B U L L E T I N OF T H E I N S T I T U T E OF

HISTORICAL RESEARCH
Vol. XLIV No. 1x0 November 1971

The Departure of Tatikios from the Crusader Army

T H Edeparture of Tatikios, the imperial representative on the Crusade,

from the Latin camp in early February 1098 is an event which has received
curiously little attention from historians. The actual circumstances of the
departure have not been fully explored, but more important, perhaps,
Tatikios’s role in Byzantine-crusader relations remains obscure.
Few of the sources for the First Crusade cast much light on the role of
Tatikios. Only one Greek source, the Alexiad of the Princess Anna Com-
nena,l illuminates this episode. Amongst the Latin sources, the account of
the anonymous Gesta Francorurn2 has been given undue prominence,
owing to the fact that many later western historians of the Crusade used the
work. Most of the Latin writers on the First Crusade were in any case
hostile to the Byzantines, and therefore quite prepared to accept the Anony-
mous’s account and his hostile characterizationof the imperial representative.
Thus Albert of Aix remarks that Tatikios was ever ready to flee from the
army: ‘semper fugae intentus ’.3 The numerous plagiarists of the Gesta add
nothing, merely repeating the Anonymous’s account, often at tiresome
length.4 The account of Raymond of Aguilerss is hardly less hostile than
that of the Anonymous, but it gives a much fuller picture of the circumstan-
ces prevailing in the crusader camp at the time of Tatikios’s departure, and
casts light on other aspects of his role on the Crusade.
It would perhaps be helpful to summarize the accounts of Tatikios’s
departure given by the three sources for the First Crusade which deal with
the matter in any detail.
The Gesta6 is generally hostile to the Byzantines. Tatikios is described
simply as ‘inimicus Tetigus’.7 T h e Anonymous records that in early
‘The Alexiad of the Princess Anna Comnena, ed. and trans. E. A. S. Dawes (1967),
cited hereafter as AC.
*There have been many editions of the Gesta. Here reference will be made
normally to the latest edition, Gesta Francorum et aliorum Hierosolirnitanorurn,
ed. Rosalind Hill ( I 962), cited as GF. :other editions will be cited more fully.
3Albert of Aix, Historia Hierosolymitana (Recueil des Historiens des Croisades,
Historiens Occidentaux, iv), p. 366.
4See for example Baldric, bishop of Dol, Historia Jerosolimitana (Recueil des
Historiens des Croisades, Historiens Occidentaux, iv), pp. 44-5.
5 Raymond of Aguilers, Historia Francorum qui cepmunt Iherusalem (Recueil des
Historiens des Croisades, Historiens Occidentaux, iii), pp. 245-6, cited as RA.
6GF*,PP. 34-5- 7 Ibid., p. 34.

0 University of London and contributors

10
138 D E P A R T U R E O F T A T I K I O SF R O M C R U S A D E R A R M Y
February 1098 the army became aware of the approach of a hostile force led
by Ridwan of Aleppo. On hearing the news Tatikios admitted his fear for
the future of the army and decided to leave the camp. Publicly he told the
other leaders that he intended to return to the Empire and have food and
supplies sent to the army by sea and by land. This, he said, he would see to
himself; and he left behind his staff as a pledge of his intention to return.
In view of the desperate supply situation in the crusader camp, so
vividly portrayed by the Anonymous1 himself, this seems an acceptable
excuse.
Raymond of Aguilers’s account is more complex and more problematic.
According to him, at the very beginning of the siege in early November 1097
there was a division amongst the leaders of the Crusade about the strategy
to be followed in besieging Antioch. At a conference of the leaders, the
count of Toulouse, Raymond of St. Gilles, pressed for a close siege of the
city, while others suggested a more distant blockade.* The outcome of the
discussion was that a close siege was undertaken. Then in late January or
early February the idea of a blockade was revived by Tatikios, who ‘quotidie
auribus principum instillabat ut discederent ad castra finitima, atque inde
frequenti assultatione et insidiis Antiochitas propulsarent ’.3 The idea had
the merit of offering a possible solution to the problem of supply which was
getting acute in the crusader camp. To counter it, Raymond of St. Gilles
offered to pay for horses lost in the protection of foraging expeditions.
Raymond of Aguilers leaves no doubt at all that the count’s offer, which does
seem to have improved matters, was made in direct opposition to Tatikios’s
suggestions, Subsequently, Raymond tells us, Tatikios circulated a rumour
to the effect that an imperial army was at hand, but that its members, after
their clashes with the Crusaders crossing the Balkans, were unwilling to
approach.4 On the pretext of overcoming this reluctance, Tatikios left the
army, leaving behind his staff. Raymond states, however, that before
Tatikios left, he granted to Bohemond the cities of Cilicia, Tarsus, Mamistra
and Adana.5 Other points mentioned by Raymond should be borne in
mind. According to him, in January 1098 Bohemond, pleading poverty,
threatened to leave the army.6 Subsequently, at about the time that Tatikios
revived the dispute over strategy, a meeting of the princes was held at which
it was agreed that Bohemond should be given the city of Antioch on its
capture, the count of Toulouse alone dissenting, and all swore an oath not
to leave the siege for seven years.’ It was shortly after this that Tatikios left
the army. One small point should be noted-Raymond used the Gestu in
writing his account of the Crusade, and almost certainlyused it in this
passage. 8
Anna Comnena’a account of the First Crusade is in many respects con-
fused. She believed that the events connected with the departure of Tatikios
‘GF.,PP. 33-4. ZRA., p. 241. 31bid.,p. 245.
41bid., p. 246. 5 IM. 6Ibid., p. 245.
’Ibid., p. 246.
8Anonymi Gestu Francorurn, ed. H. Hagenmeyer (Heidelberg, 1890). p. 51.
 DEPARTURE OF TATIKIOS FROM CRUSADER A R M Y 139
took place in the shadow of the coming of Kerbogah’s army,l at a time when
Bohemond had already reached agreement with the traitorous Armenian
officer who eventually surrendered the city to him.2 This predisposes one to
doubt her account, but Miss Buckler believes that Tatikios himself may well
have been Anna’s informant,3 and many historians have assumed that she
had access to the imperial archives. In view of this it is not impossible that
Anna was quite well informed about the doings of the Byzantine representa-
tive. In her version Bohemond, wanting Antioch, told Tatikios that the
other princes were plotting against him. They believed, Bohemond said,
that Alexius had instigated the impending hostile attack.4 Tatikios, con-
sidering the famine in the army, and the desperate military situation which
made the siege seem a hopeless task, departed to Cyprus.
Clearly these accounts are not in total agreement but from them one basic
point emerges. Tatikios left the army because he considered the position of
the Crusaders, threatened with famine and hostile attack, to be untenable.
Miss Buckler remarks, ‘We feel that even Anna does not think her father’s
man played le beau rdle here’.5 It should be noted, however, that Alexius
did not disapprove of Tatikios’s actions. Tatikios remained in the imperial
favour.6 I t would appear that Alexius accepted Tatikios’s appreciation of
the situation which had led him to leave the crusader camp.
But a large number of problems remain. What was the manner of Tati-
kios’s departure ? What public excuses did he make ? What of Raymond of
Aguilers’s assertion that Tatikios conferred the cities of Cilicia upon
Bohemond before he left ? In investigating these problems it is necessary to
clarify the situation in the crusader camp in early 1098,and to investigate the
role of Tatikios on the Crusade.
It may be profitable to consider the Crusade as it developed, from the
point of view of the imperial representative. According to Anna Comnena
Tatikios was given a twofold charge when he was appointed. He was given
troops to lead, and with these he was supposed to help the Crusaders.7 Anna
later speaks of the Roman and Frankish armies,* but she is reticent about the
actual numbers of the Byzantine forces sent on the Crusade. She hints that
Tatikios’s force was not very large when she says that its purpose was ‘to
assist them [the Crusaders] on every occasion and to avert danger’.!)
Runciman has suggested that the imperial forces merely provided guides.10
I t may be surmised that Tatikios’s force was small, and that therefore his
purpose was not primarily military but political: in the words of Anna ‘to
1 Which had not yet been formed, and did not arrive at Antioch till 6 June 1098:
H. Hagenmeyer, Chrmologie de lupremih-e uoisade (Paris, 1902),p. 156 (272).
2AC., pp. 277-9.
3G. Buckler, Anna Comnena (1929),p. 23 I and n. 8.
4According to Anna this attack was led by Curpagan (AC., p. 278). This clearly
is an error : the attack was led by Ridwan of Aleppo.
5 Buckler, p. 470, n. I . 6Ibid., p. 147 and n. 7.
7AC., p. 276. Slbid., p. 277. glbid., p. 276.
10s. Runciman, ‘The first crusade: Constantinopleto Antioch’, in A History of
thecrusades, ed. K. M. Setton, vol. i, ed. M. W. Baldwin (Philadelphia, I955), p. 292.
140 DEPARTURE O F TATIKIOS FROM CRUSADER ARMY
take over the towns from them if God allowed them to take any ’.I His job
was to assert imperial rights and to see that the Latin princes adhered to
their promise to be the emperor’s men and to return to him all the lands
recently lost to the Turks.2 The Crusaders did capture several cities after
they had left Nicaea, and handed them over to the emperor. Thus the Gesta
records that one city, probably Plastencia, was handed over to the imperial
mercenary, the renegade Norman Peter d’Aups, who promised to hold it
‘in fidelitate Dei et Sancti Sepulchri, et seniorum atque imperatoris ’.3 The
need to detach forces to act as garrisons, the natural wastage of war, famine,
disease and desertion, all must have sadly depleted Tatikios’s small force, so
that by February 1098he could have had few troops left besides his staff.
This placed him in a weak position to influence the course of the Crusade.
All things being equal, however, his mere presence as imperial agent might
have been enough to deter anti-Byzantine action.
Why was such a small force sent with Tatikios ? There are several possible
reasons. Alexius was contemplating an offensive in early 1098to follow up
any success the Crusaders might gain, so he may have been unwilling to
spare the troops. Perhaps Tatikios was merely given a watching brief until
such time as Alexius himself could join the Crusade with a powerful
military force. Anna says that Alexius was moving towards Antioch
intending to help the Crusaders, when he met a number of Latin deserters
at Philomelium in early June 1098.Their reports of the hopeless position
of the crusader forces, and rumours of the approach of another Muslim
force led him to abandon the effort.4 It would, however, be unwise to accept
this account at face value, Anna wrote long after the Crusade, and she was
above all eager to justify her father’s actions.’ In the sections dealing with
the Crusade she is particularly concerned to counter the charge that her
father had broken his promise to aid the Latins by abandoning them at
Antioch.6 This may well have led her to give a biased account of events at
Philomelium. I n any case Philomelium is a long way from Antioch.
Whether or not Alexius intended to join the Crusaders, a large army need
not have been essential for Tatikios to gain his end. He held a strong
position. As imperial representative, he could command the respect of the
Latin leaders and was in a position to remind them of their obligations.
Moreover his presence was a reassurance of imperial aid, and he could offer
(as he did, according to the Gesta) to get supplies sent to the army. He had,
in fact, a favourable bargaining position in the crusader army, and all the
evidence indicates that he was deeply in the emperor’s confidence. The son
of a Saracen captive, Tatikios had risen by hard work in the service of Alexius.
‘AC., p. 276.
*For a full discussion of the oaths of the crusader princes see S. Runciman,
History of the Cmudes ( 3 vols., Cambridge, 195 I-4), i. 142et seqq. For the special
oath taken by Raymond of Toulouse, see J. H. and L. Hill, ‘The Convention of
Alexius Comnenus and Raymond of Saint Gilles’, American Hist. Rev.,lviii ( I 952-3),
322-7.
3 GF., pp. 25-6 and p. 2 5 , nn. 5 and 6. 4AC., pp. 282-4.
SBuckler, p. 232. hlbid., p. 360; AC., p. 103.
 DEPARTURE OF TATIKIOS FROM CRUSADER ARMY 141
As early as 1081,at the time of Robert Guiscard’s attack on the Empire, he
had been Primiceriusl and had saved the emperor’s life in the conspiracy of
Diogenes Nicephorous in 1093.2 At the time of the First Crusade he was
Grand Primicerius. H e was high in the service of the emperor, and his
appointment was highly appropriate since he had had considerable experi-
ence in dealing with Franks. He had commanded Frankish mercenaries in
the campaigns against Nicaea in 10853 and the Patzinacks in 1086 and
1087.4 Such an experienced and loyal man must have been in the confidence
of Alexius, and the emperor could reasonably hope to use him to divide the
Franks by diplomacy, thus securing his aim, the return of all former
Byzantine territories.
The general lines of diplomacy to be followed must have been made clear
to Tatikios by Alexius. Anna recounts that during his discussions with the
emperor at Constantinople, Bohemond demanded that the emperor make
him Grand Domestic of the East.5 Now the hero of the AZexiad is un-
doubtedly Alexius himself, but the villain, at least in Books X-XIV, is
Bohemond. Anna wrote her work in the light of Bohemond’s seizure of
Antioch and his long struggle with Alexius. This might lead one to be
sceptical of her account of the interview at Constantinople, but for three
points: the account is very circumstantial; there is no inherent reason why
Bohemond should not have offered to enter the imperial service; and some
substantiation is furnished by the Gesta Francorum.
Historians have tended to take a very black and white view of the interview.
I t is assumed that Bohemond was prevaricating. Yet there might be great
advantage for him in entering imperial service. Anna says that he ‘was not
descended from illustrious ancestors, nor had a great supply of money, and
for this reason not even many troops, but only a very limited number of
Frankish retainers ’.6 This was probably true. Bohemond had not done well
out of the division of lands following the death of his father Robert Guiscard;
his relative poverty may well have been the decisive factor in his resolution
to go on Crusade. Moreover the Hautevilles knew a great deal about the
Byzantine empire. They had fought against Byzantium for a long time, and
many of their number had served as imperial mercenaries; according to the
Gesta, Guy, Bohemond’s half-brother, was at this time an imperial mer-
cenary.7 No one on the Crusade was in a better position to know the strengths
and weaknesses of the Empire than Bohemond, or to estimate the advantages
of entering the imperial service. But the decisive reason for accepting Anna’s
account is that it is supported, after a fashion, by the Gesta. According to
the Anonymous, Alexius promised Bohemond, in return for an oath of
allegiance, land ‘quindecim dies eundi terrae in extensione ab Antiochia
retro daret, et octo in latitudine’.* Now this was roughly equivalent to the
former duchy of Antioch, which had fallen to the Turks as late as 1085.
It has been suggested that this passage in the Gesta reporting a promise
*AC., p. 103. 2 Ibid., p. 223. 3Ibid., p. 156.
4Ibid., pp. 165-7,182. SIbid., p. 267. 6Ibid., p. 266.
TGF.,p. 63. albid., p. 12.
142 D E P A R T U R E OF TATIKIOS FROM CRUSADER ARMY
of land to Bohemond is an insertion put in at a later date to justify Bohemond’s
seizure of Antioch.1 The case for this being so must remain non-proven, for
the manuscript tradition of the Gesta gives it no support. But even if the
passage is accepted as an interpolation, it still provides some corroboration
for Anna’s account. Runciman, accepting Anna’s story, remarks that
Alexius was embarrassed by Bohemond’s demand, and, wishing to retain the
Norman’s goodwill, returned a temporizing answer.2 According to Anna,
Alexius replied ‘The time for that has not come yet; but by your energy and
reputation and above all by your fidelity it will come ere long’.3 The
trouble with noncommittal answers is that they are open to different
interpretations and it is entirely possible that it was Bohemond’s interpre-
tation of this statement which formed the basis for this passage in the Gestu,
whether it be a later interpolation or not.
Even allowing for Anna’s hostility to Bohemond, there is good reason for
accepting her account of the interview at Constantinople, and therefore for
assuming that Alexius and Tatikios knew that Bohemond was the man to
watch. This is not to say that Alexius was simply hostile, nor that Bohemond
was entirely insincere in his offer to enter imperial service. From the point
of view of Alexius, Tatikios could keep an eye on Bohemond, and perhaps
use him if circumstances were favourable.
By early February 1098events were turning sharply against the Byzan-
tines, and, indeed, against the Crusade itself. The siege of Antioch had
dragged on since November 1097without notable success. The Turks had
managed to fight off a11 the crusader efforts to seize the city and had inflicted
heavy casualties. Further, since Christmas 1097the army had been weakened
by famine and the foraging expedition led by Bohemond and the count of
Flanders, although it had fought off Duqaq of Damascus, had not produced
any provisions. T h e price of food rose to alarming heights4 and men became
discouraged. Large-scale desertions struck the crusader army, and Peter
the Hermit and Walter the Carpenter, the former leaders of the People’s
Crusade, were only the most eminent of those who fled.5 But if the crusader
cause seemed to be suffering, there was, from the point of view of Tatikios,
an even more sinister development. Bohemond had distinguished himself
greatly. He had played a leading role at the battle of Dorylaeum. His
troops were besieging a fair section of Antioch and he had gained fame in an
expedition against the Turkish fortress of Harenc near Antioch in mid
November 1097.6 Moreover the expedition of Christmas 1097seems to
have been his suggestion,’ and he was undoubtedly the architect of the
victory over Duqaq of Damascus on 30 December 1097. Even Raymond of
Aguilers was forced to admit that Bohemond was a great asset to the army.8
At this stage there occurred one of the most puzzling events of the Crusade.
1A. C. Krey, ‘A neglected passage in the Gesta’, in The Crusades and o t k Histmi-
cul Essuyspresented to D. C . Munro, ed. L. J. Paetow (New York, 1928)’ pp. 57-78.
ZRunciman, ‘The first crusade: Constantinople to Antioch’, p. 286.
3AC., p. 267. 4GF., p. 33. 5 Ibid., pp. 33-4.
SIbid., p. 29. ’Bid., p. 30. BRA.,p. 245.
 DEPARTURE OF TATIKIOS FROM CRUSADER A R M Y 143
According to Raymond of Aguilers, shortly after the return of the foraging
expedition Bohemond threatened to leave the army, pleading his poverty
and the sufferings of his men.1 The chaplain comments that what Bohemond
was after was a promise of the city of Antioch, but this must be regarded as
hindsight. Then, again according to the same chronicler, at about the time
of the dispute between Tatikios and St. Gilles over strategy, all the princes
met together in council. All, with the exception of St. Gilles, promised the
city, when it should fall, to Rohemond, and then swore an oath not to desert
the siege even if it should last for seven yeam2 No other chronicler mentions
either the promise of the city or the oath to keep up the siege. I t has been
considered that Raymond has here confused his chronology, and that this
statement refers to the promise of the princes to give Antioch to Bohemond,
made shortly before the fall of the city.3 Raymond makes no mention of
this later promise, which is known from the Gestu,4and the evidence suggests
that his account must be accepted. Considering the situation in the camp in
early February 1098 it is understandable why a meeting of the princes might
be called. There was famine in the army and morale was low. There was also
a major squabble over strategy going on between St. Gilles and Tatikios. In
these circumstances, when the people must have been deeply suspicious of
their leaders in view of the growing desertions, an oath to remain at the siege,
comparable to that taken in a similarly desperate situation during the second
siege of Antioch,s was an appropriate gesture to restore morale. Clearly,
however, if Bohemond had already threatened to leave the siege, some
concession had to be made to him. I t seems, on balance, as if the meeting
of early February did happen as Raymond described it. The events are
totally different from any that took place at any other time. T h e oath to
maintain the siege and the promise to Bohemond should be seen against the
context of sufferings and division in the crusader army.
It would be a mistake to concentrate solely on the relations between
Bohemond and Tatikios. There was another powerful element in the
situation-the count of Toulouse. According to Anna Comnena, Alexius
took an immediate liking to him and ‘explained to him more clearly what he
suspected would happen to the Latins on their journey, and he also laid bare
to him the suspicions he had of the Franks’ intention’.6 He specifically
warned him against the intrigues of Bohemond, and the count replied
‘ Bohemond has acquired perjury and treachery as a species of ancestral
heritage, and it would be a miracle if he kept his oath. However, I will
endeavour as far as in me lies always to carry out your orders’.’ This passage
needs careful analysis. It would be naive to accept it purely at face value, or
to regard it as anything more than a tentative approach to a Greco-Proven-
$a1 entente. Anna makes no mention of the sharp quarrel between the count
‘Ibid. ZIbid., p. 246.
3Raymond of Aguilers, Historia Francorurn qti ceperunt Iherusalem, trans. J . H.
and L. Hill (Philadelphia, 1968), p. 37, n. 14.
4GF., pp. 4 - 5 . SIbid., pp. 56-9.
6AC., p. 267. 7Ibid., pp. 267-8.
144 DEPARTURE OF T A T I K I O S FROM CRUSADER ARMY
and the emperor which marked the opening of their negotiations.’ She
speaks here of the two men as if they were old friends. But she wrote long
after the events she describes, and in the light of Raymond of Toulouse’s
later resistance to Bohemond’s seizure of Antioch and his subsequent long
association with Alexius.2 One need not believe that these t w o shrewd
politicians tied themselves to each other at first sight. Anna’s account may
be a reasonable rendering of what passed between the two, and undoubtedly
they got on well; but the Greco-ProvenGal alliance grew out of circumstances
as much as out of any special relationship. Alexius chose shrewdly in
cultivating St. Gilles, who probably had the biggest army of any of the
crusader leaders, and whose power and wealth made him a possible enemy
of the rising parvenu Bohemond. Anna’s account is circumstantial, and we
may take it that the two men did discuss Bohemond. Tatikios must have
been aware of the relationship between his master and St. Gilles. Divide
and rule was a maxim long applied by Byzantine diplomacy to the problem
of dealing with barbarians. Alexius had cultivated the friendship of two
major Latin leaders, Bohemond and St. Gilles. I n the light of later events
Anna stresses her father’s suspicions of Bohemond, just as she fails to
mention any he might have had about the count of Toulouse. Looked at
from the Byzantine point of view, after all, the friendship of the count could
be as dangerous as that of Bohemond.
From Tatikios’s point of view the situation in the crusader camp in early
February 1098 was highly unsatisfactory. In his master’s interests his
obvious policy was to play off the rivalry between St. Gilles and Bohemond.
This rivalry, according to Runciman, had already appeared, for Bohemond
had been suspicious of the count’s despatch of a strong force to follow up a
rumour that Antioch was about to fall.3 Circumstances, however, prevented
Tatikios from taking advantage of this rift. Raymond of Aguilers recounts
that at the start of the siege of Antioch many of the leaders had hesitated to
embark on a full-scale siege, and urged that the army should blockade the
city from winter quarters.4 The count of Toulouse, arguing for a close
siege, prevented this. Unfortunately Raymond does not say who, at this
stage, favoured the idea of a blockade. I t has been suggested that the count
of Toulouse put forward at this meeting a plan for a full-scale assault-a
plan which was overruled, and which was opposed by Bohemond who feared
that success would deprive him of control of the city.5 This seems to be a
misinterpretation. Raymond of Toulouse was not urging an immediate
assault, and his chronicler tells us specifically that his plan was accepted. As
for the intentions of Bohemond, there is no real evidence of his ambitions
at this stage, apart from his interview with Alexius.6 But there was much to
1 The quarrel concerned the imperial attack on the ProvenCal army in late Apr.
1097 (RA.,p. 237). For the meeting of Alexius and Raymond of Toulouse, see
GF., p. 13;RA.,p. 278.
2For a summary see J. H. and L. L. Hill, Raymond IV de Saint-Gilles, comte de
Toulouse (Toulouse, I&, ch. vii.
3Runciman, History of the Crusades, i. 191-2. 4See above, p. 138,n. 2.
5Runciman, History ofthe Crusades, i. 217-18. 6See above, p. 141,n. 5.
 DEPARTURE OF TATIKIOS FROM CRUSADER ARMY 145
be said for a distant blockade, especially, by early February, in view of the
difficulties of supply. It was at this stage that Tatikios revived the idea.
One may guess that Tatikios had been amongst those who had earlier urged
a distant blockade, for it had then been suggested that the army could wait
for imperial help.’
Tatikios’s revival of the idea of a blockade was strongly opposed by the
count of Toulouse. As soon as the count heard of Tatikios’s plan, he intro-
duced a system within his own army whereby knights who lost their horses
while protecting foraging expeditions would be compensated. This scheme
was copied by other armies.* Raymond of Aguilers makes it quite clear that
this scheme was produced as a counter to Tatikios’s plan for a distant
blockade. The effect on Tatikios’s position in the camp is quite clear; he
became totally isolated and unable to play off Bohemond against Raymond of
Toulouse.
I t is in the light of these events that Anna’s account of Tatikios’s reasons
for departing must be considered. Bohemond’s plot, telling Tatikios that
the other leaders believed the rumour that Alexius had instigated the
expected Turkish attack, is only credible if it is recognized that the imperial
representative could not trust his other possible ally, St. Gilles, with whom
he had been quarrelling. Such quarrels, in the limited circle of crusader
leaders, must have become very bitter. Moreover Tatikios must have been
aware of the rising prestige and the growing influence of Bohemond.
Further, Byzantine prestige, and therefore Tatikios’s own position, had
been reduced by recent events. Clearly, from Raymond of Aguilers’s account
of the conference at the start of the siege, the army had hoped for Byzantine
aid.3 This had not materialized. Further, the army was starving, and many
may have blamed the Byzantines for the failure of supplies. As Runciman
remarks: ‘the temper of the army at this moment was such that a scapegoat
might well be desired’.4 The plot narrated by Anna Comnena strains
credulity in isolation; Tatikios was not a fool, after all. But against the
background of dearth in the army, and squabbles amongst the leadership, he
may well have felt that Bohemond’s warnings conveyed something of the
general mood of the army, and decided that his usefulness was at an end. As
he had to face his master, however, his withdrawal had to be done in such a
way as to safeguard imperial interests.
What was the manner of his departure? According to the Gesta he left
shortly after the approach of a hostile army had become known, promising
to despatch supplies and ultimately to rejoin the crusader force. This was a
face-saving excuse which left the way open for his return if the crusader
army was not destroyed. Anna mentions no public excuse; she says simply
that Tatikios left under the threat of Turkish attack. Raymond of Aguilers’s
account is very different. According to him there was a rumour of an
approaching imperial army. Raymond says that Tatikios himself put this
about, but it should be noted that the imperial forces were active in western
IRA.,p. 241. ZIbid., p. 245. 3 Ibid., p. 241.
4Runciman, History of the Crusades, i. 224.
146 D E P A R T U R E OF T A T I K I O S F R O M C R U S A D E R A R M Y
Asia Minor at this time.’ Then, alleging that the imperial troops were
reluctant to approach the Crusaders with whom they had clashed in the past,
Tatikios left the army, presumably on the pretext of bringing up the
emperor’s forces. The difference between the two stories is not so great as
might at first appear. Raymond makes no mention of Tatikios’s promise of
supplies, but his undertaking to return, mentioned in the Gesta’s account,
gives a hint that military aid was expected. It should be noticed, incidentally,
that after this date the Crusaders’ supply situation seems to have improved.
Perhaps Tatikios kept his word after all.
But the most curious information about Tatikios’s departure is the
statement by Raymond of Aguilers that before going he gave the cities of
Tarsus, Mamistra and Adana, all within Cilicia, to Bohemond. Runciman
thinks it unlikely that Tatikios ever made such a gift, and suggests that this
was a report put out by Bohemond as propaganda.2 In that case why did the
Gesta not report it ? Grousset suggests that the gift of the cities was a
reward for the ‘warning’ Bohemond had given to Tatikios: ‘ Le plaisant est
que, pour remercier Bohtmond de ses avis, il lui aurait cCdC au nom de son
maitre les trois villes ciliciennes de Tarse, Adana et Mamistra’.3 This is to
regard Tatikios as a fool. Tatikios had chosen to accept Bohemond’s bogus
warnings. He felt that his position was exposed, and anyway believed that
the army was about to be wiped out. But he had to safeguard his master’s
interests, for the prospect of a crusader defeat was not absolutely certain.
Cilicia had been conquered by two rival crusader forces under Tancred and
Baldwin of Boulogne.4 The latter had been victorious, but he had departed
and founded the Latin principality of Edessa.5 The Cilician cities had
thereafter passed into the hands of Bohemond.6 All Tatikios did in granting
these cities to the Norman leader was to legitimise the position. He had
been instructed to take over any captured cities from the crusader army.
In view of his depleted resources, the manner of the conquest of Cilicia, and
the temper of the army, this was no longer possible. His grant of the cities
was the only assertion possible in the circumstances that the lands in which
the army now found itself were by right imperial, and therefore Alexius’s
alone to give. Tatikios gave nothing away; he merely made a last effort
to impress upon the leaders the legitimate position of his master. Anna, for
obvious reasons, makes no mention of the grant.
Finally a note on chronology. This is very difficult to establish firmly,
largely because knowledge of the events is dependent on the Historia
Francorurn, and Raymond of Aguilers’s chronology is notoriously poor.
According to Raymond it was early in January that Bohemond first threatened
to leave the army, for he says that this occurred at the same time as the earth-
quake which Hagenmeyer dates as happening on 30 December 1097.’
Shortly afterwards Tatikios made his proposal for a distant blockade, which
‘Runciman, History of the Crusades, p. 239. ZIbid., pp. 224-5 and p. 224,n. I.
3R. Grousset, Histoire des Croisades (3 vole., Paria, 1934-6),i. 81.
4GF., pp. 24-5. SRunciman, History of the Crusades, i. 195et seqq.
elbid., pp. 254-5. ’Hagenmeyet, p, 1x6(221).
 D E P A R T U R E OF T A T I K I O S FROM CRUSADER A R M Y 147
was countered by Raymond of Toulouse’s offer of compensation, made
about 10January.’ The meeting of the crusader leaders which promised the
city to Bohemond did not occur until after that date, and following the
meeting, or perhaps at the same time, Tatikios left. The dating here is
inexact, and Hagenmeyer’s suggestions are little more than careful guesses.
The sequence of events is clear enough, except in the vital matter of whether
Tatikios left before or after the council of the princes. Runciman thinks that
Bohemond did not threaten to leave the army till Tatikios had departed,
which seems somewhat to strain Raymond of Aguilers’s sequence. Probably
Bohemond was promised the city very shortly after the departure of the
imperial representative. Of course nothing is known of the terms of the
promise.
In assessing Alexius’s dealings with the crusader forces, historians have
been preoccupied by his alliance with the count of Toulouse. The import-
ance of this for the early stages of the Crusade has been grossly inflated by
Anna Comnena who wrote in the light of later events. Alexius appears to
have entered into negotiations with two of the leaders, Bohemond and
Raymond of Toulouse. The former made a deliberate effort to be concilia-
tory. It may be perfectly true that Bohemond was self-seeking and selfish,
but this in no way precluded the possibility of co-operation. Why was
St. Gilles, after initial hostility, prepared to be friendly with the emperor ?
I t may be that, as the first major magnate to take the cross, he considered
himself leader of the Crusade, and that Alexius was prepared to recognize
him as such in return for co-operation. But although Raymond did oppose
the grant of Antioch to Bohemond in February 1098,it was not till the
Council of November 1098that he emerged as the great champion of imperial
rights amongst the crusader leaders.2 This came about at least as much
through circumstance as through his attachment to the emperor. Albert of
Aix considered that Raymond, like Bohemond, wanted to gain the rule of
Antioch.3 Given that Albert often relied on eye-witnesses for his information,
it is entirely possible that this opinion was held by many non-ProvenGals in
the crusader camp.4
It seems unlikely that Alexius relied totally on the friendship of St. Gilles,
or that that friendship was unconditional. Tatikios’s job was to keep the
Crusaders loyal to their oaths to the emperor, and particularly to exploit the
ambitions of St. Gilles and Bohemond. As it happened, circumstances
turned sharply against Tatikios and the imperial intentions. Feeling that
his position was no longer tenable, and that in any case the crusader army
might soon be wiped out, the imperial representative withdrew. But before
he did so he formally conferred the cities of Cilicia, already in Norman
hands, upon Bohemond. I t was the only method left to him, in the circum-
stances, of reasserting imperial policy. It should be noticed that he seems
to have satisfied his master. JOHN FRANCE
Ilbid.,p. 120 (227).
ZRA., pp. 267-8. 3Albert of Aix, lib. v, ch. ii, p. 434.
4F0r Albert’s sources see B. von Kugler, Albert urn A d e n (Stuttgart, 1885).