To : RIL

From : AFP
Re : Research on Inordinate Delay of Cases
Date : 09 January 2018

Inordinate Delay of Cases violates three Constitutional rights of persons: the right to a have a
speedy trial, the right to a speedy disposition of cases, and the right to due process.

THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION

Article III

Bill of Rights

Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law,
nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

Section 14. (1) xx xx

(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, xx
xx

xx xx xx xx

Section 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial,
quasi-judicial or administrative bodies.1

Jacob v. Sandiganbayan2 defines the right to have a speedy trial as “free from vexatious, capricious
and oppressive delays, its salutary objective being to assure that an innocent person may be free from the
anxiety and expense of a court litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt determined within the
shortest possible time compatible with the presentation and consideration of whatsoever legitimate
defense he may interpose.3” This right is also enunciated in adjective law. “In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall be entitled to the following rights: xx xx to have a speedy, impartial, and
public trial.4” This is why after arraignment, the right to Continuous trial until terminated 5 is protected.
Note, however, that the right covers the trial itself, which means after a plea is made at the arraignment.

On the other hand, the right to a speedy disposition of cases is broader, and includes within its
contemplation the periods before, during, and after trial.6 People v. Sandiganbayan says that the right is

1 Emphasis and Underscoring, supplied

2 G.R. No. 162206, November 17, 2010
3 Underscoring, supplied
4 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 115 §1 (h)
5 Rule 119 §2
6 Dansal v. Judge Fernandez, G.R. No. 126814, March 2, 2000, citing Bernas, THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION: A

COMMENTARY 489.
deemed violated (i. ) when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays;
or (ii.) when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured; (iii.) or when without
cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case
tried.7 In the more recent case of People v. Sandiganbayan and Lt. Col. Leopoldo S. Acot, et al.,8 where motions
to quash filed by private respondents premised on the ground of inordinate delay in the conduct of the
preliminary investigation amounted to a violation of their constitutional rights to due process of law and
to a speedy disposition of the cases, the Supreme Court said,

The concept of speedy disposition is relative or flexible. A mere mathematical reckoning of the
time involved is not sufficient. Particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances
peculiar to each case. Hence, the doctrinal rule is that in the determination of whether that right
has been violated, the factors that may be considered and balanced are as follows: (1) the length
of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the
accused; and (4) the prejudice caused by the delay.

The Acot factors are referred to as the Balancing of Interests Test. While both the Sandiganbayan
and the Acot tests are equally applicable9 to determine the if the right has been violated, the more recently
used one is Balancing of Interests,10 where conduct of both the prosecution and defendant are weighed.11
Concurrently, these factors are the same ones considered in determining if there is inordinate delay. It is
important to point out that none of the Balancing Test factors have are a necessary or sufficient condition,
for they are related and must be considered together with relevant circumstances. These factors have no
talismanic qualities as courts must still engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process.12

This last point was elucidated in the recent case of Remulla v. Rivera, where the factor in the
Balancing Test, “(3) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused” was the point of
contention. The petitioner, Remulla, was insisting that the Sandiganbayan erred in finding that there was
inordinate delay because the private respondent did not invoke his right to speedy disposition of cases.
Remulla enumerated a series of cases invoking the right of inordinate delay, which was not asserted until
later, and claimed that they were dismissed for that reason. This was his basis for saying that assertion of
the right is sine qua non to a successful plea of inordinate delay. Likewise, the private respondent also
enumerated a similar series of cases, which conversely were successful, notwithstanding no right to
speedy disposition was invoked, and argued that assertion is not sine qua non. The Supreme Court said
that the two sets of cases are not inconsistent, and explained the other factors in the Balancing Test that
were applied, in order to come up with the respective dismissals and grants of the two sets of petitions.

The first set of cases shows that the criminal cases were not dismissed because of the
non-assertion of the accused of their right to a speedy disposition of cases or speedy trial. Other
factors in the balancing test were also considered by the Court, particularly, the reason for the
delay in the proceedings and the prejudice caused by the delay.

7 People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 188165, December 11, 2013

8 G.R. No. 199151-56, July 25, 2016
9 Lumanlaw y Bulinao v. Peralta, Jr., 217 Phil. 588 (2006)
10 See Remulla v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 218040, April 17, 2017
11 Lumanlaw y Bulinao v. Peralta, Jr., supra
12 Remulla v. Sandiganbayan, supra, citing Sps. Uy v. Adriao, 536 Phil. (2006)
 xx xx Hence, as the length of delay in these cases were properly justified by
the prosecution and the accused failed to accelerate their cases, the Court found that there was
no prejudice caused, which would warrant the assertion of their right to a speedy disposition of
cases.

In the second set of cases, the lengthy delay in the proceeding against the accused therein
was not satisfactorily explained. xx xx

Essentially, the Court found in those cases that the State miserably failed to give an
acceptable reason for the extensive delay. Due to the manifest prejudice caused to the accused
therein, the Court no longer gave weighty consideration to their lack of objection during the
period of delay. xx xx

xx xx xx xx

xx xx To reiterate, none of the factors in the balancing test is either a

necessary of sufficient condition; they are related and must be considered together with other
relevant circumstances.

In addition to factor two, “the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused” the
foregoing block quote provides guidance as to what the determination of the Test’s factor three: “reasons
for the delay” consists of. Quite plainly, moreover, reasons for the delay are also important to consider.
Examples in the cases there explained, of valid reasons for delay by the government is retaking of
testimony due to lost TSN and procedure such as NBI inquiry not being part of preliminary investigation.
As regards to sustaining the State’s right despite the alleged inordinate delays, while not mandatory,
Williams v. U.S.13 is useful, as discussed in Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan:14 (i. ) the accused suffered no serious
prejudice beyond that which ensued from the ordinary and inevitable delay; and (ii.) there was no more
delay than is reasonably attributable to the ordinary processes of justice. Conversely, it would be helpful
to the accused to ensure that the invocation of inordinate delay shows that these two circumstances are
not applicable to the reasons of delay.

Moving on to the two other factors of the Balancing of Interests Test, jurisprudence likewise
explains what consists of “(1) the length of delay” and “(4) the prejudice caused by the delay.”

As discussed, mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved is not sufficient, and particular
regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. That is why there is no definite
length of time as to what consists the length of the delay. It was held15 that inordinate delay should be
computed from the time of fact-finding investigation until the completion of the preliminary investigation
by the Ombudsman, because the guarantee would be rendered inutile if hair-splitting distinction by the
State is accepted. This is the prevailing rule.

13 250 F.2d. 19 (1957)

14 Infra
15 People v. Sandiganbayan, 723 Phil. 444 (2013)
 The landmark case of Tatad v. Sandiganbayan16 held three years before the termination of a
preliminary investigation is inordinate delay, which violates the constitutional right to due process. This
is good law, and is by far the shortest period over which inordinate delay was measured. In Anchangco v.
Ombudsman,17 the Supreme Court held that failure of the Ombudsman to resolve the criminal charges
against the petitioner Angchangco for more than six years, has transgressed on Angchangco’s
constitutional right to due process and to a speedy disposition of the cases against him. Duterte v.
Sandiganbayan18 held the same number of years as Angchangco of three years: “Substantial adherence to the
requirements of the law governing the conduct of preliminary investigation, including substantial
compliance with the time limitation prescribed by the law for the resolution of the case by the prosecutor,
is part of the procedural due process constitutionally guaranteed by the fundamental law.”

More recently, Remulla v. Rivera applied the rule to compute inordinate delay from the time of
fact-finding until the completion of the preliminary investigation in 2008, which took three years.
Thereafter, it took six years for the information to be filed in 2014. The Supreme Court upheld the
finding of the Sandiganbayan that nine years’ time is more than sufficient for inordinate delay.

Finally, with regard to “(4) the prejudice caused by the delay”, Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan19 says

Prejudice should be assessed in the light of the interest of the defendant that the speedy
trial was designed to protect, namely: to prevent oppressive pre-trial incarceration; to minimize
anxiety and concerns of the accused to trial; and to limit the possibility that his defense will be
impaired. Of these, the most serious is the last, because the inability of a defendant adequately
to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system. There is also prejudice if the defense
witnesses are unable to recall accurately the events of the distant past. Even if the accused is not
imprisoned prior to trial, he is still disadvantaged by restraints on his liberty and by living under
a cloud of anxiety, suspicion and often, hostility. His financial resources may be drained, his
association is curtailed, and he is subjected to public obloquy.

It is remarked that Corpuz already is in trial; however, the elucidation provided applies because the
Balancing of Interests Test, as mentioned, applies to the right to speedy trial, as well as the right to
disposition of cases.

Furthermore, Corpuz reveals that prejudice may be experienced by the State as well. There, the
Supreme Court found that the outright dismissal by the Sandiganbayan of the cases was unwarranted
because “In resolving the motions for reconsideration of the petitioners and the other accused, [the
Sandiganbayan] should have required the Ombudsman/Special Prosecutor, under pain of contempt, to
explain and justify the inordinate delay in the submission of the report on the reinvestigation.” It did not,
and “was content to issue mere orders denying the motions for reconsideration of the petitioners and the
other accused.” The Supreme Court found that the State was also prejudiced by the inordinate delay, not
just the accused. END

16 G.R. Nos. 72335-39, March 21, 1988

17 G.R. No. 122728, February 13, 1997
18 G.R. No. 130191. April 27, 1998
19 484 Phil. 899 (2004)