CONFESSION

G.R. No. 205412, September 09, 2015

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ADRIAN GUTING Y

TOMAS, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

For Our consideration is an appeal from the Decision1 dated May 23, 2012 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04596, which affirmed the Decision2 dated June 24, 2010
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Camiling, Tarlac, Branch 68, in Criminal Case No. 06-93,
finding accused-appellant Adrian Guting y Tomas guilty of the crime of Parricide under
Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code.

In an Information3 dated August 1, 2006, docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-93, accused-
appellant was charged before the RTC with Parricide, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about 4:50 in the rainy afternoon of July 30, 2006 at Plaridel St., Poblacion B.
Camiling, Tarlac, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with evident
premeditation, that is, having conceived and deliberated to kill his own father Jose Guting y
Ibarra, 67 years old, married, while inside their residential house, and armed with a bladed
weapon, suddenly and unexpectedly stabbed several times the victim, employing means,
manner and form in the execution thereof which tender directly and specially to insure its
commission without danger to the person of said accused, the result of which attack was
that said victim received multiple stab wounds on his body which directly caused his
instantaneous death.
When arraigned on September 19, 2006, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged.4Thereafter, pre-trial and trial on the merits ensued.

Below is a summary of the prosecution witnesses' testimonies.

Police Officer (PO1) Fidel Torre (Torre) testified that on the rainy afternoon of July 30, 2005,
at around 5:00 o'clock, he and PO1 Alexis Macusi (Macusi) were standing in front of the
Camiling Police Station when accused-appellant, all wet from the rain and with a bladed
weapon in his hand, suddenly approached them and told them that he had stabbed his
father. Hearing accused-appellant's statement, PO1 Torre immediately got the bladed
weapon from accused-appellant and turned it over to PO1 Macusi for proper disposition.5

PO1 Macusi corroborated PO1 Torre's testimony. PO1 Macusi narrated that accused-
appellant suddenly appeared before them at the Police Station, all wet and holding a knife.
Accused-appellant proclaimed that his father was already dead. Unsuspecting, PO1 Macusi
asked who killed accused-appellant's father. Accused-appellant answered, "Sinaksak ko po
yong tatay ko! Napatay ko na po!" PO1 Torre then got the knife from accused-appellant and
gave it to PO1 Macusi. PO1 Macusi placed the knife in the custodian cabinet in the Police
Station. Thereafter, PO1 Macusi, Senior Police Officer (SPO) 2 Eliseo Hermosado
(Hermosado), and SPO2 Noli Felipe (Felipe) went to the residence of Jose Guting (Jose),
accused-appellant's father, to verify the reported crime, while other police officers informed
Flora Guting (Flora), Jose's wife (also accused-appellant's mother), who was still in the
market with Emerlito Guting (Emerlito), Jose and Flora's other son (accused-appellant's
brother), who was then driving a tricycle for hire. While waiting for Flora and Emerlito, PO1
Macusi, SPO2 Hermosado, and SPO2 Felipe inquired from the neighbors if anybody had
witnessed the crime, but no one did. When Flora and Emerlito arrived, they entered the
house and saw Jose's lifeless body with blood still oozing from his wounds. Immediately,
Flora and Emerlito brought Jose to the hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival.
Subsequently, Flora and Emerlito executed their respective Sinumpaang Salaysay and filed
a case for Parricide against accused-appellant.6

On cross-examination, PO1 Macusi divulged that when the knife was given to him by PO1
Torre for safekeeping, he did not ask accused-appellant if it was the knife he used to kill his
father. Neither did accused-appellant mention to PO1 Macusi that it was the knife he used
in stabbing Jose. All that accused-appellant said was, "Sinaksak ko po yong tatay ko!
Napatay ko na po!" PO1 Macusi also admitted that he did not request for the examination
of the knife because it was clean; any trace or stain of blood on it would have been washed
away by the rains at that time. PO1 Macusi was further questioned as to why he did not
put into writing accused-appellant's admission that he killed his father, and PO1 Macusi
explained that it escaped his mind as he was still new at the job then and he was carried
away by the fast flow of events.7

Flora conceded that she was not present when Jose, her husband, was killed by accused-
appellant, their son. Flora only learned of the stabbing incident and accused-appellant's
surrender from the police officers of the Camiling Police Station. Flora declared that she
spent for the wake and burial of Jose and that Jose, who was a tricycle driver, had been
earning around P200.00 a day at the time of his death.8

Doctor Valentin Theodore Lomibao (Dr. Lomibao) conducted the autopsy of Jose's body. Dr.
Lomibao reported that Jose suffered around 39 stab wounds on the head, neck, thorax,
abdomen, and extremities. Jose's internal organs were heavily damaged by the stab
wounds, resulting in his instantaneous death. Dr. Lomibao also showed several pictures of
Jose's body which were taken before he conducted the autopsy.9

Accused-appellant opted not to present any evidence in his defense.

The RTC promulgated its Decision on June 24, 2010 finding accused-appellant guilty of
Parricide based on his verbal admission that he killed his father, Jose. Even assuming that
accused-appellant's admission was inadmissible in evidence, the RTC adjudged that the
prosecution was still able to establish sufficient circumstantial evidence which, taken
collectively, pointed to accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the brutal killing of his
father. The dispositive portion of the RTC judgment reads:
WHEREFORE, accused Adrian Guting y Tomas is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the offense of Parricide punishable under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended and hereby sentences him to a penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.

Accused is likewise ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, another amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages, and still another amount of
P30,000.00 as temperate damages.10
Accused-appellant appealed his conviction before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-
G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04596. The appellate court promulgated its Decision on May 23, 2012,
decreeing thus:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Camiling,
Tarlac, Branch 68 convicting herein accused-appellant Adrian Guting y Tomas for the
crime of Parricide under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code is AFFIRMED.11
Hence, accused-appellant comes before us via the instant appeal with the same assignment
of errors he raised before the Court of Appeals, to wit:
I

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT ON

THE BASIS OF HIS EXTRAJUDICIAL ADMISSION.
II

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT ON

THE BASIS OF INSUFFICIENT CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
III

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY

BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE
PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO OVERTHROW THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION OF
INNOCENCE IN HIS FAVOR.12
We find no merit in accused-appellant's appeal.

Accused-appellant argues that his oral confession to PO1 Torre and PO1 Macusi, without
the assistance of counsel, is inadmissible in evidence for having been made in blatant
violation of his constitutional right under Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution.

Section 12, paragraphs 1 and 3, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution mandate
that:
SEC. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he
must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel.

xxxx

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.13
The "investigation" in Section 12, paragraph 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution pertains
to "custodial investigation." Custodial investigation commences when a person is taken into
custody and is singled out as a suspect in the commission of a crime under investigation
and the police officers begin to ask questions on the suspect's participation therein and
which tend to elicit an admission.14 As we expounded in People v. Marra15:
Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after
a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way. It is only after the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an
unsolved crime and begins to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect is taken into
custody, and the police carries out a process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting
incriminating statements that the rule begins to operate. (Citation omitted.)
Applying the foregoing definitions, accused-appellant was not under custodial investigation
when he admitted, without assistance of counsel, to PO1 Torre and PO1 Macusi that he
stabbed his father to death. Accused-appellant's verbal confession was so spontaneously
and voluntarily given and was not elicited through questioning by the police authorities. It
may be true that PO1 Macusi asked accused-appellant who killed his father, but PO1
Macusi only did so in response to accused-appellant's initial declaration that his father was
already dead. At that point, PO1 Macusi still had no idea who actually committed the crime
and did not consider accused-appellant as the suspect in his father's killing. Accused-
appellant was also merely standing before PO1 Torre and PO1 Macusi in front of the
Camiling Police Station and was not yet in police custody.

Accused-appellant cites in support of his argument People v. Cabintoy,16 where we held that
an uncounselled extrajudicial confession without a valid waiver of the right to counsel -
that is, in writing and in the presence of counsel - is inadmissible in evidence. The situation
of accused-appellants in Cabintoy is not similar to that of accused-appellant herein. The
accused-appellants in Cabintoy, when they executed their extrajudicial confessions without
assistance of counsel, were already suspects under custodial investigation by the San
Mateo Police for robbery with homicide committed against a taxi driver. Accused-appellant
in the instant case, on his own volition, approached unsuspecting police officers standing
in front of the police station with a knife in his hand and readily confessed to stabbing his
father to death. Accused-appellant was arrested and subjected to custodial investigation by
the police officers only after his confession.

Hence, herein accused-appellant's confession, even if done without the assistance of a

lawyer, is not in violation of his constitutional right under Section 12, paragraph 1, Article
III of the 1987 Constitution. The present case is more akin to People v. Andan17 wherein we
allowed into evidence the uncounselled confession of therein accused-appellant given under
the following circumstances:
Under these circumstances, it cannot be successfully claimed that appellant's confession
before the mayor is inadmissible. It is true that a municipal mayor has "operational
supervision and control" over the local police and may arguably be- deemed a law
enforcement officer for purposes of applying Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the
Constitution. However, appellant's confession to the mayor was not made in response to
any interrogation by the latter. In fact, the mayor did not question appellant at all. No
police authority ordered appellant to talk to the mayor. It was appellant himself who
spontaneously, freely and voluntarily sought the mayor for a private meeting. The mayor
did not know that appellant was going to confess his guilt to him. When appellant talked
with the mayor as a confidant and not as a law enforcement officer, his uncounselled
confession to him did not violate his constitutional rights. Thus, it has been held that the
constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous
statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary
manner whereby appellant orally admitted having committed the crime. What the
Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions. The
rights under Section 12 are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the
state as would lead the accused to admit something false, not to prevent him from freely
and voluntarily telling the truth. Hence, we hold that appellant's confession to the mayor
was correctly admitted by the trial court.
Moreover, accused-appellant's verbal confession that he stabbed his father to death made
to PO1 Torre and PO1 Macusi, established through the testimonies of said police officers,
falls under Rule 130, Section 26 of the Rules of Court, which provides that "[t]he act,
declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against
him." This rule is based upon the notion that no man would make any declaration against
himself, unless it is true.18 Accused-appellant's declaration is admissible for being part of
the res gestae. A declaration is deemed part of the res gestae and admissible in evidence as
an exception to the hearsay rule when these three requisites concur: (1) the principal act,
the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the declarant
had time to contrive or devise; and (3) the statements concern the occurrence in question
and its immediately attending circumstances.19 All the requisites are present in this case.
Accused-appellant had just been through a startling and gruesome occurrence, that is, his
father's death. Accused-appellant made the confession to PO1 Torre and PO1 Macusi only a
few minutes after and while he was still under the influence of said startling occurrence,
before he had the opportunity to concoct or contrive a story. In fact, accused-appellant
seemed to still be in shock when he walked to the Police Station completely unmindful of
the rain and the knife in his hand, and headed directly to PO1 Torre and PO1 Macusi, who
were standing in front of the Police Station, to confess to stabbing his father to death. The
police officers who immediately went to the house of Jose, accused-appellant's father, found
Jose's lifeless body with blood still oozing from his stab wounds. As res gestae, accused-
appellant's spontaneous statement is admissible in evidence against him.

Accused-appellant's confession was further corroborated by the circumstantial evidence.

To justify a conviction upon circumstantial evidence, the combination of circumstances

must be such as to leave no reasonable doubt in the mind as to the criminal liability of the
accused.20 Rule 133, Section 4 of the Rules of Court enumerates the conditions when
circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction, thus:
SEC. 4. Circumstantial Evidence, when sufficient. - Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for
conviction if:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

(a) There is more than one circumstance;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and

(c) The combination of all circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond

reasonable doubt.
The RTC, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, found that the aforequoted requisites have been
satisfied in this case given the following circumstantial evidence:
1. On or about 4:50 o'clock in the afternoon of July 30, 2006, the victim was stabbed to
death.

2. Thirty minutes later, [accused-appellant] personally went to Camiling Police Station and
surrendered himself and the bladed weapon he used in killing his father to the police
authorities of the said police station.

3. When his mother learned about the incident, [accused-appellant] did nothing to appease
his responding mother. "It has always been said that criminal case are primarily about
human nature." Here is a case of a son doing nothing to explain the death of his father to
his grieving mother. Such inaction is contrary to human nature.

4. When he was detained after police investigation, [accused-appellant] did not object to his
continued detention.
These circumstances constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable
conclusion that points to accused-appellant, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty
person.21 The incriminating collage of facts against accused-appellant was created by
circumstantial evidence anchored on the credible and unbiased testimony of the
prosecution's witnesses. We will not disturb but shall accord the highest respect to the
findings of the RTC on the issue of credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies, it
having had the opportunity to observe their deportment and manner of testifying during the
trial.22

Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code defines Parricide as follows:

Art. 246. Parricide. - Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be
guilty of parricide and shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused;
and (3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a
legitimate other ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of the accused.
The key element in Parricide - other than the fact of killing - is the relationship of the
offender to the victim.23 All the elements are present in this case. Jose, the victim, was
killed by accused-appellant, his own son. Accused-appellant's birth certificate, which was
presented before the RTC, establishes that accused-appellant was the legitimate son of Jose
and Flora.

The crime of Parricide is punishable by the indivisible penalties of reclusion perpetua to

death. With one mitigating circumstance, namely, voluntary surrender, and no aggravating
circumstance, the imposition of the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua on accused-
appellant was proper.

We modify though the monetary awards imposed by the RTC and affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. When death occurs due to a crime, the following damages may be awarded: (1)
civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages;
(3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; and (5) temperate damages.24

Prevailing jurisprudence pegs the amount of civil indemnity and moral damages awarded to
the heirs of the victim of Parricide at P75,000.00 each.25 The temperate damages awarded
by the RTC in the amount of P30,000.00 should be decreased to P25,000.00 to also
conform with the latest jurisprudence.26 It is fitting to additionally award exemplary
damages in the sum of P30,000.00 considering the presence of the qualifying circumstance
of relationship.

Damages for the loss of earning capacity of Jose should be awarded as well given the
testimony of his wife, Flora, on this particular fact. We refer to our pronouncements
in People v. Verde27 that:
The heirs are also entitled to damages for the loss of earning capacity of the deceased
Francisco Gealon. The fact that the prosecution did not present documentary evidence to
support its claim for damages for loss of earning capacity of the deceased does not preclude
recovery of said damages. The testimony of the victim's wife, Delia Gealon, as to the earning
capacity of her husband Francisco Gealon sufficiently establishes the basis for making
such an award. It was established that Francisco Gealon was 48 years old at the time of his
death in 1991. His average income was P200.00 a day. Hence, in accordance with the
American Expectancy Table of Mortality adopted in several cases decided by this Court, the
loss of his earning capacity is to be calculated as follows:
To be able to claim damages for loss of earning capacity despite the non-availability of
documentary evidence, there must be oral testimony that: (a) the victim was self-employed
earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws and judicial notice was
taken of the fact that in the victim's line of work, no documentary evidence is available; or
(b) the victim was employed as a daily wage worker earning less than the minimum wage
under current labor laws.28

In the case at bar, Jose was 67 years old at the time of his death and was earning a daily
wage of P200.00 as a tricycle driver, which was below the P252.00 to P263.50 minimum
wage rate for non-agriculture under Wage Order No. 11 dated June 16, 2005 for Region III.
We take judicial notice that there is no documentary evidence available to establish the
daily earning capacity of a tricycle driver. We thus compute the award of damages for the
loss of Jose's earning capacity as follows:
Gross
Net earning life less living expenses (50% of gross annual
= x annual -
capacity (x) expectancy income)
income

x= 2(80-67) x [73,000.00-36,500.00]
3

= 8.67 x 36,500.00

= P316,455.00
Finally, in conformity with current policy, we impose interest on all monetary awards for
damages at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this Decision
until fully paid.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04596, finding
accused-appellant, Adrian Guting y Tomas, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Parricide, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellant is sentenced
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim the amounts of
P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00 as temperate
damages, P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P316,455.00 as compensation for loss of
earning capacity. All monetary awards for damages shall be subject to interest of six
percent (6%) per annum from date of finality of this Decision until they are fully paid.

SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

G.R. No. 198799 – REPEATED CASE

ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE

G.R. Nos. 212014-15, December 06, 2016

RICHARD A. CAMBE, Petitioner, v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, NATIONAL BUREAU

OF INVESTIGATION, LEVITO D. BALIGOD, AND FIELD INVESTIGATION
OFFICE, Respondents.

G.R. Nos. 212427-28

SENATOR RAMON "BONG" REVILLA, JR., Petitioner, v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN,

THROUGH ITS SPECIAL PANEL OF INVESTIGATORS, NATIONAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, LEVITO D. BALIGOD, AND FIELD INVESTIGATION OFFICE, OFFICE
OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Respondents.

G.R. Nos. 212694-95

SENATOR RAMON "BONG" REVILLA, JR., Petitioner, v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN,

NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, LEVITO D. BALIGOD, FIELD INVESTIGATION
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, AND THE
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents.

G.R. Nos. 212794-95

RICHARD A. CAMBE, Petitioner, v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, NATIONAL BUREAU

OF INVESTIGATION, LEVITO D. BALIGOD, AND FIELD INVESTIGATION
OFFICE, Respondents.

G.R. Nos. 213477-78

JOHN RAYMUND DE ASIS, Petitioner, v. CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES IN HER

OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS OMBUDSMAN, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND
SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION, Respondents.

G.R. Nos. 213532-33

RONALD JOHN LIM, Petitioner, v. CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES IN HER OFFICIAL

CAPACITY AS OMBUDSMAN, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND SANDIGANBAYAN,
FIRST DIVISION, Respondents.

G.R. Nos. 213536-37

JANET LIM NAPOLES, Petitioner, v. CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES IN HER OFFICIAL

CAPACITY AS OMBUDSMAN, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND SANDIGANBAYAN,
FIRST DIVISION, Respondents.

G.R. Nos. 218744-59

MARIO L. RELAMPAGOS, ROSARIO SALAMIDA NUÑEZ, LALAINE NARAG PAULE, AND

MARILOU DIALINO BARE, Petitioners, v. SANDIGANBAYAN, (FIRST DIVISION) AND
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before this Court are consolidated petitions1 filed by petitioners Senator Ramon "Bong"
Revilla, Jr. (Sen. Revilla), Richard A. Cambe (Cambe), Janet Lim Napoles (Napoles or Janet
Napoles), John Raymund De Asis (De Asis), and Ronald John Lim (Lim), which commonly
assail the Joint Resolution2 dated March 28, 2014 and the Joint Order3 dated June 4, 2014
of the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) in OMB-C-C-13-0316 and OMB-C-C-13-
0395 finding probable cause to indict them, along with several others, for the crimes of
Plunder, defined and penalized under Section 2 in relation to Section 1 (d) (1), (2), and (6) of
Republic Act No. (RA) 7080,4 as amended (one [1] count) and/or of violation of Section 3 (e)
of RA 30195 (sixteen [16] counts).

Further assailed are: (1) by Cambe,6 the Ombudsman's Joint Order7 dated March 14, 2014,
which denied Cambe's Supplemental Counter-Affidavit with Second Motion to Suspend
Proceedings;8 (2) by Sen. Revilla,9 the Ombudsman's Order10 dated May 15, 2014 which
denied Sen. Revilla's Omnibus Motion11 to re-conduct the preliminary investigation, among
others; and (3) by petitioners Mario L. Relampagos (Relampagos), Rosario Salamida Nuñez
(Nuñez), Lalaine Narag Paule (Paule), and Marilou Dialino Bare (Bare),12 the Resolutions
dated November 13, 201413 and May 13, 201514 of the Sandiganbayan which affirmed the
finding of probable cause against them in Criminal Case Nos. SB-14-CRM-0268, 0269,
0272, 0273, 0275, 0276, 0279, and 0280.
The Facts

Petitioners are all charged as co-conspirators for their respective participations in the illegal
pillaging of public funds sourced from the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) of
Sen. Revilla for the years 2006 to 2010,15 in the total amount of P517,000,000.00.16 The
charges are contained in two (2) complaints, namely: (1) a Complaint for Plunder17 filed by
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and Atty. Levito D. Baligod on September 16,
2013, docketed as OMB-C-C-13-0316; and (2) a Complaint for Plunder and violation of
Section 3 (e) of RA 301918 filed by the Field Investigation Office of the Ombudsman (FIO) on
November 18, 2013, docketed as OMB-C-C-13-0395, both before the Ombudsman. Briefly
stated, petitioners were implicated for the following acts:

(a) Sen. Revilla, as Senator of the Republic of the Philippines, for authorizing the illegal
utilization, diversion, and disbursement of his allocated PDAF through his endorsement of
fraudulent Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) created and controlled by Napoles's
JLN (Janet Lim Napoles) Corporation19 in relation to "ghost" PDAF-funded projects,20 and
for receiving significant portions of the diverted PDAF funds as his "commission" or
"kickback";21

(b) Cambe, as Chief of Staff of Sen. Revilla during the times material to this case, for
processing the utilization, diversion, and disbursement of Sen. Revilla's PDAF,22 and for
personally receiving his own "commission" or "kickback" from the diverted funds;23

(c) Napoles, as the mastermind of the entire PDAF scam, for facilitating the illegal
utilization, diversion, and disbursement of Sen. Revilla's PDAF through: (1) the
commencement via "business propositions" with the legislator regarding his allocated
PDAF; (2) the creation and operation of JLN-controlled NGOs to serve as "conduits" for
"ghost" PDAF-funded projects; (3) the use of spurious receipts and liquidation documents to
make it appear that the projects were implemented by her NGOs; (4) the falsification and
machinations used in securing funds from the various implementing agencies (IAs) and in
liquidating disbursements; and (5) the remittance of Sen. Revilla's PDAF for
misappropriation;24

(d) Lim and De Asis, as staff employees of Napoles, for assisting in the fraudulent
processing and releasing of the PDAF funds to the JLN-controlled
NGOs25cralawred through, among others, their designation as
Presidents/Incorporators26 of JLN-controlled NGOs, namely, Kaupdanan Para sa
Mangunguma Foundation, Inc. (KPMFI)27 and Ginintuang Alay sa Magsasaka Foundation,
Inc. (GAMFI),28 respectively, and for eventually remitting the PDAF funds to Napoles's
control;29 and

(e) Relampagos, Nuñez, Paule, and Bare (Relampagos, et al.), as employees of the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM), for participating in the misuse or diversion
of Sen. Revilla's PDAF, by acting as "contacts" of Napoles within the DBM, and thereby,
assisting in the release of the Special Allotment Release Orders (SAROs) and Notices of
Cash Allocation (NCAs) covering Sen. Revilla's PDAF.30
As alleged, the PDAF scheme commences with Napoles meeting with a legislator - in this
case, Sen. Revilla - with the former giving an offer to "acquire" his PDAF allocation in
exchange for a "commission" or "kickback" amounting to a certain percentage of the
PDAF.31 Upon their agreement on the conditions of the PDAF acquisition, including the
project for which the PDAF will be utilized, the corresponding IA tasked to implement the
same, and the legislator's "commission" or "kickback" ranging from 40-60% of either the
project cost or the amount stated in the SARO,32 the legislator would then write a letter
addressed to the Senate President for the immediate release of his PDAF, who in turn, will
endorse such request to the DBM for the release of the SARO.33 By this time, the initial
advance portion of the "commission" would be remitted by Napoles to the legislator.34 Upon
release of the SARO, Napoles would then direct her staff - including whistleblowers Benhur
Luy (Luy), Marina Sula (Sula), and Merlina Suñas (Suñas) to prepare PDAF documents
containing, inter alia, the preferred JLN-controlled NGO that will be used as a "conduit" for
the implementation of the project, the project proposals of the identified NGO, and the
endorsement letters to be signed by the legislator and/or his staff, all for the approval of
the legislator;35 and would remit the remaining portion or balance of the "commission" of
the legislator, which is usually delivered by her staff, Lim and De Asis.36 Once the
documents are approved, the same would be transmitted to the IA which would handle the
preparation of the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) to be executed by the legislator's
office, the IA, and the chosen NGO.37 Thereafter, the DBM would release the NCA38 to the IA
concerned, the head/official of which, in turn, would expedite the transaction and release
of the corresponding check representing the PDAF disbursement, in exchange for a ten
percent (10%) share in the project cost.39 Among those tasked by Napoles to pick up the
checks and deposit them to the bank accounts of the NGO concerned were Luy, Suñas, and
De Asis.40 Once the funds are in the account of the JLN-controlled NGO, Napoles would
then call the bank to facilitate the withdrawal thereof.41 Upon withdrawal of the said funds
by Napoles's staff, the latter would bring the proceeds to the office of JLN Corporation for
accounting.42 Napoles would then decide how much will be left in the office and how much
will be brought to her residence in Taguig City. De Asis, Lim, Luy, and Suñas were the ones
instructed to deliver the money to Napoles's residence.43 Finally, to liquidate the
disbursements, Napoles and her staff would manufacture fictitious lists of beneficiaries,
liquidation reports, inspection reports, project activity reports, and similar documents that
would make it appear that the PDAF-funded projects were implemented when, in fact, they
were not since they were actually inexistent or, in other words, "ghost" projects.44 Under
this modus operandi, Sen. Revilla, with the help of petitioners, among others, allegedly
funneled his PDAF amounting to around P517,000,000.0045 to the JLN-controlled NGOs
and, in return, received "commissions" or "kickbacks" amounting to at least
P224,512,500.0046

In the Orders dated November 19, 201347 and November 29, 2013,48 the Ombudsman
directed petitioners, along with several others, to submit their respective counter-affidavits,
to which petitioners complied with, except for Napoles and Lim.49

In his defense, Revilla filed his Counter-Affidavit dated January 16, 2014, contending that:
(a) his and Cambe's signatures in the PDAF documents were forgeries; (b) the utilization of
his PDAF had "always been regular and above-board"; (c) his involvement in the release of
his PDAF is limited; and (d) there is "no credible proof" to show that he committed said
illegal acts and that conspiracy exists between him and all the other persons involved in the
PDAF scam.50

Cambe, on the other hand, filed his Counter-Affidavit dated January 20, 2014 and
Supplemental Counter-Affidavit dated March 12, 2014, maintaining that: (a) his signatures
in the PDAF documents were all forgeries; and (b) he did not receive any money from Sen.
Revilla's PDAF nor connive with any of the alleged co-conspirators to acquire ill-gotten
wealth.51

For his part, De Asis filed his Counter-Affidavit dated January 16, 2014, admitting that: (a)
he was an employee of the JLN Corporation; (b) he did pick up checks for JLN-controlled
NGOs; and (c) he was an incorporator in one of the JLN-controlled NGOs; but denying that
he personally benefited from the supposed misuse of Sen. Revilla's PDAF.52

Meanwhile, Relampagos, et al., in their separate Counter-Affidavits dated December 13,

2013, contended that: (a) there is no probable cause and factual or legal basis to indict
them for the offenses charged; and (b) the criminal complaints did not specifically mention
their names as among those who allegedly participated in the misuse of Sen. Revilla's
PDAF.53
Pending resolution of the Ombudsman cases, Sen. Revilla and Cambe separately moved for
the suspension of the preliminary investigation54 on the criminal complaints, which were,
however, denied by the Ombudsman in a Joint Order55 dated January 28, 2014, holding
that no prejudicial question exists to warrant the suspension of the preliminary
investigation proceedings.56

Cambe filed another motion57 to suspend proceedings of the preliminary investigation,

claiming that the filing of the criminal complaints was premature since the Commission on
Audit (COA) had yet to issue an Order of Execution in relation to the Notices of
Disallowance58 (NDs) against Sen. Revilla's Office, docketed as Special Audits Office (SAO)
ND Nos. NLDC-2014-013-PDAF(07-09) to 020-PDAF(07-09). The said motion was, again,
denied by the Ombudsman in a Joint Order59 dated March 14, 2014 (March 14, 2014 Joint
Order). Thus, Cambe elevated the matter to this Court via a petition for certiorari, docketed
as G.R. Nos. 212014-15.

Meantime, Sen. Revilla filed a Motion to be Furnished Copies of Motions, Pleadings, and
Other Submissions (Motion to be Furnished),60 praying that he be furnished with copies of
all the counter-affidavits filed by the parties in this case, which was denied by the
Ombudsman in an Order61 dated March 11, 2014. His motion for reconsideration62 thereof
was likewise denied by the Ombudsman in an Order63 dated March 27, 2014.

Sen. Revilla likewise filed a Motion for Voluntary Inhibition (Of the Special Panel of
Investigators),64which was also denied by the Ombudsman in an Order65 dated March 7,
2014. His motion for reconsideration66 thereof was further denied in an Order67 dated May
9, 2014.

In a Joint Resolution68 dated March 28, 2014 (March 28, 2014 Joint Resolution), the
Ombudsman found probable cause to indict, among others, petitioners Sen. Revilla,
Cambe, Napoles, De Asis, and Lim of one (1) count of Plunder,69 and all the petitioners
(along with several others), except Lim, of sixteen (16) counts of violation of Section3 (e) of
RA 3019.70

The Ombudsman found that the diversion and/or misuse of Sen. Revilla's PDAF was
coursed through a complex scheme involving various participants from Sen. Revilla's Office,
the DBM, the IAs, and the JLN-controlled NGOs. The Ombudsman then went on to
conclude that through the said scheme, they were able to siphon out government funds in
the aggregate amount of P517,000,000.00, with at least P224,512,500.00 received by Sen.
Revilla.71

Thus, the Ombudsman held that probable cause exists against Sen. Revilla, Cambe,
Napoles, De Asis, and Lim for Plunder, considering that: (a) Sen. Revilla was a public officer
at the time material to the charges; (b) with the help of his co-accused, who are public
officers and private individuals, Sen. Revilla amassed, accumulated, or acquired ill-gotten
wealth through their intricate modus operandi as described above; and (c) such ill-gotten
wealth amounted to at least P224,512,500.00,72 way more than the threshold amount of
P50,000,000.00 required in the crime of Plunder.73

In the same manner, the Ombudsman established probable cause to indict all the
petitioners (along with several others), except Lim, for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019
in light of the following: (a) Sen. Revilla, Cambe, and Relampagos, et al. are all public
officers, while private individuals Napoles and De Asis all conspired with these public
officers; (b) said public officers exhibited manifest partiality to Napoles and her cohorts by
favoring her controlled NGOs without the benefit of public bidding and without having been
authorized by an appropriation law or ordinance, as legally mandated; (c) said public
officers likewise exhibited their bad faith by unduly benefiting from the "ghost" PDAF-
funded projects through the receipt of "commissions," "kickbacks," and the like; and (d)
their collective acts caused undue injury to the government in the aggregate amount of
P517,000,000.00.74

Aggrieved, all the petitioners separately moved for the reconsideration75 of the March 28,
2014 Joint Resolution. Specifically, Sen. Revilla, in his motion for
reconsideration,76 pointed out that the Ombudsman's use of the counter-affidavits, which
documents he prayed to be furnished with in his denied Motion to be Furnished, was a
grave violation of his constitutionally guaranteed right to due process.
Pending resolution of the aforesaid motions for reconsideration, the Ombudsman issued a
Joint Order77dated May 7, 2014 granting Sen. Revilla's Motion to be Furnished, but only
with respect to the counter-affidavits of his six (6) co-respondents.78 He was also directed to
file his comment thereon. Dissatisfied, Sen. Revilla then filed an Omnibus Motion79 dated
May 13,2014 praying for the: (a) partial reconsideration of the May 7, 2014 Joint Order; (b)
recall of the March 28, 2014 Joint Resolution; and (c) re-conduct of the preliminary
investigation and reconstitution of another special panel of investigators.80The said
Omnibus Motion having been denied by the Ombudsman in an Order81 dated May 15,
2014, Sen. Revilla elevated the matter to this Court via a petition for certiorari, docketed
as G.R. Nos. 212427-28.

On June 4, 2014, the Ombudsman issued a Joint Order82 (June 4, 2014 Joint Order)
denying petitioners' motions for reconsideration for lack of merit and, thereby, affirming the
March 28, 2014 Joint Resolution with minor modifications to correct clerical errors.83 These
Ombudsman's issuances led to the filing of certiorari petitions before this Court, docketed
as G.R. Nos. 212694-95, G.R. Nos. 212794-95, G.R. Nos. 213477-78, G.R. Nos.
213532-33, and G.R. Nos. 213536-37.

Consequently, on June 6 and 9, 2014, Informations were filed by the Ombudsman before
the Sandiganbayan, charging: (a) Sen. Revilla, Cambe, Napoles, De Asis, and Lim of one (1)
count of Plunder, docketed as Criminal Case No. SB-14-CRM-0240;84 and (b) all the
petitioners (along with several others), except Lim, of sixteen (16) counts of violation of
Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. SB-14-CRM-0267 to 0282.85

To forestall the service of the warrant of arrest against him, Sen. Revilla filed on June 13,
2014, a Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause and Deferment and/or
Suspension of Proceedings.86Likewise, Relampagos, et al. moved that
the Sandiganbayan declare lack of probable cause against them and suspend
proceedings.87

On June 19, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution, finding probable cause against
petitioners and their co-accused and, thereby, issued the corresponding warrants of arrest
against them.88

Thereafter, Relampagos, et al. filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration of the

Resolution Dated 19 June 2014 with Motion to Recall Warrants of Arrest and to Defer
Arraignment.89

In a Resolution90 dated August 28, 2014, the Sandiganbayan partially granted the said
motion, and dismissed Criminal Case Nos. SB-14-CRM-0267, 0270, 0271, 0274, 0277,
0278, 0281, and 0282 in so far as Relampagos, et al. were concerned for the reason that
the SAROs pertinent to these criminal cases were not issued or signed by Relampagos, et
al., but by then DBM Secretary Rolando Andaya. However, the Sandiganbayan ordered the
prosecution to present additional evidence to establish the existence of probable cause
against them in Criminal Case Nos. SB-14-CRM-0268, 0269, 0272, 0273, 0275, 0276,
0279, and 0280.

The dismissal of Criminal Case Nos. SB-14-CRM-0267, 0270, 0271, 0274, 0277, 0278,
0281, and 0282 against Relampagos, et al. was appealed91 by the prosecution, but was
denied by the Sandiganbayan in a Resolution92 dated November 13, 2014. In the same
Resolution, the Sandiganbayan affirmed the finding of probable cause against
Relampagos, et al. in Criminal Case Nos. SB-14-CRM-0268, 0269, 0272, 0273, 0275, 0276,
0279, and 0280 on the ground that the defenses they raised were evidentiary in
character.93 In particular, the Sandiganbayan held that the issue of whether the IA's
endorsement was indispensable before the SARO can be issued is a matter of evidence to be
threshed out during trial.94

Hence, Relampagos, et al. filed a motion for partial reconsideration95 citing DBM Circular
Letter No. 2015-1, s. of 2015,96 which supposedly clarified that the IAs' endorsements are
no longer required before the issuance of the corresponding SARO. The said motion was
denied by the Sandiganbayan in a Resolution97 dated May 13, 2015, pointing out that said
DBM Circular was issued only after the Ombudsman's issuance of the March 28, 2014
Joint Resolution.98 Thus, Relampagos, et al. elevated the issue before the Court via a
petition for certiorari, docketed as G.R. Nos. 218744-59.
The Issue Before This Court
The core issue in this case is whether or not the findings of probable cause against all
petitioners should be upheld.
The Court's Ruling

All petitions are bereft of merit.

I. Cambe's Motion to Suspend Proceedings.

At the outset, the Court traverses the procedural issue raised by Cambe in his petition
in G.R. Nos. 212014-15. In particular, Cambe seeks to annul and set aside the
Ombudsman's March 14, 2014 Joint Order which denied his motion to suspend
proceedings, arguing that the COA's issuance of an Order of Execution is a condition
precedent to the filing of the criminal complaints against him. This relates to the twelve (12)
NDs received by the Office of Sen. Revilla on January 14, 2014 and February 4, 2014
pertaining to expenditures charged against his PDAF during the period 2007 to 2009,
docketed as SAO ND Nos. TRC-2013-016-PDAF(07-09) to 019-PDAF(07-09)99 and NLDC-
2014-013-PDAF(07-09) to 020-PDAF(07-09),100 respectively, which Cambe claims should
first attain finality; otherwise, the filing of the criminal complaints would be premature
pursuant to the COA's 2009 Revised Rules of Procedure.101

The Court disagrees.

The administrative aspect of the cases against Cambe and Sen. Revilla in relation to the
COA's audit is clearly separate and distinct from the criminal aspect covering the charges of
Plunder and/or of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 against them. Hence, the incidents
related to it should have no effect on the filing of the latter. In Villaseñor v.
Sandiganbayan,102 this Court explained that:
[T]here are three kinds of remedies that are available against a public officer for impropriety
in the performance of his powers and the discharge of his duties: (1) civil, (2) criminal, and
(3) administrative [and that] [t]hese remedies may be invoked separately, alternately,
simultaneously or successively. Sometimes, the same offense may be the subject of all
three kinds of remedies.

xxxx

It is clear, then, that criminal and administrative cases are distinct from each other. The
settled rule is that criminal and civil cases are altogether different from administrative
matters, such that the first two will not inevitably govern or affect the third and vice
versa. Verily, administrative cases may proceed independently of criminal
proceedings.103
In Reyna v. COA (Reyna),104 this Court particularly declared that "[t]he criminal case filed
before the Office of the Ombudsman is distinct and separate from the proceedings on the
disallowance before the COA."105

Cambe's reliance on Section 6, Rule XIII of the 2009 Revised Rules of Procedure of the COA
is misplaced. As worded, the provision only accounts for the possibility of the filing of
criminal charges upon referral of the audit findings to the Ombudsman:
Section 6. Referral to the Ombudsman. - The Auditor shall report to his Director all
instances of failure or refusal to comply with the decisions or orders of the Commission
contemplated in the preceding sections. The COA Director shall see to it that the report is
supported by the sworn statement of the Auditor concerned, identifying among others, the
persons liable and describing the participation of each. He shall then refer the matter to the
Legal Services Sector who shall refer the matter to the Office of the Ombudsman or other
appropriate office for the possible filing of appropriate administrative or criminal action.
Nowhere does the provision state any delimitation or precondition to the filing of such
criminal charges. As correctly pointed out by the Ombudsman, "an audit disallowance may
not necessarily result in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions or criminal prosecution of
the responsible persons. Conversely, therefore, an administrative or criminal case may
prosper even without an audit disallowance. Verily, Rule XIII, Section 6 is consistent with
the ruling in [Reyna] that a proceeding involving an audit disallowance is distinct and
separate from a preliminary investigation or a disciplinary complaint."106

In fine, the Ombudsman did not gravely abuse its discretion in promulgating its March 14,
2014 Joint Order which denied Cambe's motion to suspend proceedings. Perforce, Cambe's
petition in G.R. Nos. 212014-15 is dismissed. That being said, the Court now proceeds to
resolve the main substantive issue anent the presence of probable cause against all
petitioners.
II. Parameters of Review.

Time and again, this Court's consistent policy has been to maintain non-interference in the
Ombudsman's determination of the existence of probable cause, provided there is no grave
abuse in the exercise of such discretion. This observed policy is based not only in respect
for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the 1987 Constitution to the Office
of the Ombudsman, but upon practicality as well.107

Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment

tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The Ombudsman's exercise of power must have been
done in an arbitrary or despotic manner which must be so patent and gross as to amount
to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at
all in contemplation of law.108

Probable cause simply means "such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief
that a crime has been committed and that respondent is probably guilty thereof. The term
does not mean 'actual and positive cause' nor does it import absolute certainty. It is
merely based on opinion and reasonable belief."109 "[T]hus, a finding based on more than
bare suspicion but less than evidence that would justify a conviction would suffice."110

In determining the elements of the crime charged for purposes of arriving at a finding of
probable cause, "only facts sufficient to support a prima facie case against the
[accused] are required, not absolute certainty."111 In this case, the petitioners were
charged with the crimes of Plunder and/or violations of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019. Plunder,
defined and penalized under Section 2112 of RA 7080, as amended, has the following
elements: (a) that the offender is a public officer, who acts by himself or in connivance with
members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates,
subordinates or other persons; (b) that he amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten
wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts described in Section 1
(d)113 thereof; and (c) that the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth
amassed, accumulated or acquired is at least Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00).114 On
the other hand, the elements of violation of Section 3 (e)115of RA 3019 are: (a) that the
accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial, or official functions
(or a private individual acting in conspiracy with such public officers); (b) that he acted with
manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable negligence; and (c) that his action
caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving any private
party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge of his
functions.116 In determining probable cause therefor, only a showing of the ostensible
presence of these elements is required.

It should be borne in mind that probable cause is determined during the context of a
preliminary investigation which is "merely an inquisitorial mode of discovering whether
or not there is reasonable basis to believe that a crime has been committed and that
the person charged should be held responsible for it."117 It "is not the occasion for the
full and exhaustive display of the prosecution's evidence."118 Therefore, "the validity and
merits of a party's defense or accusation, as well as the admissibility of testimonies and
evidence, are better ventilated during trial proper than at the preliminary investigation
level."119 Accordingly, "owing to the initiatory nature of preliminary investigations, the
technical rules of evidence should not be applied in the course of its
proceedings."120 In this light, and as will be elaborated upon below, this Court has ruled
that "probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as long as there is
substantial basis for crediting the hearsay,"121 and that even an invocation of the rule
on res inter alios acta at this stage of the proceedings is improper.122

Guided by these considerations, the Court finds that the Ombudsman did not gravely
abuse its discretion in finding probable cause to indict Sen. Revilla, Cambe, Napoles, De
Asis, and Lim of one (1) count of Plunder, and all the petitioners, except Lim, of sixteen (16)
counts of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019.
III. Probable Cause Against Sen. Revilla.

First, in G.R. Nos. 212694-95, Sen. Revilla seeks to annul the March 28, 2014 Joint
Resolution and the June 4, 2014 Joint Order of the Ombudsman finding probable cause
against him for the crimes charged, Among others, Sen. Revilla faults the Ombudsman for
allegedly disregarding his defense of forgery, and further contends that in the absence of
other competent testimony, the Ombudsman cannot consider the whistleblowers'
testimonies who purportedly were his co-conspirators in the PDAF scam, pursuant to
the res inter alios acta rule.

The petition holds no water.

The finding of probable cause against Sen. Revilla is amply supported by the evidence on
record. At the forefront are the PDAF documents, consisting of the written endorsements
signed by Sen. Revilla123himself requesting the IAs to release his PDAF funds to the
identified JLN-controlled NGOs, as well as other documents that made possible the
processing of his PDAF, e.g., the MOAs executed by the legislator's office, the IA, and the
chosen NGO. All these documents - even those not actually signed by Sen. Revilla - directly
implicate him for the crimes charged, as they were nonetheless, all issued under the
authority of his Office as Senator of the Republic of the Philippines. In Belgica v.
Ochoa (Belgica),124this Court observed that "the defining feature of all forms of
Congressional Pork Barrel would be the authority of legislators to participate in the post-
enactment phases of project implementation."125 "At its core, legislators may it be through
project lists, prior consultations or program menus - have been consistently accorded post-
enactment authority to identify the projects they desire to be funded through various
Congressional Pork Barrel allocations."126 It is through this mechanism that individual
legislators, such as Sen. Revilla, were able to practically dictate the entire expenditure of
the PDAF allocated to their offices throughout the years.

In particular, the Ombudsman details that "the NGO endorsed by the legislator would be
among those organized and controlled by Napoles. In fact, these NGOs were specifically set
by Napoles for the x x x purpose [of having the PDAF funds released]."127 Napoles's staff
would then "prepare the PDAF documents for the approval of the legislator and reflecting
the preferred NGO to implement the undertaking."128 These documents "are transmitted to
the IA which, in turn, handles the preparation of the MOA relating to the project, to be
executed by the legislator's office, the IA[,] and the NGO concerned." "The projects are
authorized as eligible under the DBM's menu for pork barrel allocations. [However,] [i]t
bears noting that the NGO is directly endorsed by the legislator [and that] [n]o public
bidding or negotiated procurement [took] place."129 As such, there was a defiance of
Government Procurement Policy Board (GPPB) Resolution No. 012-2007 which states that:
4.1 When an appropriation law or ordinance specifically earmarks an amount for projects
to be specifically contracted out to NGOs, the procuring entity may select an NGO
through competitive bidding or negotiated procurement under Section 53[(j)] of the
[IRR-A]. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Anent Sen. Revilla's claim that his signatures in the documentary evidence presented were
forged, it must be emphasized that "the findings of the x x x prosecutor [on the issue of
forgery] should be ventilated in a full-blown trial[.] [This] is highlighted by the reality
that the authenticity of a questioned signature cannot be determined solely upon its
general characteristics, or its similarities or dissimilarities with the genuine signature. The
duty to determine the authenticity of a signature rests on the judge who must
conduct an independent examination of the signature itself in order to arrive at a
reasonable conclusion as to its authenticity. [As such], Section 22 of Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court explicitly authorizes the court, by itself, to make a comparison of the
disputed handwriting with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against
whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine."130 Accordingly, Sen. Revilla's
evidence of forgery, including the findings of his purported handwriting experts, Rogelio G.
Azores (Azores)131 and Forensic Document Examiner Atty. Desiderio A. Pagui,
(Pagui)132 cannot be readily credited at this stage of the proceedings.

Besides, the Ombudsman aptly observed that Azores and Pagui admittedly used mere
photocopies of the PDAF documents in their handwriting analyses.133 In Heirs of Gregorio v.
Court of Appeals,134 this Court ruled that "[w]ithout the original document containing the
alleged forged signature, one cannot make a definitive comparison which would establish
forgery," and that "[a] comparison based on a mere [photo] copy or reproduction of the
document under controversy cannot produce reliable results."135Furthermore, it may not be
amiss to state that the credibility of Azores and Pagui as handwriting experts has yet to be
tested. They still have to authenticate their findings and be subjected to cross-examination.
Without a doubt, the prosecution should also be given a chance to properly contest Azores
and Pagui's findings with evidence of its own. It could all too well present its own
handwriting experts during trial to rebut such findings.

It is significant to emphasize that the Ombudsman had thoroughly passed upon the
veracity of Sen. Revilla's signatures on the PDAF documents. As explicitly stated in the
March 28, 2014 Joint Resolution: "[a]t all events, the Special Panel members, after
a prima facie comparison with their naked eyes of the questioned signatures
appearing in the PDAF documents and the original signatures of [Sen.] Revilla and
Cambe in their respective counter-affidavits, opine that both sets of signatures, which
bear the same style and flourish, were written by one and the same hands."136 Verily,
the Ombudsman's own factual finding on the absence of forgery, at least for the purpose of
determining probable cause, should be regarded with utmost respect. "[F]indings of fact
by the Office of the Ombudsman are conclusive when supported by substantial
evidence,"137 as in this case.

The Ombudsman's finding on the absence of forgery furthr gains credence in light of
the July 20, 2011 Letter138signed by Sen. Revilla submitted to the COA (Confirmation
Letter). The letter evinces on its face that Sen. Revilla had confirmed the authenticity of his
and Cambe's signatures appearing on the PDAF documents:
After going through these documents and initial examination, it appears that the
signatures and/or initials on these documents are my signatures or that of my
authorized representative.139
The Ombudsman further noted that the Confirmation Letter appeared to have originated
from Sen. Revilla's Office because it was issued Bar code/Reference No. 0-2011-13079.140

At this juncture, it deserves mentioning that while Luy indeed admitted that there were
times that the whistleblowers would forge the signatures of the legislators in the PDAF
documents, he, however, explicitly qualified that such forgeries were made "[w]ith the
approval of Ms. Napoles kasi sila po ang nag-uusap":
Sen. Escudero: Ang tanong ko, finorge or may finorge na ba kayong pirma ng
senador o congressman dahil pinepeke nga 'yong beneficiary, 'di ba, galing sa
listahan ng kung sino. x x x.

Mr. Luy: With the approval of Ms. Napoles kasi sila po ang nag-uusap, mav
pagkakataon po na fino-forge po.

Sen. Escudero: May pagkakataong fino-forge [ninyo] ang pirma ng mambabatas?

Mr. Luy: Opo.141

Luy's testimony therefore explicates that although the whistleblowers would sometimes
forge the legislators' signatures, such were made with the approval of Napoles based on her
prior agreement with the said legislators. It is not difficult to discern that this
authorization allows for a more expedient processing of PDAF funds since the documents
required for their release need not pass through the legislator's respective offices. It is also
apparent that this grant of authority gives the legislators room for plausible deniability: the
forging of signatures may serve as a security measure for legislators to disclaim their
participation in the event of discovery. Therefore, Luy's testimony completely makes sense
as to why the legislators would agree to authorize Napoles and her staff to forge their
signatures. As such, even if it is assumed that the signatures were forged, it does not mean
that the legislators did not authorize such forgery.

The testimonies of the whistleblowers which the prosecution submitted before the
Ombudsman - are, in fact, the most integral evidence against Sen. Revilla, since they
provide a detailed account on the inner workings of the PDAF scam to which Sen. Revilla
was directly involved. It should be pointed out that, of all the Senators, only the Offices of
Sen. Revilla, Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile (Sen. Enrile), and Sen. Jinggoy, Estrada (Sen. Estrada)
were explicitly implicated142 to have dealt with Napols in the plunder of their PDAF. Also, it
is apparent that whistleblowers Suñas, Sula, and Luy had personal knowledge of the
conspiracy since they were employees of JLN Corporation - the epicenter of the entire PDAF
operation and in their respective capacities, were individually tasked by N&poles to prepare
the pertinent documents, liquidate the financial transactions, follow up the release of the
NCAs with the DBM, and/or facilitate the withdrawal of PDAF funds deposited in the NGOs'
accounts.143

Among others, it is interesting to note that, as per Luy's testimony, Sen. Revilla was given
his own codename, same as the other involved legislators with whom Napoles transacted
with:
58. T: Maaari mo bang linawin itong sinasabi mong "codename"?
 S: Ang pangalan pong taong [tumanggap] ng pera ang nilalagay ko sa voucher pero
minsan po ay codename ang nilalagay ko.

59. T: Sino ang nagbigay ng "codename"?

S: Si Madame JANET LIM NAPOLES po ang nagbigay ng codename kasi daw po ay

sa gobyerno kami nagta-transact.

60. T: Maaari mo bang sabihin kung anu-ano ang mga "codenames" ng mga ka-
transact ni JANET LIM NAPOLES na pulitiko o kanilang [Chief of Staff]?

S: Opo. "TANDA" kay Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, "SEXY/ANAK/KUYA" kay Senator
Jinggoy Estrada, "POGI" kay Senator Bong Revilla, "GUERERA" kayCongressman
Rizalina Seachon-Lanete, "BONJING" kay Congressman RODOLFO PLAZA,
"BULAKLAK" kay Congressman SAMUEL DANGWA, "SUHA" kayCongressman
ARTHUR PINGOY, at "KURYENTE" kay Congressman EDGAR VALDEZ. Mayroon pa
po ibang codename nasa records ko. Sa ngayon po ay sila lang po ang aking
naalala.144
As observed by this Court in the Reyes case, "the names of the legislators to whom the
PDAF shares were disbursed x x x were identified by the use of 'codenames.' These
'codenames,' which were obviously devised to hide the identities of the legislators involved
in the scheme, were known by a select few in the JLN Corporation,"145 such as the
whistleblowers. The level of detail of the whistleblowers' narration of facts would surely
impress upon a reasonable and prudent mind that their statements were not merely
contrived. In addition, the fact that they had no apparent motive as to why Sen. Revilla,
among all others, would be drawn by the whistleblowers, into such a high-profile case of
plundet should likewise be taken into account. Further, in Reyes, this Court observed that:
[W]histleblower testimonies - especially in corruption cases, such as this - should not be
condemned, but rather, be welcomed as these whistleblowers risk incriminating themselves
in order to expose the perpetrators and bring them to justice. In Re: Letter of Presiding
Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. on CA-G.R. SP No. 103692 (Antonio Rosete, et al. v.
Securities and Exchange Commission, et al.) [590 Phil. 8, 49-50 (2008)], the Court gave
recognition and appreciation to whistleblowers in corruption cases, considering that
corruption is often done in secrecy and it is almost inevitable to resort to their testimonies
in order to pin down the crooked public officers.146
Sen. Revilla opposes the admission of the whistleblowers' testimonies based on the res inter
alios actarule. However, in Reyes, citing Estrada v. Ombudsman,147 this Court had
unanimously ruled that the testimonies of the same whistleblowers against Jo Christine
and John Christopher Napoles, children of Janet Napoles who were also charged with the
embezzlement of the PDAF, are admissible in evidence, considering that technical rules of
evidence are not binding on the fiscal during preliminary investigation. This Court was
unequivocal in declaring that the objection on res inter alios acta should falter:
Neither can the Napoles siblings discount the testimonies of the whistleblowers based on
their invocation of the res inter alios acta rule under Section 28, Rule 130 of the Rules on
Evidence, which states that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act,
declaration, or omission of another, unless the admission is by a conspirator under the
parameters of Section 30 of the same Rule. To be sure, the foregoing rule constitutes a
technical rule on evidence which should not be rigidly applied in the course of
preliminary investigation proceedings. In Estrada, the Court sanctioned the
Ombudsman's appreciation of hearsay evidence, which would otherwise be inadmissible
under technical rules on evidence, during the preliminary investigation "as long as there is
substantial basis for crediting the hearsay." This is because "such investigation is merely
preliminary, and does not finally adjudicate rights and obligations of parties." Applying the
same logic, and with the similar observation that there lies substantial basis for crediting
the testimonies of the whistleblowers herein, the objection interposed by the Napoles
siblings under the evidentiary res inter alios acta rule should falter. Ultimately, as
case law edifies, "[t]he technical rules on evidence are not binding on the fiscal who has
jurisdiction and control over the conduct of a preliminary investigation," as in this
case.148(Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Absent any countervailing reason, the rule on stare decisis149 mandates a similar
application of the foregoing ruling to this case.

In any event, even if it is assumed that the rule on res inter alios acta were to apply during
preliminary investigation, the treatment of the whistleblowers' statements as hearsay is
bound by the exception on independently relevant statements. "Under the doctrine of
independently relevant statements, regardless of their truth or falsity, the fact that such
statements have been made is relevant. The hearsay rule does not apply, and the
statements are admissible as evidence. Evidence as to the making of such statement is not
secondary but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or be
circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact."150 Undoubtedly, the
testimonies of the whistleblowers are independently relevant to prove the involvement of
Sen. Revilla and his coaccused in the present controversy, considering their respective
participations in the entire PDAF scam. Therefore, the statements made by whistleblowers
Suñas, Sula, and Luy, who were employees of JLN Corporation and privy to the financial
transactions of Napoles concerning, among others, Sen. Revilla's PDAF, should be given
consideration as they are directly, if not circumstantially, relevant to the issue at hand.

To add, the prosecution also presented Luy's ledger entries which corroborate his
testimony that Sen. Revilla dealt with Napoles and received PDAF kickbacks. Luy's records
disclose that the kickbacks amountpd to "at least P224,512,500.00: P10,000,000.00 for
2006; P61,000,000.00 for 2007; P80,000,000.00 for 2008; P40,000,000.00 for 2009; and
P33,512,500.00 for 2010."151

Relatedly, it should be clarified that the fact that Luy did not personally know Sen.
Revilla or that none of the whistleblowers personally saw anyone handing/delivering
money to Sen. Revilla does not mean that they did not personally know of his
involvement. Because of their functions in JLN Corporation as above-stated, it is evident
that they had personal knowledge of the fact that Napoles named Sen. Revilla as one of the
select-legislators she transacted with. More significantly, they personally processed the
PDAF funds and documents connected with Sen. Revilla's Office, which lasted for a
considerable amount of time, i.e., four (4) years [2006-2010 as charged]. As such, their
testimonies should not be completely disregarded as hearsay.

In any case, this Court has resolved that "probable cause can be established with
hearsay evidence, as long as there is substantial basis for crediting the
hearsay."152 The substantial basis for crediting the whistleblowers' testimonies, even if so
regarded as hearsay, rests on their key functions in JLN Corporation as above-mentioned,
as well as the collective evidence gathered by the prosecution tending to support the same
conclusion that Sen. Revilla and his alleged co-conspirators acted in concert to pillage his
PDAF funds.

The prosecution further submitted the affidavits of Sen. Revilla's corespondents which
constitute direct evidence that provide an account of Sen. Revilla's involvement, this time
from the perspective of certain IA officials.

Among others, National Livelihood Development Corporation Director IV Emmanuel Alexis

G. Sevidal, echoed the Ombudsman's finding that "[Sen.] Revilla, through Cambe, [was]
responsible for 'identifying the projects, determining the project costs and choosing the NGOs'
which was manifested in the letters of [Sen.] Revilla[.]"153

For his part, Technology Resource Center (TRC) Deputy, Director General Dennis L.
Cunanan (Cunanan) narrated that he met Janet Napoles sometime in 2006 or 2007.
According to him, Napoles introduced herself as "the representative of certain legislators
who supposedly picked TRC as a conduit for PDAF-funded projects"; at the same occasion,
Napoles told him that "her principals were then Senate President [Enrile], [Sen.
Revilla], [and] [Sen. Estrada.]" Cunanan further averred that he "often ended up taking
and/or making telephone verifications and follow-ups and receiving legislators or their staff
members," all in connection with PDAF projects. In addition, Cunanan even conveyed that
Luy would occasionally go to his office to pressure him to expedite the release of the PDAF
funds by calling the offices of the legislators concerned.154

Cunanan's statements were furthr corroborated by TRC Department Manager III Francisco
B. Figura (Figura), wno averred that legislators would "highly recommend"
NGOs/foundations as conduit implementors and that if TRC disagreed with their
recommendations, said legislators wquld feel insulted and take away their PDAF from TRC,
resulting in the latter losing the chance to earn service fees.155According to Figura, this set
up rendered TRC officials powerless to disregard the wishes of Sen. Revilla especially on the
matter of public bidding for the PDAF projects.156

At this juncture, this Court would like to dispel the notion. that due process rights were
violated when Sen. Revilla was denied copies of the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents
in the preliminary investigation proceedings before the Ombudsman as he argues in G.R.
Nos. 212427-28. This matter was already resolved in the similar case of Estrada, where
this Court said:
Both the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Rules of Procedure of the Office of
the Ombudsman require the investigating officer to furnish the respondent with copies of
the affidavits of the complainant and affidavits of his supporting witnesses. Neither of these
Rules require the investigating officer to furnish the respondent with copies of the affidavits
of his [co-respondents]. The right of the respondent is only "to examine the
evidence submitted by the complainant," as expressly stated in Section 3 (b), Rule 112
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. This Court has unequivocally ruled
in Paderanga that "Section 3, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
expressly provides that the respondent shall only have the right to submit a counter-
affidavit, to examine all other evidence submitted by the complainant and, where the fiscal
sets a hearing to propound clarificatory questions to the parties. or their witnesses, to be
afforded an opportunity to be present but without the right to examine or cross-examine."
Moreover, Section 4 (a, b and c), of Rule II of the Ombudsman's Rule of Procedure, read
together, only require the investigating officer to furnish the respondent with copies of the
affidavits of the complainant and his supporting witnesses. There is no law or rule
requiring the investigating officer to furnish the respondent with copies of the
affidavits of his co-respondents.157
In any event, the Ombudsman in this case went beyond its legal duty and eventually
granted Sen. Revilla's requests to be furnished with said counter-affidavits, and even
afforded him the opportunity to comment thereto.158 Thus, there is more reason to decline
his flawed claims of denial of due process. Case law statethat the touchstone of due process
is the opportunity to be heard,159 which was undeniably afforded to Sen. Revilla in this
case.

The findings of the COA in its SAO Report No. 2012-2013 (COA report)160 also buttress
the finding of probable cause against Sen.Revilla. This report presents'in detail the various
irregularities in the disbursement of the PDAF allocations of several legislators in the years
2007 to 2009, such as: (a) the IAs not actually implementing the purported projects, and
instead, directly releasing the funds to the NGOs after deducting a "management
fee," which were done at the behest of the sponsoring legislator, including Sen.
Revilla; (b) the involved NGOs did not have any track record in the implementation of
government projects, provided fictitious addresses, submitted false documents, and were
selected without any public bidding and complying with COA Circular No. 2607-001 and
GPPB Resolution No. 12-2007; and (c) the suppliers who purportedly provided supplies to
the NGOs denied ever dealing with the latter. Resultantly, the COA Report concluded that
the PDAF-funded projects of Sen. Revilla were "ghost" or inexistent.161

The findings in the COA report were further corroborated by the field verifications
conducted by the Field Investigation Office - Office of the Ombudsman (FIO) to
determine whether or not Sen. Revilla's PDAF was indeed utilized for its intended livelihood
projects. In the course of investigation, it was revealed that the mayors and municipal
agriculturists, who had reportedly received livelihood assistance kits/packages, purportedly
procured through Sen. Revilla's PDAF, actually denied receiving the same and worse, were
not even aware of any PDAF-funded projects intended for their benefit. Moreover, the
signatures on the certificates of acceptance and delivery reports were forged, and in fact,
the supposed beneficiaries listed therein were neither residents of the place where they
were named as such; had jumbled surnames; deceased; or even downright fictitious. The
foregoing led the FIO to similarly conclude that the purported livelihood projects were
"ghost" projects, and that its proceeds amounting to P517,000,000.00 were never used for
the same.162

Taking together all of the above-stated pieces of evidence, the COA and FIO reports tend
to prima facieestablish that irregularities had indeed attended the disbursement of Sen.
Revilla's PDAF and that he had a hand in such anomalous releases, being the head of
Office which unquestionably exercised operational control thereof. As the Ombudsman
correctly observed, "[t]he PDAF was allocated to him by virtue of his position as a Senator,
and therefore he exercise[d] control in the selection of his priority projects and programs.
He indorsed [Napoles's] NGOs in consideration for the remittance of kickbacks and
commissions from Napoles. Compounded by the fact that the PDAF-funded projects turned
out to be 'ghost projects', and that the rest of the PDAF allocation went into the pockets of
Napoles and her cohorts, [there is probable cause to show that] Revilla thus unjustly
enriched himself at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and
the Republic of the Philippines."163 Hence, he should stand trial for violation of Section 3 (e)
of RA 3019. For the same reasons, it is apparent that ill-gotten wealth in the amount of at
least P50,000,000.00 (i.e., P224,512,500.00) were amassed, accumulated or acquired
through a combination or series of overt acts stated in Section 1 of the Plunder Law.
Therefore, Sen. Revilla should likewise stand trial for Plunder.

Besides, case law holds164 that once the trial court finds probable cause, which results in
the issuance of a warrant of arrest (as the Sandiganbayan in this case, with respect to Sen.
Revilla and his copetitioners165), any question on the prosecution's conduct of preliminary
investigation becomes moot.

In fine, Sen. Revilla's petitions in G.R. Nos. 212427-28 and G.R. Nos. 212694-95 are
dismissed for lack of merit.
IV. Probable Cause Against Cambe.

The same conclusion obtains with respect to the petition of Cambe in G.R. Nos. 212794-
95 assailing the Ombudsman's finding of probable cause against him, as well as its failure
to furnish him copies of his corespondents' counter-affidavits.

The above-discussed pieces of evidence are all equally significant to establish probable
cause against Cambe. There is no dispute that Ca:mbe was Sen. Revilla's trusted aide,
being his Chief of Staff. By such authority, he also exercised operational control over the
affairs of Sen. Revilla's office, including the allocation of his PDAF. In fact, Cambe's
signatures explicitly appear on several PDAF documents, such as the MOAs allowing the
IAs to transfer Sen. Revilla's PDAF funds allocated for certain projects to various JLN-
controlled NGOs.166

Moreover, Cambe was personally identified by the whistleblowers to have received PDAF
money for himself and for Sen. Revilla. As recounted by Luy, Cambe was the one who
would go to Napoles's office and receive cash from the latter in the aggregate amount of
P224,512,500.00 representing Sen. Revilla's "commissions" or "kickbacks" coming from the
PDAF scam. The cash would come either from Luy's vault or from Napoles herself.167 In
simple terms, Cambe allegedly acted as a liaison between Sen. Revilla and Napoles.

For the same reasons above-discussed, there should be no valid objection against the
appreciation of the PDAF documents and whistleblowers' testimonies as evidence to
establish probable cause against Cam be at this stage of the proceedings. He also has no
right to be furnished copies of the counter-affidavits ,of his co-respondents. Thus, this
Court holds that Cambe should likewise stand trial for the crimes charged, and his petition
in G.R. Nos. 212014-15 be dismissed.
V. Probable Cause Against Napoles.

In G.R. Nos. 213536-37, Janet Napoles similarly seeks to nullify the Ombudsman's March
28, 2014 Joint Resolution and June 4, 2014 Joint Order finding probable cause against her
for Plunder and for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019. Essentially, she argues that the
complaints did not establish the specific acts of the crimes she supposedly committed. She
likewise contends that since she is not a public officer, she cannot be subjected to
prosecution by the Ombudsman before the Sandiganbayan.

Napoles's arguments are untenable.

Records clearly show that Napoles, in all reasonable likelihood, played an integral role in
the illegal utilization, diversion, and disbursement of Sen. Revilla's PDAF. In fact, she was
tagged as the mastermind of the entire PDAF scam. As outlined by the Ombudsman,
Napoles would approach legislators, such as Sen. Revilla, and "offer to 'acquire' his x x x
PDAF allocation in exchange for a 'commission' or kickback amounting to a certain
percentage of the PDAF."168 Once Napoles was informed of the availability of Sen Revilla's
PDAF, she and/or her staff would prepare listings of the available projects specifically
indicating the IAs which would carry out the same. After the listings are released by Sen.
Revilla's Office, Napoles would then give a down payment from her own pockets for delivery
to Sen. Revilla, or in case of his unavailability, to Cambe who would receive the same on
Sen. Revilla's behalf. Once the SARO and/or the NCA regarding said project is released,
Napoles would then deliver the promised "kickbacks" to Sen. Revilla. Thereafter, Sen.
Revilla and/or Cambe would endorse Napoles's NGOs to undertake the PDAF-funded
projects, all of which turned out to be "ghost" or "inexistent;" thus, allowing Napoles and
her cohorts to pocket the PDAF allocation.169

Based on the evidence in support thereof such as the PDAF documents, whistleblowers'
testimonies, the accounts of the IA officials, and the COA report, as well as the field
verifications of the FIO, Ombudsman, this Court is convinced that there lies probable cause
against Janet Napoles for the charge of Plunder as it has been prima facie established that
she, in conspiracy with Sen. Revilla, Cambe, and other personalities, was significantly
involved in the afore-described modus operandi to obtain Sen. Revilla's PDAF amounting to
at least P50,000,000.00 in "kickbacks." In the same manner, there is probable cause
against Napoles for violations of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, as it is ostensible that their
conspiracy to illegally divert PDAF Funds to "ghost" projects caused undue prejudice to the
government.

That a private individual, such as Napoles, could not be charged for Plunder and violations
of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 because the offenders in those crimes are public officers is a
complete misconception. It has been long-settled that while the primary offender in the
aforesaid crimes are public officers, private individuals may also be held liable for the
same if they are found to have conspired with said officers in committing the same.
This proceeds from the fundamental principle that in cases of conspiracy, the act of one is
the act of all.170 In this case, since it appears that Napoles has acted in concert with public
officers in the systematic pillaging of Sen. Revilla's PDAF, the Ombudsman correctly
indicted her as a co-conspirator for the aforementioned crimes.

Thus, Napoles's petition in G.R. Nos. 213536-37 is dismissed.

VI. Probable Cause Against De Asis.

In G.R. Nos. 213477-78, De Asis accuses the Ombudsman of gravely abusing its discretion
in finding probable cause against him for Plunder and violations of Section 3 (e) of RA
3019, contending, inter alia, that the performance of his functions as driver and messenger
of Napoles hardly constitutes overt acts of the aforesaid crimes or a willful participation
thereof. In this regard, he asserts that as a mere high school graduate and former security
guard, it is highly unimaginable for him to conspire with his employer and other high-
ranking government officials to commit the aforesaid crimes.

The petition has no merit.

Records show that De Asis was designated as the President/Incorporator171 of KPMFI which
was one of the many NGOs controlled by Napoles that was used in the embezzlement of
Sen. Revilla's PDAF allocations.172 Moreover, whistleblowers Luy and Suñas explicitly
n,amed De Asis as one of those who prepared money to be given to the lawmaker.173 Said
whistleblowers even declared that De Asis, among others, rec ived the checks issued by the
IAs to the NGOs and deposited the same in the bank; and that, after the money is
withdrawn from the bank, he was also one of those tasked to bring the money to Janet
Napoles's house.174 Indeed, the foregoing prove to be well-grounded bases to believe that, in
all probability, De Asis conspired with the other co-accused to commit the crimes charged.

To refute the foregoing allegations, De Asis presented defenses which heavily centered on
his perceived want of criminal intent, as well as the alleged absence of the elements of the
crimes charged. However, such defenses are evidentiary in nature, and thus, are better
ventilated during trial and not during preliminary investigation. To stress, a preliminary
investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the prosecution's
evidence; and the presence or absence of the elements of the crime is evidentiary in nature
and is a matter of defense that may be passed upon only after a full-blown trial on the
merits.175

In sum, the Ombudsman did not gravely abuse its discretion in finding probable cause to
indict De Asis for the crimes charged. Consequently, his petition in G.R. Nos. 213477-
78 is dismissed.
VII. Probable Cause Against Lim.
In G.R. Nos. 213532-33, Lim argues that the Ombudsman. gravely abused its discretion in
finding probable cause against him for Plunder. According to him, the criminal complaints
do not allege a specific action he committed that would demonstrate his involvement for the
crime charged.

Lim's contention is without merit.

As correctly pointed out by the Ombudsman, whistleblowers Luy and Suñas narrated that
over the course of the perpetuation of the PDAF scam, they, along with the other staff of
Napoles - which includes Lim - would prepare, and thereafter deliver, the kickbacks
intended for Sen. Revilla.176 The preparation and delivery of kickbacks to the legislator
and/or his trusted staff are indeed overt acts that relate to his involvement in the PDAF
scheme. To note, even if it is assumed that Lim only prepared the money and did not
deliver the same as he claims,177 the act of preparation is still connected to the common
objective of the conspiracy. Accordingly, this establishes the existence of probable cause
against him for thb crime charged. Hence, his petition in G.R. Nos. 213532-33 is likewise
dismissed.
VIII. Probable Cause Against Relampagos, et al.

Meanwhile, in G.R. Nos. 218744-59, DBM employees Relampagos, Nuñez, Paule, and Bare
assail the Sandiganbayan Resolutions dated November 13, 2014178 and May 13,
2015179 which judicially found probable cause against them for eight (8) counts of violation
of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, thereby affirming the Ombudsman's earlier finding of probable
cause against them (at least for the said eight [8] counts that were affirmed). In particular,
they argue that: (a) they cannot be faulted for issuing the SAROs without prior IA
endorsement as it was authorized under the General Appropriations Acts (GAAs) for the
years 2007 to 2009; and (b) there was no "undue haste" in the issuance of the said SAROs
as the DBM itself prescribes shorter periods in the processing of the same.180

Relampagos, et al.'s arguments fail to persuade.

As pointed out by the Ombudsman and the Sandiganbayan, some of the SAROs and NCAs
issued in the perpetuation of the PDAF scam were issued by the Office of Relampagos as
DBM Undersecretary, where Nuñez, Paule, and Bare are all working - a finding that they
themselves did not dispute.181 More significantly: (a) whistleblower Luy positively
identified Relampagos, et al. as Napoles's "contact persons" in the DBM; and (b) the
COA Report found irregularities in their issuances of the aforesaid SAROs and
NCAs.182 Ostensibly, these circumstances show Relampagos et al.'s manifest partiality and
bad faith in favor of Napoles and her cohorts that evidently caused undue prejudice to the
Government. Thus, they must stand trial for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019.

As to their contentions that there was no "undue haste" in the issuance of the said SAROs
as the GAAs for the years 2007 to 2009 authorized such issuances even without prior IA
endorsement and that the DBM itself prescribes a shorter processing time for the same,
suffice it to say that these are matters of defense that are better ventilated in a full-blown
trial. The timing of the SARO releases by these DBM officials, as well as any deviations from
legal procedure are but part of a multitude of factors to be threshed out during trial in
order to determine their exact culpability. Verily, the confines of a preliminary investigation
do not yet allow a full exposition of the parties' claims. Relampagos, et al.'s petition in G.R.
Nos. 218744-59 is therefore dismissed.
Conclusion

Case law states that "the Ombudsman's finding of probable cause does not touch on the
issue of guilt or innocence of the accused. It is not the function of the Office of the
Ombudsman to rule on such issue. All that the Office of the Ombudsman did was to weigh
the evidence presented together with the counter-allegations of the accused and determine
if there was enough reason to believe that a crime has been committed and that the
accused are probably guilty thereof."183 In the review of the Ombudsman's determination of
probable cause, we are guided by this Court's pronouncement in Vergara v.
Ombudsman,184 where it was ruled that:
[C]ourts do not interfere in the Ombudsman's exercise of discretion in determining probable
cause unless there are compelling reasons. The Ombudsman's finding of probable cause, or
lack of it, is entitled to great respect absent a showing of grave abuse of discretion. Besides,
to justify the issuance of the writ of certiorari on the ground of abuse of discretion, the
abuse must be grave, as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent as to amount to an evasion
of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all, in
contemplation of law, as to be equivalent to having acted without jurisdiction.185
Meanwhile, with respect to the Sandiganbayan's judicial determination of probable cause,
this Court, in Delos-Santos Dio v. Court of Appeals,186 enlightens that:
[A] judge's discretion to dismiss a case immediately after the filing of the information in
court is appropriate only when the failure to establish probable cause can be clearly
inferred from the evidence presented and not when its existence is simply doubtful. After
all, it call)lot be expected that upon the filing of the information in court the prosecutor
would have already presented all the evidence necessary to secure a conviction of the
accused, the objective of a previously-conducted preliminary investigation being merely to
determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime
has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held
for trial.187
In this case, the Ombudsman (and the Sandiganbayan as to Relampagos, et al.) did not err
in finding probable cause against all the petitioners. Their findings are fully supported by
the evidence on record and no semblance of misapprehension taints the same. Moreover,
this Court cannot tag key documentary evidence as forgeries and bar testimonies as
hearsay at this stage of the proceedings; otherwise, it would defy established principles and
norms followed during preliminary investigation. Jurisprudence teaches us that "[i]n
dealing with probable cause[,] athe very name implies, we deal with probabilities. These are
not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which
reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act. The standard of proof is
accordingly correlative to what must be proved."188 Overall, based on the foregoing
disquisitions, the standard of probable cause was adequately hurdled by the prosecution in
this case. As such, no grave abuse of discretion was committed by the Ombudsman and
the Sandiganbayan in the proceedings a quo. All the petitioners should therefore stand trial
for the crimes they were charged.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED for lack of erit. The findings of probable cause
against all petitioners are hereby AFFIRMED and the Sandiganbayan, as trial court,
is DIRECTED to commence/continue with the necessary proceedings in these cases with
deliberate dispatch.

SO ORDERED. cralawlawlibrary

DNA EVIDENCE

LEONEN, J.:
An intellectually disabled person is not, solely by this reason, ineligible from testifying in
court.[1] "He or she can be a witness, depending on his or her ability to relate what he or
she knows."[2] If an intellectually disabled victim's testimony is coherent, it is admissible in
court.[3]

This Court resolves this appeal[4] filed by Edgar Allan Corpuz y Flores (Allan)[5] from the
November 9, 2012 Decision[6] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 04977.

The assailed Decision affirmed the Regional Trial Court's ruling that Allan was guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of four (4) counts of Simple Rape of AAA[7], a mental retardate
(intellectually disabled) with a mental age of five (5) years and eight (8) months.[8]

Allan was charged with four (4) counts of rape in Branch 50, Regional Trial Court, Villasis,
Pangasinan.[9] The charging portions of the Informations read:

Criminal Case No. V-1123

That sometime in November, 2002 at Brgy. Puelay, Villasis, Pangasinan and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force, violence
and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual
intercourse with AAA, 14 years old, with a mental age of a 5[-]year[-]old [child], against her
will and without her consent, to her damage and prejudice.

CONTRARY to Art. 266-A, par. 1, in rel. to Art. 266-B, 6th par., as amended by R.A. 8353.

Criminal Case No. V-1134

That sometime in October, 2002 at Brgy. Puelay, Villasis, Pangasinan and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force, violence
and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual
intercourse with AAA, 14 years old, with a mental age of a 5[-]year[-]old [child], against her
will and without her consent, to her damage and prejudice.

CONTRARY to Art. 266-A, par. 1, in rel. to Art. 266-B, 6th par., as amended by R.A. 8353.

Criminal Case No. V-1135

That sometime before November 1, 2002 at Brgy. Puelay, Villasis, Pangasinan and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force,
violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
sexual intercourse with AAA, 14 years old, with a mental age of a 5[-]year[-]old [child],
against her will and without her consent, to her damage and prejudice.

CONTRARY to Art. 266-A, par. 1, in rel. to Art. 266-B, 6th par., as amended by R.A. 8353.

Criminal Case No. V-1136

That sometime in December, 2002 at Brgy. Puelay, Villasis, Pangasinan and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force, violence
and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual
intercourse with AAA, 14 years old, with a mental age of a 5[-]year[-]old [child], against her
will and without her consent, to her damage and prejudice.

CONTRARY to Art. 266-A, par. 1, in rel. to Art. 266-B, 6th paragraph, as amended by R.A.
8353.[10] (Emphasis in the original, citation omitted)

Upon arraignment, Allan pleaded not guilty to the charges.[11]

Joint trial on the merits ensued.[12] The prosecution presented the following as witnesses:
AAA's mother, BBB; AAA's older sister, CCC; AAA's uncle, GGG; AAA's aunt by affinity,
EEE; Dr. Gloria Araos-Liberato (Dr. Araos-Liberato); Brenda Tablizo (Tablizo); SPO1
Diosdado Macaraeg (SPO1 Macaraeg); Dr. Rachel Acosta (Dr. Acosta); and AAA.

BBB testified that her sister-in law, DDD, told her on March 2, 2003 that AAA was
raped.[13] BBB found out from a psychiatrist that it was Allan who raped her
daughter.[14] She revealed that Allan had also raped CCC.[15] However, that case was settled
since Allan was her brother-in-law.[16]

CCC affirmed that sometime in 2002, AAA allegedly informed her that she was not having
her period. She advised AAA to "drink something bitter" and to ask their aunt EEE about
her condition. At that time, CCC found out that AAA was pregnant.[17]

EEE[18] who lived near AAA's house,[19] averred that in the morning of February 14, 2003,
AAA entered her house while drinking from a cup.[20] EEE asked what AAA was
consuming.[21] AAA responded that it "was something to induce menstruation. "[22]

AAA then asked EEE to massage her aching stomach.[23] When EEE was about to do so,
she observed that it was noticeably bulging.[24]AAA began to cry, confessing that she
thought she was pregnant.[25]

At that time, AAA's parents were in Baguio City, so EEE called AAA's uncle GGG
instead.[26] When GGG arrived, AAA was still crying[27]when she told them, "Inkastanak ni
Allan, " pertaining to Allan.[28]
GGG brought AAA to Asingan Community Hospital[29] and to the police station to enter the
incident in the police blotter.[30]

GGG attested that his sister-in-law EEE called him on February 14, 2003.[31] When he
arrived at EEE's house, he saw AAA crying.[32] He found out that AAA was pregnant.[33]

When he confirmed AAA's pregnancy through a medical examination, EEE told him that
AAA was raped by Allan.[34]

After entering the incident in the police blotter, he also reported it to the National Bureau of
Investigation, Dagupan City.[35]

Dr. Araos-Liberato, the Medical Officer III of Medicare Community Hospital in Asingan,
Pangasinan issued the Medico Legal Certificate, which stated that AAA was 14 years old on
February 14, 2003 when she was examined. Her findings provided:

1. Healed hymenal lacerations at 11:00, 5:00 and 2:00 o'clock position. (sic)
2. Hymenal orifice admits two (2) fingertips.
3. Pregnancy test (+) corresponds to three (3) to four (4) months [a]ge of gestation.[36]

Since the defense stipulated to admit her purported statements and the existence of the
Medico Legal Certificate, her testimony was dispensed with.[37]

Brenda Tablizo, a Psychologist II of the National Bureau of Investigation, Manila, testified

that she conducted AAA's neuropsychiatric examination and evaluation on February 26,
2003 upon the request of Agent Gerald Geralde (Agent Geralde) of the National Bureau of
Investigation, Dagupan City.[38]

Tablizo identified the March 6, 2003 Report that she had sent to Agent Geralde,[39] which
stated that:

AAA had a mental age of five (5) years and eight (8) months and an IQ of 42. Her
intelligence level was equivalent to Moderate Mental Retardation.

She also found AAA to be an egocentric and self-centered individual and had difficulty in
her interpersonal relations. Poor impulse control was likewise evident in her.[40]

Tablizo testified that AAA told her that Allan "inserted his penis into her organ" (inserrek na
dadiay boto na kaniak)[41] during an interview.

SPO1 Diosdado Macaraeg was a policeman in Villasis, Pangasinan, who presented an

excerpt from the police blotter.[42]

AAA underwent another neuropsychiatric examination before taking the witness stand.[43]

Dr. Rachel Acosta testified that she had examined AAA's mental status including her
"mental, behavioral and emotional conditions and her manner of communication]." She
found that AAA had a "mild degree of mental retardation" and an Intelligence Quotient of
70.[44]

Although AAA was already 19 years old at the time of examination, her mental age was that
of a child aged five (5) to seven (7) years.[45]She observed that:

AAA's "manner of speech is quite incomprehensible in some words only but most of the
simple words are well spoken but some words that are being spoken with slur and slang
manner and defective phonation. It seems that there is an air coming out from the nose
when she talks."
[She] concluded that AAA was fit to testify as a witness depending on her emotional
condition when she testifies although she was "not oriented to time, date and place." Her
degree of honesty was great because, with mental age of 5 to 7 years old, she does not know
what is right or wrong.[46] (Emphasis supplied)

AAA was already 20 years old on May 21, 2008 when she testified.[47] She confirmed that
XXX was her four (4)-year-old child.[48]

She identified Allan as XXX's father. She also confirmed that Allan was the man she was
referring to when the prosecutor pointed at Allan.[49]

AAA was asked how Allan became XXX's father. She responded, "Iniyot nak, sir. " (He had
sex with me, sir.) She attested that when she was 13 years old, Allan had sex with her on
four (4) occasions, each of which he gave her money.[50]

On the other hand, Allan and his daughter, Almeda Corpuz-Generosa (Almeda), testified for
the defense.[51] The testimony of Almeda was dispensed with after the prosecution agreed to
accept her proposed testimony.[52] She testified that when she asked AAA about her
pregnancy, AAA failed to disclose who impregnated her.[53]

Allan denied the accusations and insisted that all the charges against him were merely
fabricated by AAA's father, FFF.[54] He allegedly sacked FFF as a truck driver in his sand
and gravel business in 2001 for allowing his son to drive the truck that led to an
accident.[55]

FFF allegedly also reported to the police that Allan had illegal drugs in his place,[56] which
caused his incarceration for illegal possession of dangerous drugs on January 2,
2002.[57] He was later acquitted of the charge.[58]

Upon motion before the trial court, the defense applied for Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA)
paternity test, which was granted on April 20, 2009.[59]

Forensic Biologist III Demelen dela Cruz (Dela Cruz) and Forensic Chemist I Gemma Shiela
Orbeta of the National Bureau of Investigation, Manila, took biological samples such as
buccal swab and blood from Allan, AAA, and XXX in open court. This was done in the
presence of Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Rodelle T. Beltran and defense counsel Atty.
Cecile S. Tomboc on May 19, 2009. Frederick Panlilio of the National Bureau of
Investigation Photo Laboratory took photos of the whole proceedings.[60]

On March 3, 2010, the defense presented Dela Cruz as an expert witness. She testified that
part of her duties as a forensic biologist was to conduct DNA paternity tests.[61]

Dela Cruz detailed every procedure that she followed beginning with DNA extraction and
analysis using "a fully automated genetic analyzer (ABI 310 genetic analyzer)" until the
printing of the resulting electropherogram, which had the DNA profiles of Allan, AAA, and
XXX. She affirmed that the comparison of their DNA profiles revealed a "100% proof that
the accused is the biological father of XXX."[62]

Forensic Chemist Mary Ann Aranas conducted a confirmatory test, which affirmed the test
result of the DNA paternity test.[63]

Through a Joint Decision,[64] the Regional Trial Court convicted Allan of four (4) counts of
Simple Rape on March 29, 2011.

The trial court ruled that AAA's testimony was "categorical, straight forward and
credible."[65] Since it was already established that the victim was intellectually disabled,[66] it
would be unlikely for her to fabricate the accusations against Allan.[67]

As confirmed by Dr. Acosta, AAA's degree of honesty was great. Considering her mental age,
she did not know how to decipher right from wrong. Thus, her simple recount of events
showed her "honesty and naivet[é]."[68]

The trial court also ruled that AAA's healed hymenal lacerations, pregnancy, and delivery of
a child adequately substantiated carnal knowledge. Similarly, AAA's categorical
identification of Allan as the offender was corroborated by the testimonies of EEE, GGG,
and Tablizo.[69]

Furthermore, the DNA paternity test result "sealed the case for the prosecution."[70] The
dispositive portion of the decision read:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Edgar

Allan Corpuz GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the four (4) counts of simple rape
charged, committed against [AAA], a mental retardate with a mental age equivalent to a five
(5)[-]year[-]and[-] eight (8)[-]month[-]old child, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua for each count and to pay the offended party P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages in each case.

SO ORDERED.[71]

In his appeal, Allan insisted that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt because
the records were bereft of any credible proof indicating that he raped AAA four (4) times.
AAA failed to testify when and where she was raped as she was not oriented with place,
date, and time.[72]

In its November 9, 2012 Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed Allan's conviction.[73] The
Court of Appeals held that carnal knowledge of an intellectually disabled person is rape
under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act
No. 8353.[74] Evidence of force or intimidation is not important since the victim is incapable
of giving her consent.[75]

It affirmed the trial court's ruling that AAA's testimony was credible. Her positive
identification of the accused and the narration of the sordid acts committed against her
sufficed.[76]

Additionally, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses adequately supported Allan's

conviction. Even without the results of the DNA paternity test, "the degree of proof to
convict [him] beyond reasonable doubt was sufficiently established by the
prosecution."[77] Thus,

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Villasis, Pangasinan, Branch 50
in Criminal Cases Nos. V-1123, V-1134, V-1135 & V-1136 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.[78] (Emphasis in the original)

Hence, an appeal before this Court was filed.

On July 1, 2013,[79] the Court of Appeals elevated to this Court the records of this case
pursuant to its Resolution[80] dated January 2, 2013, which gave due course to the Notice
of Appeal[81] filed by Allan.

In the Resolution[82] dated September 4, 2013, this Court noted the records of the case
forwarded by the Court of Appeals. The parties were then ordered to file their supplemental
briefs, should they so desired, within 30 days from notice.

On November 5, 2013, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation on behalf of
the People of the Philippines stating that it would no longer file a supplemental brief.[83] A
similar Manifestation[84] was filed by the Public Attorney's Office on behalf of Allan.

The sole issue for resolution is whether Allan's guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Allan insists that he could not have impregnated AAA because, as she has testified, she
was raped when she was 13 years old but her first menstrual period was when she was 14
years old.[85] Allegedly, AAA was inconsistent in her testimony because when she was
interviewed, she did not know who raped her.[86] Despite this, however, the trial court still
relied on AAA's testimony.[87]

He argues that the DNA paternity test result's confirmation that he is the father of AAA's
child is insufficient on its own for his conviction.[88] He then assails the accuracy of the
DNA test result claiming that:

The record shows that Forensic Biologist, Delemen Dela Cruz did not state that she
personally collected the biological specimens and neither did she mention that she put
tamper tape on the collected specimens. She merely stated that they used mask and gloves
when they collected the specimens; placed the same in a tube; put it inside a white
envelope; and thereafter sealed it to [e]nsure that the specimens will not be contaminated.
There was no showing that she thoroughly inspected the samples for tampering nor was
there explanation as to what she did with the specimens while these were in their custody.

Forensic chemist Gemma Madera, who collected biological samples from their subjects and
examined the same was not presented by the prosecution. There is, thus, uncertainty in
the DNA evidence and the probability of contamination and error is great.[89](Citations
omitted)

He concludes that since his guilt was not established with moral certainty, he should be
presumed innocent.[90]

On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General contends that the prosecution was
able to prove Allan's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.[91] Dr. Acosta's testimony on AAA's
healed lacerations, as well as AAA's pregnancy and consequent delivery, conclusively
confirmed that Allan had carnal knowledge of AAA.[92] This is substantiated by AAA's "clear,
straightforward and categorical testimony," and her positive identification of the offender.[93]

AAA's mental state was also undisputed.[94] Hence, it is unlikely that AAA would fabricate
the charges against Allan.[95] Thus,

A young girl would not usually concoct a tale of defloration; publicly admit having been
ravished and her honor tainted; allow the examination of her private parts; and undergo all
the trouble and inconvenience, not to mention the trauma and the scandal of a public trial,
had she not in fact been raped and been truly moved to protect and preserve her honor,
and motivated by the desire to obtain justice for the wicked acts committed against her.
Moreover, the court has repeatedly held that the lone testimony of the victim in a rape case,
if credible, is enough to sustain a conviction.[96] (Citation omitted)

The Office of the Solicitor General underscores that Allan's denial of the charges cannot
subdue the prosecution's positive and direct testimonies.[97] His allegation that AAA's father
fabricated the charges against him is "merely self-serving and absurd."[98] As found by the
trial court, there were no apparent indications that AAA's father had ill-feelings against
Allan since AAA's father was able to buy a truck for his own business."[99] Even assuming
that AAA's father had ill motives against Allan, it is still unbelievable for him to make a
story "that will expose his own daughter to public ridicule just to exact vengeance." [100]

Furthermore, the defense cannot question the results of the DNA paternity test.[101] Its
failure to question the dependability of the DNA testing's methodology is deemed a waiver
on its part.[102]

The appeal lacks merit.

Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No.
8353,[103] provides:
Article 266-A. Rape; When And How Committed. — Rape is Committed —
By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
1)
circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even
d)
though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof,
shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person's
2)
mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of
another person.

To warrant a rape conviction under Article 266-A, it should be shown that "a man had
carnal knowledge with a woman, or a person sexually assaulted another, under any of the
following circumstances:"[104]

a) Through force, threat or intimidation;

b) The victim is deprived of reason;
c) The victim is unconscious;
d) By means of fraudulent machination;
e) By means of grave abuse of authority;
f) When the victim is under 12 years of age; or
g) When the victim is demented.[105]

In this case, the sexual congresses between Allan and AAA were clearly established by the
victim's testimony. Apart from identifying her offender, AAA was also able to recount the
sordid acts committed against her.

Q At the present time how old are you?

A I'm 20 years old[,] sir.
Q Do you have a child?
A Yes, sir.
Q What is the name of your child?
A [XXX],[106] sir.
Q By the way, is your child a male or a female?
A Female[,] sir.
Q And how old is she now?
A She is now four (4) years old[,] sir.
Q Who is the father of [XXX] ?
A Allan [,] sir.
Q When you say Allan, are you referring to Allan Corpuz the accused in these cases?
A Yes, sir.
And the Allan whom you are referring to is he? (the government prosecutor pointing to
Q
accused Allan Corpuz).
A Yes, sir.
Q You said last time that Allan is your cousin?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, what did Allan do to you that made (him) the father of your daughter?
A "Iniyot nak[,] sir" (he had sex with me).
Q How many times did Allan ha[ve] sex with you?
A Four (4) times, sir.
Q How old were you then when Allan had sex with you?
A I was 13 years old, sir.
Q And he had sex with you according to you for four (4) times?
A Yes, sir.
And because Allan had sex with you 4 times that is the reason why you gave
Q
birth to your daughter [XXX]?
A Yes, sir, for 3 months.
Q Your daughter [XXX] has resemblance with Allan?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where is [XXX] now?
A At home[,] sir.
Q How old is [XXX] now?
A She is 4 years old[,] sir.
You said a while ago that Allan had sex with you. My question is, did you
Q
consent to have sex with Allan?
A Yes, sir.
Q You consented because he gave you money then?
A Yes, sir.
Q And do you recall how much he gave you when he had sex with you?
A [P]100.00, [P]150.00[,] sometimes [P]250.00[,] sir.[107] (Emphasis provided)

Moreover, the sexual congresses between Allan and AAA was corroborated by the Medico
Legal Certificate issued by Dr. Araos-Liberato which showed the presence of healed
hymenal lacerations at 11:00, 5:00, and 2:00 positions.[108] Healed or fresh hymenal
lacerations "are the best physical evidence of forcible defloration."[109]

The gravamen of rape under Article 266-A (1) is carnal knowledge of "a woman against her
will or without her consent."[110]Undoubtedly, sexual intercourse with an intellectually
disabled person is rape since proof of force or intimidation becomes needless as the victim
is incapable of giving consent to the act.[111]

AAA's intellectual disability was undisputed and well substantiated by the testimonies of
Tablizo and Dr. Acosta.[112] The defense did not even contest her condition.[113]

AAA was 14 years old when she had her neuropsychiatric examination with Tablizo. The
examination revealed that at the time of examination, AAA's Intelligence Quotient was 42
and her level of intelligence was equal to Moderate Mental Retardation.[114] Also, she had a
mental age of a five (5)-year-and-eight (8)-month-old child.[115]

AAA underwent another mental status examination with Dr. Acosta before being presented
as a witness. The examination revealed that she had a "mild degree of mental
retardation."[116] AAA "belonged to sub-average intellectual with an IQ of 70."[117] Although
AAA was already 19 years old at that time, her mental age was that of a child aged five (5)
to seven (7) years.[118]

For this reason, Allan's acts amounted to rape under Article 266-A 1(d) of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended.[119]

Article 266-A. Rape; When And How Committed. — Rape is Committed —

By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
1)
circumstances:

....

d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even
though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present. (Emphasis provided)

In People v. Quintos y Badilla,[120] this Court emphasized that the conditions under Article
266-A should be construed in the light of one's capacity to give consent.[121] Similarly, this
Court clarified that an intellectually disabled person is not automatically deprived of
reason.[122] Thus,

We are aware that the terms, "mental retardation" or "intellectual disability," had been
classified under "deprived of reason." The terms, "deprived of reason" and "demented",
however, should be differentiated from the term, "mentally retarded" or "intellectually
disabled." An intellectually disabled person is not necessarily deprived of reason or
demented. This court had even ruled that they may be credible witnesses. However,
his or her maturity is not there despite the physical age. He or she is deficient in
general mental abilities and has an impaired conceptual, social, and practical
functioning relative to his or her age, gender, and peers. Because of such
impairment, he or she does not meet the "socio-cultural standards of personal
independence and social responsibility."[123] (Emphasis provided, citations omitted)

In Quintos, this Court also clarified that one's capacity to give consent depends upon his or
her mental age and not on his or her chronological age.[124]

Thus, a person with a chronological age of 7 years and a normal mental age is as capable of
making decisions and giving consent as a person with a chronological age of 35 and a
mental age of 7. Both are considered incapable of giving rational consent because both are
not yet considered to have reached the level of maturity that gives them the capability to
make rational decisions, especially on matters involving sexuality. Decision-making is a
function of the mind. Hence, a person's capacity to decide whether to give consent or
to express resistance to an adult activity is determined not by his or her
chronological age but by his or her mental age. Therefore, in determining whether a
person is "twelve (12) years of age" under Article 266-A (1) (d), the interpretation should be
in accordance with either the chronological age of the child if he or she is not suffering from
intellectual disability, or the mental age if intellectual disability is
established.[125] (Emphasis provided)

If a woman above 12 years old has a mental age of a child below 12, the accused remains
liable for rape even if the victim acceded to the sordid acts.[126] The reason behind the rule
"is simply that if sexual intercourse with a victim under twelve years of age is rape, it must
thereby follow that carnal knowledge of a woman whose mental age is that of a child below
twelve years should likewise be constitutive of rape."[127]

II

To qualify as a witness, the basic test is "whether he [or she] can perceive and, perceiving,
can make known his [or her] perception to others."[128] Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
provides:

Section 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. — Except as provided in the next succeeding
section, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their
perception to others, may be witnesses.

....

Section 21. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity. — The

following persons cannot be witnesses:

Those whose mental condition, at the time of their production for examination, is such
(a)
that they are incapable of intelligently making known their perception to others;

Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable of perceiving the
(b) facts respecting which they are examined and of relating them truthfully. (Emphasis
provided)

Therefore, an intellectually disabled person is not, solely by this reason, ineligible from
testifying in court.[129] "He or she can be a witness, depending on his or her ability to relate
what he or she knows."[130] If an intellectually disabled victim's testimony is coherent, it is
admissible in court.[131]

Notwithstanding AAA's intellectual disability, she is qualified to take the witness stand. A
person with low Intelligence Quotient may still perceive and is capable of making known his
or her perception to others.
Given that AAA's qualification as a witness is already settled, AAA's mental state also does
not prevent her from being a credible witness.[132]

The credibility as a witness of an intellectually disabled person is upheld provided that she
is capable and consistent in narrating her experience. In People v. Monticalvo y Magno:[133]

Emphasis must be given to the fact that the competence and credibility of mentally
deficient rape victims as witnesses have been upheld by this Court where it is shown that
they can communicate their ordeal capably and consistently. Rather than undermine
the gravity of the complainant's accusations, it even lends greater credence to her
testimony, that, someone as feeble-minded and guileless could speak so tenaciously and
explicitly on the details of the rape if she has not in fact suffered such crime at the hands of
the accused.[134] (Emphasis provided)

Furthermore, Dr. Acosta explicitly stated that "[AAA's] degree of honesty is great" despite
her condition.

[AAA's] degree of honesty is "great" because, with her mental age, she does not know what
is right or wrong. Indeed, in light of her mental state, [AAA's] simple narration of what
happened to her is indicative of her honesty and naivet[é].[135] (Citation omitted)

Moreover, it would be unlikely for AAA to fabricate charges against Allan.[136] When there is
no proof showing that the witness was moved by any improper motive, his or her
identification of the offender as the perpetrator of the crime shall be upheld.[137]

In affirming the finding of the accused's guilt, this Court is aware that "when a woman says
that she has been raped, she says, in effect, all that is necessary to show that she had
indeed been raped."[138] If her testimony withstands the test of credibility, like in this case,
"the rapist may be adjudged guilty solely on that basis."[139]

Therefore, Allan cannot exculpate himself, claiming that his guilt was not proven beyond
reasonable doubt since AAA was allegedly not oriented to date, time, and place. AAA's
failure to offer any testimony as to when and where she was raped[140] does not matter. This
Court underscores that the date, place, and time of the incidents need not be accurately
established since these are not elements of rape.

III

In sustaining a conviction for rape, "the victim's testimony must be clear and free from
contradictions."[141] This is indispensable because in this kind of offenses, "conviction or
acquittal virtually depends entirely on the credibility of the complainant's narration since
usually, only the participants can testify as to its occurrence."[142]

Generally, the issue in rape cases involves credibility.[143] As "regards the credibility of
witnesses, th[is] Court usually defers to the findings of the trial court, absent a strong and
cogent reason to disregard [them]."[144]

Examination of the witnesses' demeanor during trial is essential "especially in rape cases
because it helps establish the moral conviction that an accused is guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged."[145] In trial, judges are given the opportunity "to detect,
consciously or unconsciously, observable cues and microexpressions that could, more than
the words said and taken as a whole, suggest sincerity or betray lies and ill will."[146] These
indispensable matters can never be mirrored in documents, as well as in objects used as
proof.[147]

In this case, the trial court found AAA's testimony as "categorical, straightforward and
credible."[148] Similarly, the Court of Appeals emphasized that it was already enough that
AAA was able to identify her offender, as well as the sordid acts committed against
her.[149]Thus, this Court has no reason to disturb these findings. The evaluation of the
credibility of a witness is "best left to the trial court because it has the opportunity to
observe the witnesses and their demeanor during the trial."[150] This Court gives great
respect to the findings of trial courts, and more so when they are affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.[151]

IV

The discrepancies pertaining to "minor details and not in actuality touching upon the
central fact of the crime" do not prejudice AAA's credibility.[152] Thus, "[i]nstead of
weakening [her] testimonies, such inconsistencies tend to strengthen [her] credibility
because they discount the possibility of their being rehearsed."[153]

Admittedly, based on Dr. Acosta's findings, AAA was "not oriented to time, date and
place."[154] For this reason, it is expected that there might be slight contradictions in her
testimony as a result of her intellectual disability.

A perusal of the alleged contradictions in AAA's testimony shows that they merely pertain
to trivial details. Hence, whether Allan impregnated AAA does not matter since the elements
of rape were already proven. Assailing AAA's pregnancy does not disprove that he had
carnal knowledge of her.

"DNA is the fundamental building block of a person's entire genetic make-up. [It] is found
in all human cells and is the same in every cell of the same person. Genetic identity is
[however] unique. Hence, a person's DNA profile can determine his identity."[155]

In resolving a crime, an evidence sample is "collected from the scene of the crime or from
the victim's body for the suspect's DNA."[156]This sample is "then matched with the
reference sample taken from the suspect and the victim."[157] DNA testing is made to
"ascertain whether an association exists between the evidence sample and the reference
sample."[158] Hence, the collected samples "are subjected to various chemical processes to
establish their profile" which may provide any of these three (3) possible results:[159]

The samples are different and therefore must have originated from different sources
1)
(exclusion). This conclusion is absolute and requires no further analysis or discussion;

It is not possible to be sure, based on the results of the test, whether the samples have
similar DNA types (inconclusive). This might occur for a variety of reasons including
2) degradation, contamination, or failure of some aspect of the protocol. Various parts of
the analysis might then be repeated with the same or a different sample, to obtain a
more conclusive result; or

The samples are similar, and could have originated from the same source (inclusion).
3) In such a case, the samples are found to be similar, the analyst proceeds to determine
the statistical significance of the similarity.[160]

The nature of a DNA analysis in determining paternity is explained in Herrera v. Alba:[161]

How is DNA typing performed? From a DNA sample obtained or extracted, a molecular
biologist may proceed to analyze it in several ways. There are five (5) techniques to conduct
DNA typing. They are: the RFLP (restriction fragment length polymorphism); "reverse dot
blot" or HLA DQ a/Pm loci which was used in 287 cases that were admitted as evidence by
37 courts in the U.S. as of November 1994; mtDNA process; VNTR (variable number
tandem repeats); and the most recent which is known as the PCR-([polymerase] chain
reaction) based STR (short tandem repeats) method which, as of 1996, was availed of by
most forensic laboratories in the world. PCR is the process of replicating or copying DNA in
an evidence sample a million times through repeated cycling of a reaction involving the so-
called DNA polymerize enzyme. STR, on the other hand, takes measurements in 13
separate places and can match two (2) samples with a reported theoretical error rate of less
than one (1) in a trillion.

Just like in fingerprint analysis, in DNA typing, "matches" are determined. To illustrate,
when DNA or fingerprint tests are done to identify a suspect in a criminal case, the
evidence collected from the crime scene is compared with the "known " print. If a
substantial amount of the identifying features are the same, the DNA or fingerprint is
deemed to be a match. But then, even if only one feature of the DNA or fingerprint is
different, it is deemed not to have come from the suspect.

As earlier stated, certain regions of human DNA show variations between people. In each of
these regions, a person possesses two genetic types called "allele", one inherited from each
parent. In [a] paternity test, the forensic scientist looks at a number of these variable
regions in an individual to produce a DNA profile. Comparing next the DNA profiles
of the mother and child, it is possible to determine which half of the child's DNA
was inherited from the mother. The other half must have been inherited from the
biological father. The alleged father's profile is then examined to ascertain whether
he has the DNA types in his profile, which match the paternal types in the child. If
the man's DNA types do not match that of the child, the man is excluded as the father. If
the DNA types match, then he is not excluded as the father.[162] (Emphasis provided,
citations omitted)

Based on the result of the DNA test conducted in this case, Allan is disputably presumed to
be the child's father.

The DNA testing result shows that "[t]here is a COMPLETE MATCH in all of the fifteen (15)
loci tested using the Powerflex 16 System between the alleles of Edgar Allan F. Corpuz and
[XXX]." Based on the findings, "there is a 99.9999% Probability of Paternity that Edgar
Allan F. Corpuz is the biological father of [XXX].[163] (Emphasis provided, citation omitted)

This is in conformity with Section 9 of the Rule on DNA Evidence which reads:

Section 9. Evaluation of DNA Testing Results. — In evaluating the results of DNA testing,
the court shall consider the following:

The evaluation of the weight of matching DNA evidence or the relevance of

(a)
mismatching DNA evidence;

The results of the DNA testing in the light of the totality of the other evidence
(b)
presented in the case; and that

DNA results that exclude the putative parent from paternity shall be conclusive proof
of non-paternity. If the value of the Probability of Paternity is less than 99.9%, the
(c) results of the DNA testing shall be considered as corroborative evidence. If the value
of the Probability of Paternity is 99.9% or higher, there shall be a disputable
presumption of paternity.(Emphasis provided)

However, the court should still assess the probative value of the DNA evidence considering,
among others, the following:

[H]ow the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination
of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper
standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of
the analyst who conducted the tests.[164]
Hence, Sections 7 and 8 of the Rule on DNA Evidence[165] specifically provide for the
considerations in assessing the probative value of DNA evidence:

Section 7. Assessment of Probative Value of DNA Evidence. — In assessing the probative

value of the DNA evidence presented, the court shall consider the following:

The chain of custody, including how the biological samples were collected, how they
(a)
were handled, and the possibility of contamination of the samples;

The DNA testing methodology, including the procedure followed in analyzing the
(b) samples, the advantages and disadvantages of the procedure, and compliance with the
scientifically valid standards in conducting the tests;

The forensic DNA laboratory, including accreditation by any reputable standards-

setting institution and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests. If the
(c)
laboratory is not accredited, the relevant experience of the laboratory in forensic
casework and credibility shall be properly established; and

(d) The reliability of the testing result, as hereinafter provided.

The provisions of the Rules of Court concerning the appreciation of evidence shall apply
suppletorily.

Section 8. Reliability of DNA Testing Methodology. — In evaluating whether the DNA testing
methodology is reliable, the court shall consider the following:

The falsifiability of the principles or methods used, that is, whether the theory or
(a)
technique can be and has been tested;

(b) The subjection to peer review and publication of the principles or methods;

The general acceptance of the principles or methods by the relevant scientific

(c)
community;

The existence and maintenance of standards and controls to ensure the correctness of
(d)
data generated;

(e) The existence of an appropriate reference population database; and

The general degree of confidence attributed to mathematical calculations used in

(f) comparing DNA profiles and the significance and limitation of statistical calculations
used in comparing DNA profiles.

To emphasize, it is the defense that moved for a DNA testing.[166] It failed to assail the result
and the dependability of the procedure before the trial court.[167] It is only now that it is
questioning the test's accuracy given that the results are not favorable to it. For this
reason, this Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the defense is already "estopped
from questioning, much less, objecting the reliability of the DNA testing methodology
conducted on the specimens submitted."[168]

The testimonies of the victim and other prosecution witnesses have sufficiently established
Allan's guilt. Even without the favorable results of the DNA test, which simply corroborated
the fact that Allan had carnal knowledge of the victim, there was enough proof to convict
Allan of the charges.[169]

Furthermore, Allan's defense of denial cannot overcome AAA's positive identification of the
accused.[170] A denial is "inherently weak and crumbles in the light of positive declarations
of truthful witnesses who testified on affirmative matters that appellant was at the scene of
the crime and was the victim's assailant."[171]

Rape is punishable by reclusion perpetua.[172] Under Article 266(10) of the Revised Penal
Code, rape is qualified "when the offender knew of the mental disability, emotional disorder
and/or physical handicap of the offended party at the time of the commission of the
crime."[173] This qualifying circumstance should be particularly alleged in the
Information.[174] A mere assertion of the victim's mental deficiency is not enough.[175] For
this reason, Allan can only be convicted of four (4) counts of rape under Article 266-A 1(d)
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.[176]

In accordance with People v. Jugueta,[177] where this Court clarified that "when the
circumstances of the crime call for the imposition of reclusion perpetua only, the civil
indemnity and moral damages should be P75,000.00 each, as well as exemplary damages
in the amount of P75,000.00."[178] Hence, the award of civil indemnity, moral damages, and
exemplary damages are each increased to P75,000.00 for each count of rape.

WHEREFORE, Edgar Allan Corpuz y Flores is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
four (4) counts of rape under Article 266-A 1(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. He
is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count of rape. He is ordered
to pay AAA the awards of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages,
and P75,000.00 as exemplary damages for each count of rape.

Interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum shall be imposed on all damages awarded
from the date of the finality of this judgment until fully paid.[179]

SO ORDERED.

OFFER OF COMPROMISE

G.R. No. 178467

SPS. CRISTINO & EDNA CARBONELL, Petitioners,

vs.
METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The petitioners assail the decision promulgated on December 7, 2006, 1 whereby the Court
of Appeals (CA) affirmed with modification the decision rendered on May 22, 19982 by the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 157, in Pasig City (RTC) dismissing the petitioners' complaint
in Civil Case No. 65725 for its lack of merit, and awarded attorney's fees under the
respondent's counterclaim.

Antecedents

The petitioners initiated against the respondent Civil Case No. 65725, an action for
damages, alleging that they had experienced emotional shock, mental anguish, public
ridicule, humiliation, insults and embarrassment during their trip to Thailand because of
the respondent's release to them of five US$ 100 bills that later on turned out to be
counterfeit. They claimed that they had travelled to Bangkok, Thailand after withdrawing
US$ l ,000.00 in US$ 100 notes from their dollar account at the respondent's Pateros
branch; that while in Bangkok, they had exchanged five US$ 100 bills into Baht, but only
four of the US$ 100 bills had been accepted by the foreign exchange dealer because the
fifth one was "no good;" that unconvinced by the reason for the rejection, they had asked a
companion to exchange the same bill at Norkthon Bank in Bangkok; that the bank teller
thereat had then informed them and their companion that the dollar bill was fake; that the
teller had then confiscated the US$ 100 bill and had threatened to report them to the police
if they insisted in getting the fake dollar bill back; and that they had to settle for a Foreign
Exchange Note receipt.3

The petitioners claimed that later on, they had bought jewelry from a shop owner by using
four of the remaining US$100 bills as payment; that on the next day, however, they had
been confronted by the shop owner at the hotel lobby because their four US$ 100 bills had
turned out to be counterfeit; that the shop owner had shouted at them: "You Filipinos, you
are all cheaters!;" and that the incident had occurred within the hearing distance of fellow
travelers and several foreigners.
The petitioners continued that upon their return to the Philippines, they had confronted the
manager of the respondent's Pateros branch on the fake dollar bills, but the latter had
insisted that the dollar bills she had released to them were genuine inasmuch as the bills
had come from the head office; that in order to put the issue to rest, the counsel of the
petitioners had submitted the subject US$ 100 bills to the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
(BSP) for examination; that the BSP had certified that the four US$100 bills were near
perfect genuine notes;4 and that their counsel had explained by letter their unfortunate
experience caused by the respondent's release of the fake US dollar bills to them, and had
demanded moral damages of ₱10 Million and exemplary damages.5

The petitioners then sent a written notice to the respondent, attaching the BSP certification
and informing the latter that they were giving it five days within which to comply with their
demand, or face court action.6 In response, the respondent's counsel wrote to the
petitioners on March 1996 expressing sympathy with them on their experience but
stressing that the respondent could not absolutely guarantee the genuineness of each and
every foreign currency note that passed through its system; that it had also been a victim
like them; and that it had exercised the diligence required in dealing with foreign currency
notes and in the selection and supervision of its employees.7

Prior to the filing of the suit in the RTC, the petitioners had two meetings with the
respondent's representatives. In the course of the two meetings, the latter's representatives
reiterated their sympathy and regret over the troublesome experience that the petitioners
had encountered, and offered to reinstate US$500 in their dollar account, and, in addition,
to underwrite a round-trip all-expense-paid trip to Hong Kong, but they were adamant and
staged a walk-out.8

In its judgment rendered on May 22, 1998,9 the RTC ruled in favor of the respondent,
disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Dismissing plaintiff’s complaint for lack of merit;

2. On the counterclaim, awarding Metrobank the amount of ₱20,000.00 as attorney's

fees.

SO ORDERED.10

The petitioners appealed, but the CA ultimately promulgated its assailed decision on
December 7, 2006 affirming the judgment of the RTC with the modification of deleting the
award of attorney's fees, 11 to wit:

As to the award of attorneys fees, we agree with appellants that there is simply no factual
and legal basis thereto.

Unquestionably, appellants filed the present case for the humiliation and embarrassment
they suffered in Bangkok. They instituted the complaint in their honest belief that they
were entitled to damages as a result of appellee's issuance of counterfeit dollar notes. Such
being the case, they should not be made answerable to attorney's fees. It is not good public
policy to put a premium on the right to litigate where such right is exercised in good faith,
albeit erroneously.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED with modification that the award of
attorney's fees is deleted.

SO ORDERED.

Issues

Hence, this appeal, with the petitioners contending that the CA gravely erred in affirming
the judgment of the RTC. They insist that inasmuch as the business of banking was
imbued with public interest, the respondent's failure to exercise the degree of diligence
required in handling the affairs of its clients showed that it was liable not just for simple
negligence but for misrepresentation and bad faith amounting to fraud; that the CA erred
in giving weight and relying on the news clippings allegedly showing that the "supernotes"
had deceived even the U.S. Secret Service and Central Intelligence Agency, for such news
were not based on facts. 12

Ruling of the Court

The appeal is partly meritorious.

The General Banking Act of 2000 demands of banks the highest standards of integrity and
performance. As such, the banks are under obligation to treat the accounts of their
depositors with meticulous care. 13 However, the banks' compliance with this degree of
diligence is to be determined in accordance with the particular circumstances of each case.

The petitioners argue that the respondent was liable for failing to observe the diligence
required from it by not doing an act from which the material damage had resulted by
reason of inexcusable lack of precaution in the performance of its duties. 14 Hence, the
respondent was guilty of gross negligence, misrepresentation and bad faith amounting to
fraud.

The petitioners' argument is unfounded.

Gross negligence connotes want of care in the performance of one's duties; it is a negligence
characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where
there is duty to act, not inadvertently but wilfully and intentionally, with a conscious
indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected. It evinces a
thoughtless disregard of consequences without exe1iing any effort to avoid them. 15

In order for gross negligence to exist as to warrant holding the respondent liable therefor,
the petitioners must establish that the latter did not exert any effort at all to avoid
unpleasant consequences, or that it wilfully and intentionally disregarded the proper
protocols or procedure in the handling of US dollar notes and in selecting and supervising
its employees.

The CA and the RTC both found that the respondent had exercised the diligence required
by law in observing the standard operating procedure, in taking the necessary precautions
for handling the US dollar bills in question, and in selecting and supervising its
employees. 16 Such factual findings by the trial court are entitled to great weight and
respect especially after being affirmed by the appellate court, and could be overturned only
upon a showing of a very good reason to warrant deviating from them.

In this connection, it is significant that the BSP certified that the falsity of the US dollar
notes in question, which were "near perfect genuine notes," could be detected only with
extreme difficulty even with the exercise of due diligence. Ms. Nanette Malabrigo, BSP's
Senior Currency Analyst, testified that the subject dollar notes were "highly deceptive"
inasmuch as the paper used for them were similar to that used in the printing of the
genuine notes. She observed that the security fibers and the printing were perfect except for
some microscopic defects, and that all lines were clear, sharp and well defined. 17

Nonetheless, the petitioners contend that the respondent should be liable for moral and
exemplary damages18 on account of their suffering the unfortunate experience abroad
brought about by their use of the fake US dollar bills withdrawn from the latter.

The contention cannot be upheld.

The relationship existing between the petitioners and the respondent that resulted from a
contract of loan was that of a creditor-debtor. 19 Even if the law imposed a high standard on
the latter as a bank by vi1iue of the fiduciary nature of its banking business, bad faith or
gross negligence amounting to bad faith was absent. Hence, there simply was no legal basis
for holding the respondent liable for moral and exemplary damages. In breach of contract,
moral damages may be awarded only where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad
faith. That was not true herein because the respondent was not shown to have acted
fraudulently or in bad faith. This is pursuant to Article 2220 of the Civil Code, to wit:

Article 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if
the court should find that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly due. The
same rule applies to breaches of contract where defendant acted fraudulently or in
bad faith.
With the respondent having established that the characteristics of the subject dollar notes
had made it difficult even for the BSP itself as the country's own currency note expert to
identify the counterfeiting with ease despite adhering to all the properly laid out standard
operating procedure and precautions in the handling of US dollar bills, holding it liable for
damages in favor of the petitioners would be highly unwarranted in the absence of proof of
bad faith, malice or fraud on its part. That it formally apologized to them and even offered
to reinstate the USD$500.00 in their account as well as to give them the all-expense-paid
round trip ticket to Hong Kong as means to assuage their inconvenience did not necessarily
mean it was liable. In civil cases, an offer of compromise is not an admission of liability,
and is inadmissible as evidence against the offeror. 20

Even without taking into consideration the news clippings to the effect that the US Secret
Service and Central Intelligence Agency had themselves been deceived by the 1990 series of
the US dollar notes infamously known as the "supernotes," the record had enough to show
in that regard, not the least of which was the testimony of Ms. Malabrigo as BSP's Senior
Currency Analyst about the highly deceptive nature of the subject US dollar notes and the
possibility for them to pass undetected.

Also, the petitioners' allegation of misrepresentation on the part of the respondent was
factually unsupported.1âwphi1 They had been satisfied with the services of the respondent
for about three years prior to the incident in question.21 The incident was but an isolated
one. Under the law, moral damages for culpa contractual or breach of contract are
recoverable only if the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith, or is found guilty of
gross negligence amounting to bad faith, or in wanton disregard of his contractual
obligations.22 The breach must be wanton, reckless, malicious or in bad faith, oppressive or
abusive.23 In order to maintain their action for damages, the petitioners must establish that
their injury resulted from a breach of duty that the respondent had owed to them, that is,
there must be the concurrence of injury caused to them as the plaintiffs and legal
responsibility on the part of the respondent. Underlying the award of damages is the
premise that an individual was injured in contemplation of law. In this regard, there must
first be a breach of some duty and the imposition of liability for that breach before damages
may be awarded; and the breach of such duty should be the proximate cause of the
injury. 24 That was not so in this case.

It is true that the petitioners suffered embarrassment and humiliation in Bangkok. Yet, we
should distinguish between damage and injury. In The Orchard Golf & Country Club, Inc. v.
Yu, 25 the Court has fittingly pointed out the distinction, viz.:

x x x Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right, damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which
results from the injury; and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the
damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the
loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. These situations are often
called dmimum absque injuria. 26

In every situation of damnum absque injuria, therefore, the injured person alone bears the
consequences because the law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act that
does not amount to a legal injury or wrong. For instance, in BP I Express Card Corporation
v. Court of Appeals ,27 the Court turned down the claim for damages of a cardholder whose
credit card had been cancelled after several defaults in payment, holding therein that there
could be damage without injury where the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a
legal duty towards the plaintiff. In such situation, the injured person alone should bear the
consequences because the law afforded no remedy for damages resulting from an act that
did not

amount to a legal injury or wrong.28 Indeed, the lack of malice in the conduct complained of
precluded the recovery of damages.29

Here, although the petitioners suffered humiliation resulting from their unwitting use of the
counterfeit US dollar bills, the respondent, by virtue of its having observed the proper
protocols and procedure in handling the US dollar bills involved, did not violate any legal
duty towards them. Being neither guilty of negligence nor remiss in its exercise of the
degree of diligence required by law or the nature of its obligation as a banking institution,
the latter

was not liable for damages. Given the situation being one of damnum absque injuria, they
could not be compensated for the damage sustained.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on December 7, 2006;
and ORDERS the petitioners to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN,
Associate Justice

PATIENT-PHYSICIAN PRIVILEGE: HOSPITAL RECORDS

G.R. No. 179786 July 24, 2013

JOSIELENE LARA CHAN, Petitioner,

vs.
JOHNNY T. CHAN, Respondent.

DECISION

ABAD, J.:

This case is about the propriety of issuing a subpoena duces tecum for the production and
submission in court of the respondent husband's hospital record in a case for declaration
of nullity of marriage where one of the issues is his mental fitness as a husband.

The Facts and the Case

On February 6, 2006 petitioner Josielene Lara Chan (Josielene) filed before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 144 a petition for the declaration of nullity of her
marriage to respondent Johnny Chan (Johnny), the dissolution of their conjugal
partnership of gains, and the award of custody of their children to her. Josielene claimed
that Johnny failed to care for and support his family and that a psychiatrist diagnosed him
as mentally deficient due to incessant drinking and excessive use of prohibited drugs.
Indeed, she had convinced him to undergo hospital confinement for detoxification and
rehabilitation.

Johnny resisted the action, claiming that it was Josielene who failed in her wifely duties. To
save their marriage, he agreed to marriage counseling but when he and Josielene got to the
hospital, two men forcibly held him by both arms while another gave him an injection. The
marriage relations got worse when the police temporarily detained Josielene for an
unrelated crime and released her only after the case against her ended. By then, their
marriage relationship could no longer be repaired.

During the pre-trial conference, Josielene pre-marked the Philhealth Claim Form1 that
Johnny attached to his answer as proof that he was forcibly confined at the rehabilitation
unit of a hospital. The form carried a physician’s handwritten note that Johnny suffered
from "methamphetamine and alcohol abuse." Following up on this point, on August 22,
2006 Josielene filed with the RTC a request for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum
addressed to Medical City, covering Johnny’s medical records when he was there confined.
The request was accompanied by a motion to "be allowed to submit in evidence" the records
sought by subpoena duces tecum.2

Johnny opposed the motion, arguing that the medical records were covered by physician-
patient privilege. On September 13, 2006 the RTC sustained the opposition and denied
Josielene’s motion. It also denied her motion for reconsideration, prompting her to file a
special civil action of certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP 97913,
imputing grave abuse of discretion to the RTC.

On September 17, 2007 the CA3 denied Josielene’s petition. It ruled that, if courts were to
allow the production of medical records, then patients would be left with no assurance that
whatever relevant disclosures they may have made to their physicians would be kept
confidential. The prohibition covers not only testimonies, but also affidavits, certificates,
and pertinent hospital records. The CA added that, although Johnny can waive the
privilege, he did not do so in this case. He attached the Philhealth form to his answer for
the limited purpose of showing his alleged forcible confinement.
 Question Presented

The central question presented in this case is:

Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the trial court correctly denied the issuance of a
subpoena duces tecum covering Johnny’s hospital records on the ground that these are
covered by the privileged character of the physician-patient communication.

The Ruling of the Court

Josielene requested the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering the hospital records
of Johnny’s confinement, which records she wanted to present in court as evidence in
support of her action to have their marriage declared a nullity. Respondent Johnny resisted
her request for subpoena, however, invoking the privileged character of those records. He
cites Section 24(c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence which reads:

SEC. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication.— The following persons

cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases:

xxxx

(c) A person authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics cannot in a civil case,
without the consent of the patient, be examined as to any advice or treatment given by him
or any information which he may have acquired in attending such patient in a professional
capacity, which information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity, and which
would blacken the reputation of the patient.

The physician-patient privileged communication rule essentially means that a physician

who gets information while professionally attending a patient cannot in a civil case be
examined without the patient’s consent as to any facts which would blacken the latter’s
reputation. This rule is intended to encourage the patient to open up to the physician,
relate to him the history of his ailment, and give him access to his body, enabling the
physician to make a correct diagnosis of that ailment and provide the appropriate cure. Any
fear that a physician could be compelled in the future to come to court and narrate all that
had transpired between him and the patient might prompt the latter to clam up, thus
putting his own health at great risk.4

1. The case presents a procedural issue, given that the time to object to the admission of
evidence, such as the hospital records, would be at the time they are offered. The offer
could be made part of the physician’s testimony or as independent evidence that he had
made entries in those records that concern the patient’s health problems.

Section 36, Rule 132, states that objections to evidence must be made after the offer of
such evidence for admission in court. Thus:

SEC. 36. Objection.— Objection to evidence offered orally must be made immediately after
the offer is made.

Objection to a question propounded in the course of the oral examination of a witness shall
be made as soon as the grounds therefor shall become reasonably apparent.

An offer of evidence in writing shall be objected to within three (3) days after notice of the
offer unless a different period is allowed by the court.

In any case, the grounds for the objections must be specified.

Since the offer of evidence is made at the trial, Josielene’s request for subpoena duces
tecum is premature. She will have to wait for trial to begin before making a request for the
issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering Johnny’s hospital records. It is when those
records are produced for examination at the trial, that Johnny may opt to object, not just to
their admission in evidence, but more so to their disclosure. Section 24(c), Rule 130 of the
Rules of Evidence quoted above is about non-disclosure of privileged matters.

2. It is of course possible to treat Josielene’s motion for the issuance of a subpoena duces
tecum covering the hospital records as a motion for production of documents, a discovery
procedure available to a litigant prior to trial. Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure provides:

SEC. 1. Motion for production or inspection; order.— Upon motion of any party showing
good cause therefor, the court in which an action is pending may (a) order any party to
produce and permit the inspection and copying or photographing, by or on behalf of the
moving party, of any designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs,
objects or tangible things, not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence material to
any matter involved in the action and which are in his possession, custody or control; or (b)
order any party to permit entry upon designated land or other property in his possession or
control for the purpose of inspecting, measuring, surveying, or photographing the property
or any designated relevant object or operation thereon. The order shall specify the time,
place and manner of making the inspection and taking copies and photographs, and may
prescribe such terms and conditions as are just. (Emphasis supplied)

But the above right to compel the production of documents has a limitation: the documents
to be disclosed are "not privileged."

Josielene of course claims that the hospital records subject of this case are not privileged
since it is the "testimonial" evidence of the physician that may be regarded as privileged.
Section 24(c) of Rule 130 states that the physician "cannot in a civil case, without the
consent of the patient, be examined" regarding their professional conversation. The
privilege, says Josielene, does not cover the hospital records, but only the examination of
the physician at the trial.

To allow, however, the disclosure during discovery procedure of the hospital records—the
results of tests that the physician ordered, the diagnosis of the patient’s illness, and the
advice or treatment he gave him—would be to allow access to evidence that is inadmissible
without the

patient’s consent. Physician memorializes all these information in the patient’s records.
Disclosing them would be the equivalent of compelling the physician to testify on privileged
matters he gained while dealing with the patient, without the latter’s prior consent.

3. Josielene argues that since Johnny admitted in his answer to the petition before the RTC
that he had been confined in a hospital against his will and in fact attached to his answer a
Philhealth claim form covering that confinement, he should be deemed to have waived the
privileged character of its records. Josielene invokes Section 17, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Evidence that provides:

SEC. 17. When part of transaction, writing or record given in evidence, the remainder
admissible.— When part of an act, declaration, conversation, writing or record is given in
evidence by one party, the whole of the same subject may be inquired into by the other, and
when a detached act, declaration, conversation, writing or record is given in evidence, any
other act, declaration, conversation, writing or record necessary to its understanding may
also be given in evidence.1âwphi1

But, trial in the case had not yet begun. Consequently, it cannot be said that Johnny had
already presented the Philhealth claim form in evidence, the act contemplated above which
would justify Josielene into requesting an inquiry into the details of his hospital
confinement. Johnny was not yet bound to adduce evidence in the case when he filed his
answer. Any request for disclosure of his hospital records would again be premature.

For all of the above reasons, the CA and the RTC were justified in denying Josielene her
request for the production in court of Johnny’s hospital records.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP 97913 dated September 17, 2007.

SO ORDERED.

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

RULE 132: HAND WRITING EXPERT TESTIMONY V EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY

DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] seeks to set aside: 1) the February 23, 2012
Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 90854 which reversed and set
aside the November 15, 2007 Order[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cavite City,
Branch 16 in Civil Case No. N-7469, and reinstated the RTC's June 8, 2007 Decision;[4] and
2) the CA's July 12, 2012 Resolution[5] denying petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.[6]

Factual Antecedents

Corazon Afable Salud (Corazon) was the registered owner of a parcel of land with building
(the Silver Coin Bldg.) in Marseilla Street, Rosario, Cavite (the subject property), covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-19394 (TCT RT-19394).[7] On May 30, 1998 or at the age
of 80, she passed away leaving behind as her heirs her two adopted children, petitioner
Deogracias A. Salud (Deogracias) and Carmencita Salud Condol (Carmencita). Deogracias is
married to Napola Y. Salud (Napola); Joseph Y. Salud (Joseph) and Joe Vincent Y. Salud
(Vincent) are their children.

On January 8,2004, Deogracias, Napola, Joseph and Vincent instituted Civil Case No. N-
7469 against respondent Rural Bank of Salinas, Inc. (RBSI), Carmencita, the Clerk of Court
and Ex-Officio Sheriff of the RTC-Cavite City, and the Cavite Register of Deeds. In their
Complaint[8] for Declaration of Nullity of Deeds of Mortgage, Special Power of Attorney,
Extrajudicial Foreclosure Sale, Certificate of Sale and Damages, with injunctive relief, they
essentially claimed that in 2000, Deogracias and Napola learned that Carmencita obtained
a P2 million loan from RBSI secured by three Deeds of Mortgage[9] over the subject property
executed by Carmencita on August 20, October 8 and October 31, 1996; that RBSI granted
the loan on the basis of a pro forma bank Special Power of Attorney[10] (August 20 SPA)
purportedly executed and signed by Corazon on August 20, 1996, specifically authorizing
Carmencita to utilize the subject property as security for any loan/s obtained by the latter
from RBSI; that they immediately informed RBSI President and Manager Teodoro G. Salud
(Teodoro) who is their close relative that Corazon never authorized Carmencita to mortgage
the subject property, and that Corazon's signature on the August 20 SPA was a forgery;
that they showed Teodoro another special power of attorney (SPA) dated August 23,
1996[11] executed by Corazon which contained her true and genuine signature, and which
authorized Deogracias to 1) specifically collect the rentals from tenants of the Silver Coin
Bldg. and another building, 2) represent Corazon in any transaction with said tenants and
the utility companies, and 3) execute and sign any paper or document relating to the
tenants and utility companies; that in 1990, the subject property was duly constituted as
their family home as inscribed in TCT RT-19394;[12] that for Carmencita's failure to pay her
loan obligation, the subject property was unduly foreclosed upon and sold to RBSI in 2002;
that the foreclosure process was defective in that a) notice of extrajudicial sale was not
given to Corazon, b) the notice of sale was not posted in a conspicuous place, and c) the
certificate of posting was executed only after the auction sale;[13] that it is evident from the
Promissory Notes[14] executed by Carmencita that the loan she secured from RBSI is her
sole obligation and responsibility, and Corazon did not obtain any benefit or advantage
therefrom; that RBSI is in possession of the certificate of title to the subject property, and
refused to surrender the same despite demand; and that the defendants were acting with
malice and bad faith in committing and perpetrating a forgery. Petitioners thus prayed that
injunctive relief be issued to enjoin RBSI from consolidating title; that the mortgage deeds,
August 20 SPA, and foreclosure and sale proceedings be nullified and voided; that RBSI be
ordered to surrender TCT RT-19394 to them; and that P1 million as moral damages,
P250,000.00 as exemplary damages, P300,000.00 as attorney's fees plus appearance fees,
P50,000.00 as litigation expenses, and costs be awarded to them.

In its Answer, RBSI essentially alleged that Carmencita was duly authorized by Corazon to
secure a loan and mortgage the subject property in August 1996; that the proceeds of the
loan was used to repair Corazon's 10-door apartment building in Makati and to pay for her
medical and hospital expenses; and that Corazon's signature on the questioned August 20
SPA was genuine and true.

On January 8, 2004, or after the filing of the Complaint, a 72-hour Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO) was issued enjoining the Cavite Register of Deeds from acting on RBSI's
application for consolidation of ownership and from canceling TCT RT-19394, The TRO was
extended until January 28, 2004.

After Civil Case No. N-7469 was raffled to Branch 16, the application for injunctive relief
was heard. On January 27, 2004, the RTC issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction.

At the pre-trial conference, the parties agreed that the only issue to be resolved in the case
is whether the signature of Corazon appearing on the August 20 SPA was genuine, and that
the August 20 SPA shall be subjected to examination by a National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) handwriting expert whose finding shall be binding upon them.[15]

On April 29, 2005, the designated NBI Documents Examiner, Jennifer Dominguez
(Dominguez), issued Questioned Document Report No. 231-405 (NBI report) with the
conclusion that the questioned signature of Corazon on the August 20 SPA and her
standard signatures on sample documents submitted for comparison "were not written by
one and the same person."[16] The NBI report was based on 19 sample signatures submitted
by petitioners, but one of the two that were submitted by RBSI was disregarded by
Dominguez.[17]

During trial, Deogracias admitted that the signature appearing on one of the sample
documents submitted by RBSI tagged as sample "S-D-2" and also marked as Exhibit "5-A"
for RBSI was affixed by Corazon.[18]

Napola testified on the issue of damages and attorney's fees.[19]

For the defense, Teodoro testified among others that Corazon has been a borrower of RBSI
even prior to 1996; that in 1996, he was approached by Corazon and Carmencita who
indicated their desire to apply for another loan with the subject property as collateral; that
Corazon asked him if she can allow Carmencita to be the borrower so that she would not
have to keep going to the bank; that he later informed Corazon that the RBSI board of
directors agreed to approve her loan application; that one week thereafter or on August 20,
1996, Corazon and Carmencita returned and filled out a P1 million loan application; that
Corazon signed the August 20 SPA in his presence; that thereafter, he directed the bank's
loan supervisor to process the necessary loan documents and have the same notarized;
that later on, Deogracias approached him on several occasions and signified his intention
to pay the loan but he was unable to do so and instead, Deogracias filed the instant case;
and that RBSI was compelled to hire legal counsel to prosecute Civil Case No. N-7469.[20]

Arty. Gregorio M. Trias (Arty. Trias), the notary public who notarized the August 20 SPA,
testified that on August 20, 1996, Corazon appeared before him to have the August 20 SPA
notarized although when the said document was brought to him the same was already
signed by Corazon; that he knew Corazon because in the past he notarized documents
signed by her; and that when he notarized the August 20 SPA, he did not inquire whether
the signature thereon was Corazon's nor did he ask whether she understood what the
document meant.[21]

Dominguez, the NBI Document Examiner, testified and essentially reiterated her original
finding that there exist significant differences between Corazon's questioned signature on
the August 20 SPA and the standard sample signatures submitted for comparison, and that
her signature on the August 20 SPA and the sample documents submitted were not written
by one and the same person.[22] At the same time, she also admitted that the signature on
RBSI's "S-D-2" or Exhibit "5-A" and that appearing on the questioned August 20 SPA could
have been written by one and the same person.[23]

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On June 8, 2007, the RTC issued its Decision, dismissing the complaint, viz.:

As a general rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive and
convincing evidence. The burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery. In the
examination of forged documents, the expertise of questioned documents examiners is not
mandatory and while probably useful, they are indispensable [sic][24] in examining or
comparing handwriting. Hence, a finding of forgery does not depend entirely on the
testimony of handwriting experts. x x x

In the instant case, the presumption of validity and regularity prevails over allegations of
forgery and fraud. As against direct evidence consisting of the testimony of a witness who
was physically present at the signing of the contract and who had personal knowledge
thereof, the testimony of Dominguez constitutes indirect or circumstantial evidence at best.
x x x Teodoro Salud, the witness to the special power of attorney confirmed the
genuineness, authenticity and due execution thereof. Said witness having been physically
present to see the decedent Corazon x x x affix her signature to the questioned document,
the weight of evidence preponderates in favor of defendants.

xxxx

It is emphasized that it was never denied by the plaintiffs that the subject Special Power of
Attorney was in fact notarized by Atty. Gregorio M. Trias, a Notary Public, and the same
was registered in his notarial book. As Atty. Trias had testified, Corazon Salud appeared
before him on August 20, 1996, the date of the special power of attorney x x x.

xxxx

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant complaint for declaration of nullity of

deeds of mortgage, special power of attorney, extrajudicial foreclosure sale, certificate of
sale and damages is, as it is hereby, ordered DISMISSED. The writ of preliminary
injunction is likewise DISSOLVED.

SO ORDERED.[25]
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration[26] which was granted by the RTC in its
November 15, 2007 Order. The trial court held that since the parties agreed to abide by,
and submit the case for decision based on, the NBI findings, then the resolution of this
case should hinge on the NBI findings. The RTC recalled that based on the NBI report, the
questioned signature in the August 20 SPA and the standard/sample signatures of Corazon
were not written by one and the same person. As regards Dominguez's failure to include
Exhibit "5" and "S-D-2" in her examination, the RTC brushed aside the same for being
inconsequential.

In addition, the RTC ruled that based on its own examination there were indeed striking
differences in the August 20 SPA signature vis-a-vis Corazon's standard signatures. Thus,
it concluded that Corazon's signature in the August 20 SPA was a forgery.

Moreover, the RTC ruled as follows:

Since the Court has already found that the SPA is a forged document, it is useless to
further ventilate on the invalidity of the notarization made by Atty. Trias. It must be stated,
nonetheless, that by notarizing this forged document, Atty. Trias committed falsehood and
misled or allowed the Court to be misled by an artifice.

xxxx

Moreover, the Court doubts the impartiality of Atty. Trias. When he notarized the forged
SPA, he was working for defendant bank and was holding office at defendant bank's
premises for more than ten (10) years x x x His testimony is therefore tainted with manifest
bias and partiality. x x x

While Teodoro maintained that the SPA was signed by Corazon in his presence, save from
this bare allegation, however, there is no iota of proof to support his claim. It has not been
shown that he affixed his signature as witness to the execution of the SPA and no one
among the attesting witnesses came forward to corroborate his claim. Even Carmencita,
who was allegedly present when the SPA was signed by Corazon, failed to appear to
substantiate Teodoro's claim. The Court notes that Carmencita was impleaded as defendant
in this case, but she neither filed her Answer nor came forward to refute plaintiffs' charges.
As it were, Teodoro's testimony should be taken with utmost circumspection. x x x

xxxx

More importantly, the act of requiring Corazon to execute an SPA in favor of Carmencita for
a loan that would be processed and released on the same day defies reason and common
sense. x x x

xxxx
All told, although the special power of attorney was a public document having in its favor
the presumption of regularity, such presumption was adequately refuted by competent
witnesses and this Court's visual analysis of the documents. Due to its knowledge of the
defect of the questioned document which it did not question, defendant bank could not be
considered a mortgagee in good faith. Though it is not expected to conduct an exhaustive
investigation on the history of the mortgagor's title, it cannot be excused from the duty of
exercising the due diligence required of a banking institution. Banks are expected to
exercise more care and prudence than private individuals in their dealings, even those that
involve registered lands, for their business is affected with public interest.

xxxx

WHEREFORE, as prayed for by plaintiffs, the Decision dated June 8, 2007 is reconsidered
and set aside. x x x

xxxx

SO ORDERED.[27]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In an appeal to the CA, RBSI asserted that the RTC erred in reconsidering its original
Decision; that the trial court disregarded the sample signatures it submitted (Exhibits "5"
and "S-D-2"); that the NBI's Dominguez herself admitted that the questioned signature and
its Exhibits "5" and "S-D-2" could have been written by one and the same person; and that
as a public document and with the testimonies of Teodoro and Atty. Trias, the August 20
SPA must be presumed to be regular.

On February 23, 2012, the CA issued the assailed Decision finding merit in the appeal. It
held that the opinions of handwriting experts are merely persuasive and not conclusive
hence not binding on the courts.

Based on its own assessment, the CA found that petitioners failed to overcome the
presumption that Corazon's signature in the August 20 SPA was genuine and not forged.
The CA observed that petitioners submitted 19 sample signatures of Corazon, denominated
as "S-1" through "S-19," while the respondent presented two signatures tagged as "S-D-1"
and "S-D-2." However, Dominguez failed to include in her examination "S-D-2." The CA
observed that the RTC failed to take into account that during her cross-examination,
Dominguez admitted that the signatures appearing on "S-D-2" and the August 20 SPA
could be written by one and the same person. More important, even Deogracias admitted
that the signature on "S-D-2" was Corazon's.

In addition, the CA held that the NBI handwriting expert herself admitted that age and
health conditions could affect one's handwriting. In fact, in her February 21, 1995 letter,
Corazon expressed that she had difficulty in writing because she was suffering from
tremors. The CA pointed out that Corazon was 77 years old when she wrote the letter, or
one year before the execution of the questioned August 20 SPA. According to the CA, slight
dissimilarities in handwriting are only natural and not indicative of forgery.

Moreover, the CA declared that the case should not be resolved based solely on the NBI
report. It noted that petitioner's claim of forgery hinged exclusively on the NBI report
whereas RSBI erected its case not only on the sample signatures of Corazon but also on the
testimonies of Teodoro, who testified that Corazon signed the August 20 SPA in his
presence, and of Atty. Trias who claimed that Corazon and Carmencita appeared before him
when he notarized the documents. As a notarized document, the August 20 SPA is
presumed valid and regular; petitioners failed to submit convincing proof of its falsity or
nullity.

Finally, the appellate court took note of Deogracias's admissions that Corazon had on
previous occasion constituted Carmencita as her attorney-in-fact in selling her property;
that Camiencita took care of Corazon during her hospital confinement in late 1996 until
her death in 1998; and that Carmencita paid Corazon's hospital bills amounting to more
than P5 million. The CA concluded that based on the foregoing, the likelihood that Corazon
executed the August 20 SPA in favor of Carmencita, is not remote.
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Order dated November 15, 2007 of the
Regional Trial Court of Cavite City, Branch 16 in Civil Case No. N-7469 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated June 8, 2007 of the same court is hereby
REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.[28]
Petitioners moved for reconsideration, but in its July 12, 2012 Resolution, the CA stood its
ground. Hence, the instant Petition.

Issues

Petitioners raise the following issues in this Petition:

22. The Court of Appeals erred in setting aside the pre-trial agreement that the petitioners
and respondent Bank are bound by the result of the NBI's document examination.

23. The Court of Appeals erred in concluding that petitioners as plaintiffs below failed to
adduce preponderant evidence to prove that the signature on the Special Power of Attorney
purportedly belonging to Corazon Afable Salud was forged. Particularly:

a. NBI Document Examiner Jennifer Dominguez was not categorical in her finding that the
subject signature was forged, all because it was "possible" that an alleged standard
signature of Corazon Afable Salud (Exhibit "5" or Exhibit "S-D-2") and the subject signature
were written by one and the same person.

b. The NBI Document Examiner did not rule out that several factors could affect an
individual's handwriting.

c. The testimony of respondent Bank's Manager, Teodoro Salud, that he saw Corazon
Afable Salud signing the Special Power of Attorney is a credible direct evidence of the
authenticity of the subject signature.

d. The Special Power of Attorney is a notarized document and is therefore presumed regular
and genuine.

e. Petitioner Deogracias Salud admitted that Corazon Afable Salud appointed in the past
Carmencita Salud Condol as her attorney-in-fact and thus it was not improbable that she
appointed her for this particular transaction.

f. Petitioner Deogracias Salud admitted that Carmencita Salud Condol paid for Corazon
Afable Salud's hospital expenses, the funding for which could not have been but the
proceeds of the transaction involved in this case.[29]
Petitioners' Arguments

In their Petition and Reply,[30] petitioners seek a reversal of the assailed CA dispositions and
reinstatement of the RTC's November 15,2007 Order, arguing that RBSI is estopped from
questioning or rejecting the NBI report since it agreed during the pre-trial proceedings to
abide by the results of the NBI examination; that RBSI is bound by such stipulation and
agreement made during pre-trial which thus constitutes a judicial admission of the findings
contained in the NBI report. Petitioners also argue that the NBI report deserves great weight
and probative value; that Dominguez's admission that there is a possibility that Exhibit "5-
A" and the August 20 SPA could have been signed by one and the same person should be
disregarded, because the preponderance of evidence points to the fact that Carmencita
forged Corazon's signature in the August 20 SPA in order to offer the subject property as
collateral, thus insuring that her personal loan application would be approved; that
Deogracias's testimony to the effect that Corazon "got mad" when she learned that
Carmencita forged her signature and mortgaged the subject property for a personal loan,
and that Corazon did not need to secure a loan to pay off her hospital bills since she had
P14 million, and that it was Carmencita who actually paid for the RBSI loans, cannot
simply be ignored.

Petitioners add that it was erroneous for the CA to have considered RBSI's Exhibit "5-A" or
"S-D-2" since Dominguez herself did not utilize the same in her examination of Corazon's
signature as it was already doubtful in the first place; that even if Deogracias admitted that
the signature (RBSI's Exhibit "5-A") was Corazon's, his opinion does not count as against
that of Dominguez's, which is scientific and more credible; that Teodoro's testimony is
doubtful; that it made no sense that while Corazon's property was being mortgaged, she
was not named as one of the principal debtors; that if Teodoro wanted to spare Corazon the
trouble of having to come to the bank since she was then already old, then he should have
asked her to execute a SPA when she and Carmencita first came to the bank, instead of
asking her to return as she did one week later or on August 20, 1996; and that the
presumption of regularity attached to a notarized document is not absolute, as such
document may be shown to be a forgery instead.

Petitioners further contend that Atty. Trias's testimony is suspect, since he was negligent in
his duties as a notary public in failing to check the veracity of the entries in the bank
documents submitted to him for notarization and in not verifying Corazon's signature on
the August 20 SPA when she appeared before him; that Atty. Trias's impartiality is
questionable considering that he was connected with RBSI and held office at the bank; and
that as against the accounts of Teodoro and Atty. Trias, Dominguez's is more credible as
she is a disinterested witness, while the two work for RBSI and are interested in securing a
favorable judgment for the bank.

Petitioners add that the circumstances surrounding Carmencita's loan application are
suspicious in that her loan was granted and released in just one day: when Corazon and
Carmencita returned to the bank on August 20, 1996 and submitted the required
documents, the promissory note, real estate mortgage and SPA were simultaneously
executed and notarized, and the loan proceeds were released. Corazon was not made a co-
debtor and the proceeds were released to Carmencita instead of Corazon who is supposedly
the beneficiary of the loan.

Finally, petitioners observed that since the CA did not make its own independent
assessment of the signatures in question, it was not in a position to reverse the RTC's
findings thereon.

Respondent's Arguments

On the other hand, respondent argues in its Comment[31] that while it was agreed during
pre-trial that the parties shall abide by the findings of the NBI, still, forgery cannot be
presumed, and it must be proved by clear and convincing evidence during trial; that the
opinions of handwriting experts are not binding upon the courts since they are not
conclusive and are merely persuasive; that the CA correctly relied on Exhibit "5-A"/"S-D-2"
which is genuine and authentic as it was confirmed by Deogracias himself to be Corazon's
signature; that the NBI report cannot be relied upon completely in view of the fact that the
signature (Exhibit "5-A") in one of the sample documents (Exhibit "5") was intentionally
disregarded, and yet Dominguez later testified and admitted that the signature thereon and
that on the questioned August 20 SPA could have been affixed by one and the same person;
that the NBI report was defective in that it utilized an erroneous methodology since
Dominguez disregarded the sample signatures submitted by RBSI; and that if Dominguez
did not disregard Exhibit "5-A"/"S-D-2," the conclusion in the NBI report would have been
different; instead, the only and inevitable conclusion would have been that the questioned
signature of Corazon in the August 20 SPA is genuine and not a forgery.

Respondent adds that in arriving at its conclusions, the CA carefully considered: a) the
applicable provisions of law; b) the inaccurate, inconclusive and unreliable findings of the
NBI; c) the apparent conflict between the conclusion in the NBI report and Dominguez's
admission on the witness stand; and d) that petitioners' evidence failed to defeat the August
20 SPA, a notarized public document which enjoys the presumption of regularity. It further
contends that the issue of Corazon's signature may not be the subject of stipulation and
instead, the parties should be allowed to test the NBI report and Dominguez's competence.

Consequently, respondent prays for the denial of the instant Petition and affirmance of the
assailed CA dispositions.

Our Ruling

The Court denies the Petition.

Considering that the trial and appellate courts rendered diametrically opposed opinions,
the Court must examine the case at length.

Pursuant to Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, "[t]he handwriting of a person may
be proved by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he
has seen the person write, or has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the
witness has acted or been charged, and has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of
such person. Evidence respecting the handwriting may also be given by a comparison,
made by the witness or the court, with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party
against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the
judge."[32]

Under the Rules of Court, the genuineness of a handwriting may be proved by the following:

(1) A witness who actually saw the person writing the instrument;

(2) A witness familiar with such handwriting and who can give his opinion thereon, such
opinion being an exception to the opinion rule;

(3) A comparison by the court of the questioned handwriting and admitted genuine
specimen thereof; and

(4) Expert evidence.

The law makes no preference, much less distinction among and between the different
means stated above in proving the handwriting of a person. It is likewise clear from the
foregoing that courts are not bound to give probative value or evidentiary value to the
opinions of handwriting experts, as resort to handwriting experts is not mandatory.[33]
While RBSI may have agreed to abide by the conclusions in the NBI report relative to
Corazon's signature, the courts may not be compelled to adopt such findings. Besides,
RBSI's evidence does not depend upon the NBI report and Dominguez's testimony; expert
testimony is irrelevant to RBSI in view of positive testimony from its witnesses to the effect
that Corazon appeared before them and signed the questioned August 20 SPA. Besides, the
questioned August 20 SPA is a notarized document. Only petitioners are entirely dependent
on the NBI report and Dominguez's testimony, since they have no other way of proving that
Corazon did not sign the questioned SPA.

Essentially, petitioners' evidence relative to Corazon's handwriting consists of: a)

Deogracias' testimony to the effect that Corazon "got mad" when she learned that
Carmencita forged her signature, that Corazon did not need to secure a loan to pay off her
hospital bills since she had P14 million, and that it was Carmencita who actually paid for
the RBSI loan; b) the NBI report which concludes that the questioned signature of Corazon
on the August 20 SPA and her standard signatures on sample documents submitted for
comparison "were not written by one and the same person"; and c) Dominguez's testimony.

For respondent, evidence consists primarily of the testimonies of Teodoro and Atty. Trias.

After due consideration of the evidence, this Court finds that on August 20, 1996, Corazon
was present at the RBSI premises with Carmencita who applied for a loan. It is also
established that prior to the transaction in question, Corazon has been a borrower of RBSI
and was not a stranger to the bank and its loan arrangements; and annotations on TCT RT-
19394 reveal that the subject property was mortgaged twice in 1992 and 1993 to secure
loans obtained by her from RBSI.[34] It likewise appears that one week prior to August 20,
1996 Corazon and Carmencita met with Teodoro to explore the possibility of Corazon taking
out another loan which thus prompted Teodoro to seek prior approval from the bank's
board of directors. Since Corazon was not a first-time borrower or client of the bank,
Teodoro who is also a close relative of the family as admitted by Deogracias himself in his
Complaint was able to secure prior board approval of a credit accommodation for her, such
that when Corazon and Carmencita returned to the RBSI on August 20, 1996, the bank
was able to complete all the loan documentation and release the proceeds that same day.
During the documentation process, Corazon executed and signed the questioned August 20
SPA in Teodoro's presence. Thereafter, the said document and other loan documents were
submitted to Atty. Trias for notarization. Corazon appeared before Atty. Trias who then
notarized the August 20 SPA and other loan documents without inquiring whether the
signature affixed on the SPA was hers indeed or that the said document was her free act
and deed, although he knew her very well as he has dealt with her in the past when he
notarized the loan, mortgage, and mortgage: cancellation documents relative to the two
previous loan and mortgage transactions executed by Corazon in 1992 and 1993.[35]

There is no reason to doubt the testimonies of Teodoro and Atty. Trias. They are
straightforward, candid, and in some respects, they are supported by admissions made by
petitioners themselves. Notable is the undisputed fact and fundamental premise that
Corazon was physically present at RBSI on August 20, 1996, when the questioned August
20 SPA was purportedly executed. Since she was at the bank premises on said date, there
is no reason to doubt RBSI's claim that she executed and signed the August 20 SPA and in
Teodoro's presence, and that thereafter the said document was notarized by Atty. Trias in
the presence of Corazon; there was no need for Carmencita to forge her signature because
Corazon was already there. It is more in accord with experience and logic to conclude that
since Corazon was already inside the bank, then she voluntarily executed and signed the
August 20 SPA in Teodoro and Carmencita's presence; any supposition that Carmencita
had to forge her signature on such document becomes unnecessary and absurd.

As petitioners themselves claim in their Complaint, Teodoro is a close relative; as such, he

is more inclined toward telling the truth rather than fabricate lies to prejudice petitioners.
His loyalty is foremost to his family and to his employer or business merely secondary.
Either way, his actions on August 20, 1996 betray his fidelity to his clients who are also his
relatives and to RBSI his employer. It may be added that contrary to petitioners' assertions,
there is nothing unusual in the procedure taken by the bank in approving and releasing the
loan posthaste. Quite the contrary, from a business point of view, Teodoro's actions in
performing service to a valued client with alacrity were laudable; at the same time he
created good business for RBSI at record speed. As Corazon was a valued client and with
her valuable property put up as sufficient collateral, there is no reason to delay
Carmencita's loan application.

For his part, Atty. Trias was equally candid in his testimony. Against his own interest, he
admitted that he failed to inquire if the signature appearing on the August 20 SPA was
Corazon's but that this was so because he already knew Corazon very well for having dealt
with her in the past. Indeed, what matters is that the party who executed these documents
appeared before him and that the person acknowledging the instrument or document is
known to him and that he/she is the same person who executed it and acknowledged that
the same is his/her free act and deed. Thus, while Atty. Trias did not verify Corazon's
identity and signature, he already knew her well as he had dealt with her in the past; and
from an examination of the loan documents, he would have known that the party involved
therein was Corazon who was then present in person before him. Indeed, Corazon was a
valued RBSI client who was well-known by the bank officers and staff. The fact that she is a
prominent businessperson and individual in the community; that Teodoro was her close
relative; and that her million-peso loan was pre-approved by the RBSI board even before
she could submit a loan application betray her stature as such.

Apart from being candid and credible, it may be said as well that Atty. Trias has no reason
to fabricate his testimony in order to favor RBSI or Corazon. The little benefit he may obtain
from doing so is not enough for him to gamble his vocation as a lawyer. His testimony
forms part of a credible chain that extends to Teodoro's convincing account of Corazon's
whereabouts and actions on August 20, 1996. Thus, while Atty. Trias was remiss in his
duties as a notary, this does not affect the Court's conclusion; the preponderance of
evidence still points toward the direction of RBSI. Atty. Trias should be reminded, however,
not to repeat the same mistake, or else the corresponding sanctions shall be meted upon
him. Indeed, care should be taken by notaries in the notarization process because at the
extreme, "[a] defective notarization will strip the document of its public character and
reduce it to a private instrument. Consequently, when there is a defect in the notarization
of a document, the clear and convincing evidentiary standard normally attached to a duly-
notarized document is dispensed with, and the measure to test the validity of such
document is preponderance of evidence."[36]

Petitioners argue that it was more in keeping with logic and common sense that Corazon
should have made herself a co-maker in the loan transaction. They cite in the instant
Petition that the "Special Power of Attorney was unnecessary in the perfection and
consummation of the (loan) transaction because all it took for respondent Bank to release
the loan proceeds was just a day from the time the loan was applied for and allegedly
Corazon x x x was in the Bank's premises when the entire transaction, from start to finish,
was being done."[37]The opposite, however, is true. Since Corazon permitted the subject
property to be put up as collateral through a special power of attorney issued to
Carmencita, there was no need to make her a co-maker of the loan. Petitioners concede
that Teodoro wanted to spare Corazon the trouble of having to personally appear at the
bank each time a loan is applied for and processed, since she was then already old.[38] If
this is the case, then making her a co-maker of the loan defeats the declared purpose.

Also, the fact that Carmencita was the sole beneficiary of the loan suggests nothing. Three
days after the August 20 SPA was executed and loan proceeds were released to Carmencita,
or on August 23, 1996, Deogracias was himself granted a SPA by Corazon authorizing him
to collect the rentals due from tenants of the Silver Coin Bldg. and another building that
his mother owned. If there is anything that may be seen from these circumstances, it is
that Corazon loved her adopted children dearly and gave to them generously. Besides, the
fact that Deogracias himself was issued a SPA by Corazon lends credence to the fact that
Carmencita was herself granted one just three days before.

While Deogracias testified that Corazon "got mad" when she learned that Carmencita forged
her signature, that Corazon did not need to secure a loan to pay off her hospital bills since
she had 514 million, and that it was Carmencita who actually paid for the RBSI loan, his
testimony cannot thwart the accounts of Teodoro and Atty. Trias. Their testimonies are
credible while that of Deogracias is uncorroborated and self-serving. The fact remains that
Corazon freely and voluntarily accompanied Carmencita to RBSI with the intention of
assisting the latter in securing a loan by offering her property as collateral. The motive for
securing the loan is irrelevant.

As for the NBI report and Dominguez's testimony, the Court agrees with the CA's
pronouncement that with Dominguez's admission during cross-examination that the
questioned signature on the August 20 SPA and Exhibit "5-A"/"S-D-2" could have been
written by one and the same person, and that with the changing circumstances such as age
and health of the individual whose signature is placed in issue, the handwriting or
signature could change, but that such change does not necessarily equate with forgery.
With these findings, the NBI report is consequently rendered inconclusive and thus
unreliable. Resultantly as well, petitioners' main piece of evidence has been debunked and
discredited; their cause of action has no leg to stand on. Even then, "[t]he opinion of
handwriting experts are not necessarily binding upon the court, the expert's function being
to place before the court data upon which the court can form its own opinion."[39]

Finally, since the Court has found that Corazon was then physically present at RBSI on
August 20, 1996, where she voluntarily executed and signed the August 20 SPA in favor of
Carmencita and in the presence of the bank's President and Manager, and thereafter she
personally caused the same to be notarized before the bank's notary public, then there is
no need to further examine and analyze her signature. The issue of the CA's failure to
conduct its own independent examination of Corazon's questioned signature is rendered
moot and academic.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The February 23, 2012 Decision and July 12, 2012
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 90854 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Brion, Mendoza, and Leonen, JJ., concur.

RECALLING A WITNESS IS THE REMEDY TO CORRECT ERROR DURING TRIAL AND NOT
TO NULLIFY PRE-TRIAL

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 197056, March 02, 2016

FE P. ZALDIVAR, ACCOMPANIED BY HER HUSBAND ELIEZER

ZALDIVAR, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND MAMERTO B.
DUMASIS., Respondents.

RESOLUTION
 REYES, J.:

Petitioner Fe P. Zaldivar (Zaldivar) filed the present petition for review on certiorari1 under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court questioning the Decision2 dated May 31, 2010 and
Resolution3 dated December 15, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
02085, which set aside the Orders4 dated November 18, 2005 and June 20, 2006 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City, Branch 23, in Criminal Case No. 03-57161.

Facts

Zaldivar and Jeanette Artajo (Artajo) were charged with Estafa pursuant to a complaint filed
by respondent Mamerto Dumasis (Dumasis) before the RTC, which was initially raffled to
Branch 33. Pre-trial conference was held by the trial court and a Pre-Trial Order was issued
on the same date, February 15, 2005. Zaldivar and her co-accused Artajo were then
arraigned and both pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.5

During the trial of the case, the prosecution presented Alma Dumasis and Delia Surmieda
as witnesses, and both identified their respective affidavits, which constituted their direct
testimonies. Zaldivar's counsel, Atty. Salvador Cabaluna, opted not to cross-examine the
witnesses, while Artajo's counsel was deemed to have waived his right to cross-examine in
view of his absence despite notice.6

Dumasis, by himself and without the consent or acquiescence of the public prosecutor
subsequently filed a Motion for Inhibition against Judge Virgilio Patag, which was granted
by the latter. Hence, the case was re-raffled to Branch 23, presided by Judge Edgardo
Catilo (Judge Catilo).7

On November 18, 2005, the RTC issued an Order, denying the admission of the
prosecution's exhibits. The trial court also nullified and set aside the previous proceedings
conducted and set the case anew for pre-trial conference. The dispositive portion of the
order reads:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, this Court orders the following:

a) The proceedings in this case wherein prosecution witnesses were presented but whose
affidavits were only considered as their direct testimonies, are hereby nullified and set aside
for want of procedural due process:

b) The prosecution's formal offer of exhibits is also set aside for being premature, in view of
the declaration of nullity of the proceeding for the presentation of prosecution witnesses;
and

c) In the greater interest of justice, this case is set for pre-trial conference anew to consider
matters not covered by the pre-trial conference last February 15, 2005.

The pre-trial conference in this case is set on January 19, 2006 at 8:30 in the morning.

Notify the Public Prosecutor, the complaining witness, both accused, their surety, and their
counsel.

SO ORDERED.8ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Zaldivar then filed on January 16, 2006 a Motion to Declare Prosecution's Case
Terminated, which was denied by the RTC in its Order dated March 10, 2006. Zaldivar filed
a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was also denied in the Order dated June 20, 2006.9

Aggrieved, Zaldivar filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with
the CA, where the issues submitted for resolution are as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1) whether, by presenting only the affidavits of its witnesses, the prosecution
failed to prove the commission of the crime charged, and which should have
resulted in the dismissal of the criminal case; and
 (2) whether there was grave abuse of discretion committed by Judge Catilo in
nullifying the proceedings and setting the case anew for pre-trial.10
In the assailed Decision dated May 31, 2010, the CA found strong and compelling reasons
to review the findings of the trial court presided by Judge Catilo, and set aside the Orders
dated November 18, 2005 and June 20, 2006.11 The dispositive portion of the CA decision
provides:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the assailed twin Orders rendered by the [RTC],
Branch 23, Iloilo City in Criminal Case No. 03-57161 dated November 18, 2005 and June
20, 2006 respectively, are hereby SET ASIDE and the trial court is hereby DIRECTED to
proceed with the trial of the case.

SO ORDERED.12ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The CA dismissed Zaldivar's theory that the prosecution failed to prove by competent and
admissible evidence the crime as charged in view of the prosecution's act of merely
presenting the affidavits of its witnesses in lieu of giving their testimonies in open court.
The CA ruled that such conclusion is best left to the sound judgment of the trial court and
that the prosecution presented its evidence in a manner that it deems fit over which neither
Zaldivar nor the trial judge has no control.13

The CA also ruled that Judge Catilo grossly abused the exercise of his discretion and
judgment when he nullified the pre-trial proceedings taken before Branch 33 and ordered
the conduct of a new pre-trial. According to the CA, the trial court's order is tantamount to
ordering a new trial or re-opening of the case to the prejudice of the rights of the
accused.14 The CA agreed with the Office of the Solicitor General's (OSG) contention that
Judge Catilo is without authority to nullify and set aside the proceedings already conducted
and to set the case for a second pre-trial conference to consider matters, which were not
covered in the first pre-trial conference held on February 15, 2005.15 Moreover, the CA
stated that instead of calling for a new pre-trial, Judge Catilo could recall witnesses as
provided for in Section 9, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.16

Zaldivar filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the CA in its Resolution
dated December 15, 2010. Unsatisfied, she instituted this petition grounded on the same
issues raised in the CA.

Zaldivar points out that the denial of the admission of exhibits of the prosecution upon
timely and sustained objections of the accused has the effect of terminating the case of the
prosecution for failure to adduce competent and admissible evidence during the trial
proper.17 Moreover, she argues that the prosecution has lamentably failed to establish by
competent and admissible evidence the crime as charged and to prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt and, therefore, the case should be dismissed instead of
being tried anew or re-opened for further proceedings.18 Finally, she contends that the
RTC's Order dated November 18, 2005 directing the conduct of another pre-trial or re-
opening of the case violates her right not to be prosecuted and tried twice on the same
information against her.19

Ruling of the Court

The assailed CA decision and resolution are affirmed for the following reasons:

The CA was correct in ruling that Zaldivar's contention that the prosecution failed to
establish by competent and admissible evidence of the crime charged is best left to the
sound judgment of the trial court.20 Zaldivar should be reminded of the rule that "the
presence or absence of the elements of the crime is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of
defense that may be passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits."21 Unless Zaldivar
files a demurrer to the evidence presented by the prosecution,22 she cannot enjoin the trial
court to terminate the case on the ground of the prosecution's alleged failure to establish
and prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.23 The validity and merits of the prosecution's
accusations, or Zaldivar's defense for that matter, as well as admissibility of testimonies
and evidence,24are better ventilated during trial proper.

The CA, likewise, correctly found grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court
when it nullified the proceedings previously conducted and ordered anew a pre-trial of the
case. Note that one of the main reasons presented by Judge Catilo in nullifying the pre-trial
proceedings was that the proceedings conducted after the pre-trial conference did not
comply with the prescribed procedure in the presentation of witnesses.25 But as
propounded by the CA, and even the OSG who appeared for Judge Catilo, what the trial
court should have done to correct any "perceived" procedural lapses committed during the
presentation of the prosecution's evidence was to recall the prosecution's witnesses and
have them identify the exhibits mentioned in their respective affidavits.26 This is explicitly
allowed by the rules, specifically Section 9, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Sec. 9. Recalling witnesses - After the examination of a witness by both sides has been
concluded, the witness cannot be recalled without leave of court. The court will grant or
withhold leave in its discretion as the interest of justice may require.
The trial court may even grant the parties the opportunity to adduce additional evidence
bearing upon the main issue in question, for strict observance of the order of trial or trial
procedure under the rules depends upon the circumstance obtaining in each case at the
discretion of the trial judge.27cralawred

Another reason adduced by the trial court in nullifying the pre-trial proceedings was that
"[t]he pre-trial order of February 15, 2005 did not contain x x x matters ought to be the
subject matter of a pre-trial conference under Sec. 1, Rule 118 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure."28

The pertinent provision governing pre-trial in criminal cases states:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 1. Pre-trial; mandatory in criminal cases. - In all criminal cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan, [RTC], Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal
Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the court shall, after arraignment and within
thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the
accused, unless a shorter period is provided for in special laws or circulars of the Supreme
Court, order a pre-trial conference to consider the following:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

(a) plea bargaining;

(b) stipulation of facts;

(c) marking for identification of evidence of the parties;

(d) waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence;

(e) modification of the order of trial if the accused admits the charge but interposes a
lawful defense; and

(f) such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial of the criminal and civil
aspects of the case.29
In this case, there is nothing on record that will show any disregard of the rule. Pieces of
evidence were marked, objections thereto were raised, issues were identified, no admissions
on factual matters were arrived at, and trial dates were set.30 As found by the CA, "[a] close
scrutiny of the Pre-Trial Conference Order dated February 15, 2005, would show that there
was due compliance with the Rules relative to the conduct of pre-trial, x x x Verily, there is
nothing in the pre-trial order which calls for its nullification as the same clearly complies
with the Rules."31 And while the Court recognizes the trial court's zeal in ensuring
compliance with the rules, it cannot, however, simply set aside the proceedings that have
been previously duly conducted, without treading on the rights of both the prosecution and
the defense who did not raise any objection to the pre-trial proceedings. Pre-trial is a
procedural device intended to clarify and limit the basic issues between the parties and to
take the trial of cases out of the realm of surprise and maneuvering. Its chief objective is to
simplify, abbreviate and expedite or dispense with the trial.32In this case, this purpose was
clearly subverted when the trial court hastily set aside the pre-trial proceedmgs and its
results. Absent any palpable explanation as to why and how said proceedings were
conducted in violation of the rules and thus should be set aside, the Court sustains the
CA's finding that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in nullifying the
previous proceedings and setting the case anew for pre-trial.chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated May
31, 2010 and Resolution dated December 15, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 02085 are hereby AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 23,
is ORDERED to proceed with Criminal Case No. 03-57161 with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Peralta, Perez, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.