The Revolution On The Granite (1990):

The Legacy Contention In Independent Ukraine

Olga Onuch12
May 2017

Edited version published in New Eastern Europe

Forthcoming as a chapter in Kowal, P. et. al eds. (2017). “Three Revolutions”.

Keywords: Activism, Protest, Ukraine, Revolution On The Granite, ‘Student Hunger

Strike, Velvet Revolutions, 1989 Revolutions, Mobilizational Frames, Claims,
Grievances, Social Network Ties, Protest Waves, Legacies of Contention.

Introduction
Since 2004 Ukraine has been a pivotal case study for scholars of protest politics.
Specifically, two moments of mass mobilization in 2004 (‘Orange Revolution’) and in
2013-2014 (‘EuroMaidan’), have received an exceeding amount of scholarly attention
(Beacháin and Polese 2010; Beissinger 2007, 2011, 2013; Beissinger and Sasse 2013;
Bunce and Wolchik 2011; Kuzio 2010; Lane 2008; Lane and White 2010; Meirowitz
and Tucker 2013; Metzger et. al. 2015; Nikolayenko 2007; Onuch 2014, 2015a; Onuch
and Sasse 2016; Popova 2014;. Tucker 2007; Tucker et. al. 2014; Way 2008; Wilson
2005, 2006). In each instance we struggle to explain the sudden and unexpected sea of
ordinary citizens take to the streets of Kyiv. And thus, we turned to foreign financing
and technological diffusion (Aslund and McFaul 2006; Beissinger 2007; Bunce and
Wolchik 2006) and social media respectively (Bohdanova 2014; Lokot 2013; Metzger
et. al. 2015; Tucker et. al. 2014), to understand the mechanisms behind the

1Olga.onuch@manchester.ac.uk, Politics Discipline Area, School of Social Sciences, University of
2This paper is based on a presentation by the author at the 3Revolutions Conference in June 2016 and
3Revolutions Symposium in February 2017 at The College of Europe Natolin Campus in Warsaw,
Poland. The author would like to thank the organizers of the 3R Project (and its partners). And would
specifically like to thank Pawel Kowal and Jan Kubik for inviting her to be part of the afore
mentioned project and events. The research in this article was made possible by past studentship
funding received from the London School of Economics (2006) and The University of Oxford and
Nuffield College (2007-2010) during the author’s DPhil study and the Newton International
Fellowship Award (awarded by the British Academy and Royal Society, 2011).

1
mobilization of over one million Ukrainian citizens. But few analyses connected
theses more recent protest-events (grievances, claims, repertoires, networks and
participants) to past activism or past protest waves. Thus, most recent analyses have
failed to fully acknowledge that moments of mass mobilization, do not occur in a
vacuum and build on past experiences of protest and activism. One such often
forgotten revolutionary moment in Ukraine is the 1990 ‘Revolution on the Granite,’
(Doniy 1995; Kovtunovych and Pryvalko 2016). Oddly enough although scholars
have identified the ‘1989’ or ‘Velvet’ Revolutions protest wave that swept eastern
Europe between 1989-1991 as significant in shaping the history of activism in the
region, few include the ‘Revolution on the Granite,’ or acknowledge its importance in
bringing about a process that led to the independence of Ukraine (Diuk 2013; Onuch
2014; Rubchak 2015). Thus, this article’s aim is to provide two important correctives.
The article argues that the ‘Revolution on the Granite’: a) was part of and
comparable to the wider wave of contention observed in in eastern Europe between
1989 and 1991; and b) was immensely significant in creating a legacy of contention in
independent Ukraine, influencing the claims, repertoires, coalitions and actors of all
future mass mobilization in the country.

Contentious Politics Literature on the Legacies of Protest

Scholars of contentious politics have noted that moments of mass mobilization tend
build upon a historical legacy of activism and mobilization that preceded them, both
within the countries and abroad (Della Porta and Tarrow 2005; McAdam et. al. 2001;
Osa 2003; Tarrow 2005, 2011; Tilly 1977, 1978, 2006). Tilly (1993) has noted that
contentious action and the social movement organizations (SMOs) that organize it
are “historically specific clusters of political performances.” Tilly argues that every
performance of protest, even if organized and enacted entirely by a ‘new’ generation
of activists is in someway connected to past events through mimesis (mimicking
action, discourse, location), adaptation, and some improvisation (Tilly 1993). When
scholars take the time to purposefully compare and analyse protest-events across
time, they can beginning to identify continuities and ruptures in repertoires, forms,
locations and actors of contention. This allows us to identify the routines of
contention (Tilly 1993). Moreover, there are particular performances or protest-events
that act as critical junctures – and set the boundaries (forms of action, types of
networks involved, discourse of grievances) for future mobilization in a given
context. For instance, the French, American and Russian Revolutions, as well as, the
Black Civil Rights, Women’s, and Peace Movements have set the ‘master frames’ of

2
contention for generations of activists to come (Benford and Snow 2000; Janoski 1998;
Morris 1986; Noakes and Johnston 2005; Tilly 1995). The use of non-violent tactics
such as sit-ins by Black Civil Rights activists in the southern United States and the
use of more direct action barricades by the ‘1968’ protesters in France have also had a
lasting influence on the repertories of contention used by future activists in each
country (Chabot and Duyvendak 2002; Tilly 1993b, 2006; Traugott 1995). Thus, failing
to understand where certain ideas and practices of contention come from - and
therefore failing to understand the connectivity and influence of past protests on
future mobilization - inhibits our research and prevents a nuanced analysis.

The Argument
This article argues that when we do not trace and understand the connectivity
between different moments of mass mobilization, the continuities and ruptures
between them (be it in terms of grievances, repertoires, actors etc.) our
understanding of more recent protest-events (their trajectories, successes and
failures) also suffers. It is vital to understand how more recent ‘revolutionary
moments’ in Ukraine fit into the broader historical trajectory of protest and activism.
As elucidated by the author elsewhere, it is argued here that we can come to
understand inter-period and inter-protest-event connectivity by tracing the
commonalities between: ideas (understood mobilizational frames, grievances, claims
and repertoires); institutions or networks (understood as individual as social
movement organizations (SMO) and the networks [or Social Movement] they form)
and; individual actors involved in the mobilization process (for more see: Onuch 2014).
Using this framework, this article will first place the ‘Revolution on the Granite’ in
comparative perspective with the wave of protest-events that took place across
eastern Europe between 1989 and 1991. Secondly, the article will outline the role of
the ‘Revolution on the Granite’ as a critical juncture for activism in Ukraine,
highlighting its innovations and elucidating how it the boundaries of future protest-
events in Ukraine.

The Revolution on the Granite: Part of a Larger Protest Wave

The ‘Revolution on the Granite’ is undoubtedly part of larger protest wave that was
observed in eastern Europe between 1989-1991. This wave had its roots in Human
Rights activism and the rise of Student and Labour Unionism across the region –
which led to the creation of social movement organizations such as Charter 77,

3
Solidarność, and the Helsinki Human Rights Groups. Following a wave of repressions
activist leaders in Czechoslovakia and Poland and elsewhere in the region were
forced underground and thus, we observed a lull in their activities and coordination
(Adams 1992; Bernhard 1993; Ekiert and Kubik 1998; Garton 1987; Kubik 2010; Luers
1990; Shepherd 2000). Gorbachev’s introduction of perestroika (restructuring) and
glasnost (openness) policies (1985-1987) created political opportunity structures for a
fresh wave of mobilization in the region. In the communist republics, these policies
provided the already active Charter 77 and Solidarność with new openings for
collective action and allowed them greater freedom to mobilize a broader cross-
cleavage network of potential participants in their respective countries (Kubik 2010;
Osa 2003; Shepherd 2000). These SMOs, and others like them in neighboring
countries, set the stage for an all-region wave of mass mobilization, while also
played an active role in roundtable discussions strengthening the democratic
opposition forces in each respective country.

The 1989 wave of protest-events are pre-empted by small protest-events in Hungary

(1988) leading to a roundtable and a new ‘democracy package’ adopted in January
1989 and elections later that year (Bruszt and Horvath 1990; Ekiert and Kubik 1998).
This is followed up with mass February 1989 strikes in Poland which achieve: the re-
legalization of Solidarność, roundtable negotiations and partly free elections in which
Solidarność were allowed to contest seats (Ekiert and Kubik 2001). Next, in the
German Democratic Republic (GDR), following a confused statement by an official
regarding travel to West Germany, a series of mass protests erupt across the GDR in
September and October 1989, they lead to change in policy that in turn results in the
fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989 (10/25/17 18:43). Within days, on
November 17, large protests commence in Prague and across Czechoslovakia,
resulting resignations, roundtables and a swift elite negotiated resulting in the
Election of activist leader Vaclav Havel being elected as president on December 29
and thus dubbed the ‘Velvet’ revolution for its swift and peaceful transition of
power (Shepherd 2000). On 22 December events in Romania notably took a different
path and turned bloody, with the violent overthrow of Ceausescu, but peaceful
protests events were also observed in Estonia (the Singing Revolution), Lativa and
Lituania (Lieven 1994; Siani-Davies 2007). By the end of 1991 the USSR had
collapsed, and all the countries in the region were undergoing their own transitions
to independence and democracy.

4
Employing the framework of connectivity between ideas, institutions and actors, we
can observe three themes across the ‘1989 Revolutions’ protest wave. The ideas that
framed the mobilizations combined grievances against low living standards and
poor worker conditions, with claims for western liberal values and rights, as well as,
a desire for national liberation from Soviet influence (Havel 2009; Kubik 2010; Osa
2003). Repertoires included, marches, strikes, occupations, and cultural events
(including theater (Czechoslovakia), song (Estonia) and visual art (Poland) (Havel
2009; Kubik 2010). Structurally, we observed the bridging of labor, dissident, student
and religious social network ties and the development of key cross-cleavage
coalition SMOs such as Charter 77 and Solidarność. In terms of individual actors, we
saw continuity in terms of the involvement of activist leaders like Havel in
Czechozslovakia, Wałęsa in Poland, the rise of new political leaders like Orban in
Hungary. And although the protest-events themselves are often seen as influential,
political scientists have agreed that the role of ‘people power’ in the collapse of
communism has been exaggerated, explaining that in each case elite actions and
negotiations brought about elections in which communist parties or their members
were able participate (Casper and Taylor 1996; Lawson 2004; O’donnell et al. 2013).
As we will see bellow, the trajectories, tactics, actors and results in Ukraine were not
too different from their neighbours to the west.

How Does the ‘Revolution on the Granite’ Compare?

Similar to the experience of their neighbours, in the 1980s nationalist, dissident,
human rights and labour SMOs in Ukraine shifted their focus towards independence
and pro-democracy claims. But one important difference remained Ukrainian SMO
networks were severely weakened, if not almost completely obliterated, following
three waves of mass repressions (including psychiatric hospitalization and
imprisonment in hard labour camps) (for more see chpater 3 in: Onuch 2014). Thus,
unlike many of their counterparts in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland who
were imprisoned for shorter periods of time, but were forced to work underground
in the 1980s, most Ukrainian activists were not even able to return to Kyiv, Kharkiv
or Lviv. It is not until after the perestroika and glasnost policies fully took hold and the
phased release of political prisoners from the gulag took place that activists in
Ukraine began once again coordinating actions – the culmination of which was the
‘Revolution on the Granite.’

When Ukrainian dissidents, like Viacheslav Chornovil and Ivan Drach, returned

5
from prisons, labour camps and exile between 1986–1988, they swiftly immersed
themselves in political activities. They resurrected Prosvita3 and Moloda Prosvita,4 set
up the People’s Movement of Ukraine or simply Rukh (Ukrainian for ‘movement’), and
resumed the publication the Samvydav (Samyzdat) Ukraiin’skyi Vistnyk (Ukrainian
Bulletin) (Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group 2004; Rukh About Us 2008).
According to Satzewich (2003, 10) much like their contemporaries (Havel, Michnik
and Walensa), Chronovil and Drach, saw these activities as a direct continuation of
their previous activitivism. Rukh, was the focal point of collective action against the
State and Party in Ukraine. Formally, established in 1989 as the People’s Movement in
Support of Perestroika, like its counterparts in Czechoslovakia and Poland, Rukh was
also reorganized into a political party in 1990 (Rukh About Us 2008). Its leaders also
saw a need to develop a more militant and engaged youth wing, and sought out
connections in Universities and schools across the country. These activities
mobilized a new generation of activists and resulted in the setting up of Molodyi
Rukh (Onuch 2014).

Similarly to the rest of regions, during this short period between 1986-1991, Ukraine
observed five types of important protest events. These included: 1) small protests in
reaction to the lack of information about the Chornobyl disaster (1986) and Protests
Commemorating the National Day of Mourning (26 April 1990 and 1991); 2) Donbas
Miners' Strikes (1989-1991);5 4) the ‘Revolution on the Granite’ also referred to as the
‘Students Hunger Strike’ (2 - 17 October 1990); and 5) Rukh coordinated protest-
events (including the Human Chain in 1990)6 (Doniy 1995; Marples 1991; Nahaylo
1990; Siegelbaum and Walkowitz 1995). Each protest-event played its own significant
role in amplifying and popularizing grievances held by diverse groups in Ukrainian
society. Nonetheless, it was the student protests, dubbed the ‘Revolution on the
Granite’ which culminated in the ‘Students Hunger Strike,’ that altered the scope and

3 Prosvita is an important cultural and educational SMO that was a key network for past generations
of Ukrainian dissidents and activists. It was founded in honour of Ukrainian poet laureate Taras
Shevchenko in 1868 (Prosvita 2007).
4 Moloda Prosvita (Young Enlightenment), was an SMO founded in 1922, it was the activist youth wing

of the Prosvita Society (Moloda Prosvita 2008).

5 Wave one took place between 15-30 July 1989, activities continued in 1990, and wave two took place

between March-April 1991(Kipiani 2011; Siegelbaum and Walkowitz 1995; United Press International
1989).
6 It is estimated that over 300,000 Ukrainians participated in a human chain on January 21, 1990. The

chain was approximately 482 kilometers long and stretched from Kyiv to lviv in order to mark the
the signing of the Act Zluky (Unity Act) It was also the first time since the annexation of Ukrainian
People's Republic in 1921, that the Ukrainian Blue and Yellow flag was raised (Nahaylo 1990; The
Ukrainian Weekly 1990b).

6
strategies of Ukrainian contentious politics not only in 1990, but for all post-
independence protest-events to come.

The reactivation of activists, their building up of cross-cleavage network ties, and the
intensification of direct action tactics in Ukraine where all very similar to experiences
in Poland or Czechoslovakia one year earlier. Moreover, as in Hungary, Poland,
GDR, and Czechoslovakia, elite and Communist Party missteps and interventions
would only further motivate and mobilize citizens to join in protest events.

The 1990 ‘Revolution on the Granite’ in Detail

Of course, the events of 1990 in Ukraine were not happening in isolation. Observing
the outcomes of elite miscalculation in the GDR and Poland, swift negotiated
transitions in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, and the fate of Ceausescu, political elite
in Ukraine were at least in-part ready to bend to protest demands creating political
opportunity structures for mobilization. One such elite action was the Ukrainian SSR
Parliament’s Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine on 16 July 1990, following
which protest coordination reached a highpoint in Ukraine (Marples 1991). First in
response to call-to-action by Rukh, protests against the proposed resigning of the
Union Treaty commenced on 16 September 1990. But it was an estimated more than
100,000 ordinary citizens (a large portion of whom were students) that joined in a 30
September mass protest that tipped the scales in favour of ‘people power’ in Ukraine
(The Ukrainian Weekly 1990a). On the following day, smaller protested continued
(estimated at 20,000) and workers unions and opposition parties organized a one-day
national strike (Mycio 1990). On 2 October 1990 students from Lviv, Kyiv and
Kharkiv descended on the Maidan Nezaleznosty (Independence Square), set up a tent
city and launched an all-Ukrainian ‘Student Hunger Strike.’ At its height it was 2000
participants strong protest and became know as the ‘Revolution on the Granite’
(Doniy 1995). The student strike and occupation of the Maidan continued until 17
October when the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine voted on and published a response
agreeing to most of the student demands (Verkhovna Rada Ukrayiny 1990). Within a
year, following elite negotiations Ukraine held new elections to for President and a
referendum on independence, but no new elections to the Verkhovna Rada. Thus, like
its counterparts in the rest of the region, the ‘Revolution on the Granite’ was
successful in achieving most but not all its initial aims (see Figure 1). ‘People power’
provided pressure on politicians but in the end elite actors negotiated independence
and the transfer of power on their own terms. But how important was the

7
‘Revolution on the Granite’ for activism in post-independence Ukraine? Using the
above-described framework the sections below will address in detail the central
ideas, institutions and actors of the ‘Revolution on the Granite’ and their influence on
protest-events that followed.

Figure 1 Published Demands Made By Protest Participants in Ukraine 1991

Donbas Miners Strike Demands March 1991 Student Strike Demands October 1990

1. Impeachment of the President of the USSR for having 1. New round of multiparty elections to the Verkhovna Rada
no mandate or national trust, who was elected by an of the Ukraine SSR (Parliament), allowing opposition
unelected board of electors – the Plenum of the Central parties to contest the elections in full, and Referendum in
Committee and Congress of National Deputies; Ukraine on Independence;
2. Dismissal the Congress of National Deputies; 2. Ending compulsory military service of young Ukrainians;
3. Ratification of the Declaration of Sovereignty of Ukraine 3. Nationalization of all of the property of the Communist
as a constitutionally binding document; Party of Ukraine and the All-Union Leninist Communist
4. Establishment of a Council of the Confederation of Youth Union (or Konsomol of Ukraine);
Sovereign States to act as a coordinating body; 4. The non-signing/reversal of the Union Treaty;
5. Realization of Item 33 of the 1989 Protocol on approved 5. The resignation of Chairman of the USSR Council of
measures for regular adjustment of wages to the price Ministers.
index which applies to all citizens;
6. Realization of Item 10 of the 1989 Protocol, granting
pensions to all workers involved in underground work
(miners) (including foremen) who have 25 years of
underground work experience, regardless of their age;
7. Realization Item 20 of the 1989 Protocol, transferring
the former State Technical University building which will
house an arts center for local children;
8. Guaranteeing immunity to all participants of the
renewed strike.

Source: Doniy (1995) Kipiani (2011), Verkhovna Rada Ukrayiny (1990).

Author’s own translations.

Ideas: Frames, Grievances & Claims of the ‘Revolution on the Granite’

As presented in more detail elsewhere, when tracing the ideas of activism
(grievances and claims) in Ukraine, mobilizational frames have moved from a focus
on national liberation to broader human and civic rights frames (see Chapter 3 in
Onuch 2014). These ideas were reflected in the actions and activities (repertoires) that
contention embodies overtime. The ‘Revolution on the Granite’ found it-self at the
crossroads or perhaps in the crosshairs of all three claims. Claims were both
nationally focused (and some may argue nationalist) – articulating what could be

8
understood as pro-Ukrainian demands (the Ukrainization of Communist Party
property) – as well as internationalist in nature, popularizing universalist Human
Rights demand (abolishment of compulsory conscription). The students also made
claims seeking liberal political reforms (resignation of non-elected statesmen and a
new round of democratically contested elections) and the protection of individual
and civic rights (demand for direct elections and a popular referendum). Thus, there
was a tension between some of the demands. They were both national/pro-
Ukrainian/collective and liberal/civic/individualist in nature. This tension, between
what can described as competing ideological master frames, was continued
throughout the next three waves of protest-events in independent Ukraine (‘Ukraine
Without Kuchma,’ UBK 2000-2001; the ‘Orange Revolution,’ 2004; and the
‘EuroMaidan,’ 2013-2014). In speaking to participants of the 1990 events, it is clear
that this tension transcended ideas and also resulted in divisions between more
‘liberal’ leaders and their networks like Doniy and Kyrylenko and more ‘right’ wing
leaders their network like Ivashchyshyn (Proceedings of the 3R Sympsium, February
28, 2017, College of Europe, Natolin). A pattern that has plagued Ukrainian activists
for decades to come.

The ‘Revolution on the Granite’ was also the main trend-setter for determining the
central repertoires of contention used by Ukrainian activists to this day. Many
repertoires observed in Ukriane, such as the ‘tent city,’ the concert stage and the use
of humor and performance, are often explained as being imported from abroad by
Think Tanks, Non Governmental Organizations and Intergovernmental
Organizations (Aslund and McFaul 2006; Bunce and Wolchik 2011; Wilson 2005). Or
more recently are traced back to the ‘Orange Revolution’ or at best to the UBK
protest events. But this is incorrect. This cluster of political performances, to use
Tilly’s words (2003) was historically specific first to the ‘Revolution on the Granite,’
and was later mimicked and adopted by future generations of activists.

The ‘Revolution on the Granite’ was innovative and changed the parameters of the
repertoires of contention in Ukraine. Its activists were first to completely occupy and
settle in a public space, the Maidan Nezalezhnosty. This ‘move to the Maidan,’ was a
departure from previous protest-events which were typically held in front of
Shevchenko Monuments, the Verhovna Rada or local councils (Onuch 2014). The
‘tent city,’ also an innovation of 1990, was important as it made the protest a more
permanent, less transient and thus, a more visible force, which the State had to
reckon with. The symbolism of choosing the Maidan Nezalezhnosty for the ‘tent city,’
which up until October 1990 was one of the main sites associated with the October

9
Revolution of 1917, was not coincidental. It represented the reclaiming of the soviet
history and a challenge to soviet colonial rule in Ukraine. As participants of the
events explained, this was the first Maidan (of many) that would demand full
independence of a democratic Ukraine from colonial and foreign control
(Proceedings of the 3R Sympsium, February 28, 2017, College of Europe, Natolin).
Thus, the reclaiming and occupation of the Maidan as the center of contention in
Ukraine is a ‘Revolution on the Granite’ legacy.

Furthermore, the ‘image’ and ‘voice’ of the Ukrainian protester was also enshrined in
1990. This included the bandanas that youth activist adorned their heads with
(repeated again in 2001, 2004 and 2014) and the flags, banners and slogans they
displayed, demanding for dignity (hidnist’) and Ukrainian unity (‘skhid i zakhid
razom,’ ‘east and west together’). The choice of a stage surrounded by barricades as
the focal point of the protest-events, where protesters would gather to make speeches
read poems, sing traditional, as well as, popular songs, was also adapted and
mimicked by participants of future protest-events (2001, 2004, 2014). The stage itself,
became the embodiment of the battleground between the protesters and state (in
2001 and 2013 when militia attempted its removal by force, succeeding in 2001) and
between activists and politicians (in 2001, 2004, 2013-2014 when multiple stages were
set up and some activists were banned from the stage). The competition of who
controls the stage and is therefore more influential in framing the protest-event
according to their ideology and to their benefit, is also a legacy of the divisions
among the leaders of the ‘Revolution on the Granite’ and the networks they
represented.

Institutions: SMOs, New Coalitions and Social Networks Ties

Although there are only a few ‘moments’ of large protest, there are many networks
of activism and at least some are active simultaneously and almost continually. This
is evident in the different trans-generational but regionalized nature of ‘tusovky’
(cliques) of activism in Ukraine (Onuch 2014). Yet, while mobilization in SMOs and
the networks they form is ongoing, it fluctuates in size, scope and visibility over time.
And, in rare moments in time they come together, become denser, begin to overlap
or are better equipped at reaching out ordinary citizens and thus, through their
cooperative interaction create the opportunity for mass mobilization. The ‘Revolution
on the Granite’ was one such moment. The student activists were able to connect to
and receive direct or symbolic support of a variety of different organizations and
groups in society. This coalition building also helped lead to their success, as the

10
potential ability to mobilize other segments of society made them appear more
powerful vis a vis the Rada which was increasingly seen as lacking a popular
mandate.

In this respect the ‘Revolution on the Granite’ also sets the pace for future network
formation, coalitions and coordination. The ‘Revolution on the Granite’ represents
possibly the first such widespread coming together of SMOs and the networks they
form. The coalition included: a) student and youth organizations from across key
islands of contention in Ukraine (Lviv, Kyiv, Kharkiv and even Odesa), b) activists
with past experience and the organizations that they helped coordinate (Ruch and
Ukrainske Bratsvo [Ukrainian Brotherhood]), c) journalists and their unions, d)
political parties and political unions (including party youth wings), and e) some
labour unions, including the Donbas miners, who joined the students or showed
solidarity with them. The most successful mobilizations in 2004 and 2013-2014, where
based on such cross-cleavage coalitions (Beissinger 2013; Onuch and Sasse 2016). The
ability of the claims, popularized by the students on the Maidan, to resonate with,
connect and not ostracize a wider network of groups laid the blueprint for future
mobilizations in Ukraine.

Actors: The Role Personalities and Personal Relationships

Finally, we come to individual actors. Through process tracing it became clear that
most post-1990 activists had very similar trajectories of personal engagement in
activism (Onuch 2014). These individuals were the key transporters or carriers of
claims and mobilizational frames over–time. In this regard the ‘Revolution on the
Granite’ also was highly influential – as it connected the old guard dissidents with a
newly socialized generation of future activist leaders. The individual dissidents
such as Chornovil, interacted with Doniy or Kyrylenko among others and created
personal links between past contention and future repertoires. But crucially, the
young leaders of the protest, such as Oleksandr Doniy, Markiyan Ivashchyshyn,
Vyacheslav Kyrylenko, and Mykhailo Svystovych among others, would later go on
to become prominent journalists, politicians and leaders of the some of most
important SMOs connected to the 2001 UBK protests and the 2004 ‘Orange
Revolution.’ They would inspire, train and mentor new generations of SMO leaders
in both the 2004 and 2013-2014 mass mobilizations. Doniy set up the Last Barricade,
went into politics and was active in the UBK protests. Ivashchyshyn mentored
young activists who would go on to set up Yellow Pora in 2004. Kyrylenko, who also

11
became a politician and is at the time of writing this article the Deputy Prime
Minister, was involved in UBK and the ‘Orange Revolution.’ He helped coordinated
the ‘Maidan’ was involved in communications between politicians and activist
SMOs. Svystovych went on to create the website Maidan.org.ua an essential tool for
activist coordination and communication. The site also published the Kuchmagate
tapes and was involved in the coordination of the UBK and ‘Orange Revolution’
protests and is an important source for activist to this very day. Thus, as individuals,
these students became some of the most influential activists, journalists and
politicians in Ukraine in the two decades that followed – they acted as mentors but
were also able to transmit the learned experiences of the first Ukrainian Maidan. And
although their revolution is often one that is forgotten, it (and their role in it) was not
unlike the other ‘1989 Revolutions,’ it helped create a contemporary legacy of
activism in Ukraine.

Conclusions
To use Tilly’s language the ‘Revolution on the Granite’ was a innovative contentious
performance. Yet, even though it was organized and enacted by a ‘new’ generation
of activists it was in someway connected to past and heavily influence future
protest-events through mimesis, adaptation, and improvisation. The ‘Revolution on
the Granite’ created a new playbook of repertoires of contention in Ukraine, most
notably making the occupation of public space, specifically the Maidan a standard
Ukrainian protest tactic. The protest created new boundaries of the discourse of
contention in independent Ukraine, which is represented an on-going struggle
between national and liberal claims. The student activists’ demands resonated and
brought together a diverse network of actors across Ukrainian society – creating a
blueprint for the cross-class coalition needed for successfully bending the state to
give in. And finally, it created a new generation of political leaders. And while not
all continued their activism and some became politicians and journalists – their
personal relationships and their ability to mentor future generations of activists
proved vital during future mobilizations in 2002, 2004, and 2013-2014. The
‘Revolution on the Granite’ was comparable to the wave of protest events that took
place across eastern Europe between 1989-1991, but represents a critical juncture for
the trajectory of Ukrainian activism. Future research should more completely map
this revolutionary moment and help locate its place in Ukrainian history.

12
Works Cited

Adams, Tenley. 1992. “Charter 77 and the Workers’ Defense Committee (KOR): The
Struggle for Human Rights in Czechoslovakia and Poland.” East European
Quarterly 26(2): 219.

Aslund, Anders, and Michael McFaul. 2006. Revolution in Orange: The Origins of
Ukraine’s Democratic Breakthrough. Carnegie Endowment.

Beacháin, Donnacha Ó, and Abel Polese. 2010. The Colour Revolutions in the Former
Soviet Republics: Successes and Failures. Taylor & Francis.

Beissinger, Mark. 2007. “Structure and Example in Modular Political Phenomena:

The Diffusion of Bulldozer/Rose/Orange/Tulip Revolutions.” Perspectives on
Politics 5(02): 259–76.

———. 2011. “Mechanisms of Maidan: The Structure of Contingency in the Making

of the Orange Revolution.” Mobilization: An International Quarterly 16(1): 25–
43.

Beissinger, Mark R. 2013. “The Semblance of Democratic Revolution: Coalitions in

Ukraine’s Orange Revolution.” American Political Science Review 107(3): 574–
92.

Beissinger, Mark R., and Gwendolyn Sasse. 2013. “An End to ‘Patience’?.” Mass
Politics in Tough Times: Opinions, Votes and Protest in the Great Recession: 334.

Benford, Robert D., and David A. Snow. 2000. “Framing Processes and Social
Movements: An Overview and Assessment.” Annual review of sociology: 611–
39.

Bernhard, Michael. 1993. “Civil Society and Democratic Transition in East Central
Europe.” Political Science Quarterly 108(2): 307–26.

Bilocerkowycz, Jaroslaw. 1988. Soviet Ukrainian Dissent: A Study of Political Alienation.

Westview Press.

Bohdanova, Tetyana. 2014. “Unexpected Revolution: The Role of Social Media in

Ukraine’s Euromaidan Uprising.” European View 13(1): 133–42.

Bruszt, Laszlo, and George K. Horvath. 1990. “1989: The Negotiated Revolution in
Hungary.” Social Research: 365–87.

13
Bunce, Valerie J., and Sharon L. Wolchik. 2006. “International Diffusion and
Postcommunist Electoral Revolutions.” Communist and Post-Communist Studies
39(3): 283–304.

———. 2011. Defeating Authoritarian Leaders in Postcommunist Countries. Cambridge

University Press.

Casper, Gretchen, and Michelle M. Taylor. 1996. Negotiating Democracy: Transitions

from Authoritarian Rule. University of Pittsburgh Pre.

Chabot, Sean, and Jan Willem Duyvendak. 2002. “Globalization and Transnational
Diffusion between Social Movements: Reconceptualizing the Dissemination of
the Gandhian Repertoire and the ‘coming Out’ Routine.” Theory and Society
31(6): 697–740.

Della Porta, Donatella, and Sidney G. Tarrow. 2005. Transnational Protest and Global
Activism. Rowman & Littlefield.

Diuk, Nadia. 2013. “Youth as an Agent for Change: The next Generation in Ukraine.”
Demokratizatsiya 21(2): 179.

Doniy, Oleksandr. 1995. Studentska Revolyutsiya Na Hraniti. Kyiv: Smoloskyp and

Triumf.

Ekiert, Grzegorz, and Jan Kubik. 1998. “Contentious Politics in New Democracies:
East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia, 1989–93.” World Politics
50(04): 547–81.

———. 2001. Rebellious Civil Society: Popular Protest and Democratic Consolidation in
Poland, 1989-1993. University of Michigan Press.

Garton, Ash Timothy. 1987. “Polska Rewolucja. Solidarność 1980-1981.”

https://philpapers.org/rec/GARPRS (March 15, 2017).

Havel, Vaclav. 2009. The Power of the Powerless (Routledge Revivals): Citizens Against
the State in Central-Eastern Europe. Routledge.

Janoski, Thomas. 1998. Citizenship and Civil Society: A Framework of Rights and
Obligations in Liberal, Traditional, and Social Democratic Regimes. Cambridge
University Press.

Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group. 2004. “Ukrainskyi Visnyk.” Kharkiv

Human Rights Protection Group.
http://archive.khpg.org/en/index.php?id=1127288239 (June 17, 2010).

14
Kipiani, Vakhtang. 2011. “Povstalyy Donbas.” Tyzhden’.
http://tyzhden.ua/History/18427?PageIndex=2 (March 16, 2017).

Kovtunovych, Tetyana, and Tetyana Pryvalko. 2016. Maydan Vid Pershoyi Osoby.
Mystetstvo Na Barykadakh. Ukrayins”kyy instytut natsionalnoyi pamyati.

Kubik, Jan. 2010. Power of Symbols Against the Symbols of Power: The Rise of Solidarity
and the Fall of State Socialism in Poland. Penn State Press.

Kuzio, Taras. 2010. “Nationalism, Identity and Civil Society in Ukraine:

Understanding the Orange Revolution.” Communist and Post-Communist
Studies 43(3): 285–96.

Lane, David. 2008. “The Orange Revolution: ‘People’s Revolution’ or Revolutionary

Coup?.” The British Journal of Politics & International Relations 10(4): 525–49.

Lane, David, and Stephen White. 2010. Rethinking the “Coloured Revolutions.”
Routledge.

Lawson, George. 2004. “Negotiated Revolutions.”

http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/44387/1/Negotiated%20revolution(LSERO).pdf (March
15, 2017).

Lieven, Anatol. 1994. The Baltic Revolution: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Path to
Independence. Yale University Press.

Lokot, Tetyana. 2013. “As Ukraine’s Protests Escalate, #Euromaidan Hashtag Lost in
a Sea of Information.” Global Voices.
http://globalvoicesonline.org/2013/12/06/as-ukraines-protests-escalate-
euromaidan-hashtag-lost-in-sea-of-information/ (January 1, 2015).

Luers, William H. 1990. “Czechoslovakia: Road to Revolution.” Foreign Affairs 69(2):

77–98.

Marples, David R. 1991. Ukraine under Perestroika: Ecology, Economics and the Workers’
Revolt. Springer.

McAdam, Doug, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly. 2001. Dynamics of Contention.
Cambridge University Press.

Meirowitz, Adam, and Joshua A. Tucker. 2013. “People Power or a One-Shot Deal?
A Dynamic Model of Protest.” American Journal of Political Science 57(2): 478–
90.

Metzger, Megan, Jonathan Nagler, and Joshua A. Tucker. 2015. “Tweeting Identity?
Ukrainian, Russian, And# Euromaidan.” Journal of Comparative Economics.

15
 http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0147596715001237 (January
7, 2016).

Moloda Prosvita. 2008. “MolodaProsvita.” www.molodaprosvita.org.ua (June 17,

2010).

Morris, Aldon D. 1986. Origins of the Civil Rights Movements. Simon and Schuster.

Mycio, Mary. 1990. “Ukrainian SSR Government Bows to Students’ Demands Maso
Macr Agrees to Resign.” The Ukrainian Weekly.
http://ukrweekly.com/archive/1990/The_Ukrainian_Weekly_1990-42.pdf
(March 16, 2017).

Nahaylo, Bohdan. 1990. “Human-Chain Demonstration in Ukraine: A Triumph for

‘Rukh’’.” Report on the USSR 2(5): 17–17.

Nikolayenko, Olena. 2007. “The Revolt of the Post-Soviet Generation: Youth

Movements in Serbia, Georgia, and Ukraine.” Comparative Politics 39(2): 169–
88.

Noakes, John A., and Hank Johnston. 2005. “Frames of Protest: A Road Map to a
Perspective.” Frames of protest: Social movements and the framing perspective: 1–
29.

O’donnell, Guillermo et al. 2013. Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative

Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies. JHU Press.

Onuch, Olga. 2014. Mapping Mass Mobilizations: Understanding Revolutionary Moments

in Ukraine and Argentina. London: Palgrave MacMillan.

———. 2015. “Maidans Past and Present: Comparing the Orange Revolution and the
EuroMaidan.” Euromaidan.

Onuch, Olga, and Gwendolyn Sasse. 2016. “Maidan in Movement: Protest Cycles,
Diversity of Actors, and Violence.” Europe-Asia Studies.

Osa, Maryjane. 2003. Solidarity and Contention: Networks of Polish Oppositions.

University of MINNESOTA Press.

Popova, Maria. 2014. “Why the Orange Revolution Was Short and Peaceful and
Euromaidan Long and Violent.” Problems of Post-communism 61(6): 64–70.

Prosvita. 2007. “Istoriya Prosvity.”

http://prosvitjanyn.org.ua/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=12
&Itemid=31 (March 16, 2017).

16
Rubchak, Marian J. 2015. New Imaginaries: Youthful Reinvention of Ukraine’s Cultural
Paradigm. Berghahn Books.

“Rukh About Us.” 2008. Rukh. http://www.nru.org.ua/about/.

Satzewich, V. 2003. The Ukrainian Diaspora. New York: Routledge.

Shepherd, Robin HE. 2000. Czechoslovakia: The Velvet Revolution and beyond. Springer.
http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1057/9780230288638.pdf (March 15,
2017).

Siani-Davies, Peter. 2007. The Romanian Revolution of December 1989. Cornell

University Press.

Siegelbaum, Lewis Henry, and Daniel J. Walkowitz. 1995. Workers of the Donbass
Speak: Survival and Identity in the New Ukraine, 1989-1992. SUNY Press.

Sokhanyk, Roman. 1986. “Ukrainian Writers’ Congress Opens with Defense of

Native Language.” The Ukrainian Weekly No.27.
http://ukrweekly.com/archive/1986/The_Ukrainian_Weekly_1986-27.pdf
(March 16, 2017).

Tarrow, Sidney. 2005. The New Transnational Activism. Cambridge University Press.

Tarrow, Sidney G. 2011. Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics.
Cambridge University Press.

The Ukrainian Weekly. 1990a. “100,000 in Kiev March to Protest Union Treaty.” The
Ukrainian Weekly: 2.

———. 1990b. “Human Chain Links Multitudes across Ukraine.” The Ukrainian
Weekly. http://ukrweekly.com/archive/1990/The_Ukrainian_Weekly_1990-
04.pdf (March 16, 2017).

Tilly, Charles. 1977. “Repertoires of Contention in America and Britian, 1750-1830.”

http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/handle/2027.42/50926 (September 16, 2014).

———. 1978. From Mobilisation to Revolution. Boston: Longman Higher Education.

———. 1993a. “Social Movements as Historically Specific Clusters of Political

Performances.” Berkeley Journal of Sociology 38: 1–30.

———. 1993b. “Social Movements as Historically Specific Clusters of Political

Performances.” Berkeley Journal of Sociology 38: 1–30.

17
———. 1995. European Revolutions, 1492-1992. Chicago, Illinois: Blackwell Publishing
Limited.

———. 2006. Regimes and Repertoires. University of Chicago Press.

Traugott, Mark. 1995. “Barricades as Repertoire: Continuities and Discontinuities in

the History of French Contention.” Repertoires and cycles of collective action: 43–
56.

Tucker, Joshua A. 2007. “Enough! Electoral Fraud, Collective Action Problems, and
Post-Communist Colored Revolutions.” Perspectives on Politics 5(03): 535–51.

Tucker, Joshua, Megan Metzger, and Pablo Barberá. 2014. SMaPP Lab Data Report:
Ukraine Protests 2013-2014. New York, NY, USA: Social Media and Political
Participation Lab, New York University.
http://smapp.nyu.edu/reports/Ukraine_Data_Report.pdf.

United Press International. 1989. “Thousands of Striking Ukrainian Miners Rejected

Official Concessions Saturday...” United Press International.
http://www.upi.com/Archives/1989/07/22/Thousands-of-striking-Ukrainian-
miners-rejected-official-concessions-Saturday/1385617083200/ (March 16,
2017).

Verkhovna Rada Ukrayiny. 1990. “Postanova Verkhovnoyi Rady Ukrayinskoyi RSR

Pro Rozhlyad Vymoh Studentiv, Yaki Provodyat Holoduvannya V M. Kyyevi
Z 2 Zhovtnya 1990 Roku № 402-XII.”
http://zakon1.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/402-12 (March 16, 2017).

Way, Lucan. 2008. “The Real Causes of the Color Revolutions.” Journal of Democracy
19(3): 55–69.

Wilson, Andrew. 2005. Ukraine’s Orange Revolution. Yale University Press.

———. 2006. “Ukraine’s Orange Revolution, NGOs and the Role of the West∗.”
Cambridge Review of International Affairs 19(1): 21–32.

18