Although the distinction between the two terms
was theoretically recognized under both the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions, the need to highlight the difference was not as
material because it was only Congress that could effect
constitutional changes by choosing between the two
modalities.
However, it is different now under the 1987 Constitution.
Apart from providing for the two modes of either Congress
constituting itself as a constituent assembly or calling out for
a constitutional convention, a third mode was introduced for
proposing changes to the Constitution. This mode refers to
the people's right to propose amendments to the fundamental
law through the filing of a petition for initiative.
Otherwise stated, our experience of what constitutes
amendment or revision under the past constitutions is not
determinative of what the two terms mean now, as related to
the exercise of the right to propose either amendments or
revision. The changes introduced to both the Constitutions of
1935 and 1973 could have indeed been deemed an
amendment or revision, but the authority for effecting either
would never have been questioned since the same belonged
solely to Congress. In contrast, the 1987 Constitution clearly
limits the right of the people to directly propose
constitutional changes to amendments only. We must
consequently not be swayed by examples of constitutional
changes effected prior to the present fundamental law, in
determining whether such changes are revisory or
amendatory in nature.
In this regard, it should be noted that the distinction laid
down by Justice Felix Q. Antonio in Javellana v. Executive
Secretary13 related to the procedure to be followed in
ratifying a completely new charter proposed by a
constitutional convention. The authority or right of the
constitutional convention itself to effect such a revision was
not put in issue in that case. As far as determining what
constitutes "amendments" for the purpose of a people's
initiative, therefore, we have neither relevant precedent nor
prior experience. We must thus confine ourselves to Dean
Sinco's basic articulation of the two terms.
It is clear from Dean Sinco's explanation that a revision may
either be of the whole or only part of the Constitution. The
part need not be a substantial part as a change may qualify
as a revision even if it only involves some of the important
provisions. For as long as the intention and plan to be carried
out contemplate a consideration of all the provisions of the
Constitution "to determine which should be altered or
suppressed, or whether the whole document should be
replaced with an entirely new one," the proposed change may
be deemed a revision and not merely an amendment.
Thus, it is not by the sheer number alone of the proposed
changes that the same may be considered as either an
amendment or revision. In so determining, another
overriding factor is the "original intention and plan
authorized to be carried out" by the proposed changes. If the
same relates to a re-examination of the entire document to
see which provisions remain relevant or if it has far-reaching
effects on the entire document, then the same constitutes a
revision and not a mere amendment of the Constitution.
From the foregoing, it is readily apparent that a combination
of the quantitative and qualitative test is necessary in
assessing what may be considered as an amendment or
revision. It is not enough that we focus simply on the physical
scope of the proposed changes, but also consider what it
means in relation to the entire document. No clear
demarcation line can be drawn to distinguish the two terms
and each circumstance must be judged on the basis of its own
peculiar conditions. The determination lies in assessing the
impact that the proposed changes may have on the entire
instrument, and not simply on an arithmetical appraisal of
the specific provisions which it seeks to affect.
In McFadden v. Jordan,14 the California Supreme Court laid
down the groundwork for the combination of quantitative and
58
qualitative assessment of proposed constitutional changes, in
order to determine whether the same is revisory or merely
amendatory. In that case, the McFadden court found the
proposed changes extensive since at least 15 of the 25 articles
contained in the California Constitution would either be
repealed in their entirety or substantially altered, and four
new topics would be introduced. However, it went on to
consider the qualitative effects that the proposed initiative
measure would have on California's basic plan of
government. It observed that the proposal would alter the
checks and balances inherent in such plan, by delegating far-
reaching and mixed powers to an independent commission
created under the proposed measure. Consequently, the
proposal in McFadden was not only deemed as broad and
numerous in physical scope, but was also held as having a
substantive effect on the fundamental governmental plan of
the State of California.
The dual aspect of the amendment/revision analysis was
reiterated by the California Supreme Court in Raven v.
Deukmeijan.15 Proposition 115, as the initiative in that case
was called, would vest in the United States Supreme Court
all judicial interpretative powers of the California courts over
fundamental criminal defense rights in that state. It was
observed that although quantitatively, the proposition did
"not seem so extensive as to change directly the substantial
entirety of the Constitution by the deletion or alteration of
numerous existing provisions," the same, nonetheless,
"would substantially alter the substance and integrity of the
state Constitution as a document of independent force and
effect." Quoting Amador Valley Joint Union High School
District v. State Board of Equalization,16 the Raven court
said:
". . . apart from a measure effecting widespread deletions,
additions and amendments involving many constitutional
articles, 'even a relatively simple enactment may accomplish
such far reaching changes in the nature of our basic
governmental plan as to amount to a revision also…[A]n
enactment which purported to vest all judicial power in the
Legislature would amount to a revision without regard either
to the length or complexity of the measure or the number of
existing articles or sections affected by such change.'"
(Underscoring supplied and citations omitted)
Thus, in resolving the amendment/revision issue, the
California Court examines both the quantitative and
qualitative effects of a proposed measure on its constitutional
scheme. Substantial changes in either respect could amount
to a revision.17
I am persuaded that we can approach the present issue in the
same manner. The experience of the courts in California is
not far removed from the standards expounded on by Dean
Sinco when he set out to differentiate between amendment
and revision. It is actually consistent, not only with our
traditional concept of the two terms, but also with the
mindset of our constitutional framers when they referred to
the disquisition of Justice Antonio in Javellana.18 We must
thus consider whether the proposed changes in this case
affect our Constitution in both its substantial physical
entirety and in its basic plan of government.
The question posed is: do the proposed changes, regardless of
whether these are simple or substantial, amount to a revision
as to be excluded from the people's right to directly propose
amendments to the fundamental law?
As indicated earlier, we may apply the
quantitative/qualitative test in determining the nature of the
proposed changes. These tests are consistent with Dean
Sinco's traditional concept of amendment and revision when
he explains that, quantitatively, revision "may result in the
rewriting either of the whole constitution, or the greater part
of it, or perhaps only some of its provisions." In any case, he
continues, "the factor that characterizes it as an act of
revision is the original intention and plan authorized to be
carried out." Unmistakably, the latter statement refers to the
qualitative effect of the proposed changes.
It may thus be conceded that, quantitatively, the changes
espoused by the proponents in this case will affect only two
(2) out of the eighteen (18) articles of the 1987 Constitution,
namely, Article VI (Legislative Department) and Article VII
(Executive Department), as well as provisions that will
ensure the smooth transition from a presidential-bicameral
system to a parliamentary-unicameral structure of
government. The quantitative effect of the proposed changes
is neither broad nor extensive and will not affect the
substantial entirety of the 1987 Constitution.
However, it is my opinion that the proposed changes will
have serious qualitative consequences on the Constitution.
The initiative petition, if successful, will undoubtedly alter,
not only our basic governmental plan, but also redefine our
rights as citizens in relation to government. The proposed
changes will set into motion a ripple effect that will strike at
the very foundation of our basic constitutional plan. It is
therefore an impermissible constitutional revision that may
not be effected through a people's initiative.
Petitioners' main proposal pertains to the shifting of our form
of government from the presidential to the parliamentary
system. An examination of their proposal reveals that there
will be a fusion of the executive and legislative departments
into one parliament that will be elected on the basis of
proportional representation. No term limits are set for the
members of parliament except for those elected under the
party-list system whose terms and number shall be provided
by law. There will be a President who shall be the head of
state, but the head of government is the Prime Minister. The
latter and his cabinet shall be elected from among the
members of parliament and shall be responsible to
parliament for the program of government.
The preceding proposal indicates that, under the proposed
system, the executive and legislature shall be one and the
same, such that parliament will be the paramount governing
institution. What this implies is that there will be no
separation between the law-making and enforcement powers
of the state, that are traditionally delineated between the
executive and legislature in a presidential form of
government. Necessarily, the checks and balances inherent
in the fundamental plan of our U.S.-style presidential system
will be eliminated. The workings of government shall instead
be controlled by the internal political dynamics prevailing in
the parliament.
Our present governmental system is built on the separation
of powers among the three branches of government. The
legislature is generally limited to the enactment of laws, the
executive to the enforcement of laws and the judiciary to the
application of laws. This separation is intended to prevent a
concentration of authority in one person or group that might
lead to an irreversible error or abuse in its exercise to the
detriment of our republican institutions. In the words of
Justice Laurel, the doctrine of separation of powers is
intended to secure action, to forestall overaction, to prevent
despotism and obtain efficiency.19
In the proposed parliamentary system, there is an obvious
lack of formal institutional checks on the legislative and
executive powers of the state, since both the Prime Minister
and the members of his cabinet are drawn from parliament.
There are no effective limits to what the Prime Minister and
parliament can do, except the will of the parliamentary
majority. This goes against the central principle of our
present constitutional scheme that distributes the powers of
government and provides for counteraction among the three
branches. Although both the presidential and parliamentary
systems are theoretically consistent with constitutional
democracy, the underlying tenets and resulting
governmental framework are nonetheless radically different.
59
Consequently, the shift from presidential to parliamentary
form of government cannot be regarded as anything but a
drastic change. It will require a total overhaul of our
governmental structure and involve a re-orientation in the
cardinal doctrines that govern our constitutional set-up. As
explained by Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J., a switch from the
presidential system to a parliamentary system would be a
revision because of its over-all impact on the entire
constitutional structure.20 It cannot, by any standard, be
deemed as a mere constitutional amendment.
An amendment envisages an alteration of one or a few
specific and separable provisions. The guiding original
intention of an amendment is to improve specific parts or to
add new provisions deemed necessary to meet new conditions
or to suppress specific portions that may have become
obsolete or that are judged to be dangerous. In revision,
however, the guiding original intention and plan
contemplates a re-examination of the entire document, or of
provisions of the document which have over-all implications
for the entire document, to determine how and to what extent
they should be altered.21 (Underscoring supplied)
The inclusion of a proposal to convene a constituent assembly
likewise shows the intention of the proponents to effect even
more far-reaching changes in our fundamental law. If the
original intent were to simply shift the form of government to
the parliamentary system, then there would have been no
need for the calling out of a constituent assembly to propose
further amendments to the Constitution. It should be noted
that, once convened, a constituent assembly can do away and
replace any constitutional provision which may not even have
a bearing on the shift to a parliamentary system of
government. The inclusion of such a proposal reveals the
proponents' plan to consider all provisions of the constitution,
either to determine which of its provisions should be altered
or suppressed or whether the whole document should be
replaced with an entirely new one.
Consequently, it is not true that only Articles VI and VII are
covered by the alleged people's initiative. The proposal to
convene a constituent assembly, which by its terms is
mandatory, will practically jeopardize the future of the entire
Constitution and place it on shaky grounds. The plan of the
proponents, as reflected in their proposed changes, goes
beyond the shifting of government from the presidential to
the parliamentary system. Indeed, it could even extend to the
"fundamental nature of our state as a democratic and
republican state."
To say that the proposed changes will affect only the
constitution of government is therefore a fallacy. To repeat,
the combined effect of the proposed changes to Articles VI
and VII and those pertaining to the Transitory Provisions
under Article XVIII indubitably establish the intent and plan
of the proponents to possibly affect even the constitutions of
liberty and sovereignty. Indeed, no valid reason exists for
authorizing further amendments or revisions to the
Constitution if the intention of the proposed changes is truly
what it purports to be.
There is no question here that only amendments to the
Constitution may be undertaken through a people's initiative
and not a revision, as textually reflected in the Constitution
itself. This conclusion is inevitable especially from a
comparative examination of Section 2 in relation to Sections
1 and 4 of Article XVII, which state:
SECTION 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this
Constitution may be proposed by:
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its
Members; or
(2) A constitutional convention.
SECTION 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise
be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of
registered voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum of the registered
voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be
authorized within five years following the ratification of this
Constitution nor oftener than once every five years
thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the
exercise of this right.
xxxx
SECTION 4. Any amendment to, or revision of, this
Constitution under Section 1 hereof shall be valid when
ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which
shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety
days after the approval of such amendment or revision.
Any amendment under Section 2 hereof shall be valid when
ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which
shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety
days after the certification by the Commission of Elections of
the sufficiency of the petition. (Underscoring supplied)
It is clear that the right of the people to directly propose
changes to the Constitution is limited to amendments and
does not include a revision thereof. Otherwise, it would have
been unnecessary to provide for Section 2 to distinguish its
scope from the rights vested in Congress under Section 1. The
latter lucidly states that Congress may propose both
amendments and a revision of the Constitution by either
convening a constituent assembly or calling for a
constitutional convention. Section 2, on the other hand,
textually commits to the people the right to propose only
amendments by direct action.
To hold, therefore, that Section 2 allows substantial
amendments amounting to revision obliterates the clear
distinction in scope between Sections 1 and 2. The intention,
as may be seen from a cursory perusal of the above
provisions, is to provide differing fields of application for the
three modes of effecting changes to the Constitution. We need
not even delve into the intent of the constitutional framers to
see that the distinction in scope is definitely marked. We
should thus apply these provisions with a discerning regard
for this distinction. Again, McFadden22 is instructive:
". . . The differentiation required is not merely between two
words; more accurately it is between two procedures and
between their respective fields of application. Each
procedure, if we follow elementary principles of statutory
construction, must be understood to have a substantial field
of application, not to be x x x a mere alternative procedure in
the same field. Each of the two words, then, must be
understood to denote, respectively, not only a procedure but
also a field of application appropriate to its procedure. The
people of this state have spoken; they made it clear when they
adopted article XVIII and made amendment relatively simple
but provided the formidable bulwark of a constitutional
convention as a protection against improvident or hasty (or
any other) revision, that they understood that there was a
real difference between amendment and revision. We find
nothing whatsoever in the language of the initiative
amendment of 1911 (art. IV, § 1) to effect a breaking down of
that difference. On the contrary, the distinction appears to be
x x x scrupulously preserved by the express declaration in the
amendment x x x that the power to propose and vote on
"amendments to the Constitution" is reserved directly to the
people in initiative proceedings, while leaving unmentioned
the power and the procedure relative to constitutional
revision, which revisional power and procedure, it will be
remembered, had already been specifically treated in section
2 of article XVIII. Intervenors' contention--that any change
less than a total one is but amendatory--would reduce to the
60
rubble of absurdity the bulwark so carefully erected and
preserved. Each situation involving the question of
amendment, as contrasted with revision, of the Constitution
must, we think, be resolved upon its own facts."
Thus, our people too have spoken when they overwhelmingly
ratified the 1987 Constitution, with the provisions on
amendments and revisions under Article XVII. The voice and
will of our people cannot be any clearer when they limited
people's initiative to mere amendments of the fundamental
law and excluded revisions in its scope. In this regard, the
task of the Court is to give effect to the people's voice, as
expressed unequivocally through the Constitution.
Article XVII on amendments and revisions is called a
"constitution of sovereignty" because it defines the
constitutional meaning of "sovereignty of the people." It is
through these provisions that the sovereign people have
allowed the expression of their sovereign will and have
canalized their powers which would otherwise be plenary. By
approving these provisions, the sovereign people have
decided to limit themselves and future generations in the
exercise of their sovereign power.23 They are thus bound by
the constitution and are powerless, whatever their numbers,
to change or thwart its mandates, except through the means
prescribed by the Constitution itself.24
It is thus misplaced to argue that the people may propose
revisions to the Constitution through people's initiative
because their representatives, whose power is merely
delegated, may do so. While Section 1 of Article XVII may be
considered as a provision delegating the sovereign powers of
amendment and revision to Congress, Section 2, in contrast,
is a self-limitation on that sovereign power. In the words of
Cooley:
x x x Although by their constitutions the people have
delegated the exercise of sovereign powers to the several
departments, they have not thereby divested themselves of
the sovereignty. They retain in their own hands, so far as
they have thought it needful to do so, a power to control the
governments they create, and the three departments are
responsible to and subject to be ordered, directed, changed or
abolished by them. But this control and direction must be
exercised in the legitimate mode previously agreed upon. The
voice of the people, acting in their sovereign capacity, can be
of legal force only when expressed at the times and under the
conditions which they themselves have prescribed and
pointed out by the Constitution, or which, consistently with
the Constitution, have been prescribed and pointed out for
them by statute; and if by any portion of the people, however
large, an attempt should be made to interfere with the
regular working of the agencies of government at any other
time or in any other mode than as allowed by existing law,
either constitutional or statutory, it would be revolutionary
in character, and must be resisted and repressed by the
officers who, for the time being, represent legitimate
government.25 (Underscoring supplied)
Consequently, there is here no case of "the spring rising
above its source." Nor is it one where the people's sovereign
power has been relegated to a lesser plane than that of
Congress. In choosing to exercise self-limitation, there is no
absence or lack of even a fraction of the sovereign power of
the people since self-limitation itself is an expression of that
sovereign power. The people have chosen to delegate and
limit their sovereign power by virtue of the Constitution and
are bound by the parameters that they themselves have
ordained. Otherwise, if the people choose to defy their self-
imposed constitutional restraints, we will be faced with a
revolutionary situation.26
It has repeatedly been emphasized that ours is a democratic
and republican state.27 Even as we affirm, however, that
aspect of direct democracy, we should not forget that, first
and foremost, we are a constitutional democracy. To uphold
direct democracy at the expense of the fundamental law is to
sanction, not a constitutional, but an extra-constitutional
recourse. This is clearly beyond the powers of the Court who,
by sovereign mandate, is the guardian and keeper of the
Constitution.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, I vote to DISMISS the
petition in G.R. No. 174153.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
____________________
EN BANC
G.R. NO. 174153
RAUL L. LAMBINO AND ENRICO B. AUMENTADO
TOGETHER WITH 6,327,952 REGISTERED VOTERS,
petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
TRADE UNION CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES
(TUCP), petitioners-intervenors,
RONALD L. ADAMAT, ROLANDO MANUEL RIVERA,
RUELO BAYA, petitioners-intervenors,
SULONGBAYAN MOVEMENT FOUNDATION, INC.,
petitioner-intervenor,
PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT AND GENERAL WORKERS
ORGANIZATION (PTGWO) AND VICTORINO F. BALAIS,
petitioners-intervenors,
ONEVOICE INC., CHRISTIAN S. MONSOD, RENE B.
AZURIN, MANUEL L. QUEZON III, BENJAMIN T.
TOLOSA, JR., SUSAN V. OPLE AND CARLOS P. MEDINA,
JR., oppositors-intervenors,
ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC., oppositor-intervenor,
ATTY. PETE QUIRINO-QUADRA, oppositor-intervenor,
BAYAN, BAYAN MUNA, KILUSANG MAYO UNO, HEAD,
ECUMENICAL BISHOPS FROUM, MIGRANTE,
GABRIELA, GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY, ANAKBAYAN,
LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS,LEONARDO SAN
JOSE, JOJO PINEDA, DR. DARBY SANTIAGO, AND DR.
REGINALD PAMUGAS, oppositors-intervenors,
LORETA ANN P. ROSALES, MARIO JOYO AGUJA, ANA
THERESA HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, oppositors-
intervenors,
LUWALHATI ANTONINO, oppositor-intervenor,
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION
(PHILCONSA), CONRADO F.ESTRELLA, TOMAS C.
TOLEDO, MARIANO M. TAJON, FROILAN M.
BACUNGAN, JOAQUIN T. VENUS, JR., FORTUNATO P.
AGUAS AND AMADO GAT INCION, oppositors-
intervenors,
SENATE MINORITY LEADER AQUILINO P. PIMENTEL,
JR. AND SENATORS SERGIO R. OSMENA III, JAMBY A.S.
MADRIGAL, LUISA P. EJERCIRO-ESTRADA, JINGGOY
ESTRADA, ALFREDO S. LIM, AND PANFILO M. LACSON,
oppositors-intervenors,
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA AND PWERSA NG
MASANG PILIPINO, oppositors-intervenors,
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES CEBU CITY
AND CEBU CHAPTER, oppositors-intervenors,
JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, BYRON D. BOCAR, MA TANYA
KARINA A. LAT, ANTONIO L. SALVADOR AND
RANDALL C. TABAYOYONG, oppostors-intervenors,
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY ITS
PRESIDENT, MANUEL VILLAR, JR., oppositor-intervenor;
G.R. NO. 174299
MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR.
AND RENE A. Q. SAGUISAG, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, REPRESENTED BY
CHAIRMAN BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, SR. AND
COMMISSIONERS RESSURRECCION Z. BORRA,
FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR. ROMEO A. BRAWNER,
61
RENE V. SARMIENTO AND JOHN DOE AND PETER
DOE, respondents.
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------- x
CONCURRING OPINION
SANDOVAL–GUTIERREZ, J.:
Vox populi vox Dei -- the voice of the people is the voice of
God. Caution should be exercised in choosing one's battlecry,
lest it does more harm than good to one's cause. In its original
context, the complete version of this Latin phrase means
exactly the opposite of what it is frequently taken to mean. It
originated from a holy man, the monk Alcuin, who advised
Charlemagne, "nec audiendi qui solent dicere vox populi vox
Dei quum tumultuositas vulgi semper insaniae proxima sit,"
meaning, "And those people should not be listened to who
keep on saying, 'The voice of the people is the voice of God,'
since the riotousness of the crowd is always very close to
madness."1 Perhaps, it is by providence that the true
meaning of the Latin phrase is revealed upon petitioners and
their allies – that they may reflect upon the sincerity and
authenticity of their "people's initiative."
History has been a witness to countless iniquities committed
in the name of God. Wars were waged, despotism tolerated
and oppressions justified – all these transpired as man
boasted of God's imprimatur. Today, petitioners and their
allies hum the same rallying call, convincing this Court that
the people's initiative is the "voice of the people" and,
therefore, the "voice of God." After a thorough consideration
of the petitions, I have come to realize that man, with his
ingenuity and arrogance, has perfected the craft of imitating
the voice of God. It is against this kind of genius that the
Court must guard itself.
The facts of the case are undisputed.
In 1996, the Movement for People's Initiative sought to
exercise the power of initiative under Section 2, Article XVII
of the Constitution which reads:
Section 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be
directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of
registered voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum of the registered
voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be
authorized within five years following the ratification of this
Constitution nor oftener than once every five years
thereafter,
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the
exercise of this right.
The exercise was thwarted by a petition for prohibition filed
with this Court by Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, et al.,
entitled "Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla and
Maria Isabel Ongpin, petitioners, v. Commission on Elections
(COMELEC), Jesus Delfin, Alberto Pedrosa and Carmen
Pedrosa, in their capacities as founding members of the
People's Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action
(PIRMA), respondents."2 The case was docketed as G.R. No.
127325. On March 19, 1997, this Court rendered its Decision
in favor of petitioners, holding that Republic Act No. 6735
(R.A. No. 6735), An Act Providing for a System of Initiative
and Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor, is
"incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and
conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the
Constitution is concerned." A majority of eight (8) Justices
fully concurred with this ruling, while five (5) subscribed to
the opposite view. One (1) opined that there is no need to rule
on the adequacy of R.A. No. 6735.
On motion for reconsideration, two (2) of the eight (8) Justices
reconsidered their positions. One (1) filed an inhibition and
the other one (1) joined the minority opinion. As a
consequence, of the thirteen (13) Justices who participated in
the deliberation, six (6) voted in favor of the majority opinion,
while the other six (6) voted in favor of the minority opinion.3
A few months thereafter, or on September 23, 1997, the Court
dismissed a similar case, entitled People's Initiative for
Reform, Modernization and Action (PIRMA) v. Commission
on Elections4 on the ground that the COMELEC did not
commit grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed PIRMA's
Petition for Initiative to Propose Amendments to the
Constitution "it appearing that that it only complied with the
dispositions in the Decision of the Court in G.R. no. 127325
(Santiago v. COMELEC) promulgated on March 19, 1997,
and its Resolution of June 10, 1997." Seven (7) Justices voted
that there was no need to re-examine its ruling, as regards
the issue of the sufficiency of R.A. No. 6735. Another Justice
concurred, but on the different premise that the case at bar
is not the proper vehicle for such re-examination. Five (5)
Justice opined otherwise.
This time, another group known as Sigaw ng Bayan, in
coordination with the Union of Local Authorities of the
Philippines (ULAP), have gathered signatures in support of
the proposed amendments to the Constitution, which entail
a change in the form of government from bicameral-
presidential to unicameral-parliamentary, thus:
A. Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI shall be amended
to read as follows:
Section 1. (1) The legislative and executive powers shall be
vested in a unicameral Parliament which shall be composed
of as many members as may be provided by law, to be
apportioned among the provinces, representative districts,
and cities in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, with at least three hundred thousand
inhabitants per district, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio. Each district shall comprise, as far as
practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory, and
each province must have at least one member.
(2) Each Member of Parliament shall be a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-five years old on the
day of the election, a resident of his district for at least one
year prior thereto, and shall be elected by the qualified voters
of his district for a term of five years without limitation as to
the number thereof, except those under the party-list system
which shall be provided for by law and whose number shall
be equal to twenty per centum of the total membership
coming from the parliamentary districts.
B. Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
are hereby amended to read, as follows:
Section 1. There shall be a President who shall be the Head
of State. The executive power shall be exercised by a Prime
Minister, with the assistance of the Cabinet. The Prime
Minister shall be elected by a majority of all the Members of
Parliament from among themselves. He shall be responsible
to the Parliament for the program of government.
C. For the purpose of insuring an orderly transition from the
bicameral-Presidential to a unicameral-Parliamentary form
of government, there shall be a new Article XVIII, entitled
"Transitory Provisions," which shall read, as follows:
Section 1. (1) The incumbent President and Vice President
shall serve until the expiration of their term at noon on the
thirtieth day of June 2010 and shall continue to exercise their
powers under the 1987 Constitution unless impeached by a
vote of two thirds of all the members of the interim
parliament.
62
(2) In case of death, permanent disability, resignation or
removal from office of the incumbent President, the
incumbent Vice President shall succeed as President. In case
of death, permanent disability, resignation or removal from
office of both the incumbent President and Vice President,
the interim Prime Minister shall assume all the powers and
responsibilities of Prime Minister under Article VII as
amended.
Section 2. Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent
President and Vice President, with the exception of Sections
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
which shall hereby be amended and Sections 18 and 24 which
shall be deleted, all other Sections of Article VI are hereby
retained and renumbered sequentially as Section 2, ad
seriatium up to 26, unless they are inconsistent with the
Parliamentary system of government, in which case, they
shall be amended to conform with a unicameral
parliamentary form of government; provided, however, that
any and all references therein to "Congress," "Senate,"
"House of Representatives" and "Houses of Congress" shall be
changed to read "Parliament;" that any and all references
therein to "Member(s) of Congress," "Senator(s)" or
"Member(s) of Parliament" and any and all references to the
"President" and/or "Acting President" shall be changed to
read "Prime Minister."
Section 3. Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent
President and Vice President, with the exception of Sections
1, 2, 3 and 4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which are
hereby be amended and Sections 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 which
are hereby deleted, all other Sections of Article VII shall be
retained and renumbered sequentially as Section 2, ad
seriatim up to 14, unless they shall be inconsistent with
Section 1 hereof, in which case they shall be deemed amended
so as to conform to a unicameral Parliamentary System of
government; provided, however, that any and all references
therein to "Congress," "Senate," "House of Representatives"
and "Houses of Congress" shall be changed to read
"Parliament;" that any and all references therein to
"Member(s) of Congress," "Senator(s)" or "Member(s) of the
House of Representatives" shall be changed to read as
"Member(s) of Parliament" and any and all references to the
"President" and/or "Acting President" shall be changed to
read "Prime Minister."
Section 4. (1) There shall exist, upon the ratification of these
amendments, an interim Parliament which shall continue
until the Members of the regular Parliament shall have been
elected and shall have qualified. It shall be composed of the
incumbent Members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives and the incumbent Members of the Cabinet
who are heads of executive departments.
(2) The incumbent Vice President shall automatically be a
Member of Parliament until noon of the thirtieth day of June
2010. He shall also be a member of the cabinet and shall head
a ministry. He shall initially convene the interim Parliament
and shall preside over its sessions for the election of the
interim Prime Minister and until the Speaker shall have
been elected by a majority vote of all the members of the
interim Parliament from among themselves.
(3) Senators whose term of office ends in 2010 shall be
Members of Parliament until noon of the thirtieth day of June
2010.
(4) Within forty-five days from ratification of these
amendments, the interim Parliament shall convene to
propose amendments to, or revisions of, this Constitution
consistent with the principles of local autonomy,
decentralization and a strong bureaucracy.
Section 5. (1) The incumbent President, who is the Chief
Executive, shall nominate, from among the members of the
interim Parliament, an interim Prime Minister, who shall be
elected by a majority vote of the members thereof. The
interim Prime Minister shall oversee the various ministries
and shall perform such powers and responsibilities as may be
delegated to him by the incumbent President."
(2) The interim Parliament shall provide for the election of
the members of Parliament which shall be synchronized and
held simultaneously with the election of all local government
officials. The duty elected Prime Minister shall continue to
exercise and perform the powers, duties and responsibilities
of the interim Prime Minister until the expiration of the term
of the incumbent President and Vice President.
Sigaw ng Bayan prepared signature sheets, and written on
its upper right hand portion is the abstract of the proposed
amendments, quoted as follows:
Abstract: Do you approve of the amendment of Article VI and
VII of the 1987 Constitution, changing the form of
government from the present bicameral-presidential to a
unicameral-parliamentary system of government, in order to
achieve greater efficiency, simplicity and economy in
government; and providing an Article XVIII as Transitory
Provisions for the orderly shift from one system to another?
On August 25, 2006, Raul L. Lambino and Enrico B.
Aumentado, herein petitioners, filed with the COMELEC a
Petition for Initiative to Amend the Constitution.5 Five (5)
days thereafter, they filed an Amended Petition alleging that
they are filing the petition in their own behalf and together
with some 6.3 million registered voters who have affixed their
signatures on the signature sheets attached thereto. They
claimed that the signatures of registered voters appearing on
the signature sheets, constituting at least twelve per cent
(12%) of all registered voters in the country, wherein each
legislative district is represented by at least three per cent
(3%) of all the registered voters, were verified by their
respective city or municipal election officers.
Several organizations opposed the petition. 6
In a Resolution dated August 31, 2006, the COMELEC
denied due course to the petition, citing as basis this Court's
ruling in Santiago, permanently enjoining it "from
entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for
initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a
sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for
the implementation of the system."
Hence, the present petition for certiorari and mandamus
praying that this Court set aside the COMELEC Resolution
and direct the latter tocomply with Section 4, Article XVII of
the Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 4 x x x
Any amendment under Section 2 hereof shall be valid when
ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which
shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety
days after the certification by the Commission on Elections of
the sufficiency of the petition.
I vote to dismiss the petition of Lambino, et al. in G.R. No.
174153 and grant the petition of Mar-len Abigail Binay, et al.
in G.R. No. 174299. Here, petitioners pray that the
COMELEC Chairman and Commissioners be required to
show why they should not be punished for contempt7 of court
for disregarding the permanent injunction issued by this
Court in Santiago.
I
Respondent COMELEC did not act with grave abuse of
discretion
Without necessarily brushing aside the other important
issues, I believe the resolution of the present petition hinges
on this singular issue -- did the COMELEC commit grave
abuse of discretion when it denied Lambino, et al.'s petition
63
for initiative to amend the Constitution on the basis of this
Court's Decision in Santiago v. COMELEC?
In other words, regardless of how the other remaining issues
are resolved, still, the ultimate yardstick is the attendance of
"grave abuse of discretion" on the part of the COMELEC.
Jurisprudence teaches that an act of a court or tribunal may
only be considered as committed in grave abuse of discretion
when the same was performed in a capricious or whimsical
exercise of judgment. The abuse of discretion must be so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty
or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to
act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility.8
The Resolution of respondent COMELEC denying due course
to the petition for initiative on the basis of a case (Santiago)
decided by this Court cannot, in any way, be characterized as
"capricious or whimsical," "patent and gross," or "arbitrary
and despotic." On the contrary, it was the most prudent
course to take. It must be stressed that in Santiago, this
Court permanently enjoins respondent COMELEC "from
entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for
initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a
sufficient law shall have been validly enacted." It being a fact
that Congress has not enacted a sufficient law, respondent
COMELEC has no alternative but to adhere to Santiago.
Otherwise, it is vulnerable to a citation for contempt. As
succinctly stated by Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban
(then Associate Justice) in his Separate Opinion in the
subsequent case of PIRMA vs. COMELEC:9
x x x I cannot fault the Comelec for complying with the ruling
even if it, too, disagreed with said decision's ratio decidendi.
Respondent Comelec was directly enjoined by the highest
Court of the land. It had no choice but to obey. Its obedience
cannot constitute grave abuse of discretion. Refusal to act on
the PIRMA petition was the only recourse open to the
Comelec. Any other mode of action would have constituted
defiance of the Court and would have been struck down as
grave abuse of discretion and contumacious disregard of this
Court's supremacy as the final arbiter of justiciable
controversies.
It need not be emphasized that in our judicial hierarchy, this
Court reigns supreme. All courts, tribunals and
administrative bodies exercising quasi-judicial functions are
obliged to conform to its pronouncements. It has the last word
on what the law is; it is the final arbiter of any justifiable
controversy. In other words, there is only one Supreme Court
from whose decisions all other courts should take their
bearings.10 As a warning to lower court judges who would
not adhere to its rulings, this Court, in People v. Santos,11
held:
Now, if a judge of a lower Court feels, in the fulfillment of his
mission of deciding cases, that the application of a doctrine
promulgated by this Superiority is against his way of
reasoning, or against his conscience, he may state his opinion
on the matter, but rather than disposing of the case in
accordance with his personal views he must first think that
it is his duty to apply the law as interpreted by the Highest
Court of the Land, and that any deviation from a principle
laid down by the latter would unavoidably cause, as a sequel,
unnecessary inconveniences, delays and expenses to the
litigants. And if despite of what is here said, a Judge still
believes that he cannot follow Our rulings, then he has no
other alternative than to place himself in the position that he
could properly avoid the duty of having to render judgment
on the case concerned (Art. 9, C.C.), and he has only one legal
way to do that.
Clearly, respondent COMELEC did not gravely abuse its
discretion in dismissing the petition of Lambino, et al. for it
merely followed this Court's ruling in Santiago.
Significantly, in PIRMA vs. COMELEC,12 a unanimous
Court implicitly recognized that its ruling in Santiago is the
established doctrine and that the COMELEC did not commit
grave abuse of discretion in invoking it, thus:
The Court ruled, first, by a unanimous vote, that no grave
abuse of discretion could be attributed to the public
respondent COMELEC in dismissing the petition filed by
PIRMA therein, it appearing that it only complied with the
dispositions of this Court in G.R. No. 127325 promulgated on
March 19, 1997, and its resolution on June 10, 1997.
Indeed, I cannot characterize as a "grave abuse of discretion"
the COMELEC's obedience and respect to the
pronouncement of this Court in Santiago.
II
The doctrine of stare decisis
bars the re-examination of Santiago
It cannot be denied that in Santiago, a majority of the
members of this Court or eight (8) Justices (as against five (5)
Justices) concurred in declaring R.A. No. 6735 an insufficient
law. When the motion for reconsideration was denied via an
equally-divided Court or a 6-6 vote, it does not mean that the
Decision was overturned. It only shows that the opposite view
fails to muster enough votes to modify or reverse the majority
ruling. Therefore, the original Decision was upheld.13 In
Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership vs. Velasco,14
this Court ruled that the denial of a motion or reconsideration
signifies that the ground relied upon have been found, upon
due deliberation, to be without merit, as not being of
sufficient weight to warrant a modification of the judgment
or final order.
With Santiago being the only impediment to the instant
petition for initiative, petitioners persistently stress that the
doctrine of stare decisis does not bar its re-examination.
I am not convinced. The maxim stare decisis et non quieta
movere translates "stand by the decisions and disturb not
what is settled."15 As used in our jurisprudence, it means
that "once this Court has laid down a principle of law as
applicable to a certain state of facts, it would adhere to that
principle and apply it to all future cases in which the facts
are substantially the same as in the earlier controversy."16
There is considerable literature about whether this doctrine
of stare decisis is a good or bad one, but the doctrine is usually
justified by arguments which focus on the desirability of
stability and certainty in the law and also by notions of
justice and fairness. Justice Benjamin Cardozo in his
treatise, The Nature of the Judicial Process stated:
It will not do to decide the same question one way between
one set of litigants and the opposite way between another. 'If
a group of cases involves the same point, the parties expect
the same decision. It would be a gross injustice to decide
alternate cases on opposite principles. If a case was decided
against me yesterday when I was a defendant, I shall look for
the same judgment today if I am plaintiff. To decide
differently would raise a feeling of resentment and wrong in
my breast; it would be an infringement, material and moral,
of my rights." Adherence to precedent must then be the rule
rather than the exception if litigants are to have faith in the
even-handed administration of justice in the courts.17
That the doctrine of stare decisis is related to justice and
fairness may be appreciated by considering the observation
of American philosopher William K. Frankena as to what
constitutes injustice:
The paradigm case of injustice is that in which there are two
similar individuals in similar circumstances and one of them
is treated better or worse than the other. In this case, the cry
of injustice rightly goes up against the responsible agent or
64
group; and unless that agent or group can establish that
there is some relevant dissimilarity after all between the
individuals concerned and their circumstances, he or they
will be guilty as charged.18
Although the doctrine of stare decisis does not prevent re-
examining and, if need be, overruling prior decisions, "It is x
x x a fundamental jurisprudential policy that prior applicable
precedent usually must be followed even though the case, if
considered anew, might be decided differently by the current
justices. This policy x x x 'is based on the assumption that
certainty, predictability and stability in the law are the major
objectives of the legal system; i.e., that parties should be able
to regulate their conduct and enter into relationships with
reasonable assurance of the governing rules of law.19
Accordingly, a party urging overruling a precedent faces a
rightly onerous task, the difficulty of which is roughly
proportional to a number of factors, including the age of the
precedent, the nature and extent of public and private
reliance on it, and its consistency or inconsistency with other
related rules of law. Here, petitioners failed to discharge their
task.
Santiago v. COMELEC was decided by this Court on March
19, 1997 or more than nine (9) years ago. During that span of
time, the Filipino people, specifically the law practitioners,
law professors, law students, the entire judiciary and
litigants have recognized this Court's Decision as a
precedent. In fact, the Santiago doctrine was applied by this
Court in the subsequent case of PIRMA. Even the legislature
has relied on said Decision, thus, several bills have been
introduced in both Houses of Congress to cure the deficiency.
I cannot fathom why it should be overturned or set aside
merely on the basis of the petition of Lambino, et al. Indeed,
this Court's conclusion in Santiago that R.A. No. 6735 is
incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and
conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the
Constitution is concerned remains a precedent and must be
upheld.
III
The proposed constitutional changes constitute revisions and
not mere amendments
Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution lays down the means
for its amendment and revision. Thus:
Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution
may be proposed by:
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its
members; or
(2) A Constitutional Convention.
Section 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be
directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of
registered votes, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum of the registered
voters therein. x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
At the outset, it must be underscored that initiative and
referendum, as means by which the people can directly
propose changes to the Constitution, were not provided for in
the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions. Thus, under these two (2)
Constitutions, there was no demand to draw the distinction
between an amendment and a revision, both being governed
by a uniform process. This is not so under our present
Constitution. The distinction between an amendment and a
revision becomes crucial because only amendments are
allowed under the system of people's initiative. Revisions are
within the exclusive domain of Congress, upon a vote of
three-fourths of all its members, or of a Constitutional
Convention.
The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission is
explicit that Section 2, Article XVII covers only amendments,
thus:
The sponsor, Commissioner Suarez, is recognized.
MR. SUAREZ: Thank you, Madam President.
May we respectfully call the attention of the Members of the
Commission that pursuant to the mandate given us last
night, we submitted this afternoon a complete Committee
Report No. 7 which embodies the proposed provision
governing initiative. This is now covered by Section 2 of the
complete committee report. With the permission of the
Members, may I quote Section 2:
The people may, after five years from the date of the last
plebiscite held, directly propose amendments to this
Constitution thru initiative upon petition of at least ten
percent of the registered voters.
This completes the blanks appearing in the original
Committee Report No. 7. This proposal was suggested on the
theory that this matter of initiative which came about
because of the extraordinary developments this year, has to
be separated from the traditional modes of amending the
Constitution as embodied in Section 1. The committee
members felt that this system of initiative should be limited
to amendments to the Constitution and should not extend to
the revision of the entire Constitution, so we removed it from
the operation of Section 1 of the proposed Article on
Amendment or Revision.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. MAAMBONG: Madam President, will the distinguished
proponent of the amendment yield to a few questions?
MR. DAVIDE: With pleasure, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG: My first question, Commissioner
Davide's proposed amendment on line I refers to
"amendments." Does it not cover the word "revision" as
defined by Commissioner Padilla when he made the
distinction between the words "amendments" and "revision?"
MR. DAVIDE: No, it does not, because "amendments" and
"revision" should be covered by Section 1. So insofar as
initiative is concerned, it can only relate to "amendments" not
"revision"
MR. MAAMBONG: Thank you.20
Considering that the initiative on the Constitution only
permits amendments, it is imperative to examine whether
petitioners' proposed changes partake of the nature of
amendments, not revisions.
The petition for initiative filed with the COMELEC by
Lambino, et al. sought to amend the following provisions of
the 1987 Constitution: Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 of Article
VI (The Legislative Department); Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of
Article VII (The Executive Department). It further includes
Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) for the purpose of
insuring an orderly transition from the bicameral-
presidential to a unicameral-parliamentary form of
government.
Succinctly, the proposals envision a change in the form of
government, from bicameral-presidential to unicameral-
parliamentary; conversion of the present Congress of the
Philippines to an Interim National Assembly; change in the
terms of Members of Parliament; and the election of a Prime
Minister who shall be vested with executive power.
65
Petitioners contend that the proposed changes are in the
nature of amendments, hence, within the coverage of a
"people's initiative."
I disagree.
The noted constitutionalist, Father Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J.,
who was also a member of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, characterized an amendment and a revision to
the Constitution as follows:
An amendment envisages an alteration of one or a few
specific and separable provisions. The guiding original
intention of an amendment is to improve specific parts or to
add new provisions deemed necessary to meet new conditions
or to suppress specific portions that may have become
obsolete or that are judged to be dangerous. In revision
however, the guiding original intention and plan
contemplates a re-examination of the entire document, or of
provisions of the document which have over-all implications
for the document to determine how and to what extent they
should be altered.21
Obviously, both "revision" and amendment" connote change;
any distinction between the two must be based upon the
degree of change contemplated. In Kelly v. Laing,22 the
Supreme Court of Michigan made the following comparison
of the two terms:
"Revision" and "amendment" have the common
characteristics of working changes in the charter, and are
sometimes used in exactly the same sense but there is an
essential difference between them.
"Revision" implies a reexamination of the whole law and a
redraft without obligation to maintain the form, scheme, or
structure of the old. As applied to fundamental law, such as
a constitution or charter, it suggests a convention to examine
the whole subject and to prepare and submit a new
instrument whether the desired changes from the old are few
or many. Amendment implies continuance of the general plan
and purpose of the law, with corrections to better accomplish
its purpose. Basically, revision suggests fundamental change,
while amendment is a correction of detail.
Although there are some authorities which indicate that a
change in a city's form of government may be accomplished
by a process of "amendment," the cases which so hold seem to
involve statutes which only distinguish between amendment
and totally new charters.23 However, as in Maine law, where
the statute authorizing the changes distinguishes between
"charter amendment" and "charter revision," it has been held
that "(a) change in the form of government of a home rule city
may be made only by revision of the city charter, not by its
amendment."24
In summary, it would seem that any major change in
governmental form and scheme would probably be
interpreted as a "revision" and should be achieved through
the more thorough process of deliberation.
Although, at first glance, petitioners' proposed changes
appear to cover isolated and specific provisions only,
however, upon careful scrutiny, it becomes clear that the
proposed changes will alter the very structure of our
government and create multifarious ramifications. In other
words, the proposed changes will have a "domino effect" or,
more appropriately, "ripple effect" on other provisions of the
Constitution.
At this juncture, it must be emphasized that the power
reserved to the people to effect changes in the Constitution
includes the power to amend anysection in such a manner
that the proposed change, if approved, would "be complete
within itself, relate to one subject and not substantially affect
any other section or article of the Constitution or require
further amendments to the Constitution to accomplish its
purpose."25 This is clearly not the case here.
Firstly, a shift from a presidential to a parliamentary form of
government affects the well-enshrined doctrine of separation
of powers of government, embodied in our Constitution, by
providing for an Executive, Legislative and Judiciary
Branches. In a Parliamentary form of government, the
Executive Branch is to a certain degree, dependent on the
direct or indirect support of the Parliament, as expressed
through a "vote of confidence." To my mind, this doctrine of
separation of powers is so interwoven in the fabric of our
Constitution, that any change affecting such doctrine must
necessarily be a revision.
In McFadden vs. Jordan,26 the California Supreme Court
ruled as follows:
It is thus clear that that a revision of the Constitution may
be accomplished only through ratification by the people of a
revised constitution proposed by a convention called for that
purpose x x x. Consequently, if the scope of the proposed
initiative measure now before us is so broad that if such
measure became law a substantial revision of our present
state Constitution would be effected, then the measure may
not properly be submitted to the electorate until and unless
it is first agreed upon by a constitutional convention. x x x.
Secondly, the shift from a bicameral to a unicameral form of
government is not a mere amendment, but is in actuality a
revision, as set forth in Adams v. Gunter27:
The proposal here to amend Section I of Article III of the 1968
Constitution to provide for a Unicameral Legislature affects
not only many other provisions of the Constitution but
provides for a change in the form of the legislative branch of
government, which has been in existence in the United States
Congress and in all of the states of the nation, except one,
since the earliest days. It would be difficult to visualize a
more revolutionary change. The concept of a House and a
Senate is basic in the American form of government. It would
not only radically change the whole pattern of the
government in this state and tear apart the whole fabric of
the Constitution, but would even affect the physical facilities
necessary to carry on government.
Thirdly, the proposed changes, on their face, signify revisions
rather than amendments, especially, with the inclusion of the
following "omnibus provision":
C. For the purpose of insuring an orderly transition from the
bicameral-Presidential to a unicameral-Parliamnetary form
of government, there shall be a new Article XVIII, entitled
"Transitory Provisions" which shall read, as follows:
xxxxxxxxx
Section 3. Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent
President and Vice-President, with the exceptions of Section
1,2,3 and 4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which are
hereby amended x x x x x x and all other Sections of Article
VII shall be retained and numbered sequentially as Section
2, ad seriatim up to 14, unless they shall be inconsistent with
Section 1 hereof, in which case they shall be deemed amended
so as to conform to a unicameral Parliamentary system of
government x x x x x x .
xxxxxxxxx
Section 4. (1) x x x
(3) Within forty-five days from ratification of these
amendments, the Interim Parliament shall convene to
propose amendments to, or revisions of, this Constitution,
consistent with the principles of local autonomy,
decentralization and a strong bureaucracy.
66
The above provisions will necessarily result in a "ripple
effect" on the other provisions of the Constitution to make
them conform to the qualities of unicameral-parliamentary
form of government. With one sweeping stroke, these
proposed provisions automatically revise some provisions of
the Constitution. In McFadden, the same practice was
considered by the Court to be in the nature of substantial
revision, necessitating a constitutional convention. I quote
the pertinent portion of its ruling, thus:
There is in the measure itself, no attempt to enumerate the
various and many articles and sections of our present
Constitution which would be affected, replaced or repealed.
It purports only to add one new article but its framers found
it necessary to include the omnibus provision (subdivision (7)
of section XII) that "If any section, subsection, sentence,
clause or phrase of the constitution is in conflict with any of
the provisions of this article, such section, subsection,
sentence, clause, or phrase is to the extent of such conflict
hereby repealed. x x x Consequently, if the scope of the
proposed intitiative measure now before us is so broad that if
such measure become law a substantial revision of our
present state Constitution would be be effected, then the
measure may not properly be submitted to the electorate
until and unless it is first agreed upon by a constitutional
convention.28
Undoubtedly, the changes proposed by the petitioners are not
mere amendments which will only affect the Articles or
Sections sought to be changed. Rather, they are in the nature
of revisions which will affect considerable portions of the
Constitution resulting in the alteration of our form of
government. The proposed changes cannot be taken in
isolation since these are connected or "interlocked" with the
other provisions of our Constitution. Accordingly, it has been
held that: "If the changes attempted are so sweeping that it
is necessary to include the provisions interlocking them, then
it is plain that the plan would constitute a recasting of the
whole Constitution and this, we think, it was intended to be
accomplished only by a convention under Section 2 which has
not yet been disturbed."29
I therefore conclude that since the proposed changes partake
of the nature of a revision of the Constitution, then they
cannot be the subject of an initiative. On this matter, Father
Bernas expressed this insight:
But why limit initiative and referendum to simple
amendments? The answer, which one can easily glean from
the rather long deliberation on initiative and referendum in
the 1986 Constitutional Commission, is practicality. In other
words, who is to formulate the revision or how is it to be
formulated? Revision, as concretely being proposed now, is
nothing less than a rebuilding of the Philippine
constitutional structure. Who were involved in formulating
the structure? What debates ensued? What records are there
for future use in interpreting the provisions which may be
found to be unclear?
In a deliberative body like Congress or a Constitutional
Convention, decisions are reached after much purifying
debate. And while the deliberations proceed, the public has
the opportunity to get involved. It is only after the work of an
authorized body has been completed that it is presented to
the electorate for final judgment. Careful debate is important
because the electorate tends to accept what is presented to it
even sight unseen.30
IV
R.A. No. 6735 is insufficient to implement the People's
initiative
Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution reads:
Section 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be
directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of
registered voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum of the registered
voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be
authorized within five years following the ratification of this
Constitution nor oftener than once every five years
thereafter,
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the
exercise of this right.
On its face, Section 2 is not a self-executory provision. This
means that an enabling law is imperative for its
implementation. Thus, Congress enacted R.A. No. 6735 in
order to breathe life into this constitutional provision.
However, as previously narrated, this Court struck the law
in Santiago for being incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in
essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on
amendments to the Constitution is concerned.
The passage of time has done nothing to change the
applicability of R.A. No. 6735. Congress neither amended it
nor passed a new law to supply its deficiencies.
Notwithstanding so, this Court is being persuaded to take a
360-degree turn, enumerating three (3) justifications why
R.A. No. 6735 must be considered a sufficient law, thus:
1) The text of R.A. No. 6735 is replete with references to the
right of people to initiate changes to the Constitution;
2) The legislative history of R.A. No. 6735 reveals the clear
intent of the lawmakers to use it as instrument to implement
the people's initiative; and
3) The sponsorship speeches by the authors of R.A. No. 6735
demonstrate the legislative intent to use it as instrument to
implement people's initiative.
I regret to say that the foregoing justifications are wanting.
A thorough reading of R.A. No. 6735 leads to the conclusion
that it covers only initiatives on national and local
legislation. Its references to initiatives on the Constitution
are few, isolated and misplaced. Unlike in the initiatives on
national and local legislation, where R.A. No. 6735 provides
a detailed, logical, and exhaustive enumeration on their
implementation,31 however, as regards initiative on the
Constitution, the law merely:
(a) mentions the word "Constitution" in Section 2;32
(b) defines "initiative on the Constitution" and includes it in
the enumeration of the three systems of initiative in Section
3;33
(c) speaks of "plebiscite" as the process by which the
proposition in an initiative on the Constitution may be
approved or rejected by the people;34
(d) reiterates the constitutional requirements as to the
number of voters who should sign the petition;35 and
(e) provides the date for the effectivity of the approved
proposition.36
In other words, R.A. No. 6735 does not specify the procedure
how initiative on the Constitution may be accomplished. This
is not the enabling law contemplated by the Constitution. As
pointed out by oppositor-intervenor Alternative Law Groups
Inc., since the promulgation of the Decision in Santiago,
various bills have been introduced in both Houses of
Congress providing for a complete and adequate process for
people's initiative, such as:
· Names, signatures and addresses of petitioners who shall
be registered voters;
67
· A statement of the provision of the Constitution or any part
thereof sought to be amended and the proposed amendment;
· The manner of initiation - in a congressional district
through a petition by any individual, group, political party or
coalition with members in the congressional district;
· The language used: the petition should be printed in English
and translated in the local language;
· Signature stations to be provided for;
· Provisions pertaining to the need and manner of posting,
that is, after the signatures shall have been verified by the
Commission, the verified signatures shall be posted for at
least thirty days in the respective municipal and city halls
where the signatures were obtained;
· Provisions pertaining to protests allowed any protest as to
the authenticity of the signatures to be filed with the
COMELEC and decided within sixty (60) days from the filing
of said protest.
None of the above necessary details is provided by R.A. No.
6735, thus, demonstrating its incompleteness and
inadequacy.
V person acting as representative or agent of the 12% of the
Petitioners are not Proper Parties to
File the Petition for Initiative
VI
The Petition for Initiative Filed with the COMELEC Does not
Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution and
R.A. No. 6735
I shall discuss the above issues together since they are
interrelated and inseparable. The determination of whether
petitioners are proper parties to file the petition for initiative
in behalf of the alleged 6.3 million voters will require an
examination of whether they have complied with the
provisions of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.
To reiterate, Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution
provides:
Section 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be
directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of
registered voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum of the registered
voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be
authorized within five years following the ratification of this
Constitution nor oftener than once every five years
thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the
exercise of this right. (Underscoring supplied)
The mandate of the above constitutional provisions is definite
and categorical. For a people's initiative to prosper, the
following requisites must be present:
1. It is "the people" themselves who must "directly propose"
"amendments" to the Constitution;
2. The proposed amendments must be contained in "a petition
of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered
voters;" and
3. The required minimum of 12% of the total number of
registered voters "must be represented by at least three per
centum of the registered voters" of "every legislative district."
In this case, however, the above requisites are not present.
The petition for initiative was filed with the COMELEC by
petitioners Lambino and Aumentado, two registered voters.
As shown in the "Verification/Certification with Affidavit of
Non-Forum Shopping" contained in their petition, they
alleged under oath that they have caused the preparation of
the petition in their personal capacity as registered voters
"and as representatives" of the supposed 6.3 million
registered voters. This goes to show that the questioned
petition was not initiated directly by the 6.3 million people
who allegedly comprised at least 12% of the total number of
registered voters, as required by Section 2. Moreover,
nowhere in the petition itself could be found the signatures
of the 6.3 million registered voters. Only the signatures of
petitioners Lambino and Aumentado were affixed therein "as
representatives" of those 6.3 million people. Certainly, that is
not the petition for people's initiative contemplated by the
Constitution.
Petitioners Lambino and Aumentado have no authority
whatsoever to file the petition "as representatives" of the
alleged 6.3 million registered voters. Such act of
representation is constitutionally proscribed. To repeat,
Section 2 strictly requires that amendments to the
Constitution shall be "directly proposed by the people
through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per
centum of the total number of registered voters." Obviously,
the phrase "directly proposed by the people" excludes any
total number of registered voters. The Constitution has
bestowed upon the people the right to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution. Such right cannot be
usurped by anyone under the guise of being the people's
representative. Simply put, Section 2 does not recognize acts
of representation. For it is only "the people" (comprising the
minimum of 12% of the total number of registered voters, of
which every legislative district must be represented by at
least three per centum of the registered voters therein) who
are the proper parties to initiate a petition proposing
amendments to the Constitution. Verily, the petition filed
with the COMELEC by herein petitioners Lambino and
Aumentado is not a people's initiative. Necessarily, it must
fail.
Cororarilly, the plea that this Court should "hear" and "heed"
"the people's voice" is baseless and misleading. There is no
people's voice to be heard and heeded as this petition for
initiative is not truly theirs, but only of petitioners Lambino
and Aumentado and their allies.
VII
The issues at bar are not political questions.
Lambino and Aumentado, petitioners in G.R. No. 174153,
vehemently argue that: (1) "the validity of the exercise of the
right of the sovereign people to amend the Constitution and
their will, as expressed by the fact that over six million
registered voters indicated their support of the Petition for
initiative is a purely political question;" and (2) "[t]he power
to propose amendments to the Constitution is a right
explicitly bestowed upon the sovereign people. Hence, the
determination by the people to exercise their right to propose
amendments under the system of initiative is a sovereign act
and falls squarely within the ambit of a political question."
The "political question doctrine" was first enunciated by the
US Supreme Court in Luther v. Borden.37 Faced with the
difficult question of whether the Supreme Court was the
appropriate institution to define the substantive content of
republicanism, the US Supreme Court, speaking thru Mr.
Justice Roger B. Taney, concluded that "the sovereignty in
every State resides in the people, as to how and whether they
exercised it, was under the circumstances of the case, a
political question to be settled by the political power." In
other words, the responsibility of settling certain
constitutional questions was left to the legislative and
executive branches of the government.
68
The Luther case arose from the so-called "Dorr Rebellion" in
the State of Rhode Island. Due to increased migration
brought about by the Industrial Revolution, the urban
population of Rhode Island increased. However, under the
1663 Royal Charter which served as the State Constitution,
voting rights were largely limited to residents of the rural
districts. This severe mal-apportionment of suffrage rights
led to the "Dorr Rebellion." Despairing of obtaining remedies
for their disenfranchisement from the state government,
suffrage reformers invoked their rights under the American
Declaration of Independence to "alter or abolish" the
government and to institute a new one. The reformers
proceeded to call for and hold an extralegal constitutional
convention, drafted a new State Constitution, submitted the
document for popular ratification, and held elections under
it. The State government, however, refused to cede power,
leading to an anomalous situation in that for a few months in
1842, there were two opposing state governments contending
for legitimacy and possession of state of offices.
The Rhode Island militia, under the authority of martial law,
entered and searched the house of Martin Luther, a Dorr
supporter. He brought suit against Luther Borden, a
militiaman. Before the US Supreme Court, Luther's counsel
argued that since the State's archaic Constitution prevented
a fair and peaceful address of grievances through democratic
processes, the people of Rhode Island had instead chosen to
exercise their inherent right in popular sovereignty of
replacing what they saw as an oppressive government. The
US Supreme Court deemed the controversy as non-justiciable
and inappropriate for judicial resolution.
In Colgrove v. Green,38 Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter, coined
the phrase "political thicket" to describe situations where
Federal courts should not intervene in political questions
which they have neither the competence nor the commission
to decide. In Colgrove, the US Supreme Court, with a narrow
4-3 vote branded the apportionment of legislative districts in
Illinois "as a political question and that the invalidation of
the districts might, in requiring statewide elections, create
an evil greater than that sought to be remedied."
While this Court has adopted the use of Frankfurter's
"political thicket," nonetheless, it has sought to come up with
a definition of the term "political question." Thus, in Vera v.
Avelino,39 this Court ruled that properly, political questions
are "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity or in regard
to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to
the legislative or executive branch of the government." In
Tañada and Macapagal v. Cuenco,40 the Court held that the
term political question connotes, in legal parlance, what it
means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It
is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not
legality, of a particular measure.
In Aquino v. Enrile,41 this Court adopted the following
guidelines laid down in Baker v. Carr42 in determining
whether a question before it is political, rather than judicial
in nature, to wit:
1) there is a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department;
or
2) there is a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable
standards for resolving it; or
3) there is the sheer impossibility of deciding the matter
without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for
non-judicial discretion; or
4) there is the sheer impossibility of the Court's undertaking
an independent resolution without expressing lack of respect
due the coordinate branches of government; or
5) there is an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a
political decision already made; or
6) there exists the potentiality of embarrassment arising
from multifarious pronouncements by various departments
on one question.
None of the foregoing standards is present in the issues
raised before this Court. Accordingly, the issues are
justiciable. What is at stake here is the legality and not the
wisdom of the act complained of.
Moreover, even assuming arguendo that the issues raised
before this Court are political in nature, it is not precluded
from resolving them under its expanded jurisdiction
conferred upon it by Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution, following Daza v. Singson.43 As pointed out in
Marcos v. Manglapus,44 the present Constitution limits
resort to the political question doctrine and broadens the
scope of judicial power which the Court, under previous
charters, would have normally and ordinarily left to the
political departments to decide.
CONCLUSION
In fine, considering the political scenario in our country
today, it is my view that the so-called people's initiative to
amend our Constitution from bicameral-presidential to
unicameral-parliamentary is actually not an initiative of the
people, but an initiative of some of our politicians. It has not
been shown by petitioners, during the oral arguments in this
case, that the 6.3 million registered voters who affixed their
signatures understood what they signed. In fact, petitioners
admitted that the Constitutional provisions sought to be
amended and the proposed amendments were not explained
to all those registered voters. Indeed, there will be no means
of knowing, to the point of judicial certainty, whether they
really understood what petitioners and their group asked
them to sign.
Let us not repeat the mistake committed by this Court in
Javellana v. The Executive Secretary.45 The Court then
ruled that "This being the vote of the majority, there is no
further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being
considered in force and effect," although it had notice that the
Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention
was not validly ratified by the people in accordance with the
1935 Constitution. The Court concluded, among others, that
the viva voce voting in the Citizens' Assemblies "was and is
null and void ab initio." That was during martial law when
perhaps majority of the justices were scared of the dictator.
Luckily at present, we are not under a martial law regime.
There is, therefore, no reason why this Court should allow
itself to be used as a legitimizing authority by the so-called
people's initiative for those who want to perpetuate
themselves in power.
At this point, I can say without fear that there is nothing
wrong with our present government structure.
Consequent1y, we must not change it. America has a
presidential type of government. Yet, it thrives ideally and
has become a super power. It is then safe to conclude that
what we should change are some of the people running the
government, NOT the SYSTEM.
According to petitioners, the proposed amendment would
effect a more efficient, more economical and more responsive
government.
Is there hope that a new breed of politicians, more qualified
and capable, may be elected as members and leaders of the
unicameral-parliament? Or will the present members of the
Lower House continue to hold their respective positions with
limitless terms?
Will the new government be more responsive to the needs of
the poor and the marginalized? Will it be able to provide
69
homes for the homeless, food for the hungry, jobs for the
jobless and protection for the weak?
This is a defining moment in our history. The issue posed
before us is crucial with transcendental significance. And
history will judge us on how we resolve this issue – shall we
allow the revision of our Constitution, of which we are duty
bound to guard and revere, on the basis of a doubtful people's
initiative?
Amending the Constitution involving a change of government
system or structure is a herculean task affecting the entire
Filipino people and the future generations. Let us, therefore,
entrust this duty to more knowledgeable people elected as
members of a Constitutional Convention.
Yes, the voice of the people is the voice of God. But under the
circumstances in this case, the voice of God is not audible.
WHEREFORE, I vote to DISMISS the petition in G.R. No.
174153 and to GRANT the petition in G.R. No. 174299.
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice
____________________
EN BANC
G.R. No. 174153
RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO, together
with 6,327,952 REGISTERED VOTERS, petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
G.R. No. 174299
MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR.
and RENE A.Q. SAGUISAG, petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, represented by
Chairman BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, SR., and Commissioners
RESURRECCION Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A. TUASON,
JR., ROMEO A. BRAWNER, RENE V. SARMIENTO, and
JOHN DOE and PETER DOE, respondents.
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------- x
SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
I am convinced beyond cavil that the respondent Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) did not commit an abuse of its
discretion in dismissing the amended petition before it. The
proposals of petitioners incorporated in said amended
petition are for the revision of the 1987 Constitution.
Further, the amended petition before the respondent
COMELEC is insufficient in substance.
The Antecedents
On August 25, 2006, petitioners Raul L. Lambino and Erico
B. Aumentado filed with the COMELEC a petition entitled
"IN THE MATTER OF PROPOSING AMENDMENTS TO
THE 1987 CONSTITUTION THROUGH A PEOPLE'S
INITIATIVE: A SHIFT FROM A BICAMERAL
PRESIDENTIAL TO A UNICAMERAL PARLIAMENTARY
GOVERNMENT BY AMENDING ARTICLES VI AND VII;
AND PROVIDING TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE
ORDERLY SHIFT FROM THE PRESIDENTIAL TO THE
PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM." The case was docketed as EM
(LD)-06-01. On August 30, 2006, petitioners filed an amended
petition. For brevity, it is referred to as the petition for
initiative.
Petitioners alleged therein, inter alia, that they filed their
petition in their own behalf and together with those who have
affixed their signatures to the signature sheets appended
thereto who are Filipino citizens, residents and registered
voters of the Philippines, and they constitute at least twelve
percent (12%) of all the registered voters in the country,
wherein each legislative district is represented by at least
three percent (3%) of all the registered voters therein.
Petitioners further alleged therein that the filing of the
petition for initiative is based on their constitutional right to
propose amendments to the 1987 Constitution by way of
people's initiative, as recognized in Section 2, Article XVII
thereof, which provides:
SEC. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be
directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of
registered voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum of the registered
voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be
authorized within five years following the ratification of this
Constitution nor oftener than once every five years
thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the
exercise of this right."
According to petitioners, while the above provision states
that "(T)he Congress shall provide for the implementation of
the exercise of this right," the provisions of Section 5(b) and
(c), along with Section 7 of Republic Act (RA) 6735,1 are
sufficient enabling details for the people's exercise of the
power. The said sections of RA 6735 state:
Sec. 5. Requirements. – (a) To exercise the power x x x
(b) A petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must
have at least twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of
registered voters as signatories, of which every legislative
district must be represented by at least three per centum
(3%) of the registered voters therein. Initiative on the
Constitution may be exercised only after five (5) years from
the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and only once every
five (5) years thereafter.
(c) The petition shall state the following:
c.1. contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted,
approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as the case may
be;
c.2. the proposition;
c.3. the reason or reasons therefor;
c.4. that it is not one of the exceptions provided herein;
c.5. signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and
c.6. an abstract or summary in not more than one hundred
(100) words which shall be legibly written or printed at the
top of every page of the petition.
xxxx
Sec. 7. Verification of Signatures. – The Election Registrar
shall verify the signatures on the basis of the registry list of
voters, voters' affidavits and voters identification cards used
in the immediately preceding election.
They also alleged that the COMELEC has the authority,
mandate and obligation to give due course to the petition for
initiative, in compliance with the constitutional directive for
the COMELEC to "enforce and administer all laws and
70
regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite,
initiative, referendum and recall."2
Petitioners incorporated in their petition for initiative the
changes they proposed to be incorporated in the 1987
Constitution and prayed that the COMELEC issue an order:
1. Finding the Petition to be sufficient pursuant to Section 4,
Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution;
2. Directing the publication of the Petition in Filipino and
English at least twice in newspapers of general and local
circulation; and
3. Calling a plebiscite to be held not earlier than sixty nor
later than ninety days after the Certification by this
Honorable Commission of the sufficiency of this Petition, to
allow the Filipino people to express their sovereign will on
the proposition.
Petitioners pray for such other reliefs deemed just and
equitable in the premises.
The Ruling of the respondent COMELEC
On August 31, 2006, the COMELEC promulgated the
assailed Resolution denying due course and dismissing the
petition for initiative. The COMELEC ruled that:
We agree with the petitioners that this Commission has the
solemn Constitutional duty to enforce and administer all
laws and regulations relative to the conduct of, as in this case,
initiative.
This mandate, however, should be read in relation to the
other provisions of the Constitution particularly on initiative.
Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
"Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may, likewise, be
directly proposed by the people through initiative, upon a
petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of
registered voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum of the registered
voters therein. x x x.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the
exercise of this right."
The aforequoted provision of the Constitution being a non-
self-executory provision needed an enabling law for its
implementation. Thus, in order to breathe life into the
constitutional right of the people under a system of initiative
to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in
part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolution,
Congress enacted RA 6735.
However, the Supreme Court, in the landmark case of
Santiago v. Commission on Elections struck down the said
law for being incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential
terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to
the Constitution is concerned
The Supreme Court, likewise, declared that this Commission
should be permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking
cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to
the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly
enacted to provide for the implementation of the system.
Thus, even if the signatures in the instant Petition appear to
meet the required minimum per centum of the total number
of registered voters, of which every legislative district is
represented by at least three per centum of the registered
voters therein, still the Petition cannot be given due course
since the Supreme Court categorically declared RA 6735 as
inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments
to the Constitution.
This Commission is not unmindful of the transcendental
importance of the right of the people under a system of
initiative. However, neither can we turn a blind eye to the
pronouncement of the High Court that in the absence of a
valid enabling law, this right of the people remains nothing
but an "empty right," and that this Commission is
permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance
of any petition for initiative on amendments to the
Constitution. (Citations omitted.)
Aggrieved, petitioners elevated the case to this Court on a
petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court.
The Petitioners' Case
In support of their petition, petitioners alleged, inter alia,
that:
I.
THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMELEC
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
REFUSING TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF, AND TO GIVE
DUE COURSE TO THE PETITION FOR INITIATIVE,
BECAUSE THE CITED SANTIAGO RULING OF 19
MARCH 1997 CANNOT BE CONSIDERED THE
MAJORITY OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT EN
BANC, CONSIDERING THAT UPON ITS
RECONSIDERATION AND FINAL VOTING ON 10 JUNE
1997, NO MAJORITY VOTE WAS SECURED TO DECLARE
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6735 AS INADEQUATE,
INCOMPLETE AND INSUFFICIENT IN STANDARD.
II.
THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6735,
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8189 AND EXISTING
APPROPRIATION OF THE COMELEC PROVIDE FOR
SUFFICIENT DETAILS AND AUTHORITY FOR THE
EXERCISE OF PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE, THUS, EXISTING
LAWS TAKEN TOGETHER ARE ADEQUATE AND
COMPLETE.
III.
THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMELEC
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
REFUSING TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF, AND IN
REFUSING TO GIVE DUE COURSE TO THE PETITION
FOR INITIATIVE, THEREBY VIOLATING AN EXPRESS
CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE AND DISREGARDING
AND CONTRAVENING THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE.
A.
THE SANTIAGO RULING OF 19 MARCH 1997 IS NOT
APPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT PETITION FOR
INITIATIVE FILED BY THE PETITIONERS.
1.
THE FRAMERS OF THE CONSTITUTION INTENDED TO
GIVE THE PEOPLE THE POWER TO PROPOSE
AMENDMENTS AND THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES ARE
NOW GIVING VIBRANT LIFE TO THIS
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION
2.
PRIOR TO THE QUESTIONED SANTIAGO RULING OF 19
MARCH 1997, THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO
EXERCISE THE SOVEREIGN POWER OF INITIATIVE
AND RECALL HAS BEEN INVARIABLY UPHELD
3.
71
THE EXERCISE OF THE INITIATIVE TO PROPOSE
AMENDMENTS IS A POLITICAL QUESTION WHICH
SHALL BE DETERMINED SOLELY BY THE SOVEREIGN
PEOPLE.
4.
BY SIGNING THE SIGNATURE SHEETS ATTACHED TO
THE PETITION FOR INITIATIVE DULY VERIFIED BY
THE ELECTION OFFICERS, THE PEOPLE HAVE
CHOSEN TO PERFORM THIS SACRED EXERCISE OF
THEIR SOVEREIGN POWER.
B.
THE SANTIAGO RULING OF 19 MARCH 1997 IS NOT
APPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT PETITION FOR
INITIATIVE FILED BY THE PETITIONERS
C.
THE PERMANENT INJUNCTION ISSUED IN SANTIAGO
V. COMELEC ONLY APPLIES TO THE DELFIN
PETITION.
1.
IT IS THE DISPOSITIVE PORTION OF THE DECISION
AND NOT OTHER STATEMENTS IN THE BODY OF THE
DECISION THAT GOVERNS THE RIGHTS IN
CONTROVERSY.
IV.
THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT FAILED OR
NEGLECTED TO ACT OR PERFORM A DUTY
MANDATED BY LAW.
A.
THE MINISTERIAL DUTY OF THE COMELEC IS TO SET
THE INITIATIVE FOR PLEBISCITE.3
Petitioners Failed to Allege and Demonstrate All the
Essential
Facts To Establish the Right to a Writ of Certiorari
Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court reads:
Sec. 1. Petition for certiorari. – When any tribunal, board or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted
without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper
court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the
proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting
such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of
the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all
pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and
a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in
the third paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46.
A writ for certiorari may issue only when the following
requirements are set out in the petition and established:
(1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board or any
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions;
(2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and
(3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. x x x4
The Court has invariably defined "grave abuse of discretion,"
thus:
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction, and it must be shown that the discretion was
exercised arbitrarily or despotically. For certiorari to lie,
there must be a capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise
of power, the very antithesis of the judicial prerogative in
accordance with centuries of both civil law and common law
traditions.5
There is thus grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
COMELEC when it acts in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary
or despotic manner in the exercise of its judgment amounting
to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not
enough.6 The only question involved is jurisdiction, either
the lack or excess thereof, and abuse of discretion warrants
the issuance of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari only
when the same is grave, as when the power is exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice
or personal hostility. A writ of certiorari is a remedy designed
for the correction of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of
judgment.7 An error of judgment is one in which the court
may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, which error is
reversible only by an appeal.8
In the present case, it appears from the assailed Resolution
of the COMELEC that it denied the petition for initiative
solely in obedience to the mandate of this Court in Santiago
v. Commission on Elections.9 In said case, the Court En Banc
permanently enjoined the COMELEC from entertaining or
taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on
amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall
have been validly enacted to provide for the implementation
of the system. When the COMELEC denied the petition for
initiative, there was as yet no valid law enacted by Congress
to provide for the implementation of the system.
It is a travesty for the Court to declare the act of the
COMELEC in denying due course to the petition for initiative
as "capricious, despotic, oppressive or whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction." In fact, in
so doing, the COMELEC merely followed or applied, as it
ought to do, the Court's ruling in Santiago to the effect that
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on the system of
initiative is a non self-executory provision and requires an
enabling law for its implementation. In relation thereto, RA
6735 was found by the Court to be "incomplete, inadequate,
or wanting in essential terms and conditions" to implement
the constitutional provision on initiative. Consequently, the
COMELEC was "permanently enjoined from entertaining or
taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on
amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall
have been validly enacted to provide for the implementation
of the system." The decision of the Court En Banc
interpreting RA 6735 forms part of the legal system of the
Philippines.10 And no doctrine or principle laid down by the
Court En Banc may be modified or reversed except by the
Court En Banc,11 certainly not by the COMELEC. Until the
Court En Banc modifies or reverses its decision, the
COMELEC is bound to follow the same.12 As succinctly held
in Fulkerson v. Thompson:13
Whatever was before the Court, and is disposed of, is
considered as finally settled. The inferior court is bound by
the judgment or decree as the law of the case, and must carry
it into execution according to the mandate. The inferior court
cannot vary it, or judicially examine it for any other purpose
than execution. It can give no other or further relief as to any
matter decided by the Supreme Court even where there is
error apparent; or in any manner intermeddle with it further
72
than to execute the mandate and settle such matters as have
been remanded, not adjudicated by the Supreme Court….
The principles above stated are, we think, conclusively
established by the authority of adjudged cases. And any
further departure from them would inevitably mar the
harmony of the whole judiciary system, bring its parts into
conflict, and produce therein disorganization, disorder, and
incalculable mischief and confusion. Besides, any rule
allowing the inferior courts to disregard the adjudications of
the Supreme Court, or to refuse or omit to carry them into
execution would be repugnant to the principles established
by the constitution, and therefore void.14
At this point, it is well to recall the factual context of Santiago
as well as the pronouncement made by the Court therein.
Like petitioners in the instant case, in Santiago, Atty. Jesus
Delfin, the People's Initiative for Reforms, Modernization
and Action (PIRMA), et al., invoked Section 2, Article XVII of
the Constitution as they filed with the COMELEC a "Petition
to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective
Officials, By People's Initiative" (the Delfin petition). They
asked the COMELEC to issue an order fixing the time and
date for signature gathering all over the country; causing the
necessary publications of said order and their petition in
newspapers of general and local circulation and instructing
municipal election registrars in all regions all over the
country and to assist petitioners in establishing signing
stations. Acting thereon, the COMELEC issued the order
prayed for.
Senator Miriam Santiago, et al. forthwith filed with this
Court a petition for prohibition to enjoin the COMELEC from
implementing its order. The Court, speaking through Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr. (later Chief Justice), granted the
petition as it declared:
1. RA 6735 "incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential
terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to
the Constitution is concerned";
2. COMELEC Resolution No. 230015 invalid insofar as it
prescribed rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative
on amendments to the Constitution because the COMELEC
is without authority to promulgate the rules and regulations
to implement the exercise of the right of the people to directly
propose amendments to the Constitution through the system
of initiative; and
3. The Delfin petition insufficient as it did not contain the
required number of signatures of registered voters.
The Court concluded in Santiago that "the COMELEC should
be permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking
cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to
the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly
enacted to provide for the implementation of the system." The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
a) GRANTING the instant petition;
b) DECLARING RA 6735 inadequate to cover the system of
initiative on amendments to the Constitution, and to have
failed to provide sufficient standard for subordinate
legislation;
c) DECLARING void those parts of Resolution No. 2300 of the
Commission on Elections prescribing rules and regulations
on the conduct of initiative or amendments to the
Constitution; and
d) ORDERING the Commission on Elections to forthwith
DISMISS the Delfin petition (UND-96-037).
The Temporary Restraining Order issued on December 18,
1996 is made permanent as against the Commission on
Elections, but is LIFTED as against private respondents.16
The Court reiterated its ruling in Santiago in another
petition which was filed with the Court by PIRMA and the
spouses Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa (who were parties in
Santiago) docketed as PIRMA v. Commission on Elections.17
The said petitioners, undaunted by Santiago and claiming to
have gathered 5,793,213 signatures, filed a petition with the
COMELEC praying, inter alia, that COMELEC officers be
ordered to verify all the signatures collected in behalf of the
petition and, after due hearing, that it (COMELEC) declare
the petition sufficient for the purpose of scheduling a
plebiscite to amend the Constitution. Like the Delfin petition
in Santiago, the PIRMA petition proposed to submit to the
people in a plebiscite the amendment to the Constitution on
the lifting of the term limits of elected officials.
The opinion of the minority that there was no doctrine
enunciated by the Court in PIRMA has no basis. The
COMELEC, in its Resolution dated July 8, 1997, dismissed
the PIRMA petition citing the permanent restraining order
issued against it by the Court in Santiago. PIRMA and the
spouses Pedrosa forthwith elevated the matter to the Court
alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
COMELEC in refusing to exercise jurisdiction over, and
thereby dismissing, their petition for initiative to amend the
Constitution.
The Court dismissed outright, by a unanimous vote, the
petition filed by PIRMA and the spouses Albert Pedrosa. The
Court declared that the COMELEC merely complied with the
dispositions in the decision of the Court in Santiago and,
hence, cannot be held to have committed a grave abuse of its
discretion in dismissing the petition before it:
The Court ruled, first, by a unanimous vote, that no grave
abuse of discretion could be attributed to the public
respondent COMELEC in dismissing the petition filed by
PIRMA therein, it appearing that it only complied with the
dispositions in the Decision of this Court in G.R. No. 127325,
promulgated on March 19, 1997, and its Resolution of June
10, 1997.
The Court next considered the question of whether there was
need to resolve the second issue posed by the petitioners,
namely, that the Court re-examine its ruling as regards R.A.
6735. On this issue, the Chief Justice and six (6) other
members of the Court, namely, Regalado, Davide, Romero,
Bellosillo, Kapunan and Torres, JJ., voted that there was no
need to take it up. Vitug, J., agreed that there was no need
for re-examination of said second issue since the case a bar is
not the proper vehicle for that purpose. Five (5) other
members of the Court, namely, Melo, Puno, Francisco,
Hermosisima and Panganiban, JJ., opined that there was
need for such a re-examination. x x x
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.18 (Underscoring
supplied.)
In the present case, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
takes the side of petitioners and argues that the COMELEC
should not have applied the ruling in Santiago to the petition
for initiative because the permanent injunction therein
referred only to the Delfin petition. The OSG buttresses this
argument by pointing out that the Temporary Restraining
Order dated December 18, 1996 that was made permanent in
the dispositive portion referred only to the Delfin petition.
The OSG's attempt to isolate the dispositive portion from the
body of the Court's decision in Santiago is futile. It bears
stressing that the dispositive portion must not be read
separately but in connection with the other portions of the
decision of which it forms a part. To get to the true intent and
meaning of a decision, no specific portion thereof should be
resorted to but the same must be considered in its entirety.
73
Hence, a resolution or ruling may and does appear in other
parts of the decision and not merely in the fallo thereof.19
The pronouncement in the body of the decision in Santiago
permanently enjoining the COMELEC "from entertaining or
taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on
amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall
have been validly enacted to provide for the implementation
of the system" is thus as much a part of the Court's decision
as its dispositive portion. The ruling of this Court is of the
nature of an in rem judgment barring any and all Filipinos
from filing a petition for initiative on amendments to the
Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly
enacted. Clearly, the COMELEC, in denying due course to
the present petition for initiative on amendments to the
Constitution conformably with the Court's ruling in Santiago
did not commit grave abuse of discretion. On the contrary, its
actuation is in keeping with the salutary principle of
hierarchy of courts. For the Court to find the COMELEC to
have abused its discretion when it dismissed the amended
petition based on the ruling of this Court in Santiago would
be sheer judicial apostasy.
As eloquently put by Justice J.B.L. Reyes, "there is only one
Supreme Court from whose decisions all other courts should
take their bearings."20 This truism applies with equal force
to the COMELEC as a quasi-judicial body for, after all,
judicial decisions applying or interpreting laws or the
Constitution "assume the same authority as the statute itself
and, until authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to
the extent that they are applicable, the criteria which must
control the actuations not only of those called upon to abide
thereby but also of those duty bound to enforce obedience
thereto."21
Petitioners Cannot Ascribe
Grave Abuse of Discretion on
the COMELEC Based on the
Minority Opinion in Santiago
It is elementary that the opinion of the majority of the
members of the Court, not the opinion of the minority,
prevails. As a corollary, the decision of the majority cannot
be modified or reversed by the minority of the members of the
Court.
However, to eschew the binding effect of Santiago, petitioners
argue, albeit unconvincingly, that the Court's declaration
therein on the inadequacy, incompleteness and insufficiency
of RA 6735 to implement the system of initiative to propose
constitutional amendments did not constitute the majority
opinion. This contention is utterly baseless.
Santiago was concurred in, without any reservation, by eight
Justices,22 or the majority of the members of the Court, who
actually took part in the deliberations thereon. On the other
hand, five Justices,23 while voting for the dismissal of the
Delfin petition on the ground of insufficiency, dissented from
the majority opinion as they maintained the view that RA
6735 was sufficient to implement the system of initiative.
Given that a clear majority of the members of the Court, eight
Justices, concurred in the decision in Santiago, the
pronouncement therein that RA 6735 is "incomplete,
inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions
insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is
concerned" constitutes a definitive ruling on the matter.
In the Resolution dated June 10, 1997, the motions for
reconsideration of the Santiago decision were denied with
finality as only six Justices, or less than the majority, voted
to grant the same. The Resolution expressly stated that the
motion for reconsideration failed "to persuade the requisite
majority of the Court to modify or reverse the Decision of 19
March 1977."24 In fine, the pronouncement in Santiago as
embodied in the Decision of March 19, 1997 remains the
definitive ruling on the matter.
It bears stressing that in PIRMA, petitioners prayed for the
Court to resolve the issue posed by them and to re-examine
its ruling as regards RA 6735. By a vote of seven members of
the Court, including Justice Justo P. Torres, Jr. and Justice
Jose C. Vitug, the Court voted that there was no need to
resolve the issue. Five members of the Court opined that
there was a need for the re-examination of said ruling. Thus,
the pronouncement of the Court in Santiago remains the law
of the case and binding on petitioners.
If, as now claimed by the minorty, there was no doctrine
enunciated by the Court in Santiago, the Court should have
resolved to set aside its original resolution dismissing the
petition and to grant the motion for reconsideration and the
petition. But the Court did not. The Court positively and
unequivocally declared that the COMELEC merely followed
the ruling of the Court in Santiago in dismissing the petition
before it. No less than Senior Justice Reynato S. Puno
concurred with the resolution of the Court. It behooved
Justice Puno to dissent from the ruling of the Court on the
motion for reconsideration of petitioners precisely on the
ground that there was no doctrine enunciated by the Court in
Santiago. He did not. Neither did Chief Justice Artemio V.
Panganiban, who was a member of the Court.
That RA 6735 has failed to validly implement the people's
right to directly propose constitutional amendments through
the system of initiative had already been conclusively settled
in Santiago as well as in PIRMA. Heeding these decisions,
several lawmakers, including no less than Solicitor General
Antonio Eduardo Nachura when he was then a member of the
House of Representatives,25 have filed separate bills to
implement the system of initiative under Section 2, Article
XVII of the Constitution.
In the present Thirteenth (13th) Congress, at least seven (7)
bills are pending. In the Senate, the three (3) pending bills
are: Senate Bill No. 119 entitled An Act Providing for People's
Initiative to Amend the Constitution introduced by Senator
Luisa "Loi" P. Ejercito Estrada; Senate Bill No. 2189 entitled
An Act Providing for People's Initiative to Amend the
Constitution introduced by Senator Miriam Defensor
Santiago; and Senate Bill No. 2247 entitled An Act Providing
for a System of People's Initiative to Propose Amendments to
the Constitution introduced by Senator Richard Gordon.
In the House of Representatives, there are at least four (4)
pending bills: House Bill No. 05281 filed by Representative
Carmen Cari, House Bill No. 05017 filed by Representative
Imee Marcos, House Bill No. 05025 filed by Representative
Roberto Cajes, and House Bill No. 05026 filed by
Representative Edgardo Chatto. These House bills are
similarly entitled An Act Providing for People's Initiative to
Amend the Constitution.
The respective explanatory notes of the said Senate and
House bills uniformly recognize that there is, to date, no law
to govern the process by which constitutional amendments
are introduced by the people directly through the system of
initiative. Ten (10) years after Santiago and absent the
occurrence of any compelling supervening event, i.e., passage
of a law to implement the system of initiative under Section
2, Article XVII of the Constitution, that would warrant the
re-examination of the ruling therein, it behooves the Court to
apply to the present case the salutary and well-recognized
doctrine of stare decisis. As earlier shown, Congress and
other government agencies have, in fact, abided by Santiago.
The Court can do no less with respect to its own ruling.
Contrary to the stance taken by petitioners, the validity or
constitutionality of a law cannot be made to depend on the
individual opinions of the members who compose it – the
Supreme Court, as an institution, has already determined RA
6735 to be "incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential
terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to
the Constitution is concerned" and therefore the same
74
remains to be so regardless of any change in the Court's
composition.26 Indeed, it is vital that there be stability in the
courts in adhering to decisions deliberately made after ample
consideration. Parties should not be encouraged to seek re-
examination of determined principles and speculate on
fluctuation of the law with every change in the expounders of
it.27
Proposals to Revise the Constitution,
As in the Case of the Petitioners'
Proposal to Change the Form of
Government, Cannot be Effected
Through the System of Initiative,
Which by Express Provision of
Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution, is Limited to Amendments
Even granting arguendo the Court, in the present case,
abandons its pronouncement in Santiago and declares RA
6735, taken together with other extant laws, sufficient to
implement the system of initiative, still, the amended
petition for initiative cannot prosper. Despite the
denomination of their petition, the proposals of petitioners to
change the form of government from the present bicameral-
presidential to a unicameral-parliamentary system of
government are actually for the revision of the Constitution.
Petitioners propose to "amend" Articles VI and VII of the
Constitution in this manner:
A. Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI shall be amended
to read as follows:
"Section 1. (1) The legislative and executive powers shall be
vested in a unicameral Parliament which shall be composed
of as many members as may be provided by law, to be
apportioned among the provinces, representative districts,
and cities in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, with at least three hundred thousand
inhabitants per district, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio. Each district shall comprise, as far as
practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory, and
each province must have at least one member.
"(2) Each Member of Parliament shall be a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-five years old on the
day of the election, a resident of his district for at least one
year prior thereto, and shall be elected by the qualified voters
of his district for a term of five years without limitation as to
the number thereof, except those under the party-list system
which shall be provided for by law and whose number shall
be equal to twenty per centum of the total membership
coming from the parliamentary districts."
B. Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
are hereby amended to read, as follows:
"Section 1. There shall be a President who shall be the Head
of State. The executive power shall be exercised by a Prime
Minister, with the assistance of the Cabinet. The Prime
Minister shall be elected by a majority of all the Members of
Parliament from among themselves. He shall be responsible
to the Parliament for the program of government.
C. For the purpose of insuring an orderly transition from the
bicameral-Presidential to a unicameral-Parliamentary form
of government, there shall be a new Article XVIII, entitled
"Transitory Provisions," which shall read as follows:
Section 1. (1) The incumbent President and Vice President
shall serve until the expiration of their term at noon on the
thirtieth day of June 2010 and shall continue to exercise their
powers under the 1987 Constitution unless impeached by a
vote of two thirds of all the members of the interim
parliament.,
(2) In case of death, permanent disability, resignation or
removal from office of the incumbent President, the
incumbent Vice President shall succeed as President. In case
of death, permanent disability, resignation or removal from
office of both the incumbent President and Vice President,
the interim Prime Minister shall assume all the powers and
responsibilities of Prime Minister under Article VII as
amended.
Section 2. "Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent
President and Vice President, with the exception of Sections
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
which shall hereby be amended and Sections 18 and 24 which
shall be deleted, all other Sections of Article VI are hereby
retained and renumbered sequentially as Section 2, ad
seriatim up to 26, unless they are inconsistent with the
Parliamentary system of government, in which case, they
shall be amended to conform with a unicameral
parliamentary form of government; provided, however, that
any and all references therein to "Congress," "Senate,"
"House of Representatives" and "House of Congress,"
"Senator[s] or "Member[s] of the House of Representatives"
and "House of Congress" shall be changed to read
"Parliament"; that any and all references therein to
"Member[s] of the House of Representatives" shall be
changed to read as "Member[s] of Parliament" and any and
all references to the "President" and or "Acting President"
shall be changed to read "Prime Minister."
Section 3. "Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent
President and Vice President, with the exception of Sections
1, 2, 3 and 4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which are
hereby amended and Sections 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 which are
hereby deleted, all other Sections of Article VII shall be
retained and renumbered sequentially as Section 2, ad
seriatim up to 14, unless they shall be inconsistent with
Section 1 hereof, in which case they shall be deemed amended
so as to conform to a unicameral Parliamentary System of
government; provided, however, that any and all references
therein to "Congress," "Senate," "House of Representatives"
and "Houses of Congress" shall be changed to read
"Parliament"; that any and all references therein to
"Member[s] of Congress," "Senator[s]" or "Member[s] of the
House of Parliament" and any and all references to the
"President" and of "Acting President" shall be changed to
read "Prime Minister."
Section 4. (1) There shall exist, upon the ratification of these
amendments, an interim Parliament which shall continue
until the Members of the regular Parliament shall have been
elected and shall have qualified. It shall be composed of the
incumbent Members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives and the incumbent Members of the Cabinet
who are heads of executive departments.
(2) The incumbent Vice President shall automatically be a
Member of Parliament until noon of the thirtieth day of June
2010. He shall also be a member of the cabinet and shall head
a ministry. He shall initially convene the interim Parliament
and shall preside over its session for the election of the
interim Prime Minister and until the Speaker shall have
been elected by a majority vote of all the members of the
interim Parliament from among themselves.
(3) Senators whose term of office ends in 2010 shall be
Members of Parliament until noon of the thirtieth day of June
2010.
(4) Within forty-five days from ratification of these
amendments, the interim Parliament shall convene to
propose amendments to, or revisions of, this Constitution
consistent with the principles of local autonomy,
decentralization and a strong bureaucracy.
"Section 5. (1) The incumbent President, who is the Chief
Executive, shall nominate, from among the members of the
interim Parliament, an interim Prime Minister, who shall be
75
elected by a majority vote of the members thereof. The
interim Prime Minister shall oversee the various ministries
and shall perform such powers and responsibilities as may be
delegated to him by the incumbent President."
(2) The interim Parliament shall provide for the election of
the members of Parliament, which shall be synchronized and
held simultaneously with the election of all local government
officials. [Thereafter, the Vice-President, as Member of
Parliament, shall immediately convene the Parliament and
shall initially preside over its session for the purpose of
electing the Prime Minister, who shall be elected by a
majority vote of all its members, from among themselves.]
The duly-elected Prime Minister shall continue to exercise
and perform the powers, duties and responsibilities of the
interim Prime Minister until the expiration of the term of the
incumbent President and Vice President.28
Petitioners claim that the required number of signatures of
registered voters have been complied with, i.e., the
signatories to the petition constitute twelve percent (12%) of
all the registered voters in the country, wherein each
legislative district is represented by at least three percent
(3%) of all the registered voters therein. Certifications
allegedly executed by the respective COMELEC Election
Registrars of each municipality and city verifying these
signatures were attached to the petition for initiative. The
verification was allegedly done on the basis of the list of
registered voters contained in the official COMELEC list
used in the immediately preceding election.
The proposition, as formulated by petitioners, to be
submitted to the Filipino people in a plebiscite to be called for
the said purpose reads:
DO YOU APPROVE THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI
AND VII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, CHANGING THE
FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT
BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL TO A UNICAMERAL-
PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM, AND PROVIDING ARTICLE
XVIII AS TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE
ORDERLY SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM TO THE
OTHER?29
According to petitioners, the proposed amendment of Articles
VI and VII would effect a more efficient, more economical and
more responsive government. The parliamentary system
would allegedly ensure harmony between the legislative and
executive branches of government, promote greater
consensus, and provide faster and more decisive
governmental action.
Sections 1 and 2 of Article XVII pertinently read:
Article XVII
SECTION 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this
Constitution may be proposed by:
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its
Members; or
(2) A constitutional convention.
SECTION 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise
be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of
registered voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum of the registered
voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be
authorized within five years following the ratification of this
Constitution nor oftener than once every five years
thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the
exercise of this right.
It can be readily gleaned that the above provisions set forth
different modes and procedures for proposals for the
amendment and revision of the Constitution:
1. Under Section 1, Article XVII, any amendment to, or
revision of, the Constitution may be proposed by –
a. Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members;
or
b. A constitutional convention.
2. Under Section 2, Article XVII, amendments to the
Constitution may be likewise directly proposed by the people
through initiative.
The framers of the Constitution deliberately adopted the
terms "amendment" and "revision" and provided for their
respective modes and procedures for effecting changes of the
Constitution fully cognizant of the distinction between the
two concepts. Commissioner Jose E. Suarez, the Chairman of
the Committee on Amendments and Transitory Provisions,
explained:
MR. SUAREZ. One more point, and we will be through.
We mentioned the possible use of only one term and that is,
"amendment." However, the Committee finally agreed to use
the terms – "amendment" or "revision" when our attention
was called by the honorable Vice-President to the substantial
difference in the connotation and significance between the
said terms. As a result of our research, we came up with the
observations made in the famous – or notorious – Javellana
doctrine, particularly the decision rendered by Honorable
Justice Makasiar, wherein he made the following distinction
between "amendment" and "revision" of an existing
Constitution: "Revision" may involve a rewriting of the whole
Constitution. On the other hand, the act of amending a
constitution envisages a change of specific provisions only.
The intention of an act to amend is not the change of the
entire Constitution, but only the improvement of specific
parts or the addition of provisions deemed essential as a
consequence of new conditions or the elimination of parts
already considered obsolete or unresponsive to the needs of
the times.
The 1973 Constitution is not a mere amendment to the 1935
Constitution. It is a completely new fundamental Charter
embodying new political, social and economic concepts.
So, the Committee finally came up with the proposal that
these two terms should be employed in the formulation of the
Article governing amendments or revisions to the new
Constitution.30
Further, the framers of the Constitution deliberately omitted
the term "revision" in Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution because it was their intention to reserve the
power to propose a revision of the Constitution to Congress
or the constitutional convention. Stated in another manner,
it was their manifest intent that revision thereof shall not be
undertaken through the system of initiative. Instead, the
revision of the Constitution shall be done either by Congress
or by a constitutional convention.
It is significant to note that, originally, the provision on the
system of initiative was included in Section 1 of the draft
Article on Amendment or Revision proposed by the
Committee on Amendments and Transitory Provisions. The
original draft provided:
SEC. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution
may be proposed:
(a) by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of
all its members; or
76
(b) by a constitutional convention; or
(c) directly by the people themselves thru initiative as
provided for in Article __ Section __ of the Constitution.31
However, after deliberations and interpellations, the
members of the Commission agreed to remove the provision
on the system of initiative from Section 1 and, instead, put it
under a separate provision, Section 2. It was explained that
the removal of the provision on initiative from the other
"traditional modes" of changing the Constitution was
precisely to limit the former (system of initiative) to
amendments to the Constitution. It was emphasized that the
system of initiative should not extend to revision.
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you, Madam President.
May we respectfully call the attention of the Members of the
Commission that pursuant to the mandate given to us last
night, we submitted this afternoon a complete Committee
Report No. 7 which embodies the proposed provision
governing the matter of initiative. This is now covered by
Section 2 of the complete committee report. With the
permission of the Members, may I quote Section 2:
The people may, after five years from the date of the last
plebiscite held, directly propose amendments to this
Constitution thru initiative upon petition of at least ten
percent of the registered voters.
This completes the blanks appearing in the original
Committee Report No. 7. This proposal was suggested on the
theory that this matter of initiative, which came about
because of the extraordinary developments this year, has to
be separated from the traditional modes of amending the
Constitution as embodied in Section 1. The committee
members felt that this system of initiative should be limited
to amendments to the Constitution and should not extend to
the revision of the entire Constitution, so we removed it from
the operation of Section 1 of the proposed Article on
Amendment or Revision. x x x32
The intention to exclude "revision" of the Constitution as a
mode that may be undertaken through the system of
initiative was reiterated and made clear by Commissioner
Suarez in response to a suggestion of Commissioner Felicitas
Aquino:
MR. SUAREZ. Section 2 must be interpreted together with
the provisions of Section 4, except that in Section 4, as it is
presently drafted, there is no take-off date for the 60-day and
90-day periods.
MS. AQUINO. Yes. In other words, Section 2 is another
alternative mode of proposing amendments to the
Constitution which would further require the process of
submitting it in a plebiscite, in which case it is not self-
executing.
MR. SUAREZ. No, not unless we settle and determine the
take-off period.
MS. AQUINO. In which case, I am seriously bothered by
providing this process of initiative as a separate section in the
Article on Amendment. Would the sponsor be amenable to
accepting an amendment in terms of realigning Section 2 as
another subparagraph (c) of Section 1, instead of setting it up
as another separate section as if it were a self-executing
provision?
MR SUAREZ. We would be amenable except that, as we
clarified a while ago, this process of initiative is limited to the
matter of amendment and should not expand into a revision
which contemplates a total overhaul of the Constitution. That
was the sense conveyed by the Committee.
MS. AQUINO. In other words, the Committee was
attempting to distinguish the coverage of modes (a) and (b) in
Section 1 to include the process of revision; whereas, the
process of initiation to amend, which is given to the public,
would only apply to amendments?
MR. SUAREZ. That is right. Those were the terms envisioned
by the Committee.33
Then Commissioner Hilario P. Davide, Jr. (later Chief
Justice) also made the clarification with respect to the
observation of Commissioner Regalado Maambong:
MR. MAAMBONG. My first question: Commissioner
Davide's proposed amendment on line 1 refers to
"amendments." Does it not cover the word "revision" as
defined by Commissioner Padilla when he made the
distinction between the words "amendments" and "revision"?
MR. DAVIDE. No, it does not, because "amendments" and
"revision" should be covered by Section 1. So insofar as
initiative is concerned, it can only relate to "amendments" not
"revision."34
After several amendments, the Commission voted in favor of
the following wording of Section 2:
AMENDMENTS TO THIS CONSTITUTION MAY
LIKEWISE BE DIRECTLY PROPOSED BY THE PEOPLE
THROUGH INITIATIVE UPON A PETITION OF AT LEAST
TWELVE PERCENT OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF
REGISTERED VOTERS OF WHICH EVERY
LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT MUST BE REPRESENTED BY
AT LEAST THREE PERCENT OF THE REGISTERED
VOTERS THEREOF. NO AMENDMENT UNDER THIS
SECTION SHALL BE AUTHORIZED WITHIN FIVE
YEARS FOLLOWING THE RATIFICATION OF THIS
CONSTITUTION NOR OFTENER THAN ONCE EVERY
FIVE YEARS THEREAFTER.
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BY LAW PROVIDE
FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EXERCISE OF
THIS RIGHT.
Sections 1 and 2, Article XVII as eventually worded read:
Article XVII
SECTION 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this
Constitution may be proposed by:
(3) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its
Members; or
(4) A constitutional convention.
SEC. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be
directly proposed by the people through initiative, upon a
petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of
registered voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum of the registered
voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be
authorized within five years following the ratification of this
Constitution nor oftener than once every five years
thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the
exercise of this right.
The final text of Article XVII on Amendments or Revisions
clearly makes a substantial differentiation not only between
the two terms but also between two procedures and their
respective fields of application. Ineluctably, the system of
initiative under Section 2, Article XVII as a mode of effecting
changes in the Constitution is strictly limited to amendments
– not to a revision – thereof.
77
As opined earlier, the framers of the Constitution, in
providing for "amendment" and "revision" as different modes
of changing the fundamental law, were cognizant of the
distinction between the two terms. They particularly relied
on the distinction made by Justice Felix Antonio in his
concurring opinion in Javellana v. Executive Secretary,35 the
controversial decision which gave imprimatur to the 1973
Constitution of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, as
follows:
There is clearly a distinction between revision and
amendment of an existing constitution. Revision may involve
a rewriting of the whole constitution. The act of amending a
constitution, on the other hand, envisages a change of only
specific provisions. The intention of an act to amend is not
the change of the entire constitution, but only the
improvement of specific parts of the existing constitution of
the addition of provisions deemed essential as a consequence
of new conditions or the elimination of parts already
considered obsolete or unresponsive to the needs of the times.
The 1973 Constitution is not a mere amendment to the 1935
Constitution. It is a completely new fundamental charter
embodying new political, social and economic concepts.36
Other elucidation on the distinction between "amendment"
and "revision" is enlightening. For example, Dean Vicente G.
Sinco, an eminent authority on political law, distinguished
the two terms in this manner:
Strictly speaking, the act of revising a constitution involves
alterations of different portions of the entire document. It
may result in the rewriting either of the whole constitution,
or the greater portion of it, or perhaps only some of its
important provisions. But whatever results the revisions may
produce, the factor that characterizes it as an act of revision
is the original intention and plan authorized to be carried out.
That intention and plan must contemplate a consideration of
all the provisions of the constitution to determine which one
should be altered or suppressed or whether the whole
document should be replaced with an entirely new one.
The act of amending a constitution, on the other hand,
envisages a change of only a few specific provisions. The
intention of an act to amend is not to consider the advisability
of changing the entire constitution or of considering that
possibility. The intention rather is to improve the specific
parts of the existing constitution or to add to it provisions
deemed essential on account of changed conditions or to
suppress portions of it that seemed obsolete, or dangerous, or
misleading in their effect.37
In the United States, the Supreme Court of Georgia in
Wheeler v. Board of Trustees38 had the occasion to make the
distinction between the two terms with respect to Ga.L. 1945,
an instrument which "amended" the 1877 Constitution of
Georgia. It explained the term "amendment:"
"Amendment" of a statute implies its survival and not
destruction. It repeals or changes some provision, or adds
something thereto. A law is amended when it is in whole or
in part permitted to remain, and something is added to or
taken from it, or it is in some way changed or altered to make
it more complete or perfect, or to fit it the better to accomplish
the object or purpose for which it was made, or some other
object or purpose.39
On the other hand, the term "revision" was explained by the
said US appellate court:
x x x When a house is completely demolished and another is
erected on the same location, do you have a changed, repaired
and altered house, or do you have a new house? Some of the
materials contained in the old house may be used again, some
of the rooms may be constructed the same, but this does not
alter the fact that you have altogether another or a new
house. We conclude that the instrument as contained in Ga.L.
1945, pp. 8 to 89, inclusive, is not an amendment to the
constitution of 1877; but on the contrary it is a completely
revised or new constitution.40
Fairly recently, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, SJ, a member of the
Constitutional Commission, expounded on the distinction
between the two terms thus:
An amendment envisages an alteration of one or a few
specific and separable provisions. The guiding original
intention of an amendment is to improve specific parts or to
add new provisions deemed necessary to meet new conditions
or to suppress specific portions that may have become
obsolete or that are judged to be dangerous. In revision,
however, the guiding original intention and plan contemplate
a re-examination of the entire document – or of provisions of
the document (which have overall implications for the entire
document or for the fundamental philosophical
underpinnings of the document) – to determine how and to
what extent it should be altered. Thus, for instance, a switch
from the presidential system to a parliamentary system
would be a revision because of its overall impact on the entire
constitutional structure. So would a switch from a bicameral
system to a unicameral system because of its effect on other
important provisions of the Constitution.
It is thus clear that what distinguishes revision from
amendment is not the quantum of change in the document.
Rather, it is the fundamental qualitative alteration that
effects revision. Hence, I must reject the puerile argument
that the use of the plural form of "amendments" means that
a revision can be achieved by the introduction of a
multiplicity of amendments!41
Given that revision necessarily entails a more complex,
substantial and far-reaching effects on the Constitution, the
framers thereof wisely withheld the said mode from the
system of initiative. It should be recalled that it took the
framers of the present Constitution four months from June 2,
1986 until October 15, 1986 to come up with the draft
Constitution which, as described by the venerable Justice
Cecilia Muñoz Palma, the President of the Constitutional
Commission of 1986, "gradually and painstakingly took
shape through the crucible of sustained sometimes
passionate and often exhilarating debates that intersected all
dimensions of the national life."42
Evidently, the framers of the Constitution believed that a
revision thereof should, in like manner, be a product of the
same extensive and intensive study and debates.
Consequently, while providing for a system of initiative
where the people would directly propose amendments to the
Constitution, they entrusted the formidable task of its
revision to a deliberative body, the Congress or Constituent
Assembly.
The Constitution is the fundamental law of the state,
containing the principles upon which the government is
founded, and regulating the division of sovereign powers,
directing to what persons each of those powers is to be
confided and the manner in which it is to be exercised.43 The
Philippines has followed the American constitutional legal
system in the sense that the term constitution is given a more
restricted meaning, i.e., as a written organic instrument,
under which governmental powers are both conferred and
circumscribed.44
The Constitution received its force from the express will of
the people. An overwhelming 16,622,111, out of 21,785,216
votes cast during the plebiscite, or 76.30% ratified the
present Constitution on February 2, 1987.45 In expressing
that will, the Filipino people have incorporated therein the
method and manner by which the same can be amended and
revised, and when the electorate have incorporated into the
fundamental law the particular manner in which the same
may be altered or changed, then any course which disregards
that express will is a direct violation of the fundamental
law.46
78

Further, these provisions having been incorporated in the
Constitution, where the validity of a constitutional
amendment or revision depends upon whether such
provisions have been complied with, such question presents
for consideration and determination a judicial question, and
the courts are the only tribunals vested with power under the
Constitution to determine such question.47
Earlier, it was mentioned that Article XVII, by the use of the
terms "amendment" and "revision," clearly makes a
differentiation not only between the two terms but also
between two procedures and their respective fields of
application. On this point, the case of McFadden v. Jordan48
is instructive. In that case, a "purported initiative
amendment" (referred to as the proposed measure) to the
State Constitution of California, then being proposed to be
submitted to the electors for ratification, was sought to be
enjoined. The proposed measure, denominated as "California
Bill of Rights," comprised a single new article with some 208
subsections which would repeal or substantially alter at least
15 of the 25 articles of the California State Constitution and
add at least four new topics. Among the likely effects of the
proposed measure were to curtail legislative and judicial
functions, legalize gaming, completely revise the taxation
system and reduce the powers of cities, counties and courts.
The proposed measure also included diverse matters as
ministers, mines, civic centers, liquor control and
naturopaths.
The Supreme Court of California enjoined the submission of
the proposed measure to the electors for ratification because
it was not an "amendment" but a "revision" which could only
be proposed by a convention. It held that from an
examination of the proposed measure itself, considered in
relation to the terms of the California State Constitution, it
was clear that the proposed initiative enactment amounted
substantially to an attempted revision, rather than
amendment, thereof; and that inasmuch as the California
State Constitution specifies (Article XVIII §2 thereof) that it
may be revised by means of constitutional convention but
does not provide for revision by initiative measure, the
submission of the proposed measure to the electorate for
ratification must be enjoined.
As piercingly enunciated by the California State Supreme
Court in McFadden, the differentiation required (between
amendment and revision) is not merely between two words;
more accurately it is between two procedures and between
their respective fields of application. Each procedure, if we
follow elementary principles of statutory construction, must
be understood to have a substantial field of application, not
to be a mere alternative procedure in the same field. Each of
the two words, then, must be understood to denote,
respectively, not only a procedure but also a field of
application appropriate to its procedure.49
Provisions regulating the time and mode of effecting organic
changes are in the nature of safety-valves – they must not be
so adjusted as to discharge their peculiar function with too
great facility, lest they become the ordinary escape-pipes of
party passion; nor, on the other hand, must they discharge it
with such difficulty that the force needed to induce action is
sufficient also to explode the machine. Hence, the problem of
the Constitution maker is, in this particular, one of the most
difficult in our whole system, to reconcile the requisites for
progress with the requisites for safety.50
Like in McFadden, the present petition for initiative on
amendments to the Constitution is, despite its denomination,
one for its revision. It purports to seek the amendment only
of Articles VI and VII of the Constitution as well as to provide
transitory provisions. However, as will be shown shortly, the
amendment of these two provisions will necessarily affect
other numerous provisions of the Constitution particularly
those pertaining to the specific powers of Congress and the
President. These powers would have to be transferred to the
Parliament and the Prime Minister and/or President, as the
case may be. More than one hundred (100) sections will be
affected or altered thereby:
1. Section 19 of Article III (Bill of Rights) on the power of
Congress to impose the death penalty for compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes;
2. Section 2 of Article V (Suffrage) on the power of Congress
to provide for securing the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot
as well as a system for absentee voting;
3. All 32 Sections of Article VI on the Legislative Department;
4. All 23 Sections of Article VII on the Executive Department;
5. The following Sections of Article VIII (Judicial
Department):
- Section 2 on power of Congress to define, prescribe and
apportion the jurisdiction of various courts;
- Section 7 on the power of Congress to prescribe the
qualifications of judges of lower courts;
- Section 8 on the composition of Judicial Bar Council (JBC)
which includes representatives of Congress as ex officio
members and on the power of the President to appoint the
regular members of the JBC;
- Section 9 on the power of the President to appoint the
members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts;
- Section 16 on duty of Supreme Court to make annual report
to the President and Congress.
6. The following Sections of Article IX (Constitutional
Commissions);
- (B) Section 3 on duty of Civil Service Commission to make
annual report to the President and Congress;
- (B) Section 5 on power of Congress to provide by law for the
standardization of compensation of government officials;
- (B) Section 8 which provides in part that "no public officer
shall accept, without the consent of Congress, any present,
emolument, etc. x x x"
- (C) Section 1 on the power of the President to appoint the
Chairman and Commissioners of the Commission on
Elections with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments;
- (C) Section 2 (7) on the power of the COMELEC to
recommend to Congress measures to minimize election
spending x x x;
- (C) Section 2 (8) on the duty of the COMELEC to recommend
to the President the removal of any officer or employee it has
deputized, or the imposition of any other disciplinary action
x x x;
- (C) Section 2 (9) on the duty of the COMELEC to submit to
the President and Congress a report on the conduct of
election, plebiscite, etc.;
- (C) Section 5 on the power of the President, with the
favorable recommendation of the COMELEC, to grant
pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for
violation of election laws, rules and regulations;
- (C) Section 7 which recognizes as valid votes cast in favor of
organization registered under party-list system;
- (C) Section 8 on political parties, organizations or coalitions
under the party-list system;
79

- (D) Section 1 (2) on the power of the President to appoint
the Chairman and Commissioners of the Commission on
Audit (COA) with the consent of the Commission of
Appointments;
- Section 4 on duty of the COA to make annual report to the
President and Congress.
7. The following Sections of Article X (Local Government):
- Section 3 on the power of Congress to enact a local
government code;
- Section 4 on the power of the President to exercise general
supervision over local government units (LGUs);
- Section 5 on the power of LGUs to create their own sources
of income x x x, subject to such guidelines as Congress may
provide;
- Section 11 on the power of Congress to create special
metropolitan political subdivisions;
- Section 14 on the power of the President to provide for
regional development councils x x x;
- Section 16 on the power of the President to exercise general
supervision over autonomous regions;
- Section 18 on the power of Congress to enact organic act for
each autonomous region as well as the power of the President
to appoint the representatives to the regional consultative
commission;
- Section 19 on the duty of the first Congress elected under
the Constitution to pass the organic act for autonomous
regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras.
8. The following Sections of Article XI (Accountability of
Public Officers):
- Section 2 on the impeachable officers (President, Vice-
President, etc.);
- Section 3 on impeachment proceedings (exclusive power of
the House to initiate complaint and sole power of the Senate
to try and decide impeachment cases);
- Section 9 on the power of the President to appoint the
Ombudsman and his deputies;
- Section 16 which provides in part that "x x x no loans or
guaranty shall be granted to the President, Vice-President,
etc.
- Section 17 on mandatory disclosure of assets and liabilities
by public officials including the President, Vice-President,
etc.
9. The following Sections of Article XII (National Economy
and Patrimony):
- Section 2 on the power of Congress to allow, by law, small-
scale utilization of natural resources and power of the
President to enter into agreements with foreign-owned
corporations and duty to notify Congress of every contract;
- Section 3 on the power of Congress to determine size of lands
of public domain;
- Section 4 on the power of Congress to determine specific
limits of forest lands;
- Section 5 on the power of Congress to provide for
applicability of customary laws;
- Section 9 on the power of Congress to establish an
independent economic and planning agency to be headed by
the President;
- Section 10 on the power of Congress to reserve to Filipino
citizens or domestic corporations(at least 60% Filipino-
owned) certain areas of investment;
- Section 11 on the sole power of Congress to grant franchise
for public utilities;
- Section 15 on the power of Congress to create an agency to
promote viability of cooperatives;
- Section 16 which provides that Congress shall not, except
by general law, form private corporations;
- Section 17 on the salaries of the President, Vice-President,
etc. and the power of Congress to adjust the same;
- Section 20 on the power of Congress to establish central
monetary authority.
10. The following Sections of Article XIII (Social Justice and
Human Rights):
- Section 1 on the mandate of Congress to give highest
priority to enactment of measures that protect and enhance
the right of people x x x
- Section 4 on the power of Congress to prescribe retention
limits in agrarian reform;
- Section 18 (6) on the duty of the Commission on Human
Rights to recommend to Congress effective measures to
promote human rights;
- Section 19 on the power of Congress to provide for other
cases to fall within the jurisdiction of the Commission on
Human Rights.
11. The following Sections of Article XIV (Education, Science
and Technology, etc.):
- Section 4 on the power of Congress to increase Filipino
equity participation in educational institutions;
- Section 6 which provides that subject to law and as Congress
may provide, the Government shall sustain the use of
Filipino as medium of official communication;
- Section 9 on the power of Congress to establish a national
language commission;
- Section 11 on the power of Congress to provide for incentives
to promote scientific research.
12. The following Sections of Article XVI (General
Provisions):
- Section 2 on the power of Congress to adopt new name for
the country, new national anthem, etc.;
- Section 5 (7) on the tour of duty of the Chief of Staff which
may be extended by the President in times of war or national
emergency declared by Congress;
- Section 11 on the power of Congress to regulate or prohibit
monopolies in mass media;
- Section 12 on the power of Congress to create consultative
body to advise the President on indigenous cultural
communities.
13. The following Sections of Article XVII (Amendments or
Revisions):
80
- Section 1 on the amendment or revision of Constitution by
Congress;
- Section 2 on the duty of Congress to provide for the
implementation of the system of initiative;
- Section 3 on the power of Congress to call constitutional
convention to amend or revise the Constitution.
14. All 27 Sections of Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions).
The foregoing enumeration negates the claim that "the big
bulk of the 1987 Constitution will not be affected."51
Petitioners' proposition, while purportedly seeking to amend
only Articles VI and VII of the Constitution and providing
transitory provisions, will, in fact, affect, alter, replace or
repeal other numerous articles and sections thereof. More
than the quantitative effects, however, the revisory character
of petitioners' proposition is apparent from the qualitative
effects it will have on the fundamental law.
I am not impervious to the commentary of Dean Vicente G.
Sinco that the revision of a constitution, in its strict sense,
refers to a consideration of the entire constitution and the
procedure for effecting such change; while amendment refers
only to particular provisions to be added to or to be altered in
a constitution.52
For clarity and accuracy, however, it is necessary to reiterate
below Dean Sinco's more comprehensive differentiation of the
terms:
Strictly speaking, the act of revising a constitution involves
alterations of different portions of the entire document. It
may result in the rewriting either of the whole constitution,
or the greater portion of it, or perhaps only some of its
important provisions. But whatever results the revisions may
produce, the factor that characterizes it as an act of revision
is the original intention and plan authorized to be carried out.
That intention and plan must contemplate a consideration of
all the provisions of the constitution to determine which one
should be altered or suppressed or whether the whole
document should be replaced with an entirely new one.
The act of amending a constitution, on the other hand,
envisages a change of only a few specific provisions. The
intention of an act to amend is not to consider the advisability
of changing the entire constitution or of considering that
possibility. The intention rather is to improve the specific
parts of the existing constitution or to add to it provisions
deemed essential on account of changed conditions or to
suppress portions of it that seemed obsolete, or dangerous, or
misleading in their effect.53
A change in the form of government from bicameral-
presidential to unicameral-parliamentary, following the
above distinction, entails a revision of the Constitution as it
will involve "alteration of different portions of the entire
document" and "may result in the rewriting of the whole
constitution, or the greater portion of it, or perhaps only some
of its important provisions."
More importantly, such shift in the form of government will,
without doubt, fundamentally change the basic plan and
substance of the present Constitution. The tripartite system
ordained by our fundamental law divides governmental
powers into three distinct but co-equal branches: the
legislative, executive and judicial. Legislative power, vested
in Congress which is a bicameral body consisting of the House
of Representatives and the Senate, is the power to make laws
and to alter them at discretion. Executive power, vested in
the President who is directly elected by the people, is the
power to see that the laws are duly executed and enforced.
Judicial power, vested in the Supreme Court and the lower
courts, is the power to construe and apply the law when
controversies arise concerning what has been done or omitted
under it. This separation of powers furnishes a system of
checks and balances which guards against the establishment
of an arbitrary or tyrannical government.
Under a unicameral-parliamentary system, however, the
tripartite separation of power is dissolved as there is a fusion
between the executive and legislative powers. Essentially,
the President becomes a mere "symbolic head of State" while
the Prime Minister becomes the head of government who is
elected, not by direct vote of the people, but by the members
of the Parliament. The Parliament is a unicameral body
whose members are elected by legislative districts. The Prime
Minister, as head of government, does not have a fixed term
of office and may only be removed by a vote of confidence of
the Parliament. Under this form of government, the system
of checks and balances is emasculated.
Considering the encompassing scope and depth of the
changes that would be effected, not to mention that the
Constitution's basic plan and substance of a tripartite system
of government and the principle of separation of powers
underlying the same would be altered, if not entirely
destroyed, there can be no other conclusion than that the
proposition of petitioners Lambino, et al. would constitute a
revision of the Constitution rather than an amendment or
"such an addition or change within the lines of the original
instrument as will effect an improvement or better carry out
the purpose for which it was framed."54 As has been shown,
the effect of the adoption of the petitioners' proposition,
rather than to "within the lines of the original instrument"
constitute "an improvement or better carry out the purpose
for which it was framed," is to "substantially alter the
purpose and to attain objectives clearly beyond the lines of
the Constitution as now cast."55
To paraphrase McFadden, petitioners' contention that any
change less than a total one is amendatory would reduce to
the rubble of absurdity the bulwark so carefully erected and
preserved. A case might, conceivably, be presented where the
question would be occasion to undertake to define with nicety
the line of demarcation; but we have no case or occasion here.
As succinctly by Fr. Joaquin Bernas, "a switch from the
presidential system to a parliamentary system would be a
revision because of its overall impact on the entire
constitutional structure. So would a switch from a bicameral
system to a unicameral system because of its effect on other
important provisions of the Constitution. It is thus clear that
what distinguishes revision from amendment is not the
quantum of change in the document. Rather, it is the
fundamental qualitative alteration that effects revision."56
The petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution
filed by petitioners Lambino, et al., being in truth and in fact
a proposal for the revision thereof, is barred from the system
of initiative upon any legally permissible construction of
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.
The Petition for Initiative on
Amendments to the Constitution
is, on its Face, Insufficient in
Form and Substance
Again, even granting arguendo RA 6735 is declared sufficient
to implement the system of initiative and that COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300, as it prescribed rules and regulations on
the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution,
is valid, still, the petition for initiative on amendments to the
Constitution must be dismissed for being insufficient in form
and substance.
Section 5 of RA 6735 requires that a petition for initiative on
the Constitution must state the following:
1. Contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted,
approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as the case may
be;
81
2. The proposition;
3. The reason or reasons therefor;
4. That it is not one of the exceptions provided herein;
5. Signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and
6. An abstract or summary proposition in not more than one
hundred (100) words which shall be legibly written or printed
at the top of every page of the petition.
Section 7 thereof requires that the signatures be verified in
this wise:
SEC. 7. Verification of Signatures. – The Election Registrar
shall verify the signatures on the basis of the registry list of
voters, voters' affidavits and voters' identification cards used
in the immediately preceding election.
The law mandates upon the election registrar to personally
verify the signatures. This is a solemn and important duty
imposed on the election registrar which he cannot delegate to
any other person, even to barangay officials. Hence, a
verification of signatures made by persons other than the
election registrars has no legal effect.
In patent violation of the law, several certifications
submitted by petitioners showed that the verification of
signatures was made, not by the election registrars, but by
barangay officials. For example, the certification of the
election officer in Lumbatan, Lanao del Sur reads in full:
LOCAL ELECTION OFFICER'S CERTIFICATION57
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that based on the verifications made
by the Barangay Officials in this City/Municipality, as
attested to by two (2) witnesses from the same Barangays,
which is part of the 2nd Legislative District of the Province
of Lanao del Sur, the names appearing on the attached
signature sheets relative to the proposed initiative on
Amendments to the 1987 Constitution, are those of bonafide
resident of the said Barangays and correspond to the names
found in the official list of registered voters of the
Commission on Elections and/or voters' affidavit and/or
voters' identification cards.
It is further certified that the total number of signatures of
the registered voters for the City/Municipality of
LUMBATAN, LANAO DEL SUR as appearing in the affixed
signatures sheets is ONE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED
EIGHTY (1,180).
April 2, 2006
IBRAHIM M. MACADATO
Election Officer
(Underscoring supplied)
The ineffective verification in almost all the legislative
districts in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM) alone is shown by the certifications, similarly
worded as above-quoted, of the election registrars of Buldon,
Maguindanao;58 Cotabato City (Special Province);59 Datu
Odin Sinsuat, Maguindanao;60 Matanog, Maguindanao;61
Parang, Maguindanao;62 Kabantalan, Maguindanao;63 Upi,
Maguinadano;64 Barira, Maguindanao;65 Sultan,
Mastura;66 Ampatuan, Maguindanao;67 Buluan,
Maguindanao;68 Datu Paglas, Maguindanao;69 Datu Piang,
Maguindanao;70 Shariff Aguak, Maguindanao;71
Pagalungan, Maguindanao;72 Talayan, Maguindanao;73
Gen. S.K. Pendatun, Maguindanao;74 Mamasapano,
Maguindanao;75 Talitay, Maguindanao;76 Guindulungan,
Maguindanao;77 Datu Saudi Ampatuan, Maguindanao;78
Datu Unsay, Maguindanao;79 Pagagawan, Maguindanao;80
Rajah Buayan, Maguindanao;81 Indanan, Sulu;82 Jolo,
Sulu;83 Maimbung, Sulu;84 Hadji Panglima, Sulu;85
Pangutaran, Sulu;86 Parang, Sulu;87 Kalingalan Caluang,
Sulu;88 Luuk, Sulu;89 Panamao, Sulu;90 Pata, Sulu;91
Siasi, Sulu;92 Tapul, Sulu;93 Panglima Estino, Sulu;94
Lugus, Sulu;95 and Pandami, Sulu. 96
Section 7 of RA 6735 is clear that the verification of
signatures shall be done by the election registrar, and by no
one else, including the barangay officials. The foregoing
certifications submitted by petitioners, instead of aiding their
cause, justify the outright dismissal of their petition for
initiative. Because of the illegal verifications made by
barangay officials in the above-mentioned legislative
districts, it necessarily follows that the petition for initiative
has failed to comply with the requisite number of signatures,
i.e., at least twelve percent (12%) of the total number of
registered voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three percent (3%) of the registered
voters therein.
Petitioners cannot disclaim the veracity of these damaging
certifications because they themselves submitted the same to
the COMELEC and to the Court in the present case to
support their contention that the requirements of RA 6735
had been complied with and that their petition for initiative
is on its face sufficient in form and substance. They are in the
nature of judicial admissions which are conclusive and
binding on petitioners.97 This being the case, the Court must
forthwith order the dismissal of the petition for initiative for
being, on its face, insufficient in form and substance. The
Court should make the adjudication entailed by the facts here
and now, without further proceedings, as it has done in other
cases.98
It is argued by petitioners that, assuming arguendo that the
COMELEC is correct in relying on Santiago that RA 6735 is
inadequate to cover initiative to the Constitution, this cannot
be used to legitimize its refusal to heed the people's will. The
fact that there is no enabling law should not prejudice the
right of the sovereign people to propose amendments to the
Constitution, which right has already been exercised by
6,327,952 voters. The collective and resounding act of the
particles of sovereignty must not be set aside. Hence, the
COMELEC should be ordered to comply with Section 4,
Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution via a writ of mandamus.
The submission of petitioners, however, is unpersuasive.
Mandamus is a proper recourse for citizens who act to enforce
a public right and to compel the persons of a public duty most
especially when mandated by the Constitution.99 However,
under Section 3, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court, for a
petition for mandamus to prosper, it must be shown that the
subject of the petition is a ministerial act or duty and not
purely discretionary on the part of the board, officer or
person, and that petitioner has a well-defined, clear and
certain right to warrant the grant thereof. A purely
ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal
performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in
obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard
to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or
impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a
public official and gives him the right to decide how or when
the duty should be performed, such duty is discretionary and
not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the
discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of an
official discretion nor judgment.100
To stress, in a petition for mandamus, petitioner must show
a well defined, clear and certain right to warrant the grant
thereof.101 In this case, petitioners failed to establish their
right to a writ of mandamus as shown by the foregoing
disquisitions.
Remand of the Case to the
COMELEC is Not Authorized by
RA 6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300
82
The dissenting opinion posits that the issue of whether or not
the petition for initiative has complied with the requisite
number of signatures of at least twelve percent (12%) of the
total number of registered voters, of which every legislative
district must be represented by at least three percent (3%) of
the registered voters therein, involves contentious facts. The
dissenting opinion cites the petitioners' claim that they have
complied with the same while the oppositors-intervenors
have vigorously refuted this claim by alleging, inter alia, that
the signatures were not properly verified or were not verified
at all. Other oppositors-intervenors have alleged that the
signatories did not fully understand what they have signed
as they were misled into signing the signature sheets.
According to the dissenting opinion, the sufficiency of the
petition for initiative and its compliance with the
requirements of RA 6735 on initiative and its implementing
rules is a question that should be resolved by the COMELEC
at the first instance. It thus remands the case to the
COMELEC for further proceedings.
To my mind, the remand of the case to the COMELEC is not
warranted. There is nothing in RA 6735, as well as in
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, granting that it is valid to
implement the former statute, that authorizes the
COMELEC to conduct any kind of hearing, whether full-
blown or trial-type hearing, summary hearing or
administrative hearing, on a petition for initiative.
Section 41 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 provides that
"[a]n initiative shall be conducted under the control and
supervision of the Commission in accordance with Article III
hereof." Pertinently, Sections 30, 31 and 32 of Article III of
the said implementing rules provide as follows:
Sec. 30. Verification of signatures. – The Election Registrar
shall verify the signatures on the basis of the registry list of
voters, voters' affidavits and voters' identification cards used
in the immediately preceding election.
Sec. 31. Determination by the Commission. – The
Commission shall act on the findings of the sufficiency or
insufficiency of the petition for initiative or referendum.
If it should appear that the required number of signatures
has not been obtained, the petition shall be deemed defeated
and the Commission shall issue a declaration to that effect.
If it should appear that the required number of signatures
has been obtained, the Commission shall set the initiative or
referendum in accordance with the succeeding sections.
Sec. 32. Appeal. – The decision of the Commission on the
findings of the sufficiency and insufficiency of the petition for
initiative or referendum may be appealed to the Supreme
Court within thirty (30) days from notice hereof.
Clearly, following the foregoing procedural rules, the
COMELEC is not authorized to conduct any kind of hearing
to receive any evidence for or against the sufficiency of the
petition for initiative. Rather, the foregoing rules require of
the COMELEC to determine the sufficiency or insufficiency
of the petition for initiative on its face. And it has already
been shown, by the annexes submitted by the petitioners
themselves, their petition is, on its face, insufficient in form
and substance. The remand of the case to the COMELEC for
reception of evidence of the parties on the contentious factual
issues is, in effect, an amendment of the abovequoted rules of
the COMELEC by this Court which the Court is not
empowered to do.
The Present Petition Presents a
Justiciable Controversy; Hence,
a Non-Political Question. Further,
the People, Acting in their Sovereign
Capacity, Have Bound Themselves
to Abide by the Constitution
Political questions refer to those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive
branch of government.102 A political question has two
aspects: (1) those matters that are to be exercised by the
people in their primary political capacity; and (2) matters
which have been specifically designated to some other
department or particular office of the government, with
discretionary power to act.103
In his concurring and dissenting opinion in Arroyo v. De
Venecia,104 Senior Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno
explained the doctrine of political question vis-à-vis the
express mandate of the present Constitution for the courts to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government:
In the Philippine setting, there is more compelling reason for
courts to categorically reject the political question defense
when its interposition will cover up abuse of power. For
Section 1, Article VIII of our Constitution was intentionally
cobbled to empower courts "... to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government." This power is new and
was not granted to our courts in the 1935 and 1972
Constitutions. It was also not xeroxed from the US
Constitution or any foreign state constitution. The CONCOM
[Constitutional Commission] granted this enormous power to
our courts in view of our experience under martial law where
abusive exercises of state power were shielded from judicial
scrutiny by the misuse of the political question doctrine. Led
by the eminent former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, the
CONCOM expanded and sharpened the checking powers of
the judiciary vis-à-vis the Executive and the Legislative
departments of government. In cases involving the
proclamation of martial law and suspension of the privilege
of habeas corpus, it is now beyond dubiety that the
government can no longer invoke the political question
defense.
xxxx
To a great degree, it diminished its [political question
doctrine] use as a shield to protect other abuses of
government by allowing courts to penetrate the shield with
new power to review acts of any branch or instrumentality of
the government ". . . to determine whether or not there has
been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction."
Even if the present petition involves the act, not of a
governmental body, but of purportedly more than six million
registered voters who have signified their assent to the
proposal to amend the Constitution, the same still constitutes
a justiciable controversy, hence, a non-political question.
There is no doubt that the Constitution, under Article XVII,
has explicitly provided for the manner or method to effect
amendments thereto, or revision thereof. The question,
therefore, of whether there has been compliance with the
terms of the Constitution is for the Court to pass upon.105
In the United States, in In re McConaughy,106 the State
Supreme Court of Minnesota exercised jurisdiction over the
petition questioning the result of the general election holding
that "an examination of the decisions shows that the courts
have almost uniformly exercised the authority to determine
the validity of the proposal, submission, or ratification of
constitutional amendments." The cases cited were Dayton v.
St. Paul,107 Rice v. Palmer,108 Bott v. Wurtz,109 State v.
Powell,110 among other cases.
There is no denying that "the Philippines is a democratic and
republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all
83
government authority emanates from them."111 However, I
find to be tenuous the asseveration that "the argument that
the people through initiative cannot propose substantial
amendments to change the Constitution turns sovereignty in
its head. At the very least, the submission constricts the
democratic space for the exercise of the direct sovereignty of
the people."112 In effect, it is theorized that despite the
unambiguous text of Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution withholding the power to revise it from the
system of initiative, the people, in their sovereign capacity,
can conveniently disregard the said provision.
I strongly take exception to the view that the people, in their
sovereign capacity, can disregard the Constitution
altogether. Such a view directly contravenes the fundamental
constitutional theory that while indeed "the ultimate
sovereignty is in the people, from whom springs all legitimate
authority"; nonetheless, "by the Constitution which they
establish, they not only tie up the hands of their official
agencies, but their own hands as well; and neither the officers
of the state, nor the whole people as an aggregate body, are
at liberty to take action in opposition to this fundamental
law."113 The Constitution, it should be remembered, "is the
protector of the people, placed on guard by them to save the
rights of the people against injury by the people."114 This is
the essence of constitutionalism:
Through constitutionalism we placed limits on both our
political institutions and ourselves, hoping that democracies,
historically always turbulent, chaotic and even despotic,
might now become restrained, principled, thoughtful and
just. So we bound ourselves over to a law that we made and
promised to keep. And though a government of laws did not
displace governance by men, it did mean that now men,
democratic men, would try to live by their word.115
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on the system of
initiative is limited only to proposals to amend to the
Constitution, and does not extend to its revision. The Filipino
people have bound themselves to observe the manner and
method to effect the changes of the Constitution. They opted
to limit the exercise of the right to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution through initiative, but did
not extend the same to the revision thereof. The petition for
initiative, as it proposes to effect the revision thereof,
contravenes the Constitution. The fundamental law of the
state prescribes the limitations under which the electors of
the state may change the same, and, unless such course is
pursued, the mere fact that a majority of the electors are in
favor of a change and have so expressed themselves, does not
work a change. Such a course would be revolutionary, and the
Constitution of the state would become a mere matter of
form.116
The very term Constitution implies an instrument of a
permanent and abiding nature, and the provisions contained
therein for its revision indicated the will of the people that
the underlying principles upon which it rests, as well as the
substantial entirety of the instrument, shall be of a like
permanent and abiding nature.117
The Filipino people have incorporated the safety valves of
amendment and revision in Article XVII of the Constitution.
The Court is mandated to ensure that these safety valves
embodied in the Constitution to guard against improvident
and hasty changes thereof are not easily trifled with. To be
sure, by having overwhelmingly ratified the Constitution, the
Filipino people believed that it is "a good Constitution" and
in the words of the learned Judge Cooley:
x x x should be beyond the reach of temporary excitement and
popular caprice or passion. It is needed for stability and
steadiness; it must yield to the thought of the people; not to
the whim of the people, or the thought evolved in excitement
or hot blood, but the sober second thought, which alone, if the
government is to be safe, can be allowed efficiency. Changes
in government are to be feared unless the benefit is certain.
As Montaign says: "All great mutations shake and disorder a
state. Good does not necessarily succeed evil; another evil
may succeed and worse.118
Indisputably, the issues posed in the present case are of
transcendental importance. Accordingly, I have approached
and grappled with them with full appreciation of the
responsibilities involved in the present case, and have given
to its consideration the earnest attention which its
importance demands. I have sought to maintain the
supremacy of the Constitution at whatever hazard. I share
the concern of Chief Justice Day in Koehler v. Hill:119 "it is
for the protection of minorities that constitutions are framed.
Sometimes constitutions must be interposed for the
protection of majorities even against themselves.
Constitutions are adopted in times of public repose, when
sober reason holds her citadel, and are designed to check the
surging passions in times of popular excitement. But if courts
could be coerced by popular majorities into a disregard of
their provisions, constitutions would become mere 'ropes of
sand,' and there would be an end of social security and of
constitutional freedom. The cause of temperance can sustain
no injury from the loss of this amendment which would be at
all comparable to the injury to republican institutions which
a violation of the constitution would inflict. That large and
respectable class of moral reformers which so justly demands
the observance and enforcement of law, cannot afford to take
its first reformatory step by a violation of the constitution.
How can it consistently demand of others obedience to a
constitution which it violates itself? The people can in a short
time re-enact the amendment. In the manner of a great moral
reform, the loss of a few years is nothing. The constitution is
the palladium of republican freedom. The young men coming
forward upon the stage of political action must be educated
to venerate it; those already upon the stage must be taught
to obey it. Whatever interest may be advanced or may suffer,
whoever or whatever may be 'voted up or voted down,' no
sacrilegious hand must be laid upon the constitution."120
WHEREFORE, I vote to DISMISS the petition in G.R. No.
174153 and to GRANT the petition in G.R. No. 174299.
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice
____________________
EN BANC
G.R. No. 174153 (RAUL LAMBINO, ET AL. vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET AL.) and
G.R. No. 174299 (MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, ET AL. vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET AL.).
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------- x
SEPARATE OPINION
AZCUNA, J.:
"Why, friends, you go to do you know not what."
-- Shakespeare, Julius Caesar, Act III, Sc. 2.
Article XVII of the Constitution states:
AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS
Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution
may be proposed by:
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its
members; or
(2) A constitutional convention.
84

Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be
directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of
registered voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum of the registered
votes therein. No amendment under this section shall be
authorized within five years following the ratification of this
Constitution nor oftener than once every five years
thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the
exercise of this right.
Sec. 3. The Congress may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its
Members, call a constitutional convention, or by a majority
vote of all its Members, submit to the electorate the question
of calling such a convention.
Sec. 4. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution
under Section 1 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held
not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after
the approval of such amendment or revision.
Any amendment under Section 2 hereof shall be valid when
ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which
shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety
days after the certification by the Commission on Elections of
the sufficiency of the petition.
This Article states the procedure for changing the
Constitution.
Constitutions have three parts – the Constitution of Liberty,
which states the fundamental rights of the people; the
Constitution of Government, which establishes the structure
of government, its branches and their operation; and the
Constitution of Sovereignty, which provides how the
Constitution may be changed.
Article XVII is the Constitution of Sovereignty.
As a result, the powers therein provided are called
constituent powers. So when Congress acts under this
provision, it acts not as a legislature exercising legislative
powers. It acts as a constituent body exercising constituent
powers.
The rules, therefore, governing the exercise of legislative
powers do not apply, or do not apply strictly, to the actions
taken under Article XVII.
Accordingly, since Article XVII states that Congress shall
provide for the implementation of the exercise of the people's
right directly to propose amendments to the Constitution
through initiative, the act of Congress pursuant thereto is not
strictly a legislative action but partakes of a constituent act.
As a result, Republic Act No. 6735, the act that provides for
the exercise of the people of the right to propose a law or
amendments to the Constitution is, with respect to the right
to propose amendments to the Constitution, a constituent
measure, not a mere legislative one.
The consequence of this special character of the enactment,
insofar as it relates to proposing amendments to the
Constitution, is that the requirements for statutory
enactments, such as sufficiency of standards and the like, do
not and should not strictly apply. As long as there is a
sufficient and clear intent to provide for the implementation
of the exercise of the right, it should be sustained, as it is
simply a compliance of the mandate placed on Congress by
the Constitution.
Seen in this light, the provisions of Republic Act No. 6735
relating to the procedure for proposing amendments to the
Constitution, can and should be upheld, despite shortcomings
perhaps in legislative headings and standards.
For this reason, I concur in the view that Santiago v.
Comelec1 should be re-examined and, after doing so, that the
pronouncement therein regarding the insufficiency or
inadequacy of the measure to sustain a people's initiative to
amend the Constitution should be reconsidered in favor of
allowing the exercise of this sovereign right.
And applying the doctrine stated in Senarillos v.
Hermosisima,2 penned by Justice J.B.L. Reyes, in relation to
Article 8 of the Civil Code, that a decision of this Court
interpreting a law forms part of the law interpreted as of the
time of its enactment, Republic Act No. 6735 should be
deemed sufficient and adequate from the start.
This next point to address, there being a sufficient law, is
whether the petition for initiative herein involved complies
with the requirements of that law as well as those stated in
Article XVII of the Constitution.
True it is that ours is a democratic state, as explicitated in
the Declaration of Principles, to emphasize precisely that
there are instances recognized and provided for in the
Constitution where our people directly exercise their
sovereign powers, new features set forth in this People Power
Charter, namely, the powers of recall, initiative and
referendum.
Nevertheless, this democratic nature of our polity is that of a
democracy under the rule of law. This equally important
point is emphasized in the very Preamble to the Constitution,
which states:
". . . the blessings of . . . democracy under the rule of law . . .
."
Such is the case with respect to the power to initiate changes
in the Constitution. The power is subject to limitations under
the Constitution itself, thus: The power could not be exercised
for the first five years after the Constitution took effect and
thereafter can only be exercised once every five years; the
power only extends to proposing amendments but not
revisions; and the power needs an act of Congress providing
for its implementation, which act is directed and mandated.
The question, therefore, arises whether the proposed changes
in the Constitution set forth in the petition for initiative
herein involved are mere amendments or rather are
revisions.
Revisions are changes that affect the entire Constitution and
not mere parts of it.
The reason why revisions are not allowed through direct
proposals by the people through initiative is a practical one,
namely, there is no one to draft such extensive changes, since
6.3 million people cannot conceivably come up with a single
extensive document through a direct proposal from each of
them. Someone would have to draft it and that is not
authorized as it would not be a direct proposal from the
people. Such indirect proposals can only take the form of
proposals from Congress as a Constituent Assembly under
Article XVII, or a Constitutional Convention created under
the same provision. Furthermore, there is a need for such
deliberative bodies for revisions because their proceedings
and debates are duly and officially recorded, so that future
cases of interpretations can be properly aided by resort to the
record of their proceedings.
Even a cursory reading of the proposed changes contained in
the petition for initiative herein involved will show on its face
that the proposed changes constitute a revision of the
Constitution. The proposal is to change the system of
government from that which is bicameral-presidential to one
that is unicameral-parliamentary.
85

While purportedly only Articles VI, VII, and XVIII are
involved, the fact is, as the petition and text of the proposed
changes themselves state, every provision of the Constitution
will have to be examined to see if they conform to the nature
of a unicameral-parliamentary form of government and
changed accordingly if they do not so conform to it. For
example, Article VIII on Judicial Department cannot stand
as is, in a parliamentary system, for under such a system, the
Parliament is supreme, and thus the Court's power to declare
its act a grave abuse of discretion and thus void would be an
anomaly.
Now, who is to do such examination and who is to do such
changes and how should the changes be worded? The
proposed initiative does not say who nor how.
Not only, therefore, is the proposed initiative, on this score, a
prohibited revision but it also suffers from being incomplete
and insufficient on its very face.
It, therefore, in that form, cannot pass muster the very limits
contained in providing for the power under the Constitution.
Neither does it comply with Republic Act No. 6735, which
states in Section 10 that not more than one subject shall be
proposed as an amendment or amendments to the
Constitution. The petition herein would propose at the very
least two subjects – a unicameral legislature and a
parliamentary form of government. Again, for this clear and
patent violation of the very act that provides for the exercise
of the power, the proposed initiative cannot lie.
This does not mean, however, that all is lost for petitioners.
For the proposed changes can be separated and are, in my
view, separable in nature – a unicameral legislature is one; a
parliamentary form of government is another. The first is a
mere amendment and contains only one subject matter. The
second is clearly a revision that affects every article and
every provision in the Constitution to an extent not even the
proponents could at present fully articulate. Petitioners
Lambino, et al. thus go about proposing changes the nature
and extent of which they do not as yet know exactly what.
The proposal, therefore, contained in the petition for
initiative, regarding a change in the legislature from a
bicameral or two-chamber body to that of a unicameral or
one-chamber body, is sustainable. The text of the changes
needed to carry it out are perfunctory and ministerial in
nature. Once it is limited to this proposal, the changes are
simply one of deletion and insertions, the wordings of which
are practically automatic and non-discretionary.
As an example, I attach to this opinion an Appendix "A"
showing how the Constitution would read if we were to
change Congress from one consisting of the Senate and the
House of Representatives to one consisting only of the House
of Representatives. It only affects Article VI on the
Legislative Department, some provisions on Article VII on
the Executive Department, as well as Article XI on the
Accountability of Public Officers, and Article XVIII on
Transitory Provisions. These are mere amendments,
substantial ones indeed but still only amendments, and they
address only one subject matter.
Such proposal, moreover, complies with the intention and
rationale behind the present initiative, which is to provide for
simplicity and economy in government and reduce the
stalemates that often prevent needed legislation.
For the nonce, therefore, I vote to DISMISS the petition,
without prejudice to the filing of an appropriate initiative to
propose amendments to the Constitution to change Congress
into a unicameral body. This is not say that I favor such a
change. Rather, such a proposal would come within the
purview of an initiative allowed under Article XVII of the
Constitution and its implementing Republic Act, and should,
therefore, be submitted to our people in a plebiscite for them
to decide in their sovereign capacity. After all is said and
done, this is what democracy under the rule of law is about.
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
____________________
EN BANC
G. R. No. 174153 October 25, 2006
RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO together
with 6,327,952 REGISTERED VOTERS
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 174299 October 25, 2006
MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR.,
and RENE A. Q. SAGUISAG
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, represented by Chairman
BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, SR., and Commissioners
RESSURRECCION Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A. TUASON,
JR., ROMEO A. BRAWNER, RENE V. SARMIENTO, and
NICODEMO T. FERRER, and John Doe and Peter Doe
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------- x
"It is a Constitution we are expounding…"1
– Chief Justice John Marshall
DISSENTING OPINION
PUNO, J.:
The petition at bar is not a fight over molehills. At the crux
of the controversy is the critical understanding of the first
and foremost of our constitutional principles — "the
Philippines is a democratic and republican State.
Sovereignty resides in the people and all government
authority emanates from them."2 Constitutionalism dictates
that this creed must be respected with deeds; our belief in its
validity must be backed by behavior.
This is a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus to set aside
the resolution of respondent Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) dated August 31, 2006, denying due course to
the Petition for Initiative filed by petitioners Raul L.
Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado in their own behalf and
together with some 6.3 million registered voters who have
affixed their signatures thereon, and praying for the issuance
of a writ of mandamus to compel respondent COMELEC to
set the date of the plebiscite for the ratification of the
proposed amendments to the Constitution in accordance with
Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution.
First, a flashback of the proceedings of yesteryears. In 1996,
the Movement for People's Initiative sought to exercise the
sovereign people's power to directly propose amendments to
the Constitution through initiative under Section 2, Article
XVII of the 1987 Constitution. Its founding member, Atty.
Jesus S. Delfin, filed with the COMELEC on December 6,
1996, a "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term
Limits of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative" (Delfin
Petition). It proposed to amend Sections 4 and 7 of Article VI,
Section 4 of Article VII, and Section 8 of Article X of the 1987
Constitution by deleting the provisions on the term limits for
all elective officials.
The Delfin Petition stated that the Petition for Initiative
would first be submitted to the people and would be formally
86
filed with the COMELEC after it is signed by at least twelve
per cent (12%) of the total number of registered voters in the
country. It thus sought the assistance of the COMELEC in
gathering the required signatures by fixing the dates and
time therefor and setting up signature stations on the
assigned dates and time. The petition prayed that the
COMELEC issue an Order (1) fixing the dates and time for
signature gathering all over the country; (2) causing the
publication of said Order and the petition for initiative in
newspapers of general and local circulation; and, (3)
instructing the municipal election registrars in all the
regions of the Philippines to assist petitioner and the
volunteers in establishing signing stations on the dates and
time designated for the purpose.
The COMELEC conducted a hearing on the Delfin Petition.
On December 18, 1996, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago,
Alexander Padilla and Maria Isabel Ongpin filed a special
civil action for prohibition before this Court, seeking to
restrain the COMELEC from further considering the Delfin
Petition. They impleaded as respondents the COMELEC,
Delfin, and Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa (Pedrosas) in their
capacities as founding members of the People's Initiative for
Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA) which was
likewise engaged in signature gathering to support an
initiative to amend the Constitution. They argued that the
constitutional provision on people's initiative may only be
implemented by a law passed by Congress; that no such law
has yet been enacted by Congress; that Republic Act No. 6735
relied upon by Delfin does not cover the initiative to amend
the Constitution; and that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300,
the implementing rules adopted by the COMELEC on the
conduct of initiative, was ultra vires insofar as the initiative
to amend the Constitution was concerned. The case was
docketed as G.R. No. 127325, entitled Santiago v.
Commission on Elections.3
Pending resolution of the case, the Court issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining the COMELEC from proceeding
with the Delfin Petition and the Pedrosas from conducting a
signature drive for people's initiative to amend the
Constitution.
On March 19, 1997, the Court rendered its decision on the
petition for prohibition. The Court ruled that the
constitutional provision granting the people the power to
directly amend the Constitution through initiative is not self-
executory. An enabling law is necessary to implement the
exercise of the people's right. Examining the provisions of
R.A. 6735, a majority of eight (8) members of the Court held
that said law was "incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in
essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on
amendments to the Constitution is concerned,"4 and thus
voided portions of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300
prescribing rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative
on amendments to the Constitution. It was also held that
even if R.A. 6735 sufficiently covered the initiative to amend
the Constitution and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 was
valid, the Delfin Petition should still be dismissed as it was
not the proper initiatory pleading contemplated by law.
Under Section 2, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution and
Section 5(b) of R.A. 6735, a petition for initiative on the
Constitution must be signed by at least twelve per cent (12%)
of the total number of registered voters, of which every
legislative district is represented by at least three per cent
(3%) of the registered voters therein. The Delfin Petition did
not contain signatures of the required number of voters. The
decision stated:
CONCLUSION
This petition must then be granted, and the COMELEC
should be permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking
cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to
the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly
enacted to provide for the implementation of the system.
We feel, however, that the system of initiative to propose
amendments to the Constitution should no longer be kept in
the cold; it should be given flesh and blood, energy and
strength. Congress should not tarry any longer in complying
with the constitutional mandate to provide for the
implementation of the right of the people under that system.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
a) GRANTING the instant petition;
b) DECLARING R.A. No. 6735 inadequate to cover the
system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, and
to have failed to provide sufficient standard for subordinate
legislation;
c) DECLARING void those parts of Resolution No. 2300 of the
Commission on Elections prescribing rules and regulations
on the conduct of initiative or amendments to the
Constitution; and
d) ORDERING the Commission on Elections to forthwith
DISMISS the DELFIN petition (UND-96-037).
The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 18 December
1996 is made permanent against the Commission on
Elections, but is LIFTED as against private respondents.5
Eight (8) members of the Court, namely, then Associate
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. (ponente), Chief Justice Andres
R. Narvasa, and Associate Justices Florenz D. Regalado,
Flerida Ruth P. Romero, Josue N. Bellosillo, Santiago M.
Kapunan, Regino C. Hermosisima, Jr. and Justo P. Torres,
fully concurred in the majority opinion.
While all the members of the Court who participated in the
deliberation6 agreed that the Delfin Petition should be
dismissed for lack of the required signatures, five (5)
members, namely, Associate Justices Jose A.R. Melo,
Reynato S. Puno, Vicente V. Mendoza, Ricardo J. Francisco
and Artemio V. Panganiban, held that R.A. 6735 was
sufficient and adequate to implement the people's right to
amend the Constitution through initiative, and that
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 validly provided the details
for the actual exercise of such right. Justice Jose C. Vitug, on
the other hand, opined that the Court should confine itself to
resolving the issue of whether the Delfin Petition sufficiently
complied with the requirements of the law on initiative, and
there was no need to rule on the adequacy of R.A. 6735.
The COMELEC, Delfin and the Pedrosas filed separate
motions for reconsideration of the Court's decision.
After deliberating on the motions for reconsideration, six (6)7
of the eight (8) majority members maintained their position
that R.A. 6735 was inadequate to implement the provision on
the initiative on amendments to the Constitution. Justice
Torres filed an inhibition, while Justice Hermosisima
submitted a Separate Opinion adopting the position of the
minority that R.A. 6735 sufficiently covers the initiative to
amend the Constitution. Hence, of the thirteen (13) members
of the Court who participated in the deliberation, six (6)
members, namely, Chief Justice Narvasa and Associate
Justices Regalado, Davide, Romero, Bellosillo and Kapunan
voted to deny the motions for lack of merit; and six (6)
members, namely, Associate Justices Melo, Puno, Mendoza,
Francisco, Hermosisima and Panganiban voted to grant the
same. Justice Vitug maintained his opinion that the matter
was not ripe for judicial adjudication. The motions for
reconsideration were therefore denied for lack of sufficient
votes to modify or reverse the decision of March 19, 1997.8
On June 23, 1997, PIRMA filed with the COMELEC a
Petition for Initiative to Propose Amendments to the
Constitution (PIRMA Petition). The PIRMA Petition was
supported by around five (5) million signatures in compliance
87
with R.A. 6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, and
prayed that the COMELEC, among others: (1) cause the
publication of the petition in Filipino and English at least
twice in newspapers of general and local circulation; (2) order
all election officers to verify the signatures collected in
support of the petition and submit these to the Commission;
and (3) set the holding of a plebiscite where the following
proposition would be submitted to the people for ratification:
Do you approve amendments to the 1987 Constitution giving
the President the chance to be reelected for another term,
similarly with the Vice-President, so that both the highest
officials of the land can serve for two consecutive terms of six
years each, and also to lift the term limits for all other
elective government officials, thus giving Filipino voters the
freedom of choice, amending for that purpose, Section 4 of
Article VII, Sections 4 and 7 of Article VI and Section 8 of
Article X, respectively?
The COMELEC dismissed the PIRMA Petition in view of the
permanent restraining order issued by the Court in Santiago
v. COMELEC.
PIRMA filed with this Court a Petition for Mandamus and
Certiorari seeking to set aside the COMELEC Resolution
dismissing its petition for initiative. PIRMA argued that the
Court's decision on the Delfin Petition did not bar the
COMELEC from acting on the PIRMA Petition as said ruling
was not definitive based on the deadlocked voting on the
motions for reconsideration, and because there was no
identity of parties and subject matter between the two
petitions. PIRMA also urged the Court to reexamine its
ruling in Santiago v. COMELEC.
The Court dismissed the petition for mandamus and
certiorari in its resolution dated September 23, 1997. It
explained:
The Court ruled, first, by a unanimous vote, that no grave
abuse of discretion could be attributed to the public
respondent COMELEC in dismissing the petition filed by
PIRMA therein, it appearing that it only complied with the
dispositions in the Decision of this Court in G.R. No. 127325
promulgated on March 19, 1997, and its Resolution of June
10, 1997.
The Court next considered the question of whether there was
need to resolve the second issue posed by the petitioners,
namely, that the Court re-examine its ruling as regards R.A.
6735. On this issue, the Chief Justice and six (6) other
members of the Court, namely, Regalado, Davide, Romero,
Bellosillo, Kapunan and Torres, JJ., voted that there was no
need to take it up. Vitug, J., agreed that there was no need
for re-examination of said second issue since the case at bar
is not the proper vehicle for that purpose. Five (5) other
members of the Court, namely, Melo, Puno, Francisco,
Hermosisima, and Panganiban, JJ., opined that there was a
need for such a re-examination x x x x9
In their Separate Opinions, Justice (later Chief Justice)
Davide and Justice Bellosillo stated that the PIRMA petition
was dismissed on the ground of res judicata.
Now, almost a decade later, another group, Sigaw ng Bayan,
seeks to utilize anew the system of initiative to amend the
Constitution, this time to change the form of government
from bicameral-presidential to unicameral-parliamentary
system.
Let us look at the facts of the petition at bar with clear eyes.
On February 15, 2006, Sigaw ng Bayan, in coordination with
Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines (ULAP),
embarked on a nationwide drive to gather signatures to
support the move to adopt the parliamentary form of
government in the country through charter change. They
proposed to amend the Constitution as follows:
A. Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI shall be amended
to read as follows:
Section 1. (1) The legislative and executive powers shall be
vested in a unicameral Parliament which shall be composed
of as many members as may be provided by law, to be
apportioned among the provinces, representative districts,
and cities in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, with at least three hundred thousand
inhabitants per district, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio. Each district shall comprise, as far as
practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory, and
each province must have at least one member.
(2) Each Member of Parliament shall be a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-five years old on the
day of the election, a resident of his district for at least one
year prior thereto, and shall be elected by the qualified voters
of his district for a term of five years without limitation as to
the number thereof, except those under the party-list system
which shall be provided for by law and whose number shall
be equal to twenty per centum of the total membership
coming from the parliamentary districts.
B. Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
are hereby amended to read, as follows:
Section 1. There shall be a President who shall be the Head
of State. The executive power shall be exercised by a Prime
Minister, with the assistance of the Cabinet. The Prime
Minister shall be elected by a majority of all the Members of
Parliament from among themselves. He shall be responsible
to the Parliament for the program of government.
C. For the purpose of insuring an orderly transition from the
bicameral-Presidential to a unicameral-Parliamentary form
of government, there shall be a new Article XVIII, entitled
"Transitory Provisions," which shall read, as follows:
Section 1. (1) The incumbent President and Vice President
shall serve until the expiration of their term at noon on the
thirtieth day of June 2010 and shall continue to exercise their
powers under the 1987 Constitution unless impeached by a
vote of two thirds of all the members of the interim
parliament.
(2) In case of death, permanent disability, resignation or
removal from office of the incumbent President, the
incumbent Vice President shall succeed as President. In case
of death, permanent disability, resignation or removal from
office of both the incumbent President and Vice President,
the interim Prime Minister shall assume all the powers and
responsibilities of Prime Minister under Article VII as
amended.
Section 2. Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent
President and Vice President, with the exception of Sections
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
which shall hereby be amended and Sections 18 and 24 which
shall be deleted, all other Sections of Article VI are hereby
retained and renumbered sequentially as Section 2, ad
seriatim up to 26, unless they are inconsistent with the
Parliamentary system of government, in which case, they
shall be amended to conform with a unicameral
parliamentary form of government; provided, however, that
any and all references therein to "Congress," "Senate,"
"House of Representatives" and "Houses of Congress" shall be
changed to read "Parliament;" that any and all references
therein to "Member(s) of Congress," "Senator(s)" or
"Member(s) of the House of Representatives" shall be
changed to read as "Member(s) of Parliament" and any and
all references to the "President" and/or "Acting President"
shall be changed to read "Prime Minister."
Section 3. Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent
President and Vice President, with the exception of Sections
88
1, 2, 3 and 4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which are
hereby amended and Sections 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 which are
hereby deleted, all other Sections of Article VII shall be
retained and renumbered sequentially as Section 2, ad
seriatim up to 14, unless they shall be inconsistent with
Section 1 hereof, in which case they shall be deemed amended
so as to conform to a unicameral Parliamentary System of
government; provided, however, that any all references
therein to "Congress," "Senate," "House of Representatives"
and "Houses of Congress" shall be changed to read
"Parliament;" that any and all references therein to
"Member(s) of Congress," "Senator(s)" or "Member(s) of the
House of Representatives" shall be changed to read as
"Member(s) of Parliament" and any and all references to the
"President" and or "Acting President" shall be changed to
read "Prime Minister."
Section 4. (1) There shall exist, upon the ratification of these
amendments, an interim Parliament which shall continue
until the Members of the regular Parliament shall have been
elected and shall have qualified. It shall be composed of the
incumbent Members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives and the incumbent Members of the Cabinet
who are heads of executive departments.
(2) The incumbent Vice President shall automatically be a
Member of Parliament until noon of the thirtieth day of June
2010. He shall also be a member of the cabinet and shall head
a ministry. He shall initially convene the interim Parliament
and shall preside over its sessions for the election of the
interim Prime Minister and until the Speaker shall have
been elected by a majority vote of all the members of the
interim Parliament from among themselves.
(3) Senators whose term of office ends in 2010 shall be
Members of Parliament until noon of the thirtieth day of June
2010.
(4) Within forty-five days from ratification of these
amendments, the interim Parliament shall convene to
propose amendments to, or revisions of, this Constitution
consistent with the principles of local autonomy,
decentralization and a strong bureaucracy.
Section 5. (1) The incumbent President, who is the Chief
Executive, shall nominate, from among the members of the
interim Parliament, an interim Prime Minister, who shall be
elected by a majority vote of the members thereof. The
interim Prime Minister shall oversee the various ministries
and shall perform such powers and responsibilities as may be
delegated to him by the incumbent President."
(2) The interim Parliament shall provide for the election of
the members of Parliament, which shall be synchronized and
held simultaneously with the election of all local government
officials. The duly elected Prime Minister shall continue to
exercise and perform the powers, duties and responsibilities
of the interim Prime Minister until the expiration of the term
of the incumbent President and Vice President.10
Sigaw ng Bayan prepared signature sheets, on the upper
portions of which were written the abstract of the proposed
amendments, to wit:
Abstract: Do you approve of the amendment of Articles VI
and VII of the 1987 Constitution, changing the form of
government from the present bicameral-presidential to a
unicameral-parliamentary system of government, in order to
achieve greater efficiency, simplicity and economy in
government; and providing an Article XVIII as Transitory
Provisions for the orderly shift from one system to another?
The signature sheets were distributed nationwide to
affiliated non-government organizations and volunteers of
Sigaw ng Bayan, as well as to the local officials. Copies of the
draft petition for initiative containing the proposition were
also circulated to the local officials and multi-sectoral groups.
Sigaw ng Bayan alleged that it also held barangay assemblies
which culminated on March 24, 25 and 26, 2006, to inform
the people and explain to them the proposed amendments to
the Constitution. Thereafter, they circulated the signature
sheets for signing.
The signature sheets were then submitted to the local
election officers for verification based on the voters'
registration record. Upon completion of the verification
process, the respective local election officers issued
certifications to attest that the signature sheets have been
verified. The verified signature sheets were subsequently
transmitted to the office of Sigaw ng Bayan for the counting
of the signatures.
On August 25, 2006, herein petitioners Raul L. Lambino and
Erico B. Aumentado filed with the COMELEC a Petition for
Initiative to Amend the Constitution entitled "In the Matter
of Proposing Amendments to the 1987 Constitution through
a People's Initiative: A Shift from a Bicameral Presidential to
a Unicameral Parliamentary Government by Amending
Articles VI and VII; and Providing Transitory Provisions for
the Orderly Shift from the Presidential to the Parliamentary
System." They filed an Amended Petition on August 30, 2006
to reflect the text of the proposed amendment that was
actually presented to the people. They alleged that they were
filing the petition in their own behalf and together with some
6.3 million registered voters who have affixed their
signatures on the signature sheets attached thereto.
Petitioners appended to the petition signature sheets bearing
the signatures of registered voters which they claimed to
have been verified by the respective city or municipal election
officers, and allegedly constituting at least twelve per cent
(12%) of all registered voters in the country, wherein each
legislative district is represented by at least three per cent
(3%) of all the registered voters therein.
As basis for the filing of their petition for initiative,
petitioners averred that Section 5 (b) and (c), together with
Section 7 of R.A. 6735, provide sufficient enabling details for
the people's exercise of the power. Hence, petitioners prayed
that the COMELEC issue an Order:
1. Finding the petition to be sufficient pursuant to Section 4,
Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution;
2. Directing the publication of the petition in Filipino and
English at least twice in newspapers of general and local
circulation; and
3. Calling a plebiscite to be held not earlier than sixty nor
later than ninety days after the Certification by the
COMELEC of the sufficiency of the petition, to allow the
Filipino people to express their sovereign will on the
proposition.
Several groups filed with the COMELEC their respective
oppositions to the petition for initiative, among them
ONEVOICE, Inc., Christian S. Monsod, Rene B. Azurin,
Manuel L. Quezon III, Benjamin T. Tolosa, Jr., Susan V.
Ople, and Carlos P. Medina, Jr.; Alternative Law Groups,
Inc., Senate Minority Leader Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr.,
Senators Sergio Osmeña III, Jamby A.S. Madrigal, Alfredo S.
Lim, Panfilo M. Lacson, Luisa P. Ejercito-Estrada, and
Jinggoy Estrada; Representatives Loretta Ann P. Rosales,
Mario Joyo Aguja, and Ana Theresia Hontiveros-Baraquel;
Bayan, Kilusang Mayo Uno, Ecumenical Bishops Forum,
Migrante, Gabriela, Gabriela Women's Party, Anakbayan,
League of Filipino Students, Leonardo San Jose, Jojo Pineda,
Drs. Darby Santiago and Reginald Pamugas; Attys. Pete
Quirino-Quadra, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, Byron D. Bocar, Ma.
Tanya Karina A. Lat, Antonio L. Salvador, and Randall C.
Tabayoyong.
On August 31, 2006, the COMELEC denied due course to the
Petition for Initiative. It cited this Court's ruling in Santiago
89
v. COMELEC11 permanently enjoining the Commission
from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for
initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a
sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for
the implementation of the system.
Forthwith, petitioners filed with this Court the instant
Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus praying that the Court
set aside the August 31, 2006 resolution of the COMELEC,
direct respondent COMELEC to comply with Section 4,
Article XVII of the Constitution, and set the date of the
plebiscite. They state the following grounds in support of the
petition:
I.
The Honorable public respondent COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion in refusing to take cognizance of,
and to give due course to the petition for initiative, because
the cited Santiago ruling of 19 March 1997 cannot be
considered the majority opinion of the Supreme Court en
banc, considering that upon its reconsideration and final
voting on 10 June 1997, no majority vote was secured to
declare Republic Act No. 6735 as inadequate, incomplete and
insufficient in standard.
II.
The 1987 Constitution, Republic Act No. 6735, Republic Act
No. 8189 and existing appropriation of the COMELEC
provide for sufficient details and authority for the exercise of
people's initiative, thus, existing laws taken together are
adequate and complete.
III.
The Honorable public respondent COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion in refusing to take cognizance of,
and in refusing to give due course to the petition for initiative,
thereby violating an express constitutional mandate and
disregarding and contravening the will of the people.
A.
Assuming in arguendo that there is no enabling law,
respondent COMELEC cannot ignore the will of the
sovereign people and must accordingly act on the petition for
initiative.
1.
The framers of the Constitution intended to give the people
the power to propose amendments and the people themselves
are now giving vibrant life to this constitutional provision.
2.
Prior to the questioned Santiago ruling of 19 March 1997, the
right of the people to exercise the sovereign power of
initiative and recall has been invariably upheld.
3.
The exercise of the initiative to propose amendments is a
political question which shall be determined solely by the
sovereign people.
4.
By signing the signature sheets attached to the petition for
initiative duly verified by the election officers, the people
have chosen to perform this sacred exercise of their sovereign
power.
B.
The Santiago ruling of 19 March 1997 is not applicable to the
instant petition for initiative filed by the petitioners.
C.
The permanent injunction issued in Santiago vs. COMELEC
only applies to the Delfin petition.
1.
It is the dispositive portion of the decision and not other
statements in the body of the decision that governs the rights
in controversy.
IV.
The Honorable public respondent failed or neglected to act or
perform a duty mandated by law.
A.
The ministerial duty of the COMELEC is to set the initiative
for plebiscite.12
The oppositors-intervenors, ONEVOICE, Inc., Christian S.
Monsod, Rene B. Azurin, Manuel L. Quezon III, Benjamin T.
Tolosa, Jr., Susan V. Ople, and Carlos P. Medina, Jr.;
Alternative Law Groups, Inc.; Bayan, Kilusang Mayo Uno,
Ecumenical Bishops Forum, Migrante Gabriela, Gabriela
Women's Party, Anakbayan, League of Filipino Students,
Leonardo San Jose, Jojo Pineda, Dr. Darby Santiago, and Dr.
Reginald Pamugas; Senate Minority Leader Aquilino Q.
Pimentel, Jr., and Senators Sergio Osmeña III, Jamby A.S.
Madrigal, Alfredo S. Lim, Panfilo M. Lacson, Luisa P.
Ejercito-Estrada, and Jinggoy Estrada; Representatives
Loretta Ann P. Rosales, Mario Joyo Aguja, and Ana Theresia
Hontiveros-Baraquel; and Attys. Pete Quirino-Quadra, Jose
Anselmo I. Cadiz, Byron D. Bocar, Ma. Tanya Karina A. Lat,
Antonio L. Salvador, and Randall C. Tabayoyong moved to
intervene in this case and filed their respective
Oppositions/Comments-in-Intervention.
The Philippine Constitution Association, Conrado F.
Estrella, Tomas C. Toledo, Mariano M. Tajon, Froilan M.
Bacungan, Joaquin T. Venus, Jr., Fortunato P. Aguas, and
Amado Gat Inciong; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Cebu City and Cebu Province Chapters; former President
Joseph Ejercito Estrada and Pwersa ng Masang Pilipino; and
the Senate of the Philippines, represented by Senate
President Manuel Villar, Jr., also filed their respective
motions for intervention and Comments-in-Intervention.
The Trade Union Congress of the Philippines, Sulongbayan
Movement Foundation, Inc., Ronald L. Adamat, Rolando
Manuel Rivera, Ruelo Baya, Philippine Transport and
General Workers Organization, and Victorino F. Balais
likewise moved to intervene and submitted to the Court a
Petition-in-Intervention. All interventions and oppositions
were granted by the Court.
The oppositors-intervenors essentially submit that the
COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
denying due course to the petition for initiative as it merely
followed this Court's ruling in Santiago v. COMELEC as
affirmed in the case of PIRMA v. COMELEC, based on the
principle of stare decisis; that there is no sufficient law
providing for the authority and the details for the exercise of
people's initiative to amend the Constitution; that the
proposed changes to the Constitution are actually revisions,
not mere amendments; that the petition for initiative does
not meet the required number of signatories under Section 2,
Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution; that it was not shown
that the people have been informed of the proposed
amendments as there was disparity between the proposal
presented to them and the proposed amendments attached to
the petition for initiative, if indeed there was; that the
verification process was done ex parte, thus rendering
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dubious the signatures attached to the petition for initiative;
and that petitioners Lambino and Aumentado have no legal
capacity to represent the signatories in the petition for
initiative.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in compliance with
the Court's resolution of September 5, 2006, filed its
Comment to the petition. Affirming the position of the
petitioners, the OSG prayed that the Court grant the petition
at bar and render judgment: (1) declaring R.A. 6735 as
adequate to cover or as reasonably sufficient to implement
the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution
and as having provided sufficient standards for subordinate
legislation; (2) declaring as valid the provisions of COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300 on the conduct of initiative or
amendments to the Constitution; (3) setting aside the
assailed resolution of the COMELEC for having been
rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction; and, (4) directing the COMELEC to
grant the petition for initiative and set the corresponding
plebiscite pursuant to R.A. 6735, COMELEC Resolution No.
2300, and other pertinent election laws and regulations.
The COMELEC filed its own Comment stating that its
resolution denying the petition for initiative is not tainted
with grave abuse of discretion as it merely adhered to the
ruling of this Court in Santiago v. COMELEC which declared
that R.A. 6735 does not adequately implement the
constitutional provision on initiative to amend the
Constitution. It invoked the permanent injunction issued by
the Court against the COMELEC from taking cognizance of
petitions for initiative on amendments to the Constitution
until a valid enabling law shall have been passed by
Congress. It asserted that the permanent injunction covers
not only the Delfin Petition, but also all other petitions
involving constitutional initiatives.
On September 26, 2006, the Court heard the case. The parties
were required to argue on the following issues:13
1. Whether petitioners Lambino and Aumentado are proper
parties to file the present Petition in behalf of the more than
six million voters who allegedly signed the proposal to amend
the Constitution.
2. Whether the Petitions for Initiative filed before the
Commission on Elections complied with Section 2, Article
XVII of the Constitution.
3. Whether the Court's decision in Santiago v. COMELEC
(G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997) bars the present petition.
4. Whether the Court should re-examine the ruling in
Santiago v. COMELEC that there is no sufficient law
implementing or authorizing the exercise of people's
initiative to amend the Constitution.
5. Assuming R.A. 6735 is sufficient, whether the Petitions for
Initiative filed with the COMELEC have complied with its
provisions.
5.1 Whether the said petitions are sufficient in form and
substance.
5.2 Whether the proposed changes embrace more than one
subject matter.
6. Whether the proposed changes constitute an amendment
or revision of the Constitution.
6.1 Whether the proposed changes are the proper subject of
an initiative.
7. Whether the exercise of an initiative to propose
amendments to the Constitution is a political question to be
determined solely by the sovereign people.
8. Whether the Commission on Elections committed grave
abuse of discretion in dismissing the Petitions for Initiative
filed before it.
With humility, I offer the following views to these issues as
profiled:
I
Petitioners Lambino and Aumentado are proper parties to
file the present Petition in behalf of the more than six million
voters who allegedly signed the proposal to amend the
Constitution.
Oppositors-intervenors contend that petitioners Lambino
and Aumentado are not the proper parties to file the instant
petition as they were not authorized by the signatories in the
petition for initiative.
The argument deserves scant attention. The Constitution
requires that the petition for initiative should be filed by at
least twelve per cent (12%) of all registered voters, of which
every legislative district must be represented by at least
three per cent (3%) of all the registered voters therein. The
petition for initiative filed by Lambino and Aumentado before
the COMELEC was accompanied by voluminous signature
sheets which prima facie show the intent of the signatories to
support the filing of said petition. Stated above their
signatures in the signature sheets is the following:
x x x My signature herein which shall form part of the
petition for initiative to amend the Constitution signifies my
support for the filing thereof.14
There is thus no need for the more than six (6) million
signatories to execute separate documents to authorize
petitioners to file the petition for initiative in their behalf.
Neither is it necessary for said signatories to authorize
Lambino and Aumentado to file the petition for certiorari and
mandamus before this Court. Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure provides who may file a petition for certiorari
and mandamus. Sections 1 and 3 of Rule 65 read:
SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari.—When any tribunal,
board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions
has acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper
court x x x x.
SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus.—When any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a
duty resulting from an office, trust, or station x x x and there
is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file
a verified petition in the proper court x x x x.
Thus, any person aggrieved by the act or inaction of the
respondent tribunal, board or officer may file a petition for
certiorari or mandamus before the appropriate court.
Certainly, Lambino and Aumentado, as among the
proponents of the petition for initiative dismissed by the
COMELEC, have the standing to file the petition at bar.
II
The doctrine of stare decisis does not bar the reexamination
of Santiago.
The latin phrase stare decisis et non quieta movere means
"stand by the thing and do not disturb the calm." The doctrine
started with the English Courts.15 Blackstone observed that
at the beginning of the 18th century, "it is an established rule
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to abide by former precedents where the same points come
again in litigation."16 As the rule evolved, early limits to its
application were recognized: (1) it would not be followed if it
were "plainly unreasonable;" (2) where courts of equal
authority developed conflicting decisions; and, (3) the binding
force of the decision was the "actual principle or principles
necessary for the decision; not the words or reasoning used to
reach the decision."17
The doctrine migrated to the United States. It was recognized
by the framers of the U.S. Constitution.18 According to
Hamilton, "strict rules and precedents" are necessary to
prevent "arbitrary discretion in the courts."19 Madison
agreed but stressed that "x x x once the precedent ventures
into the realm of altering or repealing the law, it should be
rejected."20 Prof. Consovoy well noted that Hamilton and
Madison "disagree about the countervailing policy
considerations that would allow a judge to abandon a
precedent."21 He added that their ideas "reveal a deep
internal conflict between the concreteness required by the
rule of law and the flexibility demanded in error correction.
It is this internal conflict that the Supreme Court has
attempted to deal with for over two centuries."22
Indeed, two centuries of American case law will confirm Prof.
Consovoy's observation although stare decisis developed its
own life in the United States. Two strains of stare decisis
have been isolated by legal scholars.23 The first, known as
vertical stare decisis deals with the duty of lower courts to
apply the decisions of the higher courts to cases involving the
same facts. The second, known as horizontal stare decisis
requires that high courts must follow its own precedents.
Prof. Consovoy correctly observes that vertical stare decisis
has been viewed as an obligation, while horizontal stare
decisis, has been viewed as a policy, imposing choice but not
a command.24 Indeed, stare decisis is not one of the precepts
set in stone in our Constitution.
It is also instructive to distinguish the two kinds of horizontal
stare decisis — constitutional stare decisis and statutory
stare decisis.25 Constitutional stare decisis involves judicial
interpretations of the Constitution while statutory stare
decisis involves interpretations of statutes. The distinction is
important for courts enjoy more flexibility in refusing to
apply stare decisis in constitutional litigations. Justice
Brandeis' view on the binding effect of the doctrine in
constitutional litigations still holds sway today. In soothing
prose, Brandeis stated: "Stare decisis is not . . . a universal
and inexorable command. The rule of stare decisis is not
inflexible. Whether it shall be followed or departed from, is a
question entirely within the discretion of the court, which is
again called upon to consider a question once decided."26 In
the same vein, the venerable Justice Frankfurter opined: "the
ultimate touchstone of constitutionality is the Constitution
itself and not what we have said about it."27 In contrast, the
application of stare decisis on judicial interpretation of
statutes is more inflexible. As Justice Stevens explains: "after
a statute has been construed, either by this Court or by a
consistent course of decision by other federal judges and
agencies, it acquires a meaning that should be as clear as if
the judicial gloss had been drafted by the Congress itself."28
This stance reflects both respect for Congress' role and the
need to preserve the courts' limited resources.
In general, courts follow the stare decisis rule for an
ensemble of reasons,29 viz: (1) it legitimizes judicial
institutions; (2) it promotes judicial economy; and, (3) it
allows for predictability. Contrariwise, courts refuse to be
bound by the stare decisis rule where30 (1) its application
perpetuates illegitimate and unconstitutional holdings; (2) it
cannot accommodate changing social and political
understandings; (3) it leaves the power to overturn bad
constitutional law solely in the hands of Congress; and, (4)
activist judges can dictate the policy for future courts while
judges that respect stare decisis are stuck agreeing with
them.
In its 200-year history, the U.S. Supreme Court has refused
to follow the stare decisis rule and reversed its decisions in
192 cases.31 The most famous of these reversals is Brown v.
Board of Education32 which junked Plessy v. Ferguson's33
"separate but equal doctrine." Plessy upheld as constitutional
a state law requirement that races be segregated on public
transportation. In Brown, the U.S. Supreme Court,
unanimously held that "separate . . . is inherently unequal."
Thus, by freeing itself from the shackles of stare decisis, the
U.S. Supreme Court freed the colored Americans from the
chains of inequality. In the Philippine setting, this Court has
likewise refused to be straitjacketed by the stare decisis rule
in order to promote public welfare. In La Bugal-B'laan Tribal
Association, Inc. v. Ramos,34 we reversed our original ruling
that certain provisions of the Mining Law are
unconstitutional. Similarly, in Secretary of Justice v.
Lantion,35 we overturned our first ruling and held, on motion
for reconsideration, that a private respondent is bereft of the
right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the
extradition process.
An examination of decisions on stare decisis in major
countries will show that courts are agreed on the factors that
should be considered before overturning prior rulings. These
are workability, reliance, intervening developments in the
law and changes in fact. In addition, courts put in the balance
the following determinants: closeness of the voting, age of the
prior decision and its merits.36
The leading case in deciding whether a court should follow
the stare decisis rule in constitutional litigations is Planned
Parenthood v. Casey.37 It established a 4-pronged test. The
court should (1) determine whether the rule has proved to be
intolerable simply in defying practical workability; (2)
consider whether the rule is subject to a kind of reliance that
would lend a special hardship to the consequences of
overruling and add inequity to the cost of repudiation; (3)
determine whether related principles of law have so far
developed as to have the old rule no more than a remnant of
an abandoned doctrine; and, (4) find out whether facts have
so changed or come to be seen differently, as to have robbed
the old rule of significant application or justification.
Following these guidelines, I submit that the stare decisis
rule should not bar the reexamination of Santiago. On the
factor of intolerability, the six (6) justices in Santiago held
R.A. 6735 to be insufficient as it provided no standard to
guide COMELEC in issuing its implementing rules. The
Santiago ruling that R.A. 6735 is insufficient but without
striking it down as unconstitutional is an intolerable
aberration, the only one of its kind in our planet. It
improperly assails the ability of legislators to write laws. It
usurps the exclusive right of legislators to determine how far
laws implementing constitutional mandates should be
crafted. It is elementary that courts cannot dictate on
Congress the style of writing good laws, anymore than
Congress can tell courts how to write literate decisions. The
doctrine of separation of powers forbids this Court to invade
the exclusive lawmaking domain of Congress for courts can
construe laws but cannot construct them. The end result of
the ruling of the six (6) justices that R.A. 6735 is insufficient
is intolerable for it rendered lifeless the sovereign right of the
people to amend the Constitution via an initiative.
On the factor of reliance, the ruling of the six (6) justices in
Santiago did not induce any expectation from the people. On
the contrary, the ruling smothered the hope of the people that
they could amend the Constitution by direct action.
Moreover, reliance is a non-factor in the case at bar for it is
more appropriate to consider in decisions involving contracts
where private rights are adjudicated. The case at bar involves
no private rights but the sovereignty of the people.
On the factor of changes in law and in facts, certain realities
on ground cannot be blinked away. The urgent need to adjust
certain provisions of the 1987 Constitution to enable the
country to compete in the new millennium is given. The only
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point of contention is the mode to effect the change - - -
whether through constituent assembly, constitutional
convention or people's initiative. Petitioners claim that they
have gathered over six (6) million registered voters who want
to amend the Constitution through people's initiative and
that their signatures have been verified by registrars of the
COMELEC. The six (6) justices who ruled that R.A. 6735 is
insufficient to implement the direct right of the people to
amend the Constitution through an initiative cannot waylay
the will of 6.3 million people who are the bearers of our
sovereignty and from whom all government authority
emanates. New developments in our internal and external
social, economic, and political settings demand the
reexamination of the Santiago case. The stare decisis rule is
no reason for this Court to allow the people to step into the
future with a blindfold.
III
A reexamination of R.A. 6735 will show that it is sufficient to
implement the people's initiative.
Let us reexamine the validity of the view of the six (6) justices
that R.A. 6735 is insufficient to implement Section 2, Article
XVII of the 1987 Constitution allowing amendments to the
Constitution to be directly proposed by the people through
initiative.
When laws are challenged as unconstitutional, courts are
counseled to give life to the intent of legislators. In enacting
R.A. 6735, it is daylight luminous that Congress intended the
said law to implement the right of the people, thru initiative,
to propose amendments to the Constitution by direct action.
This all-important intent is palpable from the following:
First. The text of R.A. 6735 is replete with references to the
right of the people to initiate changes to the Constitution:
The policy statement declares:
Sec. 2. Statement of Policy. -- The power of the people under
a system of initiative and referendum to directly propose,
enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution,
laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative
body upon compliance with the requirements of this Act is
hereby affirmed, recognized and guaranteed. (emphasis
supplied)
It defines "initiative" as "the power of the people to propose
amendments to the Constitution or to propose and enact
legislations through an election called for the purpose," and
"plebiscite" as "the electoral process by which an initiative on
the Constitution is approved or rejected by the people."
It provides the requirements for a petition for initiative to
amend the Constitution, viz:
(1) That "(a) petition for an initiative on the 1987
Constitution must have at least twelve per centum (12%) of
the total number of registered voters as signatories, of which
every legislative district must be represented by at least
three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein;"38
and
(2) That "(i)nitiative on the Constitution may be exercised
only after five (5) years from the ratification of the 1987
Constitution and only once every five (5) years thereafter."39
It fixes the effectivity date of the amendment under Section
9(b) which provides that "(t)he proposition in an initiative on
the Constitution approved by a majority of the votes cast in
the plebiscite shall become effective as to the day of the
plebiscite."
Second. The legislative history of R.A. 6735 also reveals the
clear intent of the lawmakers to use it as the instrument to
implement people's initiative. No less than former Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., the ponente in Santiago,
concedes:40
We agree that R.A. No. 6735 was, as its history reveals,
intended to cover initiative to propose amendments to the
Constitution. The Act is a consolidation of House Bill No.
21505 and Senate Bill No. 17 x x x x The Bicameral
Conference Committee consolidated Senate Bill No. 17 and
House Bill No. 21505 into a draft bill, which was
subsequently approved on 8 June 1989 by the Senate and by
the House of Representatives. This approved bill is now R.A.
No. 6735.
Third. The sponsorship speeches by the authors of R.A. 6735
similarly demonstrate beyond doubt this intent. In his
sponsorship remarks, the late Senator Raul Roco (then a
Member of the House of Representatives) emphasized the
intent to make initiative as a mode whereby the people can
propose amendments to the Constitution. We quote his
relevant remarks:41
SPONSORSHIP REMAKRS OF REP. ROCO
MR. ROCO. Mr. Speaker, with the permission of the
committee, we wish to speak in support of House Bill No. 497,
entitled: INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM ACT OF 1987,
which later on may be called Initiative and Referendum Act
of 1989.
As a background, we want to point out the constitutional
basis of this particular bill. The grant of plenary legislative
power upon the Philippine Congress by the 1935, 1973 and
1987 Constitutions, Mr. Speaker, was based on the principle
that any power deemed to be legislative by usage and
tradition is necessarily possessed by the Philippine Congress
unless the Organic Act has lodged it elsewhere. This was a
citation from Vera vs. Avelino (1946).
The presidential system introduced by the 1935 Constitution
saw the application of the principle of separation of powers.
While under the parliamentary system of the 1973
Constitution the principle remained applicable, Amendment
6 or the 1981 amendments to the 1973 Constitution ensured
presidential dominance over the Batasang Pambansa.
Our constitutional history saw the shifting and sharing of
legislative power between the legislature and the executive.
Transcending such changes in the exercise of legislative
power is the declaration in the Philippine Constitution that
he Philippines is a Republican State where sovereignty
resides in the people and all government authority emanates
from them.
In a Republic, Mr. Speaker, the power to govern is vested in
its citizens participating through the right of suffrage and
indicating thereby their choice of lawmakers.
Under the 1987 Constitution, lawmaking power is still
preserved in Congress. However, to institutionalize direct
action of the people as exemplified in the 1986 Revolution,
there is a practical recognition of what we refer to as people's
sovereign power. This is the recognition of a system of
initiative and referendum.
Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides, and I
quote:
The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and House of
Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people
by the provision on initiative and referendum.
In other words, Mr. Speaker, under the 1987 Constitution,
Congress does not have plenary powers. There is a reserved
legislative power given to the people expressly.
93
Section 32, the implementing provision of the same article of
the Constitution provides, and I quote:
The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a system
of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom,
whereby the people can directly propose and enact laws or
approve or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the
Congress or local legislative body after the registration of a
petition therefor signed by at least ten per centum of the total
number of registered voters, or which every legislative
district must be represented by at least three per centum of
the registered voters thereof.
In other words, Mr. Speaker, in Section 1 of Article VI which
describes legislative power, there are reserved powers given
to the people. In Section 32, we are specifically told to pass at
the soonest possible time a bill on referendum and initiative.
We are specifically mandated to share the legislative powers
of Congress with the people.
Of course, another applicable provision in the Constitution is
Section 2, Article XVII, Mr. Speaker. Under the provision on
amending the Constitution, the section reads, and I quote:
Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly
proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of
at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered
voters, of which every legislative district must be represented
by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein.
No amendment under this section shall be authorized within
five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor
oftener than once every five years thereafter.
We in Congress therefore, Mr. Speaker, are charged with the
duty to implement the exercise by the people of the right of
initiative and referendum.
House Bill No. 21505, as reported out by the Committee on
Suffrage and Electoral Reforms last December 14, 1988, Mr.
Speaker, is the response to such a constitutional duty.
Mr. Speaker, if only to allay apprehensions, allow me to show
where initiative and referendum under Philippine law has
occurred.
Mr. Speaker, the system of initiative and referendum is not
new. In a very limited extent, the system is provided for in
our Local Government Code today. On initiative, for instance,
Section 99 of the said code vests in the barangay assembly
the power to initiate legislative processes, to hold plebiscites
and to hear reports of the sangguniang barangay. There are
variations of initiative and referendum. The barangay
assembly is composed of all persons who have been actual
residents of the barangay for at least six months, who are at
least 15 years of age and citizens of the Philippines. The
holding of barangay plebiscites and referendum is also
provided in Sections 100 and 101 of the same Code.
Mr. Speaker, for brevity I will not read the pertinent
quotations but will just submit the same to the Secretary to
be incorporated as part of my speech.
To continue, Mr. Speaker these same principles are
extensively applied by the Local Government Code as it is
now mandated by the 1987 Constitution.
In other jurisdictions, Mr. Speaker, we have ample examples
of initiative and referendum similar to what is now contained
in House Bill No. 21505. As in the 1987 Constitutions and
House Bill No. 21505, the various constitutions of the states
in the United States recognize the right of registered voters
to initiate the enactment of any statute or to reject any
existing law or parts thereof in a referendum. These states
are Alaska, Alabama, Montana, Massachusetts, Dakota,
Oklahoma, Oregon, and practically all other states.
In certain American states, the kind of laws to which
initiative and referendum applies is also without ay
limitation, except for emergency measures, which is likewise
incorporated in Section 7(b) of House Bill No. 21505.
The procedure provided by the House bill – from the filing of
the petition, the requirement of a certain percentage of
supporters to present a proposition to submission to electors
– is substantially similar to those of many American laws.
Mr. Speaker, those among us who may have been in the
United States, particularly in California, during election time
or last November during the election would have noticed
different propositions posted in the city walls. They were
propositions submitted by the people for incorporation during
the voting. These were in the nature of initiative, Mr.
Speaker.
Although an infant then in Philippine political structure,
initiative and referendum is a tried and tested system in
other jurisdictions, and House Bill No. 21505 through the
various consolidated bills is patterned after American
experience in a great respect.
What does the bill essentially say, Mr. Speaker? Allow me to
try to bring our colleagues slowly through the bill. The bill
has basically only 12 sections. The constitutional
Commissioners, Mr. Speaker, saw this system of initiative
and referendum as an instrument which can be used should
the legislature show itself indifferent to the needs of the
people. That is why, Mr. Speaker, it may be timely, since we
seem to be amply criticized, as regards our responsiveness, to
pass this bill on referendum and initiative now. While
indifference would not be an appropriate term to use at this
time, and surely it is not the case although we are so
criticized, one must note that it is a felt necessity of our times
that laws need to be proposed and adopted at the soonest
possible time to spur economic development, safeguard
individual rights and liberties, and share governmental
power with the people.
With the legislative powers of the President gone, we alone,
together with the Senators when they are minded to agree
with us, are left with the burden of enacting the needed
legislation.
Let me now bring our colleagues, Mr. Speaker, to the process
advocated by the bill.
First, initiative and referendum, Mr. Speaker, is defined.
Initiative essentially is what the term connotes. It means
that the people, on their own political judgment, submit fore
the consideration and voting of the general electorate a bill
or a piece of legislation.
Under House Bill No. 21505, there are three kinds of
initiative. One is an initiative to amend the Constitution.
This can occur once every five years. Another is an initiative
to amend statutes that we may have approved. Had this bill
been an existing law, Mr. Speaker, it is most likely that an
overwhelming majority of the barangays in the Philippines
would have approved by initiative the matter of direct voting.
The third mode of initiative, Mr. Speaker, refers to a petition
proposing to enact regional, provincial, city, municipal or
barangay laws or ordinances. It comes from the people and it
must be submitted directly to the electorate. The bill gives a
definite procedure and allows the COMELEC to define rules
and regulations to give teeth to the power of initiative.
On the other hand, referendum, Mr. Speaker, is the power of
the people to approve or reject something that Congress has
already approved.
For instance, Mr. Speaker, when we divide the municipalities
or the barangays into two or three, we must first get the
consent of the people affected through plebiscite or
referendum.
94

Referendum is a mode of plebiscite, Mr. Speaker. However,
referendum can also be petitioned by the people if, for
instance, they do not life the bill on direct elections and it is
approved subsequently by the Senate. If this bill had already
become a law, then the people could petition that a
referendum be conducted so that the acts of Congress can be
appropriately approved or rebuffed.
The initial stage, Mr. Speaker, is what we call the petition.
As envisioned in the bill, the initiative comes from the people,
from registered voters of the country, by presenting a
proposition so that the people can then submit a petition,
which is a piece of paper that contains the proposition. The
proposition in the example I have been citing is whether
there should be direct elections during the barangay
elections. So the petition must be filed in the appropriate
agency and the proposition must be clear stated. It can be
tedious but that is how an effort to have direct democracy
operates.
Section 4 of the bill gives requirements, Mr. Speaker. It will
not be all that easy to have referendum or initiative
petitioned by the people. Under Section 4 of the committee
report, we are given certain limitations. For instance, to
exercise the power of initiative or referendum, at least 10
percent of the total number of registered voters, of which
every legislative district is represented by at least 3 percent
of the registered voters thereof, shall sign a petition. These
numbers, Mr. Speaker, are not taken from the air. They are
mandated by the Constitution. There must be a requirement
of 10 percent for ordinary laws and 3 percent representing all
districts. The same requirement is mutatis mutandis or
appropriately modified and applied to the different sections.
So if it is, for instance, a petition on initiative or referendum
for a barangay, there is a 10 percent or a certain number
required of the voters of the barangay. If it is for a district,
there is also a certain number required of all towns of the
district that must seek the petition. If it is for a province then
again a certain percentage of the provincial electors is
required. All these are based with reference to the
constitutional mandate.
The conduct of the initiative and referendum shall be
supervised and shall be upon the call of the Commission on
Elections. However, within a period of 30 days from receipt
of the petition, the COMELEC shall determine the
sufficiency of the petition, publish the same and set the date
of the referendum which shall not be earlier than 45 days but
not later than 90 days from the determination by the
commission of the sufficiency of the petition. Why is this so,
Mr. Speaker? The petition must first be determined by the
commission as to its sufficiency because our Constitution
requires that no bill can be approved unless it contains one
subject matter. It is conceivable that in the fervor of an
initiative or referendum, Mr. Speaker, there may be more
than two topics sought to be approved and that cannot be
allowed. In fact, that is one of the prohibitions under this
referendum and initiative bill. When a matter under
initiative or referendum is approved by the required number
of votes, Mr. Speaker, it shall become effective 15 days
following the completion of its publication in the Official
Gazette. Effectively then, Mr. Speaker, all the bill seeks to do
is to enlarge and recognize the legislative powers of the
Filipino people.
Mr. Speaker, I think this Congress, particularly this House,
cannot ignore or cannot be insensitive to the call for initiative
and referendum. We should have done it in 1987 but that is
past. Maybe we should have done it in 1988 but that too had
already passed, but it is only February 1989, Mr. Speaker,
and we have enough time this year at least to respond to the
need of our people to participate directly in the work of
legislation.
For these reasons, Mr. Speaker, we urge and implore our
colleagues to approve House Bill No. 21505 as incorporated
in Committee Report No. 423 of the Committee on Suffrage
and Electoral Reforms.
In closing, Mr. Speaker, I also request that the prepared text
of my speech, together with the footnotes since they contain
many references to statutory history and foreign jurisdiction,
be reproduced as part of the Record for future purposes.
Equally unequivocal on the intent of R.A. 6735 is the
sponsorship speech of former Representative Salvador
Escudero III, viz:42
SPONSORSHIP REMARKS OF REP. ESCUDERO
MR. ESCUDERO. Thank you, Mr. Speaker.
Mr. Speaker and my dear colleagues: Events in recent years
highlighted the need to heed the clamor of the people for a
truly popular democracy. One recalls the impatience of those
who actively participated in the parliament of the streets,
some of whom are now distinguished Members of this
Chamber. A substantial segment of the population feel
increasingly that under the system, the people have the form
but not the reality or substance of democracy because of the
increasingly elitist approach of their chosen Representatives
to many questions vitally affecting their lives. There have
been complaints, not altogether unfounded, that many
candidates easily forge their campaign promises to the people
once elected to office. The 1986 Constitutional Commission
deemed it wise and proper to provide for a means whereby
the people can exercise the reserve power to legislate or
propose amendments to the Constitution directly in case
their chose Representatives fail to live up to their
expectations. That reserve power known as initiative is
explicitly recognized in three articles and four sections of the
1987 Constitution, namely: Article VI Section 1; the same
article, Section 312; Article X, Section 3; and Article XVII,
Section 2. May I request that he explicit provisions of these
three articles and four sections be made part of my
sponsorship speech, Mr. Speaker.
These constitutional provisions are, however, not self-
executory. There is a need for an implementing law that will
give meaning and substance to the process of initiative and
referendum which are considered valuable adjuncts to
representative democracy. It is needless to state that this bill
when enacted into law will probably open the door to strong
competition of the people, like pressure groups, vested
interests, farmers' group, labor groups, urban dwellers, the
urban poor and the like, with Congress in the field of
legislation.
Such probability, however, pales in significance when we
consider that through this bill we can hasten the politization
of the Filipino which in turn will aid government in forming
an enlightened public opinion, and hopefully produce better
and more responsive and acceptable legislations.
Furthermore, Mr. Speaker, this would give the
parliamentarians of the streets and cause-oriented groups an
opportunity to articulate their ideas in a truly democratic
forum, thus, the competition which they will offer to Congress
will hopefully be a healthy one. Anyway, in an atmosphere of
competition there are common interests dear to all Filipinos,
and the pursuit of each side's competitive goals can still take
place in an atmosphere of reason and moderation.
Mr. Speaker and my dear colleagues, when the distinguished
Gentleman from Camarines Sur and this Representation
filed our respective versions of the bill in 1987, we were
hoping that the bill would be approved early enough so that
our people could immediately use the agrarian reform bill as
an initial subject matter or as a take-off point.
However, in view of the very heavy agenda of the Committee
on Local Government, it took sometime before the committee
could act on these. But as they say in Tagalog, huli man daw
95
at magaling ay naihahabol din. The passage of this bill
therefore, my dear colleagues, could be one of our finest hours
when we can set aside our personal and political
consideration for the greater good of our people. I therefore
respectfully urge and plead that this bill be immediately
approved.
Thank you, Mr. Speaker.
We cannot dodge the duty to give effect to this intent for the
"[c]ourts have the duty to interpret the law as legislated and
when possible, to honor the clear meaning of statutes as
revealed by its language, purpose and history."43
The tragedy is that while conceding this intent, the six (6)
justices, nevertheless, ruled that "x x x R.A. No. 6735 is
incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and
conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the
Constitution is concerned" for the following reasons: (1)
Section 2 of the Act does not suggest an initiative on
amendments to the Constitution; (2) the Act does not provide
for the contents of the petition for initiative on the
Constitution; and (3) while the Act provides subtitles for
National Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle II) and for
Local Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle is
provided for initiative on the Constitution.
To say the least, these alleged omissions are too weak a
reason to throttle the right of the sovereign people to amend
the Constitution through initiative. R.A. 6735 clearly
expressed the legislative policy for the people to propose
amendments to the Constitution by direct action. The fact
that the legislature may have omitted certain details in
implementing the people's initiative in R.A. 6735, does not
justify the conclusion that, ergo, the law is insufficient. What
were omitted were mere details and not fundamental policies
which Congress alone can and has determined.
Implementing details of a law can be delegated to the
COMELEC and can be the subject of its rule-making power.
Under Section 2(1), Article IX-C of the Constitution, the
COMELEC has the power to enforce and administer all laws
and regulations relative to the conduct of initiatives. Its rule-
making power has long been recognized by this Court. In
ruling R.A. 6735 insufficient but without striking it down as
unconstitutional, the six (6) justices failed to give due
recognition to the indefeasible right of the sovereign people
to amend the Constitution.
IV
The proposed constitutional changes, albeit substantial, are
mere amendments and can be undertaken through people's
initiative.
Oppositors-intervenors contend that Sections 1 and 2, Article
XVII of the 1987 Constitution, only allow the use of people's
initiative to amend and not to revise the Constitution. They
theorize that the changes proposed by petitioners are
substantial and thus constitute a revision which cannot be
done through people's initiative.
In support of the thesis that the Constitution bars the people
from proposing substantial amendments amounting to
revision, the oppositors-intervenors cite the following
deliberations during the Constitutional Commission, viz:44
MR. SUAREZ: x x x x This proposal was suggested on the
theory that this matter of initiative, which came about
because of the extraordinary developments this year, has to
be separated from the traditional modes of amending the
Constitution as embodied in Section 1. The Committee
members felt that this system of initiative should not extend
to the revision of the entire Constitution, so we removed it
from the operation of Section 1 of the proposed Article on
Amendment or Revision.
xxxxxxxxxxxx
MS. AQUINO. In which case, I am seriously bothered by
providing this process of initiative as a separate section in the
Article on Amendment. Would the sponsor be amenable to
accepting an amendment in terms of realigning Section 2 as
another subparagraph (c) of Section 1, instead of setting it up
as another separate section as if it were a self-executing
provision?
MR. SUAREZ. We would be amenable except that, as we
clarified a while ago, this process of initiative is limited to the
matter of amendment and should not expand into a revision
which contemplates a total overhaul of the Constitution. That
was the sense that was conveyed by the Committee.
MS. AQUINO. In other words, the Committee was
attempting to distinguish the coverage of modes (a) and (b) in
Section 1 to include the process of revision; whereas the
process of initiation to amend, which is given to the public,
would only apply to amendments?
MR. SUAREZ. That is right. Those were the terms envisioned
in the Committee.
Commissioner (later Chief Justice) Hilario G. Davide, Jr.,
espoused the same view:45
MR. DAVIDE. x x x x We are limiting the right of the people,
by initiative, to submit a proposal for amendment only, not
for revision, only once every five years x x x x
MR. MAAMBONG. My first question: Commissioner
Davide's proposed amendment on line 1 refers to
"amendment." Does it cover the word "revision" as defined by
Commissioner Padilla when he made the distinction between
the words "amendments" and "revision?"
MR. DAVIDE. No, it does not, because "amendments" and
"revision" should be covered by Section 1. So insofar as
initiative is concerned, it can only relate to "amendments" not
"revision."
Commissioner (now a distinguished Associate Justice of this
Court) Adolfo S. Azcuna also clarified this point46 -
MR. OPLE. To more closely reflect the intent of Section 2,
may I suggest that we add to "Amendments" "OR
REVISIONS OF" to read: "Amendments OR REVISION OF
this Constitution."
MR. AZCUNA. I think it was not allowed to revise the
Constitution by initiative.
MR. OPLE. How is that again?
MR. AZCUNA. It was not our intention to allow a revision of
the Constitution by initiative but merely by amendments.
MR. BENGZON. Only by amendments.
MR. AZCUNA. I remember that was taken on the floor.
MR. RODRIGO. Yes, just amendments.
The oppositors-intervenors then point out that by their
proposals, petitioners will "change the very system of
government from presidential to parliamentary, and the form
of the legislature from bicameral to unicameral," among
others. They allegedly seek other major revisions like the
inclusion of a minimum number of inhabitants per district, a
change in the period for a term of a Member of Parliament,
the removal of the limits on the number of terms, the election
of a Prime Minister who shall exercise the executive power,
and so on and so forth.47 In sum, oppositors-intervenors
submit that "the proposed changes to the Constitution effect
major changes in the political structure and system, the
fundamental powers and duties of the branches of the
96
government, the political rights of the people, and the modes
by which political rights may be exercised."48 They conclude
that they are substantial amendments which cannot be done
through people's initiative. In other words, they posit the
thesis that only simple but not substantial amendments can
be done through people's initiative.
With due respect, I disagree. To start with, the words
"simple" and "substantial" are not subject to any accurate
quantitative or qualitative test. Obviously, relying on the
quantitative test, oppositors-intervenors assert that the
amendments will result in some one hundred (100) changes
in the Constitution. Using the same test, however, it is also
arguable that petitioners seek to change basically only two
(2) out of the eighteen (18) articles of the 1987 Constitution,
i.e. Article VI (Legislative Department) and Article VII
(Executive Department), together with the complementary
provisions for a smooth transition from a presidential
bicameral system to a parliamentary unicameral structure.
The big bulk of the 1987 Constitution will not be affected
including Articles I (National Territory), II (Declaration of
Principles and State Policies), III (Bill of Rights), IV
(Citizenship), V (Suffrage), VIII (Judicial Department), IX
(Constitutional Commissions), X (Local Government), XI
(Accountability of Public Officers), XII (National Economy
and Patrimony), XIII (Social Justice and Human Rights), XIV
(Education, Science and Technology, Arts, Culture, and
Sports), XV (The Family), XVI (General Provisions), and even
XVII (Amendments or Revisions). In fine, we stand on unsafe
ground if we use simple arithmetic to determine whether the
proposed changes are "simple" or "substantial."
Nor can this Court be surefooted if it applies the qualitative
test to determine whether the said changes are "simple" or
"substantial" as to amount to a revision of the Constitution.
The well-regarded political scientist, Garner, says that a good
constitution should contain at least three (3) sets of
provisions: the constitution of liberty which sets forth the
fundamental rights of the people and imposes certain
limitations on the powers of the government as a means of
securing the enjoyment of these rights; the constitution of
government which deals with the framework of government
and its powers, laying down certain rules for its
administration and defining the electorate; and, the
constitution of sovereignty which prescribes the mode or
procedure for amending or revising the constitution.49 It is
plain that the proposed changes will basically affect only the
constitution of government. The constitutions of liberty and
sovereignty remain unaffected. Indeed, the proposed changes
will not change the fundamental nature of our state as "x x x
a democratic and republican state."50 It is self-evident that
a unicameral-parliamentary form of government will not
make our State any less democratic or any less republican in
character. Hence, neither will the use of the qualitative test
resolve the issue of whether the proposed changes are
"simple" or "substantial."
For this reason and more, our Constitutions did not adopt any
quantitative or qualitative test to determine whether an
"amendment" is "simple" or "substantial." Nor did they
provide that "substantial" amendments are beyond the power
of the people to propose to change the Constitution. Instead,
our Constitutions carried the traditional distinction between
"amendment" and "revision," i.e., "amendment" means
change, including complex changes while "revision" means
complete change, including the adoption of an entirely new
covenant. The legal dictionaries express this traditional
difference between "amendment" and "revision." Black's Law
Dictionary defines "amendment" as "[a] formal revision or
addition proposed or made to a statute, constitution,
pleading, order, or other instrument; specifically, a change
made by addition, deletion, or correction."51 Black's also
refers to "amendment" as "the process of making such a
revision."52 Revision, on the other hand, is defined as "[a]
reexamination or careful review for correction or
improvement."53 In parliamentary law, it is described as "[a]
general and thorough rewriting of a governing document, in
which the entire document is open to amendment."54
Similarly, Ballentine's Law Dictionary defines "amendment"
– as "[a] correction or revision of a writing to correct errors or
better to state its intended purpose"55 and "amendment of
constitution" as "[a] process of proposing, passing, and
ratifying amendments to the x x x constitution."56 In
contrast, "revision," when applied to a statute (or
constitution), "contemplates the re-examination of the same
subject matter contained in the statute (or constitution), and
the substitution of a new, and what is believed to be, a still
more perfect rule."57
One of the most authoritative constitutionalists of his time to
whom we owe a lot of intellectual debt, Dean Vicente G.
Sinco, of the University of the Philippines College of Law,
(later President of the U.P. and delegate to the Constitutional
Convention of 1971) similarly spelled out the difference
between "amendment" and "revision." He opined: "the
revision of a constitution, in its strict sense, refers to a
consideration of the entire constitution and the procedure for
effecting such change; while amendment refers only to
particular provisions to be added to or to be altered in a
constitution."58
Our people were guided by this traditional distinction when
they effected changes in our 1935 and 1973 Constitutions. In
1940, the changes to the 1935 Constitution which included
the conversion from a unicameral system to a bicameral
structure, the shortening of the tenure of the President and
Vice-President from a six-year term without reelection to a
four-year term with one reelection, and the establishment of
the COMELEC, together with the complementary
constitutional provisions to effect the changes, were
considered amendments only, not a revision.
The replacement of the 1935 Constitution by the 1973
Constitution was, however, considered a revision since the
1973 Constitution was "a completely new fundamental
charter embodying new political, social and economic
concepts."59 Among those adopted under the 1973
Constitution were: the parliamentary system in place of the
presidential system, with the leadership in legislation and
administration vested with the Prime Minister and his
Cabinet; the reversion to a single-chambered lawmaking
body instead of the two-chambered, which would be more
suitable to a parliamentary system of government; the
enfranchisement of the youth beginning eighteen (18) years
of age instead of twenty-one (21), and the abolition of literacy,
property, and other substantial requirements to widen the
basis for the electorate and expand democracy; the
strengthening of the judiciary, the civil service system, and
the Commission on Elections; the complete nationalization of
the ownership and management of mass media; the giving of
control to Philippine citizens of all telecommunications; the
prohibition against alien individuals to own educational
institutions, and the strengthening of the government as a
whole to improve the conditions of the masses.60
The 1973 Constitution in turn underwent a series of
significant changes in 1976, 1980, 1981, and 1984. The two
significant innovations introduced in 1976 were (1) the
creation of an interim Batasang Pambansa, in place of the
interim National Assembly, and (2) Amendment No. 6 which
conferred on the President the power to issue decrees, orders,
or letters of instruction, whenever the Batasang Pambansa
fails to act adequately on any matter for any reason that in
his judgment requires immediate action, or there is grave
emergency or threat or imminence thereof, with such decrees,
or letters of instruction to form part of the law of the land. In
1980, the retirement age of seventy (70) for justices and
judges was restored. In 1981, the presidential system with
parliamentary features was installed. The transfer of private
land for use as residence to natural-born citizens who had lost
their citizenship was also allowed. Then, in 1984, the
membership of the Batasang Pambansa was reapportioned
by provinces, cities, or districts in Metro Manila instead of by
regions; the Office of the Vice-President was created while
97
the executive committee was abolished; and, urban land
reform and social housing programs were strengthened.61
These substantial changes were simply considered as mere
amendments.
In 1986, Mrs. Corazon C. Aquino assumed the presidency,
and repudiated the 1973 Constitution. She governed under
Proclamation No. 3, known as the Freedom Constitution.
In February 1987, the new constitution was ratified by the
people in a plebiscite and superseded the Provisional or
Freedom Constitution. Retired Justice Isagani Cruz
underscored the outstanding features of the 1987
Constitution which consists of eighteen articles and is
excessively long compared to the Constitutions of 1935 and
1973, on which it was largely based. Many of the original
provisions of the 1935 Constitution, particularly those
pertaining to the legislative and executive departments, have
been restored because of the revival of the bicameral
Congress of the Philippines and the strictly presidential
system. The independence of the judiciary has been
strengthened, with new provisions for appointment thereto
and an increase in its authority, which now covers even
political questions formerly beyond its jurisdiction. While
many provisions of the 1973 Constitution were retained, like
those on the Constitutional Commissions and local
governments, still the new 1987 Constitution was deemed as
a revision of the 1973 Constitution.
It is now contended that this traditional distinction between
amendment and revision was abrogated by the 1987
Constitution. It is urged that Section 1 of Article XVII gives
the power to amend or revise to Congress acting as a
constituent assembly, and to a Constitutional Convention
duly called by Congress for the purpose. Section 2 of the same
Article, it is said, limited the people's right to change the
Constitution via initiative through simple amendments. In
other words, the people cannot propose substantial
amendments amounting to revision.
With due respect, I do not agree. As aforestated, the
oppositors-intervenors who peddle the above proposition rely
on the opinions of some Commissioners expressed in the
course of the debate on how to frame the amendment/revision
provisions of the 1987 Constitution. It is familiar learning,
however, that opinions in a constitutional convention,
especially if inconclusive of an issue, are of very limited value
as explaining doubtful phrases, and are an unsafe guide (to
the intent of the people) since the constitution derives its
force as a fundamental law, not from the action of the
convention but from the powers (of the people) who have
ratified and adopted it.62 "Debates in the constitutional
convention 'are of value as showing the views of the
individual members, and as indicating the reasons for their
votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the large
majority who did not talk, much less of the mass of our fellow
citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the
force of fundamental law.'"63 Indeed, a careful perusal of the
debates of the Constitutional Commissioners can likewise
lead to the conclusion that there was no abandonment of the
traditional distinction between "amendment" and "revision."
For during the debates, some of the commissioners referred
to the concurring opinion of former Justice Felix Q. Antonio
in Javellana v. The Executive Secretary,64 that stressed the
traditional distinction between amendment and revision,
thus:65
MR. SUAREZ: We mentioned the possible use of only one
term and that is, "amendment." However, the Committee
finally agreed to use the terms – "amendment" or "revision"
when our attention was called by the honorable Vice-
President to the substantial difference in the connotation and
significance between the said terms. As a result of our
research, we came up with the observations made in the
famous – or notorious – Javellana doctrine, particularly the
decision rendered by Honorable Justice Makasiar,66 wherein
he made the following distinction between "amendment" and
"revision" of an existing Constitution: "Revision" may involve
a rewriting of the whole Constitution. On the other hand, the
act of amending a constitution envisages a change of specific
provisions only. The intention of an act to amend is not the
change of the entire Constitution, but only the improvement
of specific parts or the addition of provisions deemed
essential as a consequence of new conditions or the
elimination of parts already considered obsolete or
unresponsive to the needs of the times.
The 1973 Constitution is not a mere amendment to the 1935
Constitution. It is a completely new fundamental Charter
embodying new political, social and economic concepts.
So, the Committee finally came up with the proposal that
these two terms should be employed in the formulation of the
Article governing amendments or revisions to the new
Constitution.
To further explain "revision," former Justice Antonio, in his
concurring opinion, used an analogy – "When a house is
completely demolished and another is erected on the same
location, do you have a changed, repaired and altered house,
or do you have a new house? Some of the material contained
in the old house may be used again, some of the rooms may
be constructed the same, but this does not alter the fact that
you have altogether another or a new house."67
Hence, it is arguable that when the framers of the 1987
Constitution used the word "revision," they had in mind the
"rewriting of the whole Constitution," or the "total overhaul
of the Constitution." Anything less is an "amendment" or just
"a change of specific provisions only," the intention being "not
the change of the entire Constitution, but only the
improvement of specific parts or the addition of provisions
deemed essential as a consequence of new conditions or the
elimination of parts already considered obsolete or
unresponsive to the needs of the times." Under this view,
"substantial" amendments are still "amendments" and thus
can be proposed by the people via an initiative.
As we cannot be guided with certainty by the inconclusive
opinions of the Commissioners on the difference between
"simple" and "substantial" amendments or whether
"substantial" amendments amounting to revision are covered
by people's initiative, it behooves us to follow the cardinal
rule in interpreting Constitutions, i.e., construe them to give
effect to the intention of the people who adopted it. The
illustrious Cooley explains its rationale well, viz:68
x x x the constitution does not derive its force from the
convention which framed, but from the people who ratified it,
the intent to be arrived at is that of the people, and it is not
to be supposed that they have looked for any dark or abstruse
meaning in the words employed, but rather that they have
accepted them in the sense most obvious to the common
understanding, and ratified the instrument in the belief that
that was the sense designed to be conveyed. These
proceedings therefore are less conclusive of the proper
construction of the instrument than are legislative
proceedings of the proper construction of a statute; since in
the latter case it is the intent of the legislature we seek, while
in the former we are endeavoring to arrive at the intent of the
people through the discussion and deliberations of their
representatives. The history of the calling of the convention,
the causes which led to it, and the discussions and issues
before the people at the time of the election of the delegates,
will sometimes be quite as instructive and satisfactory as
anything to be gathered form the proceedings of the
convention.
Corollarily, a constitution is not to be interpreted on narrow
or technical principles, but liberally and on broad general
lines, to accomplish the object of its establishment and carry
out the great principles of government – not to defeat them.69
One of these great principles is the sovereignty of the people.
98
Let us now determine the intent of the people when they
adopted initiative as a mode to amend the 1987 Constitution.
We start with the Declaration of Principles and State Policies
which Sinco describes as "the basic political creed of the
nation"70 as it "lays down the policies that government is
bound to observe."71 Section 1, Article II of the 1935
Constitution and Section 1, Article II of the 1973
Constitution, similarly provide that "the Philippines is a
republican state. Sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them." In a republican
state, the power of the sovereign people is exercised and
delegated to their representatives. Thus in Metropolitan
Transportation Service v. Paredes, this Court held that "a
republican state, like the Philippines x x x (is) derived from
the will of the people themselves in freely creating a
government 'of the people, by the people, and for the people'
– a representative government through which they have
agreed to exercise the powers and discharge the duties of
their sovereignty for the common good and general
welfare."72
In both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, the sovereign
people delegated to Congress or to a convention, the power to
amend or revise our fundamental law. History informs us
how this delegated power to amend or revise the Constitution
was abused particularly during the Marcos regime. The
Constitution was changed several times to satisfy the power
requirements of the regime. Indeed, Amendment No. 6 was
passed giving unprecedented legislative powers to then
President Ferdinand E. Marcos. A conspiracy of
circumstances from above and below, however, brought down
the Marcos regime through an extra constitutional
revolution, albeit a peaceful one by the people. A main reason
for the people's revolution was the failure of the
representatives of the people to effectuate timely changes in
the Constitution either by acting as a constituent assembly
or by calling a constitutional convention. When the
representatives of the people defaulted in using this last
peaceful process of constitutional change, the sovereign
people themselves took matters in their own hands. They
revolted and replaced the 1973 Constitution with the 1987
Constitution.
It is significant to note that the people modified the ideology
of the 1987 Constitution as it stressed the power of the people
to act directly in their capacity as sovereign people.
Correspondingly, the power of the legislators to act as
representatives of the people in the matter of amending or
revising the Constitution was diminished for the spring
cannot rise above its source. To reflect this significant shift,
Section 1, Article II of the 1987 Constitution was reworded.
It now reads: "the Philippines is a democratic and republican
state. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government
authority emanates from them." The commissioners of the
1986 Constitutional Commission explained the addition of
the word "democratic," in our first Declaration of Principles,
viz:
MR. NOLLEDO. I am putting the word "democratic" because
of the provisions that we are now adopting which are covering
consultations with the people. For example, we have
provisions on recall, initiative, the right of the people even to
participate in lawmaking and other instances that recognize
the validity of interference by the people through people's
organizations x x x x73
MR. OPLE. x x x x The Committee added the word
"democratic" to "republican," and, therefore, the first
sentence states: "The Philippines is a republican and
democratic state x x x x
May I know from the committee the reason for adding the
word "democratic" to "republican"? The constitutional
framers of the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions were content
with "republican." Was this done merely for the sake of
emphasis?
MR. NOLLEDO. x x x x "democratic" was added because of
the need to emphasize people power and the many provisions
in the Constitution that we have approved related to recall,
people's organizations, initiative and the like, which
recognize the participation of the people in policy-making in
certain circumstances x x x x
MR. OPLE. I thank the Commissioner. That is a very clear
answer and I think it does meet a need x x x x
MR. NOLLEDO. According to Commissioner Rosario Braid,
"democracy" here is understood as participatory democracy.
74 (emphasis supplied)
The following exchange between Commissioners Rene V.
Sarmiento and Adolfo S. Azcuna is of the same import:75
MR. SARMIENTO. When we speak of republican democratic
state, are we referring to representative democracy?
MR. AZCUNA. That is right.
MR. SARMIENTO. So, why do we not retain the old
formulation under the 1973 and 1935 Constitutions which
used the words "republican state" because "republican state"
would refer to a democratic state where people choose their
representatives?
MR. AZCUNA. We wanted to emphasize the participation of
the people in government.
MR. SARMIENTO. But even in the concept "republican
state," we are stressing the participation of the people x x x x
So the word "republican" will suffice to cover popular
representation.
MR. AZCUNA. Yes, the Commissioner is right. However, the
committee felt that in view of the introduction of the aspects
of direct democracy such as initiative, referendum or recall,
it was necessary to emphasize the democratic portion of
republicanism, of representative democracy as well. So, we
want to add the word "democratic" to emphasize that in this
new Constitution there are instances where the people would
act directly, and not through their representatives.
(emphasis supplied)
Consistent with the stress on direct democracy, the systems
of initiative, referendum, and recall were enthroned as
polestars in the 1987 Constitution. Thus, Commissioner Blas
F. Ople who introduced the provision on people's initiative
said:76
MR. OPLE. x x x x I think this is just the correct time in
history when we should introduce an innovative mode of
proposing amendments to the Constitution, vesting in the
people and their organizations the right to formulate and
propose their own amendments and revisions of the
Constitution in a manner that will be binding upon the
government. It is not that I believe this kind of direct action
by the people for amending a constitution will be needed
frequently in the future, but it is good to know that the
ultimate reserves of sovereign power still rest upon the
people and that in the exercise of that power, they can
propose amendments or revision to the Constitution.
(emphasis supplied)
Commissioner Jose E. Suarez also explained the people's
initiative as a safety valve, as a peaceful way for the people
to change their Constitution, by citing our experiences under
the Marcos government, viz:77
MR. SUAREZ. We agree to the difficulty in implementing
this particular provision, but we are providing a channel for
the expression of the sovereign will of the people through this
initiative system.
99
MR. BENGZON. Is Section 1, paragraphs (a) and (b), not
sufficient channel for expression of the will of the people,
particularly in the amendment or revision of the
Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. Under normal circumstances, yes. But we
know what happened during the 20 years under the Marcos
administration. So, if the National Assembly, in a manner of
speaking, is operating under the thumb of the Prime Minister
or the President as the case may be, and the required number
of votes could not be obtained, we would have to provide for a
safety valve in order that the people could ventilate in a very
peaceful way their desire for amendment to the Constitution.
It is very possible that although the people may be pressuring
the National Assembly to constitute itself as a constituent
assembly or to call a constitutional convention, the members
thereof would not heed the people's desire and clamor. So this
is a third avenue that we are providing for the
implementation of what is now popularly known as people's
power. (emphasis supplied)
Commissioner Regalado E. Maambong opined that the
people's initiative could avert a revolution, viz:78
MR. MAAMBONG. x x x x the amending process of the
Constitution could actually avert a revolution by providing a
safety valve in bringing about changes in the Constitution
through pacific means. This, in effect, operationalizes what
political law authors call the "prescription of sovereignty."
(emphasis supplied)
The end result is Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987
Constitution which expressed the right of the sovereign
people to propose amendments to the Constitution by direct
action or through initiative. To that extent, the delegated
power of Congress to amend or revise the Constitution has to
be adjusted downward. Thus, Section 1, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution has to be reminted and now provides: "The
legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people
by the provision on initiative and referendum."
Prescinding from these baseline premises, the argument that
the people through initiative cannot propose substantial
amendments to change the Constitution turns sovereignty on
its head. At the very least, the submission constricts the
democratic space for the exercise of the direct sovereignty of
the people. It also denigrates the sovereign people who they
claim can only be trusted with the power to propose "simple"
but not "substantial" amendments to the Constitution.
According to Sinco, the concept of sovereignty should be
strictly understood in its legal meaning as it was originally
developed in law.79 Legal sovereignty, he explained, is "the
possession of unlimited power to make laws. Its possessor is
the legal sovereign. It implies the absence of any other party
endowed with legally superior powers and privileges. It is not
subject to law 'for it is the author and source of law.' Legal
sovereignty is thus the equivalent of legal omnipotence."80
To be sure, sovereignty or popular sovereignty, emphasizes
the supremacy of the people's will over the state which they
themselves have created. The state is created by and subject
to the will of the people, who are the source of all political
power. Rightly, we have ruled that "the sovereignty of our
people is not a kabalistic principle whose dimensions are
buried in mysticism. Its metes and bounds are familiar to the
framers of our Constitutions. They knew that in its broadest
sense, sovereignty is meant to be supreme, the jus summi
imperu, the absolute right to govern."81
James Wilson, regarded by many as the most brilliant,
scholarly, and visionary lawyer in the United States in the
1780s, laid down the first principles of popular sovereignty
during the Pennsylvania ratifying convention of the 1787
Constitution of the United States:82
There necessarily exists, in every government, a power from
which there is no appeal, and which, for that reason, may be
termed supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable.
x x x x Perhaps some politician, who has not considered with
sufficient accuracy our political systems, would answer that,
in our governments, the supreme power was vested in the
constitutions x x x x This opinion approaches a step nearer to
the truth, but does not reach it. The truth is, that in our
governments, the supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable
power remains in the people. As our constitutions are
superior to our legislatures, so the people are superior to our
constitutions. Indeed the superiority, in this last instance, is
much greater; for the people possess over our constitution,
control in act, as well as right. (emphasis supplied)
I wish to reiterate that in a democratic and republican state,
only the people is sovereign - - - not the elected President, not
the elected Congress, not this unelected Court. Indeed, the
sovereignty of the people which is indivisible cannot be
reposed in any organ of government. Only its exercise may be
delegated to any of them. In our case, the people delegated to
Congress the exercise of the sovereign power to amend or
revise the Constitution. If Congress, as delegate, can exercise
this power to amend or revise the Constitution, can it be
argued that the sovereign people who delegated the power
has no power to substantially amend the Constitution by
direct action? If the sovereign people do not have this power
to make substantial amendments to the Constitution, what
did it delegate to Congress? How can the people lack this
fraction of a power to substantially amend the Constitution
when by their sovereignty, all power emanates from them? It
will take some mumbo jumbo to argue that the whole is lesser
than its part. Let Sinco clinch the point:83
But although possession may not be delegated, the exercise
of sovereignty often is. It is delegated to the organs and
agents of the state which constitute its government, for it is
only through this instrumentality that the state ordinarily
functions. However ample and complete this delegation may
be, it is nevertheless subject to withdrawal at any time by the
state. On this point Willoughby says:
Thus, States may concede to colonies almost complete
autonomy of government and reserve to themselves a right to
control of so slight and so negative a character as to make its
exercise a rare and improbable occurrence; yet so long as such
right of control is recognized to exist, and the autonomy of the
colonies is conceded to be founded upon a grant and
continuing consent of the mother countries the sovereignty of
those mother countries over them is complete and they are to
be considered as possessing only administrative autonomy
and not political independence.
At the very least, the power to propose substantial
amendments to the Constitution is shared with the people.
We should accord the most benign treatment to the sovereign
power of the people to propose substantial amendments to
the Constitution especially when the proposed amendments
will adversely affect the interest of some members of
Congress. A contrary approach will suborn the public weal to
private interest and worse, will enable Congress (the
delegate) to frustrate the power of the people to determine
their destiny (the principal).
All told, the teaching of the ages is that constitutional clauses
acknowledging the right of the people to exercise initiative
and referendum are liberally and generously construed in
favor of the people.84 Initiative and referendum powers must
be broadly construed to maintain maximum power in the
people.85 We followed this orientation in Subic Bay
Metropolitan Authority v. Commission on Elections.86 There
is not an iota of reason to depart from it.
V
100
The issues at bar are not political questions.
Petitioners submit that "[t]he validity of the exercise of the
right of the sovereign people to amend the Constitution and
their will, as expressed by the fact that over six million
registered voters indicated their support of the Petition for
Initiative, is a purely political question which is beyond even
the very long arm of this Honorable Court's power of judicial
review. Whether or not the 1987 Constitution should be
amended is a matter which the people and the people alone
must resolve in their sovereign capacity."87 They argue that
"[t]he power to propose amendments to the Constitution is a
right explicitly bestowed upon the sovereign people. Hence,
the determination by the people to exercise their right to
propose amendments under the system of initiative is a
sovereign act and falls squarely within the ambit of a
'political question.'"88
The petitioners cannot be sustained. This issue has long been
interred by Sanidad v. Commission on Elections, viz:89
Political questions are neatly associated with the wisdom, not
the legality of a particular act. Where the vortex of the
controversy refers to the legality or validity of the contested
act, that matter is definitely justiciable or non-political. What
is in the heels of the Court is not the wisdom of the act of the
incumbent President in proposing amendments to the
Constitution, but his constitutional authority to perform such
act or to assume the power of a constituent assembly.
Whether the amending process confers on the President that
power to propose amendments is therefore a downright
justiciable question. Should the contrary be found, the
actuation of the President would merely be a brutum fulmen.
If the Constitution provides how it may be amended, the
judiciary as the interpreter of that Constitution, can declare
whether the procedure followed or the authority assumed
was valid or not.
We cannot accept the view of the Solicitor General, in
pursuing his theory of non-justiciability, that the question of
the President's authority to propose amendments and the
regularity of the procedure adopted for submission of the
proposals to the people ultimately lie in the judgment of the
latter. A clear Descartes fallacy of vicious cycle. Is it not that
the people themselves, by their sovereign act, provided for
the authority and procedure for the amending process when
they ratified the present Constitution in 1973? Whether,
therefore, that constitutional provision has been followed or
not is indisputably a proper subject of inquiry, not by the
people themselves – of course – who exercise no power of
judicial review, but by the Supreme Court in whom the people
themselves vested that power, a power which includes the
competence to determine whether the constitutional norms
for amendments have been observed or not. And, this inquiry
must be done a priori not a posteriori, i.e., before the
submission to and ratification by the people.
In the instant case, the Constitution sets in black and white
the requirements for the exercise of the people's initiative to
amend the Constitution. The amendments must be proposed
by the people "upon a petition of at least twelve per centum
of the total number of registered voters, of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least three per
centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment
under this section shall be authorized within five years
following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than
once every five years thereafter."90 Compliance with these
requirements is clearly a justiciable and not a political
question. Be that as it may, how the issue will be resolved by
the people is addressed to them and to them alone.
VI
Whether the Petition for Initiative filed before the
COMELEC complied with Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution and R.A. 6735 involves contentious issues of fact
which should first be resolved by the COMELEC.
Oppositors-intervenors impugn the Petition for Initiative as
it allegedly lacks the required number of signatures under
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution. Said provision
requires that the petition for initiative be supported by at
least twelve per cent (12%) of the total number of registered
voters, of which every legislative district must be represented
by at least three per cent (3%) of the registered voters therein.
Oppositors-intervenors contend that no proper verification of
signatures was done in several legislative districts. They
assert that mere verification of the names listed on the
signature sheets without verifying the signatures reduces the
signatures submitted for their respective legislative districts
to mere scribbles on a piece of paper.
Oppositor-intervenor ONEVOICE, Inc., submitted to this
Court a certification dated August 23, 2006 issued by Atty.
Marlon S. Casquejo, Election Officer IV, Third District and
OIC, First and Second District, Davao City, stating that his
office has not verified the signatures submitted by the
proponents of the people's initiative. The certification reads:
This is to CERTIFY that this office (First, Second and Third
District, Davao City) HAS NOT VERIFIED the signatures of
registered voters as per documents submitted in this office by
the proponents of the People's Initiative. Consequently, NO
ELECTION DOCUMENTS AND/OR ORDER ISSUED BY
HIGHER SUPERIORS used as basis for such verification of
signatures.91
Senate Minority Leader Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., among
others, further clarified that although Atty. Casquejo and
Reynne Joy B. Bullecer, Acting Election Officer IV, First
District, Davao City, later issued certifications stating that
the Office of the City Election Officer has examined the list
of individuals appearing in the signature sheets,92 the
certifications reveal that the office had verified only the
names of the signatories, but not their signatures.
Oppositors-intervenors submit that not only the names of the
signatories should be verified, but also their signatures to
ensure the identities of the persons affixing their signatures
on the signature sheets.
Oppositor-intervenor Luwalhati Antonino also alleged that
petitioners failed to obtain the signatures of at least three per
cent (3%) of the total number of registered voters in the First
Legislative District of South Cotabato. For the First District
of South Cotabato, petitioners submitted 3,182 signatures for
General Santos City, 2,186 signatures for Tupi, 3,308
signatures for Tampakan and 10,301 signatures for
Polomolok, or 18,977 signatures out of 359,488 registered
voters of said district. Antonino, however, submitted to this
Court a copy of the certification by Glory D. Rubio, Election
Officer III, Polomolok, dated May 8, 2006, showing that the
signatures from Polomolok were not verified because the
Book of Voters for the whole municipality was in the custody
of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 38,
Polomolok, South Cotabato.93 Excluding the signatures from
Polomolok from the total number of signatures from the First
District of South Cotabato would yield only a total of 8,676
signatures which falls short of the three per cent (3%)
requirement for the district.
Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada and Pwersa ng
Masang Pilipino likewise submitted to this Court a
certification issued by Atty. Stalin A. Baguio, City Election
Officer IV, Cagayan de Oro City, stating that the list of names
appearing on the signature sheets corresponds to the names
of registered voters in the city, thereby implying that they
have not actually verified the signatures.94
The argument against the sufficiency of the signatures is
further bolstered by Alternative Law Groups, Inc., which
submitted copies of similarly worded certifications from the
election officers from Zamboanga del Sur95 and from
Compostela Valley.96 Alternative Law Groups, Inc., further
assails the regularity of the verification process as it alleged
101
that verification in some areas were conducted by Barangay
officials and not by COMELEC election officers. It filed with
this Court copies of certifications from Sulu and Sultan
Kudarat showing that the verification was conducted by local
officials instead of COMELEC personnel.97
Petitioners, on the other hand, maintain that the verification
conducted by the election officers sufficiently complied with
the requirements of the Constitution and the law on
initiative.
Contravening the allegations of oppositors-intervenors on the
lack of verification in Davao City and in Polomolok, South
Cotabato, petitioner Aumentado claimed that the same
election officers cited by the oppositors-intervenors also
issued certifications showing that they have verified the
signatures submitted by the proponents of the people's
initiative. He presented copies of the certifications issued by
Atty. Marlon S. Casquejo for the Second and Third
Legislative Districts of Davao City stating that he verified
the signatures of the proponents of the people's initiative. His
certification for the Second District states:
This is to CERTIFY that this Office has examined the list of
individuals as appearing in the Signature Sheets of the
Registered Voters of District II, Davao City, submitted on
April 7, 2006 by MR. NONATO BOLOS, Punong Barangay,
Centro, Davao City for verification which consists of THIRTY
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SIXTY-TWO (30,662)
signatures.
Anent thereto, it appears that of the THIRTY THOUSAND
SIX HUNDRED SIXTY-TWO (30,662) individuals, only
TWENTY-TWO THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SIXTY-
EIGHT (22,668) individuals were found to be REGISTERED
VOTERS, in the Computerized List of Voters of SECOND
CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT, DAVAO CITY.98
It was also shown that Atty. Casquejo had issued a
clarificatory certification regarding the verification process
conducted in Davao City. It reads:
Regarding the verification of the signatures of registered
voters, this Office has previously issued two (2) separate
certifications for the 2nd and 3rd Districts of Davao City on
April 20, 2006 and April 26, 2006, respectively, specifically
relating to the voters who supported the people's initiative. It
was stated therein that the names submitted, comprising
22,668 individual voters in the 2nd District and 18,469
individual voters in the 3rd District, were found [to] be
registered voters of the respective districts mentioned as
verified by this Office based on the Computerized List of
Voters.
It must be clarified that the August 23, 2006 Certification
was issued in error and by mistake for the reason that the
signature verification has not been fully completed as of that
date.
I hereby CERTIFY that this Office has examined the
signatures of the voters as appearing in the signature sheets
and has compared these with the signatures appearing in the
book of voters and computerized list of voters x x x 99
Petitioner Aumentado also submitted a copy of the
certification dated May 8, 2006 issued by Polomolok Election
Officer Glory D. Rubio to support their claim that said officer
had conducted a verification of signatures in said area. The
certification states:
This is to certify further, that the total 68,359 registered
voters of this municipality, as of the May 10, 2004 elections,
10,804 names with signatures were submitted for verification
and out of which 10,301 were found to be legitimate voters as
per official list of registered voters, which is equivalent to
15.07% of the total number of registered voters of this
Municipality.100
In addition to the lack of proper verification of the signatures
in numerous legislative districts, allegations of fraud and
irregularities in the collection of signatures in Makati City
were cited by Senator Pimentel, among others, to wit:
(1) No notice was given to the public, for the benefit of those
who may be concerned, by the Makati COMELEC Office that
signature sheets have already been submitted to it for
"verification." The camp of Mayor Binay was able to witness
the "verification process" only because of their pro-active
stance;
(2) In District 1, the proponents of charter change submitted
43,405 signatures for verification. 36,219 alleged voters'
signatures (83% of the number of signatures submitted) were
rejected outright. 7,186 signatures allegedly "passed"
COMELEC's initial scrutiny. However, upon examination of
the signature sheets by Atty. Mar-len Abigail Binay, the said
7,186 signatures could not be accounted for. Atty. Binay
manually counted 2,793 signatures marked with the word
"OK" and 3,443 signatures marked with a check, giving only
6,236 "apparently verified signatures." Before the
COMELEC officer issued the Certification, Atty. Binay
already submitted to the said office not less than 55 letters of
"signature withdrawal," but no action was ever taken
thereon;
(3) In District 2, 29,411 signatures were submitted for
verification. 23,521 alleged voters' signatures (80% of those
submitted) were rejected outright. Of the 5,890 signatures
which allegedly passed the COMELEC's initial scrutiny,
some more will surely fail upon closer examination;
(4) In the absence of clear, transparent, and uniform rules the
COMELEC personnel did not know how to treat the
objections and other observations coming from the camp of
Mayor Binay. The oppositors too did not know where to go for
their remedy when the COMELEC personnel merely
"listened" to their objections and other observations. As
mentioned earlier, the COMELEC personnel did not even
know what to do with the many "letters of signature
withdrawal" submitted to it;
(5) Signatures of people long dead, in prison, abroad, and
other forgeries appear on the Sigaw ng Bayan Signature
Sheets. There is even a 15-year old alleged signatory;
(6) There are Signature Sheets obviously signed by one
person;
(7) A Calara M. Roberto and a Roberto M. Calara both
allegedly signed the Signature Sheets.101
Also, there are allegations that many of the signatories did
not understand what they have signed as they were merely
misled into signing the signature sheets. Opposed to these
allegations are rulings that a person who affixes his
signature on a document raises the presumption that the
person so signing has knowledge of what the document
contains. Courts have recognized that there is great value in
the stability of records, so to speak, that no one should
commit herself or himself to something in writing unless she
or he is fully aware and cognizant of the effect it may have
upon her on him.102 In the same vein, we have held that a
person is presumed to have knowledge of the contents of a
document he has signed.103 But as this Court is not a trier
of facts, it cannot resolve the issue.
In sum, the issue of whether the petitioners have complied
with the constitutional requirement that the petition for
initiative be signed by at least twelve per cent (12%) of the
total number of registered voters, of which every legislative
district must be represented by at least three per cent (3%) of
the registered voters therein, involves contentious facts. Its
resolution will require presentation of evidence and their
calibration by the COMELEC according to its rules. During
102
the oral argument on this case, the COMELEC, through
Director Alioden Dalaig of its Law Department, admitted
that it has not examined the documents submitted by the
petitioners in support of the petition for initiative, as well as
the documents filed by the oppositors to buttress their claim
that the required number of signatures has not been met. The
exchanges during the oral argument likewise clearly show
the need for further clarification and presentation of evidence
to prove certain material facts.104
The only basis used by the COMELEC to dismiss the petition
for initiative was this Court's ruling in Santiago v.
COMELEC that R.A. 6735 was insufficient. It has yet to rule
on the sufficiency of the form and substance of the petition. I
respectfully submit that this issue should be properly
litigated before the COMELEC where both parties will be
given full opportunity to prove their allegations.
For the same reasons, the sufficiency of the Petition for
Initiative and its compliance with the requirements of R.A.
6735 on initiative and its implementing rules is a question
that should be resolved by the COMELEC at the first
instance, as it is the body that is mandated by the
Constitution to administer all laws and regulations relative
to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum and recall.105
VII
COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it denied due
course to the Lambino and Aumentado petition.
In denying due course to the Lambino and Aumentado
petition, COMELEC relied on this Court's ruling in Santiago
permanently enjoining it from entertaining or taking
cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to
the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly
enacted to provide for the implementation of the system.
Again, I respectfully submit that COMELEC's reliance on
Santiago constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction. The Santiago case did not establish the
firm doctrine that R.A. 6735 is not a sufficient law to
implement the constitutional provision allowing people's
initiative to amend the Constitution. To recapitulate, the
records show that in the original decision, eight (8)
justices106 voted that R.A. 6735 was not a sufficient law; five
(5) justices107 voted that said law was sufficient; and one (1)
justice108 abstained from voting on the issue holding that
unless and until a proper initiatory pleading is filed, the said
issue is not ripe for adjudication.109
Within the reglementary period, the respondents filed their
motion for reconsideration. On June 10, 1997, the Court
denied the motion. Only thirteen (13) justices resolved the
motion for Justice Torres inhibited himself.110 Of the
original majority of eight (8) justices, only six (6) reiterated
their ruling that R.A. 6735 was an insufficient law. Justice
Hermosisima, originally part of the majority of eight (8)
justices, changed his vote and joined the minority of five (5)
justices. He opined without any equivocation that R.A. 6735
was a sufficient law, thus:
It is one thing to utter a happy phrase from a protected
cluster; another to think under fire – to think for action upon
which great interests depend." So said Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes, and so I am guided as I reconsider my concurrence
to the holding of the majority that "R.A. No. 6735 is
inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments
to the Constitution and to have failed to provide sufficient
standard for subordinate legislation" and now to interpose
my dissent thereto.
xxx
WHEREFORE, I vote to dismiss the Delfin petition.
I vote, however, to declare R.A. No. 6735 as adequately
providing the legal basis for the exercise by the people of their
right to amend the Constitution through initiative
proceedings and to uphold the validity of COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300 insofar as it does not sanction the filing
of the initiatory petition for initiative proceedings to amend
the Constitution without the required names and/or
signatures of at least 12% of all the registered voters, of
which every legislative district must be represented by at
least 3% of the registered voters therein. (emphasis supplied)
Justice Vitug remained steadfast in refusing to rule on the
sufficiency of R.A. 6735. In fine, the final vote on whether
R.A. 6735 is a sufficient law was 6-6 with one (1) justice
inhibiting himself and another justice refusing to rule on the
ground that the issue was not ripe for adjudication.
It ought to be beyond debate that the six (6) justices who
voted that R.A. 6735 is an insufficient law failed to establish
a doctrine that could serve as a precedent. Under any
alchemy of law, a deadlocked vote of six (6) is not a majority
and a non-majority cannot write a rule with precedential
value. The opinion of the late Justice Ricardo J. Francisco is
instructive, viz:
As it stands, of the thirteen justices who took part in the
deliberations on the issue of whether the motion for
reconsideration of the March 19, 1997 decision should be
granted or not, only the following justices sided with Mr.
Justice Davide, namely: Chief Justice Narvasa, and Justices
Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo and Kapunan. Justices Melo,
Puno, Mendoza, Hermosisima, Panganiban and the
undersigned voted to grant the motion; while Justice Vitug
"maintained his opinion that the matter was not ripe for
judicial adjudication." In other words, only five, out of the
other twelve justices, joined Mr. Justice Davide's June 10,
1997 ponencia finding R.A. No. 6735 unconstitutional for its
failure to pass the so called "completeness and sufficiency
standards" tests. The "concurrence of a majority of the
members who actually took part in the deliberations" which
Article VII, Section 4(2) of the Constitution requires to
declare a law unconstitutional was, beyond dispute, not
complied with. And even assuming, for the sake of argument,
that the constitutional requirement on the concurrence of the
"majority" was initially reached in the March 19, 1997
ponencia, the same is inconclusive as it was still open for
review by way of a motion for reconsideration. It was only on
June 10, 1997 that the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6735 was
settled with finality, sans the constitutionally required
"majority." The Court's declaration, therefore, is manifestly
grafted with infirmity and wanting in force necessitating, in
my view, the reexamination of the Court's decision in G.R.
No. 127325. It behooves the Court "not to tarry any longer"
nor waste this opportunity accorded by this new petition
(G.R. No. 129754) to relieve the Court's pronouncement from
constitutional infirmity.
The jurisprudence that an equally divided Court can never
set a precedent is well-settled. Thus, in the United States, an
affirmance in the Federal Supreme Court upon equal division
of opinion is not an authority for the determination of other
cases, either in that Court or in the inferior federal courts. In
Neil v. Biggers,111 which was a habeas corpus state
proceeding by a state prisoner, the U.S. Supreme Court held
that its equally divided affirmance of petitioner's state court
conviction was not an "actual adjudication" barring
subsequent consideration by the district court on habeas
corpus. In discussing the non-binding effect of an equal
division ruling, the Court reviewed the history of cases
explicating the disposition "affirmed by an equally divided
Court:"
In this light, we review our cases explicating the disposition
"affirmed by an equally divided Court." On what was
apparently the first occasion of an equal division, The
Antelope, 10 Wheat, 66, 6 L. Ed. 268 (1825), the Court simply
affirmed on the point of division without much discussion.
103
Id., at 126-127. Faced with a similar division during the next
Term, the Court again affirmed, Chief Justice Marshall
explaining that "the principles of law which have been
argued, cannot be settled; but the judgment is affirmed, the
court being divided in opinion upon it." Etting v. Bank of
United States, 11 Wheat. 59, 78, 6 L. Ed. 419 (1826). As was
later elaborated in such cases, it is the appellant or petitioner
who asks the Court to overturn a lower court's decree. "If the
judges are divided, the reversal cannot be had, for no order
can be made. The judgment of the court below, therefore,
stands in full force. It is indeed, the settled practice in such
case to enter a judgment of affirmance; but this is only the
most convenient mode of expressing the fact that the cause is
finally disposed of in conformity with the action of the court
below, and that that court can proceed to enforce its
judgment. The legal effect would be the same if the appeal, or
writ of error, were dismissed." Durant v. Essex Co., 7 Wall.
107, 112, 19 L. Ed. 154 (1869). Nor is an affirmance by an
equally divided Court entitled to precedential weight. Ohio
ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263, 264, 80 S. Ct. 1463, 1464,
4 L. Ed. 2d 1708 (1960).xxx"
This doctrine established in Neil has not been overturned and
has been cited with approval in a number of subsequent
cases,112 and has been applied in various state jurisdictions.
In the case of In the Matter of the Adoption of Erin G., a
Minor Child,113 wherein a putative father sought to set aside
a decree granting petition for adoption of an Indian child on
grounds of noncompliance with the requirements of Indian
Child Welfare Act (ICWA), the Supreme Court of Alaska held
that its decision in In re Adoption of T.N.F. (T.N.F.),114
which lacked majority opinion supporting holding that an
action such as the putative father's would be governed by the
state's one-year statute of limitations, was not entitled to
stare decisis effect. In T.N.F., a majority of the justices sitting
did not agree on a common rationale, as two of four
participating justices agreed that the state's one-year statute
of limitations applied, one justice concurred in the result
only, and one justice dissented. There was no "narrower"
reasoning agreed upon by all three affirming justices. The
concurring justice expressed no opinion on the statute of
limitations issue, and in agreeing with the result, he
reasoned that ICWA did not give the plaintiff standing to
sue.115 The two-justice plurality, though agreeing that the
state's one-year statute of limitations applied, specifically
disagreed with the concurring justice on the standing
issue.116 Because a majority of the participating justices in
T.N.F. did not agree on any one ground for affirmance, it was
not accorded stare decisis effect by the state Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court of Michigan likewise ruled that the
doctrine of stare decisis does not apply to plurality decisions
in which no majority of the justices participating agree to the
reasoning and as such are not authoritative interpretations
binding on the Supreme Court.117
In State ex rel. Landis v. Williams,118 the Supreme Court of
Florida, in an equally divided opinion on the matter,119 held
that chapter 15938, Acts of 1933 must be allowed to stand,
dismissing a quo warranto suit without prejudice. The Court
held:
In a cause of original jurisdiction in this court a statute
cannot be declared unconstitutional nor its enforcement nor
operation judicially interfered with, except by the
concurrence of a majority of the members of the Supreme
Court sitting in the cause wherein the constitutionality of the
statute is brought in question or judicial relief sought against
its enforcement. Section 4 of Article 5, state Constitution.
Therefore in this case the concurrence of a majority of the
members of this court in holding unconstitutional said
chapter 15938, supra, not having been had, it follows that the
statute in controversy must be allowed to stand and
accordingly be permitted to be enforced as a presumptively
valid act of the Legislature, and that this proceeding in quo
warranto must be dismissed without prejudice. Spencer v.
Hunt (Fla.) 147 So. 282. This decision is not to be regarded as
a judicial precedent on the question of constitutional law
involved concerning the constitutionality vel non of chapter
15938. State ex rel. Hampton v. McClung, 47 Fla. 224, 37 So.
51.
Quo warranto proceeding dismissed without prejudice by
equal division of the court on question of constitutionality of
statute involved.
In U.S. v. Pink,120 the Court held that the affirmance by the
U.S. Supreme Court by an equally divided vote of a decision
of the New York Court of Appeals that property of a New
York branch of a Russian insurance company was outside the
scope of the Russian Soviet government's decrees
terminating existence of insurance companies in Russia and
seizing their assets, while conclusive and binding upon the
parties as respects the controversy in that action, did not
constitute an authoritative "precedent."
In Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc.,121 the U.S. Court of
Appeals Second Circuit, in holding that printed lyrics which
had the same meter as plaintiffs' lyrics, but which were in
form a parody of the latter, did not constitute infringement of
plaintiffs' copyrights, ruled that the prior case of Benny v.
Loew's, Inc.,122 which was affirmed by an equally divided
court, was not binding upon it, viz:
Under the precedents of this court, and, as seems justified by
reason as well as by authority, an affirmance by an equally
divided court is as between the parties, a conclusive
determination and adjudication of the matter adjudged; but
the principles of law involved not having been agreed upon
by a majority of the court sitting prevents the case from
becoming an authority for the determination of other cases,
either in this or in inferior courts.123
In Perlman v. First National Bank of Chicago,124 the
Supreme Court of Illinois dismissed the appeal as it was
unable to reach a decision because two judges recused
themselves and the remaining members of the Court were so
divided, it was impossible to secure the concurrence of four
judges as is constitutionally required. The Court followed the
procedure employed by the U.S. Supreme Court when the
Justices of that Court are equally divided, i.e. affirm the
judgment of the court that was before it for review. The
affirmance is a conclusive determination and adjudication as
between the parties to the immediate case, it is not authority
for the determination of other cases, either in the Supreme
Court or in any other court. It is not "entitled to precedential
weight." The legal effect of such an affirmance is the same as
if the appeal was dismissed.125
The same rule is settled in the English Courts. Under English
precedents,126 an affirmance by an equally divided Court is,
as between the parties, a conclusive determination and
adjudication of the matter adjudged; but the principles of law
involved not having been agreed upon by a majority of the
court sitting prevents the case from becoming an authority
for the determination of other cases, either in that or in
inferior courts.
After a tour of these cases, we can safely conclude that the
prevailing doctrine is that, the affirmance by an equally
divided court merely disposes of the present controversy as
between the parties and settles no issue of law; the
affirmance leaves unsettled the principle of law presented by
the case and is not entitled to precedential weight or value.
In other words, the decision only has res judicata and not
stare decisis effect. It is not conclusive and binding upon
other parties as respects the controversies in other actions.
Let us now examine the patent differences between the
petition at bar and the Delfin Petition in the Santiago case
which will prevent the Santiago ruling from binding the
present petitioners. To start with, the parties are different.
104
More importantly, the Delfin Petition did not contain the
signatures of the required number of registered voters under
the Constitution: the requirement that twelve per cent (12%)
of all the registered voters in the country wherein each
legislative district is represented by at least three per cent
(3%) of all the registered voters therein was not complied
with. For this reason, we ruled unanimously that it was not
the initiatory petition which the COMELEC could properly
take cognizance of. In contrast, the present petition appears
to be accompanied by the signatures of the required number
of registered voters. Thus, while the Delfin Petition prayed
that an Order be issued fixing the time and dates for
signature gathering all over the country, the Lambino and
Aumentado petition, prayed for the calling of a plebiscite to
allow the Filipino people to express their sovereign will on
the proposition. COMELEC cannot close its eyes to these
material differences.
Plainly, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying due course to the
Lambino and Aumentado petition on the basis of its mistaken
notion that Santiago established the doctrine that R.A. 6735
was an insufficient law. As aforestressed, that ruling of six
(6) justices who do not represent the majority lacks
precedential status and is non-binding on the present
petitioners.
The Court's dismissal of the PIRMA petition is of no moment.
Suffice it to say that we dismissed the PIRMA petition on the
principle of res judicata. This was stressed by former Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr., viz:
The following are my reasons as to why this petition must be
summarily dismissed:
First, it is barred by res judicata. No one aware of the
pleadings filed here and in Santiago v. COMELEC (G.R. No.
127325, 19 March 1997) may plead ignorance of the fact that
the former is substantially identical to the latter, except for
the reversal of the roles played by the principal parties and
inclusion of additional, yet not indispensable, parties in the
present petition. But plainly, the same issues and reliefs are
raised and prayed for in both cases.
The principal petitioner here is the PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE
FOR REFORM, MODERNIZATION, AND ACTION
(PIRMA) and spouses ALBERTO PEDROSA and CARMEN
PEDROSA. PIRMA is self-described as "a non-stock, non-
profit organization duly organized and existing under
Philippine laws with office address at Suite 403, Fedman
Suites, 199 Salcedo Street, Legaspi Village, Makati City,"
with "ALBERTO PEDROSA and CARMEN PEDROSA" as
among its "officers." In Santiago, the PEDROSAS were made
respondents as founding members of PIRMA which, as
alleged in the body of the petition therein, "proposes to
undertake the signature drive for a people's initiative to
amend the Constitution." In Santiago then, the PEDROSAS
were sued in their capacity as founding members of PIRMA.
The decision in Santiago specifically declared that PIRMA
was duly represented at the hearing of the Delfin petition in
the COMELEC. In short, PIRMA was intervenor-petitioner
therein. Delfin alleged in his petition that he was a founding
member of the Movement for People's Initiative, and under
footnote no. 6 of the decision, it was noted that said
movement was "[l]ater identified as the People's Initiative for
Reforms, Modernization and Action, or PIRMA for brevity."
In their Comment to the petition in Santiago, the
PEDROSAS did not deny that they were founding members
of PIRMA, and by their arguments, demonstrated beyond a
shadow of a doubt that they had joined Delfin or his cause.
No amount of semantics may then shield herein petitioners
PIRMA and the PEDROSAS, as well as the others joining
them, from the operation of the principle of res judicata,
which needs no further elaboration. (emphasis supplied)
Justice Josue N. Bellosillo adds:
The essential requisites of res judicata are: (1) the former
judgment must be final; (2) it must have been rendered by a
court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties; (3) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there
must be between the first and second actions identity of
parties, identity of subject matter, and identity of causes of
action.127
Applying these principles in the instant case, we hold that all
the elements of res judicata are present. For sure, our
Decision in Santiago v. COMELEC, which was promulgated
on 19 March 1997, and the motions for reconsideration
thereof denied with finality on 10 June 1997, is undoubtedly
final. The said Decision was rendered by this Court which
had jurisdiction over the petition for prohibition under Rule
65. Our judgment therein was on the merits, i.e., rendered
only after considering the evidence presented by the parties
as well as their arguments in support of their respective
claims and defenses. And, as between Santiago v. COMELEC
case and COMELEC Special Matter No. 97-001 subject of the
present petition, there is identity of parties, subject matter
and causes of action.
Petitioners contend that the parties in Santiago v.
COMELEC are not identical to the parties in the instant case
as some of the petitioners in the latter case were not parties
to the former case. However, a perusal of the records reveals
that the parties in Santiago v. COMELEC included the
COMELEC, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin, spouses Alberto and
Carmen Pedrosa, in their capacities as founding members of
PIRMA, as well as Atty. Pete Quirino-Quadra, another
founding member of PIRMA, representing PIRMA, as
respondents. In the instant case, Atty. Delfin was never
removed, and the spouses Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa were
joined by several others who were made parties to the
petition. In other words, what petitioners did was to make it
appear that the PIRMA Petition was filed by an entirely
separate and distinct group by removing some of the parties
involved in Santiago v. COMELEC and adding new parties.
But as we said in Geralde v. Sabido128-
A party may not evade the application of the rule of res
judicata by simply including additional parties in the
subsequent case or by not including as parties in the later
case persons who were parties in the previous suit. The
joining of new parties does not remove the case from the
operation of the rule on res judicata if the party against whom
the judgment is offered in evidence was a party in the first
action; otherwise, the parties might renew the litigation by
simply joining new parties.
The fact that some persons or entities joined as parties in the
PIRMA petition but were not parties in Santiago v.
COMELEC does not affect the operation of the prior
judgment against those parties to the PIRMA Petition who
were likewise parties in Santiago v. COMELEC, as they are
bound by such prior judgment.
Needless to state, the dismissal of the PIRMA petition which
was based on res judicata binds only PIRMA but not the
petitioners.
VIII
Finally, let the people speak.
"It is a Constitution we are expounding" solemnly intoned the
great Chief Justice John Marshall of the United States in the
1819 case of M'cCulloch v. Maryland.129 Our Constitution is
not a mere collection of slogans. Every syllable of our
Constitution is suffused with significance and requires our
full fealty. Indeed, the rule of law will wither if we allow the
commands of our Constitution to underrule us.
105
The first principle enthroned by blood in our Constitution is
the sovereignty of the people. We ought to be concerned with
this first principle, i.e., the inherent right of the sovereign
people to decide whether to amend the Constitution. Stripped
of its abstractions, democracy is all about who has the
sovereign right to make decisions for the people and our
Constitution clearly and categorically says it is no other than
the people themselves from whom all government authority
emanates. This right of the people to make decisions is the
essence of sovereignty, and it cannot receive any minimalist
interpretation from this Court. If there is any principle in the
Constitution that cannot be diluted and is non-negotiable, it
is this sovereign right of the people to decide.

This Court should always be in lockstep with the people in

the exercise of their sovereignty. Let them who will diminish
or destroy the sovereign right of the people to decide be
warned. Let not their sovereignty be diminished by those who
belittle their brains to comprehend changes in the
Constitution as if the people themselves are not the source
and author of our Constitution. Let not their sovereignty be
destroyed by the masters of manipulation who misrepresent
themselves as the spokesmen of the people.

Be it remembered that a petition for people's initiative that

complies with the requirement that it "must be signed by at
least 12% of the total number of registered voters of which
every legislative district is represented by at least 3% of the
registered voters therein" is but the first step in a long
journey towards the amendment of the Constitution. Lest it
be missed, the case at bar involves but a proposal to amend
the Constitution. The proposal will still be debated by the
people and at this time, there is yet no fail-safe method of
telling what will be the result of the debate. There will still
be a last step to the process of amendment which is the
ratification of the proposal by a majority of the people in a
plebiscite called for the purpose. Only when the proposal is
approved by a majority of the people in the plebiscite will it
become an amendment to the Constitution. All the way, we
cannot tie the tongues of the people. It is the people who
decide for the people are not an obscure footnote in our
Constitution.
The people's voice is sovereign in a democracy. Let us hear
them. Let us heed them. Let us not only sing paens to the
people's sovereignty. Yes, it is neither too soon nor too late to
let the people speak.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, I vote to REVERSE and SET ASIDE
the resolution of the Commission on Elections dated August
31, 2006, denying due course to the Petition for Initiative
filed by Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado in their
own behalf and together with some 6.3 million registered
voters who affixed their signatures thereon and to REMAND
the petition at bar to the Commission on Elections for further
proceedings.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
EN BANC
G. R. No. 174153 October 25, 2006
RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO together
with 6,327,952 REGISTERED VOTERS, Petitioners
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent; TRADE
UNION CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES (TUCP),
RONALD L. ADAMAT, ROLANDO MANUEL RIVERA,
RUELO BAYA, SULONGBAYAN MOVEMENT
FOUNDATION, INC., PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT AND
GENERAL WORKERS ORGANIZATION (PTGWO) and
VICTORINO F. BALAIS, Petitioners-Intervenors; ONE
VOICE INC., CHRISTIAN S. MONSOD, RENE B. AZURIN,
MANUEL L. QUEZON III, BENJAMIN T. TOLOSA, JR.,
SUSAN V. OPLE and CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR.,
ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC., ATTY. PETE
QUIRINO-QUADRA, BAYAN, BAYAN MUNA, KILUSANG
MAYO UNO, HEAD, ECUMENICAL BISHOPS FORUM,
MIGRANTE, GABRIELA, GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY,
ANAKBAYAN, LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS,
LEONADO SAN JOSE, JOJO PINEDA, DR. DARBY
SANTIAGO, and DR. REGINALD PAMUGAS, LORETTA
ANN P. ROSALES, MARIO JOYO AGUJA, ANA THERESIA
HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, LUWALHATI ANTONINO,
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION
(PHILCONSA), CONRADO F. ESTRELLA, TOMAS C.
TOLEDO, MARIANO M. TAJON, FROILAN M.
BACUNGAN, JOAQUIN T. VENUS, JR., FORTUNATO P.
AGUAS, and AMADO GAT INCIONG, SENATE MINORITY
LEADER AQUILINO P. PIMENTEL, JR., and SENATORS
SERGIO R. OSMEÑA III, JAMBY A.S. MADRIGAL, LUISA
P. EJERCITO-ESTRADA, JINGGOY ESTRADA, ALFREDO
S. LIM and PANFILO M. LACSON, JOSEPH EJERCITO
ESTRADA and PWERSA NG MASANG PILIPINO,
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES CEBU CITY
CHAPTER and CEBU CHAPTER, JOSE ANSELMO I.
CADIZ, BYRON D. BOCAR, MA. TANYA KARINA A. LAT,
ANTONIO L. SALVADOR and RANDALL C.
TABAYOYONG, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

106
Represented by its President, MANUEL VILLAR, JR.,
Oppositors-Intervenors;
G.R. No. 174299 October 25, 2006
MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR.,
and RENE A. Q. SAGUISAG, Petitioners
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Represented by Chairman
BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, SR., and Commissioners
RESSURRECCION Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A. TUASON,
JR., ROMEO A. BRAWNER, RENE V. SARMIENTO, and
John Doe and Peter Doe, Respondents.
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------- x
SEPARATE OPINION
QUISUMBING, J.:
1. With due respect to the main opinion written by J. Antonio
T. Carpio, and the dissent of J. Reynato S. Puno, I view the
matter before us in this petition as one mainly involving a
complex political question.1 While admittedly the present
Constitution lays down certain numerical requirements for
the conduct of a People's Initiative, such as the percentages
of signatures – being 12% of the total number of registered
voters, provided each legislative district is represented by at
least 3% – they are not the main points of controversy. Stated
in simple terms, what this Court must decide is whether the
Commission on Elections gravely abused its discretion when
it denied the petition to submit the proposed changes to the
Constitution directly to the vote of the sovereign people in a
plebiscite. Technical questions, e.g. whether petitioners
should have filed a Motion for Reconsideration before coming
to us, are of no moment in the face of the transcendental issue
at hand. What deserve our full attention are the issues
concerning the applicable rules as well as statutory and
constitutional limitations on the conduct of the People's
Initiative.
2. It must be stressed that no less than the present
Constitution itself empowers the people to "directly" propose
amendments through their own "initiative." The subject of
the instant petition is by way of exercising that initiative in
order to change our form of government from presidential to
parliamentary. Much has been written about the fulsome
powers of the people in a democracy. But the most basic
concerns the idea that sovereignty resides in the people and
that all government authority emanates from them. Clearly,
by the power of popular initiative, the people have the
sovereign right to change the present Constitution. Whether
the initial moves are done by a Constitutional Convention, a
Constitutional Assembly, or a People's Initiative, in the end
every amendment -- however insubstantial or radical -- must
be submitted to a plebiscite. Thus, it is the ultimate will of
the people expressed in the ballot, that matters.2
3. I cannot fault the COMELEC, frankly, for turning down
the petition of Messrs. Lambino, et al. For the COMELEC
was just relying on precedents, with the common
understanding that, pursuant to the cases of Santiago v.
COMELEC3 and PIRMA v. COMELEC,4 the COMELEC had
been permanently enjoined from entertaining any petition for
a people's initiative to amend the Constitution by no less than
this Court. In denying due course below to Messrs. Lambino
and Aumentado's petition, I could not hold the COMELEC
liable for grave abuse of discretion when they merely relied
on this Court's unequivocal rulings. Of course, the Santiago
and the PIRMA decisions could be reviewed and reversed by
this Court, as J. Reynato S. Puno submits now. But until the
Court does so, the COMELEC was duty bound to respect and
obey this Court's mandate, for the rule of law to prevail.
4. Lastly, I see no objection to the remand to the COMELEC
of the petition of Messrs. Lambino and Aumentado and 6.327
million voters, for further examination of the factual
requisites before a plebiscite is conducted. On page 4 of the
assailed Resolution of the respondent dated August 31, 2006,
the COMELEC tentatively expressed its view that "even if
the signatures in the instant Petition appear to meet the
required minimum per centum of the total number of
registered voters", the COMELEC could not give the Petition
due course because of our view that R.A. No. 6735 was
inadequate. That, however, is now refuted by Mr. Justice
Puno's scholarly ponencia. Now that we have revisited the
Santiago v. COMELEC decision, there is only one clear task
for COMELEC. In my view, the only doable option left for the
COMELEC, once factual issues are heard and resolved, is to
give due course to the petition for the initiative to amend our
Constitution so that the sovereign people can vote on whether
a parliamentary system of government should replace the
present presidential system.
5. I am therefore in favor of letting the sovereign people speak
on their choice of the form of government as a political
question soonest. (This I say without fear of media opinion
that our judicial independence has been tainted or imperiled,
for it is not.) Thus I vote for the remand of the petition.
Thereafter, as prayed for, COMELEC should forthwith
certify the Petition as sufficient in form and substance and
call for the holding of a plebiscite within the period mandated
by the basic law, not earlier than sixty nor later than ninety
days from said certification. Only a credible plebiscite itself,
conducted peacefully and honestly, can bring closure to the
instant political controversy.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
____________________
EN BANC
G. R. No. 174153 October 25, 2006
RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO together
with 6,327,952 REGISTERED VOTERS, petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
G. R. No. 174299 October 25, 2006
MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR.
and RENE A.Q. SAGUISAG, petitioners,
vs.
HE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Represented by
Chairman BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, SR., and Commissioners
RESURRECCION Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A. TUASON,
JR., ROMEO A. BRAWNER, RENE V. SARMIENTO, and
John Doe and Peter Doe, respondents.
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------- x
DISSENTING OPINION
CORONA, J.:
The life of the law is not logic but experience.1 Our collective
experience as a nation breathes life to our system of laws,
especially to the Constitution. These cases promise to
significantly contribute to our collective experience as a
nation. Fealty to the primary constitutional principle that the
Philippines is not merely a republican State but a democratic
one as well behooves this Court to affirm the right of the
people to participate directly in the process of introducing
changes to their fundamental law. These petitions present
such an opportunity. Thus, this is an opportune time for this
Court to uphold the sovereign rights of the people.
I agree with the opinion of Mr. Justice Reynato Puno who has
sufficiently explained the rationale for upholding the people's
107
initiative. However, I wish to share my own thoughts on
certain matters I deem material and significant.
Santiago Does Not Apply to This Case But Only to the 1997
Delfin Petition
The COMELEC denied the petition for initiative filed by
petitioners purportedly on the basis of this Court's ruling in
Santiago v. COMELEC2 that: (1) RA 6753 was inadequate to
cover the system of initiative regarding amendments to the
Constitution and (2) the COMELEC was permanently
enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of any
petition for initiative regarding amendments to the
Constitution until a sufficient law was validly enacted to
provide for the implementation of the initiative provision.
However, Santiago should not apply to this case but only to
the petition of Delfin in 1997. It would be unreasonable to
make it apply to all petitions which were yet unforeseen in
1997. The fact is that Santiago was focused on the Delfin
petition alone.
Those who oppose the exercise of the people's right to initiate
changes to the Constitution via initiative claim that Santiago
barred any and all future petitions for initiative by virtue of
the doctrines of stare decisis and res judicata. The argument
is flawed.
The ponencia of Mr. Justice Puno has amply discussed the
arguments relating to stare decisis. Hence, I will address the
argument from the viewpoint of res judicata.
Res judicata is the rule that a final judgment rendered by a
court of competent jurisdiction on the merits is conclusive as
to the rights of the parties and their privies and, as to them,
constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action involving
the same claim, demand or cause of action.3 It has the
following requisites: (1) the former judgment or order must
be final; (2) it must have been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties; (3) it
must be a judgment or order on the merits and (4) there must
be identity of parties, of subject matter, and of cause of action
between the first and second actions.4
There is no identity of parties in Santiago and the instant
case. While the COMELEC was also the respondent in
Santiago, the petitioners in that case and those in this case
are different. More significantly, there is no identity of causes
of action in the two cases. Santiago involved amendments to
Sections 4 and 7 of Article VI, Section 4 of Article VII and
Section 8 of Article X of the Constitution while the present
petition seeks to amend Sections 1to 7 of Article VI and
Sections 1 to 4 of the 1987 Constitution. Clearly, therefore,
the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it
ruled that the present petition for initiative was barred by
Santiago and, on that ground, dismissed the petition.
The present petition and that in Santiago are materially
different from each other. They are not based on the same
facts. There is thus no cogent reason to frustrate and defeat
the present direct action of the people to exercise their
sovereignty by proposing changes to their fundamental law.
People's Initiative Should Not
Be Subjected to Conditions
People's initiative is an option reserved by the people for
themselves exclusively. Neither Congress nor the COMELEC
has the power to curtail or defeat this exclusive power of the
people to change the Constitution. Neither should the
exercise of this power be made subject to any conditions, as
some would have us accept.
Oppositors to the people's initiative point out that this Court
ruled in Santiago that RA 6735 was inadequate to cover the
system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution and,
thus, no law existed to enable the people to directly propose
changes to the Constitution. This reasoning is seriously
objectionable.
The pronouncement on the insufficiency of RA 6735 was, to
my mind, out of place. It was unprecedented and dangerously
transgressed the domain reserved to the legislature.
While the legislature is authorized to establish procedures for
determining the validity and sufficiency of a petition to
amend the constitution,5 that procedure cannot
unnecessarily restrict the initiative privilege.6 In the same
vein, this Court cannot unnecessarily and unreasonably
restrain the people's right to directly propose changes to the
Constitution by declaring a law inadequate simply for lack of
a sub-heading and other grammatical but insignificant
omissions. Otherwise, the constitutional intent to empower
the people will be severely emasculated, if not rendered
illusory.
People's Right and Power to Propose Changes to the
Constitution Directly Should not be Unreasonably Curtailed
If Congress and a constitutional convention, both of which
are mere representative bodies, can propose changes to the
Constitution, there is no reason why the supreme body politic
itself – the people – may not do so directly.
Resort to initiative to amend the constitution or enact a
statute is an exercise of "direct democracy" as opposed to
"representative democracy." The system of initiative allows
citizens to directly propose constitutional amendments for
the general electorate to adopt or reject at the polls,
particularly in a plebiscite. While representative government
was envisioned to "refine and enlarge the public views, by
passing them through the medium of a chosen body of
citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of
their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice will
be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial
considerations,"7 the exercise of "direct democracy" through
initiative reserves direct lawmaking power to the people by
providing them a method to make new laws via the
constitution, or alternatively by enacting statutes.8 Efforts of
the represented to control their representatives through
initiative have been described as curing the problems of
democracy with more democracy.9
The Constitution celebrates the sovereign right of the people
and declares that "sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them."10 Unless the
present petition is granted, this constitutional principle will
be nothing but empty rhetoric, devoid of substance for those
whom it seeks to empower.
The right of the people to pass legislation and to introduce
changes to the Constitution is a fundamental right and must
be jealously guarded.11 The people should be allowed to
directly seek redress of the problems of society and
representative democracy with the constitutional tools they
have reserved for their use alone.
Accordingly, I vote to GRANT the petition in G.R. No.
174513.
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
____________________
EN BANC
G. R. No. 174153
RAUL LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO together
with 6,327,952 REGISTERED VOTERS, Petitioners
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent;
108
TRADE UNION CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES
(TUCP), RONALD L. ADAMAT, ROLANDO MANUEL
RIVERA, RUELO BAYA, SULONGBAYAN MOVEMENT
FOUNDATION, INC., PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT AND
GENERAL WORKERS ORGANIZATION (PTGWO) and
VICTORINO F. BALAIS, Petitioners-Intervenors; ONE
VOICE INC., CHRISTIAN S. MONSOD, RENE B. AZURIN,
MANUEL L. QUEZON III, BENJAMIN T. TOLOSA, JR.,
SUSAN V. OPLE and CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR.,
ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC., ATTY. PETE
QUIRINO-QUADRA, BAYAN, BAYAN MUNA, KILUSANG
MAYO UNO, HEAD, ECUMENICAL BISHOPS FORUM,
MIGRANTE, GABRIELA, GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY,
ANAKBAYAN, LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS,
LEONADO SAN JOSE, JOJO PINEDA, DR. DARBY
SANTIAGO, and DR. REGINALD PAMUGAS, LORETTA
ANN P. ROSALES, MARIO JOYO AGUJA, ANA THERESIA
HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, LUWALHATI ANTONINO,
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION
(PHILCONSA), CONRADO F. ESTRELLA, TOMAS C.
TOLEDO, MARIANO M. TAJON, FROILAN M.
BACUNGAN, JOAQUIN T. VENUS, JR., FORTUNATO P.
AGUAS, and AMADO GAT INCIONG, SENATE MINORITY
LEADER AQUILINO P. PIMENTEL, JR., and SENATORS
SERGIO R. OSMEÑA III, JAMBY A.S. MADRIGAL, LUISA
P. EJERCITO-ESTRADA, JINGGOY ESTRADA, ALFREDO
S. LIM and PANFILO M. LACSON, JOSEPH EJERCITO
ESTRADA and PWERSA NG MASANG PILIPINO,
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES CEBU CITY
CHAPTER and CEBU CHAPTER, JOSE ANSELMO I.
CADIZ, BYRON D. BOCAR, MA. TANYA KARINA A. LAT,
ANOTNIO L. SALVADOR and RANDALL C.
TABAYOYONG, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Represented by its President, MANUEL VILLAR, JR.,
Oppositors-Intervenors;
G.R. No. 174299 entitled
MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR.,
and RENE A. Q. SAGUISAG, Petitioners
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Represented by Chairman
BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, SR., and Commissioners
RESSURRECCION Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A. TUASON,
JR., ROMEO A. BRAWNER, RENE V. SARMIENTO, and
John Doe and Peter Doe, Respondents.
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------- x
SEPARATE OPINION
TINGA, J:
I join in full the opinion of Senior Associate Justice Puno. Its
enviable sang-froid, inimitable lucidity, and luminous
scholarship are all so characteristic of the author that it is
hardly a waste of pen and ink to write separately if only to
express my deep admiration for his disquisition. It is
compelling because it derives from the fundamental
democratic ordinance that sovereignty resides in the people,
and it seeks to effectuate that principle through the actual
empowerment of the sovereign people. Justice Puno's opinion
will in the short term engender reactions on its impact on
present attempts to amend the Constitution, but once the
political passion of the times have been shorn, it will endure
as an unequivocal message to the taongbayan that they are
to be trusted to chart the course of their future.
Nothing that I inscribe will improve on Justice Puno's
opinion. I only write separately to highlight a few other
points which also inform my vote to grant the petitions.
I.
I agree with Justice Puno that Santiago v. COMELEC1 and
PIRMA v. COMELEC2 had not acquired value as precedent
and should be reversed in any case. I add that the Court has
long been mindful of the rule that it necessitates a majority,
and not merely a plurality, in order that a decision can stand
as precedent. That principle has informed the members of
this Court as they deliberated and voted upon contentious
petitions, even if this consideration is not ultimately reflected
on the final draft released for promulgation.
The curious twist to Santiago and PIRMA is that for all the
denigration heaped upon Rep. Act No. 6735 in those cases,
the Court did not invalidate any provision of the statute. All
the Court said then was that the law was "inadequate". Since
this "inadequate" law was not annulled by the Court, or
repealed by Congress, it remained part of the statute books.3
I maintain that even if Rep. Act No. 6735 is truly
"inadequate", the Court in Santiago should not have simply
let the insufficiency stand given that it was not minded to
invalidate the law itself. Article 9 of the Civil Code provides
that "[n]o judge or court shall decline to render judgment by
reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws."4
As explained by the Court recently in Reyes v. Lim,5 "[Article
9] calls for the application of equity, which[, in the revered
Justice Cardozo's words,] 'fills the open spaces in the law.'"6
Certainly, any court that refuses to rule on an action
premised on Rep. Act No. 6735 on the ground that the law is
"inadequate" would have been found in grave abuse of
discretion. The previous failure by the Court to "fill the open
spaces" in Santiago further highlights that decision's status
as an unfortunate aberration.
I am mindful of the need to respect stare decisis, to the point
of having recently decried a majority ruling that was clearly
minded to reverse several precedents but refused to explicitly
say so.7 Yet the principle is not immutable.8 The passionate
words of Chief Justice Panganiban in Osmeña v. COMELEC9
bear quoting:
Before I close, a word about stare decisis. In the present case,
the Court is maintaining the ad ban to be consistent with its
previous holding in NPC vs. Comelec. Thus, respondent urges
reverence for the stability of judicial doctrines. I submit,
however, that more important than consistency and stability
are the verity, integrity and correctness of jurisprudence. As
Dean Roscoe Pound explains, "Law must be stable but it
cannot stand still." Verily, it must correct itself and move in
cadence with the march of the electronic age. Error and illogic
should not be perpetuated. After all, the Supreme Court, in
many cases, has deviated from stare decisis and reversed
previous doctrines and decisions.10 It should do no less in the
present case.11
Santiago established a tenet that the Supreme Court may
affirm a law as constitutional, yet declare its provisions as
inadequate to accomplish the legislative purpose, then barred
the enforcement of the law. That ruling is erroneous, illogical,
and should not be perpetuated.
II.
Following Justice Puno's clear demonstration why Santiago
should not be respected as precedent, I agree that the
COMELEC's failure to take cognizance of the petitions as
mandated by Rep. Act No. 6735 constitutes grave abuse of
discretion correctible through the petitions before this Court.
The Court has consistently held in cases such as Abes v.
COMELEC12, Sanchez v. COMELEC13, and Sambarani v.
COMELEC14 that "the functions of the COMELEC under
the Constitution are essentially executive and administrative
in nature".15 More pertinently, in Buac v. COMELEC16, the
Court held that the jurisdiction of the COMELEC relative to
the enforcement and administration of a law relative to a
plebiscite fell under the jurisdiction of the poll body under its
constitutional mandate "to enforce and administer all laws
and regulations relative to the conduct of a xxx plebiscite".17
109
Rep. Act No. 6735 is a law relative to the conduct of a
plebiscite. The primary task of the COMELEC under Rep.
Act No. 6735 is to enforce and administer the said law,
functions that are essentially executive and administrative
in nature. Even the subsequent duty of the COMELEC of
determining the sufficiency of the petitions after they have
been filed is administrative in character. By any measure,
the COMELEC's failure to perform its executive and
administrative functions under Rep. Act No. 6735 constitutes
grave abuse of discretion.
III.
It has been argued that the subject petitions for initiative are
barred under Republic Act No. 6735 as they allegedly
embrace more than one subject. Section 10 of Rep. Act No.
6735 classifies as a "prohibited measure," a petition
submitted to the electorate that embraces more than one
subject.18 On this point, reliance is apparently placed on the
array of provisions which are to be affected by the
amendments proposed in the initiative petition.
Section 10 of Rep. Act No. 6735 is a reflection of the long-
enshrined constitutional principle that the laws passed by
Congress "shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof".19 The one-subject
requirement under the Constitution is satisfied if all the
parts of the statute are related, and are germane to the
subject matter expressed in the title, or as long as they are
not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject and
title.20 An act having a single general subject, indicated in
the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter
how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent
with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered
in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method
and means of carrying out the general object.21
The precedents governing the one-subject, one-title rule
under the Constitution should apply as well in the
interpretation of Section 10 of Rep. Act No. 6735. For as long
as it can be established that an initiative petition embraces a
single general subject, the petition may be allowed no matter
the number of constitutional provisions proposed for
amendment if the amendments are germane to the subject of
the petition.
Both the Sigaw ng Bayan and the Lambino initiative
petitions expressly propose the changing of the form of
government from bicameral-presidential to unicameral-
parliamentary. Such a proposal may strike as
comprehensive, necessitating as it will the reorganization of
the executive and legislative branches of government,
nevertheless it ineluctably encompasses only a single general
subject still.
The 1987 Constitution (or any constitution for that matter) is
susceptible to division into several general spheres. To cite
the broadest of these spheres by way of example, Article III
enumerates the guaranteed rights of the people under the
Bill of Rights; Articles VI, VII and VIII provide for the
organizational structure of government; while Articles II,
XII, XIII & XIV, XV and XVI enunciate policy principles of
the State. What would clearly be prohibited under Section 10
of Rep. Act No. 6735 is an initiative petition that seeks to
amend provisions which do not belong to the same sphere.
For example, had a single initiative petition sought not only
to change the form of government from presidential to
parliamentary but also to amend the Bill of Rights, said
petition would arguably have been barred under Section 10,
as that petition ostensibly embraces more than one subject,
with each subject bearing no functional relation to the other.
But that is not the case with the present initiative petitions.
Neither can it be argued that the initiative petitions embrace
more than one subject since the proposed amendments seek
to affect two separate branches of government. The very
purpose of the initiative petitions is to fuse the powers of the
executive and legislative branches of government; hence, the
amendments intended to effect such general intent
necessarily affects the two branches. If it required that to
propose a shift in government from presidential to
parliamentary, the amendments to Article VII (Executive
Branch) have to be segregated to a different petition from
that which would propose amendments to Article VI
(Legislative Branch), then the result would be two initiative
petitions ─ both subject to separate authentications,
consideration and even plebiscites, all to effect one general
proposition. This scenario, which entertains the possibility
that one petition would ultimately fail while the other
succeeds, could thus allow for the risk that the executive
branch could be abolished without transferring executive
power to the legislative branch. An absurd result, indeed.
I am not even entirely comfortable with the theoretical
underpinnings of Section 10. The Constitution indubitably
grants the people the right to seek amendment of the charter
through initiative, and mandates Congress to "provide for the
implementation of the exercise of this right." In doing so,
Congress may not restrict the right to initiative on grounds
that are not provided for in the Constitution. If for example
the implementing law also provides that certain provisions of
the Constitution may not be amended through initiative, that
prohibition should not be sustained. Congress is tasked with
the implementation, and not the restriction of the right to
initiative.
The one-subject requirement under Section 10 is not provided
for as a bar to amendment under the Constitution.
Arguments can be supplied for the merit of such a
requirement, since it would afford a measure of orderliness
when the vital question of amending the Constitution arises.
The one-subject requirement does allow the voters focus
when deliberating whether or not to vote for the
amendments. These factors of desirability nonetheless fail to
detract from the fact that the one-subject requirement
imposes an additional restriction on the right to initiative not
contemplated by the Constitution. Short of invalidating the
requirement, a better course of action would be to insist upon
its liberal interpretation. After all, the Court has consistently
adhered to a liberal interpretation of the one-subject, one-
title rule.22 There is no cause to adopt a stricter
interpretative rule with regard to the one-subject rule under
Section 10 of Rep. Act No. 6735.
IV.
During the hearing on the petitions, the argument was raised
that provisions of the Constitution amended through
initiative would not have the benefit of a reference source
from the record of a deliberative body such as Congress or a
constitutional convention. It was submitted that this
consideration influenced the Constitutional Commission as it
drafted Section 2, Article XVII, which expressly provided that
only amendments, and not revisions, may be the subject of
initiative petitions.
This argument clearly proceeds from a premise that accords
supreme value to the record of deliberations of a
constitutional convention or commission in the interpretation
of the charter. Yet if the absence of a record of deliberations
stands as so serious a flaw as to invalidate or constrict
processes which change a constitution or its provisions, then
the entire initiative process authorized by the Constitution
should be scarlet-marked as well.
Even if this position can be given any weight in the
consideration of these petitions, I would like to point out that
resort to the records of deliberations is only one of many aids
to constitutional construction. For one, it should be abhorred
if the provision under study is itself clear, plain, and free from
ambiguity. As the Court held in Civil Liberties Union v.
Executive Secretary:23
110
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the
debates and proceedings of the constitutional convention in
order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting
Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other
guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to vary the
terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates
in the constitutional convention "are of value as showing the
views of the individual members, and as indicating the
reasons for their votes, but they give us no light as to the
views of the large majority who did not talk . . . We think it
safer to construe the constitution from what appears upon its
face."24
Even if there is need to refer to extrinsic sources in aid of
constitutional interpretation, the constitutional record does
not provide the exclusive or definitive answer on how to
interpret the provision. The intent of a constitutional
convention is not controlling by itself, and while the historical
discussion on the floor of the constitutional convention is
valuable, it is not necessarily decisive. The Court has even
held in Vera v. Avelino25 that "the proceedings of the
[constitutional] convention are less conclusive of the proper
construction of the fundamental law than are legislative
proceedings of the proper construction of a statute, since in
the latter case it is the intent of the legislature that courts
seek, while in the former courts are endeavoring to arrive at
the intent of the people through the discussions and
deliberations of their representatives."26 The proper
interpretation of a constitution depends more on how it was
understood by the people adopting it than the framers'
understanding thereof.27
If there is fear in the absence of a constitutional record as
guide for interpretation of any amendments adopted via
initiative, such absence would not preclude the courts from
interpreting such amendments in a manner consistent with
how courts generally construe the Constitution. For example,
reliance will be placed on the other provisions of the
Constitution to arrive at a harmonized and holistic
constitutional framework. The constitutional record is hardly
the Rosetta Stone that unlocks the meaning of the
Constitution.
V.
I fully agree with Justice Puno that all issues relating to the
sufficiency of the initiative petitions should be remanded to
the COMELEC. Rep. Act No. 6735 clearly reposes on the
COMELEC the task of determining the sufficiency of the
petitions, including the ascertainment of whether twelve
percent (12%) of all registered voters, including three percent
(3%) of registered voters in every legislative district have
indeed signed the initiative petitions.28 It should be
remembered that the COMELEC had dismissed the
initiative petitions outright, and had yet to undertake the
determination of sufficiency as required by law.
It has been suggested to the end of leading the Court to stifle
the initiative petitions that the Court may at this juncture
pronounce the initiative petitions as insufficient. The
derivation of the factual predicates leading to the suggestion
is uncertain, considering that the trier of facts, the
COMELEC in this instance, has yet to undertake the
necessary determination. Still, the premise has been floated
that petitioners have made sufficient admissions before this
Court that purportedly established the petitions are
insufficient.
That premise is highly dubitable. Yet the more fundamental
question that we should ask, I submit, is whether it serves
well on the Court to usurp trier of facts even before the latter
exercises its functions? If the Court, at this stage, were to
declare the petitions as insufficient, it would be akin to the
Court pronouncing an accused as guilty even before the lower
court trial had began.
Matugas v. COMELEC29 inveighs against the propriety of
the Court uncharacteristically assuming the role of trier of
facts, and resolving factual questions not previously
adjudicated by the lower courts or tribunals:
[P]etitioner in this case cannot "enervate" the COMELEC's
findings by introducing new evidence before this Court,
which in any case is not a trier of facts, and then ask it to
substitute its own judgment and discretion for that of the
COMELEC.
The rule in appellate procedure is that a factual question may
not be raised for the first time on appeal, and documents
forming no part of the proofs before the appellate court will
not be considered in disposing of the issues of an action. This
is true whether the decision elevated for review originated
from a regular court or an administrative agency or quasi-
judicial body, and whether it was rendered in a civil case, a
special proceeding, or a criminal case. Piecemeal
presentation of evidence is simply not in accord with orderly
justice.30
Any present determination by the Court on the sufficiency of
the petitions constitutes in effect a trial de novo, the Justices
of the Supreme Court virtually descending to the level of trial
court judges. This is an unbecoming recourse, and it simply
is not done.
VI.
The worst position this Court could find itself in is to
acquiesce to a plea that it make the choice whether to amend
the Constitution or not. This is a matter which should not be
left to fifteen magistrates who have not been elected by the
people to make the choice for them.
A vote to grant the petitions is not a vote to amend the 1987
Constitution. It is merely a vote to allow the people to directly
exercise that option. In fact, the position of Justice Puno
which I share would not even guarantee that the Lambino
and Sigaw ng Bayan initiative petitions would be submitted
to the people in a referendum. The COMELEC will still have
to determine the sufficiency of the petition. Among the
questions which still have to be determined by the poll body
in considering the sufficiency of the petitions is whether
twelve percent (12%) of all registered voters nationwide,
including three percent (3%) of registered voters in every
legislative district, have indeed signed the initiative
petitions.31
And even should the COMELEC find the initiative petitions
sufficient, the matter of whether the Constitution should be
amended would still depend on the choice of the electorate.
The oppositors are clearly queasy about some of the
amendments proposed, or the imputed motives behind the
amendments. A referendum, should the COMELEC find the
petitions as sufficient, would allow them to convey their
uneasiness to the public at large, as well as for the
proponents of the amendment to defend their proposal. The
campaign period alone would allow the public to be involved
in the significant deliberation on the course our nation should
take, with the ensuing net benefit of a more informed, more
politically aware populace. And of course, the choice on
whether the Constitution should be amended would lie
directly with the people. The initiative process involves
participatory democracy at its most elemental; wherein the
consequential debate would not be confined to the august
halls of Congress or the hallowed chambers of this Court, as
it would spill over to the public squares and town halls, the
academic yards and the Internet blogosphere, the dining
areas in the homes of the affluent and the impoverished alike.
The prospect of informed and widespread discussion on
constitutional change engaged in by a people who are
actually empowered in having a say whether these changes
should be enacted, gives fruition to the original vision of pure
democracy, as formulated in Athens two and a half millennia
111
ago. The great hero of Athenian democracy, Pericles, was
recorded as saying in his famed Funeral Oration, "We differ
from other states in regarding the man who keeps aloof from
public life not as 'private' but as useless; we decide or debate,
carefully and in person all matters of policy, and we hold, not
that words and deeds go ill together, but that acts are
foredoomed to failure when undertaken undiscussed."32
Unfortunately, given the highly politicized charge of the
times, it has been peddled that an act or vote that assists the
initiative process is one for the willful extinction of democracy
or democratic institutions. Such a consideration should of
course properly play its course in the public debates and
deliberations attendant to the initiative process. Yet as a
result of the harum-scarum, the temptation lies heavy for a
member of this Court perturbed with the prospect of
constitutional change to relieve those anxieties by simply
voting to enjoin any legal procedure that initiates the
amendment or revision of the fundamental law, even at the
expense of the people's will or what the Constitution allows.
A vote so oriented takes the conservative path of least
resistance, even as it may gain the admiration of those who
do not want to see the Constitution amended.
Still, the biases we should enforce as magistrates are those of
the Constitution and the elements of democracy on which our
rule of law is founded. Direct democracy, as embodied in the
initiative process, is but a culmination of the evolution over
the centuries of democratic rights of choice and self-
governance. The reemergence of the Athenian democratic
ideal after centuries of tyrannical rules arrived very slowly,
the benefits parceled out at first only to favored classes. The
Magna Carta granted limited rights to self-determination
and self-governance only to a few English nobles; the
American Constitution was originally intended to give a
meaningful voice only to free men, mostly Caucasian, who
met the property-holding requirements set by the states for
voting. Yet even the very idea of popular voting, limited as it
may have already been within the first few years of the
American Union, met resistance from no less a revered figure
as Alexander Hamilton, to whom the progressive historian
Howard Zinn attributes these disconcerting words:
The voice of the people has been said to be the voice of God;
and however generally this maxim has been quoted and
believed, it is not true in fact. The people are turbulent and
changing; they seldom judge or determine right. Give
therefore to the first class a distinct permanent share in the
government… Can a democratic assembly who annually
revolve in the mass of the people be supposed steadily to
pursue the public good? Nothing but a permanent body can
check the imprudence of democracy…33
This utterly paternalistic and bigoted view has not survived
into the present age of modern democracy where a person's
poverty, color, or gender no longer impedes the exercise of full
democratic rights. Yet a democracy that merely guarantees
its citizens the right to live their lives freely is incomplete if
there is no corresponding allowance for a means by which the
people have a direct choice in determining their country's
direction. Initiative as a mode of amending a constitution
may seem incompatible with representative democracy, yet it
embodies an even purer form of democracy. Initiative, which
our 1987 Constitution saw fit to grant to the people, is a
progressive measure that is but a continuation of the line of
evolution of the democratic ideal.
By allowing the sovereign people to directly propose and
enact constitutional amendments, the initiative process
should be acknowledged as the purest implement of
democratic rule under law. This right granted to over sixty
million Filipinos cannot be denied by the votes of less than
eight magistrates for reasons that bear no cogitation on the
Constitution.
I VOTE to GRANT the petitions.
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
____________________
EN BANC
G. R. No. 174153
RAUL LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO together
with 6,327,952 REGISTERED VOTERS, Petitioners
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent;
TRADE UNION CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES
(TUCP), RONALD L. ADAMAT, ROLANDO MANUEL
RIVERA, RUELO BAYA, SULONGBAYAN MOVEMENT
FOUNDATION, INC., PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT AND
GENERAL WORKERS ORGANIZATION (PTGWO) and
VICTORINO F. BALAIS, Petitioners-Intervenors; ONE
VOICE INC., CHRISTIAN S. MONSOD, RENE B. AZURIN,
MANUEL L. QUEZON III, BENJAMIN T. TOLOSA, JR.,
SUSAN V. OPLE and CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR.,
ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC., ATTY. PETE
QUIRINO-QUADRA, BAYAN, BAYAN MUNA, KILUSANG
MAYO UNO, HEAD, ECUMENICAL BISHOPS FORUM,
MIGRANTE, GABRIELA, GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY,
ANAKBAYAN, LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS,
LEONADO SAN JOSE, JOJO PINEDA, DR. DARBY
SANTIAGO, and DR. REGINALD PAMUGAS, LORETTA
ANN P. ROSALES, MARIO JOYO AGUJA, ANA THERESIA
HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, LUWALHATI ANTONINO,
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION
(PHILCONSA), CONRADO F. ESTRELLA, TOMAS C.
TOLEDO, MARIANO M. TAJON, FROILAN M.
BACUNGAN, JOAQUIN T. VENUS, JR., FORTUNATO P.
AGUAS, and AMADO GAT INCIONG, SENATE MINORITY
LEADER AQUILINO P. PIMENTEL, JR., and SENATORS
SERGIO R. OSMEÑA III, JAMBY A.S. MADRIGAL, LUISA
P. EJERCITO-ESTRADA, JINGGOY ESTRADA, ALFREDO
S. LIM and PANFILO M. LACSON, JOSEPH EJERCITO
ESTRADA and PWERSA NG MASANG PILIPINO,
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES CEBU CITY
CHAPTER and CEBU CHAPTER, JOSE ANSELMO I.
CADIZ, BYRON D. BOCAR, MA. TANYA KARINA A. LAT,
ANOTNIO L. SALVADOR and RANDALL C.
TABAYOYONG, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Represented by its President, MANUEL VILLAR, JR.,
Oppositors-Intervenors;
G.R. No. 174299
MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR.,
and RENE A. Q. SAGUISAG, Petitioners
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Represented by Chairman
BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, SR., and Commissioners
RESSURRECCION Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A. TUASON,
JR., ROMEO A. BRAWNER, RENE V. SARMIENTO, and
John Doe and Peter Doe, Respondents.
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------- x
DISSENTING OPINION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
"The people made the constitution, and the people can
unmake it. It is the creature of their will, and lives only by
their will. But this supreme and irresistible power to make
or unmake, resides only in the whole body of the people; not
in any subdivision of them."
-- Marshall, C.J., Cohens v. Virginia (1821, US) 6 Wheat 264,
389, 5 L ed. 257, 287.
I express my concurrence in the discussions and conclusions
presented in the persuasive and erudite dissent of Justice
112
Reynato S. Puno. However, I make some additional
observations in connection with my concurrence.
While it is but proper to accord great respect and reverence
to the Philippine Constitution of 1987 for being the supreme
law of the land, we should not lose sight of the truth that
there is an ultimate authority to which the Constitution is
also subordinate – the will of the people. No less than its very
first paragraph, the Preamble,1 expressly recognizes that the
Constitution came to be because it was ordained and
promulgated by the sovereign Filipino people. It is a principle
reiterated yet again in Article II, Section 1, of the
Constitution, which explicitly declares that "[t]he Philippines
is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in
the people and all government authority emanates from
them." Thus, the resolution of the issues and controversies
raised by the instant Petition should be guided accordingly
by the foregoing principle.
If the Constitution is the expression of the will of the
sovereign people, then, in the event that the people change
their will, so must the Constitution be revised or amended to
reflect such change. Resultantly, the right to revise or amend
the Constitution inherently resides in the sovereign people
whose will it is supposed to express and embody. The
Constitution itself, under Article XVII, provides for the
means by which the revision or amendment of the
Constitution may be proposed and ratified.
Under Section 1 of the said Article, proposals to amend or
revise the Constitution may be made (a) by Congress, upon a
vote of three-fourths of all its Members, or (b) by
constitutional convention. The Congress and the
constitutional convention possess the power to propose
amendments to, or revisions of, the Constitution not simply
because the Constitution so provides, but because the
sovereign people had chosen to delegate their inherent right
to make such proposals to their representatives either
through Congress or through a constitutional convention.
On the other hand, the sovereign people, well-inspired and
greatly empowered by the People Power Revolution of 1986,
reserved to themselves the right to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution through initiative, to wit –
SEC. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be
directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of
registered voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum of the registered
voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be
authorized within five years following the ratification of this
Constitution nor oftener than once every five years
thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the
exercise of this right.2
The afore-quoted section does not confer on the Filipino
people the right to amend the Constitution because, as
previously discussed, such right is inherent in them. The
section only reduces into writing this right to initiate
amendments to the Constitution where they collectively and
willfully agreed in the manner by which they shall exercise
this right: (a) through the filing of a petition; (b) supported by
at least twelve percent (12%) of the total number of registered
voters nationwide; (c) with each legislative district
represented by at least three percent (3%) of the registered
voters therein; (d) subject to the limitation that no such
petition may be filed within five years after the ratification of
the Constitution, and not oftener than once every five years
thereafter; and (e) a delegation to Congress of the authority
to provide the formal requirements and other details for the
implementation of the right.
It is my earnest opinion that the right of the sovereign people
to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through
initiative is more superior than the power they delegated to
Congress or to a constitutional convention to amend or revise
the Constitution. The initiative process gives the sovereign
people the voice to express their collective will, and when the
people speak, we must be ready to listen. Article XVII,
Section 2 of the Constitution recognizes and guarantees the
sovereign people's right to initiative, rather than limits it.
The enabling law which Congress has been tasked to enact
must give life to the said provision and make the exercise of
the right to initiative possible, not regulate, limit, or restrict
it in any way that would render the people's option of
resorting to initiative to amend the Constitution more
stringent, difficult, and less feasible, as compared to the other
constitutional means to amend or revise the Constitution. In
fact, it is worth recalling that under Article VI, Section 1 of
the Constitution, the legislative power of Congress is limited
to the extent reserved to the people by the provisions on
initiative and referendum.
It is with this frame of mind that I review the issues raised
in the instant Petitions, and which has led me to the
conclusions, in support of the dissent of Justice Puno, that (a)
The Commission on Election (COMELEC) had indeed
committed grave abuse of discretion in summarily dismissing
the petition for initiative to amend the Constitution filed by
herein petitioners Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado;
(b) The Court should revisit the pronouncements it made in
Santiago v. Commission on Elections;3 (c) It is the sovereign
people's inherent right to propose changes to the
Constitution, regardless of whether they constitute merely
amendments or a total revision thereof; and (d) The
COMELEC should take cognizance of Lambino and
Aumentado's petition for initiative and, in the exercise of its
jurisdiction, determine the factual issues raised by the
oppositors before this Court.
I
The COMELEC had indeed committed grave abuse of
discretion when it summarily dismissed Lambino and
Aumentado's petition for initiative entirely on the basis of the
Santiago case which, allegedly, permanently enjoined it from
entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for
initiative to amend the Constitution in the absence of a
sufficient law.
After a careful reading, however, of the Santiago case, I
believe in earnest that the permanent injunction actually
issued by this Court against the COMELEC pertains only to
the petition for initiative filed by Jesus S. Delfin, and not to
all subsequent petitions for initiative to amend the
Constitution.
The Conclusion4 in the majority opinion in the Santiago case
reads –
CONCLUSION
This petition must then be granted, and the COMELEC
should be permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking
cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to
the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly
enacted to provide for the implementation of the system.
We feel, however, that the system of initiative to propose
amendments to the Constitution should no longer be kept in
the cold; it should be given flesh and blood, energy and
strength. Congress should not tarry any longer in complying
with the constitutional mandate to provide for the
implementation of the right of the people under that system.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
a) GRANTING the instant petition;
b) DECLARING R.A. No. 6735 inadequate to cover the
system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, and
113
to have failed to provide sufficient standard for subordinate
legislation;
c) DECLARING void those parts of Resolution No. 2300 of the
Commission on Elections prescribing rules and regulations
on the conduct of initiative or amendments to the
Constitution; and
d) ORDERING the Commission on Elections to forthwith
DISMISS the DELFIN petition (UND-96-037).
The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 18 December
1996 is made permanent as against the Commission on
Elections, but is LIFTED as against private respondents.
Resolution on the matter of contempt is hereby reserved.
It is clear from the fallo, as it is reproduced above, that the
Court made permanent the Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) it issued on 18 December 1996 against the COMELEC.
The said TRO enjoined the COMELEC from proceeding with
the Delfin Petition, and Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa from
conducting a signature drive for people's initiative.5 It was
this restraining order, more particularly the portion thereof
referring to the Delfin Petition, which was expressly made
permanent by the Court. It would seem to me that the
COMELEC and all other oppositors to Lambino and
Aumentado's petition for initiative gave unwarranted
significance and weight to the first paragraph of the
Conclusion in the Santiago case. The first and second
paragraphs of the Conclusion, preceding the dispositive
portion, merely express the opinion of the ponente; while the
definite orders of the Court for implementation are found in
the dispositive portion.
We have previously held that –
The dispositive portion or the fallo is what actually
constitutes the resolution of the court and which is the
subject of execution, although the other parts of the decision
may be resorted to in order to determine the ratio decidendi
for such a resolution. Where there is conflict between the
dispositive part and the opinion of the court contained in the
text of the decision, the former must prevail over the latter
on the theory that the dispositive portion is the final order
while the opinion is merely a statement ordering nothing.
Hence execution must conform more particularly to that
ordained or decreed in the dispositive portion of the
decision.6
Is there a conflict between the first paragraph of the
Conclusion and the dispositive portion of the Santiago case?
Apparently, there is. The first paragraph of the Conclusion
states that the COMELEC should be permanently enjoined
from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for
initiative on amendments to the Constitution until the
enactment of a valid law. On the other hand, the fallo only
makes permanent the TRO7 against COMELEC enjoining it
from proceeding with the Delfin Petition. While the
permanent injunction contemplated in the Conclusion
encompasses all petitions for initiative on amendments to the
Constitution, the fallo is expressly limited to the Delfin
Petition. To resolve the conflict, the final order of the Court
as it is stated in the dispositive portion or the fallo should be
controlling.
Neither can the COMELEC dismiss Lambino and
Aumentado's petition for initiative on the basis of this Court's
Resolution, dated 23 September 1997, in the case of People's
Initiative for Reform, Modernization and Action (PIRMA) v.
The Commission on Elections, et al.8 The Court therein
found that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing the PIRMA Petition for initiative to
amend the Constitution for it only complied with the Decision
in the Santiago case.
It is only proper that the Santiago case should also bar the
PIRMA Petition on the basis of res judicata because PIRMA
participated in the proceedings of the said case, and had
knowledge of and, thus, must be bound by the judgment of
the Court therein. As explained by former Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr. in his separate opinion to the
Resolution in the PIRMA case –
First, it is barred by res judicata. No one aware of the
pleadings filed here and in Santiago v. COMELEC (G.R. No.
127325, 19 March 1997) may plead ignorance of the fact that
the former is substantially identical to the latter, except for
the reversal of the roles played by the principal parties and
inclusion of additional, yet not indispensable, parties in the
present petition. But plainly, the same issues and reliefs are
raised and prayed for in both cases.
The principal petitioner here is the PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE
FOR REFORM, MODERNIZATION, AND ACTION
(PIRMA) and Spouses ALBERTO PEDROSA and CARMEN
PEDROSA. PIRMA is self-described as "a non-stock, non-
profit organization duly organized and existing under
Philippine laws with office address at Suite 403, Fedman
Suites, 199 Salcedo Street, Legaspi Village, Makati City,"
with "ALBERTO PEDROSA and CARMEN PEDROSA" as
among its "officers." In Santiago, the PEDROSAS were made
respondents as founding members of PIRMA which, as
alleged in the body of the petition therein, "proposes to
undertake the signature drive for a people's initiative to
amend the Constitution." In Santiago then, the PEDROSAS
were sued in their capacity as founding members of PIRMA.
The decision in Santiago specifically declared that PIRMA
was duly represented at the hearing of the Delfin petition in
the COMELEC. In short, PIRMA was intervenor-petitioner
therein. Delfin alleged in his petition that he was a founding
member of the Movement for People's Initiative, and under
footnote no. 6 of the decision, it was noted that said
movement was "[l]ater identified as the People's Initiative for
Reforms, Modernization and Action, or PIRMA for brevity."
In their Comment to the petition in Santiago, the
PEDROSA'S did not deny that they were founding members
of PIRMA, and by their arguments, demonstrated beyond a
shadow of a doubt that they had joined Delfin or his cause.
No amount of semantics may then shield herein petitioners
PIRMA and the PEDROSAS, as well as the others joining
them, from the operation of the principle of res judicata,
which needs no further elaboration.9
While the Santiago case bars the PIRMA case because of res
judicata, the same cannot be said to the Petition at bar. Res
judicata is an absolute bar to a subsequent action for the
same cause; and its requisites are: (a) the former judgment
or order must be final; (b) the judgment or order must be one
on the merits; (c) it must have been rendered by a court
having jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties; and
(d) there must be between the first and second actions,
identity of parties, of subject matter and of causes of action.10
Even though it is conceded that the first three requisites are
present herein, the last has not been complied with.
Undoubtedly, the Santiago case and the present Petition
involve different parties, subject matter, and causes of action,
and the former should not bar the latter.
In the Santiago case, the petition for initiative to amend the
Constitution was filed by Delfin alone. His petition does not
qualify as the initiatory pleading over which the COMELEC
can acquire jurisdiction, being unsupported by the required
number of registered voters, and actually imposing upon the
COMELEC the task of gathering the voters' signatures. In
the case before us, the petition for initiative to amend the
Constitution was filed by Lambino and Aumentado, on behalf
of the 6.3 million registered voters who affixed their
signatures on the signature sheets attached thereto. Their
petition prays that the COMELEC issue an Order –
114

1. Finding the petition to be sufficient pursuant to Section 4,
Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution;
2. Directing the publication of the petition in Filipino and
English at least twice in newspapers of general and local
circulation; and
3. Calling a plebiscite to be held not earlier than sixty nor
later than ninety days after the Certification by the
COMELEC of the sufficiency of the petition, to allow the
Filipino people to express their sovereign will on the
proposition.
Although both cases involve the right of the people to initiate
amendments to the Constitution, the personalities concerned
and the other factual circumstances attendant in the two
cases differ. Also dissimilar are the particular prayer and
reliefs sought by the parties from the COMELEC, as well as
from this Court. For these reasons, I find that the COMELEC
acted with grave abuse of discretion when it summarily
dismissed the petition for initiative filed by Lambino and
Aumentado. It behooves the COMELEC to accord due course
to a petition which on its face complies with the rudiments of
the law. COMELEC was openly negligent in summarily
dismissing the Lambino and Aumentado petition. The haste
by which the instant Petition was struck down is
characteristic of bad faith, which, to my mind, is a patent and
gross evasion of COMELEC's positive duty. It has so
obviously copped out of its duty and responsibility to
determine the sufficiency thereof and sought protection and
justification for its craven decision in the supposed
permanent injunction issued against it by the Court in the
Santiago case. The COMELEC had seemingly expanded the
scope and application of the said permanent injunction,
reading into it more than what it actually states, which is
surprising, considering that the Chairman and majority of
the members of COMELEC are lawyers who should be able
to understand and appreciate, more than a lay person, the
legal consequences and intricacies of the pronouncements
made by the Court in the Santiago case and the permanent
injunction issued therein.
No less than the Constitution itself, under the second
paragraph of Article XVII, Section 4, imposes upon the
COMELEC the mandate to set a date for plebiscite after a
positive determination of the sufficiency of a petition for
initiative on amendments to the Constitution, viz –
SEC. 4. x x x
Any amendment under Section 2 hereof shall be valid when
ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which
shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety
days after the certification by the Commission on Elections of
the sufficiency of the petition.
As a rule, the word "shall" commonly denotes an imperative
obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion, and
that the presumption is that the word "shall" when used, is
mandatory.11 Under the above-quoted constitutional
provision, it is the mandatory or imperative obligation of the
COMELEC to (a) determine the sufficiency of the petition for
initiative on amendments to the Constitution and issue a
certification on its findings; and (b) in case such petition is
found to be sufficient, to set the date for the plebiscite on the
proposed amendments not earlier than 60 days nor later than
90 days after its certification. The COMELEC should not be
allowed to shun its constitutional mandate under the second
paragraph of Article XVII, Section 4, through the summary
dismissal of the petition for initiative filed by Lambino and
Aumentado, when such petition is supported by 6.3 million
signatures of registered voters. Should all of these signatures
be authentic and representative of the required percentages
of registered voters for every legislative district and the
whole nation, then the initiative is a true and legitimate
expression of the will of the people to amend the Constitution,
and COMELEC had caused them grave injustice by silencing
their voice based on a patently inapplicable permanent
injunction.
II
We should likewise take the opportunity to revisit the
pronouncements made by the Court in its Decision in the
Santiago case, especially as regards the supposed
insufficiency or inadequacy of Republic Act No. 6735 as the
enabling law for the implementation of the people's right to
initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
The declaration of the Court that Republic Act No. 6735 is
insufficient or inadequate actually gave rise to more
questions rather than answers, due to the fact that there has
never been a judicial precedent wherein the Court
invalidated a law for insufficiency or inadequacy. The
confusion over such a declaration thereby impelled former
Chief Justice Davide, Jr., the ponente in the Santiago case,
to provide the following clarification in his separate opinion
to the Resolution in the PIRMA case, thus –
Simply put, Santiago did, in reality, declare as
unconstitutional that portion of R.A. No. 6735 relating to
Constitutional initiatives for failure to comply with the
"completeness and sufficient standard tests" with respect to
permissible delegation of legislative power or subordinate
legislation. However petitioners attempt to twist the
language in Santiago, the conclusion is inevitable; the portion
of R.A. No. 6735 was held to be unconstitutional.
It is important to note, however, that while the Decision in
the Santiago case pronounced repeatedly that Republic Act
No. 6735 was insufficient and inadequate, there is no
categorical declaration therein that the said statute was
unconstitutional. The express finding that Republic Act No.
6735 is unconstitutional can only be found in the separate
opinion of former Chief Justice Davide to the Resolution in
the PIRMA case, which was not concurred in by the other
members of the Court.
Even assuming arguendo that the declaration in the Santiago
case, that Republic Act No. 6735 is insufficient and
inadequate, is already tantamount to a declaration that the
statute is unconstitutional, it was rendered in violation of
established rules in statutory construction, which state that
–
[A]ll presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality;
one who attacks a statute, alleging unconstitutionality must
prove its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt (Victoriano v.
Elizalde Rope Workers' Union, 59 SCRA 54 [19741). In fact,
this Court does not decide questions of a constitutional
nature unless that question is properly raised and presented
in appropriate cases and is necessary to a determination of
the case, i.e., the issue of constitutionality must be lis mota
presented (Tropical Homes v. National Housing Authority,
152 SCRA 540 [1987]).
First, the Court, in the Santiago case, could have very well
avoided the issue of constitutionality of Republic Act No.
6735 by ordering the COMELEC to dismiss the Delfin
petition for the simple reason that it does not constitute an
initiatory pleading over which the COMELEC could acquire
jurisdiction. And second, the unconstitutionality of Republic
Act No. 6735 has not been adequately shown. It was by and
large merely inferred or deduced from the way Republic Act
No. 6735 was worded and the provisions thereof arranged
and organized by Congress. The dissenting opinions rendered
by several Justices in the Santiago case reveal the other side
to the argument, adopting the more liberal interpretation
that would allow the Court to sustain the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 6735. It would seem that the majority in the
Santiago case failed to heed the rule that all presumptions
should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of the
statute.
115

The Court, acting en banc on the Petition at bar, can revisit
its Decision in the Santiago case and again open to judicial
review the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 6735; in
which case, I shall cast my vote in favor of its
constitutionality, having satisfied the completeness and
sufficiency of standards tests for the valid delegation of
legislative power. I fully agree in the conclusion made by
Justice Puno on this matter in his dissenting opinion12 in the
Santiago case, that reads –
R.A. No. 6735 sufficiently states the policy and the standards
to guide the COMELEC in promulgating the law's
implementing rules and regulations of the law. As
aforestated, Section 2 spells out the policy of the law; viz:
"The power of the people under a system of initiative and
referendum to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in
whole or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or
resolutions passed by any legislative body upon compliance
with the requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed,
recognized and guaranteed." Spread out all over R.A. No.
6735 are the standards to canalize the delegated power to the
COMELEC to promulgate rules and regulations from
overflowing. Thus, the law states the number of signatures
necessary to start a people's initiative, directs how initiative
proceeding is commenced, what the COMELEC should do
upon filing of the petition for initiative, how a proposition is
approved, when a plebiscite may be held, when the
amendment takes effect, and what matters may not be the
subject of any initiative. By any measure, these standards are
adequate.
III
The dissent of Justice Puno has already a well-presented
discourse on the difference between an "amendment" and a
"revision" of the Constitution. Allow me also to articulate my
additional thoughts on the matter.
Oppositors to Lambino and Aumentado's petition for
initiative argue that the proposed changes therein to the
provisions of the Constitution already amount to a revision
thereof, which is not allowed to be done through people's
initiative; Article XVII, Section 2 of the Constitution on
people's initiative refers only to proposals for amendments to
the Constitution. They assert the traditional distinction
between an amendment and a revision, with amendment
referring to isolated or piecemeal change only, while revision
as a revamp or rewriting of the whole instrument.13
However, as pointed out by Justice Puno in his dissent, there
is no quantitative or qualitative test that can establish with
definiteness the distinction between an amendment and a
revision, or between a substantial and simple change of the
Constitution.
The changes proposed to the Constitution by Lambino and
Aumentado's petition for initiative basically affect only
Article VI on the Legislative Department and Article VII on
the Executive Department. While the proposed changes will
drastically alter the constitution of our government by
vesting both legislative and executive powers in a unicameral
Parliament, with the President as the Head of State and the
Prime Minister exercising the executive power; they would
not essentially affect the other 16 Articles of the Constitution.
The 100 or so changes counted by the oppositors to the other
provisions of the Constitution are constituted mostly of the
nominal substitution of one word for the other, such as
Parliament for Congress, or Prime Minister for President. As
eloquently pointed out in the dissent of Justice Puno, the
changes proposed to transform our form of government from
bicameral-presidential to unicameral-parliamentary, would
not affect the fundamental nature of our state as a
democratic and republican state. It will still be a
representative government where officials continue to be
accountable to the people and the people maintain control
over the government through the election of members of the
Parliament.
Furthermore, should the people themselves wish to change a
substantial portion or even the whole of the Constitution,
what or who is to stop them? Article XVII, Section 2 of the
Constitution which, by the way it is worded, refers only to
their right to initiative on amendments of the Constitution?
The delegates to the Constitutional Convention who,
according to their deliberations, purposely limited Article
XVII, Section 2 of the Constitution to amendments? This
Court which has the jurisdiction to interpret the provision?
Bearing in mind my earlier declaration that the will of the
sovereign people is supreme, there is nothing or no one that
can preclude them from initiating changes to the
Constitution if they choose to do so. To reiterate, the
Constitution is supposed to be the expression and
embodiment of the people's will, and should the people's will
clamor for a revision of the Constitution, it is their will which
should prevail. Even the fact that the people ratified the 1987
Constitution, including Article XVII, Section 2 thereof, as it
is worded, should not prevent the exercise by the sovereign
people of their inherent right to change the Constitution,
even if such change would be tantamount to a substantial
amendment or revision thereof, for their actual exercise of
the said right should be a clear renunciation of the limitation
which the said provision imposes upon it. It is the inherent
right of the people as sovereign to change the Constitution,
regardless of the extent thereof.
IV
Lastly, I fail to see the injustice in allowing the COMELEC
to give due course to and take cognizance of Lambino and
Aumentado's petition for initiative to amend the
Constitution. I reiterate that it would be a greater evil if one
such petition which is ostensibly supported by the required
number of registered voters all over the country, be
summarily dismissed.
Giving due course and taking cognizance of the petition
would not necessarily mean that the same would be found
sufficient and set for plebiscite. The COMELEC still faces the
task of reviewing the petition to determine whether it
complies with the requirements for a valid exercise of the
right to initiative. Questions raised by the oppositors to the
petition, such as those on the authenticity of the registered
voters' signatures or compliance with the requisite number of
registered voters for every legislative district, are already
factual in nature and require the reception and evaluation of
evidence of the parties. Such questions are best presented
and resolved before the COMELEC since this Court is not a
trier of facts.
In view of the foregoing, I am of the position that the
Resolution of the COMELEC dated 31 August 2006 denying
due course to the Petition for Initiative filed by Lambino and
Aumentado be reversed and set aside for having been issued
in grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction,
and that the Petition be remanded to the COMELEC for
further proceedings.
In short, I vote to GRANT the petition for Initiative of
Lambino and Aumentado.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
____________________
EN BANC
G.R. No. 174153 October 25, 2006
RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO, together
with 6,327,952 REGISTERED VOTERS, petitioners, vs. The
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
116

G.R. No. 174299 October 25, 2006
MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR.,
and RENE A. Q. SAGUISAG, petitioners vs. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS, Represented by Chairman BENJAMIN S.
ABALOS, JR., and Commissioners RESURRECCION Z.
BORRA, FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., ROMEO A.
BRAWNER, RENE V. SARMIENTO, and John Doe and
Peter Doe, respondents.
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------- x
SEPARATE OPINION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Introduction
The fate of every democracy, of every government based on
the Sovereignty of the people, depends on the choices it
makes between these opposite principles: absolute power on
the one hand, and on the other the restraints of legality and
the authority of tradition.
—John Acton
In this thorny matter of the people's initiative, I concur with
the erudite and highly persuasive opinion of Justice Reynato
S. Puno upholding the people's initiative and raise some
points of my own.
The issue of the people's power to propose amendments to the
Constitution was once discussed in the landmark case of
Santiago v. COMELEC.1 Almost a decade later, the issue is
once again before the Court, and I firmly believe it is time to
reevaluate the pronouncements made in that case.
The issue of Charter Change is one that has sharply divided
the nation, and its proponents and opponents will
understandably take all measures to advance their position
and defeat that of their opponents. The wisdom or folly of
Charter Change does not concern the Court. The only thing
that the Court must review is the validity of the present step
taken by the proponents of Charter Change, which is the
People's Initiative, as set down in Article XVII, Sec. 2 of the
1987 Constitution:
Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly
proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of
at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered
voters, of which every legislative district must be represented
by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein.
No amendment under this section shall be authorized within
five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor
oftener than once every five years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the
exercise of this right.
In the Santiago case, the Court discussed whether the second
paragraph of that section had been fulfilled. It determined
that Congress had not provided for the implementation of the
exercise of the people's initiative, when it held that Republic
Act No. 6735, or "The Initiative and Referendum Act," was
"inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments
to the Constitution, and to have failed to provide sufficient
standard for subordinate legislation."2
With all due respect to those Justices who made that
declaration, I must disagree.
Republic Act No. 6735 is the proper law for proposing
constitutional amendments and it should not have been
considered inadequate.
The decision in Santiago focused on what it perceived to be
fatal flaws in the drafting of the law, in the failings of the way
the law was structured, to come to the conclusion that the law
was inadequate. The Court itself recognized the legislators'
intent, but disregarded this intent. The law was found
wanting. The Court then saw the inclusion of the
Constitution in RA 6735 as an afterthought. However, it was
included, and it should not be excluded by the Court via a
strained analysis of the law. The difficult construction of the
law should not serve to frustrate the intent of the framers of
the 1987 Constitution: to give the people the power to propose
amendments as they saw fit. It is a basic precept in statutory
construction that the intent of the legislature is the
controlling factor in the interpretation of a statute.3 The
intent of the legislature was clear, and yet RA 6735 was
declared inadequate. It was not specifically struck down or
declared unconstitutional, merely incomplete. The Court
focused on what RA 6735 was not, and lost sight of what RA
6735 was.
It is my view that the reading of RA 6735 in Santiago should
have been more flexible. It is also a basic precept of statutory
construction that statutes should be construed not so much
according to the letter that killeth but in line with the
purpose for which they have been enacted.4 The reading of
the law should not have been with the view of its defeat, but
with the goal of upholding it, especially with its avowed noble
purpose.
Congress has done its part in empowering the people
themselves to propose amendments to the Constitution, in
accordance with the Constitution itself. It should not be the
Supreme Court that stifles the people, and lets their cries for
change go unheard, especially when the Constitution itself
grants them that power.
The court's ruling in the Santiago case does not bar the
present petition because the fallo in the Santiago case is
limited to the Delfin petition.
The Santiago case involved a petition for prohibition filed by
Miriam Defensor-Santiago, et al., against the COMELEC, et
al., which sought to prevent the COMELEC from
entertaining the "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift
Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative" filed
by Atty. Jesus Delfin. In the body of the judgment, the Court
made the following conclusion, viz:
This petition must then be granted and the COMELEC
should be permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking
cognizance of any petition or initiative on amendments on the
Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly
enacted to provide for the implementation of the system
(emphasis supplied).
We feel, however, that the system of initiative to propose
amendments to the Constitution should no longer be kept in
the cold; it should be given flesh and blood, energy and
strength. Congress should not tarry any longer in complying
with the constitutional mandate to provide for the
implementation of the right of the people under that system.
In the said case, the Court's fallo states as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
a) GRANTING the instant petition;
b) DECLARING R. A. 6735 inadequate to cover the system of
initiative on amendments to the Constitution, and to have
failed to provide sufficient standard for subordinate
legislation;
c) DECLARING void those parts of Resolutions No. 2300 of
the Commission on Elections prescribing rules and
regulations on the conduct of initiative or amendments to the
Constitution; and
117

d) ORDERING the Commission on Elections to forthwith
DISMISS the DELFIN petition (UND-96-037).
The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 18 December
1996 is made permanent as against the Commission on
Elections, but is LIFTED against private respondents.
Resolution on the matter of contempt is hereby reserved.
SO ORDERED.
The question now is if the ruling in Santiago is decisive in
this case. It is elementary that when there is conflict between
the dispositive portion or fallo of the decision and the opinion
of the court contained in the text or body of the judgment, the
former prevails over the latter. An order of execution is based
on the disposition, not on the body, of the decision.5 The
dispositive portion is its decisive resolution; thus, it is the
subject of execution. The other parts of the decision may be
resorted to in order to determine the ratio decidendi for the
disposition. Where there is conflict between the dispositive
part and the opinion of the court contained in the text or body
of the decision, the former must prevail over the latter on the
theory that the dispositive portion is the final order, while
the opinion is merely a statement ordering nothing. Hence,
the execution must conform with that which is ordained or
decreed in the dispositive portion of the decision.6
A judgment must be distinguished from an opinion. The
latter is an informal expression of the views of the court and
cannot prevail against its final order or decision. While the
two may be combined in one instrument, the opinion forms
no part of the judgment. So there is a distinction between the
findings and conclusions of a court and its Judgment. While
they may constitute its decision and amount to the rendition
of a judgment, they are not the judgment itself. It is not
infrequent that the grounds of a decision fail to reflect the
exact views of the court, especially those of concurring
justices in a collegiate court. We often encounter in judicial
decisions lapses, findings, loose statements and generalities
which do not bear on the issues or are apparently opposed to
the otherwise sound and considered result reached by the
court as expressed in the dispositive part, so called, of the
decision.7
Applying the foregoing argument to the Santiago case, it
immediately becomes apparent that the disposition in the
latter case categorically made permanent the December 18,
1996 Temporary Restraining Order issued against the
COMELEC in the Delfin petition but did NOT formally
incorporate therein any directive PERMANENTLY enjoining
the COMELEC "from entertaining or taking cognizance of
any petition for initiative on amendments." Undeniably, the
perpetual proscription against the COMELEC from
assuming jurisdiction over any other petition on Charter
Change through a People's Initiative is just a conclusion and
cannot bind the poll body, for such unending ban would
trench on its constitutional power to enforce and administer
all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall under Section 2,
Article IX of the Constitution. RA 6735 gave the COMELEC
the jurisdiction to determine the sufficiency of the petition on
the initiative under Section 8, Rule 11 and the form of the
petition under Section 3, Rule I; hence, it cannot be barred
from entertaining any such petition.
In sum, the COMELEC still retains its jurisdiction to take
cognizance of any petition on initiative under RA 6735 and it
can rule on the petition and its action can only be passed upon
by the Court when the same is elevated through a petition for
certiorari. COMELEC cannot be barred from acting on said
petitions since jurisdiction is conferred by law (RA 6735) and
said law has not been declared unconstitutional and hence
still valid though considered inadequate in the Santiago case.
Respondents, however, claim that the Court in the
subsequent case of PIRMA v. Commission on Elections8
confirmed the statement of the Court in the Santiago case
that the COMELEC was "permanently enjoined from
entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for
initiative on amendments." Much reliance is placed on the
ruling contained in a Minute Resolution which reads:
The Court ruled, first, by a unanimous vote, that no grave
abuse of Discretion could be attributed to the public
respondent COMELEC in Dismissing the petition filed by
PIRMA therein, it appearing that it only Complied with the
DISPOSITIONS in the Decision of this Court in G.R. No.
127325, promulgated on March 19, 1997, and its Resolution
of June 10, 1997.
Take note that the Court specifically referred to
"dispositions" in the March 19, 1997 Decision. To reiterate,
the dispositions in the Santiago case decision refer
specifically to the December 18, 1996 TRO being made
permanent against the COMELEC but do not pertain to a
permanent injunction against any other petition for initiative
on amendment. Thus, what was confirmed or even affirmed
in the Minute Resolution in the PIRMA case pertains solely
to the December 18, 1996 TRO which became permanent, the
declaration of the inadequacy of RA 6735, and the annulment
of certain parts of Resolution No. 2300 but certainly not the
alleged perpetual injunction against the initiative petition.
Thus, the resolution in the PIRMA case cannot be considered
res judicata to the Lambino petition.
Amendment or Revision
One last matter to be considered is whether the petition may
be allowed under RA 6735, since only amendments to the
Constitution may be the subject of a people's initiative.
The Lambino petition cannot be considered an act of revising
the Constitution; it is merely an attempt to amend it. The
term amendment has to be liberally construed so as to
effectuate the people's efforts to amend the Constitution.
As an eminent constitutionalist, Dean Vicente G. Sinco,9
explained:
Strictly speaking, the act of revising a constitution involves
alterations of different portions of the entire document. It
may result in the rewriting either of the whole constitution,
or the greater portion of it, or perhaps only some of its
important provisions. But whatever results the revision may
produce, the factor that characterizes it as an act of revision
is the original intention and plan authorized to be carried out.
That intention and plan must contemplate a consideration of
all the provisions of the constitution to determine which one
should be altered or suppressed or whether the whole
document should be replaced with an entirely new one.
The act of amending a constitution, on the other hand,
envisages a change of only a few specific provisions. The
intention of an act to amend is not to consider the advisability
of changing the entire constitution or of considering that
possibility. The intention rather is to improve specific parts
of the existing constitution or to add to it provisions deemed
essential on account of changed conditions or to suppress
portions of it that seem obsolete, or dangerous, or misleading
in their effect.
In this case, the Lambino petition is not concerned with
rewriting the entire Constitution. It was never its intention
to revise the whole Constitution. It merely concerns itself
with amending a few provisions in our fundamental charter.
When there are gray areas in legislation, especially in
matters that pertain to the sovereign people's political rights,
courts must lean more towards a more liberal interpretation
favoring the people's right to exercise their sovereign power.
118
Conclusion

Sovereignty residing in the people is the highest form of

sovereignty and thus deserves the highest respect even from
the courts. It is not something that can be overruled, set
aside, ignored or stomped over by whatever amount of
technicalities, blurred or vague provisions of the law.

As I find RA 6735 to be adequate as the implementing law for

the People's Initiative, I vote to grant the petition in G.R. No.
174153 and dismiss the petition in G.R. No. 174299. The
Amended Petition for Initiative filed by petitioners Raul L.
Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado should be remanded to the
COMELEC for determination whether or not the petition is
sufficient under RA 6735, and if the petition is sufficient, to
schedule and hold the necessary plebiscite as required by RA
6735.

It is time to let the people's voice be heard once again as it

was twenty years ago. And should this voice demand a
change in the Constitution, the Supreme Court should not be
one to stand in its way.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

119

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-34150October 16, 1971
ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and THE CHIEF
ACCOUNTANT, THE AUDITOR, and THE DISBURSING
OFFICER OF THE 1971 CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION, respondents, RAUL S. MANGLAPUS,
JESUS G. BARRERA, PABLO S. TRILLANA III, VICTOR
DE LA SERNA, MARCELO B. FERNAN, JOSE Y. FERIA,
LEONARDO SIGUION REYNA, VICTOR F. ORTEGA, and
JUAN V. BORRA, Intervenors.
Arturo M. Tolentino in his own behalf.
Ramon A. Gonzales for respondents Chief Accountant and
Auditor of the 1971 Constitutional Convention.
Emmanuel Pelaez, Jorge M. Juco and Tomas L. Echivarre for
respondent Disbursing Officer of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention.
Intervenors in their own behalf.
BARREDO, J.:
Petition for prohibition principally to restrain the respondent
Commission on Elections "from undertaking to hold a
plebiscite on November 8, 1971," at which the proposed
constitutional amendment "reducing the voting age" in
Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution of the Philippines to
eighteen years "shall be, submitted" for ratification by the
people pursuant to Organic Resolution No. 1 of the
Constitutional Convention of 1971, and the subsequent
implementing resolutions, by declaring said resolutions to be
without the force and effect of law in so far as they direct the
holding of such plebiscite and by also declaring the acts of the
respondent Commission (COMELEC) performed and to be
done by it in obedience to the aforesaid Convention
resolutions to be null and void, for being violative of the
Constitution of the Philippines.
As a preliminary step, since the petition named as
respondent only the COMELEC, the Count required that
copies thereof be served on the Solicitor General and the
Constitutional Convention, through its President, for such
action as they may deem proper to take. In due time,
respondent COMELEC filed its answer joining issues with
petitioner. To further put things in proper order, and
considering that the fiscal officers of the Convention are
indispensable parties in a proceeding of this nature, since the
acts sought to be enjoined involve the expenditure of funds
appropriated by law for the Convention, the Court also
ordered that the Disbursing Officer, Chief Accountant and
Auditor of the Convention be made respondents. After the
petition was so amended, the first appeared thru Senator
Emmanuel Pelaez and the last two thru Delegate Ramon
Gonzales. All said respondents, thru counsel, resist
petitioner's action.
For reasons of orderliness and to avoid unnecessary
duplication of arguments and even possible confusion, and
considering that with the principal parties being duly
represented by able counsel, their interests would be
adequately protected already, the Court had to limit the
number of intervenors from the ranks of the delegates to the
Convention who, more or less, have legal interest in the
success of the respondents, and so, only Delegates Raul S.
Manglapus, Jesus G. Barrera, Pablo S. Trillana III, Victor de
la Serna, Marcelo B. Fernan, Jose Y. Feria, Leonardo Siguion
Reyna, Victor Ortega and Juan B. Borra, all distinguished
lawyers in their own right, have been allowed to intervene
jointly. The Court feels that with such an array of brilliant
and dedicated counsel, all interests involved should be duly
and amply represented and protected. At any rate,
notwithstanding that their corresponding motions for leave
to intervene or to appear as amicus curiae 1 have been
denied, the pleadings filed by the other delegates and some
private parties, the latter in representation of their minor
children allegedly to be affected by the result of this case with
the records and the Court acknowledges that they have not
been without value as materials in the extensive study that
has been undertaken in this case.
The background facts are beyond dispute. The Constitutional
Convention of 1971 came into being by virtue of two
resolutions of the Congress of the Philippines approved in its
capacity as a constituent assembly convened for the purpose
of calling a convention to propose amendments to the
Constitution namely, Resolutions 2 and 4 of the joint sessions
of Congress held on March 16, 1967 and June 17, 1969
respectively. The delegates to the said Convention were all
elected under and by virtue of said resolutions and the
implementing legislation thereof, Republic Act 6132. The
pertinent portions of Resolution No 2 read as follows:
SECTION 1. There is hereby called a convention to propose
amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines, to be
composed of two elective Delegates from each representative
district who shall have the same qualifications as those
required of Members of the House of Representatives.
xxx xxx xxx
SECTION 7. The amendments proposed by the Convention
shall be valid and considered part of the Constitution when
approved by a majority of the votes cast in an election at
which they are submitted to the people for their ratification
pursuant to Article XV of the Constitution.
Resolution No. 4 merely modified the number of delegates to
represent the different cities and provinces fixed originally in
Resolution No 2.
After the election of the delegates held on November 10, 1970,
the Convention held its inaugural session on June 1, 1971.
Its preliminary labors of election of officers, organization of
committees and other preparatory works over, as its first
formal proposal to amend the Constitution, its session which
began on September 27, 1971, or more accurately, at about
3:30 in the morning of September 28, 1971, the Convention
approved Organic Resolution No. 1 reading thus: .
CC ORGANIC RESOLUTION NO. 1
A RESOLUTION AMENDING SECTION ONE OF
ARTICLE V OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
PHILIPPINES SO AS TO LOWER THE VOTING AGE TO
18
120
BE IT RESOLVED as it is hereby resolved by the 1971
Constitutional Convention:
Section 1. Section One of Article V of the Constitution of the
Philippines is amended to as follows:
Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by (male) citizens of the
Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are
(twenty-one) EIGHTEEN years or over and are able to read
and write, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for
one year and in the municipality wherein they propose to vote
for at least six months preceding the election.
Section 2. This amendment shall be valid as part of the
Constitution of the Philippines when approved by a majority
of the votes cast in a plebiscite to coincide with the local
elections in November 1971.
Section 3. This partial amendment, which refers only to the
age qualification for the exercise of suffrage shall be without
prejudice to other amendments that will be proposed in the
future by the 1971 Constitutional Convention on other
portions of the amended Section or on other portions of the
entire Constitution.
Section 4. The Convention hereby authorizes the use of the
sum of P75,000.00 from its savings or from its unexpended
funds for the expense of the advanced plebiscite; provided,
however that should there be no savings or unexpended
sums, the Delegates waive P250.00 each or the equivalent of
2-1/2 days per diem.
By a letter dated September 28, 1971, President Diosdado
Macapagal, called upon respondent Comelec "to help the
Convention implement (the above) resolution." The said
letter reads:
September 28, 1971
The Commission on Elections Manila
Thru the Chairman
Gentlemen:
Last night the Constitutional Convention passed Resolution
No. 1 quoted as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
(see above)
Pursuant to the provision of Section 14, Republic Act No.
6132 otherwise known as the Constitutional Convention Act
of 1971, may we call upon you to help the Convention
implement this resolution:
Sincerely,
(Sgd.) DIOSDADO P. MACAPAGAL
DIOSDADO P. MACAPAGAL
President
On September 30, 1971, COMELEC "RESOLVED to inform
the Constitutional Convention that it will hold the plebiscite
on condition that:
(a) The Constitutional Convention will undertake the
printing of separate official ballots, election returns and tally
sheets for the use of said plebiscite at its expense;
(b) The Constitutional Convention will adopt its own
security measures for the printing and shipment of said
ballots and election forms; and
(c) Said official ballots and election forms will be
delivered to the Commission in time so that they could be
distributed at the same time that the Commission will
distribute its official and sample ballots to be used in the
elections on November 8, 1971.
What happened afterwards may best be stated by quoting
from intervenors' Governors' statement of the genesis of the
above proposal:
The President of the Convention also issued an order forming
an Ad Hoc Committee to implement the Resolution.
This Committee issued implementing guidelines which were
approved by the President who then transmitted them to the
Commission on Elections.
The Committee on Plebiscite and Ratification filed a report
on the progress of the implementation of the plebiscite in the
afternoon of October 7,1971, enclosing copies of the order,
resolution and letters of transmittal above referred to (Copy
of the report is hereto attached as Annex 8-Memorandum).
RECESS RESOLUTION
In its plenary session in the evening of October 7, 1971, the
Convention approved a resolution authored by Delegate
Antonio Olmedo of Davao Oriental, calling for a recess of the
Convention from November 1, 1971 to November 9, 1971 to
permit the delegates to campaign for the ratification of
Organic Resolution No. 1. (Copies of the resolution and the
transcript of debate thereon are hereto attached as Annexes
9 and 9-A Memorandum, respectively).
RESOLUTION CONFIRMING IMPLEMENTATION
On October 12, 1971, the Convention passed Resolution No.
24 submitted by Delegate Jose Ozamiz confirming the
authority of the President of the Convention to implement
Organic Resolution No. 1, including the creation of the Ad
Hoc Committee ratifying all acts performed in connection
with said implementation.
Upon these facts, the main thrust of the petition is that
Organic Resolution No. 1 and the other implementing
resolutions thereof subsequently approved by the Convention
have no force and effect as laws in so far as they provide for
the holding of a plebiscite co-incident with the elections of
eight senators and all city, provincial and municipal officials
to be held on November 8, 1971, hence all of Comelec's acts
in obedience thereof and tending to carry out the holding of
the plebiscite directed by said resolutions are null and void,
on the ground that the calling and holding of such a plebiscite
is, by the Constitution, a power lodged exclusively in
Congress, as a legislative body, and may not be exercised by
the Convention, and that, under Section 1, Article XV of the
Constitution, the proposed amendment in question cannot be
presented to the people for ratification separately from each
and all of the other amendments to be drafted and proposed
by the Convention. On the other hand, respondents and
intervenors posit that the power to provide for, fix the date
and lay down the details of the plebiscite for the ratification
of any amendment the Convention may deem proper to
propose is within the authority of the Convention as a
necessary consequence and part of its power to propose
amendments and that this power includes that of submitting
such amendments either individually or jointly at such time
and manner as the Convention may direct in discretion. The
Court's delicate task now is to decide which of these two poses
is really in accord with the letter and spirit of the
Constitution.
As a preliminary and prejudicial matter, the intervenors
raise the question of jurisdiction. They contend that the issue
before Us is a political question and that the Convention
being legislative body of the highest order is sovereign, and
as such, its acts impugned by petitioner are beyond the
control of the Congress and the courts. In this connection, it
is to be noted that none of the respondent has joined
121
intervenors in this posture. In fact, respondents Chief
Accountant and Auditor of the convention expressly concede
the jurisdiction of this Court in their answer acknowledging
that the issue herein is a justifiable one.
Strangely, intervenors cite in support of this contention
portions of the decision of this Court in the case of Gonzales
v. Comelec, 21 SCRA 774, wherein the members of the Court,
despite their being divided in their opinions as to the other
matters therein involved, were precisely unanimous in
upholding its jurisdiction. Obviously, distinguished counsel
have either failed to grasp the full impact of the portions of
Our decision they have quoted or would misapply them by
taking them out of context.
There should be no more doubt as to the position of this Court
regarding its jurisdiction vis-a-vis the constitutionality of the
acts of the Congress, acting as a constituent assembly, and,
for that matter, those of a constitutional convention called for
the purpose of proposing amendments to the Constitution,
which concededly is at par with the former. A simple reading
of Our ruling in that very case of Gonzales relied upon by
intervenors should dispel any lingering misgivings as regards
that point. Succinctly but comprehensively, Chief Justice
Concepcion held for the Court thus: .
As early as Angara vs. Electoral Commission (63 Phil. 139,
157), this Court — speaking through one of the leading
members of the Constitutional Convention and a respected
professor of Constitutional Law, Dr. Jose P. Laurel —
declared that "the judicial department is the only
constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine
the proper allocation of powers between the several
departments and among the integral or constituent units
thereof."
It is true that in Mabanag v. Lopez Vito (supra), this Court
characterizing the issue submitted thereto as a political one
declined to pass upon the question whether or not a given
number of votes cast in Congress in favor of a proposed
amendment to the Constitution — which was being
submitted to the people for ratification — satisfied the three-
fourths vote requirement of the fundamental law. The force
of this precedent has been weakened, however, by Suanes v.
Chief Accountant of the Senate (81 Phil. 818), Avelino v.
Cuenco, (L-2851, March 4 & 14, 1949), Tañada v. Cuenco, (L-
10520, Feb. 28, 1957) and Macias v. Commission on
Elections, (L-18684, Sept. 14, 1961). In the first we held that
the officers and employees of the Senate Electoral Tribunal
are under its supervision and control, not of that of the
Senate President, as claimed by the latter; in the second, this
Court proceeded to determine the number of Senators
necessary for quorum in the Senate; in the third, we nullified
the election, by Senators belonging to the party having the
largest number of votes in said chamber, purporting to act,
on behalf of the party having the second largest number of
votes therein of two (2) Senators belonging to the first party,
as members, for the second party, of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal; and in the fourth, we declared unconstitutional an
act of Congress purporting to apportion the representatives
districts for the House of Representatives, upon the ground
that the apportionment had not been made as may be
possible according to the number of inhabitants of each
province. Thus we rejected the theory, advanced in these four
(4) cases that the issues therein raised were political
questions the determination of which is beyond judicial
review.
Indeed, the power to amend the Constitution or to propose
amendments thereto is not included in the general grant of
legislative powers to Congress (Section 1, Art. VI,
Constitution of the Philippines). It is part of the inherent
powers of the people — as the repository sovereignty in a
republican state, such as ours (Section 1, Art. 11,
Constitution of the Philippines) — to make, and, hence, to
amend their own Fundamental Law. Congress may propose
amendments to the Constitution merely because the same
explicitly grants such power. (Section 1, Art. XV,
Constitution of the Philippines) Hence, when exercising the
same, it is said that Senators and members of the House of
Representatives act, not as members of Congress, but as
component elements of a constituent assembly. When acting
as such, the members of Congress derive their authority from
the Constitution, unlike the people, when performing the
same function, (Of amending the Constitution) for their
authority does not emanate from the Constitution — they are
the very source of all powers of government including the
Constitution itself.
Since, when proposing, as a constituent assembly,
amendments to the Constitution, the members of Congress
derive their authority from the Fundamental Law, it follows,
necessarily, that they do not have the final say on whether or
not their acts are within or beyond constitutional limits.
Otherwise, they could brush aside and set the same at
naught, contrary to the basic tenet that ours is a government
of laws, not of men, and to the rigid nature of our
Constitution. Such rigidity is stressed by the fact that the
Constitution expressly confers upon the Supreme Court,
(And, inferentially, to lower courts.) the power to declare a
treaty unconstitutional. (Sec. 2(1), Art. VIII of the
Constitution), despite the eminently political character of
treaty-making power.
In short, the issue whether or not a Resolution of Congress —
acting as a constituent assembly — violates the Constitution
is essentially justiciable not political, and, hence, subject to
judicial review, and, to the extent that this view may be
inconsistent with the stand taken in Mabanag v. Lopez Vito,
(supra) the latter should be deemed modified accordingly.
The Members of the Court are unanimous on this point.
No one can rightly claim that within the domain of its
legitimate authority, the Convention is not supreme.
Nowhere in his petition and in his oral argument and
memoranda does petitioner point otherwise. Actually, what
respondents and intervenors are seemingly reluctant to
admit is that the Constitutional Convention of 1971, as any
other convention of the same nature, owes its existence and
derives all its authority and power from the existing
Constitution of the Philippines. This Convention has not
been called by the people directly as in the case of a
revolutionary convention which drafts the first Constitution
of an entirely new government born of either a war of
liberation from a mother country or of a revolution against
an existing government or of a bloodless seizure of power a la
coup d'etat. As to such kind of conventions, it is absolutely
true that the convention is completely without restrain and
omnipotent all wise, and it is as to such conventions that the
remarks of Delegate Manuel Roxas of the Constitutional
Convention of 1934 quoted by Senator Pelaez refer. No
amount of rationalization can belie the fact that the current
convention came into being only because it was called by a
resolution of a joint session of Congress acting as a
constituent assembly by authority of Section 1, Article XV of
the present Constitution which provides:
ARTICLE XV — AMENDMENTS
SECTION 1. The Congress in joint session assembled, by a
vote of three-fourths of all the Members of the Senate and of
the House of Representatives voting separately, may propose
amendments to this Constitution or call a convention for the
purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as part of this
Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast
at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the
people for their ratification.
True it is that once convened, this Convention became
endowed with extra ordinary powers generally beyond the
control of any department of the existing government, but the
compass of such powers can be co-extensive only with the
purpose for which the convention was called and as it may
propose cannot have any effect as part of the Constitution
122
until the same are duly ratified by the people, it necessarily
follows that the acts of convention, its officers and members
are not immune from attack on constitutional grounds. The
present Constitution is in full force and effect in its entirety
and in everyone of its parts the existence of the Convention
notwithstanding, and operates even within the walls of that
assembly. While it is indubitable that in its internal
operation and the performance of its task to propose
amendments to the Constitution it is not subject to any
degree of restraint or control by any other authority than
itself, it is equally beyond cavil that neither the Convention
nor any of its officers or members can rightfully deprive any
person of life, liberty or property without due process of law,
deny to anyone in this country the equal protection of the
laws or the freedom of speech and of the press in disregard of
the Bill of Rights of the existing Constitution. Nor, for that
matter, can such Convention validly pass any resolution
providing for the taking of private property without just
compensation or for the imposition or exacting of any tax,
impost or assessment, or declare war or call the Congress to
a special session, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, pardon a convict or render judgment in a controversy
between private individuals or between such individuals and
the state, in violation of the distribution of powers in the
Constitution.
It being manifest that there are powers which the Convention
may not and cannot validly assert, much less exercise, in the
light of the existing Constitution, the simple question arises,
should an act of the Convention be assailed by a citizen as
being among those not granted to or inherent in it, according
to the existing Constitution, who can decide whether such a
contention is correct or not? It is of the very essence of the
rule of law that somehow somewhere the Power and duty to
resolve such a grave constitutional question must be lodged
on some authority, or we would have to confess that the
integrated system of government established by our founding
fathers contains a wide vacuum no intelligent man could
ignore, which is naturally unworthy of their learning,
experience and craftsmanship in constitution-making.
We need not go far in search for the answer to the query We
have posed. The very decision of Chief Justice Concepcion in
Gonzales, so much invoked by intervenors, reiterates and
reinforces the irrefutable logic and wealth of principle in the
opinion written for a unanimous Court by Justice Laurel in
Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil., 134, reading:
... (I)n the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft
strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive,
the legislative and the judicial departments of the
government. The overlapping and interlacing of functions
and duties between the several departments, however,
sometimes makes it hard to say where the one leaves off and
the other begins. In times of social disquietude or political
excitement, the great landmark of the Constitution are apt to
be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of
conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional
organ which can be called upon to determine the proper
allocation of powers between the several departments and
among the integral or constituent units thereof.
As any human production our Constitution is of course
lacking perfection and perfectibility, but as much as it was
within the power of our people, acting through their delegates
to so provide, that instrument which is the expression of their
sovereignty however limited, has established a republican
government intended to operate and function as a
harmonious whole, under a system of check and balances and
subject to specific limitations and restrictions provided in the
said instrument. The Constitution sets forth in no uncertain
language the restrictions and limitations upon governmental
powers and agencies. If these restrictions and limitations are
transcended it would be inconceivable if the Constitution had
not provided for a mechanism by which to direct the course of
government along constitutional channels, for then the
distribution of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of
rights mere expressions of sentiment and the principles of
good government mere political apothegms. Certainly the
limitations and restrictions embodied in our Constitution are
real as they should be in any living Constitution. In the
United States where no express constitutional grant is found
in their constitution, the possession of this moderating power
of the courts, not to speak of its historical origin and
development there, has been set at rest by popular
acquiescence for a period of more than one and half centuries.
In our case, this moderating power is granted, if not
expressly, by clear implication from section 2 of Article VIII
of our Constitution.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers or government.
Who is to determine the nature, scope and extent of such
powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the
instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And
when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional
boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other
departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act
of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred
obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine
conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to
establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights
which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This
is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial
supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review
under the Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial
review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be
exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties,
and limited further to the constitutional question raised or
the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could
only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to
strike conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its
functions is in this manner the judiciary does not pass upon
questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation.
More than that, courts accord the presumption of
constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because
the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but
also because the judiciary in the determination of actual
cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice
of the people as expressed through their representatives in
the executive and legislative departments of the government.
But much as we might postulate on the internal checks of
power provided in our Constitution, it ought not the less to
be remembered that, in the language of James Madison, the
system itself is not "the chief palladium of constitutional
liberty ... the people who are authors of this blessing must
also be its guardians ... their eyes must be ever ready to mark,
their voices to pronounce ... aggression on the authority of
their Constitution." In the last and ultimate analysis then,
must the success of our government in the unfolding years to
come be tested in the crucible of Filipino minds and hearts
than in consultation rooms and court chambers.
In the case at bar, the National Assembly has by resolution
(No. 8) of December 3, 1935, confirmed the election of the
herein petitioner to the said body. On the other hand, the
Electoral Commission has by resolution adopted on
December 9, 1935, fixed said date as the last day for the filing
of protests against the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly; notwithstanding the
previous confirmations made by the National Assembly as
aforesaid. If, as contended by the petitioner, the resolution of
the National Assembly has the effect of cutting off the power
of the Electoral Commission to entertain protests against the
election, returns and qualifications of members of the
National Assembly, submitted after December 3, 1935 then
the resolution of the Electoral Commission of December 9,
1935, is mere surplusage and had no effect. But, if, as
contended by the respondents, the Electoral Commission has
the sole power of regulating its proceedings to the exclusion
of the National Assembly, then the resolution of December 9,
1935, by which the Electoral Commission fixed said date as
the last day for filing protests against the election, returns
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and qualifications of members of the National Assembly,
should be upheld.
Here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it
does a conflict of a grave constitutional nature between the
National Assembly on the one hand and the Electoral
Commission on the other. From the very nature of the
republican government established in our country in the light
of American experience and of our own, upon the judicial
department is thrown the solemn and inescapable obligation
of interpreting the Constitution and defining constitutional
boundaries. The Electoral Commission as we shall have
occasion to refer hereafter, is a constitutional organ, created
for a specific purpose, namely, to determine all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly. Although the Electoral
Commission may not be interfered with, when and while
acting within the limits of its authority, it does not follow that
it is beyond the reach of the constitutional mechanism
adopted by the people and that it is not subject to
constitutional restriction. The Electoral Commission is not a
separate department of the government, and even if it were,
conflicting claims of authority under the fundamental law
between departmental powers and agencies of the
government are necessarily determined by the judiciary in
justiciable and appropriate cases. Discarding the English
type and other European types of constitutional government,
the framers of our Constitution adopted the American type
where the written constitution is interpreted and given effect
by the judicial department. In some countries which have
declined to follow the American example, provisions have
been inserted in their constitutions prohibiting the courts
from exercising the power to interpret the fundamental law.
This is taken as a recognition of what otherwise would be the
rule that in the absence of direct prohibition, courts are
bound to assume what is logically their function. For
instance, the Constitution of Poland of 1921 expressly
provides that courts shall have no power to examine the
validity of statutes (art. 81, Chap. IV). The former Austrian
Constitution contained a similar declaration. In countries
whose constitution are silent in this respect, courts have
assumed this power. This is true in Norway, Greece,
Australia and South Africa. Whereas, in Czechoslovakia
(arts. 2 and 3, Preliminary Law to Constitutional Charter of
the Czechoslavak, Republic, February 29, 1920) and Spain
(arts. 121-123, Title IX, Constitution of the Republic of 1931)
especial constitutional courts are established to pass upon
the validity of ordinary laws. In our case, the nature of the
present controversy shows the necessity of a final
constitutional arbiter to determine the conflict of authority
between two agencies created by the Constitution. Were we
to decline to take cognizance of the controversy, who will
determine the conflict? And if the conflict were left undecided
and undetermined, would not a void be thus created in our
constitutional system which may in the long run prove
destructive of the entire framework? To ask these questions
is to answer them. Natura vacuum abhorret, so must we
avoid exhaustion in our constitutional system. Upon
principle, reason, and authority, we are clearly of the opinion
that upon the admitted facts of the present case, this court
has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the
subject matter of the present controversy for the purpose of
determining the character, scope and extent of the
constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly." .
As the Chief Justice has made it clear in Gonzales, like
Justice Laurel did in Angara, these postulates just quoted do
not apply only to conflicts of authority between the three
existing regular departments of the government but to all
such conflicts between and among these departments, or,
between any of them, on the one hand, and any other
constitutionally created independent body, like the electoral
tribunals in Congress, the Comelec and the Constituent
assemblies constituted by the House of Congress, on the
other. We see no reason of logic or principle whatsoever, and
none has been convincingly shown to Us by any of the
respondents and intervenors, why the same ruling should not
apply to the present Convention, even if it is an assembly of
delegate elected directly by the people, since at best, as
already demonstrated, it has been convened by authority of
and under the terms of the present Constitution..
Accordingly, We are left with no alternative but to uphold the
jurisdiction of the Court over the present case. It goes without
saying that We do this not because the Court is superior to
the Convention or that the Convention is subject to the
control of the Court, but simply because both the Convention
and the Court are subject to the Constitution and the rule of
law, and "upon principle, reason and authority," per Justice
Laurel, supra, it is within the power as it is the solemn duty
of the Court, under the existing Constitution to resolve the
issues in which petitioner, respondents and intervenors have
joined in this case.
II
The issue of jurisdiction thus resolved, We come to the crux
of the petition. Is it within the powers of the Constitutional
Convention of 1971 to order, on its own fiat, the holding of a
plebiscite for the ratification of the proposed amendment
reducing to eighteen years the age for the exercise of suffrage
under Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution proposed in
the Convention's Organic Resolution No. 1 in the manner and
form provided for in said resolution and the subsequent
implementing acts and resolution of the Convention?
At the threshold, the environmental circumstances of this
case demand the most accurate and unequivocal statement of
the real issue which the Court is called upon to resolve.
Petitioner has very clearly stated that he is not against the
constitutional extension of the right of suffrage to the
eighteen-year-olds, as a matter of fact, he has advocated or
sponsored in Congress such a proposal, and that, in truth, the
herein petition is not intended by him to prevent that the
proposed amendment here involved be submitted to the
people for ratification, his only purpose in filing the petition
being to comply with his sworn duty to prevent, Whenever he
can, any violation of the Constitution of the Philippines even
if it is committed in the course of or in connection with the
most laudable undertaking. Indeed, as the Court sees it, the
specific question raised in this case is limited solely and only
to the point of whether or not it is within the power of the
Convention to call for a plebiscite for the ratification by the
people of the constitutional amendment proposed in the
abovequoted Organic Resolution No. 1, in the manner and
form provided in said resolution as well as in the subject
question implementing actions and resolution of the
Convention and its officers, at this juncture of its
proceedings, when as it is a matter of common knowledge and
judicial notice, it is not set to adjourn sine die, and is, in fact,
still in the preliminary stages of considering other reforms or
amendments affecting other parts of the existing
Constitution; and, indeed, Organic Resolution No. 1 itself
expressly provides, that the amendment therein proposed
"shall be without prejudice to other amendments that will be
proposed in the future by the 1971 Constitutional Convention
on other portions of the amended section or on other portions
of the entire Constitution." In other words, nothing that the
Court may say or do, in this case should be understood as
reflecting, in any degree or means the individual or collective
stand of the members of the Court on the fundamental issue
of whether or not the eighteen-year-olds should be allowed to
vote, simply because that issue is not before Us now. There
should be no doubt in the mind of anyone that, once the Court
finds it constitutionally permissible, it will not hesitate to do
its part so that the said proposed amendment may be
presented to the people for their approval or rejection.
Withal, the Court rests securely in the conviction that the fire
and enthusiasm of the youth have not blinded them to the
absolute necessity, under the fundamental principles of
democracy to which the Filipino people is committed, of
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adhering always to the rule of law. Surely, their idealism,
sincerity and purity of purpose cannot permit any other line
of conduct or approach in respect of the problem before Us.
The Constitutional Convention of 1971 itself was born, in a
great measure, because of the pressure brought to bear upon
the Congress of the Philippines by various elements of the
people, the youth in particular, in their incessant search for
a peaceful and orderly means of bringing about meaningful
changes in the structure and bases of the existing social and
governmental institutions, including the provisions of the
fundamental law related to the well-being and economic
security of the underprivileged classes of our people as well
as those concerning the preservation and protection of our
natural resources and the national patrimony, as an
alternative to violent and chaotic ways of achieving such lofty
ideals. In brief, leaving aside the excesses of enthusiasm
which at times have justifiably or unjustifiably marred the
demonstrations in the streets, plazas and campuses, the
youth of the Philippines, in general, like the rest of the
people, do not want confusion and disorder, anarchy and
violence; what they really want are law and order, peace and
orderliness, even in the pursuit of what they strongly and
urgently feel must be done to change the present order of
things in this Republic of ours. It would be tragic and
contrary to the plain compulsion of these perspectives, if the
Court were to allow itself in deciding this case to be carried
astray by considerations other than the imperatives of the
rule of law and of the applicable provisions of the
Constitution. Needless to say, in a larger measure than when
it binds other departments of the government or any other
official or entity, the Constitution imposes upon the Court the
sacred duty to give meaning and vigor to the Constitution, by
interpreting and construing its provisions in appropriate
cases with the proper parties, and by striking down any act
violative thereof. Here, as in all other cases, We are resolved
to discharge that duty.
During these twice when most anyone feels very strongly the
urgent need for constitutional reforms, to the point of being
convinced that meaningful change is the only alternative to
a violent revolution, this Court would be the last to put any
obstruction or impediment to the work of the Constitutional
Convention. If there are respectable sectors opining that it
has not been called to supplant the existing Constitution in
its entirety, since its enabling provision, Article XV, from
which the Convention itself draws life expressly speaks only
of amendments which shall form part of it, which opinion is
not without persuasive force both in principle and in logic,
the seemingly prevailing view is that only the collective
judgment of its members as to what is warranted by the
present condition of things, as they see it, can limit the extent
of the constitutional innovations the Convention may
propose, hence the complete substitution of the existing
constitution is not beyond the ambit of the Convention's
authority. Desirable as it may be to resolve, this grave
divergence of views, the Court does not consider this case to
be properly the one in which it should discharge its
constitutional duty in such premises. The issues raised by
petitioner, even those among them in which respondents and
intervenors have joined in an apparent wish to have them
squarely passed upon by the Court do not necessarily impose
upon Us the imperative obligation to express Our views
thereon. The Court considers it to be of the utmost
importance that the Convention should be untrammelled and
unrestrained in the performance of its constitutionally as
signed mission in the manner and form it may conceive best,
and so the Court may step in to clear up doubts as to the
boundaries set down by the Constitution only when and to
the specific extent only that it would be necessary to do so to
avoid a constitutional crisis or a clearly demonstrable
violation of the existing Charter. Withal, it is a very familiar
principle of constitutional law that constitutional questions
are to be resolved by the Supreme Court only when there is
no alternative but to do it, and this rule is founded precisely
on the principle of respect that the Court must accord to the
acts of the other coordinate departments of the government,
and certainly, the Constitutional Convention stands almost
in a unique footing in that regard.
In our discussion of the issue of jurisdiction, We have already
made it clear that the Convention came into being by a call
of a joint session of Congress pursuant to Section I of Article
XV of the Constitution, already quoted earlier in this opinion.
We reiterate also that as to matters not related to its internal
operation and the performance of its assigned mission to
propose amendments to the Constitution, the Convention
and its officers and members are all subject to all the
provisions of the existing Constitution. Now We hold that
even as to its latter task of proposing amendments to the
Constitution, it is subject to the provisions of Section I of
Article XV. This must be so, because it is plain to Us that the
framers of the Constitution took care that the process of
amending the same should not be undertaken with the same
ease and facility in changing an ordinary legislation.
Constitution making is the most valued power, second to
none, of the people in a constitutional democracy such as the
one our founding fathers have chosen for this nation, and
which we of the succeeding generations generally cherish.
And because the Constitution affects the lives, fortunes,
future and every other conceivable aspect of the lives of all
the people within the country and those subject to its
sovereignty, every degree of care is taken in preparing and
drafting it. A constitution worthy of the people for which it is
intended must not be prepared in haste without adequate
deliberation and study. It is obvious that correspondingly,
any amendment of the Constitution is of no less importance
than the whole Constitution itself, and perforce must be
conceived and prepared with as much care and deliberation.
From the very nature of things, the drafters of an original
constitution, as already observed earlier, operate without any
limitations, restraints or inhibitions save those that they
may impose upon themselves. This is not necessarily true of
subsequent conventions called to amend the original
constitution. Generally, the framers of the latter see to it that
their handiwork is not lightly treated and as easily mutilated
or changed, not only for reasons purely personal but more
importantly, because written constitutions are supposed to
be designed so as to last for some time, if not for ages, or for,
at least, as long as they can be adopted to the needs and
exigencies of the people, hence, they must be insulated
against precipitate and hasty actions motivated by more or
less passing political moods or fancies. Thus, as a rule, the
original constitutions carry with them limitations and
conditions, more or less stringent, made so by the people
themselves, in regard to the process of their amendment. And
when such limitations or conditions are so incorporated in the
original constitution, it does not lie in the delegates of any
subsequent convention to claim that they may ignore and
disregard such conditions because they are as powerful and
omnipotent as their original counterparts.
Nothing of what is here said is to be understood as curtailing
in any degree the number and nature and the scope and
extent of the amendments the Convention may deem proper
to propose. Nor does the Court propose to pass on the issue
extensively and brilliantly discussed by the parties as to
whether or not the power or duty to call a plebiscite for the
ratification of the amendments to be proposed by the
Convention is exclusively legislative and as such may be
exercised only by the Congress or whether the said power can
be exercised concurrently by the Convention with the
Congress. In the view the Court takes of present case, it does
not perceive absolute necessity to resolve that question, grave
and important as it may be. Truth to tell, the lack of
unanimity or even of a consensus among the members of the
Court in respect to this issue creates the need for more study
and deliberation, and as time is of the essence in this case,
for obvious reasons, November 8, 1971, the date set by the
Convention for the plebiscite it is calling, being nigh, We will
refrain from making any pronouncement or expressing Our
views on this question until a more appropriate case comes to
Us. After all, the basis of this decision is as important and
decisive as any can be.
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The ultimate question, therefore boils down to this: Is there
any limitation or condition in Section 1 of Article XV of the
Constitution which is violated by the act of the Convention of
calling for a plebiscite on the sole amendment contained in
Organic Resolution No. 1? The Court holds that there is, and
it is the condition and limitation that all the amendments to
be proposed by the same Convention must be submitted to
the people in a single "election" or plebiscite. It being
indisputable that the amendment now proposed to be
submitted to a plebiscite is only the first amendment the
Convention propose We hold that the plebiscite being called
for the purpose of submitting the same for ratification of the
people on November 8, 1971 is not authorized by Section 1 of
Article XV of the Constitution, hence all acts of the
Convention and the respondent Comelec in that direction are
null and void.
We have arrived at this conclusion for the following reasons:
1. The language of the constitutional provision
aforequoted is sufficiently clear. lt says distinctly that either
Congress sitting as a constituent assembly or a convention
called for the purpose "may propose amendments to this
Constitution," thus placing no limit as to the number of
amendments that Congress or the Convention may propose.
The same provision also as definitely provides that "such
amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when
approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at
which the amendments are submitted to the people for their
ratification," thus leaving no room for doubt as to how many
"elections" or plebiscites may be held to ratify any
amendment or amendments proposed by the same
constituent assembly of Congress or convention, and the
provision unequivocably says "an election" which means only
one.
(2) Very little reflection is needed for anyone to realize
the wisdom and appropriateness of this provision. As already
stated, amending the Constitution is as serious and
important an undertaking as constitution making itself.
Indeed, any amendment of the Constitution is as important
as the whole of it if only because the Constitution has to be
an integrated and harmonious instrument, if it is to be viable
as the framework of the government it establishes, on the one
hand, and adequately formidable and reliable as the succinct
but comprehensive articulation of the rights, liberties,
ideology, social ideals, and national and nationalistic policies
and aspirations of the people, on the other. lt is inconceivable
how a constitution worthy of any country or people can have
any part which is out of tune with its other parts..
A constitution is the work of the people thru its drafters
assembled by them for the purpose. Once the original
constitution is approved, the part that the people play in its
amendment becomes harder, for when a whole constitution is
submitted to them, more or less they can assumed its
harmony as an integrated whole, and they can either accept
or reject it in its entirety. At the very least, they can examine
it before casting their vote and determine for themselves from
a study of the whole document the merits and demerits of all
or any of its parts and of the document as a whole. And so
also, when an amendment is submitted to them that is to
form part of the existing constitution, in like fashion they can
study with deliberation the proposed amendment in relation
to the whole existing constitution and or any of its parts and
thereby arrive at an intelligent judgment as to its
acceptability.
This cannot happen in the case of the amendment in
question. Prescinding already from the fact that under
Section 3 of the questioned resolution, it is evident that no
fixed frame of reference is provided the voter, as to what
finally will be concomitant qualifications that will be
required by the final draft of the constitution to be formulated
by the Convention of a voter to be able to enjoy the right of
suffrage, there are other considerations which make it
impossible to vote intelligently on the proposed amendment,
although it may already be observed that under Section 3, if
a voter would favor the reduction of the voting age to eighteen
under conditions he feels are needed under the
circumstances, and he does not see those conditions in the
ballot nor is there any possible indication whether they will
ever be or not, because Congress has reserved those for future
action, what kind of judgment can he render on the proposal?
But the situation actually before Us is even worse. No one
knows what changes in the fundamental principles of the
constitution the Convention will be minded to approve. To be
more specific, we do not have any means of foreseeing
whether the right to vote would be of any significant value at
all. Who can say whether or not later on the Convention may
decide to provide for varying types of voters for each level of
the political units it may divide the country into. The root of
the difficulty in other words, lies in that the Convention is
precisely on the verge of introducing substantial changes, if
not radical ones, in almost every part and aspect of the
existing social and political order enshrined in the present
Constitution. How can a voter in the proposed plebiscite
intelligently determine the effect of the reduction of the
voting age upon the different institutions which the
Convention may establish and of which presently he is not
given any idea?
We are certain no one can deny that in order that a plebiscite
for the ratification of an amendment to the Constitution may
be validly held, it must provide the voter not only sufficient
time but ample basis for an intelligent appraisal of the nature
of the amendment per se as well as its relation to the other
parts of the Constitution with which it has to form a
harmonious whole. In the context of the present state of
things, where the Convention has hardly started considering
the merits of hundreds, if not thousands, of proposals to
amend the existing Constitution, to present to the people any
single proposal or a few of them cannot comply with this
requirement. We are of the opinion that the present
Constitution does not contemplate in Section 1 of Article XV
a plebiscite or "election" wherein the people are in the dark
as to frame of reference they can base their judgment on. We
reject the rationalization that the present Constitution is a
possible frame of reference, for the simple reason that
intervenors themselves are stating that the sole purpose of
the proposed amendment is to enable the eighteen year olds
to take part in the election for the ratification of the
Constitution to be drafted by the Convention. In brief, under
the proposed plebiscite, there can be, in the language of
Justice Sanchez, speaking for the six members of the Court
in Gonzales, supra, "no proper submission".
III
The Court has no desire at all to hamper and hamstring the
noble work of the Constitutional Convention. Much less does
the Court want to pass judgment on the merits of the
proposal to allow these eighteen years old to vote. But like
the Convention, the Court has its own duties to the people
under the Constitution which is to decide in appropriate
cases with appropriate parties Whether or not the mandates
of the fundamental law are being complied with. In the best
light God has given Us, we are of the conviction that in
providing for the questioned plebiscite before it has finished,
and separately from, the whole draft of the constitution it has
been called to formulate, the Convention's Organic
Resolution No. 1 and all subsequent acts of the Convention
implementing the same violate the condition in Section 1,
Article XV that there should only be one "election" or
plebiscite for the ratification of all the amendments the
Convention may propose. We are not denying any right of the
people to vote on the proposed amendment; We are only
holding that under Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution,
the same should be submitted to them not separately from
but together with all the other amendments to be proposed
by this present Convention.
126
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition herein is
granted. Organic Resolution No. 1 of the Constitutional
Convention of 1971 and the implementing acts and
resolutions of the Convention, insofar as they provide for the
holding of a plebiscite on November 8, 1971, as well as the
resolution of the respondent Comelec complying therewith
(RR Resolution No. 695) are hereby declared null and void.
The respondents Comelec, Disbursing Officer, Chief
Accountant and Auditor of the Constitutional Convention are
hereby enjoined from taking any action in compliance with
the said organic resolution. In view of the peculiar
circumstances of this case, the Court declares this decision
immediately executory. No costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Teehankee, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ.,
concur.
Separate Opinions
MAKALINTAL, J., reserves his vote —
I reserve my vote. The resolution in question is voted down
by a sufficient majority of the Court on just one ground, which
to be sure achieves the result from the legal and
constitutional viewpoint. I entertain grave doubts as to the
validity of the premises postulated and conclusions reached
in support of the dispositive portion of the decision. However,
considering the urgent nature of this case, the lack of time to
set down at length my opinion on the particular issue upon
which the decision is made to rest, and the fact that a dissent
on the said issue would necessarily be inconclusive unless the
other issues raised in the petition are also considered and
ruled upon — a task that would be premature and pointless
at this time — I limit myself to this reservation.
REYES, J.B.L., ZALDIVAR, CASTRO and MAKASIAR, JJ.,
concurring:
We concur in the main opinion penned by Mr. Justice Barredo
in his usual inimitable, forthright and vigorous style. Like
him, we do not express our individual views on the wisdom of
the proposed constitutional amendment, which is not in issue
here because it is a matter that properly and exclusively
addresses itself to the collective judgment of the people.
We must, however, articulate two additional objections of
constitutional dimension which, although they would seem to
be superfluous because of the reach of the basic constitutional
infirmity discussed in extenso in the main opinion,
nevertheless appear to us to be just as fundamental in
character and scope.
Assuming that the Constitutional Convention has power to
propose piecemeal amendments and submit each separately
to the people for ratification, we are nonetheless persuaded
that (1) that there is no proper submission of title proposed
amendment in question within the meaning and intendment
of Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution, and (2) that the
forthcoming election is not the proper election envisioned by
the same provision of the Constitution.
Mr. Justice C. V. Sanchez, in his dissent in Gonzales vs.
Commission on
Elections1 and Philippine Constitution Association vs.
Commission on Elections,2 expounded his view, with which
we essentially agree, on the minimum requirements that
must be met in order that there can be a proper submission
to the people of a proposed constitutional amendment. This
is what he said:
... amendments must be fairly laid before the people for their
blessing or spurning. The people are not to be mere rubber
stamps. They are not to vote blindly. They must be afforded
ample opportunity to mull over the original provisions,
compare them with the proposed amendments, and try to
reach a conclusion as the dictates of their conscience suggest,
free from the incubus of extraneous or possibly insidious
influences. We believe the word "submitted" can only mean
that the government, within its maximum capabilities,
should strain every effort to inform citizen of the provisions
to be amended, and the proposed amendments and the
meaning, nature and effects thereof. By this, we are not to be
understood as saying that, if one citizen or 100 citizens or
1,000 citizens cannot be reached, then there is no submission
within the meaning of the word as intended by the framers of
the Constitution. What the Constitution in effect directs is
that the government, in submitting an amendment for
ratification, should put every instrumentality or agency
within its structural framework to enlighten the people,
educate them with respect to their act of ratification or
rejection. For we have earlier stated, one thing is submission
and another is ratification. There must be fair submission,
intelligent consent or rejection." .
The second constitutional objection was given expression by
one of the writers of this concurring opinion, in the following
words:
I find it impossible to believe that it was ever intended by its
framers that such amendment should be submitted and
ratified by just "a majority of the votes cast at an election at
which the amendments are submitted to the people for their
ratification", if the concentration of the people's attention
thereon is to be diverted by other extraneous issues, such as
the choice of local and national officials. The framers of the
Constitution, aware of the fundamental character thereof,
and of the need of giving it as much stability as is practicable,
could have only meant that any amendments thereto should
be debated, considered and voted upon an election wherein
the people could devote undivided attention to the subject.4
True it is that the question posed by the proposed
amendment, "Do you or do you not want the 18-year old to be
allowed to vote?," would seem to be uncomplicated and
innocuous. But it is one of life's verities that things which
appear to be simple may turn out not to be so simple after all.
A number of doubts or misgivings could conceivably and
logically assail the average voter. Why should the voting age
be lowered at all, in the first place? Why should the new
voting age be precisely 18 years, and not 19 or 20? And why
not 17? Or even 16 or 15? Is the 18-year old as mature as the
21-year old so that there is no need of an educational
qualification to entitle him to vote? In this age of
permissiveness and dissent, can the 18-year old be relied
upon to vote with judiciousness when the 21-year old, in the
past elections, has not performed so well? If the proposed
amendment is voted down by the people, will the
Constitutional Convention insist on the said amendment?
Why is there an unseemly haste on the part of the
Constitutional Convention in having this particular proposed
amendment ratified at this particular time? Do some of the
members of the Convention have future political plans which
they want to begin to subserve by the approval this year of
this amendment? If this amendment is approved, does it
thereby mean that the 18-year old should now also shoulder
the moral and legal responsibilities of the 21-year old? Will
he be required to render compulsory military service under
the colors? Will the age of contractual consent be reduced to
18 years? If I vote against this amendment, will I not be
unfair to my own child who will be 18 years old, come 1973? .
The above are just samplings from here, there and
everywhere — from a domain (of searching questions) the
bounds of which are not immediately ascertainable. Surely,
many more questions can be added to the already long litany.
And the answers cannot be had except as the questions are
debated fully, pondered upon purposefully, and accorded
undivided attention.
Scanning the contemporary scene, we say that the people are
not, and by election time will not be, sufficiently informed of
the meaning, nature and effects of the proposed
constitutional amendment. They have not been afforded
127
ample time to deliberate thereon conscientiously. They have
been and are effectively distracted from a full and
dispassionate consideration of the merits and demerits of the
proposed amendment by their traditional pervasive
involvement in local elections and politics. They cannot thus
weigh in tranquility the need for and the wisdom of the
proposed amendment.
Upon the above disquisition, it is our considered view that
the intendment of the words, "at an election at which the
amendments are submitted to the people for their
ratification," embodied in Section 1 of Article XV of the
Constitution, has not been met.
FERNANDO, J., concurring and dissenting:
There is much to be said for the opinion of the Court penned
by Justice Barredo, characterized by clarity and vigor, its
manifestation of fealty to the rule of law couched in eloquent
language, that commands assent. As the Constitution
occupies the topmost rank in the hierarchy of legal norms,
Congress and Constitutional Convention alike, no less than
this Court, must bow to its supremacy. Thereby
constitutionalism asserts itself. With the view I entertain of
what is allowable, if not indeed required by the Constitution,
my conformity does not extend as far as the acceptance of the
conclusion reached. The question presented is indeed novel,
not being controlled by constitutional prescription, definite
and certain. Under the circumstances, with the express
recognition in the Constitution of the powers of the
Constitutional Convention to propose amendments, I cannot
discern any objection to the validity of its action there being
no legal impediment that would call for its nullification. Such
an approach all the more commends itself to me considering
that what was sought to be done is to refer the matter to the
people in whom, according to our Constitution, sovereignty
resides. It is in that sense that, with due respect, I find myself
unable to join my brethren.
I. It is understandable then why the decisive issue
posed could not be resolved by reliance on, implicit in the
petition and the answer of intervenors, such concepts as
legislative control of the constitutional convention referred to
by petitioner on the one hand or, on the other, the theory of
conventional sovereignty favored by intervenors. It is
gratifying to note that during the oral argument of petitioner
and counsel for respondents and intervenors, there
apparently was a retreat from such extreme position, all
parties, as should be the case, expressly avowing the primacy
of the Constitution, the applicable provision of which as
interpreted by this Court, should be controlling on both
Congress and the Convention. It cannot be denied though
that in at least one American state, that is Pennsylvania,
there were decisions announcing the doctrine that the powers
to be exercised by a constitutional convention are dependent
on a legislative grant, in the absence of any authority
conferred directly by the fundamental law. The result is a
convention that is subordinate to the lawmaking body. Its
field of competence is circumscribed. It has to look to the
latter for the delimitation of its permissible scope of activity.
It is thus made subordinate to the legislature. Nowhere has
such a view been more vigorously expressed than in the
Pennsylvania case of Wood's Appeal.1 Its holding though
finds no support under our constitutional provision.
It does not thereby follow that while free from legislative
control, a constitutional convention may lay claim to an
attribute sovereign in character. The Constitution is quite
explicit that it is to the people, and to the people alone, in
whom sovereignty resides.2 Such a prerogative is therefore
withheld from a convention. It is an agency entrusted with
the responsibility of high import and significance it is true; it
is denied unlimited legal competence though. That is what
sovereignty connotes. It has to yield to the superior force of
the Constitution. There can then be no basis for the
exaggerated pretension that it is an alter ego of the people. It
is to be admitted that there are some American state
decisions, the most notable of which is Sproule v.
Fredericks,3 a Mississippi case, that dates back to 1892, that
yield a different conclusion. The doctrine therein announced
cannot bind us. Our Constitution makes clear that the power
of a constitutional convention is not sovereign. It is
appropriately termed constituent, limited as it is to the
purpose of drafting a constitution or proposing revision or
amendments to one in existence, subject in either case to
popular approval.
The view that commends itself for acceptance is that
legislature and constitutional convention, alike recognized by
the Constitution, are coordinate, there being no superiority
of one over the other. Insofar as the constituent power of
proposing amendments to the Constitution is concerned, a
constitutional convention enjoys a wide sphere of autonomy
consistently with the Constitution which can be the only
source of valid restriction on its competence. It is true it is to
the legislative body that the call to a convention must
proceed, but once convened, it cannot in any wise be
interfered with, much less controlled by Congress. A contrary
conclusion would impair its usefulness for the delicate, and
paramount task assigned to it. A convention then is to be
looked upon as if it were one of the three coordinate
departments which under the principle of separation of
powers is supreme within its field and has exclusive
cognizance of matters properly subject to its jurisdiction. A
succinct statement of the appropriate principle that should
govern the relationship between a constitutional convention
and a legislative body under American law is that found in
Orfield's work. Thus: "The earliest view seems to have been
that a convention was absolute. The convention was
sovereign and subject to no restraint. On the other hand,
Jameson, whose views have been most frequently cited in
decisions, viewed a convention as a body with strictly limited
powers, and subject to the restrictions imposed on it by the
legislative call. A third and intermediate view is that urged
by Dodd — that a convention, though not sovereign, is a body
independent of the legislature; it is bound by the existing
constitution, but not by the acts of the legislature, as to the
extent of its constituent power. This view has become
increasingly prevalent in the state decisions."4
2. It is to the Constitution, and to the Constitution
alone then, as so vigorously stressed in the opinion of the
Court, that any limitation on the power the Constitutional,
Convention must find its source. I turn to its Article XV. It
reads: "The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of
three fourths of all the Members of the Senate and of the
House of Representatives voting separately, may propose
amendments to this Constitution or call a convention for that
purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as part of this
Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast
at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the
people for their ratification."
Clearly, insofar as amendments, including revision, are
concerned, there are two steps, proposal and thereafter
ratification. Thus as to the former, two constituent bodies are
provided for, the Congress of the Philippines in the mode
therein provided, and a constitutional convention that may
be called into being. Once assembled, a constitutional
convention, like the Congress of the Philippines, possesses in
all its plenitude the constituent power. Inasmuch as
Congress may determine what amendments it would have
the people ratify and thereafter take all the steps necessary
so that the approval or disapproval of the electorate may be
obtained, the convention likewise, to my mind, should be
deemed possessed of all the necessary authority to assure
that whatever amendments it seeks to introduce would be
submitted to the people at an election called for that purpose.
It would appear to me that to view the convention as being
denied a prerogative which is not withheld from Congress as
a constituent body would be to place it in an inferior category.
Such a proposition I do not find acceptable. Congress and
constitutional convention are agencies for submitting
proposals under the fundamental law. A power granted to
128
one should not be denied the other. No justification for such
a drastic differentiation either in theory or practice exists.
Such a conclusion has for me the added reinforcement that to
require ordinary legislation before the convention could be
enabled to have its proposals voted on by the people would be
to place a power in the legislative and executive branches
that could, whether by act or omission, result in the
frustration of the amending process. I am the first to admit
that such likelihood is remote, but if such a risk even if
minimal could be avoided, it should be, unless the compelling
force of an applicable constitutional provision requires
otherwise. Considering that a constitutional convention is
not precluded from imposing additional restrictions on the
powers of either the executive or legislative branches, or, for
that matter, the judiciary, it would appear to be the better
policy to interpret Article XV in such a way that would not
sanction such restraint on the authority that must be
recognized as vested in a constitutional convention. There is
nothing in such a view that to my mind would collide with a
reasonable interpretation of Article XV. It certainly is one
way by which freed from pernicious abstractions, it would be
easier to accommodate a constitution to the needs of an
unfolding future. That is to facilitate its being responsive to
the challenge that time inevitably brings in its wake.
From such an approach then, I am irresistibly led to the
conclusion that the challenged resolution was well within the
power of the convention. That would be to brush aside the
web of unreality spun from a too-restrictive mode of
appraising the legitimate scope of its competence. That would
be, for me, to give added vigor and life to the conferment of
authority vested in it, attended by such grave and awesome
responsibility.
3. It becomes pertinent to inquire then whether the
last sentence of Article XV providing that such amendment
shall be valid when submitted and thereafter approved by the
majority of the votes cast by the people at an election is a bar
to the proposed submission. It is the conclusion arrived at by
my brethren that there is to be only one election and that
therefore the petition must be sustained as only when the
convention has finished its work should all amendments
proposed be submitted for ratification. That is not for me, and
I say this with respect, the appropriate interpretation. It is
true that the Constitution uses the word "election" in the
singular, but that is not decisive. No undue reliance should
be accorded rules of grammar; they do not exert a compelling
force in constitutional interpretation. Meaning is to be sought
not from specific language in the singular but from the
mosaic of significance derived from the total context. It could
be, if it were not thus, self-defeating. Such a mode of
construction does not commend itself. The words used in the
Constitution are not inert; they derive vitality from the
obvious purposes at which they are aimed. Petitioner's stress
on linguistic refinement, while not implausible does not, for
me, carry the day.
It was likewise argued by petitioner that the proposed
amendment is provisional and therefore is not such as was
contemplated in this article. I do not find such contention
convincing. The fact that the Constitutional Convention did
seek to consult the wishes of the people by the proposed
submission of a tentative amendatory provision is an
argument for its validity. It might be said of course that until
impressed with finality, an amendment is not to be passed
upon by the electorate. There is plausibility in such a view. A
literal reading of the Constitution would support it. The spirit
that informs it though would not, for me, be satisfied. From
its silence I deduce the inference that there is no repugnancy
to the fundamental law when the Constitutional Convention
ascertains the popular will. In that sense, the Constitution,
to follow the phraseology of Thomas Reed Powel, is not
silently silent but silently vocal. What I deem the more
important consideration is that while a public official, as an
agent, has to locate his source of authority in either
Constitution or statute, the people, as the principal, can only
be limited in the exercise of their sovereign powers by the
express terms of the Constitution. A concept to the contrary
would to my way of thinking be inconsistent with the
fundamental principle that it is in the people, and the people
alone, that sovereignty resides.
4. The constitutional Convention having acted within
the scope of its authority, an action to restrain or prohibit
respondent Commission on Elections from conducting the
plebiscite does not lie. It should not be lost sight of that the
Commission on Elections in thus being charged with such a
duty does not act in its capacity as the constitutional agency
to take charge of all laws relative to the conduct of election.
That is a purely executive function vested in it under Article
X of the Constitution.5 It is not precluded from assisting the
Constitutional Convention if pursuant to its competence to
amend the fundamental law it seeks, as in this case, to
submit a proposal, even if admittedly tentative, to the
electorate to ascertain its verdict. At any rate, it may be
implied that under the 1971 Constitutional Convention Act,
it is not to turn a deaf ear to a summons from the Convention
to aid it in the legitimate discharge of its functions.6
The aforesaid considerations, such as they are, but which for
me have a force that I mind myself unable to overcome, leave
me no alternative but to dissent from my brethren, with due
acknowledgement of course that from their basic premises,
the conclusion arrived at by them cannot be characterized as
in any wise bereft of a persuasive quality of a high order.
Separate Opinions
MAKALINTAL, J., reserves his vote —
I reserve my vote. The resolution in question is voted down
by a sufficient majority of the Court on just one ground, which
to be sure achieves the result from the legal and
constitutional viewpoint. I entertain grave doubts as to the
validity of the premises postulated and conclusions reached
in support of the dispositive portion of the decision. However,
considering the urgent nature of this case, the lack of time to
set down at length my opinion on the particular issue upon
which the decision is made to rest, and the fact that a dissent
on the said issue would necessarily be inconclusive unless the
other issues raised in the petition are also considered and
ruled upon — a task that would be premature and pointless
at this time — I limit myself to this reservation.
REYES, J.B.L., ZALDIVAR, CASTRO and MAKASIAR, JJ.,
concurring:
We concur in the main opinion penned by Mr. Justice Barredo
in his usual inimitable, forthright and vigorous style. Like
him, we do not express our individual views on the wisdom of
the proposed constitutional amendment, which is not in issue
here because it is a matter that properly and exclusively
addresses itself to the collective judgment of the people.
We must, however, articulate two additional objections of
constitutional dimension which, although they would seem to
be superfluous because of the reach of the basic constitutional
infirmity discussed in extenso in the main opinion,
nevertheless appear to us to be just as fundamental in
character and scope.
Assuming that the Constitutional Convention has power to
propose piecemeal amendments and submit each separately
to the people for ratification, we are nonetheless persuaded
that (1) that there is no proper submission of title proposed
amendment in question within the meaning and intendment
of Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution, and (2) that the
forthcoming election is not the proper election envisioned by
the same provision of the Constitution.
Mr. Justice C. V. Sanchez, in his dissent in Gonzales vs.
Commission on
129
Elections1 and Philippine Constitution Association vs.
Commission on Elections,2 expounded his view, with which
we essentially agree, on the minimum requirements that
must be met in order that there can be a proper submission
to the people of a proposed constitutional amendment. This
is what he said:
... amendments must be fairly laid before the people for their
blessing or spurning. The people are not to be mere rubber
stamps. They are not to vote blindly. They must be afforded
ample opportunity to mull over the original provisions,
compare them with the proposed amendments, and try to
reach a conclusion as the dictates of their conscience suggest,
free from the incubus of extraneous or possibly insidious
influences. We believe the word "submitted" can only mean
that the government, within its maximum capabilities,
should strain every effort to inform citizen of the provisions
to be amended, and the proposed amendments and the
meaning, nature and effects thereof. By this, we are not to be
understood as saying that, if one citizen or 100 citizens or
1,000 citizens cannot be reached, then there is no submission
within the meaning of the word as intended by the framers of
the Constitution. What the Constitution in effect directs is
that the government, in submitting an amendment for
ratification, should put every instrumentality or agency
within its structural framework to enlighten the people,
educate them with respect to their act of ratification or
rejection. For we have earlier stated, one thing is submission
and another is ratification. There must be fair submission,
intelligent consent or rejection." .
The second constitutional objection was given expression by
one of the writers of this concurring opinion, in the following
words:
I find it impossible to believe that it was ever intended by its
framers that such amendment should be submitted and
ratified by just "a majority of the votes cast at an election at
which the amendments are submitted to the people for their
ratification", if the concentration of the people's attention
thereon is to be diverted by other extraneous issues, such as
the choice of local and national officials. The framers of the
Constitution, aware of the fundamental character thereof,
and of the need of giving it as much stability as is practicable,
could have only meant that any amendments thereto should
be debated, considered and voted upon an election wherein
the people could devote undivided attention to the subject.4
True it is that the question posed by the proposed
amendment, "Do you or do you not want the 18-year old to be
allowed to vote?," would seem to be uncomplicated and
innocuous. But it is one of life's verities that things which
appear to be simple may turn out not to be so simple after all.
A number of doubts or misgivings could conceivably and
logically assail the average voter. Why should the voting age
be lowered at all, in the first place? Why should the new
voting age be precisely 18 years, and not 19 or 20? And why
not 17? Or even 16 or 15? Is the 18-year old as mature as the
21-year old so that there is no need of an educational
qualification to entitle him to vote? In this age of
permissiveness and dissent, can the 18-year old be relied
upon to vote with judiciousness when the 21-year old, in the
past elections, has not performed so well? If the proposed
amendment is voted down by the people, will the
Constitutional Convention insist on the said amendment?
Why is there an unseemly haste on the part of the
Constitutional Convention in having this particular proposed
amendment ratified at this particular time? Do some of the
members of the Convention have future political plans which
they want to begin to subserve by the approval this year of
this amendment? If this amendment is approved, does it
thereby mean that the 18-year old should now also shoulder
the moral and legal responsibilities of the 21-year old? Will
he be required to render compulsory military service under
the colors? Will the age of contractual consent be reduced to
18 years? If I vote against this amendment, will I not be
unfair to my own child who will be 18 years old, come 1973? .
The above are just samplings from here, there and
everywhere — from a domain (of searching questions) the
bounds of which are not immediately ascertainable. Surely,
many more questions can be added to the already long litany.
And the answers cannot be had except as the questions are
debated fully, pondered upon purposefully, and accorded
undivided attention.
Scanning the contemporary scene, we say that the people are
not, and by election time will not be, sufficiently informed of
the meaning, nature and effects of the proposed
constitutional amendment. They have not been afforded
ample time to deliberate thereon conscientiously. They have
been and are effectively distracted from a full and
dispassionate consideration of the merits and demerits of the
proposed amendment by their traditional pervasive
involvement in local elections and politics. They cannot thus
weigh in tranquility the need for and the wisdom of the
proposed amendment.
Upon the above disquisition, it is our considered view that
the intendment of the words, "at an election at which the
amendments are submitted to the people for their
ratification," embodied in Section 1 of Article XV of the
Constitution, has not been met.
FERNANDO, J., concurring and dissenting:
There is much to be said for the opinion of the Court penned
by Justice Barredo, characterized by clarity and vigor, its
manifestation of fealty to the rule of law couched in eloquent
language, that commands assent. As the Constitution
occupies the topmost rank in the hierarchy of legal norms,
Congress and Constitutional Convention alike, no less than
this Court, must bow to its supremacy. Thereby
constitutionalism asserts itself. With the view I entertain of
what is allowable, if not indeed required by the Constitution,
my conformity does not extend as far as the acceptance of the
conclusion reached. The question presented is indeed novel,
not being controlled by constitutional prescription, definite
and certain. Under the circumstances, with the express
recognition in the Constitution of the powers of the
Constitutional Convention to propose amendments, I cannot
discern any objection to the validity of its action there being
no legal impediment that would call for its nullification. Such
an approach all the more commends itself to me considering
that what was sought to be done is to refer the matter to the
people in whom, according to our Constitution, sovereignty
resides. It is in that sense that, with due respect, I find myself
unable to join my brethren.
I. It is understandable then why the decisive issue
posed could not be resolved by reliance on, implicit in the
petition and the answer of intervenors, such concepts as
legislative control of the constitutional convention referred to
by petitioner on the one hand or, on the other, the theory of
conventional sovereignty favored by intervenors. It is
gratifying to note that during the oral argument of petitioner
and counsel for respondents and intervenors, there
apparently was a retreat from such extreme position, all
parties, as should be the case, expressly avowing the primacy
of the Constitution, the applicable provision of which as
interpreted by this Court, should be controlling on both
Congress and the Convention. It cannot be denied though
that in at least one American state, that is Pennsylvania,
there were decisions announcing the doctrine that the powers
to be exercised by a constitutional convention are dependent
on a legislative grant, in the absence of any authority
conferred directly by the fundamental law. The result is a
convention that is subordinate to the lawmaking body. Its
field of competence is circumscribed. It has to look to the
latter for the delimitation of its permissible scope of activity.
It is thus made subordinate to the legislature. Nowhere has
such a view been more vigorously expressed than in the
130
Pennsylvania case of Wood's Appeal.1 Its holding though
finds no support under our constitutional provision.
It does not thereby follow that while free from legislative
control, a constitutional convention may lay claim to an
attribute sovereign in character. The Constitution is quite
explicit that it is to the people, and to the people alone, in
whom sovereignty resides.2 Such a prerogative is therefore
withheld from a convention. It is an agency entrusted with
the responsibility of high import and significance it is true; it
is denied unlimited legal competence though. That is what
sovereignty connotes. It has to yield to the superior force of
the Constitution. There can then be no basis for the
exaggerated pretension that it is an alter ego of the people. It
is to be admitted that there are some American state
decisions, the most notable of which is Sproule v.
Fredericks,3 a Mississippi case, that dates back to 1892, that
yield a different conclusion. The doctrine therein announced
cannot bind us. Our Constitution makes clear that the power
of a constitutional convention is not sovereign. It is
appropriately termed constituent, limited as it is to the
purpose of drafting a constitution or proposing revision or
amendments to one in existence, subject in either case to
popular approval.
The view that commends itself for acceptance is that
legislature and constitutional convention, alike recognized by
the Constitution, are coordinate, there being no superiority
of one over the other. Insofar as the constituent power of
proposing amendments to the Constitution is concerned, a
constitutional convention enjoys a wide sphere of autonomy
consistently with the Constitution which can be the only
source of valid restriction on its competence. It is true it is to
the legislative body that the call to a convention must
proceed, but once convened, it cannot in any wise be
interfered with, much less controlled by Congress. A contrary
conclusion would impair its usefulness for the delicate, and
paramount task assigned to it. A convention then is to be
looked upon as if it were one of the three coordinate
departments which under the principle of separation of
powers is supreme within its field and has exclusive
cognizance of matters properly subject to its jurisdiction. A
succinct statement of the appropriate principle that should
govern the relationship between a constitutional convention
and a legislative body under American law is that found in
Orfield's work. Thus: "The earliest view seems to have been
that a convention was absolute. The convention was
sovereign and subject to no restraint. On the other hand,
Jameson, whose views have been most frequently cited in
decisions, viewed a convention as a body with strictly limited
powers, and subject to the restrictions imposed on it by the
legislative call. A third and intermediate view is that urged
by Dodd — that a convention, though not sovereign, is a body
independent of the legislature; it is bound by the existing
constitution, but not by the acts of the legislature, as to the
extent of its constituent power. This view has become
increasingly prevalent in the state decisions."4
2. It is to the Constitution, and to the Constitution
alone then, as so vigorously stressed in the opinion of the
Court, that any limitation on the power the Constitutional,
Convention must find its source. I turn to its Article XV. It
reads: "The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of
three fourths of all the Members of the Senate and of the
House of Representatives voting separately, may propose
amendments to this Constitution or call a convention for that
purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as part of this
Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast
at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the
people for their ratification."
Clearly, insofar as amendments, including revision, are
concerned, there are two steps, proposal and thereafter
ratification. Thus as to the former, two constituent bodies are
provided for, the Congress of the Philippines in the mode
therein provided, and a constitutional convention that may
be called into being. Once assembled, a constitutional
convention, like the Congress of the Philippines, possesses in
all its plenitude the constituent power. Inasmuch as
Congress may determine what amendments it would have
the people ratify and thereafter take all the steps necessary
so that the approval or disapproval of the electorate may be
obtained, the convention likewise, to my mind, should be
deemed possessed of all the necessary authority to assure
that whatever amendments it seeks to introduce would be
submitted to the people at an election called for that purpose.
It would appear to me that to view the convention as being
denied a prerogative which is not withheld from Congress as
a constituent body would be to place it in an inferior category.
Such a proposition I do not find acceptable. Congress and
constitutional convention are agencies for submitting
proposals under the fundamental law. A power granted to
one should not be denied the other. No justification for such
a drastic differentiation either in theory or practice exists.
Such a conclusion has for me the added reinforcement that to
require ordinary legislation before the convention could be
enabled to have its proposals voted on by the people would be
to place a power in the legislative and executive branches
that could, whether by act or omission, result in the
frustration of the amending process. I am the first to admit
that such likelihood is remote, but if such a risk even if
minimal could be avoided, it should be, unless the compelling
force of an applicable constitutional provision requires
otherwise. Considering that a constitutional convention is
not precluded from imposing additional restrictions on the
powers of either the executive or legislative branches, or, for
that matter, the judiciary, it would appear to be the better
policy to interpret Article XV in such a way that would not
sanction such restraint on the authority that must be
recognized as vested in a constitutional convention. There is
nothing in such a view that to my mind would collide with a
reasonable interpretation of Article XV. It certainly is one
way by which freed from pernicious abstractions, it would be
easier to accommodate a constitution to the needs of an
unfolding future. That is to facilitate its being responsive to
the challenge that time inevitably brings in its wake.
From such an approach then, I am irresistibly led to the
conclusion that the challenged resolution was well within the
power of the convention. That would be to brush aside the
web of unreality spun from a too-restrictive mode of
appraising the legitimate scope of its competence. That would
be, for me, to give added vigor and life to the conferment of
authority vested in it, attended by such grave and awesome
responsibility.
3. It becomes pertinent to inquire then whether the
last sentence of Article XV providing that such amendment
shall be valid when submitted and thereafter approved by the
majority of the votes cast by the people at an election is a bar
to the proposed submission. It is the conclusion arrived at by
my brethren that there is to be only one election and that
therefore the petition must be sustained as only when the
convention has finished its work should all amendments
proposed be submitted for ratification. That is not for me, and
I say this with respect, the appropriate interpretation. It is
true that the Constitution uses the word "election" in the
singular, but that is not decisive. No undue reliance should
be accorded rules of grammar; they do not exert a compelling
force in constitutional interpretation. Meaning is to be sought
not from specific language in the singular but from the
mosaic of significance derived from the total context. It could
be, if it were not thus, self-defeating. Such a mode of
construction does not commend itself. The words used in the
Constitution are not inert; they derive vitality from the
obvious purposes at which they are aimed. Petitioner's stress
on linguistic refinement, while not implausible does not, for
me, carry the day.
It was likewise argued by petitioner that the proposed
amendment is provisional and therefore is not such as was
contemplated in this article. I do not find such contention
convincing. The fact that the Constitutional Convention did
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seek to consult the wishes of the people by the proposed
submission of a tentative amendatory provision is an
argument for its validity. It might be said of course that until
impressed with finality, an amendment is not to be passed
upon by the electorate. There is plausibility in such a view. A
literal reading of the Constitution would support it. The spirit
that informs it though would not, for me, be satisfied. From
its silence I deduce the inference that there is no repugnancy
to the fundamental law when the Constitutional Convention
ascertains the popular will. In that sense, the Constitution,
to follow the phraseology of Thomas Reed Powel, is not
silently silent but silently vocal. What I deem the more
important consideration is that while a public official, as an
agent, has to locate his source of authority in either
Constitution or statute, the people, as the principal, can only
be limited in the exercise of their sovereign powers by the
express terms of the Constitution. A concept to the contrary
would to my way of thinking be inconsistent with the
fundamental principle that it is in the people, and the people
alone, that sovereignty resides.

4. The constitutional Convention having acted within

the scope of its authority, an action to restrain or prohibit
respondent Commission on Elections from conducting the
plebiscite does not lie. It should not be lost sight of that the
Commission on Elections in thus being charged with such a
duty does not act in its capacity as the constitutional agency
to take charge of all laws relative to the conduct of election.
That is a purely executive function vested in it under Article
X of the Constitution.5 It is not precluded from assisting the
Constitutional Convention if pursuant to its competence to
amend the fundamental law it seeks, as in this case, to
submit a proposal, even if admittedly tentative, to the
electorate to ascertain its verdict. At any rate, it may be
implied that under the 1971 Constitutional Convention Act,
it is not to turn a deaf ear to a summons from the Convention
to aid it in the legitimate discharge of its functions.6

The aforesaid considerations, such as they are, but which for

me have a force that I mind myself unable to overcome, leave
me no alternative but to dissent from my brethren, with due
acknowledgement of course that from their basic premises,
the conclusion arrived at by them cannot be characterized as
in any wise bereft of a persuasive quality of a high order.

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