Environ Dev Sustain (2009) 11:215–228

DOI 10.1007/s10668-007-9105-4

Lifestyle: suggesting mechanisms and a definition

from a cognitive science perspective

Mikael Jensen

Received: 16 October 2006 / Accepted: 28 May 2007 / Published online: 12 July 2007

Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2007

Abstract The concept of lifestyle is rather difficult to pin down. It is used in a variety of
disciplines and related to many different problems. In our highly modern society, lifestyle
is more often mentioned as something we need to change in order to achieve a sustainable
development. Our main interest then is how we create and change a lifestyle. How can
we understand why it is sometimes difficult to achieve change? In relation to terms like
beliefs, desires, intentions, habits and artefacts six factors will be suggested. Within these
factors we may have a foundation for a mechanism underlying the creation and change of
lifestyle. A definition of the concept of lifestyle from a cognitive science perspective will
also be suggested, as derived from the same foundation and terms related to it.

Keywords Lifestyle
Sustainable development
Risk
Habit

1 Introduction

The concept of lifestyle is constantly used in a variety of ways. Jensen (2007b) stresses that
the concept of lifestyle:
(1) Is most often used without being defined as if it just means way of living,
(2) In the literature is defined in many different ways and
(3) Is used on four societal levels.
A first response to this is about the vagueness of the conception of way of living. Concluding
from the sustainable development debate, needing to change our lifestyle simply means
needing to change our way of living. What does this mean, and where do we go from here?

Readers should send their comments on this paper to: BhaskarNath@aol.com within 3 months of publication
of this issue.

M. Jensen (&)
Kollegium SSKKII, Dicksonsgatan 12, Goteborg 41256, Sweden
e-mail: jensen@ling.gu.se

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A second response concerns the many different definitions. Every discipline has its own
definition of lifestyle. That is definitely a problem in an interdisciplinary discussion as it
ought to be on sustainable development. Jensen (in press) has tried to achieve some unity,
so that will not be the issue here.
A third response concerns the societal levels. The levels presented by Jensen (in press)
are as follows: (1) the global level, (2) the national level, (3) the positional (sub cultural)
level and (4) the individual level. To speak about lifestyle on the global and national level
is, again, a problem of vagueness because there are more differences within a global group
and a national group than there are between groups on the same level. The positional and
individual levels are definitely more interesting, but the concept of lifestyle on these levels
is defined by social scientists. In order to make the debate even more interdisciplinary there
should be other perspectives. The purpose of this essay is to contribute by applying a
cognitive science perspective to the problem of lifestyle. One way to do this is to suggest a
definition derived from that perspective.
According to Hansson (1999) scientific insights concerning lifestyles is shallow and
lacks a deeper analysis of mechanisms. Social scientists may have tried but have mostly
focused on the mechanisms that form self-identity. From a perspective of cognitive science
the mechanisms of lifestyle may deal with self-identity to some extent, but rather focus on
other aspects. Cognitive scientists and others dealing with cognition have developed some
theoretical concepts that can be of assistance towards reaching an explanation. This may
also provide the basis for a relevant definition from a cognitive science perspective.
It has been suggested that the term lifestyle derives from the work of Alfred Adler but it
was probably first used by Max Weber (Giddens 1991; Hallin 1999) and/or Georg Simmel.
Adler, Weber and Simmel have all influenced our understanding of the concept today.
According to Weber, lifestyle is a matter of chance and choice (Cockerham 2002; also
Giddens 1991). Chance should be understood as what the (societal) structure can offer and
choice is connected to the agent. For Weber choice is primary.
Adler’s (1924) individual psychology, a major offshoot of Freudian psychoanalysis,
builds on the relationship between adult and child. The young child is inevitably weak in
comparison to adults, and this has the effect that throughout the remainder of an indi-
vidual’s life one strives to overcome the feelings of inferiority engendered by these early
experiences. Ultimately all individuals develop their own particular style of life for
overcoming inferiority and handling the problems of interpersonal interaction. The result
of this search for a lifestyle can either be creative and constructive or destructive, in some
cases something in between.
In the 1950s, lifestyle became a term to identify consumer groups. Marketing strategies
were directed towards certain groups with commercials and products; for example ranging
from the perfect household appliance for the perfect housewife. For some time the concept
was deeply connected to consumerism (Chaney 1996).
Today the concept of lifestyle is commonly used as something that needs to be changed
if we want to achieve a sustainable development. Global UN agreements (e.g. Agenda 21)
are about implementing a sustainable global system. At the 94th Indian Science Congress,
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh declared that ‘‘we in the developing world cannot afford
to ape the West in terms of its environmentally wasteful lifestyle.’’1 The problem with a
statement like this is that the expressions, ‘‘we in the developing world’’, ‘‘the West’’ and
‘‘lifestyle’’, are vague ones and are not defined. If we relate ‘‘lifestyle’’ to ‘‘the developing
world’’ and to ‘‘the West’’ we seem to believe that ‘‘the developing world’’ has one single

1
See The Asian Age, New Delhi, 4 January 2007, p. 4.

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lifestyle, and that ‘‘the West’’ has one single lifestyle, and that these lifestyles are obvi-
ously different.
For example, if any solution is to be reached, the debate concerning environmental
problem-solving needs to be more nuanced than this and perhaps directed at a different
level. To discuss global issues that need a solution highlights the fact that the real problem
is in implementing the message at the individual level. A global problem means that every
single individual is involved. We can begin to ask why there has not been any significant
change yet. The main goal with this essay is to suggest some mechanisms which underline
the individual lifestyle and to point to some problems that individuals deal with concerning
their own lifestyle in a highly modern society. The proposal is that six factors need to be
considered in order to be able to understand lifestyle creation and change.

2 Primary considerations on lifestyle

Sociologist Giddens (1986) discusses two types of consciousness: discursive conscious-

ness—can be expressed verbally—and practical consciousness—may be understood as
unconscious acts and responses. In cognitive science the related terms metacognition—the
capacity to think about your own or others’ thoughts—and implicit memory—an
unconscious memory system that regulates routine action—are used.
Most everyday activities are routine activities (Chen et al. 2004), thus most cognitive
processes are implicit. Therefore this inquiry deals with concepts related to implicit pro-
cessing in the field of cognitive science, like for example habit. Since we sometimes
change habits purposely we need to reason on a metacognitive level.
Three concepts that can be used both on an explicit and implicit level are beliefs, desires
and intentions that have been acknowledged and used by some researchers (e.g. Wellman
1990; Perner 1991; Lang and Perner 2002; Meltzoff 1999; Bloom 1997; Fasli 2003; Jonker
et al. 2003; Baldwin and Baird 2001). Further, the use of artefacts is intertwined in our
routinised actions. We often seem to take them for granted. It has been suggested that
artefacts influence our cognition. That is why artefacts in this context are included as a
concept related to lifestyle and its underlying mechanisms.

3 Beliefs, desires and intentions

A preliminary, simple, explanation of the three concepts is: belief = what you think or
know about things and events in accordance with your perception; desire = what you want
or wish for; intention = what you mean to do according to a goal and suitable means.
Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914), the founder of pragmatism, defined belief as the
principle upon which you are willing to act (Peirce 1998; he was influenced by Alexander
Bain (see Fisch 1954)). Further, an individual’s ways of perceiving and acting in the world
will determine her beliefs about its nature, and the beliefs about what sort of world it is will
determine how she sees it and acts within it (Bateson 1972/2000; Ingold 1992).
The concept of belief is to philosophers (and cognitive scientists) similar to what
common people call knowledge (Newell 1994). Belief, as it is used here, should be
understood as different kinds of knowledge. Firstly, a form of knowledge derived from
perception used in order to act in the environment (Jonker et al. 2003; Fasli 2003; Ingold
1992; Gibson 1979). Secondly, a form of knowledge derived from perception that is
incomplete. To fill out the gaps you have to construct a theory (e.g. Gopnik and Meltzoff

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2002; Gardner 1991). In a study, 3-year-old children answered yes to the question about
whether the inside of a cow is similar to the inside of a pig without having seen the inside of
any of these animals (Murphy 2004). That is an example of how young humans form
theories. Thirdly, a form of knowledge may derive from indirect perception, that is,
someone claims (tells you) that they have seen X and you accept it. From the age of two
children expect beliefs to be a result of perception. Eventually, communicated beliefs of
others are derived from others’ perception (Wellman 1990). Fourthly, knowledge may be of
an abstract theoretical form, that is, derived from (empirical) research. The third and fourth
forms of knowledge can be called collective beliefs (Tomasello et al. 2005). Not every
belief is necessarily a support for action. Apart from abstract beliefs, beliefs can be false.
Desire is the wish for a change of state (Perner 1991; Jonker et al. 2003; Fasli 2003).
This is only possible if you have beliefs about at least two states. For example, very
fundamentally, a state of hunger and a state of satisfaction, or the state of position A and
the state of position B. You are hungry (e.g. a belief) and you have a belief of satisfaction
(you have been satisfied before), thus you may desire to be satisfied. You are at position A
(e.g. at home) and you have a belief of position B (e.g. a concert hall), thus you may desire
to be at position B.
An intention is a desired goal and a belief that you can achieve this goal with some
reasonable means (Tomasello 2003; Tomasello et al. 2005; Jonker et al. 2003; Baldwin and
Baird 2001). Goals are desired states (Newell 1994; Fasli 2003). Not every desire becomes
a goal. For you to have an intention you have to desire something that can be attained. For
this to happen you must believe it can be attained (Baldwin and Baird 2001; Fasli 2003;
Jonker et al. 2003). Intentions are about goal-directed actions (Perner 1991; Fasli 2003).
They determine what external action to take; it’s a choice of plan. The choice is decision-
making (Newell 1994; Tomasello et al. 2005).
Beliefs are more or less independent of one another (Burr and Hofer 2002). Beliefs
within an individual can conflict with each other. Desires within an individual can conflict
with each other. Intentions within an individual can not conflict with each other (Jonker
et al. 2003). If you have several goals one goal must be the main goal (or higher level
goals) and other goals are subgoals (Tomasello et al. 2005; also Newell 1994). This section
can be summarised in the following statements (see Fig. 1):
• In order to have beliefs you need to perceive the world and interact in it.
• In order to desire you need beliefs about different states.
• In order to fulfil intention you need desires that can be transformed into a goal and you
need beliefs about how to attain that goal.

Intentions
Decision making
Means Goal

Future
plans

Perception Beliefs Desires Acting

Feedback

Fig. 1 The processes of belief, desire and intention

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3.1 Examples

3.1.1 Situation 1

You are at position A, your home, and you have a belief about position B, the store. Now
you desire to go to the store. That will be your goal. Your intention to go to the store can
become an action if you can decide what means to use. What may be the best way in the
current circumstances to get to the store? You choose the car because you believe that it is
the best means. You drive to the store.
Additional beliefs:
(1) At this point you may or may not have a belief that your car produces CO2.
(2) You may or may not have a belief that CO2 is a greenhouse gas.
(3) You may or may not have a belief that greenhouse gases form a layer in the
atmosphere.
(4) You may or may not have a belief that the greenhouse layer can affect you (and the
whole biosphere) in a negative way, causing global warming.
If you have a belief that your car produces CO2 it is more or less independent from your
beliefs about position A and B and your belief about the car as a suitable means. You can
not have a desire for the belief that your car produces CO2. It will not cause you to wish for
a change of state. The same goes for the belief that CO2 is a greenhouse gas and the belief
that greenhouse gases form a layer in the atmosphere.

3.1.2 Situation 2

If you have a belief that global warming can affect you in a negative way you may wish for
a change of state. You can imagine a belief about climate that is not a threat to the
biosphere and you desire this state. The problem now is how you can make it a goal that is
attainable. First you need to have the beliefs of 1–3 above (we can call them sub-beliefs or
supportive beliefs). Then you may find a suitable means; let’s say no production of CO2,
that is, no use of cars driven by fossil fuel. Now to action...
When you return to situation 1 and you go to the store you have to decide what means are
most suitable to attain your goal. You find the car most suitable. Will you or will you not use
the car? The answer lies in your goals. You have two goals. One goal is to go to the store and
one goal is to save the biosphere (and everything living in it). They cannot both be main
goals. If your main goal is to go to the store then you will choose the best means for it. If
your main goal is to save the biosphere your means are to reduce your emission of CO2. To
go to the store then becomes a sub-goal and this sub-goal is attained by not using the car.
But there is still a problem. If your main goal is to save the biosphere you not only have
to make the store a sub-goal, you have to break down the belief which is the foundation of
your action. You have beliefs about moving around in the environment. If one type of act
has become a routine action you need a forceful belief to break it down (e.g. the car has
broken down or the road to the store is out of use).

4 Artefacts

We might say there are two types of artefacts: mental and physical (Norman 1993). Mental
artefacts are symbols (which can also be physical) like words and numbers that can be used

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in a mental process. Physical artefacts are commonly known as technology. Everyday life
is profoundly intertwined with technology (Michaelis 2003).
When considering a system you have to add up all the relevant parts in order to
understand how the system thinks, that is, human plus artefact plus environment; the
thinking unit (Bateson 1972/2000). Artefacts affect our cognition, not only artefacts like
lenses, calculators, cellphones or computers. Human cultural history is replete with evi-
dence on the use of artefacts and these artefacts have brought about cultural development
(Norman 1993; Tomasello 2001; Harris and Want 2005).

4.1 Affordances

In designing an artefact the critical issue concerns perceived affordances: what people
perceive that the object can do or be used for (Norman 1993; Gibson 1979). A pencil
affords lifting, grasping, turning, poking, supporting, tapping, biting, and writing. An
electronic device on the other hand may have powerful features that you are not even
aware of. You have to read the user’s manual in order to become aware of them.
The more advanced an artefact is the more specialised the use of it is and the more
individual the interest in it is (Bouwhuis 2000). But there are of course exceptions. Two
examples: (1) A screwdriver is relatively simple in design. Besides being able to screw in
objects with it, which is the proper use, you can use it as a lever to remove the lid from a
can (or as a wedge to separate things that are stuck together) and as a whisk to stir paint
(Ingold 1992). You can use it as a microphone in a pretence situation. A screwdriver
affords all this. (2) A CD player in a rack is often a rectangular box with some buttons on
the front. If you don’t recognise the symbols on or beside these buttons it doesn’t tell you
much. Its perceived affordance is minimal. It affords to put other objects on it; it is
stackable. You may use it as a projectile (which would be really silly). The proper use for a
CD player is not obvious in the perceived affordance.
These examples about objects’ affordances, try to communicate that there is more to an
artefact than its obvious appearance. The affordance tells the user that the artefact may be a
good means for a goal to be attained. The artefact is also part of a causal chain that is
unclear and it may cause a lot of problems that could be traced to global levels.

4.2 Embedded history and future

An artefact (a product) has an embedded timeline. When you buy it in the store you will
only experience some part of the timeline. It has a history before you bought it and it will
have a future after you have thrown it away. This history and future is not just temporal but
also in space. It has been moved through several places (Fig. 2).
Durning (1998) argues the point that the consumer class lifestyle uses goods as
throwaways. That makes the user period of the whole product timeline very short but the
before- and after-phase is not reduced. Large amounts of natural resources and energy for

Production Transportation Present time Transportation Waste

Fig. 2 Timeline of a product. Present time is the user phase

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production are used, there may be some emission during production, a lot of energy for
transportation is used, transportation usually means high level emissions and again, in the
waste-phase, more emissions.
There are studies that indicate that most people are oblivious to the direct causation
chains that are causing global warming (Stoll-Kleemann et al. 2001). The problem is
probably bigger when it comes to indirect causation chains (Jensen 2007). The production
of greenhouse gases, linked to our daily acts, is to a large degree, indirect (Michaelis 2003;
Jensen 2007). With this in mind it is an opportune time to look at the basis for our everyday
habits and choices.

5 Lifestyle mechanisms

To make decisions in an ecologically rational manner, humans use as little information as

possible and tailor their information and option search to the structure available in the
environment (Todd and Gigerenzer 2003). Ecological rationality means inclusive fitness in
some environment (Sripada and Stich 2005). But if the environment is an expert system
(Giddens 1990; Hogarth 1994) ecological rationality may not be enough. Expert systems
should be understood in three ways: (1) A system that relies on vast amounts of infor-
mation. (2) A system that needs a machine to keep track of all relevant information. (3)
Human experts cannot handle all the information but are specialists in a certain system of
information and how the machines work. Today’s society is an expert system and even
small subsystems within the society are expert systems. A power plant is one type of expert
system that everyday people know very little about.
To make decisions in our everyday life we should consider more information than we
do. Because we have bad access to information within expert systems we may make bad
decisions (Hogarth 1994). To make it through the day we select information to help us
make necessary decisions (Todd and Gigerenzer 2003). Damasio (1994, 1998, 1999) argue
that our rational decisions are made through the guidance of our emotions. That may be so
but because of our emotions some of our decisions become irrational (Sripada and Stich
2005).
The following is a proposed set of factors that can influence the creation and change of
lifestyle. There is no particular order apart from the first factor, concreteness, which is a
primary factor.

5.1 Concreteness

There are two aspects of concreteness: (1) Objects and events that you actually can per-
ceive. Human perceptual systems are ‘‘adapted to ‘middle-sized objects’ lying somewhere
between planets and atoms’’ (Meltzoff and Moore 2001, 221) which excludes a great deal.
You rely on information that you have (as little as necessary), that is, primarily information
that you can perceive. (2) Information about a particular event or a particular object told to
you by a reliable person (someone you know or someone that you perceive as reliable). A
person telling you that a Volvo is a bad car to own is of more value than statistical
information stating that a Volvo is a good car to own. You probably would not buy a
Volvo. Concrete information dominates abstract information (Hogarth 1994) (Fig. 3).
The level of concreteness will influence the creation and change of lifestyle. It will also
influence other factors (as suggested below).

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High level of concreteness Low level of concreteness

Fig. 3 Level of concreteness

5.2 Closeness

We will consider here three aspects of closeness: (1) Closeness in time. When something
just happens you are more inclined to expect similar events (Hogarth 1994). If a hundred
situations results in one outcome and the last two situations result in another, you are more
inclined to expect the last result (ibid.). When you desire something you want it to happen
sooner than later. Even if you can accept it later you would rather have it sooner.
(2) Closeness in space. When you desire goods and services, you want them close by.
When you dislike something you want it far away, out of sight. Influenced by the con-
creteness factor you would say yes to services (water and energy in your house for
whenever you desire it) but no to any problems that might be an effect of the services
(sewer, garbage, emission, or worse, nuclear waste), because out of sight it is not concrete
in the same way any more. This is called the NIMBY-principle (NIMBY = Not In My Back
Yard) (see e.g. Hampton 1996; Ek 2005; Sjöberg and Drottz-Sjöberg 2001; Wester-Herber
2004). In terms of intentionality, everything that is consistent with your goals is OK, while
side effects are not.
(3) Closeness in social relation (see Jensen 2007). If a person close to you, or someone
that you desire to be close to (e.g. an idol, role model or an authority), tells you something
it is more likely that you will lend faith to it than if it were a stranger telling you something.
Important others may influence you as to how to act in particular circumstances (Chen
et al. 2004) (Fig. 4).

5.3 Habit

Habits (or automaticity) are a way to make our everyday life more efficient (Biel 1999;
Wheatley and Wegner 2001; Chen et al. 2004). A habit starts with an intention and is
formed by the repetition of acts (Chen et al. 2004).
Habits are not uncontrollable, but to some extent controllable. By deliberate thinking
and planning, we are capable of breaking many bad habits (e.g. smoking, eating fatty
foods). Lack of awareness is another prominent feature of habits. When we make
habitual choices (e.g. driving), we are not aware of options that may be available to
us. Last, although we lack awareness when performing habitual behaviour, we are in
fact an efficient performer (Chen et al. 2004, 356) (Fig. 5).
Changing a habit requires effort. If the effort needed for habit change is high then the
chances for changes are low. First you need new beliefs (Biel 1999). Then you have to
desire this new belief. If you find it more desirable than your previous (or present) desire,

High level of closeness Low level of closeness

Fig. 4 Level of closeness

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High effort needed for habit change Low effort needed for habit change

Fig. 5 Effort needed for habit change

the new one may be your intentional goal. To form a new habit you then have to repeat
the act.
According to Meltzoff (2005) it is easy to copy another human being’s act, through an
act of imitation. Humans are imitating beings in a more complex way than other organisms.
First, we are pre-wired in the brain for this kind of act (Rizzolatti 2005) and second, we
understand intentions in others (Tomasello 2003; Meltzoff 2005). Imitation might be the
most efficient way to change habit or create a new habit.

5.4 Attraction

You do things because you can (i.e. easy goals to attain). You desire things because you
believe that others can do. You desire it because you believe it is in reach. If you have
positive beliefs about something it is attractive, hence you desire it. If something, an
artefact, is a good means towards your goal, it is attractive.
Perhaps of more importance is the scale of pleasure and pain. If you expect to repeat an
act (as in a habit) it had better be pleasurable rather than painful (Chen et al. 2004). It is
also known that we prefer things or events that are already familiar to us. Habituation
procedures or habitual learning causes it. Thus, we are attracted by familiarity (Hall 1991;
Newell 1994; also Murphy 2004; Gopnik and Meltzoff 2002) (Fig. 6).

5.5 Perceived risk

Cognitive assessment of perceived risk is affected by clues in the immediate environment

(Mesch 2000). Perceived risk in its acute form is concrete danger (like a car coming at you
at high speed). You say yes to the use of cars and trucks (etc.) but not outside your house,
especially not when you have children, as a result of NIMBY and the perceived risk of
traffic nearby (Fig. 7).
If you put a frog in a pot filled with water and let the temperature of the water increase
very slowly the frog will feel no difference until it is boiled (Bateson 1979). The perceptual
systems of humans and animals are systems that detect differences (Bateson 1979; 1972/
2000, 221; Norman 1993; Smith 1996). If there are no differences or they are too small
there will be no change in the cognitive system. This is what insidious perceived risk (as
well as insidious abstract risk) is about. Even if there is a perceivable difference it is too
small or too slow for you to take action. For example, you are able to perceive most
animals, say birds, living nearby but can you say if they increase or decrease in population?

High level of attraction Low level of attraction

Fig. 6 Level of attraction

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Acute perceived risk Insidious perceived risk

Fig. 7 The perception of risk. Is it acute or is it insidious?

5.6 Abstract risk

The NIMBY-principle also affects your behaviour even when the risk is an abstract one.
You might say yes to nuclear plants and atomic waste but no to atomic waste nearby. Some
abstract risks are acute and some are insidious. If you hear that your water is contaminated
(though you can’t see it, smell it or taste it) you will stop drinking the water immediately. If
someone tells you there is a greenhouse effect (you can’t see it, hear it, smell it, taste it or
feel it) you can dismiss it (or at least deny it to yourself (Stoll-Kleemann et al. 2001)) as
abstract theorising. You can live with the greenhouse effect as long as it doesn’t affect your
personal life.
It also depends on how the information is presented:
If people living within a certain radius of the proposed site of a new nuclear power
plant are told that it is possible that the construction will involve a miniscule
reduction in life expectancy for the community, no alarm will result. However, if the
same information is translated into, say, the expectation of two additional cancer-
induced deaths, results are likely to be different (Hogarth 1994, 140) (Fig. 8).
Acute abstract risk may affect the creation and change of lifestyle, insidious abstract risk
probably may not. Perceived risk will be valued higher than abstract risk as long as the risk
is not acute or if someone you find reliable provides you with a particular example of
abstract risk that gets you involved.

6 Discussion

In this last section I want to discuss three special issues of importance. First I am going to
define the concept of lifestyle from a cognitive science perspective, followed by a dis-
cussion of the six mechanisms. Finally the concept of lifestyle and the six mechanisms will
be used within the framework of sustainable development.

6.1 Defining lifestyle

As a foundation for action in the environment we need beliefs, desires and intentions.
Those beliefs we have about the world, influence the creation of repeated acts. Beliefs that
we do not have cannot influence us at all. In that sense we are unaware. Intentional acts that
become repeated are habits. Habits are a sort of degree of efficiency that normally helps us

Acute abstract risk Insidious abstract risk

Fig. 8 The abstract risk. Is it acute or is it insidious?

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in our everyday life. We are also able to ascribe constancy to habits (Chen et al. 2004).
They remain the same over time, but can be changed with some effort. Beliefs and desires
that we have are often in conflict with each other or disconnected from each other. There
are dynamics in our mental states as well as in the interaction with the external world
(Jonker et al. 2003).
Artefacts are intertwined in our every day life. We usually take them for granted and do
not reflect on their affect upon our cognition. Artefacts are especially useful when they
match our need to attain a goal. As long as we believe it is the best choice we will keep
using it.
A cognitive science definition of the concept of lifestyle would be formulated as follows:
• A lifestyle is a pattern of repeated acts that are both dynamic and to some degree
hidden to the individual, and they involve the use of artefacts. This lifestyle is founded
on beliefs about the world, and its constancy over time is led by intentions to attain
goals or sub-goals that are desired. In other words, a lifestyle is a set of habits that are
directed by the same main goal.

6.2 Six mechanisms

In creating and changing a lifestyle we will be influenced by some positive and some
negative factors. We might say that the positive ones are concreteness and attraction. The
more concrete and the more attractive something is to the individual the more probable it is
that it will influence the creation and change of lifestyle (cf. Jensen 2007). The negative
ones are perceived risk and abstract risk. The more acute the risk is the more probable it is
that it will affect our decisions.
When it comes to closeness it depends on whether you value something positively or
negatively. If you value something positively you want it close and if you can have it close
that will influence your use of it. If you value something negatively then you want it far
away and if you can have it far away you will stop taking notice of it. Otherwise it is a risk
that you will try to avoid.
It is only the outcome of a habit that can be positive or negative. There is no rationality
in breaking a positive habit as long as you believe it is positive (Jensen 2007). When you
come to believe that the outcome of a habit is negative, it is better to change that habit. At
that point the function of a habit will cause difficulty. It is rooted in the nervous system in
order to remain constant (i.e. in a given or purposeful context). The effort required to
change a habit may appear as a great obstacle (Chen et al. 2004).
There is an important factor that is involved with all of the mechanisms: feedback. In
every situation where you have performed an act, where you have made a choice or where
you are in a state of uncertainty, you need feedback. In terms of concreteness, feedback is
most influential when it is reliable. In terms of closeness, feedback is most influential when
it is close in time and space. In terms of attraction, feedback is most influential when it is
pleasant, familiar and/or a functional means towards your goal. In terms of risk, feedback
is most influential when you are able to be safe. In terms of habit, feedback is most
influential if the outcome is worth repeating.
If we want individuals to change lifestyle we have to design systems that produce
reliable, fast, pleasant, familiar and functional feedback. There also needs to be infor-
mation systems that stimulate citizens to form new beliefs about the everyday society they
live and work in. One simple example is to label every product with a scale from 1 to 5
telling the consumer how much greenhouse gases the production and transportation of an

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artefact has indirectly produced (see Jensen 2007). This is a way of offering fast feedback
and of giving the consumer the choice of avoiding risk.

6.3 Sustainable development

The main problem with the whole project of sustainable development is that it is not
experienced as concrete, close or as an acute risk. It is not immediately desirable and it
does not influence any habits. There are probably billions of people experiencing acute
risk, both concrete and close, but they have a minimum of impact on the global project of
sustainable development. The rest of us in our daily lives do not experience any stark
impression concerning the global project of sustainable development. In order to make an
impact, I seriously suggest that every system that can be built in our society rely on the six
mechanisms that regulate the formation and change of lifestyle.
In those cases where important information needs to be spread, concreteness is the first
means to use. If you cannot make it concrete, design a symbol or a map or diagram (Norman
1993). It is also valuable to let familiar faces spread the information. This would hopefully
be a way of forming new beliefs that can begin a process towards changing habits.
Since the consequences of global warming are too slow to perceive we need systems
that generate fast feedback. We need to know as soon as possible if our acts make any
difference. If I were able to know today that my future would benefit from the choices I
make, at the moment I would be more willing to make those choices in the here and now. A
little help to predict the consequences of my acts is a lot more than no help at all.
If something provides a good means towards your goal, it is attractive. If something is
pleasurable (instead of painful) it is attractive. If something is familiar it is attractive. There
is no way of making the project of sustainable development attractive in this sense. Some
indigenous peoples call their local environment ‘‘mother’’ and/or ‘‘father’’. That provides a
notion of pleasure and familiarity. These peoples are more motivated to protect their
environment. Positive metaphors may be just the right way of making sustainable devel-
opment attractive to everyday people (cf. Lake 2001). Hopefully there are many other ways.
We should not see lifestyle as something fixed as we believe that habits are. Habits are
changeable and therefore lifestyles must be changeable. Social scientists are often arguing
that human beings change lifestyle a lot (Michaelis 2003; Wilska 2002; Chaney 1996). It is
easy to agree if you consider the six mechanisms. In some situations, on the other hand, it
appears more difficult to make changes (also in line with the six mechanisms) since the
factors that should be seen as important actually do not concern us. The enormous chal-
lenge is to make factors about sustainable development concern us all. This essay has
offered some modest suggestions as to why some issues do not concern us and how the
same issues might be of concern.

Acknowledgement I would like to thank Adlerbertska forskningsstiftelsen for research funding. I also
would like to thank Daniel Johansson and Michael Walls for language advice.

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