Powers in General
548 which authorizes said Director
MAXIMO CALALANG, Petitioner, v. A. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL.,
Respondents.
Maximo Calalang in his own behalf. Solicitor General Ozaeta and
Assistant Solicitor General Amparo for respondents Williams,
Fragante and Bayan
(the case has 3 issues, about police power, social justice, and
undue delegation, the third being the most relevant in the sucject)
Facts:
Antecedent facts
- Maximo Calalang petition for a writ of prohibition against
the respondents, A. D. Williams, as Chairman of the
National Traffic Commission; Vicente Fragante, as Director
of Public Works; Sergio Bayan, as Acting Secretary of
Public Works and Communications; Eulogio Rodriguez, as
Mayor of the City of Manila; and Juan Dominguez, as
Acting Chief of Police of Manila.
It was alleged in the petition that:
- National Traffic Commission recommend to the Director of
Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited
from passing along Rosario Street extending from Plaza
Calderon de la Barca to Dasmariñas Street, from 7:30 a.m.
to 12:30 p.m. and from 1:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m.; and along
Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at
Antipolo Street to Echague Street, from 7 a.m. to 11 p.m.,
from a period of one year from the date of the opening of
the Colgante Bridge to traffic
- National Traffic Commission recommended to the Director
of Public Works the adoption of the measure proposed in
the resolution in pursuance of the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No.
of Public Works, to promulgate rules and regulations to
regulate and control the use of and traffic on national
roads;
- that Director of Public Works, , recommended to the
secretary of public works and communcations the approval
of the recommendation made by the Chairman of the
National Traffic Commission with the modification that the
closing of Rizal Avenue to traffic to animal-drawn vehicles
be limited to the portion thereof extending from the railroad
crossing at Antipolo Street to Azcarraga Street;
- that the Secretary of Public Works and Communications,
approved the recommendation of the latter that Rosario
Street and Rizal Avenue be closed to traffic of animal-
drawn vehicles, between the points and during the hours
as above indicated, for a period of one year from the date
of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic;
- that the Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of
Manila have enforced the rules and regulations thus
adopted resulting to the prohibition of all animal-drawn
vehicles to pass and pick up passengers in the places
above-mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners
but of the riding public as well.
Contention of the petitioner: (issue of the case) Commonwealth
Act No. 548 by which the Director of Public Works is authorized to
promulgate rules and regulations for the regulation and control of the
use of and traffic on national roads and streets is unconstitutional
because it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power.
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 548 reads as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
" To promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstructions on, roads and
streets designated as national roads by acts of the National
Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the
Philippines, the Director of Public Works, with the approval of the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications, shall promulgate the
necessary rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and
traffic on such roads and streets. Such rules and regulations, with the
approval of the President, may contain provisions controlling or
regulating the construction of buildings or other structures within a
reasonable distance from along the national roads. Such roads may
be temporarily closed to any or all classes of traffic by the Director of
Public Works and his duly authorized representatives whenever the
condition of the road or the traffic thereon makes such action
necessary or advisable in the public convenience and interest, or
for a specified period, with the approval of the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications.”
Ruling: NO.
The provisions of section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 648 do not
confer legislative power upon the Director of Public Works and the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications.
The authority therein conferred upon them and under which they
promulgated the rules and regulations now complained of is not to
determine what public policy demands but merely to carry out the
legislative policy laid down by the National Assembly in said Act, to
wit, "to promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstructions on, roads
and streets designated as national roads by acts of the National
Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the Philippines"
and to close them temporarily to any or all classes of traffic
"whenever the condition of the road or the traffic thereon makes
such action necessary or advisable in the public convenience
and interest." The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not the
determination of what the law shall be, but merely the ascertainment
of the facts and circumstances upon which the application of said law
is to be predicated. To promulgate rules and regulations on the
use of national roads and to determine when and how long a
national road should be closed to traffic, in view of the condition
of the road or the traffic thereon and the requirements of public
convenience and interest, is an administrative function which
cannot be directly discharged by the National Assembly. It must
depend on the discretion of some other government official to whom is
confided the duty of determining whether the proper occasion exists
for executing the law. But it cannot be said that the exercise of such
discretion is the making of the law.
The proper distinction the court said was this: "The Legislature
cannot delegate its power to make the law; but it can make a law
to delegate a power to determine some fact or state of things
upon which the law makes, or intends to make, its own action
depend. To deny this would be to stop the wheels of
government. There are many things upon which wise and useful
legislation must depend which cannot be known to the law-
making power, and, must, therefore, be a subject of inquiry and
determination outside of the halls of legislation."
As was observed by this court in Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro
(39 Phil, 660, 700), "The rule has nowhere been better stated than in
the early Ohio case decided by Judge Ranney, and since followed in
a multitude of cases, namely: ’The true distinction therefore is
between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily
involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority
or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in
pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid
objection can be made.’
Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the
multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations, and the
increased difficulty of administering the laws, the rigidity of the theory
of separation of governmental powers has, to a large extent, been
relaxed by permitting the delegation of greater powers by the
legislative and vesting a larger amount of discretion in administrative
and executive officials, not only in the execution of the laws, but also
in the promulgation of certain rules and regulations calculated to
promote public interest.
Express and implied Powers
Philippines Association of Service Exporters Inc. (PASEI) v. Hon.
Ruben D. Torres (Secretary of DOLE) and Jose N. Sarmineto
(Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA))
G.R. No. 101279
Aug. 6, 1992.
1. TOPIC: Express and Implied Powers
2. FACTS:
a. ANTECEDENT FACTS
- A petition for prohibition with a temporary
restraining order
- PASEI: private employment and recruitment
agency duly licensed by POEA to engage in
the business of obtaining oversease
employment for Filipino workers.
- as a result of published stories regarding
the abuses suffered by Filipino housemaids
employed in Hong Kong, DOLE Secretary
Ruben D. Torres issued Department Order
No. 16, Series of 1991, temporarily
suspending the recruitment by private
employment agencies of "Filipino domestic
helpers going to Hong Kong" (p. 30, Rollo).
The DOLE itself, through the POEA took
over the business of deploying such Hong
Kong-bound workers.
- POEA: Memorandum Circular No. 30
provided the guidelines on the Government
processing and deployment of workers to
Hong Kong, while No. 37 provided for the
processing of employment contracts.
b. CONTENTION OF THE PETITIONER
- The respondents acted with grave abuse
of discretion and/or in excess of their
rule-making authority in issuing said
circulars
- The assailed DOLE and POEA circulars are
contrary to the Constitution, are
unreasonable, unfair, and oppressive
- The requirements of publication and filing
with the Office of the National Administrative
Registrar were not complied with.
c. RULING OF LOWER COURTS: Not indicated.
3. ISSUES:
a. W/N the respondents acted with grave abuse of
discretion and/or in excess of their rule-making
authority in issuing said circulars
b. W/N the respondents failed to meet the
requirements of publication and filing.
4. RULING
a. NO, this contention has no merit.
- Art. 36 of the Labor Code (Regulatory
Power) grants the Labor Secretary the
power to restrict and regulate recruitment
and placement activities and authorizes the
Secretary to issue and promulgate rules and
regulations to carry out the objectives.
- E.O. 797 (created the POEA), vests in the
POEA the powers and duties: (a) to
establish and maintain a system to regulate
private sector participation in the
recruitment and placement of workers, (b) to
recruit and place workers for overseas
employment on a government to
government arrangement and in such other
sectors as policy may dictate.
- IN RELATION TO THE TOPIC: The
assailed circulars do not prohibit the
petitioner from engaging in the deployment
of Filipino workers for overseas employment
(only specifically to Hong Kong). The
administrative issuances fall within the
“admiinistrative and policing power
expressly or by necessary implication
conferred” upon the respondents. The
respondents were granted by law the
powers and duties to “restrict” and to
“regulate”. Their actions fall within the scope
of these.

b. Nevertheless, they are legally invalid, defective
and unenforceable for lack of power publication
and filing in the Office of the National
Administrative Register as required in Article 2
of the Civil Code, Article 5 of the Labor Code
and Sections 3(1) and 4, Chapter 2, Book VII of
the Administrative Code of 1987 which provide:
1. Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen
(15) days following the completion of
their publication in the Official Gazatte,
unless it is otherwise provided. . . . (Civil
Code.)
2. Admiistrative rules and regulations must
also be published if their purpose is to
imp,ement existing law pursuant also to
a valid delegation.
c. OVERALL RULING: The writ of prohibition is
GRANTED. The implementation of the DOLE
Department Order No. 16 and POEA
Memorandum Circulars Nos. 30 and 37 are
SUSPENDED pending compliance with the
statutory requirements.
JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. v. CA
Topic: Express and Implied Powers (Police Power)
Facts:
Following the much-publicized death of Maricris Sioson in 1991,
former President Corazon C. Aquino ordered a total ban against the
deployment of performing artists to Japan and other foreign
destinations. The ban was, however, rescinded after leaders of the
overseas employment industry promised to extend full support for a
program aimed at removing kinks in the system of deployment. The
Secretary of Labor and Employment, subsequently issued
Department Order No. 28, creating the Entertainment Industry
Advisory Council (EIAC). Pursuant to the EIAC's
recommendations,[1] the Secretary of Labor, on January 6, 1994,
issued Department Order No. 3 establishing various procedures and
requirements for screening performing artists under a new system of
training, testing, certification and deployment of the
former. Performing artists successfully hurdling the test, training and
certification requirement were to be issued an Artist's Record Book
(ARB), a necessary prerequisite to processing of any contract of
employment by the POEA.
Thereafter, the Department of Labor, following the EIAC's
recommendation, issued a series of orders fine-tuning and
implementing the new system. Prominent among these orders were
the following issuances:
1. Department Order No. 3-A, providing for additional guidelines
on the training, testing, certification and deployment of performing
artists.
2. Department Order No. 3-B, pertaining to the Artist Record Book
(ARB) requirement, which could be processed only after the artist
could show proof of academic and skills training and has passed the
required tests.
3. Department Order No. 3-E, providing the minimum salary a
performing artist ought to receive (not less than US$600.00 for those
bound for Japan) and the authorized deductions therefrom.
4. Department Order No. 3-F, providing for the guidelines on the
issuance and use of the ARB by returning performing artists who,
unlike new artists, shall only undergo a Special Orientation Program
(shorter than the basic program) although they must pass the
academic test.
Petitioner's Contention:
These department orders, 1) violated the constitutional right to travel;
2) abridged existing contracts for employment; and 3) deprived
individual artists of their licenses without due process of law. Further,
the issuance of the Artist Record Book (ARB) was discriminatory and
illegal and "in gross violation of the constitutional right... to life liberty
and property
Respondents Contention:
Respondent court concluded that the issuances constituted a valid
exercise by the state of the police power.
Issue: WON the department orders constitute a valid exercise of the
state’s police powers.
(1) Lower Court:
(2) Appellate Court: YES
(3) Supreme Court: YES
a. Majority Decision:
The latin maxim salus populi est suprema lex embodies the
character of the entire spectrum of public laws aimed at promoting the
general welfare of the people under the State's police power. As an
inherent attribute of sovereignty which virtually "extends to all public
needs," this "least limitable" of governmental powers grants a wide
panoply of instruments through which the state, as parens
patriae gives effect to a host of its regulatory powers.
As to the other provisions of Department Order No. 3
questioned by petitioners, we see nothing wrong with the requirement
for document and booking confirmation (D.O. 3-C), a minimum salary
scale (D.O. 3-E), or the requirement for registration of returning
performers. The requirement for a venue certificate or other
documents evidencing the place and nature of work allows the
government closer monitoring of foreign employers and helps keep
our entertainers away from prostitution fronts and other worksites
associated with unsavory, immoral, illegal or exploitative
practices. Parenthetically, none of these issuances appear to us, by
any stretch of the imagination, even remotely unreasonable or
arbitrary.
They address a felt need of according greater protection for an
oft-exploited segment of our OCW's. They respond to the
industry's demand for clearer and more practicable rules and
guidelines. Many of these provisions were fleshed out following
recommendations by, and after consultations with, the affected
sectors and non-government organizations. On the whole, they are
aimed at enhancing the safety and security of entertainers and artists
bound for Japan and other destinations, without stifling the industry's
concerns for expansion and growth. In any event, apart from the
State's police power, the Constitution itself mandates government to
extend the fullest protection to our overseas workers. Obviously,
protection to labor does not indicate promotion of employment
alone. Under the welfare and social justice provisions of the
Constitution, the promotion of full employment, while desirable, cannot
take a backseat to the government's constitutional duty to provide
mechanisms for the protection of our workforce, local or overseas.
Finally, it is a futile gesture on the part of petitioners to invoke
the non-impairment clause of the Constitution to support their
argument that the government cannot enact the assailed regulatory
measures because they abridge the freedom to contract. It was held
that "[t]he non-impairment clause of the Constitution... must yield to
the loftier purposes targeted by the government." Equally important,
into every contract is read provisions of existing law, and always, a
reservation of the police power for so long as the agreement deals
with a subject impressed with the public welfare.
Ministerial and Discretionary powers
FLORENDO vs ENRILE
239 SCRA 22
Discretionary and Ministerial Powers
Ministerial Duty
FACTS:
-Complainant charged the respondent deputy sheriff of the MTCC at
Cabanatuan City with the failure to enforce a writ of demolition
notwithstanding his collection and receipt of P5,200.00.
- She averred that she was the plaintiff in Civil Cases Nos. 9241 to
9249, all for ejectment, and that in a joint decision rendered on 22
June 1987 by Branch 2 of the MTCC the defendants were ordered to
vacate the premises and to surrender the possession thereof to the
complainant.
-The writ was assigned to the respondent for implementation.
- For the service and implementation of the writ of demolition, the
respondent asked and received from the complainant and her lawyer
the total sum of P5,200.00 purportedly as sheriff's fee. The
respondent issued no official receipt for this amount.
- The respondent did not execute the writ of demolition despite the
receipt of P5,200.00.
- The complainant's lawyer then wrote a letter to the respondent on 8
November 1990 demanding that the latter implement the writ of
demolition or return the aforesaid sum within ten days
-In his comment (denominated as an answer) dated 16 June 1992,
the respondent did not deny the charge that he collected P5,200.00
as sheriff's fee; however, he specifically denied the allegation that he
did not implement the writ of execution and the writ of demolition.
According to him after the expiration of the extended period, he again
approached the defendants but he was threatened by them that if he
would enforce the writ of demolition something would happen, i.e.,
"magkamatayan muna." He then prepared the return of service on the
said date.The writ was thus unsatisfied.
He further claimed that on 8 July 1991, Judge Romeo Mauricio of the
MTCC referred to Mr. Arsenio S. Vicencio, Clerk of Court IV and Ex-
Officio Sheriff of the MTCC, the respondent's return of service of 4
September 1990 for comment. In his compliance of 15 July 1991, Mr.
Vicencio informed Judge Mauricio that the threat on the respondent's
life was "real, and it will be very risky for him to implement" it, and
requested that a new deputy sheriff be assigned to enforce the writ.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent sheriff implement the writ of
execution and the writ of demolition
RULING: No. The records further disclose that the respondent's
returns of service dated 25 July 1990 and 24 September 1990 were
filed by him only on 29 May 1991 and 6 June 1991, respectively, with
the MTCC, which issued the writ of demolition.
- Either the respondent correctly dated the returns, in which case
there was a deliberate and unreasonable delay in their filing with the
court, or he antedated them to make it appear that he prepared it well
within the period provided for by the Rules of Court.
-Section 11 of Rule 39 thereof provides that a writ of execution should
be returned at any time not less than ten days nor more than sixty
days after its receipt by the sheriff who must set forth in writing on its
back the whole of his proceedings by virtue thereof and file it with the
clerk or judge to be preserved with the other papers in the case. As
the court personnel primarily responsible for the speedy and efficient
service of all court processes and writs originating from his court, it
was the respondent's duty to immediately implement the writ of
demolition. The Manual for Clerks of Court provides:
Duty of sheriff as to execution of process. — When a writ is placed in
the hands of the sheriff, it is his duty in the absence of instructions, to
proceed with reasonable celerity and promptness to execute it in
accordance with its mandate. . . . He has no discretion whether to
execute it or not.
Section E (4) of the Manual also provides:
All sheriffs and deputy sheriffs shall submit a report to the Judge
concerned on the action taken on all writs and processes assigned to
them within ten (10) days from receipt of said process or writ. Said
report shall form part of the records of the case.
The duty imposed upon the sheriff to execute the writ is
ministerial, not directory. A purely ministerial act or duty is one
which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a
prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of the legal
authority, without regard to the exercise of his own judgment
upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done.
The respondent's explanation that he was not able to implement the
writ of demolition because he was threatened with death by the
defendants is unacceptable. If that were true, he should have either
reported it to the MTCC and requested the assistance of other sheriffs
or law enforcement authorities, or filed the appropriate criminal
complaint against the defendants who had threatened him. Instead of
doing so, he filed his returns only after several months had lapsed.
For such nonfeasance and misfeasance, the respondent is guilty of
serious dereliction or neglect of duty, gross inefficiency or
incompetence, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service.
Time and again, this Court has stressed that the conduct and
behavior of everyone connected with the dispensation of justice from
the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk should be circumscribed with
the heavy burden of responsibility. They must at all times not only
observe propriety and decorum, they must also be above suspicion.

RATIO: A ministerial duty is one in respect to which nothing is left to
discretion. It is a simple, definite duty arising under conditions
admitetd or proved to exist, and imposed by law.
A ministerial act has been defined as one performed in response to a
duty which has been positively iposed by law and its performance
required at a time and in a manner or upon conditions specifically
designated, the duty to perform under the conditions specified not
being dependent upon theofficer's judgment or discretion.
That a necessity may exist for the ascertainment of the facts or
conditions, upon the existence of which the performance of an act
becomes a clear and specific duty, does not operate to convert a
ministerial act into one discretionary or judicial in nature. Although an
agency has the power to determine whether an application complies
with statutory requisites, if it appears beyond doubt that the
application does so comply, there is no discretion to reject the
application.
ROBLE ARRASTRE vs. VILLAFLOR
499 SCRA 434, AUGUST 22, 06
FACTS: For the years 1992 and 1993, petitioner Roble Arrastre, Inc.,
a cargo handling service operator, was granted Business Permits No.
349 and 276 by respondent Altragracia Villaflor as Municipal Mayor of
Hilongos, Leyteto provide and render arrastre and stevedoring
services at the Municipal Port of Hilongos, Leyte. On December
1993, pending final consideration of petitioner’s final application for
renewal with the PPA Office, Manila, the Philippine Ports Authority
(PPA) through its Port Manager Salvador Reyna of the Tacloban Port
Managers Office issued a 90- day hold-over authority to petitioner.
Stated therein was the proviso that notwithstanding the 90-day period
aforementioned, the authority shall be deemed ipso factor revoked if
an earlier permit/contract for cargo handling services is granted or
sooner withdrawn or cancelled for cause pursuant to PPA
Administrative Order No. 10-81. On January 1994, while the 90-day
hold-over authority was in effect, petitioner filed with respondent
mayor an application for the renewal of its Business Permit no. 276.
However, the same was denied.
Petitioner filed with RTC, a petition for Mandamus with
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction against respondent mayor. The
petitioner argued that the source of power of the municipal mayor to
issue licences is Section 444 (b) (3) (iv) of Republic Act. 7160,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, which is
merely for the purpose of the revenue generation and not regulation,
hence, the municipal mayor has no discretion to refuse the issuance
of a business license following the applicant’s payment or satisfaction
of the proper license fees.
Respondent mayor cited Municipal Resolution No. 93-27,
passed by the Sangguniang Bayan of Hilongos, Leyte on March 1993,
which prohibits any party which likewise operates shipping lines plying
the route of Cebu to Hilongos and vice versa, from engaging in
arrastre and stevedoring services at the Port of Hilongos. Respondent
mayor asserted that the petitioner is owned and operated by Roble
Shipping Lines, a shipping company that operates along the routes
specified in the Resolution No. 93-27; hence, effectively rendering
petitioner disqualified from operating an arrastre service therein.
The RTC opined that the PPA has the sole authority to grant
permits in the operation of cargo handling services in the Philippine
ports, whether public or private. It ruled that the refusal of
respondent mayor to approve petitioner’s application for renewal of
the business permit was not based on law nor upon her discretion.
The CA ruled that the pursuit of the duty of respondent mayor
under Section 444 (b) (3) (iv) of the Local Government Code
necessarily entails of the exercise of official discretion.
ISSUE: Whether or not the municipal mayor has the power to issue
licences and permits and suspend or revoke the same under the
general welfare clause of the Local Government Code?
HELD: Central to the resolution of the case at bar is a reading of
section 444 (b) (3) (iv) of the Local Government Code of 1991, which
provides, thus:
 Section 444. The Chief Executive: Powers, Duties,
Functions and Compensation.
(a) For efficient, effective, and economical governance
the purpose of which is the general welfare of the
municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Section
16 of this Code, the Municipal mayor shall:
xxxx
(3) Initiate and maximize the generation of resources
and revenues, and apply the same to the
implementation of development plans, program
objective and priorities as provided for under Section
18 of this Code, particularly those resources and
revenues programmed for agro-industrial development
and country-wide growth and progress, and relative
thereto, shall:
xxxx
(iv) Issue licences permits and suspend or revoke the
same for any violation of the conditions upon which
said licences or permits had been issued, pursuant to
law or ordinance.
As Section 444 (b) (3) (iv) so states, the municipal mayor to
issue licences is pursuant to Section 16 of the Local Government
Code of 1991. Section 16, known as the general welfare clause,
encapsulates the delegated power to local governments. Local
government units exercise police power through there respective
legislative bodies. Evidently, the Local Government Code of 1991 is
unequivocal that the municipal mayor has the power to issue licences
and permits and to suspend or revoke the same for any violation of
the conditions upon which said licences or permits has been issued,
pursuant to law or ordinance.
Section 444 (b) (3) (iv) of the Local Government Code of
1991, whereby the power of the respondent mayor to issue license
and permits is circumscribed, is a manifestation of the delegated
police power of a municipal corporation. Necessarily, the exercise
thereof cannot be deemed ministerial. As to the question of whether
the power is validly exercised, the matter is within the province of a
writ of certiorari, but certainly, not of mandamus.
The proper action is certiorari to determine whether grave
abuse of discretion had been committed on the part of respondent
mayor in the refusal to grant petitioner’s application. Petitioner’s
petition for mandamus is incompetent against respondent mayor’s
discretionary power.
The petition is denied. The assailed Decision and Resolution
of the Court of Appeals.
Mandatory and Permissive powers
ADASA VS. ABALOS
Facts:
-Respondent (Cecille Abalos alleged that petitioner (Bernadette
Adasa), through deceit, received and encashed two checks issued in
the name of respondent without respondent’s knowledge and consent
and that despite repeated demands by the latter, petitioner failed and
refused to pay the proceeds of the checks.
On 23 March 2001, petitioner filed a counter-affidavit admitting that
she received and encashed the two checks issued in favor of
respondent. Petitioner, however, recanted later on and alleged
instead that it was a certain Bebie Correa who received the two
checks which are the subject matter of the complaints and encashed
the same; and that said Bebie Correa left the country after
misappropriating the proceeds of the checks.
Office of Prosecutor filed two separate information for Estafa.
Petitioner: Motion for reinvestigation, but Office of Prosecutor affirmed
that there is probable cause.
Arraignment: Petitioner entered a plea of not guilty and filed a Petition
for review in DOJ
DOJ: reversed the ruling and prompted the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Iligan City to file a "Motion to Withdraw Information".
Respondent Abalos filed a motion for reconsideration arguing that the
DOJ should have dismissed the petition for review outright contending
that Sec 7 of DOJ Circular no 70 mandates that “If an information has
been filed in court pursuant to the appealed resolution the petition
shall not be given due course if the accused had already been
arraigned” the aggrieved party cannot file a petition for review as the
secretary of Justice shall deny it outright.
The trial court has granted the petitioner’s “motion to withdraw
information” and dismissed the criminal case, on February 2003.
Respondent filed a petition for certiorari before the CA on the DOJ
resolution and it reversed the sad resolution. The appellate court
emphasized that DOJ Circular 70 Sec 7 used the phrase “shall not.”
Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari contending that section 12
of the same DOJ Circular used the word “may” that would give
discretion to the Secretary of Justice to entertain an appeal, thus this
petition.
Issue: WON the overall language and the intent of DOJ Circular no 70
is directory that it would give discretion to the Secretary of Justice to
entertain an appeal even if the accused has been arraigned.
Held: No. the court held that CA is correct, the DOJ cannot give an
appeal/petition for review due course and must dismiss such actions if
the accused has already been arraigned. Therefore in Sec 12 if the
ground for the dismissal is the arraignment of the accused, it must go
back and act upon through Section 7. If Sec 12 is given a directory
application it would render earlier mandatory provisions
invalid/negligible and would undermine the main objectives of the said
circular which is “for the expeditious and efficient administration of
justice.”
REVIEW (Might come up as a question)
What is a political question?
"It is not easy, however, to define the phrase `political question', nor to
determine what matters, fall within its scope. It is frequently used to
designate all questions that lie outside the scope of the judicial
questions, which under the constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or
executive branch of the government."
In short, the term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what
it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy.
What is a justiciable question?
A justiciable question is one that can be decided by courts.
The Senate is not clothed with "full discretionary authority" in the
choice of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. The exercise of
its power thereon is subject to constitutional limitations which are
claimed to be mandatory in nature. It is clearly within the legitimate
province of the judicial department to pass upon the validity the
proceedings in connection therewith.
".. whether an election of public officers has been in accordance with
law is for the judiciary. Moreover, where the legislative department
has by statute prescribed election procedure in a given situation, the
judiciary may determine whether a particular election has been in
conformity with such statute, and, particularly, whether such statute
has been applied in a way to deny or transgress on the constitutional
or statutory rights .."
Errors in Exercise of Powers
Republic vs. Phil Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc.
1970
Topic: Errors in Exercise of Powers
2. Facts
2.1. Antecedent Facts:
 Respondent (registered owner of 238 motor
vehicles) paid to the Motor Vehicles Office the amount of P78,636.17
(second instalment of registration fees)
 The amount was paid in the form of negotiable
certificates of indebtedness, not cash
 2.2. Contention of the Petitioner:
 Payment of registration fees in the form of
negotiable certificates of indebtedness is invalid
2.3. Contention of the Respondent:
 The Chief of the Motor Vehicles Office had issued a
circular (Circular No. 5) that quoted a letter from the National
Treasurer regarding the Back Pay Law (Republic Act 304), allowing
the acceptance of negotiable certificates of indebtedness in payment
of registration fees of motor vehicles
 The Auditor General had concurred with the view of
the National Treasurer
2.4. Ruling of the lower court:
registration fees. The Back Pay Law relied by the respondent is
applicable only to taxes, not to registration fees. Respondent’s mode
of payment is invalid.
(b) The lower court correctly referred to the national
treasurer as being vested with the function of administering the Back
Pay Law. It concluded in its decision that the government was bound
by the mistaken interpretation arrived at by the national treasurer and
the auditor general. The Court disagrees, citing the case of Aguinaldo
de Romero v. Director of Lands (1919). The Court also cited the case
of Pineda v. Court of First Instance (1929) which said that the
government is never estopped by mistake or error on the part of its
agents.
4.3. Doctrine

 Petitioner’s complaint was dismissed
 The respondent’s payment using the negotiable
certificates of indebtedness is valid
3. Issues:
Relating the second issue and the topic, it would seem
that if there are errors committed in the exercise of powers by
administrative agencies, the government is not bound by the errors of
said agencies.

(a) Whether or not the acceptance of the negotiable

certificates of indebtedness tendered by the respondent bus firm to
and accepted by the Motor Vehicles Office and the corresponding
issuance of official receipts therefor acknowledging such payment by
said office is valid and binding on petitioner Republic

(b) Whether or not the government is estopped for the

mistakes committed by its agents

4. Ruling

4.1. Categorical answer to issues

(a) No
(b) No
4.2. Explanation for ruling

(a) Taxes were distinguished from regulatory fees. The

object of the latter is the enactment of specific measures that govern
the relations not only as between individuals but also as between
private parties and the political society. The former has for its object
the raising of revenue. The Motor Vehicle Act requires the payment of