Republic of the Philippines succeeded him as bona fidetenant
SUPREME COURT of the subject lots; that between
Manila July 7 to July 15, 1984, Olympio
SECOND DIVISION Mendoza, in conspiracy with the
other defendants, prevented her
G.R. No. 96492 November 26, 1992 daughter Violeta and her workers
ROMEO REYES, ANGEL PARAYAO, and through force, intimidation,
EMILIO MANANGHAYA, petitioners, strategy and stealth, from entering
vs. and working on the subject
THE COURT OF APPEALS, EUFROCINA DE premises; and that until the filing of
LA CRUZ and VIOLETA DELOS the instant case, defendants had
REYES, respondents. refused to vacate and surrender the
lots, thus violating her tenancy
NOCON, J.: rights. Plaintiff therefore prayed for
Petitioners Romeo Reyes, Angel Parayao and Emilio judgment for the recovery of
Mananghaya question the respondent Court's decision possession and damages with a writ
promulgated on November 22, 1990, 1 which of preliminary mandatory
affirmed with modification the agrarian court's injunction in the meantime.
decision promulgated January 10, 1990, 2 which Defendants Reyes, Parayao,
ordered them and the other defendants therein to, Aguinaldo and Mananghaya, duly
among others, restore possession of the disputed elected and/or appointed barangay
landholding to private respondent, Eufrocina Vda. officials of Bahay Pare, Candaba,
dela Cruz. Said respondent court's decision is now Pampanga, denied interference in
final and executory as to Olympio Mendoza and the tenancy relationship existing
Severino Aguinaldo, the other petitioners in the between plaintiff and defendant
respondent court, since they did not appeal the same. Mendoza, particularly in the
Since petitioners do not dispute the findings of fact of cultivation of the latter's farm lots.
the respondent Court, the same shall be quoted Claiming that they have always
verbatim and are as follows: exercised fairness, equity, reason
It appears from the records that and impartiality in the discharge of
Juan Mendoza, father of herein their official functions, they asked
defendant Olympio Mendoza, is the for the dismissal of the case and
owner of Farm Lots Nos. 46 and claimed moral damages and
106, Block 2, Psd-38453 of the attorney's fees in the total amount
Bahay Pare Estate, Bahay Pare, of P165,000.00 (Answer with
Candaba, Pampanga, with an area Counterclaim, Records, pp. 48-51).
of 23,000 square meters and 19,000 For his part, defendant Mendoza
square meters, respectively. raised abandonment, sublease and
Devoted to the production of palay, mortgage of the farm lots without
the lots were tenanted and his consent and approval, and non-
cultivated by Julian dela Cruz, payment of rentals, irrigation fees
husband of plaintiff Eufrocina dela and other taxes due the
Cruz. Julian died on September 25, government, as his defenses. He
1979. also demanded actual and
In her complaint, Eufrocina alleged exemplary damages, as well as
that upon the death of Julian, she attorney's fees (Answer, pp. 77-78).
During the pendency of the case in
the lower court, Mendoza of the
case in the lower court, Mendoza
was in possession of the subject
lots and had cultivated the same.
Upon motion of plaintiff, the court
directed its Deputy Sheriff to
supervise the harvesting of the
palay crops, to cause the threshing
thereof and to deposit the net
harvest (after deducting from the
expenses incurred), in a bonded
warehouse of the locality subject to
the disposition of the court. 3
The respondent Court rendered judgment affirming
the appealed agrarian court's decision with the
modification that Lot 106 is not covered by it.
The dispositive portion of the appealed decision,
which was modified, states as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby
rendered, in favor of plaintiff and
against defendants:
On the Mandatory Injunction:
1. Ordering said defendants to
restore possession of the
landholding subject of the action to
the plaintiff and enjoining said
defendants and any person claiming
under them to desist from
molesting them or interfering with
the possession and cultivation of
the landholding descriptive in
paragraph 3 of the complaint, to
wit:
Farm Lots Nos.
46 and 106,
Block 2, Psd-
38453 of the
Bahay Pare
Estate, Bahay
Pare, Candaba,
Pampanga, with a
total area of
23,969 square
meters, more or
less, owned by a
 certain Juan
Mendoza, and
devoted
principally to the
production of
palay, as
evidenced by a
Certification
from the Ministry
of Agrarian
Reform issued on
July 30, 1984.
2. a) Ordering the defendants to
vacate the premises of the two
landholding in question and to
respect the tenancy rights of
plaintiff with respect to the same;
b) Ordering defendants, jointly and
severally to pay unto plaintiff 220
cavans of palay or its equivalent in
cash of P33,000.00 from the
principal crop year of 1984, and
every harvest time until defendants
finally vacate and surrender
possession and cultivation of the
landholding in question to plaintiff.
c) the prayer for moral damages,
not having been sufficiently
proved, the same is denied.
d) Ordering defendants jointly and
severally, to pay the costs of suit.
The awards herein provided should
first be satisfied from the deposits
of the harvests ordered by the Court
from which the planting and
harvesting expenses have been paid
to defendant Olympio Mendoza;
and if said net deposits with the
Court or the warehouses as ordered
by the Court are insufficient, then
the balance should be paid by
defendants, jointly and severally. 4
Defendants who are the petitioners in this case, in a
Petition for Review on Certiorari, present for the
consideration of the Court:
[T]he lone issue of whether or not
they can be held liable, jointly and
severally, with the other
defendants, for the harvests of the
litigated property, Lot No. 46, or
the money equivalent thereof
starting from the principal crop
years of 1984 and every harvest
time thereafter until the possession
and cultivation of the aforestated
landholding are finally surrendered
to the private respondent. 5
It is the position of petitioners that they are not liable
jointly and severally with Olympio Mendoza and
Severino Aguinaldo because the present petition
involves Lot No. 46, Block 2, Psd-38453 of the
bahay Pare Estate, bahay Pare, Candaba, Pampanga
and not Lot No. 106 of the estate, which lot was
purchased by petitioner Romeo Reyes from Olympio
Mendoza's father, Juan, and which he later donated to
the barangay Bahay Pare of Candaba, Pampanga, for
the construction of the Bahay Pare Barangay High
School. 6 As to their supposed participation in the
dispossession of private respondent from the disputed
landholding, petitioners present the September 30,
1987 Resolution of Investigating Fiscal Jesus M.
Pamintuan, as approved by Pampanga Provincial
Fiscal Villamor I. Dizon, in I.S. No. 8576, 7 wherein
private respondent's complaint against petitioners and
the other defendants in the agrarian court for
violation of P.D. 583 8 was dismissed, to show that
private respondent's "point is already settled and
considered closed." 9 lastly, petitioners claim that
they were included in the present controversy so that
their political career would be destroyed.10
Private respondents deny petitioners' allegations and
contend that it was petitioners who conspired with
Olympio Mendoza and Severino Aguinaldo in
ejecting them not only from Lot No. 46 but also from
Lot No. 106. They maintain that it was in Farmlot
No. 46 from where they were ejected and
dispossessed, so much so that even if Farmlot No.
106 was removed by the Court of Appeals from the
judgment, as Farmlot No. 46 was harvesting palay
worth at least P33,000.00 per year since 1989, private
respondents, who are entitled to the possession and
peaceful enjoyment of the farmlot as provided for in
Section 23 of the Agrarian Reform Law, should be
compensated for the lost income by the petitioners
who are solidarily liable with Olympio Mendoza and
Severino Aguinaldo. 11
We find for the private respondents.
It is clear that petitioners are asking Us to re-examine
all the evidence already presented and evaluated by
the trial court and re-evaluated again by the
respondent appellate court. Said evidence served as
basis in arriving at the trial court and appellate court's
findings of fact. We shall not analyze such evidence
all over again but instead put finis to the factual
findings in this case. Settled is the rule that only
questions of law may be raised in a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court 12 absent the exceptions which do not obtain in
the instant case. 13
We agree with the appellate court in its retiocination,
which We adopt, on why it has to dismiss the appeal.
Said the Court:
In her Complaint, plaintiff-appellee
alleged that she "is the tenant of
Farm Lots Nos. 46 and 106 Block
2, Psd-38453 of the Bahay Pare
Estate, Bahay Pare, Candaba,
Pampanga, with a total area of
23,969 square meters, more or less
. . ." (Complaint, Record, vol. 1,
p.1). However, during Violeta's
testimony, she clarified that
actually only Lot No. 106, which
contains an area of P19,000 square
meters, is not included in this
controversy (T.S.N., August 10,
1989, p. 5; May 8, 1989, p. 12).
This statement was corroborated by
plaintiff's counsel, Atty. Arturo
Rivera, who informed the court that
the 19,000 square meter lot is
subject of a pending case before the
MTC of Sta. Ana, Pampanga
(Ibid.,p. 15). The inconsistency
between the averment of the
complaint and the testimony of the
witness should not only because
there was no showing that she
intended to mislead defendants and
even the trial court on the subject
matter of the suit. It would in the
complaint since together with Lot
106 had been include in the
complaint since together with Lot
46, it is owned by Olympio's father.
We also concur with the trial
court's finding on the participation
of the other appellants in the
dispossession of appellee. They not
only knew Olympio personally,
some of them were even asked by
Olympio to help him cultivate the
land, thus lending credence to the
allegation that defendant Olympio,
together with his co-defendants,
prevented plaintiff and her workers
from entering the land through
"strong arm methods". (Decision of
RTC, records, vol. II p. 564).
Finally, we rule that the trial court
did not err when it favorably
considered the affidavits of
Eufrocina and Efren Tecson
(Annexes "B" and "C") although
the affiants were not presented and
subjected to cross-examination.
Section 16 of P.D. No. 946
provides that the "Rules of Court
shall not be applicable in agrarian
cases even in a suppletory
character." The same provision
states that "In the hearing,
investigation and determination of
any question or controversy,
affidavits and counter-affidavits
may be allowed and are admissible
in evidence".
Moreover, in agrarian cases, the
quantum of evidence required is no
more than substantial evidence.
This substantial evidence rule was
incorporated in section 18, P.D.
No. 946 which took effect on June
17, 1976 (Castro vs. CS, G.R. No.
34613, January 26, 1989). In
Bagsican vs. Hon. Court of
Appeals, 141 SCRA 226, the
Supreme Court defined what
substantial evidence is:
Substantial evidence does
not necessarily import
preponderant evidence, as
is required in an ordinary
civil case. It has been
defined to be such relevant
evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as
adequate to support a
conclusion and its absence
is not shown by stressing
that there is contrary
evidence on record, direct
or circumstantial, for the
appellate court cannot
substitute its own
judgment or criteria for
that of the trial court in
determining wherein lies
the weight of evidence or
what evidence is entitled
to belief. 14
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the
decision appealed from, the petition is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit. The decision of the Court
of Appeals promulgated on November 22, 1990 is
AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 162571. June 15, 2005]
ARNEL L. AGUSTIN, petitioner, vs. HON.
COURT OF APPEALS AND MINOR
MARTIN JOSE PROLLAMANTE,
REPRESENTED BY HIS
MOTHER/GUARDIAN FE ANGELA
PROLLAMANTE, respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
At issue in this petition for certiorari [1] is
whether or not the Court of Appeals (CA) gravely
erred in exercising its discretion, amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction, in issuing a decision[2] and
resolution[3] upholding the resolution and order of the
trial court,[4] which denied petitioners motion to
dismiss private respondents complaint for support
and directed the parties to submit themselves to
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) paternity testing.
Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin
Prollamante sued Martins alleged biological father,
petitioner Arnel L. Agustin, for support and
support pendente lite before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 106.[5]
In their complaint, respondents alleged that
Arnel courted Fe in 1992, after which they entered
into an intimate relationship. Arnel supposedly
impregnated Fe on her 34th birthday on November 10,
1999. Despite Arnels insistence on abortion, Fe
decided otherwise and gave birth to their child out of
wedlock, Martin, on August 11, 2000 at the Capitol
Medical Hospital in Quezon City. The babys birth
certificate was purportedly signed by Arnel as the
father. Arnel shouldered the pre-natal and hospital
expenses but later refused Fes repeated requests for
Martins support despite his adequate financial
capacity and even suggested to have the child
committed for adoption. Arnel also denied having
fathered the child.
On January 19, 2001, while Fe was carrying
five-month old Martin at the Capitol Hills Golf and
Country Club parking lot, Arnel sped off in his van,
with the open car door hitting Fes leg. This incident
was reported to the police. In July 2001, Fe was
diagnosed with leukemia and has, since then, been
undergoing chemotherapy. On March 5, 2002, Fe and
Martin sued Arnel for support.[6]
In his amended answer, Arnel denied having
sired Martin because his affair and intimacy with Fe
had allegedly ended in 1998, long before Martins
conception. He claimed that Fe had at least one other
secret lover. Arnel admitted that their relationship
started in 1993 but he never really fell in love with
(Fe) not only because (she) had at least one secret
lover, a certain Jun, but also because she proved to be
scheming and overly demanding and possessive. As a
result, theirs was a stormy on-and-off affair. What
started as a romantic liaison between two consenting
adults eventually turned out to be a case of fatal
attraction where (Fe) became so obsessed with
(Arnel), to the point of even entertaining the idea of
marrying him, that she resorted to various devious
ways and means to alienate (him) from his wife and
family. Unable to bear the prospect of losing his wife
and children, Arnel terminated the affair although he
still treated her as a friend such as by referring
potential customers to the car aircon repair
shop[7] where she worked. Later on, Arnel found out
that Fe had another erstwhile secret lover. In May
2000, Arnel and his entire family went to the United
States for a vacation. Upon their return in June 2000,
Arnel learned that Fe was telling people that he had
impregnated her. Arnel refused to acknowledge the
child as his because their last intimacy was sometime
in 1998.[8] Exasperated, Fe started calling Arnels wife
and family. On January 19, 2001, Fe followed Arnel
to the Capitol Hills Golf and Country Club parking
lot to demand that he acknowledge Martin as his
child. According to Arnel, he could not get through
Fe and the discussion became so heated that he had
no alternative but to move on but without bumping or
hitting any part of her body.[9] Finally, Arnel claimed
that the signature and the community tax certificate
(CTC) attributed to him in the acknowledgment of
Martins birth certificate were falsified. The CTC
erroneously reflected his marital status as single
when he was actually married and that his birth year
was 1965 when it should have been 1964.[10]
In his pre-trial brief filed on May 17, 2002,
Arnel vehemently denied having sired Martin but
expressed willingness to consider any proposal to
settle the case.[11]
On July 23, 2002, Fe and Martin moved for the
issuance of an order directing all the parties to submit
themselves to DNA paternity testing pursuant to Rule
28 of the Rules of Court.[12]
Arnel opposed said motion by invoking his
constitutional right against self-incrimination.[13] He
also moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of cause
of action, considering that his signature on the birth
certificate was a forgery and that, under the law, an
illegitimate child is not entitled to support if not
recognized by the putative father.[14] In his motion,
Arnel manifested that he had filed criminal charges
for falsification of documents against Fe (I.S. Nos.
02-5723 and 02-7192) and a petition for cancellation
of his name appearing in Martins birth certificate
(docketed as Civil Case No. Q-02-46669). He
attached the certification of the Philippine National
Police Crime Laboratory that his signature in the
birth certificate was forged.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss the
complaint and ordered the parties to submit
themselves to DNA paternity testing at the expense
of the applicants. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial court.
Thus, this petition.
In a nutshell, petitioner raises two issues: (1)
whether a complaint for support can be converted to a
petition for recognition and (2) whether DNA
paternity testing can be ordered in a proceeding for
support without violating petitioners constitutional
right to privacy and right against self-
incrimination.[15]
The petition is without merit.
First of all, the trial court properly denied the
petitioners motion to dismiss because the private
respondents complaint on its face showed that they
had a cause of action against the petitioner. The
elements of a cause of action are: (1) the plaintiffs
primary right and the defendants corresponding
primary duty, and (2) the delict or wrongful act or
omission of the defendant, by which the primary right
and duty have been violated. The cause of action is
determined not by the prayer of the complaint but by
the facts alleged.[16]
 In the complaint, private respondents alleged
that Fe had amorous relations with the petitioner, as a
result of which she gave birth to Martin out of
wedlock. In his answer, petitioner admitted that he
had sexual relations with Fe but denied that he
fathered Martin, claiming that he had ended the
relationship long before the childs conception and
birth. It is undisputed and even admitted by the
parties that there existed a sexual relationship
between Arnel and Fe. The only remaining question
is whether such sexual relationship produced the
child, Martin. If it did, as respondents have alleged,
then Martin should be supported by his father Arnel.
If not, petitioner and Martin are strangers to each
other and Martin has no right to demand and
petitioner has no obligation to give support.
Preliminaries aside, we now tackle the main
issues.
Petitioner refuses to recognize Martin as his
own child and denies the genuineness and
authenticity of the childs birth certificate which he
purportedly signed as the father. He also claims that
the order and resolution of the trial court, as affirmed
by the Court of Appeals, effectively converted the
complaint for support to a petition for recognition,
which is supposedly proscribed by law. According to
petitioner, Martin, as an unrecognized child, has no
right to ask for support and must first establish his
filiation in a separate suit under Article 283[17] in
relation to Article 265[18] of the Civil Code and
Section 1, Rule 105[19] of the Rules of Court.
The petitioners contentions are without merit.
The assailed resolution and order did not
convert the action for support into one for recognition
but merely allowed the respondents to prove their
cause of action against petitioner who had been
denying the authenticity of the documentary evidence
of acknowledgement. But even if the assailed
resolution and order effectively integrated an action
to compel recognition with an action for support,
such was valid and in accordance with jurisprudence.
In Tayag v. Court of Appeals,[20] we allowed the
integration of an action to compel recognition with an
action to claim ones inheritance:
In Paulino, we held that an illegitimate child, to be
entitled to support and successional rights from the
putative or presumed parent, must prove his filiation
to the latter. We also said that it is necessary to allege
in the complaint that the putative father had
acknowledged and recognized the illegitimate child
because such acknowledgment is essential to and is
the basis of the right to inherit. There being no
allegation of such acknowledgment, the action
becomes one to compel recognition which cannot be
brought after the death of the putative father.
The ratio decidendi in Paulino, therefore, is not the
absence of a cause of action for failure of the
petitioner to allege the fact of acknowledgment in the
complaint, but the prescription of the action.
Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bar,
although petitioner contends that the complaint filed
by herein private respondent merely alleges that the
minor Chad Cuyugan is an illegitimate child of the
deceased and is actually a claim for inheritance, from
the allegations therein the same may be considered as
one to compel recognition. Further, that the two
causes of action, one to compel recognition and the
other to claim inheritance, may be joined in one
complaint is not new in our jurisprudence.
As early as [1922] we had occasion to rule thereon
in Briz vs. Briz, et al. (43 Phil. 763 [1922]) wherein
we said:
The question whether a person in the position of the
present plaintiff can in any event maintain a complex
action to compel recognition as a natural child and at
the same time to obtain ulterior relief in the character
of heir, is one which in the opinion of this court must
be answered in the affirmative, provided always that
the conditions justifying the joinder of the two
distinct causes of action are present in the particular
case. In other words, there is no absolute necessity
requiring that the action to compel
acknowledgment should have been instituted and
prosecuted to a successful conclusion prior to the
action in which that same plaintiff seeks
additional relief in the character of heir. Certainly,
there is nothing so peculiar to the action to compel
acknowledgment as to require that a rule should be
here applied different from that generally applicable
in other cases. x x x
The conclusion above stated, though not heretofore
explicitly formulated by this court, is undoubtedly to
some extent supported by our prior decisions.
Thus, we have held in numerous cases, and the
doctrine must be considered well settled, that a
natural child having a right to compel
acknowledgment, but who has not been in fact
legally acknowledged, may maintain partition
proceedings for the division of the inheritance
against his coheirs x x x; and the same person may
intervene in proceedings for the distribution of the
estate of his deceased natural father, or mother x x x.
In neither of these situations has it been thought
necessary for the plaintiff to show a prior decree
compelling acknowledgment. The obvious reason is
that in partition suits and distribution proceedings the
other persons who might take by inheritance are
before the court; and the declaration of heirship is
appropriate to such proceedings. (Underscoring
supplied)
Although the instant case deals with support
rather than inheritance, as in Tayag, the basis or
rationale for integrating them remains the same.
Whether or not respondent Martin is entitled to
support depends completely on the determination of
filiation. A separate action will only result in a
multiplicity of suits, given how intimately related the
main issues in both cases are. To
paraphrase Tayag, the declaration of filiation is
entirely appropriate to these proceedings.
On the second issue, petitioner posits that DNA
is not recognized by this Court as a conclusive means
of proving paternity. He also contends that
compulsory testing violates his right to privacy and
right against self-incrimination as guaranteed under
the 1987 Constitution. These contentions have no
merit.
Given that this is the very first time that the
admissibility of DNA testing as a means for
determining paternity has actually been the focal
issue in a controversy, a brief historical sketch of our
past decisions featuring or mentioning DNA testing is
called for.
In the 1995 case of People v.
Teehankee[21] where the appellant was convicted of
murder on the testimony of three eyewitnesses, we
stated as an obiter dictum that while eyewitness
identification is significant, it is not as accurate and
authoritative as the scientific forms of identification
evidence such as the fingerprint or the DNA test
result (emphasis supplied).
Our faith in DNA testing, however, was not
quite so steadfast in the previous decade. In Pe Lim v.
Court of Appeals,[22] promulgated in 1997, we
cautioned against the use of DNA because DNA,
being a relatively new science, (had) not as yet been
accorded official recognition by our courts. Paternity
(would) still have to be resolved by such
conventional evidence as the relevant incriminating
acts, verbal and written, by the putative father.
In 2001, however, we opened the possibility of
admitting DNA as evidence of parentage, as
enunciated in Tijing v. Court of Appeals:[23]
A final note. Parentage will still be resolved using
conventional methods unless we adopt the modern
and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have
now the facility and expertise in using DNA test for
identification and parentage testing. The University
of the Philippines Natural Science Research Institute
(UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory has now the
capability to conduct DNA typing using short tandem
repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is based on the
fact that the DNA of a child/person has two (2)
copies, one copy from the mother and the other from
the father. The DNA from the mother, the alleged
father and child are analyzed to establish parentage.
Of course, being a novel scientific technique, the use
of DNA test as evidence is still open to challenge.
Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts
should not hesitate to rule on the admissibility of
DNA evidence. For it was said, that courts should
apply the results of science when competently
obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject
said result is to deny progress.
The first real breakthrough of DNA as
admissible and authoritative evidence in Philippine
jurisprudence came in 2002 with our en
banc decision in People v. Vallejo[24] where the rape
and murder victims DNA samples from the
bloodstained clothes of the accused were admitted in
evidence. We reasoned that the purpose of DNA
testing (was) to ascertain whether an association
exist(ed) between the evidence sample and the
reference sample. The samples collected (were)
subjected to various chemical processes to establish
their profile.
A year later, in People v. Janson,[25] we
acquitted the accused charged with rape for lack of
evidence because doubts persist(ed) in our mind as to
who (were) the real malefactors. Yes, a complex
offense (had) been perpetrated but who (were) the
perpetrators? How we wish we had DNA or other
scientific evidence to still our doubts!
In 2004, in Tecson, et al. v.
COMELEC[26] where the Court en banc was faced
with the issue of filiation of then presidential
candidate Fernando Poe Jr., we stated:
In case proof of filiation or paternity would be
unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would be
difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines
genetic codes obtained from body cells of the
illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long
dead parent could be resorted to. A positive match
would clear up filiation or paternity. In Tijing vs.
Court of Appeals, this Court has acknowledged the
strong weight of DNA testing
Moreover, in our en banc decision in People v.
Yatar,[27] we affirmed the conviction of the accused
for rape with homicide, the principal evidence for
which included DNA test results. We did a lengthy
discussion of DNA, the process of DNA testing and
the reasons for its admissibility in the context of our
own Rules of Evidence:
Deoxyribonucleic Acid, or DNA, is a molecule that
encodes the genetic information in all living
organisms. A persons DNA is the same in each cell
and it does not change throughout a persons lifetime;
the DNA in a persons blood is the same as the DNA
found in his saliva, sweat, bone, the root and shaft of
hair, earwax, mucus, urine, skin tissue, and vaginal
and rectal cells. Most importantly, because of
polymorphisms in human genetic structure, no two
individuals have the same DNA, with the notable
exception of identical twins.
xxx xxx xxx
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence,
courts should consider, inter alia, the following
factors: how the samples were collected, how they
were handled, the possibility of contamination of the
samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the
samples, whether proper standards and procedures
were followed in conducting the tests, and the
qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.
In the case at bar, Dr. Maria Corazon Abogado de
Ungria was duly qualified by the prosecution as an
expert witness on DNA print or identification
techniques. Based on Dr. de Ungrias testimony, it
was determined that the gene type and DNA profile
of appellant are identical to that of the extracts
subject of examination. The blood sample taken from
the appellant showed that he was of the following
gene types: vWA 15/19, TH01 7/8, DHFRP29/10 and
CSF1PO 10/11, which are identical with semen taken
from the victims vaginal canal. Verily, a DNA match
exists between the semen found in the victim and the
blood sample given by the appellant in open court
during the course of the trial.
Admittedly, we are just beginning to integrate these
advances in science and technology in the Philippine
criminal justice system, so we must be cautious as we
traverse these relatively uncharted waters.
Fortunately, we can benefit from the wealth of
persuasive jurisprudence that has developed in other
jurisdictions. Specifically, the prevailing doctrine in
the U.S. has proven instructive.
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow (509 U.S. 579 (1993);
125 L. Ed. 2d 469) it was ruled that pertinent
evidence based on scientifically valid principles
could be used as long as it was relevant and reliable.
Judges, under Daubert, were allowed greater
discretion over which testimony they would allow at
trial, including the introduction of new kinds of
scientific techniques. DNA typing is one such novel
procedure.
Under Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it
relates directly to a fact in issue as to induce belief in
its existence or non-existence. Applying
the Daubert test to the case at bar, the DNA evidence
obtained through PCR testing and utilizing STR
analysis, and which was appreciated by the court a
quo is relevant and reliable since it is reasonably
based on scientifically valid principles of human
genetics and molecular biology.
Significantly, we upheld the constitutionality of
compulsory DNA testing and the admissibility of the
results thereof as evidence. In that case, DNA
samples from semen recovered from a rape victims
vagina were used to positively identify the accused
Joel Kawit Yatar as the rapist. Yatar claimed that the
compulsory extraction of his blood sample for DNA
testing, as well as the testing itself, violated his right
against self-incrimination, as embodied in both
Sections 12 and 17 of Article III of the Constitution.
We addressed this as follows:
The contention is untenable. The kernel of the right is
not against all compulsion, but against testimonial
compulsion. The right against self-incrimination is
simply against the legal process of extracting from
the lips of the accused an admission of guilt. It does
not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded
is not an incrimination but as part of object evidence.
Over the years, we have expressly excluded
several kinds of object evidence taken from the
person of the accused from the realm of self-
incrimination. These include
photographs,[28]hair,[29] and other bodily
substances.[30] We have also declared as
constitutional several procedures performed on the
accused such as pregnancy tests for women accused
of adultery,[31]expulsion of morphine from ones
mouth[32] and the tracing of ones foot to determine its
identity with bloody footprints.[33] In Jimenez v.
Caizares,[34] we even authorized the examination of a
womans genitalia, in an action for annulment filed by
her husband, to verify his claim that she was
impotent, her orifice being too small for his penis.
Some of these procedures were, to be sure, rather
invasive and involuntary, but all of them were
constitutionally sound. DNA testing and its results,
per our ruling in Yatar,[35] are now similarly
acceptable.
Nor does petitioners invocation of his right to
privacy persuade us. In Ople v. Torres,[36] where we
struck down the proposed national computerized
identification system embodied in Administrative
Order No. 308, we said:
In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the
right to privacy does not bar all incursions into
individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle
scientific and technological advancements that
enhance public service and the common good...
Intrusions into the right must be accompanied by
proper safeguards that enhance public service and the
common good.
Historically, it has mostly been in the areas of
legality of searches and seizures,[37] and the
infringement of privacy of communication[38] where
the constitutional right to privacy has been critically
at issue. Petitioners case involves neither and, as
already stated, his argument that his right against
self-incrimination is in jeopardy holds no water. His
hollow invocation of his constitutional rights elicits
no sympathy here for the simple reason that they are
not in any way being violated. If, in a criminal case,
an accused whose very life is at stake can be
compelled to submit to DNA testing, we see no
reason why, in this civil case, petitioner herein who
does not face such dire consequences cannot be
ordered to do the same.
DNA paternity testing first came to prominence
in the United States, where it yielded its first official
results sometime in 1985. In the decade that
followed, DNA rapidly found widespread general
acceptance.[39] Several cases decided by various State
Supreme Courts reflect the total assimilation of DNA
testing into their rules of procedure and evidence.
The case of Wilson v. Lumb[40] shows that DNA
testing is so commonly accepted that, in some
instances, ordering the procedure has become a
ministerial act. The Supreme Court of St. Lawrence
County, New York allowed a party who had already
acknowledged paternity to subsequently challenge his
prior acknowledgment. The Court pointed out that,
under the law, specifically Section 516 of the New
York Family Court Act, the Family Court examiner
had the duty, upon receipt of the challenge, to order
DNA tests:[41]
516-a. Acknowledgment of paternity. (a) An
acknowledgment of paternity executed pursuant to
section one hundred eleven-k of the social services
law or section four thousand one hundred thirty-five-
b of the public health law shall establish the paternity
of and liability for the support of a child pursuant to
this act. Such acknowledgment must be reduced to
writing and filed pursuant to section four thousand
one hundred thirty-five-b of the public health law
with the registrar of the district in which the birth
occurred and in which the birth certificate has been
filed. No further judicial or administrative
proceedings are required to ratify an unchallenged
acknowledgment of paternity.
(b) An acknowledgment of paternity executed
pursuant to section one hundred eleven-k of the
social services law or section four thousand one
hundred thirty-five-b of the public health law may be
rescinded by either signators filing of a petition with
the court to vacate the acknowledgment within the
earlier of sixty days of the date of signing the
acknowledgment or the date of an administrative or a
judicial proceeding (including a proceeding to
establish a support order) relating to the child in
which either signator is a party. For purposes of this
section, the "date of an administrative or a judicial
proceeding" shall be the date by which the
respondent is required to answer the petition. After
the expiration of sixty days of the execution of the
acknowledgment, either signator may challenge the
acknowledgment of paternity in court only on the
basis of fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact,
with the burden of proof on the party challenging the
voluntary acknowledgment. Upon receiving a
partys challenge to an acknowledgment, the court
shall order genetic marker tests or DNA tests for
the determination of the childs paternity and shall
make a finding of paternity, if appropriate, in
accordance with this article. Neither signators legal
obligations, including the obligation for child support
arising from the acknowledgment, may be suspended
during the challenge to the acknowledgment except
for good cause as the court may find. If a party
petitions to rescind an acknowledgment and if the
court determines that the alleged father is not the
father of the child, or if the court finds that an
acknowledgment is invalid because it was executed
on the basis of fraud, duress, or material mistake of
fact, the court shall vacate the acknowledgment of
paternity and shall immediately provide a copy of the
order to the registrar of the district in which the
childs birth certificate is filed and also to the putative
father registry operated by the department of social
services pursuant to section three hundred seventy-
two-c of the social services law. In addition, if the
mother of the child who is the subject of the
acknowledgment is in receipt of child support
services pursuant to title six-A of article three of the
social services law, the court shall immediately
provide a copy of the order to the child support
enforcement unit of the social services district that
provides the mother with such services.
(c) A determination of paternity made by any other
state, whether established through the parents
acknowledgment of paternity or through an
administrative or judicial process, must be accorded
full faith and credit, if and only if such
acknowledgment meets the requirements set forth in
section 452(a)(7) of the social security act.
(emphasis supplied)
DNA testing also appears elsewhere in the New
York Family Court Act:[42]
532. Genetic marker and DNA tests; admissibility of
records or reports of test results; costs of tests.
a) The court shall advise the parties of their right to
one or more genetic marker tests or DNA tests and,
on the courts own motion or the motion of any party,
shall order the mother, her child and the alleged
father to submit to one or more genetic marker or
DNA tests of a type generally acknowledged as
reliable by an accreditation body designated by the
secretary of the federal department of health and
human services and performed by a laboratory
approved by such an accreditation body and by the
commissioner of health or by a duly qualified
physician to aid in the determination of whether the
alleged father is or is not the father of the child. No
such test shall be ordered, however, upon a
written finding by the court that it is not in the
best interests of the child on the basis of res
judicata, equitable estoppel, or the presumption of
legitimacy of a child born to a married woman.
The record or report of the results of any such genetic
marker or DNA test ordered pursuant to this section
or pursuant to section one hundred eleven-k of the
social services law shall be received in evidence by
the court pursuant to subdivision (e) of rule forty-five
hundred eighteen of the civil practice law and rules
where no timely objection in writing has been made
thereto and that if such timely objections are not
made, they shall be deemed waived and shall not be
heard by the court. If the record or report of the
results of any such genetic marker or DNA test or
tests indicate at least a ninety-five percent
probability of paternity, the admission of such
record or report shall create a rebuttable
presumption of paternity, and shall establish, if
unrebutted, the paternity of and liability for the
support of a child pursuant to this article and
article four of this act.
(b) Whenever the court directs a genetic marker or
DNA test pursuant to this section, a report made as
provided in subdivision (a) of this section may be
received in evidence pursuant to rule forty-five
hundred eighteen of the civil practice law and rules if
offered by any party.
(c) The cost of any test ordered pursuant to
subdivision (a) of this section shall be, in the first
instance, paid by the moving party. If the moving
party is financially unable to pay such cost, the court
may direct any qualified public health officer to
conduct such test, if practicable; otherwise, the court
may direct payment from the funds of the appropriate
local social services district. In its order of
disposition, however, the court may direct that the
cost of any such test be apportioned between the
parties according to their respective abilities to pay or
be assessed against the party who does not prevail on
the issue of paternity, unless such party is financially
unable to pay. (emphasis supplied)
In R.E. v. C.E.W.,[43] a decision of the
Mississippi Supreme Court, DNA tests were used to
prove that H.W., previously thought to be an
offspring of the marriage between A.C.W. and
C.E.W., was actually the child of R.E. with whom
C.E.W. had, at the time of conception, maintained an
adulterous relationship.
In Erie County Department of Social Services
on behalf of Tiffany M.H. v. Greg G.,[44] the
4th Department of the New York Supreme Courts
Appellate Division allowed G.G., who had been
adjudicated as T.M.H.s father by default, to have the
said judgment vacated, even after six years, once he
had shown through a genetic marker test that he was
not the childs father. In this case, G.G. only requested
the tests after the Department of Social Services, six
years after G.G. had been adjudicated as T.M.H.s
father, sought an increase in his support obligation to
her.
In Greco v. Coleman,[45] the Michigan Supreme
Court while ruling on the constitutionality of a
provision of law allowing non-modifiable support
agreements pointed out that it was because of the
difficulty of determining paternity before the advent
of DNA testing that such support agreements were
necessary:
As a result of DNA testing, the accuracy with which
paternity can be proven has increased significantly
since the parties in this lawsuit entered into their
support agreement(current testing methods can
determine the probability of paternity to 99.999999%
accuracy). However, at the time the parties before us
entered into the disputed agreement, proving
paternity was a very significant obstacle to an
illegitimate child's access to child support. The first
reported results of modern DNA paternity testing did
not occur until 1985. ("In fact, since its first reported
results in 1985, DNA matching has progressed to
'general acceptance in less than a decade'"). Of
course, while prior blood-testing methods could
exclude some males from being the possible father of
a child, those methods could not affirmatively
pinpoint a particular male as being the father. Thus,
when the settlement agreement between the present
parties was entered in 1980, establishing paternity
was a far more difficult ordeal than at present.
Contested paternity actions at that time were often no
more than credibility contests. Consequently, in
every contested paternity action, obtaining child
support depended not merely on whether the putative
father was, in fact, the child's biological father, but
rather on whether the mother could prove to a court
of law that she was only sexually involved with one
man--the putative father. Allowing parties the option
of entering into private agreements in lieu of proving
paternity eliminated the risk that the mother would be
unable meet her burden of proof.
It is worth noting that amendments to
Michigans Paternity law have included the use of
DNA testing:[46]
722.716 Pretrial proceedings; blood or tissue typing
determinations as to mother, child, and alleged father;
court order; refusal to submit to typing or
identification profiling; qualifications of person
conducting typing or identification profiling;
compensation of expert; result of typing or
identification profiling; filing summary report;
objection; admissibility; presumption; burden of
proof; summary disposition.
Sec. 6.
(1) In a proceeding under this act before trial, the
court, upon application made by or on behalf of
either party, or on its own motion, shall order that
the mother, child, and alleged father submit to
blood or tissue typing determinations, which may
include, but are not limited to, determinations of
red cell antigens, red cell isoenzymes, human
leukocyte antigens, serum proteins,
or DNAidentification profiling, to determine
whether the alleged father is likely to be, or is not,
the father of the child. If the court orders a blood
or tissue typing or DNA identification profiling to
be conducted and a party refuses to submit to the
typing or DNA identification profiling, in addition
to any other remedies available, the court may do
either of the following:
(a) Enter a default judgment at the request of the
appropriate party.
(b) If a trial is held, allow the disclosure of the fact
of the refusal unless good cause is shown for not
disclosing the fact of refusal.
(2) A blood or tissue typing or DNA identification
profiling shall be conducted by a person accredited
for paternity determinations by a nationally
recognized scientific organization, including, but not
limited to, the American association of blood banks.
xxx xxx xxx
(5) If the probability of paternity determined by
the qualified person described in subsection (2)
conducting the blood or tissue typing
or DNA identification profiling is 99% or higher,
and theDNA identification profile and summary
report are admissible as provided in subsection
(4), paternity is presumed. If the results of the
analysis of genetic testing material from 2 or more
persons indicate a probability of paternity greater
than 99%, the contracting laboratory shall
conduct additional genetic paternity testing until
all but 1 of the putative fathers is eliminated,
unless the dispute involves 2 or more putative
fathers who have identical DNA.
(6) Upon the establishment of the presumption of
paternity as provided in subsection (5), either party
may move for summary disposition under the court
rules. this section does not abrogate the right of either
party to child support from the date of birth of the
child if applicable under section 7. (emphasis
supplied)
In Rafferty v. Perkins,[47] the Supreme Court of
Mississippi ruled that DNA test results showing
paternity were sufficient to overthrow the
presumption of legitimacy of a child born during the
course of a marriage:
The presumption of legitimacy having been rebutted
by the results of the blood test eliminating Perkins as
Justin's father, even considering the evidence in the
light most favorable to Perkins, we find that no
reasonable jury could find that Easter is not Justin's
father based upon the 99.94% probability of paternity
concluded by the DNA testing.
In S.J.F. and J.C.F. v. R.C.W.,[48] the North
Dakota Supreme Court upheld an order for genetic
testing given by the Court of Appeals, even after trial
on the merits had concluded without such order being
given. Significantly, when J.C.F., the mother, first
filed the case for paternity and support with the
District Court, neither party requested genetic testing.
It was only upon appeal from dismissal of the case
that the appellate court remanded the case and
ordered the testing, which the North Dakota Supreme
Court upheld.
The case of Kohl v. Amundson,[49] decided by
the Supreme Court of South Dakota, demonstrated
that even default judgments of paternity could be
vacated after the adjudicated father had, through
DNA testing, established non-paternity. In this case,
Kohl, having excluded himself as the father of
Amundsons child through DNA testing, was able to
have the default judgment against him vacated. He
then obtained a ruling ordering Amundson to
reimburse him for the amounts withheld from his
wages for child support. The Court said (w)hile
Amundson may have a remedy against the father of
the child, she submit(ted) no authority that require(d)
Kohl to support her child. Contrary to Amundson's
position, the fact that a default judgment was entered,
but subsequently vacated, (did) not foreclose Kohl
from obtaining a money judgment for the amount
withheld from his wages.
In M.A.S. v. Mississippi Dept. of Human
Services,[50] another case decided by the Supreme
Court of Mississippi, it was held that even if paternity
was established through an earlier agreed order of
filiation, child support and visitation orders could still
be vacated once DNA testing established someone
other than the named individual to be the biological
father. The Mississippi High Court reiterated this
doctrine in Williams v. Williams.[51]
The foregoing considered, we find no grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the public
respondent for upholding the orders of the trial court
which both denied the petitioners motion to dismiss
and ordered him to submit himself for DNA testing.
Under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
the remedy of certiorari is only available when any
tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in
excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law.[52] In Land Bank of the Philippines v. the
Court of Appeals[53] where we dismissed a special
civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, we discussed
at length the nature of such a petition and just what
was meant by grave abuse of discretion:
Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction or, in other words, where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary manner by
reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility,
and it must be so patent or gross as to amount to
an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal
to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law.
The special civil action for certiorari is a remedy
designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction
and not errors of judgment. The raison detre for the
rule is when a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error
committed while so engaged does not deprive it of
the jurisdiction being exercised when the error is
committed. If it did, every error committed by a court
would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every
erroneous judgment would be a void judgment. In
such a scenario, the administration of justice would
not survive. Hence, where the issue or question
involved affects the wisdom or legal soundness of the
decisionnot the jurisdiction of the court to render said
decisionthe same is beyond the province of a special
civil action for certiorari.
The proper recourse of the aggrieved party from a
decision of the CA is a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court. On the other hand, if the error subject of the
recourse is one of jurisdiction, or the act complained
of was perpetrated by a quasi-judicial officer or
agency with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, the proper remedy
available to the aggrieved party is a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the said Rules. (emphasis
supplied)
In the instant case, the petitioner has in no way
shown any arbitrariness, passion, prejudice or
personal hostility that would amount to grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals. The
respondent court acted entirely within its jurisdiction
in promulgating its decision and resolution, and any
error made would have only been an error in
judgment. As we have discussed, however, the
decision of the respondent court, being firmly
anchored in law and jurisprudence, was correct.
Epilogue
For too long, illegitimate children have been
marginalized by fathers who choose to deny their
existence. The growing sophistication of DNA testing
technology finally provides a much needed equalizer
for such ostracized and abandoned progeny. We have
long believed in the merits of DNA testing and have
repeatedly expressed as much in the past. This case
comes at a perfect time when DNA testing has finally
evolved into a dependable and authoritative form of
evidence gathering. We therefore take this
opportunity to forcefully reiterate our stand that DNA
testing is a valid means of determining paternity.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
petition is hereby DENIED. The Court of Appeals
decision dated January 28, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No.
80961 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 110662 August 4, 1994
TERESITA SALCEDO-ORTANEZ, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ROMEO F.
ZAMORA, Presiding Judge, Br. 94, Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City and RAFAEL S.
ORTANEZ, respondents.
Oscar A. Inocentes & Associates Law Office for
petitioner.
Efren A. Santos for private respondent.
PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court which seeks to reverse the
decision * of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.
R. SP No. 28545 entitled "Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez
versus Hon. Romeo F. Zamora, Presiding Judge, Br.
94, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City and Rafael
S. Ortanez".
The relevant facts of the case are as follows:
On 2 May 1990, private respondent Rafael S. Ortanez
filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a
complaint for annulment of marriage with damages
against petitioner Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez, on
grounds of lack of marriage license and/or
psychological incapacity of the petitioner. The
complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-90-5360
and raffled to Branch 94, RTC of Quezon City
presided over by respondent Judge Romeo F.
Zamora.
Private respondent, after presenting his evidence,
orally formally offered in evidence Exhibits "A" to
"M".
Among the exhibits offered by private respondent
were three (3) cassette tapes of alleged telephone
conversations between petitioner and unidentified
persons.
Petitioner submitted her Objection/Comment to
private respondent's oral offer of evidence on 9 June
1992; on the same day, the trial court admitted all of
private respondent's offered evidence.
A motion for reconsideration from petitioner was
denied on 23 June 1992.
A petition for certiorari was then filed by petitioner
in the Court of Appeals assailing the admission in
evidence of the aforementioned cassette tapes.
On 10 June 1993, the Court of Appeals rendered
judgment which is the subject of the present petition,
which in part reads:
It is much too obvious that the petition will
have to fail, for two basic reasons:
(1) Tape recordings are not inadmissible per
se. They and any other variant thereof can
be admitted in evidence for certain purposes,
depending on how they are presented and
offered and on how the trial judge utilizes
them in the interest of truth and fairness and
the even handed administration of justice.
(2) A petition for certiorari is notoriously
inappropriate to rectify a supposed error in
admitting evidence adduced during trial. The
ruling on admissibility is interlocutory;
neither does it impinge on jurisdiction. If it
is erroneous, the ruling should be questioned
in the appeal from the judgment on the
merits and not through the special civil
action of certiorari. The error, assuming
gratuitously that it exists, cannot be anymore
than an error of law, properly correctible by
appeal and not by certiorari.Otherwise, we
will have the sorry spectacle of a case being
subject of a counterproductive "ping-pong"
to and from the appellate court as often as a
trial court is perceived to have made an error
in any of its rulings with respect to
evidentiary matters in the course of trial.
This we cannot sanction.
WHEREFORE, the petition
for certiorari being devoid of merit, is
hereby DISMISSED. 1
From this adverse judgment, petitioner filed the
present petition for review, stating:
Grounds for Allowance of the
Petition
10. The decision of respondent
[Court of Appeals] has no basis in
law nor previous decision of the
Supreme Court.
10.1 In affirming the
questioned order of
respondent judge, the Court of
Appeals has decided a
question of substance not
theretofore determined by the
Supreme Court as the
question of admissibility in
evidence of tape recordings
has not, thus far, been
addressed and decided
squarely by the Supreme
Court.
11. In affirming the questioned
order of respondent judge, the
Court of Appeals has likewise
rendered a decision in a way not in
accord with law and with
applicable decisions of the
Supreme Court.
11.1 Although the questioned
order is interlocutory in
nature, the same can still be
[the] subject of a petition
for certiorari. 2
The main issue to be resolved is whether or not the
remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court was properly availed of by the petitioner in the
Court of Appeals.
The extraordinary writ of certiorari is generally not
available to challenge an interlocutory order of a trial
court. The proper remedy in such cases is an ordinary
appeal from an adverse judgment, incorporating in
said appeal the grounds for assailing the interlocutory
order.
However, where the assailed interlocutory order is
patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would
not afford adequate and expeditious relief, the Court
may allow certiorari as a mode of redress. 3
In the present case, the trial court issued the assailed
order admitting all of the evidence offered by private
respondent, including tape recordings of telephone
conversations of petitioner with unidentified persons.
These tape recordings were made and obtained when
private respondent allowed his friends from the question. Absent a clear showing that both parties to
military to wire tap his home telephone. 4 the telephone conversations allowed the recording of
Rep. Act No. 4200 entitled "An Act to Prohibit and the same, the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is
Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations mandatory under Rep. Act No. 4200.
of the Privacy of Communication, and for other Additionally, it should be mentioned that the above-
purposes" expressly makes such tape recordings mentioned Republic Act in Section 2 thereof imposes
inadmissible in evidence. The relevant provisions of a penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6)
Rep. Act No. 4200 are as follows: months and up to six (6) years for violation of said
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful Act. 5
for any person, not being We need not address the other arguments raised by
authorized by all the the parties, involving the applicability of American
parties to any private jurisprudence, having arrived at the conclusion that
communication or spoken the subject cassette tapes are inadmissible in evidence
word, to tap any wire or under Philippine law.
cable, or by using any WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals
other device or in CA-G. R. SP No. 28545 is hereby SET ASIDE.
arrangement, to secretly The subject cassette tapes are declared inadmissible
overhear, intercept, or in evidence.
record such SO ORDERED.
communication or spoken
word by using a device
commonly known as a
dictaphone or dictagraph
or detectaphone or walkie-
talkie or tape-recorder, or
however otherwise
described. . . .
Sec. 4. Any
communication or spoken
word, or the existence,
contents, substance,
purport, or meaning of the
same or any part thereof,
or any information therein
contained, obtained or
secured by any person in
violation of the preceding
sections of this Act shall
not be admissible in
evidence in any judicial,
quasi-judicial, legislative
or administrative hearing
or investigation.
Clearly, respondents trial court and Court of Appeals
failed to consider the afore-quoted provisions of the
law in admitting in evidence the cassette tapes in
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-69809 October 16, 1986
EDGARDO A. GAANAN, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This petition for certiorari asks for an interpretation
of Republic Act (RA) No. 4200, otherwise known as
the Anti-Wiretapping Act, on the issue of whether or
not an extension telephone is among the prohibited
devices in Section 1 of the Act, such that its use to
overhear a private conversation would constitute
unlawful interception of communications between the
two parties using a telephone line.
The facts presented by the People and narrated in the
respondent court's decision are not disputed by the
petitioner.
In the morning of October 22,
1975, complainant Atty. Tito Pintor
and his client Manuel Montebon
were in the living room of
complainant's residence discussing
the terms for the withdrawal of the
complaint for direct assault which
they filed with the Office of the
City Fiscal of Cebu against
Leonardo Laconico. After they had
decided on the proposed
conditions, complainant made a
telephone call to Laconico (tsn,
August 26, 1981, pp. 3-5).
That same morning, Laconico
telephoned appellant, who is a
lawyer, to come to his office and
advise him on the settlement of the
direct assault case because his
regular lawyer, Atty. Leon
Gonzaga, went on a business trip.
According to the request, appellant
went to the office of Laconico
where he was briefed about the
problem. (Exhibit 'D', tsn, April 22,
1982, pp. 4-5).
When complainant called up,
Laconico requested appellant to
secretly listen to the telephone
conversation through a telephone
extension so as to hear personally
the proposed conditions for the
settlement. Appellant heard
complainant enumerate the
following conditions for
withdrawal of the complaint for
direct assault.
(a) the P5,000.00 was no longer
acceptable, and that the figure had
been increased to P8,000.00. A
breakdown of the P8,000.00 had
been made together with other
demands, to wit: (a) P5,000.00 no
longer for the teacher Manuel
Montebon, but for Atty. Pintor
himself in persuading his client to
withdraw the case for Direct
Assault against Atty. Laconico
before the Cebu City Fiscal's
Office;
(b) Public apology to be made by
Atty. Laconico before the students
of Don Bosco Technical High
School;
(c) Pl,000.00 to be given to the Don
Bosco Faculty club;
(d) transfer of son of Atty.
Laconico to another school or
another section of Don Bosco
Technical High School;
(e) Affidavit of desistance by Atty.
Laconico on the Maltreatment case
earlier filed against Manuel
Montebon at the Cebu City Fiscal's
Office, whereas Montebon's
affidavit of desistance on the Direct
Assault Case against Atty.
Laconico to be filed later;
(f) Allow Manuel Montebon to
continue teaching at the Don Bosco
Technical School;
(g) Not to divulge the truth about
the settlement of the Direct Assault
Case to the mass media;
(h) P2,000.00 attorney s fees for
Atty. Pintor. (tsn, August 26, 1981,
pp. 47-48).
Twenty minutes later, complainant
called up again to ask Laconico if
he was agreeable to the conditions.
Laconico answered 'Yes'.
Complainant then told Laconico to
wait for instructions on where to
deliver the money. (tsn, March 10,
1983, pp. 2-12).
Complainant called up again and
instructed Laconico to give the
money to his wife at the office of
the then Department of Public
Highways. Laconico who earlier
alerted his friend Colonel Zulueta
of the Criminal Investigation
Service of the Philippine
Constabulary, insisted that
complainant himself should receive
the money. (tsn, March 10, 1982,
pp. 26-33). When he received the
money at the Igloo Restaurant,
complainant was arrested by agents
of the Philippine Constabulary.
Appellant executed on the
following day an affidavit stating
that he heard complainant demand
P8,000.00 for the withdrawal of the
case for direct assault. Laconico
attached the affidavit of appellant
to the complainant for
robbery/extortion which he filed
against complainant. Since
appellant listened to the telephone
conversation without complainant's
consent, complainant charged
appellant and Laconico with
 violation of the Anti-Wiretapping
Act.
After trial on the merits, the lower court, in a decision
dated November 22, 1982, found both Gaanan and
Laconico guilty of violating Section 1 of Republic
Act No. 4200. The two were each sentenced to one
(1) year imprisonment with costs. Not satisfied with
the decision, the petitioner appealed to the appellate
court.
On August 16, 1984, the Intermediate Appellate
Court affirmed the decision of the trial court, holding
that the communication between the complainant and
accused Laconico was private in nature and,
therefore, covered by Rep. Act No. 4200; that the
petitioner overheard such communication without the
knowledge and consent of the complainant; and that
the extension telephone which was used by the
petitioner to overhear the telephone conversation
between complainant and Laconico is covered in the
term "device' as provided in Rep. Act No. 4200.
In this petition for certiorari, the petitioner assails the
decision of the appellate court and raises the
following issues; (a) whether or not the telephone
conversation between the complainant and accused
Laconico was private in nature; (b) whether or not an
extension telephone is covered by the term "device or
arrangement" under Rep. Act No. 4200; (c) whether
or not the petitioner had authority to listen or
overhear said telephone conversation and (d) whether
or not Rep. Act No. 4200 is ambiguous and,
therefore, should be construed in favor of the
petitioner.
Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 4200 provides:
Section 1. It shall be unlawful for
any person, not being authorized by
all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to
tap any wire or cable or by using
any other device or arrangement, to
secretly overhear, intercept, or
record such communication or
spoken word by using a device
commonly known as a dictaphone
or dictagraph or detectaphone or
walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or
however otherwise described:
It shall be unlawful for any person,
be he a participant or not in the act
or acts penalized in the next
preceeding sentence, to knowingly
possess any tape record, wire
record, disc record, or any other
such record, or copies thereof, of
any communication or spoken word
secured either before or after the
effective date of this Act in the
manner prohibited by this law; or to
replay the same for any other
person or persons; or to
communicate the contents thereof,
either verbally or in writing, or to
furnish transcriptions thereof,
whether complete or partial, to any
other person: Provided, that the use
of such record or any copies thereof
as evidence in any civil, criminal
investigation or trial of offenses
mentioned in Section 3 hereof,
shall not be covered by this
prohibition.
We rule for the petitioner.
We are confronted in this case with the interpretation
of a penal statute and not a rule of evidence. The
issue is not the admissibility of evidence secured over
an extension line of a telephone by a third party. The
issue is whether or not the person called over the
telephone and his lawyer listening to the conversation
on an extension line should both face prison
sentences simply because the extension was used to
enable them to both listen to an alleged attempt at
extortion.
There is no question that the telephone conversation
between complainant Atty. Pintor and accused Atty.
Laconico was "private" in the sense that the words
uttered were made between one person and another
as distinguished from words between a speaker and a
public. It is also undisputed that only one of the
parties gave the petitioner the authority to listen to
and overhear the caller's message with the use of an
extension telephone line. Obviously, complainant
Pintor, a member of the Philippine bar, would not
have discussed the alleged demand for an P8,000.00
consideration in order to have his client withdraw a
direct assault charge against Atty. Laconico filed
with the Cebu City Fiscal's Office if he knew that
another lawyer was also listening. We have to
consider, however, that affirmance of the criminal
conviction would, in effect, mean that a caller by
merely using a telephone line can force the listener to
secrecy no matter how obscene, criminal, or
annoying the call may be. It would be the word of the
caller against the listener's.
Because of technical problems caused by the
sensitive nature of electronic equipment and the extra
heavy loads which telephone cables are made to carry
in certain areas, telephone users often encounter what
are called "crossed lines". An unwary citizzen who
happens to pick up his telephone and who overhears
the details of a crime might hesitate to inform police
authorities if he knows that he could be accused
under Rep. Act 4200 of using his own telephone to
secretly overhear the private communications of the
would be criminals. Surely the law was never
intended for such mischievous results.
The main issue in the resolution of this petition,
however, revolves around the meaning of the phrase
"any other device or arrangement." Is an extension of
a telephone unit such a device or arrangement as
would subject the user to imprisonment ranging from
six months to six years with the accessory penalty of
perpetual absolute disqualification for a public officer
or deportation for an alien? Private secretaries with
extension lines to their bosses' telephones are
sometimes asked to use answering or recording
devices to record business conversations between a
boss and another businessman. Would transcribing a
recorded message for the use of the boss be a
proscribed offense? or for that matter, would a "party
line" be a device or arrangement under the law?
The petitioner contends that telephones or extension
telephones are not included in the enumeration of
"commonly known" listening or recording devices,
nor do they belong to the same class of enumerated
electronic devices contemplated by law. He maintains
that in 1964, when Senate Bill No. 9 (later Rep. Act
No. 4200) was being considered in the Senate,
telephones and extension telephones were already
widely used instruments, probably the most popularly
known communication device.
Whether or not listening over a telephone party line
would be punishable was discussed on the floor of
the Senate. Yet, when the bill was finalized into a
statute, no mention was made of telephones in the
enumeration of devices "commonly known as a
dictaphone or dictagraph, detectaphone or walkie
talkie or tape recorder or however otherwise
described." The omission was not a mere oversight.
Telephone party lines were intentionally deleted from
the provisions of the Act.
The respondent People argue that an extension
telephone is embraced and covered by the term
"device" within the context of the aforementioned
law because it is not a part or portion of a complete
set of a telephone apparatus. It is a separate device
and distinct set of a movable apparatus consisting of
a wire and a set of telephone receiver not forming
part of a main telephone set which can be detached or
removed and can be transferred away from one place
to another and to be plugged or attached to a main
telephone line to get the desired communication
corning from the other party or end.
The law refers to a "tap" of a wire or cable or the use
of a "device or arrangement" for the purpose of
secretly overhearing, intercepting, or recording the
communication. There must be either a physical
interruption through a wiretap or
the deliberate installation of a device or arrangement
in order to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken
words.
An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same
category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or the other
devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as
the use thereof cannot be considered as "tapping" the
wire or cable of a telephone line. The telephone
extension in this case was not installed for that
purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary
office use. It is a rule in statutory construction that in
order to determine the true intent of the legislature,
the particular clauses and phrases of the statute
should not be taken as detached and isolated
expressions, but the whole and every part thereof
must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of
its parts. (see Commissioner of Customs v. Esso
Estandard Eastern, Inc., 66 SCRA 113,120).
In the case of Empire Insurance Com any v.
Rufino (90 SCRA 437, 443-444), we ruled:
Likewise, Article 1372 of the Civil Code
stipulates that 'however general the terms of a
contract may be, they shall not be understood
to comprehend things that are distinct and
cases that are different from those upon which
the parties intended to agree.' Similarly,
Article 1374 of the same Code provides that
'the various stipulations of a contract shall be
interpreted together, attributing to the doubtful
ones that sense which may result from all of
them taken jointly.
xxx xxx xxx
Consequently, the phrase 'all liabilities or
obligations of the decedent' used in paragraph
5(c) and 7(d) should be then restricted only to
those listed in the Inventory and should not be
construed as to comprehend all other
obligations of the decedent. The rule that
'particularization followed by a general
expression will ordinarily be restricted to the
former' is based on the fact in human
experience that usually the minds of parties
are addressed specially to the
particularization, and that the generalities,
though broad enough to comprehend other
fields if they stood alone, are used in
contemplation of that upon which the minds
of the parties are centered. (Hoffman v.
Eastern Wisconsin R., etc., Co., 134 Wis. 603,
607, 115 NW 383, cited in Francisco, Revised
Rules of Court (Evidence), 1973 ed, pp. 180-
181).
Hence, the phrase "device or arrangement" in Section
1 of RA No. 4200, although not exclusive to that
enumerated therein, should be construed to
comprehend instruments of the same or similar
nature, that is, instruments the use of which would be
tantamount to tapping the main line of a telephone. It
refers to instruments whose installation or presence
cannot be presumed by the party or parties being
overheard because, by their very nature, they are not
of common usage and their purpose is precisely for
tapping, intercepting or recording a telephone
conversation.
An extension telephone is an instrument which is
very common especially now when the extended unit
does not have to be connected by wire to the main
telephone but can be moved from place ' to place
within a radius of a kilometer or more. A person
should safely presume that the party he is calling at
the other end of the line probably has an extension
telephone and he runs the risk of a third party
listening as in the case of a party line or a telephone
unit which shares its line with another. As was held
in the case of Rathbun v. United States (355, U.S.
107, 2 L Ed 2d 137-138):
Common experience tells us that a
call to a particular telephone
number may cause the bell to ring
in more than one ordinarily used
instrument. Each party to a
telephone conversation takes the
risk that the other party may have
an extension telephone and may
allow another to overhear the
conversation. When such takes
place there has been no violation of
any privacy of which the parties
may complain. Consequently, one
element of 605, interception, has
not occurred.
In the same case, the Court further ruled that the
conduct of the party would differ in no way if instead
of repeating the message he held out his hand-set so
that another could hear out of it and that there is no
distinction between that sort of action and permitting
an outsider to use an extension telephone for the
same purpose.
Furthermore, it is a general rule that penal statutes
must be construed strictly in favor of the accused.
Thus, in case of doubt as in the case at bar, on
whether or not an extension telephone is included in
the phrase "device or arrangement", the penal statute
must be construed as not including an extension
telephone. In the case of People v. Purisima, 86
SCRA 542, 562, we explained the rationale behind
the rule:
 American jurisprudence sets down
the reason for this rule to be the
tenderness of the law of the rights
of individuals; the object is to
establish a certain rule by
conformity to which mankind
would be safe, and the discretion of
the court limited. (United States v.
Harris, 177 US 305, 44 L Ed 780,
20 S Ct 609; Braffith v. Virgin
Islands (CA3) 26 F2d 646; Caudill
v. State, 224 Ind 531, 69 NE2d;
Jennings v. Commonwealth, 109
VA 821,63 SE 1080, all cited in 73
Am Jur 2d 452). The purpose is not
to enable a guilty person to escape
punishment through a technicality
but to provide a precise definition
of forbidden acts." (State v.
Zazzaro, 20 A 2d 737, quoted in
Martin's Handbook on Statutory
Construction, Rev. Ed. pp. 183-
184).
In the same case of Purisima, we also ruled that on
the construction or interpretation of a legislative
measure, the primary rule is to search for and
determine the intent and spirit of the law. A perusal
of the Senate Congressional Records will show that
not only did our lawmakers not contemplate the
inclusion of an extension telephone as a prohibited
device or arrangement" but of greater importance,
they were more concerned with penalizing the act of
recording than the act of merely listening to a
telephone conversation.
xxx xxx xxx
Senator Tañada. Another possible objection to
that is entrapment which is certainly
objectionable. It is made possible by special
amendment which Your Honor may introduce.
Senator Diokno.Your Honor, I would feel that
entrapment would be less possible with the
amendment than without it, because with the
amendment the evidence of entrapment would
only consist of government testimony as
against the testimony of the defendant. With
this amendment, they would have the right,
and the government officials and the person in WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
fact would have the right to tape record their decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court
conversation. dated August 16, 1984 is ANNULLED and SET
Senator Tañada. In case of entrapment, it ASIDE. The petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED of the
would be the government. crime of violation of Rep. Act No. 4200, otherwise
Senator Diokno. In the same way, under this known as the Anti-Wiretapping Act.
provision, neither party could record and, SO ORDERED.
therefore, the court would be limited to
saying: "Okay, who is more credible, the
police officers or the defendant?" In these
cases, as experienced lawyers, we know that
the Court go with the peace offices.
(Congressional Record, Vol. 111, No. 33, p.
628, March 12, 1964).
xxx xxx xxx
Senator Diokno. The point I have in mind is
that under these conditions, with an agent
outside listening in, he could falsify the
testimony and there is no way of checking it.
But if you allow him to record or make a
recording in any form of what is happening,
then the chances of falsifying the evidence is
not very much.
Senator Tañada. Your Honor, this bill is not
intended to prevent the presentation of false
testimony. If we could devise a way by which
we could prevent the presentation of false
testimony, it would be wonderful. But what
this bill intends to prohibit is the use of tape
record and other electronic devices to
intercept private conversations which later on
will be used in court.
(Congressional Record, Vol. III, No. 33,
March 12, 1964, p. 629).
It can be readily seen that our lawmakers intended to
discourage, through punishment, persons such as
government authorities or representatives of
organized groups from installing devices in order to
gather evidence for use in court or to intimidate,
blackmail or gain some unwarranted advantage over
the telephone users. Consequently, the mere act of
listening, in order to be punishable must strictly be
with the use of the enumerated devices in RA No.
4200 or others of similar nature. We are of the view
that an extension telephone is not among such
devices or arrangements.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 93833 September 28, 1995
SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and
ESTER S. GARCIA, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro
D. Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City alleging that the private respondent, Ester S.
Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter's office,
allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a
"hostile and furious mood" and in a manner offensive
to petitioner's dignity and personality," contrary to
morals, good customs and public policy." 1
In support of her claim, petitioner produced a
verbatim transcript of the event and sought moral
damages, attorney's fees and other expenses of
litigation in the amount of P610,000.00, in addition to
costs, interests and other reliefs awardable at the trial
court's discretion. The transcript on which the civil
case was based was culled from a tape recording of
the confrontation made by petitioner. 2 The transcript
reads as follows:
Plaintiff Soccoro D. Ramirez
(Chuchi) — Good Afternoon
M'am.
Defendant Ester S. Garcia (ESG)
— Ano ba ang nangyari sa 'yo,
nakalimot ka na kung paano ka
napunta rito, porke member ka na,
magsumbong ka kung ano ang
gagawin ko sa 'yo.
CHUCHI — Kasi, naka duty ako
noon.
ESG — Tapos iniwan no. (Sic)
CHUCHI — Hindi m'am, pero ilan
beses na nila akong binalikan,
sabing ganoon —
ESG — Ito and (sic) masasabi ko
sa 'yo, ayaw kung (sic) mag explain
ka, kasi hanggang 10:00 p.m.,
kinabukasan hindi ka na pumasok.
Ngayon ako ang babalik sa 'yo,
nag-aaply ka sa States, nag-aaply
ka sa review mo, kung
kakailanganin ang certification mo,
kalimutan mo na kasi hindi ka sa
akin makakahingi.
CHUCHI — Hindi M'am. Kasi ang
ano ko talaga noon i-cocontinue ko
up to 10:00 p.m.
ESG — Bastos ka, nakalimutan mo
na kung paano ka pumasok dito sa
hotel. Magsumbong ka sa Union
kung gusto mo. Nakalimutan mo na
kung paano ka nakapasok dito "Do
you think that on your own
makakapasok ka kung hindi ako.
Panunumbyoyan na kita
(Sinusumbatan na kita).
CHUCHI — Itutuloy ko na M'am
sana ang duty ko.
ESG — Kaso ilang beses na akong
binabalikan doon ng mga no (sic)
ko.
ESG — Nakalimutan mo na ba
kung paano ka pumasok sa hotel,
kung on your own merit alam ko
naman kung gaano ka "ka bobo"
mo. Marami ang nag-aaply alam
kong hindi ka papasa.
CHUCHI — Kumuha kami ng
exam noon.
ESG — Oo, pero hindi ka papasa.
CHUCHI — Eh, bakit ako ang
nakuha ni Dr. Tamayo
ESG — Kukunin ka kasi ako.
CHUCHI — Eh, di sana —
ESG — Huwag mong ipagmalaki
na may utak ka kasi wala kang
utak. Akala mo ba makukuha ka
dito kung hindi ako.
CHUCHI — Mag-eexplain ako.
ESG — Huwag na, hindi ako mag-
papa-explain sa 'yo, makaalala ka
kung paano ka puma-rito. "Putang-
ina" sasabi-sabihin mo kamag-anak
ng nanay at tatay mo ang mga
magulang ko.
ESG — Wala na akong pakialam,
dahil nandito ka sa loob, nasa labas
ka puwede ka ng hindi pumasok,
okey yan nasaloob ka umalis ka
doon.
CHUCHI — Kasi M'am,
binbalikan ako ng mga taga Union.
ESG — Nandiyan na rin ako, pero
huwag mong kalimutan na hindi ka
makakapasok kung hindi ako.
Kung hindi mo kinikilala yan okey
lang sa akin, dahil tapos ka na.
CHUCHI — Ina-ano ko m'am na
utang na loob.
ESG — Huwag na lang, hindi mo
utang na loob, kasi kung baga sa
no, nilapastangan mo ako.
CHUCHI — Paano kita
nilapastanganan?
ESG — Mabuti pa lumabas ka na.
Hindi na ako makikipagusap sa 'yo.
Lumabas ka na. Magsumbong ka. 3
As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and
alleging that the said act of secretly taping the
confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a
criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of
Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200,
entitled "An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping
and other related violations of private
communication, and other purposes." An information
charging petitioner of violation of the said Act, dated
October 6, 1988 is quoted herewith:
INFORMATION
The Undersigned Assistant City
Fiscal Accusses Socorro D.
Ramirez of Violation of Republic
Act No. 4200, committed as
follows:
That on or about the 22nd day of
February, 1988, in Pasay City
Metro Manila, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this
honorable court, the above-named
 accused, Socorro D. Ramirez not
being authorized by Ester S. Garcia
to record the latter's conversation
with said accused, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with the use of a tape
recorder secretly record the said
conversation and thereafter
communicate in writing the
contents of the said recording to
other person.
Contrary to law.
Pasay City, Metro Manila,
September 16, 1988.
Upon arraignment, in lieu of a plea, petitioner filed a
Motion to Quash the Information on the ground that
the facts charged do not constitute an offense,
particularly a violation of R.A. 4200. In an order May
3, 1989, the trial court granted the Motion to Quash,
agreeing with petitioner that 1) the facts charged do
not constitute an offense under R.A. 4200; and that 2)
the violation punished by R.A. 4200 refers to a the
taping of a communication by a person other than a
participant to the communication. 4
From the trial court's Order, the private respondent
filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with this
Court, which forthwith referred the case to the Court
of Appeals in a Resolution (by the First Division) of
June 19, 1989.
On February 9, 1990, respondent Court of Appeals
promulgated its assailed Decision declaring the trial
court's order of May 3, 1989 null and void, and
holding that:
[T]he allegations sufficiently
constitute an offense punishable
under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. In
thus quashing the information
based on the ground that the facts
alleged do not constitute an
offense, the respondent judge acted
in grave abuse of discretion
correctible by certiorari. 5
Consequently, on February 21, 1990, petitioner filed
a Motion for Reconsideration which respondent
Court of Appeals denied in its Resolution 6 dated June
19, 1990. Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner vigorously argues, as her "main and
principal issue" 7 that the applicable provision of
Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of a
private conversation by one of the parties to the
conversation. She contends that the provision merely
refers to the unauthorized taping of a private
conversation by a party other than those involved in
the communication. 8 In relation to this, petitioner
avers that the substance or content of the
conversation must be alleged in the Information,
otherwise the facts charged would not constitute a
violation of R.A. 4200. 9 Finally, petitioner agues that
R.A. 4200 penalizes the taping of a "private
communication," not a "private conversation" and
that consequently, her act of secretly taping her
conversation with private respondent was not illegal
under the said act. 10
We disagree.
First, legislative intent is determined principally from
the language of a statute. Where the language of a
statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied
according to its express terms, and interpretation
would be resorted to only where a literal
interpretation would be either impossible 11 or absurb
or would lead to an injustice. 12
Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, " An Act to Prohibit
and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other Related
Violations of Private Communication and Other
Purposes," provides:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawfull for any
person, not being authorized by all
the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to
tap any wire or cable, or by using
any other device or arrangement, to
secretly overhear, intercept, or
record such communication or
spoken word by using a device
commonly known as a dictaphone
or dictagraph or detectaphone or
walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or
however otherwise described.
The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally
makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all
the parties to any private communication to secretly
record such communication by means of a tape
recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether
the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought
to be a party other than or different from those
involved in the private communication. The statute's
intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make
such recording is underscored by the use of the
qualifier "any". Consequently, as respondent Court of
Appeals correctly concluded, "even a (person) privy
to a communication who records his private
conversation with another without the knowledge of
the latter (will) qualify as a violator" 13 under this
provision of R.A. 4200.
A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records,
moreover, supports the respondent court's conclusion
that in enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeed
contemplated to make illegal, unauthorized tape
recording of private conversations or
communications taken either by the parties
themselves or by third persons. Thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Senator Tañada: That qualified
only "overhear".
Senator Padilla: So that when it is
intercepted or recorded, the
element of secrecy would not
appear to be material. Now,
suppose, Your Honor, the recording
is not made by all the parties but by
some parties and involved not
criminal cases that would be
mentioned under section 3 but
would cover, for example civil
cases or special proceedings
whereby a recording is made not
necessarily by all the parties but
perhaps by some in an effort to
show the intent of the parties
because the actuation of the parties
prior, simultaneous even
subsequent to the contract or the act
may be indicative of their intention.
Suppose there is such a recording,
would you say, Your Honor, that
the intention is to cover it within
the purview of this bill or outside?
Senator Tañada: That is covered by
the purview of this bill, Your
Honor.
Senator Padilla: Even if the record
should be used not in the
prosecution of offense but as
evidence to be used in Civil Cases
or special proceedings?
Senator Tañada: That is right. This
is a complete ban on tape recorded
conversations taken without the
authorization of all the parties.
Senator Padilla: Now, would that
be reasonable, your Honor?
Senator Tañada: I believe it is
reasonable because it is not
sporting to record the observation
of one without his knowing it and
then using it against him. It is not
fair, it is not sportsmanlike. If the
purpose; Your honor, is to record
the intention of the parties. I
believe that all the parties should
know that the observations are
being recorded.
Senator Padilla: This might reduce
the utility of recorders.
Senator Tañada: Well no. For
example, I was to say that in
meetings of the board of directors
where a tape recording is taken,
there is no objection to this if all
the parties know. It is but fair that
the people whose remarks and
observations are being made should
know that the observations are
being recorded.
Senator Padilla: Now, I can
understand.
Senator Tañada: That is why when
we take statements of persons, we
say: "Please be informed that
whatever you say here may be used
against you." That is fairness and
that is what we demand. Now, in
spite of that warning, he makes
damaging statements against his
own interest, well, he cannot
complain any more. But if you are
going to take a recording of the
observations and remarks of a
person without him knowing that it
is being taped or recorded, without
him knowing that what is being
recorded may be used against him,
I think it is unfair.
xxx xxx xxx
(Congression Record, Vol. III, No.
31, p. 584, March 12, 1964)
Senator Diokno: Do you
understand, Mr. Senator, that under
Section 1 of the bill as now
worded, if a party secretly records
a public speech, he would be
penalized under Section 1? Because
the speech is public, but the
recording is done secretly.
Senator Tañada: Well, that
particular aspect is not
contemplated by the bill. It is the
communication between one person
and another person — not between
a speaker and a public.
xxx xxx xxx
(Congressional Record, Vol. III,
No. 33, p. 626, March 12, 1964)
xxx xxx xxx
The unambiguity of the express words of the
provision, taken together with the above-quoted
deliberations from the Congressional Record,
therefore plainly supports the view held by the
respondent court that the provision seeks to penalize
even those privy to the private communications.
Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not
distinguish.
Second, the nature of the conversations is immaterial
to a violation of the statute. The substance of the
same need not be specifically alleged in the
information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of
secretly overhearing, intercepting or
recording private communications by means of the
devices enumerated therein. The mere allegation that
an individual made a secret recording of a private
communication by means of a tape recorder would
suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of
R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor General pointed out in his
COMMENT before the respondent court: "Nowhere
(in the said law) is it required that before one can be
regarded as a violator, the nature of the conversation,
as well as its communication to a third person should
be professed." 14
Finally, petitioner's contention that the phrase
"private communication" in Section 1 of R.A. 4200
does not include "private conversations" narrows the
ordinary meaning of the word "communication" to a
point of absurdity. The word communicate comes
from the latin word communicare, meaning "to share
or to impart." In its ordinary signification,
communication connotes the act of sharing or
imparting signification, communication connotes the
act of sharing or imparting, as in a conversation, 15 or
signifies the "process by which meanings or thoughts
are shared between individuals through a common
system of symbols (as language signs or
gestures)" 16 These definitions are broad enough to
include verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive
communications of "meanings or thoughts" which are
likely to include the emotionally-charged exchange,
on February 22, 1988, between petitioner and private
respondent, in the privacy of the latter's office. Any
doubts about the legislative body's meaning of the
phrase "private communication" are, furthermore, put
to rest by the fact that the terms "conversation" and
"communication" were interchangeably used by
Senator Tañada in his Explanatory Note to the bill
quoted below:
It has been said that innocent
people have nothing to fear from
their conversations being
overheard. But this statement
ignores the usual nature
of conversations as well the
undeniable fact that most, if not all,
civilized people have some aspects
of their lives they do not wish to
expose. Free conversations are
often characterized by
exaggerations, obscenity, agreeable
 falsehoods, and the expression of
anti-social desires of views not
intended to be taken seriously. The
right to the privacy of
communication, among others, has
expressly been assured by our
Constitution. Needless to state here,
the framers of our Constitution
must have recognized the nature
of conversations between
individuals and the significance of
man's spiritual nature, of his
feelings and of his intellect. They
must have known that part of the
pleasures and satisfactions of life
are to be found in the unaudited,
and free exchange
of communication between
individuals — free from every
unjustifiable intrusion by whatever
means. 17
In Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 18 a case
which dealt with the issue of telephone wiretapping,
we held that the use of a telephone extension for the
purpose of overhearing a private conversation
without authorization did not violate R.A. 4200
because a telephone extension devise was neither
among those "device(s) or arrangement(s)"
enumerated therein, 19 following the principle that
"penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of
the accused." 20 The instant case turns on a different
note, because the applicable facts and circumstances
pointing to a violation of R.A. 4200 suffer from no
ambiguity, and the statute itself explicitly mentions
the unauthorized "recording" of private
communications with the use of tape-recorders as
among the acts punishable.
WHEREFORE, because the law, as applied to the
case at bench is clear and unambiguous and leaves us
with no discretion, the instant petition is hereby
DENIED. The decision appealed from is
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-1278 January 21, 1949
LORETO BARRIOQUINTO and NORBERTO
JIMENEZ, petitioners,
vs.
ENRIQUE A. FERNANDEZ, ANTONIO
BELMONTE and FELICISIMO OCAMPO, as
Commissioners of the Fourteenth Guerrilla
Amnesty Commission, respondents.
Roseller T. Lim for petitioners.
Antonio Belmonte for respondents.
FERIA, J.:
This is a special action of mandamus instituted by the
petitioners against the respondents who composed the
14th Guerrilla Amnesty Commission, to compel the
latter to act and decide whether or not the petitioners
are entitled to the benefits of amnesty.
Petitioners Norberto Jimenez and Loreto
Barrioquinto were charged with the crime of murder.
As the latter had not yet been arrested the case
proceeded against the former, and after trial Court of
First Instance of Zamboanga sentenced Jimenez to
life imprisonment. Before the period for perfecting an
appeal had expired, the defendant Jimenez became
aware of the Proclamation No. 8, dated September 7,
1946, which grants amnesty in favor of all persons
who may be charged with an act penalized under the
Revised Penal Code in furtherance of the resistance
to the enemy or against persons aiding in the war
efforts of the enemy, and committed during the
period from December 8, 1941, to the date when
particular area of the Philippines where the offense
was actually committed was liberated from enemy
control and occupation, and said Jimenez decided to
submit his case to the Guerrilla Amnesty
Commission presided by the respondents herein, and
the other petitioner Loreto Barrioquinto, who had
then been already apprehended, did the same.
After a preliminary hearing had started, the Amnesty
Commission, prescribed by the respondents, issued
on January 9, 1947, an order returning the cases of
the petitioners to the Court of First Instance of
Zamboanga, without deciding whether or not they are
entitled to the benefits of he said Amnesty
Proclamation, on the ground that inasmuch as neither
Barrioquinto nor Jimenez have admitted having
committed the offense, because Barrioquinto alleged
that it was Hipolito Tolentino who shot and killed the
victim, they cannot invoke the benefits of amnesty.
The Amnesty Proclamation of September 7, 1946,
issued by the President with the concurrence of
Congress of the Philippines, reads in part as follows:
WHEREAS, since the inception of the war
until the liberation of the different areas
comprising the territory of the Philippines,
volunteer armed forces of Filipinos and for
of other nationalities operated as guerrillas
and other patriotic individuals and groups
pursued activities in opposition to the forces
and agents of the Japanese Empire in the
invasion and occupation of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, members of such forces, in
their determined efforts to resist the enemy,
and to bring about his ultimate defeat,
committed acts penalized under the Revised
Penal Code;
WHEREAS, charges have been presented in
the courts against many members of these
resistance forces, for such acts;
WHEREAS, the fact that such acts were
committed in furtherance of the resistance to
the enemy is not a valid defense under the
laws of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, the persons so accused should
not be regarded as criminals but rather as
patriots and heroes who have rendered
invaluable service to the nation; and
WHEREAS, it is desirable that without the
least possible delay, these persons be freed
form the indignity and the jeopardy to which
they are now being subjected;
NOW, THEREFORE, I Manuel Roxas,
President of the Philippines in accordance
with the provisions of Article VII, section
10, paragraph 6 of the Constitution, do
hereby declare and proclaim an amnesty inn
favor of al persons who committed any act
penalized under the Revised Penal Code in
furtherance of the resistance to the enemy or
against persons aiding in the war effort of
the enemy, and committed during the period
from December 8, 1941 to the date when
each particular area of the Philippines was
actually liberated from the enemy control
and occupation. This amnesty shall not
apply to crimes against chastity or to acts
committed from purely personal motives.
It is further proclaimed and declared that in
order to determine who among those against
whom charges have been filed before the
courts of the Philippines or against whom
charges may be filed in the future, come
within the terms of this amnesty, Guerrilla
Amnesty Commissions, simultaneously to
be established , shall examine the facts and
circumstance surrounding each case and, if
necessary, conduct summary hearings of
witnesses both for the complainant and the
accused. These Commissions shall decided
each case and, upon finding that it falls
within the terms of this proclamation, the
Commissions shall so declare and this
amnesty shall immediately be effective as to
the accused, who shall forthwith be released
or discharged.
The theory of the respondents, supported by the
dissenting opinion, is predicated on a wrong
conception of the nature or character of an amnesty.
Amnesty must be distinguished from pardon.
Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such
it is a private act which must be pleaded and proved
by the person pardoned, because the courts take no
notice thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the
Chief Executive with the concurrence of Congress,
and it is a public act of which the courts should take
judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one after
conviction; while amnesty is granted to classes of
persons or communities who may be guilty of
political offenses, generally before or after the
institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes
after conviction. Pardon looks forward and relieves
the offender from the consequences of an offense of
which he has been convicted, that is, it abolished or
forgives the punishment, and for that reason it does
""nor work the restoration of the rights to hold public
office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be
expressly restored by the terms of the pardon," and it
"in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of
the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the
sentence" article 36, Revised Penal Code). while
amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into
oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and
obliterates the offense with which he is charged that
the person released by amnesty stands before the law
precisely as though he had committed no offense.
(section 10[6], Article VII, Philippine Constitution;
State vs. Blalock, 62 N.C., 242, 247; In re Briggs,
135 N.C., 118; 47 S.E. 402., 403; Ex parte Law, 35
GA., 285, 296; State ex rel Anheuser—Busch
Brewing Ass'n. vs. Eby, 170 Mo., 497; 71 S.W 52,
61; Burdick vs United States, N.Y., 35 S. Ct., 267;
271; 236 U.S., 79; 59 Law. ed., 476.)
In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion and so
hold that, in order to entitle a person to the benefits of
the Amnesty Proclamation of September 7, 1946, it is
not necessary that he should, as a condition precedent
or sine qua non, admit having committed the criminal
act or offense with which he is charged and allege the
amnesty as a defense; it is sufficient that the evidence
either of the complainant or the accused, shows that
the offense committed comes within the terms of said
Amnesty Proclamation. Hence, it is not correct to say
that "invocation of the benefits of amnesty is in the
nature of a plea of confession and avoidance."
Although the accused does not confess the imputation
against him, he may be declared by the courts or the
Amnesty Commissions entitled to the benefits. For,
whether or not he admits or confesses having
committed the offense with which he is charged, the
Commissions should, if necessary or requested by the
interested party, conduct summary hearing of the
witnesses both for the complainants and the accused,
on whether he has committed the offense in
furtherance of the resistance to the enemy, or against
persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy, and
decide whether he is entitled to the benefits of
amnesty and to be "regarded as a patriot or hero who
have rendered invaluable services to the nation,," or
not, in accordance with the terms of the Amnesty
Proclamation. since the Amnesty Proclamation is a
public act, the courts as well as the Amnesty
Commissions created thereby should take notice of
the terms of said Proclamation and apply the benefits
granted therein to cases coming within their province
or jurisdiction, whether pleaded or claimed by the
person charged with such offenses or not, if the
evidence presented show that the accused is entitled
to said benefits.
The right to the benefits of amnesty, once established
by the evidence presented either by the complainant
or prosecution, or by the defense, can not be waived,
because it is of public interest that a person who is
regarded by the Amnesty Proclamation which has the
force of a law, not only as innocent, for he stands in
the eyes of the law as if he had never committed any
punishable offense because of the amnesty, but as a
patriot or hero, can not be punishment as a criminal.
Just as the courts of justice can not convict a person
who, according to the evidence, has committed an act
not punishable by law, although he confesses being
guilty thereof, so also and a fortiori they can not
convict a person considered by law not a criminal,
but as a patriot and hero, for having rendered
invaluable services to the nation inn committing such
an act.
While it is true that the evidence must show that the
offense charged was against chastity and was
committed in furtherance of the resistance against the
enemy, for otherwise, it is to be naturally presumed
that is has been committed for purely personal
motive, it is nonetheless true that though the motive
as a mental impulse is state of mind or subjective, it
need not be testified to be the defendant himself at
his arraignment or hearing of the case. Generally the
motive for the commission of an offense is
established by the testimony of witnesses on the acts
or statements of the accused before or immediately
after the commission of the offense, deeds or words
hat may express it or from which his motive or
reason for committing it may be inferred. The
statement of testimony of a defendant at the time of
arraignment or the hearing of the case about said
motive, can not generally be considered and relied
on, specially if there is evidence to the contrary, as
the true expression of the reason o motive he had at
the time of committing the offense. Because such
statements or testimony may be an afterthought or
colored by the interest he may have to suit his
defense or the purpose for which he intends to
achieve with such declaration. Hence it does not
stand to reason and logic to say, as the dissenting
opinion avers, that unless the defendant admits at the
investigation or hearing having committed the
offense with which he is charged, and states that he
did it in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy,
and not for purely personal motive, it is impossible
for the court of Commission to verify the motive for
the commission of the offense, because only the
accused could explain of the offense, because only
the accused could explain his belief and intention or
the motive of committing the offense.
There is no necessity for an accused to admit his
responsibility for the commission of a criminal act
before a court of Amnesty Commission may
investigate and extend or not to him the benefits of
amnesty. The fact that he pleads not guilty or that he
has not committed the act with which he is charged,
does not necessarily prove that he is not guilty
thereof. Notwithstanding his denial, the evidence for
the prosecution or complainant may show the
contrary, as it is generally the case in criminal
proceedings, and what should in such a case be
determined is whether or not the offense committed
is of political character. The plea of not having
committed the offense made by an accused simply
means that he can not be convicted of the offense
charged because he is not guilty thereof, and, even if
the evidence would show that he is, because he has
committed it in furtherance of the resistance to the
enemy or against persons a ding in the war efforts of
the enemy, and not for purely political motives.
According to Administrative Order No. 11 of
October 2, 1946, creating the Amnesty Commissions,
issued by the President of the Philippines, cases
pending in the Courts of First Instance of the
province in which the accused claims the benefits of
Amnesty Proclamation, and cases already decided by
said courts but not yet elevated on appeal to the
appellate courts, shall be passed upon and decided by
the respective Amnesty Commission, and cases
pending appeal shall be passed upon by the Seventh
Amnesty Commission. Under the theory of the
respondents and the writer oft he dissenting opinion,
the Commissions should refuse to comply with the
directive of said Administrative Order, because is
almost all cases pending in the Court of First
Instance, and all those pending appeal form the
sentence of said courts, the defendants must not have
pleaded guilty or admitted having committed the
offense charged for otherwise, they would not or
could not have appealed from the judgment of the
Courts of First Instance. To hold that a Amnesty
Commission should not proceed to the investigation
and act and decide whether the offense with which an
accused was charged comes within the Amnesty
Proclamation if he does not admit or confess having
committed it would be to defeat the purpose for
which the Amnesty Proclamation was issued and the
Amnesty Commission were established. If the courts
have to proceed to the trail or hearing of a case and
decide whether the offense committed by the
defendant comes within the terms of the Amnesty
Proclamation although the defendant has plead not
guilty, there is no reason why the Amnesty
Commissions can not do so. Where a defendant to
admit or confess having committed the offense or
being responsible therefor before he can invoke the
benefit of amnesty, as there is no law which makes
such admission or confession not admissible as
evidence against him in the courts of justices in case
the Amnesty Commission finds that the offense does
not come within the terms of the Amnesty
Proclamation, nobody or few would take the risk of
submitting their case to said Commission.
Besides, in the present case, the allegation of Loreto
Barrioquinto that the offended party or victim was
shot and killed by Agapito Hipolito , does not
necessarily bar the respondents from finding, after
the summary hearing of the witnesses for the
complaints and the accused, directed in the said
Amnesty Proclamation and Administrative Order No.
11, that the petitioners are responsible for the killing
of the victim, either as principals by cooperation,
inducement or conspiration, or as accessories before
as well as after the fact, but that they are entitled to
the benefits of amnesty, because they were members
of the same group of guerrilleros who killed the
victim in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy
or against persons aiding in the war efforts of the Commission only the following elements are
enemy. essential: First, that he is charged or may be charged
Wherefore, the respondents are hereby ordered to with ab offense penalized under the Revised Penal
immediately proceed to hear and decide the Code, except those against chastity or for purely
application for amnesty of petitioners Barrioquinto personal motives; second, that he committed the
and Jimenez, unless amnesty of petitioners offense in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy;
Barrioquinto and Jimenez, unless the courts have in and third, that it was committed during the period
the meantime already decided, expressly and finally, from December 8, 1941, to the date when the area
the question whether or not they are entitled to the where the offense was committed was actually
benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation No. 8 of liberated from enemy control and occupation.
September 7, 1946. So ordered. If these three elements are present in a case brought
Moran, C. J., Paras, Bengzon, and Briones, before a Guerrillas Amnesty Commission, the latter
JJ., concur. cannot refuse to hear and decide it under the
proclamation. There is nothing in the proclamation to
even hint that the applicant for amnesty must first
Separate Opinions admit having executed the acts constituting the
PERFECTO, J., concurring: offense with which he is charged or be charged.
An information for the crime of murder was filed Upon the facts in this case, petitioners are entitled to
against petitioners with the Court of First Instance of have their applications for amnesty heard and decided
Zamboanga. Because Barrioquinto was then at large, by respondent 14th Guerrilla Amnesty Commission.
the information was dismissed and a separate With the revocation of its order of January 9, 1947,
criminal case was instituted against him. Jimenez was respondent 14th Guerrilla Amnesty Commission is
tried with other accused and sentenced to life ordered to immediately proceed to hear and decide
imprisonment. Within the time for appeal, Jimenez the applications for amnesty of petitioners
became aware of Proclamation No. 8, date September Barrioquinto and Jimenez.
7, 1946, granting amnesty to all persons who have
committed offenses in furtherance of the resistance
against the Japanese, and decided to submit his case
to the 14th Guerrilla Amnesty Commission.
Barrioquinto, having been apprehended, did the
same.
After the preliminary hearing had started, the
Commission issued on January 9, 1947, an order for
the return of the cases of petitioners to the Court of
First Instance of Zamboanga, without deciding
whether or not they are entitled to amnesty, because
Barrioquinto sated in his testimony that it was
Hipolito Tolentino who fired at and killed the
offended party. The Commission issued the order
upon the thesis that, for any person to invoke the
benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation, it is required
that he should first admit having committed the
offensive act for which he is prosecuted.
The next of the Amnesty Proclamation fails to
support the thesis. To entitle a person to have his case
heard and decided by a Guerrilla Amnesty
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-37420 July 31, 1984
MACARIA A. TORRES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, VICENTE SANTILLAN,
ALFREDO NARCISO, TOMAS NARCISO,
AMADO NARCISO, SALUD NARCISO,
DEMETRIA NARCISO and ADELINA
NARCISO, respondents.
G.R. No. L-37421 July 31, 1984
MACARIA A. TORRES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, VICENTE SANTILLAN,
ALFREDO NARCISO, SALUD NARCISO,
BALDOMERO BUENAVENTURA, DEMETRIA
NARCISO, LEONARDO QUINTO, ADELINA
NARCISO, CESARIO PUNZALAN, TOMAS
NARCISO and AMADO NARCISO, respondents.
Juan R. Liwag for petitioner.
Cesar Nocon for respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari, treated as a
special civil action. 1 prays that the judgment
rendered by the then Court of Appeals in the
consolidated cases, CA-G.R. NO. 34998-R entitled
"Macaria A. Torres, plaintiff-appellee vs. Vicente
Santillan, et al., defendants-appellants",and CA-G.R.
No. 34999-R entitled "Vicente Santillan, et al.,
plaintiffs-appellants vs. Macaria A. Bautista, et al.,
defendants-appellees and the Resolution denying the
Motion for Reconsideration and Petition for New
Trial, be set aside; and that, instead, The Order of the
Court of First Instance of August 7, 1963 be
affirmed, or, in the alternative, that the case be
remanded to it for new trial.
Involved in this controversy are the respective claims
of petitioner and private respondents over Lot No.
551 of the Sta. Cruz de Malabon Estate (part of the
friar lands) in Tanza, Cavite, with an area of
approximately 1,622 square meters. covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-6804 issued in the
name of the legal heirs of Margarita Torres.
The facts of the case cover three generations. The
propositus, Margarita Torres, during the Spanish
regime, was married to Claro Santillan. Vicente and
Antonina were begotten of this union. Claro died
leaving Margarita a widow. Antonina married and
had six children, namely: Alfredo, Salud (married to
Baldomero Buenaventura), Demetria (married to
Leonardo Quinto), Adelina (married to Cesario
Punzalan), Tomas and Amado all surnamed Narciso,
who, together with Vicente Santillan, are the private
respondents. Antonina died before the institution of
the cases while Vicente died on June 4,
1957, 2 during the pendency of the cases in the Trial
Courts, without progeny .
After the death of her husband, Margarita Torres
cohabited with Leon Arvisu Arbole, without benefit
of marriage. Out of their cohabitation, petitioner
Macaria Torres (later married to Francisco Bautista)
was born on June 20, 1898, and baptized on June 26,
1898. In a Certificate of Baptism issued by the Parish
Priest of Tanza, Cavite, Leon Arvisu Arbole and
Margarita Torres were named as father and mother of
petitioner whose name was listed as Macaria Arvisu",
(Exhibit "C" Another Baptismal Certificate, however,
listed her name as Macaria Torres, while her father's
name was left blank (Exhibit "4"). Subsequently, or
on June 7, 1909, Leon Arbole and Margarita Torres
were married (Exhibit "A"). Petitioner lived with and
was reared by her parents. Margarita, the mother,
died on December 20, 1931 (Exhibit "D"), while
Leon, the father, passed away on September 14, 1933
(Exhibit " E ").
Lot No. 551, an urban lot with an area of 1,622 sq.
ms., more or less, had been leased temporarily by the
Government (Lease No. 17) to Margarita Torres who
was the actual occupant of the lot. The date of the
lease cannot be determined with exactitude from the
records. On December 13, 1910, the Government,
through the Director of Lands, issued to Margarita
Torres, Sale Certificate No. 222 (Exhibit "B") over
the said lot at the price of P428.80, payable in 20
annual installments of P20.00 each. The rental/s
previously paid of P17.40 was credited to the
purchase price. Testimonial evidence is to the effect
that Leon Arbole paid the installments out of his
earnings as a water tender at the Bureau of Lands,
Tanza, Cavite. The last installment, however, was
paid on December 17, 1936, or three (3) years after
his death.
On August 25, 1933, twenty (20) days before his
death, Leon Arbole sold and transferred in a notarial
deed all his rights and interest to the one-half (1/2)
portion of Lot No. 551 in favor of petitioner, for the
sum of P300.00. 3
On June 6, 1953, Vicente Santillan executed an
Affidavit claiming possession of Lot No. 551 and
asking for the issuance of title in his name, which he
filed with the Bureau of Lands. Based thereon, the
Bureau of Lands issued the corresponding patent in
the name of the legal heirs of Margarita Torres.
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-6804 was
eventually issued by the Register of Deeds of Cavite
on November 7, 1957, also in the name of said heirs.
On June 3, 1954, private respondents filed a
complaint against petitioner for Forcible Entry, with
the Justice of the Peace Court of Tanza, Cavite,
alleging that petitioner had entered a portion of Lot
No. 551 without their consent, constructed a house.
and refused to vacate upon demand. For her part,
petitioner claimed that she is a co-owner of the lot in
question, being one of the daughters of Margarita
Torres. The ejectment case was decided against
petitioner and the latter appealed to the then Court of
First Instance of Cavite, where it was docketed as
Civil Case No. 5547 (Ejectment Case).
On June 8, 1954, petitioner instituted an action for
partition of Lot No. 551 before the then Court of First
Instance of Cavite, docketed as Civil Case No. 5505
(Partition Case), alleging that said lot was conjugal
property of the spouses Margarita Torres and Leon
Arbole, and that she is their legitimated child. Private
respondents filed an Answer alleging that the lot
belonged exclusively to Margarita Torres; that they
are her only heirs, and that the complaint for partition
should be dismissed.
The Ejectment Case and the Partition Case were
jointly tried and decided on November 20, 1958 with
a finding that Lot No. 551 is the paraphernal property
of Margarita Torres and adjudicating to private
respondents two-thirds (2/3) of the property in equal
shares, and to petitioner a one-third (1/3)
portion. 4 Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which
private respondents opposed. Pending its resolution,
the Provincial Capitol of Cavite was burned, resulting
in the complete destruction of the records of the two
cases, which, however, were later partially
reconstituted.
On August 7, 1963, the then Court of First Instance
of Cavite, Branch 1, issued an Order granting
reconsideration and amending the Decision of
November 20, 1958. The positive portion thereof
reads as follows:
Wherefore, judgment is hereby
rendered in Civil Case No. .5505:
(1) Declaring Macaria A. Torres as
the legitimated child of the spouses
Leon Arbole and Margarita Torres;
(2) Declaring that Lot No. 551 of
the Sta. Cruz de Malabon Estate is
a conjugal partnership property of
the spouses Leon Arbole and
Margarita Torres;
(3) Adjudicating four-sixths (4/6th
of Lot No. 551 of S.C. de Malabon
Estate to Macaria Torres, and two-
sixths (2/6th) in equal shares to
Alfredo, Tomas, Amado, Salud,
Demetria and Adelina, all
surnamed Narciso, legitimate
children and heirs of the deceased
Antonina Santillan, since Vicente
Santillan is already dead. The
parties may make the partition
among themselves by proper
instruments of conveyance, subject
to confirmation by the Court. In
fairness, however, to the parties,
each party should be alloted that
portion of the lot where his or her
house has been constructed, as far
as this is possible. In case the
parties are unable to agree upon the
partition, the Court shall appoint
three commissioners to make the
partition.
As to Civil Case No. 5547, the
same is hereby dismissed.
Without costs in both cases. 5
In concluding that petitioner is a legitimated child,
the Trial Court opined:
It is undisputed that when Macaria
A. Torres was born on June 20,
1898, her parents, Leon Arbole and
Margarita Torres, had the capacity
to marry each other. There was no
legal impediment for them to marry
It has also been established that
Macaria A. Torres had been taken
care of, brought up and reared by
her parents until they died. The
certificate of baptism (Exh. "G")
also shows that Macaria Torres was
given the family name of Arvisu,
which is also the family name of
her father, Leon Arbole, and that
her father is Leon Arvisu and her
mother is Margarita Torres. Such
being the case, Macaria A. Torres
possessed the status of an
acknowledged natural child. And
when her parents were married on
June 7, 1909, she became the
legitimated daughter of on Arbole
and Margarita Torres. 6
Private respondents appealed. On April 2, 1973, the
then Court of Appeals 7 rendered the judgment sought
to be set aside herein, the decretal part of which
states:
Wherefore, judgment is hereby
rendered in Civil Case No. 5505:
(1) Declaring that Macaria A.
Torres is not the legitimated child
of the spouses Leon Arbole and
Margarita Torres;
(2) Declaring that Lot No. 551 of
the Sta Cruz de Malabon Estate is a
conjugal partnership property of the
spouses Leon Arbole and Margarita
Torres; and
(3) Adjudicating one-half (1/2) of
Lot No. 551 of S.C. de Malabon
Estate to Macaria Torres, and the
other half (1/2) in equal shares to
Alfredo, Tomas, Amado, Salud,
Demetria and Adelina, an
surnamed Narciso, legitimate
children and heirs of Antonina
Santillan, since Vicente Santillan is
already dead. The parties may
make the partition among
themselves by proper instruments
of conveyance, subject to
confirmation by the Court. In
fairness, however, to the parties,
each party should be alloted that
portion of the lot where his or her
house has been constructed, as far
as this is possible. In case the
parties are unable to agree upon the
partition, the Court shall appoint
three commissioners to make the
partition.
As to Civil Case No. 5547, the
same is hereby dismissed.
Without costs in both cases. 8
The Appellate Court was of the opinion that:
Macaria A. Torres is not a
legitimated daughter of Leon
Arvisu Arbole and Margarita
Torres, the former not having been
legally acknowledged before or
after the marriage of her parents.
As correctly pointed out by the
appellants in their brief, the fact
that she was taken cared of,
brought up and reared by her
parents until they died, and that the
certificate of baptism (Exhibit "C")
shows that she was given the
family name of Arvisu did not
bestow upon her the status of an
acknowledged natural child.
Under Article 121 of the old Civil
Code, the governing law on the
matter, children shall be considered
legitimated by subsequent marriage
only when they have been
acknowledged by the parents
before or after the celebration
thereof, and Article 131 of the
 same code provides that the
acknowledgement of a natural child
must be in the record of birth, in a
will or in some public document.
Article 131 then prescribed the
form in which the acknowledgment
of a natural child should be made.
The certificate of baptism of
Macaria A. Torres (Exhibit "C") is
not the record of birth referred to in
Article 131. This article of the old
Civil Code 'requires that unless the
acknowledgement is made in a will
or other public document, it must
be made in the record of birth, or in
other words, in the civil register
(Samson vs. Corrales Tan, 48 PhiL
406). 9
A Motion for Reconsideration and for New Trial,
dated April 16, 1973, was filed by petitioner. In
support thereof, petitioner submitted a typewritten
Sworn Statement, dated March 5, 1930, of spouses
Leon Arvisu (Arbole) and Margarita
Torres, 10 reading in full as follows:
SWORN STATEMENT
We, Leon Arvisu and Margarita
Torres husband and wife
respectively, of majority age, and
residents of the Municipality of
Tanza, Province of Cavite, P.I.,
after being duly sworn to according
to law depose and say
That Macaria de Torres is our
legitimized daughter she being born
out of wedlock on the 26 th of June
1898 all Tanza, Cavite, but as
stated she was legitimized by our
subsequent marriage.
That at the time of her birth or
conception, we, her parents could
have married without dispensation
had we desired.
That as natural child our aforesaid
daughter was surnamed de Torres
after that of her mother's at the time
she was baptized as per record on
file in the Church.
That as a legitimized daughter she
should now be surnamed Arvisu
after her father's family name.
Wherefore, it is respectfully
requested to anybody concerned
that proper remedy be made for the
change of the surname of said
Macaria de Torres as desired.
In testimony hereof, we hereunto
signed out names at Tanza, Cavite,
this 5th day of March 1930.
(Thumbmarked) (Thumbmarked)
LEON ARVISU MARGARITA
TORRES
Signed in the prsence of:
(Sgd.) Illegible (Sgd.) Macaria
Bautista
x-----------------------
-------------------------
----x
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
) first was expressed as follows:
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS )
MUNICIPALITY OF TANZA ) ss
PROVINCE OF CAVITE )
Subscribed and sworn to before me
this 5th day of March 1930. The
affiant Leon Arvisu exhibited to me
no cedula certificate being exempt
on account of going over 60 years
of age and Margarita Torres having
exhibited no cedula certificate
being exempt on account of her
sex.
Witness my hand and seal of office
on the date and place aforesaid.
. Reg. No. 56
P. No. 2
Book No. III Series of 1930. 11
The reason given for the non-production of the
notarial document during trial was that the same was
only found by petitioner's daughter, Nemensia A.
Bautista, among the personal belongings of private
respondent, Vicente Santillan, an adverse party, after
his death and who may have attempted to suppress it.
Private respondents, for their part, argued against
new trial, and contended that it is not newly
discovered evidence which could not have been
produced during the trial by the exercise of due
diligence.
The Decision of the Appellate Court was rendered by
a Division of three, composed of Justices Jesus Y.
Perez, Jose N. Leuterio and Luis B. Reyes, ponente.
When the Motion for Reconsideration and New Trial
was considered, there was disagreement, possibly as
to whether or not new trial should be granted in
respect of the sworn statement of March 5, 1930. A
Special Division of five was then formed, composed
of Justices Antonio Lucero Magno S. Gatmaitan,
Lourdes P. San Diego, Jose N. Leuterio and Luis B.
Reyes (Justice Perez having retired or having
disqualified himself). In a minute resolution of
August 24, 1973, the Division of five, by a vote of
three or two, denied both reconsideration and new
trial.
To warrant review, petitioner, has summarized her
submission based on two assignments of error. The
Although the Court of Appeals is
correct in declaring that Macaria A.
Torres is not the legitimated child
of the spouses Leon Arbole and
Margarita Torres, it has
overlooked to include in its
findings of facts the admission
made by Vicente Santillan and the
heirs of Antonina Santillan (herein
respondents) that Macaria A.
Torres and Vicente Santillan and
Antonina Santillan are brother and
sisters with a common mother
Margarita Torres and they are the
legal heirs and nearest of relatives
of Margarita Torres, and as a
consequence thereof, the Court of
Appeals had drawn an incorrect
conclusion in adjudicating the
entire share of Margarita Torres in
the conjugal property solely to
 Vicente Santillan and the heirs of
Antonina Santillan. (emphasis
supplied)
As we understand it, petitioner has conceded, with
which we concur, that, without taking account of the
sworn statement of March 5, 1930, she cannot be
considered a legitimated child of her parents.
Continuous possession of the status of a natural child,
fact of delivery by the mother, etc. will not amount to
automatic recognition, but an action for compulsory
recognition is still necessary, which action may be
commenced only during the lifetime of the putative
parents, subject to certain exceptions. 12
The admission adverted to appears in paragraph 3 of
private respondents' original complaint in the
Ejectment Case reading:
the plaintiffs and the defendant
Macaria A. Bautista are the legal
heirs and nearest of kins of
Margarita Torres, who died in
Tanza, Cavite on December 20,
1931. (Emphasis supplied).
The statement, according to petitioner, is an
admission of her legitimation and is controlling in the
determination of her participation in the disputed
property.
We are not persuaded. In the Amended Complaint
filed by private respondents in the same Ejectment
Case, the underlined portion was deleted so that the
statement simply read:
That the plaintiffs are the legal
heirs and nearest of kin of
Margarita Torres, who died at
Tanza, Cavite, on December 20,
1931.
In virtue thereof, the Amended Complaint takes the
place of the original. The latter is regarded as
abandoned and ceases to perform any further function
as a pleading. The original complaint no longer forms
part of the record. 13
If petitioner had desired to utilize the original
complaint she should have offered it in evidence.
Having been amended, the original complaint lost its
character as a judicial admission, which would have
required no proof, and became merely an
extrajudicial admission, the admissibility of which, as
evidence, required its formal offer. Contrary to therefore, the Sworn Statement was not newly
petitioner's submission, therefore there can be no discovered evidence. In our view, the document can
estoppel by extrajudicial admission made in the reasonably qualify as newly discovered evidence,
original complaint, for failure to offer it in which could not have been produced during the trial
evidence. 14 even with the exercise of due diligence; specially if it
It should be noted that in the Partition Case private really had been in the possession of Vicente
respondents, in their Answer (parag. 4), denied the Santillan, an adverse party who, it was alleged,
legitimacy of petitioner. suppressed the document.
The second error attributed to the Appellate Court In the interest of judicial expediency, the new trial
has been pleaded as follows: can be conducted by respondent Appellate Court,
Also, the Court of Appeals has now empowered to do so under Section 9 of Batas
gravely abused its discretion when Pambansa Blg. 129.
it denied the petition for new trial, WHEREFORE, this case is hereby remanded to the
knowing as it does that the now Intermediate Appellate Court for new trial, and
judgment is clearly erroneous in depending on its outcome, said Court shall also
view of the evidence which is resolve the respective participation of the parties in
offered and no amount of diligence the disputed property, inclusive of the estate of the
on the part of the petitioner could it deceased Vicente Santillan. No costs.
be produced in court at any time SO ORDERED.
before it was offered as it was
found from the personal belongings
of Vicente Santillan, an adverse
party, after his death.
It is our considered opinion that new trial was
warranted to prevent a possible miscarriage of
justice. Assuming that the genuineness and due
execution of the Sworn Statement of March 5, 1930
is established in accordance with procedural due
process, a new trial would resolve such vital
considerations as (1) whether or not said Sworn
Statement qualifies as the public document
prescribed in Article 131 of the old Civil
Code; 15 (2) whether or not it conforms to an act of
acknowledgment by the parents after the celebration
of their marriage as required by Article 121 of the
same code; 16 and (3) whether or not petitioner's
signature as a witness to said document was the
equivalent of the consent necessary for
acknowledgment of an adult person under Article 133
of that Code. 17 Affirmative answers would confer
upon petitioner the status of a legitimated child of her
parents, and would entitle her to enjoy hereditary
rights to her mother's estate.
Private respondents stress that since petitioner signed
as a witness to the document she should be
chargeable with knowledge of its existence, and,
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 85423 May 6, 1991
JOSE TABUENA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and EMILIANO
TABERNILLA, JR., respondents.
Ramon Dimen for petitioner.
Dionisio A. Hernandez for private respondent.
CRUZ, J.:
The petitioner faults the decision of the trial court, as
affirmed by the respondent court, for lack of basis. It
is argued that the lower courts should not have taken
into account evidence not submitted by the private
respondent in accordance with the Rules of Court.
The subject of the dispute is a parcel of residential
land consisting of about 440 square meters and
situated in Poblacion, Makato, Aklan. In 1973, an
action for recovery of ownership thereof was filed in
the Regional Trial Court of Aklan by the estate of
Alfredo Tabernilla against Jose Tabuena, the herein
petitioner. After trial, judgment was rendered in favor
of the plaintiff and the defendant was required to
vacate the disputed lot. 1
As the trial court found, the lot was sold by Juan
Peralta, Jr. sometime in 1926 to Alfredo Tabernilla
while the two were in the United States. Tabernilla
returned to the Philippines in 1934, and Damasa
Timtiman, acting upon her son Juan's instruction,
conveyed the subject land to Tabernilla. At the same
time, she requested that she be allowed to stay
thereon as she had been living there all her life.
Tabernilla agreed provided she paid the realty taxes
on the property, which she promised to do, and did.
She remained on the said land until her death,
following which the petitioner, her son and half-
brother of Juan Peralta, Jr., took possession thereof.
The complaint was filed when demand was made
upon Tabuena to surrender the property and he
refused, claiming it as his own.
The trial court rejected his defense that he was the
absolute owner of the lot, which he inherited from his
parents, who acquired it even before World War II
and had been living thereon since then and until they
died. Also disbelieved was his contention that the
subject of the sale between Peralta and Tabernilla
was a different piece of land planted to coconut trees
and bounded on three sides by the Makato River.
Tabuena appealed to the respondent court,
complaining that, in arriving at its factual findings,
the trial court motu proprio took cognizance of
Exhibits "A", "B" and "C", which had been marked
by the plaintiff but never formally submitted in
evidence. The trial court also erred when, to resolve
the ownership of the subject lot, it considered the
proceedings in another case involving the same
parties but a different parcel of land.
The said exhibits are referred to in the pre-trial order
as follows:
Plaintiff proceeded to mark the following
exhibits: Exh. "A", letter dated October 4,
1921 addressed in Makato, Capiz,
Philippines; Exh. "A-1", paragraph 2 of the
letter indicating that the amount of
P600.00—the first P300.00 and then another
P300.00 as interest since October 4, 1921;
Exh. "A-2", is paragraph 3 of the letter; Exh.
"B", a Spanish document; Exh. "C", deed of
conveyance filed by Tomasa Timtiman and
Alfredo Tabernilla in 1923; and Exh. "C-1",
paragraph 4 of Exh. "C".
In sustaining the trial court, the respondent court held
that, contrary to the allegations of the appellant, the
said exhibits were in fact formally submitted in
evidence as disclosed by the transcript of
stenographic notes, which it quoted at length. 2 The
challenged decision also upheld the use by the trial
court of testimony given in an earlier case, to bolster
its findings in the second case.
We have examined the record and find that the
exhibits submitted were not the above-described
documents but Exhibits "X" and "T" and their sub-
markings, which were the last will and testament of
Alfredo Tabernilla and the order of probate. It is not
at all denied that the list of exhibits does not include
Exhibits "A", "B" and "C". In fact, the trial court
categorically declared that "Exhibits "A-1, "A-2",
"B", "C" and "C-l," were not among those documents
or exhibits formally offered for admission by
plaintiff-administratrix." This is a clear contradiction
of the finding of the appellate court, which seems to
have confused Exhibits "A," "B" and "C" with
Exhibits "X" and "Y", the evidence mentioned in the
quoted transcript.
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides in Section 35
thereof as follows:
Sec. 35. Offer of evidence.—The court shall
consider no evidence which has not been
formally offered. The purpose for which the
evidence is offered must be specified.
The mere fact that a particular document is marked as
an exhibit does not mean it has thereby already been
offered as part of the evidence of a party. It is true
that Exhibits "A," "B" and "C" were marked at the
pre-trial of the case below, but this was only for the
purpose of identifying them at that time. They were
not by such marking formally offered as exhibits. As
we said in Interpacific Transit, Inc. vs. Aviles, 3 "At
the trial on the merits, the party may decide to
formally offer (the exhibits) if it believes they will
advance its cause, and then again it may decide not to
do so at all. In the latter event, such documents
cannot be considered evidence, nor can they be given
any evidentiary value."
Chief Justice Moran explained the rationale of the
rule thus:
. . . The offer is necessary because it is the
duty of a judge to rest his findings of facts
and his judgment only and strictly upon the
evidence offered by the patties at the trial. 4
We did say in People vs. Napat-a 5 that even if there
be no formal offer of an exhibit, it may still be
admitted against the adverse party if, first, it has been
duly identified by testimony duly recorded and,
second, it has itself been incorporated in the records
of the case. But we do not find that these
requirements have been satisfied in the case before
us. The trial court said the said exhibits could be
validly considered because, even if they had not been
formally offered, one of the plaintiffs witnesses,
Cunegunda Hernandez, testified on them at the trial
and was even cross-examined by the defendant's
counsel. We do not agree. Although she did testify,
all she did was identify the documents. Nowhere in
her testimony can we find a recital of the contents of
the exhibits.
Thus, her interrogation on Exhibit "A" ran:
LEGASPI: That is this Exh. "A" about ?
A The translation of the letter.
Q What is the content of this Exh. "A", the
letter of the sister of Juan Peralta to Alfredo
Tabernilla?
Court: The best evidence is the document.
Proceed. 6
She also did not explain the contents of the other two
exhibits.
The respondent court also held that the trial court
committed no reversible error in taking judicial
notice of Tabuena's testimony in a case it had
previously heard which was closely connected with
the case before it. It conceded that as a general rule
"courts are not authorized to take judicial notice, in
the adjudication of cases pending before them, of the
contents of the records of other cases, even when
such cases have been tried or are pending in the same
court, and notwithstanding the fact that both cases
may have been heard or are actually pending b before
the same judge. 7 Nevertheless, it applied the
exception that:
. . . in the absence of objection, and as a
matter of convenience to all parties, a court
may properly treat all or any part of the
original record of a case filed in its archives
as read into the record of a case pending
before it, when, with the knowledge of the
opposing party, reference is made to it for
that purpose, by name and number or in
some other manner by which it is
sufficiently designated; or when the original
record of the former case or any part of it, is
actually withdrawn from the archives by the
court's direction, at the request or with the
consent of the parties, and admitted as a part
of the record of the case then pending. 8
It is clear, though, that this exception is applicable
only when, "in the absence of objection," "with the
knowledge of the opposing party," or "at the request
or with the consent of the parties," the case is clearly
referred to or "the original or part of the records of
the case are actually withdrawn from the archives"
and "admitted as part of the record of the case then
pending." These conditions have not been established
here. On the contrary, the petitioner was completely
unaware that his testimony in Civil Case No. 1327
was being considered by the trial court in the case
then pending before it. As the petitioner puts it, the
matter was never taken up at the trial and was
"unfairly sprung" upon him, leaving him no
opportunity to counteract.
The respondent court said that even assuming that the
trial court improperly took judicial notice of the other
case, striking off all reference thereto would not be
fatal to the plaintiff's cause because "the said
testimony was merely corroborative of other
evidences submitted by the plaintiff." What "other
evidences"? The trouble with this justification is that
the exhibits it intends to corroborate, to wit, Exhibits
"A", "B" and "C", have themselves not been formally
submitted.
Considering the resultant paucity of the evidence for
the private respondent, we feel that the complaint
should have been dismissed by the trial court for
failure of the plaintiff to substantiate its allegations. It
has failed to prove that the subject lot was the same
parcel of land sold by Juan Peralta, Jr. to Alfredo
Tabernilla and not another property, as the petitioner
contends. Even assuming it was the same lot, there is
no explanation for the sale thereof by Juan Peralta,
Jr., who was only the son of Damasa Timtiman.
According to the trial court, "there is no question that
before 1934 the land in question belonged to Damasa
Timtiman." Juan Peralta, Jr. could not have validly
conveyed title to property that did not belong to him
unless he had appropriate authorization from the
owner. No such authorization has been presented.
It is true that tax declarations are not conclusive
evidence of ownership, as we have held in many
cases.1âwphi1However, that rule is also not absolute
and yields to the accepted and well-known exception.
In the case at bar, it is not even disputed that the
petitioner and his predecessors-in-interest have
possessed the disputed property since even before
World War II. In light of this uncontroverted fact, the
tax declarations in their name become weighty and
compelling evidence of the petitioner's ownership. As
this Court has held:
While it is true that by themselves tax
receipts and declarations of ownership for
taxation purposes are not incontrovertible
evidence of ownership they become strong
evidence of ownership acquired by
prescription when accompanied by proof of
actual possession of the property. 9
It is only where payment of taxes is
accompanied by actual possession of the
land covered by the tax declaration that such
circumstance may be material in supporting
a claim of ownership. 10
The tax receipts accompanied by actual and
continuous possession of the subject parcels
of land by the respondents and their parents
before them for more than 30 years qualify
them to register title to the said subject
parcels of land. 11
The Court can only wonder why, if Alfredo
Tabernilla did purchase the property and
magnanimously allowed Damasa Timtiman to remain
there, he did not at least require her to pay the realty
taxes in his name, not hers. The explanation given by
the trial court is that he was not much concerned with
the property, being a bachelor and fond only of the
three dogs he had bought from America. That is
specious reasoning. At best, it is pure conjecture. If
he were really that unconcerned, it is curious that he
should have acquired the property in the first place,
even as dacion en pago. He would have demanded
another form of payment if he did not have the
intention at all of living on the land. On the other
hand, if he were really interested in the property, we
do not see why he did not have it declared in his
name when the realty taxes thereon were paid by
Damasa Timtiman or why he did not object when the
payments were made in her own name.
In comparison, all the acts of Damasa Timtiman and
Jose Tabuena indicate that they were the owners of
the disputed property. Damasa Timtiman and her
forebears had been in possession thereof for more
than fifty years and, indeed, she herself stayed there
until she died. 12 She paid the realty taxes thereon in
her own name. 13 Jose Tabuena built a house of
strong materials on the lot. 14 He even mortgaged the
land to the Development Bank of the Philippines and
to two private persons who acknowledged him as the
owner. 15 These acts denote ownership and are not
consistent with the private respondent's claim that the
petitioner was only an overseer with mere possessory
rights tolerated by Tabernilla.
It is the policy of this Court to accord proper
deference to the factual findings of the courts below
and even to regard them as conclusive where there is
no showing that they have been reached arbitrarily.
The exception is where such findings do not conform
to the evidence on record and appear indeed to have
no valid basis to sustain their correctness. As in this
case.
The conclusions of the trial court were based mainly
on Exhibits "A", "B" and "C", which had not been
formally offered as evidence and therefore should
have been totally disregarded, conformably to the
Rules of Court. The trial court also erred when it
relied on the evidence submitted in Civil Case No.
1327 and took judicial notice thereof without the
consent or knowledge of the petitioner, in violation of
existing doctrine. Thus vitiated, the factual findings
here challenged are as an edifice built upon shifting
sands and should not have been sustained by the
respondent court.
Our own finding is that the private respondent, as
plaintiff in the lower court, failed to prove his claim
of ownership over the disputed property with
evidence properly cognizable under our adjudicative
laws. By contrast, there is substantial evidence
supporting the petitioner's contrary contentions that
should have persuaded the trial judge to rule in s
favor and dismiss the complaint.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
appealed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE,
with costs against the private respondent. It is so
ordered.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-28100 November 29, 1971
GABRIEL BAGUIO, plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
TEOFILA L. VDA. DE JALAGAT, for herself and in
representation of her minor children, DOMINADOR,
LEA and TEONIFE all surnamed JALAGAT;
ANABELLA JALAGAT and EMMANUEL
JALAGAT, defendants-appellees.
FERNANDO, J.:
The specific legal question raised in this appeal from
an order of dismissal by the Court of First Instance of
Misamis Oriental, presided by the Hon. Benjamin K.
Gorospe, one which has not as yet been the subject of
a definitive ruling is whether or not on a motion to
dismiss on the ground of res judicata that the cause
of action is barred by a prior judgment, a lower court
may take judicial notice of such previous case
decided by him resulting in the prior judgment relied
upon. Judge Gorospe answered in the affirmative. So
do we. An affirmance is thus called for.
The case started with the complaint for the quieting
of title to real property filed by plaintiff, now
appellant, Gabriel Baguio, on February, 14, 1966.
There was on March 7, 1966 a motion to dismiss
filed by defendants, now appellees, on the ground
that the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment.
This was the argument advanced: "The instant
complaint or case, besides being clearly unfounded
and malicious, is identical to or the same as that Civil
Case No. 1574 filed by the same plaintiff and against
Melecio alias Mening Jalagat, now deceased and
whose legal heirs and successors in interest are the
very defendants in the instant complaint or Civil Case
No. 2639. Said Civil Case No. 1574 was filed on
October 7, 1958 for 'Recovery of Possession and
Ownership of Real Estate' and entitled Gabriel
Baguio, plantiff, versus Melecio alias Mening
Jalagat, defendant, involving practically the same
property and practically the same parties as
defendants are the widow and the children,
respectively, thus the legal or forced heirs of the
deceased Melecio Jalagat. That the said Case No.
1574, which is identical to or is the same case as the
instant one, has already been duly and finally
terminated as could be clear from [an] order of this
Honorable Court [dated December 6, 1965]." 1 There
was an opposition on the part of plaintiff made on
March 26, 1966 on the ground that for prior judgment
or res judicata to suffice as a basis for dismissal it
must be apparent on the face of the complaint. It was
then alleged that there was nothing in the complaint
from which such a conclusion may be inferred. Then,
on September 26, 1966, came the order complained
of worded thus: "Acting on the motion to dismiss
filed by counsel for the defendants under date of
March 4, 1966, anchored on the ground that
plaintiff's cause of action is barred by a prior
judgement which this Court finds to be well-founded
as it has already dismissed plaintiff's complaint in
Civil Case No. 1574 against Melecio Jalagat alias
Mening Jalagat, defendants predecessor in interest
from whom they have derived their rights, in an order
dated December 6, 1965, pursuant to Section 3 of
Rule 17 of the new Rules of Court, which case
involved the same parcel of land as the one in the
instant case, as prayed for, Civil Case No. 2639
should be as it is hereby [dismissed]. The Court's
previous dismissal of Civil Case No. 1574 has the
effect of an adjudication upon the merits and
consequently is a bar to and may be pleaded in
abatement of any subsequent action against the same
parties over the same issues and the same subject-
matter by the same plaintiff. [So ordered]" 2 Hence,
this appeal.
The order of dismissal, as noted at the outset, must be
sustained. It is in accordance with law.
1. The sole error assigned is that a bar by prior
judgement cannot be raised in a motion to dismiss
when such ground does not appear on the face of the
complaint. What immediately calls attention in the
rather sketchy and in conclusive discussion in the six-
page brief of applicant is that there was no denial as
to the truth of the statement made by Judge Gorospe
that there was a previous dismissal the same
plaintiff's complaint against the predecessor-in-
interest of defendants, who as expressly admitted by
appellant was the deceased husband of one of them
and father of the rest. There was no denial either of
the property involved being the same and of the
finality of the decsion in the previous case which
would show that appellant's claim was devoid of any
support in law. It would be therefore futile for the
court to continue with the case as there had been such
a prior judgment certainly binding on appellant. What
then was there for the lower court to do? Was there
any sense in its being engaged in what was
essentially a fruitless, endeavor as the outcome was
predictible?
Certainly, the law would lend itself to a well-
deserved reproach if the Rules of Court would
sanction such a proceeding distinguished by nothing
but its futility. It ought to be clear even to appellant
that under the circumstances, the lower court
certainly could take judicial notice of the finality of a
judgment in a case that was previously pending and
thereafter decided by it. That was all that was done
by the lower court in decreeing the dismissal.
Certainly such an order is not contrary to law. A
citation from the comments of former Chief Justice
Moran is relevant. Thus: "Courts have also taken
judicial notice of previous cases to determine whether
or not the case pending is a moot one, or whether or
not a previous ruling is applicable in the case under
consideration." 3
2. There is another equally compelling consideration.
Appellant undoubtedly had recourse to a remedy
which under the law then in force could be availed of.
It would have served the cause of justice better, not to
mention the avoidance of needless expense on his
part and the vexation to which appellees were
subjected if he did reflect a little more on the matter.
Then the valuable time of this Tribunal would not
have been frittered away on a useless find hopeless
appeal. It has, ever been the guiding principle
from Alonso v. Villamor, 4 a 1910 decision, that a
litigant should not be allowed to worship at the altar
of technicality. That is not to dispense justice
according to law. Parties, and much more so their
counsel, should ever keep such an imperative of our
legal system in mind. 5
WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal of September
26, 1966 is hereby affirmed. With costs against
plaintiff.
 THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 122480. April 12, 2000]
BPI-FAMILY SAVINGS BANK, Inc., petitioner,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS, COURT OF TAX
APPEALS and the COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
If the State expects its taxpayers to observe fairness
and honesty in paying their taxes, so must it apply the
same standard against itself in refunding excess
payments. When it is undisputed that a taxpayer is
entitled to a refund, the State should not invoke
technicalities to keep money not belonging to it. No
one, not even the State, should enrich oneself at the
expense of another.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review assailing the
March 31, 1995 Decision of the Court of
Appeals[1] (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 34240, which
affirmed the December 24, 1993 Decision[2] of the
Court of Tax Appeals (CTA). The CA disposed as
follows:
"WHEREFORE, foregoing
premises considered, the petition is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit."[3]
On the other hand, the dispositive portion of the CTA
Decision affirmed by the CA reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, in [view of] all
the foregoing, Petitioners claim for
refund is hereby DENIED and this
Petition for Review is DISMISSED
for lack of merit."[4]
Also assailed is the November 8, 1995 CA
Resolution[5] denying reconsideration.
The Facts
The facts of this case were summarized by the CA in
this wise:
"This case involves a claim for tax
refund in the amount
of P112,491.00 representing
petitioners tax withheld for the year
1989.
In its Corporate Annual Income
Tax Return for the year 1989, the
following items are reflected:
Income.............................P1,017,93
1,831.00
Deductions........................P1,026,2
18,791.00
Net Income
(Loss).................(P8,286,960.00)
Taxable Income
(Loss).............P8,286,960.00
Less:
1988 Tax
Credit...............P
185,001.00
1989 Tax
Credit...............P
112,491.00
TOTAL
AMOUNT......................P297,492.
00
REFUNDABLE
"It appears from the foregoing 1989
Income Tax Return that petitioner
had a total refundable amount of
P297,492 inclusive of the
P112,491.00 being claimed as tax
refund in the present case.
However, petitioner declared in the
same 1989 Income Tax Return that
the said total refundable amount of
P297,492.00 will be applied as tax
credit to the succeeding taxable
year.
"On October 11, 1990, petitioner
filed a written claim for refund in
the amount of P112,491.00 with the
respondent Commissioner of
Internal Revenue alleging that it
did not apply the 1989 refundable
amount of P297,492.00 (including
P112,491.00) to its 1990 Annual
Income Tax Return or other tax
liabilities due to the alleged
business losses it incurred for the
same year.
"Without waiting for respondent
Commissioner of Internal Revenue
to act on the claim for refund,
petitioner filed a petition for review
with respondent Court of Tax
Appeals, seeking the refund of the
amount of P112,491.00.
"The respondent Court of Tax
Appeals dismissed petitioners
petition on the ground that
petitioner failed to present as
evidence its Corporate Annual
Income Tax Return for 1990 to
establish the fact that petitioner had
not yet credited the amount of
P297,492.00 (inclusive of the
amount P112,491.00 which is the
subject of the present controversy)
to its 1990 income tax liability.
"Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration, however, the same
was denied by respondent court in
its Resolution dated May 6,
1994."[6]
As earlier noted, the CA affirmed the CTA. Hence,
this Petition.[7]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In affirming the CTA, the Court of Appeals ruled as
follows:
"It is incumbent upon the petitioner
to show proof that it has not
credited to its 1990 Annual income
Tax Return, the amount of
P297,492.00 (including
P112,491.00), so as to refute its
previous declaration in the 1989
Income Tax Return that the said
amount will be applied as a tax
credit in the succeeding year of
1990. Having failed to submit such
requirement, there is no basis to
grant the claim for refund. x x x
"Tax refunds are in the nature of
tax exemptions. As such, they are
regarded as in derogation of
 sovereign authority and to be
construed strictissimi juris against
the person or entity claiming the
exemption. In other words, the
burden of proof rests upon the
taxpayer to establish by sufficient
and competent evidence its
entitlement to the claim for
refund."[8]
Issue
In their Memorandum, respondents identify the issue
in this wise:
"The sole issue to be resolved is
whether or not petitioner is entitled
to the refund of P112,491.00,
representing excess creditable
withholding tax paid for the taxable
year 1989."[9]
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
Main Issue: Petitioner Entitled to Refund
It is undisputed that petitioner had excess
withholding taxes for the year 1989 and was thus
entitled to a refund amounting to P112,491. Pursuant
to Section 69[10] of the 1986 Tax Code which states
that a corporation entitled to a refund may opt either
(1) to obtain such refund or (2) to credit said amount
for the succeeding taxable year, petitioner indicated
in its 1989 Income Tax Return that it would apply the
said amount as a tax credit for the succeeding taxable
year, 1990. Subsequently, petitioner informed the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) that it would claim
the amount as a tax refund, instead of applying it as a
tax credit. When no action from the BIR was
forthcoming, petitioner filed its claim with the Court
of Tax Appeals.
The CTA and the CA, however, denied the claim for
tax refund. Since petitioner declared in its 1989
Income Tax Return that it would apply the excess
withholding tax as a tax credit for the following year,
the Tax Court held that petitioner was presumed to
have done so. The CTA and the CA ruled that
petitioner failed to overcome this presumption
because it did not present its 1990 Return, which
would have shown that the amount in dispute was not
applied as a tax credit. Hence, the CA concluded that
petitioner was not entitled to a tax refund.
We disagree with the Court of Appeals. As a rule, the
factual findings of the appellate court are binding on
this Court. This rule, however, does not apply
where, inter alia, the judgment is premised on a
misapprehension of facts, or when the appellate court
failed to notice certain relevant facts which if
considered would justify a different
conclusion.[11] This case is one such exception.
In the first place, petitioner presented evidence to
prove its claim that it did not apply the amount as a
tax credit. During the trial before the CTA, Ms.
Yolanda Esmundo, the manager of petitioners
accounting department, testified to this fact. It
likewise presented its claim for refund and a
certification issued by Mr. Gil Lopez, petitioners
vice-president, stating that the amount of P112,491
"has not been and/or will not be automatically
credited/offset against any succeeding quarters
income tax liabilities for the rest of the calendar year
ending December 31, 1990." Also presented were the
quarterly returns for the first two quarters of 1990.
The Bureau of Internal Revenue, for its part, failed to
controvert petitioners claim. In fact, it presented no
evidence at all. Because it ought to know the tax
records of all taxpayers, the CIR could have easily
disproved petitioners claim. To repeat, it did not do
so.
More important, a copy of the Final Adjustment
Return for 1990 was attached to petitioners Motion
for Reconsideration filed before the CTA.[12] A final
adjustment return shows whether a corporation
incurred a loss or gained a profit during the taxable
year. In this case, that Return clearly showed that
petitioner incurred P52,480,173 as net loss in 1990.
Clearly, it could not have applied the amount in
dispute as a tax credit.
Again, the BIR did not controvert the veracity of the
said return. It did not even file an opposition to
petitioners Motion and the 1990 Final Adjustment
Return attached thereto. In denying the Motion for
Reconsideration, however, the CTA ignored the said
Return. In the same vein, the CA did not pass upon
that significant document.
True, strict procedural rules generally frown upon the
submission of the Return after the trial. The law
creating the Court of Tax Appeals, however,
specifically provides that proceedings before it "shall
not be governed strictly by the technical rules of
evidence."[13] The paramount consideration remains
the ascertainment of truth. Verily, the quest for
orderly presentation of issues is not an absolute. It
should not bar courts from considering undisputed
facts to arrive at a just determination of a
controversy.
In the present case, the Return attached to the Motion
for Reconsideration clearly showed that petitioner
suffered a net loss in 1990. Contrary to the holding of
the CA and the CTA, petitioner could not have
applied the amount as a tax credit. In failing to
consider the said Return, as well as the other
documentary evidence presented during the trial, the
appellate court committed a reversible error.
It should be stressed that the rationale of the rules of
procedure is to secure a just determination of every
action. They are tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice.[14] But there can be no just
determination of the present action if we ignore, on
grounds of strict technicality, the Return submitted
before the CTA and even before this Court.[15] To
repeat, the undisputed fact is that petitioner suffered a
net loss in 1990; accordingly, it incurred no tax
liability to which the tax credit could be applied.
Consequently, there is no reason for the BIR and this
Court to withhold the tax refund which rightfully
belongs to the petitioner.
Public respondents maintain that what was attached
to petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was not the
final adjustment Return, but petitioners first two
quarterly returns for 1990.[16] This allegation is
wrong. An examination of the records shows that the
1990 Final Adjustment Return was attached to the
Motion for Reconsideration. On the other hand, the
two quarterly returns for 1990 mentioned by
respondent were in fact attached to the Petition for
Review filed before the CTA. Indeed, to rebut
respondents specific contention, petitioner submitted
before us its Surrejoinder, to which was attached the
Motion for Reconsideration and Exhibit "A" thereof, Under the facts of this case, we hold that petitioner
the Final Adjustment Return for 1990.[17] has established its claim. Petitioner may have failed
CTA Case No. 4897 to strictly comply with the rules of procedure; it may
Petitioner also calls the attention of this Court, as it have even been negligent. These circumstances,
had done before the CTA, to a Decision rendered by however, should not compel the Court to disregard
the Tax Court in CTA Case No. 4897, involving its this cold, undisputed fact: that petitioner suffered a
claim for refund for the year 1990. In that case, the net loss in 1990, and that it could not have applied
Tax Court held that "petitioner suffered a net loss for the amount claimed as tax credits.
the taxable year 1990 x x x."[18] Respondent, Substantial justice, equity and fair play are on the
however, urges this Court not to take judicial notice side of petitioner. Technicalities and legalisms,
of the said case.[19] however exalted, should not be misused by the
As a rule, "courts are not authorized to take judicial government to keep money not belonging to it and
notice of the contents of the records of other cases, thereby enrich itself at the expense of its law-abiding
even when such cases have been tried or are pending citizens. If the State expects its taxpayers to observe
in the same court, and notwithstanding the fact that fairness and honesty in paying their taxes, so must it
both cases may have been heard or are actually apply the same standard against itself in refunding
pending before the same judge." [20] excess payments of such taxes. Indeed, the State must
Be that as it may, Section 2, Rule 129 provides that lead by its own example of honor, dignity and
courts may take judicial notice of matters ought to be uprightness.
known to judges because of their judicial functions. WHEREFORE, the Petition is
In this case, the Court notes that a copy of the hereby GRANTED and the assailed Decision and
Decision in CTA Case No. 4897 was attached to the Resolution of the Court of
Petition for Review filed before this Court. Appeals REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Significantly, respondents do not claim at all that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue is ordered to
said Decision was fraudulent or nonexistent. Indeed, refund to petitioner the amount of P112,491 as excess
they do not even dispute the contents of the said creditable taxes paid in 1989. No costs.
Decision, claiming merely that the Court cannot take SO ORDERED.
judicial notice thereof.
To our mind, respondents reasoning underscores the
weakness of their case. For if they had really believed
that petitioner is not entitled to a tax refund, they
could have easily proved that it did not suffer any
loss in 1990. Indeed, it is noteworthy that
respondents opted not to assail the fact appearing
therein -- that petitioner suffered a net loss in 1990 in
the same way that it refused to controvert the same
fact established by petitioners other documentary
exhibits.
In any event, the Decision in CTA Case No. 4897 is
not the sole basis of petitioners case. It is merely one
more bit of information showing the stark truth:
petitioner did not use its 1989 refund to pay its taxes
for 1990.
Finally, respondents argue that tax refunds are in the
nature of tax exemptions and are to be
construed strictissimi juris against the claimant.
 THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 151857. April 28, 2005]
CALAMBA STEEL CENTER, INC. (formerly JS
STEEL CORPORATION), petitioner,
vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A tax refund may be claimed even beyond the
taxable year following that in which the tax credit
arises. Hence, excess income taxes paid in 1995 that
have not been applied to or used in 1996 may still be
the subject of a tax refund in 1997, provided that the
claim for such refund is filed with the internal
revenue commissioner within two years after
payment of said taxes. As a caveat, the Court stresses
that the recognition of the entitlement to a tax refund
does not necessarily mean the automatic payment of
the sum claimed in the final adjustment return of the
taxpayer. The amount of the claim must still be
proven in the normal course.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review[1] under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the January 10,
2002 Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
GR SP No. 58838. The assailed Decision disposed as
follows:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the
instant petition is DISMISSED and the assailed
Decision and Resolution are AFFIRMED. Costs
against Petitioner.[3]
The Facts
Quoting the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), the
CA narrated the antecedents as follows:
Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the
manufacture of steel blanks for use by manufacturers
of automotive, electrical, electronics in industrial and
household appliances.
Petitioner filed an Amended Corporate Annual
Income Tax Return on June 4, 1996 declaring a net
taxable income of P9,461,597.00, tax credits
of P6,471,246.00 and tax due in the amount
of P3,311,559.00.
Petitioner also reported quarterly payments for the
second and third quarters of 1995 in the amounts
of P2,328,747.26 and P1,082,108.00, respectively.
It is the proposition of the [p]etitioner that for the
year 1995, several of its clients withheld taxes from
their income payments to [p]etitioner and remitted
the same to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) in
the sum of P3,159,687.00. Petitioner further alleged
that due to its income/loss positions for the three
quarters of 1996, it was unable to use the excess tax
paid for and in its behalf by the withholding agents.
Thus, an administrative claim was filed by the
[p]etitioner on April 10, 1997 for the refund
of P3,159,687.00 representing excess or unused
creditable withholding taxes for the year 1995. The
instant petition was subsequently filed on April 18,
1997.
Respondent, in his Answer, averred, among others,
that:
1) Petitioner has no cause of action;
2) Petitioner failed to comply with the procedural
requirements set out in Section 5 of Revenue
Regulations No. [(RR)] 12-94;
3) It is incumbent upon [p]etitioner to prove by
competent and sufficient evidence that the tax refund
or tax credit being sought is allowed under the
National Internal Revenue Code and its
implementing rules and regulations; and
4) Claims for tax refund or tax credit are construed
strictly against the taxpayer as they partake the nature
of tax exemption.
To buttress its claim, [p]etitioner presented
documentary and testimonial evidence. Respondent,
on the other hand, presented the [r]evenue [o]fficer
who conducted the examination of [p]etitioners claim
and found petitioner liable for deficiency value added
tax. Petitioner also presented rebuttal evidence.
The sole issue submitted for [o]ur determination is
whether or not [p]etitioner is entitled to the refund
of P3,159,687.00 representing excess or overpaid
income tax for the taxable year 1995.[4]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In denying petitioners refund, the CA reasoned
out that no evidence other than that presented before
the CTA was adduced to prove that excess tax
payments had been made in 1995. From the inception
of the case to the formal offer of its evidence,
petitioner did not present its 1996 income tax return
to disclose its total income tax liability, thus making
it difficult to determine whether such excess tax
payments were utilized in 1996.
Hence, this Petition.[5]
The Issue
Petitioner raises this sole issue for our
consideration:
Whether the Court of Appeals gravely erred when,
while purportedly requiring petitioner to submit its
1996 annual income tax return to support its claim for
refund, nonetheless ignored the existence of the tax
return extant on the record the authenticity of which
has not been denied or its admissibility opposed by
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.[6]
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is partly meritorious.
Sole Issue:
Entitlement to Tax Refund
Section 69 of the National Internal Revenue
Code (NIRC)[7] provides:
Sec. 69. Final adjustment return. -- Every corporation
liable to tax under Section 24 shall file a final
adjustment return covering the total taxable income
for the preceding calendar or fiscal year. If the sum of
the quarterly tax payments made during the said
taxable year is not equal to the total tax due on the
entire taxable net income of that year the corporation
shall either:
(a) Pay the excess tax still due; or
(b) Be refunded the excess amount paid, as the case
may be.
In case the corporation is entitled to a refund of the
excess estimated quarterly income taxes paid, the
refundable amount shown on its final adjustment
return may be credited against the estimated quarterly
income tax liabilities for the taxable quarters of the
succeeding taxable year.
Tax Refund
Allowed by NIRC
A perusal of this provision shows that a taxable
corporation is entitled to a tax refund when the sum
of the quarterly income taxes it paid during a taxable
year exceeds its total income tax due also for that
year. Consequently, the refundable amount that is
shown on its final adjustment return may be credited,
at its option, against its quarterly income tax
liabilities for the next taxable year.
 Petitioner is a corporation liable to pay income
taxes under Section 24 of the NIRC. Hence, it is
a taxable corporation. In 1995, it reported that it had
excess income taxes that had been paid for and on its
behalf by its withholding agents; and that, applying
the above-quoted Section 69, this excess should be
credited against its income tax liabilities for 1996.
However, it claimed in 1997 that it should get a
refund, because it was still unable to use the
excess income taxes paid in 1995 against its tax
liabilities in 1996. Is this possible? Stating the
argument otherwise, may excess income taxes paid in
1995 that could not be applied to taxes due in 1996
be refunded in 1997?
The answer is in the affirmative. Here are the
reasons:
Claim of Tax Refund Beyond the
Succeeding Taxable Year
First, a tax refund may be claimed even beyond
the taxable year following that in which the tax
credit arises.
No provision in our tax law limits the
entitlement to such a refund, other than the
requirement that the filing of the administrative claim
for it be made by the taxpayer within a two-year
prescriptive period. Section 204(3) of the NIRC
states that no refund of taxes shall be allowed unless
the taxpayer files in writing with the Commissioner
[the] claim for x x x refund within two years after the
payment of the tax.
Applying the aforequoted legal provisions, if
the excess income taxes paid in a given taxable
year have not been entirely used by a taxable
corporation against its quarterly income tax liabilities
for the next taxable year, the unused amount of the
excess may still be refunded, provided that
the claim for such a refund is made within two years
after payment of the tax. Petitioner filed its claim in
1997 -- well within the two-year prescriptive period.
Thus, its unused tax credits in 1995 may still be
refunded.
Even the phrase succeeding taxable year in the
second paragraph of the said Section 69 is a
limitation that applies only to a tax credit, not a tax
refund. Petitioner herein does not claim a tax credit,
but a tax refund. Therefore, the statutory limitation
does not apply.
Income Payments Merely
Declared Part of Gross Income
Second, to be able to claim a tax refund, a
taxpayer only needs to declare the income payments
it received as part of its gross income and
to establish the fact of withholding.
Section 5 of RR 12-94[8] states:
xxxxxxxxx
(a) Claims for Tax Credit or Refund of income tax
deducted and withheld on income payments shall be
given due course only when it is shown on the return
that the income payment received has been declared
as part of the gross income and the fact of
withholding is established by a copy of the
Withholding Tax Statement duly issued by the payor
to the payee showing the amount paid and the amount
of tax withheld therefrom.
(b) Excess Credits. -- A taxpayer's excess expanded
withholding tax credits for the taxable quarter/taxable
year shall automatically be allowed as a credit for
purposes of filing his income tax return for the
taxable quarter/taxable year immediately succeeding
the taxable quarter/taxable year in which the
aforesaid excess credit arose, provided, however, he
submits with his income tax return a copy of his
income tax return for the aforesaid previous taxable
period showing the amount of his aforementioned
excess withholding tax credits.
If the taxpayer, in lieu of the aforesaid automatic
application of his excess credit, wants a cash refund
or a tax credit certificate for use in payment of his
other national internal tax liabilities, he shall make a
written request therefor. Upon filing of his request,
the taxpayer's income tax return showing the excess
expanded withholding tax credits shall be examined.
The excess expanded withholding tax, if any, shall be
determined and refunded/credited to the taxpayer-
applicant. The refund/credit shall be made within a
period of sixty (60) days from date of the taxpayer's
request provided, however, that the taxpayer-
applicant submitted for audit all his pertinent
accounting records and that the aforesaid records
established the veracity of his claim for a
refund/credit of his excess expanded withholding tax
credits.
That petitioner filed its amended 1995 income
tax return in 1996 is uncontested. In addition, the
resulting investigation by the BIR on August 15,
1997, reveals that the income accounts were correctly
declared based on the existing supporting
documents.[9] Therefore, there is no need for
petitioner to show again the income payments it
received in 1995 as part of its gross income in 1996.
That petitioner filed its 1996 final adjustment
return in 1997 is the crux of the controversy.
However, as will be demonstrated shortly, the lack of
such a return will not defeat its entitlement to a
refund.
Tax Refund Provisions:
Question of Law
Third, it is a cardinal rule that only legal issues
may be raised[10] in petitions for review under Rule
45.[11]
The proper interpretation of the provisions
on tax refund is a question of law that does not call
for an examination of the probative value of the
evidence presented by the parties-litigants.[12] Having
been unable to use the excess income taxes paid in
1995 against its other tax liabilities in 1996,
petitioner clearly deserves a refund. It cannot by any
sweeping denial be deprived of what rightfully
belongs to it.
The truth or falsity of the contents of or entries
in the 1996 final adjustment return, which has not
been formally offered in evidence and examined by
respondent, involves, however, a question of fact.
This Court is not a trier of facts. Neither is it a
collection agency for the government. Although we
rule that petitioner is entitled to a tax refund, the
amount of that refund is a matter for the CTA to
determine judiciously based on the records that
include its own copy of petitioners 1996 final
adjustment return.
Liberal Construction
of Rules
Fourth, ordinary rules of procedure frown upon
the submission of final adjustment returns after trial
has been conducted. However, both the CTA law and
jurisprudence mandate that the proceedings before
the tax court shall not be governed strictly by
technical rules of evidence.[13] As a rule, its findings
of fact[14] (as well as that of the CA) are final, binding
and conclusive[15] on the parties and upon this Court;
however, as an exception, such findings may be
reviewed or disturbed on appeal[16] when they are not
supported by evidence.[17]
Our Rules of Court apply by analogy or in a
suppletory[18] character and whenever practicable and
convenient[19] and shall be liberally construed in
order to promote their objective of securing a just,
speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action
and proceeding.[20] After all, [t]he paramount
consideration remains the ascertainment of truth.[21]
In the present case, the 1996 final adjustment
return was attached as Annex A to the Reply to
Comment filed by petitioner with the CA.[22] The
return shows a negative amount for its taxable
income that year. Therefore, it could not have applied
or used the excess tax credits of 1995 against its tax
liabilities in 1996.
Judicial Notice
of Attached Return
Fifth, the CA and CTA could have taken
judicial notice of the 1996 final adjustment
return which had been attached in CTA Case No.
5799. Judicial notice takes the place of proof and is
of equal force.[23]
As a general rule, courts are not authorized to
take judicial notice of the contents of records in other
cases tried or pending in the same court, even when
those cases were heard or are actually pending before
the same judge. However, this rule admits of
exceptions, as when reference to such records is
sufficiently made without objection from the
opposing parties:
. . . [I]n the absence of objection, and as a matter of
convenience to all parties, a court may properly treat
all or any part of the original record of a case filed in
its archives as read into the record of a case pending
before it, when, with the knowledge of the opposing
party, reference is made to it for that purpose, by
name and number or in some other manner by which
it is sufficiently designated; or when the original
record of the former case or any part of it, is actually
withdrawn from the archives by the court's direction,
at the request or with the consent of the parties, and
admitted as a part of the record of the case then
pending.[24]
Prior to rendering its Decision on January 12,
2000, the CTA was already well-aware of the
existence of another case pending before it, involving
the same subject matter, parties and causes of
action.[25] Because of the close connection of that
case with the matter in controversy, the CTA could
have easily taken judicial notice[26] of the contested
document attached in that other case.
Furthermore, there was no objection raised to
the inclusion of the said 1996 final adjustment
return in petitioners Reply to Comment before the
CA. Despite clear reference to that return, a reference
made with the knowledge of respondent, the latter
still failed to controvert petitioners claim. The
appellate court should have cast aside strict
technicalities[27] and decided the case on the basis of
such uncontested return. Verily, it had the authority
to take judicial notice of its records and of the facts
[that] the record establishes.[28]
Section 2 of Rule 129 provides that courts may
take judicial notice of matters x x x ought to be
known to judges because of their judicial
functions.[29] If the lower courts really believed that
petitioner was not entitled to a tax refund, they could
have easily required respondent to ascertain its
veracity and accuracy[30] and to prove that petitioner
did not suffer any net loss in 1996.
Contrary to the contention of petitioner, BPI-
Family Savings Bank v. CA[31] (on which it rests its
entire arguments) is not on all fours with the facts of
this case.
While the petitioner in that case also filed a
written claim for a tax refund, and likewise failed to
present its 1990 corporate annual income tax return,
it nonetheless offered in evidence its top-ranking
officials testimony and certification pertaining to
only two taxable years (1989 and 1990). The said
return was attached only to its Motion for
Reconsideration before the CTA.
Petitioner in this case offered documentary and
testimonial evidence that extended beyond two
taxable years, because the excess credits in the first
(1995) taxable year had not been used up during the
second (1996) taxable year, and because the claim
for the refund of those credits had been filed during
the third (1997) taxable year. Its final adjustment
return was instead attached to its Reply to Comment
filed before the CA.
Moreover, in BPI-Family Savings Bank,
petitioner was able to show the undisputed fact: that
petitioner had suffered a net loss in 1990 x x x.[32] In
the instant case, there is no such undisputed fact as
yet. The mere admission into the records of
petitioners 1996 final adjustment return is not a
sufficient proof of the truth of the contents of or
entries in that return.
In addition, the BIR in BPI-Family Savings
Bank did not controvert the veracity of the return or
file an opposition to the Motion and the return.
Despite the fact that the return was ignored by both
the CA and the CTA, the latter even declared in
another case (CTA Case No. 4897) that petitioner had
suffered a net loss for taxable year 1990. When
attached to the Petition for Review filed before this
Court, that Decision was not at all claimed by the
BIR to be fraudulent or nonexistent. The Bureau
merely contended that this Court should not take
judicial notice of the said Decision.
In this case, however, the BIR has not been
given the chance to challenge the veracity of
petitioners final adjustment return. Neither has the
CTA decided any other case categorically declaring
a net loss for petitioner in taxable year 1996. After
this return was attached to petitioners Reply to
Comment before the CA, the appellate court should
have required the filing of other responsive pleadings
from respondent, as was necessary and proper for it
to rule upon the return.
Admissibility Versus Weight
Indeed, [a]dmissibility x x x is one thing,
weight is another.[33] To admit evidence and not to
believe it are not incompatible with each other x x
x.[34] Mere allegations by petitioner of the figures in
its 1996 final adjustment return are not a sufficient
proof of the amount of its refund entitlement. They
do not even constitute evidence[35] adverse to
respondent, against whom they are being
presented.[36]
 While it seems that the [non-production] of a upon them by law.[43] Only after it is shown that if
document which courts almost invariably expect will something is received when there is no right to
be produced unavoidably throws a suspicion over the demand it, and it was duly delivered through mistake,
cause,[37] this is not really the conclusion to be arrived the obligation to return it arises.]44[
at here. When petitioner purportedly filed its In brief, we hold that petitioner is entitled to a
administrative claim for a tax refund on April 10, refund; however, the amount must still be proved in
1997, the deadline for filing the 1996 final proper proceedings before the CTA.
adjustment return was not yet over. Hence, it could WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby PARTLY
not have attached this return to its claim. GRANTED, and the assailed Decision SET ASIDE.
For reasons unknown even to this Court, The case is REMANDED to the Court of Tax Appeals
petitioner failed to offer such return as evidence for the proper and immediate determination of the
during the trial phase of this case. For its negligence, amount to be refunded to petitioner on the basis of
petitioner cannot be allowed to seek refuge in a the latters 1996 final adjustment return. No
liberal application of the [r]ules[38] by giving it a pronouncement as to costs.
blanket approval of the total refund it claims. While SO ORDERED.
in certain instances, we allow a relaxation in the
application of the rules, we never intend to forge a
weapon for erring litigants to violate the rules with
impunity. The liberal interpretation and application of
rules apply only in proper cases of demonstrable
merit and under justifiable causes and
circumstances.[39]
It would not be proper to allow petitioner to
simply prevail and compel a refund in the amount it
claims, without affording the government a
reasonable opportunity to contest the formers
allegations.[40] Negligence consisting of the
unexplained failure to offer the exhibit should not be
rewarded with undeserved leniency. Petitioner still
bears the burden of proving the amount of its claim
for tax refund. After all, [t]ax refunds are in the
nature of tax exemptions]41[ and are to be
construed strictissimi juris against the taxpayer.
Finally, even in the absence of a final
adjustment return or any claim for a tax refund,
respondent is authorized by law to examine any book,
paper, record or other data that may be relevant or
material to such inquiry.[42] Failure to make an
assessment of petitioners proper tax liability or to
contest the return could be errors or omissions of
administrative officers that should never be allowed
to jeopardize the governments financial position.
Verily, the officers of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue should receive the support of the courts
when these officers attempt to perform in a
conscientious and lawful manner the duties imposed