Public awareness in the

pre-accession period in Sweden

1
Editor: Rolf Engström, MFA, Press and Information department
Layout: Jonas Nilsson, MFA, Press and Information department
Cover photo: Jonas Nilsson, MFA, Press and Information department
Print: XBS Grafisk Service, Stockholm 2002
ISBN 91-7496-300-7
Art. no.: UD 02.066

2
The Swedish Government’s work on information and
the media 1991–1994, prior to the Swedish
referendum on membership of the EU

Contents:

0. Introduction....................................................................................5

1. Background to the negotiations.........................................................6

2. Selected strategy..............................................................................8

3. Financing.....................................................................................12

4. Media management – focus and organisation...................................14

5. The Secretariat for Information on European Affairs..........................18

6. Public opinion on membership.......................................................25

7. Conclusions..................................................................................27

8. Appendix......................................................................................30

9. Appendix II......................................................................................36

3
4
Introduction

Sweden’s membership of the European Union became an issue in the early

1990s. Application for membership was submitted in 1991. By then, negotia-
tions on the EEA agreement between the member states of the European
Free Trade Association (EFTA), and the European Community (EC) were
already well under way. Soon enough, Sweden would have close cooperation
with the EEA countries.

The Government had declared its intention of submitting the question of

Sweden’s membership to a referendum even before Sweden’s formal applica-
tion. All political parties represented in the Swedish Riksdag (Parliament)
agreed. The Riksdag also informed the Government that major information
activities would be necessary prior to a referendum.

The outcome of a referendum was not given. Irrespective of a possible out-

come, it was recognised that thorough information was needed on the EEA
agreement, on the existing EC and on the EU, which would come into force in
November 1993, well before an eventual Swedish membership. There were
thus several steps in European integration that had to be covered in the
Swedish information campaign.

The information activities that took place between 1992-1994 are described
in this leaflet. It has been put together by Martin Haag, who at that time was
Press Secretary to the Minister of European Affairs, and Thomasine Hindmarsh,
then Information Officer at the Secretariat for Information on European
Affairs. The material is based on the writers’ own experiences from that time.
During the autumn of 2002, it will also be presented in speeches in some of
the candidate countries engaged in planning referendums of their own.

5
1. Background to the Swedish
negotiations

· Sweden outside the EC/EU for many years

· Surprise application in 1991

· Public opinion positive from the outset

The Swedish request for membership of the European Community was made
public in late 1990. The formal application was submitted to the EC Council
of Ministers in July 1991 by the (then) Social Democratic Prime Minister
Ingvar Carlsson. This step was seen as a total change in direction, as opposed to
the earlier, very hesitant Swedish attitude towards EC membership. The
question of membership had been an issue of public debate for many years,
but the main obstacle had always been the traditional Swedish foreign policy
of non-alignment. What made the situation change was primarily the new
security order within Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989.

After the general elections in September 1991, a new, centre-right government

was formed, headed by Prime Minister Carl Bildt from the Moderate Party.
The new government fully supported the application for EC/EU membership
and made it one of its top priorities. The Government wanted “to bring
Sweden fully into the European Cooperation through negotiations for
Membership of the European Community”, as it stated in its first declaration to
the Riksdag in October 1991. The Prime Minister appointed a special minister
within the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (Foreign Ministry) to be responsible for
the forthcoming negotiations. The assignment was given to Mr Ulf Dinkelspiel,
Minister for European Affairs and Foreign Trade.

The application for membership had broad political support, both from the
Social Democratic Party (Sweden’s largest party) and the new coalition
government, although there were very different opinions towards membership

6
within the four government parties as well as within the Social Democratic Party.
Membership or not was an issue that divided parties from within, rather than
between them. The (smaller) Left Party and the Green Party were clear
opponents to membership however.

Around the time of application, public opinion was very much in favour of
membership. According to the main poll institute (SIFO/Research Inter-
national) over 60 per cent of the population was in favour.

The question in the poll was phrased as follows: if there were a referendum
today, would you vote Yes or No to a Swedish membership (of the European
Community).

The Yes-side had had a majority in the polls for several years, but public
opinion was soon to change in a negative direction.

Public opinion was a key to the whole process of membership, since the main
political parties had decided in 1991 that the people should have the final
vote through a referendum after negotiations.

It is thus fair to say that, even at an early stage, the Government knew that it
would have to conduct two parallel negotiations: one with the EC/EU and its
members concerning the conditions for membership, and one with the
Swedish people concerning public support for this bold new project.

7
2. Selected strategy

· Information seen as a key issue

· A separate body for factual and unbiased information

· Financial support for adult education and non-governmental organisations

(NGOs)

· Government taking part in the debate – in favour of membership

With the future referendum in mind, the issue of information, the media and
opinion was seen as crucial from the beginning. This had also been of prime
importance during the earlier process of Swedish-European integration,
comprising membership of the EEA, an area of cooperation between the EU
and EFTA (where Sweden had been one of the founders). The Swedish
Riksdag had already asked the Government for proposals for increased
information of various kinds.

In view of this, the Government proposed to the Riksdag an information

campaign in two stages:

Stage 1. During the first year (fiscal year 1992/93) financial support was to be
awarded to organisations wishing to inform and bring into discussion the
European process of integration; the EEA agreement, the EC/EU and the
Swedish membership application.

The Government proposed a separate delegation, under the chairmanship of

former Centre Party Prime Minister Thorbjörn Fälldin, to allocate grants and
financial support to adult education and NGOs.

Establishing a separate delegation was a way of avoiding the Government

being accused of only promoting its own EU-positive policies. The Riksdag
had also expressed the importance of engaging the adult education associations.

8
The Fälldin Delegation consisted of five persons, all of them experts on European
integration. They also had very different opinions on the membership issue.

The delegation was given the task of allocating money to adult education
information projects run by adult education associations and Swedish NGOs
over a two year period. The aim was to raise public awareness on EC/EU issues.
(See more in details in the Appendix).

Apart from the delegation, the main responsibility for EU information rested
with the Foreign Ministry, which also conducted and coordinated the
negotiations. Within the ministry, a separate body, the Secretariat for Information
on EU Affairs, was planned to be set up.

Stage 2. During the second year (fiscal year 1993/94) financial support would
also be allocated to organisations wishing to conduct a formal campaign pro or
contra Swedish membership, with the upcoming referendum in mind. The
Government proposed to the Riksdag that the money available should be divided
equally between the “Yes” and “No” side.

Information issues led to a comprehensive debate in the Riksdag. Support for an

information campaign was vast. There were requests for special information for
women, as well as strong support for the traditional Swedish NGOs conducting
various kind of education. The Riksdag stipulated that information was to be
broad and comprehensive and mirror all sides. Both the positive and negative
aspects of a Swedish membership should be highlighted and debated.

The Government’s own ambition, with support from the Riksdag, was to
concentrate primarily on information about the negotiation process. The
Government was to provide basic information about the negotiations, proving
that the results were in line with the demands that Sweden had already presented
at the outset of negotiations.

It would be false to pretend that the Government could give a “neutral” or

indifferent attitude towards membership. It was clear from the start of the
process that the Government’s overriding political goal was a Swedish
membership.

9
Thus, to fulfil the Riksdag’s demands for broad and comprehensive
information, it was decided that a separate body - a Secretariat for Information on
European Affairs (the Secretariat) - was to be set up within the MFA in order
to ensure unbiased and factual information about the EC/EU, without taking a
stand for or against membership.

The Secretariat would function as a source of knowledge and information

and, together with the adult education associations and NGOs, answer the
need for basic facts prior to the referendum. The Secretariat would not
produce opinions pro or contra membership. This role was confined to the
political parties and campaign organisations.

It was discussed whether the Secretariat should be given a more independent

position, and placed outside the Government. However, the need for close
contact with relevant experts within the Government, as well as easy access to
the negotiation team, were important factors in deciding to set up the
Secretariat within the Government, but with its own administration and
budget.

This solution was perhaps not perfect, and it would come into criticism,
especially from opponents to Swedish membership. They claimed that the
Secretariat would become a hidden propaganda organisation within the
Government. The Government had no intention of creating such an
organisation, however. This would easily have been exposed and would have
backfired on the whole membership issue. Instead, by doing a good job, it was
expected that the Secretariat would gradually be able to gain respect.

Factual and unbiased information was needed in order to understand the

rather complicated European issue. Information could reduce uncertainities,
and enable citizens to take a personal decision, whether positive or negative,
towards membership. But information as such was not enough for the final
decision.

There was also a need for debate, for various opinions to be uttered and
challenged. The Government, with its own clear political objective, must also
have scope to influence opinion and take part in the debate as must also
political parties and organisations that were against membership. Debate was

10
of greater importance than pure information in this process. On the other
hand, a debate could not be undertaken without good basic information. A
sufficient level of knowledge and information among citizens would avoid the
debate becoming restricted to an area for the “political elite” only.

The Government remembered the surprising No to EC membership that the

Norwegian people had decided on back in 1973. A clear mistake from the Yes-
side, comprising the main political parties, the unions and the corporate
sector, was the inability to involve the “man on the street”. European
integration was thus seen as benefiting the “establishment” only.

According to all the studies made of this issue, the Swedish people felt
relatively uninformed and uninvolved in European matters. A “Eurobarometer”
published in 1992 concluded that seven out of ten Swedes thought that they
had too little knowledge about the EU.

There is a strong tradition of easily accessible public information prior to

political changes and decisions. Swedes demand an open debate and thorough
information prior to political decisions. People often claim that they lack
information and require more knowledge ahead of decisions. Clearly, the very
complicated EU question was to be a great challenge for the political system
in Sweden.

Good, relevant information was a keyword for the whole process of integration.

11
3. Financing

· SEK 181 million (EUR 20 million) over a two-year period

· Split between the Government, adult education, NGOs and campaign

organisations

The Government realised early on in the process, even before the start of
negotiations, that the vast information that would be required would also
need extra money, in addition to the Government’s ordinary information
budget. In its bill to the Riksdag (fiscal year 1992/93) the Government
calculated that SEK 100 million (about EUR 11 million) would be required
during the following two years. The Government asked for the Riksdag’s
approval for this sum, which consisted of two items: the Government’s own
EU information (performed by the information Secretariat) as well as grants
to adult education and NGOs. The money would be allocated on a 50/50 basis
between the Government itself and adult education and NGOs.

This was a burden on top of the already very strained Government budget at
a time when Sweden was in a recession and had large deficits in its public
finances. The Government proposed to the Riksdag that half of the amount
should be financed through cuts in other areas of public expenditures.

However no extra cuts were made and the information campaign thus
momentarily put strain on the budget.

The need for a vast and costly information campaign was never questioned, and
the Riksdag agreed that information prior to the referendum had to be given
proper resources if it were to have a chance of reaching out to the public.

When the date for the referendum had been set to 13 November 1994, it was
evident that more money had to be allocated. Campaign organisations and
political parties received an additional SEK 60 million (EUR 6.6 million) for

12
highlighting the pros and cons of membership. Information provided by the
Government and Secretariat also proved to require more funding. In total, SEK
181 million (EUR 20 million) was granted for the Swedish information
campaign. In addition, resources were used from other public sectors. Most
important was that personnel for the Secretariat and public libraries (see Chapter
5) were recruited through a Government programme for the unemployed.

13
4. Media management

· The media, the key information channel

· Good service to journalists

· Press briefings and –releases

· An open information policy, promoting the Swedish view

The Government chose a strategy of relying heavily on the media as a main

channel of information to the people. The media was provided with
background information about membership issues and the negotiations.
Direct, public, information was to be handled by the separate Secretariat. An
exception was a leaflet concerning the final result of the negotiations, which
was produced by the Government once an accession treaty had been achieved
in early 1994. This leaflet was distributed directly to all households.

The media was chosen as the best way of reaching Swedish citizens. There
were several reasons for this:

1. EC/EU negotiations were a “hot topic” in the general news, and attracted
widespread attention from journalists and the media. Generally, they
found it interesting, and often even exciting, to follow the process of
negotiations.

2. The media had high credibility among Swedes, often higher than that of the
Government itself.

3. Good media coverage demonstrated the Government’s choice to act

forcefully, thus fulfilling the political goal of EU accession. This high
visibility was also important in the domestic political debate.

4. The media reached large audiences in a very effective way.

14
The Swedish media has a long tradition of engaging in public education. More
than once, the main national newspapers produced large supplements about
the EU and what Swedish membership would mean to its citizens with regard
to such fields as the economy, politics, travel, education and other issues.

Radio and TV staged many hearings and special programmes. Although most
of the media had a critical angle in their coverage, this focus was a very
valuable channel for information.

The Foreign Ministry wanted an open information policy. As much of the

negotiations were taking place behind closed doors, it was not always possible
to give full information. But the Government insisted on giving the media the
“Swedish view”, as it was known in turn, that their counterparts were giving
the media their views.

During the negotiations, the Foreign Ministry produced a serie of press

releases, showing how far the negotiations had advanced, and how many of
the 29 negotiation chapters that had been closed.
Ministers from all ministries gave press briefings, adding more details about
the on-going process. Often, these were held in Brussels.

The Swedish Delegation to the EC/EU in Brussels was a vital focal point for
media contacts. The Swedish media had many correspondents in Brussels, and
they were the main target group. In Brussels, it was also easy to reach major
journalists from foreign media. Another important target group was foreign
correspondents based in Stockholm. The Foreign Ministry regularly produced
special briefings and press releases for them too.

Local media had fewer resources to cover European integration and were not
so well-informed on European issues. The Secretariat for Information on
European Affairs played an important part for them during the whole process
(see Chapter 5).

From a political perspective, the main task was to convey the message that
Swedish negotiations for membership were succesful, and that the
Government had obtained a response for special Swedish demands. This was
a goal in itself. But the Government also knew that it would never obtain

15
public support for a bad treaty in a referendum. The negotiators worked very
hard to secure a good accession treaty.

Swedish demands were made public in a speech by the Minister of European

Affairs, Mr Dinkelspiel, in Brussels in February 1993 when the formal
negotiations were opened. Media response was very good. The papers
published long articles, with headlines reporting “Sweden’s tough demands”
(Aftonbladet). Some papers printed Mr Dinkelspiel’s whole speech. Radio
and TV broadcast direct. The Swedish demands had been coordinated with
the Social Democratic opposition party, and had widespread support in the
Riksdag. It was important at that time to show national unity in the
forthcoming negotiations.

After the opening, a year of tough negotiations followed. In March 1994, a

preliminary agreement between Sweden and the EU member states (the EU
had now come into force) was reached after some days of round-the-clock
negotiations. The Foreign Ministry had prepared a comprehensive (10-page)
press release, with a summary of the accession treaty well in advance. The
summary was presented to the media at press conferences held by Swedish
ministers in Brussels. The closing of the negotiations came as a great surprise,
since the negotiations had previously been progressing very slowly. It
resulted in “a news break-through” in all the media, and was given quite a
positive angle.

It is easier to get good publicity for something you achieve than for something
that breaks apart!

Important results in the negotiations were Sweden’s right to continue with its
restrictive alcohol policy, as well as the use of the special Swedish “moist
snuff”, and our high environmental standards. This was all presented in the
media as “gifts to the people” from the negotiations.

This kind of news was regarded as hot stuff by the media, and the vast
coverage certainly considerably helped the Government on its home turf.

Information and media work was coordinated by the Foreign Ministry and Mr
Dinkelspiel’s office. The main tools were:

16
· Press releases
· Frequent press briefings
· Direct contacts, updating key journalists

A special group of information officers from the various ministries was set up
to follow and coordinate intra-government work. Each minister had
responsibility for his/her own areas, such as agriculture or finance. The Prime
Minister had a strong personal interest in the EU process, and within the
Prime Minister’s Office one person was given a special role for information
and polical coordination.

The Government tried to set up a special body to monitor the daily press, with
the task of “correcting” misinformation and false reports. This proved a less
successful initiative, however. In Sweden, it is very difficult to get the media to
make swift corrections. It was found more productive to let a few false reports
slip through, and instead comment and correct the false picture when given
the initiative in the media. Details were important, but equally important was
the general impression of the whole process.

A screening of media coverage showed that it was relatively unbiased,

presenting both positive and negative sides. The editorial pages were
generally favourable towards membership. National unity also worked in
favour of the Government. The negotiations could be compared with sports
events, where national teams often have the broad public support of their
own citizens. There was a good deal of speculation before the negotiations
that Sweden would do badly, and “give up the match”. This kind of criticism
was hardly seen in the media after the negotiations were closed.

17
5. The Secretariat for Information
on European Affairs

· Unbiased information within the Foreign Ministry

· Separate budget and personnel to ensure neutrality regarding membership

The Secretariat for Information on European Affairs (the Secretariat) was

located in the Foreign Ministry to enable it to make use of the knowledge of
experts on European integration. These were at the time mainly to be found
within the ministries, especially within the Foreign Ministry and its trade
department, responsible for negotiations.

The Riksdag had stated that broad, comprehensive and unbiased information
should be spread all over the country. The Secretariat was not to argue for
membership and it was to take no part in the debate. The main task was
instead to facilitate peoples’ own decisions in the referendum to come.

The overall objective for the Secretariat was initially set up by the Minister of
European Affairs, Mr Dinkelspiel. He formulated it quite simply, stating that
nobody should be able to argue, on the day of the referendum, that they had
lacked information.

Head of the Secretariat was Ms Suzanne Askelöf, who was recruited from the
Swedish Association of Local Authorities. All personnel were recruited from
outside the Government Offices. The Secretariat had a budget of its own of a
total of SEK 63 million (EUR 7 million). All of the above were in order to
ensure an unbiased performance.

18
Forming an information strategy

· Surveys on information behaviour on which to base the strategy

· Printed matter, distribution through networks and direct information

services the main cornerstones

To establish an information strategy, the Secretariat began by analysing the

need for information. Surveys and opinion polls were used to obtain a picture
of what people knew about the EEA agreement and the EC/EU, what they
wanted to know more about and what information channels that were found
reliable. Researchers on mass communication were also asked for advice.

The Secretariat realised that knowledge of European integration was limited

and that people wanted to learn more. As regards information channels, the
media was the most important. Several surveys over the years have shown
that the mass media has considerable impact on Swedes’ opinions and
knowledge.

In 1992-1993, the main national dailies, TV and news agencies had

correspondents in Brussels and covered European matters to some extent,
while local media found it difficult to find the time to engage in European
integration and knew less about it.

It was also noted that opinions and attitudes are often formed within groups
of friends, family and colleagues. In these limited groups, people who took an
active part in the public debate were important opinion-makers.

When forming the strategy to reach out to the people, it was also considered
of interest that a majority of the Swedes quite often visited public libraries,
not only to borrow books but also to find information about politics, services
and current issues.

The above findings resulted in the conclusion that the Secretariat would focus
its strategy on three main activities:

19
1. Producing basic, unbiased and comprehensive information material at
different levels to make information accessible.
2. Distributing information material through well-established institutions
that could reach large groups of people. An information network was set up
with libraries, schools, adult education associations, NGOs and journalists.
3. Establishing a direct information service for people who wanted to pose
questions directly; a call centre.
Using these three types of channels, the Secretariat would ensure that broad
and comprehensive facts about European integration would be available all
over Sweden. More details about these activities can be found in the Appendix.

When reviewing the strategy today, it is important to note that the Internet was
not available at the time. Today, the Internet could have been an easy way of
producing and spreading information and holding a dialogue with people.

Press service

· Journalists needed extra attention

· Background information sent out prior to events
· Seminars held in Sweden and Brussels

The call centre that was set up for the general public received many calls from
journalists asking for help in finding information and background facts for
their reports and articles. Journalists and editorial offices were found to need
special attention in terms both of more thorough facts and instant answers.
Responding to this need, a call service was set up that was exclusive to the media.

The Government’s own work with the media dealt with negotiations for
membership (Chapter 4). The major newspapers and news agencies had
correspondents in Brussels who had a good grasp of European integration.
Local media had less knowledge and resources for covering EU issues. At
times they also needed help in understanding the background to information
about the negotiations from the Government.

20
The press service became an important service centre. It answered questions
within hours and sent out background information prior to major decisions
and events. Local media made extensive use of the service, and the national
dailies and major news desks on TV and radio were frequent callers.
Employees of the press service were also asked to appear on both TV and
radio. This contributed to the Secretariat’s own marketing.

The Secretariat also conducted a series of seminars for journalists in different

parts of Sweden and a trip to Brussels was arranged for some thirty journalists in
1994 to meet with experts in the Swedish Delegation to the EU and in EU
institutions.

Target groups appointed by the Riksdag

· The Riksdag appointed groups with special needs
· Disabled, immigrants, young people
· Women’s perspectives on membership
· Activities performed by the Secretariat and NGOs who received money
from the Fälldin Delegation

When the Riksdag approved the funding for the information campaign, it also
pointed out that certain groups had special needs as regards information. It
was the Secretariat’s duty to cater for these groups. This applied to the
disabled. For the visually handicapped, information was available on cassettes
and in Braille. Deaf people could communicate with the call centre through a
text-telephone and a special information brochure was available for people
with mental development disturbances.

Immigrants were another target group, since they could have difficulties
taking advantage of normal sources of information. A brochure was therefore
translated into the eight largest immigrant languages.

Pupils in the upper secondary school were also targeted. Schools became
members of the Secretariat’s network and were given extra attention. A one-

21
day EU introductory course was provided for teachers and school librarians all
over the country. Schools had free access to the data bases and they could
order as much as they wanted of the printed matter. The fact sheets were
commonly used in teaching. The call centre also helped many pupils with
questions they had when writing essays. In addition, an exhibition and a book
on the EU aimed directly at young people was produced by an independent
group consisting of journalists and artists. The “Mexa Express” project was
sponsored by the Secretariat. The exhibition toured Sweden by train and the
book, which was very much appreciated among young people because of its
informal tone, was sent out to schools.

Finally, the Riksdag had pointed out that it was important also to focus on
women’s perspectives on EU issues. The Secretariat conducted seminars
highlighting these issues, and disseminated printed matter.

Another important means of reaching the prioritised target groups was

through the Fälldin Delegation, which allocated money to information
projects in accordance with these priorities.

Knowledge and information need among the

general public

· Continuous evaluation to ensure results

· EU membership was considered a very complex question

· The media was the most credible channel

· The Secretariat managed to gain relatively high credibility

The Secretariat’s activities were continuously evaluated to ensure that

resources were deployed in an efficient manner and that information was, in
fact, easily accessible. For this task, the Department of Journalism and Mass
Communication at the University of Gothenburg was engaged.

Surveys conducted by this university showed that the question of Sweden’s

22
membership was considered to be very complex by a majority of people. The
last month before the referendum, interest for the matter had increased but
the majority of the adult population was uncertain as to how they should vote.

The media, and especially TV and morning papers, were the most important
channels for information. But in the last month as many as 78 per cent of the
population also wanted more thorough information than that given by the
media. Discussions with friends and family were in that sense important for a
majority of the people. The Secretariat was also stated to be an important and
credible source of information. Over 40 per cent of the population had read
some of its material at the time of the referendum. Over 50 per cent were also
aware that there was a call centre they could use.

Two thirds of the population thought it was easy to find information prior to
the referendum. Considering all the activities performed and the amount of
money spent on the information campaign, the fact that one-third still had
difficulties in finding information, once again proves the great demand posed
by the Swedish people on information. Another figure showed that 75 per
cent knew that there was information available, but they hadn’t read it since it
was too difficult or because of lack of time.

As a consequence, only about 40 per cent considered that they knew enough
about the EU one month before the referendum. A few months earlier that
figure had been 60 per cent, so people seem to have become more insecure
towards the end, when they had to take a stand.

A possible reason why so many were indecisive may have been a feeling of
uncertainty about the future. It was hard to give absolute firm answers as to
what membership – or standing outside the EU – would mean on areas such
as Sweden’s independence, the rate of crime and threats to or improvements
in the environment. The campaign organisations had different attitudes and
answers to several questions and the Secretariat could only state what rules
would have to change (some for the better, some for the worse). At times, the
call centre personnel noted that people were confused and, as a point of
interest, also frustrated over the fact that the Secretariat would not advise
them on how to vote!

23
Given the above, it is interesting to note that 34 per cent of the population
thought that feelings were more important than logical arguments when one
was to decide on a Yes or No and as many as 42 per cent thought it was a
matter of principle which no information could change.

The figures above are average figures. There was considerable divergence in
the ways in which different groups of society sought information and how
involved they were in the referendum. The well-educated had more know-
ledge than the less educated and were also more active in seeking information.
Men thought that they knew more than women and people in the cities had
a greater knowledge than people in the countryside.

The Department of Journalism and Mass Communication at the University of

Gothenburg stated briefly in their final report on the information campaign
that people all over Sweden were seriously engaged in the question of
membership. They sought information, they made use of the EU info points
that the libraries constituted, many rang the call centre and they generally
discussed the issues involved to a large extent. People were emotionally
engaged. However, it is interesting to note that their knowledge of basic EU
matters, such as the role of the Council of Ministers, hardly increased at all.

24
6. Public opinion on membership 1

· No-side gaining strength

· Large numbers of undecided

· Lack of sufficient information and knowledge

From the Government’s point of view, the most difficult part of the whole
European integration process was to convince the Swedish people of the
advantages of EU membership. As mentioned earlier, positive opinion shifted
rather abruptly during 1992. Several reasons can be found:

· Economic recession in Sweden in the early 1990s

· Growing reluctance towards supra-nationality and political union

· Scepticism towards a single currency

· Important national issues seen as threatened by EU membership

· Concerns about reduced welfare and social services

Negative opinion culminated in the autumn of 1992, when 53 per cent of the
population said they would vote No in a referendum. The Yes-side only
gathered 30 per cent. A year earlier, 60 per cent had said they would vote Yes.

During 1993, the Yes-side increased slowly to around 35 per cent, but the No-
side still had the lead. There was no given outcome for the referendum.

A large proportion of the population, approximately 30 per cent, was unsure

and undecided just before the referendum in November 1994.

The referendum concerned a Yes or No to the accession treaty that Sweden

had negotiated with the EU. In the actual referendum, on 13 November 1994,
1. See appendix II

25
Yes-votes outweighed the No-votes. 52.27 per cent voted for membership
according to the accession treaty and 46.83 per cent voted against. About 83
per cent of the population took part in the referendum.

After the referendum, support for membership once more declined, followed
by stronger support after some three years of membership.

Women were more negative than men. Elderly and young people were also
more negative than middle-aged people.

The typical No-voter was a woman, employed in the public sector. The typical
Yes-voter was a middle-aged, privately employed, man.

26
7. Conclusions

· Large resources required

· Unbiased information necessary

· Public debate necessary for final decision

In our experience, it was a wise decision to spend considerable resources on

information. A referendum as a forum for decision-making requires substantial
information efforts. As the Government itself was in favour of membership, it
was also wise to confine the allocation of money for adult education and
NGOs to a separate delegation.

In Sweden, with a well-developed network of adult education associations

and NGOs, information, knowledge and education that was channelled
outside official institutions was very important. To allocate substantial sums for
these organisations made the Government less vulnerable to criticism than if it
had tried to promote its own policies with public money. Public support for the
Fälldin Delegation was large. It was perceived as honest and just.

The Government deliberately chose not to use advertising- or PR agencies in

the information campaign. This would have backfired and certainly given the
whole campaign a less serious image. Those parties and organisations that
wanted to run their own campaigns pro or contra membership were, of
course, free to use agencies.

The Secretariat for Information on European Affairs managed to gain

relatively high credibility for its work, but the fact that it was placed within
the Foreign Ministry meant that it had to work hard to achieve it. This took a
lot of time and energy which could otherwise have been used for actual
information activities. On the other hand, the Secretariat would have had
great difficulties in receiving facts and updates on the negotiations if it had
been placed outside the Government Offices.

27
The Secretariat’s printed matter was initially subject to criticism for being
hidden propaganda. It was therefore was very cautious in eliminating all
judgements and views of opinion and concentrating on basic and easy
readable facts. Facts were received from experts in the ministries and then
edited into easily understandable texts. At times, this process created tensions
between experts and information officers, who had different roles. Experts
were working with the negotiations and, of course, arguing in favour of the
Government’s achievements while information officers were struggling to
show that they were unbiased and to make the EU interesting for people who
knew very little, which also meant simplifying the facts.

The two campaign organisations referred to the Secretariat from time to time,
on some occasions agreeing, and on others arguing that the Secretariat was
wrong. This was, in fact, positive for the Secretariat. It would have been
devastating always to have been applauded by one side.

The call centre and information available at libraries was a success in so far
that information was easily accessible for everyone. Printed matter was
produced in very large editions and it can be questioned whether the quantity
needed was actually over-estimated. However, this made it easy to find
throughout the country.

The least succesful part of the whole information campaign was probably the
brochures distributed to all households. One was sent out by the Secretariat
just when the negotiations opened (but was in fact written by experts in the
Government since the Secretariat did not yet have its own editorial staff). The
second was produced by the Government when the accession treaty was
closed and gave the Government’s view on the treaty. It was much criticised.
The impact of these brochures can be questioned. They were expensive to
distribute, many probably went into the waste paper basket and they were
accused of being hidden propaganda. The debate on being “neutral or not”,
clouded the main information purpose.

The Swedish information campaign took place in 1992-94, well before the
arrival of the Internet in daily life. If it had been organised today, a major part
of the information effort would probably have been published on the
Internet, and much less resources spent on brochures.

28
In conclusion, it must be appreciated that information campaigns are difficult
to run, especially on subjects that are controversial, which EU membership
was for Sweden. There is often an assumption that information campaigns are
hidden propaganda and the opposite then has to be proved.

The fact that the two campaign sides, working for Yes and No in the
referendum, were given equal economical support was extremely important.
Despite this, the No-side argued that the conditions were unfair, since the Yes-
side was, in fact, supported by industry, by the farmers association and several
trade unions that also put money into the Yes-campaign. The anti-EU
movement did not have such financially strong supporters and because of this,
it is true that the Yes-side was in fact financially stronger. Public support was
however allocated equally.

The main task of this campaign was to give the Swedish people information that
enabled citizens to form a personal opinion and to take part in the referendum.
The overall goal laid down by the Riksdag about “broad, comprehensive and
easy accessible information” prior to the referendum seems to have been
relatively well achieved. Information was available and people were engaged in
the matter. The level of knowledge, however, did not increase.

29
8. Appendix

The Fälldin Delegation in more detail

The Fälldin Delegation allocated funds for information projects run by adult
education associations and NGOs. In the second year, campaign organisations
were also invited to apply for grants. Support could be awarded for seminars,
courses, education and exhibitions as well as for the production and distribution
of information material. Support was not given to administration costs.
Individuals, companies, political parties and the mass media could not be granted
funds. The Delegation covered 80 per cent of the budgeted costs of an approved
project while the organisation itself had to provide the other 20 per cent.

To be approved, an information project had to be broad and comprehensive,

have a distinct information purpose and a target group. The effects of
membership on the situation of women in Sweden was a subject that was
particularly prioritised in accordance with the guidelines laid down by the
Riksdag. Applications had to contain a project plan and budget. This helped
the Delegation to conclude whether it was a seriously considered project that
would generate the widespread dissemination of information.

The Delegation announced every period of application in national morning

papers. On each occasion, several hundred organisations applied for funds and
from these, some 20-30 organisations were usually approved. The Delegation
chose to grant funds to major projects that were considered to have a good
chance of reaching out to the public.

The major part of the money was allocated to the well-established adult
educational associations and schools. In the first year (1991/1992) they
received SEK 16 million while SEK 9 million went to NGOs.
During the second year (1992/93), campaign organisations were also invited
to apply for contributions for campaign activities. The closer to the referendum,
the more important it was to help stimulate the debate on the pros and cons
of membership. Adult educational associations and schools received SEK 12

30
million, NGOs SEK 2 million and the campaign organistions SEK 5 million
each. An additional SEK 60 million (EUR 6.6 million) was subsequently
allocated to these organisations and the political parties in the Riksdag for
campaign activities.

The Secretariat’s main activities in more detail

Production of information material and data bases

· Brochures at different levels of simplification to make them easy to read

for everyone
· Data bases
· Fast production on topical issues

The Secretariat recruited its own journalists and started publishing booklets,
fact sheets and brochures with facts on European integration, covering the
EEA agreement and the EC/EU. Facts were collected from government
officials involved in European affairs and edited by the Secretariat’s editorial
office. The fact sheets were published in three different series at varying levels
of simplification.. The brochures had to be easily accessible in two ways; easy
to obtain, but also easy to read and comprehend. Ultimately, there were three
general brochures, 20 booklets and about 100 fact sheets at different levels.

Printed matter dealt with subjects that people wanted to know more about
(which the Secretariat gathered from the call centre). Eventually the material
covered all factual matters. Whenever there was an increase in interest in
some issue, a new fact sheet was produced in order to provide people with the
facts they wanted.

Printed matter was published in very large editions (300 000 to 600 000
copies). It was distributed all over the country and was free to pick up in all
public libraries. It was also to be found in, for example, employment offices,
hospitals and social insurance offices and closer to the referendum, in post
offices. The very first brochure was sent to all households.

31
In addition to printed matter, the Secretariat produced data bases
They consisted of :
“Questions and Answers” - answers to common questions received by the call
centre.
“EU Lecturers” - 700 experts and debaters from government ministries,
public authorities, universities, adult education associations, NGOs and
campaign organisations who had agreed to give lectures and take part in
debates.
“The EU Calendar” - information about activities and events concerning the
EU in Brussels as well as all over Sweden.
“EU directives” - directives and xx in full text
“ABC to Europe” - explanations for abbreviations
“EU bibliography” – an extensive bibliography over EU literature.

Spreading the information widely through networks

· Easy accessible information all over the country

· Cooperation with existing institutions

· Libraries encouraged to take on regional and local EU information

services

In order to spread printed matter, the Secretariat established contact with

several existing institutions and opinion-makers and engaged them in an
information network. These institutions continuously came into contact with
a large number of people of different ages and with different backgrounds.
Without them, the Secretariat would have been unable to reach all these
groups of people on its own. Furthermore, the Secretariat wanted to
cooperate with institutions that already enjoyed credibility from the public.
Using a network was time-saving in several ways.

32
The most innovative project was probably the way in which the Secretariat
invited Sweden’s well organised local public libraries and county
administrative boards to take part in an information network. A library
support organisation was created and libraries were offered several activities
and means to help them build up their own EU information services. In 1992,
there were approximately 1 400 library units in Sweden and as many as 60 per
cent of the population visited local libraries regularly.

Libraries received printed matter to hand out free to their visitors and had
data bases, reference literature and special advice services from the
Secretariat. The main libraries in each municipality appointed “EU-librarians”
who were offered a training programme (university level) on European
integration. If needed, “EU librarians” could be recruited within the
framework of a Government training scheme for the unemployed.

The EU services available at libraries were also marketed through the

Secretariat.

Libraries were also encouraged to cooperate with EU institutions and

campaign organisations, and display their printed matter as well. As a result,
public libraries came to play a very important part in the lead-up to the
referendum as well-known and easy accessible EU info points. There was a
steady increase in the demand for free brochures at all libraries.

Other institutions to be engaged were the county administrative boards. They

appointed “EU coordinators” with the task of networking within each region
and encouraging information activities arranged by organisations, institutions
and libraries, supported by the Secretariat.

Cooperation was also established with schools and teachers, universities,

organisations and NGOs. Journalists were another important group for the
Secretariat. All groups talking part in the information network were provided
with basic information, some especially designed for their particular need.
Seminars on several topics and with various target groups were also arranged
for them in different parts of Sweden.

33
The call centre
· A direct information service - call centre - for posing questions

· Basic facts, no pros and cons

· A data base of “Q’s and A’s” built up as a working tool

In addition to its other activities, the Information Secretariat set up a call

centre for those who wanted to pose questions directly and find out more
about particular issues. Moreover, such a service was necessary for people who
could not make it to a library. The call centre was both a way of ensuring that
information was easy accessible for everyone and a means of holding a
dialogue with people and finding out what they wanted to know. The call
centre was manned by young law and social science graduates who were
trained in EU integration and EC law. They were recruited under a
Government training programme for the unemployed. The service was
available on weekdays from 9 a.m. to 9 p.m. on a toll-free number. Callers
received an answer at once or otherwise within 24 hours. Printed matter
could also be ordered through the call centre. After being reviewed by
experts, the questions and answers were put into a data base. The “Q’s and A’s”
was used as a working tool when answering which allowed the call centre to
answer more rapidly over time. It was also used as input when deciding on
topics for new fact sheets.

At times, there was great pressure on the call centre. In general, the number of
calls increased every time the media contained news about Sweden and the
EEA agreement or Sweden and the EU.

To find out whether the Secretariat was really unbiased and neutral
concerning membership, many journalists called and “tested” the call centre.
Employees were, however, very cautious at giving any judgments or opinions.
Questions about the pros and cons of membership were also referred to the
two campaign organisations.

In the final months before the referendum, the number of calls increased day by
day, rocketing during the last two weeks. The call centre then received about a
thousand calls a day. Twenty people were engaged in answering questions.

34
Marketing

· Modest marketing budget

· Information spots on TV and radio

· Advertisements in newspapers when the interest arose

To further increase knowledge about the information available throughout the

country, the Secretariat did some marketing of its services. The budget for
marketing was fairly modest, only a few per cent of its total budget. The strategy
was to advertise when public interest rose due to EEA or EC/EU news in the
media. Focus was mainly put on the last couple of months, which were expected
to be the most intense as regards the debate and peoples’ interest.

The principal means of marketing were information spots on national and

commercial TV, national and local radio and a limited advertising campaign in
newspapers. The Secretariat advertised in the major national morning and
evening papers, as well as in local media and specialised periodicals, in order to
cover the whole country and people with different interests. The institutions
that took part in the network were also provided with posters to display their
own EU services.

The message of this marketing was “You need information prior to the
referendum to enable you to form your own opinion. Unbiased information is
available. Go to your library, dial the call centre and order our brochures”.

Activities taking place at libraries, schools, NGOs and other networking

institutions as well as attention in the media were still the most important
ways of marketing the information available prior to the referendum.

35
9. Appendix II

EU Preferences in Sweden

EU preferences (May 1992–May 1994). Percentage

Total Women
For Against Don’t Tot. No. For Against Don’t
know % resp. know
May ‘92 31.1 35.8 33.0 100 7522 23.1 39.4 37
Nov ‘92 27.4 43.2 29.4 100 7491 20.8 45.7 33
May ‘93 28.2 42.5 29.2 100 7406 21.0 45.7 33
Nov ‘93 26.0 44.8 29.2 100 7496 19.8 46.4 33
May ‘94 30.5 40.0 29.4 100 7492 24.6 41.2 34

Question: If there were a referendum today about Sweden joining the EU, h
or against joining?

EU preferences (May 1995 – May 1996). Percentage

Total Women
Yes/ No/ Don't Tot. No. Yes/ No/ Don't
for against know % resp. for against know
Referendum 48.3 42.0 9.7 100 7443 43.7 45.3 11
Nov ‘941
May ‘952 28.6 61.9 9.5 100 7422 23.2 65.7 11
Nov ‘95 26.9 60.5 12.6 100 7521 20.8 65.0 14
May ‘96 26.2 60.4 13.3 100 3673 19.9 65.1 15
May ‘963 30.0 52.4 17.6 100 3710 23.7 56.8 19
1
This is the distribution of the answers to the question: “How did you vote in
membership?”. In this case “Don’t know” includes 8.7 percentage points “Di
2
Question (May 1995–May 1996): If there were a referendum today on the S
the EU, how would you vote – YES or NO to membership?
3
Question (May 1996 –): Are you principally for or against Sweden’s memb
you undecided?

36
EU Preferences in Sweden May 1992 - May 2002

How woul d How did you How would For / aga

you vote? vote? you vote? members
Per cent
70

60
No

50
Against

40

30
For Yes

20
Don't know

10
Statis

0
May Nov May Nov May Ref. May Nov May Nov May Nov May Nov Ma
92 92 93 93 94 Nov94 95 95 96 96 97 97 98 98 99

37