PP vs Simplicio Villanueva

FACTS: In 1959, Villanueva was charged with Malicious Mischief in the

municipality of Alaminos in Laguna. In said case, the private offended party
asked his lawyer friend, Ariston Fule to prosecute said case. Apparently, Fule
was the fiscal in San Pablo, Laguna. Villanueva the opposed the appearance of
Fule as counsel for the offended party as he said that according to the Rules of
Court when an attorney had been appointed to the position of Assistant
Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal and therein qualified, by operation of law, he
ceased to engage in private law practice.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ariston Fule is engaged in private law practice.
HELD: No. Private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself
to be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his
professional services are available to the public for a compensation, as a source
of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services. In the case at bar, Fule is
not being compensated but rather he’s doing it for free for his friend who
happened to be the offended party. Practice is more than an isolated
appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts
of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise. Further, the fact
that the Secretary of Justice approved Fule’s appearance for his friend should be
given credence.

Cui vs Cui

Facts: The Hospicio de San Jose de Barili, is a charitable institution established

by the spouses Don Pedro Cui and Dona Benigna Cui for the care and support,
free of charge, of indigent invalids, and incapacitated and helpless persons.” It
acquired corporate existence by legislation (Act No. 3239). Sec. 2 of the Act gave
the initial management to the founders jointly and, in case of their incapacity or
death, to “such persons as they may nominate or designate, in the order
prescribed to them. (embodied in Sec. 2 of the spouses deed of donation)”

Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui and defendant Antonio Ma. Cui are brothers, being the
sons of Mariano Cui, one of the nephews of the spouses Don Pedro and Dona
Benigna Cui. In 1960, the then incumbent administrator of the Hospicio, resigned
in favor of Antonio Cui pursuant to a “convenio” entered into between them that
was embodied on a notarial document. Jesus Cui, however had no prior notice of
either the “convenio” or of his brother’s assumption of the position.

Upon the death of Dr. Teodoro Cui, Jesus Cui wrote a letter to his brother
Antonio, demanding that the office be turned over to him. When the demand was
not complied, Jesus filed this case. Lower court ruled in favor of Jesus.
ISSUE: Who is best qualified as administrator for the Hospicio?

HELD: Antonio should be the Hospicio’s administrator.

Jesus is the older of the two and under equal circumstances would be preferred
pursuant to sec.2 of the deed of donation. However, before the test of age may
be, applied the deed gives preference to the one, among the legitimate
descendants of the nephews named, who if not a lawyer (titulo de abogado),
should be a doctor or a civil engineer or a pharmacist, in that order; or if failing all
theses, should be the one who pays the highest taxes among those otherwise
qualified.

Jesus Ma. Cui holds the degree of Bachelor of laws but is not a member of the
Bar, not having passed the examinations. Antonio Ma. Cui, on the other hand, is
a member of the Bar and although disbarred in 1957, was reinstated by
resolution, about two weeks before he assumed the position of administrator of
the Hospicio.

The term “titulo de abogado” means not mere possession of the academic
degree of Bachelor of Laws but membership in the Bar after due admission
thereto, qualifying one for the practice of law. A Bachelor’s degree alone,
conferred by a law school upon completion of certain academic requirements,
does not entitle its holder to exercise the legal profession. By itself, the degree
merely serves as evidence of compliance with the requirements that an applicant
to the examinations has “successfully completed all the prescribed courses, in a
law school or university, officially approved by the Secretary of Education.

The founders of the Hospicio provided for a lwayer, first of all, because in all of
the works of an administrator, it is presumed, a working knowledge of the law
and a license to practice the profession would be a distinct asset.

Under this criterion, the plaintiff Jesus is not entitled as against defendant, to the
office of administrator. Reference is made to the fact that the defendant Antonio
was disbarred (for immorality and unprofessional conduct). However, it is also a
fact, that he was reinstated before he assumed the office of administrator. His
reinstatement is recognition of his moral rehabilitation, upon proof no less than
that required for his admission to the Bar in the first place. Also, when defendant
was restored to the roll of lawyers the restrictions and disabilities resulting from
his previous disbarment were wiped out.

In Re: Atty. Raul Almacen

FACTS:
Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen filed a “Petition to Surrender the Lawyer’s Certificate
of Title” to the Supreme Court as a sign of his protest as against to what he call a
tribunal “peopled by people who are calloused to our pleas for justice…”. He also
expressed strong words as against the judiciary like “justice… is not only blind,
but also deaf and dumb.” . The petition rooted from the case he lost due to the
absence of time and place in his motion in the trial court. His appeal was
dismissed in the Court of Appeals by reason of jurisprudence. In a petition for
certiorari in the Supreme Court, it was again dismissed thru a minute resolution.
With the disappointments, he thought of this sacrificial move. He claimed that this
petition to surrender his title is only in trust, and that he may obtain the title again
as soon as he regained confidence in the justice system.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Almacen should be given disciplinary actions for his acts.

HELD:
YES. Indefinite suspension imposed.

RATIO:
It has been pointed out by the Supreme Court that there is no one to blame but
Atty. Almacen himself because of his negligence. Even if the intentions of his
accusations are so noble, in speaking of the truth and alleged injustices,so as not
to condemn the sinners but the sin, it has already caused enough damage and
disrepute to the judiciary. Since this particular case is sui generis in its nature, a
number of foreign and local jurisprudence in analogous cases were cited as
benchmarks and references. Between disbarment and suspension, the latter was
imposed. Indefinite suspension may only be lifted until further orders, after Atty.
Almacen may be able to prove that he is again fit to resume the practice of law.

Tan vs Sabandal
Respondent Nicolas El. Sabandal passed the 1978 Bar Examinations but
because of pending administrative complaints filed against him, he was not
allowed to take the lawyer's oath. He then filed a Petition to be admitted to the
Philippine Bar and to be allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys. The complainants,
namely, Eufrosina Y. Tan, Benjamin Cabigon, Cornelio Agnis and Diomedes D.
Agnis, opposed the Petition on several grounds.

In a Resolution of this Court en banc promulgated on 29 November 1983,

respondent's petition was denied, the Court finding, inter alia, that:

"x x x the evidence supports the charge of unauthorized practice of law. While
respondent's infraction may be mitigated in that he appeared for his in-laws in
CAR Cases Nos. 347 and 326 where they were parties, it is clear from the
proceedings in CAR Case No. 347 that he clarified his position only after the
opposing counsel had objected to his appearance. Besides, he specifically
manifested 'Atty. Nicolas Sabandal, appearing for the defendants, your Honor'
(Exhibit 'A-1'). He called himself 'attorney' knowing full well that he was not yet
admitted to the Bar. Oppositors' evidence sufficiently shows that respondent had
held himself out as an 'attorney' in the agrarian, civil and criminal cases
mentioned by said oppositors. Respondent cannot shift the blame on the
stenographer, for he could have easily asked for rectification. x x x Oppositors
had also presented evidence of proceedings wherein witnesses testified as to
respondent's being their lawyer and their compensating him for his services
(Exhibits 'D-8' and 'D-9'). It may be that in the Court of a municipality, even non-
lawyers may appear (Sec. 34, Rule 138, Rules of Court). If respondent had so
manifested, no one could have challenged him. What he did, however, was to
hold himself out as a lawyer, and even to write the Station Commander of Roxas,
complaining of harassment to 'our clients', when he could not but have known
that he could not yet engage in the practice of law. His argument that the term
'client' is a 'dependent or person under the protection of another and not a person
who engages in the profession' is puerile." (126 SCRA 60, at 67 & 68)
A Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Resolution was filed by respondent
on 23 January 1984, which was opposed by Complainants, who stated that the
"span of time was so short to determine with sufficient definiteness whether or
not respondent has reformed;" that "the testimonials are self-serving obviously
prepared by respondent himself and had them signed by the signatories who
could not refuse him." In its Resolution of 8 May 1984 the Court denied
reconsideration.

On 23 May 1985 respondent filed an Ex-parte Motion for Reconsideration

reiterating his prayer to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath, which was again
opposed by Complainants, and which was denied by the Court on 16 July 1985,
with the Court stating that no other Motions of this kind would be entertained.

Undaunted, on 2 December 1985, respondent filed another Motion for

Reconsideration and Appeal for Mercy and Forgiveness, which the Court simply
NOTED in its Resolution of 7 January 1986.

In a letter dated 4 December 1986 respondent's children echoed his appeal to

the Court to allow him to take the lawyer's oath, which the Court noted without
action on 7 July 1987.

On 28 June 1988, respondent filed a second Petition to be allowed to take the

lawyer's oath. Complainants were required to comment but they have not done
so to date.

In a letter dated 23 November 1988 addressed to the Chief Justice and

Associate Justices of this Court, respondent asks for forgiveness, understanding
and benevolence and promises that, if given a chance to be a member of the
Philippine Bar, he would always be faithful to the lawyer's oath and conduct
himself in an upright manner.

Whether or not respondent shall be admitted to the Philippine Bar rests to a great
extent in the sound discretion of the Court. An applicant must satisfy the Court
that he is a person of good moral character, fit and proper to practice law.

In several cases wherein reinstatements to the legal profession were allowed, the
following criteria were considered: the person appreciates the significance of his
dereliction and he has assured the Court that he now possesses the requisite
probity and integrity necessary to guarantee that he is worthy to be restored to
the practice of law (Magat vs. Santiago, L-43301-45665, April 1, 1980, 97 SCRA
1); the time that has elapsed between disbarment and the application for
reinstatement, his good conduct and honorable dealing subsequent to his
disbarment, his active involvement in civic, educational, and religious
organizations (In Re: Juan T. Publico, 102 SCRA 721 [1981]); the favorable
indorsement of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, as well as the local
government officials and citizens of his community (In Re: Quinciano D.
Vailoces, Adm. Case No. 439, September 30, 1982; 117 SCRA 1); the pleas of
his mother and wife for the sake and the future of his family (Andres vs.
Cabrera, SBC-585, February 29, 1984, 127 SCRA 802).

The foregoing criteria may be made applicable to respondent's case. After the
lapse of ten (10) years from the time respondent took and passed the 1978 Bar
Examination, he has shown contrition and willingness to reform. He has also
submitted several testimonials, including one from the IBP Zamboanga del Norte,
attesting to his good moral character and civic consciousness.

ACCORDINGLY, respondent Nicolas El. Sabandal is hereby allowed to take the

lawyer's oath, with the Court binding him to his assurance that he shall strictly
abide by and adhere to the language, meaning and spirit of the Lawyer's Oath
and the highest standards of the legal profession.

Rose Bunagan-Bansig vs Atty. Rogelio Celera

Facts: Bansig, sister of bunagan narrated that, respondent and Gracemarie R.

Bunagan, entered into a contract of marriage. However, notwithstanding
respondent’s marriage with Bunagan, respondent contracted another marriage
with a certain Ma. Cielo Paz Torres Alba, as evidenced by a certified xerox copy
of the certificate of marriage Bansig stressed that the marriage between
respondent and Bunagan was still valid and in full legal existence when he
contracted his second marriage with Alba, and that the first marriage had never
been annulled or rendered void by any lawful authority.

Bansig alleged that respondent’s act of contracting marriage with Alba, while his
marriage is still subsisting, constitutes grossly immoral and conduct unbecoming
of a member of the Bar, which renders him unfit to continue his membership in
the Bar.

Issue: whether respondent is still fit to continue to be an officer of the court in the
dispensation of justice

Ruling: For purposes of this disbarment proceeding, these Marriage Certificates

bearing the name of respondent are competent and convincing evidence to prove
that he committed bigamy, which renders him unfit to continue as a member of
the Bar

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.

Canon 7- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of

him as a member of the Bar. He made a mockery of marriage, a sacred
institution demanding respect and dignity. His act of contracting a second
marriage while his first marriage is subsisting constituted grossly immoral
conduct and are grounds for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Revised Rules of Court.

Jose Alcala vs Honesto De Leon

https://www.scribd.com/document/192856932/Alcala-vs-de-Vera

Natividad Navarro vs Ivan Solidum

PER CURIAM:
This case originated from a complaint for disbarment, dated 26 May 2008, filed
by Natividad P. Navarro (Navarro) and Hilda S. Presbitero (Presbitero) against
Atty. Ivan M. Solidum, Jr. (respondent) before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD).
From the Report, dated 1 July 2009, of the IBP-CBD, we gathered the following
facts of the case:

On 4 April 2006, respondent signed a retainer agreement with Presbitero to

follow up the release of the payment for the latter's 2.7-hectare property located
in Bacolod which was the subject of a Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) to the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). The agreement also included the
payment of the debts of Presbitero's late husband to the Philippine National Bank
(PNB), the sale of the retained areas of the property, and the collection of the
rentals due for the retained areas from their occupants. It appeared that the DAR
was supposed to pay P700,000 for the property but it was mortgaged by
Presbitero and her late husband to PNB for P1,200,000. Presbitero alleged that
PNB's claim had already prescribed, and she engaged the services of
respondent to represent her in the matter. Respondent proposed the filing of a
case for quieting of title against PNB. Respondent and Presbitero agreed to an
attorney's fee of 10% of the proceeds from the VOS or the sale of the property,
with the expenses to be advanced by Presbitero but deductible from
respondent's fees. Respondent received P50,000 from Presbitero, supposedly
for the expenses of the case, but nothing came out of it.

In May 2006, Presbitero's daughter, Ma. Theresa P. Yulo (Yulo), also engaged
respondent's services to handle the registration of her 18.85-hectare lot located
in Nasud-ong, Caradio-an, Himamaylan, Negros. Yulo convinced her sister,
Navarro, to finance the expenses for the registration of the property. Respondent
undertook to register the property in consideration of 30% of the value of the
property once it is registered. Respondent obtained P200,000 from Navarro for
the registration expenses. Navarro later learned that the registration decree over
the property was already issued in the name of one Teodoro Yulo. Navarro
alleged that she would not have spent for the registration of the property if
respondent only apprised her of the real situation of the property.

On 25 May 2006, respondent obtained a loan of P1,000,000 from Navarro to

finance his sugar trading business. Respondent and Navarro executed a
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) and agreed that the loan (a) shall be for a
period of one year; (b) shall earn interest at the rate of 10% per month; and (c)
shall be secured by a real estate mortgage over a property located in Barangay
Alijis, Bacolod City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 304688. They
also agreed that respondent shall issue postdated checks to cover the principal
amount of the loan as well as the interest thereon. Respondent delivered the
checks to Navarro, drawn against an account in Metrobank, Bacolod City Branch,
and signed them in the presence of Navarro.

In June 2006, respondent obtained an additional loan of P1,000,000 from

Navarro, covered by a second MOA with the same terms and conditions as the
first MOA. Respondent sent Navarro, through a messenger, postdated checks
drawn against an account in Bank of Commerce, Bacolod City Branch.
Respondent likewise discussed with Navarro about securing a "Tolling
Agreement" with Victorias Milling Company, Inc. but no agreement was signed.

At the same time, respondent obtained a loan of P1,000,000 from Presbitero

covered by a third MOA, except that the real estate mortgage was over a 263-
square-meter property located in Barangay Taculing, Bacolod City. Respondent
sent Presbitero postdated checks drawn against an account in Metrobank,
Bacolod City Branch.

Presbitero was dissatisfied with the value of the 263-square-meter property

mortgaged under the third MOA, and respondent promised to execute a real
estate mortgage over a 1,000-square-meter parcel of land adjacent to the 4,000-
square-meter property he mortgaged to Navarro. However, respondent did not
execute a deed for the additional security.

Respondent paid the loan interest for the first few months. He was able to pay
complainants a total of P900,000. Thereafter, he failed to pay either the principal
amount or the interest thereon. In September 2006, the checks issued by
respondent to complainants could no longer be negotiated because the accounts
against which they were drawn were already closed. When complainants called
respondent's attention, he promised to pay the agreed interest for September
and October 2006 but asked for a reduction of the interest to 7% for the
succeeding months.

In November 2006, respondent withdrew as counsel for Yulo. On the other hand,
Presbitero terminated the services of respondent as counsel. Complainants then
filed petitions for the judicial foreclosure of the mortgages executed by
respondent in their favor. Respondent countered that the 10% monthly interest
on the loan was usurious and illegal. Complainants also filed cases for estafa
and violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 against respondent.

Complainants alleged that respondent induced them to grant him loans by

offering very high interest rates. He also prepared and signed the checks which
turned out to be drawn against his son's accounts. Complainants further alleged
that respondent deceived them regarding the identity and value of the property
he mortgaged because he showed them a different property from that which he
owned. Presbitero further alleged that respondent mortgaged his 263-square-
meter property to her for P1,000,000 but he later sold it for only P150,000.

Respondent, for his defense, alleged that he was engaged in sugar and realty
business and that it was Yulo who convinced Presbitero and Navarro to extend
him loans. Yulo also assured him that Presbitero would help him with the refining
of raw sugar through Victorias Milling Company, Inc. Respondent alleged that
Navarro fixed the interest rate and he agreed because he needed the money. He
alleged that their business transactions were secured by real estate mortgages
and covered by postdated checks. Respondent denied that the property he
mortgaged to Presbitero was less than the value of the loan. He also denied that
he sold the property because the sale was actually rescinded. Respondent
claimed that the property he mortgaged to Navarro was valuable and it was
actually worth more than P8,000,000.

Respondent alleged that he was able to pay complainants when business was
good but he was unable to continue paying when the price of sugar went down
and when the business with Victorias Milling Company, Inc. did not push through
because Presbitero did not help him. Respondent also denied that he was hiding
from complainants.

Respondent further alleged that it was Yulo who owed him P530,000 as interest
due for September to December 2005. He denied making any false
representations. He claimed that complainants were aware that he could no
longer open a current account and they were the ones who proposed that his
wife and son issue the checks. Respondent further alleged that he already
started with the titling of Yulo's lot but his services were terminated before it could
be completed.

A supplemental complaint was filed charging respondent with accepting cases

while under suspension. In response, respondent alleged that he accepted
Presbitero's case in February 2006 and learned of his suspension only in May
2006.

After conducting a hearing and considering the position papers submitted by the
parties, the IBP-CBD found that respondent violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

The IBP-CBD found that respondent borrowed P2,000,000 from Navarro and
P1,000,000 from Presbitero which he failed to pay in accordance with the MOAs
he executed. The IBP-CBD found that based on the documents presented by the
parties, respondent did not act in good faith in obtaining the loans. The IBP-CBD
found that respondent either promised or agreed to pay the very high interest
rates of the loans although he knew them to be exorbitant in accordance with
jurisprudence. Respondent likewise failed to deny that he misled Navarro and her
husband regarding the identity of the property mortgaged to them. Respondent
also mortgaged a property to Presbitero for P1,000,000 but documents showed
that its value was only P300,000. Documents also showed that he sold that
property for only P150,000. Respondent conspired with Yulo to secure loans by
promising her a 10% commission and later claimed that they agreed that Yulo
would "ride" on the loan by borrowing P300,000 from the amount he obtained
from Navarro and Presbitero. Respondent could not explain how he lost all the
money he borrowed in three months except for his claim that the price of sugar
went down.
 The IBP-CBD found that respondent misled Navarro and Presbitero regarding
the issuance of the postdated checks, and there was nothing in the records that
would show that he informed them that it would be his wife or son who would
issue the checks. The IBP-CBD also found that respondent had not been
transparent in liquidating the money he received in connection with Presbitero's
VOS with DAR. He was also negligent in his accounting regarding the
registration of Yulo's property which was financed by Navarro.

The IBP-CBD found that respondent was guilty of violating Rule 1.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility for committing the following acts:

(1) signing drawn checks against the account of his son as if they were from his own account;
(2) misrepresenting to Navarro the identity of the lot he mortgaged to her;
(3) misrepresenting to Presbitero the true value of the 263-square- meter lot he mortgaged to her;
(4) conspiring with Yulo to obtain the loans from complainants;
(5) agreeing or promising to pay 10% interest on his loans although he knew that it was exorbitant; and
failing to pay his loans because the checks he issued were dishonored as the accounts were already
(6)
closed.

The IBP-CBD also found that respondent violated Canon 16 and Rule 16.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility when he failed to properly account for
the various funds he received from complainants.

In addition, the IBP-CBD found that respondent violated Rule 16.04 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility which prohibits borrowing money from a client
unless the client's interest is fully protected or the client is given independent
advice.

On the matter of practicing law while under suspension, the IBP-CBD found that
the records were not clear whether the notice of suspension respondent received
on 29 May 2006 was the report and recommendation of the IBP-CBD or the final
decision of this Court. The IBP-CBD likewise found that there was insufficient
evidence to prove that respondent mishandled his cases.

The IBP-CBD recommended that respondent be meted the penalty of

disbarment.

In Resolution No. XIX-2011-267 dated 14 May 2011, the IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved the recommendation of the IBP-CBD with modification by
reducing the recommended penalty from disbarment to suspension from the
practice of law for two years. The IBP Board of Governors likewise ordered
respondent to return the amount of his unpaid obligation to complainants.

Complainants filed a motion for reconsideration, praying that the penalty of

disbarment be instead imposed upon respondent.
The only issue in this case is whether respondent violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

The records show that respondent violated at least four provisions of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 1.01. - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or

deceitful conduct.

With respect to his client, Presbitero, it was established that respondent agreed
to pay a high interest rate on the loan he obtained from her. He drafted the MOA.
Yet, when he could no longer pay his loan, he sought to nullify the same MOA he
drafted on the ground that the interest rate was unconscionable. It was also
established that respondent mortgaged a 263-square-meter property to
Presbitero for P1,000,000 but he later sold the property for only P150,000,
showing that he deceived his client as to the real value of the mortgaged
property. Respondent's allegation that the sale was eventually rescinded did not
distract from the fact that he did not apprise Presbitero as to the real value of the
property.

Respondent failed to refute that the checks he issued to his client Presbitero and
to Navarro belonged to his son, Ivan Garcia Solidum III whose name is similar to
his name. He only claimed that complainants knew that he could no longer open
a current bank account, and that they even suggested that his wife or son issue
the checks for him. However, we are inclined to agree with the IBP-CBD's
finding that he made complainants believe that the account belonged to him. In
fact, respondent signed in the presence of Navarro the first batch of checks he
issued to Navarro. Respondent sent the second batch of checks to Navarro and
the third batch of checks to Presbitero through a messenger, and complainants
believed that the checks belonged to accounts in respondent's name.

It is clear that respondent violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility. We have ruled that conduct, as used in the Rule, is not confined
to the performance of a lawyer's professional duties.[1] A lawyer may be
disciplined for misconduct committed either in his professional or private
capacity.[2] The test is whether his conduct shows him to be wanting in moral
character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, or whether it renders him
unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.[3]

In this case, the loan agreements with Navarro were done in respondent's private
capacity. Although Navarro financed the registration of Yulo's lot, respondent and
Navarro had no lawyer-client relationship. However, respondent was Presbitero's
counsel at the time she granted him a loan. It was established that respondent
misled Presbitero on the value of the property he mortgaged as a collateral for
his loan from her. To appease Presbitero, respondent even made a Deed of
Undertaking that he would give her another 1,000-square-meter lot as additional
collateral but he failed to do so.

Clearly, respondent is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct, both

in his professional capacity with respect to his client, Presbitero, and in his
private capacity with respect to complainant Navarro. Both Presbitero and
Navarro allowed respondent to draft the terms of the loan agreements.
Respondent drafted the MOAs knowing that the interest rates were exorbitant.
Later, using his knowledge of the law, he assailed the validity of the same MOAs
he prepared. He issued checks that were drawn from his son's account whose
name was similar to his without informing complainants. Further, there is nothing
in the records that will show that respondent paid or undertook to pay the loans
he obtained from complainants.

Canon 16 and Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provide:

CANON 16. - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND

PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.

Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received
for or from the client.

The fiduciary nature of the relationship between the counsel and his client
imposes on the lawyer the duty to account for the money or property collected or
received for or from his client.[4] We agree with the IBP-CBD that respondent
failed to fulfill this duty. In this case, the IBP-CBD pointed out that respondent
received various amounts from complainants but he could not account for all of
them.

Navarro, who financed the registration of Yulo's 18.85-hectare lot, claimed that
respondent received P265,000 from her. Respondent countered that P105,000
was paid for real estate taxes but he could not present any receipt to prove his
claim. Respondent also claimed that he paid P70,000 to the surveyor but the
receipt was only for P15,000. Respondent claimed that he paid P50,000 for filing
fee, publication fee, and other expenses but again, he could not substantiate his
claims with any receipt. As pointed out by the IBP-CBD, respondent had been
less than diligent in accounting for the funds he received from Navarro for the
registration of Yulo's property. Unfortunately, the records are not clear whether
respondent rendered an accounting to Yulo who had since passed away.

As regards Presbitero, it was established during the clarificatory hearing that

respondent received P50,000 from Presbitero. As the IBP-CBD pointed out, the
records do not show how respondent spent the funds because he was not
transparent in liquidating the money he received from Presbitero.

Clearly, respondent had been negligent in properly accounting for the money he
received from his client, Presbitero. Indeed, his failure to return the excess
money in his possession gives rise to the presumption that he has
misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice of, and in violation of the trust
reposed in him by, the client.[5]

Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 16.04. - A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client's
interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice.
Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the interest of
justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling
for the client.

Here, respondent does not deny that he borrowed P1,000,000 from his client
Presbitero. At the time he secured the loan, respondent was already the retained
counsel of Presbitero.

While respondent's loan from Presbitero was secured by a MOA, postdated

checks and real estate mortgage, it turned out that respondent misrepresented
the value of the property he mortgaged and that the checks he issued were not
drawn from his account but from that of his son. Respondent eventually
questioned the terms of the MOA that he himself prepared on the ground that the
interest rate imposed on his loan was unconscionable. Finally, the checks issued
by respondent to Presbitero were dishonored because the accounts were already
closed. The interest of his client, Presbitero, as lender in this case, was not fully
protected. Respondent violated Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which presumes that the client is disadvantaged by the lawyer's
ability to use all the legal maneuverings to renege on his obligation.[6] In his
dealings with his client Presbitero, respondent took advantage of his knowledge
of the law as well as the trust and confidence reposed in him by his client.

We modify the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors imposing on

respondent the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for two years.
Given the facts of the case, we see no reason to deviate from the
recommendation of the IBP-CBD imposing on respondent the penalty of
disbarment. Respondent failed to live up to the high standard of morality,
honesty, integrity, and fair dealing required of him as a member of the legal
profession.[7] Instead, respondent employed his knowledge and skill of the law
and took advantage of his client to secure undue gains for himself[8] that warrants
his removal from the practice of law. Likewise, we cannot sustain the IBP Board
of Governors' recommendation ordering respondent to return his unpaid
obligation to complainants, except for advances for the expenses he received
from his client, Presbitero, that were not accounted at all. In disciplinary
proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is whether the officer of the court is
still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar.[9] Our only concern is
the determination of respondent's administrative liability.[10] Our findings have no
material bearing on other judicial action which the parties may choose to file
against each other.[11] Nevertheless, when a lawyer receives money from a client
for a particular purpose involving the client-attorney relationship, he is bound to
render an accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for that
particular purpose.[12] If the lawyer does not use the money for the intended
purpose, he must immediately return the money to his client.[13] Respondent was
given an opportunity to render an accounting, and he failed. He must return the
full amount of the advances given him by Presbitero, amounting to P50,000.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Atty. Ivan M. Solidum, Jr. GUILTY of violating
Rule 1.01, Canon 16, Rule 16.01, and Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Accordingly, the Court DISBARS him from the practice of law
effective immediately upon his receipt of this Decision.

Atty. Solidum is ORDERED to return the advances he received from Hilda S.

Presbitero, amounting to P50,000, and to submit to the Office of the Bar
Confidant his compliance with this order within thirty days from finality of this
Decision.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all its chapters, and the Office
of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts all over the country. Let
a copy of this Decision be attached to the personal records of respondent.

Ceferino Delos Santos vs Sebastian Palanca

FACTS: In 1952, Atty. Ceferino De Los Santos, Sr. and his son, also a lawyer,
was engaged by Sebastian Palanca to represent the latter in an estate
proceedings case. Their written agreement only covered the estate case.
However, some time later, Palanca also engaged the services of Attys. De Los
Santos in a civil case against La Tondeña, Inc. That was not covered by any
written agreement.
That case was later dismissed due to the negligence of Atty. De Los Santos and
their failure to appear in court during trial. As such, Palanca refused to pay them
their attorney’s fees. It is the contention of Atty. De Los Santos that they should
still be paid their fees amounting to Php40,000.00 based on quantum meruit.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. De Los Santos and his son are entitled to attorney’s
fees based on quantum meruit.
HELD: No. It was upon their negligence that the civil case was dismissed. Even
assuming that their negligence is excusable, as they in fact so claim, still, the fact
is, the case was dismissed due to their non-appearance and negligence. Hence,
they are not entitled to any fee at all.

Gloria Jinon vs Leonardo Jiz

FACTS: In 2003, Gloria Jinon engaged the services of Atty. Leonardo Jiz to help
her recover a land title from her sister-in-law. Jinon paid Atty. Jiz Php17,000.00
as acceptance fee.
After accepting the case, Atty. Jiz sent demand letters to Jinon’s sister-in-law,
collected rents from the tenant of the disputed property, and gave legal advice to
Jinon. At the same time, he asked Php45,000.00 from Jinon which he said will be
used as expenses in the transfer of title. But Atty. Jiz never made a move to
cause the title to be transferred in Jinon’s name.
Eventually, Jinon decided to terminate the services of Atty. Jiz. And since the title
was not transferred in her name, she demanded that Atty. Jiz return the
Php45,000.00 she earlier paid as well as the rents that Atty. Jiz had been
collecting (amounting to Php12,000.00). Atty. Jiz only returned Php5,000.00 from
the rent.
Jinon then filed an administrative case against Atty. Jiz. Jinon demanded that
Atty. Jiz return the Php45,000.00, the remaining Php7,000.00 rent, as well as the
Php17,000.00 acceptance fee.
In his defense, Atty. Jiz averred that Jinon agreed that his services will be worth
Php75,000.00; and that his services will only cover the protection of the rights of
Jinon against her sister in law and not for the recovery of title. As such, deducting
the Php45,000.00 and the acceptance fee of Php17,000.00, Jinon actually still
owe Atty. Jiz Php13,000.00.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Leonardo Jiz violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
HELD: Yes, he violated Canons 16 and 18. Atty. Jiz was remiss in his duties as
a lawyer in neglecting his client’s case and misappropriating her fund. The
defense raised by Atty. Jiz cannot be given credence because it appears that the
receipt for the acceptance fee he received from Jinon showed that the Php17 k
was the “full payment”. The receipt was even signed by him. Said amount is also
sufficient to cover the actual legal services he rendered to Jinon.
Since he was not able to act on the transfer of title, he must return Jinon’s
money. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose, such as for the
processing of transfer of land title, but not used for the purpose, should be
immediately returned. A lawyer’s failure to return upon demand the funds
held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has
appropriated the same for his own use in violation of the trust reposed to
him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general morality as well as of
professional ethics. It impairs public confidence in the legal profession and
deserves punishment. Atty. Jiz was suspended for two years.
 COMELEC vs Noynay
Facts: In an Order issued on 25 August 1997, respondent Judge Tomas B.
Noynay,as presiding judge of Branch 23, motu proprio ordered the records of the
cases to bewithdrawn and directed the Comelec Law Department to file the
cases with theappropriate Municipal Trial Court on the ground that pursuant to
Section 32 of B.P.Blg. 129 as amended by R.A. no. 7691, the Regional Trial
Court has no jurisdictionover the cases since the maximum imposable penalty in
each of the cases does notexceed six years of imprisonment.

Issue:WhetherornotR.A.No.7691hasdivestedRegion
a l T r i a l C o u r t s o r jurisdiction over election offenses, which are punishable
with imprisonment of notexceeding six years.

Held: By virtue of the exception provided for in opening sentence of section 32 of

B.P. Blg. 129, the exclusive original jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts,
MunicipalTrial Courts and Municipal Circuit Courts does not cover those criminal
cases whichby specific provisions of law fall within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of RegionalTrial Courts and of the Sandiganbayan, regardless of the
penalty prescribed therefor.Pursuant to Section 268 of the Omnibus Election
Code, election offenses also fallwithin the exception provided for in the opening
sentence of Section 32 of BatasP a m b a n s a 1 2 9 . Republic Act 7691 can by
no means be considered as a special law on jurisdiction –it is merely an
amendatory law intended to amend specific sections of the
JudiciaryReorganization Act of 1980 and it does not have the effect of repealing
laws vestingupon the Regional trial Courts or the Sandiganbayan exclusive
original jurisdiction toheart and decide the cases therein specified.Congress may
thus provide by law that a certain class of cases should be exclusivelyheard and
determined by one court. Such law would be a special law and must beconstrued
as an exception to the general law on jurisdiction of courts. However, Congress
never intended that R. A. no. 7691 should repeal such special provisions
isindubitably evident from the fact that it did not touch at all the opening sentence
of Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129 providing for the exception.
 Libertad Cantiller vs Atty. Humberto
FACTS: In 1987, the sisters Ma. Libertad Cantiller and Peregrina Cantiller lost an
ejectment case. The two were later introduced by a friend to Atty. Humberto
Potenciano. Potenciano said he can help the sisters because the judge handling
the case was his close friend. Potenciano, with the little time he got, immediately
filed a petition to counter the order to vacate issued against the sisters. He asked
for P1,000.00 for his fees from the sisters.
But later on, the judge handling the case asked Potenciano to inhibit because of
the fact that they are friends. Potenciano then asked an additional P2,000.00
from the sisters. He said he needs to find another judge who can rule in their
favor. He also asked another P10,000.00 from the sisters. He said this amount is
needed in order for them to re-acquire their apartment. On top of the P10k, he
also asked for another P1k for additional expenses. The sisters were able to pool
resources from friends just to raise the amount asked for by Potenciano.
It turned out however that the court never asked P10k from the parties nor was
the additional P1k asked by the court. Worse, said amount (P11k) was never
deposited in court. The sisters demanded Potenciano to return the said amount
but he failed to do so hence they filed an administrative case against him. In his
defense, Potenciano claimed that the sister were merely harassing him.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Potenciano should be subjected to disciplinary
actions.
HELD: Yes. From the records, it appears that Potenciano haphazardly prepared
the pleadings he wrote for the sisters. In fact, the cases he filed for the sisters
were all dismissed for lack of cause of action. Worse, he got P11k from the
sisters but never used the same for the case instead he pocketed it for
himself. When he contracted the sisters, Potenciano, as a lawyer, bound himself
to undertake his legal services with maximum effort until the conclusion of the
case. The failure to exercise due diligence or the abandonment of a client’s
cause makes such lawyer unworthy of the trust which the client had reposed on
him.
It is also of no moment that Potenciano had little time to prepare for the pleading.
When he accepted the case, his clients reposed full faith in him. But he never
complemented the trust and faith reposed in him. He even bragged his closeness
with the judge and even intimated the need to “buy” another judge. Such actions
are reprehensible.
Potenciano was suspended indefinitely until he can show to the court that he is fit
to practice law.

Atty. Elmer Solidon vs Atty. Ramil Macalalad

FACTS:
Complainant, through a mutual acquaintance asked respondent to handle the
judicial titling of a parcel of land owned by complainant’s relatives. Respondent
accepted the task to be completed within a period of eight (8) months and
received Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as initial payment; the remaining
balance of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) was to be paid when
complainant received the certificate of title to the property. Respondent has not
filed any petition for registration over the property sought to be titled up to the
filing of this case. In the Complaint, Position Papers and documentary evidence
submitted, complainant claimed that he tried to contact respondent to follow-up
on the status of the case six (6) months after he paid the initial legal fees. He did
this through phone calls and text messages to their known acquaintances and
relatives, and, finally, through a letter sent by courier to the
respondent. However, he did not receive any return communication.
Complainant sought the disbarment of respondent for violations of Rule
16.01, Rule 18.03, and Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
involving negligence in handling a case. Complainant argued that he had no
intention of reneging from his obligation, as he already had prepared the draft
petition, and he failed to file it because it lacked the needed documentary
requirements that his clients should have furnished him. The Investigating
Commissioner of IBP made a finding negligence on the part of the respondent.
This was affirmed by the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline.

ISSUE:
Legal Ethics
(1) Whether or not the respondent’s excuse is exculpatory.

RULING:
Legal Ethics
(1) No. Respondent’s excuse is not exculpatory. He was imposed the (modified)
penalty of suspension for six (6) months from the practice of law and was
ordered to return to the complainant the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) with interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum from the date of
promulgation of the Decision until the full amount is returned.
In administrative cases against lawyers, the quantum of proof required is
preponderance of evidence which the complainant has the burden to
discharge. We fully considered the evidence presented and we are fully satisfied
that the complainant’s evidence, as outlined above, fully satisfies the required
quantum of proof in proving respondent’s negligence. Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility provides for the rule on negligence and
states:

Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
The Court has consistently held, in construing this Rule, that the mere failure of
the lawyer to perform the obligations due to the client is considered per se a
violation. (underscoring provided)
In addition to the above finding of negligence, [Court] also [found] respondent
guilty of violating Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
requires a lawyer to account for all the money received from the client. In this
case, respondent did not immediately account for and promptly return the money
he received from complainant even after he failed to render any legal service
within the contracted time of the engagement.

Hornilla vs Salunat
Facts: Hornilla filed a complaint against Atty. Salunat with the IBP Commission
on Bar Discipline for unethical practice regarding conflict of interests. Said
counsel is a member of the ASSA Law Office and acted as the lawyer for the
Philippine Public School Teacher’s Association.

In a squabble between the PPSTA and some of its board members pending SEC
resolution for unlawful spending and undervalued sale of real properties, Atty.
Salunat appeared as counsel for said board members.

Respondent says he only appeared in behalf of ASSA since he was a partner.

Moreover, he only filed a Manifestation for extreme urgency.

Issue: Whether or not Salunat is guilty of unethical behavior as a member of the

IBP.

Held: Yes. Respondent Atty. Ernesto Salunat is found GUILTY of representing

conflicting interests and is ADMONISHED to observe a higher degree of fidelity
in the practice of his profession. He is further WARNED that a repetition of the
same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

RULE 15.03. A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.

There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two

or more opposing parties. The test is whether or not in behalf of one client, it is
the lawyers duty to fight for an issue orclaim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the
other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by
him when he argues for the other client. This rule covers not only cases in which
confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which no
confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interests
if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to perform
an act which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he
represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use
against his first client any knowledge acquired through their connection.Another
test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation
will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and
loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the
performance thereof.

Where corporate directors have committed a breach of trust either by their

frauds, ultra vires acts, or negligence, and the corporation is unable or unwilling
to institute suit to remedy the wrong, a stockholder may sue on behalf of himself
and other stockholders and for the benefit of the corporation, to bring about a
redress of the wrong done directly to the corporation and indirectly to the
stockholders. This is what is known as a derivative suit, and settled is the
doctrine that in a derivative suit, the corporation is the real party in interest while
the stockholder filing suit for the corporations behalf is only nominal party. The
corporation should be included as a party in the suit.

In the case at bar, the records show that SEC Case No. 05-97-5657, entitled
Philippine Public School Teachers Assn., Inc., et al. v. 1992-1995 Board of
Directors of the Philippine Public School Teachers Assn. (PPSTA), et al., was
filed by the PPSTA against its own Board of Directors. Respondent admits that
the ASSA Law Firm, of which he is the Managing Partner, was the retained
counsel of PPSTA. Yet, he appeared as counsel of record for the respondent
Board of Directors in the said case. Clearly, respondent was guilty of conflict of
interest when he represented the parties against whom his other client, the
PPSTA, filed suit.