Secondly, a definition must be expressed in terms of things which are prior to, and better

known than, the things defined1. This is clear, since the object of a definition is to give us
knowledge of the thing defined, and it is by means of things prior and better known that we acquire
fresh knowledge, as in the course of demonstrations. But the terms " prior " and "better known" are,
a s usual susceptible of two meanings; they may mean (1) absolutely or logically prior and better
known, or (2) better known relatively to us. In the absolute sense, or from the standpoint of reason,
a point is better known than a line, a line than a plane, and a plane than a solid, as also a unit is
better known than number (for the unit is prior to, and the first principle of, any number). Similarly,
in the absolute sense, a letter is prior to a syllable. But the case is sometimes different relatively to
us; for example, a solid is more easily realised by the senses than a plane, a plane than a line, and a
line than a point. Hence, while it is more scientific to begin with the absolutely prior, it may,
perhaps, be permissible, in case the learner is not capable of following the scientific order, to
explain things by means of what is more intelligible to him. "Among the definitions framed on this
principle are those of the point, the line and the plane; all these explain what is prior by means of
what is posterior, for the point is described as the extremity of a line, the line of a plane, the plane of
a solid." But, if it is asserted that such definitions by means of things which are more intelligible
relatively only to a particular individual are really definitions, it will follow that there may be many
definitions of the same thing, one for each individual for whom a thing is being defined, and even
different definitions for one and the same individual at different times, since at first sensible objects
are more intelligible, while to a better trained mind they become less so. It follows therefore that a
thing should be defined by means of the absolutely prior and not the relatively prior, in order that
there may be one sole and immutable definition. This is further enforced by reference to the
requirement that a good definition must state the genus and the differentiae, for these are among the
things which are, in the absolute sense, better known than, and prior to, the species (τῶν ἁπλῶς
γνωριμωτέρων καὶ προτέρων τοῦ εἴ δους ὲστίν). For to destroy the genus and the differentia is to
destroy the species, so that the former are prior to the species; they are also better known, for, when
the species is known, the genus and the differentia must necessarily be known also, e.g. he who
knows "man" must also know "animal" and "land-animal," but it does not follow, when the genus
and differentia are known, that the species is known too, and hence the species is less known than
they are2. It may be frankly admitted that the scientific definition will require superior mental
powers for its apprehension; and the extent of its use must be a matter of discretion. So far Aristotle;
and we have here the best possible explanation why Euclid supplemented his definition of a point
by the statement in I.Def. 3 that the extremities of a line are points and his definition of a surface by
I.Def. 6 to the effect that the extremities of a surface are lines. The supplementary explanations do
1 Topics VI. 4, 141 a 16 sqq.
2 Topics VI. 4, 141 b 25—34.
in fact enable us to arrive at a better understanding of the formal definitions of a point and a line
respectively, as is well explained by Simson in his note on Def. I. Simson says, namely, that we
must consider a solid, that is, a magnitude which has length, breadth and thickness, in order to
understand aright the definitions of a point, a line and a surface. Consider, for instance, the
boundary common to two solids which are contiguous or the boundary which divides one solid into
two contiguous parts; this boundary is a surface. We can prove that it has no thickness by taking
away either solid, when it remains the boundary of the other; for, if it had thickness, the thickness
must either be a part of one solid or of the other, in which case to take away one or other solid
would take away the thickness and therefore the boundary itself: which is impossible. Therefore the
boundary or the surface has no thickness. In exactly the same way, regarding a line as the boundary
of two contiguous surfaces, we prove that the line has no breadth; and, lastly, regarding a point as
the common boundary or extremity of two lines, we prove that a point has no length, breadth or
thickness.