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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 277

Information | Reference

Case Title:
JOKER P. ARROYO, EDCEL C.
LAGMAN, JOHN HENRY R. OSMEÑA,
WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA, AND 268 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
RONALDO B. ZAMORA, petitioners, Arroyo vs. De Venecia
vs. JOSE DE VENECIA, RAUL DAZA,
RODOLFO ALBANO, THE EXECUTIVE *
G.R. No. 127255. August 14, 1997.
SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF
FINANCE, AND THE COMMISSIONER
OF INTERNAL REVENUE, JOKER P. ARROYO, EDCEL C. LAGMAN, JOHN HENRY
R. OSMEÑA, WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA, AND RONALDO
respondents.
B. ZAMORA, petitioners, vs. JOSE DE VENECIA, RAUL
Citation: 277 SCRA 268
DAZA, RODOLFO ALBANO, THE EXECUTIVE
Less...
SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, AND
Docket Number: G.R. No. THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
127255 respondents.
Counsel: Azcuna, Yorac,
Sarmiento, Arroyo & Chua and Rene
A.V. Saguisag, Cesar A. Sevilla & Constitutional Law; Separation of Powers; Judicial Review;
Associates Legislative Rules of Procedure; The cases, both in the Philippines
and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the courts
Ponente/Other Opinion:
the power to inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a
ROMERO
House of Congress failed to comply with its own rules, in the
Dispositive Portion:
absence of showing that there was a violation of a constitutional
WHEREFORE, the petition for provision or the rights of private individuals.·It is clear from
certiorari and prohibition is the foregoing facts that what is alleged to have been violated in
DISMISSED. the enactment of R.A. No. 8240 are merely internal rules of
Citation Ref: 199 SCRA 692 | procedure of the House rather than constitutional requirements
177 SCRA 668 | 16 SCRA 379 | 241 for the enactment of a law, i.e., Art. VI, §§26-27. Petitioners do
SCRA 681 | 27 SCRA 131 | 34 Phil. not claim that there was no quorum but only that, by some
729 | 78 Phil. 1 | 109 Phil. 863 | 7 maneuver allegedly in violation of the rules of the House, Rep.
SCRA 347 | 191 SCRA 452 | 235 Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the presence
SCRA 630 | 56 SCRA 714 | 25 SCRA of a quorum. Petitioners contend that the House rules were
754 | 227 SCRA 703 | 42 SCRA 448 adopted pursuant to the constitutional provision that „each
House may determine the rules of its proceedings‰ and that for
|
this reason they are judicially enforceable. To begin with, this
contention stands the principle on its head. In the decided cases,
Search Result the constitutional provision that „each House may determine the
rules of its proceed-ings‰ was invoked by parties, although not
successfully, precisely to support claims of autonomy of the
legislative branch to conduct its business free from interference
by courts. Here petitioners cite the provision for the opposite
purpose of invoking judicial review. But the cases, both here and
abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the courts the
power to inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House
of Congress failed to comply with its own rules, in the absence of
showing that there was a violation of a constitutional provision
or the rights of private individuals.

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Same; Same; Same; Same; The prevailing view is that Rules
of Proceedings are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at
the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily
procedural.·We conclude this survey with the useful summary
of the rulings by former Chief Justice Fernando, commenting on
the power of each House of Congress to determine its rules of
proceedings. He wrote: Rules are hardly permanent in character.
The prevailing view is that they are subject to revocation,
modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them
as they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no
concern with their observance. They may be waived or
disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to
conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying the act
taken if the requisite number of members have agreed to a
particular measure. The above principle is subject, however, to
this qualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule
affects persons other than members of the legislative body the
question presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its
validity is open to question in a case where private rights are
involved.

Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court has no more power


to look into the internal proceedings of a House than members of
that House have to look over the shoulders of the justices, as long
as no violation of constitutional provisions is shown.·In this
case no rights of private individuals are involved but only those
of a member who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose
to transfer the dispute to this Court. We have no more power to
look into the internal proceedings of a House than members of
that House have to look over our shoulders, as long as no
violation of constitutional provisions is shown. Petitioners must
realize that each of the three departments of our government has
its separate sphere which the others may not invade without
upsetting the delicate balance on which our constitutional order
rests. Due regard for the working of our system of government,
more than mere comity, compels reluctance on our part to enter
upon an inquiry into an alleged violation of the rules of the
House. We must accordingly decline the invitation to exercise our
power.

Same; Same; Same; Political Questions; While Art. VIII, §1


has broadened the scope of judicial inquiry into areas normally
left to the political departments to decide, such as those relating
to national security, it has not altogether done away with political
questions such as those which arise in the field of foreign
relations.·Petitioners, quoting former Chief Justice Roberto
ConcepcionÊs sponsorship in

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the Constitutional Commission, contend that under Art. VIII, §1,


„nothing involving abuse of discretion [by the other branches of
the government] amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction is
beyond judicial review.‰ Implicit in this statement of the former
Chief Justice, however, is an acknowledgment that the
jurisdiction of this Court is subject to the case and controversy

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requirement of Art. VIII, §5 and, therefore, to the requirement of
a justiciable controversy before courts can adjudicate
constitutional questions such as those which arise in the field of
foreign relations. For while Art. VIII, §1 has broadened the scope
of judicial inquiry into areas normally left to the political
departments to decide, such as those relating to national
security, it has not altogether done away with political questions
such as those which arise in the field of foreign relations.

Same; Same; Same; Same; If, then, the established rule is


that courts cannot declare an act of the legislature void on
account merely of noncompliance with rules of procedure made by
itself, it follows that such a case does not present a situation in
which a branch of the government has „gone beyond the
constitutional limits of its jurisdiction‰ so as to call for the
exercise of the CourtÊs Art. VIII, §1 power.·As we have already
held, under Art. VIII, §1, this CourtÊs function is merely [to]
check whether or not the governmental branch or agency has gone
beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it
erred or has a different view. In the absence of a showing . . . [of]
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there
is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power. . . . It
has no power to look into what it thinks is apparent error. If,
then, the established rule is that courts cannot declare an act of
the legislature void on account merely of noncompliance with
rules of procedure made by itself, it follows that such a case does
not present a situation in which a branch of the government has
„gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction‰ so as to
call for the exercise of our Art. VIII, §1 power.

Same; Same; Same; Legislative Rules of Procedure;


Bicameral Conference Committee Reports; No rule of the House of
Representatives has been cited which specifically requires that in
cases involving the approval of a conference committee report, the
Chair must restate the motion and conduct a viva voce or
nominal voting.·Petitioners argue that, in accordance with the
rules of the House, Rep. AlbanoÊs motion for the approval of the
conference committee report should have been stated by the
Chair and later the individual votes of the Members should have
been taken. They say that the method used in

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this case is a legislatorÊs nightmare because it suggests


unanimity when the fact was that one or some legislators
opposed the report. No rule of the House of Representatives has
been cited which specifically requires that in cases such as this
involving approval of a conference committee report, the Chair
must restate the motion and conduct a viva voce or nominal
voting. On the other hand, as the Solicitor General has pointed
out, the manner in which the conference committee report on H.
No. 7198 was approved was by no means a unique one. It has
basis in legislative practice. It was the way the conference
committee report on the bills which became the Local
Government Code of 1991 and the conference committee report
on the bills amending the Tariff and Customs Code were
approved.

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Same; Same; Same; Same; The advantages or disadvantages,
the wisdom or folly of a method do not present any matter for
judicial consideration·the Court cannot provide a second
opinion on what is the best procedure.·Indeed, it is no
impeachment of the method to say that some other way would be
better, more accurate and even more just. The advantages or
disadvantages, the wisdom or folly of a method do not present
any matter for judicial consideration. In the words of the U.S.
Circuit Court of Appeals, „this Court cannot provide a second
opinion on what is the best procedure. Notwithstanding the
deference and esteem that is properly tendered to individual
congressional actors, our deference and esteem for the institution
as a whole and for the constitutional command that the
institution be allowed to manage its own affairs precludes us
from even attempting a diagnosis of the problem.‰

Same; Same; Same; Same; The Constitution does not require


that the yeas and the nays of the Members be taken every time a
House has to vote, except only in the following instances·upon
the last and third readings of a bill, at the request of one-fifth of
the Members present, and in repassing a bill over the veto of the
President.·Nor does the Constitution require that the yeas and
the nays of the Members be taken every time a House has to
vote, except only in the following instances: upon the last and
third readings of a bill, at the request of one-fifth of the Members
present, and in repassing a bill over the veto of the President.
Indeed, considering the fact that in the approval of the original
bill the votes of the Members by yeas and nays had already been
taken, it would have been sheer tedium to repeat the process.

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Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; The phrase


„grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction‰ has a settled meaning in the jurisprudence of
procedure·it means such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment by a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi judicial power
as to amount to lack of power.·Given this fact, it is difficult to
see how it can plausibly be contended that in signing the bill
which became R.A. No. 8240, respondent Speaker of the House
be acted with grave abuse of his discretion. Indeed, the phrase
„grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction‰ has a settled meaning in the jurisprudence of
procedure. It means such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment by a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi judicial power
as to amount to lack of power. As Chief Justice Concep-cion
himself said in explaining this provision, the power granted to
the courts by Art. VIII, §1 extends to cases where „a branch of
the government or any of its officials has acted without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to
constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction.‰

Same; Same; Same; Same; Quorum; The question of quorum


cannot be raised repeatedly·especially when the quorum is
obviously present·for the purpose of delaying the business of the
House; A Member of the House waives his objection to the

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presence of a quorum by his continued interpellation for in so
doing he in effect acknowledges the presence of a quorum.·Here,
the matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure
of the House with which the Court should not be concerned. To
repeat, the claim is not that there was no quorum but only that
Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the
presence of a quorum. Rep. ArroyoÊs earlier motion to adjourn for
lack of quorum had already been defeated, as the roll call
established the existence of a quorum. The question of quorum
cannot be raised repeatedly·especially when the quorum is
obviously present·for the purpose of delaying the business of
the House. Rep. Arroyo waived his objection by his continued
interpellation of the sponsor for in so doing he in effect
acknowledged the presence of a quorum.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Enrolled Bill Doctrine;


Presumptions; Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of a
bill by the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate
and the certification by the secretaries of both Houses of Congress
that it was passed are conclusive of its due enactment; There is no
claim either here or in the decision in the EVAT cases that the
enrolled bill embodies a con-

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clusive presumption.·Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the


signing of H. No. 7198 by the Speaker of the House and the
President of the Senate and the certification by the secretaries of
both Houses of Congress that it was passed on November 21,
1996 are conclusive of its due enactment. Much energy and
learning is devoted in the separate opinion of Justice Puno,
joined by Justice Davide, to disputing this doctrine. To be sure,
there is no claim either here or in the decision in the EVAT cases
[Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance] that the enrolled bill embodies
a conclusive presumption.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Where there is no evidence


to the contrary, the Court will respect the certification of the
presiding officers of both Houses that a bill has been duly passed.
·In one case we „went behind‰ an enrolled bill and consulted
the Journal to determine whether certain provisions of a statute
had been approved by the Senate. But, where as here there is no
evidence to the contrary, this Court will respect the certification
of the presiding officers of both Houses that a bill has been duly
passed. Under this rule, this Court has refused to determine
claims that the three-fourths vote needed to pass a proposed
amendment to the Constitution had not been obtained, because
„a duly authenticated bill or resolution imports absolute verity
and is binding on the courts.‰

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The enrolled bill doctrine,


as a rule of evidence, is well established, and to overrule it now is
to repudiate the massive teaching of our cases and overthrow an
established rule of evidence.·The enrolled bill doctrine, as a rule
of evidence, is well established. It is cited with approval by text
writers here and abroad. The enrolled bill rule rests on the

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following considerations: . . . As the President has no authority to
approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the
custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official
attestations of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of
the President of the Senate, and of the President of the United
States, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the legislative
and executive departments of the government, charged,
respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the laws,
that it was passed by Congress. The respect due to coequal and
independent departments requires the judicial department to act
upon that assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress,
all bills authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the court to
determine, when the question properly arises, whether the Act,
so authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution. To
overrule

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the doctrine now, as the dissent urges, is to repudiate the


massive teaching of our cases and overthrow an established rule
of evidence.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Legislative Journals; The


Journal is regarded as conclusive with respect to matters that are
required by the Constitution to be recorded therein, and with
respect to other matters, in the absence of evidence to the contrary,
the Journal has also been accorded conclusive effect.·The
Journal is regarded as conclusive with respect to matters that
are required by the Constitution to be recorded therein. With
respect to other matters, in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, the Journals have also been accorded conclusive effect.
Thus, in United States v. Pons, this Court spoke of the
imperatives of public policy for regarding the Journals as „public
memorials of the most permanent character,‰ thus: „They should
be public, because all are required to conform to them; they
should be permanent, that rights acquired today upon the faith
of what has been declared to be law shall not be destroyed
tomorrow, or at some remote period of time, by facts resting only
in the memory of individuals.‰ As already noted, the bill which
became R.A. No. 8240 is shown in the Journal. Hence its due
enactment has been duly proven.

Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court has not been


invested with a roving commission to inquire into complaints,
real or imagined, of legislative skullduggery·it would be acting
in excess of its power and would itself be guilty of grave abuse of
its discretion were it to do so.·It would be an unwarranted
invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for this
Court either to set aside a legislative action as void because the
Court thinks the House has disregarded its own rules of
procedure, or to allow those defeated in the political arena to
seek a rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can find
their remedy in that department itself. The Court has not been
invested with a roving commission to inquire into complaints,
real or imagined, of legislative skullduggery. It would be acting
in excess of its power and would itself be guilty of grave abuse of
its discretion were it to do so. The suggestion made in a case may

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instead appropriately be made here: petitioners can seek the
enactment of a new law or the repeal or amendment of R.A. No.
8240. In the absence of anything to the contrary, the Court must
assume that Congress or any House thereof acted in the good
faith belief that its conduct was permitted by its rules, and
deference rather than disrespect is due the judgment of that
body.

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PUNO, J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion:

Constitutional Law; Judicial Review; Separation of Powers;


Political Questions; In the Philippine setting, there is a more
compelling reason for courts to categorically reject the political
question defense when its interposition will cover up abuse of
power.·In the Philippine setting, there is a more compelling
reason for courts to categorically reject the political question
defense when its interposition will cover up abuse of power. For
section 1, Article VIII of our Constitution was intentionally
cobbled to empower courts „x x x to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government.‰ This power is new and was
not granted to our courts in the 1935 and 1972 Constitutions. It
was not also xeroxed from the US Constitution or any foreign
state constitution. The CONCOM granted this enormous power
to our courts in view of our experience under martial law where
abusive exercises of state power were shielded from judicial
scrutiny by the misuse of the political question doctrine. Led by
the eminent former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, the
CONCOM expanded and sharpened the checking powers of the
judiciary vis-a-vis the Executive and the Legislative departments
of government. In cases involving the proclamation of martial
law and suspension of the privilege of habeas corpus, it is now
beyond dubiety that the government can no longer invoke the
political question defense. Section 18 of Article VII completely
eliminated this defense.

Same; Same; Same; Same; In resolving the case at bar, the


lessons of our own history should provide us the light and not the
experience of foreigners.·I urge my brethren in the Court to give
due and serious consideration to this new constitutional
provision as the case at bar once more calls us to define the
parameters of our power to review violations of the rules of the
House. We will not be true to our trust as the last bulwark
against government abuses if we refuse to exercise this new
power or if we wield it with timidity. To be sure, it is this
exceeding timidity to unsheath the judicial sword that has
increasingly emboldened other branches of government to
denigrate, if not defy, orders of our courts. In Tolentino, I
endorsed the view of former Senator Salonga that this novel
provision stretching the latitude of judicial power is distinctly
Filipino and its interpretation should not be depreciated by
undue reliance on inapplicable foreign jurisprudence. In
resolving the case at bar, the lessons of our own history should
provide us the light and not the experience of foreigners.

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Same; Same; Same; Legislative Rules of Procedure; Enrolled


Bill Doctrine; An enrolled bill is a declaration by the two Houses,
through their presiding officers, to the President that a bill, thus
attested, has received in due the sanction of the legislative branch
of the government, and that it is delivered to him in obedience to
the constitutional requirement that all bills which pass Congress
shall be presented to him.·An enrolled bill is one which has
been duly introduced, finally enacted by both Houses, signed by
the proper officers of each House and approved by the President.
It is a declaration by the two Houses, through their presiding
officers, to the President that a bill, thus attested, has received
in due the sanction of the legislative branch of the government,
and that it is delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional
requirement that all bills which pass Congress shall be
presented to him.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases;


„Modified Entry or Affirmative Contradiction Rule‰ and
„Extrinsic Evidence Rule,‰ Explained.·Over the years, the
enrolled bill theory has undergone important mutations. Some
jurisdictions have adopted the modified entry or affirmative
contradiction rule. Under this rule, the presumption in favor of
the enrolled bill is not conclusive. The rule concedes validity to
the enrolled bill unless there affirmatively appears in the
journals of the legislature a statement that there has not been
compliance with one or more of the constitutional requirements.
Other jurisdictions have adopted the Extrinsic Evidence Rule
which holds that an enrolled bill is only prima facie evidence
that it has been regularly enacted. The prima facie presumption,
however, can be destroyed by clear, satisfactory and convincing
evidence that the constitutional requirements in enacting a law
have been violated. For this purpose, journals and other extrinsic
evidence are allowed to be received. Some limit the use of
extrinsic evidence to issues of fraud or mistakes.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The principle of separation


of powers is the principal prop of the enrolled bill doctrine.·The
principle of separation of powers is thus the principal prop of the
enrolled bill doctrine. The doctrine is also justified as a rule of
convenience. Supposedly, it avoids difficult questions of evidence.
It is also believed that it will prevent the filing of too many cases
which will cast a cloud of uncertainty on laws passed by the
legislature. As explained in Ex Pacte Wren „if the validity of
every act published as law is to be tested by examining its
history, as shown by the journals of the two houses of the
legislature, there will be an amount of litiga-

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tion, difficulty, and painful uncertainty appalling in its

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contemplation, and multiplying a hundredfold the alleged
uncertainty of the law.‰ The conclusiveness of the enrolled bill is
also justified on the ground that journals and other extrinsic
evidence are conducive to mistake, if not fraud.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is high time we re-


examine our preference for the enrolled bill doctrine.·Clearly,
the enrolled bill doctrine no longer enjoys its once unassailable
respectability in United States. Sutherland reveals that starting
in the 1940Ês, „x x x the tendency seems to be toward the
abandonment of the conclusive presumption rule and the
adoption of the third rule leaving only a prima facie presumption
of validity which may be attacked by any authoritative source of
information.‰ It is high time we re-examine our preference for the
enrolled bill doctrine. It was in the 1947 case of Mabanag v.
Lopez Vito, that this Court, with three (3) justices dissenting,
first embraced the rule that a duly authenticated bill or
resolution imports absolute verity and is binding on the courts.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is time to bury the


enrolled bill for its fiction of conclusiveness shuts off truth in
many litigations·giving an enrolled bill a mere prima facie
presumption of correctness will facilitate our task of dispensing
justice based on truth.·I respectfully submit that it is now time
for the Court to make a definitive pronouncement that we no
longer give our unqualified support to the enrolled bill doctrine.
There are compelling reasons for this suggested change in
stance. For one, the enrolled bill is appropriate only in England
where it originated because in England there is no written
Constitution and the Parliament is supreme. For another, many
of the courts in the United States have broken away from the
rigidity and unrealism of the enrolled bill in light of
contemporary developments in lawmaking. And more important,
our uncritical adherence to the enrolled bill is inconsistent with
our Constitution, laws and rules. In Mabanag, we relied on
section 313 of the Old Code of Civil Procedure as amended by Act
No. 2210 as a principal reason in embracing the enrolled bill.
This section, however has long been repealed by our Rules of
Court. A half glance at our Rules will show that its section on
conclusive presumption does not carry the conclusive
presumption we give to an enrolled bill. But this is not all. The
conclusiveness of an enrolled bill which all too often results in the
suppression of truth cannot be justified under the 1987
Constitution. The Preamble of our Constitution demands that we
live not only under a rule of law but also

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under a regime of truth. Our Constitution also adopted a


national policy requiring full public disclosure of all state
transactions involving public interest. Any rule which will defeat
this policy on transparency ought to be disfavored. And to
implement these policies, this Court was given the power to pry
open and to strike down any act of any branch or instrumentality
of government if it amounts to grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It is time to bury the

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enrolled bill for its fiction of conclusiveness shuts off truth in
many litigations. We cannot dispense justice based on fiction for
the search for justice is the search for truth. I submit that giving
an enrolled bill a mere prima facie presumption of correctness
will facilitate our task of dispensing justice based on truth.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Quorum; The rules on how to


question the existence of a quorum are procedural in character,
and their observance or non-observance is a matter of judgment
call on the part of our legislators and it is not the business of the
Court to reverse this judgment when untainted by grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.·In sum, I
respectfully submit that the Court has jurisdiction over the
petition at bar and that issues posed by petitioner are justiciable.
Nonetheless, I do not find any grave abuse of discretion
committed by the public respondents to justify granting said
petition. As the ponencia points out, the petition merely involves
the complaint that petitioner was prevented from raising the
question of quorum. The petition does not concern violation of
any rule mandated by the Constitution. Nor does it involve the
right of a non-member of the House which requires
constitutional protection. The rules on how to question the
existence of a quorum are procedural in character. They are
malleable by nature for they were drafted to help the House
enact laws. As well stated, these rules are servants, not masters
of the House. Their observance or non-observance is a matter of
judgment call on the part of our legislators and it is not the
business of the Court to reverse this judgment when untainted
by grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.


Certiorari and/or Prohibition.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.


Azcuna, Yorac, Sarmiento, Arroyo & Chua and Rene
A.V. Saguisag for petitioners.

279

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Arroyo vs. De Venecia

Cesar A. Sevilla & Associates for Jose de Venecia.

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari and/or prohibition


challenging the validity of Republic Act No. 8240, which
amends certain provisions of the National Internal
Revenue Code by imposing so-called „sin taxes‰ (actually
specific taxes) on the manufacture and sale of beer and
cigarettes.
Petitioners are members of the House of
Representatives. They brought this suit against
respondents Jose de Venecia, Speaker of the House of
Representatives, Deputy Speaker Raul Daza, Majority
Leader Rodolfo Albano, the Executive Secretary, the
Secretary of Finance, and the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, charging violation of the rules of the House
which petitioners claim are „constitutionally mandated‰ so
that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the

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Constitution.
The law originated in the House of Representatives as
H. No. 7198. This bill was approved on third reading on
September 12, 1996 and transmitted on September 16,
1996 to the Senate which approved it with certain
amendments on third reading on November 17, 1996. A
bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile
the disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate
versions of the bill.
The bicameral conference committee submitted its
report to the House at 8 a.m. on November 21, 1996. At
11:48 a.m., after a recess, Rep. Exequiel Javier, chairman
of the Committee on Ways and Means, proceeded to deliver
his sponsorship speech, after which he was interpellated.
Rep. Rogelio Sarmiento was first to interpellate. He was
interrupted when Rep. Arroyo moved to adjourn for lack of
quorum. Rep. Antonio Cuenco objected to the motion and
asked for a head count. After a roll call, the Chair (Deputy1
Speaker Raul Daza) declared the presence of a quorum.
Rep. Arroyo appealed the

_______________________

1 JOURNAL No. 39, pp. 66-68; Rollo, pp. 210, 212; Transcript of

November 21, 1996 session, pp. 39-52; Rollo, pp. 368-381; Petition, p. 6,
par. 10; Rollo, p. 8.

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280 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


Arroyo vs. De Venecia

ruling of the Chair, but his motion was defeated when put
to a vote. The interpellation of the sponsor thereafter
proceeded.
Petitioner Rep. Joker Arroyo registered to interpellate.
He was fourth in the order, following Rep. Rogelio
Sarmiento, Rep. Edcel C. Lagman and Rep. Enrique
Garcia. In the course of his interpellation, Rep. Arroyo
announced that he was going to raise a question on the
quorum, although until the end of his interpellation he
never did. What happened thereafter is shown in the
following transcript of the session on November 21, 1996 of
the House of Representatives, as published by Congress in
the newspaper issues of December 5 and 6, 1996:

MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move that we now approve and


ratify the conference committee report.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). Any objection to the
motion?
MR. ARROYO. What is that, Mr. Speaker?
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There being none,
approved. (Gavel)
MR. ARROYO. No, no, no, wait a minute, Mr. Speaker, I stood
up. I want to know what is the question that the Chair asked the
distinguished sponsor.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There was a motion by
the Majority Leader for approval of the report, and the Chair
called for the motion.
MR. ARROYO. Objection, I stood up, so I wanted to object.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is
suspended for one minute.

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(It was 3:01 p.m.)
(3:40 p.m., the session was resumed) THE DEPUTY
SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is resumed.
MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move to adjourn until four
oÊclock, Wednesday, next week.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is
adjourned until four oÊclock, Wednesday, next week. (It was 3:40
p.m.)

On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the
House of Representatives and the President of the Senate
and
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Arroyo vs. De Venecia

certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of


Congress as having been finally passed by the House of
Representatives and by the Senate on November 21, 1996.
The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Fidel V.
Ramos on November 22, 1996.
Petitioners claim that there are actually four different
versions of the transcript of this portion of Rep. ArroyoÊs
interpellation: (1) the transcript of audio-sound recording
of the proceedings in the session hall immediately after the
session adjourned at 3:40 p.m. on November 21, 1996,
which petitioner Rep. Edcel C. Lagman obtained from the
operators of the sound system; (2) the transcript of the
proceedings from 3:00 p.m. to 3:40 p.m. of November 21,
1996, as certified by the Chief of the Transcription Division
on November 21, 1996, also obtained by Rep. Lagman; (3)
the transcript of the proceedings from 3:00 p.m. to 3:40
p.m. of November 21, 1996 as certified by the Chief of the
Transcription Division on November 28, 1996, also
obtained by Rep. Lagman; and (4) the published version
abovequoted. According to petitioners, the four versions
differ on three points, to wit: (1) in the audio-sound
recording the word „approved,‰ which appears on line 13 in
the three other versions, cannot be heard; (2) in the
transcript certified on November 21, 1996 the word „no‰ on
line 17 appears only once, while in the other versions it is
repeated three times; and (3) the published version does
not contain the sentence „(Y)ou better prepare for a
quorum because I will raise the question of the quorum,‰
which appears in the other versions.
PetitionersÊ allegations are vehemently denied by
respondents. However, there is no need to discuss this
point as petitioners have announced that, in order to
expedite the resolution of this petition, they admit, without
conceding, the correctness of the transcripts relied upon by
the respondents. Petitioners agree that for purposes of this
proceeding the word „approved‰ appears in the transcripts.
Only the proceedings of the House of Representatives on
the conference committee report on H. No. 7198 are in
question. PetitionersÊ principal argument is that R.A. No.
8240 is
282

282 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

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Arroyo vs. De Venecia

null and void because it was passed in violation of the


rules of the House; that these rules embody the
„constitutional mandate‰ in Art. VI, §16(3) that „each
House may determine the rules of its proceedings‰ and
that, consequently, violation of the House rules is a
violation of the Constitution itself. They contend that the
certification of Speaker De Venecia that the law was
properly passed is false and spurious.
More specifically, petitioners charge that (1) in violation
of Rule2 VIII, §35 and Rule XVII, §103 of the rules of the
House, the Chair, in submitting the conference committee
report to the House, did not call for the yeas or nays, but
simply asked for its approval by motion in order to prevent
petitioner Arroyo from questioning the presence 3
of a
quorum; (2) in violation of Rule XIX, §112, the Chair
deliberately ignored Rep. ArroyoÊs question, „What is that .
. . Mr. Speaker?‰ and did not repeat Rep. AlbanoÊs motion 4
to approve or ratify; (3) in violation of Rule XVI, §97, the
Chair refused to recognize Rep. Arroyo and instead
proceeded to act on Rep. AlbanoÊs motion and afterward
declared the report approved; and (4) in violation of Rule5
XX, §§121-122, Rule XXI, §123, and Rule XVIII, §109, the
Chair suspended the session without first ruling on

___________________

2 Rule VIII, §35. Voting.·Every member present in the session shall

vote on every question put unless he inhibits himself on account of


personal pecuniary interest therein. Rule XVII, §103. Manner of Voting.
·The Speaker shall rise to put a question saying „As many as are in
favor of (as the question may be). say Aye‰ and, after the affirmative
vote is counted. „As many as are opposed. Say Nay . . .‰
3 Rule XIX, §112. Reading and Withdrawal of Motions.·The Speaker

shall state the motion or, if in writing, shall cause it to be read by the
Secretary General before being debated. A motion may be withdrawn
any time before its approval.
4 Rule XVI, §97. Recognition of Member.·When two or more

members rise at the same time, the Speaker shall recognize the Member
who is to speak first.
5 Rule XX, §121. Definition.·Questions of privilege are those

affecting the duties, conduct, rights, privileges, dignity, integrity of

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Arroyo vs. De Venecia

Rep. ArroyoÊs question which, it is alleged, is a point of


order or a privileged motion. It is argued that Rep. ArroyoÊs
query should have been resolved upon the resumption of
the session on November 28, 1996, because the
parliamentary situation at the time of the adjournment
remained upon the resumption of the session.
Petitioners also charge that the session was hastily
adjourned at 3:40 p.m. on November 21, 1996 and the bill
certified by Speaker Jose De Venecia to prevent petitioner
Rep. Arroyo from formally challenging the existence of a
quorum and asking for a reconsideration.
Petitioners urge the Court not to feel bound by the

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Page 13 of 52
certification of the Speaker of the House that the law had
been properly passed, considering the CourtÊs power under
Art. VIII, §1 to pass on claims of grave abuse of discretion
by the other departments of the government, and they ask6
for a reexamination of Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance,
which affirmed the conclusiveness of an enrolled bill, in
view of the changed membership of the Court.
The Solicitor General filed a comment in behalf of all
respondents. In addition, respondent De Venecia filed a
supplemental comment. RespondentsÊ defense is anchored
on the

_____________________

reputation of the House or of its members, collectively or individually.

§122. Precedence.·Subject to the ten-minute rule, questions of privilege shall


have precedence over all other questions, except a motion to adjourn and a point
of order.
Rule XXI, §123. Definition and Precedence.·A privileged motion pertains to a
subject matter which, under the rules, takes precedence over others. The order of
precedence of privileged motions is determined in each case by the rules.
Rule XVIII, §109. Who May Vote; Procedure; Exceptions.·When a bill, report
or motion is adopted or lost, a member who voted with the majority may move for
its reconsideration on the same or succeeding session day. The motion shall take
precedence over all other questions, except a motion to adjourn, a question of
privilege, and a point of order.

6 235 SCRA 630 (1994).

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284 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


Arroyo vs. De Venecia

principle of separation of powers and the enrolled bill


doctrine. They argue that the Court is not the proper
forum for the enforcement of the rules of the House and
that there is no justification for reconsidering the enrolled
bill doctrine. Although the Constitution provides in Art.
VI, §16(3) for the adoption by each House of its rules of
proceedings, enforcement of the rules cannot be sought in
the courts except insofar as they implement constitutional
requirements such as that relating to three readings on
separate days before a bill may be passed. At all events,
respondents contend that, in passing the bill which became
R.A. No. 8240, the rules of the House, as well as
parliamentary precedents for approval of conference
committee reports on mere motion, were faithfully
observed.
In his supplemental comment, respondent De Venecia
denies that his certification of H. No. 7198 is false and
spurious and contends that under the journal entry rule,
the judicial inquiry sought by the petitioners is barred.
Indeed, Journal No. 39 of the House of Representatives,
covering the sessions of November 20 and 21, 1996, shows
that „On Motion of Mr. Albano, there being no objection,
the Body approved the7 Conference Committee Report on
House Bill No. 7198.‰ This Journal was approved on
December 8
2, 1996 over the lone objection of petitioner Rep.
Lagman.
After considering the arguments of the parties, the
Court finds no ground for holding that Congress committed

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Page 14 of 52
a grave abuse of discretion in enacting R.A. No. 8240. This
case is therefore dismissed.
First. It is clear from the foregoing facts that what is
alleged to have been violated in the enactment of R.A. No.
8240 are merely internal rules of procedure of the House
rather than constitutional requirements for the enactment
of a law, i.e., Art. VI, §§26-27. Petitioners do not claim that
there was no quorum but only that, by some maneuver
allegedly in vio-

___________________

7 Rollo, p. 228.
8 Id., p. 229.

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Arroyo vs. De Venecia

lation of the rules of the House, Rep. Arroyo was effectively


prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum.
Petitioners contend that the House rules were adopted
pursuant to the constitutional provision that9 „each House
may determine the rules of its proceedings‰ and that for
this reason they are judicially enforceable. To begin with,
this contention10 stands the principle on its head. In the
decided cases, the constitutional provision that „each
House may determine the rules of its proceedings‰ was
invoked by parties, although not successfully, precisely to
support claims of autonomy of the legislative branch to
conduct its business free from interference by courts. Here
petitioners cite the provision for the opposite purpose of
invoking judicial review.
But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of
expression, all deny to the courts the power to inquire into
allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress
failed to comply with its own rules, in the absence of
showing that there was a violation of a constitutional
provision or the rights of private individuals. In Osmeña v.
11
Pendatun, it was held: „At any rate, courts have declared
that Âthe rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to
revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the
body adopting them.Ê And it has been said that
ÂParliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their
observance, the courts have no concern. They may be
waived or disregarded by the legislative body.Ê
Consequently, Âmere failure to conform to parliamentary
usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a
deliberative body) when the requisite number of members
have agreed to a particular measure.Ê ‰

__________________

9 Art. VI, §16(3).


10 E.g., United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co., 144 U.S. 1, 36 L.Ed. 321
(1862); Exxon Corp. v. FTC, 589 F. 2d 582 (1978); Murray v. Buchanan,
674 F.2d 14 (1982); Metzenbaum v. Federal Energy Regulatory ComÊn.
675 F.2d 1282 (1982). See also Osmeña v. Pendatun, 109 Phil. 863
(1960).
11 109 Phil. at 870-71. See also EVAT cases [Tolentino v. Secretary of

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Finance], 235 SCRA 630.

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286 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


Arroyo vs. De Venecia

12
In United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co., the rule was
stated thus: „The Constitution empowers each house to
determine its rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules
ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental
rights, and there should be a reasonable relation between
the mode or method of proceeding established by the rule
and the result which is sought to be attained. But within
these limitations all matters of method are open to the
determination of the House, and it is no impeachment of
the rule to say that some other way would be better, more
accurate, or even more just. It is no objection to the
validity of a rule that a different one has been prescribed
and in force for a length of time. The power to make rules is
not one which once exercised is exhausted. It is a
continuous power, always subject to be exercised by the
House, and within the limitations suggested, absolute and
beyond the challenge of any other body or tribunal.‰
13
In Crawford v. Gilchrist, it was held: „The provision
that each House shall determine the rules of its
proceedings does not restrict the power given to a mere
formulation of standing rules, or to the proceedings of the
body in ordinary legislative matters; but in the absence of
constitutional restraints, and when exercised by a majority
of a constitutional quorum, such authority extends to a
determination of the propriety and effect of any action as it
is taken by the body as it proceeds in the exercise of any
power, in the transaction of any business, or in the
performance of any duty conferred upon it by the
Constitution.‰
14
In State ex rel. City Loan & Savings Co. v. Moore, the
Supreme Court of Ohio stated: „The provision for
reconsideration is no part of the Constitution and is
therefore entirely within the control of the General
Assembly. Having made the rule, it should be regarded, but
a failure to regard it is not the subject-matter of judicial
inquiry. It has been decided by the courts of last resort of
many states, and also by the United

__________________

12 144 U.S. at 5, 36 L.Ed. at 324-25 (emphasis added).


13 64 Fla. 41; 59 So. 963, 968 (1912) (emphasis added).
14 124 Ohio St. 256, 177 N.E. 910, 911 (1931) (emphasis added).

287

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Arroyo vs. De Venecia

States Supreme Court, that a legislative act will not be


declared invalid for noncompliance with rules.‰
15
In State v. Savings Bank, the Supreme Court of Errors
of Connecticut declared itself as follows: „The Constitution

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Page 16 of 52
declares that each house shall determine the rules of its
own proceedings and shall have all powers necessary for a
branch of the Legislature of a free and independent state.
Rules of proceedings are the servants of the House and
subject to its authority. This authority may be abused, but
when the House has acted in a matter clearly within its
power, it would be an unwarranted invasion of the
independence of the legislative department for the court to
set aside such action as void because it may think that the
House has misconstrued or departed from its own rules of
procedure.‰
16
In McDonald v. State, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
held: „When it appears that an act was so passed, no
inquiry will be permitted to ascertain whether the two
houses have or have not complied strictly with their own
rules in their procedure upon the bill, intermediate its
introduction and final passage. The presumption is
conclusive that they have done so. We think no court has
ever declared an act of the legislature void for non-
compliance with the rules of procedure made by itself, or
the respective branches thereof, and which it or they may
change or suspend at will. If there are any such
adjudications, we decline17to follow them.‰
Schweizer v. Territory is illustrative of the rule in these
cases. The 1893 Statutes of Oklahoma provided for three
readings on separate days before a bill may be passed by
each house of the legislature, with the proviso that in case
of an emergency the house concerned may, by two-thirds
vote, suspend the operation of the rule. Plaintiff was
convicted in the district court of violation of a law
punishing gambling. He appealed contending that the
gambling statute was not properly passed by the
legislature because the suspension of the

___________________

15 79 Conn. 141, 64 Atl. 5, 9-10 (1906) (emphasis added).


16 80 Wis. 407, 50 N.W. 185, 186 (1891) (emphasis added).
17 5 Okl. 297, 47 Pac. 1094 (1897) (emphasis added).

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288 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


Arroyo vs. De Venecia

rule on three readings had not been approved by the


requisite two-thirds vote. Dismissing this contention, the
State Supreme Court of Oklahoma held:
We have no constitutional provision requiring that the
legislature should read a bill in any particular manner. It
may, then, read or deliberate upon a bill as it sees fit,
either in accordance with its own rules, or in violation
thereof, or without making any rules. The provision of
section 17 referred to is merely a statutory provision for
the direction of the legislature in its action upon proposed
measures. It receives its entire force from legislative
sanction, and it exists only at legislative pleasure. The
failure of the legislature to properly weigh and consider an
act, its passage through the legislature in a hasty manner,
might be reasons for the governor withholding his
signature thereto; but this alone, even though it is shown

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to be a violation of a rule which the legislature had made
to govern its own proceedings, could be no reason for the
courtÊs refusing its enforcement after it was actually
passed by a majority of each branch of the legislature, and
duly signed by the governor. The courts cannot declare an
act of the legislature void on account of noncompliance with
rules of procedure made by itself to govern its deliberations.
McDonald v. State, 80 Wis. 407, 50 N.W. 185; In re Ryan,
80 Wis. 414, 50 N.W. 187; State v. Brown, 33 S.C. 151, 11
S.E. 641; Railway Co. v. Gill, 54 Ark. 101, 15 S.W. 18.
We conclude this survey with the useful summary of the
rulings by former Chief Justice Fernando, commenting on
the power of each House of Congress to determine its rules
of proceedings. He wrote:

Rules are hardly permanent in character. The prevailing view is


that they are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the
pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily
procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their
observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the
legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them
does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite
number of members have agreed to a particular measure. The
above principle is subject, however, to this qualification. Where
the construction to be given to a rule affects persons other than
members of the legislative body the question

289

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Arroyo vs. De Venecia

presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is


18
open to question in a case where private rights are involved.

In this case no rights of private individuals are involved


but only those of a member who, instead of seeking redress
in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to this Court.
We have no more power to look into the internal
proceedings of a House than members of that House have
to look over our shoulders, as long as no violation of
constitutional provisions is shown.
Petitioners must realize that each of the three
departments of our government has its separate sphere
which the others may not invade without upsetting the
delicate balance on which our constitutional order rests.
Due regard for the working of our system of government,
more than mere comity, compels reluctance on our part to
enter upon an inquiry into an alleged violation of the rules
of the House. We must accordingly decline the invitation to
exercise our power.
Second. Petitioners, quoting former Chief Justice
Roberto ConcepcionÊs sponsorship in the Constitutional
Commission, contend that under Art. VIII, §1, „nothing
involving abuse of discretion [by the other branches of the
government] amounting19to lack or excess of jurisdiction is
beyond judicial review.‰ Implicit in this statement of the
former Chief Justice, however, is an acknowledgment that
the jurisdiction of this Court is subject to the case and
controversy requirement of Art. VIII, §5 and, therefore, to
the requirement of a justiciable controversy before courts
can adjudicate constitutional questions such as those

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which arise in the field of foreign relations. For while Art.
VIII, §1 has broadened the scope of

_____________________

18 ENRIQUE M. FERNANDO, CONSTITUTION OF THE


PHILIPPINES ANNOTATED 188-189 (1977); Pacete v. Secretary of the
Commission on Appointments, 40 SCRA 58 (1971).
19 Petition, p. 25, quoting the sponsorship speech of former Chief

Justice Roberto Concepcion, chairman of the Committee on Judiciary of


the Constitutional Commission, in 1 RECORDS OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 436 (Session of July 10,
1986).

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290 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


Arroyo vs. De Venecia

judicial inquiry into areas normally left to the political


departments
20
to decide, such as those relating to national
security, it has not altogether done away with political
questions such as those which arise in the field of foreign
relations. As we have already held, under Art. VIII, §1,
this CourtÊs function

is merely [to] check whether or not the governmental branch or


agency has gone beyond the constitutional limits of its
jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view. In the
absence of a showing . . . [of] grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to
exercise its corrective power. . 21. . It has no power to look into
what it thinks is apparent error.

If, then, the established rule is that courts cannot declare


an act of the legislature void on account merely of
noncompliance with rules of procedure made by itself, it
follows that such a case does not present a situation in
which a branch of the government has „gone beyond the
constitutional limits of its jurisdiction‰ so as to call for the
exercise of our Art. VIII, §1 power.
Third. Petitioners claim that the passage of the law in
the House was „railroaded.‰ They claim that Rep. Arroyo
was still making a query to the Chair when the latter
declared Rep. AlbanoÊs motion approved.
What happened is that, after Rep. ArroyoÊs
interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report,
Majority Leader Rodolfo Albano moved for the approval
and ratification of the conference committee report. The
Chair called out for objections to the motion. Then the
Chair declared: „There being none, approved.‰ At the same
time the Chair was saying this, however,

__________________

20 Gonzales v. Macaraig, 191 SCRA 452 (1990); See Marcos v.

Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668, 695 (1989); Lansang v. Garcia, 42 SCRA 448
(1971).
21 Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 199 SCRA

692, 701 (1991); Llamas v. Orbos, 202 SCRA 849, 857 (1991); Lansang v.
Garcia, 42 SCRA at 480-481 (emphasis added).

291

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VOL. 277, AUGUST 14, 1997 291
Arroyo vs. De Venecia

Rep. Arroyo was asking, „What is that . . . Mr. Speaker?‰


The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously.
Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the
Majority LeaderÊs motion, the approval of the conference
committee report had by then already been declared by the
Chair, symbolized by its banging of the gavel.
Petitioners argue that, in accordance with the rules of
the House, Rep. AlbanoÊs motion for the approval of the
conference committee report should have been stated by
the Chair and later the individual votes of the Members
should have been taken. They say that the method used in
this case is a legislatorÊs nightmare because it suggests
unanimity when the fact was that one or some legislators
opposed the report.
No rule of the House of Representatives has been cited
which specifically requires that in cases such as this
involving approval of a conference committee report, the
Chair must restate the motion and conduct a viva voce or
nominal voting. On the other hand, as the Solicitor
General has pointed out, the manner in which the
conference committee report on H. No. 7198 was approved
was by no means a unique one. It has basis in legislative
practice. It was the way the conference committee report
on the bills which became the Local Government Code of
1991 and the conference committee report on the bills
amending the Tariff and Customs Code were approved.
In 1957, the practice was questioned as being contrary
to the rules of the House. The point was answered by
Majority Leader Arturo M. Tolentino and his answer
became the ruling of the Chair. Mr. Tolentino said:

Mr. TOLENTINO. The fact that nobody objects means a


unanimous action of the House. Insofar as the matter of
procedure is concerned, this has been a precedent since I came
here seven years ago, and it has been the procedure in this
House that if somebody objects, then a debate follows and after
the debate, then the voting comes in.
....
Mr. Speaker, a point of order was raised by the gentleman
from Leyte, and I wonder what his attitude is now on his point of

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292 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


Arroyo vs. De Venecia

order. I should just like to state that I believe that we have had a
substantial compliance with the Rules. The Rule invoked is not
one that refers to statutory or constitutional requirement, and a
substantial compliance, to my mind, is sufficient. When the
Chair announces the vote by saying „Is there any objection?‰ and
nobody objects, then the Chair announces „The bill is approved
on second reading.‰ If there was any doubt as to the vote, any
motion to divide would have been proper. So, if that motion is not
presented, we assume that the House approves the measure. So I
believe there is substantial compliance here, and if anybody
wants a division of the House he can always ask for it, and the

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Page 20 of 52
Chair can announce how many are in favor and how many are
22
against.

Indeed, it is no impeachment of the method to say that


some other23 way would be better, more accurate and even
more just. The advantages or disadvantages, the wisdom
or folly of a method
24
do not present any matter for judicial
consideration. In the words of the U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals, „this Court cannot provide a second opinion on
what is the best procedure. Notwithstanding the deference
and esteem that is properly tendered to individual
congressional actors, our deference and esteem for the
institution as a whole and for the constitutional command
that the institution be allowed to manage its own affairs
precludes25 us from even attempting a diagnosis of the
problem.‰
Nor does the Constitution require that the yeas and the
nays of the Members be taken every time a House has to
vote, except only in the following
26
instances: upon the last
and third readings of 27a bill, at the request of one-fifth of
the Members present, and in repassing a bill over the veto
of the Presi-

__________________

224 CONG. REC. 413-414 (Feb. 15, 1957).


23United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co., 144 U.S. at 5, 36 L.Ed. at
324-25; State v. Lewis, 186 S.E. 625, 630 (1936).
24 United States v. Smith, 286 U.S. 6, 76 L.Ed. 954 (1931).

25 Gregg v. Barrett, 771 F.2d 539, 549 (1985).

26 Art. VI, §26(2).

27 Id., §16(4).

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VOL. 277, AUGUST 14, 1997 293


Arroyo vs. De Venecia

28
dent. Indeed, considering the fact that in the approval of
the original bill the votes of the Members by yeas and nays
had already been taken, it would have been sheer tedium
to repeat the process.
Petitioners claim that they were prevented from seeking
reconsideration allegedly as a result of the precipitate29
suspension and subsequent adjournment of the session. It
would appear, however, that the session was suspended to
allow the parties to settle the problem, because when it
resumed at 3:40 p.m. on that day Rep. Arroyo did not say
anything anymore. While it is true that the Majority
Leader moved for adjournment until 4 p.m. of Wednesday
of the following week, Rep. Arroyo could at least have
objected if there was anything he wanted to say. The fact,
however, is that he did not. The Journal of November 21,
1996 of the House shows:

ADJOURNMENT OF SESSION

On motion of Mr. Albano, there being no objection, the Chair


declared the session adjourned until four oÊclock in the afternoon
of Wednesday, November 27, 1996.
It was 3:40 p.m. Thursday, November 21, 1996. (emphasis
added)

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This Journal was approved on December 2, 1996. Again, no
one objected to its approval except Rep. Lagman.
It is thus apparent that petitionersÊ predicament was
largely of their own making. Instead of submitting the
proper motions for the House to act upon, petitioners
insisted on the pendency of Rep. ArroyoÊs question as an
obstacle to the passage of the bill. But Rep. ArroyoÊs
question was not, in form or substance, a point30
of order or
a question of privilege entitled to precedence. And even if
Rep. ArroyoÊs question were so,

_____________________

28Id., §27(1).
29Id., p. 17; id., p. 19.
30 INOCENCIO PAREJA, RULES OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES COMMENTED AND ANNOTATED 331 (1963);

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294 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


Arroyo vs. De Venecia

Rep. AlbanoÊs motion to adjourn would have precedence


and would have 31
put an end to any further consideration of
the question.
Given this fact, it is difficult to see how it can plausibly
be contended that in signing the bill which became R.A.
No. 8240, respondent Speaker of the House be acted with
grave abuse of his discretion. Indeed, the phrase „grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction‰ has a settled meaning in the jurisprudence of
procedure. It means such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment by a tribunal exercising judicial or
quasi judicial power as to amount to lack of power. As
Chief Justice Concepcion himself said in explaining this
provision, the power granted to the courts by Art. VIII, §1
extends to cases where „a branch of the government or any
of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute32an abuse of
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.‰
Here, the matter complained of concerns a matter of
internal procedure of the House with which the Court
should not be concerned. To repeat, the claim is not that
there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was
effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a
quorum. Rep. ArroyoÊs earlier motion to adjourn for lack of
quorum had already been defeated, as the roll call
established the existence of a quorum. The question of
quorum cannot be raised repeatedly·especially when the
quorum is obviously present·for 33
the purpose of delaying
the business of the House. Rep. Arroyo waived his
objection by his continued interpellation of the

____________________

REYNALDO FAJARDO, PRINCIPLES OF PARLIAMENTARY


PROCEDURE 157-158, 172-173 (1963).
31 Rule XIX, §13.

32 1 RECORDS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 436

(Session of July 10, 1986).


33 ALICE STURGIS, STANDARD CODE OF PARLIAMENTARY

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Page 22 of 52
PROCEDURE, 17 (1950).

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Arroyo vs. De Venecia

sponsor for in so doing34


he in effect acknowledged the
presence of a quorum.
At any rate it is noteworthy that of the 111 members of
the House earlier found to be present on November 21,
1996, only the five, i.e., petitioners in this case, are
questioning the manner by which the conference
committee report on H. No. 7198 was approved on that day.
No one, except Rep. Arroyo, appears to have objected to the
manner by which the report was approved. Rep. John
Henry Osmeña did not participate 35
in the bicameral
conference committee proceedings.36
Rep. Lagman and Rep.
Zamora objected to the report but not to the manner it
was approved; while it is said that, if voting had been
conducted, Rep. Tañada would 37
have voted in favor of the
conference committee report.
Fourth. Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of
H. No. 7198 by the Speaker of the House and the President
of the Senate and the certification by the secretaries of
both Houses of Congress that it was passed on November
21, 1996 are conclusive of its due enactment. Much energy
and learning is devoted in the separate opinion of Justice
Puno, joined by Justice Davide, to disputing this doctrine.
To be sure, there is no claim either here or in the decision
in the EVAT cases [Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance] that
the enrolled
38
bill embodies a conclusive presumption. In one
case we „went behind‰ an enrolled bill and consulted the
Journal to determine whether certain provisions of a
statute had been approved by the Senate.
But, where as here there is no evidence to the contrary,
this Court will respect the certification of the presiding
officers of both Houses that a bill has been duly passed.
Under

___________________

34 PAUL MASON, MANUAL OF LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE 335

(1953).
35 Conference Committee Report, Rollo, p. 36; Petition, p. 14; Rollo, p.

16.
36 Ibid.

37 Petition, p. 14; Rollo, p. 16.

38 Astorga v. Villegas, 56 SCRA 714 (1974).

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296 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


Arroyo vs. De Venecia

this rule, this Court has refused to determine claims that


the three-fourths vote needed to pass a proposed
amendment to the Constitution had not been obtained,
because „a duly authenticated bill or resolution
39
imports
absolute verity and is binding on the courts.‰ This Court
quoted from Wigmore on Evidence the following excerpt

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Page 23 of 52
which embodies good, if oldfashioned, democratic theory:

The truth is that many have been carried away with the
righteous desire to check at any cost the misdoings of
Legislatures. They have set such store by the Judiciary for this
purpose that they have almost made them a second and higher
Legislature. But they aim in the wrong direction. Instead of
trusting a faithful Judiciary to check an inefficient Legislature,
they should turn to improve the Legislature. The sensible
solution is not to patch and mend casual errors by asking the
Judiciary to violate legal principle and to do impossibilities with
the Constitution; but to represent ourselves with competent,
careful, and honest legislators, the work of whose hands on the
statute-roll may come to reflect credit upon the name of popular
40
government.

This Court has refused to even look into allegations that


the enrolled bill sent to the President contained provisions
which had been „surreptitiously‰ inserted in the conference
committee:

[W]here allegations that the constitutional procedures for the


passage of bills have not been observed have no more basis than
another allegation that the Conference Committee
„surreptitiously‰ inserted provisions into a bill which it had
prepared, we should decline the invitation to go behind the
enrolled copy of the bill. To disregard the „enrolled bill‰ rule in
such cases would be to disregard the respect due the other two
41
departments of our government.

__________________

39 Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1, 12 (1947).


40 Id. at 17, quoting 4 JOHN WIGMORE, TREATISE ON THE LAW
ON EVIDENCE §1350 at 702 (1940). This excerpt is preserved in the
Chadbourne edition of this locus classicus. See 4 WIGMORE ON
EVIDENCE §1350 at 834 (James H. Chadbourne, ed. 1972).
41 EVAT cases [Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance], 235 SCRA at 672.

Cf. Morales vs. Subido, 27 SCRA 131 (1969).

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Arroyo vs. De Venecia

It has refused to look into charges that an amendment was


made upon the last reading of a bill in violation of Art. VI,
§26(2) of the Constitution that „upon42the last reading of a
bill, no amendment 43
shall be allowed.‰
In other cases, this Court has denied claims that the
tenor of a bill was otherwise than as certified by the
presiding officers of both Houses of Congress.
The enrolled bill doctrine, as a rule of evidence, is well
established. 44It is cited with approval by text writers here
and abroad. The enrolled bill rule rests on the following
considerations:

. . . As the President has no authority to approve a bill not


passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the
Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the President of the
Senate, and of the President of the United States, carries, on its
face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive

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Page 24 of 52
departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the
duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by
Congress. The respect due to coequal and independent
departments requires the judicial department to act upon that
assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills
authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the court to
determine, when the question properly arises, whether the Act,
45
so authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution.

To overrule the doctrine now, as the dissent urges, is to


repudiate the massive teaching of our cases and overthrow
an established rule of evidence.

____________________________

42 Philippine Judges AssÊn v. Prado, 227 SCRA 703, 710 (1993);

Morales v. Subido, 27 SCRA 131.


43 Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. v. Gimenez, 7 SCRA 347

(1963); Resins, Inc. v. Auditor General, 25 SCRA 754 (1968).


44 4 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE §1350 (James H. Chadbourne, ed.

1972); 6 MANUEL V. MORAN, COMMENTS ON THE RULES OF


COURT 115 (1980); 7 VICENTE J. FRANCISCO, THE REVISED
RULES OF COURT (Pt. II) 454 (1973).
45 Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 672, 36 L.Ed. 294, 303

(1891).

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298 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


Arroyo vs. De Venecia

Indeed, petitioners have advanced no argument to warrant


a departure from the rule, except to say that, with a
change in the membership of the Court, the three new
members may be assumed to have an open mind on the
question of the enrolled bill rule. Actually, not three but
four (Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, and Quiason, JJ.) have
departed from the Court since our decision in the EVAT
cases and their places have since been taken by four new
members (Francisco, Hermosisima, Panganiban, and
Torres, JJ.). Petitioners are thus simply banking on the
change in the membership of the Court.
Moreover, as already noted, the due enactment of the
law in question is confirmed by the Journal of the House of
Novem-ber 21, 1996 which shows that the conference
committee report on H. No. 7198, which became R.A. No.
8240, was approved on that day. The keeping of the
Journal is required by the Constitution. Art. VI, §16(4)
provides:

Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from


time to time publish the same, excepting such parts as may, in
its judgment, affect national security; and the yeas and nays on
any question shall, at the request of one-fifth of the Members
present, be entered in the Journal.
Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings.

The Journal is regarded as conclusive with respect to


matters that are46 required by the Constitution to be
recorded therein. With respect to other matters, in the
absence of evidence to the contrary, the Journals have also
been accorded conclusive effect. Thus, in United States v.

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47
Pons, this Court spoke of the imperatives of public policy
for regarding

____________________

46 The following are required to be entered on the Journal: (1) The

yeas and nays on the third and final reading of a bill (Art. VI, §26[2]); (2)
the yeas and nays on any question, at the request of onefifth of the
members present (Id., §16 [4]); (3) the yeas and nays upon repassing a
bill over the PresidentÊs veto (Id., §27 (1); and (4) the PresidentÊs
objection to a bill which he has vetoed. (Id.)
47 34 Phil. 729, 735 (1916), quoting State ex rel. Herron v. Smith, 44

Ohio 348 (1886).

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VOL. 277, AUGUST 14, 1997 299


Arroyo vs. De Venecia

the Journals as „public memorials of the most permanent


character,‰ thus: „They should be public, because all are
required to conform to them; they should be permanent,
that rights acquired today upon the faith of what has been
declared to be law shall not be destroyed tomorrow, or at
some remote period of time, by facts resting only in the
memory of individuals.‰ As already noted, the bill which
became R.A. No. 8240 is shown in the Journal. Hence its
due enactment has been duly proven.

··············

It would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of


a coequal department for this Court either to set aside a
legislative action as void because the Court thinks the
House has disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to
allow those defeated in the political arena to seek a
rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can find
their remedy in that department itself. The Court has not
been invested with a roving commission to inquire into
complaints, real or imagined, of legislative skullduggery. It
would be acting in excess of its power and would itself be
guilty of grave abuse of its48discretion were it to do so. The
suggestion made in a case may instead appropriately be
made here: petitioners can seek the enactment of a new
law or the repeal or amendment of R.A. No. 8240. In the
absence of anything to the contrary, the Court must
assume that Congress or any House thereof acted in the
good faith belief that its conduct was permitted by its
rules, and deference 49rather than disrespect is due the
judgment of that body.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and
prohibition is DISMISSED.

____________________

48 Gregg v. Barrett, 771 F.2d 529.


49 Metzenbaum v. Federal Energy Regulatory ComÊn, 675 F.2d 1282.

300

300 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

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Arroyo vs. De Venecia

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa (C.J.), Padilla, Melo, Kapunan, Francisco


and
Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
Regalado, J., In the result.
Davide, Jr., J., I join with Mr. Justice PunoÊs
concurring/dissenting.
Romero, J., Please see Separate Opinion.
Bellosillo, J., No part due to relationship to parties.
Puno, J., See Concurring & Dissenting Opinion.
Vitug, J., Please see separate opinion (concurring).
Panganiban, J., No part. Former counsel of a party.
Torres, Jr., J., No part: On leave during
deliberations.

SEPARATE OPINION

ROMERO, J.:

In filing this separate opinion for the dismissal of the


instant petition, I am not backtracking from the dissent 1
which I expressed in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance. I
am somewhat bothered that if I do not elaborate, the vote
which I cast today might be wrongly construed as an
implied abandonment of, and inconsistent with, my firm
stance in Tolentino.
The landmark case of Tolentino, just like the one under
consideration, involved a similar challenge to the
constitutionality of a significant tax measure namely,
Republic Act No. 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded
Value-Added Tax (EVAT) Law. There, a number of issues,
both substantive and procedural, were posed by
petitioners, each of which was discussed by the majority
opinion of Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza who,
incidentally, is also the ponente of instant decision. At any
rate, it is worth noting that I did not entirely

_________________

1 235 SCRA 630.

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VOL. 277, AUGUST 14, 1997 301


Arroyo vs. De Venecia

disagree with each and every argument of the opinion,


most especially those touching upon substantive issues. My
main objection in Tolentino, it will be recalled, focused
instead on what I perceived was a substantial breach and
disregard by the Legislature of vital constitutional
requirements ordaining the procedures to be followed in
the passage of a bill which, in my opinion, the majority
seemed to have cavalierly put to2 rest by hiding under the
cloak of the enrolled bill theory and the precept that the

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Court is not the proper forum for the 3enforcement of
internal legislative rules allegedly violated. To

_________________

2 Id., at p. 672: „Fourth. Whatever doubts there may be as to the

formal validity of Republic Act No. 7716 must be resolved in its favor.
Our cases manifest firm adherence to the rule that an enrolled copy of a
bill is conclusive not only of its provisions but also of its due enactment.
Not even claims that a proposed constitutional amendment was invalid
because the requisite votes for its approval had not been obtained or
that certain provisions of a state had been ÂsmuggledÊ in the printing of
the bill have moved or persuaded us to look behind the proceedings of a
coequal branch of the government.

There is no reason now to depart from this rule. No claim is here made that the
Âenrolled billÊ rule is absolute. In fact in one case we Âwent behindÊ an enrolled bill
and consulted the Journal to determine whether certain provisions of a statute
had been approved by the Senate in view of the fact that the President of the
Senate himself, who had signed the enrolled bill, admitted a mistake and
withdrew his signature, so that in effect there was no longer an enrolled bill to
consider.
But where allegations that the constitutional procedures for the passage of
bills have not been observed have no more basis than another allegation that the
Conference Committee ÂsurreptitiouslyÊ inserted provisions into a bill which it
had prepared, we should decline the invitation to go behind the enrolled copy of
the bill. To disregard the Âenrolled billÊ rule in such cases would be to disregard
the respect due the other two departments of our government.‰

3 Id., at p. 675: „Moreover, this Court is not the proper forum for the

enforcement of these internal Rules. To the contrary, as we have already


ruled, Âparliamentary rules are merely procedural and with their
observance the courts have no concern.Ê Our concern is with the
procedural requirements of the Constitution for the enact-

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302 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


Arroyo vs. De Venecia

me, the position then taken by the majority exhibited blind


adherence to otherwise sound principles of law which did
not, however, fit the facts as presented before the Court.
Hence, I objected, not so much because I found these
principles unwise or obsolete, but rather because they were
applied, or misapplied, to a case which I believe did not call
for their application.
When I differed from the majority opinion which applied
the enrolled bill theory, I was very careful to emphasize
that reliance thereon is not to be discontinued but that its
application must be limited to minor matters relating more
to form and factual issues which do not materially alter the
essence and substance of the law itself. Thus:

„As applied to the instant petition, the issue posed is whether or


not the procedural irregularities that attended the passage of
House Bill No. 11197 and Senate Bill No. 1630, outside of the
reading and printing requirements which were exempted by the
Presidential certification, may no longer be impugned, having
been ÂsavedÊ by the conclusiveness on us of the enrolled bill. I see
no cogent reason why we cannot continue to place reliance on the
enrolled bill, but only with respect to matters pertaining to the
procedure followed in the enactment of bills in Congress and their

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subsequent engrossment, printing errors, omission of words and
phrases and similar relatively minor matters relating more to
form and factual issues which do not materially alter the essence
and substance of the law itself.
Certainly, courts cannot claim greater ability to judge
procedural legitimacy, since constitutional rules on legislative
procedure are easily mastered. Procedural disputes are over
facts·whether or not the bill had enough votes, or three
readings, or whatever·not over the meaning of the constitution.
Legislators, as eyewitnesses, are in a better position than a court
to rule on the facts. The argument is also made that legislatures
would be offended if courts examined legislative procedure.
Such a rationale, however, cannot conceivably apply to
substantive changes in a bill introduced towards the end of its
tortuous trip

____________________

ment of laws. As far as these requirements are concerned, we are satisfied


that they have been faithfully observed in these cases.‰

303

VOL. 277, AUGUST 14, 1997 303


Arroyo vs. De Venecia

through Congress, catching both legislators and the public


unawares and altering the same beyond recognition even by its
sponsors. 4
This issue I wish to address forthwith.‰

As regards the principle that the Court is not the proper


forum for the enforcement of internal legislative rules,
both the majority and I were actually of one mind such
that I was quick to qualify the extent of the CourtÊs review
power in respect of internal procedures in this wise:

„I wish to consider this issue in light of Article VIII, Sec. 1 of the


Constitution which provides that Â(j)udicial power includes the
duty of the courts of justice x x x to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.Ê We are also guided by the
principle that a court may interfere with the internal procedures
5
of its coordinate branch only to uphold the Constitution.‰

I differed, however, from the majority insofar as that


principle was applied. In this respect, I showed that the
introduction of several provisions in the Bicameral
Conference Committee Report did not only violate the
pertinent House and Senate Rules defining the limited
power of the conference committee but that the
Constitutional proscription against any amendment upon
the last reading of a bill was likewise breached. Hence, in
view of these lapses, I thought that judicial review would
have been proper in order to uphold the Constitution. This
the majority, however, disregarded invoking the same
principle which should have justified the Court in
questioning the actuations of the legislative branch.
At this juncture, I wish to reiterate my continuing
adherence to the aforesaid reasons I cited in the Tolentino
dissent. At the same time, I realize that the arguments I
raised in my dissent would not hold true in the instant

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petition.

___________________

4 Id., pp. 778-779; emphasis supplied.


5 Id., p. 780; emphasis supplied; compare to note 3, supra.

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304 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


Arroyo vs. De Venecia

For one thing, unlike in Tolentino, the rules of the House of


Representatives allegedly violated by respondents in the
instant petition are purely internal rules designed for the
orderly conduct of the HouseÊs business. They have no
direct or reasonable nexus to the requirements and
proscriptions of the Constitution in the passage of a bill
which would otherwise warrant the CourtÊs intervention.
Likewise, the petitioners are not in any way complaining
that substantial alterations have been introduced in
Republic Act No. 8240. The thrust of petitionersÊ
arguments in attacking the validity of the law is merely
with respect to the fact that Rep. Joker Arroyo was
effectively prevented from invoking the question of quorum
and not that the substance thereof offends constitutional
standards. This being the case, I do not now feel called
upon to invoke my previous argument that the enrolled bill
theory should not be conclusive as regards „substantive
changes in a bill introduced towards the end of its tortuous
trip through Congress,‰ when it is palpably unwarranted
under the circumstances of instant petition.

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION

PUNO, J.:

I concur in the result. I do appreciate the fine legal


disquisition of Mr. Justice Mendoza to justify the dismissal
of the case at bar. Nevertheless, I have to express my views
on the alleged non-justiciability of the issue posed by the
petitioner as well as the applicability of the archaic
enrolled bill doctrine in light of what I perceive as new
wrinkles in our law brought about by the 1987
Constitution and the winds of changing time.

With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by


the petitioner are non-justiciable. Nor do I agree that we
will trivialize the principle of separation of power if we
assume jurisdiction over the case at bar. Even in the
United States, the principle of separation of power is no
longer an impregna-

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Page 30 of 52
ble impediment against the interposition of judicial power
on cases involving breach of rules of procedure by
legislators.
Rightly, the ponencia uses the 1891 case of US v.
1
Ballin, as a window to view the issues before the Court. It
is in Ballin where the US Supreme Court first defined the
boundaries of the2 power of the judiciary to review
congressional rules. It held:

„x x x
„The Constitution, in the same section, provides, that each
house may determine the rules of its proceedings.‰ It appears
that in pursuance of this authority the House had, prior to that
day, passed this as one of its rules:

Rule XV

3. On the demand of any member, or at the suggestion of the


Speaker, the names of members sufficient to make a quorum in
the hall of the House who do not vote shall be noted by the clerk
and recorded in the journal, and reported to the Speaker with
the names of the members voting, and be counted and
announced in determining the presence of a quorum to do
business. (House Journal, 230, Feb. 14, 1890)
The action taken was in direct compliance with this rule. The
question, therefore, is as to the validity of this rule, and not what
methods the Speaker may of his own motion resort to for
determining the presence of a quorum, nor what matters the
Speaker or clerk may of their own volition place upon the
journal. Neither do the advantages or disadvantages, the wisdom
or folly, of such a rule present any matters for judicial
consideration. With the courts the question is only one of power.
The Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of
proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore constitutional
restraints or violate fundamental rights, and there should be a
reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceedings
established by the rule and the result which is sought to be

________________

1 144 US 1 (1891).
2 The case involved the validity of a law which allegedly was passed in
violation of House Rule XV which provided that members present in the chamber
but not voting would be „counted and announced in determining the presence of a
quorum to do business.‰

306

306 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


Arroyo vs. De Venecia

attained. But within these limitations all matters of method are


open to the determination of the House, and it is no
impeachment of the rule to say that some other way would be
better, more accurate, or even more just. It is no objection to the
validity of a rule that a different one has been prescribed and in
force for a length of time. The power to make rules is not one
which once exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous power,
always subject to be exercised by the House, and within the
limitations suggested, absolute and beyond the challenge of any

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other body or tribunal.‰

Ballin, clearly confirmed the jurisdiction of courts to pass


upon the validity of congressional rules, i.e., whether they
are constitutional. Rule XV was examined by the Court
and it was found to satisfy the test: (1) that it did not
ignore any constitutional restraint; (2) it did not violate
any fundamental right; and (3) its method has a
reasonable relationship with the result sought to be
attained. By examining Rule XV, the Court did not allow
its jurisdiction to be defeated by the mere invocation of the
principle of separation of powers. 3
Ballin was followed in 1932 by the case of US v. Smith.
In Smith, the meaning of sections 3 and 4 of Rule XXXVIII
of the US Senate was in issue, viz.:

„x x x
„3. When a nomination is confirmed or rejected, any Senator
voting in the majority may move for a reconsideration on the
same day on which the vote was taken, or on either of the next
two days of actual executive session of the Senate; but if a
notification of the confirmation or rejection of a nomination shall
have been sent to the President before the expiration of the time
within which a motion to reconsider may be made, the motion to
reconsider shall be accompanied by a motion to request the
President to return such notification to the Senate. Any motion
to reconsider the vote on a nomination may be laid on the table
without prejudice to the nomination, and shall be a final
disposition of such motion.
4. Nominations confirmed or rejected by the Senate shall not
be returned by the Secretary to the President until the
expiration of the time limited for making a motion to reconsider
the same, or

____________________

3 286 US 6 (1932).

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Arroyo vs. De Venecia

while a motion to reconsider is pending, unless otherwise


ordered by the Senate.‰

It appears that the nomination of Mr. Smith as member of


the Federal Power Commission has been confirmed by the
US Senate. The resolution of confirmation was sent to the
US President who then signed the appointment of Mr.
Smith. The Senate, however, reconsidered the confirmation
of Mr. Smith and requested the President to return its
resolution of confirmation. The President refused. A
petition for quo warranto was filed against Mr. Smith. The
Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Brandeis, assumed
jurisdiction over the dispute relying on Ballin. It exercised
jurisdiction although „the question primarily at issue
relates to the construction of the applicable rules, not to
their constitutionality.‰ Significantly, the Court rejected the
Senate interpretation of its own rules even while it held
that it must be accorded the most sympathetic
consideration.

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„x x x
„Sixth. To place upon the standing rules of the Senate a
construction different from that adopted by the Senate itself
when the present case was under debate is a serious and delicate
exercise of judicial power. The Constitution commits to the
Senate the power to make its own rules; and it is not the
function of the Court to say that another rule would be better. A
rule designed to ensure due deliberation in the performance of
the vital function of advising and consenting to nominations for
public office, moreover, should receive from the Court the most
sympathetic consideration. But the reasons, above stated,
against the SenateÊs construction seem to us compelling. We are
confirmed in the view we have taken by the fact, since the
attempted reconsideration of SmithÊs confirmation, the Senate
itself seems uniformly to have treated the ordering of immediate
notification to the President as tantamount to authorizing him to
proceed to perfect the appointment.

Smith, of course, involves the right of a third person and


its ruling falls within the test spelled out in Ballin.

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308 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


Arroyo vs. De Venecia

Smith was followed by the 1948 case of Christoffel v.


4
United States. Christoffel testified before the Committee
on Education and Labor of the House of Representatives.
He denied he was a communist and was charged with
perjury in the regular court. He adduced evidence during
the trial that the committee had no quorum when the
perjurious statement was given. Nonetheless, he was
convicted in view of the judgeÊs charge to the members of
the jury that to find Christoffel guilty, they had to find
beyond a reasonable doubt that·

„x x x
„x x x the defendant Christoffel appeared before a quorum of
at least thirteen members of the said Committee, and that Âat
least that number must have been actually and physically
present . . . If such a Committee so met, that is, if thirteen
members did meet at the beginning of the afternoon session of
March 1, 1947, and thereafter during the progress of the hearing
some of them left temporarily or otherwise and no question was
raised as to the lack of a quorum, then the fact that the majority
did not remain there would not affect, for the purposes of this
case, the existence of that Committee as a competent tribunal
provided that before the oath was administered and before the
testimony of the defendant was given there were present as
many as 13 members of that Committee at the beginning of the
afternoon session . . . .‰

Christoffel objected to the charge on the ground that it


allowed the jury to assume there was a continuous quorum
simply because it was present at the start of the meeting of
the Committee. Under the House rules, a quorum once
established is presumed to continue until the lack of
quorum is raised. Again, the court assumed jurisdiction
over the case. A majority of the Court, with Mr. Justice
Murphy, as ponente, defined the issue as „what rules the
House had established and whether they have been

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followed.‰ It held:

_________________

4 338 US 89 (1948).

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„x x x
„Congressional practice in the transaction of ordinary
legislative business is of course none of our concern, and by the
same token the considerations which may lead Congress as a
matter of legislative practice to treat as valid the conduct of its
committees do not control the issue before us. The question is
neither what rules Congress may establish for its own
governance, nor whether presumptions of continuity may protect
the validity of its legislative conduct. The question is rather what
rules the House has established and whether they have been
followed. It of course has the power to define what tribunal is
competent to exact testimony and the conditions that establish
its competency to do so. The heart of this case is that by the
charge that was given it the jury was allowed to assume that the
conditions of competency were satisfied even though the basis in
fact was not established and in face of a possible finding that the
facts contradicted the assumption.
We are measuring a conviction of crime by the statute which
defined it. As a consequence of this conviction, petitioner was
sentenced to imprisonment for a term of from two to six years.
An essential part of a procedure which can be said fairly to inflict
such a punishment is that all the elements of the crime charged
shall be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. An element of the
crime charged in the instant indictment is the presence of a
competent tribunal, and the trial court properly so instructed the
jury. The House insists that to be such a tribunal a committee
must consist of a quorum, and we agree with the trial courtÊs
charge that to convict, the jury had to be satisfied beyond a
reasonable doubt that there were Âactually and physically
presentÊ a majority of the committee.
Then to charge, however, that such requirement is satisfied by
a finding that there was a majority present two or three hours
before the defendant offered his testimony, in the face of evidence
indicating the contrary, is to rule as a matter of law that a
quorum need not be present when the offense is committed. This
not only seems to us contrary to the rules and practice of the
Congress but denies petitioner a fundamental right. That right is
that he be convicted of crime only on proof of all the elements of
the crime charged against him. A tribunal that is not competent
is no tribunal, and it is unthinkable that such a body can be the
instrument of criminal conviction.‰

The minority complained that the „House has adopted the


rule and practice that a quorum once established is
presumed
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to continue unless and until a point of no quorum is raised.
By this decision, the Court, in effect, invalidates that rule x
x x.‰ The minority view commanded only the vote of three
(3) justices.
The US Supreme Court pursued the same line in 1963
5
in deciding the case of Yellin v. United States. Yellin was
indicted on five counts of willfully refusing to answer
questions put to him by a sub-committee of the House
Committee on UnAmerican Activities. He was convicted by
the District Court of contempt of Congress on four counts.
The conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for
the 7th Circuit. On certiorari, he assailed his conviction on
the ground that the Committee illegally denied his request
to be heard in executive session. He alleged there was a
violation of Committee Rule IV which provides that „if a
majority of the Committee or subcommittee, duly
appointed as provided by the rules of the House of
Representatives, believes that the interrogation of a
witness in a public hearing might endanger national
security or unjustly injure his reputation, or the reputation
of other individuals, the Committee shall interrogate such
witness in an executive session for the purpose of
determining the necessity or admissibility of conducting
such interrogation thereafter in a public hearing.‰ In a 5-4
decision, the Court, speaking thru Mr. Chief Justice
Warren, held:

„x x x
„Yellin should be permitted the same opportunity for judicial
review when he discovers at trial that his rights have been
violated. This is especially so when the CommitteeÊs practice leads
witnesses to misplaced reliance upon its rules. When reading a
copy of the CommitteeÊs rules, which must be distributed to
every witness under Rule XVII, the witnessÊ reasonable
expectation is that the Committee actually does what it purports
to do, adhere to its own rules. To foreclose a defense based upon
those rules, simply because the witness was deceived by the
CommitteeÊs appearance of regularity, is not fair. The Committee
prepared the groundwork for prosecution in

________________

5 374 US 109 (1963).

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YellinÊs case meticulously. It is not too exacting to require that the


Committee be equally meticulous in obeying its own rules.‰

It additionally bears stressing that in the United States,


the judiciary has pruned the „political
6
thicket.‰ In the
benchmark case of Baker v. Carr, the US Supreme Court
assumed jurisdiction to hear a petition for re-
apportionment of the Tennes-see legislature ruling that
„the political question doctrine, a tool for maintenance of
government order, will not be so applied as to promote only
disorder‰ and that „the courts cannot reject as Âno law suit,Ê
a bona fide controversy as to whether some action
denominated ÂpoliticalÊ exceeds constitutional authority.‰

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In the Philippine setting, there is a more compelling
reason for courts to categorically reject the political
question defense when its interposition will cover up abuse
of power. For section 1, Article VIII of our Constitution was
intentionally cob-bled to empower courts „x x x to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.‰
This power is new and was not granted to our courts in the
1935 and 1972 Constitutions. It was not also xeroxed from
the US Constitution or any foreign state constitution. The
CONCOM granted this enormous power to our courts in
view of our experience under martial law where abusive
exercises of state power were shielded from judicial
scrutiny by the misuse of the political question doctrine.
Led by the eminent former Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion, the CONCOM expanded and sharpened the
checking powers of the judiciary vis-a-vis the Executive
and the Legislative departments of government. In cases
involving the proclamation of martial law and suspension
of the privilege of habeas corpus, it is now beyond dubiety
that the government can no longer invoke the political
question defense.

__________________

6 369 US 186 (1962); see also Bond vs. Floyd, 385 US 116 (1966).

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312 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


Arroyo vs. De Venecia

Section 18 of Article VII completely eliminated this defense


when it provided:

„x x x
„The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate
proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual
basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must
promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the
Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or
legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of
jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where
civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the
privilege of the writ.‰

The CONCOM did not only outlaw the use of the political
question defense in national security cases. To a great
degree, it diminished its use as a shield to protect other
abuses of government by allowing courts to penetrate the
shield with the new power to review acts of any branch or
instrumentality of the government „x x x to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.‰ In Tolentino v.
7
Secretary of Finance, I posited the following postulates:

„x x x
„Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme
Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

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Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.‰
Former Chief Justice Roberto R. Concepcion, the sponsor of
this provision in the Constitutional Commission explained the
sense and the reach of judicial power as follows:

____________________

7 235 SCRA 630.

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Arroyo vs. De Venecia

Âx x x
Âx x x In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the
question of whether or not a branch of government or any of its
officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction,
or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial
power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.

This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that


the courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of this nature,
by claiming that such matters constitute political question.Ê

The Constitution cannot be any clearer. What it granted to this


Court is not a mere power which it can decline to exercise.
Precisely to deter this disinclination, the Constitution imposed it
as a duty of this Court to strike down any act of a branch or
instrumentality of government or any of its officials done with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Rightly or wrongly, the Constitution has elongated
the checking powers of this Court against the other branches of
government despite their more democratic character, the
President and the legislators being elected by the people.
It is, however, theorized that this provision is nothing new. I
beg to disagree for the view misses the significant changes made
in our constitutional canvass to cure the legal deficiencies we
discovered during martial law. One of the areas radically
changed by the framers of the 1987 Constitution is the
imbalance of power between and among the three great branches
of our government·the Executive, the Legislative and the
Judiciary. To upgrade the powers of the Judiciary, the
Constitutional Commission strengthened some more the
independence of courts. Thus, it further protected the security of
tenure of the members of the Judiciary by providing ÂNo law
shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when it undermines
the security of tenure of its Members.Ê It also guaranteed fiscal
autonomy to the Judiciary.
More, it depoliticalized appointments in the judiciary by
creating the Judicial and Bar Council which was tasked with
screening the list of prospective appointees to the judiciary. The
power of confirming appointments to the judiciary was also
taken away from Congress. The President was likewise given a
specific time to fill up vacancies in the judiciary·ninety (90)
days from the occurrence of the vacancy in case of the Supreme
Court and ninety (90) days from the submission of the list of

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recommendees by the Judicial and Bar

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314 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


Arroyo vs. De Venecia

Council in case of vacancies in the lower courts. To further


insulate appointments in the judiciary from the virus of politics,
the Supreme Court was given the power to Âappoint all officials
and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the Civil
Service Law.Ê And to make the separation of the judiciary from
the other branches of government more watertight, it prohibited
members of the judiciary to be Âx x x designated to any agency
performing quasi judicial or administrative functions.Ê While the
Constitution strengthened the sinews of the Supreme Court, it
reduced the powers of the two other branches of government,
especially the Executive. Notable of the powers of the President
clipped by the Constitution is his power to suspend the writ of
habeas corpus and to proclaim martial law. The exercise of this
power is now subject to revocation by Congress. Likewise, the
sufficiency of the factual basis for the exercise of said power may
be reviewed by this Court in an appropriate proceeding filed by
any citizen.

The provision defining judicial power as including the Âduty of


the courts of justice . . . to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
GovernmentÊ constitutes the capstone of the efforts of the
Constitutional Commission to upgrade the powers of this court
vis-a-vis the other branches of government. This provision was
dictated by our experience under martial law which taught us
that a stronger and more independent judiciary is needed to
abort abuses in government. x x x.
xxx
In sum, I submit that in imposing to this Court the duty to
annul acts of government committed with grave abuse of
discretion, the new Constitution transformed this Court from
passivity to activism. This transformation, dictated by our
distinct experience as a nation, is not merely evolutionary but
revolutionary. Under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, this Court
approached constitutional violations by initially determining
what it cannot do; under the 1987 Constitution, there is a shift in
stress·this Court is mandated to approach constitutional
violations not by finding out what it should not do but what it
must do. The Court must discharge this solemn duty by not
resuscitating a past that petrifies the present.

I urge my brethren in the Court to give due and serious


consideration to this new constitutional provision as the
case at bar once more calls us to define the parameters of
our power to review violations of the rules of the House.
We will not be
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Arroyo vs. De Venecia

true to our trust as the last bulwark against government


abuses if we refuse to exercise this new power or if we

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wield it with timidity. To be sure, it is this exceeding
timidity to unsheath the judicial sword that has
increasingly emboldened other branches of government 8to
denigrate, if not defy, orders of our courts. In Tolentino, I
endorsed the view of former Senator Salonga that this
novel provision stretching the latitude of judicial power is
distinctly Filipino and its interpretation should not be
depreciated by undue reliance on inapplicable foreign
jurisprudence. In resolving the case at bar, the lessons of
our own history should provide us the light and not the
experience of foreigners.

II

Again with due respect, I dissent from the majority insofar


as it relied on the enrolled bill doctrine to justify the
dismissal of the petition at bar.
An enrolled bill is one which has been duly introduced,
finally enacted by both Houses, signed by the proper 9
officers of each House and approved by the President. It is
a declaration by the two Houses, through their presiding
officers, to the President that a bill, thus attested, has
received in due the sanction of the legislative branch of the
government, and that it is delivered to him in obedience to
the constitutional requirement that all bills which pass
Congress shall be presented to him.
The enrolled bill originated in England where there is
no written Constitution controlling the legislative branch
of the government, and the acts of Parliament, being
regarded in their nature as judicial·as emanating from
the highest tribunal in the land·are placed on the same
footing and regarded with the same veneration as the
judgment of the

__________________

8 Supra.
9 BlackÊs Law Dictionary, 4th Rev. ed., p. 624.

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316 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


Arroyo vs. De Venecia

10
courts which cannot be collaterally attacked. In England,
the conclusiveness of the bill was premised on the rationale
that „an act of parliament thus made is the exercise of the
highest authority that this kingdom acknowledges upon
earth. And it cannot be altered, amended, dispensed with,
suspended or repealed, but in the same forms and by the
same authority of parliament; for it is a maxim in law that
it requires11 the same strength to dissolve as to create an
obligation.
Over the years, the enrolled bill theory has undergone
important mutations. Some jurisdictions have adopted the
modified entry or affirmative contradiction rule. Under this
rule, the presumption in favor of the enrolled bill is not
conclusive. The rule concedes validity to the enrolled bill
unless there affirmatively appears in the journals of the
legislature a statement that there has not been compliance
12
with one or more of the constitutional requirements.

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Other jurisdictions have adopted the Extrinsic Evidence
Rule which holds that an enrolled bill is only prima facie
evidence that it has been regularly enacted. The prima
facie presumption, however, can be destroyed by clear,
satisfactory and convincing evidence that the
constitutional requirements in enacting a law have been
violated. For this purpose, journals and other extrinsic
13
evidence are allowed to be received. Some limit the use of
14
extrinsic evidence to issues of fraud or mistakes.

___________________

10 Price v. Moundsville, 64 Am. St. Rep. 878, 879; 43 W. Vir-ginia 523

[1897].
11 Carr v. Coke, 47 Am. St. Rep. 801, 803 [1895]; see also Note on ex

rel. Reed v. Jones, 23 L.R.A. 211 [1893]. The rule of conclusiveness is


similar to the common law rule of the inviolability of the Sheriff Ês
return. The Sheriff is considered as an officer of the King just as a
parliamentary act is deemed as a regal act and no official can dispute
the KingÊs word. Dallas, Sutherland Statutes and Statutory
Construction, Vol. 1, 4th ed., pp. 408-418 (1972).
12 Sutherland, op. cit., p. 410.

13 Sutherland, Vol. I, Section 1405 (3rd ed., 1943).

14 See e.g., Mogilner v. Metropolitan Plan Communication, 236 Ind.

298, 140 N.E. 2d 220 [1957].

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These variants developed after a re-examination of the


rationale of the enrolled bill. The modern rationale for the
15
enrolled bill theory was spelled out in Field v. Clark, viz.:

xxx
„The signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives,
and, by the President of the Senate, in open session, of an
enrolled bill, is an official attestation by the two houses of such
bill as one that has passed Congress. It is a declaration by the
two Houses, through their presiding officers, to the President,
that a bill, thus attested, has received, in due form, the sanction
of the legislative branch of the government, and that it is
delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional requirement
that all bills which pass Congress shall be presented to him. And
when a bill, thus attested, receives his approval, and is deposited
in the public archives, its authentication as a bill that has passed
Congress should be deemed complete and unimpeachable. As the
President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by
Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of
State, and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of
the President of the United States, carries, on its face, a solemn
assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the
government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and
executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect
due to coequal and independent departments requires the judicial
department to act upon the assurance, and to accept, as having
passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated;
leaving the courts to determine, when the question properly
arises, whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity with
the Constitution.

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The principle of separation of powers is thus the principal
prop of the enrolled bill doctrine. The doctrine is also
justified as a rule of convenience.
16
Supposedly, it avoids
difficult questions of evidence. It is also believed that it
will prevent the filing of too many cases which will cast a
cloud of uncertainty on laws passed by the legislature. As
explained in Ex Pacte

_________________

15Op. cit., footnote No. 2.


1650 Am. Jur. Statutes, S. 150 (1938) 4 J. Wigmore Evidence, S. 1350
(3rd ed. 1940).

318

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Arroyo vs. De Venecia

17
Wren „if the validity of every act published as law is to be
tested by examining its history, as shown by the journals of
the two houses of the legislature, there will be an amount
of litigation, difficulty, and painful uncertainty appalling in
its contemplation, and multiplying a hundredfold the
alleged uncertainty of the law.‰ The conclusiveness of the
enrolled bill is also justified on the ground that journals
and other extrinsic evidence are conducive to mistake, if
not fraud. These justifications for the enrolled bill theory
have been rejected in various jurisdictions in the United
States. In his Dissenting Opinion in Tolentino v. Secretary
18
of Finance, and its companion cases, Mr. Justice Regalado
cited some of the leading American cases which discussed
the reasons for the withering, if not demise of the enrolled
bill theory, viz.:

„x x x
„Even in the land of its source, the so-called conclusive
presumption of validity originally attributed to that doctrine has
long been revisited and qualified, if not altogether rejected. On
the competency of judicial inquiry, it has been held that „(u)nder
the Âenrolled bill ruleÊ by which an enrolled bill is sole expository
of its contents and conclusive evidence of its existence and valid
enactment, it is nevertheless competent for courts to inquire as
to what prerequisites are fixed by the Constitution of which
journals of respective houses of Legislature are required to
furnish the evidence.
In fact, in Gwynn vs. Hardee, etc., et al., the Supreme Court of
Florida declared:
(1) While the presumption is that the enrolled bill, as signed by
the legislative offices and filed with the secretary of state, is the
bill as it passed, yet this presumption is not conclusive, and when
it is shown from the legislative journals that a bill though
engrossed and enrolled, and signed by the legislative officers,
contains provisions that have not passed both houses, such
provisions will be held spurious and not a part of the law. As was
said by Mr. Justice Cockrell in the case of Wade vs. Atlantic
Lumber Co., 51 Fla. 628, text 633, 41 So. 72, 73:

___________________

17 63 Miss 512 (1886).


18 Op. cit., pp. 729-732 (1994).

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ÂThis Court is firmly committed to the holding that when the journals
speak they control, and against such proof the enrolled bill is not
conclusive.Ê

More enlightening and apropos to the present controversy is the


decision promulgated on May 13, 1980 by the Supreme Court of
Kentucky in D & W Auto Supply, et al. vs. Department of
Revenue, et al., pertinent excerpts wherefrom are extensively
reproduced here-under.
x x x In arriving at our decision we must, perforce, reconsider
the validity of a long line of decisions of this court which created
and nurtured the so-called Âenrolled billÊ doctrine.
xxx
[1] Section 46 of the Kentucky Constitution sets out certain
procedures that the legislature must follow before a bill can be
considered for final passage. x x x.
xxx
x x x Under the enrolled bill doctrine as it now exists in
Kentucky, a court may not look behind such a bill, enrolled and
certified by the appropriate officers, to determine if there are any
defects.
xxx
x x x In Lafferty, passage of the law in question violated this
provision, yet the bill was properly enrolled and approved by the
governor. In declining to look behind the law to determine the
propriety of its enactment, the court enunciated three reasons for
adopting the enrolled bill rule. First, the court was reluctant to
scrutinize the processes of the legislature, an equal branch of
government. Second, reasons of convenience prevailed, which
discouraged requiring the legislature to preserve its records and
anticipated considerable complex litigation if the court ruled
otherwise. Third, the court acknowledged the poor record-
keeping abilities of the General Assembly and expressed a
preference for accepting the final bill as enrolled, rather than
opening up the records of the legislature. x x x.
xxx
Nowhere has the rule been adopted without reason, or as a
result of judicial whim. There are four historical bases for the
doctrine. (1) An enrolled bill was a ÂrecordÊ and, as such, was not
subject to attack at common law. (2) Since the legislature is one
of the three branches of government, the courts, being coequal,
must indulge in every presumption that legislative acts are
valid. (3) When the rule

320

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Arroyo vs. De Venecia

was originally formulated, record-keeping of the legislatures was


so inadequate that a balancing of equities required that the final
act, the enrolled bill, be given efficacy. (4) There were theories of
convenience as expressed by the Kentucky court in Lafferty.

The rule is not unanimous in the several states, however and it


has not been without its critics. From an examination of cases
and treaties, we can summarize the criticism as follows: (1)

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Artificial presumptions, especially conclusive ones, are not
favored. (2) Such a rule frequently (as in the present case)
produces results which do not accord with facts or constitutional
provisions. (3) The rule is conducive to fraud, forgery, corruption
and other wrongdoings. (4) Modern automatic and electronic
record-keeping devices now used by legislatures remove one of the
original reasons for the rule. (5) The rule disregards the primary
obligation of the courts to seek the truth and to provide a remedy
for a wrong committed by any branch of government. In light of
these considerations, we are convinced that the time has come to
re-examine the enrolled bill doctrine.
[2] This court is not unmindful of the admonition of the
doctrine of stare decisis. The maxim is „Stare decisis et non
quieta movere,‰ which simply suggests that we stand by
precedents and to disturb settled points of law. Yet, this rule is not
inflexible, nor is it of such a nature as to require perpetuation of
error or logic. As we stated in DanielÊs AdmÊr v. Hoofnel, 287 Ky
834, 155 S.W. 2d 469, 471-72 (1941).‰

The force of the rule depends upon the nature of the question to be
decided and the extent of the disturbance of rights and practices which
a change in the interpretation of the law or the course of judicial
opinions may create. Cogent considerations are whether there is clear
error and urgent reasons Âfor neither justice nor wisdom requires a court
to go from one doubtful rule to another,Ê and whether or not the evils of
the principle that has been followed will be more injurious than can
possibly result from a change.Ê

Certainly, when a theory supporting a rule of law is not


grounded on facts, or upon sound logic, or is unjust, or has been
discredited by actual experience, it should be discarded, and with
it the rule it supports.
[3] It is clear to us that the major premise of the Lafferty
decision, the poor record-keeping of the legislature, has
disappeared. Modern equipment and technology are the rule in
record-keeping by our General Assembly. Tape recorders, electric
typewriters, dupli-

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cating machines, recording equipment, printing presses,


computers, electronic voting machines, and the like remove all
doubts and fears as to the ability of the General Assembly to
keep accurate and readily accessible records.

It is also apparent that the ÂconvenienceÊ rule is not appropriate in


todayÊs modern and developing judicial philosophy. The fact that
the number and complexity of lawsuits may increase is not
persuasive if one is mindful that the overriding purpose of our
judicial system is to discover the truth and see that justice is
done. The existence of difficulties and complexities should not
deter this pursuit and we reject any doctrine or presumption that
so provides.
Lastly, we address the premise that the equality of the various
branches of government requires that we shut our eyes to
constitutional failing and other errors of our copartners in
government. We simply do not agree. Section 26 of the Kentucky
Constitution provides that any law contrary to the constitution is
Âvoid.Ê The proper exercise of judicial authority requires us to
recognize any law which is unconstitutional and to declare it

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void. Without elaborating the point, we believe that under
section 228 of the Kentucky Constitution it is our obligation to
Âsupport . . . the Constitution of the commonwealth.Ê We are
sworn to see that violations of the constitution·by any person,
corporation, state agency or branch or government·are brought
to light and corrected. To countenance an artificial rule of law
that silences our voices when confronted with violations of our
constitution is not acceptable to this court.
We believe that a more reasonable rule is the one which
Professor Sutherland describes as the Âextrinsic evidence.Ê x x x.
Under this approach there is a prima facie presumption that an
enrolled bill is valid, but such presumption may be overcome by
clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence establishing that
constitutional requirements have not been met.
We therefore overrule Lafferty v. Huffman and all other cases
following the so-called enrolled bill doctrine, to the extent that
there is no longer a conclusive presumption that an enrolled bill
is valid. x x x.‰

Clearly, the enrolled bill doctrine no longer enjoys its once


unassailable respectability in United States. Sutherland
reveals that starting in the 1940Ês, „x x x the tendency
seems to be toward the abandonment of the conclusive
presumption rule and the adoption of the third rule leaving
only a prima

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322 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


Arroyo vs. De Venecia

facie presumption of validity which may be attacked by


19
any authoritative source of information.‰
It is high time we re-examine our preference for the
enrolled bill doctrine. It was in the 1947 case of Mabanag
20
v. Lopez Vito, that this Court, with three (3) justices
dissenting, first embraced the rule that a duly
authenticated bill or resolution imports absolute verity and
is binding on the courts. In 1963, we firmed up this ruling
21
in Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez, thus:

„x x x
„Hence, Âurea formaldehydeÊ is clearly a finished product
which is patently distinct and different from ÂureaÊ and
Âformaldehyde,Ê as separate articles used in the manufacture of
the synthetic resin known as Âurea formaldehyde.Ê Petitioner
contends, however, that the bill approved in Congress contained
the copulative conjunction ÂandÊ between the term ÂureaÊ and
Âformaldehyde,Ê and that the members of Congress intended to
exempt ÂureaÊ and ÂformaldehydeÊ separately as essential
elements in the manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called
Âurea formaldehyde,Ê not the latter as a finished product, citing in
support of this view the statements made on the floor of the
Senate, during the consideration of the bill before said House, by
members thereof. But said individual statements do not
necessarily reflect the view of the Senate. Much less do they
indicate the intent of the House of Representatives (see Song
Kiat Chocolate Factory vs. Central Bank, 54 Off. Gaz. 615;
Mayor Motors, Inc. vs. Acting Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, L-15000 [March 29, 1961]; Manila Jockey Club, Inc. vs.
Games and Amusement Board, L-12727 [February 19, 1960]).
Furthermore, it is well settled that enrolled bill·which uses the

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term Âurea formaldehydeÊ instead of Âurea and formaldehydeÊ·
conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure
passed by Congress and approved by the President (Primicias vs.
Paredes, 61 Phil. 118, 120; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1;
Macias vs. Comm. on Elections, L-18684, Sept. 14, 1961). If there
has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was
certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the Execu-

______________________

19 Sutherland, op. cit., pp. 224-225.


20 78 Phil. 1 (1947).
21 7 SCRA 374.

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VOL. 277, AUGUST 14, 1997 323


Arroyo vs. De Venecia

tive·on which we cannot speculate without jeopardizing the


principle of separation of powers and undermining one of the
cornerstones of our democratic system·the remedy is by
amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree.‰
22
In the 1969 case of Morales v. Subido, we reiterated our
fidelity to the enrolled bill doctrine, viz.:

„x x x. We cannot go behind the enrolled Act to discover what


really happened. The respect due to the other branches of the
Government demands that we act upon the faith and credit of
what the officers of the said branches attest to as the official acts
of their respective departments. Otherwise we would be cast in the
unenviable and unwanted role of a sleuth trying to determine
what actually did happen in the labyrinth of law-making, with
consequent impairment of the integrity of the legislative process.
The investigation which the petitioner would like this Court to
make can be better done in Congress. After all, House cleaning·
the immediate and imperative need for which seems to be
suggested by the petitioner·can best be effected by the occupants
thereof. Expressed elsewise, this is a matter worthy of the
attention not of an Oliver Wendell Holmes but of a Sherlock
Holmes.‰

Significantly, however, Morales diluted the conclusiveness


rule of the enrolled bill doctrine. The ponencia stressed:

„By what we have essayed above we are not of course to be


understood as holding that in all cases the journals must yield to
the enrolled bill. To be sure there are certain matters which the
Constitution expressly requires must be entered on the journal of
each house. To what extent the validity of a legislative act may
be affected by a failure to have such matters entered on the
journal, is a question which we do not now decide. All we hold is
that with respect to matters not expressly required to be entered
on the journal, the enrolled bill prevails in the event of any
discrepancy.‰
23
In the 1974 case of Astorga v. Villegas, we further diluted
the enrolled bill doctrine when we refused to apply it after
the

_____________________

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22 27 SCRA 131, 134-135.
23 56 SCRA 714.

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Senate President declared his signature on the bill as


invalid. We ruled:

„x x x
„PetitionerÊs argument that the attestation of the presiding
offices of Congress is conclusive proof of a billÊs due enactment,
required, it is said, by the respect due to a co-equal department
of the government, is neutralized in this case by the fact that the
Senate President declared his signature on the bill to be invalid
and issued a subsequent clarification that the invalidation for
his signature meant that the bill he had signed had never been
approved by the Senate. Obviously this declaration should be
accorded even greater respect than the attestation it invalidated,
which it did for a reason that is undisputed in fact and
indisputable in logic.
As far as Congress itself is concerned, there is nothing
sacrosanct in the certification made by the presiding officers. It is
merely a mode of authentication. The law-making process in
Congress ends when the bill is approved by both Houses, and the
certification does not add to the validity of the bill or cure any
defect already present upon its passage. In other words it is the
approval by Congress and not the signatures of the presiding
officers that is essential. Thus the (1935) Constitution says that
„[e]very bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes law,
be presented to the President.‰ In Brown vs. Morris, supra, the
Supreme Court of Missouri, interpreting a similar provision in
the State Constitution, said that the same „makes it clear that the
indispensable step is the final passage and it follows that if a bill,
otherwise fully enacted as a law, is not attested by the presiding
officer, the proof that it has Âpassed both housesÊ will satisfy the
constitutional requirement.‰
Petitioner agrees that the attestation in the bill is not
mandatory but argues that the disclaimer thereof by the Senate
President, granting it to have been validly made, would only
mean that there was no attestation at all, but would not affect
the validity of the statute. Hence, it is pointed out, Republic Act
No. 4065 would remain valid and binding. This argument begs
the issue. It would limit the courtÊs inquiry to the presence or
absence of the attestation and to the effect of its absence upon
the validity of the statute. The inquiry, however, goes farther.
Absent such attestation as a result of the disclaimer, and
consequently there being no enrolled bill to speak of, what
evidence is there to determine whether or not the bill had been
duly enacted. In such a case the entries in the journal should be
consulted.

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Arroyo vs. De Venecia

The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no


ordinary record. The Constitution requires it. While it is true

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Page 46 of 52
that the journal is not authenticated and is subject to the risk of
misprinting and other errors, the point is irrelevant in this case.
This Court is merely asked to inquire whether the text of House
Bill No. 9266 signed by the Chief Executive was the same text
passed by both Houses of Congress. Under the specific facts and
circumstances of this case, this Court can do this and resort to
the Senate journal for the purpose. The journal discloses that
substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor
and approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the
printed text sent to the President and signed by him. This Court
is not asked to incorporate such amendments into the alleged law,
which admittedly is a risky undertaking, but to declare that the
bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become law. This
We do, as indeed both the President of the Senate and the Chief
Executive did, when they withdrew their signatures therein. In
the face of the manifest error committed and subsequently
rectified by the President of the Senate and by the Chief
Executive, for this Court to perpetuate that error by
disregarding such rectification and holding that the erroneous
bill has become law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction and
bring about mischievous consequences not intended by the law-
making body.‰

In 1993, the enrolled bill doctrine was again used as a


secondary rationale in the case of Philippine Judges
24
Association v. Prado. In this case, the judges claimed that
the pertinent part of section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 repealing
the franking privilege of the judiciary appeared only in the
Conference Committee Report. In rejecting this contention,
this Court ruled:

„While it is true that a conference committee is the mechanism


for compromising differences between the Senate and the House,
it is not limited in its jurisdiction to this question. Its broader
function is described thus:
ÂA conference committee may deal generally with the subject
matter or it may be limited to resolving the precise differences
between the two houses. Even where the conference committee is
not by rule limited in its jurisdiction, legislative

___________________

24 227 SCRA 703.

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326 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


Arroyo vs. De Venecia

custom severely limits the freedom with which new subject


matter can be inserted into the conference bill. But occasionally
a conference committee produces unexpected results, results
beyond its mandate. These excursions occur even where the rules
impose strict limitations on conference committee jurisdiction.
This is symptomatic of the authoritarian power of conference
committee (Davies, Legislative Law and Process: In a Nutshell,
1986 Ed., p. 81).Ê

It is a matter of record that the Conference Committee Report on


the bill in question was returned to and duly approved by both
the Senate and the House of Representatives. Thereafter, the bill
was enrolled with its certification by Senate President Neptali A.
Gonzales and Speaker Ramon V. Mitra of the House of

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Representatives as having been duly passed by both Houses of
Congress. It was then presented to and approved by President
Corazon C. Aquino on April 3, 1992.
Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may not
inquire beyond the certification of the approval of a bill from the
presiding officers of Congress. Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v.
Gimenez laid down the rule that the enrolled bill is conclusive
upon the Judiciary (except in matters that have to be entered in
the journals like the yeas and nays on the final reading of the
bill). The journals are themselves also binding on the Supreme
Court, as we held in the old (but still valid) case of U.S. vs. Pons,
where we explained the reason thus:

ÂTo inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine legislature
when they are, as we have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate
both the letter and spirit of the organic laws by which the Philippine
Government was brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and
independent department of the Government, and to interfere with the
legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature.Ê

Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the


petitionersÊ charges that an amendment was made upon the last
reading of the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 7354 and that
copies thereof in its final form were not distributed among the
members of each House. Both the enrolled bill and the legislative
journals certify that the measure was duly enacted i.e., in
accordance with the Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. We
are bound by such official assurances from a coordinate
department of the government, to which we owe, at the very
least, a becoming courtesy.‰

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Finally in 1994 came the case of Tolentino v. Secretary of


25
Finance, et al. and its companion cases. Involved in the
case was the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7716, otherwise
known as 26
the Expanded Value Added Tax Law. The
majority partly relied on the enrolled bill doctrine in
dismissing challenges to the constitutionality of R.A. No.
7716. It held:

„x x x
„Fourth. Whatever doubts there may be as to the formal
validity of Republic Act No. 7716 must be resolved in its favor.
Our cases manifest firm adherence to the rule that an enrolled
copy of a bill is conclusive not only of its provisions but also of its
due enactment. Not even claims that a proposed constitutional
amendment was invalid because the requisite votes for its
approval had not been obtained or that certain provisions of a
statute had been ÂsmuggledÊ in the printing of the bill have
moved or persuaded us to look behind the proceedings of a
coequal branch of the government. There is no reason now to
depart from this rule.
No claim is here made that the Âenrolled billÊ rule is absolute.
In fact in one case we Âwent behindÊ an enrolled bill and
consulted the Journal to determine whether certain provisions of
a statute had been approved by the Senate in view of the fact
that the President of the Senate himself, who had signed the
enrolled bill, admitted a mistake and withdrew his signature, so

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that in effect there was no longer an enrolled bill to consider.
But where allegations that the constitutional procedures for
the passage of bills have not been observed have no more basis
than another allegation that the Conference Committee
ÂsurreptitiouslyÊ inserted provisions into a bill which it had
prepared, we should decline the invitation to go behind the
enrolled copy of the bill. To disregard the Âenrolled billÊ rule in
such cases would be to disregard the respect due the other two
departments of our government.‰

These cases show that we have not blindly accepted the


conclusiveness of the enrolled bill. Even in Tolentino, Mr.
Justice Mendoza was cautious enough to hold that „no
claim

____________________

25Supra.
26Justices Cruz, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo and Puno
dissented.

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328 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


Arroyo vs. De Venecia

is here made that the enrolled bill is absolute.‰ I


respectfully submit that it is now time for the Court to
make a definitive pronouncement that we no longer give
our unqualified support to the enrolled bill doctrine. There
are compelling reasons for this suggested change in stance.
For one, the enrolled bill is appropriate only in England
where it originated because in England there is no written
Constitution and the Parliament is supreme. For another,
many of the courts in the United States have broken away
from the rigidity and un-realism of the enrolled27bill in light
of contemporary developments in lawmaking. And more
important, our uncritical adherence to the enrolled bill is
inconsistent28
with our Constitution, laws and rules. In
Mabanag, we relied on section 313 of the Old Code of
Civil Procedure as amended by Act No. 2210 as a principal
reason in embracing the enrolled bill. This section,
however has long been repealed by our Rules of Court. A
half glance at our Rules will show that its section on
conclusive presumption does not carry the conclusive
presumption we give to an enrolled bill. But this is not all.
The conclusiveness of an enrolled bill which all too often
results in the suppression of truth cannot be justified under
the 1987 Constitution. The Preamble of our Constitution
demands that we live not only under a rule of law but also
under a regime of truth. Our Constitution also adopted a
29
national policy requiring full public disclosure of all state
transactions involving public interest. Any rule which will
defeat this policy on transparency ought to be disfavored.
And to implement these policies, this Court was given the
power to pry open and to strike down any act of any branch
or instrumentality of government if it amounts to grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. It is time to bury the enrolled bill for its fiction
of conclusiveness shuts off truth in many litigations. We
cannot dispense justice based on fiction for the search for
justice is the search for truth. I submit that giving

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___________________

27 See writerÊs dissenting opinion in Tolentino, supra, p. 818.


28 Op. cit.
29 Section 28 of Article II of the Constitution.

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Arroyo vs. De Venecia

an enrolled bill a mere prima facie presumption of


correctness will facilitate our task of dispensing justice
based on truth.

III

In sum, I respectfully submit that the Court has


jurisdiction over the petition at bar and that issues posed
by petitioner are justiciable. Nonetheless, I do not find any
grave abuse of discretion committed by the public
respondents to justify granting said petition. As the
ponencia points out, the petition merely involves the
complaint that petitioner was prevented from raising the
question of quorum. The petition does not concern violation
of any rule mandated by the Constitution. Nor does it
involve the right of a non-member of the House which
requires constitutional protection. The rules on how to
question the existence of a quorum are procedural in
character. They are malleable by nature for they were
drafted to help the House enact laws. As well stated, these
rules are servants, not masters of the House. Their
observance or nonobservance is a matter of judgment call
on the part of our legislators and it is not the business of
the Court to reverse this judgment when untainted by
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.

CONCURRING OPINION

VITUG, J.:

When the 1987 Constitution has embodied, in its


circumscription of judicial power under Section 1, Article
VIII, of the Constitution, the determination of whether or
not there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of government, the Supreme
Court, upon which that great burden has been imposed,
could not have been thought of as likewise being thereby
tasked with the awesome responsibility of overseeing the
entire bureaucracy. The term grave abuse of discretion has
long been understood in our jurisprudence as, and confined
to, a capricious and whimsical or despotic exercise of
judgment as amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

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I see nothing of that sort in the case at bar. Absent a clear
case of grave abuse of discretion, like the patent disregard
of a Constitutional proscription, I would respect the
judgment of Congress under whose province the specific
responsibility falls and the authority to act is vested. To do
otherwise would be an unwarranted intrusion into the
internal affairs of a co-equal, independent and coordinate
branch of government. At no time, it would seem to me,
has it been intended by the framers of the fundamental
law to cause a substantial deviation, let alone departure,
from the time-honored and accepted principle of
separation, but balanced, powers of the three branches of
government. There is, of course, a basic variant between
the old rule and the new Charter on the understanding of
the term „judicial power.‰ Now, the Court is under
mandate to assume jurisdiction over, and to undertake
judicial inquiry into, what may even be deemed to be
political questions provided, however, that grave abuse of
discretion·the sole test of justiciability on purely political
issues·is shown to have attended the contested act.
All taken, I most humbly reiterate my separate opinion
in Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance and companion cases
(G.R. No. 115455, etc., 235 SCRA 630) and vote to deny the
instant petition.
Petition for certiorari and prohibition dismissed.

Notes.·The House without the Senate which had


adjourned sine die, is not „Congress‰·neither the House
nor the Senate can hold session independently of the other
in the same manner as neither can transact any legislative
business after the adjournment of the other. (Guevara vs.
Inocentes, 16 SCRA 379 [1966])
It is a recognized principle of international law and
under our system of separation of powers that diplomatic
immunity is essentially a political question and courts
should refuse to look beyond a determination by the
executive branch of the government, and where the plea of
diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed by the
executive branch of the government as in the case at bar, it
is then the duty of the courts
331

VOL. 277, AUGUST 15, 1997 331


Court of Appeals vs. Escalante

to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate


suggestion by the principal law officer of the government,
the Solicitor General or other officer acting under his
direction. (Lasco vs. United Nations Revolving Fund for
Natural Resources Exploration, 241 SCRA 681 [1995])

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