xxx

(i) To hold lands of the public domain in excess of the area permitted to
private corporations by statute.

(j) To reclaim lands and to construct work across, or otherwise, any stream,
watercourse, canal, ditch, flume x x x.

xxx

(o) To perform such acts and exercise such functions as may be necessary for
the attainment of the purposes and objectives herein specified." (Emphasis
supplied)

PD No. 1084 authorizes PEA to reclaim both foreshore and submerged areas of the
public domain. Foreshore areas are those covered and uncovered by the ebb and
flow of the tide.61 Submerged areas are those permanently under water regardless of
the ebb and flow of the tide.62 Foreshore and submerged areas indisputably belong
to the public domain63 and are inalienable unless reclaimed, classified as alienable
lands open to disposition, and further declared no longer needed for public service.

The ban in the 1973 Constitution on private corporations from acquiring alienable
lands of the public domain did not apply to PEA since it was then, and until today, a
fully owned government corporation. The constitutional ban applied then, as it still
applies now, only to "private corporations and associations." PD No. 1084 expressly
empowers PEA "to hold lands of the public domain" even "in excess of the area
permitted to private corporations by statute." Thus, PEA can hold title to private
lands, as well as title to lands of the public domain.

In order for PEA to sell its reclaimed foreshore and submerged alienable lands of the
public domain, there must be legislative authority empowering PEA to sell these
lands. This legislative authority is necessary in view of Section 60 of CA No.141,
which states –

"Sec. 60. x x x; but the land so granted, donated or transferred to a province,

municipality, or branch or subdivision of the Government shall not be
alienated, encumbered or otherwise disposed of in a manner affecting its
title, except when authorized by Congress; x x x." (Emphasis supplied)

Without such legislative authority, PEA could not sell but only lease its reclaimed
foreshore and submerged alienable lands of the public domain. Nevertheless, any
legislative authority granted to PEA to sell its reclaimed alienable lands of the public
domain would be subject to the constitutional ban on private corporations from
acquiring alienable lands of the public domain. Hence, such legislative authority
could only benefit private individuals.

Dispositions under the 1987 Constitution

The 1987 Constitution, like the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions before it, has adopted
the Regalian doctrine. The 1987 Constitution declares that all natural resources are
"owned by the State," and except for alienable agricultural lands of the public
domain, natural resources cannot be alienated. Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution state that –
 "Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum
and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or
timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by
the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural
resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and
utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision
of the State. x x x.

Section 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or
timber, mineral lands, and national parks. Agricultural lands of the public
domain may be further classified by law according to the uses which they
may be devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited
to agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may not
hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, for a
period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than
twenty-five years, and not to exceed one thousand hectares in area.
Citizens of the Philippines may lease not more than five hundred hectares, or
acquire not more than twelve hectares thereof by purchase, homestead, or
grant.

Taking into account the requirements of conservation, ecology, and

development, and subject to the requirements of agrarian reform, the
Congress shall determine, by law, the size of lands of the public domain which
may be acquired, developed, held, or leased and the conditions therefor."
(Emphasis supplied)

The 1987 Constitution continues the State policy in the 1973 Constitution banning
private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public
domain. Like the 1973 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution allows private
corporations to hold alienable lands of the public domain only through lease. As in
the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, the general law governing the lease to private
corporations of reclaimed, foreshore and marshy alienable lands of the public
domain is still CA No. 141.

The Rationale behind the Constitutional Ban

The rationale behind the constitutional ban on corporations from acquiring, except
through lease, alienable lands of the public domain is not well understood. During
the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the commissioners probed
the rationale behind this ban, thus:

"FR. BERNAS: Mr. Vice-President, my questions have reference to page 3, line

5 which says:

`No private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public
domain except by lease, not to exceed one thousand hectares in area.'

If we recall, this provision did not exist under the 1935 Constitution, but this
was introduced in the 1973 Constitution. In effect, it prohibits private
corporations from acquiring alienable public lands. But it has not been very
clear in jurisprudence what the reason for this is. In some of the cases
decided in 1982 and 1983, it was indicated that the purpose of this is to
prevent large landholdings. Is that the intent of this provision?
MR. VILLEGAS: I think that is the spirit of the provision.

FR. BERNAS: In existing decisions involving the Iglesia ni Cristo, there were
instances where the Iglesia ni Cristo was not allowed to acquire a mere 313-
square meter land where a chapel stood because the Supreme Court said it
would be in violation of this." (Emphasis supplied)

In Ayog v. Cusi,64 the Court explained the rationale behind this constitutional ban in
this way:

"Indeed, one purpose of the constitutional prohibition against purchases of

public agricultural lands by private corporations is to equitably diffuse land
ownership or to encourage 'owner-cultivatorship and the economic family-size
farm' and to prevent a recurrence of cases like the instant case. Huge
landholdings by corporations or private persons had spawned social unrest."

However, if the constitutional intent is to prevent huge landholdings, the

Constitution could have simply limited the size of alienable lands of the public
domain that corporations could acquire. The Constitution could have followed the
limitations on individuals, who could acquire not more than 24 hectares of alienable
lands of the public domain under the 1973 Constitution, and not more than 12
hectares under the 1987 Constitution.

If the constitutional intent is to encourage economic family-size farms, placing the

land in the name of a corporation would be more effective in preventing the break-
up of farmlands. If the farmland is registered in the name of a corporation, upon the
death of the owner, his heirs would inherit shares in the corporation instead of
subdivided parcels of the farmland. This would prevent the continuing break-up of
farmlands into smaller and smaller plots from one generation to the next.

In actual practice, the constitutional ban strengthens the constitutional limitation on

individuals from acquiring more than the allowed area of alienable lands of the public
domain. Without the constitutional ban, individuals who already acquired the
maximum area of alienable lands of the public domain could easily set up
corporations to acquire more alienable public lands. An individual could own as many
corporations as his means would allow him. An individual could even hide his
ownership of a corporation by putting his nominees as stockholders of the
corporation. The corporation is a convenient vehicle to circumvent the constitutional
limitation on acquisition by individuals of alienable lands of the public domain.

The constitutional intent, under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, is to transfer
ownership of only a limited area of alienable land of the public domain to a qualified
individual. This constitutional intent is safeguarded by the provision prohibiting
corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain, since the vehicle to
circumvent the constitutional intent is removed. The available alienable public lands
are gradually decreasing in the face of an ever-growing population. The most
effective way to insure faithful adherence to this constitutional intent is to grant or
sell alienable lands of the public domain only to individuals. This, it would seem, is
the practical benefit arising from the constitutional ban.

The Amended Joint Venture Agreement

The subject matter of the Amended JVA, as stated in its second Whereas clause,
consists of three properties, namely:

1. "[T]hree partially reclaimed and substantially eroded islands along Emilio

Aguinaldo Boulevard in Paranaque and Las Pinas, Metro Manila, with a
combined titled area of 1,578,441 square meters;"

2. "[A]nother area of 2,421,559 square meters contiguous to the three

islands;" and

3. "[A]t AMARI's option as approved by PEA, an additional 350 hectares more

or less to regularize the configuration of the reclaimed area."65

PEA confirms that the Amended JVA involves "the development of the Freedom
Islands and further reclamation of about 250 hectares x x x," plus an option
"granted to AMARI to subsequently reclaim another 350 hectares x x x."66

In short, the Amended JVA covers a reclamation area of 750 hectares. Only 157.84
hectares of the 750-hectare reclamation project have been reclaimed, and
the rest of the 592.15 hectares are still submerged areas forming part of
Manila Bay.

Under the Amended JVA, AMARI will reimburse PEA the sum of P1,894,129,200.00
for PEA's "actual cost" in partially reclaiming the Freedom Islands. AMARI will also
complete, at its own expense, the reclamation of the Freedom Islands. AMARI will
further shoulder all the reclamation costs of all the other areas, totaling 592.15
hectares, still to be reclaimed. AMARI and PEA will share, in the proportion of 70
percent and 30 percent, respectively, the total net usable area which is defined in
the Amended JVA as the total reclaimed area less 30 percent earmarked for common
areas. Title to AMARI's share in the net usable area, totaling 367.5 hectares, will be
issued in the name of AMARI. Section 5.2 (c) of the Amended JVA provides that –

"x x x, PEA shall have the duty to execute without delay the necessary deed
of transfer or conveyance of the title pertaining to AMARI's Land share based
on the Land Allocation Plan. PEA, when requested in writing by AMARI,
shall then cause the issuance and delivery of the proper certificates of
title covering AMARI's Land Share in the name of AMARI, x x x;
provided, that if more than seventy percent (70%) of the titled area at any
given time pertains to AMARI, PEA shall deliver to AMARI only seventy
percent (70%) of the titles pertaining to AMARI, until such time when a
corresponding proportionate area of additional land pertaining to PEA has
been titled." (Emphasis supplied)

Indisputably, under the Amended JVA AMARI will acquire and own a
maximum of 367.5 hectares of reclaimed land which will be titled in its
name.

To implement the Amended JVA, PEA delegated to the unincorporated PEA-AMARI

joint venture PEA's statutory authority, rights and privileges to reclaim foreshore
and submerged areas in Manila Bay. Section 3.2.a of the Amended JVA states that –

"PEA hereby contributes to the joint venture its rights and privileges to
perform Rawland Reclamation and Horizontal Development as well as own the
 Reclamation Area, thereby granting the Joint Venture the full and exclusive
right, authority and privilege to undertake the Project in accordance with the
Master Development Plan."

The Amended JVA is the product of a renegotiation of the original JVA dated April
25, 1995 and its supplemental agreement dated August 9, 1995.

The Threshold Issue

The threshold issue is whether AMARI, a private corporation, can acquire and own
under the Amended JVA 367.5 hectares of reclaimed foreshore and submerged areas
in Manila Bay in view of Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which
state that:

"Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum,
and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or
timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by
the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural
resources shall not be alienated. x x x.

xxx

Section 3. x x x Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to

agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may not hold
such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, x x
x."(Emphasis supplied)

Classification of Reclaimed Foreshore and Submerged Areas

PEA readily concedes that lands reclaimed from foreshore or submerged areas of
Manila Bay are alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. In its
Memorandum,67 PEA admits that –

"Under the Public Land Act (CA 141, as amended), reclaimed lands are
classified as alienable and disposable lands of the public domain:

'Sec. 59. The lands disposable under this title shall be classified as
follows:

(a) Lands reclaimed by the government by dredging, filling, or other

means;

x x x.'" (Emphasis supplied)

Likewise, the Legal Task Force68 constituted under Presidential Administrative Order
No. 365 admitted in its Report and Recommendation to then President Fidel V.
Ramos, "[R]eclaimed lands are classified as alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain."69 The Legal Task Force concluded that –

"D. Conclusion

Reclaimed lands are lands of the public domain. However, by statutory

authority, the rights of ownership and disposition over reclaimed lands have
 been transferred to PEA, by virtue of which PEA, as owner, may validly
convey the same to any qualified person without violating the Constitution or
any statute.

The constitutional provision prohibiting private corporations from holding

public land, except by lease (Sec. 3, Art. XVII,70 1987 Constitution), does not
apply to reclaimed lands whose ownership has passed on to PEA by statutory
grant."

Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, the foreshore and submerged
areas of Manila Bay are part of the "lands of the public domain, waters x x x and
other natural resources" and consequently "owned by the State." As such, foreshore
and submerged areas "shall not be alienated," unless they are classified as
"agricultural lands" of the public domain. The mere reclamation of these areas by
PEA does not convert these inalienable natural resources of the State into alienable
or disposable lands of the public domain. There must be a law or presidential
proclamation officially classifying these reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable
and open to disposition or concession. Moreover, these reclaimed lands cannot be
classified as alienable or disposable if the law has reserved them for some public or
quasi-public use.71

Section 8 of CA No. 141 provides that "only those lands shall be declared open to
disposition or concession which have been officially delimited and
classified."72 The President has the authority to classify inalienable lands of the
public domain into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, pursuant to
Section 6 of CA No. 141. In Laurel vs. Garcia,73 the Executive Department attempted
to sell the Roppongi property in Tokyo, Japan, which was acquired by the Philippine
Government for use as the Chancery of the Philippine Embassy. Although the
Chancery had transferred to another location thirteen years earlier, the Court still
ruled that, under Article 42274 of the Civil Code, a property of public dominion
retains such character until formally declared otherwise. The Court ruled that –

"The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time for actual
Embassy service does not automatically convert it to patrimonial property.
Any such conversion happens only if the property is withdrawn from public
use (Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene Co. v. Bercilles, 66 SCRA 481 [1975]. A
property continues to be part of the public domain, not available for
private appropriation or ownership 'until there is a formal declaration
on the part of the government to withdraw it from being such' (Ignacio
v. Director of Lands, 108 Phil. 335 [1960]." (Emphasis supplied)

PD No. 1085, issued on February 4, 1977, authorized the issuance of special land
patents for lands reclaimed by PEA from the foreshore or submerged areas of Manila
Bay. On January 19, 1988 then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Special Patent
No. 3517 in the name of PEA for the 157.84 hectares comprising the partially
reclaimed Freedom Islands. Subsequently, on April 9, 1999 the Register of Deeds of
the Municipality of Paranaque issued TCT Nos. 7309, 7311 and 7312 in the name of
PEA pursuant to Section 103 of PD No. 1529 authorizing the issuance of certificates
of title corresponding to land patents. To this day, these certificates of title are still
in the name of PEA.

PD No. 1085, coupled with President Aquino's actual issuance of a special patent
covering the Freedom Islands, is equivalent to an official proclamation classifying the
Freedom Islands as alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. PD No. 1085
and President Aquino's issuance of a land patent also constitute a declaration that
the Freedom Islands are no longer needed for public service. The Freedom Islands
are thus alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, open to
disposition or concession to qualified parties.

At the time then President Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517, PEA had already
reclaimed the Freedom Islands although subsequently there were partial erosions on
some areas. The government had also completed the necessary surveys on these
islands. Thus, the Freedom Islands were no longer part of Manila Bay but part of the
land mass. Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution classifies lands of the
public domain into "agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks."
Being neither timber, mineral, nor national park lands, the reclaimed Freedom
Islands necessarily fall under the classification of agricultural lands of the public
domain. Under the 1987 Constitution, agricultural lands of the public domain are the
only natural resources that the State may alienate to qualified private parties. All
other natural resources, such as the seas or bays, are "waters x x x owned by the
State" forming part of the public domain, and are inalienable pursuant to Section 2,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.

AMARI claims that the Freedom Islands are private lands because CDCP, then a
private corporation, reclaimed the islands under a contract dated November 20,
1973 with the Commissioner of Public Highways. AMARI, citing Article 5 of the
Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, argues that "if the ownership of reclaimed lands
may be given to the party constructing the works, then it cannot be said that
reclaimed lands are lands of the public domain which the State may not
alienate."75 Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters reads as follows:

"Article 5. Lands reclaimed from the sea in consequence of works constructed

by the State, or by the provinces, pueblos or private persons, with proper
permission, shall become the property of the party constructing such
works, unless otherwise provided by the terms of the grant of
authority." (Emphasis supplied)

Under Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, private parties could reclaim
from the sea only with "proper permission" from the State. Private parties could own
the reclaimed land only if not "otherwise provided by the terms of the grant of
authority." This clearly meant that no one could reclaim from the sea without
permission from the State because the sea is property of public dominion. It also
meant that the State could grant or withhold ownership of the reclaimed land
because any reclaimed land, like the sea from which it emerged, belonged to the
State. Thus, a private person reclaiming from the sea without permission from the
State could not acquire ownership of the reclaimed land which would remain
property of public dominion like the sea it replaced.76 Article 5 of the Spanish Law of
Waters of 1866 adopted the time-honored principle of land ownership that "all lands
that were not acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong
to the public domain."77

Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters must be read together with laws subsequently
enacted on the disposition of public lands. In particular, CA No. 141 requires that
lands of the public domain must first be classified as alienable or disposable before
the government can alienate them. These lands must not be reserved for public or
quasi-public purposes.78 Moreover, the contract between CDCP and the government
was executed after the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution which barred private
corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. This
contract could not have converted the Freedom Islands into private lands of a
private corporation.

Presidential Decree No. 3-A, issued on January 11, 1973, revoked all laws
authorizing the reclamation of areas under water and revested solely in the National
Government the power to reclaim lands. Section 1 of PD No. 3-A declared that –

"The provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, the

reclamation of areas under water, whether foreshore or inland, shall
be limited to the National Government or any person authorized by it
under a proper contract. (Emphasis supplied)

x x x."

PD No. 3-A repealed Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 because
reclamation of areas under water could now be undertaken only by the National
Government or by a person contracted by the National Government. Private parties
may reclaim from the sea only under a contract with the National Government, and
no longer by grant or permission as provided in Section 5 of the Spanish Law of
Waters of 1866.

Executive Order No. 525, issued on February 14, 1979, designated PEA as the
National Government's implementing arm to undertake "all reclamation projects of
the government," which "shall be undertaken by the PEA or through a proper
contract executed by it with any person or entity." Under such contract, a
private party receives compensation for reclamation services rendered to PEA.
Payment to the contractor may be in cash, or in kind consisting of portions of the
reclaimed land, subject to the constitutional ban on private corporations from
acquiring alienable lands of the public domain. The reclaimed land can be used as
payment in kind only if the reclaimed land is first classified as alienable or disposable
land open to disposition, and then declared no longer needed for public service.

The Amended JVA covers not only the Freedom Islands, but also an additional
592.15 hectares which are still submerged and forming part of Manila Bay. There is
no legislative or Presidential act classifying these submerged areas as
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain open to disposition. These
submerged areas are not covered by any patent or certificate of title. There can be
no dispute that these submerged areas form part of the public domain, and in their
present state are inalienable and outside the commerce of man. Until reclaimed
from the sea, these submerged areas are, under the Constitution, "waters x x x
owned by the State," forming part of the public domain and consequently
inalienable. Only when actually reclaimed from the sea can these submerged areas
be classified as public agricultural lands, which under the Constitution are the only
natural resources that the State may alienate. Once reclaimed and transformed into
public agricultural lands, the government may then officially classify these lands as
alienable or disposable lands open to disposition. Thereafter, the government may
declare these lands no longer needed for public service. Only then can these
reclaimed lands be considered alienable or disposable lands of the public domain and
within the commerce of man.

The classification of PEA's reclaimed foreshore and submerged lands into alienable or
disposable lands open to disposition is necessary because PEA is tasked under its
charter to undertake public services that require the use of lands of the public
domain. Under Section 5 of PD No. 1084, the functions of PEA include the following:
"[T]o own or operate railroads, tramways and other kinds of land transportation, x x
x; [T]o construct, maintain and operate such systems of sanitary sewers as may be
necessary; [T]o construct, maintain and operate such storm drains as may be
necessary." PEA is empowered to issue "rules and regulations as may be necessary
for the proper use by private parties of any or all of the highways, roads,
utilities, buildings and/or any of its properties and to impose or collect fees or
tolls for their use." Thus, part of the reclaimed foreshore and submerged lands held
by the PEA would actually be needed for public use or service since many of the
functions imposed on PEA by its charter constitute essential public services.

Moreover, Section 1 of Executive Order No. 525 provides that PEA "shall be primarily
responsible for integrating, directing, and coordinating all reclamation projects for
and on behalf of the National Government." The same section also states that "[A]ll
reclamation projects shall be approved by the President upon recommendation of
the PEA, and shall be undertaken by the PEA or through a proper contract executed
by it with any person or entity; x x x." Thus, under EO No. 525, in relation to PD No.
3-A and PD No.1084, PEA became the primary implementing agency of the National
Government to reclaim foreshore and submerged lands of the public domain. EO No.
525 recognized PEA as the government entity "to undertake the reclamation of lands
and ensure their maximum utilization in promoting public welfare and
interests."79 Since large portions of these reclaimed lands would obviously be
needed for public service, there must be a formal declaration segregating reclaimed
lands no longer needed for public service from those still needed for public service. 1âwphi1.nêt

Section 3 of EO No. 525, by declaring that all lands reclaimed by PEA "shall belong
to or be owned by the PEA," could not automatically operate to classify inalienable
lands into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. Otherwise, reclaimed
foreshore and submerged lands of the public domain would automatically become
alienable once reclaimed by PEA, whether or not classified as alienable or
disposable.

The Revised Administrative Code of 1987, a later law than either PD No. 1084 or EO
No. 525, vests in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources ("DENR" for
brevity) the following powers and functions:

"Sec. 4. Powers and Functions. The Department shall:

(1) x x x

xxx

(4) Exercise supervision and control over forest lands, alienable and
disposable public lands, mineral resources and, in the process of exercising
such control, impose appropriate taxes, fees, charges, rentals and any such
form of levy and collect such revenues for the exploration, development,
utilization or gathering of such resources;

xxx

(14) Promulgate rules, regulations and guidelines on the issuance of

licenses, permits, concessions, lease agreements and such other
privileges concerning the development, exploration and utilization of
the country's marine, freshwater, and brackish water and over all
 aquatic resources of the country and shall continue to oversee,
supervise and police our natural resources; cancel or cause to cancel
such privileges upon failure, non-compliance or violations of any regulation,
order, and for all other causes which are in furtherance of the conservation of
natural resources and supportive of the national interest;

(15) Exercise exclusive jurisdiction on the management and

disposition of all lands of the public domain and serve as the sole
agency responsible for classification, sub-classification, surveying and
titling of lands in consultation with appropriate agencies."80 (Emphasis
supplied)

As manager, conservator and overseer of the natural resources of the State, DENR
exercises "supervision and control over alienable and disposable public lands." DENR
also exercises "exclusive jurisdiction on the management and disposition of all lands
of the public domain." Thus, DENR decides whether areas under water, like
foreshore or submerged areas of Manila Bay, should be reclaimed or not. This means
that PEA needs authorization from DENR before PEA can undertake reclamation
projects in Manila Bay, or in any part of the country.

DENR also exercises exclusive jurisdiction over the disposition of all lands of the
public domain. Hence, DENR decides whether reclaimed lands of PEA should be
classified as alienable under Sections 681 and 782 of CA No. 141. Once DENR decides
that the reclaimed lands should be so classified, it then recommends to the
President the issuance of a proclamation classifying the lands as alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain open to disposition. We note that then DENR
Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr. countersigned Special Patent No. 3517 in
compliance with the Revised Administrative Code and Sections 6 and 7 of CA No.
141.

In short, DENR is vested with the power to authorize the reclamation of areas under
water, while PEA is vested with the power to undertake the physical reclamation of
areas under water, whether directly or through private contractors. DENR is also
empowered to classify lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable lands
subject to the approval of the President. On the other hand, PEA is tasked to
develop, sell or lease the reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain.

Clearly, the mere physical act of reclamation by PEA of foreshore or submerged

areas does not make the reclaimed lands alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain, much less patrimonial lands of PEA. Likewise, the mere transfer by the
National Government of lands of the public domain to PEA does not make the lands
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, much less patrimonial lands of
PEA.

Absent two official acts – a classification that these lands are alienable or disposable
and open to disposition and a declaration that these lands are not needed for public
service, lands reclaimed by PEA remain inalienable lands of the public domain. Only
such an official classification and formal declaration can convert reclaimed lands into
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, open to disposition under the
Constitution, Title I and Title III83 of CA No. 141 and other applicable laws.84

PEA's Authority to Sell Reclaimed Lands

PEA, like the Legal Task Force, argues that as alienable or disposable lands of the
public domain, the reclaimed lands shall be disposed of in accordance with CA No.
141, the Public Land Act. PEA, citing Section 60 of CA No. 141, admits that
reclaimed lands transferred to a branch or subdivision of the government "shall not
be alienated, encumbered, or otherwise disposed of in a manner affecting its
title, except when authorized by Congress: x x x."85 (Emphasis by PEA)

In Laurel vs. Garcia,86 the Court cited Section 48 of the Revised Administrative
Code of 1987, which states that –

"Sec. 48. Official Authorized to Convey Real Property. Whenever real property
of the Government is authorized by law to be conveyed, the deed of
conveyance shall be executed in behalf of the government by the following: x
x x."

Thus, the Court concluded that a law is needed to convey any real property
belonging to the Government. The Court declared that -

"It is not for the President to convey real property of the government on his
or her own sole will. Any such conveyance must be authorized and
approved by a law enacted by the Congress. It requires executive and
legislative concurrence." (Emphasis supplied)

PEA contends that PD No. 1085 and EO No. 525 constitute the legislative authority
allowing PEA to sell its reclaimed lands. PD No. 1085, issued on February 4, 1977,
provides that –

"The land reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore area of Manila

Bay pursuant to the contract for the reclamation and construction of the
Manila-Cavite Coastal Road Project between the Republic of the Philippines
and the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines dated
November 20, 1973 and/or any other contract or reclamation covering the
same area is hereby transferred, conveyed and assigned to the
ownership and administration of the Public Estates
Authority established pursuant to PD No. 1084; Provided, however, That the
rights and interests of the Construction and Development Corporation of the
Philippines pursuant to the aforesaid contract shall be recognized and
respected.

Henceforth, the Public Estates Authority shall exercise the rights and assume
the obligations of the Republic of the Philippines (Department of Public
Highways) arising from, or incident to, the aforesaid contract between the
Republic of the Philippines and the Construction and Development Corporation
of the Philippines.

In consideration of the foregoing transfer and assignment, the Public Estates

Authority shall issue in favor of the Republic of the Philippines the
corresponding shares of stock in said entity with an issued value of said
shares of stock (which) shall be deemed fully paid and non-assessable.

The Secretary of Public Highways and the General Manager of the Public
Estates Authority shall execute such contracts or agreements, including
 appropriate agreements with the Construction and Development Corporation
of the Philippines, as may be necessary to implement the above.

Special land patent/patents shall be issued by the Secretary of

Natural Resources in favor of the Public Estates Authority without
prejudice to the subsequent transfer to the contractor or his
assignees of such portion or portions of the land reclaimed or to be
reclaimed as provided for in the above-mentioned contract. On the
basis of such patents, the Land Registration Commission shall issue
the corresponding certificate of title." (Emphasis supplied)

On the other hand, Section 3 of EO No. 525, issued on February 14, 1979, provides
that -

"Sec. 3. All lands reclaimed by PEA shall belong to or be owned by the

PEA which shall be responsible for its administration, development, utilization
or disposition in accordance with the provisions of Presidential Decree No.
1084. Any and all income that the PEA may derive from the sale, lease or use
of reclaimed lands shall be used in accordance with the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 1084."

There is no express authority under either PD No. 1085 or EO No. 525 for PEA to sell
its reclaimed lands. PD No. 1085 merely transferred "ownership and administration"
of lands reclaimed from Manila Bay to PEA, while EO No. 525 declared that lands
reclaimed by PEA "shall belong to or be owned by PEA." EO No. 525 expressly states
that PEA should dispose of its reclaimed lands "in accordance with the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 1084," the charter of PEA.

PEA's charter, however, expressly tasks PEA "to develop, improve, acquire,
administer, deal in, subdivide, dispose, lease and sell any and all kinds of lands x
x x owned, managed, controlled and/or operated by the government."87(Emphasis
supplied) There is, therefore, legislative authority granted to PEA to sell its
lands, whether patrimonial or alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may
sell to private parties its patrimonial propertiesin accordance with the PEA charter
free from constitutional limitations. The constitutional ban on private corporations
from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain does not apply to the sale of
PEA's patrimonial lands.

PEA may also sell its alienable or disposable lands of the public domain to
private individuals since, with the legislative authority, there is no longer any
statutory prohibition against such sales and the constitutional ban does not apply to
individuals. PEA, however, cannot sell any of its alienable or disposable lands of the
public domain to private corporations since Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution expressly prohibits such sales. The legislative authority benefits only
individuals. Private corporations remain barred from acquiring any kind of alienable
land of the public domain, including government reclaimed lands.

The provision in PD No. 1085 stating that portions of the reclaimed lands could be
transferred by PEA to the "contractor or his assignees" (Emphasis supplied) would
not apply to private corporations but only to individuals because of the constitutional
ban. Otherwise, the provisions of PD No. 1085 would violate both the 1973 and 1987
Constitutions.
The requirement of public auction in the sale of reclaimed lands

Assuming the reclaimed lands of PEA are classified as alienable or disposable lands
open to disposition, and further declared no longer needed for public service, PEA
would have to conduct a public bidding in selling or leasing these lands. PEA must
observe the provisions of Sections 63 and 67 of CA No. 141 requiring public auction,
in the absence of a law exempting PEA from holding a public auction.88 Special
Patent No. 3517 expressly states that the patent is issued by authority of the
Constitution and PD No. 1084, "supplemented by Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended." This is an acknowledgment that the provisions of CA No. 141 apply to the
disposition of reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain unless otherwise
provided by law. Executive Order No. 654,89 which authorizes PEA "to determine the
kind and manner of payment for the transfer" of its assets and properties, does not
exempt PEA from the requirement of public auction. EO No. 654 merely authorizes
PEA to decide the mode of payment, whether in kind and in installment, but does
not authorize PEA to dispense with public auction.

Moreover, under Section 79 of PD No. 1445, otherwise known as the Government

Auditing Code, the government is required to sell valuable government property
through public bidding. Section 79 of PD No. 1445 mandates that –

"Section 79. When government property has become unserviceable for

any cause, or is no longer needed, it shall, upon application of the officer
accountable therefor, be inspected by the head of the agency or his duly
authorized representative in the presence of the auditor concerned and, if
found to be valueless or unsaleable, it may be destroyed in their presence. If
found to be valuable, it may be sold at public auction to the highest
bidder under the supervision of the proper committee on award or similar
body in the presence of the auditor concerned or other authorized
representative of the Commission, after advertising by printed notice in
the Official Gazette, or for not less than three consecutive days in any
newspaper of general circulation, or where the value of the property does
not warrant the expense of publication, by notices posted for a like period in
at least three public places in the locality where the property is to be sold. In
the event that the public auction fails, the property may be sold at a
private sale at such price as may be fixed by the same committee or
body concerned and approved by the Commission."

It is only when the public auction fails that a negotiated sale is allowed, in which
case the Commission on Audit must approve the selling price.90 The Commission on
Audit implements Section 79 of the Government Auditing Code through Circular No.
89-29691 dated January 27, 1989. This circular emphasizes that government assets
must be disposed of only through public auction, and a negotiated sale can be
resorted to only in case of "failure of public auction."

At the public auction sale, only Philippine citizens are qualified to bid for PEA's
reclaimed foreshore and submerged alienable lands of the public domain. Private
corporations are barred from bidding at the auction sale of any kind of alienable land
of the public domain.

PEA originally scheduled a public bidding for the Freedom Islands on December 10,
1991. PEA imposed a condition that the winning bidder should reclaim another 250
hectares of submerged areas to regularize the shape of the Freedom Islands, under
a 60-40 sharing of the additional reclaimed areas in favor of the winning bidder.92 No
one, however, submitted a bid. On December 23, 1994, the Government Corporate
Counsel advised PEA it could sell the Freedom Islands through negotiation, without
need of another public bidding, because of the failure of the public bidding on
December 10, 1991.93

However, the original JVA dated April 25, 1995 covered not only the Freedom
Islands and the additional 250 hectares still to be reclaimed, it also granted an
option to AMARI to reclaim another 350 hectares. The original JVA, a negotiated
contract, enlarged the reclamation area to 750 hectares.94 The failure of public
bidding on December 10, 1991, involving only 407.84 hectares,95 is not a valid
justification for a negotiated sale of 750 hectares, almost double the area publicly
auctioned. Besides, the failure of public bidding happened on December 10, 1991,
more than three years before the signing of the original JVA on April 25, 1995. The
economic situation in the country had greatly improved during the intervening
period.

Reclamation under the BOT Law and the Local Government Code

The constitutional prohibition in Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is

absolute and clear: "Private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable
lands of the public domain except by lease, x x x." Even Republic Act No. 6957
("BOT Law," for brevity), cited by PEA and AMARI as legislative authority to sell
reclaimed lands to private parties, recognizes the constitutional ban. Section 6 of RA
No. 6957 states –

"Sec. 6. Repayment Scheme. - For the financing, construction, operation and

maintenance of any infrastructure projects undertaken through the build-
operate-and-transfer arrangement or any of its variations pursuant to the
provisions of this Act, the project proponent x x x may likewise be repaid in
the form of a share in the revenue of the project or other non-monetary
payments, such as, but not limited to, the grant of a portion or percentage of
the reclaimed land, subject to the constitutional requirements with
respect to the ownership of the land: x x x." (Emphasis supplied)

A private corporation, even one that undertakes the physical reclamation of a

government BOT project, cannot acquire reclaimed alienable lands of the public
domain in view of the constitutional ban.

Section 302 of the Local Government Code, also mentioned by PEA and AMARI,
authorizes local governments in land reclamation projects to pay the contractor or
developer in kind consisting of a percentage of the reclaimed land, to wit:

"Section 302. Financing, Construction, Maintenance, Operation, and

Management of Infrastructure Projects by the Private Sector. x x x

xxx

In case of land reclamation or construction of industrial estates, the

repayment plan may consist of the grant of a portion or percentage of the
reclaimed land or the industrial estate constructed."

Although Section 302 of the Local Government Code does not contain a proviso
similar to that of the BOT Law, the constitutional restrictions on land ownership
automatically apply even though not expressly mentioned in the Local Government
Code.

Thus, under either the BOT Law or the Local Government Code, the contractor or
developer, if a corporate entity, can only be paid with leaseholds on portions of the
reclaimed land. If the contractor or developer is an individual, portions of the
reclaimed land, not exceeding 12 hectares96 of non-agricultural lands, may be
conveyed to him in ownership in view of the legislative authority allowing such
conveyance. This is the only way these provisions of the BOT Law and the Local
Government Code can avoid a direct collision with Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution.

Registration of lands of the public domain

Finally, PEA theorizes that the "act of conveying the ownership of the reclaimed
lands to public respondent PEA transformed such lands of the public domain to
private lands." This theory is echoed by AMARI which maintains that the "issuance of
the special patent leading to the eventual issuance of title takes the subject land
away from the land of public domain and converts the property into patrimonial or
private property." In short, PEA and AMARI contend that with the issuance of Special
Patent No. 3517 and the corresponding certificates of titles, the 157.84 hectares
comprising the Freedom Islands have become private lands of PEA. In support of
their theory, PEA and AMARI cite the following rulings of the Court:

1. Sumail v. Judge of CFI of Cotabato,97 where the Court held –

"Once the patent was granted and the corresponding certificate of title was
issued, the land ceased to be part of the public domain and became private
property over which the Director of Lands has neither control nor
jurisdiction."

2. Lee Hong Hok v. David,98 where the Court declared -

"After the registration and issuance of the certificate and duplicate certificate
of title based on a public land patent, the land covered thereby automatically
comes under the operation of Republic Act 496 subject to all the safeguards
provided therein."3. Heirs of Gregorio Tengco v. Heirs of Jose
Aliwalas,99 where the Court ruled -

"While the Director of Lands has the power to review homestead patents, he
may do so only so long as the land remains part of the public domain and
continues to be under his exclusive control; but once the patent is registered
and a certificate of title is issued, the land ceases to be part of the public
domain and becomes private property over which the Director of Lands has
neither control nor jurisdiction."

4. Manalo v. Intermediate Appellate Court,100 where the Court held –

"When the lots in dispute were certified as disposable on May 19, 1971, and
free patents were issued covering the same in favor of the private
respondents, the said lots ceased to be part of the public domain and,
therefore, the Director of Lands lost jurisdiction over the same."
 5.Republic v. Court of Appeals,101 where the Court stated –

"Proclamation No. 350, dated October 9, 1956, of President Magsaysay legally

effected a land grant to the Mindanao Medical Center, Bureau of Medical
Services, Department of Health, of the whole lot, validly sufficient for initial
registration under the Land Registration Act. Such land grant is constitutive of
a 'fee simple' title or absolute title in favor of petitioner Mindanao Medical
Center. Thus, Section 122 of the Act, which governs the registration of grants
or patents involving public lands, provides that 'Whenever public lands in the
Philippine Islands belonging to the Government of the United States or to the
Government of the Philippines are alienated, granted or conveyed to persons
or to public or private corporations, the same shall be brought forthwith
under the operation of this Act (Land Registration Act, Act 496) and shall
become registered lands.'"

The first four cases cited involve petitions to cancel the land patents and the
corresponding certificates of titles issued to private parties. These four cases
uniformly hold that the Director of Lands has no jurisdiction over private lands or
that upon issuance of the certificate of title the land automatically comes under the
Torrens System. The fifth case cited involves the registration under the Torrens
System of a 12.8-hectare public land granted by the National Government to
Mindanao Medical Center, a government unit under the Department of Health. The
National Government transferred the 12.8-hectare public land to serve as the site
for the hospital buildings and other facilities of Mindanao Medical Center, which
performed a public service. The Court affirmed the registration of the 12.8-hectare
public land in the name of Mindanao Medical Center under Section 122 of Act No.
496. This fifth case is an example of a public land being registered under Act No.
496 without the land losing its character as a property of public dominion.

In the instant case, the only patent and certificates of title issued are those in the
name of PEA, a wholly government owned corporation performing public as well as
proprietary functions. No patent or certificate of title has been issued to any private
party. No one is asking the Director of Lands to cancel PEA's patent or certificates of
title. In fact, the thrust of the instant petition is that PEA's certificates of title should
remain with PEA, and the land covered by these certificates, being alienable lands of
the public domain, should not be sold to a private corporation.

Registration of land under Act No. 496 or PD No. 1529 does not vest in the
registrant private or public ownership of the land. Registration is not a mode of
acquiring ownership but is merely evidence of ownership previously conferred by
any of the recognized modes of acquiring ownership. Registration does not give the
registrant a better right than what the registrant had prior to the registration. 102 The
registration of lands of the public domain under the Torrens system, by itself, cannot
convert public lands into private lands.103

Jurisprudence holding that upon the grant of the patent or issuance of the certificate
of title the alienable land of the public domain automatically becomes private land
cannot apply to government units and entities like PEA. The transfer of the Freedom
Islands to PEA was made subject to the provisions of CA No. 141 as expressly stated
in Special Patent No. 3517 issued by then President Aquino, to wit:

"NOW, THEREFORE, KNOW YE, that by authority of the Constitution of the

Philippines and in conformity with the provisions of Presidential Decree No.
1084, supplemented by Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended,
 there are hereby granted and conveyed unto the Public Estates Authority the
aforesaid tracts of land containing a total area of one million nine hundred
fifteen thousand eight hundred ninety four (1,915,894) square meters; the
technical description of which are hereto attached and made an integral part
hereof." (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, the provisions of CA No. 141 apply to the Freedom Islands on matters not
covered by PD No. 1084. Section 60 of CA No. 141 prohibits, "except when
authorized by Congress," the sale of alienable lands of the public domain that are
transferred to government units or entities. Section 60 of CA No. 141 constitutes,
under Section 44 of PD No. 1529, a "statutory lien affecting title" of the registered
land even if not annotated on the certificate of title.104Alienable lands of the public
domain held by government entities under Section 60 of CA No. 141 remain public
lands because they cannot be alienated or encumbered unless Congress passes a
law authorizing their disposition. Congress, however, cannot authorize the sale to
private corporations of reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain because of the
constitutional ban. Only individuals can benefit from such law.

The grant of legislative authority to sell public lands in accordance with Section 60 of
CA No. 141 does not automatically convert alienable lands of the public domain into
private or patrimonial lands. The alienable lands of the public domain must be
transferred to qualified private parties, or to government entities not tasked to
dispose of public lands, before these lands can become private or patrimonial lands.
Otherwise, the constitutional ban will become illusory if Congress can declare lands
of the public domain as private or patrimonial lands in the hands of a government
agency tasked to dispose of public lands. This will allow private corporations to
acquire directly from government agencies limitless areas of lands which, prior to
such law, are concededly public lands.

Under EO No. 525, PEA became the central implementing agency of the National
Government to reclaim foreshore and submerged areas of the public domain. Thus,
EO No. 525 declares that –

"EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 525

Designating the Public Estates Authority as the Agency Primarily Responsible

for all Reclamation Projects

Whereas, there are several reclamation projects which are ongoing or being
proposed to be undertaken in various parts of the country which need to be
evaluated for consistency with national programs;

Whereas, there is a need to give further institutional support to the

Government's declared policy to provide for a coordinated, economical and
efficient reclamation of lands;

Whereas, Presidential Decree No. 3-A requires that all reclamation of areas
shall be limited to the National Government or any person authorized by it
under proper contract;

Whereas, a central authority is needed to act on behalf of the

National Government which shall ensure a coordinated and integrated
approach in the reclamation of lands;
 Whereas, Presidential Decree No. 1084 creates the Public Estates
Authority as a government corporation to undertake reclamation of
lands and ensure their maximum utilization in promoting public
welfare and interests; and

Whereas, Presidential Decree No. 1416 provides the President with continuing
authority to reorganize the national government including the transfer,
abolition, or merger of functions and offices.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by

virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution and pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 1416, do hereby order and direct the following:

Section 1. The Public Estates Authority (PEA) shall be primarily

responsible for integrating, directing, and coordinating all
reclamation projects for and on behalf of the National Government. All
reclamation projects shall be approved by the President upon
recommendation of the PEA, and shall be undertaken by the PEA or through a
proper contract executed by it with any person or entity; Provided, that,
reclamation projects of any national government agency or entity authorized
under its charter shall be undertaken in consultation with the PEA upon
approval of the President.

x x x ."

As the central implementing agency tasked to undertake reclamation projects

nationwide, with authority to sell reclaimed lands, PEA took the place of DENR as the
government agency charged with leasing or selling reclaimed lands of the public
domain. The reclaimed lands being leased or sold by PEA are not private lands, in
the same manner that DENR, when it disposes of other alienable lands, does not
dispose of private lands but alienable lands of the public domain. Only when
qualified private parties acquire these lands will the lands become private lands. In
the hands of the government agency tasked and authorized to dispose of
alienable of disposable lands of the public domain, these lands are still
public, not private lands.

Furthermore, PEA's charter expressly states that PEA "shall hold lands of the
public domain" as well as "any and all kinds of lands." PEA can hold both lands of
the public domain and private lands. Thus, the mere fact that alienable lands of the
public domain like the Freedom Islands are transferred to PEA and issued land
patents or certificates of title in PEA's name does not automatically make such lands
private.

To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to PEA
as private lands will sanction a gross violation of the constitutional ban on private
corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. PEA will
simply turn around, as PEA has now done under the Amended JVA, and transfer
several hundreds of hectares of these reclaimed and still to be reclaimed lands to a
single private corporation in only one transaction. This scheme will effectively nullify
the constitutional ban in Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which was
intended to diffuse equitably the ownership of alienable lands of the public domain
among Filipinos, now numbering over 80 million strong.
This scheme, if allowed, can even be applied to alienable agricultural lands of the
public domain since PEA can "acquire x x x any and all kinds of lands." This will open
the floodgates to corporations and even individuals acquiring hundreds of hectares
of alienable lands of the public domain under the guise that in the hands of PEA
these lands are private lands. This will result in corporations amassing huge
landholdings never before seen in this country - creating the very evil that the
constitutional ban was designed to prevent. This will completely reverse the clear
direction of constitutional development in this country. The 1935 Constitution
allowed private corporations to acquire not more than 1,024 hectares of public
lands.105 The 1973 Constitution prohibited private corporations from acquiring any
kind of public land, and the 1987 Constitution has unequivocally reiterated this
prohibition.

The contention of PEA and AMARI that public lands, once registered under Act No.
496 or PD No. 1529, automatically become private lands is contrary to existing laws.
Several laws authorize lands of the public domain to be registered under the Torrens
System or Act No. 496, now PD No. 1529, without losing their character as public
lands. Section 122 of Act No. 496, and Section 103 of PD No. 1529, respectively,
provide as follows:

Act No. 496

"Sec. 122. Whenever public lands in the Philippine Islands belonging to the x
x x Government of the Philippine Islands are alienated, granted, or conveyed
to persons or the public or private corporations, the same shall be
brought forthwith under the operation of this Act and shall become registered
lands."

PD No. 1529

"Sec. 103. Certificate of Title to Patents. Whenever public land is by the

Government alienated, granted or conveyed to any person, the same shall
be brought forthwith under the operation of this Decree." (Emphasis supplied)

Based on its legislative history, the phrase "conveyed to any person" in Section 103
of PD No. 1529 includes conveyances of public lands to public corporations.

Alienable lands of the public domain "granted, donated, or transferred to a province,

municipality, or branch or subdivision of the Government," as provided in Section 60
of CA No. 141, may be registered under the Torrens System pursuant to Section 103
of PD No. 1529. Such registration, however, is expressly subject to the condition in
Section 60 of CA No. 141 that the land "shall not be alienated, encumbered or
otherwise disposed of in a manner affecting its title, except when authorized
by Congress." This provision refers to government reclaimed, foreshore and
marshy lands of the public domain that have been titled but still cannot be alienated
or encumbered unless expressly authorized by Congress. The need for legislative
authority prevents the registered land of the public domain from becoming private
land that can be disposed of to qualified private parties.

The Revised Administrative Code of 1987 also recognizes that lands of the public
domain may be registered under the Torrens System. Section 48, Chapter 12, Book
I of the Code states –
 "Sec. 48. Official Authorized to Convey Real Property. Whenever real property
of the Government is authorized by law to be conveyed, the deed of
conveyance shall be executed in behalf of the government by the following:

(1) x x x

(2) For property belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, but

titled in the name of any political subdivision or of any corporate
agency or instrumentality, by the executive head of the agency or
instrumentality." (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, private property purchased by the National Government for expansion of a

public wharf may be titled in the name of a government corporation regulating port
operations in the country. Private property purchased by the National Government
for expansion of an airport may also be titled in the name of the government agency
tasked to administer the airport. Private property donated to a municipality for use
as a town plaza or public school site may likewise be titled in the name of the
municipality.106 All these properties become properties of the public domain, and if
already registered under Act No. 496 or PD No. 1529, remain registered land. There
is no requirement or provision in any existing law for the de-registration of land from
the Torrens System.

Private lands taken by the Government for public use under its power of eminent
domain become unquestionably part of the public domain. Nevertheless, Section 85
of PD No. 1529 authorizes the Register of Deeds to issue in the name of the National
Government new certificates of title covering such expropriated lands. Section 85 of
PD No. 1529 states –

"Sec. 85. Land taken by eminent domain. Whenever any registered land, or
interest therein, is expropriated or taken by eminent domain, the National
Government, province, city or municipality, or any other agency or
instrumentality exercising such right shall file for registration in the proper
Registry a certified copy of the judgment which shall state definitely by an
adequate description, the particular property or interest expropriated, the
number of the certificate of title, and the nature of the public use. A
memorandum of the right or interest taken shall be made on each certificate
of title by the Register of Deeds, and where the fee simple is taken, a new
certificate shall be issued in favor of the National Government,
province, city, municipality, or any other agency or instrumentality
exercising such right for the land so taken. The legal expenses incident to the
memorandum of registration or issuance of a new certificate of title shall be
for the account of the authority taking the land or interest therein."
(Emphasis supplied)

Consequently, lands registered under Act No. 496 or PD No. 1529 are not
exclusively private or patrimonial lands. Lands of the public domain may also be
registered pursuant to existing laws.

AMARI makes a parting shot that the Amended JVA is not a sale to AMARI of the
Freedom Islands or of the lands to be reclaimed from submerged areas of Manila
Bay. In the words of AMARI, the Amended JVA "is not a sale but a joint venture with
a stipulation for reimbursement of the original cost incurred by PEA for the earlier
reclamation and construction works performed by the CDCP under its 1973 contract
with the Republic." Whether the Amended JVA is a sale or a joint venture, the fact
remains that the Amended JVA requires PEA to "cause the issuance and delivery of
the certificates of title conveying AMARI's Land Share in the name of AMARI."107

This stipulation still contravenes Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which
provides that private corporations "shall not hold such alienable lands of the public
domain except by lease." The transfer of title and ownership to AMARI clearly means
that AMARI will "hold" the reclaimed lands other than by lease. The transfer of title
and ownership is a "disposition" of the reclaimed lands, a transaction considered a
sale or alienation under CA No. 141,108 the Government Auditing Code,109 and
Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.

The Regalian doctrine is deeply implanted in our legal system. Foreshore and
submerged areas form part of the public domain and are inalienable. Lands
reclaimed from foreshore and submerged areas also form part of the public domain
and are also inalienable, unless converted pursuant to law into alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain. Historically, lands reclaimed by the
government are sui generis, not available for sale to private parties unlike other
alienable public lands. Reclaimed lands retain their inherent potential as areas for
public use or public service. Alienable lands of the public domain, increasingly
becoming scarce natural resources, are to be distributed equitably among our ever-
growing population. To insure such equitable distribution, the 1973 and 1987
Constitutions have barred private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable
land of the public domain. Those who attempt to dispose of inalienable natural
resources of the State, or seek to circumvent the constitutional ban on alienation of
lands of the public domain to private corporations, do so at their own risk.

We can now summarize our conclusions as follows:

1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands,

now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands
of the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but
may not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA
may only sell these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership
limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws.

2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable

natural resources of the public domain until classified as alienable or
disposable lands open to disposition and declared no longer needed for public
service. The government can make such classification and declaration only
after PEA has reclaimed these submerged areas. Only then can these lands
qualify as agricultural lands of the public domain, which are the only natural
resources the government can alienate. In their present state, the 592.15
hectares of submerged areas are inalienable and outside the commerce
of man.

3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation,

ownership of 77.34 hectares110of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void
for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which
prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the
public domain.

4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of

290.156 hectares111 of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is
void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which
 prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of
the public domain. PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the
government can classify the reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable, and
further declare them no longer needed for public service. Still, the transfer of
such reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain to AMARI will be void in
view of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private
corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.

Clearly, the Amended JVA violates glaringly Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution. Under Article 1409112 of the Civil Code, contracts whose "object or
purpose is contrary to law," or whose "object is outside the commerce of men," are
"inexistent and void from the beginning." The Court must perform its duty to defend
and uphold the Constitution, and therefore declares the Amended JVA null and
void ab initio.

Seventh issue: whether the Court is the proper forum to raise the issue of
whether the Amended JVA is grossly disadvantageous to the government.

Considering that the Amended JVA is null and void ab initio, there is no necessity to
rule on this last issue. Besides, the Court is not a trier of facts, and this last issue
involves a determination of factual matters.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Public Estates Authority and Amari
Coastal Bay Development Corporation are PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from
implementing the Amended Joint Venture Agreement which is hereby
declared NULL and VOID ab initio.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by AKLAN NATIONAL COLLEGE

OF FISHERIES (ANCF) and DR. ELENITA R. ANDRADE, in her capacity as
ANCF Superintendent, Petitioner,
vs.
HEIRS OF MAXIMA LACHICA SIN, namely: SALVACION L. SIN, ROSARIO S.
ENRIQUEZ, FRANCISCO L. SIN, MARIA S. YUCHINTAT, MANUEL L. SIN,
JAIME CARDINAL SIN, RAMON L. SIN, and CEFERINA S. VITA,Respondents.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

This is a Petition for Review assailing the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 65244 dated February 24, 2003, which upheld the Decisions of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kalibo, Aklan in Civil Case No. 6130 and the First
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of New Washington and Batan, Aklan in Civil
Case No. 1181, segregating from the Aklan National College of Fisheries (ANCF)
reservation the portion of land being claimed by respondents.

Petitioner in this case is the Republic of the Philippines, represented by ANCF and
Dr. Elenita R. Andrade, in her capacity as Superintendent of ANCF. Respondents
claim that they are the lawful heirs of the late Maxima Lachica Sin who was the
owner of a parcel of land situated at Barangay Tambac, New Washington, Aklan, and
more particularly described as follows:
A parcel of cocal, nipal and swampy land, located at Barangay Tambac, New
Washington, Aklan, containing an approximate area of FIFTY[-]EIGHT THOUSAND
SIX HUNDRED SIX (58,606) square meters, more or less, as per survey by Geodetic
Engineer Reynaldo L. Lopez. Bounded on the North by Dumlog Creek; on the East by
Adriano Melocoton; on the South by Mabilo Creek; and on the West by Amado
Cayetano and declared for taxation purposes in the name of Maxima L. Sin
(deceased) under Tax Declaration No. 10701 (1985) with an assessed value of
Php1,320.00.2

On August 26, 1991, respondent heirs instituted in the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan a
complaint against Lucio Arquisola, in his capacity as Superintendent of ANCF
(hereinafter ANCF Superintendent), for recovery of possession, quieting of title, and
declaration of ownership with damages. Respondent heirs claim that a 41,231-
square meter-portion of the property they inherited had been usurped by ANCF,
creating a cloud of doubt with respect to their ownership over the parcel of land they
wish to remove from the ANCF reservation.

The ANCF Superintendent countered that the parcel of land being claimed by
respondents was the subject of Proclamation No. 2074 of then President Ferdinand
E. Marcos allocating 24.0551 hectares of land within the area, which included said
portion of private respondents’ alleged property, as civil reservation for educational
purposes of ANCF. The ANCF Superintendent furthermore averred that the subject
parcel of land is timberland and therefore not susceptible of private ownership.

Subsequently, the complaint was amended to include ANCF as a party defendant

and Lucio Arquisola, who retired from the service during the pendency of the case,
was substituted by Ricardo Andres, then the designated Officer-in-Charge of ANCF.

The RTC remanded the case to the MCTC of New Washington and Batan, Aklan, in
view of the enactment of Republic Act No. 7659 which expanded the jurisdiction of
first-level courts. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 1181 (4390).

Before the MCTC, respondent heirs presented evidence that they inherited a bigger
parcel of land from their mother, Maxima Sin, who died in the year 1945 in New
Washington, Capiz (now Aklan). Maxima Sin acquired said bigger parcel of land by
virtue of a Deed of Sale (Exhibit "B"), and then developed the same by planting
coconut trees, banana plants, mango trees and nipa palms and usufructing the
produce of said land until her death in 1945.

In the year 1988, a portion of said land respondents inherited from Maxima Sin was
occupied by ANCF and converted into a fishpond for educational purpose.
Respondent heirs of Maxima Sin asserted that they were previously in possession of
the disputed land in the concept of an owner. The disputed area was a swampy land
until it was converted into a fishpond by the ANCF. To prove possession,
respondents presented several tax declarations, the earliest of which was in the year
1945.

On June 19, 2000, the MCTC rendered its Decision in favor of respondents, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered declaring plaintiffs [respondent heirs herein] the

owner and possessor of the land in question in this case and for the defendants to
cause the segregation of the same from the Civil Reservation of the Aklan National
College of Fisheries, granted under Proclamation No. 2074 dated March 31, 1981.

It is further ordered, that defendants jointly and severally pay the plaintiffs actual
damages for the unearned yearly income from nipa plants uprooted by the
defendants [on] the land in question when the same has been converted by the
defendants into a fishpond, in the amount of Php3,500.00 yearly beginning the year
1988 until plaintiffs are fully restored to the possession of the land in question.

It is finally ordered, that defendants jointly and severally pay the plaintiffs the sum
of Php10,000.00 for attorney’s fees and costs of this suit.3

According to the MCTC, the sketch made by the Court Commissioner in his report
(Exh. "LL") shows that the disputed property is an alienable and disposable land of
the public domain. Furthermore, the land covered by Civil Reservation under
Proclamation No. 2074 was classified as timberland only on December 22, 1960
(Exh. "4-D"). The MCTC observed that the phrase "Block II Alien or Disp. LC 2415"
was printed on the Map of the Civil Reservation for ANCF established under
Proclamation No. 2074 (Exh. "6"), indicating that the disputed land is an alienable
and disposable land of the public domain.

The MCTC likewise cited a decision of this Court in the 1976 case of Republic v.
Court of Appeals4 where it was pronounced that:

Lands covered by reservation are not subject to entry, and no lawful settlement on
them can be acquired. The claims of persons who have settled on, occupied, and
improved a parcel of public land which is later included in a reservation are
considered worthy of protection and are usually respected, but where the President,
as authorized by law, issues a proclamation reserving certain lands, and warning all
persons to depart therefrom, this terminates any rights previously acquired in such
lands by a person who has settled thereon in order to obtain a preferential right of
purchase. And patents for lands which have been previously granted, reserved from
sale, or appropriated are void. (Underscoring from the MCTC, citations omitted.)

Noting that there was no warning in Proclamation No. 2074 requiring all persons to
depart from the reservation, the MCTC concluded that the reservation was subject to
private rights if there are any.

The MCTC thus ruled that the claim of respondent heirs over the disputed land by
virtue of their and their predecessors’ open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession amounts to an imperfect title, which should be respected and protected.

Petitioner, through the Solicitor General, appealed to the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan,
where the case was docketed as Civil Case No. 6130.

On May 2, 2001, the RTC rendered its Decision affirming the MCTC judgment with
modification:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision is modified absolving

Appellant Ricardo Andres from the payment of damages and attorney’s fees. All
other details of the appealed decision are affirmed in toto.5
The RTC stressed that Proclamation No. 2074 recognizes vested rights acquired by
private individuals prior to its issuance on March 31, 1981.

The RTC added that the findings of facts of the MCTC may not be disturbed on
appeal unless the court below has overlooked some facts of substance that may
alter the results of its findings. The RTC, however, absolved the Superintendent of
the ANCF from liability as there was no showing on record that he acted with malice
or in bad faith in the implementation of Proclamation No. 2074.6

Petitioner Republic, represented by the ANCF and Dr. Elenita R. Andrade, in her
capacity as the new Superintendent of the ANCF, elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals through a Petition for Review. The petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
65244.

On February 24, 2003, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision dismissing the
petition for lack of merit. In addition to the findings of the MCTC and the RTC, the
Court of Appeals held:

Moreover, petitioner had not shown by competent evidence that the subject land
was likewise declared a timberland before its formal classification as such in 1960.
Considering that lands adjoining to that of the private respondents, which are also
within the reservation area, have been issued original certificates of title, the same
affirms the conclusion that the area of the subject land was agricultural, and
therefore disposable, before its declaration as a timberland in 1960.

It should be noted that Maxima Lachica Sin acquired, through purchase and sale, the
subject property from its previous owners spouses Sotera Melocoton and Victor
Garcia on January 15, 1932, or 28 years before the said landholding was declared a
timberland on December 22, 1960. Tacking, therefore, the possession of the
previous owners and that of Maxima Lachica Sin over the disputed property, it does
not tax ones imagination to conclude that the subject property had been privately
possessed for more than 30 years before it was declared a timberland. This being
the case, the said possession has ripened into an ownership against the State, albeit
an imperfect one. Nonetheless, it is our considered opinion that this should come
under the meaning of "private rights" under Proclamation No. 2074 which are
deemed segregated from the mass of civil reservation granted to petitioner.7(Citation
omitted.)

Hence, this Petition for Review, anchored on the following grounds:

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN UPHOLDING

RESPONDENTS’ CLAIM TO SUPPOSED "PRIVATE RIGHTS" OVER SUBJECT LAND
DESPITE THE DENR CERTIFICATION THAT IT IS CLASSIFIED AS TIMBERLAND.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING

THE DECISIONS OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT AND THE MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT
TRIAL COURTS RELEASING THE SUBJECT LAND BEING CLAIMED BY RESPONDENTS
FROM THE MASS OF PUBLIC DOMAIN AND AWARDING DAMAGES TO THEM.8
The central dispute in the case at bar is the interpretation of the first paragraph of
Proclamation No. 2074:

Upon recommendation of the Director of Forest Development, approved by the

Minister of Natural Resources and by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, I,
FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, do hereby set aside as Civil
Reservation for Aklan National College of Fisheries, subject to private rights, if any
there be, parcels of land, containing an aggregate area of 24.0551 hectares,
situated in the Municipality of New Washington, Province of Aklan, Philippines,
designated Parcels I and II on the attached BFD Map CR-203, x x x [.]9

The MCTC, the RTC and the Court of Appeals unanimously held that respondents
retain private rights to the disputed property, thus preventing the application of the
above proclamation thereon. The private right referred to is an alleged imperfect
title, which respondents supposedly acquired by possession of the subject property,
through their predecessors-in-interest, for 30 years before it was declared as a
timberland on December 22, 1960.

At the outset, it must be noted that respondents have not filed an application for
judicial confirmation of imperfect title under the Public Land Act or the Property
Registration Decree. Nevertheless, the courts a quo apparently treated respondents’
complaint for recovery of possession, quieting of title and declaration of ownership
as such an application and proceeded to determine if respondents complied with the
requirements therefor.

The requirements for judicial confirmation of imperfect title are found in Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, as
follows:

Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the
public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose
titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance
of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the
issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

xxxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in
the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the
filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or
force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of
title under the provisions of this chapter.

An equivalent provision is found in Section 14(1) of the Property Registration

Decree, which provides:

SECTION 14. Who may apply.— The following persons may file in the proper Court
of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or
through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in- interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

This Court has thus held that there are two requisites for judicial confirmation of
imperfect or incomplete title under CA No. 141, namely: (1) open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land by himself or
through his predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim of ownership since time
immemorial or from June 12, 1945; and

(2) the classification of the land as alienable and disposable land of the public
domain.10

With respect to the second requisite, the courts a quo held that the disputed
property was alienable and disposable before 1960, citing petitioner’s failure to show
competent evidence that the subject land was declared a timberland before its
formal classification as such on said year.11 Petitioner emphatically objects, alleging
that under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State
and that lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to
belong to the State.

After a thorough review of the records, we agree with petitioner. As this Court held
in the fairly recent case of Valiao v. Republic12:

Under the Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands of the
public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to any
ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been
reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private person
by the State remain part of the inalienable public domain. Unless public land is
shown to have been reclassified as alienable or disposable to a private person by the
State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain. Property of the public domain
is beyond the commerce of man and not susceptible of private appropriation and
acquisitive prescription. Occupation thereof in the concept of owner no matter how
long cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title. The burden of proof in
overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is
on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that
the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this
presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of
the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable.

There must be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as alienable and
disposable. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is
1âwphi1

alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the
government, such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an
administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a
legislative act or a statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the
government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the required number
of years is alienable and disposable. (Citations omitted.)

This Court reached the same conclusion in Secretary of the Department of

Environment and Natural Resources v. Yap,13 which presents a similar issue with
respect to another area of the same province of Aklan. On November 10, 1978,
President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1801 declaring Boracay Island, among
other islands, caves and peninsulas of the Philippines, as tourist zones and marine
reserves under the administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA). On
September 3, 1982, PTA Circular 3-82 was issued to implement Proclamation No.
1801. The respondents-claimants in said case filed a petition for declaratory relief
with the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan, claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular
3-82 precluded them from filing an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect
title or survey of land for titling purposes. The respondents claim that through their
predecessors-in-interest, they have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of their lands in Boracay since June 12, 1945 or
earlier since time immemorial.

On May 22, 2006, during the pendency of the petition for review of the above case
with this Court, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 1064
classifying Boracay Island into four hundred (400) hectares of reserved forest land
(protection purposes) and six hundred twenty-eight and 96/100 (628.96) hectares
of agricultural land (alienable and disposable). Petitioner-claimants and other
landowners in Boracay filed with this Court an original petition for prohibition,
mandamus and nullification of Proclamation No. 1064, alleging that it infringed on
their "prior vested right" over portions of Boracay which they allege to have
possessed since time immemorial. This petition was consolidated with the petition
for review concerning Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular 3- 82.

This Court, discussing the Regalian Doctrine vis-à-vis the right of the claimants to
lands they claim to have possessed since time immemorial, held:

A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with
the presumption of State ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that
there must be a positive act of the government, such as an official proclamation,
declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land for agricultural or other
purposes. In fact, Section 8 of CA No. 141 limits alienable or disposable lands only
to those lands which have been "officially delimited and classified."

The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands
of the public domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming
ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or
disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be
established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or
disposable. There must still be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as
alienable and disposable. To prove that the land subject of an application for
registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a positive act
of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an
administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a
legislative act or a statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the
government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the required number
of years is alienable and disposable.

In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action,

report, statute, or certification was presented to the Court. The records are bereft of
evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by private
claimants were subject of a government proclamation that the land is alienable and
disposable. Absent such well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot accept
the submission that lands occupied by private claimants were already open to
disposition before 2006. Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be
assumed. They call for proof.14 (Emphases in the original; citations omitted.)

Accordingly, in the case at bar, the failure of petitioner Republic to show competent
evidence that the subject land was declared a timberland before its formal
classification as such in 1960 does not lead to the presumption that said land was
alienable and disposable prior to said date. On the contrary, the presumption is that
unclassified lands are inalienable public lands. Such was the conclusion of this Court
in Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols v.
Republic,15 wherein we held:

While it is true that the land classification map does not categorically state that the
islands are public forests, the fact that they were unclassified lands leads to the
same result. In the absence of the classification as mineral or timber land, the land
remains unclassified land until released and rendered open to disposition. x x x.
(Emphasis supplied, citation deleted.)

The requirements for judicial confirmation of imperfect title in Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act, as amended, and the equivalent provision in Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree was furthermore painstakingly debated upon by the
members of this Court in

Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic.16 In Malabanan, the members of this Court

were in disagreement as to whether lands declared alienable or disposable after
June 12, 1945 may be subject to judicial confirmation of imperfect title. There was,
however, no disagreement that there must be a declaration to that effect.

In the case at bar, it is therefore the respondents which have the burden to identify
a positive act of the government, such as an official proclamation, declassifying
inalienable public land into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. Since
respondents failed to do so, the alleged possession by them and by their
predecessors-in-interest is inconsequential and could never ripen into ownership.
Accordingly, respondents cannot be considered to have private rights within the
purview of Proclamation No. 2074 as to prevent the application of said proclamation
to the subject property. We are thus constrained to reverse the rulings of the courts
a quo and grant the prayer of petitioner Republic to dismiss Civil Case No. 1181
(4390) for lack of merit.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review is GRANTED. The

Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 65244 dated February 24, 2003,
which upheld the Decisions of the Regional Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan in Civil Case
No. 6130 and the First Municipal Circuit Trial Court of New Washington and Batan,
Aklan in Civil Case No. 1181 (4390), segregating from the Aklan National College of
Fisheries reservation the portion of land being claimed by respondents is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 1181 (4390) of the First Municipal Circuit Trial Court
of New Washington and Batan, Aklan is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC., REPRESENTED BY

RONNIE P. INOCENCIO, Respondent.

DECISION
 REYES, J.:

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to
annul and set aside the Decision2 dated November 10, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA–G.R. CV
No. 90503. The CA affirmed the Decision3 dated May 16, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig
City, Branch 69, in Land Registration Case No. N–11465.

The Facts

On December 3, 2001, Remman Enterprises, Inc. (respondent), filed an application4 with the RTC for
judicial confirmation of title over two parcels of land situated in Barangay Napindan, Taguig, Metro
Manila, identified as Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077, Mcadm–590–D, Taguig Cadastre, with an area of 29,945
square meters and 20,357 sq m, respectively.

On December 13, 2001, the RTC issued the Order5 finding the respondent’s application for registration
sufficient in form and substance and setting it for initial hearing on February 21, 2002. The scheduled
initial hearing was later reset to May 30, 2002.6 The Notice of Initial Hearing was published in the Official
Gazette, April 1, 2002 issue, Volume 98, No. 13, pages 1631–16337 and in the March 21, 2002 issue
of People’s Balita,8 a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. The Notice of Initial Hearing was
likewise posted in a conspicuous place on Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077, as well as in a conspicuous place on
the bulletin board of the City hall of Taguig, Metro Manila.9

On May 30, 2002, when the RTC called the case for initial hearing, only the Laguna Lake Development
Authority (LLDA) appeared as oppositor. Hence, the RTC issued an order of general default except LLDA,
which was given 15 days to submit its comment/opposition to the respondent’s application for
registration.10

On June 4, 2002, the LLDA filed its Opposition11 to the respondent’s application for registration,
asserting that Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 are not part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain. On the other hand, the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner), on July 16, 2002, likewise filed
its Opposition,12 alleging that the respondent failed to prove that it and its predecessors–in–interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the subject parcels of land since
June 12, 1945 or earlier.

Trial on the merits of the respondent’s application ensued thereafter.

The respondent presented four witnesses: Teresita Villaroya, the respondent’s corporate secretary;
Ronnie Inocencio, an employee of the respondent and the one authorized by it to file the application for
registration with the RTC; Cenon Cerquena (Cerquena), the caretaker of the subject properties since
1957; and Engineer Mariano Flotildes (Engr. Flotildes), a geodetic engineer hired by the respondent to
conduct a topographic survey of the subject properties.

For its part, the LLDA presented the testimonies of Engineers Ramon Magalonga (Engr. Magalonga) and
Christopher A. Pedrezuela (Engr. Pedrezuela), who are both geodetic engineers employed by the LLDA.

Essentially, the testimonies of the respondent’s witnesses showed that the respondent and its
predecessors–in–interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the said
parcels of land long before June 12, 1945. The respondent purchased Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 from
Conrado Salvador (Salvador) and Bella Mijares (Mijares), respectively, in 1989. The subject properties
were originally owned and possessed by Veronica Jaime (Jaime), who cultivated and planted different
kinds of crops in the said lots, through her caretaker and hired farmers, since 1943. Sometime in 1975,
Jaime sold the said parcels of land to Salvador and Mijares, who continued to cultivate the lots until the
same were purchased by the respondent in 1989.

The respondent likewise alleged that the subject properties are within the alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain, as evidenced by the certifications issued by the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR).

In support of its application, the respondent, inter alia, presented the following documents: (1) Deed of
Absolute Sale dated August 28, 1989 executed by Salvador and Mijares in favor of the respondent;13 (2)
survey plans of the subject properties;14 (3) technical descriptions of the subject properties;15 (4)
Geodetic Engineer’s Certificate;16 (5) tax declarations of Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 for 2002;17 and (6)
certifications dated December 17, 2002, issued by Corazon D. Calamno (Calamno), Senior Forest
Management Specialist of the DENR, attesting that Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 form part of the alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain.18

On the other hand, the LLDA alleged that the respondent’s application for registration should be denied
since the subject parcels of land are not part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain;
it pointed out that pursuant to Section 41(11) of Republic Act No. 485019 (R.A. No. 4850), lands,
surrounding the Laguna de Bay, located at and below the reglementary elevation of 12.50 meters are
public lands which form part of the bed of the said lake. Engr. Magalonga, testifying for the oppositor
LLDA, claimed that, upon preliminary evaluation of the subject properties, based on the topographic
map of Taguig, which was prepared using an aerial survey conducted by the then Department of
National Defense–Bureau of Coast in April 1966, he found out that the elevations of Lot Nos. 3068 and
3077 are below 12.50 m. That upon actual area verification of the subject properties on September 25,
2002, Engr. Magalonga confirmed that the elevations of the subject properties range from 11.33 m to
11.77 m.

On rebuttal, the respondent presented Engr. Flotildes, who claimed that, based on the actual
topographic survey of the subject properties he conducted upon the request of the respondent, the
elevations of the subject properties, contrary to LLDA’s claim, are above 12.50 m. Particularly, Engr.
Flotildes claimed that Lot No. 3068 has an elevation ranging from 12.60 m to 15 m while the elevation
of Lot No. 3077 ranges from 12.60 m to 14.80 m.

The RTC Ruling

On May 16, 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision,20 which granted the respondent’s application for
registration of title to the subject properties, viz: chanRoble svirtual Lawli bra ry

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is rendered confirming the title of the applicant Remman
Enterprises Incorporated over a parcels of land [sic] consisting of 29,945 square meters (Lot 3068) and
20,357 (Lot 3077) both situated in Brgy. Napindan, Taguig, Taguig, Metro Manila more particularly
described in the Technical Descriptions Ap–04–003103 and Swo–00–001769 respectively and ordering
their registration under the Property Registration Decree in the name of Remman Enterprises
Incorporated.

SO ORDERED.21 ChanRoblesVi rtua lawlib rary

The RTC found that the respondent was able to prove that the subject properties form part of the
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. The RTC opined that the elevations of the subject
properties are very much higher than the reglementary elevation of 12.50 m and, thus, not part of the
bed of Laguna Lake. The RTC pointed out that LLDA’s claim that the elevation of the subject properties is
below 12.50 m is hearsay since the same was merely based on the topographic map that was prepared
using an aerial survey on March 2, 1966; that nobody was presented to prove that an aerial survey was
indeed conducted on March 2, 1966 for purposes of gathering data for the preparation of the
topographic map.
Further, the RTC posited that the elevation of a parcel of land does not always remain the same; that
the elevations of the subject properties may have already changed since 1966 when the supposed aerial
survey, from which the topographic map used by LLDA was based, was conducted. The RTC likewise
faulted the method used by Engr. Magalonga in measuring the elevations of the subject properties,
pointing out that:

Further, in finding that the elevation of the subject lots are below 12.5 meters, oppositor’s witness
merely compared their elevation to the elevation of the particular portion of the lake dike which he used
as his [benchmark] or reference point in determining the elevation of the subject lots. Also, the
elevation of the said portion of the lake dike that was then under the construction by FF Cruz was
allegedly 12.79 meters and after finding that the elevation of the subject lots are lower than the said
[benchmark] or reference point, said witness suddenly jumped to a conclusion that the elevation was
below 12.5 meters. x x x.

Moreover, the finding of LLDA’s witness was based on hearsay as said witness admitted that it was
DPWH or the FF Cruz who determined the elevation of the portion of the lake dike which he used as the
[benchmark] or reference point in determining the elevation of the subject lots and that he has no
personal knowledge as to how the DPWH and FF Cruz determined the elevation of the said [benchmark]
or reference point and he only learn[ed] that its elevation is 12.79 meters from the information he got
from FF Cruz.22ChanRoblesVi rtualaw lib rary

Even supposing that the elevations of the subject properties are indeed below 12.50 m, the RTC opined
that the same could not be considered part of the bed of Laguna Lake. The RTC held that, under Section
41(11) of R.A. No. 4850, Laguna Lake extends only to those areas that can be covered by the lake water
when it is at the average annual maximum lake level of 12.50 m. Hence, the RTC averred, only those
parcels of land that are adjacent to and near the shoreline of Laguna Lake form part of its bed and not
those that are already far from it, which could not be reached by the lake water. The RTC pointed out
that the subject properties are more than a kilometer away from the shoreline of Laguna Lake; that they
are dry and waterless even when the waters of Laguna Lake is at its maximum level. The RTC likewise
found that the respondent was able to prove that it and its predecessors–in–interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the subject properties as early as 1943.

The petitioner appealed the RTC Decision dated May 16, 2007 to the CA.

The CA Ruling

On November 10, 2011, the CA, by way of the assailed Decision,23 affirmed the RTC Decision dated May
16, 2007. The CA found that the respondent was able to establish that the subject properties are part of
the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain; that the same are not part of the bed of Laguna
Lake, as claimed by the petitioner. Thus: chanRoblesvi rt ualLaw lib rary

The evidence submitted by the appellee is sufficient to warrant registration of the subject lands in its
name. Appellee’s witness Engr. Mariano Flotildes, who conducted an actual area verification of the
subject lots, ably proved that the elevation of the lowest portion of Lot No. 3068 is 12.6 meters and the
elevation of its highest portion is 15 meters. As to the other lot, it was found [out] that the elevation of
the lowest portion of Lot No. 3077 is also 12.6 meters and the elevation of its highest portion is 15
meters. Said elevations are higher than the reglementary elevation of 12.5 meters as provided for under
paragraph 11, Section 41 of R.A. No. 4850, as amended.

In opposing the instant application for registration, appellant relies merely on the Topographic Map
dated March 2, 1966, prepared by Commodore Pathfinder, which allegedly shows that the subject
parcels of land are so situated in the submerge[d] [lake water] of Laguna Lake. The said data was
gathered through aerial photography over the area of Taguig conducted on March 2, 1966. However,
nobody testified on the due execution and authenticity of the said document. As regards the testimony
of the witness for LLDA, Engr. Ramon Magalonga, that the subject parcels of land are below the 12.5
meter elevation, the same can be considered inaccurate aside from being hearsay considering his
admission that his findings were based merely on the evaluation conducted by DPWH and FF Cruz. x x
x.24 (Citations omitted)chan roblesv irt ualawli bra ry

The CA likewise pointed out that the respondent was able to present certifications issued by the DENR,
attesting that the subject properties form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain, which was not disputed by the petitioner. The CA further ruled that the respondent was able to
prove, through the testimonies of its witnesses, that it and its predecessors–in–interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the subject properties prior to June 12, 1945.

Hence, the instant petition.

The Issue

The sole issue to be resolved by the Court is whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC Decision dated
May 16, 2007, which granted the application for registration filed by the respondent.

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

The petitioner maintains that the lower courts erred in granting the respondent’s application for
registration since the subject properties do not form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain. The petitioner insists that the elevations of the subject properties are below the
reglementary level of 12.50 m and, pursuant to Section 41(11) of R.A. No. 4850, are considered part of
the bed of Laguna Lake.

That the elevations of the subject properties are above the reglementary level of 12.50 m is a finding of
fact by the lower courts, which this Court, generally may not disregard. It is a long–standing policy of
this Court that the findings of facts of the RTC which were adopted and affirmed by the CA are generally
deemed conclusive and binding. This Court is not a trier of facts and will not disturb the factual findings
of the lower courts unless there are substantial reasons for doing so.25 cra lawred

That the subject properties are not part of the bed of Laguna Lake, however, does not necessarily mean
that they already form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. It is still
incumbent upon the respondent to prove, with well–nigh incontrovertible evidence, that the subject
properties are indeed part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. While deference is
due to the lower courts’ finding that the elevations of the subject properties are above the reglementary
level of 12.50 m and, hence, no longer part of the bed of Laguna Lake pursuant to Section 41(11) of
R.A. No. 4850, the Court nevertheless finds that the respondent failed to substantiate its entitlement to
registration of title to the subject properties.

“Under the Regalian Doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands of the public domain
belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to any ownership of land. All lands not
appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly,
public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land, or alienated
to a private person by the State, remain part of the inalienable public domain. The burden of proof in
overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person
applying for registration, who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or
disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be presented to establish that
the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable.”26

The respondent filed its application for registration of title to the subject properties under Section 14(1)
of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 152927 , which provides that: chanRoblesvi rtual Lawli bra ry

Sec. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an
application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors–in interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

xxx
Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 refers to the judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles to
public land acquired under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141, or the Public Land Act,
as amended by P.D. No. 1073.28 Under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, applicants for registration of title
must sufficiently establish: first, that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of
the public domain; second, that the applicant and his predecessors–in–interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the same; and third, that it is under
a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.29

The first requirement was not satisfied in this case. To prove that the subject property forms part of the
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, the respondent presented two certifications30 issued
by Calamno, attesting that Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 form part of the alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain “under Project No. 27–B of Taguig, Metro Manila as per LC Map 2623, approved on
January 3, 1968.”

However, the said certifications presented by the respondent are insufficient to prove that the subject
properties are alienable and disposable. In Republic of the Philippines v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,31 the
Court clarified that, in addition to the certification issued by the proper government agency that a parcel
of land is alienable and disposable, applicants for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary
had approved the land classification and released the land of public domain as alienable and disposable.
They must present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as
true copy by the legal custodian of the records. Thus: chanRoblesvirtual Lawli brary

Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The
applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification
and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the
application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO
or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration must present a copy of the original
classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal
custodian of the official records. These facts must be established to prove that the land is
alienable and disposable. Respondent failed to do so because the certifications presented by
respondent do not, by themselves, prove that the land is alienable and disposable.32 (Emphasis ours) chanrob lesvi rtualaw lib rary

In Republic v. Roche,33 the Court deemed it appropriate to reiterate the ruling in T.A.N. Properties,
viz:
cha nRoblesvi rt ualLaw lib rary

Respecting the third requirement, the applicant bears the burden of proving the status of the land. In
this connection, the Court has held that he must present a certificate of land classification status
issued by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) or the
Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) of the DENR. He must also
prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land as
alienable and disposable, and that it is within the approved area per verification through
survey by the CENRO or PENRO. Further, the applicant must present a copy of the original
classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as true copy by the legal
custodian of the official records. These facts must be established by the applicant to prove that the
land is alienable and disposable.

Here, Roche did not present evidence that the land she applied for has been classified as alienable or
disposable land of the public domain. She submitted only the survey map and technical description of
the land which bears no information regarding the land’s classification. She did not bother to establish
the status of the land by any certification from the appropriate government agency. Thus, it cannot be
said that she complied with all requisites for registration of title under Section 14(1) of P.D.
1529.34 (Citations omitted and emphasis ours) chanrob lesvi rtua lawlib rary

The DENR certifications that were presented by the respondent in support of its application for
registration are thus not sufficient to prove that the subject properties are indeed classified by the DENR
Secretary as alienable and disposable. It is still imperative for the respondent to present a copy of the
original classification approved by the DENR Secretary, which must be certified by the legal custodian
thereof as a true copy. Accordingly, the lower courts erred in granting the application for registration in
spite of the failure of the respondent to prove by well–nigh incontrovertible evidence that the subject
properties are alienable and disposable.

Nevertheless, the respondent claims that the Court’s ruling in T.A.N. Properties, which was promulgated
on June 26, 2008, must be applied prospectively, asserting that decisions of this Court form part of the
law of the land and, pursuant to Article 4 of the Civil Code, laws shall have no retroactive effect. The
respondent points out that its application for registration of title to the subject properties was filed and
was granted by the RTC prior to the Court’s promulgation of its ruling in T.A.N. Properties. Accordingly,
that it failed to present a copy of the original classification covering the subject properties approved by
the DENR Secretary and certified by the legal custodian thereof as a true copy, the respondent claims,
would not warrant the denial of its application for registration.

The Court does not agree.

Notwithstanding that the respondent’s application for registration was filed and granted by RTC prior to
the Court’s ruling in T.A.N. Properties, the pronouncements in that case may be applied to the present
case; it is not antithetical to the rule of non–retroactivity of laws pursuant to Article 4 of the Civil Code.
It is elementary that the interpretation of a law by this Court constitutes part of that law from the date it
was originally passed, since this Court’s construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative
intent that the interpreted law carried into effect.35 “Such judicial doctrine does not amount to the
passage of a new law, but consists merely of a construction or interpretation of a pre–existing one.”36

Verily, the ruling in T.A.N. Properties was applied by the Court in subsequent cases notwithstanding that
the applications for registration were filed and granted by the lower courts prior to the promulgation
of T.A.N. Properties.

In Republic v. Medida,37 the application for registration of the subject properties therein was filed on
October 22, 2004 and was granted by the trial court on June 21, 2006. Similarly, in Republic v.
Jaralve,38the application for registration of the subject property therein was filed on October 22, 1996
and was granted by the trial court on November 15, 2002. In the foregoing cases, notwithstanding that
the applications for registration were filed and granted by the trial courts prior to the promulgation
of T.A.N. Properties, this Court applied the pronouncements in T.A.N. Properties and denied the
applications for registration on the ground, inter alia, that the applicants therein failed to present a copy
of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified by the legal custodian thereof
as a true copy.

Anent the second and third requirements, the Court finds that the respondent failed to present sufficient
evidence to prove that it and its predecessors–in–interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the subject properties since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

To prove that it and its predecessors–in–interest have been in possession and occupation of the subject
properties since 1943, the respondent presented the testimony of Cerquena. Cerquena testified that the
subject properties were originally owned by Jaime who supposedly possessed and cultivated the same
since 1943; that sometime in 1975, Jaime sold the subject properties to Salvador and Mijares who, in
turn, sold the same to the respondent in 1989.

The foregoing are but unsubstantiated and self–serving assertions of the possession and occupation of
the subject properties by the respondent and its predecessors–in–interest; they do not constitute the
well–nigh incontrovertible evidence of possession and occupation of the subject properties required by
Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529. Indeed, other than the testimony of Cerquena, the respondent failed to
present any other evidence to prove the character of the possession and occupation by it and its
predecessors–in–interest of the subject properties.

For purposes of land registration under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, proof of specific acts of
ownership must be presented to substantiate the claim of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the land subject of the application. Applicants for land registration cannot
just offer general statements which are mere conclusions of law rather than factual evidence of
possession. Actual possession consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature
as a party would actually exercise over his own property.39
Although Cerquena testified that the respondent and its predecessors–in–interest cultivated the subject
properties, by planting different crops thereon, his testimony is bereft of any specificity as to the nature
of such cultivation as to warrant the conclusion that they have been indeed in possession and occupation
of the subject properties in the manner required by law. There was no showing as to the number of
crops that are planted in the subject properties or to the volume of the produce harvested from the
crops supposedly planted thereon.

Further, assuming ex gratia argumenti that the respondent and its predecessors–in–interest have indeed
planted crops on the subject properties, it does not necessarily follow that the subject properties have
been possessed and occupied by them in the manner contemplated by law. The supposed planting of
crops in the subject properties may only have amounted to mere casual cultivation, which is not the
possession and occupation required by law.

“A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant does not constitute possession under
claim of ownership. For him, possession is not exclusive and notorious so as to give rise to a
presumptive grant from the state. The possession of public land, however long the period thereof may
have extended, never confers title thereto upon the possessor because the statute of limitations with
regard to public land does not operate against the state, unless the occupant can prove possession and
occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the required number of years.”40

Further, the Court notes that the tax declarations over the subject properties presented by the
respondent were only for 2002. The respondent failed to explain why, despite its claim that it acquired
the subject properties as early as 1989, and that its predecessors–in–interest have been in possession of
the subject property since 1943, it was only in 2002 that it started to declare the same for purposes of
taxation. “While tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership, they constitute proof of claim
of ownership.”41 That the subject properties were declared for taxation purposes only in 2002 gives rise
to the presumption that the respondent claimed ownership or possession of the subject properties
starting that year. Likewise, no improvement or plantings were declared or noted in the said tax
declarations. This fact belies the claim that the respondent and its predecessors–in–interest, contrary to
Cerquena’s testimony, have been in possession and occupation of the subject properties in the manner
required by law.

Having failed to prove that the subject properties form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain and that it and its predecessors–in–interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the same since June 12, 1945, or earlier, the respondent’s
application for registration should be denied.

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the instant petition is GRANTED. The
Decision dated November 10, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA–G.R. CV No. 90503, which affirmed the
Decision dated May 16, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 69, in Land Registration
Case No. N–11465 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Application for Registration of Remman
Enterprises, Inc. in Land Registration Case No. N–11465 is DENIED for lack of merit. ChanRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary

NICOMEDES J. LOZADA, Petitioner,

vs.
EULALIA BRACEWELL, EDDIE BRACEWELL, ESTELLITA BRACEWELL, JAMES
BRACEWELL, JOHN BRACEWELL, EDWIN BRACEWELL, ERIC BRACEWELL,
and HEIRS OF GEORGE BRACEWELL,Respondents.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated May 23,
2007 and the Resolution3 dated August 14, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CV No. 81075, which affirmed the Decision4 dated July 31, 2003 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Las Pifias City, Branch 275 in Civil Case No. LP 98-0025,
directing the Land Registration Authority (LRA) to set aside Decree of Registration
No. N-217036 (Decree No. N-217036) and Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 0-
78 in the name of petitioner Nicomedes J. Lozada (petitioner), and ordering the
latter to cause the amendment of Plan PSU-129514 as well as segregate therefrom
Lot 5 of Plan PSU-180598.

The Facts

On December 10, 1976, petitioner filed an application for registration and

confirmation of title over a parcel of land covered by Plan PSU-129514, which was
granted on February 23, 1989 by the RTC of Makati City, Branch 134, acting as a
land registration court.5 Consequently, on July 10, 1997, the LRA issued Decree No.
N-217036 in the name of petitioner, who later obtained OCT No. 0-78 covering the
said parcel of land.6

On February 6, 1998, within a year from the issuance of the aforementioned decree,
James Bracewell, Jr. (Bracewell) filed a petition for review of a decree of registration
under Section 32 of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1529,7 otherwise known as the
"Property Registration Decree," before the RTC of Las Piñas City, Branch 275 (Las
Piñas City-RTC), docketed as Civil Case No. LP 98-0025,8 claiming that a portion of
Plan PSU-129514, consisting of 3,097 square meters identified as Lot 5 of Plan PSU-
180598 (subject lot) – of which he is the absolute owner and possessor – is
fraudulently included in Decree No. N-217036.9 He allegedly filed on September 19,
1963 an application for registration and confirmation of the subject lot, as well as of
Lots 1, 2, 3, and 4 of Plan PSU-180598, situated in Las Piñas City, which was
granted by the RTC of Makati City, Branch 58, on May 3, 1989.10 He further averred
that petitioner deliberately concealed the fact that he (Bracewell) is one of the
adjoining owners, and left him totally ignorant of the registration proceedings
involving the lots covered by Plan PSU-129514.11 Instead of impleading him,
petitioner listed Bracewell’s grandmother, Maria Cailles, as an adjoining owner,
although she had already died by that time.12

In his answer13 to the foregoing allegations, petitioner called Bracewell a mere

interloper with respect to the subject lot, which the Bureau of Lands had long
declared to be part and parcel of Plan PSU-129514.14 He argued that his Plan PSU-
129514 was approved way back in 1951 whereas Bracewell’s Plan PSU-180598 was
surveyed only in 1960, and stated that the latter plan, in fact, contained a footnote
that a portion known as Lot 5, i.e., the subject lot, is a portion of the parcel of land
covered by Plan PSU-129514.15

The overlapping was confirmed by LRA Director Felino M. Cortez in his 2nd
Supplementary Report dated August 5, 1996, which was submitted to the RTC of
Makati City, Branch 134.16 The report, which contains a recommendation that
petitioner be ordered to cause the amendment of Plan PSU-129514 in view of
Bracewell’s claims, reads as follows:

COMES NOW the Land Registration Authority (LRA) and to the Honorable Court
respectfully submits this report:

1. LRA records show that a decision was rendered by the Honorable Court on
February 23, 1989, confirming the title of the herein applicant [petitioner]
over the parcel of land covered by plan PSU-129514;

2. Upon updating of plotting on our Municipal Index Sheet, thru its tie line, it
was found to overlap with plan PSU-180598, Lot 5, applied in LRC Record No.
N-24916, which was referred to the Lands Management Services, El Bldg.,
 Quezon City, for verification and/or correction in our letter dated January 12,
1996 x x x;

3. In reply, the Regional Technical Director, thru the Chief, Surveys Division,
in his letter dated 20 June 1996, x x x, informed this Authority that after [re-
verification] and research of the plan, they found out that Lot 5, PSU-180598
applied in LRC Record No. N-24916 is a portion of plan PSU-129514, applied
in the instant case;

4. Our records further show that the petition for registration of title to real
property pertaining to Lot 5, PSU-180598 filed by the petitioner James
Bracewell, Jr. under Land Reg. Case No. N-4329, LRC Record No. N-24916
has been granted by the Honorable Court per his decision dated May 3, 1989.

WHEREFORE, the foregoing is respectfully submitted to the Honorable Court for its
information with the recommendation that the applicant [herein petitioner] in the
instant case be ordered to cause for the amendment of plan PSU-129514, subject of
registration, by segregating therefrom the portion of Lot 5, PSU-180598 also decided
in Land Reg. Case No. N-4328. The approved amended plan and the corresponding
certified technical descriptions shall forthwith be submitted to the Honorable Court
for its approval to enable us to comply with the decision of the Court dated May 3,
1989 in the instant case.17 (Emphases supplied)

The Las Piñas City-RTC Ruling

Finding that petitioner obtained Decree No. N-217036 and OCT No. 0-78 in bad
faith, the Las Piñas City-RTC rendered a Decision18 on July 31, 2003 in favor of
Bracewell, who had died during the pendency of the case and was substituted by
Eulalia Bracewell and his heirs (respondents). Accordingly, it directed the LRA to set
aside Decree No. N-217036 and OCT No. 0-78, and ordered petitioner (a) to cause
the amendment of Plan PSU-129514 and to segregate therefrom the subject lot, and
(b) to pay respondents the sum of ₱100,000.00 as attorney's fees, as well as the
cost of suit.19

The Las Piñas City-RTC faulted petitioner for deliberately preventing respondents
from participating and objecting to his application for registration when the
documentary evidence showed that, as early as 1962, Bracewell had been paying
taxes for the subject lot; and that he (Bracewell) was recognized as the owner
thereof in the records of the Bureau of Lands way back in 1965, as well as in the
City Assessor's Office.20

Aggrieved, petitioner elevated his case on appeal21 before the CA, docketed as CA-
G.R. CV No. 81075, arguing mainly that the Las Piñas City-RTC had no jurisdiction
over a petition for review of a decree of registration under Section 32 of PD 1529,
which should be filed in the same branch of the court that rendered the decision and
ordered the issuance of the decree.22 He likewise raised (a) the failure of Bracewell to
submit to conciliation proceedings,23as well as (b) the commission of forum shopping,
considering that the decision granting Bracewell’s application for registration over
Lots 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 of Plan PSU-180598 was still pending resolution before the
Court at the time he filed Civil Case No. LP 98-0025.24

The CA Ruling
In a Decision25 dated May 23, 2007, the appellate court affirmed the assailed
judgment of the RTC, finding that respondents were able to substantiate their claim
of actual fraud in the procurement of Decree No. N-217036, which is the only
ground that may be invoked in a petition for review of a decree of registration under
Section 32 of PD 1529. It held that, since the petition for review was filed within one
(1) year from the issuance of the questioned decree, and considering that the
subject lot is located in Las Piñas City, the RTC of said city had jurisdiction over the
case.26 It further declared that: (a) there was no need to submit the case a quo for
conciliation proceedings because the LRA, which is an instrumentality of the
government, had been impleaded; (b) no forum shopping was committed because
the petition for review of the decree of registration before the Las Piñas City-RTC
and the application for land registration then pending before the Court involved
different parties and issues; and (c) the award of attorney’s fees was well within the
sound discretion of the RTC.27

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration28 having been denied,29 he now comes before
the Court via the instant petition for review, challenging primarily the jurisdiction of
the Las Piñas City-RTC which set aside and nullified the judgment rendered by the
RTC of Makati City, Branch 134 that had not yet become final and was still within its
exclusive control and discretion because the one (1) year period within which the
decree of registration issued by the LRA could be reviewed has not yet elapsed.30

The Issue Before the Court

The core issue raised for the Court’s resolution is whether or not the Las Piñas City-
RTC has jurisdiction over the petition for review of Decree No. N-217036, which was
issued as a result of the judgment rendered by the RTC of Makati City, Branch 134.

The Court’s Ruling

The petition must fail.

Under Act No. 49631 (Act 496), or the "Land Registration Act," as amended,32 – which
was the law in force at the time of the commencement by both parties of their
respective registration proceedings – jurisdiction over all applications for registration
of title was conferred upon the Courts of First Instance (CFIs, now RTCs) of the
respective provinces in which the land sought to be registered is situated.33

The land registration laws were updated and codified under PD 1529, which took
effect on January 23, 1979,34 and under Section 1735 thereof, jurisdiction over an
application for land registration is still vested on the CFI (now, RTC) of the province
or city where the land is situated.36

Worth noting is the explanation proffered by respondents in their comment to the

instant petition that when petitioner filed his land registration case in December
1976, jurisdiction over applications for registration of property situated in Las Piñas
City was vested in the RTC of Makati City in view of the fact that there were no RTC
branches yet in the Las Piñas City at that time.37 Bracewell’s own application over
Lots 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 of Plan PSU-180598, all situated in Las Piñas City, was thus
granted by the RTC of Makati City, Branch 58.38

Subsequently, Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 129,39 otherwise known as "The Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980," was enacted and took effect on August 14,
1981,40 authorizing the creation of RTCs in different judicial regions, including the
RTC of Las Piñas City as part of the National Capital Judicial Region.41 As pointed out
by the court a quo in its Decision dated July 31, 2003, the RTC of Las Piñas City was
established "in or about 1994."42Understandably, in February 1998, Bracewell sought
the review of Decree No. N-217036 before the Las Piñas City-RTC, considering that
the lot subject of this case is situated in Las Piñas City.

Petitioner maintains that the petition for review should have been filed with the RTC
of Makati City, Branch 134, which rendered the assailed decision and ordered the
issuance of Decree No. N-217036, citing the 1964 case of Amando Joson, et al. v.
Busuego43 (Joson) among others. In said case, Spouses Amando Joson and Victoria
Balmeo (Sps. Joson) filed a petition to set aside the decree of registration issued in
favor of Teodora Busuego (Busuego) on the ground that the latter misrepresented
herself to be the sole owner of the lot when in truth, the Sps. Joson were owners of
one-half thereof, having purchased the same from Busuego’s mother.44 The court a
quo therein dismissed the petition for the reason that since its jurisdiction as a
cadastral court was special and limited, it had no authority to pass upon the issues
raised. Disagreeing, the Court held that, as long as the final decree has not been
issued and the period of one (1) year within which it may be reviewed has not
elapsed, the decision remains under the control and sound discretion of the court
rendering the decree, which court after hearing, may even set aside said decision or
decree and adjudicate the land to another.45

To be clear, the only issue in Joson was which court should take cognizance of the
nullification of the decree, i.e., the cadastral court that had issued the decree, or the
competent CFI in the exercise of its general jurisdiction.46 It should be pointed out,
however, that with the passage of PD 1529, the distinction between the general
jurisdiction vested in the RTC and the limited jurisdiction conferred upon it as a
cadastral court was eliminated. RTCs now have the power to hear and determine all
questions, even contentious and substantial ones, arising from applications for
original registration of titles to lands and petitions filed after such
registration.47 Accordingly, and considering further that the matter of whether the
RTC resolves an issue in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited
jurisdiction as a special court is only a matter of procedure and has nothing to do
with the question of jurisdiction,48petitioner cannot now rely on the Joson
pronouncement to advance its theory.

Section 32 of PD 1529 provides that the review of a decree of registration falls

within the jurisdiction of and, hence, should be filed in the "proper Court of First
Instance," viz.:

Section 32. Review of decree of registration; Innocent purchaser for value. The
1âwphi1

decree of registration shall not be reopened or revised by reason of absence,

minority, or other disability of any person adversely affected thereby, nor by any
proceeding in any court for reversing judgments, subject, however, to the right of
any person, including the government and the branches thereof, deprived of land or
of any estate or interest therein by such adjudication or confirmation of title
obtained by actual fraud, to file in the proper Court of First Instance a petition for
reopening and review of the decree of registration not later than one year from and
after the date of the entry of such decree of registration, but in no case shall such
petition be entertained by the court where an innocent purchaser for value has
acquired the land or an interest therein, whose rights may be prejudiced. Whenever
the phrase "innocent purchaser for value" or an equivalent phrase occurs in this
Decree, it shall be deemed to include an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other
encumbrancer for value.

Upon the expiration of said period of one year, the decree of registration and the
certificate of title issued shall become incontrovertible. Any person aggrieved by
such decree of registration in any case may pursue his remedy by action for
damages against the applicant or any other persons responsible for the fraud.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Since the LRA’s issuance of a decree of registration only proceeds from the land
registration court’s directive, a petition taken under Section 32 of PD 1529 is
effectively a review of the land registration court’s ruling. As such, case law instructs
that for "as long as a final decree has not been entered by the [LRA] and the period
of one (1) year has not elapsed from the date of entry of such decree, the title is not
finally adjudicated and the decision in the registration proceeding continues to be
under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering it."49

While it is indeed undisputed that it was the RTC of Makati City, Branch 134 which
rendered the decision directing the LRA to issue Decree No. N-217036, and should,
applying the general rule as above-stated, be the same court before which a petition
for the review of Decree No. N-217036 is filed, the Court must consider the
circumstantial milieu in this case that, in the interest of orderly procedure, warrants
the filing of the said petition before the Las Piñas City-RTC.

Particularly, the Court refers to the fact that the application for original registration
in this case was only filed before the RTC of Makati City, Branch 134 because, during
that time, i.e., December 1976, Las Piñas City had no RTC. Barring this situation,
the aforesaid application should not have been filed before the RTC of Makati City,
Branch 134 pursuant to the rules on venue prevailing at that time. Under Section 2,
Rule 4 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court, which took effect on January 1, 1964, the
proper venue for real actions, such as an application for original registration, lies
with the CFI of the province where the property is situated, viz.:

Sec. 2. Venue in Courts of First Instance.— (a) Real actions. — Actions affecting title
to, or for recovery of possession, or for partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure
of mortgage on, real property, shall be commenced and tried in the province where
the property or any part thereof lies.

As the land subject of this case is undeniably situated in Las Piñas City, the
application for its original registration should have been filed before the Las Piñas
City-RTC were it not for the fact that the said court had yet to be created at the time
the application was filed. Be that as it may, and considering further that the
complication at hand is actually one of venue and not of jurisdiction (given that RTCs
do retain jurisdiction over review of registration decree cases pursuant to Section 32
of PD 1529), the Court, cognizant of the peculiarity of the situation, holds that the
Las Piñas City-RTC has the authority over the petition for the review of Decree No.
N-217036 filed in this case. Indeed, the filing of the petition for review before the
Las Piñas City-RTC was only but a rectificatory implementation of the rules of
procedure then-existing, which was temporarily set back only because of past
exigencies. In light of the circumstances now prevailing, the Court perceives no
compelling reason to deviate from applying the rightful procedure. After all, venue is
only a matter of procedure50 and, hence, should succumb to the greater interests of
the orderly administration of justice.51
Anent the other ancillary issues raised by petitioner on forum shopping, submission
to conciliation proceedings, and award of attorney's fees, suffice it to say that the
same have been adequately discussed by the appellate court and, hence, need no
further elucidation.

Finally, on the matter of petitioner's objections against the trial judge's "unusual
interest" in the case, the Court concurs with the CA in saying that such tirades are
not helpful to his cause. Besides, as pointed out in the Decision dated July 31, 2003
of the RTC of Las Piñas City, Branch 275, petitioner already had his chance to
disqualify the trial judge from further hearing the case, but the appellate court
dismissed his petition in CA G.R. SP No. 74187 for lack of merit.52

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated May 23, 2007 and the
Resolution dated August 14, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 81075
are hereby AFFIRMED.

PACIFICO M. VALIAO, for G.R. No. 170757

himself and in behalf of his
co-heirs LODOVICO, Present:
RICARDO, BIENVENIDO,
all Surnamed VALIAO and
NEMESIO M. GRANDEA, VELASCO,
Petitioners, JR., J., Chairperson,
PERALTA,
- versus- ABAD,
MENDOZA, and
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.
REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, MACARIO
ZAFRA, and MANUEL Promulgated:
YUSAY,
Respondents, November 28, 2011
x---------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------x

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside the Decision[1] and
Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
54811, which reversed the Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Kabankalan, Negros Occidental, Branch 61, in Land
Registration Case No. 03, granting petitioners' application for
registration of title over a parcel of land located in Ilog, Negros
Occidental.
The factual milieu of this case is as follows:

On August 11, 1987, petitioners[4] Pacifico, Lodovico, Ricardo,

Bienvenido, all surnamed Valiao, and Nemesio Grandea filed with
the RTC of Kabankalan, Negros Occidental an application for
registration of a parcel of land with an area of 504,535 square
meters, more or less, situated in Barrio Galicia, Municipality of
Ilog, Negros Occidental.

On June 20, 1988, private oppositors Macario Zafra and Manuel

Yusay filed their Motion to Dismiss the application on the
following grounds: (1) the land applied for has not been declared
alienable and disposable; (2) res judicata has set in to bar the
application for registration; and (3) the application has no factual
or legal basis.

On August 24, 1988, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic),

through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the
application for registration on the following grounds, among
others: that neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-
interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the land in question since June 12,
1945 or prior thereto; that the muniment/s of title and/or the
tax declaration/s and tax payments/receipts of applicants, if any,
attached to or alleged in the application, do/es not constitute
competent and sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition of
the land applied for or of their open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation in the concept of owner,
since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto; that the parcel of land
applied for is a portion of public domain belonging to the
Republic, which is not subject to private appropriation; and that
the present action is barred by a previous final judgment in a
cadastral case prosecuted between the same parties and
involving the same parcel of land.

On July 3, 1989, the RTC denied private oppositors' Motion to

Dismiss. Trial thereafter ensued.

In support of their application for registration, petitioners alleged

that they acquired the subject property in 1947, upon the death
of their uncle Basilio Millarez (Basilio), who purchased the land
from a certain Fermin Payogao, pursuant to a Deed of
Sale[5] dated May 19, 1916 entirely handwritten in Spanish
language. Basilio possessed the land in question from May 19,
1916 until his death in 1947. Basilio's possession was open,
continuous, peaceful, adverse, notorious, uninterrupted and in
the concept of an owner. Upon Basilio's death, the applicants as
co-heirs possessed the said land until 1966, when oppositor
Zafra unlawfully and violently dispossessed them of their
property, which compelled them to file complaints of Grave
Coercion and Qualified Theft against Zafra. In support of their
claim of possession over the subject property, petitioners
submitted in evidence Tax Declaration No. 9562[6] dated
September 29, 1976 under the names of the heirs of Basilio
Millarez.
The RTC, in its Decision dated December 15, 1995, granted
petitioners' application for registration of the subject property,
the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court hereby

orders and decrees registration of Lot No. 2372 subject of the
present proceedings and the registration of title thereto, in
favor of the applicants, who are declared the true and lawful
 owners of said Lot No. 2372, except applicant Lodovico Valiao,
who sold his right to Macario Zafra.

Upon the finality of this decision, let the corresponding decree

of registration and Certificate of Title be issued in the name of
the applicants, Heirs of Basilio Millarez, namely: Pacifico
Valiao, Ricardo Valiao, Bienvenido Valiao and Nemesio
Grandea, subject to the rights of private oppositors, Macario
Zafra and Manuel Yusay over said lot whose fishpond permits
are declared VALID and will expire on December 31, 2003.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.[7]

Aggrieved by the Decision, the private oppositors and the

Republic, through Assistant Prosecutor Josue A. Gatin, filed an
appeal with the CA, which reversed the trial court's findings in
its Decision dated June 23, 2005. The CA ruled that the
classification of lands of the public domain is an exclusive
prerogative of the executive department of the government and
in the absence of such classification, the lands remain as
unclassified until it is released therefrom and rendered open to
disposition. Further, there exists a prior cadastral case involving
the same parties herein and the same Lot No. 2372, which ruled
that Lot No. 2372 belongs to the Republic. The CA held that such
judgment constitutes res judicata that bars a subsequent action
for land registration. It also ruled that the subject property is
part of the inalienable land of the public domain and petitioners
failed to prove that they and their predecessors-in-interest had
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of
the land in question since June 12, 1945 or earlier. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is

GRANTED. Accordingly, We REVERSE the Decision dated
December 15, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court, DENY the
application for registration of title filed by petitioners-appellees,
 DECLARE as moot and academic any and all claims of private
oppositors-appellants over Lot No. 2372, and DECLARE the
subject parcel of land to be inalienable and indisposable land
belonging to the public domain.

SO ORDERED.[8]

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied

by the CA in a Resolution dated November 17, 2005. Hence, the
present petition with the following issues:

I
WHETHER OR NOT LOT NO. 2372 OF THE ILOG CADASTRE IS
ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE LAND OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN.

II
WHETHER OR NOT THE CLAIM OF PRESCRIPTION BY THE
APPLICANT WILL LIE ON LOT NO. 2372.

III
WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
IN CAD. CASE NO. 23, ENTITLED LODOVICO VALIAO, ET, AL.,
VS. MACARIO ZAFRA, ET, AL., AC G.R. NO. CV-68873,
CONSTITUTES RES JUDICATA AS FAR AS THIS APPLICATION
FOR REGISTRATION IS CONCERNED.

IV
WHETHER OR NOT THE ALLEGED POSSESSION OF THE
APPLICANTS THROUGH THEIR PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST
IS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THEIR CLAIM FOR
PRESCRIPTION. [9]

Petitioners claim that Lot No. 2372 is an alienable and disposable

portion of the public domain. The possession of applicants'
predecessors-in interest since 1916 until 1966 had been open,
continuous and uninterrupted; thus, converting the said land
into a private land. The subject lot had already become private
in character in view of the length of time the applicants and their
predecessors-in-interest had possessed the subject lot, which
entitles them to the confirmation of their title. Petitioners further
claim that prior dismissal in a cadastral proceeding does not
constitute res judicata in a subsequent application for
registration of a parcel of land.

In its Comment, the OSG submits that the issues to be

resolved in the present petition, i.e., whether Lot No. 2372 is
alienable and disposable land of the public domain and whether
petitioners have the right to have the said property registered in
their name through prescription of time are questions of fact,
which were already passed upon by the CA and no longer
reviewable by the Court, since findings of fact of the CA, when
supported by sufficient evidence, are conclusive and binding on
the parties. The OSG further claims that petitioners failed to
prove that the subject lot is part of the alienable and disposable
portion of the public domain and that petitioners' application for
land registration is already barred by a prior decision in a
cadastral case. Lastly, the OSG asserts that petitioners did not
present sufficient evidence to prove that their possession over
the subject lot applied for had been open, peaceful, exclusive,
continuous and adverse.

Anent the propriety of filing a petition for review under Rule 45

of the Rules of Court, the principle is well-established that this
Court is not a trier of facts and that only questions of law may
be raised. The resolution of factual issues is the function of the
lower courts whose findings on these matters are received with
respect and are, as a rule, binding on this Court. This rule,
however, is subject to certain exceptions. One of these is when
the findings of the appellate court are contrary to those of the
trial court.[10] Due to the divergence of the findings of the CA and
the RTC, the Court will now re-examine the facts and evidence
adduced before the lower courts.

Section 14 (1) of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1529, otherwise

known as the Property Registration Decree provides:

SEC. 14. Who may apply. - The following persons may file
in the proper Court of First Instance an application for
registration of title to land, whether personally or through their
duly-authorized representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their

predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

From the foregoing, petitioners need to prove that: (1) the land
forms part of the alienable and disposable land of the public
domain; and (2) they, by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest, have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the
subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership from June 12,
1945 or earlier.[11] These the petitioners must prove by no less
than clear, positive and convincing evidence.[12]

Under the Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in our

Constitution, all lands of the public domain belong to the State,
which is the source of any asserted right to any ownership of
land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private
ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly,
public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as
alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the
State remain part of the inalienable public domain.[13] Unless
public land is shown to have been reclassified as alienable or
disposable to a private person by the State, it remains part of
the inalienable public domain. Property of the public domain is
beyond the commerce of man and not susceptible of private
appropriation and acquisitive prescription. Occupation thereof in
the concept of owner no matter how long cannot ripen into
ownership and be registered as a title.[14] The burden of proof in
overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of
the public domain is on the person applying for registration (or
claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of
the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this
presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that
the land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable
or disposable.[15]

There must be a positive act declaring land of the public domain

as alienable and disposable. To prove that the land subject of an
application for registration is alienable, the applicant must
establish the existence of a positive act of the government, such
as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an
administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The applicant
may also secure a certification from the government that
the land claimed to have been possessed for the required
number of years is alienable and disposable.[16]

No such evidence was offered by the petitioners to show that

the land in question has been classified as alienable and
disposable land of the public domain. In the absence of
incontrovertible evidence to prove that the subject property is
already classified as alienable and disposable, we must consider
the same as still inalienable public domain.[17]Verily, the rules on
the confirmation of imperfect title do not apply unless and until
the land subject thereof is released in an official proclamation to
that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural
lands of the public domain.

With respect to the existence of a prior cadastral case, it

appears that on July 11, 1966, the petitioners filed in Cadastral
Case No. 23 of the then CFI of Negros Occidental a petition to
reopen the proceedings relative to three lots, one of which is Lot
No. 2372. The lower court, in its Order[18] dated October 20,
1980, held that Lot No. 2372 belongs to the Republic. It found
that after the subject lot was declared public land, it was found
to be inside the communal forest. On appeal, the CA, in its
Decision[19] dated August 7, 1984, found no reversible error and
affirmed the decision of the cadastral court. Thereafter, a
petition elevating the case to this Court was dismissed for lack
of merit.[20] In the present case, the CA, in its Decision dated
June 23, 2005, ruled that such judgment constitutes res
judicata that will bar a subsequent action for land registration on
the same land.

In Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals,[21] the Court held that

a judicial declaration that a parcel of land is public, does not
preclude even the same applicant from subsequently seeking a
judicial confirmation of his title to the same land, provided he
thereafter complies with the provisions of Section 48[22] of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, and as long as said
public lands remain alienable and disposable. In the case at bar,
not only did the petitioners fail to prove that the subject land is
part of the alienable and disposable portion of the public domain,
they failed to demonstrate that they by themselves or through
their predecessors-in-interest have possessed and occupied the
subject land since June 12, 1945 or earlier as mandated by the
law.
It is settled that the applicant must present proof of specific acts
of ownership to substantiate the claim and cannot
just offer general statements which are mere conclusions oflaw
than factual evidence of possession.[23] Actual possession
consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such
a nature as a party would actually exercise over his own
property.[24]

The testimonies of Nemesio and Pacifico as to their own and their

predecessors-in-interest's possession and ownership over the
subject lot fail to convince Us. Petitioners claim that Basilio was
in possession of the land way back in 1916. Yet no tax declaration
covering the subject property, during the period Basilio allegedly
occupied the subject property, i.e., 1916 to 1947, was presented
in evidence. Other than the bare allegations of Nemesio and
Pacifico that Basilio allegedly introduced improvements on the
subject property, there is nothing in the records which would
substantiate petitioners' claim that Basilio was in possession of
Lot No. 2372 since June 12, 1945 or earlier, the period of
possession required by law. Hence, petitioners' assertion that
Basilio possessed the property in question from 1916 to 1947 is,
at best, conjectural and self-serving.

As regards petitioners' possession of the land in question from

1947 to 1966, petitioners could only support the same with a tax
declaration dated September 29, 1976. At best, petitioners can
only prove possession since said date. What is required is open,
exclusive, continuous and notorious possession by petitioners
and their predecessors-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of
ownership, since June 12, 1945 or earlier.[25] Petitioners failed
to explain why, despite their claim that their predecessors-in-
interest have possessed the subject properties in the concept of
an owner even before June 12, 1945, it was only in 1976 that
they started to declare the same for purposes of taxation.
Moreover, tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive
evidence of ownership or of the right to possess land when not
supported by any other evidence. The disputedproperty may
have been declared for taxation purposes in the names of the
applicants for registration, or of their predecessors-in-interest,
but it does not necessarily proveownership. They are
merely indicia of a claim of ownership.[26]

Evidently, since the petitioners failed to prove that (1) the

subject property was classified as part of the disposable and
alienable land of the public domain; and (2) they and their
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation thereof
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or
earlier, their application for confirmation and registration of the
subject property under PD 1529 should be denied.

WHEREFORE, the Decision and Resolution of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 54811, which reversed the Decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Kabankalan, Negros Occidental,
Branch 61, in Land Registration Case No. 03, is AFFIRMED. The
application for registration of title filed by the petitioners Pacifico
Valiao, Lodovico Valiao, Ricardo Valiao, Bienvenido Valiao, and
Nemesio Grandea, over Lot No. 2372, with a total area
of 504,535 square meters, more or less, situated in Barrio
Galicia, Municipality of Ilog, Negros Occidental, is DENIED.

LAUREANO V. HERMOSO, as G.R. No. 166748

represented by his Attorney-in-
Fact FLORIDA L. UMANDAP,
Petitioner,

- versus -
 Present:
COURT OF APPEALS and HEIRS
OF ANTONIO FRANCIA and YNARES-
PETRA FRANCIA, NAMELY: SANTIAGO, J.,
BENJAMIN P. FRANCIA, CECILIA Chairperson,
FRANCIA, AMOS P. FRANCIA, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
JR., FRANCISCO F. VILLARICA, CHICO-NAZARIO,
DANILO F. VILLARICA, NACHURA, and
RODRIGO F. VILLARICA, PERALTA, JJ.
MELCHOR F. VILLARICA, JESUS
F. VILLARICA, BENILDA F. Promulgated:
VILLARICA and ERNESTO F.
VILLARICA, April 24, 2009
Respondents.

x------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------x

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision[1] dated October
15, 2004 and the Resolution[2] dated January 19, 2005 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 77546.

The case involves parcels of land located at Malhacan,

Meycauyan, Bulacan, identified as Lot No. 3257 owned by Petra
Francia and Lot 3415 owned by Antonio Francia. The lots
comprises an area of 2.5 and 1.5850 hectares, respectively, and
forms part of a larger parcel of land with an area of 32.1324
hectares co-owned by Amos, Jr., Benjamin, Cecilia, Petra,
Antonio and Rufo, all surnamed Francia.[3]

Since 1978, petitioner and Miguel Banag (Banag) have been

occupying and cultivating Lot Nos. 3257 and 3415 as tenants
thereof. They filed a petition for coverage of the said lots under
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27.[4] On July 4, 1995, the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) issued an order granting
the petition, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, foregoing facts and jurisprudence

considered, Order is hereby issued:

1. PLACING the subject two (2) parcels of land being

tenanted by petitioners Laureano Hermoso and Miguel
Banag situated at Malhacan, Meycauayan, Bulacan,
owned by Amos Francia, et al. under the coverage of
Operation Land Transfer pursuant to P.D. 27; and

2. DIRECTING the DAR personnel concerned to process

the issuance of emancipation patents in favor of said
Laureano Hermoso and Miguel Banag after a parcellary
mapping have been undertaken by the Bureau of Lands
over the subject landholdings.

SO ORDERED.[5]

Respondents filed an omnibus motion for reconsideration and

reinvestigation. On December 9, 1995, the DAR affirmed with
modification the earlier order, and disposed of the case as
follows:

WHEREFORE, all premises considered, ORDER is hereby

issued AFFIRMING the first dispositive portion of the
Order, dated July 4, 1995, issued in the instant case,
but MODIFYING the second dispositive portion of the
same now to read, as follows:

1. PLACING the subject two (2) parcels of

land being tenanted by petitioners Laureano
Hermoso and Miguel Banag situated at
Malhacan, Meycauayan, Bulacan, owned by
Amos Francia, et al. under the coverage of
Operation Land Transfer pursuant to P.D. 27;
and
 2. DIRECTING the DAR personnel concerned
to hold in abeyance the processing of the
emancipation patent of Miguel Banag until the
issue of tenancy relationship in DARAB Cases
Nos. 424-Bul92 and 425-Bul92 is finally
resolved and disposed.

No further motion of any and/or the same nature shall

be entertained.

SO ORDERED.[6]

In a separate development, petitioner and Banag filed with the

Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB)
consolidated Cases Nos. 424-BUL-92 and 425-BUL-92. The
cases delved on whether both petitioner and Banag are tenants
of respondents in the subject landholding. On June 3, 1996, the
DARAB rendered a Decision[7] upholding the tenancy relationship
of petitioner and Banag with the respondents. Respondents filed
a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. A petition
for review on certiorari was filed before the CA. However, the
petition was denied on technical grounds in a Resolution[8] dated
October 9, 1996. A motion for reconsideration was filed, but the
same was likewise denied in a Resolution[9] dated December 27,
1996. The case was eventually elevated to this Court in G.R. No.
127668. On March 12, 1997, the Court denied the petition for
lack of verification,[10] and subsequently, also denied the motion
for reconsideration in a Resolution[11] dated July 14, 1997.

Earlier, on January 20, 1997, Banag filed before the DAR,

an urgent ex-parte motion for the issuance of an emancipation
patent. On March 13, 1997, the DAR granted the motion.[12] On
March 21, 1997, respondents filed a motion for reconsideration.
They claimed that the lands involved have been approved for
conversion to urban purposes in an Order[13] dated June 5, 1973
issued by the DAR Secretary. The conversion order stated that
the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) under Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 27 does not cover the subject parcels of land.[14] On
March 10, 1998, the DAR issued an Order[15] affirming the March
13, 1997 order granting the motion for issuance of emancipation
patent in favor of Banag. On March 30, 1998, respondents filed
a notice of appeal and correspondingly filed their appeal
memorandum.[16] On April 21, 2003, the Office of the President
through the Deputy Executive Secretary rendered a
Decision[17] denying respondents appeal. The dispositive portion
of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is

hereby DISMISSED and the questioned Order dated 10
March 1998 of the DAR Secretary AFFIRMED in toto.

Parties are required to INFORM this Office, within five

(5) days from notice, of the dates of their receipt of this
Decision.

SO ORDERED.[18]

Respondents then filed with the CA a petition for review under

Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. They maintained that P.D. No. 27
does not cover the subject parcels of land pursuant to the June
5, 1973 Order of the DAR Secretary reclassifying the lands and
declaring the same as suited for residential, commercial,
industrial or other urban purposes. Furthermore, the Housing
and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) reclassified the lands
as early as October 14, 1978.

On October 15, 2004, the CA rendered the assailed

Decision,[19] the fallo of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED.

Accordingly, the assailed decision of the Office of the
President is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new
decision is hereby rendered dismissing the Petition for
Coverage under P.D. No. 27 filed by respondents [now
herein petitioner].

SO ORDERED.[20]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. On January 19,
2005, the CA rendered the assailed Resolution[21] denying the
motion for reconsideration.

Hence, the instant petition.

The sole issue in this petition is whether Lot Nos. 3257 and 3415
are covered by P.D. No. 27.
Petitioner avers that the final and executory decision of this
Court in G.R. No. 127668 affirming that he is a tenant of the
landholding in question entitles him to avail of the right granted
under PD 27. In other words, because of the finality of the
decision declaring him a tenant of the landholding in question,
in effect, the subject lots are considered as agricultural lands and
are thus covered by P.D. No. 27. Parenthetically, we take judicial
notice of the decision of the Court in G.R. No. 127668, in which
the tenancy relationship between petitioner and respondents
was upheld. That decision is already final and executory.

Respondents, for their part, claim that the lands were

already declared suited for residential, commercial, industrial or
other urban purposes in accordance with the provisions of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3844 as early as 1973. Hence, they are
no longer subject to P.D. No. 27.

We resolve to deny the petition.

Section 3, Article XII[22] of the Constitution mandates that

alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to
agricultural lands.

The classification of lands of the public domain is of two

types, i.e., primary classification and secondary classification.
The primary classification comprises agricultural, forest or
timber, mineral lands, and national parks. These are lands
specifically mentioned in Section 3, Article XII of the
Constitution. The same provision of the Constitution, however,
also states that agricultural lands of the public domain may
further be classified by law according to the uses to which they
may be devoted. This further classification of agricultural lands
is referred to as secondary classification.[23]

Under existing laws, Congress has granted authority to a

number of government agencies to effect the secondary
classification of agricultural lands to residential, commercial or
industrial or other urban uses.

Thus, Section 65 of R.A. No. 6657 or the Comprehensive

Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988, which took effect on June
15, 1988, explicitly provides:

Section 65. Conversion of Lands. After the lapse of five

(5) years from its award, when the land ceases to be
economically feasible and sound for agricultural
purposes, or the locality has become urbanized and the
land will have a greater economic value for residential,
commercial or industrial purposes, the DAR, upon
application of the beneficiary or the landowner, with due
notice to the affected parties, and subject to existing
laws, may authorize the reclassification or conversion of
the land and its disposition: Provided, That the
beneficiary shall have fully paid his obligation.

On the other hand, Section 20 of R.A. No. 7160 otherwise

known as the Local Government Code of 1991[24] states:

SECTION 20. Reclassification of Lands.

(a) A city or municipality may, through an

ordinance passed by the sanggunian after
conducting public hearings for the purpose,
authorize the reclassification of agricultural
lands and provide for the manner of their
utilization or disposition in the following cases:
(1) when the land ceases to be economically
 feasible and sound for agricultural purposes as
determined by the Department of Agriculture or
(2) where the land shall have substantially
greater economic value for residential,
commercial, or industrial purposes, as
determined by
the sanggunian concerned: Provided, That such
reclassification shall be limited to the following
percentage of the total agricultural land area at
the time of the passage of the ordinance:

(1) For highly urbanized and

independent component cities,
fifteen percent (15%);

(2) For component cities and first to

the third class municipalities, ten
percent (10%); and

(3) For fourth to sixth class

municipalities, five percent
(5%): Provided, further, That
agricultural lands distributed to
agrarian reform beneficiaries
pursuant to Republic Act Numbered
Sixty-six hundred fifty-seven (R.A.
No. 6657), otherwise known as The
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law, shall not be affected by the
said reclassification and the
conversion of such lands into other
purposes shall be governed by
Section 65 of said Act.

(b) The President may, when public interest so

requires and upon recommendation of the
National Economic and Development Authority,
authorize a city or municipality to reclassify
lands in excess of the limits set in the next
preceding paragraph.
 (c) The local government units shall, in conformity
with existing laws, continue to prepare their
respective comprehensive land use plans
enacted through zoning ordinances which shall
be the primary and dominant bases for the
future use of land resources: Provided, That the
requirements for food production, human
settlements, and industrial expansion shall be
taken into consideration in the preparation of
such plans.

(d) Where the approval by a national agency is

required for reclassification, such approval shall
not be unreasonably withheld. Failure to act on
a proper and complete application for
reclassification within three (3) months from
receipt of the same shall be deemed as approval
thereof.

(e) Nothing in this Section shall be construed as

repealing, amending, or modifying in any
manner the provisions of R.A. No. 6657.

But even long before these two trail-blazing legislative

enactments, there was already R.A. No. 3844 or the Agricultural
Land Reform Code, which was approved on August 8, 1963,
Section 36 of which reads:

SECTION 36. Possession of Landholding;

Exceptions.Notwithstanding any agreement as to the
period or future surrender, of the land, agricultural
lessee shall continue in the enjoyment and possession
of his landholding except when his dispossession has
been authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final
and executory if after due hearing it is shown that:

(1) The agricultural lessor-owner or a

member of his immediate family will
personally cultivate the landholding
or will convert the landholding, if
suitably located, into residential,
 factory, hospital or school site or
other useful non-agricultural
purposes: Provided, That the
agricultural lessee shall be entitled to
disturbance compensation equivalent
to five years rental on his landholding
in addition to his rights under
Sections twenty-five and thirty-four,
except when the land owned and
leased by the agricultural lessor, is
not more that five hectares, in which
case instead of disturbance
compensation the lessee may be
entitled to an advanced notice of at
least one agricultural year before
ejectment proceedings are filed
against him: Provided, further, That
should the landholder not cultivate
the land himself for three years or fail
to substantially carry out such
conversion within one year after the
dispossession of the tenant, it shall
be presumed that he acted in bad
faith and the tenant shall have the
right to demand possession of the
land and recover damages for any
loss incurred by him because of said
dispossessions;

(2) The agricultural lessee failed to

substantially comply with any of the
terms and conditions of the contract
or any of the provisions of this Code
unless his failure is caused by
fortuitous event or force majeure;

(3) The agricultural lessee planted

crops or used the landholding for a
purpose other than what had been
previously agreed upon;
 (4) The agricultural lessee failed to
adopt proven farm practices as
determined under paragraph 3 of
Section twenty-nine;

(5) The land or other substantial

permanent improvement thereon is
substantially damaged or destroyed
or has unreasonably deteriorated
through the fault or negligence of the
agricultural lessee;

(6) The agricultural lessee does not pay

the lease rental when it falls
due: Provided, That if the non-
payment of the rental shall be due to
crop failure to the extent of seventy-
five per centum as a result of a
fortuitous event, the non-payment
shall not be a ground for
dispossession, although the
obligation to pay the rental due that
particular crop is not thereby
extinguished; or

(7) The lessee employed a sub-lessee

on his landholding in violation of the
terms of paragraph 2 of Section
twenty-seven.

The petitioner in the instant case claims that he is entitled

to the issuance of an emancipation patent under P.D. No. 27.
The said decree promulgated by then President Ferdinand E.
Marcos, on October 21, 1972, is entitled, DECREEING THE
EMANCIPATION OF TENANTS FROM THE BONDAGE OF THE SOIL
TRANSFERRING TO THEM THE OWNERSHIP OF THE LAND THEY
TILL AND PROVIDING THE INSTRUMENTS AND MECHANISMS
THEREFOR. However, the law specifically applied to tenant-
farmers of private agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice
and corn under a system of share tenancy or lease tenancy,
whether classified as landed estate or not.

For the parcels of land subject of this petition to come

within the coverage of P.D. No. 27, it is necessary to determine
whether the land is agricultural. Section 3(c) of R.A. No. 6657
defines agricultural land, as follows:

(c) Agricultural Land refers to the land devoted to

agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not
classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or
industrial land.

and Section 3(b) specifies agricultural activity as:

(b) Agriculture, Agriculture Enterprise or Agricultural

Activity means cultivation of the soil, planting of crops,
growing of fruit trees, including the harvesting of such
farm products, and other farm activities and practices
performed by a farmer in conjunction with such farming
operations done by persons whether natural or juridical.

On the basis of these definitions, the subject parcels of land

cannot be considered as within the ambit of P.D. No. 27. This
considering that the subject lots were reclassified by the DAR
Secretary as suited for residential, commercial, industrial or
other urban purposes way before petitioner filed a petition for
emancipation under P.D. No. 27. The pertinent portions of the
June 5, 1973 Order[25] read:

Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act 3844, as

amended, the said requests of the petitioners were
referred to the National Planning Commission as well as
to the Agrarian Reform Team Leader, Valenzuela,
Bulacan for proper investigation.

The National Planning Commission in compliance

therewith after due investigation and physical survey of
the subject areas, favorably recommended the
suitability of the same to residential, commercial,
industrial or other urban purposes.

Similarly, the Agrarian Reform Team in Valenzuela,

Bulacan after due investigation thereof found the parcels
of land subject hereof highly suitable for conversion into
urban purposes in view of his findings and verification of
the location, facilities necessary for urban development
and also, the low agricultural income thereof
(unirrigated), of the said land. The Team Leader
concerned in his recommendation submitted to this
Office made mentioned (sic) that in his declaration of
the suitability of the subject properties for urban
purposes, he believes that the conformity of the tenants
consisting of eleven (11) tenants are no longer needed
so long as the petitioners are willing to pay the
disturbance compensation as provided for by law. The
petitioners manifested to the Team Leader concerned
their willingness to pay each and every tenant the
disturbance compensation according to law. To show
further their sincerity to comply with the provisions of
the law on disturbance compensation, and to show that
their (petitioners) purpose of the instant request is not
to evade the provisions of Decree 27, they stated in their
letter-request that they will not eject any tenants
therefrom, nor dispossessed (sic) them of their
landholdings until after they are fully and justly paid the
disturbance compensation according to law.

The subject parcels of land are not included in the land

transfer operation according to the teams report.

It maybe mentioned in this connection, that from the

report of the National Planning Commission submitted
to this Office, it appears that the subject properties are
strategically located in the urban center of the town
of Meycauayan wherein there are already existing
developed and occupied residential subdivisions and
even low cost housing projects subsidized by funds from
government financial institution. Likewise, there are also
 industrial establishments in its vicinity according to the
National Planning Commissions report.

In view of the foregoing, and considering the parcels of

land subject hereof to be suited for residential,
commercial, industrial or other urban purposes as found
and recommended by the National Planning Commission
and the Agrarian Reform Team concerned, and
considering further that the said parcels of land by
reason of their location and the existence of developed
and occupied residential subdivisions and industrial
establishments in the immediate vicinity maybe
considered as one of the possible areas to be reserved
for urban development as contemplated in the Letter of
Instruction No. 46 of the President, and considering
finally, that the right of the agricultural tenants therein
will be fully compensated and there will be no ejectment
of tenants until after full payment thereof, as manifested
by the petitioners, the instant requests of the petitioners
should be, as hereby it is, given due course and the
parcels of land subject thereof are hereby declared
suited for residential, commercial, industrial or other
urban purposes in accordance with the provisions of
Republic Act 3844, as amended.

It is understood however, that no agricultural tenants

and/or lessees shall be ejected from or dispossessed of
their landholdings by virtue of this Order not until after
they are duly and justly paid the disturbance
compensation according to law, the amount of which
maybe determined and fixed by the proper court in the
absence of any mutual agreement thereto by and
between the agricultural lessees and the owner-
petitioners.

SO ORDERED.[26]

The main contention of petitioner for the approval of the

emancipation patent in his favor under P.D. No. 27 is the fact
that respondents were not able to realize the actual conversion
of the land into residential purposes. To bolster his claim,
petitioner relies on Section 36 (1) of R.A. No. 3844, viz.:

SECTION 36. Possession of Landholding; Exceptions.

Notwithstanding any agreement as to the period or
future surrender, of the land, an agricultural lessee shall
continue in the enjoyment and possession of his
landholding except when his dispossession has been
authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final and
executory if after due hearing it is shown that:

(1) The agricultural lessor-owner or a member of his

immediate family will personally cultivate the
landholding or will convert the landholding, if suitably
located, into residential, factory, hospital or school site
or other useful non-agricultural purposes: Provided;
That the agricultural lessee shall be entitled to
disturbance compensation equivalent to five years
rental on his landholding in addition to his rights under
Sections twenty-five and thirty-four, except when the
land owned and leased by the agricultural lessor, is not
more than five hectares, in which case instead of
disturbance compensation the lessee may be entitled to
an advanced notice of at least one agricultural year
before ejectment proceedings are filed against
him: Provided, further, That should the landholder
not cultivate the land himself for three years or fail
to substantially carry out such conversion within
one year after the dispossession of the tenant, it
shall be presumed that he acted in bad faith and
the tenant shall have the right to demand
possession of the land and recover damages for
any loss incurred by him because of said
dispossessions.

xxxx[27]

However, the provision of R.A. No. 3844 had already been

amended by R.A. No. 6389, as early as September 10, 1971.
Section 36 (1) of R.A. No. 3844, as amended, now reads:
 SECTION 36. Possession of Landholding; Exceptions.
Notwithstanding any agreement as to the period or
future surrender, of the land, an agricultural lessee shall
continue in the enjoyment and possession of his
landholding except when his dispossession has been
authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final and
executory if after due hearing it is shown that:

(1) The landholding is declared by the department head

upon recommendation of the National Planning
Commission to be suited for residential, commercial,
industrial or some other urban purposes: Provided, That
the agricultural lessee shall be entitled to disturbance
compensation equivalent to five times the average of
the gross harvests on his landholding during the last five
preceding calendar years;

xxxx[28]

Under R.A. No. 6389, the condition imposed on the

landowner to implement the conversion of the agricultural land
to non-agricultural purposes within a certain period was deleted.
With the enactment of the amendatory law, the condition
imposed on the landowner to implement the conversion of the
agricultural land to a non-agricultural purpose within a certain
period was deleted.[29] The remedy left available to the tenant is
to claim disturbance compensation.

In Natalia Realty, Inc. v. Department of Agrarian

Reform[30], the Court held that lands not devoted to agricultural
activity and those that were previously converted to non-
agricultural uses are outside the coverage of the CARL, viz.:

We now determine whether such lands are covered

by the CARL. Section 4 of R.A. 6657 provides that the
CARL shall "cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement
and commodity produced, all public and private
agricultural lands." As to what constitutes "agricultural
land," it is referred to as "land devoted to agricultural
 activity as defined in this Act and not classified as
mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial
land." The deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission confirm this limitation. "Agricultural lands"
are only those lands which are "arable and suitable
agricultural lands" and "do not include commercial,
industrial and residential lands."
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the undeveloped
portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision cannot in any
language be considered as "agricultural lands." These
lots were intended for residential use. They ceased to be
agricultural lands upon approval of their inclusion in the
Lungsod Silangan Reservation. Even today, the areas in
question continued to be developed as a low-cost
housing subdivision, albeit at a snail's pace. This can
readily be gleaned from the fact that SAMBA members
even instituted an action to restrain petitioners from
continuing with such development. The enormity of the
resources needed for developing a subdivision may have
delayed its completion but this does not detract from the
fact that these lands are still residential lands and
outside the ambit of the CARL. [31]

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition

is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated October 15,
2004 and the Resolution dated January 19, 2005 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 77546 are hereby affirmed. The
case is remanded to the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator
of Bulacan for the proper computation of the disturbance
compensation of petitioner.

HEIRS OF THE LATE SPOUSES G.R. No. 151312

PEDRO S. PALANCA AND
SOTERRANEA RAFOLS VDA.
DE PALANCA namely: IMELDA
R. PALANCA, MAMERTA R. Present:
PALANCA, OFELIA P. MIGUEL,
ESTEFANIA P. PE, CANDELARIA
P. PUNZALAN, NICOLAS R. PUNO, J., Chairperson,
PALANCA, CONSTANTINO R. SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
PALANCA, EDMUNDO PALANCA, CORONA,*
LEOCADIA R. PALANCA and AZCUNA, and
OLIVERIO R. PALANCA, represented GARCIA, JJ.
by their attorney-in-fact, OFELIA P.
MIGUEL,
Petitioners, Promulgated:

- versus -
August 30, 2006
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
(represented by the Lands Management
Bureau), REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
OF PALAWAN (Office of the
Executive Judge) and the REGISTER
OF DEEDS OF PALAWAN,
Respondents.
X --------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------ X

DECISION

AZCUNA, J.:

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule

45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the
decision[1] dated July 16, 2001, and the resolution[2]dated
December 21, 2001, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 62081 entitled Republic of the Philippines (Represented by
the Lands Management Bureau) v. Court of First Instance (CFI)
of Palawan (now Regional Trial Court), Seventh Judicial District,
Branch II presided over by Former District Judge, Jose P.
Rodriguez, et al.

The antecedent facts[3] are as follows:

On July 19, 1973, the heirs of Pedro S. Palanca,
(petitioners herein), filed an application to bring the pieces of
land they allegedly owned under the operation of the Land
 Registration Act. These are: a two hundred thirty-nine thousand
nine hundred eighty (239,980) square meter parcel of land
situated in Barrio Panlaitan, Municipality of Busuanga, Province
of Palawan, as shown on plan Psu-04-000074, and a one
hundred seventy-six thousand five hundred eighty-eight
(176,588) square meter land in Barrio of Panlaitan (Island
of Capari), Municipality of New Busuanga, Province of Palawan,
as shown on plan Psu-04-000073. They acquired said realties
by inheritance from the late Pedro S. Palanca, who had occupied
and possessed said land openly and continuously in the concept
of an owner since 1934, or 39 years before the filing of said
application, and planted on said lands about 1,200 coconut
trees on each land, declared the same for taxation purposes and
paid the taxes thereof. The first parcel of land is presently
occupied by Lopez, Libarra, an encargado of herein
(petitioners), while the second is occupied by
(petitioner) Candelaria Punzalan. In Civil Case No. 573
entitled Heirs of Pedro Palanca, Plaintiffs, vs.
Alfonso Guillamac, Defendant, for Recovery of Possession of a
Parcel of Land the Court of First Instance of Palawan rendered
a decision on March 4, 1970, declaring (petitioners), the heirs
of Pedro S. Palanca, as the rightful possessors of the land
at Talampulan Island, Bario of Panlaitan, Municipality
of Busuanga, Province of Palawan, covered by Psu-04-000074,
including the two (2) hectare portion occupied and claimed by
Alfonso Guillamac.

It also appears that the jurisdictional requirements as to

notices, as prescribed by Section 31, Act No. 496, namely
publication in the Official Gazette, were complied with.

During the initial hearing of the case, verbal oppositions to the

application were made by the Provincial Fiscal of Palawan
purportedly for and in behalf of the Bureau of Forest
Development, the Bureau of Lands, and the Department of
Agrarian Reform, some inhabitants of the subject properties and
a businessman by the name of Alfonso Guillamac. The Provincial
Fiscal stated that the lands subject of the application had no
clearance from the Bureau of Forestry and that portions thereof
may still be part of the timberland block and/or public forest
under the administration of the Bureau of Forestry and had not
been certified as being alienable and disposable by the Bureau
of Lands. He therefore requested that the resolution on the
application be stayed pending the examination and issuance of
the required clearance by the Bureau of Forest
Development. After the lapse of three years from the date of
[4]

the initial hearing, however, no valid and formal opposition was

filed by any of the oppositors in the form and manner required
by law.[5] Neither did the Provincial Fiscal present witnesses from
the relevant government bureaus and agencies to support his
contention that the subject lands had not yet been cleared for
public disposition.

On the other hand, petitioners submitted the plan and technical

description of the land, a survey certificate approved by the
Bureau of Lands and also tax declarations showing that they
have consistently paid the realty taxes accruing on the property.
Petitioners likewise presented six witnesses in support of their
application, namely ConstantinoPalanca, Ofelia Palanca-Miguel,
Lopez Libarra, Alejandro Cabajar, Alfonso Lucero
and Augustin Timbancaya.

Both Constantino Palanca and Ofelia Palanca-Miguel

testified that: (1) they were heirs of one Pedro S. Palanca; (2)
they, together with their other siblings, were applicants for the
registration of two parcels of land located in
Barrio Panlaitan, Busuanga, Palawan; (3) their father, Pedro
S. Palanca, acquired ownership over the subject properties by
continuous, public and notorious possession; (4) their father
built a house on each parcel of land and planted coconut trees;
(5) since their fathers death, they have continued their
possession over the lands in the concept of owners and adverse
to all claimants; and (6) the properties have been declared for
taxation purposes and the corresponding taxes religiously paid
for over forty (40) years.[6]
Lopez Libarra and Alejandro Cabajar testified that they knew the
late Pedro S. Palanca and worked for the latter as an overseer
and a capataz respectively in the cultivation of the subject
properties. Cabajar, in particular, claimed that he helped clear
the lands sometime in the mid-1920s, planted upon such lands
coconut trees which are now bearing fruit, and continued working
with Pedro S. Palanca until the latters death in 1943. He
subsequently went to work for the heirs of Pedro
S. Palanca whom he confirms now own and manage the
properties.[7]
For his part, Libarra testified that he had been the overseer of
the two coconut plantations of the late Pedro S. Palanca since
1934. He identified the location of the properties, averring that
one plantation is in Talampulan, Panlaitan Island and the other
in Talampetan, Capari Island. He further testified that at the
time he was employed in 1934, there were already
improvements in the form of coconut trees planted in the areas,
a number of which were already bearing fruits. His duties
included overseeing and cleaning the plantations, making copra
and replanting the area when necessary. He also claimed he
worked with Pedro S. Palanca until the latters death in 1943 and
continues to work for the latters heirs up to the present.[8]
Also presented were Alfonso Lucero and Augustin Timbancaya,
who testified thus:

Alfonso Lucero testified that he is a Forester in the Bureau

of Forest Development, formerly the Bureau of Forestry. He was
once assigned as the Chief of Land Classification Party No. 55 in
Palawan. Presently, he is a member of the Composite Land
Classification Team No. 32 in the province with station at
Puerto Princessa City. He has been employed with the Bureau
of Forest Development for about 30 years, starting as a Forest
Guard in 1947. As chief of Land Classification Party No. 55, he
covered the territory from Puerto Princesa City northward up
to Busuanga, where the land in question is located. His duty was
to supervise the team that conducted the limitation, segregation
and deviation of agricultural lands within the area. He served in
this capacity for twelve (12) years until December 1975. As
such, he issued certifications after due classification by his
office, of alienable and disposable land for administration by the
Bureau of Lands and eventual disposition to interested parties.
He had been in Busuanga, Palawan a number of times and is
familiar with the lands in question, one of which is
in Talampetan, Capari Island and the other
in Talampulan, Panlaitan Island. He is aware that the lands in
question are claimed and administered by the heirs of Pedro
S. Palanca. The improvements on the land are at least 40 years
old in his estimation. He recalls having issued a certification of
release of this property for disposition to private parties, but
could not remember the exact date when he did so. He identified
Exhibits JJ and KK to be certifications to the effect
that Talampulan in Panlaitan Island and Talampetan, a portion
of Capari Island, both in Busuanga (formerly Coron), Palawan,
are fully cultivated and mainly planted to coconuts before World
War II by herein applicants, the heirs of Pedro S. Palanca. He is
fully convinced that the lands in question have already been
released before the war for agricultural purposes in favor of
Pedro S. Palanca, applicants predecessor-in-interest. Releases
of agricultural lands which are done in bulk at present was not
in vogue before the last war, for releases at that time were made
on a case-to-case basis. Under the pre-war system, an
application for a piece of land was individually referred to the
then Bureau of Forestry which in turn conducted a classification
of the area as to its availability, whether it be for sale,
homestead, etc. On the basis of the Bureau of Forestry
investigation, a certification was then issued as to its availability
for the purpose for which the application was made. The
certification was made on the basis of such application, and was
called the isolated case release or the case-to-case basis. This
procedure was followed in the case of herein applicants and
there seemed to be no reason to doubt that the area was in fact
released to herein applicants. Therefore, the area is no longer
under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forest Development.

Alfonso Lucero also testified that as Chief of Land

Classification Party No. 55, he was the one directly in charge of
classification and release of lands of public domain for
agricultural purposes. His office is directly under the bureau
chief in Manila, although for administrative purposes he is
carried with the district forestry office in Puerto Princesa City.
The certifications he issue carry much weight in land
classification and releases in the province unless revoked by the
Manila Office.
 Augustin O. Timbancaya testified that he is a licensed
geodetic engineer, formerly called a land surveyor. His services
were engaged by applicant Ofelia P. Miguel, the representative
of the other applicants, to conduct and prepare a land plan for
two parcels of land subject of the application. He went
personally to the lands in question. He executed Exhibit U, the
Plan of Land covered by PSU-04-000073, containing an area of
one hundred seventy-six thousand, five hundred eighty-eight
(176,588) square meters situated
at Talampetan, CapariIsland, Busuanga, Palawan, approved by
the Director of Lands on June 25, 1973. He also identified Exhibit
V, the Plan of Land under PSU-04-000074, containing an area
of two hundred thirty-nine thousand, nine hundred eighty (239,
980) square meters located
at Talampulan, Panlaitan Island, Busuanga, Palawan, which
was also approved by the Director of Lands on June 25, 1973.
Both lands are in barrio Panlaitan, Busuanga (formerly Coron),
Palawan, and have an aggregate total area of four hundred
sixteen thousand five hundred sixty-eight (416,568) square
meters. All these surveys were properly monumented. He
personally prepared the technical description for both lots. He
also prepared the Geodetic Engineers Certificates and had the
same notarized by Atty. Remigio Raton, the first on January 24,
1972 and the second on March 14, 1972. He believes that both
parcels of land have been released for agricultural purposes
because if it were otherwise, the survey plans he executed
would not have been approved by the Director of Lands. In other
words, the approval of the Land Plans by the Director of the
Bureau of Lands indicates that the lands in question have been
previously released for alienation and disposition. Both parcels
of land have been fully developed and the coconuts planted
thereon are about 50 years old. He has no doubt that these
lands were released for agricultural purposes long ago.[9]

After trial, the CFI of Palawan issued a decision

on December 15, 1977 declaring petitioners as the owners in fee
simple of the two parcels of land in question. Thereafter, Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 4295 was issued in the name of
petitioners. Subsequently, out of OCT No. 4295, Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. T-7095, T-7096, T-10396, T-10397, T-
10398, T-10399, T-10418, and T-10884 were issued.
On December 6, 2000, or after almost twenty-three years,
respondent Republic of the Philippines filed with the CA a
petition[10] for annulment of judgment, cancellation of the decree
of registration and title, and reversion. Respondent sought to
annul the December 15, 1977 decision of the CFI, arguing that
the decision was null and void because the two lands in question
were unclassified public forest land and, as such, were not
capable of private appropriation. In support of this proposition,
respondent presented Land Classification Map No. 839, Project
2-A dated December 9, 1929 showing that the subject properties
were unclassified lands as of that date as well as a certification
dated November 24, 2000 issued by the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office stating that the
islands of Talampulan and Capar(i) Island located in the
municipality of Busuanga, Palawan are within the unclassified
public forest. Respondent likewise drew attention to Executive
Proclamation No. 219 issued on July 2, 1967which classified
the Province of Palawan as a National Game Refuge and Bird
Sanctuary and the small islands off Palawan as national reserves
closed to exploitation and settlement under the administration of
the Parks and Wildlife Office, subject only to existing private
rights.[11] In view of the fact that the properties were never
classified as alienable and disposable, respondent argued that
the CFI did not have jurisdiction to make a disposition of the
same.

In addition, respondent asserted that the participants in the

proceedings committed perfidious acts amounting to extrinsic
fraud which is one of the grounds for the annulment of a
judgment. Respondent maintained that a culture of collusion
existed between and among the petitioners, the Provincial Fiscal
and the ranking officer of the District Forestry Office, Alfonso
Lucero, such that the State was deprived of the opportunity to
fairly present its case to the court.

On July 16, 2001, the CA rendered the assailed decision, the

dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The

decision of the then Court of First Instance of Palawan, Branch II,
dated December 15, 1977, in Land Registration Case No. N-21,
LRC Record No. N-44308 is hereby declared NULL and
VOID. Accordingly, Decree No. N-172081 and the corresponding
Original Certificate of Title No. 4295 issued in the name of the
Heirs of Pedro S. Palanca, as well as the subsequent Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. T-7095, T-7096, T-10396, T-10397, T-
10398, T-10399, T-10410 and T-10884 and all
subsequent TCTs issued thereafter are also declared NULL and
VOID. Private respondents Heirs of Pedro
S. Palanca are DIRECTED to surrender said transfer certificates
of title to public respondent Register of Deeds of Palawan; and the
latter is also DIRECTED to cause the cancellation thereof.

SO ORDERED.[12]

Petitioners motion for reconsideration was likewise denied

by the CA in a resolution[13] dated December 21, 2001. Hence,
this petition.

Petitioners contend that the CA disregarded settled

jurisprudence and applicable land laws when it ruled that the
subject properties covered by their application for registration
were forest lands and that, consequently, the land registration
court did not have jurisdiction to award the same to them. They
opine that it is not necessary for them to prove that the
government had expressly given a grant of the subject
properties to Pedro S. Palanca, their predecessor-in-interest,
separate of the legislative grant given to them purportedly under
Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Public Land Act). Petitioners
furthermore insist that a particular land need not be formally
released by an act of the Executive before it can be deemed open
to private ownership, citing the cases of Ramos v. Director of
Lands[14] and Ankron v. Government of the Philippine
Islands.[15] They likewise argue that the CA erred in relying upon
Executive Proclamation No. 219 and upon Land Classification
Map No. 839, Project 2-A to nullify petitioners mother title.
According to petitioners, the reversal of the CFIs decision
violated the principle of res judicata as well as the rule on
incontrovertibility of land titles under Act No. 496.

Respondent, on the other hand, denies the allegations of

the petition in its comment[16] dated August 6, 2002 and
contends that (a) the claim that the subject parcels of land are
public agricultural lands by virtue of a legislative grant is
unfounded and baseless; (b) the land registration court of
Puerto Princesa, Palawan, was devoid of jurisdictional
competence to order titling of a portion of forest land; (c) the CA
is correct in declaring that there must be a prior release of the
subject lands for agricultural purposes; (d) the rules
on res judicata and the incontestability of Torrens titles do not
find proper applications in the exercise of the power of reversion
by the State; and (e) estoppel and laches will not operate
against the State. Respondent also reiterates its contention that
collusion existed between the parties in the proceedings below
which prevented a fair submission of the controversy, to the
damage and prejudice of the Republic.

At the outset, it must be emphasized that an action for

reversion filed by the State to recover property registered in
favor of any party which is part of the public forest or of a forest
reservation never prescribes. Verily, non-disposable public lands
registered under the Land Registration Act may be recovered by
the State at any time[17] and the defense of res judicata would
not apply as courts have no jurisdiction to dispose of such lands
of the public domain.[18] That being said, it must likewise be kept
in mind that in an action to annul a judgment, the burden of
proving the judgments nullity rests upon the petitioner. The
petitioner has to establish by clear and convincing evidence that
the judgment being challenged is fatally defective.[19]
 Under the facts and circumstances of this case, the Court
finds that respondent met the required burden of proof.
Consequently, the CA did not err in granting respondents petition
to annul the decision of the land registration court. This petition
for review, therefore, lacks merit.

Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act upon which petitioners

anchor their claim states:

Sec. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines,

occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any
such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not
been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First
Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of
title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

xxx

(b) Those who, by themselves or through

their predecessors-in-interest, have been in
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or
ownership, for at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title, except when prevented by
war or force majeure. Those shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions
of this chapter.

The above provision clearly requires the concurrence of two

things: (1) that the land sought to be registered is public
agricultural land, and (2) that the applicant seeking registration
must have possessed and occupied the same for at least thirty
years prior to the filing of the application. That the petitioners,
through Pedro S. Palanca, have been in possession of the
properties since 1934 is not disputed. What is in doubt is the
compliance with the first requisite.

To reiterate, the validity of the CFI decision was impugned

on the basis of the courts lack of jurisdiction. If the properties
were alienable public lands, then the CFI, acting as a land
registration court, had jurisdiction over them and could validly
confirm petitioners imperfect title. Otherwise, if the properties
were indeed public forests, then the CA was correct in declaring
that the land registration court never acquired jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the case and, as a result, its decision
decreeing the registration of the properties in favor of petitioners
would be null and void.

The reason for this is the fact that public forests are
inalienable public lands. The possession of public forests on the
part of the claimant, however long, cannot convert the same into
private property.[20] Possession in such an event, even if
spanning decades or centuries, could never ripen into
ownership.[21] It bears stressing that unless and until the land
classified as forest is released in an official proclamation to that
effect so that it may form part of the disposable lands of the
public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not
apply.[22]

In the present case, Land Classification Map No. 839,

Project 2-A[23] indicated that
the Talampulan and Capari Islands on which the properties were
located were unclassified public lands as of December 9, 1929.
It was by virtue of Executive Proclamation No. 219 issued on July
2, 1967 that these islands were subsequently classified as
national reserves. Based on these, it becomes evident that the
subject properties have never been released for public
disposition. Obviously, from the time that petitioners and their
predecessor-in-interest were occupying the properties in 1934
until the time that an application for registration was filed in
1973, these properties remained as inalienable public lands.
 While it is true that the land classification map does not
categorically state that the islands are public forests, the fact
that they were unclassified lands leads to the same result. In the
absence of the classification as mineral or timber land, the land
remains unclassified land until released and rendered open to
disposition.[24] When the property is still unclassified, whatever
possession applicants may have had, and however long, still
cannot ripen into private ownership.[25] This is because, pursuant
to Constitutional precepts, all lands of the public domain belong
to the State, and the State is the source of any asserted right to
ownership in such lands and is charged with the conservation of
such patrimony.[26] Thus, the Court has emphasized the need to
show in registration proceedings that the government, through
a positive act, has declassified inalienable public land into
disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.[27]

Petitioners reliance upon Ramos v. Director of

Lands [28]
and Ankron v. Government [29]
is misplaced. These
cases were decided under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the first
Public Land Act No. 926 enacted by the Philippine Commission
on October 7, 1926, under which there was no legal provision
vesting in the Chief Executive or President of the Philippines the
power to classify lands of the public domain into mineral, timber
and agricultural so that the courts then were free to make
corresponding classifications in justiciable cases, or were vested
with implicit power to do so, depending upon the preponderance
of the evidence.

As petitioners themselves admit, registration of the

properties is sought under Commonwealth Act No. 141. Sections
6 and 7 of the Act provide as follows:

Section 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the

Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, shall from time to time
classify the lands of the public domain into

(a) Alienable or disposable,

(b) Timber, and
(c) Mineral lands,
 and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such
lands from one class to another, for the purposes of their
administration and disposition.

Section 7. For the purposes of the administration

and disposition of alienable or disposable public lands,
the President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce, shall from time to time
declare what lands are open to disposition or concession
under this Act.

Based on the foregoing, the classification or reclassification

of public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest
lands is the exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department
of the government. Clearly, the courts no longer have the
authority, whether express or implied, to determine the
classification of lands of the public domain.[30]

To the Courts mind, petitioners have failed to present

incontrovertible proof that the lands they claimed had previously
been classified as alienable. The bare allegation of Alfonso
Lucero that a certification had been issued releasing the
properties for agricultural purposes is not sufficient to prove this
fact. The best evidence would be the document itself which,
however, was not produced in this case. It was error for the land
registration court to have taken Mr. Luceros testimony at face
value, absent any other evidence to conclusively prove that the
land had been released for public disposition.

Furthermore, it must be pointed out that petitioners

contention that the State has the burden to prove that the land
which it avers to be of public domain is really of such nature
applies only in instances where the applicant has been in
possession of the property since time immemorial. When
referring to this type of possession, it means possession of which
no person living has seen the beginning and the existence of
which such person has learned from the latters
elders. [31]
Immemorial possession justifies the presumption that
the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had
been private property even before the Spanish conquest.[32] The
possession of petitioners in this case does not fall under the
above-named exception as their possession, by their own
admission, only commenced sometime in 1934.

To reiterate, where there is a showing that lots sought to

be registered are part of the public domain, the applicant for land
registration under Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141
must secure a certification from the government that the lands
claimed to have been possessed by the applicant as owner for
more than 30 years are alienable and disposable.[33] Petitioners
failure to do so in this case, when taken with the evidence
adduced by respondent showing that the lands in question
indeed remain part of the public domain and form part of the
national reserves, confirms that the CFI never acquired
jurisdiction to order the registration of such lands in favor of
petitioners, and certainly justifies their reversion to the State.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. No

costs.

THE SECRETARY OF THE G.R. No. 167707

DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT
AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE
REGIONAL EXECUTIVE Present:
DIRECTOR, DENR-REGION VI,
REGIONAL TECHNICAL PUNO, C.J.,
DIRECTOR FOR LANDS, QUISUMBING,
LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU, YNARES-SANTIAGO,
REGION VI PROVINCIAL CARPIO,
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
RESOURCES OFFICER OF KALIBO, CORONA,*
AKLAN, REGISTER OF DEEDS, CARPIO MORALES,
DIRECTOR OF LAND AZCUNA,
REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, TINGA,
DEPARTMENT OF TOURISM CHICO-NAZARIO,
SECRETARY, DIRECTOR OF VELASCO, JR.,
PHILIPPINE TOURISM NACHURA,**
AUTHORITY, REYES,
Petitioners, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
BRION, JJ.
- versus -

MAYOR JOSE S. YAP, LIBERTAD

TALAPIAN, MILA Y. SUMNDAD, and
ANICETO YAP, in their behalf and Promulgated:
in behalf of all those similarly situated,
Respondents. October 8, 2008

x---------------------------------------
-----------x

DR. ORLANDO SACAY and G.R. No. 173775

WILFREDO GELITO, joined by
THE LANDOWNERS OF
BORACAY SIMILARLY
SITUATED NAMED IN A LIST,
ANNEX A OF THIS PETITION,
Petitioners,

- versus -

THE SECRETARY OF THE

DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT
AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE
REGIONAL TECHNICAL
DIRECTOR FOR LANDS, LANDS
MANAGEMENT BUREAU,
REGION VI, PROVINCIAL
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES OFFICER, KALIBO,
AKLAN,
Respondents.
x---------------------------------------
-----------x
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:

AT stake in these consolidated cases is the right of the

present occupants of Boracay Island to secure titles over their
occupied lands.

There are two consolidated petitions. The first is G.R. No.

167707, a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming that[2]of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in Kalibo, Aklan, which granted the petition for
declaratory relief filed by respondents-claimants Mayor Jose
Yap, et al. and ordered the survey of Boracay for titling
purposes. The second is G.R. No. 173775, a petition for
prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No.
1064[3] issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo classifying
Boracay into reserved forest and agricultural land.

The Antecedents

G.R. No. 167707

Boracay Island in the Municipality of Malay, Aklan, with its

powdery white sand beaches and warm crystalline waters, is
reputedly a premier Philippine tourist destination. The island is
also home to 12,003 inhabitants[4] who live in the bone-shaped
islands three barangays.[5]

On April 14, 1976, the Department of Environment and

Natural Resources (DENR) approved the National
Reservation Survey of Boracay
Island,[6] which identified several lots as being occupied or
claimed by named persons.[7]

On November 10, 1978, then President Ferdinand Marcos

issued Proclamation No. 1801[8] declaring Boracay Island,
among other islands, caves and peninsulas in the Philippines,
as tourist zones and marine reserves under the
administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority
(PTA). President Marcos later approved the issuance
of PTACircular 3-82 dated September 3, 1982, to implement
[9]

Proclamation No. 1801.

Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No

3-82 precluded them from filing an application for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling
purposes, respondents-claimants
Mayor Jose S. Yap, Jr., Libertad Talapian, Mila Y. Sumndad, and
Aniceto Yap filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC in
Kalibo, Aklan.

In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that

Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 raised doubts
on their right to secure titles over their occupied lands. They
declared that they themselves, or through their predecessors-
in-interest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation in Boracay since June 12,
1945, or earlier since time immemorial. They declared their
lands for tax purposes and paid realty taxes on them.[10]

Respondents-claimants posited that Proclamation No. 1801

and its implementing Circular did not place Boracay beyond the
commerce of man. Since the Island was classified as a tourist
zone, it was susceptible of private ownership. Under Section
48(b) of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141, otherwise known as
the Public Land Act, they had the right to have the lots registered
in their names through judicial confirmation of imperfect titles.

The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General

(OSG), opposed the petition for declaratory
relief. The OSG countered that Boracay Island was
an unclassified land of the public domain. It formed part of the
mass of lands classified as public forest, which was not available
for disposition pursuant to Section 3(a) of Presidential Decree
(PD) No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code,[11] as amended.
 The OSG maintained that respondents-claimants reliance
on PD No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 was misplaced. Their
right to judicial confirmation of title was governed by CA No. 141
and PD No. 705. Since Boracay Island had not been classified as
alienable and disposable, whatever possession they had cannot
ripen into ownership.

During pre-trial, respondents-claimants and

the OSG stipulated on the following facts: (1) respondents-
claimants were presently in possession of parcels of land in
Boracay Island; (2) these parcels of land were planted with
coconut trees and other natural growing trees; (3) the coconut
trees had heights of more or less twenty (20) meters and were
planted more or less fifty (50) years ago; and (4) respondents-
claimants declared the land they were occupying for tax
purposes.[12]

The parties also agreed that the principal issue for

resolution was purely legal: whether Proclamation No. 1801
posed any legal hindrance or impediment to the titling of the
lands in Boracay. They decided to forego with the trial and to
submit the case for resolution upon submission of their
respective memoranda.[13]

The RTC took judicial notice[14] that certain parcels of land

in Boracay Island, more particularly Lots 1 and 30, Plan PSU-
5344, were covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 19502 (RO
2222) in the name of the Heirs of Ciriaco S. Tirol. These lots were
involved in Civil Case Nos. 5222 and 5262 filed before
the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan.[15] The titles were issued on
August 7, 1933.[16]

RTC and CA Dispositions

On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of

respondents-claimants, with a fallo reading:
 WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court
declares that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular
No. 3-82 pose no legal obstacle to the petitioners and
those similarly situated to acquire title to their lands in
Boracay, in accordance with the applicable laws and in
the manner prescribed therein; and to have their lands
surveyed and approved by respondent Regional
Technical Director of Lands as the approved survey does
not in itself constitute a title to the land.

SO ORDERED.[17]

The RTC upheld respondents-claimants right to have their

occupied lands titled in their name. It ruled that neither
Proclamation No. 1801 nor PTA Circular No. 3-82 mentioned that
lands in Boracay were inalienable or could not be the subject of
disposition.[18] The Circular itself recognized private ownership of
lands.[19] The trial court cited Sections 87[20] and 53[21] of the
Public Land Act as basis for acknowledging private ownership of
lands in Boracay and that only those forested areas in public
lands were declared as part of the forest reserve.[22]

The OSG moved for reconsideration but its motion was

denied.[23] The Republic then appealed to the CA.

On December 9, 2004, the appellate court affirmed in

toto the RTC decision, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises,

judgment is hereby rendered by us DENYING the appeal
filed in this case and AFFIRMING the decision of the
lower court.[24]

The CA held that respondents-claimants could not be

prejudiced by a declaration that the lands they occupied since
time immemorial were part of a forest reserve.

Again, the OSG sought reconsideration but it was similarly

denied.[25] Hence, the present petition under Rule 45.
 G.R. No. 173775

On May 22, 2006, during the pendency of G.R. No.

167707, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation
No. 1064[26] classifying Boracay Island into four hundred (400)
hectares of reserved forest land (protection purposes) and six
hundred twenty-eight and 96/100 (628.96) hectares of
agricultural land (alienable and disposable). The Proclamation
likewise provided for a fifteen-meter buffer zone on each side of
the centerline of roads and trails, reserved for right-of-way and
which shall form part of the area reserved for forest land
protection purposes.

On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Dr. Orlando

Sacay,[27] Wilfredo Gelito,[28] and other landowners[29] in
Boracay filed with this Court an original petition for prohibition,
mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No. 1064.[30] They
allege that the Proclamation infringed on their prior vested rights
over portions of Boracay. They have been in continued
possession of their respective lots in Boracay since time
immemorial. They have also invested billions of pesos in
developing their lands and building internationally renowned first
class resorts on their lots.[31]

Petitioners-claimants contended that there is no need for a

proclamation reclassifying Boracay into agricultural land. Being
classified as neither mineral nor timber land, the island
is deemed agricultural pursuant to the Philippine Bill of 1902
and Act No. 926, known as the first Public Land Act.[32] Thus,
their possession in the concept of owner for the required period
entitled them to judicial confirmation of imperfect title.

Opposing the petition, the OSG argued that petitioners-

claimants do not have a vested right over their occupied portions
in the island. Boracay is an unclassified public forest land
pursuant to Section 3(a) of PD No. 705. Being public forest, the
claimed portions of the island are inalienable and cannot be the
subject of judicial confirmation of imperfect title. It is only the
executive department, not the courts, which has authority to
reclassify lands of the public domain into alienable and
disposable lands. There is a need for a positive government act
in order to release the lots for disposition.

On November 21, 2006, this Court ordered the

consolidation of the two petitions as they principally involve the
same issues on the land classification of BoracayIsland.[33]

Issues

G.R. No. 167707

The OSG raises the lone issue of whether Proclamation No.

1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose any legal obstacle for
respondents, and all those similarly situated, to acquire title to
their occupied lands in Boracay Island.[34]

G.R. No. 173775

Petitioners-claimants hoist five (5) issues, namely:

I.
AT THE TIME OF THE ESTABLISHED POSSESSION OF
PETITIONERS IN CONCEPT OF OWNER OVER THEIR
RESPECTIVE AREAS IN BORACAY, SINCE TIME
IMMEMORIAL OR AT THE LATEST SINCE 30 YRS. PRIOR
TO THE FILING OF THE PETITION FOR DECLARATORY
RELIEF ON NOV. 19, 1997, WERE THE AREAS
OCCUPIED BY THEM PUBLIC AGRICULTURAL LANDS AS
DEFINED BY LAWS THEN ON JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION
OF IMPERFECT TITLES OR PUBLIC FOREST AS DEFINED
BY SEC. 3a, PD 705?

II.
 HAVE PETITIONERS OCCUPANTS ACQUIRED PRIOR
VESTED RIGHT OF PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OVER THEIR
OCCUPIED PORTIONS OF BORACAY LAND, DESPITE
THE FACT THAT THEY HAVE NOT APPLIED YET FOR
JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLE?

III.
IS THE EXECUTIVE DECLARATION OF THEIR AREAS AS
ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE UNDER SEC 6, CA 141
[AN] INDISPENSABLE PRE-REQUISITE FOR
PETITIONERS TO OBTAIN TITLE UNDER
THE TORRENS SYSTEM?

IV.
IS THE ISSUANCE OF PROCLAMATION 1064
ON MAY 22, 2006, VIOLATIVE OF THE PRIOR VESTED
RIGHTS TO PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OF
PETITIONERS OVER THEIR LANDS IN BORACAY,
PROTECTED BY THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE
CONSTITUTION OR IS PROCLAMATION 1064 CONTRARY
TO SEC. 8, CA 141, OR SEC. 4(a) OF RA 6657.

V.
CAN RESPONDENTS BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS TO
ALLOW THE SURVEY AND TO APPROVE THE SURVEY
PLANS FOR PURPOSES OF THE APPLICATION FOR
TITLING OF THE LANDS OF PETITIONERS IN
BORACAY?[35] (Underscoring supplied)

In capsule, the main issue is whether private claimants

(respondents-claimants in G.R. No. 167707 and petitioners-
claimants in G.R. No. 173775) have a right to secure titles over
their occupied portions in Boracay. The twin petitions pertain to
their right, if any, to judicial confirmation of imperfect title under
CA No. 141, as amended. They do not involve their right to
secure title under other pertinent laws.

Our Ruling

Regalian Doctrine and power of the executive

to reclassify lands of the public domain
 Private claimants rely on three (3) laws and executive acts
in their bid for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, namely:
(a) Philippine Bill of 1902[36] in relation to Act No. 926, later
amended and/or superseded by Act No. 2874 and CA No.
141;[37] (b) Proclamation No. 1801[38] issued by then President
Marcos; and (c) Proclamation No. 1064[39] issued by President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. We shall proceed to determine their
rights to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under
these laws and executive acts.

But first, a peek at the Regalian principle and the power of

the executive to reclassify lands of the public domain.

The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain

into agricultural, forest or timber.[40] Meanwhile, the 1973
Constitution provided the following divisions: agricultural,
industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral,
timber or forest and grazing lands, and such other classes as
may be provided by law,[41] giving the government great leeway
for classification.[42] Then the 1987 Constitution reverted to the
1935 Constitution classification with one addition: national
parks.[43] Of these, only agricultural lands may be
alienated.[44] Prior to Proclamation No. 1064 of May 22,
2006, Boracay Island had never been expressly and
administratively classified under any of these grand
divisions. Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain.

The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public

domain belong to the State, that the State is the source of any
asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the
conservation of such patrimony.[45] The doctrine has been
consistently adopted under the 1935, 1973, and 1987
Constitutions.[46]

All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within

private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.[47] Thus,
all lands that have not been acquired from the government,
either by purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part of
the inalienable public domain.[48] Necessarily, it is up to the State
to determine if lands of the public domain will be disposed of for
private ownership. The government, as the agent of the state, is
possessed of the plenary power as the persona in law to
determine who shall be the favored recipients of public lands, as
well as under what terms they may be granted such privilege,
not excluding the placing of obstacles in the way of their exercise
of what otherwise would be ordinary acts of ownership.[49]

Our present land law traces its roots to the Regalian

Doctrine. Upon the Spanish conquest of the Philippines,
ownership of all lands, territories and possessions in
the Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown.[50] The Regalian
doctrine was first introduced in the Philippines through the Laws
of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas, which laid the foundation
that all lands that were not acquired from the Government,
either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain.[51]

The Laws of the Indies was followed by the Ley

Hipotecaria or the Mortgage Law of 1893. The Spanish Mortgage
Law provided for the systematic registration of titles and deeds
as well as possessory claims.[52]

The Royal Decree of 1894 or the Maura Law[53] partly

amended the Spanish Mortgage Law and the Laws of the
Indies. It established possessory information as the method of
legalizing possession of vacant Crown land, under certain
conditions which were set forth in said decree.[54] Under Section
393 of the Maura Law, an informacion posesoria or possessory
information title,[55] when duly inscribed in the Registry of
Property, is converted into a title of ownership only after the
lapse of twenty (20) years of uninterrupted possession which
must be actual, public, and adverse,[56] from the date of its
inscription.[57] However, possessory information title had to be
perfected one year after the promulgation of the Maura Law, or
until April 17, 1895. Otherwise, the lands would revert to the
State.[58]
 In sum, private ownership of land under the Spanish regime
could only be founded on royal concessions which took various
forms, namely: (1) titulo real or royal grant; (2) concesion
especial or special grant; (3) composicion con el estado or
adjustment title; (4) titulo de compra or title by purchase; and
(5) informacion posesoria or possessory information title.[59]

The first law governing the disposition of public lands in

the Philippines under American rule was embodied in the
Philippine Bill of 1902.[60] By this law, lands of the public domain
in the Philippine Islands were classified into three (3) grand
divisions, to wit: agricultural, mineral, and timber or forest
lands.[61] The act provided for, among others, the disposal of
mineral lands by means of absolute grant (freehold system) and
by lease (leasehold system).[62] It also provided the definition by
exclusion of agricultural public lands.[63] Interpreting the
meaning of agricultural lands under the Philippine Bill of 1902,
the Court declared in Mapa v. Insular Government:[64]

x x x In other words, that the phrase agricultural

land as used in Act No. 926 means those public lands
acquired from Spain which are not timber or
mineral lands. x x x[65](Emphasis Ours)

On February 1, 1903, the Philippine Legislature passed Act

No. 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act. The act
established a system of registration by which recorded title
becomes absolute, indefeasible, and imprescriptible. This is
known as the Torrens system.[66]

Concurrently, on October 7, 1903, the Philippine

Commission passed Act No. 926, which was the first Public Land
Act. The Act introduced the homestead system and made
provisions for judicial and administrative confirmation of
imperfect titles and for the sale or lease of public lands. It
permitted corporations regardless of the nationality of persons
owning the controlling stock to lease or purchase lands of the
public domain.[67] Under the Act, open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands for
the next ten (10) years preceding July 26, 1904 was sufficient
for judicial confirmation of imperfect title.[68]

On November 29, 1919, Act No. 926 was superseded by

Act No. 2874, otherwise known as the second Public Land Act.
This new, more comprehensive law limited the exploitation of
agricultural lands to Filipinos and Americans and citizens of other
countries which gave Filipinos the same privileges. For judicial
confirmation of title, possession and occupation en concepto
dueo since time immemorial, or since July 26, 1894, was
required.[69]

After the passage of the 1935 Constitution, CA No.

141 amended Act No. 2874 on December 1, 1936. To this day,
CA No. 141, as amended, remains as the existing general law
governing the classification and disposition of lands of the public
domain other than timber and mineral lands,[70] and privately
owned lands which reverted to the State.[71]

Section 48(b) of CA No. 141 retained the requirement

under Act No. 2874 of possession and occupation of lands of the
public domain since time immemorial or since July 26,
1894. However, this provision was superseded by Republic Act
(RA) No. 1942,[72] which provided for a simple thirty-year
prescriptive period for judicial confirmation of imperfect
title. The provision was last amended by PD No. 1073,[73] which
now provides for possession and occupation of the land applied
for since June 12, 1945, or earlier.[74]

The issuance of PD No. 892[75] on February 16,

1976 discontinued the use of Spanish titles as evidence in land
registration proceedings.[76] Under the decree, all holders of
Spanish titles or grants should apply for registration of their
lands under Act No. 496 within six (6) months from the
effectivity of the decree on February 16, 1976. Thereafter, the
recording of all unregistered lands[77] shall be governed by
Section 194 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by
Act No. 3344.

On June 11, 1978, Act No. 496 was amended and updated
by PD No. 1529, known as the Property Registration Decree. It
was enacted to codify the various laws relative to registration of
property.[78] It governs registration of lands under
the Torrens system as well as unregistered lands, including
chattel mortgages.[79]

A positive act declaring land as alienable and

disposable is required. In keeping with the presumption of
State ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that
there must be a positive act of the government, such as an
official proclamation,[80] declassifying inalienable public land into
disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.[81] In fact,
Section 8 of CA No. 141 limits alienable or disposable lands only
to those lands which have been officially delimited and
classified.[82]

The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State

ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person
applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must
prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or
disposable.[83] To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible
evidence must be established that the land subject of the
application (or claim) is alienable or disposable.[84] There must
still be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as
alienable and disposable. To prove that the land subject of an
application for registration is alienable, the applicant must
establish the existence of a positive act of the government such
as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an
administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.[85]The applicant
may also secure a certification from the government that the
land claimed to have been possessed for the required number of
years is alienable and disposable.[86]
 In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order,
administrative action, report, statute, or certification was
presented to the Court. The records are bereft of evidence
showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by
private claimants were subject of a government proclamation
that the land is alienable and disposable. Absent such well-nigh
incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot accept the
submission that lands occupied by private claimants were
already open to disposition before 2006. Matters of land
classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for
proof.[87]

Ankron and De Aldecoa did not make the whole of

Boracay Island, or portions of it, agricultural lands. Private
claimants posit that Boracay was already an agricultural land
pursuant to the old cases Ankron v. Government of the
Philippine Islands (1919)[88] and De Aldecoa v. The Insular
Government (1909).[89] These cases were decided under the
provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926. There
is a statement in these old cases that in the absence of evidence
to the contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands
until the contrary is shown.[90]

Private claimants reliance on Ankron and De Aldecoa is

misplaced. These cases did not have the effect of converting the
whole of Boracay Island or portions of it into agricultural
lands. It should be stressed that the Philippine Bill of 1902 and
Act No. 926 merely provided the manner through which land
registration courts would classify lands of the public
domain. Whether the land would be classified as timber, mineral,
or agricultural depended on proof presented in each case.

Ankron and De Aldecoa were decided at a time when the

President of the Philippines had no power to classify lands of the
public domain into mineral, timber, and agricultural. At that
time, the courts were free to make corresponding classifications
in justiciable cases, or were vested with implicit power to do so,
depending upon the preponderance of the evidence.[91] This was
the Courts ruling in Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca
and Soterranea Rafols Vda. De Palanca v. Republic,[92] in which
it stated, through Justice Adolfo Azcuna, viz.:

x x x Petitioners furthermore insist that a particular

land need not be formally released by an act of the
Executive before it can be deemed open to private
ownership, citing the cases of Ramos v. Director of
Lands and Ankron v. Government of the
Philippine Islands.

xxxx

Petitioners reliance upon Ramos v. Director of

Lands and Ankron v. Government is misplaced. These
cases were decided under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and
the first Public Land Act No. 926 enacted by the
Philippine Commission on October 7, 1926, under which
there was no legal provision vesting in the Chief
Executive or President of the Philippines the power to
classify lands of the public domain into mineral, timber
and agricultural so that the courts then were free to
make corresponding classifications in justiciable cases,
or were vested with implicit power to do so, depending
upon the preponderance of the evidence.[93]

To aid the courts in resolving land registration cases under

Act No. 926, it was then necessary to devise a presumption on
land classification. Thus evolved the dictum in Ankron that the
courts have a right to presume, in the absence of evidence to
the contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands
until the contrary is shown.[94]

But We cannot unduly expand the presumption

in Ankron and De Aldecoa to an argument that all lands of the
public domain had been automatically reclassified as disposable
and alienable agricultural lands. By no stretch of imagination did
the presumption convert all lands of the public domain into
agricultural lands.

If We accept the position of private claimants, the Philippine

Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926 would have automatically made all
lands in the Philippines, except those already classified as timber
or mineral land, alienable and disposable lands. That would
take these lands out of State ownership and worse, would be
utterly inconsistent with and totally repugnant to the long-
entrenched Regalian doctrine.

The presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa attaches only

to land registration cases brought under the provisions of Act
No. 926, or more specifically those cases dealing with judicial
and administrative confirmation of imperfect titles. The
presumption applies to an applicant for judicial or administrative
conformation of imperfect title under Act No. 926. It certainly
cannot apply to landowners, such as private claimants or their
predecessors-in-interest, who failed to avail themselves of the
benefits of Act No. 926. As to them, their land remained
unclassified and, by virtue of the Regalian doctrine, continued to
be owned by the State.

In any case, the assumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa was

not absolute. Land classification was, in the end, dependent on
proof. If there was proof that the land was better suited for non-
agricultural uses, the courts could adjudge it as a mineral or
timber land despite the presumption. In Ankron, this Court
stated:

In the case of Jocson vs. Director of

Forestry (supra), the Attorney-General admitted in
effect that whether the particular land in question
belongs to one class or another is a question of fact. The
mere fact that a tract of land has trees upon it or has
mineral within it is not of itself sufficient to declare that
one is forestry land and the other, mineral land. There
must be some proof of the extent and present or future
value of the forestry and of the minerals. While, as we
have just said, many definitions have been given for
agriculture, forestry, and mineral lands, and that in each
case it is a question of fact, we think it is safe to say that
in order to be forestry or mineral land the proof must
show that it is more valuable for the forestry or the
mineral which it contains than it is for agricultural
purposes. (Sec. 7, Act No. 1148.) It is not sufficient to
show that there exists some trees upon the land or that
it bears some mineral. Land may be classified as forestry
or mineral today, and, by reason of the exhaustion of
the timber or mineral, be classified as agricultural land
tomorrow. And vice-versa, by reason of the rapid
growth of timber or the discovery of valuable minerals,
lands classified as agricultural today may be differently
classified tomorrow. Each case must be decided
upon the proof in that particular case, having
regard for its present or future value for one or the
other purposes. We believe, however, considering the
fact that it is a matter of public knowledge that a
majority of the lands in the Philippine Islands are
agricultural lands that the courts have a right to
presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary,
that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until
the contrary is shown. Whatever the land involved in
a particular land registration case is forestry or
mineral land must, therefore, be a matter of
proof. Its superior value for one purpose or the
other is a question of fact to be settled by the
proof in each particular case. The fact that the land
is a manglar [mangrove swamp] is not sufficient for the
courts to decide whether it is agricultural, forestry, or
mineral land. It may perchance belong to one or the
other of said classes of land. The Government, in the
first instance, under the provisions of Act No. 1148,
may, by reservation, decide for itself what portions of
public land shall be considered forestry land, unless
private interests have intervened before such
reservation is made. In the latter case, whether the land
is agricultural, forestry, or mineral, is a question of
proof. Until private interests have intervened, the
Government, by virtue of the terms of said Act (No.
1148), may decide for itself what portions of the public
 domain shall be set aside and reserved as forestry or
mineral land. (Ramos vs. Director of Lands,39 Phil.
175; Jocson vs. Director of
Forestry, supra) [95] (Emphasis ours)

Since 1919, courts were no longer free to determine the

classification of lands from the facts of each case, except those
that have already became private lands.[96] Act No. 2874,
promulgated in 1919 and reproduced in Section 6 of CA No. 141,
gave the Executive Department, through the President,
the exclusive prerogative to classify or reclassify public lands
into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest.96-a Since then,
courts no longer had the authority, whether express or implied,
to determine the classification of lands of the public domain.[97]

Here, private claimants, unlike the Heirs of Ciriaco Tirol who

were issued their title in 1933,[98] did not present a justiciable
case for determination by the land registration court of the
propertys land classification. Simply put, there was no
opportunity for the courts then to resolve if the land the Boracay
occupants are now claiming were agricultural lands. When Act
No. 926 was supplanted by Act No. 2874 in 1919, without an
application for judicial confirmation having been filed by private
claimants or their predecessors-in-interest, the courts were no
longer authorized to determine the propertys land
classification. Hence, private claimants cannot bank on Act No.
926.

We note that the RTC decision[99] in G.R. No. 167707

mentioned Krivenko v. Register of Deeds of Manila,[100] which
was decided in 1947 when CA No. 141, vesting the Executive
with the sole power to classify lands of the public domain was
already in effect. Krivenko cited the old cases Mapa v. Insular
Government,[101] De Aldecoa v. The Insular
Government, [102]
and Ankron v. Government of the
Philippine Islands.[103]

Krivenko, however, is not controlling here because it

involved a totally different issue. The pertinent issue
in Krivenko was whether residential lots were included in the
general classification of agricultural lands; and if so, whether an
alien could acquire a residential lot. This Court ruled that as an
alien, Krivenko was prohibited by the 1935 Constitution[104] from
acquiring agricultural land, which included residential lots. Here,
the issue is whether unclassified lands of the public domain are
automatically deemed agricultural.

Notably, the definition of agricultural public lands

mentioned in Krivenko relied on the old cases decided prior to
the enactment of Act No. 2874, including Ankron and De
Aldecoa.[105] As We have already stated, those cases cannot
apply here, since they were decided when the Executive did not
have the authority to classify lands as agricultural, timber, or
mineral.

Private claimants continued possession under Act

No. 926 does not create a presumption that the land is
alienable. Private claimants also contend that their continued
possession of portions of Boracay Island for the requisite period
of ten (10) years under Act No. 926[106] ipso facto converted the
island into private ownership. Hence, they may apply for a title
in their name.

A similar argument was squarely rejected by the Court

in Collado v. Court of Appeals.[107] Collado, citing the separate
opinion of now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in Cruz v. Secretary
of Environment and Natural Resources,107-a ruled:

Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act,

was passed in pursuance of the provisions of
the Philippine Bill of 1902. The law governed
the disposition of lands of the public domain.
It prescribed rules and regulations for the
homesteading, selling and leasing of portions
of the public domain of the Philippine Islands,
and prescribed the terms and conditions to
enable persons to perfect their titles to public
 lands in the Islands. It also provided for the
issuance of patents to certain native settlers
upon public lands, for the establishment of
town sites and sale of lots therein, for the
completion of imperfect titles, and for the
cancellation or confirmation of Spanish
concessions and grants in the Islands. In
short, the Public Land Act operated on the
assumption that title to public lands in the
Philippine Islands remained in the
government; and that the governments title
to public land sprung from the Treaty of Paris
and other subsequent treaties between Spain
and the United States. The term public land
referred to all lands of the public domain
whose title still remained in the government
and are thrown open to private appropriation
and settlement, and excluded the patrimonial
property of the government and the friar
lands.

Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to argue that

under the Philippine Bill of 1902
and Public Land Act No. 926, mere possession by
private individuals of lands creates the legal
presumption that the lands are alienable and
disposable.[108] (Emphasis Ours)

Except for lands already covered by existing titles,

Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain
prior to Proclamation No. 1064. Such unclassified lands
are considered public forest under PD No. 705. The
DENR[109] and the National Mapping and Resource Information
Authority[110] certify that Boracay Island is an unclassified land
of the public domain.

PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all

unclassified lands of the public domain as public forest. Section
3(a) of PD No. 705 defines a public forest as a mass of lands of
the public domain which has not been the subject of the present
system of classification for the determination of which lands are
needed for forest purpose and which are not. Applying PD No.
705, all unclassified lands, including those in Boracay Island,
are ipso facto considered public forests. PD No. 705, however,
respects titles already existing prior to its effectivity.

The Court notes that the classification of Boracay as a forest

land under PD No. 705 may seem to be out of touch with the
present realities in the island. Boracay, no doubt, has been
partly stripped of its forest cover to pave the way for commercial
developments. As a premier tourist destination for local and
foreign tourists, Boracay appears more of a commercial island
resort, rather than a forest land.

Nevertheless, that the occupants of Boracay have built

multi-million peso beach resorts on the island;[111] that the island
has already been stripped of its forest cover; or that the
implementation of Proclamation No. 1064 will destroy the islands
tourism industry, do not negate its character as public forest.

Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act and the
Constitution[112] classifying lands of the public domain
into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national
parks, do not necessarily refer to large tracts of wooded land or
expanses covered by dense growths of trees and
underbrushes.[113] The discussion in Heirs of Amunategui v.
Director of Forestry[114] is particularly instructive:

A forested area classified as forest land of the

public domain does not lose such classification simply
because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its
forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may
actually be covered with grass or planted to crops
by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. Forest lands do
not have to be on mountains or in out of the way
places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa
palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water
may also be classified as forest land. The classification
is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does
not have to be descriptive of what the land
 actually looks like. Unless and until the land classified
as forest is released in an official proclamation to that
effect so that it may form part of the disposable
agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on
confirmation of imperfect title do not
apply.[115] (Emphasis supplied)

There is a big difference between forest as defined in a dictionary

and forest or timber land as a classification of lands of the public
domain as appearing in our statutes. One is descriptive of what
appears on the land while the other is a legal status, a
classification for legal purposes.[116] At any rate, the Court is
tasked to determine the legal status of Boracay Island, and not
look into its physical layout. Hence, even if its forest cover has
been replaced by beach resorts, restaurants and other
commercial establishments, it has not been automatically
converted from public forest to alienable agricultural land.

Private claimants cannot rely on Proclamation No.

1801 as basis for judicial confirmation of imperfect
title. The proclamation did not convert Boracay into an
agricultural land. However, private claimants argue that
Proclamation No. 1801 issued by then President Marcos in 1978
entitles them to judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The
Proclamation classified Boracay, among other islands, as a
tourist zone. Private claimants assert that, as a tourist spot, the
island is susceptible of private ownership.

Proclamation No. 1801 or PTA Circular No. 3-82 did not

convert the whole of Boracay into an agricultural land. There is
nothing in the law or the Circular which made Boracay Island an
agricultural land. The reference in Circular No. 3-82 to private
lands[117] and areas declared as alienable and
disposable [118]
does not by itself classify the entire island as
agricultural. Notably, Circular No. 3-82 makes reference not only
to private lands and areas but also to public forested lands. Rule
VIII, Section 3 provides:
 No trees in forested private lands may be cut
without prior authority from the PTA. All forested areas
in public lands are declared forest
reserves. (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, the reference in the Circular to both

private and public lands merely recognizes that the island can
be classified by the Executive department pursuant to its powers
under CA No. 141. In fact, Section 5 of the Circular recognizes
the then Bureau of Forest Developments authority to declare
areas in the island as alienable and disposable when it provides:

Subsistence farming, in areas declared as alienable

and disposable by the Bureau of Forest Development.

Therefore, Proclamation No. 1801 cannot be deemed the

positive act needed to classify Boracay Island as alienable and
disposable land. If President Marcos intended to classify the
island as alienable and disposable or forest, or both, he would
have identified the specific limits of each, as President Arroyo
did in Proclamation No. 1064. This was not done in Proclamation
No. 1801.

The Whereas clauses of Proclamation No. 1801 also explain

the rationale behind the declaration of Boracay Island, together
with other islands, caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as a
tourist zone and marine reserve to be administered by
the PTA to ensure the concentrated efforts of the public and
private sectors in the development of the areas tourism potential
with due regard for ecological balance in the marine
environment. Simply put, the proclamation is aimed at
administering the islands for tourism and ecological
purposes. It does not address the areas alienability.[119]

More importantly, Proclamation No. 1801 covers not only

Boracay Island, but sixty-four (64) other islands, coves, and
peninsulas in the Philippines, such as Fortune and Verde Islands
in Batangas, Port Galera in Oriental Mindoro, Panglao and
Balicasag Islands in Bohol, Coron Island, Puerto Princesa and
surrounding areas in Palawan, Camiguin Island in Cagayan de
Oro, and Misamis Oriental, to name a few. If the designation
of Boracay Island as tourist zone makes it alienable and
disposable by virtue of Proclamation No. 1801, all the other
areas mentioned would likewise be declared wide open for
private disposition. That could not have been, and is clearly
beyond, the intent of the proclamation.

It was Proclamation No. 1064 of 2006 which

positively declared part of Boracay as alienable and
opened the same to private ownership. Sections 6 and 7 of
CA No. 141[120] provide that it is only the President, upon the
recommendation of the proper department head, who has the
authority to classify the lands of the public domain into alienable
or disposable, timber and mineral lands.[121]

In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, President Gloria

Macapagal-Arroyo merely exercised the authority granted to her
to classify lands of the public domain, presumably subject to
existing vested rights. Classification of public lands is the
exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department, through the
Office of the President. Courts have no authority to do
so.[122] Absent such classification, the land remains unclassified
until released and rendered open to disposition.[123]

Proclamation No. 1064 classifies Boracay into 400 hectares

of reserved forest land and 628.96 hectares of agricultural land.
The Proclamation likewise provides for a 15-meter buffer zone
on each side of the center line of roads and trails, which are
reserved for right of way and which shall form part of the area
reserved for forest land protection purposes.
Contrary to private claimants argument, there was nothing
invalid or irregular, much less unconstitutional, about the
classification of Boracay Island made by the President through
Proclamation No. 1064. It was within her authority to make such
classification, subject to existing vested rights.
 Proclamation No. 1064 does not violate the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. Private claimants
further assert that Proclamation No. 1064 violates the provision
of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) or RA No.
6657 barring conversion of public forests into agricultural
lands. They claim that since Boracay is a public forest under PD
No. 705, President Arroyo can no longer convert it into an
agricultural land without running afoul of Section 4(a) of RA No.
6657, thus:

SEC. 4. Scope. The Comprehensive Agrarian

Reform Law of 1988 shall cover, regardless of tenurial
arrangement and commodity produced, all public and
private agricultural lands as provided in Proclamation
No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229, including other
lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture.

More specifically, the following lands are covered

by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program:

(a) All alienable and disposable lands of the

public domain devoted to or suitable for
agriculture. No reclassification of forest
or mineral lands to agricultural lands shall
be undertaken after the approval of this
Act until Congress, taking into account
ecological, developmental and equity
considerations, shall have determined by
law, the specific limits of the public
domain.

That Boracay Island was classified as a public forest under

PD No. 705 did not bar the Executive from later converting it into
agricultural land. Boracay Island still remained an unclassified
land of the public domain despite PD No. 705.

In Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and

Soterranea Rafols v. Republic,[124] the Court stated that
unclassified lands are public forests.
 While it is true that the land classification
map does not categorically state that the islands
are public forests, the fact that they were
unclassified lands leads to the same result. In the
absence of the classification as mineral or timber land,
the land remains unclassified land until released and
rendered open to disposition.[125] (Emphasis supplied)

Moreover, the prohibition under the CARL applies only to a

reclassification of land. If the land had never been previously
classified, as in the case of Boracay, there can be no prohibited
reclassification under the agrarian law. We agree with the
opinion of the Department of Justice[126] on this point:

Indeed, the key word to the correct application of

the prohibition in Section 4(a) is the word
reclassification. Where there has been no previous
classification of public forest [referring, we repeat, to the
mass of the public domain which has not been the
subject of the present system of classification for
purposes of determining which are needed for forest
purposes and which are not] into permanent forest or
forest reserves or some other forest uses under the
Revised Forestry Code, there can be no reclassification
of forest lands to speak of within the meaning of Section
4(a).

Thus, obviously, the prohibition in Section 4(a) of

the CARL against the reclassification of forest lands to
agricultural lands without a prior law delimiting the
limits of the public domain, does not, and cannot, apply
to those lands of the public domain, denominated as
public forest under the Revised Forestry Code, which
have not been previously determined, or classified, as
needed for forest purposes in accordance with the
provisions of the Revised Forestry Code.[127]

Private claimants are not entitled to apply for judicial

confirmation of imperfect title under CA No. 141. Neither
do they have vested rights over the occupied lands under
the said law. There are two requisites for judicial confirmation
of imperfect or incomplete title under CA No. 141, namely: (1)
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the subject land by himself or through his
predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim of ownership
since time immemorial or from June 12, 1945; and (2) the
classification of the land as alienable and disposable land of the
public domain.[128]

As discussed, the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and

Proclamation No. 1801 did not convert portions
of Boracay Island into an agricultural land. The island remained
an unclassified land of the public domain and, applying the
Regalian doctrine, is considered State property.

Private claimants bid for judicial confirmation of imperfect

title, relying on the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and
Proclamation No. 1801, must fail because of the absence of the
second element of alienable and disposable land. Their
entitlement to a government grant under our present Public Land
Act presupposes that the land possessed and applied for is
already alienable and disposable. This is clear from the wording
of the law itself.[129] Where the land is not alienable and
disposable, possession of the land, no matter how long, cannot
confer ownership or possessory rights.[130]

Neither may private claimants apply for judicial

confirmation of imperfect title under Proclamation No. 1064, with
respect to those lands which were classified as agricultural
lands. Private claimants failed to prove the first element of open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of their lands in
Boracay since June 12, 1945.

We cannot sustain the CA and RTC conclusion in the

petition for declaratory relief that private claimants complied
with the requisite period of possession.
 The tax declarations in the name of private claimants are
insufficient to prove the first element of possession. We note
that the earliest of the tax declarations in the name of private
claimants were issued in 1993. Being of recent dates, the tax
declarations are not sufficient to convince this Court that the
period of possession and occupation commenced on June 12,
1945.

Private claimants insist that they have a vested right in

Boracay, having been in possession of the island for a long
time. They have invested millions of pesos in developing the
island into a tourist spot. They say their continued possession
and investments give them a vested right which cannot be
unilaterally rescinded by Proclamation No. 1064.

The continued possession and considerable investment of

private claimants do not automatically give them a vested right
in Boracay. Nor do these give them a right to apply for a title to
the land they are presently occupying. This Court is
constitutionally bound to decide cases based on the evidence
presented and the laws applicable. As the law and jurisprudence
stand, private claimants are ineligible to apply for a judicial
confirmation of title over their occupied portions in Boracay even
with their continued possession and considerable investment in
the island.

One Last Note

The Court is aware that millions of pesos have been

invested for the development of Boracay Island, making it a by-
word in the local and international tourism industry. The Court
also notes that for a number of years, thousands of people have
called the island their home. While the Court commiserates with
private claimants plight, We are bound to apply the law strictly
and judiciously. This is the law and it should prevail. Ito ang
batas at ito ang dapat umiral.
 All is not lost, however, for private claimants. While they
may not be eligible to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect
title under Section 48(b) of CA No. 141, as amended, this does
not denote their automatic ouster from the residential,
commercial, and other areas they possess now classified as
agricultural. Neither will this mean the loss of their substantial
investments on their occupied alienable lands. Lack of title does
not necessarily mean lack of right to possess.

For one thing, those with lawful possession may claim good
faith as builders of improvements. They can take steps to
preserve or protect their possession. For another, they may look
into other modes of applying for original registration of title, such
as by homestead[131] or sales patent,[132] subject to the
conditions imposed by law.

More realistically, Congress may enact a law to entitle

private claimants to acquire title to their occupied lots or to
exempt them from certain requirements under the present land
laws. There is one such bill[133] now pending in the House of
Representatives. Whether that bill or a similar bill will become a
law is for Congress to decide.

In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, the government has

taken the step necessary to open up the island to private
ownership. This gesture may not be sufficient to appease some
sectors which view the classification of the island partially into a
forest reserve as absurd. That the island is no longer overrun by
trees, however, does not becloud the vision to protect its
remaining forest cover and to strike a healthy balance between
progress and ecology. Ecological conservation is as important as
economic progress.

To be sure, forest lands are fundamental to our nations

survival. Their promotion and protection are not just fancy
rhetoric for politicians and activists. These are needs that
become more urgent as destruction of our environment gets
prevalent and difficult to control. As aptly observed by Justice
Conrado Sanchez in 1968 in Director of Forestry v. Munoz:[134]

The view this Court takes of the cases at bar is but

in adherence to public policy that should be followed
with respect to forest lands. Many have written much,
and many more have spoken, and quite often, about the
pressing need for forest preservation, conservation,
protection, development and reforestation. Not without
justification. For, forests constitute a vital segment of
any country's natural resources. It is of common
knowledge by now that absence of the necessary green
cover on our lands produces a number of adverse or ill
effects of serious proportions. Without the trees,
watersheds dry up; rivers and lakes which they supply
are emptied of their contents. The fish disappear.
Denuded areas become dust bowls. As waterfalls cease
to function, so will hydroelectric plants. With the rains,
the fertile topsoil is washed away; geological erosion
results. With erosion come the dreaded floods that
wreak havoc and destruction to property crops,
livestock, houses, and highways not to mention precious
human lives. Indeed, the foregoing observations should
be written down in a lumbermans decalogue.[135]

G.R. No. 135385 December 6, 2000

ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA, petitioners,

vs.
SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, SECRETARY OF
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT and CHAIRMAN and COMMISSIONERS OF THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, respondents.
HON. JUAN M .FLAVIER, HON. PONCIANO BENNAGEN, BAYANI ASCARRAGA,
EDTAMI MANSAYANGAN, BASILIO WANDAG, EVELYN DUNUAN, YAOM
TUGAS, ALFREMO CARPIANO, LIBERATO A. GABIN, MATERNIDAD M. COLAS,
NARCISA M. DALUPINES, BAI KIRAM-CONNIE SATURNO, BAE MLOMO-
BEATRIZ T. ABASALA, DATU BALITUNGTUNG-ANTONIO D. LUMANDONG,
DATU MANTUMUKAW TEOFISTO SABASALES, DATU EDUAARDO BANDA,
DATU JOEL UNAD, DATU RAMON BAYAAN, TIMUAY JOSE ANOY, TIMUAY
MACARIO D. SALACAO, TIMUAY EDWIN B. ENDING, DATU SAHAMPONG
MALANAW VI, DATU BEN PENDAO CABIGON, BAI NANAPNAY-LIZA SAWAY,
BAY INAY DAYA-MELINDA S. REYMUNDO, BAI TINANGHAGA HELINITA T.
PANGAN, DATU MAKAPUKAW ADOLINO L. SAWAY, DATU MAUDAYAW-
CRISPEN SAWAY, VICKY MAKAY, LOURDES D. AMOS, GILBERT P. HOGGANG,
TERESA GASPAR, MANUEL S. ONALAN, MIA GRACE L. GIRON, ROSEMARIE G.
PE, BENITO CARINO, JOSEPH JUDE CARANTES, LYNETTE CARANTES-VIVAL,
LANGLEY SEGUNDO, SATUR S. BUGNAY, CARLING DOMULOT, ANDRES
MENDIOGRIN, LEOPOLDO ABUGAN, VIRGILIO CAYETANO, CONCHITA G.
DESCAGA, LEVY ESTEVES, ODETTE G. ESTEVEZ, RODOLFO C. AGUILAR,
MAURO VALONES, PEPE H. ATONG, OFELIA T. DAVI, PERFECTO B.
GUINOSAO, WALTER N. TIMOL, MANUEL T. SELEN, OSCAR DALUNHAY, RICO
O. SULATAN, RAFFY MALINDA, ALFREDO ABILLANOS, JESSIE ANDILAB,
MIRLANDO H. MANGKULINTAS, SAMIE SATURNO, ROMEO A. LINDAHAY,
ROEL S. MANSANG-CAGAN, PAQUITO S. LIESES, FILIPE G. SAWAY,
HERMINIA S. SAWAY, JULIUS S. SAWAY, LEONARDA SAWAY, JIMMY UGYUB,
SALVADOR TIONGSON, VENANCIO APANG, MADION MALID, SUKIM MALID,
NENENG MALID, MANGKATADONG AUGUSTO DIANO, JOSEPHINE M.
ALBESO, MORENO MALID, MARIO MANGCAL, FELAY DIAMILING, SALOME P.
SARZA, FELIPE P. BAGON, SAMMY SALNUNGAN, ANTONIO D. EMBA, NORMA
MAPANSAGONOS, ROMEO SALIGA, SR., JERSON P. GERADA, RENATO T.
BAGON, JR., SARING MASALONG, SOLEDAD M. GERARDA, ELIZABETH L.
MENDI, MORANTE S. TIWAN, DANILO M. MALUDAO, MINORS MARICEL
MALID, represented by her father CORNELIO MALID, MARCELINO M. LADRA,
represented by her father MONICO D. LADRA, JENNYLYN MALID,
represented by her father TONY MALID, ARIEL M. EVANGELISTA,
represented by her mother LINAY BALBUENA, EDWARD M. EMUY, SR.,
SUSAN BOLANIO, OND, PULA BATO B'LAAN TRIBAL FARMER'S
ASSOCIATION, INTER-PEOPLE'S EXCHANGE, INC. and GREEN FORUM-
WESTERN VISAYAS, intervenors.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, intervenor.
IKALAHAN INDIGENOUS PEOPLE and HARIBON FOUNDATION FOR THE
CONSERVATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES, INC., intervenor.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and
mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain
provisions of Republic Act No. 8371 (R.A. 8371), otherwise known as the Indigenous
Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and Regulations
(Implementing Rules).

In its resolution of September 29, 1998, the Court required respondents to

comment.1 In compliance, respondents Chairperson and Commissioners of the
National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), the government agency created
under the IPRA to implement its provisions, filed on October 13, 1998 their
Comment to the Petition, in which they defend the constitutionality of the IPRA and
pray that the petition be dismissed for lack of merit.

On October 19, 1998, respondents Secretary of the Department of Environment and

Natural Resources (DENR) and Secretary of the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) filed through the Solicitor General a consolidated Comment. The
Solicitor General is of the view that the IPRA is partly unconstitutional on the ground
that it grants ownership over natural resources to indigenous peoples and prays that
the petition be granted in part.

On November 10, 1998, a group of intervenors, composed of Sen. Juan Flavier, one
of the authors of the IPRA, Mr. Ponciano Bennagen, a member of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, and the leaders and members of 112 groups of
indigenous peoples (Flavier, et. al), filed their Motion for Leave to Intervene. They
join the NCIP in defending the constitutionality of IPRA and praying for the dismissal
of the petition.

On March 22, 1999, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) likewise filed a Motion
to Intervene and/or to Appear as Amicus Curiae. The CHR asserts that IPRA is an
expression of the principle of parens patriae and that the State has the responsibility
to protect and guarantee the rights of those who are at a serious disadvantage like
indigenous peoples. For this reason it prays that the petition be dismissed.

On March 23, 1999, another group, composed of the Ikalahan Indigenous People
and the Haribon Foundation for the Conservation of Natural Resources, Inc.
(Haribon, et al.), filed a motion to Intervene with attached Comment-in-
Intervention. They agree with the NCIP and Flavier, et al. that IPRA is consistent
with the Constitution and pray that the petition for prohibition and mandamus be
dismissed.

The motions for intervention of the aforesaid groups and organizations were
granted.

Oral arguments were heard on April 13, 1999. Thereafter, the parties and
intervenors filed their respective memoranda in which they reiterate the arguments
adduced in their earlier pleadings and during the hearing.

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the IPRA and its
Implementing Rules on the ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of
the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other
natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2,
Article XII of the Constitution:

"(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of ancestral domains, and
Section 3(b) which, in turn, defines ancestral lands;

"(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides that ancestral domains
including inalienable public lands, bodies of water, mineral and other resources
found within ancestral domains are private but community property of the
indigenous peoples;

"(3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines the composition of
ancestral domains and ancestral lands;

"(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples
over the ancestral domains;

(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples
over the ancestral lands;

"(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenous peoples in the
harvesting, extraction, development or exploration of minerals and other natural
resources within the areas claimed to be their ancestral domains, and the right to
enter into agreements with nonindigenous peoples for the development and
utilization of natural resources therein for a period not exceeding 25 years,
renewable for not more than 25 years; and
"(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility to maintain,
develop, protect and conserve the ancestral domains and portions thereof which are
found to be necessary for critical watersheds, mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries,
wilderness, protected areas, forest cover or reforestation."2

Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of

"ancestral domains" and "ancestral lands" which might even include private lands
found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) violate the rights of private
landowners.3

In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the powers and
jurisdiction of the NCIP and making customary law applicable to the settlement of
disputes involving ancestral domains and ancestral lands on the ground that these
provisions violate the due process clause of the Constitution.4

These provisions are:

"(1) sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process of delineation and

recognition of ancestral domains and which vest on the NCIP the sole
authority to delineate ancestral domains and ancestral lands;

"(2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon certification by the NCIP that a
particular area is an ancestral domain and upon notification to the following
officials, namely, the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,
Secretary of Interior and Local Governments, Secretary of Justice and
Commissioner of the National Development Corporation, the jurisdiction of
said officials over said area terminates;

"(3) Section 63 which provides the customary law, traditions and practices of
indigenous peoples shall be applied first with respect to property rights,
claims of ownership, hereditary succession and settlement of land disputes,
and that any doubt or ambiguity in the interpretation thereof shall be
resolved in favor of the indigenous peoples;

"(4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and practices shall be used
to resolve disputes involving indigenous peoples; and

"(5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the jurisdiction over all claims and
disputes involving rights of the indigenous peoples."5

Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP
Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, which provides that "the administrative
relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the President is characterized as a lateral
but autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and program coordination." They
contend that said Rule infringes upon the President’s power of control over executive
departments under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution.6

Petitioners pray for the following:

"(1) A declaration that Sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 52[I], 57, 58, 59, 63, 65 and 66
and other related provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional and invalid;
 "(2) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Chairperson and
Commissioners of the NCIP to cease and desist from implementing the
assailed provisions of R.A. 8371 and its Implementing Rules;

"(3) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of the

Department of Environment and Natural Resources to cease and desist from
implementing Department of Environment and Natural Resources Circular No.
2, series of 1998;

"(4) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of Budget

and Management to cease and desist from disbursing public funds for the
implementation of the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371; and

"(5) The issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the Secretary of

Environment and Natural Resources to comply with his duty of carrying out
the State’s constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration,
development, utilization and conservation of Philippine natural resources."7

After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court voted as follows:

Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed an opinion, which the
Chief Justice and Justices Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and Santiago join, sustaining the
validity of the challenged provisions of R.A. 8371. Justice Puno also filed a separate
opinion sustaining all challenged provisions of the law with the exception of Section
1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the IPRA, and Section 57 of the IPRA which he contends
should be interpreted as dealing with the large-scale exploitation of natural
resources and should be read in conjunction with Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution. On the other hand, Justice Mendoza voted to dismiss the petition solely
on the ground that it does not raise a justiciable controversy and petitioners do not
have standing to question the constitutionality of R.A. 8371.

Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition. Justice
Panganiban filed a separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6,
7 (a)(b), 8, and related provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. He reserves
judgment on the constitutionality of Sections 58, 59, 65, and 66 of the law, which he
believes must await the filing of specific cases by those whose rights may have been
violated by the IPRA. Justice Vitug also filed a separate opinion expressing the view
that Sections 3(a), 7, and 57 of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. Justices Melo, Pardo,
Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon join in the separate opinions of Justices
Panganiban and Vitug.

As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not
obtained, the case was redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the voting
remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.

Attached hereto and made integral parts thereof are the separate opinions of
Justices Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, and Panganiban.

SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes,
Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and Panganiban JJ., see separate opinion

Footnotes

1
Rollo, p. 114.

2
Petition, Rollo, pp. 16-23.

3
Id. at 23-25.

4
Section 1, Article III of the Constitution states: "No person shall be deprived
of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws."

5
Rollo, pp. 25-27.

6
Id. at 27-28.

7
Transcript of Stenographic Notes of the hearing held on April 13, 1999, pp.
5-6.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

SEPARATE OPINION

PUNO, J.:

PRECIS

A classic essay on the utility of history was written in 1874 by Friedrich Nietzsche
entitled "On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life." Expounding on
Nietzsche's essay, Judge Richard Posner1 wrote:2

"Law is the most historically oriented, or if you like the most backward-looking, the
most 'past-dependent,' of the professions. It venerates tradition, precedent,
pedigree, ritual, custom, ancient practices, ancient texts, archaic terminology,
maturity, wisdom, seniority, gerontocracy, and interpretation conceived of as a
method of recovering history. It is suspicious of innovation, discontinuities,
'paradigm shifts,' and the energy and brashness of youth. These ingrained attitudes
are obstacles to anyone who wants to re-orient law in a more pragmatic direction.
But, by the same token, pragmatic jurisprudence must come to terms with
history."
When Congress enacted the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA), it
introduced radical concepts into the Philippine legal system which appear to collide
with settled constitutional and jural precepts on state ownership of land and other
natural resources. The sense and subtleties of this law cannot be appreciated
without considering its distinct sociology and the labyrinths of its history. This
Opinion attempts to interpret IPRA by discovering its soul shrouded by the mist of
our history. After all, the IPRA was enacted by Congress not only to fulfill the
constitutional mandate of protecting the indigenous cultural communities' right to
their ancestral land but more importantly, to correct a grave historical injustice
to our indigenous people.

This Opinion discusses the following:

I. The Development of the Regalian Doctrine in the Philippine Legal System.

A. The Laws of the Indies

B. Valenton v. Murciano

C. The Public Land Acts and the Torrens System

D. The Philippine Constitutions

II. The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA).

A. Indigenous Peoples

1. Indigenous Peoples: Their History

2. Their Concept of Land

III. The IPRA is a Novel Piece of Legislation.

A. Legislative History

IV. The Provisions of the IPRA Do Not Contravene the Constitution.

A. Ancestral domains and ancestral lands are the private property of

indigenous peoples and do not constitute part of the land of the public
domain.

1. The right to ancestral domains and ancestral lands: how acquired

2. The concept of native title

(a) Cariño v. Insular Government

(b) Indian Title to land

(c) Why the Cariño doctrine is unique

3. The option of securing a torrens title to the ancestral land

 B. The right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral
domains is a limited form of ownership and does not include the right to
alienate the same.

1. The indigenous concept of ownership and customary law

C. Sections 7 (a), 7 (b) and 57 of the IPRA do not violate the Regalian
Doctrine enshrined in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.

1. The rights of ICCs/IPs over their ancestral domains and lands

2. The right of ICCs/IPs to develop lands and natural resources within

the ancestral domains does not deprive the State of ownership over
the natural resources, control and supervision in their development
and exploitation.

(a) Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules goes
beyond the parameters of Section 7(a) of the law on ownership
of ancestral domains and is ultra vires.

(b) The small-scale utilization of natural resources in Section 7

(b) of the IPRA is allowed under Paragraph 3, Section 2, Article
XII of the 1987 Consitution.

(c) The large-scale utilization of natural resources in Section 57

of the IPRA may be harmonized with Paragraphs 1 and 4,
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.

V. The IPRA is a Recognition of Our Active Participation in the International

Indigenous Movement.

DISCUSSION

I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE REGALIAN DOCTRINE IN THE PHILIPPINE LEGAL

SYSTEM.

A. The Laws of the Indies

The capacity of the State to own or acquire property is the state's power
of dominium.3 This was the foundation for the early Spanish decrees embracing the
feudal theory of jura regalia. The "Regalian Doctrine" or jura regalia is a Western
legal concept that was first introduced by the Spaniards into the country
through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas. The Laws of the Indies,
i.e., more specifically, Law 14, Title 12, Book 4 of the Novisima Recopilacion de
Leyes de las Indias, set the policy of the Spanish Crown with respect to the
Philippine Islands in the following manner:

"We, having acquired full sovereignty over the Indies, and all lands, territories, and
possessions not heretofore ceded away by our royal predecessors, or by us, or in
our name, still pertaining to the royal crown and patrimony, it is our will that all
lands which are held without proper and true deeds of grant be restored to us as
they belong to us, in order that after reserving before all what to us or to our
viceroys, audiencias, and governors may seem necessary for public squares, ways,
pastures, and commons in those places which are peopled, taking into consideration
not only their present condition, but also their future and their probable increase,
and after distributing to the natives what may be necessary for tillage and
pasturage, confirming them in what they now have and giving them more if
necessary, all the rest of said lands may remain free and unencumbered for us to
dispose of as we may wish.

We therefore order and command that all viceroys and presidents of pretorial courts
designate at such time as shall to them seem most expedient, a suitable period
within which all possessors of tracts, farms, plantations, and estates shall exhibit to
them and to the court officers appointed by them for this purpose, their title deeds
thereto. And those who are in possession by virtue of proper deeds and receipts, or
by virtue of just prescriptive right shall be protected, and all the rest shall be
restored to us to be disposed of at our will."4

The Philippines passed to Spain by virtue of "discovery" and conquest.

Consequently, all lands became the exclusive patrimony and dominion of the
Spanish Crown. The Spanish Government took charge of distributing the lands by
issuing royal grants and concessions to Spaniards, both military and civilian.5 Private
land titles could only be acquired from the government either by purchase or by the
various modes of land grant from the Crown.6

The Laws of the Indies were followed by the Ley Hipotecaria, or the Mortgage
Law of 1893.7 The Spanish Mortgage Law provided for the systematic registration
of titles and deeds as well as possessory claims. The law sought to register and tax
lands pursuant to the Royal Decree of 1880. The Royal Decree of 1894, or the
"Maura Law," was partly an amendment of the Mortgage Law as well as the Laws of
the Indies, as already amended by previous orders and decrees.8 This was the last
Spanish land law promulgated in the Philippines. It required the "adjustment" or
registration of all agricultural lands, otherwise the lands shall revert to the state.

Four years later, by the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898, Spain ceded to
the government of the United States all rights, interests and claims over the national
territory of the Philippine Islands. In 1903, the United States colonial government,
through the Philippine Commission, passed Act No. 926, the first Public Land
Act.

B. Valenton v. Murciano

In 1904, under the American regime, this Court decided the case of Valenton v.
Murciano.9

Valenton resolved the question of which is the better basis for ownership of land:
long-time occupation or paper title. Plaintiffs had entered into peaceful occupation of
the subject land in 1860. Defendant's predecessor-in-interest, on the other hand,
purchased the land from the provincial treasurer of Tarlac in 1892. The lower court
ruled against the plaintiffs on the ground that they had lost all rights to the land by
not objecting to the administrative sale. Plaintiffs appealed the judgment, asserting
that their 30-year adverse possession, as an extraordinary period of prescription in
the Partidas and the Civil Code, had given them title to the land as against
everyone, including the State; and that the State, not owning the land, could not
validly transmit it.
The Court, speaking through Justice Willard, decided the case on the basis of "those
special laws which from earliest time have regulated the disposition of the public
lands in the colonies."10 The question posed by the Court was: "Did these special
laws recognize any right of prescription as against the State as to these lands; and if
so, to what extent was it recognized?"

Prior to 1880, the Court said, there were no laws specifically providing for the
disposition of land in the Philippines. However, it was understood that in the absence
of any special law to govern a specific colony, the Laws of the Indies would be
followed. Indeed, in the Royal Order of July 5, 1862, it was decreed that until
regulations on the subject could be prepared, the authorities of the Philippine
Islands should follow strictly the Laws of the Indies, the Ordenanza of
the Intendentes of 1786, and the Royal Cedula of 1754.11

Quoting the preamble of Law 14, Title 12, Book 4 of the Recopilacion de Leyes de
las Indias, the court interpreted it as follows:

"In the preamble of this law there is, as is seen, a distinct statement that all those
lands belong to the Crown which have not been granted by Philip, or in his name, or
by the kings who preceded him. This statement excludes the idea that there
might be lands not so granted, that did not belong to the king. It excludes
the idea that the king was not still the owner of all ungranted lands, because
some private person had been in the adverse occupation of them. By the mandatory
part of the law all the occupants of the public lands are required to produce before
the authorities named, and within a time to be fixed by them, their title papers. And
those who had good title or showed prescription were to be protected in their
holdings. It is apparent that it was not the intention of the law that mere possession
for a length of time should make the possessors the owners of the land possessed
by them without any action on the part of the authorities."12

The preamble stated that all those lands which had not been granted by Philip, or in
his name, or by the kings who preceded him, belonged to the Crown.13 For those
lands granted by the king, the decree provided for a system of assignment of such
lands. It also ordered that all possessors of agricultural land should exhibit their title
deed, otherwise, the land would be restored to the Crown.14

The Royal Cedula of October 15, 1754 reinforced the Recopilacion when it ordered
the Crown's principal subdelegate to issue a general order directing the publication
of the Crown's instructions:

"x x x to the end that any and all persons who, since the year 1700, and up to the
date of the promulgation and publication of said order, shall have occupied royal
lands, whether or not x x x cultivated or tenanted, may x x x appear and exhibit to
said subdelegates the titles and patents by virtue of which said lands are occupied. x
x x. Said subdelegates will at the same time warn the parties interested that in case
of their failure to present their title deeds within the term designated, without a just
and valid reason therefor, they will be deprived of and evicted from their lands, and
they will be granted to others."15

On June 25, 1880, the Crown adopted regulations for the adjustment of lands
"wrongfully occupied" by private individuals in the Philippine
Islands. Valenton construed these regulations together with contemporaneous
legislative and executive interpretations of the law, and concluded that plaintiffs'
case fared no better under the 1880 decree and other laws which followed it, than it
did under the earlier ones. Thus as a general doctrine, the Court stated:

"While the State has always recognized the right of the occupant to a deed if he
proves a possession for a sufficient length of time, yet it has always insisted that
he must make that proof before the proper administrative officers, and
obtain from them his deed, and until he did that the State remained the
absolute owner."16

In conclusion, the Court ruled: "We hold that from 1860 to 1892 there was no law in
force in these Islands by which the plaintiffs could obtain the ownership of these
lands by prescription, without any action by the State."17 Valenton had no rights
other than those which accrued to mere possession. Murciano, on the other hand,
was deemed to be the owner of the land by virtue of the grant by the provincial
secretary. In effect, Valenton upheld the Spanish concept of state ownership of
public land.

As a fitting observation, the Court added that "[t]he policy pursued by the
Spanish Government from earliest times, requiring settlers on the public
lands to obtain title deeds therefor from the State, has been continued by
the American Government in Act No. 926."18

C. The Public Land Acts and the Torrens System

Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance of the provisions of
the the Philippine Bill of 1902. The law governed the disposition of lands of the
public domain. It prescribed rules and regulations for the homesteading, selling, and
leasing of portions of the public domain of the Philippine Islands, and prescribed the
terms and conditions to enable persons to perfect their titles to public lands in the
Islands. It also provided for the "issuance of patents to certain native settlers upon
public lands," for the establishment of town sites and sale of lots therein, for the
completion of imperfect titles, and for the cancellation or confirmation of Spanish
concessions and grants in the Islands." In short, the Public Land Act operated on the
assumption that title to public lands in the Philippine Islands remained in the
government;19 and that the government's title to public land sprung from the Treaty
of Paris and other subsequent treaties between Spain and the United States.20 The
term "public land" referred to all lands of the public domain whose title still remained
in the government and are thrown open to private appropriation and
settlement,21 and excluded the patrimonial property of the government and the friar
lands.22

Act No. 926 was superseded in 1919 by Act 2874, the second Public Land
Act. This new law was passed under the Jones Law. It was more comprehensive in
scope but limited the exploitation of agricultural lands to Filipinos and Americans and
citizens of other countries which gave Filipinos the same privileges.23 After the
passage of the 1935 Constitution, Act 2874 was amended in 1936
by Commonwealth Act No. 141. Commonwealth Act No. 141 remains the present
Public Land Law and it is essentially the same as Act 2874. The main difference
between the two relates to the transitory provisions on the rights of American
citizens and corporations during the Commonwealth period at par with Filipino
citizens and corporations.24

Grants of public land were brought under the operation of the Torrens
system under Act 496, or the Land Registration Law of 1903. Enacted by the
Philippine Commission, Act 496 placed all public and private lands in the Philippines
under the Torrens system. The law is said to be almost a verbatim copy of the
Massachussetts Land Registration Act of 1898,25 which, in turn, followed the
principles and procedure of the Torrens system of registration formulated by Sir
Robert Torrens who patterned it after the Merchant Shipping Acts in South Australia.
The Torrens system requires that the government issue an official certificate of title
attesting to the fact that the person named is the owner of the property described
therein, subject to such liens and encumbrances as thereon noted or the law
warrants or reserves.26 The certificate of title is indefeasible and imprescriptible and
all claims to the parcel of land are quieted upon issuance of said certificate. This
system highly facilitates land conveyance and negotiation.27

D. The Philippine Constitutions

The Regalian doctrine was enshrined in the 1935 Constitution. One of the fixed
and dominating objectives of the 1935 Constitutional Convention was the
nationalization and conservation of the natural resources of the country.28There
was an overwhelming sentiment in the Convention in favor of the principle
of state ownership of natural resources and the adoption of the Regalian
doctrine.29 State ownership of natural resources was seen as a necessary starting
point to secure recognition of the state's power to control their disposition,
exploitation, development, or utilization.30 The delegates to the Constitutional
Convention very well knew that the concept of State ownership of land and natural
resources was introduced by the Spaniards, however, they were not certain whether
it was continued and applied by the Americans. To remove all doubts, the
Convention approved the provision in the Constitution affirming the Regalian
doctrine.31

Thus, the 1935 Constitution, in Section 1 of Article XIII on "Conservation and

Utilization of Natural Resources," reads as follows:

"Sec. 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain,
waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to
the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization
shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by
such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at
the time of the inauguration of the Government established under this
Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural
land, shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the
exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be
granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, except as to water rights for
irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of
water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the
grant."

The 1973 Constitution reiterated the Regalian doctrine in Section 8, Article XIV on
the "National Economy and the Patrimony of the Nation," to wit:

"Sec. 8. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum
and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, wildlife, and
other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State. With the
exception of agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, and
resettlement lands of the public domain, natural resources shall not be
alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the exploration,
development, exploitation, or utilization of any of the natural resources
shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for
not more than twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water
supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in
which cases beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant."

The 1987 Constitution reaffirmed the Regalian doctrine in Section 2 of Article XII
on "National Economy and Patrimony," to wit:

"Sec. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum,
and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or
timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by
the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural
resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development and
utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and
supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities or
it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing
agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least
sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such
agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not
more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as may be
provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or
industrial uses other than the development of water power, beneficial use may be
the measure and limit of the grant.

x x x."

Simply stated, all lands of the public domain as well as all natural
resources enumerated therein, whether on public or private land, belong to the
State. It is this concept of State ownership that petitioners claim is being
violated by the IPRA.

II. THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT.

Republic Act No. 8371 is entitled "An Act to Recognize, Protect and Promote the
Rights of Indigenous Cultural Communities/ Indigenous Peoples, Creating a National
Commission on Indigenous Peoples, Establishing Implementing Mechanisms,
Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes." It is simply known as
"The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997" or the IPRA.

The IPRA recognizes the existence of the indigenous cultural communities

or indigenous peoples (ICCs/IPs) as a distinct sector in Philippine society. It
grants these people the ownership and possession of their ancestral
domains and ancestral lands, and defines the extent of these lands and
domains. The ownership given is the indigenous concept of ownership
under customary law which traces its origin to native title.

Other rights are also granted the ICCs/IPs, and these are:

- the right to develop lands and natural resources;

 - the right to stay in the territories;

- the right in case of displacement;

- the right to safe and clean air and water;

- the right to claim parts of reservations;

- the right to resolve conflict;32

- the right to ancestral lands which include

a. the right to transfer land/property to/among members of the same

ICCs/IPs, subject to customary laws and traditions of the community
concerned;

b. the right to redemption for a period not exceeding 15 years from

date of transfer, if the transfer is to a non-member of the ICC/IP and is
tainted by vitiated consent of the ICC/IP, or if the transfer is for an
unconscionable consideration.33

Within their ancestral domains and ancestral lands, the ICCs/IPs are given the right
to self-governance and empowerment,34 social justice and human rights,35 the right
to preserve and protect their culture, traditions, institutions and community
intellectual rights, and the right to develop their own sciences and technologies.36

To carry out the policies of the Act, the law created the National Commission on
Indigenous Peoples (NCIP). The NCIP is an independent agency under the Office of
the President and is composed of seven (7) Commissioners belonging to ICCs/IPs
from each of the ethnographic areas- Region I and the Cordilleras; Region II; the
rest of Luzon; Island groups including Mindoro, Palawan, Romblon, Panay and the
rest of the Visayas; Northern and Western Mindanao; Southern and Eastern
Mindanao; and Central Mindanao.37 The NCIP took over the functions of the Office
for Northern Cultural Communities and the Office for Southern Cultural Communities
created by former President Corazon Aquino which were merged under a revitalized
structure.38

Disputes involving ICCs/IPs are to be resolved under customary laws and

practices. When still unresolved, the matter may be brought to the NCIP, which is
granted quasi-judicial powers.39 The NCIP's decisions may be appealed to the Court
of Appeals by a petition for review.

Any person who violates any of the provisions of the Act such as, but not limited to,
unauthorized and/or unlawful intrusion upon ancestral lands and domains shall be
punished in accordance with customary laws or imprisoned from 9 months to 12
years and/or fined from ₱100,000.00 to ₱500,000.00 and obliged to pay damages.40

A. Indigenous Peoples

The IPRA is a law dealing with a specific group of people, i.e., the Indigenous
Cultural Communities (ICCs) or the Indigenous Peoples (IPs). The term "ICCs" is
used in the 1987 Constitution while that of "IPs" is the contemporary international
language in the International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention 169 41 and the
United Nations (UN) Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.42

ICCs/IPs are defined by the IPRA as:

"Sec. 3 [h]. Indigenous Cultural Communities/ Indigenous Peoples- refer to a group

of people or homogeneous societies identified by self-ascription and ascription by
others, who have continuously lived as organized community on communally
bounded and defined territory, and who have, under claims of ownership since time
immemorial, occupied, possessed and utilized such territories, sharing common
bonds of language, customs, traditions and other distinctive cultural traits, or who
have, through resistance to political, social and cultural inroads of colonization, non-
indigenous religions and cultures, became historically differentiated from the
majority of Filipinos. ICCs/IPs shall likewise include peoples who are regarded as
indigenous on account of their descent from the populations which inhabited the
country, at the time of conquest or colonization, or at the time of inroads of non-
indigenous religions and cultures, or the establishment of present state boundaries,
who retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and political
institutions, but who may have been displaced from their traditional domains or who
may have resettled outside their ancestral domains."

Indigenous Cultural Communities or Indigenous Peoples refer to a group of

people or homogeneous societies who have continuously lived as an
organized community on communally bounded and defined territory. These
groups of people have actually occupied, possessed and utilized their territories
under claim of ownership since time immemorial. They share common bonds of
language, customs, traditions and other distinctive cultural traits, or, they, by their
resistance to political, social and cultural inroads of colonization, non-indigenous
religions and cultures, became historically differentiated from the Filipino majority.
ICCs/IPs also include descendants of ICCs/IPs who inhabited the country at the time
of conquest or colonization, who retain some or all of their own social, economic,
cultural and political institutions but who may have been displaced from their
traditional territories or who may have resettled outside their ancestral domains.

1. Indigenous Peoples: Their History

Presently, Philippine indigenous peoples inhabit the interiors and mountains of

Luzon, Mindanao, Mindoro, Negros, Samar, Leyte, and the Palawan and Sulu group
of islands. They are composed of 110 tribes and are as follows:

1. In the Cordillera Autonomous Region- Kankaney, Ibaloi, Bontoc, Tinggian

or Itneg, Ifugao, Kalinga, Yapayao, Aeta or Agta or Pugot, and Bago of Ilocos
Norte and Pangasinan; Ibanag of Isabela, Cagayan; Ilongot of Quirino and
Nueva Vizcaya; Gaddang of Quirino, Nueva Vizcaya, Itawis of Cagayan;
Ivatan of Batanes, Aeta of Cagayan, Quirino and Isabela.

2. In Region III- Aetas.

3. In Region IV- Dumagats of Aurora, Rizal; Remontado of Aurora, Rizal,

Quezon; Alangan or Mangyan, Batangan, Buid or Buhid, Hanunuo and Iraya
of Oriental and Occidental Mindoro; Tadyawan of Occidental Mindoro;
Cuyonon, Palawanon, Tagbanua and Tao't bato of Palawan.
 4. In Region V- Aeta of Camarines Norte and Camarines Sur; Aeta-Abiyan,
Isarog, and Kabihug of Camarines Norte; Agta, and Mayon of Camarines Sur;
Itom of Albay, Cimaron of Sorsogon; and the Pullon of Masbate and
Camarines Sur.

5. In Region VI- Ati of Negros Occidental, Iloilo and Antique, Capiz; the
Magahat of Negros Occidental; the Corolano and Sulod.

6. In Region VII- Magahat of Negros Oriental and Eskaya of Bohol.

7. In Region IX- the Badjao numbering about 192,000 in Tawi-Tawi,

Zamboanga del Sur; the Kalibugan of Basilan, the Samal, Subanon and Yakat.

8. Region X- Numbering 1.6 million in Region X alone, the IPs are: the
Banwaon, Bukidnon, Matigsalog, Talaanding of Bukidnon; the Camiguin of
Camiguin Island; the Higa-unon of Agusan del Norte, Agusan del Sur,
Bukidnon and Misamis Occidental; the Tigwahanon of Agusan del Sur,
Misamis Oriental and and Misamis Occidental, the Manobo of the Agusan
provinces, and the Umayamnon of Agusan and Bukidnon.

9. In Region XI- There are about 1,774,065 IPs in Region XI. They are tribes
of the Dibabaon, Mansaka of Davao del Norte; B'laan, Kalagan, Langilad,
T'boli and Talaingod of Davao del Sur; Mamamanua of Surigao del Sur;
Mandaya of the Surigao provinces and Davao Oriental; Manobo Blit of South
Cotabato; the Mangguangon of Davao and South Cotabato; Matigsalog of
Davao del Norte and Del Sur; Tagakaolo, Tasaday and Ubo of South
Cotabato; and Bagobo of Davao del sur and South Cotabato.

10. In Region XII- Ilianen, Tiruray, Maguindanao, Maranao, Tausug,

Yakan/Samal, and Iranon.43

How these indigenous peoples came to live in the Philippines goes back to
as early as 25,000 to 30,000 B.C.

Before the time of Western contact, the Philippine archipelago was peopled
largely by the Negritos, Indonesians and Malays.44 The strains from these groups
eventually gave rise to common cultural features which became the dominant
influence in ethnic reformulation in the archipelago. Influences from the Chinese and
Indian civilizations in the third or fourth millenium B.C. augmented these ethnic
strains. Chinese economic and socio-cultural influences came by way of Chinese
porcelain, silk and traders. Indian influence found their way into the religious-
cultural aspect of pre-colonial society.45

The ancient Filipinos settled beside bodies of water. Hunting and food gathering
became supplementary activities as reliance on them was reduced by fishing and the
cultivation of the soil.46 From the hinterland, coastal, and riverine communities, our
ancestors evolved an essentially homogeneous culture, a basically common way of
life where nature was a primary factor. Community life throughout the
archipelago was influenced by, and responded to, common ecology. The generally
benign tropical climate and the largely uniform flora and fauna favored similarities,
not differences.47 Life was essentially subsistence but not harsh.48
The early Filipinos had a culture that was basically Malayan in structure and form.
They had languages that traced their origin to the Austronesian parent-stock and
used them not only as media of daily communication but also as vehicles for the
expression of their literary moods.49 They fashioned concepts and beliefs about the
world that they could not see, but which they sensed to be part of their lives.50 They
had their own religion and religious beliefs. They believed in the immortality of the
soul and life after death. Their rituals were based on beliefs in a ranking deity whom
they called Bathalang Maykapal, and a host of other deities, in the environmental
spirits and in soul spirits. The early Filipinos adored the sun, the moon, the animals
and birds, for they seemed to consider the objects of Nature as something to be
respected. They venerated almost any object that was close to their daily life,
indicating the importance of the relationship between man and the object of
nature.51

The unit of government was the "barangay," a term that derived its meaning from
the Malay word "balangay," meaning, a boat, which transported them to these
shores.52 The barangay was basically a family-based community and consisted of
thirty to one hundred families. Each barangay was different and ruled by a chieftain
called a "dato." It was the chieftain's duty to rule and govern his subjects and
promote their welfare and interests. A chieftain had wide powers for he exercised all
the functions of government. He was the executive, legislator and judge and was the
supreme commander in time of war.53

Laws were either customary or written. Customary laws were handed down
orally from generation to generation and constituted the bulk of the laws of
the barangay. They were preserved in songs and chants and in the memory of the
elder persons in the community.54 The written laws were those that the chieftain and
his elders promulgated from time to time as the necessity arose.55 The oldest known
written body of laws was the Maragtas Code by Datu Sumakwel at about 1250 A.D.
Other old codes are the Muslim Code of Luwaran and the Principal Code of
Sulu.56 Whether customary or written, the laws dealt with various subjects, such as
inheritance, divorce, usury, loans, partnership, crime and punishment, property
rights, family relations and adoption. Whenever disputes arose, these were decided
peacefully through a court composed by the chieftain as "judge" and the barangay
elders as "jury." Conflicts arising between subjects of different barangays were
resolved by arbitration in which a board composed of elders from neutral barangays
acted as arbiters.57

Baranganic society had a distinguishing feature: the absence of private

property in land. The chiefs merely administered the lands in the name of the
barangay. The social order was an extension of the family with chiefs embodying the
higher unity of the community. Each individual, therefore, participated in the
community ownership of the soil and the instruments of production as a member of
the barangay.58 This ancient communalism was practiced in accordance with the
concept of mutual sharing of resources so that no individual, regardless of status,
was without sustenance. Ownership of land was non-existent or unimportant
and the right of usufruct was what regulated the development of
lands.59 Marine resources and fishing grounds were likewise free to all. Coastal
communities depended for their economic welfare on the kind of fishing sharing
concept similar to those in land communities.60 Recognized leaders, such as the
chieftains and elders, by virtue of their positions of importance, enjoyed some
economic privileges and benefits. But their rights, related to either land and sea,
were subject to their responsibility to protect the communities from danger and to
provide them with the leadership and means of survival.61
Sometime in the 13th century, Islam was introduced to the archipelago in
Maguindanao. The Sultanate of Sulu was established and claimed jurisdiction over
territorial areas represented today by Tawi-tawi, Sulu, Palawan, Basilan and
Zamboanga. Four ethnic groups were within this jurisdiction: Sama, Tausug, Yakan
and Subanon.62The Sultanate of Maguindanao spread out from Cotabato toward
Maranao territory, now Lanao del Norte and Lanao del Sur.63

The Muslim societies evolved an Asiatic form of feudalism where land was
still held in common but was private in use. This is clearly indicated in the
Muslim Code of Luwaran. The Code contains a provision on the lease of cultivated
lands. It, however, has no provision for the acquisition, transfer, cession or sale of
land.64

The societies encountered by Magellan and Legaspi therefore were primitive

economies where most production was geared to the use of the producers and to the
fulfillment of kinship obligations. They were not economies geared to exchange and
profit.65 Moreover, the family basis of barangay membership as well as of leadership
and governance worked to splinter the population of the islands into numerous small
and separate communities.66

When the Spaniards settled permanently in the Philippines in 1565, they

found the Filipinos living in barangay settlements scattered along water
routes and river banks. One of the first tasks imposed on the missionaries and the
encomenderos was to collect all scattered Filipinos together in a reduccion.67 As early
as 1551, the Spanish government assumed an unvarying solicitous attitude towards
the natives.68 The Spaniards regarded it a sacred "duty to conscience and humanity
to civilize these less fortunate people living in the obscurity of ignorance" and to
accord them the "moral and material advantages" of community life and the
"protection and vigilance afforded them by the same laws."69

The Spanish missionaries were ordered to establish pueblos where the church and
convent would be constructed. All the new Christian converts were required to
construct their houses around the church and the unbaptized were invited to do the
same.70 With the reduccion, the Spaniards attempted to "tame" the reluctant
Filipinos through Christian indoctrination using the convento/casa real/plaza complex
as focal point. The reduccion, to the Spaniards, was a "civilizing" device to make the
Filipinos law-abiding citizens of the Spanish Crown, and in the long run, to make
them ultimately adopt Hispanic culture and civilization.71

All lands lost by the old barangays in the process of pueblo organization as
well as all lands not assigned to them and the pueblos, were now declared
to be crown lands or realengas, belonging to the Spanish king. It was from
the realengas that land grants were made to non-Filipinos.72

The abrogation of the Filipinos' ancestral rights in land and the introduction
of the concept of public domain were the most immediate fundamental
results of Spanish colonial theory and law.73 The concept that the Spanish
king was the owner of everything of value in the Indies or colonies was
imposed on the natives, and the natives were stripped of their ancestral
rights to land.74

Increasing their foothold in the Philippines, the Spanish colonialists, civil and
religious, classified the Filipinos according to their religious practices and beliefs, and
divided them into three types . First were the Indios, the Christianized Filipinos,
who generally came from the lowland populations. Second, were the Moros or the
Muslim communities, and third, were the infieles or the indigenous
communities.75

The Indio was a product of the advent of Spanish culture. This class was favored by
the Spaniards and was allowed certain status although below the Spaniards.
The Moros and infieles were regarded as the lowest classes.76

The Moros and infieles resisted Spanish rule and Christianity. The Moros were
driven from Manila and the Visayas to Mindanao; while the infieles, to the
hinterlands. The Spaniards did not pursue them into the deep interior. The upland
societies were naturally outside the immediate concern of Spanish interest, and the
cliffs and forests of the hinterlands were difficult and inaccessible, allowing
the infieles, in effect, relative security.77 Thus, the infieles, which were peripheral
to colonial administration, were not only able to preserve their own culture but also
thwarted the Christianization process, separating themselves from the newly evolved
Christian community.78 Their own political, economic and social systems were kept
constantly alive and vibrant.

The pro-Christian or pro-Indio attitude of colonialism brought about a generally

mutual feeling of suspicion, fear, and hostility between the Christians on the one
hand and the non-Christians on the other. Colonialism tended to divide and rule an
otherwise culturally and historically related populace through a colonial system that
exploited both the virtues and vices of the Filipinos.79

President McKinley, in his instructions to the Philippine Commission of April

7, 1900, addressed the existence of the infieles:

"In dealing with the uncivilized tribes of the Islands, the Commission
should adopt the same course followed by Congress in permitting the tribes
of our North American Indians to maintain their tribal organization and
government, and under which many of those tribes are now living in peace and
contentment, surrounded by civilization to which they are unable or unwilling to
conform. Such tribal government should, however, be subjected to wise and firm
regulation; and, without undue or petty interference, constant and active effort
should be exercised to prevent barbarous practices and introduce civilized
customs."80

Placed in an alternative of either letting the natives alone or guiding them in the
path of civilization, the American government chose "to adopt the latter measure as
one more in accord with humanity and with the national conscience."81

The Americans classified the Filipinos into two: the Christian Filipinos and
the non-Christian Filipinos. The term "non-Christian" referred not to religious
belief, but to a geographical area, and more directly, "to natives of the Philippine
Islands of a low grade of civilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart from
settled communities."82

Like the Spaniards, the Americans pursued a policy of assimilation. In 1903,

they passed Act No. 253 creating the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes
(BNCT). Under the Department of the Interior, the BNCT's primary task was to
conduct ethnographic research among unhispanized Filipinos, including those in
Muslim Mindanao, with a "special view to determining the most practicable means
for bringing about their advancement in civilization and prosperity." The BNCT was
modeled after the bureau dealing with American Indians. The agency took a
keen anthropological interest in Philippine cultural minorities and produced a wealth
of valuable materials about them.83

The 1935 Constitution did not carry any policy on the non-Christian
Filipinos. The raging issue then was the conservation of the national
patrimony for the Filipinos.

In 1957, the Philippine Congress passed R.A. No. 1888, an "Act to effectuate in a
more rapid and complete manner the economic, social, moral and political
advancement of the non-Christian Filipinos or national cultural minorities and to
render real, complete, and permanent the integration of all said national cultural
minorities into the body politic, creating the Commission on National
Integration charged with said functions." The law called for a policy of
integration of indigenous peoples into the Philippine mainstream and for this
purpose created the Commission on National Integration (CNI).84 The CNI was
given, more or less, the same task as the BNCT during the American regime. The
post-independence policy of integration was like the colonial policy of
assimilation understood in the context of a guardian-ward relationship.85

The policy of assimilation and integration did not yield the desired result. Like the
Spaniards and Americans, government attempts at integration met with
fierce resistance. Since World War II, a tidal wave of Christian settlers from the
lowlands of Luzon and the Visayas swamped the highlands and wide open spaces in
Mindanao.86Knowledge by the settlers of the Public Land Acts and the
Torrens system resulted in the titling of several ancestral lands in the
settlers' names. With government initiative and participation, this titling
displaced several indigenous peoples from their lands. Worse, these peoples
were also displaced by projects undertaken by the national government in the name
of national development.87

It was in the 1973 Constitution that the State adopted the following provision:

"The State shall consider the customs, traditions, beliefs, and interests of national
cultural communities in the formulation and implementation of State policies."88

For the first time in Philippine history, the "non-Christian tribes" or the
"cultural minorities" were addressed by the highest law of the Republic,
and they were referred to as "cultural communities." More importantly this
time, their "uncivilized" culture was given some recognition and their "customs,
traditions, beliefs and interests" were to be considered by the State in the
formulation and implementation of State policies. President Marcos abolished the
CNI and transferred its functions to the Presidential Adviser on National
Minorities (PANAMIN). The PANAMIN was tasked to integrate the ethnic groups
that sought full integration into the larger community, and at the same time "protect
the rights of those who wish to preserve their original lifeways beside the larger
community."89 In short, while still adopting the integration policy, the decree
recognized the right of tribal Filipinos to preserve their way of life.90

In 1974, President Marcos promulgated P.D. No. 410, otherwise known as

the Ancestral Lands Decree. The decree provided for the issuance of land
occupancy certificates to members of the national cultural communities who were
given up to 1984 to register their claims.91 In 1979, the Commission on the
Settlement of Land Problems was created under E.O. No. 561 which provided a
mechanism for the expeditious resolution of land problems involving small settlers,
landowners, and tribal Filipinos.92

Despite the promulgation of these laws, from 1974 to the early 1980's, some
100,000 Kalingas and Bontoks of the Cordillera region were displaced by the Chico
River dam project of the National Power Corporation (NPC). The Manobos of
Bukidnon saw their land bulldozed by the Bukidnon Sugar Industries Company
(BUSCO). In Agusan del Sur, the National Development Company was authorized by
law in 1979 to take approximately 40,550 hectares of land that later became the
NDC-Guthrie plantation in Agusan del Sur. Most of the land was possessed by the
Agusan natives.93 Timber concessions, water projects, plantations, mining, and cattle
ranching and other projects of the national government led not only to the eviction
of the indigenous peoples from their land but also to the reduction and destruction
of their natural environment.94

The Aquino government signified a total shift from the policy of integration
to one of preservation. Invoking her powers under the Freedom Constitution,
President Aquino created the Office of Muslim Affairs, Office for Northern
Cultural Communities and the Office for Southern Cultural Communities all
under the Office of the President.95

The 1987 Constitution carries at least six (6) provisions which insure the
right of tribal Filipinos to preserve their way of life.96 This Constitution goes
further than the 1973 Constitution by expressly guaranteeing the rights of
tribal Filipinos to their ancestral domains and ancestral lands. By
recognizing their right to their ancestral lands and domains, the State has
effectively upheld their right to live in a culture distinctly their own.

2. Their Concept of Land

Indigenous peoples share distinctive traits that set them apart from the Filipino
mainstream. They are non-Christians. They live in less accessible, marginal, mostly
upland areas. They have a system of self-government not dependent upon the laws
of the central administration of the Republic of the Philippines. They follow ways of
life and customs that are perceived as different from those of the rest of the
population.97 The kind of response the indigenous peoples chose to deal with colonial
threat worked well to their advantage by making it difficult for Western concepts and
religion to erode their customs and traditions. The "infieles societies" which had
become peripheral to colonial administration, represented, from a cultural
perspective, a much older base of archipelagic culture. The political systems were
still structured on the patriarchal and kinship oriented arrangement of power and
authority. The economic activities were governed by the concepts of an ancient
communalism and mutual help. The social structure which emphasized division of
labor and distinction of functions, not status, was maintained. The cultural styles and
forms of life portraying the varieties of social courtesies and ecological adjustments
were kept constantly vibrant.98

Land is the central element of the indigenous peoples' existence. There is no

traditional concept of permanent, individual, land ownership. Among the Igorots,
ownership of land more accurately applies to the tribal right to use the land or to
territorial control. The people are the secondary owners or stewards of the land and
that if a member of the tribe ceases to work, he loses his claim of ownership, and
the land reverts to the beings of the spirit world who are its true and primary
owners. Under the concept of "trusteeship," the right to possess the land does not
only belong to the present generation but the future ones as well.99

Customary law on land rests on the traditional belief that no one owns the land
except the gods and spirits, and that those who work the land are its mere
stewards.100 Customary law has a strong preference for communal
ownership, which could either be ownership by a group of individuals or families
who are related by blood or by marriage,101 or ownership by residents of the same
locality who may not be related by blood or marriage. The system of communal
ownership under customary laws draws its meaning from the subsistence and highly
collectivized mode of economic production. The Kalingas, for instance, who are
engaged in team occupation like hunting, foraging for forest products, and swidden
farming found it natural that forest areas, swidden farms, orchards, pasture and
burial grounds should be communally-owned.102 For the Kalingas, everybody has a
common right to a common economic base. Thus, as a rule, rights and obligations to
the land are shared in common.

Although highly bent on communal ownership, customary law on land also

sanctions individual ownership.The residential lots and terrace rice farms are
governed by a limited system of individual ownership. It is limited because
while the individual owner has the right to use and dispose of the property, he does
not possess all the rights of an exclusive and full owner as defined under our Civil
Code.103 Under Kalinga customary law, the alienation of individually-owned land is
strongly discouraged except in marriage and succession and except to meet sudden
financial needs due to sickness, death in the family, or loss of crops.104 Moreover,
and to be alienated should first be offered to a clan-member before any village-
member can purchase it, and in no case may land be sold to a non-member of
the ili.105

Land titles do not exist in the indigenous peoples' economic and social
system. The concept of individual land ownership under the civil law is alien
to them. Inherently colonial in origin, our national land laws and
governmental policies frown upon indigenous claims to ancestral lands.
Communal ownership is looked upon as inferior, if not inexistent.106

III. THE IPRA IS A NOVEL PIECE OF LEGISLATION.

A. The Legislative History of the IPRA

It was to address the centuries-old neglect of the Philippine indigenous

peoples that the Tenth Congress of the Philippines, by their joint efforts, passed
and approved R.A. No. 8371, the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) of
1997. The law was a consolidation of two Bills- Senate Bill No. 1728 and House Bill
No. 9125.

Principally sponsored by Senator Juan M. Flavier,107 Senate Bill No. 1728 was a
consolidation of four proposed measures referred to the Committees on Cultural
Communities, Environment and Natural Resources, Ways and Means, as well as
Finance. It adopted almost en toto the comprehensive version of Senate Bill Nos.
1476 and 1486 which was a result of six regional consultations and one
national consultation with indigenous peoples nationwide.108 At the Second
Regular Session of the Tenth Congress, Senator Flavier, in his sponsorship speech,
gave a background on the situation of indigenous peoples in the Philippines, to wit:
"The Indigenous Cultural Communities, including the Bangsa Moro, have long
suffered from the dominance and neglect of government controlled by the majority.
Massive migration of their Christian brothers to their homeland shrunk their territory
and many of the tribal Filipinos were pushed to the hinterlands. Resisting the
intrusion, dispossessed of their ancestral land and with the massive exploitation of
their natural resources by the elite among the migrant population, they became
marginalized. And the government has been an indispensable party to this insidious
conspiracy against the Indigenous Cultural Communities (ICCs). It organized and
supported the resettlement of people to their ancestral land, which was massive
during the Commonwealth and early years of the Philippine Republic. Pursuant to
the Regalian Doctrine first introduced to our system by Spain through the Royal
Decree of 13 February 1894 or the Maura Law, the government passed laws to
legitimize the wholesale landgrabbing and provide for easy titling or grant of lands to
migrant homesteaders within the traditional areas of the ICCs."109

Senator Flavier further declared:

"The IPs are the offsprings and heirs of the peoples who have first inhabited and
cared for the land long before any central government was established. Their
ancestors had territories over which they ruled themselves and related with other
tribes. These territories- the land- include people, their dwelling, the mountains, the
water, the air, plants, forest and the animals. This is their environment in its totality.
Their existence as indigenous peoples is manifested in their own lives through
political, economic, socio-cultural and spiritual practices. The IPs culture is the living
and irrefutable proof to this.

Their survival depends on securing or acquiring land rights; asserting their rights to
it; and depending on it. Otherwise, IPs shall cease to exist as distinct peoples."110

To recognize the rights of the indigenous peoples effectively, Senator Flavier

proposed a bill based on two postulates: (1) the concept of native title; and (2)
the principle of parens patriae.

According to Senator Flavier, "[w]hile our legal tradition subscribes to the Regalian
Doctrine reinstated in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution," our "decisional
laws" and jurisprudence passed by the State have "made exception to the doctrine."
This exception was first laid down in the case of Cariño v. Insular
Government where:

"x x x the court has recognized long occupancy of land by an indigenous member of
the cultural communities as one of private ownership, which, in legal concept, is
termed "native title." This ruling has not been overturned. In fact, it was affirmed in
subsequent cases."111

Following Cariño, the State passed Act No. 926, Act No. 2874, C.A. No. 141, P.D.
705, P.D. 410, P.D. 1529, R.A. 6734 (the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region of
Muslim Mindanao). These laws, explicitly or implicitly, and liberally or restrictively,
recognized "native title" or "private right" and the existence of ancestral lands and
domains. Despite the passage of these laws, however, Senator Flavier continued:

"x x x the executive department of government since the American occupation has
not implemented the policy. In fact, it was more honored in its breach than in its
observance, its wanton disregard shown during the period unto the Commonwealth
and the early years of the Philippine Republic when government organized and
supported massive resettlement of the people to the land of the ICCs."

Senate Bill No. 1728 seeks to genuinely recognize the IPs right to own and possess
their ancestral land. The bill was prepared also under the principle of parens
patriae inherent in the supreme power of the State and deeply embedded in
Philippine legal tradition. This principle mandates that persons suffering from serious
disadvantage or handicap, which places them in a position of actual inequality in
their relation or transaction with others, are entitled to the protection of the State.

Senate Bill No. 1728 was passed on Third Reading by twenty-one (21)
Senators voting in favor and none against, with no abstention.112

House Bill No. 9125 was sponsored by Rep. Zapata, Chairman of the Committee
on Cultural Communities. It was originally authored and subsequently presented and
defended on the floor by Rep. Gregorio Andolana of North Cotabato.113

Rep. Andolana's sponsorhip speech reads as follows:

"This Representation, as early as in the 8th Congress, filed a bill of similar

implications that would promote, recognize the rights of indigenous cultural
communities within the framework of national unity and development.

Apart from this, Mr. Speaker, is our obligation, the government's obligation to
assure and ascertain that these rights shall be well-preserved and the cultural
traditions as well as the indigenous laws that remained long before this Republic was
established shall be preserved and promoted. There is a need, Mr. Speaker, to look
into these matters seriously and early approval of the substitute bill shall bring into
reality the aspirations, the hope and the dreams of more than 12 million Filipinos
that they be considered in the mainstream of the Philippine society as we fashion for
the year 2000." 114

Rep. Andolana stressed that H.B. No. 9125 is based on the policy of preservation as
mandated in the Constitution. He also emphasized that the rights of IPs to their land
was enunciated in Cariño v. Insular Government which recognized the fact that
they had vested rights prior to the establishment of the Spanish and American
regimes.115

After exhaustive interpellation, House Bill No. 9125, and its corresponding
amendments, was approved on Second Reading with no objections.

IV. THE PROVISIONS OF THE IPRA DO NOT CONTRAVENE THE

CONSTITUTION.

A. Ancestral Domains and Ancestral Lands are the Private Property of

Indigenous Peoples and Do Not Constitute Part of the Land of the Public
Domain.

The IPRA grants to ICCs/IPs a distinct kind of ownership over ancestral

domains and ancestral lands.Ancestral lands are not the same as ancestral
domains. These are defined in Section 3 [a] and [b] of the Indigenous Peoples Right
Act, viz:
"Sec. 3 a) Ancestral Domains. - Subject to Section 56 hereof, refer to all areas
generally belonging to ICCs/IPs comprising lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and
natural resources therein, held under a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed
by ICCs/IPs by themselves or through their ancestors, communally or individually
since time immemorial, continuously to the present except when interrupted by war,
force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence of
government projects or any other voluntary dealings entered into by government
and private individuals/corporations, and which are necessary to ensure their
economic, social and cultural welfare. It shall include ancestral lands, forests,
pasture, residential, agricultural, and other lands individually owned whether
alienable and disposable or otherwise, hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship
areas, bodies of water, mineral and other natural resources, and lands which may no
longer be exclusively occupied by ICCs/IPs but from which they traditionally had
access to for their subsistence and traditional activities, particularly the home ranges
of ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic and/or shifting cultivators;

b) Ancestral Lands.- Subject to Section 56 hereof, refers to land occupied,

possessed and utilized by individuals, families and clans who are members of the
ICCs/IPs since time immemorial, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest, under claims of individual or traditional group ownership, continuously, to
the present except when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by
force, deceit, stealth, or as a consequence of government projects and other
voluntary dealings entered into by government and private individuals/corporations,
including, but not limited to, residential lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forests,
swidden farms and tree lots."

Ancestral domains are all areas belonging to ICCs/IPs held under a claim of
ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs by themselves or through their
ancestors, communally or individually since time immemorial, continuously until the
present, except when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force,
deceit, stealth or as a consequence of government projects or any other voluntary
dealings with government and/or private individuals or corporations. Ancestral
domains comprise lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural
resources therein and includes ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential,
agricultural, and other lands individually owned whether alienable or not,
hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship areas, bodies of water, mineral
and other natural resources. They also include lands which may no longer be
exclusively occupied by ICCs/IPs but from which they traditionally had access to for
their subsistence and traditional activities, particularly the home ranges of ICCs/IPs
who are still nomadic and/or shifting cultivators.116

Ancestral lands are lands held by the ICCs/IPs under the same conditions as
ancestral domains except that these are limited to lands and that these lands are
not merely occupied and possessed but are also utilized by the ICCs/IPs under
claims of individual or traditional group ownership. These lands include but are not
limited to residential lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forests, swidden farms
and tree lots.117

The procedures for claiming ancestral domains and lands are similar to the
procedures embodied in Department Administrative Order (DAO) No. 2, series of
1993, signed by then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) Angel Alcala.118 DAO No. 2 allowed the delineation of ancestral
domains by special task forces and ensured the issuance of Certificates of Ancestral
Land Claims (CALC's) and Certificates of Ancestral Domain Claims (CADC's) to IPs.
The identification and delineation of these ancestral domains and lands is a power
conferred by the IPRA on the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples
(NCIP).119 The guiding principle in identification and delineation is self-
delineation.120 This means that the ICCs/IPs have a decisive role in determining the
boundaries of their domains and in all the activities pertinent thereto.121

The procedure for the delineation and recognition of ancestral domains is set forth
in Sections 51 and 52 of the IPRA. The identification, delineation and certification
of ancestral lands is in Section 53 of said law.

Upon due application and compliance with the procedure provided under the law and
upon finding by the NCIP that the application is meritorious, the NCIP shall issue a
Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT) in the name of the community
concerned.122 The allocation of lands within the ancestral domain to any
individual or indigenous corporate (family or clan) claimants is left to the ICCs/IPs
concerned to decide in accordance with customs and traditions.123 With respect to
ancestral lands outside the ancestral domain, the NCIP issues a Certificate of
Ancestral Land Title (CALT).124

CADT's and CALT's issued under the IPRA shall be registered by the NCIP before the
Register of Deeds in the place where the property is situated.125

(1) Right to Ancestral Domains and Ancestral Lands: How Acquired

The rights of the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains and ancestral lands may be
acquired in two modes: (1) by native title over both ancestral lands and
domains; or (2) by torrens title under the Public Land Act and the Land
Registration Act with respect to ancestral lands only.

(2) The Concept of Native Title

Native title is defined as:

"Sec. 3 [l]. Native Title- refers to pre-conquest rights to lands and domains which,
as far back as memory reaches, have been held under a claim of private ownership
by ICCs/IPs, have never been public lands and are thus indisputably presumed to
have been held that way since before the Spanish Conquest."126

Native title refers to ICCs/IPs' preconquest rights to lands and domains held under
a claim of private ownership as far back as memory reaches. These lands are
deemed never to have been public lands and are indisputably presumed to have
been held that way since before the Spanish Conquest. The rights of ICCs/IPs to
their ancestral domains (which also include ancestral lands) by virtue of native title
shall be recognized and respected.127 Formal recognition, when solicited by ICCs/IPs
concerned, shall be embodied in a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT),
which shall recognize the title of the concerned ICCs/IPs over the territories
identified and delineated.128

Like a torrens title, a CADT is evidence of private ownership of land by native

title. Native title, however, is a right of private ownership peculiarly granted to
ICCs/IPs over their ancestral lands and domains. The IPRA categorically declares
ancestral lands and domains held by native title as never to have been public land.
Domains and lands held under native title are, therefore, indisputably presumed to
have never been public lands and are private.

(a) Cariño v. Insular Government129

The concept of native title in the IPRA was taken from the 1909 case of Cariño v.
Insular Government.130 Cariñofirmly established a concept of private land title
that existed irrespective of any royal grant from the State.

In 1903, Don Mateo Cariño, an Ibaloi, sought to register with the land registration
court 146 hectares of land in Baguio Municipality, Benguet Province. He claimed that
this land had been possessed and occupied by his ancestors since time immemorial;
that his grandfather built fences around the property for the holding of cattle and
that his father cultivated some parts of the land. Cariño inherited the land in
accordance with Igorot custom. He tried to have the land adjusted under the
Spanish land laws, but no document issued from the Spanish Crown.131 In 1901,
Cariño obtained a possessory title to the land under the Spanish Mortgage
Law.132 The North American colonial government, however, ignored his possessory
title and built a public road on the land prompting him to seek a Torrens title to his
property in the land registration court. While his petition was pending, a U.S.
military reservation133 was proclaimed over his land and, shortly thereafter, a
military detachment was detailed on the property with orders to keep cattle and
trespassers, including Cariño, off the land.134

In 1904, the land registration court granted Cariño's application for absolute
ownership to the land. Both the Government of the Philippine Islands and the U.S.
Government appealed to the C.F.I. of Benguet which reversed the land registration
court and dismissed Cariño's application. The Philippine Supreme Court 135 affirmed
the C.F.I. by applying the Valenton ruling. Cariño took the case to the U.S.
Supreme Court.136 On one hand, the Philippine government invoked the Regalian
doctrine and contended that Cariño failed to comply with the provisions of the Royal
Decree of June 25, 1880, which required registration of land claims within a limited
period of time. Cariño, on the other, asserted that he was the absolute owner of the
land jure gentium, and that the land never formed part of the public domain.

In a unanimous decision written by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, the U.S. Supreme
Court held:

"It is true that Spain, in its earlier decrees, embodied the universal feudal theory
that all lands were held from the Crown, and perhaps the general attitude of
conquering nations toward people not recognized as entitled to the treatment
accorded to those in the same zone of civilization with themselves. It is true, also,
that in legal theory, sovereignty is absolute, and that, as against foreign nations, the
United States may assert, as Spain asserted, absolute power. But it does not follow
that, as against the inhabitants of the Philippines, the United States asserts that
Spain had such power. When theory is left on one side, sovereignty is a question of
strength, and may vary in degree. How far a new sovereign shall insist upon the
theoretical relation of the subjects to the head in the past, and how far it shall
recognize actual facts, are matters for it to decide."137

The U.S. Supreme Court noted that it need not accept Spanish doctrines. The choice
was with the new colonizer. Ultimately, the matter had to be decided under U.S.
law.
The Cariño decision largely rested on the North American constitutionalist's concept
of "due process" as well as the pronounced policy "to do justice to the natives."138 It
was based on the strong mandate extended to the Islands via the Philippine Bill of
1902 that "No law shall be enacted in said islands which shall deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any person therein
the equal protection of the laws." The court declared:

"The acquisition of the Philippines was not like the settlement of the white race in
the United States. Whatever consideration may have been shown to the North
American Indians, the dominant purpose of the whites in America was to occupy
land. It is obvious that, however stated, the reason for our taking over the
Philippines was different. No one, we suppose, would deny that, so far as consistent
with paramount necessities, our first object in the internal administration of the
islands is to do justice to the natives, not to exploit their country for private gain. By
the Organic Act of July 1, 1902, chapter 1369, section 12 (32 Statutes at Large,
691), all the property and rights acquired there by the United States are to be
administered 'for the benefit of the inhabitants thereof.' It is reasonable to suppose
that the attitude thus assumed by the United States with regard to what was
unquestionably its own is also its attitude in deciding what it will claim for its own.
The same statute made a bill of rights, embodying the safeguards of the
Constitution, and, like the Constitution, extends those safeguards to all. It provides
that 'no law shall be enacted in said islands which shall deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any person therein the
equal protection of the laws.' In the light of the declaration that we have quoted
from section 12, it is hard to believe that the United States was ready to declare in
the next breath that "any person" did not embrace the inhabitants of Benguet, or
that it meant by "property" only that which had become such by ceremonies of
which presumably a large part of the inhabitants never had heard, and that it
proposed to treat as public land what they, by native custom and by long
association,- of the profoundest factors in human thought,- regarded as their
own."139

The Court went further:

"Every presumption is and ought to be against the government in a case like the
present. It might, perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far
back as testimony or memory goes, the land has been held by individuals
under a claim of private ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in
the same way from before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been
public land. Certainly in a case like this, if there is doubt or ambiguity in the
Spanish law, we ought to give the applicant the benefit of the doubt."140

The court thus laid down the presumption of a certain title held (1) as far back as
testimony or memory went, and (2) under a claim of private ownership. Land held
by this title is presumed to "never have been public land."

Against this presumption, the U.S. Supreme Court analyzed the Spanish decrees
upheld in the 1904 decision ofValenton v. Murciano. The U.S. Supreme Court
found no proof that the Spanish decrees did not honor native title. On the contrary,
the decrees discussed in Valenton appeared to recognize that the natives owned
some land, irrespective of any royal grant. The Regalian doctrine declared in the
preamble of the Recopilacion was all "theory and discourse" and it was observed
that titles were admitted to exist beyond the powers of the Crown, viz:
"If the applicant's case is to be tried by the law of Spain, we do not discover
such clear proof that it was bad by that law as to satisfy us that he does not
own the land. To begin with, the older decrees and laws cited by the
counsel for the plaintiff in error seem to indicate pretty clearly that the
natives were recognized as owning some lands, irrespective of any royal
grant. In other words, Spain did not assume to convert all the native inhabitants of
the Philippines into trespassers or even into tenants at will. For instance, Book 4,
title 12, Law 14 of the the Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias, cited for a contrary
conclusion in Valenton v. Murciano, 3 Philippine 537, while it commands viceroys
and others, when it seems proper, to call for the exhibition of grants, directs them to
confirm those who hold by good grants or justa prescripcion. It is true that it
begins by the characteristic assertion of feudal overlordship and the origin
of all titles in the King or his predecessors. That was theory and discourse.
The fact was that titles were admitted to exist that owed nothing to the
powers of Spain beyond this recognition in their books." (Emphasis
supplied).141

The court further stated that the Spanish "adjustment" proceedings never held sway
over unconquered territories. The wording of the Spanish laws were not framed in a
manner as to convey to the natives that failure to register what to them has always
been their own would mean loss of such land. The registration requirement was "not
to confer title, but simply to establish it;" it was "not calculated to convey to the
mind of an Igorot chief the notion that ancient family possessions were in danger, if
he had read every word of it."

By recognizing this kind of title, the court clearly repudiated the doctrine
of Valenton. It was frank enough, however, to admit the possibility that the
applicant might have been deprived of his land under Spanish law because of the
inherent ambiguity of the decrees and concomitantly, the various interpretations
which may be given them. But precisely because of the ambiguity and of the
strong "due process mandate" of the Constitution, the court validated this
kind of title.142 This title was sufficient, even without government administrative
action, and entitled the holder to a Torrens certificate. Justice Holmes explained:

"It will be perceived that the rights of the applicant under the Spanish law present a
problem not without difficulties for courts of a legal tradition. We have deemed it
proper on that account to notice the possible effect of the change of sovereignty and
the act of Congress establishing the fundamental principles now to be observed.
Upon a consideration of the whole case we are of the opinion that law and justice
require that the applicant should be granted what he seeks, and should not be
deprived of what, by the practice and belief of those among whom he lived, was his
property, through a refined interpretation of an almost forgotten law of Spain."143

Thus, the court ruled in favor of Cariño and ordered the registration of the
148 hectares in Baguio Municipality in his name.144

Examining Cariño closer, the U.S. Supreme Court did not categorically refer to the
title it upheld as "native title." It simply said:

"The Province of Benguet was inhabited by a tribe that the Solicitor-

General, in his argument, characterized as a savage tribe that never was
brought under the civil or military government of the Spanish Crown. It
seems probable, if not certain, that the Spanish officials would not have
granted to anyone in that province the registration to which formerly the
plaintiff was entitled by the Spanish Laws, and which would have made his
title beyond question good. Whatever may have been the technical position of
Spain it does not follow that, in the view of the United States, he had lost all rights
and was a mere trespasser when the present government seized his land. The
argument to that effect seems to amount to a denial of native titles through an
important part of the Island of Luzon, at least, for the want of ceremonies which the
Spaniards would not have permitted and had not the power to enforce."145

This is the only instance when Justice Holmes used the term "native title" in the
entire length of the Cariño decision. It is observed that the widespread use of the
term "native title" may be traced to Professor Owen James Lynch, Jr., a Visiting
Professor at the University of the Philippines College of Law from the Yale University
Law School. In 1982, Prof. Lynch published an article in the Philippine Law
Journal entitled Native Title, Private Right and Tribal Land Law.146 This article
was made after Professor Lynch visited over thirty tribal communities throughout the
country and studied the origin and development of Philippine land laws.147 He
discussed Cariño extensively and used the term "native title" to refer to Cariño's
title as discussed and upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in said case.

(b) Indian Title

In a footnote in the same article, Professor Lynch stated that the concept of "native
title" as defined by Justice Holmes in Cariño "is conceptually similar to "aboriginal
title" of the American Indians.148 This is not surprising, according to Prof. Lynch,
considering that during the American regime, government policy towards ICCs/IPs
was consistently made in reference to native Americans.149 This was clearly
demonstrated in the case of Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro.150

In Rubi, the Provincial Board of Mindoro adopted a Resolution authorizing the

provincial governor to remove the Mangyans from their domains and place them in a
permanent reservation in Sitio Tigbao, Lake Naujan. Any Mangyan who refused to
comply was to be imprisoned. Rubi and some Mangyans, including one who was
imprisoned for trying to escape from the reservation, filed for habeas corpus
claiming deprivation of liberty under the Board Resolution. This Court denied the
petition on the ground of police power. It upheld government policy promoting the
idea that a permanent settlement was the only successful method for educating the
Mangyans, introducing civilized customs, improving their health and morals, and
protecting the public forests in which they roamed.151 Speaking through Justice
Malcolm, the court said:

"Reference was made in the President's instructions to the Commission to the policy
adopted by the United States for the Indian Tribes. The methods followed by the
Government of the Philippine Islands in its dealings with the so-called non-Christian
people is said, on argument, to be practically identical with that followed by the
United States Government in its dealings with the Indian tribes. Valuable lessons, it
is insisted, can be derived by an investigation of the American-Indian policy.

From the beginning of the United States, and even before, the Indians have been
treated as "in a state of pupilage." The recognized relation between the Government
of the United States and the Indians may be described as that of guardian and ward.
It is for the Congress to determine when and how the guardianship shall be
terminated. The Indians are always subject to the plenary authority of the United
States.152
x x x.

As to the second point, the facts in the Standing Bear case and the Rubi case are not
exactly identical. But even admitting similarity of facts, yet it is known to all that
Indian reservations do exist in the United States, that Indians have been taken from
different parts of the country and placed on these reservations, without any previous
consultation as to their own wishes, and that, when once so located, they have been
made to remain on the reservation for their own good and for the general good of
the country. If any lesson can be drawn from the Indian policy of the United States,
it is that the determination of this policy is for the legislative and executive branches
of the government and that when once so decided upon, the courts should not
interfere to upset a carefully planned governmental system. Perhaps, just as many
forceful reasons exist for the segregation of the Manguianes in Mindoro as existed
for the segregation of the different Indian tribes in the United States."153

Rubi applied the concept of Indian land grants or reservations in the Philippines. An
Indian reservation is a part of the public domain set apart by proper authority for
the use and occupation of a tribe or tribes of Indians.154 It may be set apart by an
act of Congress, by treaty, or by executive order, but it cannot be established by
custom and prescription.155

Indian title to land, however, is not limited to land grants or reservations. It

also covers the "aboriginal right of possession or occupancy."156 The
aboriginal right of possession depends on the actual occupancy of the lands in
question by the tribe or nation as their ancestral home, in the sense that such lands
constitute definable territory occupied exclusively by the particular tribe or
nation.157 It is a right which exists apart from any treaty, statute, or other
governmental action, although in numerous instances treaties have been negotiated
with Indian tribes, recognizing their aboriginal possession and delimiting their
occupancy rights or settling and adjusting their boundaries.158

American jurisprudence recognizes the Indians' or native Americans' rights

to land they have held and occupied before the "discovery" of the Americas
by the Europeans. The earliest definitive statement by the U.S. Supreme
Court on the nature of aboriginal title was made in 1823 in Johnson &
Graham's Lessee v. M'Intosh.159

In Johnson, the plaintiffs claimed the land in question under two (2) grants made
by the chiefs of two (2) Indian tribes. The U.S. Supreme Court refused to recognize
this conveyance, the plaintiffs being private persons. The only conveyance that was
recognized was that made by the Indians to the government of the European
discoverer. Speaking for the court, Chief Justice Marshall pointed out that the
potentates of the old world believed that they had made ample compensation to the
inhabitants of the new world by bestowing civilization and Christianity upon them;
but in addition, said the court, they found it necessary, in order to avoid conflicting
settlements and consequent war, to establish the principle that discovery gives
title to the government by whose subjects, or by whose authority, the
discovery was made, against all other European governments, which title
might be consummated by possession.160 The exclusion of all other Europeans
gave to the nation making the discovery the sole right of acquiring the soil from the
natives and establishing settlements upon it. As regards the natives, the court
further stated that:
"Those relations which were to exist between the discoverer and the natives were to
be regulated by themselves. The rights thus acquired being exclusive, no other
power could interpose between them.

In the establishment of these relations, the rights of the original inhabitants were,
in no instance, entirely disregarded; but were necessarily, to a considerable extent,
impaired. They were admitted to be the rightful occupants of the soil, with a
legal as well as just claim to retain possession of it, and to use it according
to their own discretion; but their rights to complete sovereignty, as independent
nations, were necessarily diminished, and their power to dispose of the soil at their
own will, to whomsoever they pleased, was denied by the fundamental principle that
discovery gave exclusive title to those who made it.

While the different nations of Europe respected the right of the natives as
occupants, they asserted the ultimate dominion to be in themselves; and
claimed and exercised, as a consequence of this ultimate dominion, a power
to grant the soil, while yet in possession of the natives. These grants have
been understood by all to convey a title to the grantees, subject only to the
Indian right of occupancy."161

Thus, the discoverer of new territory was deemed to have obtained the exclusive
right to acquire Indian land and extinguish Indian titles. Only to the discoverer-
whether to England, France, Spain or Holland- did this right belong and not to any
other nation or private person. The mere acquisition of the right nonetheless did not
extinguish Indian claims to land. Rather, until the discoverer, by purchase or
conquest, exercised its right, the concerned Indians were recognized as the "rightful
occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as just claim to retain possession of it."
Grants made by the discoverer to her subjects of lands occupied by the Indians were
held to convey a title to the grantees, subject only to the Indian right of occupancy.
Once the discoverer purchased the land from the Indians or conquered them, it was
only then that the discoverer gained an absolute title unrestricted by Indian rights.

The court concluded, in essence, that a grant of Indian lands by Indians could not
convey a title paramount to the title of the United States itself to other parties,
saying:

"It has never been contended that the Indian title amounted to nothing. Their right
of possession has never been questioned. The claim of government extends
to the complete ultimate title, charged with this right of possession, and to
the exclusive power of acquiring that right."162

It has been said that the history of America, from its discovery to the present day,
proves the universal recognition of this principle.163

The Johnson doctrine was a compromise. It protected Indian rights and their native
lands without having to invalidate conveyances made by the government to many
U.S. citizens.164

Johnson was reiterated in the case of Worcester v. Georgia.165 In this case, the
State of Georgia enacted a law requiring all white persons residing within the
Cherokee nation to obtain a license or permit from the Governor of Georgia; and any
violation of the law was deemed a high misdemeanor. The plaintiffs, who were white
missionaries, did not obtain said license and were thus charged with a violation of
the Act.

The U.S. Supreme Court declared the Act as unconstitutional for interfering with the
treaties established between the United States and the Cherokee nation as well as
the Acts of Congress regulating intercourse with them. It characterized the
relationship between the United States government and the Indians as:

"The Indian nations were, from their situation, necessarily dependent on some
foreign potentate for the supply of their essential wants, and for their protection
from lawless and injurious intrusions into their country. That power was naturally
termed their protector. They had been arranged under the protection of Great
Britain; but the extinguishment of the British power in their neighborhood, and the
establishment of that of the United States in its place, led naturally to the
declaration, on the part of the Cherokees, that they were under the protection of the
United States, and of no other power. They assumed the relation with the United
States which had before subsisted with Great Britain.

This relation was that of a nation claiming and receiving the protection of one more
powerful, not that of individuals abandoning their national character, and submitting
as subjects to the laws of a master."166

It was the policy of the U.S. government to treat the Indians as nations with distinct
territorial boundaries and recognize their right of occupancy over all the lands within
their domains. Thus:

"From the commencement of our government Congress has passed acts to regulate
trade and intercourse with the Indians; which treat them as nations, respect their
rights, and manifest a firm purpose to afford that protection which treaties stipulate.
All these acts, and especially that of 1802, which is still in force, manifestly
consider the several Indian nations as distinct political communities, having
territorial boundaries, within which their authority is exclusive, and having
a right to all the lands within those boundaries, which is not only
acknowledged, but guaranteed by the United States.

x x x.

"The Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, independent

political communities, retaining their original natural rights, as the
undisputed possessors of the soil from time immemorial, with the single
exception of that imposed by irresistible power, which excluded them from
intercourse with any other European potentate than the first discoverer of the coast
of the particular region claimed: and this was a restriction which those European
potentates imposed on themselves, as well as on the Indians. The very term
"nation," so generally applied to them, means "a people distinct from others." x x
x.167

The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community, occupying its own territory, with
boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no force,
and which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter but with the assent of the
Cherokees themselves or in conformity with treaties and with the acts of Congress.
The whole intercourse between the United States and this nation is, by our
Constitution and laws, vested in the government of the United States."168
The discovery of the American continent gave title to the government of the
discoverer as against all other European governments. Designated as the naked
fee,169 this title was to be consummated by possession and was subject to the Indian
title of occupancy. The discoverer acknowledged the Indians' legal and just claim to
retain possession of the land, the Indians being the original inhabitants of the land.
The discoverer nonetheless asserted the exclusive right to acquire the Indians' land-
either by purchase, "defensive" conquest, or cession- and in so doing, extinguish the
Indian title. Only the discoverer could extinguish Indian title because it alone
asserted ultimate dominion in itself. Thus, while the different nations of Europe
respected the rights of the natives as occupants, they all asserted the ultimate
dominion and title to be in themselves.170

As early as the 19th century, it became accepted doctrine that although fee
title to the lands occupied by the Indians when the colonists arrived
became vested in the sovereign- first the discovering European nation and
later the original 13 States and the United States- a right of occupancy in
the Indian tribes was nevertheless recognized. The Federal Government
continued the policy of respecting the Indian right of occupancy, sometimes called
Indian title, which it accorded the protection of complete ownership.171 But this
aboriginal Indian interest simply constitutes "permission" from the whites to occupy
the land, and means mere possession not specifically recognized as ownership by
Congress.172 It is clear that this right of occupancy based upon aboriginal possession
is not a property right.173 It is vulnerable to affirmative action by the federal
government who, as sovereign, possessed exclusive power to extinguish the right of
occupancy at will.174 Thus, aboriginal title is not the same as legal
title. Aboriginal title rests on actual, exclusive and continuous use and occupancy
for a long time.175 It entails that land owned by Indian title must be used within the
tribe, subject to its laws and customs, and cannot be sold to another sovereign
government nor to any citizen.176 Such title as Indians have to possess and occupy
land is in the tribe, and not in the individual Indian; the right of individual Indians to
share in the tribal property usually depends upon tribal membership, the property of
the tribe generally being held in communal ownership.177

As a rule, Indian lands are not included in the term "public lands," which is ordinarily
used to designate such lands as are subject to sale or other disposal under general
laws.178 Indian land which has been abandoned is deemed to fall into the public
domain.179 On the other hand, an Indian reservation is a part of the public domain
set apart for the use and occupation of a tribe of Indians.180 Once set apart by
proper authority, the reservation ceases to be public land, and until the Indian title
is extinguished, no one but Congress can initiate any preferential right on, or restrict
the nation's power to dispose of, them.181

The American judiciary struggled for more than 200 years with the
ancestral land claims of indigenous Americans.182 And two things are
clear. First, aboriginal title is recognized. Second, indigenous property systems are
also recognized. From a legal point of view, certain benefits can be drawn from a
comparison of Philippine IPs to native Americans.183 Despite the similarities between
native title and aboriginal title, however, there are at present some misgivings on
whether jurisprudence on American Indians may be cited authoritatively in the
Philippines. The U.S. recognizes the possessory rights of the Indians over their land;
title to the land, however, is deemed to have passed to the U.S. as successor of the
discoverer. The aboriginal title of ownership is not specifically recognized as
ownership by action authorized by Congress.184 The protection of aboriginal title
merely guards against encroachment by persons other than the Federal
Government.185 Although there are criticisms against the refusal to recognize the
native Americans' ownership of these lands,186 the power of the State to extinguish
these titles has remained firmly entrenched.187

Under the IPRA, the Philippine State is not barred form asserting sovereignty over
the ancestral domains and ancestral lands.188 The IPRA, however, is still in its
infancy and any similarities between its application in the Philippines vis-à-vis
American Jurisprudence on aboriginal title will depend on the peculiar facts of each
case.

(c) Why the Cariño doctrine is unique

In the Philippines, the concept of native title first upheld in Cariño and enshrined in
the IPRA grants ownership, albeit in limited form, of the land to the ICCs/IPs. Native
title presumes that the land is private and was never public. Cariño is the only
case that specifically and categorically recognizes native title. The long line
of cases citing Cariño did not touch on native title and the private character
of ancestral domains and lands. Cariñowas cited by the succeeding cases to
support the concept of acquisitive prescription under the Public Land Act
which is a different matter altogether. Under the Public Land Act, land sought to
be registered must be public agricultural land. When the conditions specified in
Section 48 [b] of the Public Land Act are complied with, the possessor of the land is
deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant of the land.189 The
land ceases to be part of the public domain,190 ipso jure,191 and is converted to
private property by the mere lapse or completion of the prescribed statutory period.

It was only in the case of Oh Cho v. Director of Lands192 that the court declared
that the rule that all lands that were not acquired from the government, either by
purchase or grant, belong to the public domain has an exception. This exception
would be any land that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his
predecessors-in-interest since time immemorial. It is this kind of possession that
would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the public
domain or that it had been private property even before the Spanish conquest.193 Oh
Cho, however, was decided under the provisions of the Public Land Act
and Cariño was cited to support the applicant's claim of acquisitive prescription
under the said Act.

All these years, Cariño had been quoted out of context simply to justify long,
continuous, open and adverse possession in the concept of owner of public
agricultural land. It is this long, continuous, open and adverse possession in the
concept of owner of thirty years both for ordinary citizens194 and members of the
national cultural minorities195 that converts the land from public into private and
entitles the registrant to a torrens certificate of title.

(3) The Option of Securing a Torrens Title to the Ancestral Land Indicates
that the Land is Private.

The private character of ancestral lands and domains as laid down in the IPRA is
further strengthened by the option given to individual ICCs/IPs over their
individually-owned ancestral lands. For purposes of registration under the
Public Land Act and the Land Registration Act, the IPRA expressly converts
ancestral land into public agricultural land which may be disposed of by the
State. The necessary implication is that ancestral land is private. It,
however, has to be first converted to public agricultural land simply for
registration purposes. To wit:

"Sec. 12. Option to Secure Certificate of Title Under Commonwealth Act 141, as
amended, or the Land Registration Act 496- Individual members of cultural
communities, with respect to their individually-owned ancestral lands who, by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, have been in continuous
possession and occupation of the same in the concept of owner since time
immemorial or for a period of not less than thirty (30) years immediately preceding
the approval of this Act and uncontested by the members of the same ICCs/IPs shall
have the option to secure title to their ancestral lands under the provisions of
Commonwealth Act 141, as amended, or the Land Registration Act 496.

For this purpose, said individually-owned ancestral lands, which are agricultural in
character and actually used for agricultural, residential, pasture, and tree farming
purposes, including those with a slope of eighteen percent (18%) or more, are
hereby classified as alienable and disposable agricultural lands.

The option granted under this section shall be exercised within twenty (20) years
from the approval of this Act."196

ICCs/IPs are given the option to secure a torrens certificate of title over their
individually-owned ancestral lands. This option is limited to ancestral lands only, not
domains, and such lands must be individually, not communally, owned.

Ancestral lands that are owned by individual members of ICCs/IPs who, by

themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, have been in continuous
possession and occupation of the same in the concept of owner since time
immemorial197 or for a period of not less than 30 years, which claims are
uncontested by the members of the same ICCs/IPs, may be registered under C.A.
141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, or Act 496, the Land Registration Act.
For purposes of registration, the individually-owned ancestral lands are classified as
alienable and disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, provided, they are
agricultural in character and are actually used for agricultural, residential, pasture
and tree farming purposes. These lands shall be classified as public agricultural lands
regardless of whether they have a slope of 18% or more.

The classification of ancestral land as public agricultural land is in compliance with

the requirements of the Public Land Act and the Land Registration Act. C.A. 141, the
Public Land Act, deals specifically with lands of the public domain.198 Its provisions
apply to those lands "declared open to disposition or concession" x x x "which have
not been reserved for public or quasi-public purposes, nor appropriated by the
Government, nor in any manner become private property, nor those on which a
private right authorized and recognized by this Act or any other valid law x x x or
which having been reserved or appropriated, have ceased to be so."199 Act 496, the
Land Registration Act, allows registration only of private lands and public agricultural
lands. Since ancestral domains and lands are private, if the ICC/IP wants to
avail of the benefits of C.A. 141 and Act 496, the IPRA itself converts his
ancestral land, regardless of whether the land has a slope of eighteen per
cent (18%) or over,200 from private to public agricultural land for proper
disposition.
The option to register land under the Public Land Act and the Land Registration Act
has nonetheless a limited period. This option must be exercised within twenty (20)
years from October 29, 1997, the date of approval of the IPRA.

Thus, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the
public domain. They are private and belong to the ICCs/IPs. Section 3 of
Article XII on National Economy and Patrimony of the 1987 Constitution classifies
lands of the public domain into four categories: (a) agricultural, (b) forest or timber,
(c) mineral lands, and (d) national parks. Section 5 of the same
Article XII mentions ancestral lands and ancestral domains but it does not classify
them under any of the said four categories. To classify them as public lands
under any one of the four classes will render the entire IPRA law a
nullity. The spirit of the IPRA lies in the distinct concept of ancestral domains and
ancestral lands. The IPRA addresses the major problem of the ICCs/IPs which is loss
of land. Land and space are of vital concern in terms of sheer survival of the
ICCs/IPs.201

The 1987 Constitution mandates the State to "protect the rights of

indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands" and that
"Congress provide for the applicability of customary laws x x x in
determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domain."202 It is the
recognition of the ICCs/IPs distinct rights of ownership over their ancestral
domains and lands that breathes life into this constitutional mandate.

B. The right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral

domains is a limited form of ownership and does not include the right to
alienate the same.

Registration under the Public Land Act and Land Registration Act recognizes the
concept of ownership under the civil law. This ownership is based on adverse
possession for a specified period, and harkens to Section 44 of the Public Land Act
on administrative legalization (free patent) of imperfect or incomplete titles and
Section 48 (b) and (c) of the same Act on the judicial confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete titles. Thus:

"Sec. 44. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who is not the owner of more
than twenty-four hectares and who since July fourth, 1926 or prior thereto, has
continuously occupied and cultivated, either by himself or through his predecessors-
in-interest, a tract or tracts of agricultural public lands subject to disposition, or who
shall have paid the real estate tax thereon while the same has not been occupied by
any person shall be entitled, under the provisions of this chapter, to have a free
patent issued to him for such tract or tracts of such land not to exceed twenty-four
hectares.

A member of the national cultural minorities who has continuously occupied

and cultivated, either by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, a
tract or tracts of land, whether disposable or not since July 4, 1955, shall be
entitled to the right granted in the preceding paragraph of this
section: Provided, That at the time he files his free patent application he is
not the owner of any real property secured or disposable under the
provision of the Public Land Law.203

x x x.
"Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the
public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose
titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance
of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the
issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

(a) [perfection of Spanish titles] xxx.

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have

been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation
of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the
filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war
or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all
the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this Chapter.

(c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by themselves or

through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of lands of the
public domain suitable to agriculture, whether disposable or not,
under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least 30 years shall be
entitled to the rights granted in sub-section (b) hereof."204

Registration under the foregoing provisions presumes that the land was originally
public agricultural land but because of adverse possession since July 4, 1955 (free
patent) or at least thirty years (judicial confirmation), the land has become private.
Open, adverse, public and continuous possession is sufficient, provided, the
possessor makes proper application therefor. The possession has to be confirmed
judicially or administratively after which a torrens title is issued.

A torrens title recognizes the owner whose name appears in the certificate as
entitled to all the rights of ownership under the civil law. The Civil Code of the
Philippines defines ownership in Articles 427, 428 and 429. This concept is based on
Roman Law which the Spaniards introduced to the Philippines through the Civil Code
of 1889. Ownership, under Roman Law, may be exercised over things or rights. It
primarily includes the right of the owner to enjoy and dispose of the thing owned.
And the right to enjoy and dispose of the thing includes the right to receive from the
thing what it produces,205 the right to consume the thing by its use,206 the right to
alienate, encumber, transform or even destroy the thing owned,207 and the right to
exclude from the possession of the thing owned by any other person to whom the
owner has not transmitted such thing.208

1. The Indigenous Concept of Ownership and Customary Law.

Ownership of ancestral domains by native title does not entitle the ICC/IP to a
torrens title but to a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT). The CADT formally
recognizes the indigenous concept of ownership of the ICCs/IPs over their ancestral
domain. Thus:

"Sec. 5. Indigenous concept of ownership.- Indigenous concept of ownership

sustains the view that ancestral domains and all resources found therein shall serve
as the material bases of their cultural integrity. The indigenous concept of ownership
generally holds that ancestral domains are the ICCs/IPs private but community
property which belongs to all generations and therefore cannot be sold, disposed or
destroyed. It likewise covers sustainable traditional resource rights."

The right of ownership and possession of the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral

domains is held under the indigenous concept of ownership. This concept
maintains the view that ancestral domains are the ICCs/IPs private but
community property. It is private simply because it is not part of the public
domain. But its private character ends there. The ancestral domain is
owned in common by the ICCs/IPs and not by one particular person. The
IPRA itself provides that areas within the ancestral domains, whether delineated or
not, are presumed to be communally held.209 These communal rights, however,
are not exactly the same as co-ownership rights under the Civil Code.210 Co-
ownership gives any co-owner the right to demand partition of the property held in
common. The Civil Code expressly provides that "no co-owner shall be obliged to
remain in the co-ownership." Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition
of the thing in common, insofar as his share is concerned.211 To allow such a right
over ancestral domains may be destructive not only of customary law of the
community but of the very community itself.212

Communal rights over land are not the same as corporate rights over real
property, much less corporate condominium rights. A corporation can exist
only for a maximum of fifty (50) years subject to an extension of another fifty years
in any single instance.213 Every stockholder has the right to disassociate himself from
the corporation.214 Moreover, the corporation itself may be dissolved voluntarily or
involuntarily.215

Communal rights to the land are held not only by the present possessors of
the land but extends to all generations of the ICCs/IPs, past, present and
future, to the domain. This is the reason why the ancestral domain must be kept
within the ICCs/IPs themselves. The domain cannot be transferred, sold or conveyed
to other persons. It belongs to the ICCs/IPs as a community.

Ancestral lands are also held under the indigenous concept of

ownership. The lands are communal. These lands, however, may be transferred
subject to the following limitations: (a) only to the members of the same ICCs/IPs;
(b) in accord with customary laws and traditions; and (c) subject to the right of
redemption of the ICCs/IPs for a period of 15 years if the land was transferred to a
non-member of the ICCs/IPs.

Following the constitutional mandate that "customary law govern property rights or
relations in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domains,"216 the
IPRA, by legislative fiat, introduces a new concept of ownership. This is a
concept that has long existed under customary law.217

Custom, from which customary law is derived, is also recognized under the
Civil Code as a source of law.218 Some articles of the Civil Code expressly provide
that custom should be applied in cases where no codal provision is applicable.219 In
other words, in the absence of any applicable provision in the Civil Code, custom,
when duly proven, can define rights and liabilities.220

Customary law is a primary, not secondary, source of rights under the IPRA and
uniquely applies to ICCs/IPs. Its recognition does not depend on the absence
of a specific provision in the civil law. The indigenous concept of ownership
under customary law is specifically acknowledged and recognized, and coexists with
the civil law concept and the laws on land titling and land registration.221

To be sure, the indigenous concept of ownership exists even without a paper

title. The CADT is merely a "formal recognition" of native title. This is clear from
Section 11 of the IPRA, to wit:

"Sec. 11. Recognition of Ancestral Domain Rights.- The rights of ICCs/IPs to their
ancestral domains by virtue of Native Title shall be recognized and respected.
Formal recognition, when solicited by ICCs/IPs concerned shall be embodied in a
Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title, which shall recognize the title of the concerned
ICCs/IPs over the territories identified and delineated."

The moral import of ancestral domain, native land or being native is "belongingness"
to the land, being people of the land- by sheer force of having sprung from the land
since time beyond recall, and the faithful nurture of the land by the sweat of one's
brow. This is fidelity of usufructuary relation to the land- the possession of
stewardship through perduring, intimate tillage, and the mutuality of blessings
between man and land; from man, care for land; from the land, sustenance for
man.222

C. Sections 7 (a), 7 (b) and 57 of the IPRA Do Not Violate the Regalian
Doctrine Enshrined in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.

1. The Rights of ICCs/IPs Over Their Ancestral Domains and Lands

The IPRA grants the ICCs/IPs several rights over their ancestral domains and
ancestral lands. Section 7 provides for the rights over ancestral domains:

"Sec. 7. Rights to Ancestral Domains.- The rights of ownership and possession of

ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains shall be recognized and protected. Such rights
include:

a) Right of Ownership.- The right to claim ownership over lands, bodies of

water traditionally and actually occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred places,
traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and all improvements made
by them at any time within the domains;

b) Right to Develop Lands and Natural Resources.- Subject to Section 56

hereof, the right to develop, control and use lands and territories
traditionally occupied, owned, or used; to manage and conserve
natural resources within the territories and uphold the
responsibilities for future generations; to benefit and share the
profits from allocation and utilization of the natural resources found
therein; the right to negotiate the terms and conditions for the
exploration of natural resources in the areas for the purpose of
ensuring ecological, environmental protection and the conservation
measures, pursuant to national and customary laws; the right to an
informed and intelligent participation in the formulation and implementation
of any project, government or private, that will affect or impact upon the
ancestral domains and to receive just and fair compensation for any damages
which they may sustain as a result of the project; and the right to effective
 measures by the government to prevent any interference with, alienation and
encroachment upon these rights;"

c) Right to Stay in the Territories.- The right to stay in the territory and not to
be removed therefrom. No ICCs/IPs will be relocated without their free and
prior informed consent, nor through any means other than eminent domain. x
x x;

d) Right in Case of Displacement.- In case displacement occurs as a result of

natural catastrophes, the State shall endeavor to resettle the displaced
ICCs/IPs in suitable areas where they can have temporary life support
systems: x x x;

e) Right to Regulate the Entry of Migrants.- Right to regulate the entry of

migrant settlers and organizations into their domains;

f) Right to Safe and Clean Air and Water.-For this purpose, the ICCs/IPs shall
have access to integrated systems for the management of their inland waters
and air space;

g) Right to Claim Parts of Reservations.- The right to claim parts of the

ancestral domains which have been reserved for various purposes, except
those reserved and intended for common and public welfare and service;

h) Right to Resolve Conflict.- Right to resolve land conflicts in accordance with

customary laws of the area where the land is located, and only in default
thereof shall the complaints be submitted to amicable settlement and to the
Courts of Justice whenever necessary."

Section 8 provides for the rights over ancestral lands:

"Sec. 8. Rights to Ancestral Lands.- The right of ownership and possession of the
ICCs/IPs to their ancestral lands shall be recognized and protected.

a) Right to transfer land/property.- Such right shall include the right to

transfer land or property rights to/among members of the same ICCs/IPs,
subject to customary laws and traditions of the community concerned.

b) Right to Redemption.- In cases where it is shown that the transfer of

land/property rights by virtue of any agreement or devise, to a non-member
of the concerned ICCs/IPs is tainted by the vitiated consent of the ICCs/IPs,
or is transferred for an unconscionable consideration or price, the transferor
ICC/IP shall have the right to redeem the same within a period not exceeding
fifteen (15) years from the date of transfer."

Section 7 (a) defines the ICCs/IPs the right of ownership over their
ancestral domains which covers (a) lands, (b) bodies of water traditionally and
actually occupied by the ICCs/IPs, (c) sacred places, (d) traditional hunting and
fishing grounds, and (e) all improvements made by them at any time within the
domains. The right of ownership includes the following rights: (1) the right to
develop lands and natural resources; (b) the right to stay in the territories; (c) the
right to resettlement in case of displacement; (d) the right to regulate the entry of
migrants; (e) the right to safe and clean air and water; (f) the right to claim parts of
the ancestral domains as reservations; and (g) the right to resolve conflict in
accordance with customary laws.

Section 8 governs their rights to ancestral lands. Unlike ownership over the
ancestral domains, Section 8 gives the ICCs/IPs also the right to transfer the land or
property rights to members of the same ICCs/IPs or non-members thereof. This is in
keeping with the option given to ICCs/IPs to secure a torrens title over the
ancestral lands, but not to domains.

2. The Right of ICCs/IPs to Develop Lands and Natural Resources Within the
Ancestral Domains Does Not Deprive the State of Ownership Over the Natural
Resources and Control and Supervision in their Development and Exploitation.

The Regalian doctrine on the ownership, management and utilization of natural

resources is declared in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, viz:

"Sec. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum,
and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or
timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by
the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall
not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural
resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The
State may directly undertake such activities, or, it may enter into co-
production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino
citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose
capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not
exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and
under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights
for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other
than the development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit
of the grant.

The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic waters,
territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment
exclusively to Filipino citizens.

The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by

Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence
fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.

The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving
either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development,
and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the
general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the
economic growth and general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the state
shall promote the development and use of local scientific and technical resources.

The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance
with this provision, within thirty days from its execution."223

All lands of the public domain and all natural resources- waters, minerals,
coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries,
forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources- are owned
by the State. The Constitution provides that in the exploration, development and
utilization of these natural resources, the State exercises full control and
supervision, and may undertake the same in four (4) modes:

1. The State may directly undertake such activities; or

2. The State may enter into co-production, joint venture or production-

sharing agreements with Filipino citizens or qualified corporations;

3. Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by

Filipino citizens;

4. For the large-scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals,

petroleum and other mineral oils, the President may enter into agreements
with foreign-owned corporations involving technical or financial assistance.

As owner of the natural resources, the State is accorded primary power and
responsibility in the exploration, development and utilization of these
natural resources. The State may directly undertake the exploitation and
development by itself, or, it may allow participation by the private sector through
co-production,224joint venture,225 or production-sharing agreements.226 These
agreements may be for a period of 25 years, renewable for another 25 years. The
State, through Congress, may allow the small-scale utilization of natural resources
by Filipino citizens. For the large-scale exploration of these resources, specifically
minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils, the State, through the President, may
enter into technical and financial assistance agreements with foreign-owned
corporations.

Under the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, (R.A. 7942) and the People's Small-Scale
Mining Act of 1991 (R.A. 7076) the three types of agreements, i.e., co-production,
joint venture or production-sharing, may apply to both large-scale227 and small-scale
mining.228 "Small-scale mining" refers to "mining activities which rely heavily on
manual labor using simple implements and methods and do not use explosives or
heavy mining equipment."229

Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs
ownership over the natural resources within their ancestral domains. The
right of ICCs/IPs in their ancestral domains includes ownership, but this
"ownership" is expressly defined and limited in Section 7 (a) as:

"Sec. 7. a) Right of ownership- The right to claim ownership over lands, bodies of
water traditionally and actually occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional
hunting and fishing grounds, and all improvements made by them at any time within
the domains;"

The ICCs/IPs are given the right to claim ownership over "lands, bodies of water
traditionally and actually occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional hunting
and fishing grounds, and all improvements made by them at any time within the
domains." It will be noted that this enumeration does not mention bodies of water
not occupied by the ICCs/IPs, minerals, coal, wildlife, flora and fauna in the
traditional hunting grounds, fish in the traditional fishing
grounds, forests or timber in the sacred places, etc. and all other natural resources
found within the ancestral domains. Indeed, the right of ownership under
Section 7 (a) does not cover "waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, floraand fauna and all other
natural resources" enumerated in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution as belonging to the State.

The non-inclusion of ownership by the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in Section
7(a) complies with the Regalian doctrine.

(a) Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules Goes Beyond the
Parameters of Sec. 7 (a) of the IPRA And is Unconstitutional.

The Rules Implementing the IPRA230 in Section 1, Part II, Rule III reads:

"Section 1. Rights of Ownership. ICCs/IPs have rights of ownership over lands,

waters, and natural resources and all improvements made by them at any time
within the ancestral domains/ lands. These rights shall include, but not limited to,
the right over the fruits, the right to possess, the right to use, right to consume,
right to exclude and right to recover ownership, and the rights or interests over land
and natural resources. The right to recover shall be particularly applied to lands lost
through fraud or any form or vitiated consent or transferred for an unconscionable
price."

Section 1 of the Implementing Rules gives the ICCs/IPs rights of ownership over
"lands, waters and natural resources." The term "natural resources" is not one of
those expressly mentioned in Section 7 (a) of the law. Our Constitution and
jurisprudence clearly declare that the right to claim ownership over land does not
necessarily include the right to claim ownership over the natural resources found on
or under the land.231 The IPRA itself makes a distinction between land and
natural resources. Section 7 (a) speaks of the right of ownership only over
the land within the ancestral domain. It is Sections 7 (b) and 57 of the law
that speak of natural resources, and these provisions, as shall be discussed
later, do not give the ICCs/IPs the right of ownership over these resources.

The constitutionality of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules was
not specifically and categorically challenged by petitioners. Petitioners actually assail
the constitutionality of the Implementing Rules in general.232Nevertheless, to avoid
any confusion in the implementation of the law, it is necessary to declare that the
inclusion of "natural resources" in Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing
Rules goes beyond the parameters of Section 7 (b) of the law and is contrary to
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.

(b) The Small-Scale Utilization of Natural Resources In Sec. 7 (b) of the

IPRA Is Allowed Under Paragraph 3, Section 2 of Article XII of the
Constitution.

Ownership over natural resources remain with the State and the IPRA in Section 7
(b) merely grants the ICCs/IPs the right to manage them, viz:

"Sec. 7 (b) Right to Develop Lands and Natural Resources.- Subject to Section 56
hereof, right to develop, control and use lands and territories traditionally occupied,
owned, or used; to manage and conserve natural resourceswithin the territories and
uphold the responsibilities for future generations; to benefit and share the profits
from allocation and utilization of the natural resources found therein; the right to
negotiate the terms and conditions for the exploration of natural resources in the
areas for the purpose of ensuring ecological, environmental protection and the
conservation measures, pursuant to national and customary laws; the right to an
informed and intelligent participation in the formulation and implementation of any
project, government or private, that will affect or impact upon the ancestral domains
and to receive just and fair compensation for any damages which they may sustain
as a result of the project; and the right to effective measures by the government to
prevent any interference with, alienation and encroachment upon these rights;"

The right to develop lands and natural resources under Section 7 (b) of the
IPRA enumerates the following rights:

a) the right to develop, control and use lands and territories traditionally
occupied;

b) the right to manage and conserve natural resources within the territories
and uphold the responsibilities for future generations;

c) the right to benefit and share the profits from the allocation and utilization
of the natural resources found therein;

d) the right to negotiate the terms and conditions for the exploration
of natural resources for the purpose of ensuring ecological, environmental
protection and the conservation measures, pursuant to national and
customary laws;

e) the right to an informed and intelligent participation in the formulation and

implementation of any project, government or private, that will affect or
impact upon the ancestral domains and to receive just and fair compensation
for any damages which they may sustain as a result of the project;

f) the right to effective measures by the government to prevent any

interference with, alienation and encroachment upon these rights.233

Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral domains remains

with the State and the ICCs/IPs are merely granted the right to "manage
and conserve" them for future generations, "benefit and share" the profits
from their allocation and utilization, and "negotiate the terms and
conditions for their exploration" for the purpose of "ensuring ecological and
environmental protection and conservation measures." It must be noted that
the right to negotiate the terms and conditions over the natural resources covers
only their exploration which must be for the purpose of ensuring ecological and
environmental protection of, and conservation measures in the ancestral domain. It
does not extend to the exploitation and development of natural resources.

Simply stated, the ICCs/IPs' rights over the natural resources take the form
of management or stewardship. For the ICCs/IPs may use these resources and
share in the profits of their utilization or negotiate the terms for their exploration. At
the same time, however, the ICCs/IPs must ensure that the natural resources within
their ancestral domains are conserved for future generations and that the
"utilization" of these resources must not harm the ecology and environment
pursuant to national and customary laws.234
The limited rights of "management and use" in Section 7 (b) must be taken
to contemplate small-scale utilization of natural resources as distinguished
from large-scale. Small-scale utilization of natural resources is expressly
allowed in the third paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution "in recognition of the plight of forest dwellers, gold panners, marginal
fishermen and others similarly situated who exploit our natural resources for their
daily sustenance and survival."235 Section 7 (b) also expressly mandates the
ICCs/IPs to manage and conserve these resources and ensure environmental and
ecological protection within the domains, which duties, by their very nature,
necessarily reject utilization in a large-scale.

(c) The Large-Scale Utilization of Natural Resources In Section 57 of the

IPRA Is Allowed Under Paragraphs 1 and 4, Section 2, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution.

Section 57 of the IPRA provides:

"Sec. 57. Natural Resources within Ancestral Domains.- The ICCs/IPs shall
have priority rights in the harvesting, extraction, development or
exploitation of any natural resources within the ancestral domains. A non-
member of the ICCs/IPs concerned may be allowed to take part in the development
and utilization of the natural resources for a period of not exceeding twenty-five (25)
years renewable for not more than twenty-five (25) years: Provided, That a formal
and written agreement is entered into with the ICCs/IPs concerned or that the
community, pursuant to its own decision-making process, has agreed to allow such
operation: Provided finally, That the NCIP may exercise visitorial powers and take
appropriate action to safeguard the rights of the ICCs/IPs under the same contract."

Section 57 speaks of the "harvesting, extraction, development or

exploitation of natural resources within ancestral domains" and "gives the ICCs/IPs
'priority rights' therein." The terms "harvesting, extraction, development or
exploitation" of any natural resources within the ancestral domains
obviously refer to large-scale utilization. It is utilization not merely for
subsistence but for commercial or other extensive use that require technology other
than manual labor.236 The law recognizes the probability of requiring a non-member
of the ICCs/IPs to participate in the development and utilization of the natural
resources and thereby allows such participation for a period of not more than 25
years, renewable for another 25 years. This may be done on condition that a formal
written agreement be entered into by the non-member and members of the
ICCs/IPs.

Section 57 of the IPRA does not give the ICCs/IPs the right to "manage and
conserve" the natural resources. Instead, the law only grants the ICCs/IPs "priority
rights" in the development or exploitation thereof. Priority means giving preference.
Having priority rights over the natural resources does not necessarily mean
ownership rights. The grant of priority rights implies that there is a superior
entity that owns these resources and this entity has the power to grant preferential
rights over the resources to whosoever itself chooses.

Section 57 is not a repudiation of the Regalian doctrine. Rather, it is an affirmation

of the said doctrine that all natural resources found within the ancestral domains
belong to the State. It incorporates by implication the Regalian doctrine, hence,
requires that the provision be read in the light of Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution. Interpreting Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution237 in
relation to Section 57 of IPRA, the State, as owner of these natural
resources, may directly undertake the development and exploitation of the
natural resources by itself, or in the alternative, it may recognize the
priority rights of the ICCs/IPs as owners of the land on which the natural
resources are found by entering into a co-production, joint venture, or
production-sharing agreement with them. The State may likewise enter into
any of said agreements with a non-member of the ICCs/IPs, whether
natural or juridical, or enter into agreements with foreign-owned
corporations involving either technical or financial assistance for the large-
scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and
other mineral oils, or allow such non-member to participate in its
agreement with the ICCs/IPs. If the State decides to enter into an agreement
with a non-ICC/IP member, the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP)
shall ensure that the rights of the ICCs/IPs under the agreement shall be protected.
The agreement shall be for a period of 25 years, renewable for another 25 years.

To reiterate, in the large-scale utilization of natural resources within the ancestral

domains, the State, as owner of these resources, has four (4) options: (1) it may, of
and by itself, directly undertake the development and exploitation of the natural
resources; or (2) it may recognize the priority rights of the ICCs/IPs by entering into
an agreement with them for such development and exploitation; or (3) it may enter
into an agreement with a non-member of the ICCs/IPs, whether natural or juridical,
local or foreign; or (4) it may allow such non-member to participate in the
agreement with the ICCs/IPs.

The rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources
in their ancestral domains merely gives the ICCs/IPs, as owners and
occupants of the land on which the resources are found, the right to the
small-scale utilization of these resources, and at the same time, a priority in
their large-scale development and exploitation. Section 57 does not
mandate the State to automatically give priority to the ICCs/IPs. The State
has several options and it is within its discretion to choose which option to
pursue. Moreover, there is nothing in the law that gives the ICCs/IPs the right to
solely undertake the large-scale development of the natural resources within their
domains. The ICCs/IPs must undertake such endeavour always under State
supervision or control. This indicates that the State does not lose control and
ownership over the resources even in their exploitation. Sections 7 (b) and 57 of the
law simply give due respect to the ICCs/IPs who, as actual occupants of the land
where the natural resources lie, have traditionally utilized these resources for their
subsistence and survival.

Neither is the State stripped of ownership and control of the natural resources by
the following provision:

"Section 59. Certification Precondition.- All departments and other governmental

agencies shall henceforth be strictly enjoined from issuing, renewing or granting any
concession, license or lease, or entering into any production-sharing agreement.
without prior certification from the NCIP that the area affected does not overlap with
any ancestral domain. Such certification shall only be issued after a field-based
investigation is conducted by the Ancestral Domains Office of the area
concerned: Provided, That no certification shall be issued by the NCIP without the
free and prior informed and written consent of the ICCs/IPs concerned: Provided,
further, That no department, government agency or government-owned or -
controlled corporation may issue new concession, license, lease, or production
sharing agreement while there is a pending application for a CADT: Provided, finally,
That the ICCs/IPs shall have the right to stop or suspend, in accordance with this
Act, any project that has not satisfied the requirement of this consultation process."

Concessions, licenses, lease or production-sharing agreements for the exploitation of

natural resources shall not be issued, renewed or granted by all departments and
government agencies without prior certification from the NCIP that the area subject
of the agreement does not overlap with any ancestral domain. The NCIP certification
shall be issued only after a field-based investigation shall have been conducted and
the free and prior informed written consent of the ICCs/IPs obtained. Non-
compliance with the consultation requirement gives the ICCs/IPs the right to stop or
suspend any project granted by any department or government agency.

As its subtitle suggests, this provision requires as a precondition for the issuance of
any concession, license or agreement over natural resources, that a certification be
issued by the NCIP that the area subject of the agreement does not lie within any
ancestral domain. The provision does not vest the NCIP with power over the other
agencies of the State as to determine whether to grant or deny any concession or
license or agreement. It merely gives the NCIP the authority to ensure that the
ICCs/IPs have been informed of the agreement and that their consent thereto has
been obtained. Note that the certification applies to agreements over natural
resources that do not necessarily lie within the ancestral domains. For those that are
found within the said domains, Sections 7(b) and 57 of the IPRA apply.

V. THE IPRA IS A RECOGNITION OF OUR ACTIVE PARTICIPATION IN THE

INDIGENOUS INTERNATIONAL MOVEMENT.

The indigenous movement can be seen as the heir to a history of anti-imperialism

stretching back to prehistoric times. The movement received a massive impetus
during the 1960's from two sources. First, the decolonization of Asia and Africa
brought into the limelight the possibility of peoples controlling their own destinies.
Second, the right of self-determination was enshrined in the UN Declaration on
Human Rights.238 The rise of the civil rights movement and anti-racism brought to
the attention of North American Indians, Aborigines in Australia, and Maori in New
Zealand the possibility of fighting for fundamental rights and freedoms.

In 1974 and 1975, international indigenous organizations were founded,239 and

during the 1980's, indigenous affairs were on the international agenda. The people
of the Philippine Cordillera were the first Asians to take part in the international
indigenous movement. It was the Cordillera People's Alliance that carried out
successful campaigns against the building of the Chico River Dam in 1981-82 and
they have since become one of the best-organized indigenous bodies in the world.240

Presently, there is a growing concern for indigenous rights in the international scene.
This came as a result of the increased publicity focused on the continuing disrespect
for indigenous human rights and the destruction of the indigenous peoples'
environment, together with the national governments' inability to deal with the
situation.241Indigenous rights came as a result of both human rights and
environmental protection, and have become a part of today's priorities for the
international agenda.242

International institutions and bodies have realized the necessity of applying policies,
programs and specific rules concerning IPs in some nations. The World Bank, for
example, first adopted a policy on IPs as a result of the dismal experience of
projects in Latin America.243 The World Bank now seeks to apply its current policy on
IPs to some of its projects in Asia. This policy has provided an influential model for
the projects of the Asian Development Bank.244

The 1987 Philippine Constitution formally recognizes the existence of ICCs/IPs and
declares as a State policy the promotion of their rights within the framework of
national unity and development.245 The IPRA amalgamates the Philippine category of
ICCs with the international category of IPs,246 and is heavily influenced by both the
International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention 169 and the United Nations (UN)
Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.247

ILO Convention No. 169 is entitled the "Convention Concerning Indigenous and
Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries"248 and was adopted on June 27, 1989. It is
based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, and many other international instruments on the prevention of
discrimination.249 ILO Convention No. 169 revised the "Convention Concerning the
Protection and Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal
Populations in Independent Countries" (ILO No. 107) passed on June 26, 1957.
Developments in international law made it appropriate to adopt new international
standards on indigenous peoples "with a view to removing the assimilationist
orientation of the earlier standards," and recognizing the aspirations of these
peoples to exercise control over their own institutions, ways of life and economic
development."250

CONCLUSION

The struggle of the Filipinos throughout colonial history had been plagued by ethnic
and religious differences. These differences were carried over and magnified by the
Philippine government through the imposition of a national legal order that is mostly
foreign in origin or derivation.251 Largely unpopulist, the present legal system has
resulted in the alienation of a large sector of society, specifically, the indigenous
peoples. The histories and cultures of the indigenes are relevant to the evolution of
Philippine culture and are vital to the understanding of contemporary problems.252 It
is through the IPRA that an attempt was made by our legislators to understand
Filipino society not in terms of myths and biases but through common experiences in
the course of history. The Philippines became a democracy a centennial ago and the
decolonization process still continues. If the evolution of the Filipino people into a
democratic society is to truly proceed democratically, i.e., if the Filipinos as a whole
are to participate fully in the task of continuing democratization,253 it is this Court's
duty to acknowledge the presence of indigenous and customary laws in the country
and affirm their co-existence with the land laws in our national legal system.

With the foregoing disquisitions, I vote to uphold the constitutionality of the

Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997.

ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA, petitioners,

vs.
SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, SECRETARY OF
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT and CHAIRMAN and COMMISSIONERS OF THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, respondents.
HON. JUAN M .FLAVIER, HON. PONCIANO BENNAGEN, BAYANI ASCARRAGA,
EDTAMI MANSAYANGAN, BASILIO WANDAG, EVELYN DUNUAN, YAOM
TUGAS, ALFREMO CARPIANO, LIBERATO A. GABIN, MATERNIDAD M. COLAS,
NARCISA M. DALUPINES, BAI KIRAM-CONNIE SATURNO, BAE MLOMO-
BEATRIZ T. ABASALA, DATU BALITUNGTUNG-ANTONIO D. LUMANDONG,
DATU MANTUMUKAW TEOFISTO SABASALES, DATU EDUAARDO BANDA,
DATU JOEL UNAD, DATU RAMON BAYAAN, TIMUAY JOSE ANOY, TIMUAY
MACARIO D. SALACAO, TIMUAY EDWIN B. ENDING, DATU SAHAMPONG
MALANAW VI, DATU BEN PENDAO CABIGON, BAI NANAPNAY-LIZA SAWAY,
BAY INAY DAYA-MELINDA S. REYMUNDO, BAI TINANGHAGA HELINITA T.
PANGAN, DATU MAKAPUKAW ADOLINO L. SAWAY, DATU MAUDAYAW-
CRISPEN SAWAY, VICKY MAKAY, LOURDES D. AMOS, GILBERT P. HOGGANG,
TERESA GASPAR, MANUEL S. ONALAN, MIA GRACE L. GIRON, ROSEMARIE G.
PE, BENITO CARINO, JOSEPH JUDE CARANTES, LYNETTE CARANTES-VIVAL,
LANGLEY SEGUNDO, SATUR S. BUGNAY, CARLING DOMULOT, ANDRES
MENDIOGRIN, LEOPOLDO ABUGAN, VIRGILIO CAYETANO, CONCHITA G.
DESCAGA, LEVY ESTEVES, ODETTE G. ESTEVEZ, RODOLFO C. AGUILAR,
MAURO VALONES, PEPE H. ATONG, OFELIA T. DAVI, PERFECTO B.
GUINOSAO, WALTER N. TIMOL, MANUEL T. SELEN, OSCAR DALUNHAY, RICO
O. SULATAN, RAFFY MALINDA, ALFREDO ABILLANOS, JESSIE ANDILAB,
MIRLANDO H. MANGKULINTAS, SAMIE SATURNO, ROMEO A. LINDAHAY,
ROEL S. MANSANG-CAGAN, PAQUITO S. LIESES, FILIPE G. SAWAY,
HERMINIA S. SAWAY, JULIUS S. SAWAY, LEONARDA SAWAY, JIMMY UGYUB,
SALVADOR TIONGSON, VENANCIO APANG, MADION MALID, SUKIM MALID,
NENENG MALID, MANGKATADONG AUGUSTO DIANO, JOSEPHINE M.
ALBESO, MORENO MALID, MARIO MANGCAL, FELAY DIAMILING, SALOME P.
SARZA, FELIPE P. BAGON, SAMMY SALNUNGAN, ANTONIO D. EMBA, NORMA
MAPANSAGONOS, ROMEO SALIGA, SR., JERSON P. GERADA, RENATO T.
BAGON, JR., SARING MASALONG, SOLEDAD M. GERARDA, ELIZABETH L.
MENDI, MORANTE S. TIWAN, DANILO M. MALUDAO, MINORS MARICEL
MALID, represented by her father CORNELIO MALID, MARCELINO M. LADRA,
represented by her father MONICO D. LADRA, JENNYLYN MALID,
represented by her father TONY MALID, ARIEL M. EVANGELISTA,
represented by her mother LINAY BALBUENA, EDWARD M. EMUY, SR.,
SUSAN BOLANIO, OND, PULA BATO B'LAAN TRIBAL FARMER'S
ASSOCIATION, INTER-PEOPLE'S EXCHANGE, INC. and GREEN FORUM-
WESTERN VISAYAS, intervenors.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, intervenor.
IKALAHAN INDIGENOUS PEOPLE and HARIBON FOUNDATION FOR THE
CONSERVATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES, INC., intervenor.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and
mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain
provisions of Republic Act No. 8371 (R.A. 8371), otherwise known as the Indigenous
Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and Regulations
(Implementing Rules).

In its resolution of September 29, 1998, the Court required respondents to

comment.1 In compliance, respondents Chairperson and Commissioners of the
National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), the government agency created
under the IPRA to implement its provisions, filed on October 13, 1998 their
Comment to the Petition, in which they defend the constitutionality of the IPRA and
pray that the petition be dismissed for lack of merit.
On October 19, 1998, respondents Secretary of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) and Secretary of the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) filed through the Solicitor General a consolidated Comment. The
Solicitor General is of the view that the IPRA is partly unconstitutional on the ground
that it grants ownership over natural resources to indigenous peoples and prays that
the petition be granted in part.

On November 10, 1998, a group of intervenors, composed of Sen. Juan Flavier, one
of the authors of the IPRA, Mr. Ponciano Bennagen, a member of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, and the leaders and members of 112 groups of
indigenous peoples (Flavier, et. al), filed their Motion for Leave to Intervene. They
join the NCIP in defending the constitutionality of IPRA and praying for the dismissal
of the petition.

On March 22, 1999, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) likewise filed a Motion
to Intervene and/or to Appear as Amicus Curiae. The CHR asserts that IPRA is an
expression of the principle of parens patriae and that the State has the responsibility
to protect and guarantee the rights of those who are at a serious disadvantage like
indigenous peoples. For this reason it prays that the petition be dismissed.

On March 23, 1999, another group, composed of the Ikalahan Indigenous People
and the Haribon Foundation for the Conservation of Natural Resources, Inc.
(Haribon, et al.), filed a motion to Intervene with attached Comment-in-
Intervention. They agree with the NCIP and Flavier, et al. that IPRA is consistent
with the Constitution and pray that the petition for prohibition and mandamus be
dismissed.

The motions for intervention of the aforesaid groups and organizations were
granted.

Oral arguments were heard on April 13, 1999. Thereafter, the parties and
intervenors filed their respective memoranda in which they reiterate the arguments
adduced in their earlier pleadings and during the hearing.

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the IPRA and its
Implementing Rules on the ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of
the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other
natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2,
Article XII of the Constitution:

"(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of ancestral domains, and
Section 3(b) which, in turn, defines ancestral lands;

"(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides that ancestral domains
including inalienable public lands, bodies of water, mineral and other resources
found within ancestral domains are private but community property of the
indigenous peoples;

"(3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines the composition of
ancestral domains and ancestral lands;

"(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples
over the ancestral domains;
(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples
over the ancestral lands;

"(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenous peoples in the
harvesting, extraction, development or exploration of minerals and other natural
resources within the areas claimed to be their ancestral domains, and the right to
enter into agreements with nonindigenous peoples for the development and
utilization of natural resources therein for a period not exceeding 25 years,
renewable for not more than 25 years; and

"(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility to maintain,
develop, protect and conserve the ancestral domains and portions thereof which are
found to be necessary for critical watersheds, mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries,
wilderness, protected areas, forest cover or reforestation."2

Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of

"ancestral domains" and "ancestral lands" which might even include private lands
found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) violate the rights of private
landowners.3

In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the powers and
jurisdiction of the NCIP and making customary law applicable to the settlement of
disputes involving ancestral domains and ancestral lands on the ground that these
provisions violate the due process clause of the Constitution.4

These provisions are:

"(1) sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process of delineation and

recognition of ancestral domains and which vest on the NCIP the sole
authority to delineate ancestral domains and ancestral lands;

"(2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon certification by the NCIP that a
particular area is an ancestral domain and upon notification to the following
officials, namely, the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,
Secretary of Interior and Local Governments, Secretary of Justice and
Commissioner of the National Development Corporation, the jurisdiction of
said officials over said area terminates;

"(3) Section 63 which provides the customary law, traditions and practices of
indigenous peoples shall be applied first with respect to property rights,
claims of ownership, hereditary succession and settlement of land disputes,
and that any doubt or ambiguity in the interpretation thereof shall be
resolved in favor of the indigenous peoples;

"(4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and practices shall be used
to resolve disputes involving indigenous peoples; and

"(5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the jurisdiction over all claims and
disputes involving rights of the indigenous peoples."5

Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP
Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, which provides that "the administrative
relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the President is characterized as a lateral
but autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and program coordination." They
contend that said Rule infringes upon the President’s power of control over executive
departments under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution.6

Petitioners pray for the following:

"(1) A declaration that Sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 52[I], 57, 58, 59, 63, 65 and 66
and other related provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional and invalid;

"(2) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Chairperson and

Commissioners of the NCIP to cease and desist from implementing the
assailed provisions of R.A. 8371 and its Implementing Rules;

"(3) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of the

Department of Environment and Natural Resources to cease and desist from
implementing Department of Environment and Natural Resources Circular No.
2, series of 1998;

"(4) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of Budget

and Management to cease and desist from disbursing public funds for the
implementation of the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371; and

"(5) The issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the Secretary of

Environment and Natural Resources to comply with his duty of carrying out
the State’s constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration,
development, utilization and conservation of Philippine natural resources."7

After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court voted as follows:

Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed an opinion, which the
Chief Justice and Justices Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and Santiago join, sustaining the
validity of the challenged provisions of R.A. 8371. Justice Puno also filed a separate
opinion sustaining all challenged provisions of the law with the exception of Section
1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the IPRA, and Section 57 of the IPRA which he contends
should be interpreted as dealing with the large-scale exploitation of natural
resources and should be read in conjunction with Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution. On the other hand, Justice Mendoza voted to dismiss the petition solely
on the ground that it does not raise a justiciable controversy and petitioners do not
have standing to question the constitutionality of R.A. 8371.

Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition. Justice
Panganiban filed a separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6,
7 (a)(b), 8, and related provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. He reserves
judgment on the constitutionality of Sections 58, 59, 65, and 66 of the law, which he
believes must await the filing of specific cases by those whose rights may have been
violated by the IPRA. Justice Vitug also filed a separate opinion expressing the view
that Sections 3(a), 7, and 57 of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. Justices Melo, Pardo,
Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon join in the separate opinions of Justices
Panganiban and Vitug.

As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not
obtained, the case was redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the voting
remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.

Attached hereto and made integral parts thereof are the separate opinions of
Justices Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, and Panganiban.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs. GREGORIO AGUNOY, SR., Et al., SPOUSES
EDUARDO and ARCELITA MARQUEZ and RURAL BANK
OF GAPAN, NUEVA ECIJA, respondents.

DECISION
GARCIA, J.:

Interplaying in this case are two (2) counter-balancing doctrines

in the law of land titles: one, the doctrine of fraus et jus
nunquam cohabitant, which basically means that no one may
enjoy the fruits of fraud,[1] and the other, the doctrine that a
fraudulent title may be the root of valid title in the name of an
innocent buyer for value and in good faith.[2]
Invoking the first, petitioner Republic of the Philippines in this
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
seeks to nullify and set aside the decision dated September 26,
2002[3] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 55732, which
reversed an earlier decision of the Regional Trial Court at
Cabanatuan City, Branch 25, in its Civil Case No. 831-AF, an action
for cancellation of free patent, original certificate of title and
derivative transfer certificates of title, thereat filed by the
petitioner against, among others, the herein respondents.
The facts are well laid out in the decision under review:

On May 26, 1958, Gregorio Agunoy, Sr. filed his application for
Free Patent No. 5-1414 covering two parcels of land identified
as Lot Nos. 1341 and 1342, Cad 269, Sta. Rosa Cadastre, Nueva
Ecija, containing an aggregate area of 18.6486 hectares with the
Bureau of Lands. On January 18, 1967, he was issued Free Patent
No. 314450 by the Director of Lands.

On February 6, 1967, the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija

registered Free Patent No. 314450 and issued the
corresponding Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-4522 in the
name of Gregorio Agunoy, Sr.
On March 10, 1967, the heirs of Eusebio Perez, represented by
Francisca Perez, caused the annotation on the said OCT of an
adverse claim in their favor over a portion of 15.1593 hectares of
the property.

On July 30, 1975, the said heirs of Eusebio Perez filed a formal
protest docketed as B.L. Claim No. 760 (n) with the Bureau of
Lands alleging that Lot 1341 of the Sta. Rosa Cadastre, Nueva
Ecija, covered by Original Certificate of Title No-P4522 is identical
to Lots 1 and 2 of Plan Psu-47200 which had been adjudicated as
private property of said protestant pursuant to a decision
promulgated on October 24, 1960 by the Court of First Instance
of Nueva Ecija in Land Registration Case No. 430, LRC Records
No. 14876.

On May 3, 1976, the chief of the Legal Division, Bureau of Lands,

conducted a formal investigation and ocular inspection of the
premises and it was ascertained that Free Patent No. 314450 and
its corresponding OCT No. P-4522 were improperly and
fraudulently issued (Records, p.78)

On July 31, 1979, upon the death of the wife of Gregorio Agunoy,
Sr., the heirs, namely Gregorio Sr., Tomas, Lilian, Angelito and
Gregorio, Jr., executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition with Sale
in favor of Joaquin Sangabol for and in consideration of the sum
of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00).

The Original Certificate of Title No. P-4522 was cancelled by the

Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija and Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 166270 was issued in favor of the aforenamed heirs.
Said TCT No. 166270 was again cancelled by reason of the
concurrent sale to Joaquin Sangabol in whose favor TCT No. NT-
166271 was issued.

On August 1, 1979, Joaquin Sangabol sold an undivided portion

of three (3) hectares of the property described as Lot 1341 in TCT
No. NT-166271 to Fortunato Para for and in consideration of the
sum of Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (3,500.00)

The following day, he sold the property described as Lot 1342 in

TCT No. NT-166271 to Virginia P. Jimenez for and in
consideration of the sum of One Thousand Five Hundred Pesos
(P1,500.00) in whose favor TCT No. N-166287 was issued.
On May 12, 1980, the adverse claim of Francisca Perez, et al.
annotated at the back of the OCT was cancelled by the Register
of Deeds of Nueva Ecija (Exhibit G).

On January 16, 1981, Joaquin Sangabol subdivided the property

described as Lot 1341 in TCT No. NT-166271 into three lots
designated as Lot Nos. 1341-A, 1341-B, and 1341-C of plan Psd-
299875 duly approved by the Land Registration Commission.

TCT No. NT-166271 was cancelled and TCT No. NT-168972

covering Lot No. 1341-A was issued to spouses Fortunato Para
and Araceli Sena. TCT Nos. NT-168973 and NT-168974 covering
Lot Nos. 1341-B and 1341-C were issued in favor of Joaquin
Sangabol.

On June 15, 1982, Virginia P. Jimenez sold the property covered

by TCT No. NT-166287 in favor of spouses Blandino and Josefina
A. Salva Cruz for Eleven Thousand Five Hundred Pesos
(P11,500.00) where TCT No. 174634 was issued in favor of said
spouses. On June 17, 1982, Josefina A. Salva Cruz effected the
subdivision of the property into thirteen (13) lots designated as
Lot Nos. 1342-A t0 1342-M as per subdivision plan Psd-03-
004756 thereby canceling TCT No. NT-174634 and TCT Nos. NT-
174635 to 174647 were issued in lieu thereof.

On November 2, 1982, Fortunato Para, through his attorney-in-

fact Gloria Bergonia, mortgaged the property covered by TCT No.
NT-168972 in favor of the Perpetual Finance and Investment, Inc.
in the amount of One Hundred Twenty Five Thousand Pesos
(P125,000.00). The mortgage was foreclosed and the property
was sold at public auction. Thereafter, the corresponding
certificate of sale was executed in favor of Perpetual Finance and
Credit, Inc.

On March 3, 1983, the properties covered by TCT Nos. NT-

174643 and NT- 174644 were mortgaged with the Rural Bank of
Gapan for Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00). On February 25,
1985, the mortgage was likewise foreclosed and the properties
were sold at public auction in favor of the said bank.

On December 16, 1986, Joaquin Sangabol sold the property

covered by TCT No. NT-168974 to Eduardo R. Dee for and in
consideration of the sum of One Hundred Twenty [Thousand]
Pesos (P120,000.00). Subsequently, TCT No. NT-168974 was
cancelled and TCT No. 196579 was issued in the name of Eduardo
R. Dee.

On January 5, 1988, the heirs of Ruperto Perez (oldest son of

Eusebio), now represented by Sabina P. Hernandez, filed a
supplemental protest alleging that:

a) Lot Nos. 1341 and 1342, Cad 269 of the Sta. Rosa
Cadatre have been exclusively occupied and cultivated
by them and their immediate predecessors-in-interest
who have introduced permanent improvements
thereon consisting of irrigated ricelands, mango trees,
bamboo groves and other crops;

b) Gregorio Agunoy, Sr. never occupied and cultivated said

parcels of land in the manner and for the period
required by law;

c) Said parcels of land are identical to Lots 1, 3 and a

portion of 87,674 square meters of Lot 4 of the
amended plan-47200 Amd. as shown by the relocation
survey conducted by Geodetic Engineer Deogracias L.
Javier on July 29, 1977;

d) The patent and title issued to Gregorio Agunoy, Sr. were

obtained through fraud and misrepresentation.
(Records pp. 9-10)

The Bureau of Lands conducted anew an investigation and ocular

inspection of Lot 1342, Cad. 269 of Sta. Rosa Cadastre, Nueva
Ecija, and came out with the following findings, to wit:

a) Lot 1342, Cad. 269 of Sta Rosa Cadastre, Nueva Ecija is

located at Barangay Imbunia (formerly Marawa),
Municipality of Jaen, Nueva Ecija;

b) Said lot was originally registered in the Office of the

Register of Deeds of Cabanatuan City on May 23, 1914
under OCT No. 125 issued in the name of Valeriano
Espiritu, pursuant to Decree No. 15733 issued on May
20, 1914 in Land Registration Case No. 9552;
 c) On May 13, 1952, said property was conveyed in favor
of Isaias Carlos under TCT No. 11554 and the latter
conveyed the same in favor of the spouses Santiago
Mateo and Leogarda Juliano;

d) TCT No. 11554 was cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT

No. 17471 was issued in the name of Santiago Mateo.
(Records, pp. 13;78)

On May 10, 1988, the Chief of the Legal Division recommended to

the Director of Lands that court action be instituted for the
cancellation of Free Patent No. 314450 and its corresponding
Original Certificate of Title No. P-4522 in the name Gregorio
Agunoy, Sr., as well as other subsequent transfer certificates of
title issued therefrom based on the foregoing findings
(Underscoring supplied).

It was against the foregoing backdrop of events when, on May

24, 1990, in the Regional Trial Court at Gapan, Nueva Ecija
petitioner Republic of the Philippines, thru the Office of the Solicitor
General, filed the complaint[4] in this case against several
defendants, among whom are the herein respondents Gregorio
Agunoy, Sr., his children, the spouses Eduardo Dee and Arcelita
Marquez-Dee and the Rural Bank of Gapan, Nueva Ecija. In its
complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 831-AF, petitioner Republic
alleged, inter alia, as follows:

30. Free Patent No. 314450 and its corresponding Original

Certificate of Title No. P-4522 were procured by defendant
Gregorio Agunoy, Sr., through fraud, deceit and
misrepresentation since the property in question (Lots 1341 and
1342) at the time the patent and the title were issued was
already adjudicated as private property of the heirs of Eusebio
Perez and Valeriano Espiritu, respectively. Consequently, the then
Bureau of Lands, now Lands Management Bureau, no longer had
any jurisdiction and control over the same. xxx xxx.

31. The fraudulent acts and misrepresentation of defendant

Gregorio Agunoy, Sr. had misled the then Bureau of Lands in
issuing said patent. Since the property in question was no longer
a disposable public land, Free Patent No. 314450 and its
corresponding Original Certificate of Title No. P-4522 issued to
defendant Gregorio Agunoy, Sr. are null and void and should be
cancelled. Moreover, Gregorio Agunoy, Sr. has not occupied and
cultivated the land in the manner and for the length of time
required by law (C.A. 141 as amended; see also RA 782)
(Emphasis supplied),

and accordingly prayed for a judgment -

1. Declaring Free Patent No. 314450 and the

corresponding Original Certificate of Title No. P-4522 in the name
of Gregorio Agunoy, as well as all other subsequent transfer
certificates of title emanating therefrom, i.e., Transfer Certificates
of Title Nos. NT-168972, NT-168973, NT-196579, NT-174635 to
NT-174647 (inclusive), including all liens and encumbrances
annotated thereon, null and void;

2. Ordering defendants to surrender their owners duplicate copies

of all subsequent transfer certificates of title emanating from
Original Certificate of Title No. P-4522 to the Register of Deeds of
Nueva Ecija;

3. Directing the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija to cancel the

aforesaid certificates of title;

4. Ordering defendants and all those claiming under them to

desist from exercising or representing acts of ownership and/or
possession in the premises (Underscoring supplied).

xxx xxx xxx

Eventually, in a decision dated September 9, 1996,[5] the trial

court rendered judgment for the Republic, thus:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of

the plaintiff and against the defendants as follows:

1. Declaring as null and void Free Patent No. 314450 and

the corresponding Original Certificate of Title No. P-
4522 in the name of Gregorio Agunoy, as well as all
other subsequent transfer certificates of titles
emanating therefrom (TCT Nos. NT-166270, NT-
166271, NT- 168972, NT-168973, NT-168974, NT-
166287 and NT-174634 to NT-174647, inclusive, of the
 Registry of Deeds of Nueva Ecija) including all liens
and encumbrances annotated thereon;

2. Ordering defendants to surrender their owner's duplicate

copies of all the said subsequent transfer certificates of
titles emanating from Original Certificate of Title No. P-
4522 to the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija, and
ordering the Register of Deeds to cancel the aforesaid
certificates of titles;

3. Ordering reversion of the pieces of land embraced in

Free Patent No. 314450 and OCT No. P-4522 of the
Registry of Deeds of Nueva Ecija, to the mass of public
domain except the pieces of land which were already
the subject of land registration proceedings;

4. Ordering that henceforth the defendants and all those

claiming under them to desist from disturbing the
ownership of the government over the said pieces of
land, and

5. To pay costs of suits.

For lack of evidence, the third-party complaint filed by the Rural

Bank of Gapan, Inc. against defendants-Spouses Blandino Salva
Cruz and Josefina Salva Cruz is hereby dismissed without
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED (Underscoring supplied).

Therefrom, the spouses Eduardo Dee and Arcelita Marquez-Dee

and the Rural Bank of Gapan, Nueva Ecija went to the Court of
Appeals, whereat their recourse was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
55732.
As earlier stated herein, the appellate court, in a decision dated
September 26, 2002,[6] reversed and set aside the appealed
decision of the trial court, to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED and

the decision of the trial court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A
new judgment is hereby rendered to read as follows:
1. Defendant Gregorio Agunoy, Sr. is declared to have validly and
properly acquired Free Patent No. 314450 and the corresponding
Original Certificate of Title No. P-4522 over Lot Nos. 1341 and
1342, Cad 269, Sta. Rosa Cadastre, Nueva Ecija; and

2. The title over the portion of Lot No. 1342, now covered by TCT
No. 196579 in the name of defendants-appellants Spouses Dee is
likewise declared valid for having acquired in good faith and for
value.

SO ORDERED.

Hence, this recourse by the petitioner, submitting for our

resolution the following issues[7]:
I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN

DECLARING THAT PETITIONER IS NOT THE REAL PARTY-IN-
INTEREST IN THIS CASE AND THAT GREGORIO AGUNOY, SR.
HAD VALIDLY ACQUIRED FREE PATENT NO. 314450 AND
ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. P-4522 OVER LOT NOS.
1341 AND 1342, CAD. 269, STA. ROSA CADASTRE, NUEVA ECIJA.

II.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN

DECLARING THAT THE TITLE OVER THE PORTION OF LOT NO.
1342, NOW COVERED BY TCT NO. 196579 IN THE NAMES OF
RESPONDENTS SPOUSES EDUARDO DEE AND ARCELITA
MARQUEZ IS VALID FOR HAVING BEEN ACQUIRED IN GOOD
FAITH AND FOR VALUE.

We DENY.
To begin with, we agree with the Court of Appeals that
petitioner Republic is not the real party-in-interest in this case.
Basic it is in the law of procedure that every action must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest,
meaning the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the
suit,[8] a procedural rule reechoed in a long line of cases decided
by this Court. For sure, not too long ago, in Shipside, Inc. vs. Court
of Appeals,[9] citing earlier cases, we wrote:
xxx. Consequently, the Republic is not a real party in interest and
it may not institute the instant action. Nor may it raise the
defense of imprescriptibility, the same being applicable only in
cases where the government is a party in interest. Under Section
2 of Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, "every action
must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in
interest." To qualify a person to be a real party in interest in
whose name an action must be prosecuted, he must appear to be
the present real owner of the right sought to enforced (Pioneer
Insurance v. CA, 175 SCRA 668 [1989]). A real party in interest
is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the
suit. And by real interest is meant a present substantial interest,
as distinguished from a mere expectancy, or a future, contingent,
subordinate or consequential interest.

The very complaint in this case, supra, filed by petitioner

Republic before the trial court unmistakably alleges that at the time
Free Patent No. 31445 and its corresponding Original Certificate of
Title No. P-45222 were issued to Gregorio Agunoy, Sr., the
property in question (Lots 1341 and 1342) xxx was already
adjudicated as private property of the heirs of Eusebio Perez and
Valeriano Espiritu, and that at that time, the property in
question was no longer a disposable public land. In fact, in
paragraph 27(f) of the same complaint, petitioner further alleged:

f) Furthermore, it was found that prior to the issuance of Free

Patent No. 314450 on January 18, 1967, Lot 1341 of Sta. Rosa
Cadastre, Nueva Ecija, which was one of the two (2) parcels of
land applied for by Gregorio Agunoy, Sr., was already the subject
of an application for registration filed by the heirs of Eusebio
Perez in 1958 before the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija,
docketed as LRC Case No. 430, LRC Record No. 14876, and
wherein a Decision was promulgated on October 24, 1960
adjudicating Lots 1 and 2 of Plan Psu-47200 as private
properties of said heirs-claimants. The aforesaid Decision was
already final and executory at the time the patent was issued to
defendant Gregorio Agunoy, Sr. (Except for the underscoring on
as private properties, the rest are of the petitioner itself).

With the very admissions by the petitioner itself in its basic

pleading that Lots No. 1341 and 1342 are already private
properties of the heirs of Eusebio Perez and Valeriano Espiritu,
and are, therefore, no longer disposable public land over which
the then Bureau of Lands, now Lands Management Bureau, no
longer had any jurisdiction and control, we are simply at a loss
to understand how petitioner Republic can still profess to be the
real party-in-interest in this case, and insists that the disputed
properties are still part of the public domain. If ever, the real party-
in-interest could be none other than the heirs of Eusebio Perez and
Valeriano Espiritu, but certainly not the petitioner.
Then, too, it is striking to note that even as the complaint is
basically one for reversion of private property to the mass of public
domain, petitioner did not implead either the heirs of Eusebio Perez
or that of Valeriano Espiritu. Without doubt, if our decision hereon
were to be in favor of petitioner, the real beneficiary thereof is not
the State. And because, as no less admitted by the petitioner, the
lands subject of this case are no longer part of the public domain,
the nullification of Agunoys Free Patent P-314450 and OCT No. P-
4522 would not result in the reversion of the lands subject thereof
to the mass of public land. And the government, not being the real
party-in-interest, is without personality to institute reversion
proceedings. So it is that in an earlier case,[10] we had an occasion
to say:

There is no merit in petitioners' contention that only the State

may bring an action for reconveyance of the lots in dispute. To
reiterate, Lot 2344 is a private property in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession of the Santiago family. The
nullification of its free patent and title would not therefore result
in its reversion to the public domain. Hence, the State,
represented by the Solicitor General, is not the real party in
interest.

We could have, at this point, already written finis to this

decision. Nonetheless, for the peace of mind of those concerned,
we have opted to address the second issue raised in the petition:
whether the appellate court erred in declaring as valid for having
been acquired for value and in good faith the title over the portion
of Lot No. 1342, covered by TCT No. 196579 in the name of the
respondent spouses Eduardo Dee and Arcelita Marquez-Dee.
After sleeping for an unreasonably long period of time lasting
for decades, the heirs of Eusebio Perez can longer defeat the better
right arising from the Torrens titles in the names of the present
transferees of the properties, unless and until anyone succeeds in
overcoming the presumption of good faith in securing their
respective titles.
For one, even granting as true the petitioners allegation of a
prior cadastral case - LRC Case No. 430, LRC Rec. No. 148 -
involving a portion of the lots subject of Agunoys Free Patent,
wherein a decision was allegedly promulgated on October 24,
1960 in favor of the heirs of Eusebio Perez, which decision,
according to petitioner, was already final and executory, we are
greatly bothered by the fact that none of the heirs of Eusebio Perez
could show having exerted due diligence towards at least
attempting to accomplish the registration of the properties involved
in the said cadastral case, which properties, according to petitioner
and the Perezes, are identical to Lot Nos. 1341 and 1342. Verily,
were we to believe the allegations of the heirs of Eusebio Perez in
their own protest with the Bureau of Lands dated July 30,
1975,[11] there is an express order for registration in LRC Case No.
430, as follows:

WHEREFORE, decision is hereby rendered affirming the order of

general default heretofore entered and ordering the registration
of Lots Nos. 1 and 2 of Plan Psu-47200, situated in the Barrio of
Marawa, Municipality of Jaen, Nueva Ecija, containing a total area
of 21.9284 hectares in the following manner:

xxx xxx xxx

From as early as October 24, 1960, when the aforequoted

decision in LRC Case No. 430 was promulgated, to as late as
February 6, 1967, when OCT No. P-4522 of Gregorio Agunoy, Sr.
was issued, or a slumber lasting for more than six (6) years, the
heirs of Eusebio Perez had numerous opportunities to cause the
implementation of the said registration order. Inexplicably, they let
this chance passed by. Vigilantibus, sed non dormientibus, jura
subveniunt, the law aids the vigilant, not those who sleep on their
rights.[12] And speaking of rights, one may not sleep on a right while
expecting to preserve it in its pristine purity.[13]
For another, Jose Mendigoria, Public Lands Inspector and
Investigator of the Bureau of Lands, made the following remarks
in his certification dated February 28, 1966:[14]
10. Remarks: Attached hereto is the certification of the
Clerk of Court and the Register of Deeds, Cabanatuan City
for ready references in connection with the speedy
issuance of patent in favor of the applicant.

It is informed in this connection that the survey claimants

of these Lots, 1341 for Eusebio Perez and 1342 for
Valenciano Espiritu could not be located in the locality. The
lots were already abandoned by them so that in the year
1941, the present applicant took possession of the land
thru his tenants.

Countering the foregoing certification, petitioner Republic

claims that a more recent verification survey conducted
on February 15, 1988 by Geodetic Engineer Melencio Mangahas,
also of the Bureau of Lands, reveals an anomaly in the issuance of
Agunoy, Sr.s Free Patent No. 314450. Again, we quote from
petitioners complaint, particularly paragraph 27 (c) thereof, to wit:

c) The results of the verification survey conducted by Geodetic

Engineer Melencio Mangahas of the Bureau of Lands on February
15, 1988 on the premises confirmed the earlier findings of said
Office that Lot 1341 Cad. 269 of Sta. Rosa Cadastre, Nueva Ecija,
covered by Free Patent No. 314450 and OCT No. P-4522 in the
name of Gregorio Agunoy, Sr., is identical to Lots 1, 3 and a
portion of 87,674 square meters of Lot 4 of the amended Plan
Psu-47200 which was surveyed and approved on January 21,
1966 in the name of Eusebio Perez. It was verified likewise that
Lot 1341 is within Barrio Marawa, Jaen, Nueva Ecija.

As between the February 28, 1966 certification of Jose

Mendigoria, supra, which led to the issuance of Agunoys OCT No.
P-4522 and numerous derivative titles descending therefrom, and
the February 15, 1988 verification survey of Geodetic Engineer
Melencio Mangahas, cited in the aforequoted paragraph of
petitioners complaint, which led to nothing, suffice it to quote
herein what this Court has said in PEZA vs. Fernandez:[15]

xxx. Indeed, the inevitable consequences of the Torrens system

of land registration must be upheld in order to give stability to it
and provide finality to land disputes,

and in Heirs of Brusas vs. Court of Appeals:[16]

The real purpose of the Torrens System of land registration is to
quiet title to land and stop forever any question as to its legality.
Once a title is registered the owner may rest secure without the
necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting on
the mirador de su casa, to avoid the possibility of losing his land.
Indeed, titles over lands under the Torrens system should be
given stability for on it greatly depends the stability of the
country's economy. Interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium.

If at all, the discrepancy in the two (2) separate survey reports

of Mendigoria and Mangahas can only be imputable to either the
past or more recent officials of the Bureau of Lands.
Of course, we are well aware of the rule reiterated in Republic
vs. Court of Appeals and Santos,[17] that, generally, the State
cannot be put in estoppel by the mistakes or errors of its officials
or agents. In that very case, however, citing 31 CJS 675-676, we
went further by saying -

xxx. Nevertheless, the government must not be allowed to deal

dishonorably or capriciously with its citizens, and must not play
an ignoble part or do a shabby thing; and subject to limitations
xxx, the doctrine of equitable estoppel may be invoked against
public authorities as well as against private individuals

In any event, the verification survey conducted by Geodetic

Engineer Melencio Mangahas on February 15, 1988 came almost
twenty-two (22) years after the February 28, 1966 certification of
Jose Mendigoria; more than twenty-one (21) years after the
issuance of Agunoy Sr.s Free Patent No. 314450 on January 18,
1967 and its registration as Original Certificate of Title No. P-4522
on February 6, 1967; and more than eight (8) years reckoned from
July 31, 1979 when, upon the death of the wife of Gregorio Agunoy,
Sr., the heirs executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition with Sale
in favor of Joaquin Sangabol. In the meanwhile, for about half a
decade thereafter, ownership over the properties transferred from
one buyer to another, with each and every transferee enjoying the
presumption of good faith. If only on this score alone that the
present petition must fall.
There can be no debate at all on petitioners submission that no
amount of legal technicality may serve as a solid foundation for the
enjoyment of the fruits of fraud. It is thus understandable why
petitioner chants the dogma of fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant.
 Significantly, however, in the cases cited by petitioner
Republic,[18] as well as in those other cases[19] where the doctrine
of fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant was applied against a patent
and title procured thru fraud or misrepresentation, we note that
the land covered thereby is either a part of the forest zone which
is definitely non-disposable, as in Animas, or that said patent and
title are still in the name of the person who committed the fraud or
misrepresentation, as in Acot, Animas, Republic vs. CA and Del
Mundo and Director of Lands vs. Abanilla, et al. and, in either
instance, there were yet no innocent third parties standing in the
way.
Here, it bears stressing that, by petitioners own judicial
admission, the lots in dispute are no longer part of the public
domain, and there are numerous third, fourth, fifth and more
parties holding Torrens titles in their favor and enjoying the
presumption of good faith. This brings to mind what we have
reechoed in Pino vs. Court of Appeals[20] and the cases[21]therein
cited:

[E]ven on the supposition that the sale was void, the general rule
that the direct result of a previous illegal contract cannot be valid
(on the theory that the spring cannot rise higher than its source)
cannot apply here for We are confronted with the functionings of
the Torrens System of Registration. The doctrine to follow is
simple enough: a fraudulent or forged document of sale may
become the ROOT of a valid title if the certificate of title has
already been transferred from the name of the true owner to the
name of the forger or the name indicated by the forger.

It is even worse in this case because here, there is no forger to

speak of. The remark of Land Inspector Jose Mendigoria about the
abandonment by Eusebio Perez and Valenciano Espiritu cannot, by
itself, be fraudulent. And, for all we know, that remark may even
turn out to be the truth. What petitioner perceives as fraud may be
nothing more than the differences of professional opinions between
Land Inspector Jose Mendigoria and Geodetic Engineer Melencio
Mangahas. But regardless of who between the two is correct, the
hard reality is that the properties in question are no longer floating
objects on a spring that cannot rise higher than its source, as they
are now very much ashore and firmly standing on the high solid
ground of the Torrens system of land registration.
 WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby AFFIRMED and this petition DENIED.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
CELESTINA NAGUIAT, Respondent.

DECISION

GARCIA, J.:

Before the Court is this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking the reversal of the Decision1dated May 29, 1998 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 37001 which affirmed an earlier decision2 of the Regional
Trial Court at Iba, Zambales, Branch 69 in Land Registration Case No. N-25-1.

The decision under review recites the factual backdrop, as follows:

This is an application for registration of title to four (4) parcels of land located in
Panan, Botolan, Zambales, more particularly described in the amended application
filed by Celestina Naguiat on 29 December 1989 with the Regional Trial Court of
Zambales, Branch 69. Applicant [herein respondent] alleges, inter alia, that she is
the owner of the said parcels of land having acquired them by purchase from the LID
Corporation which likewise acquired the same from Demetria Calderon, Josefina
Moraga and Fausto Monje and their predecessors-in-interest who have been in
possession thereof for more than thirty (30) years; and that to the best of her
knowledge, said lots suffer no mortgage or encumbrance of whatever kind nor is
there any person having any interest, legal or equitable, or in possession thereof.

On 29 June 1990, the Republic of the Philippines [herein petitioner]. . . filed an

opposition to the application on the ground that neither the applicant nor her
predecessors-in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the lands in question since 12 June 1945 or prior
thereto; that the muniments of title and tax payment receipts of applicant do not
constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona-fide acquisition of the lands
applied for or of his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation thereof in the concept of (an) owner; that the applicant’s claim of
ownership in fee simple on the basis of Spanish title or grant can no longer be
availed of . . .; and that the parcels of land applied for are part of the public domain
belonging to the Republic of the Philippines not subject to private appropriation.

On 15 October 1990, the lower court issued an order of general default as against
the whole world, with the exception of the Office of the Solicitor General, and
proceeded with the hearing of this registration case.

After she had presented and formally offered her evidence . . . applicant rested her
case. The Solicitor General, thru the Provincial Prosecutor, interposed no objection
to the admission of the exhibits. Later . . . the Provincial Prosecutor manifest (sic)
that the Government had no evidence to adduce. 3
In a decision4 dated September 30, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment for
herein respondent Celestina Naguiat, adjudicating unto her the parcels of land in
question and decreeing the registration thereof in her name, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court hereby adjudicates the parcels of land
situated in Panan, Botolan, Zambales, appearing on Plan AP-03-003447 containing
an area of 3,131 square meters, appearing on Plan AP-03-003446 containing an
area of 15,322 containing an area of 15,387 square meters to herein applicant
Celestina T. Naguiat, of legal age, Filipino citizen, married to Rommel Naguiat and a
resident of Angeles City, Pampanga together with all the improvements existing
thereon and orders and decrees registration in her name in accordance with Act No.
496, Commonwealth Act No. 14, [should be 141] as amended, and Presidential
Decree No. 1529. This adjudication, however, is subject to the various
easements/reservations provided for under pertinent laws, presidential decrees
and/or presidential letters of instructions which should be annotated/ projected on
the title to be issued. And once this decision becomes final, let the corresponding
decree of registration be immediately issued. (Words in bracket added)

With its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the trial court, petitioner
Republic went on appeal to the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 37001.

As stated at the outset hereof, the CA, in the herein assailed decision of May 29,
1998, affirmed that of the trial court, to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Hence, the Republic’s present recourse on its basic submission that the CA’s decision
"is not in accordance with law, jurisprudence and the evidence, since respondent has
not established with the required evidence her title in fee simple or imperfect title
in respect of the subject lots which would warrant their registration under … (P.D.
1529 or Public Land Act (C.A.) 141." In particular, petitioner Republic faults the
appellate court on its finding respecting the length of respondent’s occupation of the
property subject of her application for registration and for not considering the fact
that she has not established that the lands in question have been declassified from
forest or timber zone to alienable and disposable property.

Public forest lands or forest reserves, unless declassified and released by positive act
of the Government so that they may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of
the public domain, are not capable of private appropriation.5 As to these assets, the
rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.6 Given this postulate, the
principal issue to be addressed turns on the question of whether or not the areas in
question have ceased to have the status of forest or other inalienable lands of the
public domain.

Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act7 and the Constitution8 classifying
lands of the public domain into "agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands and
national parks," do not necessarily refer to a large tract of wooded land or an
expanse covered by dense growth of trees and underbrush. As we stated in Heirs of
Amunategui 9-
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such
classification simply because loggers or settlers have stripped it of its forest cover.
Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or
planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have
to be on mountains or in out of the way places. xxx. The classification is merely
descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what
the land actually looks like. xxx

Under Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution,10 which embodies the Regalian
doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State – the source of any
asserted right to ownership of land.11 All lands not appearing to be clearly of private
dominion presumptively belong to the State.12 Accordingly, public lands not shown to
have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land or alienated to a
private person by the State remain part of the inalienable public domain.13 Under
Section 6 of the Public Land Act, the prerogative of classifying or reclassifying lands
of the public domain, i.e., from forest or mineral to agricultural and vice versa,
belongs to the Executive Branch of the government and not the court.14 Needless to
stress, the onus to overturn, by incontrovertible evidence, the presumption that the
land subject of an application for registration is alienable or disposable rests with the
applicant.15

In the present case, the CA assumed that the lands in question are already alienable
and disposable. Wrote the appellate court:

The theory of [petitioner] that the properties in question are lands of the public
domain cannot be sustained as it is directly against the above doctrine. Said doctrine
is a reaffirmation of the principle established in the earlier cases . . . that open,
exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for period prescribed by
law creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite
period, ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be
public land and becomes private property …. (Word in bracket and underscoring
added.)

The principal reason for the appellate court’s disposition, finding a registerable title
for respondent, is her and her predecessor-in-interest’s open, continuous and
exclusive occupation of the subject property for more than 30 years. Prescinding
from its above assumption and finding, the appellate court went on to conclude,
citing Director of Lands vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC)16 and Herico vs.
DAR,17 among other cases, that, upon the completion of the requisite period of
possession, the lands in question cease to be public land and become private
property.

Director of Lands, Herico and the other cases cited by the CA are not, however,
winning cards for the respondent, for the simple reason that, in said cases, the
disposable and alienable nature of the land sought to be registered was established,
or, at least, not put in issue. And there lies the difference.

Here, respondent never presented the required certification from the proper
government agency or official proclamation reclassifying the land applied for as
alienable and disposable. Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be
assumed. It calls for proof.18 Aside from tax receipts, respondent submitted in
evidence the survey map and technical descriptions of the lands, which, needless to
state, provided no information respecting the classification of the property. As the
Court has held, however, these documents are not sufficient to overcome the
presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain.19

It cannot be overemphasized that unwarranted appropriation of public lands has

been a notorious practice resorted to in land registration cases.20 For this reason, the
Court has made it a point to stress, when appropriate, that declassification of forest
and mineral lands, as the case may be, and their conversion into alienable and
disposable lands need an express and positive act from the government.21

The foregoing considered, the issue of whether or not respondent and her
predecessor-in-interest have been in open, exclusive and continuous possession of
the parcels of land in question is now of little moment. For, unclassified land, as
here, cannot be acquired by adverse occupation or possession; occupation thereof in
the concept of owner, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership and be
registered as title.22

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED and the assailed decision dated May
29, 1998 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 37001 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Accordingly, respondent’s application for original registration of title in Land
Registration Case No. N-25-1 of the Regional Trial Court at Iba, Zambales, Branch
69, is DENIED.

LETICIA P. LIGON, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE CELIA LIPANA-REYES, Presiding Judge, Branch
81, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Iglesia ni Kristo and the Register of
Deeds of Quezon City, respondent.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed
the order of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Br. 82, granting the motion of
respondent of Iglesia ni Kristo to direct petitioner to surrender the owner's duplicate
of the certificates of title in her possession.

On 19 October 1990 respondent Iglesia ni Kristo (INK) filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City a complaint 1 for specific performance with damages against
the Islamic Directorate of the Philippines (IDP) docketed as Civil Case No. Q90-
6937. Respondent INK alleged in its complaint that by virtue of an Absolute Deed of
Sale dated 20 April 1989 IDP sold to it two (2) parcels of land located at Tandang
Sora, Barrio Culiat, Quezon City, both of which IDP is the registered owner. The
parties stipulated in the deed of sale that the IDP shall undertake to evict all
squatters and illegal occupants in the property within forty-five (45) days from the
execution of the contract.

IDP failed to fulfill this obligation. Hence INK prayed that the trial court order IDP to
comply with its obligation of clearing the subject lots of illegal occupants and to pay
damages to INK.
IDP alleged in its answer that it was INK which violated the contract by delaying the
payment of the purchase price and prayed that the contract of sale be rescinded and
revoked.

On 15 June 1991 INK filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the ground
that there was actually no genuine issue as to any material fact.

On 12 September 1991 the trial court rendered partial judgment, and on 7 October
1991 an amended partial judgment granting the reliefs prayed for by INK except the
prayer for damages which was to be resolved later.

On 22 January 1992 INK filed a motion in the same case praying that petitioner
Leticia Ligon, who was in possession of the certificates of title over the properties as
mortgagee of IDP, be directed to surrender the certificates to the Register of Deeds
of Quezon City for the registration of the Absolute Deed of Sale in its name. INK
alleged that the document could not be registered because of the refusal and/or
failure of petitioner to deliver the certificates of title despite repeated requests.

On 31 January 1992 petitioner Ligon filed an opposition to the motion on the ground
that the IDP was not served copy of the motion, and the ownership of the INK over
the property was still in issue since rescission was sought by the IDP as a
counterclaim. She prayed that the motion be denied, but should it be granted, the
Register of Deeds be directed after registration to deliver the owner's duplicate
copies of the new certificates of title to her.

On 15 February 1992 petitioner filed a Supplemental Opposition questioning the

jurisdiction of the trial court because the motion involved the registrability of the
document of sale, and she was not made a party to the main case.

On 2 March 1992 the trial court granted the motion of INK and ordered petitioner to
surrender to INK the owner's copy of RT-26521 (170567) and RT-26520 (176616) in
open court for the registration of the Absolute Deed of Sale in the latter's name and
the annotation of the mortgage executed in favor of petitioner on the new transfer
certificates of title to be issued to INK.2

On 6 April 1992, on motion of petitioner Ligon, the trial court reconsidered its order
by directing her to deliver the certificates of title to the Register of Deeds of Quezon
City. 3

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals seeking the
annulment of the two (2) orders. However, on 28 October 1992 the Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition and affirmed the orders of the trial court.

Petitioner now comes to us alleging that the trial court erred: (a) in ruling that it had
jurisdiction over petitioner; (b) in upholding the orders of the trial court even as
they violated the rule prohibiting splitting of a single cause of action and forum-
shopping; (c) in holding that INK is the owner of the property and entitled to
registration of its ownership; and, (d) in holding that INK has a superior right to the
possession of the owner's copies of the certificates of title.

Upon prior leave, the IDP intervened alleging that prior to the issuance by the trial
court of the order of 2 March 1992, its legal Board of Trustees filed a motion for
intervention informing said court that the sale of the properties was not executed by
it but was made possible by a fake Board of Trustees, hence, the sale is void. The
trial court denied the motion since jurisdiction over the incident properly belonged to
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Conformably therewith, IDP
brought the matter before the SEC which later declared that the sale of the
properties was void. Thus, IDP banks on this favorable decision in similarly seeking
the nullification of the questioned orders of the trial court.

Under our land registration law, no voluntary instrument shall be registered by the
Register of Deeds unless the owner's duplicate certificate is presented together with
such instrument, except in some cases or upon order of the court for cause shown.
In case the person in possession of the duplicate certificates refuses or fails to
surrender the same to the Register of Deeds so that a voluntary document may be
registered and a new certificate issued, Sec. 107, Chapter 10, of P.D. No. 1529
clearly states:

Sec. 107. Surrender of withheld duplicate certificates. — Where it is

necessary to issue a new certificate of title pursuant to any involuntary
instrument which divests the title of the registered owner against his
consent or where a voluntary instrument cannot be registered by
reason of the refusal or failure of the holder to surrender the owner's
duplicate certificate of title, the party in interest may file a petition in
court to compel surrender of the same to the Register of Deeds. The
court, after hearing, may order the registered owner or any person
withholding the duplicate certificate to surrender the same and direct
the entry of a new certificate or memorandum upon such surrender. If
the person withholding the duplicate certificate is not amenable to the
process of the court, or if for any reason the outstanding owner's
duplicate certificate cannot be delivered, the court may order the
annulment of the same as well as the issuance of a new certificate of
title in lieu thereof. Such new, certificate and all duplicates thereof
shall contain a memorandum of the annulment of the outstanding
duplicate.

Before the enactment of P.D. No. 1529 otherwise known as the Property Registration
Decree, the former law, Act No. 496 otherwise known as the Land Registration Act,
and all jurisprudence interpreting the former law had established that summary
reliefs such as an action to compel the surrender of owner's duplicate certificate of
title to the Register of Deeds could only be filed with and granted by the Regional
Trial Court sitting as a land registration court if there was unanimity among the
parties or there was no adverse claim or serious objection on the part of any party in
interest, otherwise, if the case became contentious and controversial it should be
threshed out in an ordinary action or in the case where the incident properly
belonged.4

Under Sec. 2 of P.D. No. 1529, it is now provided that "Courts of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Courts) shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all applications for
original registration of titles to lands, including improvements and interest therein
and over all petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to hear and
determine all questions arising upon such applications or petitions." The above
provision has eliminated the distinction between the general jurisdiction vested in
the regional trial court and the limited jurisdiction conferred upon it by the former
law when acting merely as a cadastral court. Aimed at avoiding multiplicity of suits
the change has simplified registration proceedings by conferring upon the regional
trial courts the authority to act not only on applications for original registration but
also over all petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to hear and
determine all questions arising upon such applications or petitions.5

The principal action filed by INK in Civil Case No. Q-90-6937 before the trial court
was for specific performance with damages based on a document of sale. Such
action was well within the exclusive jurisdictions of the Regional Trial Court.6 When
IDP, the defendant in the trial court, did not question the genuineness and validity of
said deed of sale and its obligations thereunder, the summary judgment issued by
the court granting the reliefs sought by INK was also an exercise of its general
jurisdiction.

Hence, when INK filed a motion for the issuance of an order from the same court to
compel the holder of the duplicate certificates of title to surrender the same to the
Register of Deeds for the registration of the deed of sale subject of the principal
action, the motion was a necessary incident to the main case. When the sale of the
property was upheld by the court in its judgment and the defendant was directed to
comply with its terms and conditions, the right of INK to have the same registered
with the Register of Deeds could not be disregarded. To assert and enjoy its right,
INK should be allowed to seek the aid of the court to direct the surrender of the
certificates of title. Since Regional Trial Courts are courts of general jurisdiction, they
may therefore take cognizance of this case pursuant to such jurisdiction. 7 Even
while Sec. 107 of P.D. 1529 speaks of a petition which can be filed by one who
wants to compel another to surrender the certificates of title to the Register of
Deeds, this does not preclude a party to a pending case to include as incident
therein the relief stated under Sec. 107, especially if the subject certificates of title
to be surrendered are intimately connected with the subject matter of the principal
action.8 This principle is based on expediency and in accordance with the policy
against multiplicity of suits.

The records of the case show that the subsisting mortgage lien of petitioner appears
in the certificates of title Nos. 26520 and 26521. Hence, the order of the trial court
directing the surrender of the certificates to the Register of Deeds in order that the
deed of sale in favor of INK can be registered, cannot in any way prejudice her
rights and interests as a mortgagee of the lots. Any lien annotated on the previous
certificates of title which subsists should be incorporated in or carried over to the
new transfer certificates of title. This is true even in the case of a real estate
mortgage because pursuant to Art. 2126 of the Civil Code it directly and
immediately subjects the property upon which it is imposed, whoever the possessor
may be, to the fulfillment of the obligation for whose security it was constituted. It is
inseparable from the property mortgaged as it is a right in rem — a lien on the
property whoever its owner may be. It subsists notwithstanding a change in
ownership; in short, the personality of the owner is disregarded. Thus, all
subsequent purchasers must respect the mortgage whether the transfer to them be
with or without the consent of the mortgagee, for such mortgage until discharged
follows the property.9 It is clear therefore that the surrender by petitioner of the
certificates of title to the Register of Deeds as ordered by the trial court will not
create any substantial injustice to her. To grant the petition and compel INK to file a
new action in order to obtain the same reliefs it asked in the motion before the trial
court is to encourage litigations where no substantial rights are prejudiced. This end
should be avoided. Courts should not be so strict about procedural lapses that do
not really impair the proper administration of justice. The rules are intended to
insure the orderly conduct of litigations because of the higher objective they seek,
which is, to protect the parties' substantive rights. 10
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals dated 28 October 1992
is AFFIRMED.

INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE DON MARIANO SAN

PEDRO Y ESTEBAN, represented by its HEIR-
JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATOR, ENGRACIO F. SAN
PEDRO, petitioner-appellant, vs. COURT OF APPEALS
(Second Division), AURELIO OCAMPO, DOMINADOR
D. BUHAIN, TERESA C. DELA CRUZ, respondents-
appellees.

[G.R. No. 106496. December 18, 1996]

ENGRACIO SAN PEDRO, CANDIDO GENER, ROSA

PANTALEON, VICENTE PANTALEON, ELEUTERIO
PANTALEON, TRINIDAD SAN PEDRO, RODRIGO SAN
PEDRO, RICARDO NICOLAS, FELISA NICOLAS, and
LEONA SAN PEDRO, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, (Sixteenth Division) and
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DECISION
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:

The most fantastic land claim in the history of the Philippines is

the subject of controversy in these two consolidated cases. The
heirs of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban laid claim and have
been laying claim to the ownership of, against third persons and
the Government itself, a total land area of approximately 173,000
hectares or 214,047 quiniones,[1] on the basis of a Spanish title,
entitled Titulo de Propriedad Numero 4136 dated April 25,
1894. The claim, according to the San Pedro heirs, appears to
cover lands in the provinces of Nueva Ecija, Bulacan, Rizal, Laguna
and Quezon; and such Metro Manila cities as Quezon City, Caloocan
City, Pasay City, City of Pasig and City of Manila, thus affecting in
general lands extending from Malolos, Bulacan to the City Hall of
Quezon City and the land area between Dingalan Bay in the north
and Tayabas Bay in the south.[2]
 Considering the vastness of the land claim, innumerable
disputes cropped up and land swindles and rackets proliferated
resulting in tedious litigation in various trial courts, in the appellate
court and in the Supreme Court,[3] in connection therewith.
We have had the impression that our decisions in Director of
Forestry, et al. v. Muoz, 23 SCRA 1183 [1968]; Antonio, et al. v.
Barroga, et al., 23 SCRA 357 [1968]; Carabot, et al. v. Court of
Appeals, et al., 145 SCRA 368 [1986]; Republic v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, et al., 186 SCRA 88 [1990]; Widows and Orphans
Association, Inc. (WIDORA) v. Court of Appeals, et al., 212 SCRA
360 [1992]; NAPOCOR v. Court of Appeals, et al., 144 SCRA 318
[1986]; Republic v. Court of Appeals, et al., 135 SCRA 156 [1985];
and Director of Lands v. Tesalona, 236 SCRA 336
[1994] terminated the controversy as to ownership of lands
[4]

covered by Spanish Land Titles, for it is the rule that, once this
Court, as the highest Tribunal of the land, has spoken, there the
matter must rest:
It is withal of the essence of the judicial function that at
some point, litigation must end. Hence, after the
procedures and processes for lawsuits have been
undergone, and the modes of review set by law have been
exhausted, or terminated, no further ventilation of the
same subject matter is allowed. To be sure, there may be,
on the part of the losing parties, continuing disagreement
with the verdict, and the conclusions therein
embodied. This is of no moment, indeed, is to be expected;
but, it is not their will, but the Courts, which must prevail;
and, to repeat, public policy demands that at some definite
time, the issues must be laid to rest and the courts
dispositions thereon accorded absolute finality.[5] [Cited
cases omitted]
It is, therefore, to the best interest of the people and the
Government that we render judgment herein writing finis to these
controversies by laying to rest the issue of validity of the basis of
the estates claim of ownership over this vast expanse of real
property.
The following facts are pertinent in the resolution of these long
drawn-out cases:

G.R. NO. 103727

G.R No. 103727, an appeal by certiorari, arose out of a complaint[6] for
recovery of possession and/or damages with a prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction. This was dismissed by the Regional Trial
Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 104, Quezon
City in its decision[7] dated July 7, 1989, the dispositive
portion[8] of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, dismissing the

complaint against the defendants Aurelio Ocampo, Dominador
Buhain and Teresa dela Cruz and ordering plaintiff to pay each of
the herein defendants, the sum of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS
(P5,000.00) as and for attorneys fees, and to pay the costs of
suit.

The said complaint for recovery of possession of real property

and/or reconveyance with damages and with a prayer for
preliminary injunction was filed on August 15, 1988 by Engracio
San Pedro as heir-judicial administrator of the Intestate Estate of
Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban against Jose G. De Ocampo,
Aurelio Ocampo, MARECO, Inc., Rey Antonio Noguera, Teresa C.
dela Cruz, Gaudencio R. Soliven, Diomedes Millan, Carmen
Rayasco, Dominador D. Buhain, Mario D. Buhain, Jose D. Buhain,
Arestedes S. Cauntay, Manuel Chung and Victoria Chung Tiu (El
Mavic Investment & Development Corporation), Capitol Hills Realty
Corporation and Jose F. Castro. The complaint was docketed as
Civil Case No. Q-88-447 in Branch 104, Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City.
In the complaint, it was alleged, among others: (1) that
Engracio San Pedro discovered that the aforenamed defendants
were able to secure from the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City titles
to portions of the subject estate, particularly Transfer Certificates
of Title Nos. 1386, 8982, 951975-951977, 313624, 279067, 1412,
353054, 372592, 149120, 86404, 17874-17875, all emanating
from Original Certificate of Title No. 614[9] and Transfer Certificates
of Title Nos. 255544 and 264124, both derivatives of Original
Certificate of Title No. 333; (2) that the aforesaid defendants were
able to acquire exclusive ownership and possession of certain
portions of the subject estate in their names through deceit, fraud,
bad faith and misrepresentation; (3) that Original Certificates of
Title Nos. 614 and 333 had been cancelled by and through a final
and executory decision dated March 21, 1988 in relation to letter
recommendations by the Bureau of Lands, Bureau of Forest
Development and the Office of the Solicitor General and also in
relation to Central Bank Circulars dated April 7, 1971, April 23,
1971, September 12, 1972 and June 10, 1980; and (4) that the
issue of the existence, validity and genuineness of Titulo
Propriedad No. 4136 dated April 25, 1894 which covers the subject
estate had been resolved in favor of the petitioner estate in a
decision dated April 25, 1978 by the defunct Court of First Instance,
Branch 1 of Baliwag, Bulacan pertaining to a case docketed as
Special Proceeding No. 312-B.[10]
Summons were served on only five of the aforementioned
defendants, namely, Aurelio Ocampo, MARECO, Inc., Teresita G.
dela Cruz, Dominador Buhain and Manuel Chung and Victoria
Chung Tiu.[11]
On February 7, 1989, the lower court ordered the dismissal of
the complaint against Mareco, Inc. for improper service of
summons and against Manuel Chung and Victoria Chung Tiu for
lack of cause of action considering that the registered owner of the
parcel of land covered by TCT No. 86404 is El Mavic Investment
and Development Co., Inc., not Manuel Chung and Victoria Chung
Tiu.[12]
Trial on the merits proceeded against the private respondents
Ocampo, Buhain and Dela Cruz.
On July 7, 1989, the lower court rendered judgment dismissing
the complaint based on the following grounds: (a) Ocampo, Buhain
and Dela Cruz are already the registered owners of the parcels of
land covered by Torrens titles which cannot be defeated by the
alleged Spanish title, Titulo Propriedad No. 4136, covering the
subject estate; and (b) the decision of the Court of First Instance
of Bulacan entitled In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of the late
Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban specifically stated in its
dispositive portion that all lands which have already been legally
and validly titled under the Torrens system by private persons shall
be excluded from the coverage of Titulo Propriedad No. 4136.[13]
The motion for reconsideration thereof was denied,[14] and so,
the petitioner estate interposed an appeal with the Court of
Appeals. On January 20, 1992, the appeal was dismissed[15] for
being unmeritorious and the lower courts decision was affirmed
with costs against the petitioner estate. The appellate court
ratiocinated:
 (1) neither the Titulo Propriedad No. 4136 nor a genuine
copy thereof was presented in the proceeding below;
(2) the illegible copy of the Titulo presented in court was
not registered under the Torrens System hence, it cannot
be used as evidence of land ownership;
(3) the CFI decision invoked by petitioner estate in its favor
expressly excluded from the Titulo titled lands of private
individuals;
(4) the Titulo is inferior to that of the registered titles of
Ocampo, Buhain and Dela Cruz as correctly ruled by the
lower court;
(5) there is no evidence showing that OCT No. 614 from which
titles of Ocampo, Buhain and Dela Cruz originated was already
cancelled, hence, the lower court did not err in not declaring the
same as null and void.[16]
Not having obtained a favorable judgment on appeal, the
petitioner estate, on March 16, 1992, filed the present
petition[17] docketed as G. R. No. 103727.

G.R. NO. 106496

G.R No. 106496, a petition for review on certiorari, began as a

petition[18] for letters of administration over the intestate estate of
the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban which eventually resulted
to an Order[19] dated November 17, 1978 declaring inter alia,
Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 as null and void and of no legal
force and effect.

The dispositive portion[20] of the said Order reads:

WHEREFORE, this Court so orders that:

1) The Decision dated April 25, 1978 is reconsidered and

set aside.

2) Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is declared null and void

and of no legal force and effect and that therefore no
rights could be derived therefrom.

3) All orders approving the sales, conveyances, donations

or any other transactions involving the lands covered
 by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 are declared
invalidated, void and of no force and effect.

4) All lands covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 are

excluded from the inventory of the estate of the late
Mariano San Pedro y Esteban.

5) The heirs, agents, privies or anyone acting for and in

behalf of the estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y
Esteban are enjoined from representing or exercising
any acts of possession or ownership or from disposing
in any manner portions of all the lands covered by
Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 and to immediately
vacate the same.

6) Engracio San Pedro and Justino Benito as co-

administrators submit in Court within twenty days their
final accounting and inventory of all real and personal
properties of the estate which had come into their
possession or knowledge under oath.

7) This case is hereby re-opened, to allow movants-

intervenors to continue with the presentation of their
evidence in order to rest their case.

The consideration and approval of the

administrators final accounting and inventory of the
presentation of movants-intervenors evidence as
well as the consideration of all other incidents are
hereby set on December 22, 1978 at 8:30 a. m.
The aforementioned petition for letters of administration over
the intestate estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban was
filed on December 29, 1971 with the defunct Court of First Instance
of Bulacan, Fifth Judicial District, Branch IV, Baliuag, Bulacan. The
petition docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 312-B was initiated by Engracio
San Pedro and Justino Z. Benito who sought to be appointed as
administrator and co-administrator, respectively.
On February 29, 1972, after the jurisdictional facts were
established, evidence for the petitioners was received by the lower
court without any opposition.[21]
 On March 2, 1972, then Presiding Judge Juan F. Echiverri issued
an Order appointing Engracio San Pedro as Administrator of the
subject estate.[22]
On March 11, 1972, the Court issued letters of administration
in favor of Engracio San Pedro upon posting of a bond in the sum
of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00).[23]
On February 7, 1974, Administrator Engracio San Pedro was
ordered to furnish copies of the letters of administration and other
pertinent orders approving certain dispositions of the properties of
the estate to the following entities:
(a) The Commanding General
Philippine Constabulary
Camp Crame, Quezon City
(b) The Solicitor General
Manila
(c) The Government Corporate Counsel
A. Mabini St., Manila
(d) The City Mayors of Quezon City & Caloocan
(e) The Governors of Rizal, Quezon and Bulacan
(f) The City Treasurers of Quezon City and
Caloocan
(g) The Provincial Treasurers of Quezon, Bulacan
and Rizal
(h) The PHHC, Diliman, Quezon City
(i) The PAHRRA Quezon Boulevard, Quezon City
(j) The Municipal Treasurers of the various
municipalities in which properties of the estate are
located; and
(k) Office of Civil Relations, Camp Crame, Quezon
City and Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City.[24]
The above Order was issued so as to protect the general public
from any confusion brought about by various persons who had
been misrepresenting themselves as having been legally
authorized to act for the subject estate and to sell its properties by
virtue thereof.
 On August 30, 1976, a Motion for Intervention and an
Opposition to the Petition was filed by the Republic of the
Philippines alleging, inter alia:
4. That under Presidential Decree No. 892, dated
February 16, 1976, Spanish titles like the TITULO is
absolutely inadmissible and ineffective as proof of
ownership in court proceedings, except where the
holder thereof applies for land registration under Act
496, which is not true in the proceedings at bar;
5. That no less than the Supreme Court had declared
TITULO DE PROPIEDAD NO. 4136 as invalid;
6. That, moreover, the late Don Mariano San Pedro y
Esteban and/or his supposed heirs have lost whatever
rights of ownership they might have had to the so-
called Estate on the ground of inaction, laches and/or
prescription;
7. That, accordingly, there is no estate or property to
be administered for purposes of inventory, settlement
or distribution in accordance with law, and all the
inventories so far submitted, insofar as they embraced
lands within the TITULO, are deemed ineffective and
cannot be legally considered; and
8. That the Republic of the Philippines has a legal
interest in the land subject matter of the petition
considering that, except such portions thereof had
been (sic) already the subject of valid adjudication or
disposition in accordance with law, the same belong in
State ownership.[25]
On February 15, 1977, the Republic filed a Motion to Suspend
Proceedings.[26]
On February 16, 1977, the Republics Opposition to the Petition
for Letters of Administration was dismissed by means of the
following Order issued by Judge Benigno Puno:
WHEREFORE, for lack of jurisdiction to determine the legal
issues raised, the Court hereby DISMISSES the Opposition
dated August 30, 1976, filed by the Office of the Solicitor
General; likewise, for lack of merit, the Motion to Suspend
Proceedings dated February 15, 1977, filed by the Office of
the Solicitor General is DENIED.
 The administrator Engracio San Pedro and the co-
administrator Justino Z. Benito are ordered to furnish the
office of the Solicitor General all copies of inventories
already filed in Court within ten (10) days from notice
hereof.[27]
On March 9, 1977, a motion for reconsideration was filed by the
Republic.[28]
On April 25, 1978, the lower court then presided over by Judge
Agustin C. Bagasao, rendered a 52-page decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

(a) Declaring the existence, genuineness and authenticity

of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 of the Registry of Deeds
of Bulacan, issued on April 29, 1984, in the name of the
deceased Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban, covering a
total area of approximately 214,047 quiniones or 173,000
hectares, situated in the Provinces of Bulacan, Rizal,
Quezon, Quezon City and Caloocan City;

(b) Declaring Engracio San Pedro, Candido Gener, Santiago

Gener, Rosa Pantaleon, Vicente Pantaleon, Eleuterio
Pantaleon, Trinidad San Pedro, Rodrigo San Pedro, Ricardo
Nicolas, and Teresa Nicolas, as the true and lawful heirs of
the deceased Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban and
entitled to inherit the intestate estate left by the said
deceased, consisting of the above-mentioned tract of
private land covered and described by said above-
mentioned Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 of the Registry of
Deeds of Bulacan, excluding therefrom: (a) all lands which
have already been legally and validly titled under the
Torrens System, by private persons, or the Republic of the
Philippines, or any of its instrumentalities or agencies; (b)
all lands declared by the government as reservations for
public use and purposes; (c) all lands belonging to the
public domain; and, (d) all portions thereof which had been
sold, quitclaimed and/or previously excluded by the
Administrator and duly approved by a final order of the
Court, except those which may hereafter be set aside,
after due consideration on a case to case basis, of various
 motions to set aside the said Court order which approved
the said sales, quitclaims, and/or exclusions;

(c) The designation of Atty. Justino Z. Benito as co-

administrator, is hereby revoked to take effect
immediately, to obviate any confusion in the administration
of the Estate, and to fix the responsibilities of
administration to the co-heir Administrator, Engracio San
Pedro, whose appointment as such is hereby confirmed.
The said co-administrator Justino Z. Benito is hereby
ordered to render his final accounting of his co-
administration of the Estate, within thirty (30) days from
receipt of copy hereof;

(d) The Co-Heir-Administrator, Engracio San Pedro is

hereby ordered to amass, collate, consolidate and take
possession of all the net estate of the deceased Don Marino
San Pedro y Esteban, as well as all other sets and credits
lawfully belonging to the estate and/or to take appropriate
legal action to recover the same in the proper Courts of
Justice, government offices or any appropriate forum; and
to pay all taxes or charges due from the estate to the
Government, and all indebtedness of the estate, and
thereafter, to submit a project of partition of the estate
among the lawful heirs as herein recognized and declared.

It is, however, strongly recommended to His Excellency,

President Ferdinand E. Marcos that, to avoid the
concentration of too much land to a few persons and in line
with the projected urban land reform program of the
government, corollary to the agricultural land reform
program of the New Society, the above intestate estate of
the late Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban should be
expropriated or purchased by negotiated sale by the
government to be used in its human settlements and low
cost housing projects.

No Costs.

SO ORDERED.[29]

On May 17, 1978, the Republic moved for a reconsideration of

the above decision:[30]
 On June 5, 1978, administrator Engracio San Pedro filed a
Manifestation and Petition for the Inhibition of the then newly
appointed Presiding Judge Oscar Fernandez. On July 12,1978, after
the Republic filed its Reply to the Petition for Inhibition, Judge
Fernandez denied the said petition.[31]
After hearings were conducted on the Republics Motion for
Reconsideration, Judge Fernandez issued the aforestated
Order[32] dated November 17, 1978 which, in essence, set aside
Judge Bagasaos decision dated April 25, 1978 by declaring Titulo
de Propriedad No. 4136 as null and void and of no legal force and
effect, thus, excluding all lands covered by Titulo de Propriedad No.
4136 from the inventory of the estate of the late Mariano San Pedro
y Esteban.
The petitioners-heirs of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban
appealed to the Court of Appeals and alleged that the lower court
did not act with impartiality when it granted the Republics motion
for reconsideration which was merely pro forma, thereby
overturning a prior declaration by the same court of the existence,
genuineness and authenticity of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 in
the name of the deceased Mariano San Pedro.[33]
On March 11, 1992, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal
of the petitioners-heirs.[34] In affirming the assailed Order dated
November 17, 1978, the appellate court focused its discussion
solely on the issue of whether or not the lower court erred in
declaring Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 null and void. The
appellate court ruled that the petitioners-heirs failed to controvert
the Republics claim that Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is invalid on
the following bases; (a) non-production of the original of the
subject title; (b) inadmissibility of the photostat copies of the said
title; and (c) non-registration of the subject Spanish title under Act
No. 496 (Land Registration Act) as required by Presidential Decree
No. 892 (Discontinuance of the Spanish Mortgage System of
Registration and of the Use of Spanish Titles as Evidence in Land
Registration Proceedings).
The petitioners-heirs moved for a reconsideration of the Court
of Appeals decision by invoking certain cases wherein the validity
of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 had been allegedly
recognized. The Court of Appeals refused to be swayed and denied
the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.[35]
 Hence, the herein petition,[36] docketed as G. R. No. 106496,
was filed on September 18, 1992.
After the parties filed their respective pleadings in G.R. Nos.
103727 and 106496, this Court resolved to consolidate both cases
on September 15, 1994.[37]
While these cases were pending before us, several parties filed
separate motions for intervention which we denied on different
occasions for lack of merit.
In G.R. No. 103727, the grounds relied upon for the grant of
the petition are as follows:
I. That petitioner-appellant as plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-
88-447, RTC, Branch 104 was denied due process of law
due to gross negligence of lawyer, which respondent
court grossly failed to take cognizance of.
II. That the respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion
tantamount to lack of jurisdiction in not remanding the case for
trial and in affirming the lower courts null and void judgment.[38]
In G.R. No. 106496, the petitioners-heirs present the following
assignment of errors, to wit:
First. Respondent Court of Appeals affirmed the appealed
order which resolved a question of title or ownership over
which the lower court as an intestate court has no
jurisdiction and over the vigorous and repeated objections
of the petitioners.[39]
Second. Respondent Court of Appeals erred in upholding
the order of Judge Fernandez setting aside the order and
decision of Judge Puno and Bagasao; Judge Fernandez
thereby acted as an appellate court reviewing, revising,
amending or setting aside the order and decision of Judges
of equal rank.[40]
Third. Respondent Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction to
uphold the order of Judge Fernandez who without
jurisdiction, set aside the order of Judge Puno and the
decision of Judge Bagasao, both of which were already
final.[41]
Fourth. Respondent Court of Appeals was unmindful of the
fact that Judge Fernandez was appointed by President
Marcos to reverse Judge Bagasao, regardless of the
 evidence, thereby unmindful that petitioners were denied
the cold neutrality of an impartial tribunal.[42]
Fifth. Respondent Court of Appeals erred in not considering
the evidence presented before Judges Echiverri, Puno and
Bagasao and merely adopted the order of Judge Fernandez
who never received a single piece of evidence,
notwithstanding the 1906 Guido title over Hacienda
Angono in Binangonan, Rizal, the boundary owner stated
therein being Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban, and the
November 1991 en banc decision of the Supreme Court
upholding the Guido title.[43]
Of paramount importance over and above the central issue of
the probative value of the petitioners Spanish title in these cases
is the propriety of the lower courts resolution of the question of
ownership of the subject San Pedro estate in the special
proceedings case. Thus, before we address ourselves to the issue
of whether or not petitioners Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is null
and void and of no legal force and effect, it is best that we first
determine whether or not the lower court, acting as a probate
court, in the petition for letters of administration, committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in settling the
issue of ownership of the San Pedro estate covered by Titulo
Propriedad No. 4136.
Petitioners-heirs, in G.R. No. 106496, on the one hand, contend
that the lower court, then CFI, Bulacan, Branch IV, had no
jurisdiction as an intestate court,[44] to resolve the question of title
or ownership raised by the public respondent Republic of the
Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General in the
intestate proceedings of the estate of Mariano San Pedro y
Esteban.[45]
The public respondent, on the other hand, invoking its
sovereign capacity as parens patriae, argues that petitioners
contention is misplaced considering that when the Republic
questioned the existence of the estate of Mariano San Pedro y
Esteban, the lower court became duty-bound to rule on the
genuineness and validity of Titulo de Propriedad 4136 which
purportedly covers the said estate, otherwise, the lower court in
the intestate proceedings would be mistakenly dealing with
properties that are proven to be part of the States patrimony or
improperly included as belonging to the estate of the deceased.[46]
 A probate courts jurisdiction is not limited to the determination
of who the heirs are and what shares are due them as regards the
estate of a deceased person. Neither is it confined to the issue of
the validity of wills. We held in the case of Maingat v.
Castillo,[47] that the main function of a probate court is to settle and
liquidate the estates of deceased persons either summarily or
through the process of administration. Thus, its function
necessarily includes the examination of the properties, rights and
credits of the deceased so as to rule on whether or not the
inventory of the estate properly included them for purposes of
distribution of the net assets of the estate of the deceased to the
lawful heirs.
In the case of Trinidad v. Court of Appeals,[48] we stated, thus:
x x x questions of title to any property apparently still
belonging to estate of the deceased maybe passed upon in
the Probate Court, with the consent of all the
parties, without prejudice to third persons x x x
Parenthetically, questions of title pertaining to the
determination prima facie of whether certain properties ought to
be included or excluded from the inventory and accounting of the
estate subject of a petition for letters of administration, as in the
intestate proceedings of the estate of the late Mariano San Pedro
y Esteban, maybe resolved by the probate court. In this light, we
echo our pronouncement in the case of Garcia v. Garcia[49]that:
x x x The court which acquired jurisdiction over the
properties of a deceased person through the filing of the
corresponding proceedings, has supervision and control
over the said properties, and under the said power, it is its
inherent duty to see that the inventory submitted by the
administrator appointed by it contains all the properties,
rights and credits which the law requires the administrator
to set out in his inventory. In compliance with this duty,
the court has also inherent power to determine what
properties, rights and credits of the deceased should be
included in or excluded from the inventory. Should an heir
or person interested in the properties of a deceased person
duly call the courts attention to the fact that certain
properties, rights or credits have been left out in the
inventory, it is likewise the courts duty to hear the
observations, with power to determine if such observations
 should be attended to or not and if the properties referred
to therein belong prima facie to the intestate, but no such
determination is final and ultimate in nature as to the
ownership of the said properties.[50] [Underscoring
Supplied]
In view of these disquisitions of this Court, we hold that the
lower court did not commit any reversible error when it issued the
Order dated November 17, 1978 which set aside Judge Bagasaos
decision dated April 25, 1978 and declared Titulo de Propriedad No.
4136 as null and void, consequently excluding all lands covered by
the said title from the inventory of the estate of the late Mariano
San Pedro y Esteban.
A corollary issue sought to be ventilated by the petitioners-heirs
as regards the assailed Order of November 17, 1978 is the
impropriety of Judge Fernandez act of granting the motion for
reconsideration filed by the public respondent Republic since,
Judge Fernandez did not personally hear the intestate
case. Petitioners thus dubbed him as a reviewing judge.By setting
aside the Decision dated April 25, 1978 of his predecessors in CFI,
Branch IV, Baliuag, Bulacan, namely, Judge Benigno Puno and
Judge Agustin C. Bagasao, respectively, Judge Fernandez, acting
as a reviewing judge, proceeded without authority and/or
jurisdiction.[51]
There is no question that, barring any serious doubts as to
whether the decision arrived at is fair and just, a newly appointed
judge who did not try the case can decide the same as long as the
record and the evidence are all available to him and that the same
were taken into consideration and thoroughly studied. The
reviewing judge argument of the petitioners-heirs has no leg to
stand on considering that the fact that the judge who penned the
decision did not hear a certain case in its entirety is not a
compelling reason to jettison his findings and conclusion inasmuch
as the full record was available to him for his perusal.[52] In the
case at bar, it is evident that the 41-page Order dated November
17, 1978 of Judge Fernandez bespeaks of a knowledgeable and
analytical discussion of the rationale for reconsidering and setting
aside Judge Bagasaos Decision dated April 25, 1978.
Considering the definiteness of our holding in regard to the
correctness of Judge Fernandez disposition of the case, i.e., the
issuance by the lower court of the assailed Order of November 17,
1978, we now focus on the core issue of whether or not the lower
court in G.R. No. 106496 committed reversible error in excluding
from the inventory of the estate of the deceased Mariano San Pedro
y Esteban all lands covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136
primarily on the ground that the said title is null and void and of
no legal force and effect.Juxtaposed with this is the issue of
whether or not the appellate court, in both cases, G.R. Nos. 103727
and 106496, erred in not recognizing Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136
as evidence to prove ownership by the late Mariano San Pedro of
the lands covered thereby.
It is settled that by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 892 which
took effect on February 16, 1976, the system of registration under
the Spanish Mortgage Law was abolished and all holders of Spanish
titles or grants should cause their lands covered thereby to be
registered under the Land Registration Act[53] within six (6) months
from the date of effectivity of the said Decree or until August 16,
1976.[54] Otherwise, non-compliance therewith will result in a re-
classification of their lands.[55] Spanish titles can no longer be
countenanced as indubitable evidence of land ownership.[56]
Section 1 of the said Decree provides:
SECTION 1. The system of registration under the Spanish
Mortgage Law is discontinued, and all lands recorded under
said system which are not yet covered by Torrens title shall
be considered as unregistered lands.
All holders of Spanish titles or grants should apply for
registration of their lands under Act No. 496, otherwise
known as the Land Registration Act, within six (6) months
from the effectivity of this decree. Thereafter, Spanish
titles cannot be used as evidence of land ownership in any
registration proceedings under the Torrens system.
Hereafter, all instruments affecting lands originally
registered under the Spanish Mortgage Law may be
recorded under Section 194 of the Revised Administrative
Code, as amended by Act. 3344.
The Whereas clauses of the aforesaid Decree specify the
underlying policies for its passage, to wit:
WHEREAS, fraudulent sales, transfers, and other forms of
conveyances of large tracts of public and private lands to
unsuspecting and unwary buyers appear to have been
 perpetrated by unscrupulous persons claiming ownership
under Spanish titles or grants of dubious origin;
WHEREAS, these fraudulent transactions have often
resulted in conflicting claims and litigations between
legitimate title holders, bona fide occupants or applicants
of public lands, on the one hand, and the holders of, or
person claiming rights under the said Spanish titles or
grants, on the other, thus creating confusion and
instability in property ownership and threatening the
peace and order conditions in the areas affected;
WHEREAS, statistics in the Land Registration Commission
show that recording in the system of registration under
the Spanish Mortgage Law is practically nil and that this
system has become obsolete;
WHEREAS, Spanish titles to lands which have not yet been
brought under the operation of the Torrens system, being
subject to prescription, are now ineffective to prove
ownership unless accompanied by proof of actual
possession;
WHEREAS, there is an imperative need to discontinue the
system of registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law
and the use of Spanish titles as evidence in registration
proceedings under the Torrens system;
In the case of Director of Lands v. Heirs of Isabel Tesalona, et
al.,[57] we took cognizance of this Decree and thus held that caution
and care must be exercised in the acceptance and admission of
Spanish titles taking into account the numerous fake titles that
have been discovered after their supposed reconstitution
subsequent to World War II.
In both cases, petitioners-heirs did not adduce evidence to show
that Titulo de Propriedad 4136 was brought under the operation of
P.D. 892 despite their allegation that they did so on August 13,
1976.[58] Time and again we have held that a mere allegation is not
evidence and the party who alleges a fact has the burden of proving
it.[59] Proof of compliance with P.D. 892 should be the Certificate of
Title covering the land registered.
In the petition for letters of administration, it was a glaring error
on the part of Judge Bagasao who rendered the reconsidered
Decision dated April 25, 1978 to have declared the existence,
genuineness and authenticity of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 in
the name of the deceased Mariano San Pedro y Esteban despite
the effectivity of P.D. No. 892. Judge Fernandez, in setting aside
Judge Bagasao's decision, emphasized that Titulo de Propriedad
No. 4136, under P.D. 892, is inadmissible and ineffective as
evidence of private ownership in the special proceedings case. He
made the following observations as regards the Titulo, to wit:
"The Solicitor General, articulating on the dire
consequences of recognizing the nebulous titulo as an
evidence of ownership underscored the fact that during the
pendency of this case, smart speculators and wise alecks
had inveigled innocent parties into buying portions of the
so-called estate with considerations running into millions of
pesos.
Some, under the guise of being benign heroes even
feigned donations to charitable and religious organizations,
including veterans' organizations as smoke screen to the
gargantuan fraud they have committed and to hood wink
further other gullible and unsuspecting victims.[60]
In the same light, it does not escape this Courts onomatopoeic
observation that the then heir-judicial administrator Engracio San
Pedro who filed the complaint for recovery of possession and/or
reconveyance with damages in G.R. No. 103727 on August 15,
1988 invoked Judge Bagasaos Decision of April 25, 1978 in support
of the Titulos validity notwithstanding the fact that, by then, the
said Decision had already been set aside by Judge Fernandez Order
of November 17, 1978. We are in accord with the appellate courts
holding in G.R. No. 103727 insofar as it concludes that since the
Titulo was not registered under Act No. 496, otherwise known as
the Land Registration Act, said Titulo is inferior to the registered
titles of the private respondents Ocampo, Buhain and Dela Cruz.
This Court can only surmise that the reason for the non-
registration of the Titulo under the Torrens system is the lack of
the necessary documents to be presented in order to comply with
the provisions of P.D. 892. We do not discount the possibility that
the Spanish title in question is not genuine, especially since its
genuineness and due execution have not been proven. In both
cases, the petitioners-heirs were not able to present the original of
Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 nor a genuine copy thereof. In the
special proceedings case, the petitioners-heirs failed to produce the
Titulo despite a subpoena duces tecum (Exh. Q-RP) to produce it
as requested by the Republic from the then administrators of the
subject intestate estate, Engracio San Pedro and Justino Benito,
and the other interested parties. As an alternative to prove their
claim of the subject intestate estate, the petitioners referred to a
document known as hypoteca (the Spanish term is `hipoteca)
allegedly appended to the Titulo. However, the said hypoteca was
neither properly identified nor presented as evidence.Likewise, in
the action for recovery of possession and/or reconveyance with
damages, the petitioners-heirs did not submit the Titulo as part of
their evidence. Instead, only an alleged illegible copy of the Titulo
was presented. (Exhs. C-9 to C-19).
The Best Evidence Rule as provided under Rule 130, section 2
of the Rules of Court is stated in unequivocal terms. Subparagraphs
(a) and (b) of the said Rule read:
SEC. 2. - Original writing must be produced; exceptions. -
There can be no evidence of a writing the contents of
which is the subject of inquiry, other than the original
writing itself, except in the following cases:

(a) When the original has been lost, destroyed, or cannot be

produced in court;

(b) When the original is in the possession of the party against

whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it
after reasonable notice;"

xxxxxxxxx
Sections 4 and 5 of the same Rule further read:
SEC. 4. Secondary evidence when original is lost or
destroyed. --- When the original writing has been lost or
destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, upon proof of
its execution and loss or destruction or unavailability, its
contents may be proved by a copy, or by a recital of its
contents in some authentic document, or by the
recollection of witnesses.
SEC. 5. Secondary evidence when original is in adverse
partys custody. --- If the writing be in the custody of the
adverse party, he must have reasonable notice to produce
it. If after such notice and after satisfactory proof of its
 existence, he fails to produce the writing, the contents
thereof may be proved as in the case of its loss. But the
notice to produce it is not necessary where the writing is
itself a notice, or where it has been wrongfully obtained or
withheld by the adverse party.
Thus, the court shall not receive any evidence that is merely
substitutionary in its nature, such as photocopies, as long as the
original evidence can be had. In the absence of a clear showing
that the original writing has been lost or destroyed or cannot be
produced in court, the photocopy submitted, in lieu thereof, must
be disregarded, being unworthy of any probative value and being
an inadmissible piece of evidence.[61]
Hence, we conclude that petitioners-heirs failed to establish by
competent proof the existence and due execution of the
Titulo. Their explanation as to why the original copy of the Titulo
could not be produced was not satisfactory. The alleged contents
thereof which should have resolved the issue as to the exact extent
of the subject intestate estate of the late Mariano San Pedro were
not distinctly proved. In the case of Ong Hing Po v. Court of
Appeals,[62] we pointed out that:
Secondary evidence is admissible when the original
documents were actually lost or destroyed. But prior to the
introduction of such secondary evidence, the proponent
must establish the former existence of the document. The
correct order of proof is as follows: existence; execution;
loss; contents. This order may be changed if necessary in
the discretion of the court.[63]
In upholding the genuineness and authenticity of Titulo de
Propriedad No. 4136, Judge Bagasao, in his decision, relied on: (1)
the testimony of the NBI expert, Mr. Segundo Tabayoyong,
pertaining to a report dated January 28, 1963 denominated as
Questioned Documents Report No. 230-163; (2) a photostat copy
of the original of the Titulo duly certified by the then Clerk of Court
of the defunct Court of First Instance of Manila; and (3)
the hipoteca registered in the Register of Deeds of Bulacan on
December 4, 1894.
Judge Fernandez, in his November 1978 Order which set aside
Judge Bagasaos April 1978 decision correctly clarified that the NBI
report aforementioned was limited to the genuineness of the two
signatures of Alejandro Garcia and Mariano Lopez Delgado
appearing on the last page of the Titulo, not the Titulo itself. When
asked by the counsel of the petitioners-heirs to admit the existence
and due execution of the Titulo, the handling Solicitor testified:
xxxxxxxxx
ATTY. BRINGAS:
With the testimony of this witness, I would like to call the distinguished counsel
for the government whether he admits that there is actually a titulo
propriedad 4136.
COURT:
Would you comment on that Solicitor Agcaoili?
ATTY. AGCAOILI:
We are precisely impugning the Titulo and I think the question of counsel is
already answered by witness. The parties have not yet established the due
existence of the titulo.
ATTY. BRINGAS:
We are constrained to ask this matter in order to be candid about the
question. The witness is a witness for the government, so with the
testimony of this witness for the government to the effect that there is
actually in existence Titulo Propiedad 4136; we are asking the question
candidly to the government counsel whether he is prepared to state that
there is really in existence such Titulo Propiedad 4136.
ATTY. AGCAOILI:
We are now stating before this Court that there was such a document
examined by the NBI insofar as the signatures of Alejandro Garcia
and Manuel Lopez Delgado are concerned and they are found to be
authentic.[64]
The following significant findings of Judge Fernandez further
lend credence to our pronouncement that the Titulo is of dubious
validity:
x x x the NBI in its Questioned Document Report No. 448-
977 dated September 2, 1977 (Exhibit `O-RP) concluded
that the document contained material alterations as
follows:

a) On line 15 of p. 1, Title and on line 5 of p. 2, Title, the

word Pinagcamaligan was written after Pulo;

b) On line 16, p. 1, Title, un was converted to mil;

c) On Line 18, p. 1, Title, mil was written at the end of tres in tres
mil;
d) On line 19 of p. 1, Title, a semblance of mil was written after
setentay tres;

e) On line 6, p. 2, Title, un was formed to a semblance of uni;

and

f) On line 8, p. 2, Title, un was formed to mil.

The plain and evident purpose was definitely to enlarge the

area of the Titulo. According to Mr. Tabayoyong of the NBI,
there are still pieces of black ashes around the rings of the
portions which are indications of burnings. The burnings
were made on the very portions where there were previous
erasures, alterations and intercalations. Understandably,
the burnings were done to erase traces of the criminal
act.[65]
In the case of National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals,
et al.[66] Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera, in reinstating the trial
courts judgment therein, sustained the finding that:
x x x The photostatic copy (in lieu of the lost original) of
the Spanish title in the name of Mariano San Pedro shows
obvious alterations and intercalations in an attempt to
vastly increase the area and change the location of the
land described in the original title x x x.
Anent the inadmissibility as evidence of the photostat copy of
the Titulo, we sustain the lower courts analysis, as affirmed by the
appellate court, viz:
To begin with, the original of Titulo de Propiedad No. 4136
was never presented in Court. Upon request of the
Government, a subpoena duces tecum (Exhibit Q-RP) was
issued to the two administrators, Engracio San Pedro and
Justino Benito as well as to other interested parties to
produce the original of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136. But
no one produced the Titulo. What the parties did was to
pass the buck to one another.
Without any plausible explanation at all on as to why the
original could not be produced, the Court cannot take
cognizance of any secondary evidence.
It was explained that the Titulo after changing hands,
finally fell into the hands of a certain Moon Park of Korea
 but who later disappeared and that his present
whereabouts could not be known.
Strangely enough, despite the significance of the titulo, no
serious efforts on the part of the claimants-heirs were
exerted to retrieve this document of vital importance
despite the Court order to produce it in order to determine
its authenticity.
It would not be enough to simply say that Moon Parks
whereabouts are unknown or that there are not enough
funds to locate him. The only logical conclusion would be
that the original would be adverse if produced.[67]
As regards the hipoteca which allegedly defines the metes and
bounds of the subject intestate estate, the petitioners-heirs have
not established the conditions required by law for their admissibility
as secondary evidence to prove that there exists a document
designated as Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136. Hence, the same
acquires no probative value.[68]
At this juncture, our decision dated June 28, 1968 in Director of
Forestry, et al. v. Hon. Emmanuel M. Muoz, as Judge of the Court
of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch I, et al.[69] is enlightening. In
said case, private respondent, Pinaycamaligan Indo-Agro
Development Corporation, Inc. (PIADECO), claimed to be the
owner of some 72,000 hectares of land located in the municipalities
of Angat, Norzagaray and San Jose del Monte, province of Bulacan,
and in Antipolo and Montalban, province of Rizal. To prove its
ownership Piadeco relied on Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 dated
April 28, 1894. Scholarly opining that the Titulo is of doubtful
validity,[70] Justice Conrado V. Sanchez, speaking for the Court,
stated that:
But an important moiety here is the deeply disturbing
intertwine of two undisputed facts. First. The Title
embraces land `located in the Provinces of Bulacan, Rizal,
Quezon, and Quezon City. Second. The title was signed
only by the provincial officials of Bulacan, and inscribed
only in the Land Registry of Bulacan. Why? The situation,
indeed, cries desperately for a plausible answer.
To be underscored at this point is the well-embedded
principle that private ownership of land must be proved not
only through the genuineness of title but also with a clear
identity of the land claimed. (Oligan v. Mejia, 17 Phil. 494,
496; Villa Abrille v. Banuelos, 20 Phil. 1,
8, citing Sison v. Ramos, 13 Phil. 54 and Belen v. Belen, 13
Phil. 202; Licad v. Bacani, 51 Phil 51, 54-56;
Lasam v. Director, 65 Phil. 367, 371. This Court ruled in a
case involving a Spanish title acquired by purchase that
the land must be concretely measured per hectare or
per quinon, not in mass (cuerpos ciertos),
(Valdez v. Director, 62 Phil. 362, 373, 375). The fact that
the Royal Decree of August 31, 1888 used 30 hectares as a
basis for classifying lands strongly suggests that the land
applied for must be measured per hectare.
Here, no definite area seems to have been mentioned in
the title. In Piadecos Rejoinder to Opposition dated April
28, 1964 filed in Civil Case 3035-M, it specified that area
covered by its Titulo de Propiedad as 74,000 hectares
(Rollo in L-24796, p. 36). In its Opposition of May 13, 1964
in the same case, it described the land as containing
72,000 hectares (Id., p. 48). Which is which? This but
accentuates the nebulous identity of Piadecos
land. Piadecos ownership thereof then equally suffers from
vagueness, fatal at least in these proceedings.
Piadeco asserts that Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban, the
original owner appearing on the title, acquired his rights
over the property by prescription under Articles 4 and 5 of
the Royal Decree of June 25, 1880, (Rollo of L-24796, p.
184) the basic decree that authorized adjustment of
lands. By this decree, applications for adjustment --
showing the location, boundaries and area of land applied
for -- were to be filed with the Direccion General de
Administracion Civil, which then ordered the classification
and survey of the land with the assistance of the interested
party or his legal representative (Ponce, op. cit., p. 22).
The Royal Decree of June 5, 1880 also fixed the period for
filing applications for adjustment at one year from the date
of publication of the decree in the Gaceta de Manila on
September 10, 1880, extended for another year by the
Royal Order of July 15, 1881 (Ibid.). If Don Mariano sought
adjustment within the time prescribed, as he should have,
then, seriously to be considered here are the Royal Orders
of November 25, 1880 and of October 26, 1881, which
limited adjustment to 1,000 hectares of arid lands, 500
hectares of land with trees and 100 hectares of irrigable
lands (See: Government v. Avila, 46 Phil. 146, 154;
Bayot v. Director of Lands, 98 Phil. 935, 941. Article 15 of
the Royal Decree of January 26, 1889 limited the area that
may be acquired by purchase to 2,500 hectares, with
allowable error up to 5%. Ponce, op. cit., p. 19). And, at
the risk of repetition, it should be stated again that
Piadecos Titulo is held out to embrace 72,000 or 74,000
hectares of land.
But if more were needed, we have the Maura Law (Royal
Decree of February 13, 1894), published in the Gaceta de
Manila on April 17, 1894 (Ibid., p. 26; Ventura, op. cit., p.
28). That decree required a second petition for adjustment
within six months from publication, for those who had not
yet secured their titles at the time of the publication of the
law (Ibid.). Said law also abolished the provincial boards
for the adjustment of lands established by Royal Decree of
December 26, 1884, and confirmed by Royal Decree of
August 31, 1888, which boards were directed to deliver to
their successors, the provincial boards established by
Decree on Municipal Organization issued on May 19, 1893,
all records and documents which they may hold in their
possession (Ramirez v. Director of Land, supra, at p. 124).
Doubt on Piadecos title here supervenes when we come to
consider that title was either dated April 29 or April 25,
1894, twelve or eight days after the publication of the
Maura Law.
Let us now take a look, as near as the record allows, at
how Piadeco exactly acquired its rights under
the Titulo. The original owner appearing thereon was Don
Mariano San Pedro y Esteban.From Piadecos explanation -
- not its evidence (Rollo of L-24796, pp. 179-188) we cull
the following: On December 3, 1894, Don Mariano
mortgaged the land under pacto de retro, redeemable
within 10 years, for P8,000.00 to one Don Ignacio
Conrado. This transaction was said to have been registered
or inscribed on December 4, 1894. Don Mariano Ignacio
died, his daughter, Maria Socorro Conrado, his only heir,
adjudicated the land to herself. At about the same time,
Piadeco was organized. Its certificate of registration was
 issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission on June
27, 1932. Later, Maria Socorro, heir of Don Ignacio,
became a shareholder of Piadeco when she conveyed the
land to Piadecos treasurer and an incorporator, Trinidad B.
Estrada, in consideration of a certain amount of Piadeco
shares. Thereafter, Trinidad B. Estrada assigned the land
to Piadeco. Then came to the scene a certain Fabian
Castillo, appearing as sole heir of Don Mariano, the original
owner of the land. Castillo also executed an affidavit of
adjudication to himself over the same land, and then sold
the same to Piadeco. Consideration therefor was paid
partially by Piadeco, pending the registration of the land
under Act 496.
The question may well be asked: Why was full payment of
the consideration to Fabian Castillo made to depend on the
registration of the land under the Torrens system, if
Piadeco was sure of the validity of Titulo de
Propiedad 4136? This, and other factors herein pointed
out, cast great clouds of doubt that hang most
conspicuously over Piadecos title.
Moreover, in the case of Widows & Orphans Association, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals,[71] we categorically enunciated that the alleged
Spanish title, Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136, had become bereft of
any probative value as evidence of land ownership by virtue of P.D.
892 as contained in our Resolution dated February 6, 1985 in a
related case entitled Benito and WIDORA v. Ortigas docketed as
G.R. No. 69343. On March 29, 1985, an entry of final judgment
was made respecting G.R. No. 69343.
Under the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, the prior
declarations by this Court relating to the issue of the validity of
Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 preclude us from adjudicating
otherwise. In the Muoz case, we had cast doubt on the Titulos
validity. In the WIDORA case, the Titulos nullification was
definitive. In both cases, the Republic and the estate of Mariano
San Pedro y Esteban were on opposite ends before this bench. In
the case en banc of Calalang v. Register of Deeds of Quezon
City,[72] the Court explained the concept of conclusiveness of
judgment, viz:
x x x conclusiveness of judgment - states that a fact or
question which was in issue in a former suit and was there
 judicially passed upon and determined by a court of
competent jurisdiction, is conclusively settled by the
judgment therein as far as the parties to that action and
persons in privity with them are concerned and cannot be
again litigated in any future action between such parties or
their privies, in the same court or any other court of
concurrent jurisdiction on either the same or different
cause of action, while the judgment remains unreversed by
proper authority.It has been held that in order that a
judgment in one action can be conclusive as to a particular
matter in another action between the same parties or their
privies, it is essential that the issue be identical. If a
particular point or question is in issue in the second action,
and the judgment will depend on the determination of that
particular point or question, a former judgment between
the same parties or their privies will be final and conclusive
in the second if that same point or question was in issue
and adjudicated in the first suit (Nabus v. Court of Appeals,
193 SCRA 732 [1991]). Identity of cause of action is not
required by merely identity of issues.
The issue, whether Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is valid or not,
must now be laid to rest. The Titulo cannot be relied upon by the
petitioners-heirs or their privies as evidence of ownership. In the
petition for letters of administration the inventory submitted before
the probate court consisted solely of lands covered by the
Titulo. Hence, there can be no net estate to speak of after the
Titulos exclusion from the intestate proceedings of the estate of
the late Mariano San Pedro.
In G.R. No. 103727, the Titulo cannot be superior to the Torrens
Titles of private respondents Buhain, Ocampo and Dela Cruz,
namely TCT No. 372592 (Exh. 2, Buhain), TCT No. 8982 (Exh. 2-
De Ocampo) and TCT No. 269707 (Exh. 2 - Dela Cruz).[73] Under
the Torrens system of registration, the titles of private respondents
became indefeasible and incontrovertible one year from its final
decree.[74] More importantly, TCT Nos. 372592, 8982, 269707,
having been issued under the Torrens system, enjoy the conclusive
presumption of validity.[75] As a last hurrah to champion their claim
to the vast estate covered by the subject Spanish title, the
petitioners-heirs imputed fraud and bad faith which they failed to
prove on the part of the private respondents as regards their
Torrens titles and accused their own counsel of gross negligence
for having failed to call the proper witnesses from the Bureau of
Forestry to substantiate the petitioners-heirs claim that OCT No.
614 from which private respondents were derived is null and
void. It is an elementary legal principle that the negligence of
counsel binds the client.[76] The records show that the petitioners-
heirs were not at all prejudiced by the non-presentation of evidence
to prove that OCT No. 614 is a nullity considering that their
ownership itself of the lands being claimed was not duly proved. In
the case of Villa Rhecar Bus v. Dela Cruz, et al.,[77] we held:
It is unfortunate that the lawyer of the petitioner neglected
his responsibilities to his client. This negligence ultimately
resulted in a judgment adverse to the client. Be that as it
may, such mistake binds the client, the herein
petitioner. As a general rule, a client is bound by the
mistakes of his counsel. (Que v. Court of Appeals, 101
SCRA 13 [1980] Only when the application of the general
rule would result in serious injustice should an exception
thereto be called for. Under the circumstances obtaining in
this case, no undue prejudice against the petitioner has
been satisfactorily demonstrated. At most, there is only an
unsupported claim that the petitioner had been prejudiced
by the negligence of its counsel, without an explanation to
that effect.
Sans preponderance of evidence in support of the contention that
the petitioners-heirs were denied due process on account of the
negligence of their counsel, the writ of certiorari is unavailing.
It bears repeating that the heirs or successors-in-interest of
Mariano San Pedro y Esteban are not without recourse. Presidential
Decree No. 892, quoted hereinabove, grants all holders of Spanish
Titles the right to apply for registration of their lands under Act No.
496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act, within six (6)
months from the effectivity of the Decree. Thereafter, however,
any Spanish Title, if utilized as evidence of possession, cannot be
used as evidence of ownership in any land registration proceedings
under the Torrens system.
All instruments affecting lands originally registered under the
Spanish Mortgage Law may be recorded under Section 194 of the
Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Act 3344.
In view hereof, this is as good a time as any, to remind the
Solicitor General to be more vigilant in handling land registration
cases and intestate proceedings involving portions of the subject
estate. It is not too late in the day for the Office of the Solicitor
General to contest the Torrens titles of those who have acquired
ownership of such portions of land that rightfully belong to the
State.
In fine, the release of the matured Land Bank Capital Bonds
issued in favor of Mariano San Pedro y Esteban on August 13, 1968
sought by one Catalino San Pedro, alleged heir, legal holder and
owner of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is a matter not ripe for
adjudication in these cases. Firstly, Catalino San Pedro is not a
party in any of the two cases before us for review, hence, this Court
in a Resolution dated May 10, 1993,[78] denied Catalinos motion for
leave to reopen and/or new trial. And, secondly, the
aforementioned bonds were not included in the inventory of the
subject estate submitted by then administrators, Engracio San
Pedro and Justino Benito before the probate court.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petitions in G.R.
Nos. 103727 and 106496 are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Consequently, in G.R. No. 103727, the decision of the Court of
Appeals dated January 20, 1992 is hereby AFFIRMED.
In G.R. No. 106496, judgment is hereby rendered as follows :
(1) Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is declared null and void
and, therefore, no rights could be derived therefrom;
(2) All lands covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 are
excluded from the inventory of the estate of the late
Mariano San Pedro y Esteban;
(3) The petition for letters of administration, docketed as
Special Proceedings No. 312-B, should be, as it is,
hereby closed and terminated.
(4) The heirs, agents, privies and/or anyone acting for and
in behalf of the estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y
Esteban are hereby disallowed to exercise any act of
possession or ownership or to otherwise, dispose of in
any manner the whole or any portion of the estate
covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136; and they are
hereby ordered to immediately vacate the same, if they
or any of them are in possession thereof.
This judgment is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.