Lasanas vs People

Crime committed: Bigamy

Any person who contracts a second marriage without first having a judicial
declaration of the nullity of his or her first marriage, albeit on its face void
and inexistent for lack of a marriage license, is guilty of bigamy as defined
and penalized by Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.

Facts:On February 16, 1968,[2] Judge Carlos B. Salazar of the Municipal

Trial Court of San Miguel, Iloilo solemnized the marriage of accused Noel
Lasanas and Socorro Patingo[3]without the benefit of a marriage
license.[4] The records show that Lasanas and Patingo had not executed any
affidavit of cohabitation to excuse the lack of the marriage license.[5] On
August 27, 1980, Lasanas and Patingo reaffirmed their marriage vows in a
religious ceremony before Fr. Rodolfo Tamayo at the San Jose Church in
Iloilo City.[6] They submitted no marriage license or affidavit of
cohabitation for that purpose.[7] Both ceremonies were evidenced by the
corresponding marriage certificates.[8] In 1982, Lasanas and Patingo
separated de facto because of irreconcilable differences.[9]

On December 27, 1993, the accused contracted marriage with Josefa

Eslaban in a religious ceremony solemnized by Fr. Ramon Sequito at the
Sta. Maria Church in Iloilo City. Their marriage certificate reflected the civil
status of the accused as single.[10]

On July 26, 1996, the accused filed a complaint for annulment of marriage
and damages against Socorro in the RTC in Iloilo City,[11] which was
docketed as Civil Case No. 23133 and raffled to Branch 39 of the RTC. The
complaint alleged that Socorro had employed deceit, misrepresentations
and fraud in securing his consent to their marriage; and that subsequent
marital breaches, psychological incompatibilities and her infidelity had
caused him to suffer mental anguish, sleepless nights and social
humiliation warranting the award of damages. In support of his complaint,
he further alleged, among others, that:

He was married to the defendant on February 16, 1968 which marriage was
officiated by Hon. Carlos B. Salazar, Municipal Judge of San Miguel, Iloilo.
Machine copy of the Marriage Contract is herewith attached as Exhibit "A"
and made part hereof; which marriage was ratified by a wedding at San
Jose Church, Iloilo City on August 27, 1980 and registered at the office of
Iloilo City Registrar. Machine copy of the Marriage Contract is herewith
attached as Annex "B";

Ruling: The law on bigamy is found in Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code, which provides:

Article 349. Bigamy. The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon
any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the
former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has
been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the
proper proceedings.

The elements of the crime of bigamy are as follows: (1) that the offender has
been legally married; (2) that the marriage has not been legally dissolved
or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be
presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that he or she contracts a
second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent
marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.[27]

pursuant to Teves, the accused's conviction for bigamy is affirmed. The

crime of bigamy was consummated from the moment he contracted the
second marriage without his marriage to Socorro being first judicially
declared null and void, because at the time of the celebration of the second
marriage, his marriage to Socorro was still deemed valid and subsisting due
to such marriage not being yet declared null and void by a court of
competent jurisdiction.[

Go bangayan vs Bangayan Jr.

Crime: Bigamy
Bigamy – Non-existent marriage
In September 1979, Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. married Azucena Alegre. In 1982, while Alegre
was outside the Philippines, Benjamin developed a romantic relationship with Sally Go.
Sally’s father was against this. In order to appease her father, Sally convinced Benjamin to
sign a purported marriage contract in March 1982.
In 1994, the relationship between Sally and Benjamin soured. Sally filed a bigamy case
against Benjamin. Benjamin on the other hand filed an action to declare his alleged
marriage to Sally as non-existent. To prove the existence of their marriage, Sally presented
a marriage license allegedly issued to Benjamin.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage between Sally and Benjamin is bigamous.
HELD: No. The elements of bigamy are:
1. That the offender has been legally married.
2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent,
the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code.
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage.
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.
In this case, the fourth element is not present. The marriage license presented by Sally was
not authentic as in fact, no marriage license was ever issued to both parties in view of the
alleged marriage. The marriage between them was merely in jest and never complied with
the essential requisites of marriage. Hence, there is no bigamous marriage to speak of.

Ivler vs San Pedro

Crime: The petition seeks the review1 of the Orders2 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City
affirming sub-silencio a lower court’s ruling finding inapplicable the Double Jeopardy Clause to bar a
second prosecution for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property. This,
despite the accused’s previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical
Injuries arising from the same incident grounding the second prosecution.

Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was charged before
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 (MeTC), with two separate offenses: (1)
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries (Criminal Case No. 82367) for injuries
sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property (Criminal Case No. 82366) for the death of
respondent Ponce’s husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponce’s vehicle.
Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both cases.

On 7 September 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in Criminal Case No. 82367 and was
meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the
Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the
same offense of reckless imprudence.

The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under the same
provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing
quasi-offenses. The text of the provision reads:

Ruling: On the issue on double jeopardy, the two charges were prosecuted by the court under the
provision of Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code that penalizes quasi-offenses such as
negligence. What this provision contemplates in quasi-offenses of criminal negligence is punishing
the act of negligence that if intentionally done will constitute a criminal offense. Thus, the law
punishes the negligent act and not the result thereof. It takes into account the gravity of the offenses
in determining the penalty but not to qualify the substance of the offense. It treats a negligent act as
single whether the injurious result affects one or several persons. The offense of criminal negligence
remains as one and cannot be split into different crimes and prosecutions. The contention of the
lower court to invoke Article 48 where light offenses such as slight physical injuries cannot be
complexed with grave or less grave felony such as homicide that the court is compelled to separate
both charges is untenable in this case. The principle of prosecuting quasi offenses remain intact in
the case thus the petitioner cannot be prosecuted for 2 offenses of similar charges on reckless
imprudence. His prosecution on the first offense thus bars another prosecution for the second
offense by virtue of the principle of double jeopardy. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the
lower court.

Art. 48- the penalty for complex crimes when a single act constitutes two or more grave or
less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for commiting the other, the penalty
for the most serious crime shall be imposed, and the same shall be applied in its maximum.

Reckless imprudence vs Simple imprudence

Reckless imprudence consist of voluntary, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act which
results to material damage, this is due to the inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person
performing or failing to do an act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of
intelligence physical condition and other cirmustances regarding time, place and persons. While
simple imprudence is the lack of precaution displayed in those cases where damage caused is not
immediate or the danger is not clearly manifest.

Sevilla vs People
Venancio, a newly elected councillor of Malabon City, was charged with the crime of
Falsification of Public Document when he allegedly stated in his Personnel Data
Sheet, an official document, that he had no pending criminal case when in fact he is
accused in a criminal case for Assault Upon An Agent of A Person In Authority. In
his defense, he alleged that he merely signed the prepared PDS which he ordered
copied from his old PDS. This prepared PDS was brought to his home by his secretary
as he still had no office then.
After trial, the Sandiganbayan found him liable for the crime of Falsification of Public
document thru Reckless Imprudence.
In his appeal to the Supreme Court, Venancio theorises that he cannot be held liable
for Falsification of Public Document thru Reckless Imprudence because the
Information charged him with Intentional Falsification of Public Document.
The Supreme Court:
“Were criminal negligence but a modality in the commission of felonies, operating
only to reduce the penalty therefor, then it would be absorbed in the mitigating
circumstances of Art. 13, specially the lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as
the one actually committed. Furthermore, the theory would require that the
corresponding penalty should be fixed in proportion to the penalty prescribed for each
crime when committed willfully. For each penalty for the willful offense, there would
then be a corresponding penalty for the negligent variety. But instead, our Revised
Penal Code (Art. 365) fixes the penalty for reckless imprudence at arresto mayor
maximum, to prision correccional , if the willful act would constitute a grave felony,
notwithstanding that the penalty for the latter could range all the way from prision
mayor to death, according to the case. It can be seen that the actual penalty for
criminal negligence bears no relation to the individual willful crime, but is set in
relation to a whole class, or series, of crimes. (Emphasis supplied)
This explains why the technically correct way to allege quasi-crimes is to state that
their commission results in damage, either to person or property.[15] (Citations
omitted and emphasis ours)

TEVES V. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 188775, [August 24, 2011]

DOCTRINE:

Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes
of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected
marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous
marriage void.

A judicial declaration of nullity is required before a valid subsequent marriage can be

contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage, reprehensible and immoral.

FACTS:

On 26 November 1992, a marriage was solemnized between Cenon Teves (Cenon) and
Thelma Jaime-Teves (Thelma). After the marriage, Thelma left to work abroadand
would only come home to the Philippines for vacations. In 2002, Thelma was informed
that her husband had contracted marriage with a certain Edita Calderon. Thelma then
went to the National Statistics Office and secured a copy of the Certificate of Marriage
indicating that her husband (Cenon) and Edita contracted marriage on 10 December
2001 in Bulacan. In 2006, the uncle of Thelma, filed a complaint accusing petitioner
Cenon of bigamy. Petitioner was charged with bigamy under Article 349 of the RPC on
June 2006. However, during the pendency of the criminal case for bigamy, the RTC of
Caloocan City, rendered a decision dated May 2006 (one month before the case for
bigamy was decided) declaring the marriage of petitioner and Thelma null and void on
the ground that Thelma is physically incapacitated to comply with her essential marital
obligations pursuant to Article 36, Family Code. Said decision became final by
a Certification of Finality issued on 27 June 2006. Petitioner Cenon appealed before the
CA contending that the court a quo erred in not ruling that his criminal liability had
already been extinguished. Petitioner claims that since his previous marriage was
declared null and void, “there is in effect no marriage at all, and thus, there is no bigamy
to speak of.”

Petitioner further contends that the ruling of the Court in Mercado v. Tan is inapplicable
in his case because in the Mercado case the prosecution for bigamy was initiated before
the declaration of nullity of marriage was filed. Petitioner says that in his case, the first
marriage had already been legally dissolved at the time the bigamy case was filed in
court.

ISSUE:

Whether petitioner may be held guilty for the crime of Bigamy (Article 346, RPC)
despite the judicial declaration that his previous marriage with Thema is null and void.

HELD:

YES. The court held that it does not matter whether the case for declaration of nullity
was filed before the case for bigamy was instituted, for as long as the offender contracted
a subsequent marriage while his previous marriage is subsisting thereby not being able
to secure a Declaration of Nullity of the First marriage AT THE TIME HE
CONTRACTED THE SECOND MARRIAGE.

RATIO:

The instant case has all the elements of the crimeof bigamy under Art. 346 of the RPC.
Thus, the CA was correct in affirming the conviction of petitioner. Petitioner was legally
married to Thelma on 26 November 1992. He contracted a second or subsequent
marriage with Edita on 10 December 2001. At the time of his second marriage with
Edita, his marriage with Thelma was legally subsisting. It is noted that the finality of the
decision declaring the nullity of his first marriage with Thelma was only on 27 June
2006 or about five (5) years after his second marriage to Edita. Finally, the second or
subsequent marriage of petitioner with Edita has all the essential requisites for validity.
Petitioner has in fact not disputed the validity of such subsequent marriage.

People vs Paycana

Appellant Jesus Paycana Jr. was charged[1] with the complex

crime of parricide with unintentionalabortion before the Regional

Trial Court (RTC) of Iriga City, Branch 37. Appellant pleaded not guilty during the
arraignment.[2]Pre-trial ensued, in which appellant admitted that the
victim Lilybeth Balandra-Paycana (Lilybeth) is his legitimate wife.[3]
Appellant sought to exculpate himself from the crime by setting up self-defense,
claiming that it was his wife who attacked him first. In view of the nature of self-
defense, it necessarily follows that appellant admits having killed his seven (7)-
month pregnant wife, and in the process put to death their unborn child.

The prosecution presented Tito Balandra (Tito), the father of the victim;
Angelina Paycana (Angelina), appellants eldest daughter who personally witnessed
the whole gruesome incident; Barangay Tanod Juan Paraal, Jr.; Dr. Stephen
Beltran, who conducted the autopsy; and Santiago Magistrado, Jr., the embalmer
who removed the fetus from the deceaseds body.

The evidence for the prosecution established that on 26 November 2002, at

around 6:30 in the morning, appellant, who worked as a butcher, came home from
the slaughter house carrying his
[4]
tools of trade, a knife, a bolo, and a sharpener. His wife was

preparing their children for school and was waiting for him to come home from his
work. For reasons known to him alone, appellant stabbed his wife 14 times. [5] Tito,
whose house is at back of appellants house, heard his daughter shouting for help.
When he arrived, he saw his daughter lying prostrate near the door and her feet
were trembling. But seeing appellant, who was armed, he stepped back. Angelina
told Tito by the window that appellant had held her mothers neck and stabbed
her. [6]

Appellant claimed that he wrested the weapon from Lilybeth after she
stabbed him first. According to him, they had an altercation on the evening of 25
November 2002 because he saw a man coming out from the side of their house and
when he confronted his wife about the man, she did not answer. On the following
morning, he told her that they should live separately. As appellant got his things
and was on his way out of the door, Lilybeth stabbed him. But he succeeded in
wresting the knife from Lilybeth. And he stabbed her. He added that he was not
aware of the number of times he stabbed his wife because he was then dizzy and
lots of blood was coming out of his wound.[7]
The RTC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, properly convicted appellant of the
complex crime of parricide with unintentional abortion in the killing of his seven
(7)-month pregnant wife.

Bearing the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, the crime of

parricide[22] is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by
the accused; and (3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate
or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant or other descendant, or the
legitimate spouse of the accused. The key element in parricide is the relationship of
the offender with the victim. In the case of parricide of a spouse, the best proof of
the relationship between the accused and the deceased would be the marriage
certificate. The testimony of the accused of being married to the victim, in itself,
may also be taken as an admission against penal interest.[23]

As distinguished from infanticide,[24] the elements of unintentional

abortion[25] are as follows: (1) that there is a pregnant woman; (2) that violence is
used upon such pregnant woman without intending an abortion; (3) that the
violence is intentionally exerted; and (4) that as a result of the violence the fetus
dies, either in the womb or after having been expelled therefrom. In the crime of
infanticide, it is necessary that the child be born alive and be viable, that is, capable
of independent existence.[26] However, even if the child who was expelled
prematurely and deliberately were alive at birth, the offense is abortion due to the
fact that a fetus with an intrauterine life of 6 months is not viable.[27] In the present
case, the unborn fetus was also killed when the appellant stabbed Lilybeth several
times.

The case before us is governed by the first clause of Article 48[28] because by
a single act, that of stabbing his wife, appellant committed the grave felony of
parricide as well as the less grave felony of unintentional abortion. A complex
crime is committed when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies.

Under the aforecited article, when a single act constitutes two or more grave
or less grave felonies the
penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its m
aximum period irrespective of the presence of modifying circumstances. Applying
the aforesaid provision of law, the maximum penalty for the
most serious crime (parricide) is death. However, the Court of
Appeals properly commuted the penalty of death imposed on the appellant
to reclusion perpetua, pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346.[29]

People vs Abay

On March 8, 2000, appellant Roberto Abay y Trinidad was charged with rape in relation to Section
5(b), Article III of RA 7610 in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 41 under the following
Information:

That sometime in December 1999, in the City of Manila, Philippines, [appellant] by means of force
and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly commit sexual abuse and
lascivious conduct against [AAA], a minor, 13 years of age, by then and there kissing her breast and
whole body, lying on top of her and inserting his penis into her vagina, thus succeeded in having
carnal knowledge of her, against her will and consent thereafter threatening to kill her should she
report the incident, thereby gravely endangering her survival and normal growth and development, to
the damage and prejudice of [AAA].

AAA testified that appellant, her mother’s live-in partner, had been sexually abusing her since she
was seven years old. Whenever her mother was working or was asleep in the evening, appellant
would threaten her with a bladed instrument2 and force her to undress and engage in sexual
intercourse with him.

BBB corroborated AAA’s testimony. She testified that she knew about appellant’s dastardly acts.
However, because he would beat her up and accuse AAA of lying whenever she confronted him,
she kept her silence. Thus, when she caught appellant in the act of molesting her daughter on
December 25, 1999, she immediately proceeded to the police station and reported the incident..

Ruling:Under Section 5(b), Article III of RA 761012 in relation to RA 8353,13 if the victim of sexual
abuse14 is below 12 years of age, the offender should not be prosecuted for sexual abuse but for
statutory rape under Article 266-A(1)(d) of the Revised Penal Code15 and penalized with reclusion
perpetua.16 On the other hand, if the victim is 12 years or older, the offender should be charged with
either sexual abuse17 under Section 5(b) of RA 7610 or rape under Article 266-A (except paragraph
1[d]) of the Revised Penal Code. However, the offender cannot be accused of both crimes18 for the
same act because his right against double jeopardy will be prejudiced. A person cannot be subjected
twice to criminal liability for a single criminal act.19 Likewise, rape cannot be complexed with a
violation of Section 5(b) of RA 7610. Under Section 48 of the Revised Penal Code (on complex
crimes),20 a felony under the Revised Penal Code (such as rape) cannot be complexed with an
offense penalized by a special law.21

In this case, the victim was more than 12 years old when the crime was committed against her. The
Information against appellant stated that AAA was 13 years old at the time of the incident. Therefore,
appellant may be prosecuted either for violation of Section 5(b) of RA 7610 or rape under Article
266-A (except paragraph 1[d]) of the Revised Penal Code. While the Information may have alleged
the elements of both crimes, the prosecution’s evidence only established that appellant sexually
violated the person of AAA through force and intimidation22 by threatening her with a bladed
instrument and forcing her to submit to his bestial designs. Thus, rape was established.23

Indeed, the records are replete with evidence establishing that appellant forced AAA to engage in
sexual intercourse with him on December 25, 1999. Appellant is therefore found guilty of rape under
Article 266-A(1)(a) of the Revised Penal Code and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. Furthermore, to
conform with existing jurisprudence, he is ordered to pay AAA P75,000 as civil indemnity ex-
delicto24 and P75,000 as moral damages.25

Persuasion, intimidation enticement and coercion. 12-18 (to be covered by child abuse)

Gonzales vs Sato (EXAM TO BES 10 POINTS)

Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

ART. 332. Persons exempt from criminal liability. – No criminal, but only civil liability shall result from
the commission of the crime of theft, swindling, or malicious mischief committed or caused mutually
by the following persons:

1. Spouses, ascendants and descendants, or relatives by affinity in the same line;

2. The widowed spouse with respect to the property which belonged to the deceased spouse
before the same shall have passed into the possession of another; and

3. Brothers and sisters and brothers-in-law and sisters-in-law, if living together.

The exemption established by this article shall not be applicable to strangers participating in the
commission of the crime. (emphasis supplied)

For purposes of the aforementioned provision, is the relationship by affinity created between the
husband and the blood relatives of his wife (as well as between the wife and the blood relatives of
her husband) dissolved by the death of one spouse, thus ending the marriage which created such
relationship by affinity? Does the beneficial application of Article 332 cover the complex crime of
estafa thru falsification?

Mediatrix G. Carungcong, in her capacity as the duly appointed administratrix1 of petitioner intestate
estate of her deceased mother Manolita Gonzales vda. de Carungcong, filed a complaint-
affidavit2 for estafa against her brother-in-law, William Sato, a Japanese national. Her complaint-
affidavit read:

In a resolution dated March 25, 1997, the City Prosecutor of Quezon City dismissed the
complaint.4 On appeal, however, the Secretary of Justice reversed and set aside the resolution dated
March 25, 1997 and directed the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to file an Information against Sato
for violation of Article 315, paragraph 3(a) of the Revised Penal Code.5 Thus, the following
Information was filed against Sato in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87:6

INFORMATION

The undersigned accuses WILLIAM SATO of the crime of ESTAFA under Article 315[,] par. 3(a) of
the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
That on or about the 24th day of November, 1992, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named
accused, by means of deceit, did, then and there, wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud
MANOLITA GONZALES VDA. DE CARUNGCONG in the following manner, to wit: the said accused
induced said Manolita Gonzales Vda. De Carungcong[,] who was already then blind and 79 years
old[,] to sign and thumbmark a special power of attorney dated November 24, 1992 in favor of
Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato, daughter of said accused, making her believe that said document involved
only her taxes, accused knowing fully well that said document authorizes Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato,
then a minor, to sell, assign, transfer or otherwise dispose of to any person or entity of her properties
all located at Tagaytay City

registered in the name of Manolita Gonzales Vda. De Carungcong, and once in the possession of
the said special power of attorney and other pertinent documents, said accused made Wendy
Mitsuko Sato sign the three (3) Deeds of Absolute Sale covering Transfer Certificate of Title [TCT]
No. 3148 for P250,000.00, [TCT] No. 3149 for P250,000.00 and [Tax Declaration] GR-016-0735
for P650,000.00 and once in possession of the proceeds of the sale of the above properties, said
accused, misapplied, misappropriated and converted the same to his own personal use and benefit,
to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of Manolita Gonzales Vda. De Carungcong who died in
1994.

Sato moved for the quashal of the Information, claiming that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal
Code, his relationship to the person allegedly defrauded, the deceased Manolita who was his
mother-in-law, was an exempting circumstance.

The prosecution disputed Sato’s motion in an opposition dated March 29, 2006.

In an order dated April 17, 2006,8 the trial court granted Sato’s motion and ordered the dismissal of
the criminal case:

The Trial Prosecutor’s contention is that the death of the wife of the accused severed the
relationship of affinity between accused and his mother-in-law. Therefore, the mantle of protection
provided to the accused by the relationship is no longer obtaining.

A judicious and thorough examination of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code convinces this Court
of the correctness of the contention of the [d]efense. While it is true that the death of Zenaida
Carungcong-Sato has extinguished the marriage of accused with her, it does not erase the fact that
accused and Zenaida’s mother, herein complainant, are still son[-in-law] and mother-in-law and they
remained son[-in-law] and mother-in-law even beyond the death of Zenaida.

Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code, is very explicit and states no proviso. "No criminal, but
only civil liability[,] shall result from the commission of the crime of theft, swindling or malicious
mischief committed or caused mutually by xxx 1) spouses, ascendants and descendants, or relatives
by affinity in the same line."

Article 332, according to Aquino, in his Commentaries [to] Revised Penal Code, preserves family
harmony and obviates scandal, hence even in cases of theft and malicious mischief, where the
crime is committed by a stepfather against his stepson, by a grandson against his grandfather, by a
son against his mother, no criminal liability is incurred by the accused only civil (Vicente Alavare, 52
Phil. 65; Adame, CA 40 OG 12th Supp. 63; Cristobal, 84 Phil. 473).

Such exempting circumstance is applicable herein.

WHEREFORE, finding the Motion to Quash Original Information meritorious, the same is GRANTED
and, as prayed for, case is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.9 (underlining supplied in the original)

The prosecution’s motion for reconsideration10 was denied in an order dated June 2, 2006.11

Dissatisfied with the trial court’s rulings, the intestate estate of Manolita, represented by Mediatrix,
filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals12 which, however, in a decision13 dated August 9,
2007, dismissed it. It ruled:

[W]e sustain the finding of [the trial court] that the death of Zenaida did not extinguish the
relationship by affinity between her husband, private respondent Sato, and her mother Manolita, and
does not bar the application of the exempting circumstance under Article 332(1) of the Revised
Penal Code in favor of private respondent SatO

Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in not reversing the orders of the trial court. It
cites the commentary of Justice Luis B. Reyes in his book on criminal law that the rationale of Article
332 of the Revised Penal Code exempting the persons mentioned therein from criminal liability is
that the law recognizes the presumed co-ownership of the property between the offender and
the offended party. Here, the properties subject of the estafa case were owned by Manolita whose
daughter, Zenaida Carungcong-Sato (Sato’s wife), died on January 28, 1991. Hence, Zenaida
never became a co-owner because, under the law, her right to the three parcels of land could
have arisen only after her mother’s death. Since Zenaida predeceased her mother, Manolita,
no such right came about and the mantle of protection provided to Sato by the relationship
no longer existed.

Sato counters that Article 332 makes no distinction that the relationship may not be invoked in case
of death of the spouse at the time the crime was allegedly committed. Thus, while the death of
Zenaida extinguished her marriage with Sato, it did not dissolve the son-in-law and mother-in-law
relationship between Sato and Zenaida’s mother, Manolita.

For his part, the Solicitor General maintains that Sato is covered by the exemption from criminal
liability provided under Article 332. Nothing in the law and jurisprudence supports petitioner’s claim
that Zenaida’s death dissolved the relationship by affinity between Sato and Manolita. As it is, the
criminal case against Sato created havoc among the members of the Carungcong and Sato families,
a situation sought to be particularly avoided by Article 332’s provision exempting a family member
committing theft, estafa or malicious mischief from criminal liability and reducing his/her liability to
the civil aspect only.

The petition has merit.

The resolution of this case rests on the interpretation of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code. In
particular, it calls for the determination of the following: (1) the effect of death on the relationship by
affinity created between a surviving spouse and the blood relatives of the deceased spouse and (2)
the extent of the coverage of Article 332.

Thus, for purposes of Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code, we hold that the relationship by
affinity created between the surviving spouse and the blood relatives of the deceased spouse
survives the death of either party to the marriage which created the affinity. (The same principle
applies to the justifying circumstance of defense of one’s relatives under Article 11[2] of the Revised
Penal Code, the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of grave offense committed
against one’s relatives under Article 13[5] of the same Code and the absolutory cause of relationship
in favor of accessories under Article 20 also of the same Code.)

Scope of Article 332 of The Revised Penal Code

The absolutory cause under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code only applies to the felonies of
theft, swindling and malicious mischief. Under the said provision, the State condones the criminal
responsibility of the offender in cases of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. As an act of grace,
the State waives its right to prosecute the offender for the said crimes but leaves the private
offended party with the option to hold the offender civilly liable.

However, the coverage of Article 332 is strictly limited to the felonies mentioned therein. The plain,
categorical and unmistakable language of the provision shows that it applies exclusively to the
simple crimes of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. It does not apply where any of the crimes
mentioned under Article 332 is complexed with another crime, such as theft through falsification or
estafa through falsification.39

The Information against Sato charges him with estafa. However, the real nature of the offense is
determined by the facts alleged in the Information, not by the designation of the offense.40 What
controls is not the title of the Information or the designation of the offense but the actual facts recited
in the Information.41 In other words, it is the recital of facts of the commission of the offense, not the
nomenclature of the offense, that determines the crime being charged in the Information.42 It is the
exclusive province of the court to say what the crime is or what it is named.43 The determination by
the prosecutor who signs the Information of the crime committed is merely an opinion which is not
binding on the court.44

A reading of the facts alleged in the Information reveals that Sato is being charged not with simple
estafa but with the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public documents.

Effect of Absolutory Cause Under Article 332 on Criminal Liability For The Complex Crime of
Estafa Through Falsification of Public Documents

The question may be asked: if the accused may not be held criminally liable for simple estafa by
virtue of the absolutory cause under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, should he not be
absolved also from criminal liability for the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public
documents? No.

True, the concurrence of all the elements of the two crimes of estafa and falsification of public
document is required for a proper conviction for the complex crime of estafa through falsification of
public document. That is the ruling in Gonzaludo v. People.46 It means that the prosecution must
establish that the accused resorted to the falsification of a public document as a necessary means to
commit the crime of estafa.

However, a proper appreciation of the scope and application of Article 332 of the Revised Penal
Code and of the nature of a complex crime would negate exemption from criminal liability for the
complex crime of estafa through falsification of public documents, simply because the accused may
not be held criminally liable for simple estafa by virtue of the absolutory cause under Article 332.

The absolutory cause under Article 332 is meant to address specific crimes against property,
namely, the simple crimes of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. Thus, all other crimes, whether
simple or complex, are not affected by the absolutory cause provided by the said provision. To apply
the absolutory cause under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code to one of the component crimes
of a complex crime for the purpose of negating the existence of that complex crime is to unduly
expand the scope of Article 332. In other words, to apply Article 332 to the complex crime of estafa
through falsification of public document would be to mistakenly treat the crime of estafa as a
separate simple crime, not as the component crime that it is in that situation. It would wrongly
consider the indictment as separate charges of estafa and falsification of public document, not as a
single charge for the single (complex) crime of estafa through falsification of public document.

The purpose of Article 332 is to preserve family harmony and obviate scandal.47

Falsification of Public Documents May Be a Necessary Means for Committing Estafa Even
Under Article 315 (3[a])

The elements of the offense of estafa punished under Article 315 (3[a]) of the Revised Penal Code
are as follows:

(1) the offender induced the offended party to sign a document;

(2) deceit was employed to make the offended party sign the document;

(3) the offended party personally signed the document and

(4) prejudice is caused to the offended party.

While in estafa under Article 315(a) of the Revised Penal Code, the law does not require that the
document be falsified for the consummation thereof, it does not mean that the falsification of the
document cannot be considered as a necessary means to commit the estafa under that provision.

When the offender commits in a public document any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article
171 of the Revised Penal Code as a necessary means to commit another crime, like estafa, theft or
malversation, the two crimes form a complex crime under Article 48 of the same Code.58 The
falsification of a public, official or commercial document may be a means of committing estafa
because, before the falsified document is actually utilized to defraud another, the crime of
falsification has already been consummated, damage or intent to cause damage not being an
element of the crime of falsification of a public, official or commercial document.59 In other words, the
crime of falsification was committed prior to the consummation of the crime of estafa.60 Actually
utilizing the falsified public, official or commercial document to defraud another is estafa.61 The
damage to another is caused by the commission of estafa, not by the falsification of the document.62 1avv phi 1

Applying the above principles to this case, the allegations in the Information show that the
falsification of public document was consummated when Sato presented a ready-made SPA to
Manolita who signed the same as a statement of her intention in connection with her taxes. While
the falsification was consummated upon the execution of the SPA, the consummation of the estafa
occurred only when Sato later utilized the SPA. He did so particularly when he had the properties
sold and thereafter pocketed the proceeds of the sale. Damage or prejudice to Manolita was caused
not by the falsification of the SPA (as no damage was yet caused to the property rights of Manolita at
the time she was made to sign the document) but by the subsequent use of the said document. That
is why the falsification of the public document was used to facilitate and ensure (that is, as a
necessary means for) the commission of the estafa.

The situation would have been different if Sato, using the same inducement, had made Manolita sign
a deed of sale of the properties either in his favor or in favor of third parties. In that case, the
damage would have been caused by, and at exactly the same time as, the execution of the
document, not prior thereto. Therefore, the crime committed would only have been the simple crime
of estafa.63 On the other hand, absent any inducement (such as if Manolita herself had been the one
who asked that a document pertaining to her taxes be prepared for her signature, but what was
presented to her for her signature was an SPA), the crime would have only been the simple crime of
falsification.64

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision dated August 9, 2007 and the
resolution dated January 23, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. S.P. No. 95260
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is remanded to the trial court which is directed to try the
accused with dispatch for the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public documents.

Case Digest: People v. Gallo

G.R. No. 187730: June 29, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. RODOLFO GALLO y GADOT,

Accused-Appellant.

VELASCO, JR., J.:

FACTS:

Accused-appellant Gallo and accused Pacardo and Manta together with Mardeolyn
and 9 others, were charged with syndicated illegal recruitment and 18 counts of
estafacommitted against eighteen complainants, including Dela Caza, Guantero and
Sare. The present appeal concerns solely accused-appellants conviction for
syndicated illegal recruitment in Criminal Case No. 02-206293 and for estafain
Criminal Case No. 02-206297. According to the prosecution, Dela Caza was
introduced by Panuncio to accused-appellant Gallo, Pacardo, Manta, Mardeolyn,
Lulu Mendanes, Yeo Sin Ung and another Korean national at the office of MPM
Agency located in Malate, Manila. Accused-appellant Gallo then introduced himself
as a relative of Mardeolyn and informed Dela Caza that the agency was able to send
many workers abroad. Together with Pacardo and Manta, he also told Dela Caza
about the placement fee of PhP150,000 with a down payment of PhP45,000 and the
balance to be paid through salary deduction. With accused-appellants assurance
that many workers have been sent abroad, as well as the presence of the 2 Korean
nationals and upon being shown the visas procured for the deployed workers, Dela
Caza was convinced to part with his money and paid the agency. After 2 weeks, the
said agency moved and changed their name. After 2 more months of waiting in vain
to be deployed, Dela Caza and the other applicants decided to take action. The first
attempt was unsuccessful because the agency again moved to another place.
However, with the help of the Office of Ambassador Seres and the Western Police
District, they were able to locate the new address at Carriedo, Manila. The agency
explained that it had to move in order to separate those who are applying as
entertainers from those applying as factory workers. Accused-appellant Gallo,
together with Pacardo and Manta, were then arrested. For his defense, accused-
appellant denied having any part in the recruitment of Dela Caza. In fact, he testified
that he also applied with MPM Agency for deployment to Koreaas a factory worker.
RTC and CA convicted the appellants.
ISSUE: Whether or not accused-appellant is guilty of illegal recruitment committed
by a syndicate.

HELD: Yes.
CRIMINAL LAW

the prosecution likewise established that accused-appellant is guilty of the crime

of estafa as defined under Article 315 paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code

Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud

another by any means mentioned hereinbelow
xxxx
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent
acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the
fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess
power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency,
business or imaginary transactions; or by means of other
similar deceits.

The elements of estafa in general are: (1) that the accused defrauded another (a) by
abuse of confidence, or (b) by means of deceit; and (2) that damage or prejudice
capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third person.
Deceit is the false representation of a matter of fact, whether by words or conduct,
by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which should have
been disclosed; and which deceives or is intended to deceive another so that he
shall act upon it, to his legal injury. All these elements are present in the instant
case: the accused-appellant, together with the other accused at large, deceived the
complainants into believing that the agency had the power and capability to send
them abroad for employment; that there were available jobs for them in Korea as
factory workers; that by reason or on the strength of such assurance, the
complainants parted with their money in payment of the placement fees; that after
receiving the money, accused-appellant and his co-accused went into hiding by
changing their office locations without informing complainants; and that
complainants were never deployed abroad. As all these representations of the
accused-appellant proved false, paragraph 2(a), Article 315 of the RPC is thus
applicable.

To commit syndicated illegal recruitment, three elements must be established: (1)

the offender undertakes either any activity within the meaning of recruitment
and placement defined under Article 13(b), or any of the prohibited practices
enumerated under Art. 34 of the Labor Code; (2) he has no valid license or
authority required by law to enable one to lawfully engage in recruitment and
placement of workers;[8] and (3) the illegal recruitment is committed by a group of
three (3) or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another.[9] When
illegal recruitment is committed by a syndicate or in large scale, i.e., if it is
committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group, it is
considered an offense involving economic sabotage.[10]

People vs Tria

CRIME: estafa
The Facts

The criminal information to which the petitioner pleaded “Not Guilty” reads: chanRoblesvi rtual Lawli bra ry

That on or [about] March 8, 2000 in Valenzuela City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud
and deceive SEVEN SPHERE ENTERPRISES represented by one GERTRUDES MENESES in the following
manner to wit: the said accused received assorted jewelry from SEVEN SPHERE ENTERPRISES
worth P23,375.50 under the express obligation on the part of the said accused to sell the same and to
account for and deliver the proceeds of the sale or to return the merchandise, if unsold, to SEVEN SPHERE
ENTERPRISES, within six (6) days from receipt thereof, but said accused once in possession of the pieces of
jewelry, with abuse of trust and confidence, misappropriate, misapply and convert to her own personal use
and benefit the said amount of P23,375.50 and despite repeated demands to her to immediately account
for and remit the proceeds of the sale of [sic] to return the goods, refused and failed and still refuses and
fails to do so, to the damage and prejudice of SEVEN SPHERE ENTERPRISES in the aforementioned amount
of P23,375.50.
Ruling of the Court

The appeal is devoid of merit.

Preliminarily, it bears emphasizing that factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the
Estafa through misappropriation or conversion is defined and penalized under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC), which states: chanRoblesvi rt ual Lawlib rary

Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). - Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned
hereinbelow shall be punished by: chan roble svi rtual lawlib rary
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the
amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds
the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one
year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty
years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed under the
provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may
be.
x x x x

1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely: chanrob lesvi rt uallawlib ra ry

x x x x

(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods or any other personal
property received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other
obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even though such obligation be
totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received such money, goods, or other
property.

The elements of estafa under this provision are: (1) that the money, good or other personal property is
received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation
involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return, the same; (2) that there be misappropriation or
conversion of such money or property by the offender or denial on his part of such receipt; (3) that such
misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (4) that there is a demand made
by the offended party on the offender.24 cralawlawlibra ry

The first, third and fourth elements are immediately discernible from the prosecution’s evidence. Exhibit “B”
which is the ‘Receipt of Goods on Consignment’ shows that on March 8, 2000, the petitioner received pieces
of jewelry on consignment from Seven Sphere with the obligation to return the unsold pieces or remit the
sale proceeds of the sold items. This documentary evidence was corroborated by the testimony of Meneses,
who signed the document in behalf of the consignor at the time of its execution. She identified the
petitioner’s signature on the document and she confirmed the contents of the agreement as being a
consignment contract, as well as the petitioner’s consequent duties thereunder to remit sale proceeds or
return the unsold pieces of jewelry.

Meanwhile, the second element of misappropriation or conversion has been defined in this wise: cha nRoblesv irt ual Lawlib rary

The words “convert” and “misappropriate” connote the act of using or disposing of another’s property as if it
were one’s own, or of devoting it to a purpose or use different from that agreed upon. To misappropriate for
one’s own use includes not only conversion to one’s personal advantage, but also every attempt to dispose
of the property of another without right. In proving the element of conversion or misappropriation, a legal
presumption of misappropriation arises when the accused fails to deliver the proceeds of the sale or to
return the items to be sold and fails to give an account of their whereabouts.25 chan robles law

In fine, we find no reversible error in the CA decision affirming the findings of the RTC on the petitioner’s
criminal liability for estafa. However, the penalty imposed upon her must be corrected.

CARMEN LIWANAG, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS

and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the
Solicitor General, respondents.
Petitioner was charged with the crime of estafa before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 93, Quezon City, in an information which reads as
follows:
That on or between the month of May 19, 1988 and August, 1988 in Quezon City,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with
intent of gain, with unfaithfulness, and abuse of confidence, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud one ISIDORA ROSALES, in the
following manner, to wit: on the date and in the place aforementioned, said
accused received in trust from the offended party cash money amounting
to P536,650.00, Philippine Currency, with the express obligation involving the duty to
act as complainants agent in purchasing local cigarettes (Philip Morris and Marlboro
cigarettes), to resell them to several stores, to give her commission corresponding to
40% of the profits; and to return the aforesaid amount of offended party, but said
accused, far from complying her aforesaid obligation, and once in possession thereof,
misapplied, misappropriated and converted the same to her personal use and benefit,
despite repeated demands made upon her, accused failed and refused and still fails and
refuses to deliver and/or return the same to the damage and prejudice of the said
ISIDORA ROSALES, in the aforementioned amount and in such other amount as
may be awarded under the provision of the Civil Code.

In the instant petition, however, it is evident that Liwanag could not

dispose of the money as she pleased because it was only delivered to her for
a single purpose, namely, for the purchase of cigarettes, and if this was not
possible then to return the money to Rosales. Since in this case there was no
transfer of ownership of the money delivered, Liwanag is liable for conversion
under Art. 315, par. 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appealed decision of the
Court of Appeals dated November 29, 1993, is AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.
Juridical Possession- personal property is received in trust, or on
commission or for administration or under any obligation involving the
duty to make delivery of, or to return the same.

Material Possesion-the recipient of a personal property has no right

whatsoever over the property except to hold it for the purpose assigned by
the owner. Does not acquire any right only to hold.
 San diego vs People

Crime: Qualified Theft

Petitioner Grace San Diego had been the accountant of Obando Fisherman's Multi-Purpose
Cooperative, Inc. (OFMPCI) from January 1993 to March 11, 1997. Petitioner was in charge of
accounting all business transactions of the cooperative and performed the functions of cashier and
teller, granted loans and did check discounting and trading. She also recorded and reported the cash
in bank transactions and summarized the bank transactions for the day and was also entrusted with
a set of blank checks pre-signed and was authorized to fill up the checks, particularly the date, the
amount in words and in figures, and the payee.

That from November 18, 1996 to January 6, 1997, petitioner acted as cashier when Teresita
Gonzales was on maternity leave and acted as teller from January 13- 30, 1997 when Flordeliza
Ocampo was on her honeymoon. She then, on both occasions, had complete access to the cash
vaults and filing cabinets of the cooperative where its documents were kept.

On March 12, 1997, petitioner stopped reporting for work. Narciso Correa, the General Manager of
the cooperative, then instructed the bookkeeper, Angelita Dimapelis, to prepare bank book balance
based on the cash transactions during the day at the office. They tried to establish the accountability
of San Diego by comparing the cash position she prepared and certified as correct against the
balances of the bank. Dimapelis asked the different depository banks for their bank balances since
their savings account passbooks and bank statements were missing at that time.4

It was only after Corres and Dimapelis reconciled the cash position with the bank balances that they
discovered the discrepancies in petitioner's report. The audited figure showed the cash on hand in
bank to be Php3,712,442.80 as of March 11, 1997.However, petitioner reported and certified the
cash on hand of the cooperative with the total amount of Php9,590,455.17 to be correct. Dimapelis
reported the said discrepancies to Correa and the Board of Directors. It was then that they decided
to file a criminal complaint against San Diego.5

Thus, an Information was filed against petitioner for the crime of qualified theft,6 which reads as
follows:

That [on] or about the period from January 1996 up to March 1997 in the [M]unicipality of Obando,
[P]rovince of Bulacan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, being employed as accountant, cashier and teller of Obando Fisherman's Multi-
Purpose Cooperative, Inc. (OFMPCI) and as such had access to the books, cash vaults and bank
deposits of the Cooperative and with grave abuse of confidence, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to gain and without the knowledge and consent of Obando
Fisherman's Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc., take, steal and carry away with her cash amounting to
Php6,016,084.26, to [the] damage and prejudice of the said Obando Fisherman's Multi-Purpose
Cooperative, Inc., in the said amount of Php6,016,084.26. CONTRARY TO LAW.7

Petitioner then insists that the proof adduced plausibly indicates commission of estafa and not
qualified theft. Petitioner argued that if the thing is not taken away, but received and then
appropriated or converted without the consent of the owner, the crime committed is estafa.23 This
Court is not persuaded by her argument. One of the elements of estafa24 with abuse of confidence is
that the money, goods or other personal property be received by the offender in trust, or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery
of, or to return, the same. When the thing is received by the offender from the offended party in trust
or in commission or for administration, the offender acquires both material or physical possession
and juridical possession of the thing received.25

Juridical possession means a possession which gives the transferee a right over the thing
transferred and this he may set up even against the owner.26 It was established in the trial that
petitioner never received the sum of money in trust, or on commission or for administration. Correa
outlined the procedure followed by the cooperative in the deposit of its funds with the cooperative's
depository banks, thus:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Consequently, the Decision and Resolution, dated March 6,
2006 and December 14, 2006, respectively, of the Court of Appeals affirming with modification the
Decision dated August 20, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 17, finding
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified theft under Article 310, in
connection with Article 308 of the Revised· Penal Code, are hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Petitioner Grace San Diego y Trinidad is sentenced to reclusion perpetua, with all
its accessory penalties. and to indemnify the Obando Fisherman's Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. in
the amount of Php2,080,000.00, plus interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from finality
of judgment until full satisfaction:

Santos vs people

Sometime in November 1980, the complaining witness, Encarnacion Peñalosa, entrusted her car, a
1976 Ford Escort, to herein petitioner Lauro Santos for repair of the carburetor. The work was to
cost P300.00. A week later, Santos persuaded her to have her car repainted by him for P6,500.00,
within a period of two months. 1

After two months, Peñalosa went to the petitioner's repair shop at MacArthur Highway, Malabon, to
retrieve her car. Santos refused to deliver the vehicle unless she paid him P634.60 for the repairs.
As she did not have the money then, she left the shop to get the needed payment. Upon her return,
she could not find Santos although she waited five hours for him. She went back to the shop several
times thereafter but to no avail. 2

Peñalosa was to learn later that Santos had abandoned his shop in Malabon. Unable to recover her
car, she filed a complaint for carnapping against Santos with the Constabulary Highway Patrol
Group in Camp Crame. The case was dismissed when the petitioner convinced the military
authorities that the complainant had sold the vehicle to him. He submitted for this purpose a Deed of
Sale with Right of Repurchase in his favor. 3

In his defense, the petitioner now quibbles about the supposed inconsistences of the complaining
witness that he says make her testimony questionable. Our ruling is that such inconsistencies are
minor lapses and do not impair Peñalosa's credibility as a whole. Santos also wonders why, if it is
true that she had asked him to repair and repaint her car, she had not even made an advance
payment. One reason could be that he himself did not ask for such advance, considering that they
were members of the same bowling team. There is even the suggestion that he was smitten with her
although she says she rejected his suit. 6

The petitioner's main reliance, though, is on the Deed of Sale with Right of Repurchase which he
submitted at the trial to prove that Peñalosa had sold the car to him and now had no claim to it.
The lower courts were correct in rejecting this shoddy evidence. It is a wonder that it was even
considered at all when the case filed in Camp Crame was dismissed.

A cursory look at this alleged document will show that it is spurious. There are alterations and
deletions that are not even initialed to authenticate the changes. Two entire paragraphs are
cancelled. The name and address of the supposed original vendee are crossed out and those of the
petitioner are written in place of the deletions. Moreover, the so-called deed is not notarized.

It would have been so easy to re-type the one-page document to express clearly and indubitably the
intent of the parties and then have it properly acknowledged. But this was not done. The petitioner
insists that the document was originally intended to be concluded between Peñalosa and Domingo
Corsiga but was hastily changed to make Santos the buyer and mortgagee. 7 Surely a vendee would
not be so rash as to depend for his title to the thing purchased on such a shabby and dubious deed of
sale.

The petitioner also makes much of the fact that Peñalosa did not even sign a job order or get a
receipt when she delivered her car to him for repairs. In fact, she did not even check where his repair
shop was. He forgets that he was no less trusting either. He himself does not explain why the
amount of P6,000.00 he allegedly gave for the car was not acknowledged by Peñalosa in the Deed
of Sale or in a separate instrument. There was no proof at all of such payment.

Given these circumstances, we find it easier to believe that Peñalosa had signed the original
document with the intention of selling her car to Domingo Corsiga, the party first named therein, but
later changed her mind. She left the unused document in her car and Santos, chancing upon it when
the vehicle was delivered to him, decided to modify it to suit his purposes.

Besides, as the respondent court correctly observed, why would Santos still demand from Peñalosa
the cost of the repairs on the car if he claims he had already bought it from her? And there is also
the glaring fact that Santos was unable to register the car in his name despite the lapse of all of two
years after his alleged purchase of the vehicle.

In his supplemental memorandum, the petitioner says he could not register the car because it had
merely been mortgaged to him and he had to wait until the expiration of the period of
repurchase. 8 Yet, during his cross-examination on March 5, 1984, Santos repeatedly declared that the
car belonged to him and that the right of repurchase expired after two months from November or
December 1980. He also said that rather than register it, he could cannibalize the car and sell the spare
parts separately at greater profit. 9

Although the information charged the petitioner with estafa, the crime committed was theft. It is
settled that what controls is not the designation of the offense but the description thereof as alleged
in the information. 11 And as described therein, the offense imputed to Santos contains all the essential
elements of theft, to wit: (1) that there be a taking of personal property; (2) that said property belongs to
another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of
the owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against
persons or force upon things. 12

Theft should not be confused with estafa. According to Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino in his book
on the Revised Penal Code, "The principal distinction between the two crimes is that in theft the
thing is taken while in estafa the accused receives the property and converts it to his own use or
benefit. However, there may be theft even if the accused has possession of the property. If he was
entrusted only with the material or physical (natural) or de facto possession of the thing, his
misappropriation of the same constitutes theft, but if he has the juridical possession of the thing, his
conversion of the same constitutes embezzlement or estafa." 13

The petitioner argues that there was no intent to gain at the time of the taking of the vehicle and so
no crime was committed. In U.S. v. De Vera, 14 we held that the subsequent appropriation by the
accused of the thing earlier delivered to him supplied the third element that made the crime theft instead
of estafa.

Illustrating, the Court declared:

... let us suppose that A, a farmer in the Province of Bulacan, agrees to sell B a
certain quantity of rice at a certain price per picul. A ships several sacks of the grain
which B receives in his warehouse. If, prior to the measuring required before the
payment of the agreed price, B takes a certain quantity of rice from the different
sacks, there can be no doubt that he is guilty of the crime of theft. Now, it may be
asked: Did not B receive the sacks of rice shipped to him by A?-Yes. And did A
voluntarily deliver the sacks of rice which he owned by shipping them to B?-Yes Was
the taking of the rice by B from the different sacks done with A's consent?- No.

This shows, to our mind, that the theory of the defense is untenable, according to
which, when the thing is received and then appropriated or converted to one's own
use without the consent of the owner, the crime committed is not that of theft.

It was erroneous for the respondent court to hold the petitioner guilty of qualified theft because the
fact that the object of the crime was a car was not alleged in the information as a qualifying
circumstance. 15 Santos would have had reason to argue that he had not been properly informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him, as qualified theft carries a higher penalty.

But although not pleaded and so not considered qualifying, the same circumstance may be
considered aggravating, having been proved at the trial. 16 Hence the imposable penalty for the theft,
there being no other modifying circumstances, should be in the maximum degree.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED as herein modified. The petitioner is declared
guilty of theft and sentenced to from six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor to thirteen (13)
years of reclusion temporal. He is also ordered to restore the car in question to the private
respondent, or if this is no longer possible, to pay her the value thereof in the amount of P38,000.00,

People vs Puig

On 7 November 2005, the Iloilo Provincial Prosecutor’s Office filed before

Branch 68 of the RTC in Dumangas, Iloilo, 112 cases of Qualified Theft
against respondents Teresita Puig (Puig) and Romeo Porras (Porras) who
were the Cashier and Bookkeeper, respectively, of private complainant Rural
Bank of Pototan, Inc. The cases were docketed as Criminal Cases No. 05-
3054 to 05-3165.

The dismissal by the RTC of the criminal cases was allegedly due to
insufficiency of the Informations and, therefore, because of this defect, there is
no basis for the existence of probable cause which will justify the issuance of
the warrant of arrest. Petitioner assails the dismissal contending that the
Informations for Qualified Theft sufficiently state facts which constitute (a) the
qualifying circumstance of grave abuse of confidence; and (b) the element of
taking, with intent to gain and without the consent of the owner, which is the
Bank.

In determining the existence of probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest,

the RTC judge found the allegations in the Information inadequate. He ruled
that the Information failed to state facts constituting the qualifying
circumstance of grave abuse of confidence and the element of taking without
the consent of the owner, since the owner of the money is not the Bank, but
the depositors therein. He also cites People v. Koc Song,4 in which this Court
held:

There must be allegation in the information and proof of a relation, by

reason of dependence, guardianship or vigilance, between the
respondents and the offended party that has created a high degree of
confidence between them, which the respondents abused.

At this point, it needs stressing that the RTC Judge based his conclusion that
there was no probable cause simply on the insufficiency of the allegations in
the Informations concerning the facts constitutive of the elements of the
offense charged. This, therefore, makes the issue of sufficiency of the
allegations in the Informations the focal point of discussion.

Qualified Theft, as defined and punished under Article 310 of the Revised
Penal Code, is committed as follows, viz:

ART. 310. Qualified Theft. – The crime of theft shall be punished by the
penalties next higher by two degrees than those respectively specified
in the next preceding article, if committed by a domestic servant, or with
grave abuse of confidence, or if the property stolen is motor vehicle,
mail matter or large cattle or consists of coconuts taken from the
premises of a plantation, fish taken from a fishpond or fishery or if
property is taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic
eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance.
(Emphasis supplied.)

Theft, as defined in Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, requires the
physical taking of another’s property without violence or intimidation against
persons or force upon things. The elements of the crime under this Article are:
 1. Intent to gain;

2. Unlawful taking;

3. Personal property belonging to another;

4. Absence of violence or intimidation against persons or force upon

things.

To fall under the crime of Qualified Theft, the following elements must concur:

1. Taking of personal property;

2. That the said property belongs to another;

3. That the said taking be done with intent to gain;

4. That it be done without the owner’s consent;

5. That it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation

against persons, nor of force upon things;

6. That it be done with grave abuse of confidence.

It is beyond doubt that tellers, Cashiers, Bookkeepers and other employees of

a Bank who come into possession of the monies deposited therein enjoy the
confidence reposed in them by their employer. Banks, on the other hand,
where monies are deposited, are considered the owners thereof. This is very
clear not only from the express provisions of the law, but from established
jurisprudence. The relationship between banks and depositors has been held
to be that of creditor and debtor. Articles 1953 and 1980 of the New Civil
Code, as appropriately pointed out by petitioner, provide as follows:

In a long line of cases involving Qualified Theft, this Court has firmly
established the nature of possession by the Bank of the money deposits
therein, and the duties being performed by its employees who have custody of
the money or have come into possession of it. The Court has consistently
considered the allegations in the Information that such employees acted with
grave abuse of confidence, to the damage and prejudice of the Bank, without
particularly referring to it as owner of the money deposits, as sufficient to
make out a case of Qualified Theft. For a graphic illustration, we cite Roque v.
People,6 where the accused teller was convicted for Qualified Theft based on
this Information:

[S]ince the teller occupies a position of confidence, and the bank places
money in the teller’s possession due to the confidence reposed on the
teller, the felony of qualified theft would be committed.7

Also in People v. Sison,8 the Branch Operations Officer was convicted of the
crime of Qualified Theft based on the Information as herein cited:

The judgment of conviction elaborated thus:

The crime perpetuated by appellant against his employer, the Philippine

Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB), is Qualified Theft. Appellant
could not have committed the crime had he not been holding the
position of Luneta Branch Operation Officer which gave him not only
sole access to the bank vault xxx. The management of the PCIB
reposed its trust and confidence in the appellant as its Luneta Branch
Operation Officer, and it was this trust and confidence which he
exploited to enrich himself to the damage and prejudice of PCIB x x x.9

People vs Jatulan

Crime: Kidnapping for Ransom.

On 20 February 1995, in the RTC of Antipolo City, an Information [2] for

KIDNAPPING for RANSOM under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code was
filed against herein appellant JUDITH JATULAN y PONCE @ Lito and three
others, namely: Paul Liporada y Honorio, Meil Liporada y Honorio and Gilbert
Denyega y Musico. Docketed in the same court as Criminal Case No. 95-11947
and raffled to Branch 73 thereof, the Information alleged:

That at about 12:30 in the afternoon of 13 February, 1995 at

Teremil Subdivision, Mambugan, Antipolo, Rizal and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, together
with some other persons whose liabilities are still being determined in a
preliminary investigation, conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping one another, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, carry away and kidnap KARWIN AMADO, a minor
 being only five (5) years old, against his will and without the knowledge
and consent of his parents, and thereafter brought him to a safehouse in a
mountainous area at Sitio Tagisan, Mayamot, Antipolo Rizal where he
was kept, detained and deprived of his liberty for the purpose of
extorting ransom in the amount of TWO HUNDRED FIFTY
THOUSAND PESOS(P250,000.00) for his release.

Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No.
7659,[8] defines the crime of kidnapping, viz:

ART. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention.--Any

private individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other
manner deprive him of liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death:

1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three

days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.

3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon

the person kidnapped or detained; or if threats to kill him shall have been
made.

4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except

when the accused is any of the parents, female or a public officer.

The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was

committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any
other person, even if none of the circumstance above-mentioned were
present in the commission of the offense.

When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the

detention or is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the
maximum penalty shall be imposed.

For appellant to be convicted of kidnapping or serious illegal detention under the

aforequoted provision, the prosecution is burdened to prove beyond reasonable
doubt the following elements of the crime, namely: (1) the offender is a private
individual who is not any of the parents of the victim nor a female; (2) he kidnaps
or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (3) the act of
detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (4) in the commission of the crime,
any of the following circumstances is present: (a) the kidnapping or detention lasts
for more than three days; (b) it is committed by simulating public authority; (c) any
serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or
threats to kill him are made; or (d) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor,
female or a public official.[9] If the victim of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention is a minor, the duration of his detention is immaterial. Likewise, if the
victim is kidnapped and illegally detained for the purpose of extorting ransom, the
duration of his detention is also of no moment and the crime is qualified and
becomes punishable by death even if none of the circumstances mentioned in
paragraphs 1 to 4 of Article 267 is present.

The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the

victims liberty coupled with the intent of the accused to effect it.[10] The original
Spanish version of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code used the term lock up
(encarcerar) rather than kidnap (sequestrator or raptor) which includes not only
the imprisonment of a person but also the deprivation of his liberty in whatever
form and for whatever length of time.[11]

Appellant insists that there was no deprivation of liberty in this case because
Karwin voluntarily went with him to the mountainous area of Mayamot to get the
promised Shaider toy, and that during the period that Karwin was with him, the
boy was always left alone at the hut where he could do anything he wished,
including escaping.

The argument does not persuade. There is deprivation of liberty even if the victim
went voluntarily with the accused where the voluntary action was induced by the
accuseds false inducement without which the victim would not have gone with
him.[13] Here, Karwin, a 5-year old boy, was enticed by appellant to go with him to
the mountain side on the pretext that appellant will give Karwin a toy, a promise
that was never fulfilled. And when Karwin signified his desire to go home,
appellant told him to stay put because he had to wait for the ransom.
Appellant was charged with the crime of kidnapping for ransom. Ransom means
money, price or consideration paid or demanded for the redemption of a captured
person that would release him from captivity. No specific form of ransom is
required to consummate the felony of kidnapping for ransom as long as the ransom
was intended as a bargaining chip in exchange for the victims freedom. [14]Whether
or not the ransom is actually paid to or received by the perpetrator is of no
moment.[15]

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision dated 16 December 2005 of the CA

in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01596, finding herein appellant JUDITH JATULAN y
PONCE @ Lito GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Kidnapping for Ransom
is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that appellant is hereby sentenced
to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.

People vs Villamar
Marilyn Villamar was charged with the crime of illegal detention and frustrated murder in
an information dated November 9, 1993, the accusatory portion of which reads:

That in or about and during the period beginning 7:00 a.m. of June 5, 1993 to 9:00
a.m. of the same day, in Barangay Cabalantian, Municipality of Bacolor, Province of
Pampanga, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, MARILYN RAFAEL-VILLAMAR, suspecting that Maria Luz
Cortez would not return her daughter Jonalyn Villamar whom she entrusted to said
Maria Luz Cortez, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
surreptitiously enter the house of Maria Luz Cortez and by means of force and
intimidation and with threats to kill take said Maria Luz Cortez, a woman of 20 years
old as the latter entered her house whom said accused detained and kept locked inside
the house from 7:00 a.m. to 9:00 a.m. of June 5, 1993 or a period of two (2) hours,
more or less, under restraint and against the will of the said Maria Luz Cortez and said
accused during the period of detention maltreated and refused to release said Maria
Luz Cortez until her demand for a sum of money and a getaway vehicle was given to
her and on the occasion thereof, accused with evident premeditation and with intent to
kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and strike
with a deadly weapon to wit: a knife and a chisel, one Maria Luz Cortez who as a
result thereof, suffered various lacerated wounds on the head which ordinarily would
cause the death of the said Maria Luz Cortez, thus performing all the acts of execution
which should have produced the crime of murder as a consequence, but nevertheless
did not produce it by reason of causes independent of her will, that is, by the timely
arrival of the authorities who rescued Maria Luz Cortez which prevented her death.
 Before a conviction for kidnapping and serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code can be sustained, the following elements must concur, namely: (a) the
offender is a private individual, (b) kidnaps or detains another that will deprive the victim of his
liberty, (c) the act of detention is illegal and (d) in the commission of the offense any of the
following circumstances are present - the detention lasts for more than five (5) days; it is
committed by simulating a public authority, serious physical injuries are inflicted or threats to
kill are made and the person kidnapped is a minor, female or public officer.[3] It is important that
indubitable proof be presented that the actual intent of the malefactor was to deprive the
offended party of his/her liberty,[4] and not when such restraint of liberty was merely an incident
in the commission of another offense primarily intended by the offender.[5]
Under the law, as presently worded, it is essential that the kidnapping or detention was
committed for the purpose of extorting ransom.[9] In the instant case, there is no showing
whatsoever that Villamar wanted to extort money from Cortez prior to their confrontation.
When accused-appellant coerced Cortez to reveal the whereabouts of the "Sinumpaang
Salaysay" for the purpose of destroying the same, the act merely constituted grave coercion, as
provided in Article 286 of the Revised Penal Code. The crime of grave coercion has three
elements: (a) that any person is prevented by another from doing something not prohibited by
law, or compelled to do something against his or her will, be it right or wrong; (b) that the
prevention or compulsion is effected by violence, either by material force or such a display of it
as would produce intimidation and, consequently, control over the will of the offended party; and
(c) that the person who restrains the will and liberty of another has no right to do so; in other
words, that the restraint is not made under authority of law or in the exercise of any lawful
right.[10]
While Villamar did compel Cortez to do something against the latter's will, it must be
stressed that the same cannot be categorized as an act of illegal detention. Still, when Villamar
was erroneously charged for illegal detention, such oversight will not preclude a guilty verdict
for the crime of grave coercion. In the early case of U.S. v. Quevengco,[11]and, recently, in People
v. Astorga,[12] we ruled that the offense of grave coercion is necessarily included in illegal
detention; as such, an information for illegal detention will not bar the accused from being
convicted of grave coercion, instead of the original charge.[13]
Regarding the imposable penalty, while we are aware that on February 20, 1995, Republic
Act No. 7890[14] was passed increasing the penalty for crimes involving grave coercion
from arresto mayor to prision correccional, such amendatory law will not be applicable in the
instant case, for the simple reason that the offense was committed on June 5, 1993 two years
before the said law was enacted. Villamar should not, therefore, be unduly prejudiced by the
imposition of a more severe penalty than that provided in the law then in force.[15]
Hence, we hold that the penalty of arresto mayor, which is from one month and one day to
six months, is the proper penalty imposable for the offense of grave coercion. Considering that
Villamar has been in detention since July 1995 to the present - a period of three years and three
months - which is well beyond the six-month maximum period provided for in the old law, there
is no more legal justification for her continued confinement. She has served for a longer period
than she should.
 WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal is PARTIALLY
GRANTED. Appellant is convicted only for grave coercion and is sentenced to six (6) months of
arresto mayor. Unless she is being held for some other lawful cause, her immediate RELEASE is
hereby ordered, considering that she has served beyond the maximum penalty imposed by
law. Costs de oficio.