Judicial Department

SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as
may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.

SECTION 2. The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of
various courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in
Section 5 hereof.

No law shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when it undermines the security of tenure of its
Members.

SECTION 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary may not be
reduced by the legislature below the amount appropriated for the previous year and, after approval,
shall be automatically and regularly released.

SECTION 4. (1) The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate
Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven Members. Any
vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.

(2) All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement, or law,
which shall be heard by the Supreme Court en banc, and all other cases which under the Rules of
Court are required to be heard en banc, including those involving the constitutionality, application, or
operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other
regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took
part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.

(3) Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a
majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and
voted thereon, and in no case, without the concurrence of at least three of such Members. When the
required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc: Provided, that no doctrine or
principle of law laid down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified
or reversed except by the court sitting en banc.

SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.

(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court
may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:

(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in
question.
(b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in
relation thereto.

(c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.

(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.

(e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.

(3) Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public interest may require. Such
temporary assignment shall not exceed six months without the consent of the judge concerned.

(4) Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice.

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and
legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive
procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and
shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and
quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.

(6) Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the Civil Service Law.

SECTION 6. The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the
personnel thereof.

SECTION 7. (1) No person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme Court or any lower collegiate
court unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. A Member of the Supreme Court must be
at least forty years of age, and must have been for fifteen years or more a judge of a lower court or
engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines.

(2) The Congress shall prescribe the qualifications of judges of lower courts, but no person may be
appointed judge thereof unless he is a citizen of the Philippines and a member of the Philippine Bar.

(3) A Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and
independence.

SECTION 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme
Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a
representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a
professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.

(2) The regular Members of the Council shall be appointed by the President for a term of four years
with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Of the Members first appointed, the
representative of the Integrated Bar shall serve for four years, the professor of law for three years, the
retired Justice for two years, and the representative of the private sector for one year.

(3) The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall be the Secretary ex officio of the Council and shall keep a
record of its proceedings.
(4) The regular Members of the Council shall receive such emoluments as may be determined by the
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court shall provide in its annual budget the appropriations for the
Council.

(5) The Council shall have the principal function of recommending appointees to the Judiciary. It may
exercise such other functions and duties as the Supreme Court may assign to it.

SECTION 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall be appointed by
the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every
vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.

For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointments within ninety days from the
submission of the list.

SECTION 10. The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court,
and of judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in office, their salary shall
not be decreased.

SECTION 11. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall hold office during
good behavior until they reached the age of seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the
duties of their office. The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower
courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the
deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.

SECTION 12. The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not be
designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.

SECTION 13. The conclusions of the Supreme Court in any case submitted to it for decision en banc
or in division shall be reached in consultation before the case is assigned to a Member for the writing
of the opinion of the Court. A certification to this effect signed by the Chief Justice shall be issued and
a copy thereof attached to the record of the case and served upon the parties. Any Member who took
no part, or dissented, or abstained from a decision or resolution must state the reason therefor. The
same requirements shall be observed by all lower collegiate courts.

SECTION 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.

No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due
course or denied without stating the legal basis therefor.

SECTION 15. (1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or
resolved within twenty-four months from date of submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless
reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and three months for all
other lower courts.

(2) A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last
pending, brief, or memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the court itself.

(3) Upon the expiration of the corresponding period, a certification to this effect signed by the Chief
Justice or the presiding judge shall forthwith be issued and a copy thereof attached to the record of
the case or matter, and served upon the parties. The certification shall state why a decision or
resolution has not been rendered or issued within said period.
(4) Despite the expiration of the applicable mandatory period, the court, without prejudice to such
responsibility as may have been incurred in consequence thereof, shall decide or resolve the case or
matter submitted thereto for determination, without further delay.

SECTION 16. The Supreme Court shall, within thirty days from the opening of each regular session of
the Congress, submit to the President and the Congress an annual report on the operations and
activities of the Judiciary.

ARTICLE XIII

Social Justice and Human Rights

SECTION 1. The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and
enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political
inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the
common good.

To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, and disposition of property and
its increments.

SECTION 2. The promotion of social justice shall include the commitment to create economic
opportunities based on freedom of initiative and self-reliance.

Labor

SECTION 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and
unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.

It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations,
and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law. They shall be
entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage. They shall also
participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be
provided by law.

The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between workers and employers and
the preferential use of voluntary modes in settling disputes, including conciliation, and shall enforce
their mutual compliance therewith to foster industrial peace.

The State shall regulate the relations between workers and employers, recognizing the right of labor
to its just share in the fruits of production and the right of enterprises to reasonable returns on
investments, and to expansion and growth.

Agrarian and Natural Resources Reform

SECTION 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of
farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or,
in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State
shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities
and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological,
developmental, or equity considerations, and subject to the payment of just compensation. In
determining retention limits, the State shall respect the right of small landowners. The State shall
further provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing.

SECTION 5. The State shall recognize the right of farmers, farmworkers, and landowners, as well as
cooperatives, and other independent farmers’ organizations to participate in the planning,
organization, and management of the program, and shall provide support to agriculture through
appropriate technology and research, and adequate financial, production, marketing, and other
support services.

SECTION 6. The State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform or stewardship, whenever
applicable in accordance with law, in the disposition or utilization of other natural resources, including
lands of the public domain under lease or concession suitable to agriculture, subject to prior rights,
homestead rights of small settlers, and the rights of indigenous communities to their ancestral lands.

The State may resettle landless farmers and farmworkers in its own agricultural estates which shall
be distributed to them in the manner provided by law.

SECTION 7. The State shall protect the rights of subsistence fishermen, especially of local
communities, to the preferential use of local marine and fishing resources, both inland and offshore. It
shall provide support to such fishermen through appropriate technology and research, adequate
financial, production, and marketing assistance, and other services. The State shall also protect,
develop, and conserve such resources. The protection shall extend to offshore fishing grounds of
subsistence fishermen against foreign intrusion. Fishworkers shall receive a just share from their
labor in the utilization of marine and fishing resources.

SECTION 8. The State shall provide incentives to landowners to invest the proceeds of the agrarian
reform program to promote industrialization, employment creation, and privatization of public sector
enterprises. Financial instruments used as payment for their lands shall be honored as equity in
enterprises of their choice.

Urban Land Reform and Housing

SECTION 9. The State shall, by law, and for the common good, undertake, in cooperation with the
public sector, a continuing program of urban land reform and housing which will make available at
affordable cost decent housing and basic services to underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban
centers and resettlements areas. It shall also promote adequate employment opportunities to such
citizens. In the implementation of such program the State shall respect the rights of small property
owners.

SECTION 10. Urban or rural poor dwellers shall not be evicted nor their dwellings demolished, except
in accordance with law and in a just and humane manner.

No resettlement of urban or rural dwellers shall be undertaken without adequate consultation with
them and the communities where they are to be relocated.

Health

SECTION 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health
development which shall endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social services
available to all the people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the
underprivileged sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children. The State shall endeavor to provide free
medical care to paupers.

SECTION 12. The State shall establish and maintain an effective food and drug regulatory system
and undertake appropriate health manpower development and research, responsive to the country’s
health needs and problems.

SECTION 13. The State shall establish a special agency for disabled persons for rehabilitation, self-
development and self-reliance, and their integration into the mainstream of society.

Women

SECTION 14. The State shall protect working women by providing safe and healthful working
conditions, taking into account their maternal functions, and such facilities and opportunities that will
enhance their welfare and enable them to realize their full potential in the service of the nation.

Role and Rights of People’s Organizations

SECTION 15. The State shall respect the role of independent people’s organizations to enable the
people to pursue and protect, within the democratic framework, their legitimate and collective
interests and aspirations through peaceful and lawful means.

People’s organizations are bona fide associations of citizens with demonstrated capacity to promote
the public interest and with identifiable leadership, membership, and structure.

SECTION 16. The right of the people and their organizations to effective and reasonable participation
at all levels of social, political, and economic decision-making shall not be abridged. The State shall,
by law, facilitate the establishment of adequate consultation mechanisms.

Human Rights

SECTION 17. (1) There is hereby created an independent office called the Commission on Human
Rights.

(2) The Commission shall be composed of a Chairman and four Members who must be natural-born
citizens of the Philippines and a majority of whom shall be members of the Bar. The term of office and
other qualifications and disabilities of the Members of the Commission shall be provided by law.

(3) Until this Commission is constituted, the existing Presidential Committee on Human Rights shall
continue to exercise its present functions and powers.

(4) The approved annual appropriations of the Commission shall be automatically and regularly
released.

SECTION 18. The Commission on Human Rights shall have the following powers and functions:

(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving
civil and political rights;
(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof
in accordance with the Rules of Court;

(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the
Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for preventive measures and legal aid
services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection;

(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities;

(5) Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to enhance respect for the
primacy of human rights;

(6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote human rights and to provide for
compensation to victims of violations of human rights, or their families;

(7) Monitor the Philippine Government’s compliance with international treaty obligations on human
rights;

(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of
documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any investigation
conducted by it or under its authority;

(9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its
functions;

(10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and

(11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law.

SECTION 19. The Congress may provide for other cases of violations of human rights that should fall
within the authority of the Commission, taking into account its recommendations.

AN ACT REORGANIZING THE JUDICIARY, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR

OTHER PURPOSES

PRELIMINARY CHAPTER

Section 1. Title. – This Act shall be known as "The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980."

Section 2. Scope. – The reorganization herein provided shall include the Court of Appeals, the Court
of First Instance, the Circuit Criminal Courts, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts, the Courts
of Agrarian Relations, the City Courts, the Municipal Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Courts.

CHAPTER I
COURT OF APPEALS

Section 3. Organization. – There is hereby created a Court of Appeals which consists of a Presiding
Justice and fifty Associate Justice who shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines. The
Presiding Justice shall be so designated in his appointment, and the Associate Justice shall have
precedence according to the dates of their respective appointments, or when the appointments of two
or more of them shall bear the same date, according to the order in which their appointments were
issued by the President. Any member who is reappointed to the Court after rendering service in any
other position in the government shall retain the precedence to which he was entitled under his
original appointment, and his service in the Court shall, for all intents and purposes, be considered as
continuous and uninterrupted. (as amended by Exec. Order No. 33,, July 28, 1986.)

Section 4. Exercise of powers and functions. – The Court Appeals shall exercise its powers,
functions, and duties, through seventeen (17) divisions, each composed of three (3) members. The
Court may sit en banc only for the purpose of exercising administrative, ceremonial, or other non-
adjudicatory functions. (as amended by Exec. Order No. 33,.)

Section 5. Succession to Office of Presiding Justice. – In case of a vacancy in the absence of

inability to perform the powers, functions, and duties of his office, the associate Justice who is first in
precedence shall perform his powers, functions, and duties until such disability is removed, or another
Presiding Justice is appointed and has qualified.

Section 6. Who presides over session of a division. – If the Presiding Justice is present in any
session of a division of the Court, he shall preside. In his absence, the Associate Justice attending
such session who has precedence shall preside.

Section 7. Qualifications. – The Presiding Justice and the Associate Justice shall have the same
qualifications as those provided in Constitution for Justice of the Supreme Court.

Section 8. Grouping of Divisions. – (Expressly repealed by Section 4, Exec. Order No. 33, July 28,
1986.)

Section 9. Jurisdiction. – The Court of Appeals shall Exercise:

1. Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas

corpus, and quo warranto,and auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction;

2. Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgements of Regional Trial
Courts; and

3. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgements, resolutions, orders or awards of
Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commission,
including the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Social Security Commission, the
Employees Compensation Commission and the Civil Service Commission, Except those falling
within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the
Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions
of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph 4 of the fourth
paragraph od Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.

The court of Appeals shall have the power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence and
perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original
and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new trials or Appeals must be
continuous and must be completed within three (3) months, unless extended by the Chief Justice. (as
amended by R.A. No. 7902.)

Section 10. Place of holding sessions. – The Court of Appeals shall have its permanent station in the
City of Manila. Whenever demanded by public interest, the Supreme Court, upon its own initiative or
upon recommendation of the Presiding Justice, may authorize a division of the Court to hold sessions
outside Manila, periodically, or for such periods and at such places as the Supreme Court may
determine, for the purpose of hearing and deciding cases.

Section 11. Quorum – A majority of the actual members of the Court shall constitute a quorum for its
session en banc. Three members shall constitute a quorum for the session of a division. The
unanimous vote of the three members of a division shall be necessary for the pronouncement of a
decision of final resolution, which shall be reached in consultation before the writing of the opinion by
any members of the division. In the event that the three members do not reach a unanimous vote, the
Presiding Justice shall request the Raffle Committee of the Court for the designation of two additional
Justice to sit temporarily with them, forming a special division of five members and the concurrence of
a majority of such division shall be necessary for the pronouncement of a decision or final resolution.
The designation of such additional Justice shall be made strictly by raffle.

A month for reconsideration of its decision or final resolution shall be resolved by the Court within
ninety (90) days from the time it is submitted for resolution, and no second motion for reconsideration
from the same party shall be entertainment. (as amended by Exec. Order No. 33, July 28, 1986.)

Section 12. Internal Rules. – The court en banc is authorized to promulgate rules or orders governing
the constitution of the divisions and the assignment of Appellate Justices thereto, the distribution of
cases, and other matters pertaining to the operations of the Court of its divisions. Copies of such
rules and orders shall be furnished by the Supreme Court, which rules and orders shall be effective
fifteen (15) days after receipt thereof, unless directed otherwise by the Supreme Court.

CHAPTER II
REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS

Section 13. Creation of Regional Trial Courts. – There are hereby created thirteen (13) Regional Trial
Courts, one for each of the following judicial regions:

Section 14. Regional Trial Courts.

Section 15. Qualifications. – No persons shall be appointed Regional Trial Judge unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, at least thirty-five years of age, and for at least ten years, has
been engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines or has held a public office in the Philippines
requiring admission to the practice of law as an indispensable requisite.

Section 16. Time and duration of sessions. – The time and duration of daily sessions of the Regional
Trial Courts shall be determined by the Supreme Court: Provided, however, That all motions, except
those requiring immediate action, shall be heard in the afternoon of every Friday, unless it falls on a
holiday, in which case, the hearing shall be held on the afternoon of the next succeeding business
day: Provided, further, That the Supreme Court may, for good reasons, fix a different motion day in
specified areas

Section 17. Appointment and assignment of Regional Trial Judges. – Every Regional Trial Judge
shall be appointed to a region which shall be his permanent station, and his appointment shall state
the branch of the court and the seat thereof to which he shall be originally assigned. However, the
Supreme Court may assign temporarily a Regional Trial Judge to another region as public interest
may require, provided that such temporary assignment shall not last longer than six (6) months
without the consent of the Regional Trial Judge concerned.
A Regional Trial Judge may be assigned by the Supreme Court to any branch or city or municipality
within the same region as public interest may require, and such assignment shall not be deemed an
assignment to another station within the meaning of this section.

Section 18. Authority to define territory appurtenant to each branch. – The Supreme Court shall
define the territory over which a branch of the Regional Trial Court shall exercise its authority. The
territory thus defined shall be deemed to be the territorial area of the branch concerned for purposes
of determining the venue of all suits, proceedings or actions, whether civil or criminal, as well as
determining the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
over the said branch may exercise appellate jurisdiction. The power herein granted shall be exercised
with a view to making the courts readily accessible to the people of the different parts of the region
and making the attendance of litigants and witnesses as inexpensive as possible.

Section 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction:

(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;

(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest
therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such the value exceeds Fifty thousand
pesos (50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or
buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;

(3) In all actions in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction where he demand or claim exceeds One
hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or , in Metro Manila, where such demand or claim
exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (200,000.00);

(4) In all matters of probate, both testate and intestate, where the gross value of the estate
exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in probate matters in Metro Manila,
where such gross value exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (200,000.00);

(5) In all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations;

(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body
exercising jurisdiction or any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions;

(7) In all civil actions and special proceedings falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
a Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court and of the Courts of Agrarian Relations as now
provided by law; and

(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind,
attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the property in controversy
exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (100,000.00) or, in such other abovementioned items
exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (200,000.00). (as amended by R.A. No. 7691*)

Section 20. Jurisdiction in criminal cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body,
except those now falling under the exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan which
shall hereafter be exclusively taken cognizance of by the latter.
Section 21. Original jurisdiction in other cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise original
jurisdiction:

(1) In the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus
and injunction which may be enforced in any part of their respective regions; and

(2) In actions affecting ambassadors and other public ministers and consuls.

Section 22. Appellate jurisdiction. – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise appellate jurisdiction over all
cases decided by Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
in their respective territorial jurisdictions. Such cases shall be decided on the basis of the entire
record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and such memoranda and/or briefs as may be
submitted by the parties or required by the Regional Trial Courts. The decision of the Regional Trial
Courts in such cases shall be appealable by petition for review to the

Court of Appeals which may give it due course only when the petition shows prima facie that the
lower court has committed an error of fact or law that will warrant a reversal or modification of the
decision or judgment sought to be reviewed.

Section 23. Special jurisdiction to try special cases. – The Supreme Court may designate certain
branches of the Regional Trial Courts to handle exclusively criminal cases, juvenile and domestic
relations cases, agrarian cases, urban land reform cases which do not fall under the jurisdiction of
quasi-judicial bodies and agencies, and/or such other special cases as the Supreme Court may
determine in the interest of a speedy and efficient administration of justice.

Section 24. Special Rules of Procedure. – Whenever a Regional Trial Court takes cognizance of
juvenile and domestic relation cases and/or agrarian cases, the special rules of procedure applicable
under present laws to such cases shall continue to be applied, unless subsequently amended by law
or by rules of court promulgated by the Supreme Court.

CHAPTER III
METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS, AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT
TRIAL COURTS

Section 25. Establishment of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts. – There shall be created a Metropolitan Trial Court in each metropolitan area established
by law, a Municipal Trial Court in each of the other cities or municipalities, and a Municipal Circuit
Trial Court in each circuit comprising such cities and/or municipalities as are grouped together
pursuant to law.

Section 26. Qualifications. – No person shall be appointed judge of a Metropolitan Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, at least 30 years of age, and, for at least five years, has been engaged in the practice of
law in the Philippines, or has held a public office in the Philippines requiring admission to the practice
of law as an indispensable requisite.

Section 27. Metropolitan Trial Courts of the National Capital Region. – There shall be a Metropolitan
Trial Court in the National Capital Region, to be known as the Metropolitan Trial Court of Metro
Manila, which shall be composed of eighty-two (82) branches. There shall be:
Section 28. Other Metropolitan Trial Courts. – The Supreme Court shall constitute Metropolitan Trial
Courts in such other metropolitan areas as may be established by law whose territorial jurisdiction
shall be co-extensive with the cities and municipalities comprising the metropolitan area.

Every Metropolitan Trial Judge shall be appointed to a metropolitan area which shall be his
permanent station and his appointment shall state branch of the court and the seat thereof to which
he shall be originally assigned. A Metropolitan Trial Judge may be assigned by the Supreme Court to
any branch within said metropolitan area as the interest of justice may require, and such assignment
shall not be deemed an assignment to another station within the meaning of this section.

Section 29. Municipal Trial Courts in cities. – In every city which does not form part of a metropolitan
area, there shall be a Municipal Trial Court with one branch, except as hereunder provided:

Section 30. Municipal Trial Courts. – In each of the municipalities that are not comprised within a
metropolitan area and a municipal circuit there shall be a Municipal Trial Court which shall have one
branch, except as hereunder provided:

Section 31. Municipal Circuit Trial Court. – There shall be a Municipal Circuit Trial Court in each area
defined as a municipal circuit, comprising one or more cities and/or one or more municipalities. The
municipalities comprising municipal circuits as organized under Administrative Order No. 33, issued
on June 13, 1978 by the Supreme Court pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 537, are hereby
constituted as municipal circuits for purposes of the establishment of the Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts, and the appointment thereto of Municipal Circuit Trial Judges: Provided, however, That the
Supreme Court may, as the interests of justice may require, further reorganize the said courts taking
into account workload, geographical location, and such other factors as will contribute to a rational
allocation thereof, pursuant to the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 537 which shall be applicable
insofar as they are not inconsistent with this Act.

Every Municipal Circuit Trial Judge shall be appointed to a municipal circuit which shall be his official
station.

The Supreme Court shall determine the city or municipality where the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
shall hold sessions.

Section 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts in criminal cases. – Except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional
Trial Courts and of the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city or municipal ordinances committed
within their respective territorial jurisdiction; and

(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding
six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or
other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon,
irrespective of kind, nature, value, or amount thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses
involving damage to property through criminal negligence they shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction thereof. (as amended by R.A, No. 7691)

Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts in civil cases. – Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts shall exercise:
 (1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and probate proceedings, testate and
intestate, including the grant of provisional remedies in proper cases, where the value of the
personal property, estate, or amount of the demand does not exceed One hundred thousand
pesos (P100,000.00) or, in Metro Manila where such personal property, estate, or amount of
the demand does not exceed Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) exclusive of
interest damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs, the amount
of which must be specifically alleged: Provided, That where there are several claims or causes
of action between the same or different parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount
of the demand shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes of action, irrespective of
whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions;

(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer: Provided,
That when, in such cases, the defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and
the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the
issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession.

(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein
does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila,
where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of
interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and
costs: Provided, That value of such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the
adjacent lots. (as amended by R.A. No. 7691)

Section 34. Delegated jurisdiction in cadastral and land registration cases. – Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts may be assigned by the Supreme
Court to hear and determine cadastral or land registration cases covering lots where there is no
controversy or opposition, or contested lots the where the value of which does not exceed One
hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00), such value to be ascertained by the affidavit of the claimant
or by agreement of the respective claimants if there are more than one, or from the corresponding tax
declaration of the real property. Their decisions in these cases shall be appealable in the same
manner as decisions of the Regional Trial Courts. (as amended by R.A. No. 7691)

Section 35. Special jurisdiction in certain cases. – In the absence of all the Regional Trial Judges in a
province or city, any Metropolitan Trial Judge, Municipal Trial Judge, Municipal Circuit Trial Judge
may hear and decide petitions for a writ of habeas corpus or applications for bail in criminal cases in
the province or city where the absent Regional Trial Judges sit.

Section 36. Summary procedures in special cases. – In Metropolitan Trial Courts and Municipal Trial
Courts with at least two branches, the Supreme Court may designate one or more branches thereof
to try exclusively forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, those involving violations of traffic laws,
rules and regulations, violations of the rental law, and such other cases requiring summary disposition
as the Supreme Court may determine. The Supreme Court shall adopt special rules or procedures
applicable to such cases in order to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination thereof
without regard to technical rules. Such simplified procedures may provide that affidavits and counter-
affidavits may be admitted in lieu of oral testimony and that the periods for filing pleadings shall be
non-extendible.

Section 37. Preliminary investigation. – Judges of Metropolitan Trial Courts, except those in the
National Capital Region, of Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall have
authority to conduct preliminary investigation of crimes alleged to have been committed within their
respective territorial jurisdictions which are cognizable by the Regional Trial Courts.
The preliminary investigation shall be conducted in accordance with the procedure prescribed in
Section 1, paragraphs (a), (b), (c), and (d), of Presidential Decree No. 911: Provided, however, That if
after the preliminary investigation the Judge finds a prima facie case, he shall forward the records of
the case to the Provincial/City Fiscal for the filing of the corresponding information with the proper
court.

No warrant of arrest shall be issued by the Judge in connection with any criminal complaint filed with
him for preliminary investigation, unless after an examination in writing and under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and his witnesses, he finds that a probable cause exists.

Any warrant of arrest issued in accordance herewith may be served anywhere in the Philippines.

Section 38. Judgments and processes. –

(1) All judgments determining the merits of cases shall be in writing, stating clearly the facts
and the law on which they were based, signed by the Judge and filed with the Clerk of Court.
Such judgment shall be appealable to the Regional Trial Courts in accordance with the
procedure now prescribed by law for appeals to the Court of First Instance, by the provisions of
this Act, and by such rules as the Supreme Court may hereafter prescribe.

(2) All processes issued by the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts, in cases falling within their jurisdiction, may be served anywhere in the
Philippines without the necessity of certification by the Judge of the Regional Trial Court.

CHAPTER IV
GENERAL PROVISIONS

Section 39. Appeals. – The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or
decisions of any court in all cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final order,
resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from: Provided however, That in habeas
corpus cases, the period for appeal shall be forty-eight (48) hours from the notice of the judgment
appealed from.

No record on appeal shall be required to take an appeal. In lieu thereof, the entire record shall be
transmitted with all the pages prominently numbered consecutively, together with an index of the
contents thereof.

This section shall not apply in appeals in special proceedings and in other cases wherein multiple
appeals are allowed under applicable provisions of the Rules of Court.

Section 40. Form of decision in appealed cases. – Every decision of final resolution of a court in
appealed cases shall clearly and distinctly state the findings of fact and the conclusions of law on
which it is based, which may be contained in the decision or final resolution itself, or adopted by
reference from those set forth in the decision, order, or resolution appealed from.

Section 41. Salaries. – Intermediate Appellate Justices, Regional Trial Judges, Metropolitan Trial
Judges, Municipal Trial Judges, and Municipal Circuit Trial Judges shall receive such compensation
and allowances as may be authorized by the President along the guidelines set forth in Letter of
Implementation No. 93 pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 985, as amended by Presidential Decree
No. 1597.
Section 42. Longevity pay. – A monthly longevity pay equivalent to 5% of the monthly basic pay shall
be paid to the Justices and Judges of the courts herein created for each five years of continuous,
efficient, and meritorious service rendered in the judiciary; Provided, That in no case shall the total
salary of each Justice or Judge concerned, after this longevity pay is added, exceed the salary of the
Justice or Judge next in rank.

Section 43. Staffing pattern. – The Supreme Court shall submit to the President, within thirty (30)
days from the date of the effectivity of this Act, a staffing pattern for all courts constituted pursuant to
this Act which shall be the basis of the implementing order to be issued by the President in
accordance with the immediately succeeding section.

Section 44. Transitory provisions. – The provisions of this Act shall be immediately carried out in
accordance with an Executive Order to be issued by the President. The Court of Appeals, the Courts
of First Instance, the Circuit Criminal Courts, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts, the Courts
of Agrarian Relations, the City Courts, the Municipal Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Courts shall
continue to function as presently constituted and organized, until the completion of the reorganization
provided in this Act as declared by the President. Upon such declaration, the said courts shall be
deemed automatically abolished and the incumbents thereof shall cease to hold office. The cases
pending in the old Courts shall be transferred to the appropriate Courts constituted pursuant to this
Act, together with the pertinent functions, records, equipment, property and the necessary personnel.

The applicable appropriations shall likewise be transferred to the appropriate courts constituted
pursuant to this Act, to be augmented as may be necessary from the funds for organizational
changes as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 80. Said funding shall thereafter be included in the
annual General Appropriations Act.

Section 45. Shari'a Courts. – Shari'a Courts to be constituted as provided for in Presidential Decree
No. 1083, otherwise known as the "Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines," shall be
included in the funding appropriations so provided in this Act.

Section 46. Gratuity of judges and personnel separated from office. – All members of the judiciary
and subordinate employees who shall be separated from office by reason of the reorganization
authorized herein, shall be granted a gratuity at a rate equivalent to one month's salary for every year
of continuous service rendered in any branch of the government or equivalent nearest fraction thereof
favorable to them on the basis of the highest salary received: Provided, That such member of the
judiciary or employee shall have the option to retire under the Judiciary Retirement Law or general
retirement law, if he has met or satisfied the requirements therefor.

Section 47. Repealing clause. – The provisions of Republic Act No. 296, otherwise known as the
Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, of Republic Act No. 5179 as amended, of the Rules of Court, and
of all other statutes, letters of instructions and general order or parts thereof, inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or accordingly modified.

Republic Act No. 7691 March 25, 1994

AN ACT EXPANDING THE JURISDICTION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS,

MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS, AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS, AMENDING FOR THE
PURPOSE BATAS PAMBANSA, BLG. 129, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE "JUDICIARY
REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1980"

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress

assembled::
Section 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the "Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980", is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction.

"(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary
estimation;

"(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any
interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000,00) or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value
exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and
unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon
the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;

"(3) In all actions in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction where the demand or claim
exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in Metro Manila, where such
demand or claim exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00);

"(4) In all matters of probate, both testate and intestate, where the gross value of the
estate exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in probate matters in
Metro Manila, where such gross value exceeds Two Hundred thousand pesos
(P200,000.00);

"(5) In all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations;

"(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body
exercising jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions;

"(7) In all civil actions and special proceedings falling within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of a Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court and of the Court of Agrarian
Relations as now provided by law; and

"(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever
kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the property in
controversy exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in such other
cases in Metro Manila, where the demand exclusive of the abovementioned items
exceeds Two Hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00)."

Section 2. Section 32 of the same law is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts in Criminal Cases. – Except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction
of Regional Trial Courts and of the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

"(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city or municipal ordinances
committed within their respective territorial jurisdiction; and
 "(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not
exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other
imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such
offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof:
Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal
negligence, they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof."

Section 3. Section 33 of the same law is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts in Civil Cases. – Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

"(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and probate proceedings, testate
and intestate, including the grant of provisional remedies in proper cases, where the
value of the personal property, estate, or amount of the demand does not exceed One
hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in Metro Manila where such personal
property, estate, or amount of the demand does not exceed Two hundred thousand
pesos (P200,000.00), exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees,
litigation expenses, and costs, the amount of which must be specifically alleged:
Provided, That interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses,
and costs shall be included in the determination of the filing fees: Provided, further, That
where there are several claims or causes of actions between the same or different
parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality
of the claims in all the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action
arose out of the same or different transactions;

"(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer:
Provided, That when, in such cases, the defendant raises the questions of ownership in
his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the
issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue
of possession; and

"(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession
of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or
interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil
actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees,
litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That in cases of land not declared for taxation
purposes, the value of such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the
adjacent lots."

Section 4. Section 34 of the same law is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Sec. 34. Delegated Jurisdiction in Cadastral and Land Registration Cases. – Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts may be assigned by the
Supreme Court to hear and determine cadastral or land registration cases covering lots where
there is no controversy or opposition, or contested lots where the value of which does not
exceed One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00), such value to be ascertained by the
affidavit of the claimant or by agreement of the respective claimants if there are more than one,
or from the corresponding tax declaration of the real property. Their decisions in these cases
shall be appealable in the same manner as decisions of the Regional Trial Courts."
Section 5. After five (5) years from the effectivity of this Act, the jurisdictional amounts mentioned in
Sec. 19(3), (4), and (8); and Sec. 33(1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 as amended by this Act, shall be
adjusted to Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00). Five (5) years thereafter, such jurisdictional
amounts shall be adjusted further to Three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00): Provided,
however, That in the case of Metro Manila, the abovementioned jurisdictional amounts shall be
adjusted after five (5) years from the effectivity of this Act to Four hundred thousand pesos
(P400,000.00).

Section 6. All laws, decrees, and orders inconsistent with the provisions of this Act shall be
considered amended or modified accordingly.

Section 7. The provisions of this Act shall apply to all civil cases that have not yet reached the pre-
trial stage. However, by agreement of all the parties, civil cases cognizable by municipal and
metropolitan courts by the provisions of this Act may be transferred from the Regional Trial Courts to
the latter. The executive judge of the appropriate Regional Trial Courts shall define the administrative
procedure of transferring the cases affected by the redefinition of jurisdiction to the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.

Section 8. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Official Gazette or
in two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.

BUSTOS V LUCERO

The petitioner herein, an accused in a criminal case, filed a motion with the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga after he had been bound over to that court for trial, praying that the record of the case be
remanded to the justice of the peace court of Masantol, the court of origin, in order that the petitioner
might cross-examine the complainant and her witnesses in connection with their testimony, on the
strength of which warrant was issued for the arrest of the accused. The motion was denied and that
denial is the subject matter of this proceeding.

According to the memorandum submitted by the petitioner's attorney to the Court of First Instance in
support of his motion, the accused, assisted by counsel, appeared at the preliminary investigation. In
that investigation, the justice of the peace informed him of the charges and asked him if he pleaded
guilty or not guilty, upon which he entered the plea of not guilty. "Then his counsel moved that the
complainant present her evidence so that she and her witnesses could be examined and cross-
examined in the manner and form provided by law." The fiscal and the private prosecutor objected,
invoking section 11 of rule 108, and the objection was sustained. "In view thereof, the accused's
counsel announced his intention to renounce his right to present evidence," and the justice of the
peace forwarded the case to the court of first instance.

Leaving aside the question whether the accused, after renouncing his right to present evidence, and
by reason of that waiver he was committed to the corresponding court for trial, is estopped, we are of
the opinion that the respondent judge did not act in excess of his jurisdiction or in abuse of discretion
in refusing to grant the accused's motion to return the record for the purpose set out therein.
In Dequito and Saling Buhay vs. Arellano, G.R. No. L-1336, recently promulgated, in which case the
respondent justice of the peace had allowed the accused, over the complaint's objection, to recall the
complainant and her witnesses at the preliminary investigation so that they might be cross-examined,
we sustained the justice of the peace's order. We said that section 11 of Rule 108 does not curtail the
sound discretion of the justice of the peace on the matter. We said that "while section 11 of Rule 108
defines the bounds of the defendant's right in the preliminary investigation, there is nothing in it or any
other law restricting the authority, inherent in a court of justice, to pursue a course of action
reasonably calculated to bring out the truth."

But we made it clear that the "defendant can not, as a matter of right, compel the complaint and his
witnesses to repeat in his presence what they had said at the preliminary examination before the
issuance of the order of arrest." We called attention to the fact that "the constitutional right of an
accused to be confronted by the witnesses against him does not apply to preliminary hearings' nor
will the absence of a preliminary examination be an infringement of his right to confront witnesses."
As a matter of fact, preliminary investigation may be done away with entirely without infringing the
constitutional right of an accused under the due process clause to a fair trial.

The foregoing decision was rendered by a divided court. The minority went farther than the majority
and denied even any discretion on the part of the justice of the peace or judge holding the preliminary
investigation to compel the complainant and his witnesses to testify anew.

Upon the foregoing considerations, the present petition is dismissed with costs against the petitioner.

PRISCILLA ALAMA JOSE V RAMON JAVELLANA

Antecedents

On September 8, 1979, Margarita Marquez Alma Jose (Margarita) sold for consideration
of P160,000.00 to respondent Ramon Javellana by deed of conditional sale two parcels of land with
areas of 3,675 and 20,936 square meters located in Barangay Mallis, Guiguinto, Bulacan. They
agreed that Javellana would pay P80,000.00 upon the execution of the deed and the balance
of P80,000.00 upon the registration of the parcels of land under the Torrens System (the registration
being undertaken by Margarita within a reasonable period of time); and that should Margarita become
incapacitated, her son and attorney-in-fact, Juvenal M. Alma Jose (Juvenal), and her daughter,
petitioner Priscilla M. Alma Jose, would receive the payment of the balance and proceed with the
application for registration.[3]

After Margarita died and with Juvenal having predeceased Margarita without issue, the
vendors undertaking fell on the shoulders of Priscilla, being Margaritas sole surviving heir. However,
Priscilla did not comply with the undertaking to cause the registration of the properties under the
Torrens System, and, instead, began to improve the properties by dumping filling materials therein
with the intention of converting the parcels of land into a residential or industrial subdivision. [4] Faced
with Priscillas refusal to comply, Javellana commenced on February 10, 1997 an action for specific
performance, injunction, and damages against her in the Regional Trial Court in Malolos, Bulacan
(RTC), docketed as Civil Case No. 79-M-97 entitled Ramon C. Javellana, represented by Atty.
Guillermo G. Blanco v. Priscilla Alma Jose.

In Civil Case No. 79-M-97, Javellana averred that upon the execution of the deed of
conditional sale, he had paid the initial amount of P80,000.00 and had taken possession of the
parcels of land; that he had paid the balance of the purchase price to Juvenal on different dates upon
Juvenals representation that Margarita had needed funds for the expenses of registration and
payment of real estate tax; and that in 1996, Priscilla had called to inquire about the mortgage
constituted on the parcels of land; and that he had told her then that the parcels of land had not been
mortgaged but had been sold to him.[5]

Javellana prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary
injunction to restrain Priscilla from dumping filling materials in the parcels of land; and that Priscilla be
ordered to institute registration proceedings and then to execute a final deed of sale in his favor. [6]

Priscilla filed a motion to dismiss, stating that the complaint was already barred by prescription;
and that the complaint did not state a cause of action.[7]

The RTC initially denied Priscillas motion to dismiss on February 4, 1998.[8] However, upon her
motion for reconsideration, the RTC reversed itself on June 24, 1999 and granted the motion to
dismiss, opining that Javellana had no cause of action against her due to her not being bound to
comply with the terms of the deed of conditional sale for not being a party thereto; that there was no
evidence showing the payment of the balance; that he had never demanded the registration of the
land from Margarita or Juvenal, or brought a suit for specific performance against Margarita or
Juvenal; and that his claim of paying the balance was not credible. [9]

Javellana moved for reconsideration, contending that the presentation of evidence of full
payment was not necessary at that stage of the proceedings; and that in resolving a motion to
dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action, the facts alleged in the complaint were
hypothetically admitted and only the allegations in the complaint should be considered in resolving
the motion.[10] Nonetheless, he attached to the motion for reconsideration the receipts showing the
payments made to Juvenal.[11] Moreover, he maintained that Priscilla could no longer succeed to any
rights respecting the parcels of land because he had meanwhile acquired absolute ownership of
them; and that the only thing that she, as sole heir, had inherited from Margarita was the obligation to
register them under the Torrens System.[12]

On June 21, 2000, the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of any reason to
disturb the order of June 24, 1999.[13]

Accordingly, Javellana filed a notice of appeal from the June 21, 2000 order, [14] which the RTC
gave due course to, and the records were elevated to the Court of Appeals (CA).

In his appeal (C.A.-G.R. CV No. 68259), Javellana submitted the following as errors of the
RTC,[15] to wit:

I
 THE TRIAL COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE FACT THAT
PLAINTIFF-APELLANT HAD LONG COMPLIED WITH THE FULL PAYMENT OF THE
CONSIDERATION OF THE SALE OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY AND HAD
IMMEDIATELY TAKEN ACTUAL AND PHYSICAL POSSESSION OF SAID
PROPERTY UPON THE SIGNING OF THE CONDITIONAL DEED OF SALE;

II
THE TRIAL COURT OBVIOUSLY ERRED IN MAKING TWO CONFLICTING
INTERPRETATIONS OF THE PROVISION OF THE CIVIL [CODE], PARTICULARLY
ARTICLE 1911, IN THE LIGHT OF THE TERMS OF THE CONDITIONAL DEED OF
SALE;

III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT DEFENDANT-APPELLEE BEING
NOT A PARTY TO THE CONDITIONAL DEED OF SALE EXECUTED BY HER
MOTHER IN FAVOR OF PLAINTFF-
APPELLANT IS NOT BOUND THEREBY AND CAN NOT BE COMPELLED TO DO
THE ACT REQUIRED IN THE SAID DEED OF CONDITIONAL SALE;

IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE AMENDED COMPLAINT WITHOUT
HEARING THE CASE ON THE MERITS.

Priscilla countered that the June 21, 2000 order was not appealable; that the appeal was not
perfected on time; and that Javellana was guilty of forum shopping.[16]
It appears that pending the appeal, Javellana also filed a petition for certiorari in the CA to
assail the June 24, 1999 and June 21, 2000 orders dismissing his complaint (C.A.-G.R. SP No.
60455). On August 6, 2001, however, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari,[17] finding that the
RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the orders, and holding that it only
committed, at most, an error of judgment correctible by appeal in issuing the challenged orders.

On November 20, 2002, the CA promulgated its decision in C.A.-G.R. CV No.

68259,[18] reversing and setting aside the dismissal of Civil Case No. 79-M-97, and remanding the
records to the RTC for further proceedings in accordance with law. [19] The CA explained that the
complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action; that Priscilla, as sole heir, succeeded to the rights and
obligations of Margarita with respect to the parcels of land; that Margaritas undertaking under the
contract was not a purely personal obligation but was transmissible to Priscilla, who was
consequently bound to comply with the obligation; that the action had not yet prescribed due to its
being actually one for quieting of title that was imprescriptible brought by Javellana who had actual
possession of the properties; and that based on the
complaint, Javellana had been in actual possession since 1979, and the cloud on his title had come
about only when Priscilla had started dumping filling materials on the premises.[20]
 On May 9, 2003, the CA denied the motion for reconsideration, [21] stating that it decided to
give due course to the appeal even if filed out of time because Javellana had no intention to delay the
proceedings, as in fact he did not even seek an extension of time to file his appellants brief; that
current jurisprudence afforded litigants the amplest opportunity to present their cases free from the
constraints of technicalities, such that even if an appeal was filed out of time, the appellate court was
given the discretion to nonetheless allow the appeal for justifiable reasons.

Issues

Priscilla then brought this appeal, averring that the CA thereby erred in not outrightly
dismissing Javellanas appeal because: (a) the June 21, 2000 RTC order was not appealable; (b) the
notice of appeal had been filed belatedly by three days; and (c) Javellana was guilty of forum
shopping for filing in the CA a petition for certiorari to assail the orders of the RTC that were the
subject matter of his appeal pending in the CA. She posited that, even if the CAs decision to entertain
the appeal was affirmed, the RTCs dismissal of the complaint should nonetheless be upheld because
the complaint stated no cause of action, and the action had already prescribed.

On his part, Javellana countered that the errors being assigned by Priscilla involved questions
of fact not proper for the Court to review through petition for review on certiorari; that the June 21,
2000 RTC order, being a final order, was appealable; that his appeal was perfected on time; and that
he was not guilty of forum shopping because at the time he filed the

petition for certiorari the CA had not yet rendered a decision in C.A.-G.R.
CV No. 68259, and because the issue of ownership raised in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 68259 was different
from the issue of grave abuse of discretion raised in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 60455.

Ruling

The petition for review has no merit.

I
Denial of the motion for reconsideration of the
order of dismissal was a final order and appealable

Priscilla submits that the order of June 21, 2000 was not the proper subject of an appeal considering
that Section 1 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides that no appeal may be taken from an order
denying a motion for reconsideration.

Priscillas submission is erroneous and cannot be sustained.

First of all, the denial of Javellanas motion for reconsideration left nothing more to be done by the
RTC because it confirmed the dismissal of Civil Case No. 79-M-97. It was clearly a final order, not an
interlocutory one. The Court has distinguished between final and interlocutory orders in Pahila-
Garrido v. Tortogo,[22] thuswise:

The distinction between a final order and an interlocutory order is well known. The
first disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or
action, leaving nothing more to be done except to enforce by execution what the court
has determined, but the latter does not completely dispose of the case but leaves
something else to be decided upon. An interlocutory order deals with preliminary
matters and the trial on the merits is yet to be held and the judgment
rendered. The test to ascertain whether or not an order or a judgment is

interlocutory or final is: does the order or judgment leave something to be done in the
trial court with respect to the merits of the case? If it does, the order or judgment is
interlocutory; otherwise, it is final.

And, secondly, whether an order is final or interlocutory determines whether appeal is the
correct remedy or not. A final order is appealable, to accord with the final judgment rule enunciated in
Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court to the effect that appeal may be taken from a judgment or
final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by
these Rules to be appealable;[23] but the remedy from an interlocutory one is not an appeal but a
special civil action for certiorari. The explanation for the differentiation of remedies given in Pahila-
Garrido v. Tortogo is apt:

xxx The reason for disallowing an appeal from an interlocutory order is to avoid
multiplicity of appeals in a single action, which necessarily suspends the hearing and
decision on the merits of the action during the pendency of the appeals. Permitting
multiple appeals will necessarily delay the trial on the merits of the case for a
considerable length of time, and will compel the adverse party to incur unnecessary
expenses, for one of the parties may interpose as many appeals as there are incidental
questions raised by him and as there are interlocutory orders rendered or issued by the
lower court. An interlocutory order may be the subject of an appeal, but only after a
judgment has been rendered, with the ground for appealing the order being included in
the appeal of the judgment itself.

The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an

appropriate special civil action under Rule 65, provided that the interlocutory order is
rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Then
is certiorari under Rule 65 allowed to be resorted to.

Indeed, the Court has held that an appeal from an order denying a motion for reconsideration of a
final order or judgment is effectively an appeal from the final order or judgment itself; and has
expressly clarified that the prohibition against appealing an order denying a motion for
reconsideration referred only to a denial of a motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory order. [24]

II
Appeal was made on time pursuant to Neypes v. CA

Priscilla insists that Javellana filed his notice of appeal out of time. She points out that he
received a copy of the June 24, 1999 order on July 9, 1999, and filed his motion for reconsideration
on July 21, 1999 (or after the lapse of 12 days); that the RTC denied his motion for reconsideration
through the order of June 21, 2000, a copy of which he received on July 13, 2000; that he had only
three days from July 13, 2000, or until July 16, 2000, within which to perfect an appeal; and that
having filed his notice of appeal on July 19, 2000, his appeal should have been dismissed for being
tardy by three days beyond the expiration of the reglementary period.

Section 3 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 3. Period of ordinary appeal. The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15)
days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on
appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal
within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order.

The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or
reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or
reconsideration shall be allowed. (n)

Under the rule, Javellana had only the balance of three days from July 13, 2000, or until July
16, 2000, within which to perfect an appeal due to the timely filing of his motion for reconsideration
interrupting the running of the period of appeal. As such, his filing of the notice of appeal only on July
19, 2000 did not perfect his appeal on time, as Priscilla insists.
The seemingly correct insistence of Priscilla cannot be upheld, however, considering that the
Court meanwhile adopted the fresh period rule in Neypes v. Court of Appeals,[25] by which an
aggrieved party desirous of appealing an adverse judgment or final order is allowed a fresh period of
15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the RTC reckoned from receipt of the order
denying a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration, to wit:

The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all courts. It has the sole
prerogative to amend, repeal or even establish new rules for a more simplified and
inexpensive process, and the speedy disposition of cases. In the rules governing
appeals to it and to the Court of Appeals, particularly Rules 42, 43 and 45, the Court
allows extensions of time, based on justifiable and compelling reasons, for parties to file
their appeals. These extensions may consist of 15 days or more.

To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair
opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of
15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted
 from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for
reconsideration.

Henceforth, this fresh period rule shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals
from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for
review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from
quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by
certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal
period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial,
motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution.[26]

The fresh period rule may be applied to this case, for the Court has already retroactively
extended the fresh period rule to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage and
this will not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, inasmuch as
there are no vested rights in rules of procedure.[27] According to De los Santos v. Vda. de
Mangubat:[28]

Procedural law refers to the adjective law which prescribes rules and forms of
procedure in order that courts may be able to administer justice. Procedural laws do not
come within the legal conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule against the
retroactive operation of statues ― they may be given retroactive effect on actions
pending and undetermined at the time of their passage and this will not violate any right
of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, insomuch as there are no vested
rights in rules of procedure.

The fresh period rule is a procedural law as it prescribes a fresh period of 15 days
within which an appeal may be made in the event that the motion for reconsideration is
denied by the lower court. Following the rule on retroactivity of procedural laws, the
"fresh period rule" should be applied to pending actions, such as the present case.

Also, to deny herein petitioners the benefit of the fresh period rule will amount to
injustice, if not absurdity, since the subject notice of judgment and final order were
issued two years later or in the year 2000, as compared to the notice of judgment and
final order in Neypes which were issued in 1998. It will be incongruous and illogical that
parties receiving notices of judgment and final orders issued in the year 1998 will enjoy
the benefit of the fresh period rule while those later rulings of the lower courts such as in
the instant case, will not.[29]

Consequently, we rule that Javellanas notice of appeal was timely filed pursuant to the fresh
period rule.

III
No forum shopping was committed
 Priscilla claims that Javellana engaged in forum shopping by filing a notice of appeal and a
petition for certiorari against the same orders. As earlier noted, he denies that his doing so violated
the policy against forum shopping.

The Court expounded on the nature and purpose of forum shopping in In Re: Reconstitution of
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 303168 and 303169 and Issuance of Owners Duplicate Certificates
of Title In Lieu of Those Lost, Rolando Edward G. Lim, Petitioner:[30]

Forum shopping is the act of a party litigant against whom an adverse judgment
has been rendered in one forum seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion in
another forum, other than by appeal or the special civil action of certiorari, or the
institution of two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause or
supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition. Forum
shopping happens when, in the two or more pending cases, there is identity of parties,
identity of rights or causes of action, and identity of reliefs sought. Where the elements
of litis pendentia are present, and where a final judgment in one case will amount to res
judicata in the other, there is forum shopping. For litis pendentia to be a ground for the
dismissal of an action, there must be: (a) identity of the parties or at least such as to
represent the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief
prayed for, the relief being founded on the same acts; and (c) the identity in the two
cases should be such that the judgment which may be rendered in one would,
regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other.

For forum shopping to exist, both actions must involve the same transaction, same
essential facts and circumstances and must raise identical causes of action, subject
matter and issues. Clearly, it does not exist where different orders were questioned, two
distinct causes of action and issues were raised, and two objectives were sought.

Should Javellanas present appeal now be held barred by his filing of the petition
for certiorari in the CA when his appeal in that court was yet pending?

We are aware that in Young v. Sy,[31] in which the petitioner filed a notice of appeal to elevate
the orders concerning the dismissal of her case due to non-suit to the CA and a petition
for certiorari in the CA assailing the same orders four months later, the Court ruled that the
successive filings of the notice of appeal and the petition for certiorari to attain the same objective of
nullifying the trial courts dismissal orders constituted forum shopping that warranted the dismissal of
both cases. The Court said:

Ineluctably, the petitioner, by filing an ordinary appeal and a petition

for certiorari with the CA, engaged in forum shopping. When the petitioner commenced
the appeal, only four months had elapsed prior to her filing with the CA
the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 and which eventually came up to this Court by
way of the instant Petition (re: Non-Suit). The elements of litis pendentia are present
between the two suits. As the CA, through its Thirteenth Division, correctly noted, both
 suits are founded on exactly the same facts and refer to the same subject
matterthe RTC Orders which dismissed Civil Case No. SP-5703 (2000) for

failure to prosecute. In both cases, the petitioner is seeking the reversal of the RTC
orders. The parties, the rights asserted, the issues professed, and the reliefs prayed for,
are all the same. It is evident that the judgment of one forum may amount to res
judicata in the other.
xxxx
The remedies of appeal and certiorari under Rule 65 are mutually exclusive and
not alternative or cumulative. This is a firm judicial policy. The petitioner cannot hedge
her case by wagering two or more appeals, and, in the event that the ordinary appeal
lags significantly behind the others, she cannot post facto validate this circumstance as
a demonstration that the ordinary appeal had not been speedy or adequate enough, in
order to justify the recourse to Rule 65. This practice, if adopted, would sanction the
filing of multiple suits in multiple fora, where each one, as the petitioner couches it,
becomes a precautionary measure for the rest, thereby increasing the chances of a
favorable decision. This is the very evil that the proscription on forum shopping seeks to
put right. In Guaranteed Hotels, Inc. v. Baltao, the Court stated that the grave evil
sought to be avoided by the rule against forum shopping is the rendition by two
competent tribunals of two separate and contradictory decisions. Unscrupulous party
litigants, taking advantage of a variety of competent tribunals, may repeatedly try their
luck in several different fora until a favorable result is reached. To avoid the resultant
confusion, the Court adheres strictly to the rules against forum shopping, and any
violation of these rules results in the dismissal of the case.[32]

The same result was reached in Zosa v. Estrella,[33] which likewise involved the successive
filing of a notice of appeal and a petition for certiorari to challenge the same orders, with the Court
upholding the CAs dismissals of the appeal and the petition for certiorari through separate decisions.

Yet, the outcome in Young v. Sy and Zosa v. Estrella is unjust here even if the orders of the
RTC being challenged through appeal and the petition for certiorariwere the same. The unjustness
exists because the appeal and the petition for certiorari actually sought different objectives. In his
appeal in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 68259, Javellana aimed to undo the RTCs erroneous dismissal of Civil
Case No. 79-M-97 to clear the way for his judicial demand for specific performance to be tried and
determined in due course by the RTC; but his petition for certiorari had the ostensible objective to
prevent (Priscilla) from developing the subject property and from proceeding with the ejectment case
until his appeal is finally resolved, as the CA explicitly determined in its decision in C.A.-G.R. SP No.
60455.[34]

Nor were the dangers that the adoption of the judicial policy against forum shopping designed
to prevent or to eliminate attendant. The first danger, i.e., the multiplicity of suits upon one and the
same cause of action, would not materialize considering that the appeal was a continuity of Civil Case
No. 79-M-97, whereas C.A.-G.R. SP No. 60455 dealt with an independent ground of alleged grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC. The second
danger, i.e., the unethical malpractice of shopping for a friendly court or judge to ensure a favorable
ruling or judgment after not getting it in the appeal, would not arise because the CA had not yet
decided C.A.-G.R. CV No. 68259 as of the filing of the petition for certiorari.

Instead, we see the situation of resorting to two inconsistent remedial approaches to be the
result of the tactical misjudgment by Javellanas counsel on the efficacy of the appeal to stave off his
caretakers eviction from the parcels of land and to prevent the development of them into a residential
or commercial subdivision pending the appeal. In the petition for certiorari, Javellana explicitly averred
that his appeal was inadequate and not speedy to prevent private respondent Alma Jose and her
transferee/assignee xxx from developing and disposing of the subject property to other parties to the
total deprivation of petitioners rights of possession and ownership over the subject property, and that
the dismissal by the RTC had emboldened private respondents to fully develop the property and for
respondent Alma Jose to file an ejectment case against petitioners overseer xxx.[35] Thereby, it
became far-fetched that Javellana brought the petition for certiorari in violation of the policy against
forum shopping.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; AFFIRMS the decision
promulgated on November 20, 2002; and ORDERS the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.

NEYPES V CA

Petitioners Domingo Neypes, Luz Faustino, Rogelio Faustino, Lolito Victoriano, Jacob Obania

and Domingo Cabacungan filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land and/or

reconveyance and/or reversion with preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 43,

of Roxas, Oriental Mindoro, against the Bureau of Forest Development, Bureau of Lands, Land Bank

of the Philippines and the heirs of Bernardo del Mundo, namely, Fe, Corazon, Josefa, Salvador and

Carmen.

In the course of the proceedings, the parties (both petitioners and respondents) filed various

motions with the trial court. Among these were: (1) the motion filed by petitioners to declare the

respondent heirs, the Bureau of Lands and the Bureau of Forest Development in default and (2) the

motions to dismiss filed by the respondent heirs and the Land Bank of the Philippines, respectively.

In an order dated May 16, 1997, the trial court, presided by public respondent Judge Antonio

N. Rosales, resolved the foregoing motions as follows: (1) the petitioners motion to declare
respondents Bureau of Lands and Bureau of Forest Development in default was granted for their

failure to file an answer, but denied as against the respondent heirs of del Mundo because the

substituted service of summons on them was improper; (2) the Land Banks motion to dismiss for lack

of cause of action was denied because there were hypothetical admissions and matters that could be

determined only after trial, and (3) the motion to dismiss filed by respondent heirs of del Mundo,

based on prescription, was also denied because there were factual matters that could be determined

only after trial.[1]

The respondent heirs filed a motion for reconsideration of the order denying their motion to

dismiss on the ground that the trial court could very well resolve the issue of prescription from the

bare allegations of the complaint itself without waiting for the trial proper.

In an order[2] dated February 12, 1998, the trial court dismissed petitioners complaint on the

ground that the action had already prescribed. Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the order of

dismissal on March 3, 1998 and, on the 15th day thereafter or on March 18, 1998, filed a motion for

reconsideration. On July 1, 1998, the trial court issued another order dismissing the motion for

reconsideration[3] which petitioners received on July 22, 1998. Five days later, on July 27, 1998,

petitioners filed a notice of appeal[4]and paid the appeal fees on August 3, 1998.

On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed eight

days late.[5] This was received by petitioners on July 31, 1998. Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration but this too was denied in an order dated September 3, 1998.[6]

Via a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,

petitioners assailed the dismissal of the notice of appeal before the Court of Appeals.

In the appellate court, petitioners claimed that they had seasonably filed their notice of appeal.

They argued that the 15-day reglementary period to appeal started to run only on July 22, 1998 since

this was the day they received the final order of the trial court denying their motion for
reconsideration. When they filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998, only five days had elapsed

and they were well within the reglementary period for appeal.[7]
 On September 16, 1999, the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the petition. It ruled that the 15-

day period to appeal should have been reckoned from March 3, 1998 or the day they received the

February 12, 1998 order dismissing their complaint. According to the appellate court, the order was

the final order appealable under the Rules. It held further:

Perforce the petitioners tardy appeal was correctly dismissed for the (P)erfection
of an appeal within the reglementary period and in the manner prescribed by law is
jurisdictional and non-compliance with such legal requirement is fatal and effectively
renders the judgment final and executory.[8]

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned decision. This was denied by the

Court of Appeals on January 6, 2000.

In this present petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules, petitioners ascribe the following errors

allegedly committed by the appellate court:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE

PETITIONERS PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND MANDAMUS AND IN AFFIRMING
THE ORDER OF THE HON. JUDGE ANTONIO N. ROSALES WHICH DISMISSED
THE PETITIONERS APPEAL IN CIVIL CASE NO. C-36 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, BRANCH 43, ROXAS, ORIENTAL MINDORO, EVEN AFTER THE
PETITIONERS HAD PAID THE APPEAL DOCKET FEES.

II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE ERRED IN RULING AND

AFFIRMING THE DECISION OR ORDER OF THE RESPONDENT HON. ANTONIO M.
ROSALES THAT PETITIONERS APPEAL WAS FILED OUT OF TIME WHEN
PETITIONERS RECEIVED THE LAST OR FINAL ORDER OF THE COURT ON JULY
22, 1998 AND FILED THEIR NOTICE OF APPEAL ON JULY 27, 1998 AND PAID THE
APPEAL DOCKET FEE ON AUGUST 3, 1998.

III

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FURTHER ERRED IN RULING THAT THE

WORDS FINAL ORDER IN SECTION 3, RULE 41, OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE WILL REFER TO THE [FIRST] ORDER OF RESPONDENT JUDGE
HON. ANTONIO M. MORALES DATED FEBRUARY 12, 1998 INSTEAD OF THE LAST
AND FINAL ORDER DATED JULY 1, 1998 COPY OF WHICH WAS RECEIVED BY
PETITIONERS THROUGH COUNSEL ON JULY 22, 1998.
 IV.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FINALLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE

DECISION IN THE CASE OF DENSO, INC. V. IAC, 148 SCRA 280, IS APPLICABLE
IN THE INSTANT CASE THEREBY IGNORING THE PECULIAR FACTS AND
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE AND THE FACT THAT THE SAID DECISION WAS
RENDERED PRIOR TO THE ENACTMENT OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE.[9]

The foregoing issues essentially revolve around the period within which petitioners should have filed

their notice of appeal.

First and foremost, the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process. It is merely a

statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of

law. Thus, one who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must comply with the requirements of the

Rules. Failure to do so often leads to the loss of the right to appeal.[10] The period to appeal is fixed by

both statute and procedural rules. BP 129,[11] as amended, provides:

Sec. 39. Appeals. The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or
decisions of any court in all these cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the
notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from.
Provided, however, that in habeas corpus cases, the period for appeal shall be (48)
forty-eight hours from the notice of judgment appealed from. x x x

Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:

SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. ― The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15)
days from the notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record
on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal
within thirty (30) days from the notice of judgment or final order.

The period to appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or
reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or
reconsideration shall be allowed. (emphasis supplied)

Based on the foregoing, an appeal should be taken within 15 days from the notice of judgment or final

order appealed from. A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing
more for the court to do with respect to it. It is an adjudication on the merits which, considering the

evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties

are; or it may be an order or judgment that dismisses an action.[12]

As already mentioned, petitioners argue that the order of July 1, 1998 denying their motion for

reconsideration should be construed as the final order, not the February 12, 1998 order which

dismissed their complaint. Since they received their copy of the denial of their motion for

reconsideration only on July 22, 1998, the 15-day reglementary period to appeal had not yet lapsed

when they filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998.

What therefore should be deemed as the final order, receipt of which triggers the start of the

15-day reglementary period to appealthe February 12, 1998 order dismissing the complaint or the

July 1, 1998 order dismissing the MR?

In the recent case of Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc.,[13] the trial court declared

petitioner Quelnan non-suited and accordingly dismissed his complaint. Upon receipt of the order of

dismissal, he filed an omnibus motion to set it aside. When the omnibus motion was filed, 12 days of

the 15-day period to appeal the order had lapsed. He later on received another order, this time

dismissing his omnibus motion. He then filed his notice of appeal. But this was likewise dismissed ―

for having been filed out of time.

The court a quo ruled that petitioner should have appealed within 15 days after the dismissal of

his complaint since this was the final order that was appealable under the Rules. We reversed the
trial court and declared that it was the denial of the motion for reconsideration of an order of dismissal

of a complaint which constituted the final order as it was what ended the issues raised there.

This pronouncement was reiterated in the more recent case of Apuyan v. Haldeman et al.[14] where

we again considered the order denying petitioner Apuyans motion for reconsideration as the final

order which finally disposed of the issues involved in the case.

Based on the aforementioned cases, we sustain petitioners view that the order dated July 1, 1998

denying their motion for reconsideration was the final order contemplated in the Rules.

We now come to the next question: if July 1, 1998 was the start of the 15-day reglementary

period to appeal, did petitioners in fact file their notice of appeal on time?

Under Rule 41, Section 3, petitioners had 15 days from notice of judgment or final order to

appeal the decision of the trial court. On the 15 th day of the original appeal period (March 18, 1998),
petitioners did not file a notice of appeal but instead opted to file a motion for reconsideration.

According to the trial court, the MR only interrupted the running of the 15-day appeal period.[15] It

ruled that petitioners, having filed their MR on the last day of the 15-day reglementary period to

appeal, had only one (1) day left to file the notice of appeal upon receipt of the notice of denial of their
MR. Petitioners, however, argue that they were entitled under the Rules to a fresh period of 15 days

from receipt of the final order or the order dismissing their motion for reconsideration.

In Quelnan and Apuyan, both petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of

the trial court. We ruled there that they only had the remaining time of the 15-day appeal period to file

the notice of appeal. We consistently applied this rule in similar cases,[16] premised on the long-settled

doctrine that the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period permitted by law is not

only mandatory but also jurisdictional.[17] The rule is also founded on deep-seated considerations of

public policy and sound practice that, at risk of occasional error, the judgments and awards of courts

must become final at some definite time fixed by law.[18]

Prior to the passage of BP 129, Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court read:

Sec. 3. How appeal is taken. Appeal maybe taken by serving upon the
adverse party and filing with the trial court within thirty (30) days from notice of
order or judgment, a notice of appeal, an appeal bond, and a record on
appeal. The time during which a motion to set aside the judgment or order or for new
trial has been pending shall be deducted, unless such motion fails to satisfy the
requirements of Rule 37.

But where such motion has been filed during office hours of the last day of the
period herein provided, the appeal must be perfected within the day following that in
which the party appealing received notice of the denial of said motion. [19] (emphasis
supplied)

According to the foregoing provision, the appeal period previously consisted of 30 days. BP 129,

however, reduced this appeal period to 15 days. In the deliberations of the Committee on Judicial
Reorganization[20] that drafted BP 129, the raison d etre behind the amendment was to shorten the

period of appeal[21] and enhance the efficiency and dispensation of justice. We have since required
strict observance of this reglementary period of appeal. Seldom have we condoned late filing of

notices of appeal,[22] and only in very exceptional instances to better serve the ends of justice.
 In National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority and Authority v. Municipality of

Libmanan,[23] however, we declared that appeal is an essential part of our judicial system and the

rules of procedure should not be applied rigidly. This Court has on occasion advised the lower courts

to be cautious about not depriving a party of the right to appeal and that every party litigant should be

afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, free from the

constraint of technicalities.

In de la Rosa v. Court of Appeals,[24] we stated that, as a rule, periods which require litigants to

do certain acts must be followed unless, under exceptional circumstances, a delay in the filing of an

appeal may be excused on grounds of substantial justice. There, we condoned the delay incurred by

the appealing party due to strong considerations of fairness and justice.

In setting aside technical infirmities and thereby giving due course to tardy appeals, we have

not been oblivious to or unmindful of the extraordinary situations that merit liberal application of the

Rules. In those situations where technicalities were dispensed with, our decisions were not meant to

undermine the force and effectivity of the periods set by law. But we hasten to add that in those rare

cases where procedural rules were not stringently applied, there always existed a clear need to

prevent the commission of a grave injustice. Our judicial system and the courts have always tried to

maintain a healthy balance between the strict enforcement of procedural laws and the guarantee that

every litigant be given the full opportunity for the just and proper disposition of his cause. [25]

The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all courts. [26] It has the sole

prerogative to amend, repeal or even establish new rules for a more simplified and inexpensive

process, and the speedy disposition of cases. In the rules governing appeals to it and to the Court of

Appeals, particularly Rules 42,[27] 43[28] and 45,[29] the Court allows extensions of time, based on

justifiable and compelling reasons, for parties to file their appeals. These extensions may consist of

15 days or more.

To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity

to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to
file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a

motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. [30]

 Henceforth, this fresh period rule shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the

Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional

Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies[31] to the Court
of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court.[32] The new rule aims

to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the

motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution.

We thus hold that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal within the fresh period of

15 days, counted from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of notice denying their motion for

reconsideration). This pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules which
states that the appeal shall be taken within 15 days from notice of judgment or final order appealed

from. The use of the disjunctive word or signifies disassociation and independence of one thing from

another. It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies. [33] Hence, the use

of or in the above provision supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days from the

notice of judgment or within 15 days from notice of the final order, which we already determined to

refer to the July 1, 1998 order denying the motion for a new trial or reconsideration.

Neither does this new rule run counter to the spirit of Section 39 of BP 129 which shortened

the appeal period from 30 days to 15 days to hasten the disposition of cases. The original period of

appeal (in this case March 3-18, 1998) remains and the requirement for strict compliance still
applies. The fresh period of 15 days becomes significant only when a party opts to file a motion for

new trial or motion for reconsideration. In this manner, the trial court which rendered the assailed

decision is given another opportunity to review the case and, in the process, minimize and/or rectify

any error of judgment. While we aim to resolve cases with dispatch and to have judgments of courts

become final at some definite time, we likewise aspire to deliver justice fairly.

In this case, the new period of 15 days eradicates the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal

period should be counted from receipt of notice of judgment (March 3, 1998) or from receipt of notice

of final order appealed from (July 22, 1998).

To recapitulate, a party litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt

of the Regional Trial Courts decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the order (the final order)
denying his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-day period may
be availed of only if either motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory after

the lapse of the original appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section 3.

Petitioners here filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998 or five days from receipt of the

order denying their motion for reconsideration on July 22, 1998. Hence, the notice of appeal was well

within the fresh appeal period of 15 days, as already discussed. [34]

We deem it unnecessary to discuss the applicability of Denso (Philippines), Inc. v. IAC[35] since the

Court of Appeals never even referred to it in its assailed decision.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed decision of the Court of

Appeals REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, let the records of this case be remanded to the

Court of Appeals for further proceedings.