World Road Association - Risk Management For Emergency Situations Appendix A B Case Studies

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org
2016A26EN
RISK MANAGEMENT FOR

EMERGENCY SITUATIONS
APPENDIX A & B
Technical Committee 1.5 Risk Management
World Road Association
STATEMENTS
The World Road Association (PIARC) is a nonprofit organisation established in 1909 to improve international
co-operation and to foster progress in the field of roads and road transport.
The study that is the subject of this report was defined in the PIARC Strategic Plan 2012 – 2015 and approved
by the Council of the World Road Association, whose members are representatives of the member national
governments. The members of the Technical Committee responsible for this report were nominated by the
member national governments for their special competences.
Any opinions, findings, conclusions and recommendations expressed in this publication are those of the authors
and do not necessarily reflect the views of their parent organisations or agencies.
This report is available from the internet site of the World Road Association (PIARC): http://www.piarc.org
Copyright by the World Road Association. All rights reserved.

World Road Association (PIARC)
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RISK MANAGEMENT FOR
EMERGENCY SITUATIONS
APPENDIX A & B
Technical Committee 1.5 Risk Management
World Road Association
APPENDIX RISK MANAGEMENT FOR EMERGENCY SITUATIONS 2016A26EN
CONTENTS
APPENDIX A: CASE STUDIES......................................................................................................................................3
CIVIL PROTECTION PLANNING AND ACTIONS FOR MANAGING

HAZARDS DUE TO SNOWFALL AND FROST – GREECE...................................................................................4
1. INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................................................................4
2. PLANNING AND ACTIONS FOR MANAGING SNOWFALL
AND FROST IN THE ROAD NETWORK............................................................................................................4
3. RESPONSIBILITIES OF ORGANIZATIONS..................................................................................................5
4. PLANNING OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROCEDURES
AT THE REGIONAL AND LOCAL SCALE.........................................................................................................7
5. VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS, PUBLIC INFORMATION AND SOCIAL PROVISIONS.................8
6. GENERAL COORDINATION AND MEMO FOR ACTION...........................................................................8
7. CONTACT IN THE AUTHORITY......................................................................................................................9
ORGANIZED RELOCATION OF PEOPLE THREATENED BY A DISASTER -

A CASE STUDY FROM A MAJOR FOREST FIRE IN RHODES ISLAND, GREECE...................................10
1. INTRODUCTION: DEFINITION AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK
FOR “ORGANIZED RELOCATION” .................................................................................................................10
2. COOPERATIVE AND COORDINATIVE ACTIONS:
PUBLIC INFORMATION AND TRANSPORTATION PROCEDURES..........................................................12
3. PUBLIC INFORMATION PROCEDURES.....................................................................................................12
4. TRANPORTATION PROCEDURES................................................................................................................12
5. CASE STUDY: THE JULY 2008 RHODES ISLAND FOREST FIRE .........................................................13
6. CONCLUSIONS.................................................................................................................................................16
STATE HIGHWAY 2 WAIOEKA GORGE SLIP REINSTATEMENT................................................................. 17

1. INTRODUCTION / OVERVIEW......................................................................................................................17
2. REINSTATEMENT OF STATE HIGHWAY....................................................................................................19
3. COMMUNICATION...........................................................................................................................................20
4. INTER-AGENCY COORDINATION...............................................................................................................20
5. LESSONS LEARNT...........................................................................................................................................21
RISK AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AS A BASIS

FOR ROAD INTELLIGENT TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS (ITS)
PLANNING AND OPERATION....................................................................................................................................22
1. INTRODUCTION...............................................................................................................................................22
2. ROAD TRANSPORT RISK MANAGEMENT................................................................................................23
3. TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT PLANS FOR EMERGENCIES........................................................................25
4. ITS, TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT CENTRES AND RISK MANAGEMENT..............................................26
5. ROAD ITS-BASED RISK MANAGEMENT CASE-STUDIES IN SPAIN..................................................28
6. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS............................................................................................32
2016A26EN APPENDIX RISK MANAGEMENT FOR EMERGENCY SITUATIONS
EMERGENCY SITUATION MANAGEMENT OF HIGH FLOODS

ON DORNESTI BRIDGE, SUCEAVA, ROMANIA – CASE STUDY....................................................................33
1. INTRODUCTION / OVERVIEW......................................................................................................................33
2. IMPACT ON SAFETY AREA............................................................................................................................35
3. CASE STUDY ANALYSIS................................................................................................................................36
4. CONSIDERATIONS/STRATEGIES/CONCLUSIONS..................................................................................39
CONCLUSIONS:....................................................................................................................................................40
5. COST/RESOURCES...........................................................................................................................................40
COOPERATION AND COORDINATION OF ROAD

AND ROAD-RELATED ORGANIZATIONS IN EMERGENCY SITUATIONS IN JAPAN...........................42
1. INTRODUCTION...............................................................................................................................................42
2. STRUCTURE OF COOPERATION AND COORDINATION IN EMERGENCY SITUATION...............42
3. COOPERATION AND COORDINATION
WITH RELEVANT GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS................................................................................44
4. COORDINATION / COOPERATION BETWEEN HIGHWAY AUTHORITIES........................................46
5. COORDINATION / COOPERATION BETWEEN
HIGHWAY AUTHORITIES AND CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTORS.......................................................46
6. COORDINATION / COOPERATION BETWEEN
HIGHWAY AUTHORITIES AND CONSTRUCTION CONSULTANTS........................................................48
7. SPONTANEOUS COOPERATION WITH NON-ROAD RELATED ORGANIZATIONS .......................50
8. CONCLUSION....................................................................................................................................................51
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A MANAGEMENT PROGRAM

FOR BUSINESS CONTINUITY AT THE MINISTERE DES TRANSPORTS DU QUEBEC........................52
1. THE ORIGINS OF A GOVERNMENTAL POLICY IN QUÉBEC................................................................52
2. THE CONTEXT OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BCMP AT THE MTQ.......................................53
3. THE METHODOLOGY ....................................................................................................................................54
4. DEPARTMENT COORDINATION .................................................................................................................55
5. TESTING STRATEGIES THROUGH PILOT PROJECTS ...........................................................................56
6. A WORTHY BCMP ............................................................................................................................................57
7. GLOSSARY.........................................................................................................................................................57
COMMUNICATION WITH THE PUBLIC FOR EMERGENCY SITUATION – NEMA IN KOREA..........59

1. OVERVIEW OF THE NDMSS..........................................................................................................................59
2. STRUCTURE OF THE GOVERNMENT DISASTER MANAGEMENT NETWORK SYSTEM............59
ROADSIDE SERVER FOR DRIVER ASSISTANCE AND SAFETY WARNING SYSTEM...........................64

1. INTRODUCTION...............................................................................................................................................64
2. FRAMEWORK OF SMART ROAD.................................................................................................................64
3. CASE 1: COLLISION WARING FOR SIGNALIZED INTERSECTION....................................................65
4. CASE 2: EXPRESSWAY....................................................................................................................................67
THE QUEENSLAND EXPERIENCE OF THE SUMMER

OF 2013 - TOWARD A CULTURE OF RESILIENCE -............................................................................................69
1. INTRODUCTION...............................................................................................................................................70
2. APPROACH.........................................................................................................................................................74
3. LEARNINGS.......................................................................................................................................................74
4. RESOURCES.......................................................................................................................................................76
5. CONCLUSIONS.................................................................................................................................................76
APPLICATION OF RISK AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

TO ROAD OPERATIONS IN VICTORIA, AUSTRALIA.......................................................................................77
1. INTRODUCTION ..............................................................................................................................................78
2. RESULTS ............................................................................................................................................................79
3. IMPACT ON SAFETY .......................................................................................................................................80
4. RESOURCES ......................................................................................................................................................82
5. CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................................................................82

TO ROAD OPERATIONS IN VICTORIA, AUSTRALIA.......................................................................................83
1. INTRODUCTION ..............................................................................................................................................84
2. RISK MANAGEMENT PLANS .......................................................................................................................85
3. SUMMARY .........................................................................................................................................................88

TO ROAD OPERATIONS IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA...............................................................................................89
1. INTRODUCTION ..............................................................................................................................................90
2. EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK.........................................................................................91
3. IMPACT ON MAINTAINING SAFE ACCESS...............................................................................................95
4. CONSIDERATIONS / STRATEGIES / CONCLUSIONS..............................................................................99
5. CONCLUSION..................................................................................................................................................100
6. BIBLIOGRAPHY..............................................................................................................................................101
REFERENCES APPENDIX A......................................................................................................................................102
APPENDIX B: COMBINED AND LARGE SCALE DISASTERS.......................................................................105
EXPERIENCE SHEET (1994 NORTHRIDGE EARTHQUAKE, USA) .............................................................108
EXPERIENCE SHEET (1995 KOBE EARTHQUAKE, JAPAN) ......................................................................... 110
EXPERIENCE SHEET (2010 ERUPTION OF VOLCANO MERAPI, INDONESIA).....................................112
EXPERIENCE SHEET (2010 CHEMICAL SPILL, HUNGARY) ....................................................................... 115
EXPERIENCE SHEET (2011 KII PENINSULA HEAVY RAIN, JAPAN) ........................................................ 117
EXPERIENCE SHEET (2005 HURRICANE KATRINA, USA)...........................................................................119
EXPERIENCE SHEET (2009 TAIWAN HEAVY RAIN, TAIWAN) ...................................................................122
EXPERIENCE SHEET (2011 EAST JAPAN EARTHQUAKE, JAPAN) ............................................................125

3
APPENDIX A
CASE STUDIES
CIVIL PROTECTION PLANNING AND ACTIONS FOR MANAGING

HAZARDS DUE TO SNOWFALL AND FROST – GREECE.
• Prepared by Dr. Ioannis Benekos
Study / Project / Activity Details
Country:..........................................Greece.
Type of hazard:...............................Snowfall / frost.
Risk classification:..........................Emergency response planning and actions.
Abstract / Summary
An overview of the 2010-2011 civil protection planning and actions required for managing
hazards due to snowfall and frost phenomena in Greece is provided. The role, responsibilities,
interactions and main activities for the different road and non-road organizations are presented.
1. INTRODUCTION
Snowfall and frost are phenomena which when occurring in strong intensity can be classified as
natural disasters that can endanger life and property of people and seriously impact adversely the
economy and infrastructure of the country. Occurrence of these phenomena can last from a few
hours to several days. The serious consequences and problems that snowstorm and frost have
resulted in the life of the urban and rural population during the last couple of years in Greece,
led the Civil Protection Secretariat which is the primary responsible for addressing these
situations, to revisit the planning and actions of the different parties involved in emergency
situations in order to ensure a better coordination and response of those parties.
2. PLANNING AND ACTIONS FOR MANAGING SNOWFALL AND FROST IN

THE ROAD NETWORK
Traffic interruption is the major result of the snowfall and frost activity to the road network.
Appropriate planning and actions for managing these situations can be categorized in three
stages:
• Stage 1: pre-winter period (period from end of winter until one month before start of new
winter season).
––Evaluation of snow removal actions during last winter period and recording of the problems that
occurred.
––Planning and programming of human and other resources for managing next winter season based on
acquired experience.
––Proposals for ensuring necessary funding and resources.
––Supply and storage of necessary materials (e.g. salt) and resources.
––Maintenance of equipment and machinery.
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• Stage 2: preparation period (one month period before start of new winter season).
––Review of planning based on availability of resources.
––Leasing of equipment from the private sector.
––Hiring of seasonal (temporary) staff to meet service needs if necessary.
––Allocation of staff duties and responsibilities for the operation and management of the available
resources and situations. Control of machinery and equipment.
––Assignment of person in charge (Coordinator) per major road sector and designation of the respective
basis for operation.
––Programming of staff shifts based on respective planning.
––Issuance of action plan from each Coordinator for managing emergency situations and ensuring the
safety of the emergency response personnel according to the guidance provided by the Center of
Operations Command of the Civil Protection.
––Prioritization of road sectors for emergency response in case of extensive snowfall and frost.
––Assurance of organization operability in case of emergency situations.
––Meeting with other organizations implicated in emergency response control and operation for
addressing snowfall and frost situations.
––Informational meeting with prefectural and local organizations implicated in emergency response
procedures for discussing preparedness, prevention and safety measures.
• Stage 3: winter period (mid-November to April).

––Assurance of relevant flow of information (i.e. meteorological conditions) to the basis of operation of
each Coordinator.
––Application of relevant plan of action when and where required.
––Redistribution of resources according to actual needs.
––Supply of additional resources if required. Repair of equipment and machinery.
––Phasing out of works and actions according to planning.
3. RESPONSIBILITIES OF ORGANIZATIONS
The coordination between the various organizations extends to different levels of the
administration (Ministries, road authorities, private sector and non-road-related organizations)
for the various road sectors. The Centre of Operations Command of the Civil Protection
Secretariat which falls under the supervision of the Ministry of Civil Protection assumes the
general coordination of operations and the issuance of respective warnings to the local (Regional,
Regional Unit, Municipal) organizations.
The different organizations are responsible and provide resources for the following main
activities:
• Operation, maintenance and snow (and object such as vehicle) removal of the road network.
• Traffic management and road network supervision.
• Information regarding prevailing road and forecasted weather conditions.
• Emergency response procedures for emergency situations to evacuate and rescue road users.
There are four (4) Ministries that are implicated in case of snowfall and/or frost emergency
situations:
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• Ministry of Civil Protection: assumes the general coordination through the Centre of
Operations Command of the Civil Protection Secretariat. The Ministry controls the Police and
the Highway Patrol which are responsible for the supervision of the road network and traffic
management in case of emergency situations and the Fire Department which is responsible for
the rescue and evacuation of road users.
• Ministry of Infrastructure, Transportation and Networks: assumes the responsibility for
the operation, maintenance and snow removal of motorways and major road arteries. The
respective jurisdiction is assigned through the General Secretariat of Public Works to the
Special Agency of Public Works/ Motorway Maintenance on a road sector basis.
• Ministry of Interior: assumes the responsibility for providing the financial resources to the
regional state organizations (Region, Regional Unit, Municipality).
• Ministry of Health and Social Solidarity: assumes the responsibility for coordinating Health
Units providing medical care to road users through the National Centre of Health Operation.
The jurisdiction for the operation, maintenance and snow removal for the concession road sector
falls under the respective Concessionaire. The jurisdiction for the supervision of the concession
road sector contract provisions relevant to the operation and maintenance falls under the General
Secretariat of co-financed public works of the Ministry of Infrastructure, Transportation and
Networks and EGNATIA S.A. (owned by the public sector).
The responsibility for snow removal and problems in the road network due to frost falls under
the relevant Administrative Authorities (Region, Regional Unit, Municipality) and their
respective Agencies (Directorate for Maintenance Control and Directorate of Construction of
Maintenance Works for the Region; Directorate of Technical Services for the Regional Unit and
the Municipality) for the road network under their jurisdiction.
Each organization assumes the responsibility for leasing vehicles necessary for snow removal
and/or towing trucks from the private sector as needed. This doesn’t preclude cooperation
between the different organizations provided that relevant agreements have been established
prior to the event.
Traffic management and control during normal operating conditions and emergency situations
falls under the responsibility of the Police and the Highway Patrol. The Police and Highway
Patrol shall coordinate with the Coordinators for establishing locations for temporary parking of
vehicles in case of an emergency so that the situation can be addressed by the snow removal units
without being hindered by immobilized vehicles on the road network.
Information of the parties involved in emergency operations regarding the prevailing conditions
of the road network is the responsibility of the Police Headquarters through its local Centres of
Command. The information can also be directly transmitted to the Centre of Operations
Command of the Civil Protection.
Evacuation and rescue of road users is the primary responsibility of the Fire Department Units.
Medical assistance and transportation of injured persons following evacuation and rescue is the
responsibility of the National Centre of Immediate Assistance through the coordination provided
from the National Centre of Health Operations. The Fire Department also assumes the
responsibility of providing blankets and food to road users located in immobilized vehicles with
the assistance of the Police or the Highway Patrol if necessary.
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Preparedness of the different organizations is achieved through warnings provided to the

organizations by the regional/local Departments and Offices of Civil Protection after these have
received respective notification through the Centre of Operations Command of the Civil
Protection. The latter obtains the relevant weather information through daily reports of forecasted
weather provided by the National Meteorological Agency.
When extreme weather conditions result in isolation of mountainous areas which endangers its
local population, local authorities are responsible for coordinating with organizations that
possess appropriate means for relieve of the situation (e.g. Fire Department, Police, Army, etc.).
In such extreme cases, the Ministry of Defense can become implicated as well.
4. PLANNING OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROCEDURES AT THE REGIONAL

AND LOCAL SCALE
There exist three administrative subdivisions at the regional and local scale: Region, Regional
Unit and Municipality. The actions for preparedness to address snowfall and frost and the
planning of the emergency response procedures for each subdivision mainly consist of the
aforementioned Stage 2 steps:
• The administrative authorities responsible for snowfall and frost situations should establish a
plan of action for addressing these situations in the road network of their jurisdiction. The plan
should take into account accumulated experience and the availability of resources.
• Based on the plan of action, leasing requirements of equipment from the private sector and
hiring needs of seasonal (temporary) staff to meet service needs should be established.
• Manning of the responsible Authorities should be performed before the start of the winter
season.
• Assignment of person in charge (Coordinator) per major road sector and designation of
their area of jurisdiction and the respective basis for operation. Allocation of staff duties
and responsibilities and programming of staff shifts based on respective planning should be
performed for optimal operation and management of the available resources and situations.
• Issuance of guidance from each Coordinator for managing emergency situations and ensuring
the safety of the emergency response personnel according to the general guidance provided by
the Center of Operations Command of the Civil Protection.
• Control of machinery and equipment should be performed and adequate storage of supplies for
addressing the situations (e.g. salt, blankets) should be ensured.
• Completion of subcontracting and leasing of machinery and equipment from the private sector.
• Prioritization of road sectors for emergency response in case of extensive snowfall and frost.
• A coordination meeting with other organizations of the respective administrative subdivision
implicated in emergency response control and operation for addressing snowfall and frost
situations should be convened. Persons in charge for addressing snowfall and frost situations
(Coordinators) and officers from the Civil Protection division from the next lower level
administrative subdivision should attend the meeting as well. The meeting should identify
needs of material and supplies that should be covered as well as the availability of resources
to ne borrowed/lent from/to lower administrative subdivisions in case of an emergency.
Should lack of adequate possibility of addressing an emergency be identified, it should be
immediately reported to the Centre of Operations Command of the Civil Protection from its
local subdivisions.
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5. VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS, PUBLIC INFORMATION AND SOCIAL

PROVISIONS
Mobilization and coordination of voluntary organizations (provided that these organizations are
inscribed in the Civil Protection General Secretariat registers) is assumed by the local Civil
Protection Office or Department. The Centre of Operations Command of the Civil Protection
and its local subdivisions has the lead role for informing the public regarding the emergency
situation for providing basic supplies (shelter, food) to the affected population in coordination
with the Ministry of Health and Social Solidarity. Road authorities have limited role to none in
the above unless directed by the Centre of Operations Command of the Civil Protection.
6. GENERAL COORDINATION AND MEMO FOR ACTION
The role of the General Secretariat of Civil Protection is to assume the coordination of the
actions of all organizations associated with responding to snowfall and frost emergency
situations. Moreover, it further assumes the responsibility of managing the consequences that
may arise from these emergency situations.
All organizations are required to maintain a channel of communication with the Centre of Command
of the Civil Protection in order to receive information about weather conditions and warnings.
Furthermore, the organizations are required to take preventive safety measures to ensure proper
operation of their facilities. Besides road and transport-related organizations (e.g. trains) and
authorities which need to safeguard traffic and mobility within their jurisdiction, other non-road
related organizations (e.g. Water Supply and Drainage Agency, Electricity Agency, etc.) need to
take appropriate actions to secure operability in case of emergency situations.
All organizations responsible for civil protection actions in an operational level are required to
report to the Centre of Command of the Civil Protection. Furthermore, the Police Headquarters,
the Fire Department Headquarters and the National Centre of Immediate Assistance are required
to submit to the Centre of Command of the Civil Protection their respective updated operational
plans of actions for snowfall and frost emergency situations.
Following the directives of the General Plan of Civil Protection for emergency situations called
“Xenokrates”, in addition and complementary to the existing emergency response plans, the
Directorates, Departments and Offices of Civil Protection are required to construct a memo which
basically answers to the questions “who, what, when, where, why” for two distinct situations:
• Memo of action to ensure preparedness and availability of resources.

• Memo of action to dispose resources in case of an emergency and for managing the consequences
of a snowfall/frost event.
Each memo should contain:
• The agency/organization to inform and mobilize in case of an emergency.

• Table with contact info for chief responsible persons per action and of their deputies.
• Communication protocol.
• Updated list of operationally available resources for addressing snowfall and frost emergency
situations.
9
A copy of these memos of action is communicated to the Police and Fire Department Divisions.
It should be noted that the aforementioned memos do not constitute a substitute for the memos
that each organization implicated in emergency response for snowfall and frost situations should
draft and which regulate their mode of operation and other matters and logistics pertaining to
their operability.
Finally, a folder is filed from the Civil Protection Secretariat for each snowfall/frost emergency
situation. The folder contains the reports from each organization implicated in the emergency
situation in which the course of action is described in detail and in chronological order, the
disasters and failures are recorded, and proposals for future corrective actions are presented. A
summary report provides a general overview and summary of the performed actions and the
proposed amendments.
7. CONTACT IN THE AUTHORITY
Dr. Ioannis Benekos

Greek PIARC
Filadelfias 16 - 16122 Kessariani, Athens - Greece
Email: ybenekos@gmail.com
Phone: +30 694 96 28 199
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ORGANIZED RELOCATION OF PEOPLE THREATENED BY A DISASTER -

A CASE STUDY FROM A MAJOR FOREST FIRE IN RHODES ISLAND,
GREECE.
• Theodorou Phoebus
• Dimitrios Alexandris, Ph.D
• Ioannis Benekos, Ph.D (Greece’s representative in WRA’s TC 1.5 – Risk Management. Email:
ybenekos@gmail.com)
• Antonakos Andreas , Ph.D (General Secretariat of Civil Protection. Email: aantonakos@gscp.gr)
• Dionysios Makris (Greece’s First Delegate in WRA)
Abstract
Organized relocation of citizens from an area that is threatened by an ongoing or imminent

disaster is organized and implemented by the competent local or regional Civil Protection
authorities. The Police and CP authorities are responsible for defining safe routes for transportation.
Police is also responsible for securing the evacuated area, controlling the traffic and for keeping
order during and after the relocation of citizens. The Coast Guard assists the organized relocation
when marine resources are needed (boats). In the case where organized relocation involves
vulnerable population groups, including people disabled or with health problems, the presence
of ambulance units should be ensured in advance in order to provide immediate pre-hospital
medical assistance. Selection of appropriate sites for relocation should account for health and
safety requirements, be performed, if possible, within the limit of the municipality and minimize
further need for relocation.
The relocation of 2,000 people, most of them foreign citizens, due to a major forest fire which
took place in July 2008 in Rhodes Island, Greece, resulting in a total burned area of 13 Km2 and
an evacuated area equal to 1,6 Km2 is presented. The evacuated area was not a typical residential
area as most of it was occupied by large hotel facilities. The relocation area was an organized
beach 3 km away from the evacuated area. The entire operation, considered as fully successful
by the Greek authorities, with the corresponding organization of resources and actions is
presented and analyzed within the scope of risk mitigation.
Keywords: forest fire, evacuation, civil protection, population relocation, risk mitigation.
1. INTRODUCTION: DEFINITION A ND LEGAL FR AMEWOR K FOR

“ORGANIZED RELOCATION”
Among the actions needed to protect the life and health of citizens is their removal-relocation
from areas threatened by ongoing or imminent disaster. The need of safe relocation of people
during ongoing disasters was made clear during the 2007 devastating forest fires in the Helia
region of Peloponnese, Greece, where 36 people died, most of them trying to get away from the
approaching forest fires.
Organized relocation as defined by Greek Law 3613/2007 is the organized movement-relocation

of citizens from an area that is threatened by an ongoing or imminent disaster. It is not mandatory,
and citizens can refuse to leave the threatened area after they are officially informed for the
danger they are facing on their own responsibility.
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According to Article 1 of Greek Law 3013/2002, which is the fundamental law for civil protection
in Greece, the purpose of the Civil Protection includes the protection of life and health of citizens
against natural, technological and other disasters. As such, organized relocation is organized and
implemented by the competent local or regional Civil Protection authorities,
Guidelines for the organized relocation in order to protect citizens from ongoing or imminent
disaster due to forest fires have been published by the central Greek Civil Protection authority
which is the General Secretariat for Civil Protection. In the case of forest fires, relocated citizens
usually have to stay away from the threatened area only for a few hours.
This paper presents the procedures required for the relocation of 2,000 people, most of them
foreign citizens, due to a major forest fire which took place in July 2008 in Rhodes Island,
Greece, resulting in a total burned area of 13 Km2 and an evacuated area equal to 1,6 Km2.
The decision-making process, basic requirements and limitations of the relocation procedure are
presented within the cooperative and coordinative action framework of the relevant authorities.
The importance of clear public information and transportation procedures and the availability of
well-maintained roads used for relocation in the scope of mitigating the risk are highlighted.
Decision-making, basic requirements and limitations for organized relocation
According to Greek Law 3613/2007, the person-authority who decides on the implementation of
the organized relocation procedure is the Mayor of the affected area who also oversees the civil
protection actions in local level or the Head of the Region, when the ongoing or imminent disaster
can affect more than one municipality.
In all cases, this decision should be based upon the recommendation of the authorities that have
the responsibility to limit the impacts of the disaster. In the case of forest fires, the person who
officially recommends the implementation of organized relocation is the Chief Officer of the
local or regional Fire Brigade, who is acting as coordinator of the incident.
Recommendation and decision for implementation of organized relocation should take into
account the following:
• organized relocation of citizens is considered as a prevention measure, which should be

implemented in due time (several hours before citizens are exposed to actual danger so that
competent authorities have enough time to properly organize the entire operation) and under
certain conditions and limitations, the assessment of which can only be done locally;
• the risk faced by the people due to forest fires emanates primarily from human exposure to
very high temperatures due to the heat generated by the burning of plant biomass and from
human exposure to fire products (smoke, airborne particles, hot ash, etc.) which diffuse into the
atmosphere. Therefore, the rationale of all decisions for the organized relocation of citizens due
to forest fires should be related basically with the above risks. Where burning of other types of
fuel such as building materials, waste, etc., is likely to occur, the risk may vary depending on
the type of fuel;
• the decision to relocate citizens from a site that is threatened by an ongoing or imminent
disaster due to forest fire, should be taken when operational forces acting in the field, estimate
that the personal safety of people at risk cannot be reduced provided that the risk of movement
12
in which citizens may be exposed heading to a safe place is not greater than the risk of staying
near the area of the evolving destructive phenomenon.
Organized relocation is decided only in the case where competent authorities can ensure timely
and efficient organization for its safe implementation. If this is not the case, this decision can
easily cause greater consequences, possibly involving human losses, and be turned into a rescue
operation, which is a more difficult and risky operation, especially when a large number of
people are involved.
2. COOPERATIVE AND COORDINATIVE ACTIONS: PUBLIC

INFORMATION AND TRANSPORTATION PROCEDURES.
In ensuring an efficient and quick organized relocation two procedures are of primary importance
in cooperative and coordinative actions: public information and transportation procedures.
3. PUBLIC INFORMATION PROCEDURES
People located in the area that is decided to be evacuated, are officially informed about the
decision of organized relocation from the police. The information process is performed on a door
to door basis. The decision for relocation is also announced by local and/or national mass media
(TV, radio). The announcement must include the following information:
• who took the decision and who is responsible for the implementation;
• clearly identify the boundaries of the area from which citizens must be relocated and the risk
they face if they remain in it;
• identify where and when citizens will gather in case they need to be transported (hotspots) and
personal items they may or should have with them;
• identify the anticipated duration of the relocation, and the place of destination;
• identify safe routes and indicate those that can be followed for the citizens who want to use
their own means of transportation;
• report support available at the destination.
In tourist areas, hotel owners and rental apartment owners as well as tour operators, are notified
first in order to inform tourists about the decision for organized relocation and respective
procedures. In those cases, the Operations Centre of Civil Protection of the General Secretariat
for Civil Protection is informed, which notifies the Crisis Management Unit of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs so that the embassies of foreign citizens are officially informed.
4. TRANPORTATION PROCEDURES
Transportation of citizens can be done by public or private transportation means, or even by

personal cars. The Police and Civil Protection authorities are responsible for defining safe routes
for transportation. Police is also responsible for securing the evacuated area, controlling the
traffic and for keeping the order during and after the relocation of citizens. The Coast Guard
assists the organized relocation when marine resources (boats) are needed.
13
In the case where organized relocation involves vulnerable population groups, including people
disabled or with health problems, the presence of ambulance units should be ensured in advance
in order to provide immediate pre-hospital medical assistance.
In case where foreign citizens (tourists, etc.) who need transportation are involved, a special
gathering point must be defined, provided this is possible, in order to insure better communication
with the authorities and create better conditions for their support.
The sites selected for relocation should be located within the limits of the municipality, if possible,
and meet all health and safety requirements which are no less than those applicable to any
citizens gathering sites. Furthermore, the likelihood of having to relocate from those sites for
safety reasons should be minimized.
5. CASE STUDY: THE JULY 2008 RHODES ISLAND FOREST FIRE
In July 22 2008, a forest fire started in Rhodes Island located in the south-eastern part of the
Aegean Sea in Greece. During the next 4 days the fire grew bigger and finally the total burned
area reached 13 Km2. The location and the burned area of the forest fire are shown in illustration 1.
Illustration 1: Location map showing the burned area of the2008 Rhodes Island forest fire.
For the fire fighting enormous amount of means and personnel were used including 10 firefighting
planes and 8 firefighting helicopters. During the third day of the fire it was clear that some
populated areas were threatened by the fire. More precisely, those areas were not threatened
directly by the fire (flames, heat wave) but they were exposed to smoke and airborne particles
produced by the fire. Illustration 2 offers a panoramic view of the forest fire from inhabited
areas.
14
Illustration 2. Panoramic view of the forest fire from inhabited areas..
The threatened area was not a typical residential area as most of it was occupied by large hotel
facilities. The total area that was considered as directly threatened by the fire was of a size equal
to 1,6 Km2 and the number of persons located within this area was estimated to be around 2.000
(almost all of them were foreign citizens).The burned and the evacuated areas are shown in
illustration 3.
Illustration 3. Map showing the burned area and the evacuated area.
15
The hotel facilities located within the evacuated area are shown in illustration 4.
Illustration 4. Map showing the hotel facilities within the evacuated area.
The official decision for the organized relocation was taken in July 25th, 24 hours before the
implementation, by the Municipal Civil Protection Coordination Committee. For each hotel a
gathering point (hotspot) was set in agreement with hotel managers.
Citizens were transported by private tourist buses hired by the municipality as well as public
buses provided by the municipality. The relocation area was an organized beach 3 km away from
the evacuated area. There was only one road parallel to the shore available for the transportation
and it was cleared and turned into a one-way road by the local police forces. The burned,
evacuated and relocation areas are shown in illustration 5.
Illustration 5. Map showing the burned, the evacuated area and the relocation area.
16
Citizens were informed that they would have to stay in the relocation area until the end of the day
and that they should take with them the necessary things for one full day at the beach. Potable
water, food and toilets-bathrooms were available at the relocation area for all citizens at no cost.
An ambulance was available at all times during the procedure even though no one was hurt or in
need of any kind of medical care. Relocated citizens were transported back to their hotels at the
end of the day with the same transportation means.
6. CONCLUSIONS
The operation highlighted the importance of possessing clear and specific procedures with a
clearly defined chain of command, decision-making process and assigned responsibilities for a
successful organized relocation of people.
Important aspects of this procedure are the specific information provided to the public for
ensuring appropriate coordination and communication with responsible authorities, the
availability of sufficient transportation means and the maintenance of major evacuation roads in
good condition for a quick and inhibited relocation.
The entire operation was considered by the Greek local and national authorities as fully
successful. Organized relocation of citizens during forest fires has been implemented successfully
several times in Greece since 2008.
17
STATE HIGHWAY 2 WAIOEKA GORGE SLIP REINSTATEMENT
Study / project / activity details
Country:..........................................New Zealand
Geographical Area involved:..........Eastern Bay of Plenty, North Island
Type of Hazard:...............................Natural Hazard
Risk Classification:.........................Emergency Management
Authorities/Operators involved:.....New Zealand Transport Agency
Year of implementation:..................2012
Contact Person:..............................Brett Gliddon (New Zealand)
Abstract / Summary
The Waioeka Gorge slip on State Highway 2 between Opotiki and Gisborne in the Eastern Bay
of Plenty, New Zealand was a significant event that closed the highway. This closure added an
extra 2.5 hours to journey times north of Gisborne disrupting transport operations impacting on
the regional economy. An emergency response to this event resulted in the state highway being
open to traffic via a temporary road with 4 weeks, and permanently reinstated with 38 weeks.
During this process coordination and communication with key stakeholders and the public
proved to be an integral part of implementing the response.
1. INTRODUCTION / OVERVIEW
The Bay of Plenty is New Zealand’s fifth most populated region, home to 280,000 people. A
760km state highway network supports a $10 billion economy and New Zealand’s largest port by
volume. State Highway 2 in the south of the region is the only direct northern access to the
Gisborne region, population 47,000. Between Opotiki and Gisborne, State Highway 2 passes
through the 57km Waioeka Gorge. Alternatives to this route are limited to either State Highway 35
around the East Cape or State Highway 5 through Taupo which each add a minimum 2.5 hours
travel time to a journey north of Gisborne. A local road alternative to State Highway 2 through
the Waioeka Gorge exists, however it is not suitable a detour for state highway traffic.
Illustration 6:
Map of Bay
of Plenty State
Highway
Network -
New Zealand
18
On March 3rd 2012, a large slip estimated at 100,000m3 fell on State Highway 2 in the Waioeka
Gorge. This slip was thought to have been caused by a combination of unstable rock mass, heavy
rainfall and historic faultlines. The state highway was completely blocked by this event, having
a major effect on the function of the state highway network in this region of New Zealand. As
the manager of the state highway network on behalf of the New Zealand Government, it was the
responsibility of the New Zealand Transport Agency to direct the emergency response to this
event.
Illustration 7: Waioeka Gorge Slip State Highway 2
Due to the steep topography and unstable rock mass through the Waioeka Gorge, rock falls are
a frequent event. As a result, contractor resources are based in Opotiki to service the gorge.
Twice daily patrols clear minor rock fall debris from the highway and report back any events
requiring more resources. In the last 5 years there has been 11 closures varying in duration from
2 to 15 hours, however the last major closure was in July 1998 which lasted several weeks. The
four week closure of the Waioeka Gorge in March 2012 had a significant impact on the Gisborne
economy, increasing the cost and reducing the efficiency of freight in and out of the Gisborne
region. This negatively impacted the regional harvest season and product transport. State
Highway 2 through the Waioeka Gorge is also a popular tourist route. The reduction in tourist
numbers and increased journey time to Gisborne resulted in some weekend events being
cancelled. The closure was also felt by the residents of the Gisborne region, further isolating
them from the rest of New Zealand.
Illustration 8: Temporary road and stream passage

19
2. REINSTATEMENT OF STATE HIGHWAY
The reinstatement of State Highway 2 through the Waioeka gorge was split into 3 phases: the
initial response, stabilisation of the slip face and permanent reinstatement. Immediately after
notification was received of the slip, the initial response began. Contractors were deployed to
establish road closures and consultants and NZTA descended on the site to assess the slip. A
response plan was established which involved removing loose material from the slip via sluicing
and winching, and constructing a temporary road around the base of the slip by shifting the
stream. The temporary road was completed and deemed safe for use 4 weeks after the initial slip
had occurred. Initially the temporary road was opened during daylight hours only with manned
traffic control and spotters to ensure the safety of road users. Movement of the slip was monitored
with daily surveying of prisms installed on the face. Cumulative mapping of the data collected
was used to give early indication of possible slope failure. Opening hours were extended to 24
hours once it was decided the risk of further serious slope failures had reduced to an acceptable
level.
Illustration 9: Stabilisation of the slip face
Illustration 10: Permanent reinstatement of State Highway 2
With State Highway 2 open, the focus of the response then switched to permanent reinstatement.
The primary focus during this stage was the removal and disposal of the slip material. This was
undertaken by constructing a track up the slip face and removing the material from the top
down, stabilising the slip face in the process. Slip material removal was a 21 week process.
20
While this was being undertaken a permanent reinstatement design was developed and funding
secured for its construction. During this period 24 hour traffic control was maintained.
Phase three began with a contract for permanent reinstatement being awarded. The contract
involved the construction of a mass block and mechanically stabilised earth retaining wall
adjacent the stream, the relocation of the road alignment towards the stream and the construction
of permanent road and debris barriers. Phase three took 20 weeks to complete.
3. COMMUNICATION
During the initial phase of reinstatement, communication with the public was paramount. The
first priority was to ensure the message got out that the Waioeka Gorge was closed and detours
needed to be used. This was extremely important as the only available detours added an extra
2.5 hours to the journey. Immediately after notification of the slip was received, the Traffic Road
Event Information System (TREIS) was updated. This system feeds to information forums
viewable by the public and the media. Variable Message Signs (VMS) were set up at key
intersections on the state highway network in the region to ensure that those road users who had
missed all other communications were made aware of the closure before reaching the gorge. A
dedicated website and contact email address were established as the core of communications for
the event. Media releases were issued every second day and updates were sent to identified
stakeholders and members of the public who had subscribed. Additional to the formal channels
of communication via the website and media releases, meetings were held with key stakeholders
such as transport operators and local and regional councils to ensure they understood the
reinstatement process. Radio and newspaper interviews were also conducted to ensure key
messages were received by the media.
Once the temporary road was constructed and open 24 hours, communications were scaled
back. Updates were provided as progress on the permanent reinstatement was made.
4. INTER-AGENCY COORDINATION
The Waioeka Gorge slip on State Highway 2 was an event that affected numerous stakeholders.
While the section of State Highway 2 closed falls under the jurisdiction of the NZTA Bay of
Plenty region, its function as part of the regional and national network and location near regional
boundaries meant coordination was essential between overlapping agencies. Close coordination
was required with the local councils due to their relationship with residents and businesses in
their area, and also in regards to possible detour routes. It was important that communication
channels between the Bay of Plenty NZTA office and Gisborne/Hawkes Bay NZTA office which
manages the state highway network south of the Waioeka Gorge were kept active. To the public
there is limited distinction between NZTA regions therefore it was essential that the offices
acted as one. Coordination was also required between the NZTA and key transport operators and
tourist operators during the initial phase of reinstatement to ensure they were kept up to date on
progress. As the Waioeka Gorge is a sensitive ecological area, coordination was also required
with the Department of Conservation and the Regional Council who both have particular interest
in the effects of the slip and the state highway’s reinstatement on the local environment.
21
5. LESSONS LEARNT
1. Communication:
Ensuring that you immediately develop a communication plan allowing for clear, concise and
regular communication with the media, stakeholders and road users is critical to successfully
managing any emergency situation. In this particular event, we did not do this fast enough
leaving the community and media searching for information from any source they could find
regardless of how reliable the information was. Once we were able to put in place, and implement,
a comprehensive communication plan we were able to control the information released to the
public and ensure true and accurate information was provided at all times. This ultimately
allowed our staff to focus on the recovery plan rather than spend their time responding to reactive
communication issues.
2. Critical Time Lost

a. Initial lack of client involvement/leadership:
We quickly learnt during this event that, no matter how good your response plans are, you still need
strong client leadership in any emergency situation. During this event, we initially relied too heavily
on our contractors and consultants resulting in a lack of direction and, ultimately, delays. Once we
established stronger client involvement and leadership, we were able to progress the recovery much
faster by allowing each party (client/contractor/consultant) to focus on what they do best rather than
trying to second guess the clients requirements or expectations.
b. Mobilisation:
Being able to mobilise a contractor and consultant quickly is very important. This means having plant
and labour strategically positioned across your network to ensure that you can respond adequately
when a significant event occurs. In this situation we were lucky as we had two strategically placed
depots at both ends of the gorge which meant that we could mobilise plant and labour quickly and
attack the works from both sides if required. Without this it could have been several days before we
would have been able to respond due to the travel distance to this remote site.
3. Establishment of response plans

It is critical that you have developed and tested response plans for your entire network. These
plans set out who does what and when. We already had a good response plan for this type of
event which we were able to action almost immediately. Of course, you can always refine this
and holding a lesson learnt exercise after the event is important.
4. Establishment of ongoing monitoring

In the case of this particular slip, we discovered that our understanding of the topography and
existing monitoring processes for the gorge needed refinement to better allow us to manage
future risks. We have now reviewed how we monitor the gorge and are changing some of our
systems from focussing purely on small-scale rock fall to considering large-scale instability to
help us better predict future events.
5. Contract Forms
Having in place suitable contracts with your suppliers allowing for quick responses and an ability
to work together to achieve the best outcomes without being slowed or distracted by contractual
arguments is critical. In the case of this particular event, the focus and ability of both our
contractor and consultant to work together as one without letting their contractual positions
impact upon delivery was one of the key reasons for our success.
22
RISK AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AS A BASIS FOR ROAD

INTELLIGENT TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS (ITS) PLANNING AND
OPERATION
• Enrique Belda Esplugues Ph.D. (Vice Director for Security Information and Communication
Systems, Home Office- Email: ebelda@interior.es)
• Pedro Tomas Martinez (Mobility Management Area Manager, General Directorate of Traffic,
Home Office - Spanish Secretary in TC 1.5 “Risk Management” - Email: ptomas@dgt.es)
• Ioannis Benekos (WG3 Leader in WRA’s TC 1.5 – Risk Management. Email: ybenekos@
gmail.com).
Abstract
This paper presents ITS (Intelligent Transportation Systems) applied to roadway traffic
management in risk and emergency situations from the view of traffic operators. An overview
of risk and emergency management methodology is included, which draws up the general
framework for decision making towards risk reduction and adverse impact mitigation on traffic
safety and traffic flow. The benefits of traffic management ITS in the Spanish context are
described with case-studies which depict best practices and learned lessons in terms of planning,
operation, communication, design and coordination. A number of determinant factors are
identified and studied for better ITS design and location from a two-fold perspective including
both traffic safety and fluidity, and risk and emergency roadway-related management.
1. INTRODUCTION
In modern and hyper-connected societies, events putting people and services at risk have been
found to also cause serious damage to road network and traffic, and consequently on local and
global economies.
The transport system in Spain accounts for 16% of its GDP, and heavily depends on road, which
accounts for 81,6%, and 43,2% modal share for freight and passengers respectively [1]. When it
comes to risk management, two key elements must be protected and managed correctly in order
to notably minimize disruptions in economy:
• Road Transport Infrastructures.

• Road Transport Operation.
The trustworthiness and sustainability of Road Systems rely on infrastructures, but also on
highway capacity, travel-time reliability, road safety, freight transport security, energy supply, as
well as public health and environmental protection.
Effective risk and emergency management strategies are to preserve the aforementioned elements
when non-recurrent adverse events occur.
According to the European Commission, ITS deployment has resulted in a 20% travel time
reduction, a rise of 5-10% in network capacity and 10-15% road accidents reduction. Therefore,
road technology is to play a key role in ensuring sustainability and minimizing negative impacts.
23
The following sections present how ITS can be successfully integrated in the risk management
and emergency planning and operation framework.
Illustration 11: Risk treatment procedure
2. ROAD TRANSPORT RISK MANAGEMENT
Uncertainty is ubiquitous in the realm of risk and emergency management. Consequently, the
aim of risk management must point towards reducing risks and uncertainties affecting a given
geographic area or economic sector while trading off costs and social risk tolerance, through risk
assessment, risk minimization and risk mitigation strategies.
Thus, risk management is to provide a structured step-by-step iterative sequence including all
steps below:
Context definition
Establishing comprehensively the economic, political, social and engineering context and
establishing risk criteria and thresholds is a first step in properly activating and coordinating
public authorities within the legal framework.
It is recommended that a coordination task group focused on risk management is formed early
to identify all stakeholders. This task group should also be responsible for drawing up plans
including risk management goals and related cost-benefit analysis.
24
Risk identification
Once the context is defined, risk sources must be identified. The related vulnerabilities and
possible consequences in terms of technical requirements, budget, impacted areas, plans, and
assets must also be identified.
Environmental and natural hazards are easily identified and codified (event magnitude versus
frequency of occurrence), whereas anthropogenic risks are harder to identify, especially those
affecting modern transport infrastructures with limited historical records.
Risk analysis
Risk analysis aims to:
• Determine the impact of risk.

• Evaluate occurrences.
• Provide risk overview (rate the risks)
It is vital to identify all existing systems and technical procedures to control and monitor risks,
and evaluate their weaknesses and strengths.
Since the level of risk acceptance is heavily dependent on both consequences, and probabilities,
risk analysis requires a deep knowledge of assets, and impacting events. Therefore, risk levels
can be graded on a precision-scale and can be calculated using qualitative, semi-quantitative or
quantitative methods based on data availability, time and cost.
Risk evaluation
Risk evaluation involves comparing risk levels found at the analysis stage with previously
established thresholds. Costs and benefits of all involved stakeholders must be considered:
• risks below “acceptable” threshold levels must be treated with no further action;
• risks exceeding “unacceptable” threshold levels require in-depth assessment, and actions
implementation.
Risk treatment
Options to treat risks must take into account specific cost-effective measures. Once a treatment
strategy is selected, it is essential to develop a Risk Treatment Plan. Illustration 11 depicts the
risk treatment procedure.
Monitoring and review

Due to the variable nature of risks and to constant development of risk management methodologies,
continuous risk monitoring and review of the management procedure is required to guarantee
the plan effectiveness.
Communication and broadcasting

During risk management processes, communication among involved stakeholders is essential.
Every stakeholder must analyze and deliver information pertaining to their competence field in
a cooperative way for the benefit of the community, which will timely receive filtered upgraded
information.
25
3. TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT PLANS FOR EMERGENCIES
Emergencies are considered troublesome situations and potentially large-scale adverse events
that require important coordination among a number of public and private bodies. Most of these
situations directly affect roadway systems and require preventive risk management procedures
and on-time coordinated emergency services actions such as, management of natural disasters
(floods, earthquakes, forest fires) and evacuation of affected sites or even cities. Critical
situations, which require traffic management strategies, are divided into three categories:
specific, localized and extended. All these situations may inflict severe adverse impacts to users.
A comprehensive road network management is required in order to guarantee road safety to
users and security to all citizens. Traffic Management Plans (TMPs) are high added value tools
for optimizing resources and ensuring both mobility and security. TMPs for critical situations
are framed into General Emergencies Plans in coordination with all decision-makers involved.
The main purposes of Emergency Management are two-fold:
• evacuation of users as soon as possible;

• enable fast, safe and effective access of rescue services to the affected area.
The basis of emergency management is the identification and assessment of any risk that could
potentially escalate into a crisis, and the arrangement of plans, procedures and measures to
address it. For each of the most significant identified risks, a Strategic Scenario for Crisis
Management must be defined, which includes risk analysis and definition of operational stages.
In developing the strategic scenarios, it is vital to identify which public and private authorities
can get involved at all levels (national, regional, local), and eventually which ad-hoc bodies are
to be created in order to address the crisis. Critical infrastructure and services potentially affected
are also identified and described.
The strategic scenarios describe measures to be operated for risk management and also include
TMPs designed to address scenarios such as terrorist attacks, adverse weather situations, energy
supply shortage, nuclear accidents, or social harmony disruptions.
Illustration 12 shows the different stages of the General TMP designed by the Directorate
General of Traffic (DGT) in Spain within the context of Euro Regional projects SERTI and
ARTS. The role of ITS in information collection and propagation is apparent in the whole
process.
26
Illustration 12. General TMP Methodology Stages
4. ITS, TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT CENTRES AND RISK MANAGEMENT
A number of worldwide case-studies prove that the only efficient way to face increasing transport
demand is the use of electronic equipment on roads, vehicles and Traffic Management Centers
(TMC), and through the implementation of new concepts such as e-commerce, intelligent roads,
e-business [2], telecommuting, or car-sharing.
In line with the aforementioned, DGT has steadily deployed ITS services on Spanish roads since
1982, and recently, the “National Plan for Road ITS Consolidation” was developed in line with
2010/40/EU Directive and White Paper for Transport. Consequently, Spanish ITS industry has
become one of the most relevant, innovative and edge-cutting actors in mobility management in
the world [3]. During the last decades DGT has led the development and implementation of ITS
on Spanish roadways, which has boosted the improvement of safety, efficiency and comfort for
road transport. The potential of ITS for dynamic/adaptive mobility management is vital for
Traffic Authorities aiming to maximize roadway network capacity and reliability.
ITS improvements result in better management and control of road network as well as on a more
reliable and updated user traffic and road safety-related info, therefore allowing for informed
travel decisions, modal choice, reduced energy consumption, decreased emissions levels, less
congestion, increased road capacity and increased road safety [4].
In order to better manage emergencies, TMC have developed measures that can be classified
into preventive and operational:
27
Illustration 13: Architecture of TMC system used by DGT
Preventive measures: ITS implementation is necessary when risks arise in order to avoid
negative consequences. These can be further classified:
• Direct measures to prevent potential situations.

• Measures proposed to prevent a specific threat (medium-short term).
• Measures aiming to minimizing the consequences arising from an imminent situation
(immediate threat).
Implementation of these measures which can boost early decision-making, largely rely on the
availability and quality of integrated ITS data:
• Weather forecasts.
• Traffic forecasts.
• Speed management.
• Automatic Traffic enforcement.
• Vehicle to vehicle communication (V2V).
• Vehicle to Infrastructure communication (V2I).
Operational measures, which are adopted for effective implementation of crisis management:
• Information and data exchange among involved Agencies and Organizations.

• Enforcement and monitoring by DGT´s helicopters service.
• Traffic Police on-board enforcement equipment.
• LPR-based Access Control, which provides real-time information to users and boosts traffic
management to enable evacuation and detours.
• Variable message signs (VMS), to show reliable and updated on-trip information.
• Alternative and Emergency Services routes.
• Special measures to increase road capacity based on ITS devices: additional lanes, dual lanes,
dedicated lanes, speed control, hard shoulder running.
28
The aforementioned measures are mostly implemented with the support of ITS systems which
are the core of automatic/manual incident detection, action implementation, and information
dissemination.
Illustration 14: Sample of Operation Protocol for Variable Message Sign.
To ensure proper operation of ITS, Traffic Management Centres operators must be trained
accordingly, and ITS equipment requires standardization. In Spain, the Agency for traffic ITS
devices standardization is AENOR, while DGT leads active working of standardization
subcommittees such as CTN 199. Illustration 13 depicts a piece of the Operation Protocol for
Variable Message Sign which is implemented in Spain.
5. ROAD ITS-BASED RISK MANAGEMENT CASE-STUDIES IN SPAIN
In this section, real successful case-studies undertaken by DGT in the context of road traffic risk
management are illustrated:
Energy supply risk

The transport system in Spain accounts for 16% of its GDP, and heavily depends on road, which
accounts for 81,6%, and 43,2% modal share for freight and passengers respectively, with 90% of
energy sources coming from fossil fuels. In 2011, the petroleum price rose up to concerning
levels due to the Arab Spring. The global circumstances put Spanish economy to a risky and
vulnerable position in terms of energy supply and trade balance (62% of Spain´s trade balance
deficit is due to energy imports), which warranted urgent preventive cost-effective actions.
Based on a number of researches and studies, the proposal was a nation-wide reduction of 10km/h
of speed limits (120 km/h) on all highways. A law (RD 303/2011) was passed to enable this
temporary speed road traffic reduction.
The following tables and maps depict the ITS structure which was activated in order to minimize
energy-like risks from a traffic risk management perspective. The implementation and
29
inforcement of the speed limit was possible due to a coordinated nationwide ITS operation
aiming to:
• Adapt speed limits promptly (Speed Controls).

• Inform road users about enforced speed limits (VMS).
Around 400 M€ were saved from reduced petrol imports, which reached 2003 consumption
levels. This reduction of imports was possible because of the mean speed decrease in all highways
as shown in table 1:
TABLE 1 - MEAN SPEED DECREASE DUE TO 110 KM/H LAW ENFORCEMENT (RADARS DATA).
Radars dataloop Detectors data
2010-2011 2010-2011
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2010 2011
Variation Variation
April March February January
111,08 106,19 102,49 103,24 101,67 101,56 -0,11% 105,6 106,94 1,27%
109,05 106,13 102,61 103,02 101,98 100,99 -0,97% 105,98 107,36 1,30%
109,39 106,14 103,97 104,48 101,85 95,64 -6,10% 106,76 101,31 -5,10%
109,64 105,22 102,4 106,13 103,06 96,23 -6,63% 107,36 102,32 -4,69%
Enforce in compliance and report law offenders promptly (National ITS Enforcement Management Centre).
Illustration 15: I.T.S devices enforced to control and manage temporary speed limits.5
Massive seasonal migration events (Paso del Estrecho)

Every single year some 300.000 vehicles from Europe drive across Spain towards Northern
Africa along trans-European transport strategic corridors, in a two-month period during the
summer.
This seasonal additional volume of traffic (some 5.000 daily additional trips) requires specific
ad-hoc Traffic Management Plans in order to maximize road capacity, achieve seamless road-ship
trips, while avoiding risks associated with social disorders, road safety, and strategic link traffic
delays.
30
Hence, DGT implements a number of ITS-based traffic management strategies such as:
• Vehicle parking management in ports and in routes.

• Driver information.
• Pre-trip.
• On-board.
• Intermodal coordination (see illustration 17).
• Alternative itineraries and detours
• Traffic enforcement (speed controls, black lists, etc).
Illustration 16: V.M.S with info on port occupation levels.
Illustration 17: Parking management examples
Massive events (the case of Moto GP races).

When massive events take place, a high number of trips are attracted to a relatively small area of
the roadway network, which results in dramatic rises of traffic volumes for peak periods and
disequilibrium of traffic composition. This can trigger adverse impacts affecting wide areas if
proper Risk Management Plans are not implemented.
31
Spain hosts 3 Moto-GP events per year. These are worldwide popular sport events, which attract
fans Europe-wide which mostly come by motorbikes in a time period ranging 1-3 days.
TABLE 2 – MASSIVE EVENTS TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT PLANS ASSESSMENT

Année 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Queue length to access
85 91 57 48,5 36,6 32,8 14,2 17,2 18,2
GP site (km.)
Number of total attracted
240.929 291.456 311.976 358.559 294.899 280.892 273.425 259.192 234.139
vehicles
End of evacuation time. 20:10 19:00 20:15 18:15 18:30 17:45 17:32 17:45 17:40
In such a context, ad-hoc TMPs have been developed in order to effectively achieve the following goals:
• Maximize road capacity.

• Minimize traffic accidents.
• Guarantee traffic high standards to the rest of users.
• Provide updated on-board and pre-trip information to target drivers.
• Risk management
The TMPs describe to a great extent which are the actions to be undertaken from the TMC according
to pre-defined levels of traffic parameters (volume, speed, density, and mixed traffic) regarding:
• VMS (where, when, why; normalized format [5]).

• Traffic restrictions (type of vehicle, time periods, road stretch, duration, etc).
• Speed enforcement.
• Ramp metering at merging points (Traffic Police).
• Emergency parking lots.
• Dedicated emergency vehicle lanes.
• Hard shoulder running.
• Traffic segregations.
• Access controls.
• Information and broadcasting: Radio, TV, Apps, websites.
The adverse scenarios that are considered within the Emergency Traffic Management Plan are
the following:
• Preventive massive evacuation of the circuit site.

• Evacuation of casualties in case of accident, terrorist attacks, etc.
• Fluid access of emergency vehicles into the circuit.
• Management of incidents and avoidance of secondary traffic incidents.
• En-route traffic enforcement.
In the recent years, results have been quite successful in terms of road safety and traffic efficiency:
queues have been reduced over 90% while traffic demand has remained constant, which proves
that TMPs have worked out as expected and ITS has assisted on maximizing existing roadway
capacity.
32
6. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Efficient road traffic planning and management is the backbone of a reliable, and safe land
transport system, and can indeed become the basis of risk and emergency management if ITS are
integrated in emergency management of potentially adverse events that can eventually occur in
roadways.
ITS enable more efficient daily traffic management, but also provide the possibility to maintain
acceptable security levels and implement mobility management policies related to preventive
risk minimization (energy, pollution, border-crossing, access-control, etc), and responsive
emergency management (site evacuation, alternative itineraries, dual lanes, preventive road
closures, emergency itineraries, etc).
Whichever is the kind of risk or emergency to be tackled, the learned lessons indicate that a
coordinated and comprehensive deployment of various ITS devices is recommended in order to
promptly manage special traffic operations from Traffic Management Centers monitor
infrastructure characteristics, traffic parameters, socioeconomic variables, geographical
structure, and roadway capacity limitations.
Further research is recommended to be undertaken to achieve general guidelines on ITS

deployment from the perspective of Risk and Emergency Traffic Management and incorporate
it into planning and project procedures.
33
EMERGENCY SITUATION MANAGEMENT OF HIGH FLOODS ON

DORNESTI BRIDGE, SUCEAVA, ROMANIA – CASE STUDY
• Prepared by Zbarnea Constantin and Popa Vasile
Study details
Country:..........................................ROMANIA
Geographical Area involved:..........North of Romania
Type of Hazard:...............................Road user
Risk Classification:.........................Risk management
Authorities/Operators involved:.....Ministry of Transports, Ministry of Defence,
Ministry of Internal Affairs
Year of implementation:..................2010
Abstract / Summary
This paper presents the Emergency Situation Management of High Floods in 2010 on Dornesti
Bridge, Suceava, Romania. Following the severe rainfalls that affected Romania starting
21.06.2010, 37 counties out of a total of 41 were seriously affected by floods, torrents, flash
floods or landslides. The most affected counties were in the noth-east part of Romania. About
5.257 km of national, county and local roads were affected and 707 bridges and 2.729 culverts
were damaged. The north part of Moldavia (region in north east of Romania) was seriously
affected by floods and the bridge connecting Radauti municipality to Siret city and further to the
border between Romania and Ukraine along route 17A, was damaged. The local and national
authorities (Ministry of Transports, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Internal Affairs) were
mobilized to undertake appropriate actions. Management of the emergency situation was
assumed by the National Committee for Emergency Situations. The floods from the end of June
2010 caused only for Regional Direcorate of Roads and Bridges Iasi, 94 calamity sectors of
national roads and costs rising to over 8 million euro.
1. INTRODUCTION / OVERVIEW
The highways and national road network in Romania is under the Government property and the
authority in charge with maintenance, repairing, rehabilitation and administration is the
Romanian National Company of Motorways and National Roads, a joint company own by the
state. Romanian National Company of Motorways and National Roads is divided in 7 regional
road directorates (Bucuresti, Craiova, Timisoara, Cluj, Brasov, Iasi and Constanta). A brief
situation about the highways and national road network length under the authority of Romanian
National Company of Motorways and National Roads for the reference date 01.01.2013 is shown
in table 3.
The Regional Directorate of National Roads Iasi has the authority to administrate the national
roads network of 8 counties (Suceava, Botosani, Neamt, Iasi, Bacau, Vaslui, Vrancea and
Galati) - see illustration 18.
34
TABLE 3 - SITUATION ABOUT THE HIGHWAYS AND NATIONAL ROAD NETWORK
Regional Directorates of Roads National Roads +
National Roads (km) Highways (km)
and Bridges Highways (km)
1. Bucuresti 2,430.186 222.4 2,652.586
2. Craiova 1,969.442 1,969.442
3. Timisoara 1,957.178 68.8 2,025.978
4. Cluj 2,536.249 51.8 2,588.049
5. Brasov 1,710.008 17.56 1,727.568
6. Iasi 3,284.265 3,283.265
7.
Constanta 1,522.086 169.19 1,691.276
TOTAL 15.408.390 529.75 15,938.140
Illustration 18: Regional directorate of roads and bridges - LASI
Illustration 19: Bridge of Dornesti - DN 17A km 77+575
National Road DN 17A links the North West of Suceava County, Radauti municipality to Siret
city and further to the border between Romania and Ukraine. The North West region of Suceava
County is called Bucovina, region were lives an important minority of Ukrainians. Also this
region is an important center for tourism and timber companies.
35
National Road 17A characteristics:
• 7.00 m carriageway width and two shoulders of 0.5 m each

• counted traffic of 8,400 standard vehicles/24 hours (year of counting – 2010)
• 70% of the route in mountain region
The bridge of Dornesti is situated on DN 17A km 77+575 (fig.2), over Suceava river, was built in
1966 and by the following characteristics:
• total length – 433.45 m

• carriageway width – 7.80 m
• bridge width – 11.20
• the superstructure had 18 spans:
• 17 spans of 23.00 m length
• 1 span of 36.60 m length
Illustration 20
2. IMPACT ON SAFETY AREA
Following the severe rainfalls that affected Romania starting 22.06.2010, 37 counties out of a total
of 41 were seriously affected by floods, torrents, flash floods or landslides. About 5.257 km of
national, county and local roads were affected and 707 bridges and 2.729 culverts were damaged.
The roads under administration of Regional Directorate of National Roads Iasi were the most
affected. In two counties (Suceava and Botosani) located in north of the country, the rainfall
during 6 days (22-28.06.2010) exceed 237 litres/square meters. Significant flash flooding occurs
on main rivers causing important damages for roads and bridges. More than 90 national road
sectors of Regional Directorate of National Roads Iasi were affected, 50 of them only in Suceava
County. More than 7,000 houses were damaged and over 800 houses were completely destroyed.
36
3. CASE STUDY ANALYSIS
The severe rainfalls were forecasted by The National Meteorological Administration (NMA)
that announced the orange code for the north of the country. According Romanian Norm
Regarding the National Management System for Emergency Situations on Public Roads, at the
level of each county, a Temporary Activity Operational Unit (T.A.O.U.) was formed to manage
the emergency situations on the road network. T.A.O.U. was in charge with road network
inspection, traffic guidance and collecting information about road conditions. At that time,
national road network had no ITS systems and there was no contract/agreement between road
administrator and contractors for intervention in case of emergency situation.
The road network inspection was important for collecting information’s about road conditions,
evolution of emergency situation, collecting and providing correct information’s, offering
authorities available routes for interventions in disaster areas, damage evaluation, and taking
appropriate decision of intervention. Information’s were collected even from road users, local
village/cities authorities and local police stations.
All important information’s were collected and transmitted every 3 hours to:
• Regional Directorate of National Roads Iasi → Romanian National Company of Motorways

and National Roads (published on company website) → Ministry of Transports
• General Inspectorate for Emergency Situations
• Police Road Department
• Mass media
Illustration 21
T.A.O.U. collaborated with Police Road Department in order to take the suitable actions, to
establish alternative routes, road traffic deviations for damaged road sectors, to signalize
damaged bridges and culverts and to set the appropriate emergency traffic signs.
37
At the end of the rainy time, Regional Directorate of National Roads Iasi started on site assessment
of the damages. Considering that Regional Directorate of National Roads Iasi had contracts only
for road maintenance works, the second step was to contact contractors and designers and to
invite them to participate to the “direct negotiation” procedure for the repairing works.
Following the floods, after inspecting the Dorneşti bridge, it was found that pier no.2 (P2) and
pier no.4 (P4) were scoured and the pier no.3 (P3) was scoured and rotated. The bridge decks
adjacent pier no.3 (P3) was tilted from the bearings (illustration 20).
The Regional Directorate of National Roads Iasi contacted the biggest contractor in the area
(S.C.C.F. Group COLAS) associated with a designer company (IPTANA) to make an onsite visit
to evaluate the needed works and for financial estimation.
Illustration 22
Illustration 23
Following the visit they have made it onsite at that time, it was appreciated that the pier no.3 (P3)
could be strengthen P3 and the bridge deck could be brought to the initial position. But, a few
days after onsite visit, the pier no.3 (P3) continued to tilt and rotate (illustration 21, 22 and 23),
the action leading to the collapse of the adjacent a bridge decks also causing a slight tilt of the
pier no.5 (P5).
38
The situation was quickly reevaluated and it was decided to design and built only one span
between pier no.2 and pier no.4. The needed works and necessary found were reevaluated and
the estimated reconstruction time was estimated to about 5 months.
Due to the necessity of transporting goods, food, building materials etc. to the disaster areas, the
pressure made by local authorities and companies transporting goods, Ministry of Transports,
Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Internal Affairs were mobilized to undertake appropriate
actions. So, next to the affected bridge, a pontoon bridge (illustration 23 and 24) was built by the
troops of the 72nd Engineer Battalion of Romanian military forces, in order to assure the traffic
continuity during the reparation of the Dornesti bridge.
Illustration 24
The temporary deviation road and the entry slip road for the pontoon bridge were built by the
contractor of the main works (S.C.C.F. Group COLAS).
For Dornesti bridge the preferred repairing solution was to build a single span of 46 meters long
between pier no2 (P2) and pier no.4 (P4) and to consolidate the adjacent piers (illustration 25).
About 5 months were needed for bridge reparation and traffic reestablishment.
Illustration 25
39
4. CONSIDERATIONS/STRATEGIES/CONCLUSIONS
High floods main causes:
• climate change
• large amounts of rainfalls in short periods of time on limited areas;
• excess transport capacity of the bridges and culverts sections, due to the bridges and culverts
sections under-dimensioning
• obstruction of the drain sections by timber and household wastes deposited in river bottoms or
river slopes;
• widespread deforestation and inadequate execution of works agro facilitating erosion leading
to higher discharge coefficient on the slopes and engaging large amounts of silt;
• placement of unauthorized construction (houses, household, etc..) in riverbed;
• housing construction in floodplains, on inadequate foundations using poor quality materials;
• riverbed erosion caused by ballast and sand excavations
• lack or insufficient funds for hydraulic works necessary for defense against flood, both in the
beds of watercourses and on slopes;
Illustration 26
Illustration 27
40
5. CONCLUSIONS:
• reconsidering the hydraulic bridge design according to climate change

• funding need for hydraulic works necessary for defense against flood
• prohibiting ballast and sand excavations near bridges in order to eliminate the most riverbed
erosion
• prohibiting the placement of unauthorized construction in riverbed
• need to create a legislative framework to stop the widespread deforestation of privately-owned
forests
• ITS systems need to be implemented in order to facilitate road surveillance and to get
information at the right time;
• need of contract/agreement between road administrator and contractors for intervention in case
of emergency situation;
6. COST/RESOURCES
In concurrence with the start of repairs, Regional Directorate of National Roads Iasi also started
the contract price negotiations for design and repairing works. Due to the large number contractors
and designers in charge with repairing of the 94 damaged sectors of national roads and bridges,
the negotiations were very difficult. Each damaged sector had a separate contract. Regional
Directorate of National Roads Iasi established two committees in charge to negotiate the contract
prices and the necessary repairing works. The Romanian legal form of contracting the works in
case of calamities was “direct negotiation with companies invited to participate”. Most of the
companies asked for bigger prices that they usually use in regular contracts, due the nature of
“emergency works”.
For Dornesti bridge it took one month and a half of negotiations to get to the final contract and
the repairing works for Dornesti bridge raised at 3.631.004 euro (design and built). The site
inspection was made by Regional Directorate of Roads and Bridges Iasi own staff.
The floods from the end of June 2010 caused only for Regional Directorate of Roads and Bridges
Iasi, 94 calamity sectors of national roads.
The financial support to protect against the effects of natural disasters are covered in Romania
from the following sources:
• Government Intervention Fund Government;

• European Union Solidarity Fund;
• Own revenues of affected legal and natural persons;
• Optional or compulsory insurances;
• Donations from Romanian legal and natural persons, or aid from other organizations or foreign
countries;
The major natural disasters that occurred in Romania between June - July 2010, amounted
876,000,000 Eur. Only for the Regional Directorate of Roads and Bridges Iaşi, the financial
support was in amount of 10,576,734 Eur. In the first stage the financial support was covered as
follows:
41
• 10,219,206 Eur from the Government Intervention Fund;

• 338,304 Eur from the donations received from legal and natural persons;
• 19,224 Eur from own trade revenues of the Regional Directorate of Roads and Bridges Iaşi.
For the Dorneşti Bridge the financial support was in amount of 3,631,004 Eur, representing
34,33% of the total financial support of Regional Directorate of Roads and Bridges Iaşi.
In order to cope with the natural disasters and to show solidarity with a Member State affected
by a major natural disaster, in 2002 within the European Union was founded the European Union
Solidarity Fund (Regulation EC 2012/2002), annual budget of the fund being aprox. 1 billion
Eur. This grant funds for the damages that are not covered by insurances and it doesn’t grant, for
example, the losses suffered by natural persons. Starting with 2005 Romania used this fund 4
times, between 2005 -2010, receiving a total support of 108,000,000 Eur.
For the natural disaster that occurred in June – July 2010, Romania claimed to European
Commission a financial support on August 31st, 2010 (according to methodology, the deadline to
submit a request is within 10 weeks from the date of registration of the first damage). The
amount approved by European Commission by Decision no. 3851 from July 6th, 2010 was of
24,967,741 Eur.
Of the total amount of 24,967,741 Eur from European Union Solidarity Fund, amount approved
for Romania, the financial support was distributed as follows:
Beneficiary from European Union Solidarity Fund - European Commission Decision Amount (EUR)
(2011) 3851/06.06.2011 24,967,741
Ministry of Environment and Forests 14,066,790
Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure, of which: 10,900,951
- National Company of Highways and National Roads in Romania, of which: 9,276,713
-Regional Directorate of Roads and Bridges, Iasi, including: 8,310,633
- « Dorneşti Bridge on National Road DN 17A km 77 + 575 » 2,928,207
To restore infrastructure of Dorneşti Bridge, of the total works executed in amount of 3,631,004
Eur, finally, the financial support was distributed as follows:
• 2,928,207 EUR from Solidarity Fund of EU;

• 702,770 EUR from the Government Intervention Fund, representing VAT on eligible expenses;
• 27 EUR from own trade revenues of Regional Directorate of Roads and Bridges, representing
various approvals and agreements necessary for work authorization.
It must be mentioned that each State Member of the European Union, in a first phase supports
total financial costs of a major disaster occured, then there is a possibility of receiving a grant
from the European Commission. Financial support for Romania for the case of Dornesti Bridge,
was approved about one year after the disaster occurrence (August 31st, 2010 date when the
request was submitted - June 6th, 2011 approval date).
42
COOPERATION AND COORDINATION OF ROAD AND ROAD-RELATED

ORGANIZATIONS IN EMERGENCY SITUATIONS IN JAPAN
• Prepared by Yukio ADACHI (Hanshin Expressway, JAPAN).
Study / project / activity details
Country...........................................Japan
Geographical area involved...........Japan
Type of hazard.................................All type of hazard
Risk classification...........................Emergency management
Authorities / Operators involved.....All highway authorities in Japan
Contact person................................Yukio ADACHI (Japan)
1. INTRODUCTION
Japan is a kind of natural disaster country. Japan has experienced a lot of natural disaster. Based
on the experience of such disasters, road authorities in Japan has been established the cooperation
or coordination system with related organizations in advance for quick response and restoration
from road disaster. These collaborations had been established within limited road related
organizations such as between road authorities, police, contractors and consultant companies.
However those collaborations have been widely spread to other organizations such as local
government, self-defense force, or local residents and the area of collaboration have also been
expanded. Those collaboration agreements have rapidly accelerated since 2011 East Japan
Earthquake. This paper summarizes the current cooperation and coordination work of road and
road related organizations in emergency situation of Japan.
2. STRUCTURE OF COOPERATION AND COORDINATION IN EMERGENCY

SITUATION
A number of organizations are involved in road operation. Those organizations can be considered the
hierarchical classification of the five categories (Ministries, Road authorities, Private sectors,
Non-road related companies, Road users) in general. Illustration 28 shows the structure pyramid of
cooperation and coordination work. Table 4 shows the current state of collaborative framework in
each category.
Road-related organization
Non-road-related
organization or
Road users
Illustration 28:
The structure
Coordination Non-road- pyramid of
between related cooperation
the Ministries and
organization
coordination
work in
Coordination emergency
between road authorities situation
Road users
Private sector
43
TABLE 4 - EXAMPLES OF COOPERATION AND COORDINATION WORK IN EACH HYERACHY
Category Examples of cooperation and coordination work
• Establish close relation system between related ministries, especially police and fire department
Ministry level • Cooperation with Self-defense force for road clearing and providing base field in hazard area
• Cooperation with local government both normal and emergency situations
Road
• Human and material support in the initial activities (Dispatch engineers, vehicles, etc.)
Authority
• Technical cooperation in investigation and restoration
level
Private sector • Human and material support during the initial restoration (Construction workers and materials.)
level • Assistance of human resources in the investigation and restoration phase
Non-road
related • Voluntary emergency and recovery support by non-road related organizations such as accessible
organization road map
level
• Mutual cooperation between road authority and local resident on maintenance of expressway in
Road user
normal situation and expressway tsunami shelter in emergency situation
level
• Provision of road information from drivers through the road dial including normal situation
TABLE 5. EXAMPLE OF MAJOR BCP ITEMS OF HIGHWAY AUTHORITIES [6]

1. Designation of BCP personnels
2. Determination of the decision hierarchy in emergency situation
3. Check of communication tools and office resources
4. Ensuring emergency equipment and materials
5. Build a cooperative relation with related companies and the agency in disaster
6. Continuous BCP drill
Planning evacuation procedure Designation of emergency route and vehicle

44
3. COOPERATION AND COORDINATION WITH RELEVANT

GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS
As part of national civil protection, national and local government established management
system ensuring comprehensive emergency management and response system from any attack.
Road emergency management is conducted under the control of this management systems.
The key step of the road emergency management is to establish close cooperation and coordination
system between related organizations in advance. According to most of the BCP (Business
Continuity Plan) that is planned by the highway authorities in Japan to continue the highway
service in emergency situations, the establishment of close cooperative system for emergency
information with the organizations emergency cooperated agencies, related agencies, and group
companies is one of the most priority need for BCP planning. Table 5 shows the typical BCP plan
of highway authority [6]. Especially, the establishment of close relationship with police for
exchanging emergency information is essential and necessary, for example road closure
information, designation of emergency transport route, and designation of emergency vehicle.
Recently, in addition to the cooperation with road related organizations, cooperative relationship
with self-defense force (SDF) has been initiated [7]. In this cooperative agreement, the highway
authorities provide their highway communication line and service area as disaster relief base
stations to SDF in emergency. In turn, SDF provides emergency road clearing work to secure the
emergency traffic route. This agreement was established based on the experience at the 2011
East Japan Earthquake. SDF used the highway service area as their base station, and highway
authorities secured energy and food supply at the service area. This Agreement expects more
quick initial relief and recovery by reducing the effort on securing base station at the disaster
area.
In other aspects, the local governments have been efforts on building a mutually beneficial
relationship with road authorities not only in emergency but also in ordinary activity [8]. The
purpose of this agreement is 1) to make effective use of their resources, [7] to promote the
development of community cooperation including through disaster response, tourism promotion,
and increased consumption of specialty products together, and thereby [8] to improve the
convenience of the user, the expansion of the provision of services through the use of high-quality
of highways, parking area as well as the service area.
45
TABLE 6. EXAMPLE OF COOPERATION BETWEEN SDF AND HIGHWAY AUTHORITIES [7]
1. Share of disaster information
2. Provide highway facility, service area, equipment, and goods as disaster relief base station
3. Emergency road clearing to ensure emergency route in disaster area
4. Periodic meeting and drill
Disaster relief base station at highway service area Emergency road clearing
TABLE 7. EXAMPLE OF COMPREHENSIVE PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN HIGHWAY AUTHORITIES AND

LOCAL GOVERNMENT [8]
1. Mutual cooperation in disaster. Share of disaster information / Support technical cooperation in
inspection of damaged structures / Provide emergency materials and equipment / Emergency use of
highway / Secure safety of the left victims of drivers and local residents / Effective use of doctor and
emergency helicopter
2. Strengthenin the support of the emergency response. Paramedic activities utilizing doctor and emergency
helicopter / Disaster education in cooperation with traffic safety education
3. Promotion of tourism and use of highway
4. Enhancing local specialty product sales at highway service area
5. Environmental measures.
6. Mutual technical cooperation
Mutual cooperation in disaster

46
4. COORDINATION / COOPERATION BETWEEN HIGHWAY AUTHORITIES
Material and human resources are secured in highway authorities in order to work for road
management in ordinary situation. Therefore, the number of the engineers that might be required
for initial activities and recovery activities in emergency would be insufficient, especially in
large-scale disasters. It has been pointed out that it is effective to obtain cooperation from related
organizations outside the disaster affected area. Based on the experience of past disasters,
“Agreement on mutual cooperation in emergency restoration work at earthquake disasters” is
made to deepen and promote mutual cooperation with various highway authorities. Table 8 show
one of the mutual cooperation agreement in highway anthorities.
TABLE 8. EXAMPLE OF MUTUAL COOPERATION AMONG THE URBAN EXPRESSWAY AUTHORITIES [9]
1. Share of disaster information
2. Support of human and material resources. Support of engineers / Provide material resources / Provide
equipment

AND CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTORS
The Japanese construction contractors believe that it is their social mission that they perform the
response activities in case of disaster, such as emergency removal of road debris, emergency
disaster restoration, and safety secure of victims of the affected area. Thus, they are positively
making cooperation agreement with road authorities to perform such emergency activities. The
agreement [10] generally covers emergency damage inspection, emergency restoration, and
procurement of construction materials and equipment although the agreements are made with
each company or association. Table 9 shows one of the cooperation agreement between highway
authorities and construction contractors.
47
TABLE 9. EXAMPLE OF EMERGENCY AGREEMENT BETWEEN HIGHWAY AUTHORITIES AND
CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTORS [10]
1. Investigation of damaged road structures in emergency
2. Emergency measures, as well as procurement of materials and equipment in accordance with the
restoration of function of the road traffic affected by the disaster
3. Technical advice
According to the lessons learned from 2011 East Japan Earthquake, the construction companies
in disaster affected area began their emergency work in very early stage after the disaster due
those agreements. The MLIT survey [11] reported that 60% of the local construction company,
who was involved in the emergency restoration works, began their operations within four hours
after the disaster occurs, shown in illustration 29. In particular under these agreements, the
construction companies in disaster area began their inspection of road without any request from
the road authorities. Another report [12] says that local construction companies voluntarily
began to remove road debris in cooperation with local police and fire department without any
request from road manager due to communication line failure, even though such work was
beyond the agreement. These quick response is believed particularly effective in case of the very
wide and very large disaster.
Illustration 29: Number of the companies participating to emergency work

at 2011 East Japan Earthquake6)
48
TABLE 10. SUCCESS EXAMPLE CONTRIBUTING TO THE QUICK RESTORATION DUE TO EMERGENCY
AGREEMENT BETWEEN ROAD AUTHORITY AND CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTORS [13]
In the restoration of fire that occurred in the Metropolitan Expressway, the emergency agreement with construction
contractors has been functioning effectively.
Gasoline tanker fire Quick restoration in only 73 days
In case of the 2011 east Japan earthquake, in addition at the north east area of Japan, national
government branch bureau, prefectural government, and major cities had made cooperation
agreement with construction contractors association under one agreement. This agreement
frame helped a lot of emergency works. All the emergency needs were assembled together at the
local government office, and then, on behalf of those public organizations, the local government
office requested them to the association. This centralized agreement is a good lesson for future
emergency work in case of large and wide scale disaster.
Such agreement is effective not only for natural disasters but also for man-made disaster. In case
of the restoration of double-deck viaduct suffered by tanker fire in urban highway, it was also
reported that the same kind of pre-agreement was pretty effective for rapid emergency measures,
restoration research, and restoration work [13].

AND CONSTRUCTION CONSULTANTS
The quality of the first step of the emergency work such as disaster recovery and reconstruction
work depends on the fast delivery and good inspection result and reconstruction design. As the
scale of the disaster will be large, such fast and accurate delivery of the emergency work will be
difficult. For this reason, the road administrator and the association of consultants made
agreements in order to ensure the quick delivery with respect to emergency measures, inspection
of damaged infrastructure, and reconstruction design.
49
TABLE 11. EXAMPLE OF EMERGENCY AGREEMENT BETWEEN HIGHWAY AUTHORITY AND
CONSULTANT ASSOCIATION [14]
1. Investigation of road damage in the event of a disaster
2. Design for emergency measures for functional recovery of road traffic affected by the disaster 3 Technical
cooperation.
Damage investigation
Here is a good example this kind agreement was very effective for restoration. In the case of 2011
Kii peninsula heavy rain, the total rainfall caused by the typhoon reached 1600mm. Due to this
heavy rainfall, deep-seated landslide over a large area, the formation of a sediment dam, and the
shredding of the road occurred in wide area in Kii peninsula. In this case, the consultant
association worked as the head quarter of companies and the association received to the work of
36 emergency and restoration design projects requested by 16 times based on the agreement. The
projects included the installation of alert system for sediment dam collapse in the disastrous
situation in three days, the emergency measures for road opening of access roads to the affected
areas, and the restoration design work of social infrastructure in many areas. The consultant
association was allocated the job to the member companies considering the work load and their
capacity. Those works greatly contributed the rapid recovery from the disaster.
If a large scale disaster occurred in one region, it is very important to allocate the regional consultant
force appropriately in order to perform inspection, emergency measures, and restoration design
with limited work force. In that sense, disaster agreement with the consultant association and
regional and local government have important implications for the key of recovery.
TABLE 12. SUCCESS EXAMPLE CONTRIBUTING TO THE QUICK RESTORATION DUE TO EMERGENCY
AGREEMENT BETWEEN ROAD AUTHORITY AND CONSULTANT ASSOCIATION [15]
36 emergency requests in 3 months, for example, survey, inspection and design work that were essential for
disaster recovery, were carried out on the basis of agreement. The quick work and contributions resulted in early
recovery of social infrastructure.
50
7. SPONTANEOUS COOPERATION WITH NON-ROAD RELATED

ORGANIZATIONS
1) Cooperation with ITS organization (Accessible traffic map) [16], [17]
At the time of 2011 East Japan Earthquake, the road network in north east part of Japan were
broken and the traffic was prohibited due to earthquake destruction or trouble from nuclear
power plant. Such local highly restricted road transport systems had disrupted various rescue
and delivery activities in the disaster area.
TABLE 13. ACCESSIBLE TRAFFIC MAP [16]

Cooperated with ITS organizations, car manufacturers, and car navigation companies, accessible traffic map
was provided information on the web about the possibility of the road traffic
Inorder to mitigate the situation, ITS organization, auto manufactures, and car-navigation
manufacturer made accessible traffic road map that became available for use on 8 days after the
earthquake. The collaboration further opened the probe information to the public, so as to enable
vehicle accessible roads in the disaster region to be mapped correctly (for example, roads where
vehicles were able to pass are shown in blue). The same traffic road map was also available on
Google’s website “Google Crisis Response”. This information was updated daily basis.
51
TABLE 14. EXAMPLE OF EXPRESSWAY AS TSUNAMI EVACUATION POINT [18]
At the time of East Japan earthquake, over 230 people were escaped to the embankment of expressway from tsunami
disaster.
Tsunami affected area Emergency steps provided after 2011 East Japan
earthquake
2) Cooperation with local residents [18]
As a place of refuge from the tsunami, the case of taking advantage of the highway embankment
has been increasing. This trend has been triggered by the fact that a lot of tsunami refugees
evacuate to the highway embankment at 2011 East Japan earthquake. In the case of Sendai
tsunami affected area, highway embankment was about 5-10 meters in height and relatively mild
slope. It has been reported that 230 residents went up the slope at the tsunami hit. Based on this
experience, residents demanded the use of a place for tsunami shelter, and staircase that connects
the local road and highway slopes was constructed.
This trend has spread across the country. Agreement between highway companies and local
governments has been established to use highway as a temporary shelter tsunami. In response to
this background, legal development is being implemented.
8. CONCLUSION
Needless to say, cooperation and coordination among disaster response organizations are
essential for information transfer in the event of a disaster, the road clearing, emergency measures,
and their restoration. Such cooperative / coordination system has been working spontaneously at
the time of disasters in the past. By establishing such cooperation / coordination system in
advance, its effect is being exerted more. However, even in Japan, only highway companies or
local road authorities that were suffered large scale disaster actively worked on making such
emergency agreement with other organizations. It is expected that more effort on horizontal
development of information is necessary.
52
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A MANAGEMENT PROGRAM FOR BUSINESS

CONTINUITY AT THE MINISTÈRE DES TRANSPORTS DU QUÉBEC
• By Robert Loranger, P.Eng., M.P.M. (Centre de coordination de la sécurité civile, Ministère des
Transports du Québec, Canada - French secretary and member (Canada-Qc), PIARC TC 1.5).
1. THE ORIGINS OF A GOVERNMENTAL POLICY IN QUEBEC
In the wake of the September 11 attacks, improving the resilience of essential systems against
the risks of all kinds, including intentional acts, has become a major challenge in the North
American context. In Canada, the National Strategy for Critical Infrastructure [19] and the
Action Plan for Critical Infrastructure [20] established a collective approach integrating all risks.
They were created for federal, provincial and territorial administrations, as well as for private
sector such as telecommunications networks, energy production and distribution, transportation
of goods or people, financial institutions.
As part of its fundamental role, the Gouvernement du Québec has the responsibility of ensuring
public security at all times. One of the ways of assuming this responsibility is to ensure the
constant supply of essential products and services to the public. In this perspective, with public
interest as the priority, the Gouvernement du Québec has confided the role of coordinating the
government’s strategy for protecting essential systems to the Organisation de la sécurité civile
du Québec (OSCQ) [21].
This strategy specifically obliges the 15 ministries and public agencies (MAs) that take part in
the Plan national de sécurité civile (PNSC) [22] to encourage and support measures for prevention,
preparedness, intervention and recovery. These measures aim to increase the resiliency of critical
systems such as water distribution, transportation of goods and people throughout the territory,
energy supply and access to health care. Illustration 30 illustrates the government’s vision of
business continuity management.
Illustration 30: Government’s vision of business continuity managemen

53
In 2009, the H1N1 influenza pandemic created a situation where the Quebec government’s
activities were temporarily diverted by a public health emergency. This resulted in an important
delay in business continuity management.
However, the lessons that were drawn from this pandemic contributed, either by similarity or
association, to improving the Gouvernement du Québec’s expertise in business continuity. In
this context, the Secrétariat du Conseil du trésor (SCT) [23] became the department responsible
for business continuity.
In 2010, the SCT created an institutional framework in the form of a guidebook for helping MAs
to create their own business continuity management program or BCMP. This guidebook (called
Guide sur la gestion de la continuité des services) [24] has since become the document to which
MAs must refer.
2. THE CONTEXT OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BCMP AT THE

MTQ
The BCMP aims to progressively furnish the MTQ a global management system that will allow
it to restore or maintain its ability to supply essential products and services.
Already, the Plan ministériel de mesures d’urgence et de sécurité civile (PMMUSC) [25]
structures interventions in order to ensure the mobility of goods or people on transport
infrastructures. Illustration 31 illustrates the civil protection approach chosen by the MTQ.
Illustration 31: Civil protection approach at the MTQ
In this way, the BCMP complements the PMMUSC in planning and preparing the restoration of
critical systems within a given time frame in the case where a disaster interrupts these systems
and the MTQ’s ability to intervene is limited.
54
3. THE METHODOLOGY
The chosen approach was drawn from the best business continuity management practices
presented in ISO 22301 standard, “Societal security – Business continuity management systems
– Requirements” and on the methodology framework of the Business Continuity Institute (BCI).
Illustration 32 outlines the stages of implementing the BCMP at the MTQ.
Illustration 32: Stages of implementing the BCMP at the MTQ
Stage 1 – Begin the project
The first stage is the moment when top executive commits, a coordination framework is put in
place, and the overall continuity objectives, the methodology and the time frame for implementation
are established.
Stage 2 – Impact assessment
The goal of this stage is to determine the critical activities and their related continuity objectives.
Special attention must be paid to the cascading effects of an interruption of activities. The results
should allow an objective comparison of the degree of impact caused by the interruption of
different activities, and to establish priorities and recovery times.
Stage 3 – Business continuity plans
This is the stage where business continuity plans are developed. A continuity plan includes the
following elements :
• a structure for coordinating the continuity of services;

• the roles and responsibilities of each (direct participants, administrative units or top executive);
• a warning and mobilisation process;
• a strategy for managing events in the context of business continuity;
• an action plan for restoring each critical activity or group of activities.
Stage 4 – The implementation of the BCMP
The final stage involves the establishment of parameters for the management of business
continuity. Exercises or simulations are held and procedures for updating continuity plans are
established. Finally, the documentation concerning the BCMP is distributed.
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4. DEPARTMENT COORDINATION
The MTQ [26] began its work in 2008 when the deputy minister confirmed the development and
implementing of a BCMP in the perspective of proactively improving the resilience of essential
systems.
As shown in illustration 33, a departmental steering committee composed of representatives of

the Direction générale des services à la gestion et de la surveillance des marchés (management
services and financial market supervisory), the Direction des ressources humaines (human
resources) and the Service de la sécurité civile (civil protection service).
Illustration 33: Structure of department coordination
The main duties attributed to the steering committee:
• Determine and prioritize the critical functions and the essential P/S of the MTQ;
• Evaluate the internal and external interdependencies of these essential P/S as well as the
consequences of their potential interruption;
• Analyse the risks and determine the measures for prevention and risk reduction, and the
potential strategies for continuity;
• Implement plans for the continuity of essential services.
The committee’s first tasks were to outline the elaboration and the implanting of the BCMP. It
was determined that :
• the work structure of the steering committee will be part of the structure of the ministerial
coordination for civil protection.
• the chosen strategies adopt a all-risks approach.
• the business continuity plans will not include information resources. Information resources fall
under department policies concerning the protection of information under existing plans for
protecting information in case of emergencies. The same can be said for the unavailability of
56
employees due to a labour dispute or a pandemic. These situations are covered by plans that
are already in place.
• the continuity of essential services will not apply to the unavailability of transportation
infrastructures. These situations are foreseen in the Plan ministériel de mesure d’urgence et
de sécurité civile (PMMUSC). Business continuity completes the emergency measures by
anticipating the actions needed in situations where the MTQ suffers a total or partial incapacity
to intervene.
• plans must aim to restore critical services to a minimum level of service within two weeks or
less, according to the situation.
5. TESTING STRATEGIES THROUGH PILOT PROJECTS
In 2009 and 2010, the project team undertook two pilot projects in order to test the BCMP
integration strategy and related methodologies. The first experiment took place in the control
room of the Louis-Hippolyte-La Fontaine bridge/tunnel [27]. The business continuity plans was
concerned with video monitoring and electromechanical equipment. The second experiment
studied 30 critical activities in service centres [28] in Saint-Hyacinthe, Boucherville and Foster
(Eastern Monteregie region).
These two pilot projects :
• highlighted the importance of properly identifying critical activities, specifically in regards to

the types of consequences and the levels of tolerance in the organisation;
• helped develop strategies that are better adapted to the organisational and operational contexts;
• improved the understanding of activities internal and external interdependences;
• helped define a specific frame of reference for establishing a business continuity plan for a
disaster in a building housing a service centre.
Considering the experiments, implantation of the BCMP will accelerate in the next few years. In
the short term, the project team plans to:
• propose to the Executive committee a business continuity policy project;
• design tools to facilitate the implantation of business continuity plans in the regional offices;
• integrate different continuity plans to the PMMUSC;
• develop project teams in the regional offices to oversee and coordinate stakeholders and create
continuity plans.
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6. A WORTHY BCMP
When the process of implantation is complete, the MTQ’s BCMP will bring together the following
elements:
• a departmental coordination structure;

• a strategy for managing events;
• business continuity plans for each administrative unit;
• procedures for carrying out the continuity plans;
• procedures for updating the continuity plans;
• functional documentation.
It is important, however, that these elements remain operational and up-to-date at all times. In
this perspective, the challenge for the project team is to ensure that all the necessary mechanisms
are in place so that the BCMP is constantly adapted to its changing context.
Every important change could justify up-dating the BCMP, whether it concerns adding or
removing products or services, integrating new activities, the evolution of the technological
environment or a major change in the environment outside the organisation.
7. GLOSSARY
All risks approach: An approach that considers risks and catastrophes, both natural and
anthropic, as well as the vulnerabilities that can be associated with them.
Business continuity: The capacity of an organisation to ensure, in case of a major disaster, the
continuity of its business practices according to the level of services needed.
Business Continuity Management Program (BCMP): Part of an organisation’s over-all

management system, based on its business management approach to risk, which aims to define,
deploy, test, keep up-to-date and improve business continuity.
Critical services (activities): The operations, processes, means or functions used by an

organisation to ensure the delivery of essential products and services.
Critical systems: The processes, infrastructures, installations, technologies, networks, goods

and services judged essential for the health, safety, protection and financial well-being of citizens,
and the effective functioning of government. These systems can either be considered individually
or as interconnected and interdependent.
Essential infrastructures: The processes, systems, installations, technologies, networks, goods

and services required to ensure citizens’ health, safety, protection and financial well-being, as
well as the proper functioning of governments. This can refer to autonomous infrastructures or
to interdependent infrastructures within a province or a territory, or that reach beyond national
boundaries.
Essential products or services: Products or services whose absence, even if brief, could have
significant consequences on the health, life, safety, social and financial well-being of individuals
58
or of a community, for the viability of a company, or the effective functioning of government and
its institutions.
Essential systems: This refers to interconnected elements, and includes management and control
systems requiring human, material, financial and information resources. For the Gouvernement
du Québec, the expression Essential System seems more appropriate than Essential Infrastructure.
The first expression avoids the term Infrastructure, borrowed from civil engineering, suggesting
structures, buildings, etc.
Minimum level of service: Corresponds to a basic level of a product or service to be restored

after a given interruption time.
OSCQ: Organisation de la sécurité civile du Québec. This organisation brings together

emergency preparedness coordinators from 15 ministries and governmental organisations that
play a role in civil protection. The OSCQ plans emergency preparedness measures at a national
scale and, in case of a major disaster, coordinates the measures undertaken by each of the people
in charge of the mission according to the Plan national de sécurité civile (PNSC) .
Recovery time: The maximum down time that can be tolerated before a critical service (activity)
is restored to a basic level of service.
Resilience: The capacity of a system, a group or a society exposed to potential hardships to

adapt, to resist or to change in order to establish and maintain existing structures and an
acceptable level of operation.
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COMMUNICATION WITH THE PUBLIC FOR EMERGENCY SITUATION –

NEMA IN KOREA
• By Hyeok Jin, Choi, P.Eng, Structure Safety team,

Korea Expressway Corporation, Member(Korea), PIARC TC1.5
1. OVERVIEW OF THE NDMSS
The National Disaster Management Support System (NDMSS) in Korea is jointly operated by
the national government, local autonomous entities, and related authorities. Its purposes are to
protect the lives and property of the people and to help improve people’s quality of life.
It is a scientific, formulated information system that supports general disaster management

activities by establishing systems to prevent dangerous factors, such as various hazards that
threaten public safety, to promptly respond to emergency situations, and to support damage
recovery and restoration.
Large-volume message broadcasting technology is capable of delivering identical messages

(60~230 Korean characters) to multiple subscribers through one-time message transmission, as
with mobile communication technology application services in which a certain receiving ID
must be entered in a cellular phone to receive data information from a base station.
2. STRUCTURE OF THE GOVERNMENT DISASTER MANAGEMENT

NETWORK SYSTEM
The government disaster management network system consists of the Disaster Information
Sharing Center, the Status Relay System, and an integrated GIS system. The disaster information
management agencies, other relevant agencies, and the municipal governments of cities, counties,
districts, towns, townships, and neighborhoods are able to exchange and utilize specific disaster
information. The general public is able to receive public disaster information from the National
Disaster Management Information Center.
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1. Disaster Information Sharing Center
The Disaster Information Sharing Center is an information distribution hub that promotes the
sharing of information by automatically collecting various disaster-monitoring data from disaster
operations and management agencies. It increases the efficiency of disaster response operations
by interfacing with the Status Relay System.
Illustration 34: Disaster Information Sharing Center

Data search by disaster type
• Various data from diverse agencies are sorted into information on man-made, natural, and
social disasters. On a single screen, users can search for disaster status by type, as well as
recovery resource data.
Situational data search by agency

• Hazardous situations, sorted according to the standards of each agency, can be monitored so
that users are able to check on the situation even before a disaster occurs, promoting effective
disaster response when emergencies occur.
Information on regional resources

• Information is provided on the medical and material supplies required for disaster response in
each region, to enable the efficient management of such resources.
Distribution of information among agencies

• It is possible to identify how and where information provided by each agency is used.
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2. Status Relay System
The Status Relay System is a system that is utilized jointly by the central administration,
municipal governments, and other disaster management agencies. Designed for use by disaster
management agencies, the system promotes cooperative response by relaying the status of
disasters nationwide.
Relaying disaster status

• Relaying disaster status to emergency management users within the central administration,
municipal governments, and other relevant agencies
Diverse methods of relaying messages based on importance
• Relaying disaster status through the disaster Status Relay System
• Relaying disaster status and sharing data through messengers
• Swift recognition of disaster situations through warning lights, faxes, or SMSs
Establishment of a unified Status Relay System among disaster management agencies

• Completion of a real-time response system among the agencies for relaying status information
and confirming receipt of information
• Establishment of a horizontal Status Relay System among disaster management agencies
Agencies utilizing the Status Relay System

• Central administration
• Municipal governments (cities, provinces, counties, districts, towns, townships, neighborhoods,
etc.)
• Relevant agencies
• Firefighting agencies (Fire Defense Headquarters and fire stations)
3. Integrated GIS System
The integrated GIS system uses an integrated GIS database with standardized GIS data provided
by the agencies using the disaster information sharing system and GIS data from NEMA to
represent data spatially on an electronic map.
The collected GIS data can be delivered to all the concerned agencies using the disaster
information sharing system.
4. National Disaster Management Information Center
The National Disaster Management Information Center provides various details (e.g., preventive
safety information containing action guidelines; integrated command room, consisting of
regional safety data and status board; training and psychological-treatment centers) by
customizing them according to disaster type and regional requirements, so that citizens can
easily utilize them.
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Illustration 35: The National Disaster Management Information Center
Action Guidelines Service in Times of Disaster

• Issuance of citizen action guidelines, in Flash animation, by disaster type (e.g., typhoon/flood,
heavy snow, fire, forest fire, Asian dust, earthquake, electrical/gas accident, building/ structure
collapse)
Municipal Government Civil Defense Training Support Service

• Delivery of civil defense cybertraining pilot services, such as video lectures and firefighting
tests
Disaster Damage Status and Recovery Support Information

• Status information by disaster type and region on public facilities, private property, and human
casualties
• Guidelines for emergency support agencies (e.g., disaster response agencies, municipal
government disaster response coordinators, fire stations, emergency medical centers, blood
centers)
Real-Time Disaster Status Information

• Issuance of three-hour forecasts for typhoons, water level of dams and rivers, and rainfall, to
help citizens prepare for disasters
5. Natural Disaster Forecast & Warning System
Disaster Forecasts, Alerts & Warnings through Public Broadcasting

When disaster occurs or is imminent, swiftly delivers disaster information via public broadcasting,
including forecasts, warnings, alerts, and emergency measures, pursuant to the provisions of
Section. 2, Article 38 of the Basic Act of Disaster and Safety Control
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Using such means as terrestrial/satellite broadcasting providers, the system broadcasts weather
conditions, disaster forecasts & warnings, disaster status, countermeasures to minimize damage,
tips on appropriate post-disaster/emergency actions, and other details required for damage
prevention and mitigation.
CBS-based Emergency Disaster Message Broadcasting

Advanced delivery system to transmit disaster information in large-volume messages through
mobile communication providers’ base stations, broadcast by entering recipients’ IDs in a
cellular phone and rapidly sending disaster status/situation to multiple mobile phone users
simultaneously. Starting Dec. 1, 2006, service has been provided nationwide using an in-house
CBS system, serving the country’s three mobile communication providers’ 30 million customers,
who use mobile phones that support CBS.
Auto Voice (Message) Notification System

Sets up a database of information on key disaster prevention personnel, including public officials
responsible for disaster prevention, and residents living in areas vulnerable to disasters; also,
when a disaster is imminent, a high-speed transmission of disaster information is sent in the
form of voice or short messages to mobile phones, landlines, and community loudspeakers.
Disaster broadcasting to the Center and to 232 cities, counties, and districts, as well as setup and
operation of a database for 500,000 users
Auto Rainfall Warning System

When heavy rains occur in mountains and valleys, rain conditions in the upstream area are
observed in real time, and warnings and information are swiftly and automatically sent to
campers and vacationers in the downstream areas
This system has been installed and is currently operated in 145 districts nationwide that are
susceptible to disasters, including mountains and valleys, recreational areas along creek-beds,
and natural recreation areas.
Disaster Message EDB (Electronic Display Board)
Rapid display and delivery of information on disaster conditions via EDBs installed in places
susceptible to disasters. They are also often used in national awareness campaigns on topics like
disaster prevention and environmental protection that employ ongoing PR.
This system has been installed and is currently being operated in 299 places that are vulnerable
to disasters, such as beaches and riverside pleasure grounds.
Radio (RDS, Radio Data System) Disaster Warning Broadcasting

Automatically operates loudspeakers in public gathering places by using radio auto ON/OFF
technology, delivering information on disaster conditions to as many people as possible
By 2004, model RDSs had been set up in five zones, including the areas that were ravaged by
Typhoon Maemi: the Bukhan River district (Hwacheon County, Gangwon-do), the Millak area
(Busan’s Suyeong district), the Banbyeon area (Yeongyang, North Gyeongsang Province), the
Haewun area (Masan, South Gyeongsang Province), and the Yeondeung area (Yeosu, South
Jeolla Province).
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ROADSIDE SERVER FOR DRIVER ASSISTANCE AND SAFETY WARNING

SYSTEM
• By Eui-joon Lee, P.E., ph.D (Korea SMART Highway Study & Application Center, Korea
Expressway Corporation, Korea - Member(Korea), PIARC TC1.5)
1. INTRODUCTION
In many countries, a variety of in-vehicle telematics systems and ITS (Intelligent Traffic Systems)
are already available, while new systems are being currently designed. Telematics is defined as
in-vehicle systems that offer positive safety and infotainment services as well as location and
traffic information via wireless communications technologies. Based on information and
communication, many drivers can be received real-time traffic time and safety information by
traffic server which is physically located central position (like as traffic information center).
However, recently many projects about smart road system shows distributed servers existence
physically located as RSE(Roadside Equipment). The distributed servers are called smart
roadside server or local server.
The smart roadside server has many functionalities that could be local optimal decision, real-time
processing and distributed processing (collection and information providing). Through smart
roadside server at roadside, we can be provided emergency safety processing for travelling
drivers and local optimal control by fitting local road situation.
This is a smart roadside server framework and two cases of application about road safety situation
at signalized intersection and EXPRESSWAY system. This problem about local optimal
distributed servers at roadside is more complicated than internal distributed servers because of
road environment. Variable weathers, variable traffic situations, wireless communication and
positioning condition can be considered at smart roadside servers.
2. FRAMEWORK OF SMART ROAD
Requirements
The smart roadside server should have capabilities as following:
• Real-time context-aware computing and processing

• Interoperability of various road sensors and vehicle data sensors
• Wireless and seamless communication (V2I) like as DSRC, WAVE, 2G, 3G, and so on
• Distributed data sharing and transmitting to center server
• Optimal database design and policy
• Connection to telematics and mobile phones
• Authentication, authorization
• Open standard platform
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Frameworks of smart road

The framework of smart road is as following illustration 36. The framework consists of 4 part:
a road sensor, vehicular data, smart roadside server and service center.
Illustration 36: Framework of smart roadside server
3. CASE 1: COLLISION WARING FOR SIGNALIZED INTERSECTION
System model
Resent trends in other IT technologies are road sensors for intersection traffic detection. Road
sensors are deployed around a target area where approaching lanes cross at an intersection. The
smart roadside server is its automatic collection of distantly scattered information such as
vehicular data. And then, the server can process the database to create a new service. The smart
roadside server located at the center of a crossroad gathers vehicular information from road
sensor and vehicle communication and transmits the gathered information to approaching
vehicles. Through roadside sever algorithm, each vehicle that approaches the crossroad can then
predict and avoid possible traffic accidents. The system and service model is as following
illustration 37.
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Illustration 37: System model of collision waring for signalized intersection
Driver Assistance and Safety Warning by Telematics device in vehicle

If the discrimination results of collision warning information indicate a collision warning
situation, the warning information is provided to the vehicle’s telematics devices using wireless
communication networks such as DSRC, WAVE(Wireless Access for Vehicular Environments).,
WLAN, and so on.
The most fatal accidents at signalized intersections are caused by dilemma zone problems. The
portion of the roadway in advance of an intersection, where a driver may be indecisive as to
whether they should stop or proceed into and through the intersection at the onset of a yellow
light, is called the dilemma zone[4]~[6]. This method as driver assistance and safety warning can
be reduced the dilemma zone accident. That is, the smart roadside sever system allows a driver
to reduce his speed by notifying the driver whether the car is expected to be in a collision. With
the information, the driver can safely stop at the stop line. Moreover, in cases in which a car is
predicted to not stop at a stop line, the system provides information to the traffic signal controller,
which creates a red traffic signal for all lanes. This research considers the possibility that the
application of a new service is possible for the safety of signalized intersections. The road
collision warning information model may be directly provided to all vehicle users.
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4. CASE 2: EXPRESSWAY
System model
A EXPRESSWAY system requires basic data such as vehicular information, traffic flow, traffic
control, safety information, road conditions, and weather information. The key issue is providing
each vehicle with the appropriate ICT technology in a safe and efficient manner. At EXPRESSWAY
system, smart roadside server of a system receives road surface state information of each zone
of the road in a service area from at least one road sensor located in the service area to calculate
a road safety coefficient of each zone, and receives location information and running information
of a vehicle from at least one vehicle terminal located in the service area to calculate a traffic
flow analysis coefficient. The smart roadside server provides a vehicular safety service to a
vehicle terminal by using the road safety coefficient of each zone and the traffic flow analysis
coefficient. The system and service model is as following illustration 38.
Illustration 38: System model of SMART Highway
Driver Assistance and Safety Warning by Telematics device in vehicle

As the result of the algorithm is advisory safety speed for driver, the information should be
provided to the vehicle’s telematics devices using wireless communication networks. A following
illustration 39 shows the example of GUI at telematics terminal. The left circle about 80 is about
advisory speed for driver travelling service area which is considered road surface data (this
situation is wet) and traffic condition. This GUI example is result of development of telematics
device which is included a total travelling distance, total travelling time, fuel consumption value,
CO2 value of vehicle with OBD-II interface from ECU (Engine Control Unit).
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Illustration 39: Example of telematics device with advisory speed information
This application is very useful as driver assistance. In some research, providing road surface
warning signs was shown to be effective in reducing accident frequency and severity. And Speed
not only affects the severity of a crash, but is also related to the risk of being involved in a crash
in the first place.
This processing method from smart roadside server can be used new service model for SMART
roads that have implemented new ICT technologies such as an IVHS (Intelligent Vehicle and
Highway System).
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THE QUEENSLAND EXPERIENCE OF THE SUMMER OF 2013 -

TOWARD A CULTURE OF RESILIENCE -
Activity details
Country:..........................................Australia
Geographical Area involved:..........State of Queensland
Type of Asset:..................................Road, rail, maritime infrastructure
Type of Event:..................................Natural disaster
Risk Classification:.........................Risk management
Authorities involved:.......................Queensland’s Department of Transport and Main Roads
Year of implementation:..................2010 –2015
Summary
After major flood events in 2010, 2011 and 2012, Queensland’s Department of Transport and
Main Roads (DTMR), has an established and well-practiced disaster response and recovery
process. The summer wet season of 2013 produced extreme weather events across Queensland
which tested these processes.
At the height of the 2013 floods, more than 7500km of road was affected requiring reconstruction,
but by the end of the 60 day recovery period the department had fully reopened 72% of affected
roads. Immediately after the disasters, the department responded to over 1600 enquiries from the
heavy vehicle industry, issued 66 flood recovery permits, and saved the industry an estimated $1m.
Incorporating the principles and guidelines of ISO 31000 (Risk Management) and ISO 22301
(Business Continuity Management Systems) the department’s Road Network Incident Response
Planning provided Regional Emergency Management Teams with an overview of a region’s
locations which were likely to be affected by heavy rainfall.
While the events of 2013 also impacted the maritime, rail and customer service areas, this case
study focuses on disruption to the transport system as it relates to road infrastructure. It illustrates
the impact of flooding, citing the Central Queensland Region from the perspective of an
operational and tactical response to the event. It also notes strategic oversight, given the
department’s tiered disruptive event processes.
70
1. INTRODUCTION
The natural hazard

The Australian Government’s Bureau of Meteorology named Tropical Cyclone Oswald
(Category 1) on the afternoon of 21 January 2013. The tropical cyclone caused minor wind-related
impacts at landfall. However, the remnants of Tropical Cyclone Oswald brought heavy rain to
much of the east coast of Queensland and northern New South Wales from 21 to 29 January.
Significant flooding occurred over most coastal catchments from Rockhampton to northern
New South Wales. The following two maps show the rainfall analysis in millimeters for the week
ending 29 January 2013 (illustration 40) and the Queensland rainfall deciles January 2013,
showing areas which had their wetest January on record (illustration 41).
Rainfall
400 mm
300 mm
200 mm
150 mm
100 mm
50 mm
25 mm
15 mm
10 mm
5 mm
1 mm
0 mm
Illustration 40: Rainfall analysis in millimeters for the week ending 29 January 2013
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Highest on
record
10 Very Much
Above Average
8-9 Above Average
4-7 Average
2-3 Below Average
1 Very Much
Below Average
Lowest on
record
Illustration 41: Queensland rainfall deciles January 2013,

showing areas which had their wetest January on record
Under the State Disaster Management Plan, prepared pursuant to Section 49 of the Queensland
Disaster Management Act 2003, DTMR is the functional lead agency for transportation
infrastructure, providers and regulation; roads and transport recovery. Disaster management in
Queensland is risk based and comprehensive across the prevention, preparedness, response and
recovery phases and those risks are communicated in the community.
Under the State’s disaster department, management roles and responsibilities arrangements
include:
• functional lead agency for transport systems

• primary agency for ship-sourced pollution where it impacts, or is likely to impact, on
Queensland coastal waters
• functional lead agency for infrastructure recovery (transportation)
• provide information and advice on the impact of disruptive events on road, rail, aviation and
maritime infrastructure as it affects the transport system
• enable an accessible transport system through reinstating road, rail and maritime infrastructure
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• assist with the safe movement of people as a result of mass evacuation of a disaster affected
community
• ensure the capability of logistics related industries are appropriately applied to disaster response
and recovery activities.
Regional context
One of the most severely affected areas of Queensland in the 2013 floods was the Central
Queensland Region which covers an area of 574,279km². It is home to over 220,000 Queenslanders.
The region manages approximately 7500km of state-controlled roads including approximately
1010km of the AusLink network11.
Ex-Tropical Cyclone Oswald resulted in significant damage to transport infrastructure

(illustrations 42 - 45). All the highways were affected with structural damage to bridges and
roads. Examples of these impacts include the flooding of five flood ways and 6km of the
Gladstone-Monto Road being washed away. In addition, more than 6m of water overtopped the
Essendean Bridge on Bundaberg-Miriam Vale Road. As record flooding receded, the priority for
the department was to inspect the condition of the road network and undertake emergency
repairs to reconnect communities.
Within four days, side tracks were in place on the Capricorn and Dawson Highways, allowing
communities to be restocked and reconnected. Smaller communities remained isolated for more
than two weeks. RoadTek, the department’s road maintenance arm performed admirably
re-establishing services to the Central Queensland community. Local maintenance and civil
contractors supported RoadTek crews, to deliver emergent works on a priority basis.
Reconstruction of major infrastructure is a significant engineering task. More than eight weeks
after Tropical Cyclone Oswald passed, communities were still recovering.
The following illustrations 42 to 45 depict the extent of the devastation.
Illustration 42: One of the many landslips in Central Region (Burnett Highway)
1 T heNational Land Transport Network is defined in the Auslink (National Land Transport) Act National Land Transport
Network Determination 2005. It is a single integrated network of land transport linkages of strategic national importance,
which is funded by Federal, State and Territory Governments. The National Network is based on national and inter-regional
transport corridors including connections through urban areas, links to ports and airports, rail, road and intermodal
connections that together are of critical importance to national and regional economic growth development and connectivity.
73
Illustration 43: Neerkol Creek washout, near Stanwell
Illustration 44: Yeppen Crossing, Rockhampton
Illustration 45: Capricorn Highway, between Gracemere and Rockhampton

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2. APPROACH
In DTMR, we plan and build road, rail, freight and maritime infrastructure for Queensland and
regulate those who use it. Our core business is to deliver better public transport and transport
infrastructure to connect Queensland. We achieve this through better planning and ensuring we
are more cost effective in our service delivery. We also ensure the roads, railways, busways and
marine infrastructure we build and maintain are more efficient, reliable and safer.
DTMR has a three tiered approach (strategic, operational and tactical) enabling management of
its transport system. The tiers align with Queensland’s disaster and recovery from disruptive
events at local, district and state levels.
At the operational tier, the department’s regions review regional Road Network Incident Response
Planning2 arrangements. Traditionally the review is completed prior to the Queensland summer
storm season. Regions identify areas of potential disruption in the network infrastructure and
response protocols.
Information gathered from the planning arrangements is targeted for preposition of material and
personnel prior to an event. The information is registered with the department’s geospatial
systems to support planning and response processes for disruptive events. Planning arrangements
are tested at least annually through regional and departmental exercise programs.
3. LEARNINGS
The Department of Transport and Main Roads is moving from a wet weather focus to include
thinking of all hazards. This approach broadens assessment to include potential disruptions for
better safety, management and asset protection, contributing to more resilient infrastructure.
Infrastructure is placed into social, political, economic and environmental contexts as
consideration is given to broader repercussions for the community and the State as well as
physical impacts on infrastructure.
This shift incorporates operational and administrative continuation of essential business while
considering all hazards, transport modes and impact on community and industry as part of the
preparation phase. This Continuity Network 3 Response Planning4 (CNRP) improves linkages
within and across regions and the disaster management arrangements thus enabling the
department’s roles and responsibilities in Queensland’s disaster management framework.
CNRP provides a process to identify and structure information for managing disruption to
Transport and Main Roads regional business from administrative and operational perspectives.
The planning arrangements for business continuity management and road continuity management
are considered together. This ensures regional capability is used to its capacity, as ‘One for
TMR’, the other. The Regional CNRP records information for managing local disruption. In
disaster events, it enables the department’s responsibilities as the functional le management
arrangements.
2 Since the 2013 event Road Network Incident Response Plans have been reviewed and been improved to include regional
continuity processes. They are now Continuity Network Response Planning.
3 The department’s business continuity management is known as the Continuity Process.
4 Previously known as Road Network Incident Response Plan.
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4. CNRP:
• is an all-risk, all-hazard, all-of-network approach to disruptive event management;

• promotes interoperability and consistency among Transport and Main Roads’ regions;
• documents local knowledge to inform regional and state-wide planning and response actions.
A well developed CNRP:

• accounts for the region’s administrative and operational business;
• provides an overview of the region’s organisational structure, its trigger points and escalation
process for disruptive event management including the Regional Emergency Management
Team5;
• provides links to disruptive planning for regional transport modes such as rail, bus and
maritime services.
As the department’s operational planning for CNRP for disruptive event management, regional
CNRP is a valuable summary of DTMR’s planning arrangements for road and associated
infrastructure disruption. It is to be shared with Local and District Disaster Management Groups
within Queensland’s disaster management arrangements to augment community preparation
and response to disruptive events. CNRP incorporates a comprehensive approach through which
strategies for risk assessment are identified, managed and contribute to an integrated process to
“expect the unexpected”. Illustration 46 shows the principles of the emergency management
cycle. Under the principles (prevent, prepare, respond and recover) are actions the department
undertakes as part of the emergency management process.
Illustration 46:
Principles of the emergency management
cycle
5 These are regional coordination teams.

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5. RESOURCES
The process development of the CNRP is a collaboration between the department’s regions and
its corporate operations area. It incorporates international standards into day-to-day practices
across the State.
6. CONCLUSIONS
The future direction for managing disruptive events is based on achieving community and
organisational resilience. A cooperative approach is needed as the impact of disruptive events is
a shared responsibility.
The impact of climatic events and information hungry communities have driven governments,
organisations and individuals to re-appraise the management of disruptive events. In a resilient
community, risks associated with a disruptive event are assessed to establish how far the risk
potentially extends to impact individuals, communities and organisations, their ability to recover
quickly and learn from the event.
• Authors from the Department of Transport and Main Roads - Deborah Azzopardi, Kristopher
Biddle, Mary Frost
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APPLICATION OF RISK AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT TO ROAD

OPERATIONS IN VICTORIA, AUSTRALIA
Prepared by: Keith Weegberg, Manager Network Operations VicRoads
Activity details
Geographical Area involved:..........State of Victoria Type of Hazard: Road User
Risk Classification:.........................Risk Management
Authorities/Operators involved:.....VicRoads
Year of implementation:..................Mid 2000’s
Abstract
Victoria is a small State of Australia with a total land area of 227,600km2 and a population of
around 5.5m people. VicRoads, the State’s primary Road Authority, manages approximately
22,259 km of roads across the State in metropolitan and rural environments.
Under the Victoria Emergency Management Act (1986), VicRoads is responsible for a range of
activities associated with roads and road safety during emergencies. This includes planning for
emergencies, responding to emergencies, mitigating the affects of emergencies on the community
and recovering from emergencies.
This paper will discuss how VicRoads has implemented risk management arrangements for the
provision of road closure information during natural disasters.
Illustration 47: Map of Australia, including Victoria

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1. INTRODUCTION
Victoria is subject to regular, widespread natural disasters such as wild fires, strong winds and
flooding. In almost every instance, these emergencies affect multiple roads and limit the
communities’mobilityandaccess to local and distant services and business. The closures also
affect many businesses that rely on transport and the road network.
Illustration 48: Land slip following heavy rain and winds – Grampians
Illustration 49: Road closure due to bush fire smoke - Harrietville
Historically, the lead combating emergency service was responsible for providing public
information on road closures. A review of previous emergencies identified significant public
confusion when seeking road closure information as its location and format changed depending
on the emergency.
The quality, reliability and content were also identified as issues that were raised through public
forums, media and formal reviews. Given the focus of the Emergency Services is combating
emergencies, allocating resources to road closure information was a lower priority and generally
outside their core business and skills.
VicRoads, as the States primary road authority, was subsequently nominated as the coordinating
agency for public information regarding road closures and traffic restrictions at all times.
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The requirement was for the provision of up to date and accurate road closure and traffic
condition information to be available to the Emergency Services, public and media on a 24 hour
per day, 7 day per week basis.
2. RESULTS
To ensure the information was captured, readily available and accessible by the public, a number
of changes and improvements were implemented.
These included:
• Making it easier for the Emergency Services to feed road closure information to VicRoads
through a manned 24 hour telephone service.
• VicRoads attending Emergency Incident Control Centre’s for road closure information when
established. An Incident Control Centre is established bythe lead emergency service during
major emergencies for the management and coordination of the tactical response.
• Developing a data capture system that can be used outside VicRoads normal office environment.
The operation of the system over mobile data networks was critical to enabling VicRoads to
operate from Incident Control Centers.
• The development of multiple platforms for the public to access the information, including
a website and mobile telephone applications. This was to allow access to the information
regardless of location and through multiple technologies.
• Through the established emergency management broadcast arrangements, encouraging the
radio media to use the data and provide public updates on a regular basis.
Illustration 50: Road Closure Website Statistics - Feb/March 2012 (Widespread Flooding)
Illustration 51: Road Closure Website Access Statistics –Dec 2012/Jan 2013 (Localised Bush Fires)
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The project, including establishing the overall requirements, creating the information database,
website, mobile telephone applications, new procedures and staff training were completed in
around eight months.
An analysis of the use of the VicRoads Road Closure website, known as VicTraffic, during
floods and fires has demonstrated the high use and acceptance by the public. Illustration 52
below shows site visits during a flood event that peaked at over 60,000 in a single day and
180,000 over the first 4 days. During this period over 60 roads were affected.
Illustration 53 below shows the website visits over a two week period where bush fires were
affecting an area of the Victorian High Country. This area is popular with tourists that were
checking access availability during the holiday period. Despite only two roads being affected,
over 55,000 site
3. IMPACT ON SAFETY
The community risk of limited or poor quality road information includes attempting to access
areas that are restricted, greater exposure to fires, floods and fallen trees and inefficient use of
the available road network. It can also lead to enormous frustration when drivers are delayed at
closure locations for extended periods, sometimes overnight. This has also lead to serious
confrontations between drivers and traffic managers at closure locations.
In rural areas of Victoria, there are often alternative routes between towns. During emergencies
it is possible that not all routes are affected or are affected in a different manner. This is
particularly the case during floods where some roads follow rivers and are affected more so that
roads which are remote from rivers or along the top of mountain ridges. The ready availability
of map based road closure information allows the public to identify closed roads and to utilise
open roads that provide an alternative route.
During fires, road closures are subject to different levels of access. These range from Emergency
Services Only to Local Residents Only. The differing levels of restriction are also included on
the website and this allows locals to know when their access has been reinstated whilst tourists
and other visitors remain excluded.
In emergency service Incident Control Centres, the map based information is used extensively.
It assists with planning the logistics of the response and identification of potential public access
risk locations.
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Illustration 52: VicRoads website during a major flood enent
Illustration 53: VicRoads website zoomed view

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4. RESOURCES
With the changes in practices associated with road closure information now part of the routine
procedures for all agencies, additional on-going costs are minimal. During major emergencies,
additional VicRoads resources are relocated to Incident Control Centres to improve information
gathering. This is considered to be important to ensure the information is both reliable and up to
date. This is a minor cost in the overall scheme of a major emergency.
5. CONCLUSION
The availability of reliable and up to date road closure information during emergencies allows
the public to plan their travel in accordance with conditions, minimising their exposure to risk.
It also allows the Emergency Services to improve management and coordination of the response
and to recognise potential access risks.
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APPLICATION OF RISK AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT TO THE

WEST GATE BRIGE (VICTORIA, AUSTRALIA)
Activity details
Geographical Area involved:..........State of Victoria
Type of Hazard:...............................Road User & Infrastructure
Risk Classification:.........................Risk Management
Authorities/Operators involved:.....VicRoads
Year of implementation:..................Mid 2005
Abstract
Victoria is a small State of Australia with a total land area of 227,600km2 and a population of
around 5.5m people. VicRoads, the State’s primary Road Authority, manages approximately
22,259 km of roads across the State in metropolitan and rural environments.
Under the Victoria Emergency Management Act (1986), VicRoads is responsible for a range of
activities associated with roads and road safety during emergencies. This includes planning for
emergencies, responding to emergencies, mitigating the affects of emergencies on the community
and recovering from emergencies.
This paper will discuss how VicRoads has implemented risk management arrangements for the
day to day operation of the Westgate Bridge.
Illustration 54: Map of Australia, including Victoria

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1. INTRODUCTION
The Westgate Bridge is an iconic bridge structure that spans the Yarra River in inner Melbourne.
The Westgate Bridge is part of a critical freeway link in the inner metropolitan area and carries
around 170,000 vehicles per day with 5 traffic lanes in each direction. It also provides a key
access route for road transport to the Port of Melbourne which handles over 2.5m containers
annually.
The Bridge was opened in 1978 and has had several strengthening upgrades during the 30 years
of service to ensure it can continue to meet the increasing demands for freight and commuter
traffic.
Illustration 55: The Westgate Bridge from the Air
Illustration 56: The Westgate Bridge from the Yarra River

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2. RISK MANAGEMENT PLANS
With the continuous increases in traffic volumes over the years, the emergency stopping lanes
on the Bridge were converted into permanent traffic lanes in 2010. To assist with traffic
management on the Bridge, an overhead lane control and variable speed limit system was
installed as a part of this change. This system is managed and operated remotely by VicRoads’
Traffic Management Centre.
Strong Winds
The Westgate Bridge location is regularly subject to strong winds which can affect high sided
vehicles (trucks, caravans etc) and motorcyclists. To manage this risk, the wind speeds on the
Bridge are monitored continuously through two wind meters. When pre-determined thresholds
are met, the vehicle speed limit on the bridge is lowered. All the thresholds have an assigned
alert level that is transmitted to the Traffic Management Centre’s consolidated alert system,
allowing the traffic management staff to be constantly aware of the wind conditions.
Illustration 57: Westgate Bridge Remote Monitoring Display
Illustration 58: Overhead Lane Control & Variable Speed Signs

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When average wind speeds of greater than 60kph are detected, an alert to motorists via variable
message signs is initiated; wind speeds of greater than 80kph initiate a lowering of the vehicle
speed limit from 80kph to 60kph; wind speeds of greater then 100kph initiate a further lowering
of the vehicle speed limit to 40kph; wind speeds greater than 100kph may also reduce the
number of traffic lanes over the Bridge in each direction from 5 to 3 or 2, depending on the
direction of the winds. In extreme conditions, that is wind speeds over 120kph, the Bridge may
be closed to all traffic. This strong wind management approach is used on a day to day basis to
minimize the risk of incidents associated with strong winds on the Westgate Bridge.
To assist the Traffic Management Centre staff with monitoring of conditions on the Westgate
Bridge, a dedicated desk top display has been developed. The desk top display includes text and
image format information on wind speed, wind direction, air and surface temperature, and alerts
for expansion joint and electrical supply conditions.
Illustration 59: Westgate Bridge Remote Monitoring Display
Illustration 60: Overhead Lane Control & Variable Speed Signs

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Traffic Incidents
With the high volume of traffic using the Westgate Bridge on a daily basis, management of
incidents and avoidance of secondary incidents is critical to traffic flow. Upon detection of an
incident, the overhead lane control system is used to close lanes on the approach to the incident
location. The display to drivers includes merge arrows upstream from the incident and lane
closure symbols immediately prior to the incident.
To improve safety at the merge area, the variable speed limit system is used to lower the speed
limit. For the safety of emergency response personnel, the variable speed limit system also is
used to lower the speed at the incident to 40kph.
These traffic management responses assist with the safe management of incidents and the
avoidance of secondary incidents.
Security
The Westgate Bridge has been declared an essential service and critical infrastructure under the
Terrorism (Community Protection) Act 2003. This declaration requires VicRoads to implement
a range of monitoring and security measures to protect the asset against security threats. The
range of security measures includes secure fenced areas beneath the bridge, closed circuit
television monitoring of restricted areas, intrusion alarms in the bridge piers, abutments and
elevated sections, established response and closure procedures and 24 hour security patrols. In
response to a security incident, vehicle traffic across the bridge can be stopped within 2 minutes.
The installation of physical hardening of vulnerable areas of the Westgate Bridge has also been
undertaken.
The security measures are used to limit the risks associated with unauthorised bridge access and
security threats.
Bridge Maintenance
The Westgate Bridge requires on-going preventative maintenance to limit the unplanned closures
for repairs. With the significant daily volume of traffic using the Bridge, all planned maintenance
is undertaken during periods of lower traffic volumes.
The majority of the maintenance activities are undertaken inside lane closures, over night and
during holiday periods. The resealing of the bridge surface is the most disruptive maintenance
activity, usually requires the closure of 3 lanes and is planned months in advance.
The overhead lane control system is used to close lanes and merge traffic to provide a safe
working environment for the maintenance activities. The variable speed limit system is used to
lower speeds in the merge area and passed the works site.
The risks associated with bridge maintenance are managed through a combination of scheduling
the works at lower traffic volume periods, use of the lane control system and use of the variable
speed limit system.
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3. SUMMARY
The Westgate Bridge is an important road link in the day to day operation of the traffic network
for the City of Melbourne. With daily traffic volumes of over 170,000 vehicles and providing
primary access to the Port of Melbourne, it plays a critical role in community mobility and
prosperity.
The management of risks associated with the operation of the Westgate Bridge is VicRoads
responsibility. VicRoads has implemented risk management arrangements to ensure the
continued and safe operation of the Westgate Bridge. These risks range from day to day traffic
incidents to National security.
• Prepared by: Keith Weegberg, Manager Network Operations VicRoads

89
APPLICATION OF RISK AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT TO ROAD

OPERATIONS IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA
Maintaining access to provide continuous road operations of a strategic road corridor
• Prepared by Andrew Excell, Stephen Pascale, Stefanie Zakrzewski and Rebecca Timmings,
Department of Planning, Transport and Infrastructure, Government of South Australia
Study / Project / Activity Details
Geographical Area Involved:..........South Australia
Type of Hazard:...............................Natural Disaster or Manmade Hazard and impact on the
Road User
Risk Classification:.........................Maintaining access to communities and transporting
freight during road closures
Authors:...........................................Andrew Excell, Stephen Pascale, Stefanie Zakrzewski
and Rebecca Timmings
Year of implementation:..................2011 – 2013
Summary
This paper will discuss how the Department of Planning, Transport and Infrastructure has
implemented the PPRR principles (prevent, prepare, respond and manage the recovery (PPRR)
of natural disasters and man-made hazards) as part of its risk management approach to managing
access along the South East Freeway / Dukes Highway. This 725km highway is the national
connection between two capital cities of Australia; Adelaide and Melbourne. As the multi-lane
highway leaves Adelaide, the capital of South Australia, it traverses through hilly terrain with
short tunnels, then changes to a high speed freeway, then crosses over the River Murray on a
narrow bridge and changes to a two lane highway (one way in each direction) for the next 200km
to the South Australian-Victorian state border. This road continues for another 300km until a
freeway commences at Ballarat into Melbourne. This route presents various risk management
challenges in keeping the transport corridor operational during events from road crashes to bush
fires.
The priorities as part of the PPRR approach are to maintain access to communities and ensuring
disruption to freight movement is minimised. Various emergency management strategies are
implemented depending on the type of emergency and where it occurs along the corridor.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Illustration 61: Adelaide-Melbourne corridor

South Australia is the fourth largest state of Australia with a total land area of 983,482km2. South
Australia has many contrasts with rugged outback wilderness, scenic mountain ranges, an
extensive coastline, offshore islands and a large, meandering river. The South Australian
Department of Planning, Transport and Infrastructure (DPTI) manages and operates 13 000km
arterial road network, including bridges, tunnels, road lights, approximately 800 traffic signal
sites, and over 10 000km of outback roads which traverse through these varied road environments.
Rural communities within South Australia and other capital cities across the country are
generally linked by one highway.
DPTI currently applies a comprehensive approach to emergency and risk management through
the implementation of National Emergency Risk Assessment Guidelines (NERAG) to prevent,
prepare, respond and manage the recovery of natural disasters and man-made hazards.
Illustration 62: Adelaide-Melbourne corridor,

multi-lane freeway to narrow bridge to rural two lane highway
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This approach is guided by an established Emergency Management Framework which is

managed through a rigorous governance process to ensure the continual improvement of the
management of natural disasters and man-made hazards so that key transport routes within the
road network remain operable and that communities remain connected and the transport of
freight is sustained to meet economic priorities.
2. EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK
Emergency management involves a much broader range of issues and strategies than those
generally linked with the management of day to day incidences. Emergency management is
most commonly a multi-agency environment.
Across Australia, many of the agencies that need to communicate with each other and exchange
information during a major emergency/disaster rarely do so on a day-to-day basis. However in
South Australia, the emergency management community is much more compact, allowing for
better networks and relationships.
2.1. Historical approach
Historically, managing emergencies involved a heavy emphasis on hazardous events occurring.

As a direct consequence of such an emphasis, acquisition of resources to provide a comprehensive
emergency response capability occurred at the expense of thorough risk management and risk
prevention. As a further consequence, because risk management was not conducted as well as it
may have been the actual level of risk resulting from hazard impacts increased. Overall this
methodology was costly and ineffective.
2.2. Risk Management Approach
Nowadays, not only in South Australia, but nationally as well, the emergency management
emphasis is on mitigation (stopping or minimising the hazard impact). In order to do this
effectively, the current strategy for dealing with emergencies puts the focus on Risk Management
and Risk Prevention.
The Australian Government recognises four concepts of emergency management. They are:
• The All Hazards Approach

• The Comprehensive Approach
• The All Agencies (or Integrated) Approach
• The Prepared Community
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Illustration 61: Risk Management Approach
Whilst the Australian Government cannot direct the states and territories to undertake certain
emergency management practices, it can however encourage them to do so.
The comprehensive approach to emergency management used by all Australian jurisdictions

recognises that rather than wait for emergencies to occur and then react, risks to the community
and the environment must be managed in a rational manner. It specifies that emergency
management activities should be undertaken across the full spectrum of prevention, preparedness,
response and recovery. These four stages are often referred to as PPRR. It is important to note
that these activities are not ‘linear’ and independent of each other. While preparedness and
response activities are closely related and sequential, recovery commences at the time of impact
of an event. The comprehensive approach to emergency management requires that PPRR
programs be effectively integrated.
2.3. Governance
2.3.1. National Emergency Management Arrangements

The Attorney-General’s Department (AGD) seeks to encourage an ‘all agencies’, ‘all hazards’
approach to the prevention or mitigation of disasters, preparedness for their impact, response to
that impact and recovery from the consequences across all states.
Emergency Management Australia (EMA) is part of the AGD and has responsibility to assist
states and territories to develop emergency management capabilities and provide national
leadership in the development of measures to reduce risk to communities and manage the
consequences of disasters. In the event of a major disaster, the EMA will establish the Crisis
Coordination Centre, which the state will link directly with.
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A National Risk Assessment Framework is used in Australia for effective risk management
decisions and to foster a consistent baseline for information on risk across all hazards. The
National Emergency Risk Assessment Guidelines (NERAG) was developed and forms part of
the sound practical, social and economic reasons for having a national approach to the conduct
of emergency risk assessments.
Given the complexity and severity of possible consequences from emergency events, these
guidelines have been designed to generate an integrated, comprehensive and objective
understanding of emergency risks. The outputs from risk assessments undertaken using the
NERAG will improve decision-making when allocating scarce resources for risk treatment and
emergency preparedness measures.
The method used is scalable, has been developed for assessing emergency risks arising from any
hazard and is for use at local, regional, state/territory and national levels. Depending on the
context of application, any study conducted using the guidelines will necessarily focus on
particular hazards of significance and impact classes of importance to the community in question.
2.3.2. State Emergency Management Arrangements

In South Australia, the Emergency Management Act is the primary emergency management
legislation and is assigned to the Premier (the elected Head of the State). The Premier is assisted
with his oversight of the Act by the Emergency Management Council (EMC), a Cabinet
Committee comprising of a number of Ministers that meets about 6 times per year. The council’s
objective is to ensure the adequacy of the State Emergency Management Plan (SEMP), disaster
preparedness and mitigation arrangements of government for all disasters (natural or man-made
and including terrorism) and ensure over-arching strategic coordination of emergency
management arrangements across the state. The SEMP outlines the responsibilities, authorities
and mechanisms to prevent, or if they occur manage, and recover from, incidents and disasters
within South Australia.
The State Emergency Management Committee (SEMC) is established by virtue of the Emergency
Management Act and reports directly to the EMC. Its membership includes the Chief Executives
of the major government agencies and the Chief Officers of the Emergency Services. It is
chaired by the Chief Executive of the Department of Premier and Cabinet in line with the Premier
being the responsible Minister.
The SEMC is a strategic planning committee that reports to the Emergency Management Council
on matters that relate to the preparedness of the state against identified hazards or protective
security matters. The committee has established a number of Advisory Groups that provide an
oversight role in the areas of prevention, preparedness, response and recovery and may establish
taskforces or project teams on particular issues that require a specialist activity be undertaken.
This may for example be in relation to the outcomes of major inquiries conducted after an
emergency incident.
A hazard leader is appointed by SEMC as the agency which has the knowledge, expertise and
resources to undertake a leadership role for the planning of emergency management activities
pertaining to the prevention of, preparedness for, response to and recovery from its appointed
future hazard.
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Hazard leaders are those agencies that have been assigned responsibility for ensuring that plans
to deal with specific hazards are addressed. Hazard leaders do not have an operational role and
are not to be confused with Control Agencies which, when the hazard impacts, are the ones
responsible for dealing with the hazard.
A hazard leader has the authority of the SEMC to bring together all agencies of government and
any required commonwealth, local or non government entities to undertake this planning role
and provides a facilitation and oversight role to the comprehensive planning process.
2.3.3. Local Emergency Management Arrangements

Local government has a critical role in emergency management as they are best placed to
determine local risks and mitigation strategies to reduce the effects of emergencies on local
communities.
There are 11 Zone Emergency Management Committees (ZEC) in South Australia which are
established for each of the states local government regions. They carry out a similar role to the
State Emergency Management Committee, but at a regional or zone level. They are not operational
but instead have a planning role.
2.3.4. Department of Planning, Transport and Infrastructure (DPTI)

Functional Services are a group of agencies that perform functional roles that support response
and recovery activities during an emergency. They contribute to the coordination role of the
State Emergency Centre (SEC). A State Controller heads each Functional Service. DPTI resides
within the Transport Functional Services (TFS) for all emergency matters relating to transport.
The performance of government requires that the resources provided are allocated appropriately
and protected effectively to ensure the provision of efficient and effective services. Minimising
the impact of adverse events and maximising the benefit created by managing potential risks is
central to this being achieved.
DPTI has responsibility for a wide range of complex areas and manages significant levels of risk
through a framework consistent with AS/NZS ISO31000:2009 Risk Management Standard and
is known as Enterprise Risk Assessor (ERA). Risk management components within this
framework provide the foundations and departmental arrangements to embed the framework
throughout all levels. In its adaptability it assists the department in managing risk effectively
through the application of Divisional risk management processes at varying levels and within
specific context.
95
Illustration 62: Governance Structure for Emergency Management in South Australia
The departmental Risk Management Policy, a component of the framework, sets out the approach
to be adopted to identify and manage risk within the department. The Risk Management
approach adopted is committed to embedding risk management into the organisation’s culture,
practices and decision making processes. This policy applies to staff at all levels within the
department.
3. IMPACT ON MAINTAINING SAFE ACCESS
Key highways link South Australia’s capital city, Adelaide, with other key capital cities within
Australia. The highway that links Adelaide to Melbourne (the Victorian Capital City) is known
as the Adelaide-Melbourne corridor and the South Australian section of this corridor runs for
approximately 284 kilometres and consists of the South East Freeway, the Princes Highway and
the Dukes Highway through to its end point at border town near the Victorian border. Commencing
in Adelaide, this multi-lane highway traverses through hilly terrain within the metropolitan area
catering for a traffic volume of 47,800 Annual Average Daily Traffic (AADT) with approximately
8% of traffic being Freight Vehicles and changes to a rural two lane highway catering for a
traffic volume of 4,000 AADT with approximately 38% of traffic being freight vehicles. A large
portion of the freight vehicles that uses this corridor are known as B-Doubles and can be 26
metres long, 2.5metres wide, 4.3 metres high, and have a mass of 76 tonnes. These vehicles are
mixed in with all other road users, including vulnerable road users such as cyclists.
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The Adelaide-Melbourne corridor has a number of distinct roles, including:
• it is the primary freight link between Melbourne and Adelaide

• it forms part of the broader link between the eastern states and Perth and Darwin
• it provides an important link in the international transport chain for agriculture, mining and
other export-oriented industries
• it is the main connection between a large number of growing regional and rural communities
and the capital cities of Melbourne and Adelaide
• it forms an important link for tourism between Melbourne and Adelaide.
Illustration 63: Emergency Detour Plan with alternate routes for light vehicles and freight vehicles
As such, maintaining access and road operations along this corridor is essential to cater for the economic
growth of South Australia and to provide essential services to communities along the corridor.
3.1. Application of the Emergency Management framework on the Adelaide-Melbourne

Corridor
3.1.1. Plan and prepare

3.1.1.1. Detours
Given the variety of road environment, traffic distribution and terrain, there are a range of
typical emergencies that need to be planned for along this corridor, the application of an All
Hazards Approach in the planning of emergency management allows the responsive and
appropriate management of emergencies such as a major crash creating a fire in tunnels on the
South East Freeway (within the metropolitan area) to a bush fire within the remote area of the
Dukes Highway.
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The local Zone Emergency Committees have been the mechanism to bring all the stakeholders
involved in managing and using the corridor to come together to plan and prepare for emergencies
along this corridor with the key focus of maintaining access.
In 2011, in response to concerns from members of the community that the highway was regularly
closed due to emergency events formalised detour routes for the whole length of the corridor
were developed. The detour routes are managed by the Transport Functional Services (TFS)
group using a risk management process. These detour routes considered both access for light
vehicles and freight vehicles and in some instances direct these modes of traffic through alternate
routes to ensure that long, wide and heavy freight vehicles can actually fit down these roads.
The formalised detour routes are interchangeable and flexible to allow for an emergency that
restricts access to a localised section of the highway (e.g. a traffic accident) or a large section of
the highway (e.g. a bush fire). When activated, the detour routes are communicated to the public
in a variety of ways including via the South Australia Police (SAPOL) communications, variable
message signs, social media, radio broadcasts, website information. In some locations hinged
detour signs that indicate the suitable route for all vehicles to follow are installed. Some of these
detours add considerable distance and travel time to the travel journey (e.g. over 200km).
The highway link within the metropolitan area traverses through a region known as the Adelaide
Hills. The roads within the Adelaide Hills are of a lower standard and larger freight vehicles
(B Doubles) cannot be re routed. Depending on the nature of the emergency, these freight vehicles
may use this opportunity to take a regulated rest break or, if it is possible, the B Doubles can be
turned around and sent back to then link into other B Double routes.
Illustration 64: Detour Sign for Detour D1

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Illustration 65: Detour Sign for Detour D1
3.1.1.2. Traffic incidents and freight movement

In the early 2000’s, the 3km section of highway that travels through the Adelaide Hills was
realigned to provide a more direct route the hilly terrain. As a result of this realignment, this
section of the highway has long steep grades (7.0%), traverses through a short tunnel (through
which dangerous goods are transported) and ends at a set of traffic signals. The ending of such
a long downhill section of highway with traffic signals is considered quite unique.
Whilst the highway has a series of arrestor beds to enable heavy vehicles to pull-off the road if
their brakes fail travelling down the descent before the traffic signals. Heavy vehicles were
speeding down the highway, losing control and crashing into other cars on the freeway. Over the
past thirteen years, as a result of these crashes DPTI has undertaken numerous risk assessments
to identify the operational risks along the highway, and identify mitigation strategies to manage
these identified risks. Mitigation measures varied from communication campaigns to highlight
“The Right Gear” to use as trucks descended down the highway, to the implementation of
Advanced Traffic Management Systems (ATMS) including full Closed Circuit Television
(CCTV) coverage, Intelligent Traffic System (ITS) devices, global ITS systems and variable
speed limits. As the mitigation measures were implemented, the operation of the highway
improved, however crashes continued to occur resulting in the highway access being restricted
and detour routes being implemented through the emergency management process.
After a serious crash that involved a freight vehicle speeding down the highway, losing control,
missing the arrestor beds and crashing at the traffic signals at the bottom of the freeway, DPTI
implemented a 60 km/h speed limit for trucks with five or more axles and a restriction that they
use the left lane to commence their descent into Adelaide. Ongoing monitoring of this initiative
identified that a significant proportion of freight vehicles continued to exceed the 60 km/h speed
99
limit, and as a result compliance with the new speed limit is now being enforced by two fixed
speed cameras on the highway which are linked to counting devices that classify each vehicle
and record speeds.
This risk management and planning process reduced the number of emergencies that the
emergency response teams needed to respond to, and ensured that when an emergency occurred
along this section of road, processes were in place to detour traffic and maintain access. Through
the implementation of an All Hazards Approach, this process can be applied to traffic incidents,
bush fires, floods and other emergencies that occur along this varied corridor.
4. CONSIDERATIONS / STRATEGIES / CONCLUSIONS
4.1. Future projects on the Adelaide-Melbourne Corridor
Given the success of the mitigation measures to operate the highway and manage incidents and
emergencies, DPTI is commencing the implementation of two new projects to extend the ATMS
further along the highway and to implement a fully managed motorway on a short section of the
highway.
The extension of the ATMS to Murray Bridge, Adelaide’s eastern gateway will include the
installation of variable speed limit signs, variable message signs and full coverage CCTV.
Additional incident and emergency management infrastructure such as:
• remotely controlled detour signs to divert traffic during an incident; and

• electrically operated median barrier gates on the downhill section of the highway to provide
access for emergency services personnel, and to divert traffic during an incident,
will be installed to enhance the capabilities of the DPTI to maintain access in the event of an
emergency or traffic incident.
A further Managed Motorway project will be implemented on a small section of the highway. The
project involves the innovative use of dynamic hard shoulder running (HSR) controlled through the
Lane Use Management System (LUMS) to provide enhanced incident and emergency management
capabilities. The project will also address capacity and congestion issues at this location. While
used internationally, the dynamic use of HSR has not been used in Australia to date.
4.2. Future projects on within other key corridor through South Australia
Across South Australia, there are many different regions and key highways that link various
communities and other state capital cities. The application of the PPPR principles into the All
Hazards Approach has been systematically undertaken for the Adelaide-Melbourne corridor.
Other key corridors, such as the Adelaide-Darwin corridor, which traverses 2,700 km, and the
Adelaide-Perth corridor, which traverses 2,600 km and caters for road trains that can be 54
metres, have many different types of road environments and different types of emergencies.
Currently there is no formalised emergency management plan for these other key corridors.
Whilst South Australia uses an All Hazards Approach to managing emergencies through the
emergency management framework, DPTI is in the process of applying the PPPR principles to
100
other key corridors to enable the development of systemised processes for the enhanced
management of incidents and emergencies that specifically relate to these corridors and the key
local stakeholders that are the first points of contact in the event of an incident or emergency.
5. CONCLUSION
South Australia’s emergency management framework, governance structure and All Hazards
approach to emergency management enables the effective management of day-to-day incidents,
minor emergencies and natural disasters.
Through the implementation of the PPRR principles (prevent, prepare, respond and manage the
recovery) the emergency management emphasis is on prevent and prepare to mitigate, i.e.
stopping or minimising the hazard impact before the incident or emergency occurs. In order to
do this effectively, regular inter-agency reviews and meetings ensures risk management is at the
forefront of discussions.
This collaborative approach enables better networks, effective working relationship and clearer
understanding of roles and responsibilities across agencies. Not only does this process
continuously improve the way we work together and identify preventative projects to minimise
risks and prepare for emergency situation, it also which facilitates the effective exchange
information during a major emergency/disaster.
Illustration 66: Adelaide-Darwin corridor (2,700 km)

101
Illustration 67: Adelaide-Perth corridor (2,600 km)
Further, by working collaboratively together to manage day-to-day incidents and minor

emergencies, South Australian agencies are well prepared to respond quickly and effectively to
natural disasters and other major emergencies.
6. BIBLIOGRAPHY
• Australian Government. (2011, August 16). Australian Emergency Management. Retrieved

May 15, 2013, from http://www.em.gov.au/Pages/default.aspx
• Government of South Australia. (2012, October 16). Atlas South Australia. Retrieved May 14,
2013
• Government of South Australia. (2011). sa.gov.au. Retrieved May 15, 2013, from Find what
you are looking for: http://www.sa.gov.au/subject/transport,+travel+and+motoring/motoring/
Heavy+vehicles
• Government of South Australia. (2011). sa.gov.au. Retrieved May 15, 2013, from Find what
you are looking for... Transport, travel and motoring: http://www.sa.gov.au/subject/Transport
%2C+travel+and+motoring/Motoring/Roads+and+traffic
• Government of South Australia. (2013, May 13). South Australian Fire and Emergency
Services Commission. Retrieved May 14, 2013
102
REFERENCES APPENDIX A
[1] Intelligent Energy Europe – EPOMM Plus Mobility Management Monitors Spain 2011.
[2] National Plan for Road ITS Consolidation – DGT
[3] A nation of innovation – Thinking Highways Vol.8 No.1. pg.46-pg.50
[4] Accident Rate in Spain 2011, (Dirección General de Tráfico) – http://publicacionesoficiales.boe.es/
[5] Variable Traffic Signs Manual for T.M.Cs operators.
[6] (For example) Hanshin Expressway: “Business Continuity Plan”, April 1, 2008, (In Japanese),
http://www.hanshin-exp.co.jp/company/torikumi/jisin/BCP20080401.html
[7] (For example) Japan Ground Self Defense Force Middle Army and NEXCO Central: “ Implementing
Agreement on cooperation between Japan Ground Self Defense Force Middle Army and NEXCO Central”,
March 22, 2012, (In Japanese), http://corp.w-nexco.co.jp/corporate/release/hq/h24/0322/pdfs/01.pdf
[8] (For example) Chiba prefecture, NEXCO East, and Metropolitan Expressway: “Comprehensive
partnership among Chiba prefecture, NEXCO East, and Metropolitan Expressway”, October 10,
2012, (In Japanese), http://www.pref.chiba .lg.jp/doukei/press/2012/20121009houkatukyoutei.htm
[9] (For example) Hanshin Expressway and 6 other urban expressway companies and public corporation:
“Agreement on mutual cooperation in emergency restoration work such as during the earthquake”,
March 7, 2011, (In Japanese), http://www.hanshin-exp.co.jp/topics2/1330999646F.pdf
[10] (For example) Hanshin Expressway and Kansai Branch of Japan Federation of Construction
Contractors: “Agreement on emergency measure activity in the event of a disaster”, April 01, 2009
[11] Tohoku Regional Development Bureau, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport: Press
document “Immediately after the earthquake, local construction companies started working
quickly,” July 24, 2012, http://www.thr.mlit.go.jp/bumon/kisya/kisyah/ images/42180_1.pdf
[12] Construction Promotion Fund: “Results of Survey of the construction industry in the Great East
Japan Earthquake Disaster”, Promotion of the construction industry, March, 2012
[13] Takashi Masui: “Management of Structures in Metropolitan Expressway”, Proc. of the PIARC TC
C.3 second international seminar, Beijing, China, Nov 2010
[14] (For example) Hanshin Expressway and Kinki Branch of Japan civil engineering consultants
association: “Agreement on emergency measure activity in the event of a disaster”, April 01, 2009
[15] Kinki Branch of Japan civil engineering consultants association: “Large-scale disaster at Kii
peninsula”, No.12 Typhoon, 2011.
[16] Intelligent transport systems and service for Europe: “ITS Japan News: Probe Helps Traffic
Information in Disaster Area”, http://www.ertico.com/its-japan-news-probe-helps-traffic-informa-
tion-in-disaster-area/
[17] Takeyasu SUZUKI et al: “Utilization of Probe Vehicle Information in Disasters in Japan, Proc. of
15th WCEE”, Lisbon, September 2012
[18] Road Division, Panel on Infrastructure Development, MLIT: “For ensuring the reliability of the
country, including disaster prevention”, Nov. 2012, http://www.mlit.go.jp/common/000229314.pdf
[19] www.publicsafety.gc.ca/prg/ns/ci/ntnl-eng.aspx
[20] www.publicsafety.gc.ca/prg/ns/ci/ct-pln-eng.aspx
[21] www.securitepublique.gouv.qc.ca/securite-civile/securite-civile-quebec/activites-evenements/
colloque/ colloque-2009/1173.html (English version not available)
[22] www.securitepublique.gouv.qc.ca/securite-civile/securite-civile-quebec/plan-national.html
(English version not available)
[23] www.tresor.gouv.qc.ca/en/
[24] Not available for the public
[25] www.mtq.gouv.qc.ca/portal/page/portal/ministere/ministere/securite_civile (English version not available)
103
[26] Organization chart: www.mtq.gouv.qc.ca/portal/page/portal/ministere/ministere/organisation/organigramme

(English version not available)
[27] This bridge/tunnel is in the eastern part of metropolitan Montréal. It represents an essential highway
link between the shores of the St-Lawrence River. www.mtq.gouv.qc.ca/portal/page/portal/regions/
montreal_ile/pont_tunnel_louis_h_lafontaine40ans (English version not available)
[28] The MTQ has more than 60 service centres throughout Québec.
105
APPENDIX B
COMBINED AND LARGE SCALE DISASTERS
Summary of the Additional International Survey
106
1. DEFINITION OF DISASTER
“Disaster is a crisis situation that far exceeds the capabilities”.

Quarentelly, 1985.
2. THREE DIMENSIONAL APPROACH FOR DISASTER DEFINITION
FREQUENCY
Issue1.5.4 Issue1.5.3
INTENSITY
COMPLEXITY
Illustration 68: Three dimensional approach for disaster definition
3) CHARACTERIZATION OF LARGE SCALE DISASTER
FREQUENCY
Unfamiliar Large scale
disaster disaster
Infrequent
disaster
countries
Common
disaster
Common Frequent disaster

disaster countries
INTENSITY
Illustration 69: Characterization of disaster (large scale)
107
4) CHARACTERIZATION OF COMBINED DISASTER
Event 1
Event 2
TIME
Illustration 70: Hazard simultaneously occurred
Event 1 Event 2
TIME
Illustration 71: Hazard chain-occurred
5) DESCRIPTION OF DISASTER DEFINITION
TABLE 15 – DESCRIPTION OF DISASTER DEFINITION

Scale of single Hazard
Hazard mode Occurrence hazard situation
Large scale Unfamiliar Very rare Medium
Single Not change
hazards Large scale Rare Large
Simultaneously
occurring hazards Multiple Simultaneous Medium Not change
Combined
(Type 1)
hazards
Chain reaction Change with
Multiple Consecutive Medium
Hazards (Type 2) time
6) EXPERIENCES IN THE WORLD
TABLE 16. EXPERIENCES AND REPORTERS

Disaster Reporter
1. Large scale disaster –Large- Herby LISSADE
1994 Northridge Earthquake, USA Chief, Office of emergency - Caltrans, USA
2. Large scale disaster –Large- Yukio ADACHI
1995 Kobe Earthquake, Japan Chief maintenance engineer - Hanshin expressway, JAPAN
3. Large scale disaster -Unfamiliar- Djoko MURJANTO
2010 Eruption of Volcano Merapi, Indonesia Director general of highways - MOI, Indonesia
4. Large scale disaster -Unfamiliar- Csilla KAMARAS
2010 Chemical Spill, Hungary Engineer - National Transport Authority, Hungary
5. Large scale disaster –Large- Yukio ADACHI
2011 Kii Peninsula Heavy Rain, Japan Chief maintenance engineer, - Hanshin expressway, JAPAN
6. Combined disaster -Simultaneous & Chain- James LAMBERT
2005 Hurricane Katrina, USA Professor - University of Virginia, USA
7. Combined disaster - Simultaneous - Chin-Fa, CHEN
2009 Taiwan heavy rain, Taiwan Directorate General of Highways - MOTC, Taiwan
8. Combined disaster - Simultaneous - Yukio ADACHI
2011 East Japan earthquake, Japan Chief maintenance engineer - Hanshin expressway, JAPAN
108
EXPERIENCE SHEET (1994 NORTHRIDGE EARTHQUAKE, USA)
1. BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE DISASTER EXPERIENCE
At 4:31 a.m. on January 17, 1994 Northridge, California (Los Angeles area) experienced a
magnitude 6.8 earthquake that caused widespread damage to the transportation system in the
area. A total of 480 damage locations were identified throughout the Los Angeles area, including
171 State highways, 124 State bridges, and 185 local streets and bridges.
2. THE MAIN DIFFICULTY OF THE DISASTER TO MANAGE THE ROAD

NETWORK
Immediately following the earthquake, the only communication link available was the California
Highway Patrol radio link. The availability and use of cell phones and pagers were also critical
to the ability to respond. There were very little methods of communication available for use..
3. CLASSIFICATION OF THE HAZARD MODE OF THE DISASTER
TABLE 17 - CLASSIFICATION
Hazard mode Occurrence Scale of single Hazard
hazard
Large scale hazards Single - Large Not change
Simultaneously
occurring Multiple Simultaneous Medium Not change
Combined
hazards
hazards
hazards time
4. THE MAIN LESSONS FOR MANAGING THE DISASTER/DIFFICULTY
• Redundant communications are essential.

• Establishing a well-publicized central source for information dissemination and inquiry avoids
conflicting data being given and enables others to focus on recovery activities.
• An emergency response plan was important for both field and headquarters offices and they
should build upon experiences learned from previous activities.
5) COOPERATE OR COORDINATE WITH OTHER ORGANIZATIONS FOR

MANAGING THE DISASTER/DIFFICULTY
a. Police, fire department, local community, or other public sectors

The California Secretary of the Business Transportation and Housing Agency provided overall
coordination of what became known as the Governor’s Northridge Earthquake Task Force which
included representative from local, state and federal agencies. The purpose of the Task Force
109
was to coordinate all the transportation related actions associated with the response to, and
recovery from, the earthquake damage. This coordination was essential because the extensive
damage and the resultant impacts covered a vastly large area and involved numerous agencies at
all levels.
b. Public media, web information media, or NPO (non-profit organization)

Communication with the media, elected officials, and the public was the role of the Caltrans
Public Affairs Offices. Updated information on the status of roadways available and the release
of the information was timed for the press to meet daily deadlines.
6. UTILIZATION OF INTELLIGENT TRANSPORT SYSTEM FOR

MANAGING THE ABOVE MENTIONED DISASTER/DIFFICULTY
Information on the damaged freeways and the initial detours that were established was passed to
other Traffic Management Centers outside the Los Angeles area. Portable message boards from
throughout the State were sent to the Los Angeles Area, to provide advance warnings and to
advise the travelling public about the detours. A 1-800-COMMUTE number was made available
throughout the recovery period as a single number to call for all information on carpooling and
public transit.
7. LESSONS LEARNED FROM THIS DISASTER IN TERMS OF BETTER

MANAGEMENT FOR YOUR ROAD NETWORK
a. In terms of robustness (= redundancy, alternative routes) of your road or road network

Maps of pre-planned detours for the areas’ freeways proved to be useful in designating and
establishing the initial detours.
b. In terms of self-sustainedness (= ability of the road network to remain operable) of your

road or road network
An early recognition of the importance of coordinating all detours and lane closures with local
agencies, Caltrans assigned an individual in District 7 (Los Angeles Area) to be responsible for
detour coordination. There were also daily meetings between District operations, maintenance,
project development and construction personnel to coordinate modifications to detours and lane
closures.
c. In terms of dynamic risk management (= real time management)

Caltrans relied in the TMCs in and outside of the Los Angeles area to monitor traffic congestion
and notify the travelling public about detours and public transit options.
8. REFERENCES
US DOT: Effect of catastrophic events on transportation system management and operations,

April 2002
110
EXPERIENCE SHEET (1995 KOBE EARTHQUAKE, JAPAN)
The Hyogo-ken Nanbu earthquake occurred at 5:46 am on January 17, 1995. Table 1 shows the
loss from the Kobe earthquake disaster. This earthquake caused an overall damage of
approximately 10 trillion JPY. The loss reached to almost 20% of annual budget of the Japanese
Government. The disaster gave significant impact to the national economy and society.
The impact to highway bridges was tremendously severe.

NETWORK
Due to the strong shaking of near field earthquake, the highway that was expected as emergency
traffic route were heavily damaged. Therefore, the traffic in the city of Kobe was paralyzed for
a long period of time due to loss of the traffic function of expressways. In response to the lesson
aforementioned, seismic retrofit project had been launched for existing road structures.
hazard
Simultaneously
Multiple Simultaneous Medium Not change
Combined occurring hazards
hazards Chain reaction
Multiple Consecutive Medium Change with time
hazards
Less availability of mobile information technology made it difficult in grasping the disaster
situation. It is the remained issue for initial emergency response. Taking this opportunity, the
some highway companies developed the earthquake damage prediction system to help speed up
the initial activity.
111
5. COOPERATE OR COORDINATE WITH OTHER ORGANIZATIONS FOR


The highway company affected by the disaster was insufficient in human and material resources
in the period of emergency response and restoration. Mutual voluntary aid activities were carried
out by dispatch of technical personnel and provision of emergency and restoration goods.
Agreement on mutual assistance in the event of a disaster has been developed on the basis of this
opportunity.

Disaster prevention volunteers actively involved in support of the affected residents. In order for
beginner volunteers to work efficiently, an organization called “Disaster Volunteer Center” is
established for adjusting volunteer work. However, there was no co-cooperation between the
non-road related organization and road authorities.

No information.


Disaster prevention toughness of the road network is significantly important in emergency
response and restoration. Based on this lesson, public bodies reviewed the emergency route
network in terms of robustness and redundancy.

Road facilities have been always constructed in accordance with most updated design standards.
But the retrofit of existing road facilities has become an issue on the other hand. Therefore, the
earthquake retrofit of existing road infrastructure has been conducted as a kind of country level
project.

Less availability of mobile information technology made it difficult in grasping the disaster
situation. It is the remained issue for initial emergency response. Taking this opportunity, the
some highway companies developed the earthquake damage prediction system to help speed up
the initial activity.
8. REFERENCES
Yukio ADACHI and Hiroyuki NAKAJIMA: Seismic Damage and Restoration of Hanshin
Expressway due to 1995 Hyogoken-Nanbu Earthquake, Proc. of the First international seminar
of PIARC TC18, Kobe JAPAN, November 2000
112
EXPERIENCE SHEET (2010 ERUPTION OF VOLCANO MERAPI,

INDONESIA)
Mount Merapi which is located in Yogyakarta and Central of Java is one of the active volcanoes.
Its latest major eruption occurred in 2010. Immediate eruption and lava flow did not affect the
roads and bridges as hot lava flow path had been prepared beforehand. Millions of cubic meters
of remaining post-eruption material on the mountain created new hazards for infrastructures
such as roads and bridges. Combined with pouring rain, those volcanic materials consisting of
sand to rocks the size of a house streamed down into the lower plains, either following watershed
or even formed a new watershed due to its wild flow. This is known as cold lava flood.
As an effect, roads and bridges were crumbling caused by material brunt of cold lava. During
the emergency response phase, repair were made to disconnect vital accesses with priority for
evacuation routes and distribution logistics. Various efforts from disposal of materials that
blocked the road, installation of emergency bridges and normalization of riverbed/ watershed
were also conducted. For the mitigation, the Directorate General of Highways (DG od Highway)
had a coordination with Directorare General of Water for creating better watershed to control the
flow of cold lava flood as well as strengthened the bridges structure.
113

NETWORK
• Local operators were also parts of disasters victims. It became an obstacle to carry out
emergency response.
• Logistics infrastructure (including communication) for the personnel who should perform the
emergency response was not sufficient.
• The geographical condition of Indonesia’s vast and mountainous terrain, providing obstacle in
reaching the disaster site on time
• Availability of heavy equipment for natural disasters (Disaster Relief Unit) as well as materials
in disaster-prone areas were still limited.
• Lack of coordination among institutions.
hazard
Simultaneously
hazards
• Improving the regulation or NSPK related to emergency response management and disaster
mitigation, as The Minister of Public Works Decree (MPW) No. 223th. 2008 is being revised.
• Preparing manuals and operational regulations for the MPW Decree.
• Frequently increasing dissemination, particularly about disaster-prone areas.
• Improve coordination among agencies especially with BNPB and BPBD with a neater layout
organization.
• Setting up DRU Fleet (including the operator) and the location of the material hazardous materials.
• Setting up the concept of disaster mitigation.


• PIC/ command in times of disaster at national level is BNPB and at regional level are BPBDs.
They serve as a coordinator for all other agencies such as the Ministry of Public Works,
Ministry of Health, Ministry of Social and other Government institutions including National
Police, Fire Department and non-governmental related sectors.
• Communities were already actively involved in the early warning system, but were still limited
to evacuate efforts.
• As for the infrastructure of roads and bridges, the public has not been aware of any active
hotline for the public to report when there is a disaster that befell roads / bridges (eg: an
avalanche blocked roads or bridges were crumbling) to MPW / DGH.
No information
114

There isn’t any intelligent transport system available for covering all of Indonesia areas..


Preparation and planning of the road network should be based on a risk map, selected trace
should be the most minimum risk.

Planning / design of roads & bridges should be conducted by special specification (sustaining
disaster risk).

Planning and management alternatives emergency response and disaster mitigation should
encompass dynamic situation / that may occur when a disaster happens. This is achieved by
preparing Standard Operating Procedures or Manuals for emergency response situation.
8. REFERENCES
Djoko Murjanto: Disaster Management in Road Infrastructure: A Response Management of

Merapi Volcano Eruption, Proc. of risk and emergency management for roads, PIARC TC15,
Osaka JAPAN, May, 2013
115
EXPERIENCE SHEET (2010 CHEMICAL SPILL, HUNGARY)
The Ajka alumina sludge spill was an industrial accident at a caustic waste reservoir chain of the
Ajkai Timföldgyár alumina plant in Ajka, Veszprém County, in western Hungary. On 4 October
2010, at 12:25, the northwestern corner of the dam of reservoir no. 10 collapsed, freeing
approximately one million cubic metres (35 million cubic feet) of liquid waste from red mud
lakes. The mud was released as a 1–2 m (3–7 ft) wave, flooding several nearby localities,
including the village of Kolontár and the town of Devecser. At least nine people died, and 122
people were injured. About 40 square kilometres (15 sq mi) of land were initially affected. The
spill reached the Danube on 7 October 2010. The ruptured and weakened wall of the reservoir
that released the caustic sludge is in danger of collapsing entirely, which could release an
additional 500,000 cubic metres of sludge.
It was not initially clear how the containment at the reservoir had been breached, although the
accident came after a particularly wet summer in Hungary, as in other parts of central Europe.
Police have seized documents from the Ajkai Timföldgyár plant, although a spokesman for MAL
Hungarian Aluminium (MAL Magyar Alumínium Termelő és Kereskedelmi Zrt.), the company
that operates the plant, said the last inspection of the pond had shown “nothing untoward”.

NETWORK
The main difficulty was the contamination of the road and the environment of the road, first of
all during the remove-transport of the sludge spill. The national roads were closed for a long
time. The biggest problem was the traffic diversion, and the traffic loading on the neighbor
villages. By the traffic diversion was a lot of problem with the load capacity of the bridges.
116
hazard
Simultaneously
hazards
The effective coordination of the urgently, immediate actions between the disaster management,
the police and the road operation..

The contact, the communication was fluently in the urgently tasks (road closures, traffic
diversion, the cleaning of the sludge, controlling, etc.)

The contact was effective, fluently.

The information of the public media was managed from the Disaster Management.

No. In this area was not established ITS.


The actions until the disaster – urgently and long-run – determinate the continuous changing. It
was not plan able, predictability forward.

The actions until the disaster – urgently and long-run – determinate the continuous changing. It
was not plan able, predictability forward.

We are not using dynamic risk management.
117
EXPERIENCE SHEET (2011 KII PENINSULA HEAVY RAIN, JAPAN)
In the case of 2011 Kii peninsula heavy rain, the total rainfall caused by the typhoon reached
1600mm. Due to this heavy rainfall, deep-seated landslide over a large area, the formation of a
sediment dam, and the shredding of the road occurred in wide area in Kii peninsula.
In the mountain region, many important national and municipal roads for this region have been
forced to road closures and detour over a long period of time due to the damage caused by flood
and deep landslides.

NETWORK
Extensive sediment damage occurred due to five day consecutive heavy rain where almost the
same as the amount of half a year was. Due to the sediment damage, poor road network in
disaster prevention toughness were destroyed. Mountain village with many orphaned in the
short term by this, logistics reconstruction of the affected areas have been paralyzed in the long
term. In cooperation with the tsunami disaster prevention measures of Kii Peninsula area,
reconstruction of the road network with high toughness disaster prevention has been planning.
hazard
Simultaneously
hazards
Many landslide dams was formed due to deep large-scale collapse of slopes. Secondary disaster
risk due to the collapse of the sediment dam made it difficult in disaster recovery work. The early
establishment of warning systems for secondary disasters by constant monitoring of landslide dam
made it possible to carry out the emergency and recovery works without secondary disaster.
118


In the case of a major disaster, many engineers are needed temporarily in restoration measures
and emergency response in the affected region. Therefore, effective allocation of the limited
number of engineer resources to disaster response work was a challenging work. In the case of
emergency and restoration work at Kii peninsula heavy rain, a lot of emergency response
business were asked to Kinki branch, construction consultant Association. Enormous support
services carried out in a short period of time by the good response by association members made
it possible quick restoration of disaster area.

Not investigated

No information.


Extensive sediment damage occurred due to five day consecutive heavy rain where almost the
same as the amount of half a year was.
Due to the sediment damage, poor road network in disaster prevention toughness were destroyed.
Mountain village with many orphaned in the short term by this, logistics reconstruction of the
affected areas have been paralyzed in the long term. In cooperation with the tsunami disaster
prevention measures of Kii Peninsula area, reconstruction of the road network with high
toughness disaster prevention has been planning.

Not investigated

Many landslide dams was formed due to deep large-scale collapse of slopes. Secondary disaster
risk due to the collapse of the sediment dam made it difficult in disaster recovery work. The
early establishment of warning systems for secondary disasters by constant monitoring of
landslide dam made it possible to carry out the emergency and recovery works without secondary
disaster.
8. REFERENCES
http://www.pref.nara.jp/16688.htm
119
EXPERIENCE SHEET (2005 HURRICANE KATRINA, USA)
• Hurricane Katrina caused significant damage to the transportation system in the Gulf Coast
region. The overall cost to repair or replace the bridges damaged during the hurricane is
estimated at over $1 billion.
• A lot of major highway bridges over water collapsed and took months for repair due to due to
scoring and wave force caused by hurricanes.
• A lot of people were left behind during a mass evacuation due to lack of evacuation plan in
large scale event and miss communication between the public services.

NETWORK
[Mainly report on evacuation difficulty].
An emerging problem in the post-Katrina world is managing the logistics of handling

transportation of evacuees – knowing where will they be is difficult since management of
shelters is often a local function and there is a lack of coordination between local and state/fed
level.
hazard
Simultaneously
Combined
hazards
hazards
hazards time
The review of practice (learned from Hurricane Katrina and other events) showed that
transportation plays an active role in supporting and assisting in evacuations. Transportation
personnel are involved before, during, and after evacuations by managing and maintaining
transportation systems, including traffic:
120
• need the planning by transportation agencies for the evacuation of dependent and special needs
populations;
• need improvement of the communications during evacuations between agencies, evacuees,
and remote data acquisition devices;
• need formal planning for post event reentry of evacuees and mass repopulation of impacted
areas.


• In the Gulf Coast region, there is some coordination of evacuation plans with adjoining
jurisdictions, but the coordination is inadequate for catastrophes on the scale of Hurricane
Katrina.
• Need development of regional plans for mass evacuations in connection with catastrophic
incidents on the scale of Hurricane Katrina. These plans should be developed jointly by State
and local officials within the region in cooperation with officials from appropriate Federal
agencies.

State and local governments use a variety of methods of communications to inform residents
before an evacuation begins. But these methods are not well developed for non-English speaking
people in terms of providing real time information such as evacuation announcement.

ITS applications such as Variable Message Signs (VMS), Highway Advisory Radio (HAR), 511
telephone systems (for traveler information), video surveillance cameras, Motorist Assistance
Patrols, web sites with traveler information, High-Occupancy Vehicle (HOV) lanes (some with
ramp meter bypass control), and Transportation Management Centers (TMCs) were all found to
have application in emergency response and recovery.
But need improvement of the ITS facility in terms of large mass evacuation control:
• use of ITS Video Surveillance System Videotapes for Law Enforcement;
• use of Highway Advisory Radio (HAR);
• assessment study in New Orleans area: According to the report on the highway evacuation
assessment, Authorities noted that ITS camera and detector coverage along I-10 east and west
would improve evacuation operations.


Lessons learned (In the area of Emergency Traffic Management and Evacuation):
• designation of Regional Emergency Evacuation Routes;
• regional Coordination in Emergency Transportation and Evacuation Route Planning;
• accommodation of Oversize and Overweight Vehicles During Emergencies.
121

Lessons learned (In the area of Personnel and Resource Management):
• vehicle-Towing Contracts;
• damage Assessment Skills;
• identification of Emergency Responders;
• personnel Reporting During Emergencies;
• prioritizing Resources;
• handling Mass Casualty Incidents;
• terrorist Targets.

Lessons learned (In the area of Emergency Operations Center Practices):
• activation of Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs);
• coordination among Emergency Operations Centers.
8. REFERENCES
• USDOT, USDHS: Catastrophic Hurricane Evacuation Plan Evaluation: A report to Congress,

June, 2006
• FHWA, USDOT: Emergency Transportation Operations Preparedness and Response, February,
2007
• FHWA, USDOT: Highway Evacuations in Selected Metropolitan Areas: Assessment of
Impediments, April 2010
• FHWA, USDOT: Evacuating Populations with Special Needs, April 2009
122
EXPERIENCE SHEET (2009 TAIWAN HEAVY RAIN, TAIWAN)
Typhoon Morakot destructed Taiwan in 2009 and caused many disasters. At the time, I was the
chief of Second Maintenance Office, Directorate General of Highways and the concept of
watershed management was the first time to use to operate early warning closure. On August
9th, the active precipitation index was achieved by real rainfall on upstream of Zhuoshui River
Basin; therefor, the early warning closure for Zhuoshui bridge on downstream was carried out
according to SOPs at PM 7:00. Next day, many disasters had been found especially the provincial
highway No. 21 in Sinyi Township, Nantou Country. There were 10 roadbeds had been lost along
that highway and over ten thousand people could not leave dangerous places. In order to rescue
as soon as possible, the container engineering method had been used to reconstruct roadbeds and
the provincial highway No. 21 had been re-open on August 25th. However, the other threatening
about climate, tropic depression, with heavy rainfall influenced Taiwan gradually after Typhoon
Morakot and four steps, judgment, deployment, early warning, and response, had been operate
through observing the primary rainfall station precipitation indices, which were selected using
statistics. The innovative thinking, watershed management and risk management, was promoted
from this moment.

NETWORK
Previously, disaster rescue was executed passively after damage has already occurred; however,
faced with multiple disasters induced by the severe climate in Taiwan, active methods must be
proposed to ensure the safety of the population. After Typhoon Sinlaku in 2008 and Typhoon
Morakot in 2009, innovative early warning systems, including judgment, deployment, early
warning, and response, were presented in Taiwan and the concepts of watershed management for
bridges and risk management for highways were promoted to achieve early warning. The key to
these management methods is observing the primary rainfall station precipitation indices, which
were selected using statistics. Different responses are appropriate, depending on the precipitation
indices. In addition, Standard operating procedures for highway disaster prevention in Taiwan
were formulated based on hazard examination and application.
123
hazard
Simultaneously
Combined
hazards
hazards
hazards time
Before disaster, many early warning messages about roads are delivered by location-based
services (LBSs), changeable message signs (CMSs), broadcasts, and TV, and population locations
are determined in advance. However, these messages sometimes do not be observed. Therefore,
the main lessons are education and promotion.
Two frameworks have been developed to popularize disaster safety in Taiwan: education
promotion and delivering messages. The concept has been promoted by DMs, short films,
pre-employment training for guides and bus drivers, and education for students; Delivering
messages is important for safety during disasters; therefore, broadcast, LBSs, CMSs and scrolling
text on TVs are used to expose people to highway prevention messages.


According to monitoring information, early warning closure decisions may be made and these
messages will be provided to other public sectors to maintain the safety of the population.
Therefore, we cooperated with other public sectors like Tourism Bureau and local governments
in Taiwan. For Tourism Bureau, the early warning messages can be transmitted to tourist
agencies by a special system and the agencies will make contacts with their guests to avoid
entering disaster-prone areas. For local governments, the officer will persuade local people and
tourists to leave the dangerous areas and assist in evacuating.

Early warning messages will be delivered through broadcasts and TV programs and announced
on the website. In 2013, we also cooperated with Google to announce some road closure messages,
early warning closure and disaster closure, on the Google Crisis Response Platform; therefore,
our messages will be widely transmitted.

Changeable message signs (CMSs) are used to transmit the disaster information to the public on
the roads and location-based services (LBSs) will send the messages to general people in the
specific areas.
124


No information

No information.

In the future, we will face to the challenge of multiple disasters which are extreme due to climate
change and we also know that no construction can be safe under extreme attack. Therefore,
dynamic risk management is more important for our road network. Actually, early warning
systems, including judgment, deployment, early warning, and response, applied in Taiwan was
based on risk management to operate and many works in every step will be carried with time.
8. REFERENCES
Meng-Fen WU, Chin-Fa CHEN, and Wen-Shin CHEN: Hazard Prevention and Early Warning
Systems of the Highways in Taiwan, Proc. of the 14th REAAA CONFERENCE, Kula Lumpur,
Malaysia, March 2013
125
EXPERIENCE SHEET (2011 EAST JAPAN EARTHQUAKE, JAPAN)
East Japan earthquake occurred at 14:46 on March 11, 2011. The epicenter was estimated in the
Pacific Ocean 150km away from Miyagi prefecture. The calculated magnitude (Mw) was 9.0
that was the largest earthquake in recorded history in Japan. This earthquake triggered an
unprecedented combined disaster including ground shaking effect, tsunami effect, and effect of
nuclear power plant accident. Very wide are of Japan, from the Hokkaido area to Tokyo area,
was affected by that effect as well as continuously occurred other effect, such as liquefaction,
land subsidence, fire or landslides. Dead or missing due to the earthquake was estimated about
19,000. About 40 million houses and buildings were destroyed or partially destroyed. Direct
damage was estimated at about 25 trillion yen that was the world largest loss in the history.

NETWORK
Due to the combined disaster, poor road network that was lack of disaster prevention toughness
were destroyed extensively. Early recovery of the minimum road function was made through “tooth
comb project”, however, it remain the problem with respect to large logistics of recovery and
restoration in the disaster area. According to this lesson, project evaluation in consideration of
disaster prevention toughness in cost benefit analysis is adopted for evaluating the road new project.
hazard
Simultaneously
Combined
hazards
hazards
hazards time
Long-term down of the power supply and communication facilities made it very difficult to
communicate among head quarter, branch office, and site office. Taking this opportunity,
function of disaster prevention facilities and equipment have been reviewed.
126


In order to smooth obtain of disaster information and quick support of the disaster emergency
measures, the national government dispatched disaster preparedness (liaison) and technical
support team (TEC-FORCE) to the local government. Their organic work between national and
local government supported the smooth emergency response and subsequent recovery effort
such as “tooth comb project”.

Dissemination of road related information were voluntarily supported by NPO organization and
Google, such as “road closure information” or “accessible road map”.

Road disaster information road was disseminated through road information boards, roadside
radio, and mass media. The success of the dissemination depends on the driver behavior. ITS
spot technology is being developed to inform disaster information to the drivers actively by
interrupting through all-in-one system that integrates ETC and car navigation system.


Disaster prevention toughness of the road network is significantly important in emergency
response and restoration according to the previous lessons. Therefore, the new road project
evaluation was changed to evaluate B/C taking into account the disaster prevention and toughness
for benefit.

Road facilities have been always constructed in accordance with most updated design standards.
But the retrofit of existing road facilities has become an issue on the other hand. Therefore, the
earthquake retrofit of existing road infrastructure has been conducted as a kind of country level
project.

Long-term down of the power supply and communication facilities made it very difficult to
communicate among head quarter, branch office, and site office. Taking this opportunity,
function of disaster prevention facilities and equipment have been reviewed.
8. REFERENCES
N. Arima: “Lessons from the east Japan earthquake on disaster information management in
early stage of disaster”, Distributed material of the PIARC TC1.5 meeting in Madrid, Madrid,
Nov. 2012
Copyright by the World Road Association. All rights reserved.
World Road Association (PIARC)

Tour Pascal - 19e étage
92055 La Défense CEDEX, FRANCE
International Standard Book Number: 978-2-84060-426-6

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RISK MANAGEMENT FOR

Copyright by the World Road Association. All rights reserved.

APPENDIX A: CASE STUDIES......................................................................................................................................3

CIVIL PROTECTION PLANNING AND ACTIONS FOR MANAGING

ORGANIZED RELOCATION OF PEOPLE THREATENED BY A DISASTER -

STATE HIGHWAY 2 WAIOEKA GORGE SLIP REINSTATEMENT................................................................. 17

RISK AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AS A BASIS

EMERGENCY SITUATION MANAGEMENT OF HIGH FLOODS

COOPERATION AND COORDINATION OF ROAD

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A MANAGEMENT PROGRAM

COMMUNICATION WITH THE PUBLIC FOR EMERGENCY SITUATION – NEMA IN KOREA..........59

ROADSIDE SERVER FOR DRIVER ASSISTANCE AND SAFETY WARNING SYSTEM...........................64

THE QUEENSLAND EXPERIENCE OF THE SUMMER

APPLICATION OF RISK AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

APPLICATION OF RISK AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

APPLICATION OF RISK AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

REFERENCES APPENDIX A......................................................................................................................................102

APPENDIX B: COMBINED AND LARGE SCALE DISASTERS.......................................................................105

EXPERIENCE SHEET (1994 NORTHRIDGE EARTHQUAKE, USA) .............................................................108

EXPERIENCE SHEET (1995 KOBE EARTHQUAKE, JAPAN) ......................................................................... 110

EXPERIENCE SHEET (2010 ERUPTION OF VOLCANO MERAPI, INDONESIA).....................................112

EXPERIENCE SHEET (2010 CHEMICAL SPILL, HUNGARY) ....................................................................... 115

EXPERIENCE SHEET (2005 HURRICANE KATRINA, USA)...........................................................................119

EXPERIENCE SHEET (2009 TAIWAN HEAVY RAIN, TAIWAN) ...................................................................122

EXPERIENCE SHEET (2011 EAST JAPAN EARTHQUAKE, JAPAN) ............................................................125

CIVIL PROTECTION PLANNING AND ACTIONS FOR MANAGING

• Prepared by Dr. Ioannis Benekos

Study / Project / Activity Details

2. PLANNING AND ACTIONS FOR MANAGING SNOWFALL AND FROST IN

• Stage 3: winter period (mid-November to April).

Preparedness of the different organizations is achieved through warnings provided to the

4. PLANNING OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROCEDURES AT THE REGIONAL

5. VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS, PUBLIC INFORMATION AND SOCIAL

6. GENERAL COORDINATION AND MEMO FOR ACTION

• Memo of action to ensure preparedness and availability of resources.

Each memo should contain:

• The agency/organization to inform and mobilize in case of an emergency.

7. CONTACT IN THE AUTHORITY

Dr. Ioannis Benekos

ORGANIZED RELOCATION OF PEOPLE THREATENED BY A DISASTER -

Organized relocation of citizens from an area that is threatened by an ongoing or imminent

1. INTRODUCTION: DEFINITION A ND LEGAL FR AMEWOR K FOR

Organized relocation as defined by Greek Law 3613/2007 is the organized movement-relocation

Decision-making, basic requirements and limitations for organized relocation

• organized relocation of citizens is considered as a prevention measure, which should be

2. COOPERATIVE AND COORDINATIVE ACTIONS: PUBLIC

3. PUBLIC INFORMATION PROCEDURES

Transportation of citizens can be done by public or private transportation means, or even by

5. CASE STUDY: THE JULY 2008 RHODES ISLAND FOREST FIRE

Illustration 2. Panoramic view of the forest fire from inhabited areas..

STATE HIGHWAY 2 WAIOEKA GORGE SLIP REINSTATEMENT

Study / project / activity details

Illustration 7: Waioeka Gorge Slip State Highway 2

Illustration 8: Temporary road and stream passage

2. REINSTATEMENT OF STATE HIGHWAY

Illustration 9: Stabilisation of the slip face

Illustration 10: Permanent reinstatement of State Highway 2

2. Critical Time Lost

3. Establishment of response plans

4. Establishment of ongoing monitoring

RISK AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AS A BASIS FOR ROAD

• Road Transport Infrastructures.