"A Messiah That Will Never Come"1 A New Look At..war Diplomacy

chris tudda
“A Messiah that Will Never Come”1: A New Look at

Saratoga, Independence, and Revolutionary
War Diplomacy*
During the summer of 1777, the Continental Army under the command of
General Horatio Gates fought against the British army in northern New York.
Gates’s counterpart, British Major General John Burgoyne, had launched an
audacious plan to cut off the New England colonies from the rest of the
continent by invading New York in a pincer movement—from Canada in the
north and from New York City in the south. Burgoyne, however, ran into fierce
resistance from Gates’s men, who harassed the British army in numerous hit-
and-run attacks and fought a brilliant defensive war from their encampments on
the Hudson River. On October 12, the continentals surrounded the British in
the hills over Saratoga, New York. Seeing the writing on the wall, Burgoyne
sued for peace, and five days later he surrendered his entire army. Under the
terms of the Saratoga Convention, Burgoyne agreed to sit out the rest of the war.
The stunning victory electrified the continent and reinforced the American
commitment to independence.2
For over a century, historians of diplomacy during the American Revolution-
ary War have grappled with the importance of the American victory over the
*The views presented here are my own and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S.
Department of State or the U.S. government. I would like to thank my colleagues in the Office
of the Historian, Stephanie R. Hurter and Keri Lewis, the anonymous reviewers for Diplomatic
History for their generous and substantive comments on various drafts of this essay, and Joe
Wicentowski of the Office of the Historian for his help with choosing and optimizing the
portraits.
1. John Adams dubbed the rumors of another parliamentary attempt at reconciliation “a
Messiah that will never come. This Story of Commissioners is as arrant an Illusion as ever was
hatched in the Brain of an Enthusiast, a Politician, or a Maniac.” The Americans would not save
the British from themselves. British actions had convinced the colonies that Britain could not
be trusted. Adams warned, “We are not in a very submissive Mood. They will get no advantage
of Us” no matter how hard they tried. See “Letter from John Adams to Abigail Adams,” 15
April 1776, Adams Family Papers: An Electronic Archive (electronic edition) (Boston, 2002),
available from http://www.masshist.org/digitaladams (hereafter AFP), accessed 19 June 2003.
2. For more on the battle of Saratoga and the convention, see Max M. Mintz, The Generals
of Saratoga: John Burgoyne and Horatio Gates (New Haven, CT, 1990); Richard R. Ketchum,
Saratoga: Turning Point of America’s Revolutionary War (New York, 1997); and Robert Middle-
kauff, The Glorious Cause: The American Revolution, 1763–1789, rev. and exp. ed. (New York,
2005), 370–84.
Diplomatic History, Vol. 32, No. 5 (November 2008). © 2008 The Society for Historians of
American Foreign Relations (SHAFR). Published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc., 350 Main Street,
Malden, MA, 02148, USA and 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK.
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British at Saratoga in October 1777. Many have argued that the victory con-
vinced the French to agree to sign the Treaty of Amity and Commerce with the
United States in February 1778, and led to the authorization of the peace
mission in March 1778 led by King George III’s close political confidant,
Frederick, Earl of Carlisle. Others have downplayed Saratoga’s importance and
have instead examined whether or not the alliance with France signified the
triumph of an idealistic new nation determined to end business as usual, or a
masterful stroke of old-fashioned balance of power diplomacy.3
In this article, I argue that Saratoga did not significantly affect the diplomacy
of the war, because the Americans’ commitment to independence became the
central tenet of a diplomatic consciousness that had been developing since early
1775, achieved full flower in 1776, and triumphed in the winter of 1777–1778.
This consciousness signified the continued maturation of a distinctly American
national identity based upon political and commercial independence that relied
upon, not rejected, classic balance of power diplomacy. In the fifteen months
between the battles at Lexington and Concord and the signing of the Declara-
tion of Independence, the colonies became ever more estranged from Britain.
Even when the Continental Congress proposed conciliation, Britain not only
rejected such overtures but responded by increasing military and economic
pressure against the colonies. The lesson the Congress learned was that Britain’s
actions repeatedly belied their words of amicable reconciliation. The impulse to
declare independence grew stronger as the gap between London’s words and
deeds widened, until the colonies became convinced that only through a formal
declaration of independence from Britain could they reclaim the unique
3. For the argument that Saratoga was crucial to the signing of the treaty and the sending
of the Carlisle Commission, see Edward S. Corwin, French Policy and the American Alliance of
1778 (Princeton, NJ, 1916), 141; Samuel Flagg Bemis, The Diplomacy of the American Revolution
(New York, 1935), 60–65; Charles R. Ritcheson, British Politics and the American Revolution
(Norman, OK, 1954), 258–68; William C. Stinchcombe, The American Revolution and the French
Alliance (Syracuse, NY, 1969), 21–23; Lawrence S. Kaplan, Colonies into Nation: American
Diplomacy 1763–1801 (New York, 1972), 104–6; Jonathan R. Dull, Franklin the Diplomat: The
French Mission (Philadelphia, 1982), 9–10, 29–30; Ketchum, Saratoga; H. W. Brands, The First
American: The Life and Times of Benjamin Franklin (New York, 2000), 543; David McCullough,
John Adams (New York, 2001), 187; Walter Isaacson, Benjamin Franklin: An American Life (New
York, 2003), 343, 346; Gordon S. Wood, The Americanization of Benjamin Franklin (New York,
2004), 190; Ron Chernow, Alexander Hamilton (New York, 2004), 100, 112; Joseph J. Ellis, His
Excellency: George Washington (New York, 2004), 105; Stacy Schiff, A Great Improvisation:
Franklin, France, and the Birth of America (New York, 2005), 111; and Mark A. Stoler, “SHAFR
Presidential Address: War and Diplomacy: Or, Clausewitz for Historians,” Diplomatic History
29 ( January 2005): 9–10. Historians who have discounted Saratoga’s importance include Henri
Doniol, Histoire de la Participation de la France à l’Établissement des États-Unis d’Amérique
[History of French Participation in the Establishment of the United States of America], 5 vols.
(Paris, 1886–1892); John J. Meng, The Comte de Vergennes: European Phases of His Diplomacy
(1774–1780) (Washington, DC, 1932), 64–65; Weldon A. Brown, Empire or Independence: A
Study in the Failure of Reconciliation, 1774–1783 (1941; rev. ed. Port Washington, NY, 1966),
265–67; Gerald Stourzh, Benjamin Franklin and American Foreign Policy (Chicago, 1954), 56–60;
and Jonathan R. Dull, The French Navy and American Independence: A Study of Arms and
Diplomacy, 1774–1787 (Princeton, NJ, 1975), 90–98.
“A Messiah that Will Never Come” : 781
political and economic identity they had developed during the first six decades
of the eighteenth century.
In their dealings with the British and the French, American leaders and
diplomats actively engaged in power politics and practiced an early form of
“triangular diplomacy” that was wholly accepted in the courts of Europe.4
Confident that Paris and London needed their commercial and political friend-
ship, the Americans played and misled one in order to exact concessions from
the other.5 The notion that the Founders feared that the republican ideals of
virtue and selflessness would be compromised by involvement with the Euro-
pean powers entered American ideology only after Britain officially recognized
independence in 1783. The victory at Saratoga did not determine America’s
course of action during the Revolution, but merely strengthened its resolve to
completely break from Britain.6
The British defeat at Saratoga also did not change the behavior of the
European powers. This is perhaps most evident by the fact that after 1775,
every reconciliation offer originated in London. Because none of these offers—
including the Carlisle Commission—refused to grant or recognize American
independence, they were all rejected. Thus, the Carlisle Commission was only
the latest in a long line of reconciliation attempts and only coincided with the
signing of the Treaty of Amity and Commerce. France’s decision to officially
ally itself with the United States, on the other hand, merely put a public face
on an unofficial, collaborative relationship of arms supplies and trade protec-
tion that had existed since 1775. Indeed, by the fall of 1777, France’s foreign
minister, Charles Gravier, the Comte de Vergennes, had urged an open
4. Contemporaries of President Richard M. Nixon and his chief foreign-policy adviser,

Henry A. Kissinger, described their policy of playing off the Soviet Union and the People’s
Republic of China as “triangular diplomacy.”
5. The most prominent enunciation of this view is Felix Gilbert, To the Farewell Address:
Ideas of Early American Foreign Policy (Princeton, NJ, 1961). Edmund Morgan argues that the
Americans, especially Benjamin Franklin, identified France’s national interest with America’s.
See Edmund Morgan, Benjamin Franklin (New Haven, CT, 2002), 260–61. On the other hand,
Paul Varg argues that the Americans “condemned traditional diplomacy” and instead believed
that free trade would destroy the mercantilist system. American independence buttressed this
and Franklin used Saratoga to convince Vergennes to join an alliance he did not want. See Paul
Varg, The Foreign Policies of the Founding Fathers (East Lansing, MI, 1961), 3–23.
6. For this argument, see James H. Hutson, “Intellectual Foundations of Early American
Diplomacy,” Diplomatic History 1 (Winter 1977): 1–19. As Bernard Bailyn has noted, American
diplomacy reflected a combination of idealism and realism. See Bernard Bailyn, To Begin the
World Anew: The Genius and Ambiguities of the American Founders (New York, 2003), 67. Many
of the Founders, in particular Thomas Jefferson, believed that the United States differed
fundamentally from the Europeans. This idea, later called “American exceptionalism,” influ-
enced American diplomacy throughout much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. For
more on the concept of American exceptionalism, see Walter Lippmann, U.S. Foreign Policy:
Shield of the Republic (Boston, 1943), 6, 47; Reinhold Niebuhr, The Irony of American History
(New York, 1952), 36–38; C. Vann Woodward, “The Age of Reinterpretation,” American
Historical Review 66 (October 1960): 2–8; and Jack P. Greene, The Intellectual Construction of
America: Exceptionalism and Identity from 1492 to 1800 (Chapel Hill, NC, 1993), particularly
98–99.
alliance with the United States to thwart a potential British-American

alliance, which he feared would attack France and its House of Bourbon ally,
Spain.
Certainly by the time that resistance to the 1765 Stamp Act led to its repeal
a year later, many colonists had developed, as Max Savelle has argued, a “con-
sciousness of the differentness of America’s economic interests from those of the
mother country.” Indeed, several historians have noted that the vastness of the
North American continent and its geographical, social, and political distance
from Great Britain contributed to a growing national identity that fundamen-
tally diverged from that of its colonial masters. As Britain attempted to crack
down on the growing restlessness for more autonomy in the colonies, these
differences widened to the point that a consciousness of independence, as Eliga
Gould argues, “based on a separate nationality,” had taken hold in America by
1775. The unresolved question was whether the Americans should act to achieve
their independence or remain loyal subjects of the King.7
t h e colonists we ig h in d e p e n d e n ce and r ec onc iliation

On 4 January 1775, the British decided to implement a crackdown in the
colonies in the wake of the Boston Tea Party and other nonimportation mea-
sures, the continued criticism of “taxation without representation,” the creation
of the first Continental Congress in September 1774, and rumors of the estab-
lishment of colonial militias. British Colonial Secretary William Legge, Earl of
Dartmouth, ordered the colonial governors in North America to prevent
“certain persons styling themselves delegates” (Dartmouth refused to recognize
the Continental Congress as a legitimate body) from meeting again in May. The
First Congress had been held “without His Majesty’s authority” and had aired
“pretended grievances” at King George III and the British parliament. He
ordered British troops to maintain their lockdown of Boston and extended
Britain’s blockade of the city’s harbor. Parliament then closed New England’s
7. Max Savelle, Seeds of Liberty: The Genesis of the American Mind (New York, 1948), 564–82,
and Eliga H. Gould, The Persistence of Empire: British Political Culture in the Age of the American
Revolution (Chapel Hill, NC, 2000), 196. For the dilemma about pursuing independence, see
John M. Bumsted and Charles E. Clark, “New England’s Tom Paine: John Allen and the Spirit
of Liberty,” William and Mary Quarterly 21, no. 4 (October 1964): 566. See also Alan Valentine,
Lord North, vol. I (Norman, OK, 1967), 309; Jack P. Greene, The Quest for Power: The Lower
Houses of Assembly in the Southern Royal Colonies, 1689–1776 (New York, 1972), 361; Joseph J.
Ellis, After the Revolution: Profiles of Early American Culture (New York, 1979), 9–13; T. H.
Breen, Tobacco Culture: The Mentality of the Great Tidewater Planters on the Eve of the Revolution
(Princeton, NJ, 1985); Paul K. Longmore, The Invention of George Washington (Berkeley, CA,
1988), 4, 68–79; Edmund S. Morgan, Inventing the People: The Rise of Popular Sovereignty in
England and America (New York, 1988), 243; Bernard Bailyn, Faces of Revolution: Personalities and
Themes in the Struggle for American Independence (New York, 1990), 163–67; John Camp, Out of
the Wilderness: The Emergence of an American Identity in Colonial New England (Middletown, CT,
1990); David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity
(Minneapolis, 1992): Bailyn, To Begin the World Anew, 33–36; and T.H. Breen, The Marketplace
of Revolution: How Consumer Politics Shaped American Independence (New York, 2004).
fisheries. Meanwhile, Virginia Governor Lord Dunmore postponed the House

of Burgesses meeting through the winter.8
A month later, King George III addressed Parliament and promised further
measures to rein in the rebellious colonists. The king refused to cede any ground
on parliamentary sovereignty, in particular on its right to taxation. He then
privately told his prime minister, Lord North, “This language ought to open the
eyes of the deluded Americans” that his patience had worn thin. If they contin-
ued their provocative actions, he warned, “it must set every delicate man at
liberty to avow the propriety of the most coercive measures.” Two weeks later,
North offered a reconciliation proposal that would “forbear” the levying of taxes
on the colonies. In return, he stipulated, the colonists must contribute “to the
common defence,” support the “existing government’s” authority, and dissolve
the Continental Congress.9
By early April, as Parliament extended its restrictive measures against trade
and fisheries to every colony except New York and North Carolina, General
Thomas Gage, the military governor of Massachusetts and the commander of
British forces in North America, sent more troops to Boston, suspended the
Massachusetts legislature, moved to break the nonimportation initiatives, and
targeted rebel leaders for arrest. Dr. Joseph Warren, a close confidante of John
and Samuel Adams and the organizer of the Massachusetts militia, told his wife
“the People are ready and determine[d] to defend this Country Inch by Inch.”
Warren, tipped off about the impending arrests of Samuel Adams and John
Hancock, sent Paul Revere to warn them to leave their hiding places as Gage
moved troops out of Boston and into the countryside. The Massachusetts militia
in turn began to move artillery pieces and arms it had been secretly stockpiling.
On the morning of 19 April, British and American soldiers fought at Lexington
and Concord.10
The Lexington and Concord engagements dominated conversation as the
Second Continental Congress met in Philadelphia on 10 May. The leader of
Pennsylvania’s delegation, Dr. Benjamin Franklin, wrote his friend Joseph
Priestley, “America is exasperated by [British] conduct” that belied their words of
reconciliation. “The breach between the two countries is grown wider, and in
danger of becoming irreparable.” On 25 May, the Congress accused Parliament
of enacting “several unconstitutional and oppressive acts,” including the
8. “Earl of Dartmouth to Governors in North America (Circular),” 4 January 1775,

in K. G. Davies, ed., Documents of the American Revolution 1770–1783 (Colonial Office Series)
(Dublin, 1972–1981; hereafter DAR) Volume IX, Transcripts 1775: 24.
9. “Copy of a Resolution of the House of Commons,” 20 February 1775, in Worthington
Chauncey Ford, ed., Journals of the Continental Congress 1774–1789 (Washington, DC, 1905),
II:62–63 (hereafter JCC); and “King George to Lord North,” 8 February 1775, in John
Fortescue, ed., The Correspondence of King George the Third from 1760 to December 1783 (London,
1967), III:172, 177 (hereafter KGC).
10. “Letter from Joseph Warren to Mercy Warren,” 6 April 1775, in Warren-Adams Letters
(1917; reprint ed., New York, 1972), 1:44–45; and “Earl of Dartmouth to Lieut-General
Thomas Gage,” 15 April 1775, DAR XII:97.
imposition and collection of taxes, and accused the British of initiating the
attacks on Lexington and Concord “with a severity and cruelty not to be justified
even towards declared enemies.” The Congress also unanimously resolved “to
persevere the more vigourously in preparing for their defence,” as the likelihood
of accommodation with Britain had diminished. It also rejected North’s recon-
ciliation proposal, which due to mail delays had just reached the continent.
Despite its anger, however, the Congress also unanimously voted to try to
achieve reconciliation on its own terms by presenting “a humble and dutiful
petition” directly to King George.11
The “Olive Branch” Petition, written largely by the leader of the congres-
sional moderates, Franklin’s fellow Pennsylvanian John Dickinson, was adopted
on 8 July. Assuming the role of respectful, loyal supplicants, the petition assured
the king that Americans remained his “faithful subjects,” as evidenced by their
contributions during the Seven Years War with France. However, for the past
dozen years, Parliament had cut off its nose to spite its face by enacting laws,
taxes, and duties that had not only injured the colonies but weakened Britain’s
own economy. The short-sighted and punitive actions of His Majesty’s minis-
ters, “who abuse your royal confidence and authority,” and now had “compelled
us to arm in our own defence,” could have been avoided had Parliament
respected the colonists’ right to air their grievances. The petition then asked the
king for “a happy and permanent reconciliation” that forestalled “the further
destruction of the lives of your Majesty’s subjects” by a repeal of the many acts
that “distress any of your Majesty’s colonies.”
Radicals such as John and Samuel Adams, who favored a more bellicose
missive to the king, swallowed their pride and voted for the measure, even as
John lamented Congress’s unwillingness to be as “alarmed as it ought to be”
about the coming “Deceit and Hostility, Fire, Famine, Pestilence and Sword,
from Administration and Parliament.” Franklin, who served on the petition
committee with Dickinson, predicted that the Ministry would reject the Peti-
tion, arguing that Britain “has neither Temper nor Wisdom enough to seize
the Golden Opportunity” to reconcile amicably.12 The radicals achieved an
important victory, however. Later that day, Congress approved a letter to the
British people that exhibited a much more defiant tone. Britain’s colonial
brethren, the Congress said, had been injured, indeed betrayed, by an outlaw
Parliament that had enacted harsh measures, forcing them to defend them-
selves. The colonists vowed to seek justice from the English people rather
11. “Letter from Benjamin Franklin to Joseph Priestley,” 16 May 1775, in Paul H. Smith,
ed., Letters of Delegates to Congress 1774–1789 (Washington, DC, 1976), 1:296–97 (hereafter
Letters) (emphasis by author); and “Thursday 25 May 1775,” JCC II:64–66.
12. “Petition to the King,” 8 July 1775, JCC II:158–62, and “Franklin to Joseph Priestley,”
7 July 1775; “John Adams to James Warren,” 6 July 1775, in Robert J. Taylor, ed., The Papers
of John Adams (Cambridge, MA, 1983), 3:60–62 (hereafter JAP); and “Franklin to Jonathan
Shipley,” 7 July 1775, in W. B. Wilcox et al., eds., The Papers of Benjamin Franklin (New Haven,
CT, 1959-ongoing), 22:93–98. (hereafter BFP).
than submit “with the Bayonet at their Breast” to Parliament’s unconstitu-

tional measures.13
Determined to highlight the gap between Britain’s words of reconciliation
and their oppressive actions, Franklin wrote to his friend David Hartley, who
had been plying Franklin with letters detailing London’s friendship for the
colonists. Franklin accused the British of malicious “Burning of Towns, and
firing from Men of War on defenceless Cities and Villages filled with Women &
Children; the exciting of Indians to fall on our innocent Back Settlers; and our
Slaves to murder their Masters.” He warned that if Britain did not stop these
measures, “she will lose the Colonies forever.” John Adams wrote “Ld. North is
at his old Work again. Sending over his Anodynes to America—deceiving one
credulous American after another, into a Belief he means Conciliation, when in
Truth he means nothing but Revenge.”14
These measures, as John Adams, among others, recognized, ironically offered
the colonists an opportunity to pursue their own political and commercial
interests and take tentative steps toward independence. He told Dr. Warren, “I
am happy to find a Disposition so rapidly growing in America to exert itself.”
During a congressional debate, Maryland’s Samuel Chase urged the Congress to
“treat with foreign Nations upon Trade” because the British refused to relax
their quarantine of American goods. Although such action would torpedo hopes
for reconciliation, the colonies must act in their own interest. Adams told
Warren that the Congress could offer its commerce, but not its “sovereignty,” to
any other European country. These sentiments show that Congress recognized
that there was no contradiction between trading with the Europeans and pur-
suing an independent foreign policy.15
On 26 October, King George addressed Parliament and accused the colonists
of seeking “an independent Empire.” He also vowed to squash “the torrent of
violence” with a force “strong enough to compel their acquiescence” to the
“subordination” of England, summarily dismissed the colonists’ complaints, and
said Parliament’s responses “breathed a spirit of moderation and forbearance.”
13. “Address by the Twelve Colonies, by their Delegates in Congress, to the Inhabitants of
Great Britain,” July 1775, ibid., 163–71. In the meantime, King George told North, “I am
certain any other conduct but compelling obedience would be ruinous” to Britain’s control over
its empire. An official declaration that the Americans had adopted a state of rebellion made
sense, he mused, for it “shews the determination of prosecuting with vigour every measure
that may tend to force those deluded people to submission.” Accordingly, on 23 August, he
announced that the Americans had been “misled by dangerous and ill designing men” into a state
of “open and avowed rebellion” against the crown. See “King George to Lord North,”
5 July 1775, and “King George to Lord North,” 18 August 1775, both in KGC III:233, 248;
and “A Proclamation, by the King, for Suppressing Rebellion and Sedition,” 23 August 1775, in
Peter Force, ed., American Archives Series IV (Washington, DC, 1837), 3:240–41 (hereafter AA).
14. “Franklin to David Hartley,” 12 September 1775, 4; “Franklin to Jonathan Shipley,”
13 September 1775; and “John Adam’s Diary,” 24 September 1775, all in Letters 2:4, 7, 49.
15. “John Adams to James Warren,” 1 October 1775; “John Adams’ Notes of Debates,”
4 October 1775, both in ibid., 90, 110; and “John Adams to Joseph Warren,” 7 October 1775,
JAP 3:188–90.
On 22 December, North instituted the Prohibition Act, which “prohibited all

commerce within the thirteen North American colonies,” declared colonial
ships and cargoes “forfeit to the Crown,” and sanctioned the impressment of
American sailors into the British navy.16
Even though the Continental Congress was unaware of London’s new
measures, they acted as though they knew that a complete break with Britain
was inevitable. Franklin, now chairman of the Congress’s Committee of Secret
Correspondence (CSC), asked C. W. F. Dumas, a naturalized Dutchman of
French parentage, noted political liberal, and strong supporter of American
independence, to secretly represent the colonies at the Dutch court as a paid
agent. The Dutchman accepted and informed Franklin that the French min-
ister to The Netherlands said that fear of an anti-French Anglo-American
reconciliation had convinced Paris to pursue a treaty of alliance with the
Americans.17
When word of the king’s speech and the Prohibition Act reached the conti-
nent in February 1776, the colonists reacted angrily. Eliphalet Dyer of Con-
necticut lamented, “From the Appearance of the Kings Speech All hopes of
Reconciliation seem at an end. Therefore Nothing remains on our part but the
most Vigorous preparation and Exertions.” The commander of the Continental
Army, General George Washington, dubbed the speech “full of rancour &
resentment.” Because the king wanted to take “vigorous measures” to “deprive
us of our constitutional rights & liberties,” America should respond with “more
vigorous ones.”18 The British had angered Washington for decades—as a planter
and landowner in Virginia, he had been particularly hurt by tax hikes, the Stamp
Act, and the machinations of the British mercantilist system—and he had just
been subjected to an “unofficial” reconciliation proffer from a British aristocrat,
Lord Drummond. Drummond proposed through an intermediary that Wash-
ington bypass the Congress and pursue reconciliation on his own, but the offer
was chock full of general language that put the onus on the colonists to make
good with their king. Suspicious about Drummond’s furtive approach, the
general quickly notified the Congress about the proposal. The Congress agreed
that the North Ministry had sent Drummond to offer yet another disingenuous
offer aimed at dividing the colonies. The Drummond affair cemented Wash-
ington’s anti-British attitude; he later told a confidante that since the British
16. “King George’s Speech to the House of Lords,” 22 November 1775, AA, ser. IV, 6:1–2;
and Pauline Maier, American Scripture: Making the Declaration of Independence (New York, 1997),
25–26.
17. “Franklin to Dumas,” 9 December 1775, and “Dumas to Franklin,” 30 April 1976, in
Jared Sparks, ed., The Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution (Washington, DC,
1857), V:188–89, 191 (hereafter DC).
18. “Eliphalet Dyer to Joseph Trumbull,” 15 January 1776, Letters 3:95; and “Washington
to John Hancock,” 4 January 1776, in W. W. Abbott, ed., The Papers of George Washington,
Revolutionary War Series, vol. 3, June–September 1775 (Charlottesville, VA, 1985), 20 (hereafter
GWP).
Figure 1: A French print showing Washington with a copy of the alliance in his hand.
Courtesy Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State.
army’s behavior at the battle of Bunker Hill, “I have never entertained an Idea
of an Accommodation.” He also warned the Congress to guard against the
ministry’s “artful declarations, or specious pretences.”19
19. For Washington’s enmity toward Britain, see Richard Brookhiser, Founding Father:
Rediscovering George Washington (New York, 1996), 21–22, 141; and Ellis, His Excellency, 59–60.
For the specifics of the Drummond Proposal, see “Thomas Lynch to Washington,” 5 February
1776, GWP 3:252–53, and “Washington to Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Reed,” 10 February
1776, ibid., 288. For Washington’s dismissal of the offer and notification to the Congress, see
“Washington to Hancock,” 14 February 1776, ibid., 306–7. Congress agreed with the general’s
suspicions about Drummond’s offer; see “Hancock to Washington,” 6 March 1776, ibid., 415.
The Congress then reminded the American people that “at a time when every
Thing dear and valuable to such a People is in imminent Danger,” London
continued to spurn the Congress’s heartfelt entreaties and had instead imposed
a “Sentence of universal Slavery” on the colonists. The British had attacked
towns and tried to choke off colonial commerce by unconstitutionally raising
taxes and duties on exports and closing fisheries. The practice of nonimportation
should be continued because “we have a right to withdraw or to continue our
own Commerce.” However, “even this peaceful Expedient” had been considered
“a seditious and unwarrantable Combination.” Still reluctant to declare inde-
pendence, but determined to defend themselves from British attacks, the
Congress dismissed the charge that it sought “an independent Empire.” Should
British soldiers persist in continuing their attacks, independence would be the
colonies’ “fate” rather than “wish.”20
British actions, the Congress continued to argue, contradicted their claim to
want an amicable reconciliation. John Hancock wrote that North’s Prohibition
Act “bodes no Good” for the colonies because their naval vessels had now
become a “lawful prize.” This decision, Hancock concluded, would lead to war,
not reconciliation. Robert Morris of Pennsylvania noted that the ministry had
charged the colonists with wanting independence, and then attacked American
cities, which only “prepares Men’s minds for an Independency, that were
shock’d at the idea a few weeks ago.” Furthermore, “should this Campaign open
with furious Acts of Parliament, you may bid adieu to the American Colonies.”
John Adams told his wife Abigail, “I see no Prospect, no Probability, no Possi-
bility” of reconciliation. Dr. Warren wrote Adams that he “always dreaded”
British “Negotiations” because of their lack of sincerity and warned “no one can
see safety or happiness in a future Connection with B.”21
British deceit led the Congress to openly debate whether to seek a treaty with
foreign powers, particularly France, because such a treaty would lead to signifi-
cant commercial benefits for both parties. John Adams remarked, “Open your
Ports to Foreigners. Your Trade will become of so much Consequence, that
Foreigners will protect you.” James Wilson and Roger Sherman argued against
half-measures and urged the colonies to trade with “greater vigour,” because
independence could not mean isolation. George Wythe argued that indepen-
dence could also be used as a diplomatic and political tool to convince Europe-
ans to aid the colonies. “We must declare ourselves a free people,” Wythe
counseled, for such a declaration would convince the Europeans of their
For more on the Drummond Proposal, see Curtis P. Nettles, George Washington and American
Independence (Boston, 1951), 178–80; Herbert A. Meistrich, “Lord Drummond and Reconcili-
ation,” Proceedings of the New Jersey Historical Society 81 (10/63); and Milton M. Klein, “Failure
of a Mission: The Drummond Peace Proposal of 1775,” Huntington Library Quarterly 35 (1972).
20. “Tuesday, 13 February 1776,” JCC 4:133–46 (italics in original).
21. “John Hancock to Thomas Cushing,” 13 February 1776, Letters 3:244; “Robert Morris
to Robert Herries,” 15 February 1776, ibid., 258; “John Adams to Abigail Adams, 18 February
1776,” AFP; and “Warren to Adams,” 7 March 1776, JAP 4:45.
determination to break free from Britain.22 John and Samuel Adams argued that
France would realize, sooner or later, that intervention on the side of America
would help “dismember” the British Empire. Whereas John warned that the
preservation of independence demanded that it only establish commercial rather
than political or military ties with France, Samuel dismissed such fears, arguing
that France “would with Cheerfulness, openly lend her Aid to promote it, if
America would declare herself free and independent.” British intransigence had
moved the goalposts of the discussion in the Congress; debate now centered on
how best to promote and maintain independence.23
As the Congress inched toward supporting independence, in early March, the
CSC officially authorized Silas Deane to go to France to purchase arms and
ammunition, and informed him “there is a great appearance we shall come to a
total separation from Great Britain.” Deane was also instructed to explore a
commercial and defensive alliance with Paris. John Crowley has argued that
these instructions should be viewed “in mercantilist terms by emphasizing the
potential for a new friendship” between the two nations based upon a “premise
of commercial recolonization.” However, when viewed in the context of the goal
of economic, political, and commercial independence, the Americans were actu-
ally playing the diplomatic game of offer and counteroffer. The discussion in the
Congress and Deane’s instructions demonstrate that the Americans never com-
promised on their desire for commercial and political independence and clearly
understood that independence did not preclude them from engaging in diplo-
macy with the European powers.24
The Congress received information from a pro-American, former British
army officer that Britain would never reconcile on any terms other than sub-
mission. Heeding this intelligence, the Congress called for naval ships “to cruise
on the enemies of these United Colonies” and approved the confiscation of
British goods from British ships. Because the British had “rejected” all petitions
aimed at reconciliation, had begun “an unjust war” against the colonies “in a
cruel manner,” and Parliament had declared them to be in “open rebellion,” the
Americans should reciprocate.25
As whispers of another parliamentary attempt at reconciliation swept
through the continent, American enmity intensified. Franklin attacked the min-
istry for providing “us with new Causes of increasing Enmity, and new Reasons
22. “Notes of Debates in the Continental Congress,” 16 February 1776, John Adams Diary
26, 16 February–April 1776, AFP.
23. “John Adams’s Notes on Foreign Alliances,” 1 March 1776; “Notes on Relations with
France,” March–April 1776; and “Samuel Adams to Samuel Cooper,” 3 April 1776, all in Letters
3:481–83.
24. “The Committee of Correspondence to Silas Deane,” 3 March 1776, DC I:6. As
“France replaced Britain in a privileged trading relationship,” Crowley further contends,
“American commerce would remain colonial in character.” See John E. Crowley, The Privileges
of Independence: Neomercantilism and the American Revolution (Baltimore, 1993), 55–57.
25. Saturday, 23 March 1776, JCC IV:229–32.
for wishing an eternal Separation; so that there is a rapid Increase of the

formerly Small Party who were for an independent Government.” Samuel
Adams reminded Dr. Warren that “experience should teach us to pay no Regard
to” reconciliation, and Richard Henry Lee said after “the 12 years experience
we have had of the perfidy and despotic intentions of the British Court,” the
Congress must pursue “Treaties of Alliance with foreign States.”26
The rumors turned out to be true. North authorized a reconciliation
commission in May led by Admiral Richard Lord Howe and his brother
General William Howe. The commission offered a pardon “for all treasons,”
an end to the trade quarantine on colonial ports, and the lifting of all trade
restrictions. In return, the colonists must end their rebellion and forswear
further revolts, dissolve all provincial congresses, disband all militias and
return occupied forts to British control, contribute an annual payment to Par-
liament in return for their defense, and end nonimportation and the collection
of taxes on British imports. In sum, the colonists must subordinate their inter-
ests “to the authority of the parent state.” North, however, had either under-
estimated, dismissed, or was unaware of the colonists’ anger and resolve to
pursue independence.27
While the British prepared to offer their terms, on 10 May, John Adams and
Lee introduced a resolution calling for the individual colonies to draft their own
constitutions in preparation for their independence. The Congress passed it five
days later. The resolution blamed the ministry for the recent parliamentary act
that “excluded the Inhabitants of these united Colonies from the Protection of
his Crown.” Furthermore, “Reason and good Conscience” dictated that the
American people not trust Britain’s reconciliation proposals. Adams called it
“the most important Resolution that ever was taken in America.”28
Adams continued to be the most effective proponent of independence.
Britain, he wrote Abigail, “has at last driven America, to the last Step, a compleat
Seperation from her, a total, absolute Independence.” On 3 June, he declared
independence “the natural Course and order of things.” Lee agreed and called
independence a “necessity,” not a choice, because only through it could America
gain foreign allies. On 6 June, Lee stood up in the Continental Congress and,
seconded by Adams, moved to declare America independent. Six days later the
Congress appointed Dickinson, Franklin, Adams, Benjamin Harrison, and
26. “Franklin to Josiah Quincy,” 15 April 1776; “Samuel Adams to James Warren,” 16 April
1776; and “Richard Henry Lee to Patrick Henry,” 20 April 1776, all in Letters 3:529, 539,
563–64.
27. “Instructions to Commissioners for Restoring Peace in America,” 5 May 1776, DAR
1776:121–24.
28. For the text of the resolution and Adams’s comment, see “John Adams to Joseph
Warren,” 15 May 1776, JAP 4:186. Joseph Ellis has called the decision to form individual state
constitutions “the most discernable way to declare American independence.” See Joseph J.
Ellis, American Sphinx: The Character of Thomas Jefferson (New York, 1996), 53. See also
McCullough, John Adams, 108–9.
Morris to a committee charged with setting up a treaty format with a foreign

power.29
The Congress as a whole then began to debate the pros and cons of inde-
pendence. Adams answered the two arguments that the anti-independence
caucus had raised head-on. First, he told those who worried that all of Britain
would turn against America that they forgot about the large number of English-
men, in particular members of the commercial class and civil libertarians, who
already supported the colonies against the ministry. Second, those who feared
that an alliance with other European powers endangered independence misun-
derstood the fundamental fact that Europe “already know that We are as obnox-
ious to the British Court as we can be. They know that Parliament in effect
declared Us independent” when it tried to force the colonies to accede to
parliamentary demands. Finally, he argued that the Europeans know “we have
acted these Thirteen months, to all Intents and Purposes, as if We were”
independent, by engaging the British army and sending emissaries to European
courts.30
Dickinson and John Livingston, the leaders of the anti-independence forces,
contended that independence would in reality “weaken us more than could be
compensated by any foreign alliance.” France and Spain, they said, would hardly
help America, even if doing so weakened Britain, because they would “be jealous
of that rising power which would one day certainly strip them of all their
American possessions.” Ironically, Dickinson and Livingston made Franklin’s
and Adams’s point—the Americans possessed the power to affect international
affairs. Lee countered “we should declare a fact,” independence, “that already
exists.” An official declaration of independence, Lee argued, would compel the
Europeans to “treat with us.” Any possible “jealousy” paled in comparison to
British-American reconciliation, which would be the Europeans’ worst night-
mare. Smart Europeans, Lee said, recognized their national interests lay with
supporting the new nation. On 10 June the Congress appointed Adams, Fran-
klin, Roger Sherman, Robert Livingston, and Thomas Jefferson to draft a
declaration of independence. On 2 July 1776, Congress adopted the Declaration
of Independence.31
29. “Letter from John Adams to Abigail Adams,” 17 May 1776, AFP; “RH Lee to Landon
Carter,” 2 June 1776, 117, and “John Adams to Patrick Henry,” 3 June 1776, both in Letters
4:117, 122. For more on Lee’s resolution and its relationship to soliciting European aid, see
Maier, American Scripture, 41–43.
30. “John Adams to Zabdiel Adams,” 21 June 1776, Letters 4:278.
31. “Thomas Jefferson’s Notes of Proceedings of Congress,” 7–28 June 1776, ibid., 161–
63. For more on Dickinson’s objections, see “John Dickinson’s Notes for a Speech in Con-
gress,” 1 July 1776, ibid., 353–57. For an excellent discussion of the entire drafting process of
the declaration, see Maier, American Scripture, 99–153. For a concise discussion of Jefferson’s
primary role in drafting the declaration, see Ellis, American Sphinx, 58–74. Lee accurately
predicted Vergennes’s maneuvers in the fall of 1777. Whereas Dickinson remained opposed to
independence and abstained from voting for, and refused to sign, the declaration, many foes of
independence joined the loyalist cause for a myriad of reasons. Estimated by many scholars to
comprise anywhere from one third to 40 percent of the American population, prominent
Adams split his time between helping write the declaration and working on
the treaty committee, and on 18 July the committee submitted the Plan of
Treaties, or Model Treaty, to the Congress. Although Felix Gilbert has argued
that the Model Treaty showed an unwillingness to hew to “the diplomatic
practice of the time,” in fact the Treaty demonstrates the Founders’ desire to
participate in the international system of the time and play France and Britain
off against one another. Written mainly by Adams, the plan combined his ideas
about independence and the need for commercial alliances that he and other
pro-independence Americans had been calling for since the middle of 1775.
The plan called for a treaty with France based on American independence
and the protection of each nation’s commerce from attacks by British warships
and pirates. Adams envisioned a relationship where neither nation would arm
privateers to prey on the other’s commercial shipping or join Britain in a war
against the other.32
Meanwhile, the Howe brothers landed in New York and requested a meeting
with the Americans—although they concurrently wrote London that they could
find no such “disposition” to reconcile on British terms. In early September,
however, the Congress instructed John Adams, Franklin, and Edward Rutledge
to meet with Admiral Howe as representatives of a new, independent nation.
Adams, who had opposed the meeting because he figured it would be more of
the same, nonetheless agreed to attend in order to tell Howe that Congress
would not knuckle under to the British.33
In their account of the meeting, Adams, Franklin, and Rutledge related how
Howe said he could only consult with “private gentlemen of influence in the
colonies,” not congressmen. The Americans responded “we consider ourselves
in no other character” than as congressmen representing an independent group
of states, not colonies. After Howe offered merely verbal “assurances” rather
than an “explicit proposition of peace” in writing and demanded the Americans
“return their allegiance and obedience” to Britain, Adams reminded him that
their previous petitions had either gone unanswered or been “treated with
contempt.” Only after Parliament declared war had they declared their inde-
pendence, and further attempts to convince them to trade independence for
peace would be fruitless. As John Adams told Samuel Adams, “the whole affair
of the Commission appears to me, as it ever did,” to be yet another ploy in a long
loyalists included the Pennsylvanian and former Continental Congressman Joseph Galloway,
Massachusetts’s Thomas Hutchinson, and Franklin’s son William. For an examination of the
Loyalists, see Janice Potter, The Liberty We See: Loyalist Ideology in New Colonial New York and
Massachusetts (Cambridge, MA, 1983), and Sheila L. Skemp, William Franklin: Son of a Patriot,
Servant of a King (New York, 1999).
32. “Thursday, July 18, 1776,” JCC V:576–89, and Gilbert, To the Farewell Address, 53–54.
33. “Commissioners for Restoring Peace in America to Lord George Germain,” 11 August
1776, DAR 1776:182–83; Valentine, Lord North I:412; and “John Adams to Abigail Adams,” 6
September 1776, AFP.
Figure 2: The congressional commissioners meet Admiral Howe. Courtesy Office of the
Historian, U.S. Department of State.
line of communications and pronouncements “calculated only to decoy and

deceive.”34
The British, on the other hand, described the encounter differently. Henry
Strachey, Howe’s secretary, wrote that Howe opened the meeting by explaining
that the Declaration of Independence “precluded him” from negotiations
because Parliament refused to recognize American independence. His counter-
parts, he said, “must also be sensible,” and recognize “he could not confer with
them as a Congress.” Rutledge responded that they had been elected by citizens
of an independent nation. Howe then appealed to their economic self-interest
by touting the mutual advantages of American commerce. After he explained
that Britain “wanted” America’s fighting men in order to increase its own power,
Franklin replied that America’s men had already gotten what they wanted by
fighting Britain and then reiterated, “all former Attachment was Obliterated.”
Rutledge turned Howe’s argument around and argued that Britain’s interests lay
34. “John Adams to Sam Adams,” 14 September 1776, Letters 5:109; and “Report of the
Lord Howe Meeting,” Thursday, 17 September 1776, JCC V:765–66.
Figure 3: The Comte de Vergennes. Courtesy Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of
State.
in the establishment of an alliance with an independent United States of America

so “that she might enjoy a greater Share of the Commerce” that would accrue
from a new relationship between the two nations. He also warned Howe that
Britain must act on this offer now “before any thing is settled with other foreign
powers.” Howe, not surprisingly, refused Rutledge’s offer.35
The Howe Commission failed to accomplish anything as both sides dug in
and set about to defeat the other by whatever means available. The Congress
therefore quickly authorized Deane to negotiate a treaty with France based upon
the earlier Model Treaty guidelines. Deane, the Congress said, should “press
for the immediate and explicit declaration of France in our Favour,” inform
Vergennes that the United States renounced any return to subjugation by the
British, and would open its trade to France. Otherwise, the new nation would
establish a “Re-union” with Britain. Deane, who had been in Paris for over a
year purchasing arms and sounding out whether France would support the
cause, began to engage in European-style diplomacy in order to convince
35. “Henry Strachey’s Notes on Lord Howe’s Meeting with a Committee of Congress,” 11
September 1776, Letters 5:138–41 (italics in the original).
Vergennes to commit to a treaty with the United States that the Americans were
convinced would be in France’s self-interest. Indeed, Vergennes had been con-
templating such a move for months.36
the unit e d st at e s an d f ran ce b uild ties

As the Americans and British dug in their heels during the spring of 1776,
the French cabinet decided to secretly support the colonies in their bid for
independence. They did so in order to “cause those ideas of independence to
burst forth, which as yet are only secretly budding amongst them.” The French
realized that if the British lost their North American colonies, they would be
seriously weakened and France would be correspondingly strengthened. As
British repression further “embitter[ed] their minds,” Vergennes predicted,
“they will be all the more furious for war.” For the moment, Paris would publicly
declare it wanted peace with Britain, yet clearly inform the British that it did
not “fear” conflict. The minister of war, Claude-Louis, the Comte de Saint
Germain, stated that France must avoid both war and “a fatal torpor which
would draw upon her the contempt of Europe.” The chief of the cabinet,
Jean-Frédéric Philipeaux, the Comte de Maurepas, argued “there will never be
a more favorable time for reducing the power of England,” especially because a
British-American reconciliation would hamper French access to American
domestic manufactures and prevent it from profiting from the lucrative sugar
and molasses trade that France’s Caribbean colonies produced. These state-
ments demonstrate that the Americans and French were moving on similar
courses and identified each other as natural diplomatic, commercial, and politi-
cal allies.37
Jacques Barbeu-Dubourg, a pro-American French philosopher and friend
of Franklin, informed Vergennes that Deane had signed a contract with two
French arms dealers that left “no doubt the intentions of the Congress” to
separate from Britain. Barbeu-Dubourg used this intelligence to argue that
France “could hardly leave the Americans alone” unless it wanted to cede its
potential “immense trade” with the rising New World power. The French
playwright and secret service member Pierre Augustin Caron de Beaumarchais
also implored Vergennes to help the colonists and informed the Comte that the
arms dealers had found fifteen thousand muskets from stores in Lyon that they
36. William Lee informed the French court about the rejection of the Howe Commission.
Barbeu-Dubourg responded that “the resolution to suffer everything rather than surrender and
return to obedience” still prevailed in America. See “William Lee to Barbeu-Dubourg,” 16
September 1776, in B. F. Stevens, ed., Facsimiles of Manuscripts in European Archives Relating to
America, 1773–1783, vol. VI (London, 1889–1898) (hereafter Facsimiles); “Richard Henry Lee’s
Proposed Instructions,” 10 September 1776, Letters 5:131–32; and “Instructions to Agent in
France,” 24 September 1776, JCC V:813–16.
37. Vergennes “Considérations,” 12 March 1776; Maurepas, “Reflexions sur la Necessité
de Secourir les Américains et de se Préparer à la Gueree avec l’Angleterre,” March 1776; and
Saint Germain, “Memoir en Réponse aux ‘Considérations,’ ” 12 March 1776, all in Facsimiles,
XIII.
could send to the rebels. Vergennes approved the measures as long as they
remained secret.38
After the adoption of the Declaration of Independence, the Congress and
France continued to move on parallel tracks toward a more open relationship.
On 8 July the CSC authorized Deane to effect the “final separation from Great
Britain. It was the universal demand of the people.” Deane should “sound the
Court of France on the subject of mutual commerce between her and these
States.” As this letter crossed the ocean, Vergennes, clearly of like mind with the
Congress, told the controller general of finances “our political as well as our
mercantile interests demand that we should treat favourably the Americans who
frequent our ports” and ordered the elimination of all duties on American
commerce.39
Deane continually kept the CSC informed about his progress. In a meeting
with Barbeu-Dubourg, he assured the Frenchman that his countrymen were
determined to be independent from the “common danger,” Britain. Barbeu-
Dubourg replied that King Louis’s decision to open French ports to U.S.
shipping in defiance of British warnings proved that he recognized the impor-
tance of its commerce. Deane also disclosed that Beaumarchais offered to
provide “whatever should be wanted” in terms of arms, ships, and ammunition
and the establishment of “an extensive commercial house, solely for the purpose
of serving you in Europe.” Because France could not openly violate either
written or unwritten agreements with England, Deane urged the committee to
keep their correspondence secret. Deane recognized that France wanted to
move slowly and Vergennes would have to convince the king to openly support
the United States, which was akin to a declaration of war with Britain.40
Deane notified the Congress that the British had tried to disrupt his dialogue
with the French by falsely asserting that reconciliation was imminent or even
achieved. These false rumors made the French court “extremely uneasy,” raising
fears that French possessions in the West Indies could be endangered by a
British-American reconciliation. Beaumarchais and Deane together reassured
Vergennes that the United States remained committed to independence and that
the two nations’ interests remained “inseparably connected.” Both wanted a
weakened Britain and an independent United States. But Deane made sure
Vergennes understood that if the British recognized America’s independence,
38. “Barbeu-Dubourg to Vergennes,” 31 May 1776; “Beaumarchais to Vergennes,” 1 June

1776; and “Vergennes to Barbeu-Dubourg,” 1 June 1776, all in Facsimiles, VI. Vergennes told
Barbeu-Dubourg, “One can connive at certain things but one cannot authorise them.”
39. “The Committee of Secret Correspondence to Deane,” 8 July 1776, Letters 4:405; and
“Vergennes to de Glugny,” 10 July 1776, Facsimiles, XIII.
40. “Deane to the Committee of Secret Correspondence,” 18 August 1776, DC I:9–19.
Meanwhile, France’s Comptroller-General of Finances de Glugny informed Vergennes that
“no obstacle may be placed . . . in the way of the armament which you are having prepared at
Nantes for America.” See “de Glugny to Vergennes,” 8 August 1776, Facsimiles, XIII; and
“Beaumarchais to the Committee of Secret Correspondence,” 18 August 1776, DC I:27–29.
an Anglo-American reconciliation could occur that could be turned against

France at any moment. Deane also predicted Britain would continue to try
reconciliation because it could not afford the cost of an indefinite war. The latter
argument dovetailed with Vergennes’s reluctance to openly commit France to
hostilities; better to let the Americans bleed the British with French munitions
and commercial aid.41
In December, Franklin and Arthur Lee joined Deane as the Congress’s
commissioners to France. Deane continued to warn the Congress that Britain’s
“most effectual” diplomatic “card” was “asserting that an accommodation”
would soon be reached, because it would prevent France and Spain from helping
the United States. Official pledges of congressional determination to remain
independent therefore became critical. In a letter to the commissioners, the
Congress warned that Britain would try anything to sink the negotiations with
France. The commissioners must explain to France that all reconciliation
attempts, “except on the principle of peace as individual states,” are “totally at an
end.” Again, the commissioners could use the prospect of Anglo-American
reconciliation, as long as independence was recognized, to gain French aid and
eventually a treaty.42
the unit e d st at e s e n g ag e s in t riangular diplomacy

On 31 October 1776, King George harangued Parliament again, and charged
that the Americans had rejected “with circumstances of indignity and insult”
Britain’s reconciliation attempts. He argued that he only wished “to promote
the true interests of all my subjects. No people ever enjoyed more happiness, or
lived under a milder Government, than those now revolted Provinces.” He also
accused the Congress of leading the people down the path of rebellion and
lamented the “arbitrary tyranny of their chiefs.” In spite of these charges and his
determination to “restore to them the blessings of law and liberty,” the king
noted the power of American commerce, and worried that continued rebellion
would in turn not only weaken British commerce but imperil “the present
system of all Europe.” He also boasted of the continued “messages of amity” he
had received from the courts of Europe.43
41. “Deane to the Committee of Secret Correspondence,” 1 October 1776, DC I:32–35;

and “Deane to Dumas,” 10 October 1776, DC V:213–14.
42. “Deane to the Committee of Secret Correspondence,” 1 December 1776, and
“Committee of Secret Correspondence to Benjamin Franklin, Silas Deane, and Arthur Lee,
Commissioners at Paris,” 21 December 1776, all in DC I:58–65, 165–69. On 30 December the
Congress sent commissioners to Austria, Spain, Prussia, and Tuscany. Each was instructed to
reassure these nations of America’s dedication to independence, that Britain would use “artful
and insidious” means to convince Europe otherwise, and that European self-interest depended
upon keeping America separate from Britain. See Monday 30 December 1776, JCC VI:1054–
58.
43. “Speech of King George III to the House of Lords,” 31 October 1776, AA, ser. 5,
3:961–62 (emphasis in the original).
George’s speech reached North America in February 1777, and the Congress
reacted quickly with disdain. Samuel Adams called George “not very wise” and
dismissed the king’s confidence in the Europeans. The “Quarrel he has plungd
himself into with America,” Adams argued, had in reality “excited a Curiosity
and a Watchfulness in some of the Powers of Europe, which will produce a
contrary Effect.” Richard Henry Lee called George a “Tyrant” and found it
“curious” that “a Man on so public a situation” had voiced “his utter disregard
for the truth.” William Whipple wrote his brother that the “Tyrant” could not
hide his fear of the Americans, whereas William Hooper said King George
“trembles for his Kingdom.” The king’s belligerent rhetoric thinly masked his
fear, and validated the Congress’s decision to reconcile only on the basis of
independence. Their commercial and political strength had not only weakened
Britain but attracted French support. They remained confident that France
would officially ally with the United States and the other European nations
would soon follow suit.44
At the same time, the Congress received a letter from Charles Lee, who
reported that the Howe brothers wanted to meet again. Thomas Burke wrote
“the general sense of Congress” considered “any conference” with the Howes
“Impolitic and degrading—degrading because [it was] beneath the Dignity of
Congress to Treat with persons whose very Powers supposed them objects of
their Dominion” and “Impolitic because it would give an Opportunity of cir-
culating Stories in the Courts of Europe that the Congress” wanted to negotiate
“a Treaty of Reconciliation with Britain and by this means suspend for sometime
their Intention of befreinding [sic] us.” Dr. Benjamin Rush said “the Court of
Britain is alarmed with fear of a French war. They have no terms to offer us. They
mean only to deceive and divide us.” John Adams argued “the King’s Speech is
decisive against us. It lets loose all the dogs of war & corruption upon us, but it
carries a remedy to its terrors along with it—it holds the probability of a war
with France.” The Congress unanimously refused to consent to a second
meeting with the Howes.45
On 19 March, the commissioners in Paris officially proposed that the United
States and France negotiate a treaty. Deane first affirmed the Congress’s will-
ingness “to maintain as long as possible their independence, whether assisted or
not by any other power.” He then employed the carrot-and-stick approach with
Vergennes that pro-independence Americans had been advocating for the past
three years. On the one hand, he stressed that independence would weaken
Britain’s political, economic, and military power in both the New and the Old
44. “Samuel Adams to Samuel Cooper,” 9 February 1777; “Richard Henry Lee to John
Page,” 4 February 1777; “William Whipple to Joseph Whipple,” 8 February 1777; and
“William Hooper to Joseph Hewes,” 15 February 1777, all in Letters 6:207, 209–10, 215, 245,
290.
45. “Thomas Burke’s Notes of Debates,” 21 February 1777; “Benjamin Rush’s Notes of
Debates,” 21 February 1777; and “Benjamin Rush to Robert Morris,” 22 February 1777, all in
ibid., 336, 340–41, 346 (first emphasis by author, second emphasis in the original).
worlds, thereby boosting French power. If the French remained on the sidelines,
however, Deane threatened to use American commerce to affect a rapproche-
ment with Britain. Meanwhile, Beaumarchais told Vergennes “secret advances”
for reconciliation were being made to Franklin by official and unofficial British
emissaries, of “which you are doubtless unaware.” Beaumarchais explained that
the British approached Franklin instead of Deane because they considered the
latter “a formidable obstacle to every plan of reconciliation,” and wanted “him
out of this country at any price.”46
Deane also told Dumas, who was in London monitoring developments in
Parliament, that the Congress would never abandon its commitment to inde-
pendence no matter how hard the British attempted reconciliation. Deane had
discovered that British intelligence had been floating rumors that the Americans
had caved in to British advances and had renounced independence. He reassured
Dumas that he knew the American people “perfectly, and the principles by
which they are activated,” and he did not “believe they will ever accommodate
on terms lower than independence.” Deane then asked Dumas to preach the
long-term benefits of Dutch-American commerce when he returned to Holland.
A week later, Dumas wrote the newly formed Committee on Foreign Affairs
(CFA, which had replaced the CSC) that although the Dutch Court recognized
the benefits of American commerce, it would remain neutral out of fear that
Britain would retaliate against Dutch shipping.47
The commissioners also continued to buttonhole France and Spain for finan-
cial credits, arms, and munitions. They argued that the two crowns would “be
greatly Gainers by the American Commerce . . . while Britain is diminished and
weakened in proportion,” and dismissed rumors of any impending reconciliation
deal with Britain. Deane and Franklin, however, warned “nothing will induce
the Congress to accommodate on the Terms of an exclusive Commerce with
Britain, but the Despair of obtaining effectual Aid and Support from Europe.”
Although the editors of the Benjamin Franklin Papers argue that the memoran-
dum “conveys a sense of depression” because the United States was “in deep
financial trouble,” it actually demonstrates the commissioners’ consistent strat-
egy of using the possibility of an Anglo-American reunion to gain French aid.
Indeed, French documents show that Vergennes believed the Americans were
dealing from a position of strength, wryly noting that they “see and feel their
interests only, and think that everything else must be subordinated to them.”48
46. “Deane to Comte de Vergennes,” 19 March 1777, in Silas Deane, The Deane Papers,
vol. II 1777–1778 (New York, 1887), 26–28 (hereafter DP); and “Beaumarchais to Vergennes,”
22 March 1777, Facsimiles, XV.
47. “Deane to C. W. F. Dumas,” 7 June 1777, DP II:67–69, and “Dumas to the Committee
on Foreign Affairs,” 14 June 1777, DC V:238–39. For more on the rising enmity between
England and The Netherlands, see H. M. Scott, British Foreign Policy in the Age of the American
Revolution (Oxford, 1990), 223–33.
48. “Memorial from the American Commissioners to Vergennes,” 25 September 1777,
BFP 24, and footnote, 555–60.
Throughout the summer and fall of 1777, the French ambassador to Britain,
the Marquis de Noailles, and Vergennes mulled over Britain’s increasing bel-
ligerency in the face of what London perceived to be French cooperation with
the former colonies. The British had demanded that France turn over American
privateers to the British navy or face British attacks on French shipping. Both
men agreed that France must not provoke Britain, but maintain its right to
trade on the high seas with any nation. Increasingly important to their calcu-
lations, however, was an unwillingness to anger the United States. De Noailles
calculated that with their abundant natural resources, naturally increasing
population, their capacity for agricultural production and domestic manufac-
turing seemingly limitless, and their willingness to use these resources to
achieve their own ends, the Americans were “a rising people.” If the United
States could successfully become independent from Britain, he contended, it
“cannot but increase, some day, our riches, and our importance in the political
balance of Europe.” Vergennes agreed, and although he half-heartedly cracked
down on the activities of the American privateers in French waters and ports,
he refused to “deliver them up” to Britain. He also repeatedly told London’s
ambassador to France, David Murray, Viscount Stormont, that France would
protect its right to trade with any nation. At the same time, he worried that
Britain planned to attack France whether it supported the United States
or not.49
The desire for a relationship clearly was not one-sided. In fact, the French
wanted to curry the favor of the United States to the point that they were willing
to risk incurring Britain’s wrath. Vergennes’s concern that war could break out
with Britain ironically convinced him that if France stayed out of the conflict, it
would lose a golden opportunity to weaken Britain and gain American friend-
ship. The Comte thus informed de Noailles that he and King Louis had decided
to send troops and ships to France’s West Indies possessions in order to protect
them from a possible British attack. This growing alarm at the prospect of an
Anglo-American reconciliation also permeated his repeated attempts to con-
vince Spain to join an anti-British alliance. Although the Spanish foreign
minister, Count Florida Blanca, had continually told the French ambassador to
Spain, the Marquis d’Ossun, that Spain was too weak to fight Britain, Vergennes
responded that the two crowns must enter the war in order to either enjoy “the
merits of having cooperated towards her liberty” or “lose the confidence of the
Americans and alienate them entirely.”50
49. “Vergennes to de Naoilles,” 19 July 1777; “de Naoilles to Vergennes,” 1 August 1777;
“Vergennes to de Naoilles,” 9 August 1777; and “Vergennes to de Naoilles,” 30 August 1777,
all in Facsimiles, XVI; “de Naoilles to Vergennes,” 12 September 1777, Facsimiles, XVIII. For an
examination of British policy on the high seas vis-à-vis France and American privateers, see
Scott, British Foreign Policy, 214, 241–43.
50. “Marquis d’Ossun to Vergennes,” 4 September 1777, Facsimiles, XVIII; “Vergennes to
d’Ossun,” 6 September 1777, and “Vergennes to d’Ossun,” 26 September 1777, both in
Facsimiles, XIX.
On 3 October, Vergennes again warned d’Ossun that France and Spain could
not afford to alienate the United States. He argued that “if we comply with the
Americans, we have no real security that they will not go over to peace” with
Britain. But “if we refuse them, there is a likelihood that we shall oblige them to
do so.” Tilting toward overt intervention, Vergennes also informed d’Ossun that
King Louis had decided to give money to the United States but would wait until
his Spanish counterpart responded before deciding the exact amount. Although
the Americans did not know of the letter, their strategy of threatening reconcili-
ation with Britain to wrangle concessions from France had worked. The Spanish,
however, remained unconvinced. In a letter to Vergennes, Florida Blanca said that
Spain preferred for the time being to “pacify” Britain and refused to contribute
any money to the Americans. Vergennes responded that he and Louis “deplore
that the present circumstances of Spain” prevented financial aid.51
De Naoilles sharpened Vergennes’s fears by reporting that the ministry’s
position seemed to be softening. In a 20 November speech, King George had,
for the first time, used the term “peace, and of the return of confidence in the
American colonies,” whereas “the term submission has been suppressed.” This
indicated the British were “now disposed to try means of reconciliation” with its
rebellious colony because King George “only speaks . . . of the re-establishment
of ” the “constitutional subordination” of America. Vergennes’s decision to lift
restrictions on privateers and allow them to sell their “prizes” in French ports
shows how he was determined to try to gain American favor just in case the
ministry ultimately decided to recognize an independent United States.52
News of the astonishing victory at Saratoga reached the CFA at the end of
October. The committee quickly wrote Franklin that he must “make the best
and most immediate use of this intelligence to depress our enemies and produce
essential aid to our cause in Europe.” Franklin must also remind Vergennes that
“the public acknowledgement of the Independence of these United States”
would lead to “beneficial consequences” such as access to trade and, especially,
goodwill toward France. The chair of the committee, James Lovell, told John
Adams (en route to France to replace Deane) to impress upon “foreign Courts
the Idea that we are absolutely determined” to be independent. On 22 Novem-
ber the Congress unanimously declared it would reject any proposal that did not
recognize American independence.53
51. “Vergennes to d’Ossun,” 3 October 1777; “Count de Florida Blanca Paper,” 17

October 1777; and “Vergennes to d’Ossun,” 31 October 1777, all in Facsimiles, XIX (emphasis
in the original).
52. “De Naoilles to Vergennes,” 21 November 1777, and “Vergennes to de Naoilles,” 29
November 1777, both in ibid. (emphasis in the original).
53. “The Committee for Foreign Affairs to the American Commissioners, 31 October
1777,” BFP 25:134–35; and “Saturday 22 November 1777,” JCC IX:951–52; “Lovell to
Adams,” JAP 5:340. The committee repeated their instructions in “Committee for Foreign
Affairs to the American Commissioners,” 2 December 1777, ibid., 226.
News of their defeat at Saratoga reached the ministry in December. At first

they were stunned, but North quickly recovered and stepped up his official and
unofficial courting of the commissioners in Paris. Franklin, Deane, and Lee, on
the other hand, exulted in the news and publicly announced the victory in
thousands of printed handbills that were passed around the city. At the same
time, they continued to pressure Vergennes by informing him of Britain’s
renewed reconciliation attempts. Indeed, the Comte so feared these entreaties
that on 15 December he instructed his ambassador to Spain, the Comte de
Montmorin, to inform Florida Blanca that French intelligence had just learned
about a recent secret meeting between an anonymous British agent and Deane.
Because Vergennes considered Deane “the most decided of all in not wishing for
any coalition with England, if he can hope for one with the two Crowns,” his
new willingness to meet with the British signified a shift in the commissioners’
stance. This came on the heels of Deane’s clever revelation that another British
agent had approached the commissioners and offered to “cordially reunite” by
dangling the commercial fruits of a British-American war against France and
Spain. Because the offer did not include American independence, Deane told
Vergennes that it had been refused. These maneuverings show that Saratoga
only deepened each government’s commitment to pursue their own goals.54
On 18 December, Franklin, Lee, and Deane informed the Congress that both
public and court opinion were moving in their favor. They also noted “the great
news” of Saratoga, “news that apparently occasioned as much general joy in
France as if it had been a victory of their own troops over their own enemies.”
Vergennes, meanwhile, had confessed that it was “manifestly in the interest of
France that the power of England should be diminished by our separation from
it.” Vergennes appeared ready to offer official treaty negotiations, as long as
the Americans promised to remain independent. Because they had consistently
maintained the nonnegotiability of independence, Vergennes’s demand proved
that their strategy to threaten reunion with Britain influenced France’s thinking.
It also demonstrates that the victory at Saratoga played little role in the calcu-
lations of American, French, and British diplomats. Indeed, two more months of
diplomacy would pass before the signing of the Franco-American treaty.55
vergennes push e s f o r a f ran co - am e ri c an allianc e

Beaumarchais informed Vergennes about Saratoga on 5 December. The next
day King Louis, under what he called “circumstances now appearing more
54. “The American Commissioners: A Public Announcement,” 4 December 1777, BFP

25:234–36; and “Vergennes to Montmorin,” 15 December 1777, Facsimiles, XX. It should also
be noted that when the commissioners asked North for an exchange of prisoners being held in
Europe, they signed the request “The Commissioners Plenipotentiary from the Independent
and United States of America.” See “The American Commissioners to Lord North,” 12
December 1777, BFP 25:273–76.
55. “The American Commissioners to the Committee for Foreign Affairs,” 18 December
1777, DC I:259–60.
favourable to the establishment of a close understanding,” proposed treaty talks

with the commissioners. He warned, however, that the talks must remain secret
until Spain acted “in concert with him,” for France could not “recognise and
publicly declare” its support for American independence on its own. On 11
December, Vergennes told d’Ossun’s successor in Madrid, Montmorin, that
Saratoga might accelerate Britain’s attempts to reconcile with America, and if
France is the “first to recognize the independence of the Americans,” it “will be
the one to gather all the fruit of this war.” But he worried that the commissioners
“aim perhaps less at drawing a decision from us than a reply which may
enlighten them as to the course they should pursue.” He again appealed for
Spanish support. The next day, de Naoilles told Vergennes that a prominent
member of the British parliament, Lord Richmond, endorsed independence and
“a Treaty of Union” with the United States. He also reported that North
planned to offer another reconciliation plan after Parliament’s recess. On 13
December, Vergennes told Montmorin that no matter which course France
chose, “we shall not avoid war with England.” Therefore the two crowns must
take the “only course” available: intervention on the American side.56
French documents further confirm the fears about a reconciliation that
Vergennes had been expressing since late summer. De Naoilles informed the
Comte that a member of the British parliament had written Franklin offering
peace and reunion. Vergennes responded that Saratoga would “incline” the
British to pursue “a prompt reconciliation rather than the continuation a
ruinous war.” He then instructed Montmorin to again lobby the Spanish to join
France in an alliance with the United States. On 23 December, Florida Blanca
informed Vergennes that although Madrid would provide “abundant aid in
money” and “protection” and “watch attentively” to see whether the British
continued reconciliation efforts—a concession to be sure—it would not join
such an alliance. On 5 January, Montmorin notified Vergennes that Florida
Blanca had predicted that if the former British Prime Minister William Pitt the
Elder, Lord Chatham, replaced North as prime minister, he would approve
independence. For the time being, however, Madrid “felt patience is the most
suitable course for the two Crowns to follow.” Florida Blanca worried that “any
step which would openly compromise them would be imprudent” and “expose
Spain to immense losses.” Spain’s King Charles supported this analysis.57
On 7 January, Vergennes informed Montmorin that France would officially
ally with the United States regardless of Spain’s decision. Madrid’s cautious
56. “Beaumarchais to Vergennes,” 5 December 1777, Facsimiles, XIX; “Statement in the

Hand of the Comte de Vergennes and Marked by the King ‘approuvé’ of His Willingness to
enter Propositions for the American Commissioners under Certain Indicated Conditions,” 6
December 1777; “Vergennes to Montomorin,” 11 December 1777; “de Noailles to Vergennes,”
12 December 1777; and “Vergennes to Montomorin,” 13 December 1777, all in Facsimiles, XX.
57. “De Naoilles to Vergennes,” 18 December 1777; “Vergennes to de Naoilles,” 20
December 1777; and “Florida Blanca to Vergennes,” 23 December 1777, all in ibid.; “Mont-
morin to Vergennes,” 5 January 1778, Facsimiles, XXI.
approach “no longer suffices,” for neither the Americans nor the British
respected nonintervention. The United States, he argued, would not accept
“Vague speeches,” but action. The two crowns should take advantage of this
golden opportunity to “cause the humiliation of a haughty, unjust and rapacious
Power” by openly supporting American independence. If Spain wanted to sit the
war out, they would have to live with the consequences of their decision. France
would work with the commissioners and sign a treaty with or without their
Spanish allies.58
b ritain and fran ce wo o t h e co m m issi oner s

While the French and Spanish argued about open alliance with the United
States, the ministry flooded Paris with personal emissaries who tried to cajole
the commissioners into reconciliation. When Franklin’s British friend David
Hartley asked why the United States risked its independence by negotiating
with France, Franklin responded “America has been forced and driven into the
Arms of France” by “a cruel Mother-in-Law.” Nothing could “persuade her
Return and Submission to the Will of so barbarous an Enemy.” Undaunted by
Franklin’s answer, Hartley tried again on Christmas Day, asking for reconcili-
ation while lamenting that Parliament had not received “specific propositions
from America.” Of course, the commissioners had proposed reconciliation—as
long as Britain recognized their independence—a concession the ministry had
refused to proffer. A day later, however, after James Hutton, another old friend
of Franklin’s, visited Paris, Jacques-Donatien Leray, the Duke de Chaumont, a
friend of Vergennes and arms supplier to the Americans (the commissioners
had been staying at his mansion gratis for months), confessed “I am afraid” that
the British emissaries might succeed. These December discussions demonstrate
Franklin’s consistent strategy of flirting with the British—knowing all the while
the French would learn about the talks—while maintaining his commitment to
independence.59
The commissioners proved to be anything but willing to submit to France.
On 8 January, during back-to-back meetings with Vergennes’s first assistant,
Conrad Alexandre Gerard, Deane and Franklin brilliantly played upon fears of
an Anglo-American reconciliation. In a memorandum to Vergennes, Gerard
described how Deane expressed “much uneasiness at the conduct of Mr. Hutton,
58. Vergennes, “Paper Submitted to the King and Marked by Him ‘approuvé’ in Answer to
the Decision of the Spanish Court of the 23rd December 1777,” 7 January 1778, enclosed in
“Vergennes to Montmorin,” 8 January 1778, Facsimiles, XXI.
59. “Franklin to David Hartley,” 12 December 1777, in ibid., 651–52; “Hartley to Frank-
lin,” 25 December 1777, BFP 25:345–52; “Chaumont to Vergennes,” 7 January 1778, Facsimiles,
VIII. These communications show that Gordon Wood has mistakenly claimed that Franklin
“initially ignored all British efforts to talk” until after Paris “kept hesitating about openly allying
with America.” Only then, Wood argues, did Franklin meet with another British emissary, Paul
Wentworth, in January. See Wood, The Americanization of Benjamin Franklin, 190–91. For more
on Chaumont’s role, see Thomas J. Schaeper, France and America in the Revolutionary Era: The
Life of Jacques-Donatien Leray de Chaumont, 1725–1803 (Providence, RI, 1995), 124, 127, 159.
and confessed that Dr. Franklin was very reticent in this matter,” thereby hinting
that Hutton had made some headway with Franklin. Gerard “begged” Deane
not to disclose news of France’s “inclination” to sign a treaty with the Americans
to Franklin because he feared Franklin would use this information to gain
concessions from Hutton. Franklin, on the other hand, “tried to elude” Gerard’s
inquiries about the meeting with Hutton, while Deane “encouraged me with a
glance” to keep after Franklin. Gerard changed tactics and told Franklin that
Louis and Vergennes wanted a treaty and laid out the terms, prompting Franklin
to note sarcastically he “had proposed and solicited vainly for a year” for such
a deal.60
Two days later, Chaumont notified Vergennes that Hutton, fearing an
impending Franco-American treaty, offered Franklin an Anglo-American alli-
ance. Because the offer, once again, did not include independence, Franklin
dismissed it, but slyly did not rule out reconciliation with independence, exactly
what Vergennes had feared for months. Interestingly, back in London, King
George privately conceded “nothing short of Independency will be accepted” by
the Americans, but “to treat with Independence can never be possible.” Instead,
he urged North and British diplomats in Paris to step up accommodation
rumors in order to discredit Franklin and Deane while England prepared for war
with France. On 29 January, North proposed a “pacifick [sic]” plan that would
separate “some Colonies from the rest” by offering them an exemption from
parliamentary taxation and a repeal of such measures as the Tea Duty. North,
however, realized this plan would “have little effect in America.” Unfortunately,
he confessed, “it is the best proposition” he had “yet been able to bring to any
perfection” that could reestablish the relationship on the ministry’s terms.
Thwarted by events and the Congress’s commitment to independence, he
offered his resignation, which the king refused on 31 January.61
Britain’s efforts proved to be too little, too late. On 6 February 1778, the
American commissioners in Paris signed two treaties with Vergennes. The first,
a treaty of amity and commerce, included a most-favored nation clause, mutual
protection of shipping, and an agreement respecting the rights of neutrals to
trade in wartime. The second treaty, one of conditional and defensive alliance,
assumed that a state of war would soon exist between France and Britain. Upon
its signing, France became the first great power to recognize the independence
of the United States.
60. Gerard, “Narrative of Conference with the American Commissioners,” 9 January 1778,
Facsimiles, XXI. Two weeks later, Gerard delivered a treaty plan to the commissioners. Ver-
gennes promised France wanted “nothing of America but to be perfectly free.” Vergennes also
swore to invite “all the Nations of Europe to accede” to America’s independence. See “Plan of
Treaty from Vergennes to the American Commissioners,” 22 January 1778, Facsimiles, V.
61. “Chaumont to Vergennes, ‘Journeed Complete avec le Morave [Hutton],’ ” 10 January
1778, both in Facsimiles, VIII (emphasis in the original); “The King to Lord North,” 13 January
1778; “Lord North to the King,” 29 January 1778; and “The King to Lord North,” 31
January 1778, all in KGC IV:14–15, 27–28.
b ritain tries o n e m o re t im e : t h e carlisle c ommission

Unaware of the signing of the treaty with France, the ministry tried to once
again achieve reconciliation. On 17 February, North introduced the reconcili-
ation proposal that guided the Carlisle Commission to Parliament. The pro-
posal included a general amnesty, a promise to only establish standing armies in
the colonies with the colonists’ permission, an end to taxation of the colonies,
and the recognition of the existing colonial assemblies, including the Continen-
tal Congress. In return, the colonies must recognize the supremacy of Parlia-
ment and “contribute to the public charge” by giving a “moderate” sum to
Britain for their own defense. North concluded that because the Declaration of
Independence had not been a “legal” act, it would be “rescinded,” not formally
revoked.
De Noailles called North’s reconciliation plan “more explicit” and “more
yielding” than ever before. The speech “caused the greatest astonishment” in
Parliament because North made it clear that “renunciation of independence
was not to be the sine qua non condition of peace, seeing that he regards” the
contributions to the common defense “as a sufficient recognition of depen-
dence.” Germain, now the secretary of state for America, instructed the Carlisle
commissioners to go over the heads of the Continental Congress and take their
case to the American people “before ill-intentioned persons” could “misrepre-
sent” the ministry. Should they demur, he promised “to prosecute the war with
the utmost vigour” because “the most essential interests of the British empire”
had been threatened. After Parliament enacted the bills on 9 March, North
privately authorized Carlisle to offer the colonists “an extension of the trade of
America” with Britain and a “small” representation in the House of Commons.62
Meanwhile, British agents spread rumors around Paris that the Congress had
already reconciled with Britain. The commissioners told Gerard that the “news
you have received from England cannot be true. No Treaty would be entred [sic]
into with Howe by Washington,” because Parliament had only offered “Pardon
upon Submission,” which Congress had consistently rejected. Franklin dismissed
the rumors as “an Artifice” designed to impugn the honor of the United States
and destroy the new Franco-American treaty. Realizing his disinformation cam-
paign had failed, King George ordered North “to demand a categorical answer”
from the French “whether they have signed any Treaty with the Rebels.” On 23
March, de Noailles delivered a “paper” to King George that essentially acknowl-
edged the treaty. The king called it “equivalent to a declaration” of war.63
62. “de Noailles to Vergennes,” 19 February 1778, Facsimiles, XXII; “Circular from Lord
George Germain to the Commissioners for Restoring Peace,” 19 February 1778; “Lord
George Germain to Lords of Admiralty,” 8 March 1778, and “Instructions to Commissioners
for Quieting Disorders in North America,” 12 April 1778, all in DAR XV:48–58, 81–93.
63. “The American Commissioners in Paris to Gerard,” 22 February 1778, BFP 25:701;
“The King to Lord North,” 3 March 1778, and “The King to Lord North,” 23 March 1778,
both in KGC IV:46, 74.
North also presented King George with two “rough sketches” of a proposed
treaty with the Americans and what appeared to be a letter from the commis-
sioners laying out their case for reconciliation. If the letter was genuine, North
said, “a speedy accommodation upon these principles would be very desirable in
our circumstances.” However, North admitted that “he much questions the
sincerity of Dr. Franklyn.” North’s suspicions about the document shows that
he, like Vergennes, realized that the commissioners would do anything to
promote their own self-interest and were willing to spread disinformation just
like the ministry. George replied “the inimical conduct of Franklin towards this
country, makes me aware that hatred to this Country is the constant object of his
mind.” Franklin, George feared, would sabotage any “generous proposals” of
accommodation the “Rebellious Colonies may accept.” Nonetheless, in order to
end the war and “to be enabled with redoubled ardour to avenge the faithless
and insolent conduct of France,” Britain must “keep open the channel of inter-
course with that insidious man.”64
On 10 April, Franklin notified Vergennes that John Adams had just arrived in
Paris, bearing the congressional resolution of 22 November that rejected any
accommodation with England short of independence. Vergennes responded that
he hoped the United States would ignore British attempts to sign a separate
peace even if London granted American independence.65
Amid unconfirmed rumors of a signed treaty with France, news of Carlisle’s

mission reached the United States in April. Once again, because the plan refused
to recognize independence, Congress said it would reject any such overture.
Britain’s continued dishonesty about reconciliation was exemplified by the dis-
covery that British agents had forged a congressional resolution giving General
Washington the power to label soldiers who left before the end of their terms
“deserters.” This proved that Britain could not be trusted to keep its word about
amicable reconciliation and buttressed the Congress’s commitment to indepen-
dence. Governor Jonathan Trumbull of Connecticut summed up these feelings
when he wrote: “There was a day when this step” from England “might have
been accepted with joy and gratitude, but that day, sir, is past—irrevocably.” The
United States would not agree to peace “on any other conditions than the most
perfect and absolute independence.” The CFA called the British “wicked and
insincere” and said the Carlisle plan sought only to “create divisions” among
Americans.66
64. “Lord North to the King,” 25 March 1778, and “The King to Lord North, 26 March
1778, in KGC IV:76, 80.
65. “Franklin and Arthur Lee to Vergennes,” 10 April 1778, and “Vergennes to the Ameri-
can Commissioners in Paris,” 15 April 1778, JAP 6:25–27, 34.
66. “Wednesday, 22 April 1778,” JCC X:375–79; “Lovell to John Adams,” 29 April 1778,
JAP 6:70; “Governor Jonathan Trumbull to Governor William Tryon,” 23 April 1778, DAR
XV 1778:104–5; and “Committee on Foreign Affairs to the Commissioners in Paris,” 30 April
1778, JCC X:74–75.
In Paris, John Adams also shrugged off North’s latest reconciliation attempt.
The British, he wrote, “still flatter themselves” that they could divide the United
States “and still believe that they have a formidable Interest in that Country.”
The new nation instead remained united, and France had become “sincerely,
and deeply Attached to the American Cause and to the new Alliance between the
Two Countries.” Indeed, a few days later, Vergennes assured the commissioners
that King Louis would “protect” both American and French commerce. On 27
April, Germain informed North that a French fleet had set sail for North
America to help the American navy.67
When the Franco-American Treaty arrived in the United States on 2 May
1778, the Continental Congress ratified it within two days. In a written public
address distributed throughout the continent, the Congress reiterated how after
years of “deliberate malice” from Parliament and British soldiers, the United
States had achieved its independence, whether Britain recognized it or not.
Congress cautioned that although it welcomed French aid, only through
“courage and perseverance” could the new nation succeed in the volatile inter-
national system. Patience, strength, and the expansion of its commerce would
“reimburse” the United States for all it had lost during the war, and indepen-
dence would guarantee future wealth far beyond anything the people could
imagine.68
Major General William Heath wrote Adams that the treaty gave “universal
joy” to Americans. The British and American loyalists, on the other hand, were
“much confounded” because they had convinced themselves that France would
never officially acknowledge America’s independence, much less sign a treaty of
alliance. The CFA declared “every thing at home and abroad seems verging
toward a happy and permanent period,” but acknowledged “We are preparing
for either War or Peace.” It reiterated American resolve for independence,
especially as the British continued to spread “misrepresentations” otherwise.69
Consequently, in an 8 May 1778 resolution, the Continental Congress
announced, “After the unremitted efforts of our enemies, we are stronger than
before.” Any further reconciliation attempts by “the wicked emissaries who so
assiduously labor to promote their cause” would be rebuffed. The Congress,
recalling that all previous reconciliation offers had refused to acknowledge
independence, stated “there is no man absurd as to suppose that the least shadow
of liberty can be preserved in a dependent connexion [sic] with Great Britain.”70
67. “John Adams to the President of Congress,” 25 April 1778, JAP 6:52; and “Lord
George Germain to Lord North,” 27 April 1778, in KGC IV:121–22.
68. “An Address of the Congress to the Inhabitants of the United States of America,” 8 May
1778, JCC XI 1778:474–81.
69. “William Heath to John Adams,” 14 May 1778, and “The Committee on Foreign
Affairs to the Commissioners in Paris,” 14 May 1778, both in ibid., 114–17.
70. “An Address of the Congress to the Inhabitants of the United States of America,” 8 May
1778, JCC XI 1778:479.
The Carlisle commissioners arrived in Philadelphia in early June. Carlisle

quickly wrote the Congress and offered “peace to America upon terms honour-
able and beneficial” to both parties. He assured the Congress “the means
employed to effect” peace would be “Sincerity, Good faith, [and] unreserved
confidences.” Carlisle also decried the “insidious interposition” of France, who
wanted “to prevent our reconciliation and prolong this destructive war.” Two
weeks later, the president of the Continental Congress, Henry Laurens, called
the terms “derogatory to the honor of an independent nation.” Britain could
prove its “sincerity” only by withdrawing its army and ships from North
America.71
Carlisle in vain tried to convince the Congress to agree to his offer through-
out the summer and fall of 1778. In early July, Carlisle warned “a separation
must be attended with bad consequences” for both sides. On 7 July, he notified
Germain that the “decided rejection” of North’s proposal “leaves no hope” of
success and asked to be recalled rather than continue the fruitless attempts at
reconciliation. Two weeks later he claimed that only the destruction of the
French fleet now off the shores of the continent would convince the Americans
to see the error of their ways. On 2 September, Germain informed Carlisle that
the king insisted he continue his mission even as George privately admitted
“further concession is a joke.” On 21 September, Carlisle reported the escape of
the French fleet to the Caribbean.72
John Adams reported that whereas France had not yet declared war on
Britain, “the Ships of the two Nations are often fighting at Sea.” He called
Britain “a Melancholly Spectacle . . . Destitute of Wisdom and Virtue to make
Peace; burning with malice and revenge; yet affrighted and confounded at the
Prospect of War.” To his astonishment, Britain refused to recognize American
independence and end a war that would only “weaken and exhaust her.” Despite
their numerous reconciliation proposals, the “Idea of a fair and honourable
Treaty with Congress, never enters their Minds.” Instead they resorted to
“Chicanery” in an attempt to hoodwink Americans into reconciliation without
independence.73
71. “Hints of General Reasoning for the Commissioners’ Letter to the Congress,” 1 June
1778, in Facsimiles, I (emphasis in the original), delivered as “Commissioners for Quieting
Disorders to Henry Laurens, President, and other Members of Congress,” 9 June 1778, DAR
XV 1778:135–36; and “Letter from the President of Congress to the Earl of Carlisle,” 17 June
1778, JCC XI:614–15.
72. “Earl of Carlisle’s Consideration of the Advantage resulting to Great Britain and
America from the Terms offered,” 3 July 1778, in Facsimiles, I; “Commissioners for Quieting
Disorders to Lord George Germain,” 7 July 1778; “Commissioners for Quieting Disorders to
Lord George Germain,” 21 July 1778; and “Lord George Germain to the Commissioners for
Quieting Disorders,” 2 September 1778, all in DAR XV 1778:164–67, 192–93; “King George
to Lord North,” 12 August 1778, in KGC IV:186; and “Commissioners for Quieting Disorders
to Lord George Germain,” 21 July 1778, DAR XV 1778:203.
73. “Adams to James Lovell,” 9 July 1778, and “Adams to Elbridge Gerry,” 9 July 1778,
both in L.H. Butterfield, ed., Diary and Autobiography of John Adams (Cambridge, MA, 1961),
4:148, 149.
Meanwhile Vergennes, still worried that the Congress might repudiate the
treaties and reconcile with Britain, told Franklin and Adams that although
King Louis had not officially declared war against England, the mutual recall of
ambassadors had set up a de facto state of war. Franklin and Adams in turn
assured Vergennes that even if Britain recognized America’s independence,
America would never turn against France. On 28 July, they showed him the
letters from the Congress of 14 and 15 May that rejected the anticipated peace
commission.74
The revolutionary generation slowly recognized the necessity of indepen-

dence from Britain as they realized that the ministry would never give them
control over their own destinies. After 1775, British efforts to reconcile with the
Americans by offering all sorts of guarantees short of independence were
doomed to failure. The evidence shows that Saratoga had little impact on the
diplomatic decision making of the American revolutionaries. Although it served
as a psychological boost to a people engaged in armed struggle against the
eighteenth century’s most powerful nation, it only fortified their belief in
the inevitability of American independence. The Carlisle Commission was only
the latest feeble attempt to achieve a “Messiah” that had repeatedly been
rejected out of hand.
74. “Franklin and Adams to the President of Congress,” 23 July 1778, and “The Commis-
sioners in Paris to the Committee on Foreign Affairs,” 29 July 1778, both in JAP 6:312, 321–36.

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“A Messiah that Will Never Come”1: A New Look at

4. Contemporaries of President Richard M. Nixon and his chief foreign-policy adviser,

alliance with the United States to thwart a potential British-American

t h e colonists we ig h in d e p e n d e n ce and r ec onc iliation

ﬁsheries. Meanwhile, Virginia Governor Lord Dunmore postponed the House

8. “Earl of Dartmouth to Governors in North America (Circular),” 4 January 1775,

than submit “with the Bayonet at their Breast” to Parliament’s unconstitu-

On 22 December, North instituted the Prohibition Act, which “prohibited all

for wishing an eternal Separation; so that there is a rapid Increase of the

Morris to a committee charged with setting up a treaty format with a foreign

line of communications and pronouncements “calculated only to decoy and

in the establishment of an alliance with an independent United States of America

the unit e d st at e s an d f ran ce b uild ties

38. “Barbeu-Dubourg to Vergennes,” 31 May 1776; “Beaumarchais to Vergennes,” 1 June

an Anglo-American reconciliation could occur that could be turned against

the unit e d st at e s e n g ag e s in t riangular diplomacy

41. “Deane to the Committee of Secret Correspondence,” 1 October 1776, DC I:32–35;

51. “Vergennes to d’Ossun,” 3 October 1777; “Count de Florida Blanca Paper,” 17

News of their defeat at Saratoga reached the ministry in December. At ﬁrst

vergennes push e s f o r a f ran co - am e ri c an allianc e

54. “The American Commissioners: A Public Announcement,” 4 December 1777, BFP

favourable to the establishment of a close understanding,” proposed treaty talks

56. “Beaumarchais to Vergennes,” 5 December 1777, Facsimiles, XIX; “Statement in the

b ritain and fran ce wo o t h e co m m issi oner s

b ritain tries o n e m o re t im e : t h e carlisle c ommission

Amid unconﬁrmed rumors of a signed treaty with France, news of Carlisle’s

The Carlisle commissioners arrived in Philadelphia in early June. Carlisle

The revolutionary generation slowly recognized the necessity of indepen-

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