Bentir vs leanda

Facts: Respondent Leyte Gulf Traders, Inc. filed a complaint for reformation of instrument, specific
performance, annulment of conditional sale and damages with prayer for writ of injunction against
petitioners Yolanda Rosello-Bentir and the spouses Samuel and Charito Pormida. Respondent
corporation alleged that it entered into a contract of lease of a parcel of land with petitioner Bentir for a
period of twenty years starting May 5, 1968. According to respondent corporation, the lease was
extended for another four years or until May 31, 1992. On May 5, 1989, petitioner Bentir sold the leased
premises to petitioner spouses Samuel Pormada and Charito Pormada. Respondent corporation
questioned the sale alleging that it had a right of first refusal. Petitioners allege that the inadvertence of
the lawyer who prepared the lease contract is not a ground for reformation. The trial court dismissed
the case against petitioners. An appeal was brought to the CA which reversed RTC’s ruling. Hence this
appeal.

Issue: Whether or not reformation was justified and that such right has not prescribed

Held: The remedy of reformation of an instrument is grounded on the principle of equity where, in order
to express the true intention of the contracting parties, an instrument already executed is allowed by
law to be reformed. In the case at bar, respondent corporation had ten years from 1968, the time when
the contract of lease was executed, to file an action for reformation. It did so only on May 15, 1992 or
twenty-four years after the cause of action accrued, hence, its cause of action has prescribed. If the
extended period of lease was expressly agreed upon by the parties, then the term should be exactly
what the parties stipulated. Even if the supposed 4-year extended lease be considered as an implied
new lease under Art. 1670, "the other terms of the original contract" contemplated in said provision are
only those terms which are germane to the lessee's right of continued enjoyment of the property
leased. The prescriptive period of ten years provided for in Art. 1144 applies by operation of law, not by
the will of the parties. Therefore, the right of action for reformation accrued from the date of execution
of the contract of lease in 1968. Even if there was no prescription, respondent corporation brought the
present action for reformation after an alleged breach or violation of the contract was already
committed by petitioner Bentir. Consequently, the remedy of reformation no longer lies.
Concepcion Ainza et al v. Antonio and Eugenia Padua

June 18, 2012

This is a case involving family members. In April 1987, Ainza and her daughter Eugenia orally agreed that
Ainza pay P100k in exchange for half of the portion of Eugenia’s undivided conjugal property (a lot
located in QC). No Deed of Absolute Sale was executed. There was physical delivery of the land through
Concepcion’s other daughter (Natividad) acting as atty-in-fact. Concepcion thereafter allowed Natividad
and her husband occupy the purchased portion of the land.

In 1994, Antonio caused the division of the lot into three (two were occupied by the spouses),
necessarily displacing Natividad. He also had each subdivision titled. Antonio requested Natividad to
vacate the premises. Antonio averred that his wife only admitted of selling 1/3 of the property to
Concepcion for which a receipt was issued signed by Concepcion. The RTC ruled in favor of Concepcion.
The CA reversed the RTC ruling. CA explained that the property is conjugal hence the sale should have
been with Antonio’s consent.

ISSUE: Whether or not the contract of sale between Ainza and Eugenia is valid.

HELD: Yes it is valid until annulled (voidable). There was a perfected contract of sale between Eugenia
and Concepcion. The records show that Eugenia offered to sell a portion of the property to Concepcion,
who accepted the offer and agreed to pay P100,000.00 as consideration. The contract of sale was
consummated when both parties fully complied with their respective obligations. Eugenia delivered the
property to Concepcion, who in turn, paid Eugenia the price of P100,000.00, as evidenced by the receipt.
Since the land was undivided when it was sold, Concepcion is entitled to have half of it.

Antonio cannot, however, attack the validity of the sale b/n his wife and his mom-in-law, either under
the Family Code or the Old Civil Code due to prescription. The sale came to his knowledge in 1987. He
only filed the case in 1999. His right prescribed in 1993 (under the FC [5 years]) and 1997 (under OCC [10
years]).
ABALOS vs. HEIRS of VICENTE TORIO

December 14, 2011

Petitioners: Jaime Abalos, Spouses Salazar, Consuelo Salazar, Heirs of

Aquilino Abalos, Heirs of Aquilina Abalos

Respondents: Heirs of Vicente Torio

Facts:

- July 24, 1996: Respondents filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession and Damages with the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Pangasinan against Jaime Abalos and the spouses Salazar.

- Respondents contended that they are the heirs of Vicente Torio who died intestate on the year 1973.
They stated that Mr. Vicente allowed Jaime and Spouses Salazar to stay on his land (2,950 sq. m.) at
Pangasinan.

- After the death of Vicente, the respondents still allowed petitioners to stay.

- On 1985, respondents requested Mr. Vicente and Salazar to vacate the

subject lot but the latter refused.

- Respondents filed a complaint against petitioners.

- Jaime and the Spouses Salazar filed their Answer with Counterclaim and stated that respondents' cause
of action is barred by acquisitive prescription.

- Petitioners claim the court has no jurisdiction over the nature of the action

and the persons of the defendant. They also alleged that they are in actual, continuous and peaceful
possession of the subject lot as owners since time immemorial.

- They also said that they have been paying real property taxes and have been introducing
improvements on the said land.

- December 10, 2003: MTC issued a Decision ordering herein petitioners to vacate the subject lot and
turnover said property to the heirs of Vicente Torio.

- Jaime and the Spouses Salazar appealed the Decision of the MTC with the

RTC of Lingayen, Pangasinan.

- June 14, 2005: RTC ruled in favor of Jaime and the Spouses Salazar, holding that they have acquired the
subject property through prescription. Accordingly, the RTC dismissed herein respondents' complaint.

- Heirs of Vicente Torio filed a petition for review with the CA assailing the

Decision of the RTC.

- June 30, 2006: CA granted the petition of the respondents (in this case).

- Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the same was denied by the CA in its Resolution
dated November 13, 2006.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not appreciating that herein petitioners are now the
absolute and exclusive owners of the land in question by virtue of acquisitive prescription. EXCLUSIVE
OWNERS OF THE LAND IN

Held:

After a review of the records, however, the Court finds that the petition must fail as it finds no error in
the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the CA and the MTC.

Petitioners claim that they have acquired ownership over the disputed lot through ordinary acquisitive
prescription. Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may be ordinary or
extraordinary. Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession in good faith and with just title for
ten (10) years. Without good faith and just title, acquisitive prescription can only be extraordinary in
character which requires uninterrupted adverse possession for thirty (30) years,

Possession “in good faith” consists in the reasonable belief that the person from whom the thing is
received has been the owner thereof, and could transmit his ownership. There is “just title” when the
adverse claimant came into possession of the property through one of the modes recognized by law for
the acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but the grantor was not the owner or could not
transmit any right.

In the instant case, it is clear that during their possession of the property in question, petitioners
acknowledged ownership thereof by the immediate predecessor-in-interest of respondents. This is
clearly shown by the Tax Declaration in the name of Jaime for the year 1984 wherein it contains a
statement admitting that Jaime's house was built on the land of Vicente, respondents' immediate
predecessor-in-interest.

Petitioners never disputed such an acknowledgment. Thus, having knowledge that they nor their
predecessors-in-interest are not the owners of the disputed lot, petitioners' possession could not be
deemed as possession in good faith as to enable them to acquire the subject land by ordinary
prescription.
In this respect, the Court agrees with the CA that petitioners' possession of the lot in question was by
mere tolerance of respondents and their predecessors-in-interest. Acts of possessory character
executed due to license or by mere tolerance of the owner are inadequate for purposes of acquisitive
prescription. Possession, to constitute the foundation of a prescriptive right, should be adverse, if not,
such possessory acts, no matter how long, do not start the running of the period of prescription.

Moreover, the CA correctly held that even if the character of petitioners' possession of the subject
property had become adverse, still falls short of the required period of thirty (30) years in cases of
extraordinary acquisitive prescription. Records show that the earliest Tax Declaration in the name of
petitioners was in 1974. Reckoned from such date, the thirty-year period was completed in 2004.
However, herein respondents' complaint was filed in 1996, effectively interrupting petitioners'
possession upon service of summons on them.

Mercado v. Espinocilla

G.R. No. 184109. February 1, 2012.

First Division; Villarama, Jr. J.

Facts: Doroteo Espinocilla owned a parcel of land, Lot No. 552, with an area of 570 sq. m.. After he died,
his five children, Salvacion, Aspren, Isabel, Macario, and Dionisia divided the equally among themselves.
Later, Dionisia died without issue ahead of her four siblings, and Macario took possession of Dionisia’s
share. In an affidavit of transfer of real property dated November 1, 1948, Macario claimed that Dionisia
had donated her share to him in May 1945.

Thereafter, on August 9, 1977, Macario and his daughters Betty Gullaba and Saida Gabelo sold
225 sq. m. to his son Roger Espinocilla, husband of Belen Espinocilla and father of Ferdinand Espinocilla.

Sometime in 2000, Celerino Mercado sued, before a Regional Trial Court (RTC), Belen and
Ferdinand Espinocilla to recover two portions: an area of 28.5 sq. m. which he bought from Aspren and
another 28.5 sq. m. which allegedly belonged to him but was occupied by Macario’s house. His claim has
since been modified to an alleged encroachment of only 39 sq. m. that he claims must be returned to
him. He avers that he is entitled to own and possess 171 sq. m. of Lot No. 552, having inherited 142.5 sq.
m. from his mother Salvacion and bought 28.5 sq. m. from his aunt Aspren. According to him, his
mother’s inheritance is 142.5 sq. m., that is, 114 sq. m. from Doroteo plus 28.5 sq. m. from Dionisia.
Since the area he occupies is only 132 sq. m., he claims that respondents encroach on his share by 39 sq.
m.

In 2006, the RTC ruled in favor of Mercado and held that he is entitled to 171 sq. m. It found
that Mercado inherited 142.5 sq. m. from his mother Salvacion and bought 28.5 sq. m. from his aunt
Aspren. Thus, the Espinocillas must return 39 sq. m. to Mercado who occupies only 132 sq. m. There
being no public document to prove Dionisia’s donation, the RTC also held that Macario’s 1948 affidavit is
void and is an invalid repudiation of the shares of his sisters Salvacion, Aspren, and Isabel in Dionisia’s
share. Accordingly, Macario cannot acquire said shares by prescription. Finally, and more importantly,
the RTC further held that the oral partition of Lot No. 552 by Doroteo’s heirs did not include Dionisia’s
share and that partition should have been the main action. Thus, the RTC ordered partition and deferred
the transfer of possession of the 39 sq. m. pending partition.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC.

Issue: Is Mercado’s action to recover certain portions of Lot No. 552 already barred by prescription?

Held: Yes. Acquisitive prescription of real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary. Ordinary acquisitive
prescription requires possession in good faith and with just title for 10 years. In extraordinary
prescription, ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired through
uninterrupted adverse possession for 30 years without need of title or of good faith.

Mercado himself admits the adverse nature of the Espinocillas’ possession with his assertion
that Macario’s fraudulent acquisition of Dionisia’s share created a constructive trust. In a constructive
trust, there is neither a promise nor any fiduciary relation to speak of and the so-called trustee
(Macario) neither accepts any trust nor intends holding the property for the beneficiary (Salvacion,
Aspren, Isabel). The relation of trustee and cestui que trust does not in fact exist, and the holding of a
constructive trust is for the trustee himself, and therefore, at all times adverse. Prescription may
supervene even if the trustee does not repudiate the relationship.

Then, too, the Espinocillas’ uninterrupted adverse possession for 55 years of 109 sq. m. of Lot
No. 552 was established. Macario occupied Dionisia’s share in 1945 although his claim that Dionisia
donated it to him in 1945 was only made in a 1948 affidavit. Furthermore, Macario’s possession of
Dionisia’s share was public and adverse since his other co-owners, his three other sisters, also occupied
portions of Lot No. 552.

.R. No. 187451 : August 29, 2012

JESUS VIRTUCIO, represented by ABDON VIRTUCIO, Petitioner, v. JOSE ALEGARBES, Respondent.

MENDOZA, J.:

FACTS:
Respondent Jose Alegarbes (Alegarbes) filed a homestead application for a 24-hectare tract of
unsurveyed land. His application was approved on January 23, 1952. In 1955, however, the land was
subdivided into three (3) lots -- Lot Nos. 138, 139 and 140, Pls-19 - as a consequence of a public land
subdivision. Lot 139 was allocated to Ulpiano Custodio (Custodio) while Lot 140 was allocated to
petitioner Jesus Virtucio (Virtucio).

Alegarbes opposed the homestead applications filed by Custodio and Virtucio, claiming that his
approved application covered the whole area, including Lot Nos. 139 and 140. On October 30, 1961, the
Director of Lands rendered a decision denying Alegarbes' protest and amending the latter's application
to exclude Lots 139 and 140. Only Lot 138 was given due course.

Alegarbes appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, who dismissed the appeal.
On appeal to the Office of the President, the latter affirmed the dismissal order. Thus, an order of
execution was issued by the Lands Management Bureau of the DENR. It ordered Alegarbes and all those
acting in his behalf to vacate the subject lot, but he refused.

On September 26, 1997, Virtucio then filed a complaint for recovery of possession and ownership before
the RTC. The RTC ruled infavor of Virtucio. The CA reversed the RTC and ruled that Alegarbes became
ipso jure owner of Lot 140 by virtue of acquisitive prescription.

Aggrieved, Virtucio filed this petition. He argues that the period of acquisitive prescription was
interrupted on October 30, 1961 when Alegarbes filed a protest before the Director of Lands. Virtucio
further claims that since 1954, several extrajudicial demands were also made upon Alegarbes
demanding that he vacate said lot. Those demands constitute the "extrajudicial demand" contemplated
in Article 1155, thus, tolling the period of acquisitive prescription.

ISSUE: Whether or not Alegarbes acquired ownership over the subject property by acquisitive
prescription?

HELD: The petition must fail.

CIVIL LAW: acquisitive prescription; kinds of prescription

Article 1106 of the New Civil Code, in relation to its Article 712, provides that prescription is a mode of
acquiring ownership through the lapse of time in the manner and under the conditions laid down by
law. Under the same law, it states that acquisitive prescription may either be ordinary or extraordinary.
Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession of things in good faith and with just title for a
period of ten years, while extraordinary acquisitive prescription requires uninterrupted adverse
possession of thirty years, without need of title or of good faith.

There are two kinds of prescription provided in the Civil Code. One is acquisitive, that is, the acquisition
of a right by the lapse of time as expounded in par. 1, Article 1106. Other names for acquisitive
prescription are adverse possession and usucapcion. The other kind is extinctive prescription whereby
rights and actions are lost by the lapse of time as defined in Article 1106 and par. 2, Article 1139.
Another name for extinctive prescription is litigation of action. These two kinds of prescription should
not be interchanged. Article 1155 of the New Civil Code refers to the interruption of prescription of
actions. Interruption of acquisitive prescription, on the other hand, is found in Articles 1120-1125 of the
same Code.

Thus, Virtucios reliance on Article 1155 for purposes of tolling the period of acquisitive prescription is
misplaced. The only kinds of interruption that effectively toll the period of acquisitive prescription are
natural and civil interruption. Civil interruption takes place with the service of judicial summons to the
possessor. When no action is filed, then there is no occasion to issue a judicial summons against the
respondents. The period of acquisitive prescription continues to run.

In this case, Virtucio claims that the protest filed by Alegarbes against his homestead application
interrupted the thirty (30)-year period of acquisitive prescription. The law, as well as jurisprudence,
however, dictates that only a judicial summons can effectively toll the said period. Only in cases filed
before the courts may judicial summons be issued and, thus, interrupt possession. Records show that it
was only in 1997 when Virtucio filed a case before the RTC. The CA was, therefore, correct in ruling that
Alegarbesbecame ipso jure owner of Lot 140 entitling him to retain possession of it because he was in
open, continuous and exclusive possession for over thirty (30) years of alienable public land.

NO banes vs concepcion

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DOMINGO ESPINOSA

G.R. No. 171514 July 18, 2012

F:

- March 3, 1999, R filed an application for land registration covering a parcel of land (5,525sqm) in
Consolacion, Cebu; alleged that: (a) property is A&D; (b) he purchased the property from his mother,
Isabel Espinosa, on July 4, 1970; and (c) he and his PII had been in possession of the property in the
concept of an owner for more than 30 years

- R submitted the blueprint of Advanced Survey Plan, 2 tax dec for the years 1965 and 1974 in
Isabel’s name, Certification issued by the Office of the Treasurer of Consolacion, Cebu and 3 tax dec for
the years 1978, 1980 and 1985

- P opposed: (a) Sec 48(b) of CA141had not been complied with as Espinosa’s PII possessed the
property only after June 12, 1945; and (b) tax dec do not prove that possession are in the character and
for the length of time required by law

- MTC granted Espinosa’s petition: Espinosa was able to establish his ownership and possession
over the subject lot which is within the area considered by DENR as A&D; applicant has been in OCEN
and under claim of title thereto within the time prescribed by law (Sec. 14, sub-par. 1, P.D. 1529)

- CA dismissed petitioner’s appeal and affirmed MTC: possession for at least 30 years, despite the
fact that it commenced after June 12, 1945, sufficed to convert the property to private.

I: WON Espinosa has acquired an imperfect title over the subject property that is worthy of confirmation
and registration.

H: NO

- Erred in not applying the present text of Section 48(b) of the PLA

- Sec 14(2) of PD 1529: The following persons may file an application for registration: Those who
have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provision of existing laws.

- Sec 48(b) of the PLA originally states: Those who by themselves or through PII have been in
OCEN possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition or ownership, except as against the Government, since July 26, 1894, except when prevented
by war or force majeure.

- June 22, 1957: RA 1942 amended Sec 48(b) of the PLA by providing a 30-year prescriptive period
for JC of imperfect title

- Jan 25, 1977: PD 1073 was issued, changing the requirement for possession and occupation for a
period of 30 years to possession and occupation since June 12, 1945 or earlier

- PD 1073, in effect, repealed RA 1942 such that applications under Sec 48(b) of PLA filed after the
promulgation of PD 1073 should allege and prove possession and occupation that dated back to June 12,
1945 or earlier

- For one to invoke Sec 48(b), it must be demonstrated that such possession and occupation
commenced on Jan 24, 1947 and 30-year period was completed prior to the effectivity of PD 1073.

- There is nothing on record showing that as of Jan 25, 1977 or prior to the effectivity of PD 1073,
he or Isabel had already acquired title by means of possession and occupation of the property for 30
years
- it is Sec 14(2) of PD 1529 categorically provides, only private properties may be acquired thru
prescription and under Articles 420 and 421 of the Civil Code, only those properties, which are not for
public use, public service or intended for the development of national wealth, are considered private.

- There must be an express declaration by the State that PUBD property is no longer intended for
public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into
patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable or disposable,
remains property of the public dominion and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription.

- As the property is not held by the State in its private capacity, acquisition of title thereto
necessitates observance of the provisions of Sec 48(b) of the PLA in relation to Section 14(1) of P.D. No.
1529 or possession and occupation since June 12, 1945.

- Notation on the survey plan does not constitute incontrovertible evidence that would overcome
the presumption that the property belongs to the inalienable public domain: a mere surveyor has no
authority to reclassify lands of the public domain.

No Remman vs Republic