Develop Fire Protection Guidelines and Standards PDF

SAIC 2008f
DEVELOP FIRE PROTECTION GUIDELINES AND STANDARDS
FINAL REPORT
March 20, 2008
Prepared By:
Stephen L. Turner
Science Applications International Corporation
301 Laboratory Road
Oak Ridge, Tennessee, USA
Prepared for:
Mitsubishi Corporation
Nuclear Power Systems, Power systems Unit
16-3, Konan 2-Chome, Minato-Ku
Tokyo, Japan 108-8228
This document is being exported as ECCN 2E290, NLR per the

U.S. Department of Commerce Export Administration Regulations, 15 CFR 730-774.
080320 MMMM Fire Standards Final R1.doc

REVISION LOG
February 19, 2008

Preliminary Report, SAIC 2008b
File “080219 MMMM Fire Standards R0.doc”
March 20, 2008

Final Report, SAIC 2008f
File “080320 MMMM Fire Standards Final R1.doc”
Fixed minor errors and edited

Added some references, re-checked references
Checked abbreviations and acronyms
DISCLAIMER
This report has been prepared by Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) for the sole and
exclusive use of Mitsubishi Corporation (MC) its client for the study. Any other person or entity
obtaining, using, or relying on this report hereby acknowledges that they do so at their own risk, and that
SAIC shall have no responsibility or liability for the consequences thereof. This report is specifically
limited by this scope of work. The opinions and recommendations contained in this Report are dependent
on the accuracy, completeness and correctness of the data, specifications, documents and other
information provided by MC, if any, whether provided in writing or orally.
080320 MMMM Fire Standards Final R1.doc

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
LIST OF FIGURES ...................................................................................................................................... 5
LIST OF TABLES........................................................................................................................................ 6
ACRONYMS................................................................................................................................................ 7
1. Introduction.................................................................................................................................... 13
2. Guidance for All Fuel Cycle Facilities .......................................................................................... 17

2.1 History of Fire Protection Standards for Nuclear Facilities.............................................. 17
2.1.1 NRC Fire Analysis History ............................................................................... 19
2.1.2 History of NFPA 801 ........................................................................................ 20
2.2 General Guidance from NFPA 801................................................................................... 21
2.3 General Guidance from NUREG 1520 and NUREG-1513 .............................................. 21
3. Facility Analysis Methods ............................................................................................................. 27

3.1 Fire Hazards Analysis....................................................................................................... 27
3.1.1 NRC 1992 FCF Guidance for FHA................................................................... 27
3.1.2 NFPA 801 Guidance for FHA........................................................................... 28
3.1.3 NUREG-1520 Guidance for FHA..................................................................... 30
3.1.4 NRC FDTs for FHA.......................................................................................... 30
3.2 Fire Modeling ................................................................................................................... 34
3.2.1 US: NRC V&V of Fire Codes.......................................................................... 34
3.2.2 GRS Support for NRC V&V: BE #4 Set up and Data ..................................... 51
3.2.3 GRS and IRSN Support for ICFMP Cable Tray Analysis ................................ 52
3.3 Design Confirmation using ASTM Standards .................................................................. 55
4. Facility Design Information........................................................................................................... 61

4.1 Fuel Fabrication Facilities................................................................................................. 61
4.1.1 MFFF ................................................................................................................ 61
4.1.2 Guidance from NFPA 801................................................................................. 61
4.2 Reprocessing Facilities ..................................................................................................... 62
4.2.1 General Guidance from NFPA 801................................................................... 62
3
4.2.2 Guidance from NRC RG 3.16 and RG 3.12...................................................... 63
4.2.3 DOE-STD-1066 Criteria for Reprocessing Facilities ....................................... 68
4.2.4 NFPA 36 Standard for Solvent Extraction Plants ............................................. 68
4.2.5 NRC 1992 Technical Position (FR Vol 50, No. 124) ....................................... 73
4.2.6 DOE/TIC - 11603 Guidance ............................................................................. 76
4.3 Enrichment Facilities ........................................................................................................ 79
4.3.1 USEC SER ........................................................................................................ 79
4.3.2 LES SER ........................................................................................................... 80
4.3.3 Enrichment Facility Guidance from the LES SER............................................ 81
4.4 Light Water Reactors ........................................................................................................ 92
4.4.1 Regulatory Guide 1.189 .................................................................................... 93
4.4.2 IAEA Fires for NPP NS-G-1.7.......................................................................... 93
4.4.3 NFPA 804.......................................................................................................... 96
4.4.4 NFPA 805.......................................................................................................... 97
4.4.5 ANI Fire Assessment ...................................................................................... 100
5. Plans for the Future...................................................................................................................... 101
6. Knowledge Management System Design .................................................................................... 107

6.1 Requirements .................................................................................................................. 107
6.2 Conceptual Design and Specification Development Method ......................................... 107
7. References.................................................................................................................................... 113
APPENDIX A FIRE Standards................................................................................................................. A-1
APPENDIX B NFPA 801 REQUIREMENTS ......................................................................................... B-1
4
LIST OF FIGURES
Page
Figure 1-1 Method in this Report for FCF Fire Protection Design and Evaluation.................................... 15
Figure 3.2-1 NRC V&V Method ............................................................................................................... 41
Figure 3.2-2 Multi-compartment Corridor Used in NRC V&V ................................................................. 43
Figure 3.2-3 Multilevel Building used in NRC V&V................................................................................. 43
Figure 3.2-4 FDS Snapshot of ICFMP BE #4 Experiment at iBMB ......................................................... 51
Figure 3.2-5 FDS HGL Temperature Prediction for BE #4........................................................................ 52
Figure 3.2- 6 Example Results: HGL Development, Base Case Part 1 ...................................................... 54
Figure 5-1 Plan for Fire Protection Guide for FCF................................................................................... 104
Figure 5-2 Work Items from Plan for MOX FCF .................................................................................... 105
Figure 6-1 Prototype Testing User Interface............................................................................................. 111
5
LIST OF TABLES
Page
Table 1-1 Report Topics ............................................................................................................................. 14
Table 2.3-1 NUREG-1520 Standard Review Plan for Fire for FCF.......................................................... 21
Table 3.1-1 NRC 1992 Guidance for FHA ................................................................................................ 27
Table 3.1-2 NUREG-1805 FDT Tools for FHA........................................................................................ 32
Table 3.2-1 Fire Attributes and Model Capabilities.................................................................................... 44
Table 3.2-2 Results of NRC V&V ............................................................................................................. 48
Table 3.2-3 Typical Results for NRC Cable Tray Study ............................................................................ 54
Table 3.3-1 ASTM Standards for V&V and Design Confirmation ............................................................ 56
Table 4.2-1 Reg. Guide 3.16 Design for Pu Processing and Fuel Plants .................................................... 63
Table 4.2-2 Reg. Guide 3.12 Guide for Ventilation.................................................................................... 66
Table 4.2-3 NFPA 36, Standard for Solvent Extraction Plants,.................................................................. 69
Table 4.2-4 NRC 1992 Topics Guidance for FCF ...................................................................................... 73
Table 4.2-5 DOE/TIC-11603 Design for Reprocessing Facilities ............................................................. 76
Table 4.2-5 Fire Protection Guidance from SER for Enrichment Facility.................................................. 82
Table 4.4-1 IAEA Fire Guidance............................................................................................................... 93
Table 6-1 Data Definitions........................................................................................................................ 108
Table 6-2 Functional Requirement Definitions......................................................................................... 108
New Tier 1 NFPA Standards .................................................................................................................... A-4
Table A-1 Tier 1 NFPA Standards............................................................................................................ A-5
Table A-2 Tier 1 Other Non-NFPA Standards ....................................................................................... A-42
Table A-3 Tier 2 Standards.................................................................................................................... A-49
Table B-1 NFPA 801 Requirements ........................................................................................................ B-2
6
ACRONYMS
ACI American Concrete Institute
ACP American Centrifuge Plant
AHJ Authority Having Jurisdiction
AIHA American Industrial Hygiene Association
ANI American Nuclear Insurers
ANS American Nuclear Society
ANSI American National Standards Institute
API American Petroleum Institute
ASCE American Society of Civil Engineers
ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers
ASTM American Society of Testing and Materials
AWS American Welding Society
AWWA American Water Works Association
BDC Baseline Design Criteria
BE Benchmark Exercise
BLEVE Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosions
BOCA Building Official Code Administrators
BRE Building Research Establishment
Btu British Thermal Units
BWR Boiling-Water Reactor
CAR Construction Authorization Request
cc Cubic Centimeter
CDF Core Damage Frequency
CF Cubic Foot
CFAST Consolidated Model of Fire Growth and Smoke Transport
CFD Computational Fluid Dynamics
cfm Cubic feet per minute (flow rate)
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
CGA Compressed Gas Association
CI Cast-iron-pipe-equivalent
CL Centerline Temperature
cm Centimeter
CNG Compressed Natural Gas
COCOSYS Containment Code System -
Conops Organization and Conduct of Operations (Item Type 1 Appendix A)
CPVC Chlorinated Poly (vinyl Chloride)
CRDB Cylinder Receipt and Dispatch Building
CSA Canadian Standards Association
CSR Cable Spreading Room
CSR Codes, Standards and Regulations
DB Design Bases of the PSSCs (Item Type 4 in Appendix A)
DB Design Bases of the PSSCs (Item Type 4 in Appendix A)
7
DB Design Basis
DBE Design Basis Event
DBF Design Basis Fire
DCS Duke, Cogema, Stone and Webster
DFC Draft for Comment (NRC type of document)
DN Diameter Nominal
DOE U.S. Department of Energy
DR Wall-thickness-Dimension Ratio
DSSA Division of Systems Safety and Analysis
EdF Electricite de France
EIS Environmental Impact Statement
EPRI Electric Power Research Institute
EPSS Emergency Power Supply System
ES&H Environmental, Safety, and Health
ESF Engineered Safety Feature
F&S Features and Systems (Item Type 2 Appendix A)
F&S Features and Systems
FCF Fuel Cycle Facilities (non-reactor nuclear facilities)
FDS Fire Dynamics Simulator
FDTs Fire Dynamics Tools (NUREG-1805)
FHA Fire Hazard Analysis (Item Type 3 in Appendix A)
FHA Fire Hazards Analysis
FIVE Fire-Induced Vulnerability Evaluation
FM Factory Mutual Research Corporation
FM/SNL Factory Mutual & Sandia National Laboratories
fpm Feet per Minute
FR Federal Register
FRA Fire Risk Analysis
ft Feet
Gal Gallon
GB Glovebox
GL (NRC) Generic Letter
Gmp Gallons per Minute
GNEP Global Nuclear Energy Partnership
Gesellschaft fuer Anlagen-und Reaktorsicherheit (translates roughly as Company
GRS
or Society for Reactor Safety)
HEPA High Efficiency Particulate Air filters
HF Hydrogen fluoride
HGL Hot Gas Layer
HRE Human Reliability Evaluation
HRR Heat Release Rate
HRSGs Heat Recovery Steam Generators
HVAC Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning
8
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
iBMB Institut fuer Baustoffe, Massivbau und Brandschutz
ICBO International Congress of Building Officials
ICFMP International Collaborative Fire Model Project
IDLH Immediately Dangerous To Life and Health
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers
in Inches
in. w.g. Inches of water gauge (pressure)
IPEEE Individual Plant Examination of External Events
IPS Iron Pipe Sizes
IROFS Items Relied On for Safety
IRSN Institut de Radioprotection et de Surete Nucleaire
ISA Integrated Safety Analysis (or Assessment)
ISO International Organization for Standardization
JASMINE Analysis of Smoke Movement in Enclosures
JNES Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization
JPR Job Performance Requirements
kg Kilogram
KMS Knowledge Management System
kPa Kilo Pascals
kW kilowatts
L Liter
LEL Lower Explosive Limit
LES Louisiana Energy Services
LNG Liquefied natural Gas
LP Liquefied Petroleum
Lpm Liters per minute
LWR Light Water Reactor
m Meter
MAGIC Fire Code Name
MCR Main Control Room
MFFF MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility
min Minute
mm Millimeter
MOU Memorandum of Understanding
MOX Mixed Oxide
MSC Military Sea Lift Command
MSS Manufacturers Standardization Society
MSW Municipal Solid Waste
NBS National Bureau of Standards (now NIST)
NBSIR NBS Information Report
NEC National Electric Code
NEF National Enrichment Facility
9
NFPA National Fire Protection Association
NII Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (United Kingdom)
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
NPF Nuclear Pools Forum
NPP Nuclear Power Plant
NPS Nominal Pipe Size
NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NRR Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRC)
NRR Nuclear Reactor Regulation
NUREG Nuclear Regulatory Commission Publications
OCR Optical Character Recognition
OD Outside Diameter
PA Public Address system
Pa Pascals
PASS Personal Alert Safety Systems
PE Polyethylene
PML Probable Maximum Loss
PMMA Polymethyl-methacrylate
PRA Probabilistic Risk Assessment or Analysis
Psia Pounds per square inch absolute
Psig Pounds per square inch gage
PSSC Principal Structures, Systems and Components
Pu Plutonium
PVC Polyvinyl Chloride
QA Quality Assurance
PWR Pressurized Water Reactor
RAI Request for Additional Information
RDF Refuse-derived fuel
RES Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (NRC)
RG Regulatory Guide
RIA Risk Informed Approach
RI/PB Risk-Informed, Performance-Based
ROP Reactor Oversight Process
SAIC Science Applications International Corporation
SAR Supplied Air Respirators
SBCCI Southern Building Code Congress International, Inc.
SCBA Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus
SDP Significance Determination Process
SEPSS Stored Emergency Power Supply system
SER Safety Evaluation Report
scf Standard (atmospheric pressure) Cubic Feet
SFPE Society of Fire Protection Engineers
SI International System of Units
10
SNL Sandia National Laboratory
SNM Special Nuclear Material
SPLB Plant Systems Branch (NRC)
SRP Standard Review Plan (for safety basis)
SSC Systems, Structures, and Components
Sv Sievert
SWU Separative Work Unit
SX Solvent extraction
TMS The Masonry Society
TP Technical Position
TSB Technical Services Building
UBC Uranium Byproduct Cylinder
UF6 Uranium Hexafluoride
UL United Underwriters Laboratory
ULC Underwriters Laboratories of Canada
UO2F2 Uranyl Fluoride
UPS Uninterruptible Power Supplies
US United States of America
USEC US Enrichment Corporation
V&V Verification & Validation
VTT Valtion Teknillinen Tutkimuskeskus (Finland)
w.g. Water Gauge (inches w.g. used for pressure)
WPI Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Wt Weight
yr Year
11
INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
12
1. Introduction
The objective of this report is to help make guidelines and standards to do fire protection design, safety
evaluation, and approval for operations in Fuel Cycle Facilities (FCF). This report is the next step to
make the Japan standards from all the previous information that Science Applications International
Corporation (SAIC) has provided. To make the standards for Japan this report also discusses how the
“Plans for the Future” and a conceptual design and specification for a “Knowledge Management System
(KMS)” that can be used to collect and search information.
One main result is to identify Codes, Standards and Regulations (CSR) in addition to the CSR identified
in the previous SAIC task (SAIC 2007). Then the additional standards identified in this report will be
added to make a complete list of standards that can be used in Japan as shown below:
Fire Standards Additional Fire Fire Standards to be

Identified from Standards Identified in considered for Japan
Previous SAIC Work guidance in Appendix A
Sections 2 and 3
Appendix A identifies the standards that can be used in Japan. Then, Section 4 discusses the ways that
the standards can be implemented in Japan as part of the long-term plan.
Figure 1-1 shows the organization of this report. As shown in Figure 1-1, the additional standards to be
considered for Japan can come from a study of guidance for all FCF in Section 2 and for Facility Specific
FCF in Section 3. Section 3 covers guidance for the specific FCF for Reprocessing Facilities, Fuel
Fabrication Facilities, and Uranium Enrichment Facilities as shown in Figure 1-1.
All references are public documents.
This report covers the topics in Table 1-1 per the contract agreement.
13
Table 1-1 Report Topics
Contract Requirement/Topic Report Location
Topic 1: Guidance for All Fuel Cycle Facilities 2
General Guidance 2.2, 2.3
Detailed Specifications and Design Standards Appendix A
Topic 2: Facility Analysis Methods 3
Fire Hazards Analysis 3.1
Fire Modeling 3.2
Design Confirmation 3.3
Topic 3 Facility Design Information 4
Fuel Fabrication 4.1
Reprocessing 4.2
Enrichment 4.3
Light Water Reactors 4.4
Topic 4: Plans for the Future 5
Topic 5. Knowledge Management System Conceptual Design 6
14
Figure 1-1 Method in this Report for FCF Fire Protection Design and Evaluation
Standards from these documents are considered to include in Appendix A
JAPAN FIRE
PROTECTION GUIDANCE
NFPA 801 Standard for Topic 1
Fire Protection for
Facilities Handling General Design Requirements
Guidance for All FCF
Radioactive Materials See Appendix B
General Guidance
Standards in Appendix A
Detailed Specifications for
design based on Standards
Fire Modeling Methods and Data

USA, Section 3.2.1 Topic 2
NUREG-1513 IRSN and GRS, Section 3.2.2 and Facility Analysis Methods
Integrated Safety Analysis Guidance 3.2.3
Fire Hazards Analysis
Fire Modeling
Design Confirmation
NUREG-1520
Standard Review Plan for the Review of a
License Application for a Fuel Cycle Facility Topic 3
Fuel Fabrication Facilities
MFFF Documents, NFPA 801 Specific Facility Design
Section 4.1
Reprocessing Facilities Fuel Fabrication
DOE/TIC 11603, NRC RG 3.16,
NFPA 36
Section 4.2 Reprocessing Facilities
Enrichment Facilities
SERs for Centrifuge Plants
Light Water Reactor Section 4.3 Enrichment Facilities
Items that may apply to FCF
Section 4.4
NRC, NFPA, ANI, IAEA, NPF
15
16
2. Guidance for All Fuel Cycle Facilities
The guidance for all FCF discussed in this section are from National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)
801 and Nuclear Regulatory Commission Publications (NUREG)-1520 (NRC 2002b), the Standard
Review Plan (SRP) for FCF. The detailed design and analysis requirements from NFPA 801 are in
Appendix B. Standards called out in NFPA 801 are in Appendix A.
As mentioned in Section 1, SAIC has made previous reports to identify standards to use for design. The
previously defined standards are in Appendix A. The standards that are referenced in NFPA 801 were
reviewed to include any new standards to the list in Appendix A. The method to add new standards is
discussed in Appendix A. Most of the standards referenced in NFPA 801 were already identified in the
previous SAIC work and were already included in Appendix A.
2.1 History of Fire Protection Standards for Nuclear Facilities
This section shows the history of the standards that are called out in this report and other events that are
`important to the development of standards for nuclear facilities in the United States of America (US).
:
1955: Atomic Energy Commission and NFPA issue first Version of NFPA 801 as “Recommended
Practice” (See Section 2.2 for more on the development of NFPA 801)
1974: Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Regulatory Guide (RG) 3.16: “General Fire
Protection Guide for Plutonium Processing and Fuel Fabrication Plants” (NRC 1974).
1975: Brown’s Ferry fire (see txt at the end of this list)
1986: Problems at Sequoya Fuel (see text after this list)
1986 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)/TIC-11603 issued to cover DOE Nonreactor facilities (see
Section 4.2.6 and DOE 1986).
1989: NRC proposed guidance for fire protection issued (NRC 1989a and NRC 1989)
1992: 1989 NRC proposal is issued as “Guidance on Fire Protection for Fuel Cycle Facilities” in
57FR 3560-13 (NRC 1992)
1995: NRC Issued General Letter 95-01 established 4 Technical Position Papers (TP):
Management/Quality Assurance (QA), Requirements for Operation, Chemical Safety, Fire
Protection (see Section 4.2.5 and NRC 1995)
1995: NFPA 801 changed from Recommended Practice to a “standard” (see Section 2.5.1)
17
Late 1990’s: NRC used Risk Informed Approach (RIA) and Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA) to
address safety including fires
1999: International Collaborative Fire Model Project (ICFMP) begins (See Section 3.2 and NRC
2001a)
2000: NUREG-1718: Standard Review Plan for MFFF (SRP), Chapter 7, “Fire Protection”,
Appendix D, and Appendix E (NRC 2000)
2001: NUREG-1513, Integrated Safety Analysis Guidance Document (NRC 2001b) discusses fire
protection (see Section 2.4.1).
2002: NUREG-1520 Standard Review Plan for the Review of a License Application for a Fuel
Cycle Facility - Final Report (NRC 2002b). Chapter 7 discusses fire protection. See Section
2.4.1.
2003-Present: Safety Evaluation Reports (SER) for various facilities: Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel
Fabrication Facilities (MFFF), and two (2) Uranium Enrichment Facilities (US Enrichment
Corporation (USEC), and Louisiana Energy Services (LES) (See Section 4.3 for enrichment
facilities)
2004- NRC compiled all knowledge of NPP post shut down after fires in a report (NRC 2004).
1979 Browns Ferry Fire
On March 22, 1975, a fire at the Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) fundamentally changed the
concept of fire protection and associated regulatory requirements for US NPP. Plant workers were fixing
leaks in the cable spreading room (CSR) outside the reactor building. The workers used a candle to test
seals for air leaks into the reactor building. The polyurethane foam seal, however, was not fire-rated. The
flame from the candle ignited both the seal and the electrical cables that passed through it.
By the time firefighters extinguished the fire, it had burned for almost 7 hours. More than 1600 electrical
cables were affected, 628 of which were important to plant safety. The fire damaged electrical power,
control systems, and instrumentation cables and impaired cooling systems for the reactor. Operators could
not monitor the plant normally and had to perform emergency repairs on systems needed to shut the
reactor down safely.
Investigations after the fire revealed deficiencies in the design of fire protection features at NPPs and in
the plant procedures for responding to a fire. Fire insurance companies, normally concerned with
occupant safety and property protection, did not sufficiently consider nuclear safety issues. A fire in
18
certain locations at a nuclear plant could cause redundant safety systems and components to fail, making
it difficult to shut the reactor down safely.
Since the Browns Ferry incident, no fire at a US commercial (NPP) has affected the safe operation of a
reacto
1986 Sequoya Fuels Problem:
A 14-ton cylinder of Uranium Hexafluoride (UF6) leaked at the plant killing two workers. Although this
was not a fire, the accident showed that the NRC needed better oversight of FCF operations including
fires. This event caused NRC to issue the proposed guidance in 1989 that was then issued as a
recommendation in 1992 and implemented in 1995 by Generic Letter (GL) 95-01 (NRC 1995).
2.1.1 NRC Fire Analysis History
The first probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) for reactors WASH-1400 in 1974 done by Dr. Rasmussen
did not include fires (NRC 1975). WASH-1400 focused on “internal events”. PRA by reactors also
focused on internal events. Fires were not studied until the major fire at Brown’s Ferry plant in 1975.
After the Brown’s Ferry Fire, NRC added Appendix R to 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 50
(NRC 2004d) that required evaluation for fires for nuclear reactors. Appendix R said that the licensee
must show that there is safe shutdown in a fire. There were many issues such as cable fires that caused
short circuits and could affect the reactor controls.
During the 1980’s Sandia National Laboratory (SNL) and others supported many studies for fires such as:
Fire risk assessment
Characterization of fire sources
Review of operating experience and fires
Fire suppression and extinction effectiveness
Fire modeling and model validation
During the 1990s the studies were:

More risk analysis
Plant aging issues and the need to protect old cables from fire
But funding was reduced by NRC in the 1990s
19
During the 2000s the studies were more focus on probabilistic assessments and NFPA-805 and the need
to have or improve:
The fire PRA method
How to implement and do PRA for fires
How to Verify & Validate (V&V) the models and the PRA
How to resolve “circuit issues” for shorting control cables in fires
How to reduce the number of manual actions in a fire
How to add human reliability evaluation (HRE) to fire PRA
PRA for internal events is understood, PRA for fires is not developed
Today, Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE),
NRC, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), and laboratories like SNL continue to
study how to do Fire PRA.
2.1.2 History of NFPA 801

The NFPA Committee on Atomic Energy was organized in 1953 for the purpose of providing the fire
protection specialist with certain fundamental information about radioactive materials and their handling
and to provide designers and operators of such laboratories with some guidance on practices necessary for
fire safety. The first edition of NFPA 801, whose coverage was limited to laboratories handling
radioactive materials, was adopted at the 1955 Annual Meeting. The remaining history is:
• In 1970 the format was revised, and the document was updated to reflect current thinking and
practices. It was also expanded to apply to all locations, exclusive of nuclear reactors, where
radioactive materials are stored, handled, or used.
• The 1980 edition included a clarified statement regarding the presence of and levels of
radiation; cautionary statements about the assumption of risks by the fire officer and the
importance of training in the handling of radioactive materials by fire department personnel; a
clarification concerning the variations of the intensity of a radiation field.
• The 1991 edition was a total revision of the document and included a complete reorganization
of the chapters. This was done to provide an update of the latest technology and to improve the
document's user-friendliness.
• The 1995 edition included a variety of updates necessary to convert the document from a
recommended practice to a standard. One of the more noteworthy changes was a revised scope
statement to recognize a threshold value with respect to the amount of radioactive materials that
are stored, handled, or used.
20
• The 1998 edition incorporated the recommendations of NFPA 802, Recommended Practice for
Fire Protection for Nuclear Research and Production Reactors.
• The 2003 edition includes a new chapter on permanent facility shutdown and decommissioning.
2.2 General Guidance from NFPA 801
The guidance from NFPA 801 is the most comprehensive guidance for FCF. Therefore, all the guidance
is in Appendix B. As discussed in Section 5, SAIC recommends that Japan use NFPA 801 as a guide to
make a comprehensive, high level guidance document for FCF.
2.3 General Guidance from NUREG 1520 and NUREG-1513
As shown in Figure 1-1, NUREG-1520 and NUREG-1513 provide guidance for facility analysis.
NUREG-1513 provides guidance on the ISA that is used to evaluate all accidents. Fires are included in
the ISA process.
NUREG-1520 provides guidance in Chapter 7 for how to review and evaluate the fire analysis as shown
in Table 2.3-1. Japan should develop a review plan like NUREG-1520 because it is very complete.
Table 2.3-1 NUREG-1520 Standard Review Plan for Fire for FCF
Table 2.3-1 NUREG-1520 Standard Review Plan for Fires FCF, Section Number, Guidance
7.1 PURPOSE OF REVIEW
The purpose of this review is to determine with reasonable assurance that the applicant has designed a facility that
provides adequate protection against fires and explosions that could affect the safety of licensed materials and thus
present an increased radiological risk. The review should also establish that the application has considered
radiological consequences of the fires and will institute suitable safety controls to protect workers, the public, and
the environment.
7.2 RESPONSIBILITY FOR REVIEW

Primary: Fire Safety Specialist
Secondary: Criticality Safety Specialist
Environmental Specialist
Chemical Safety Specialist
Physical Security Specialist
Supporting: Regional, Resident, and Fuel Cycle Inspection Staff
7.3 AREAS OF REVIEW

The regulation established in 10 CFR 70.62(a) (NRC 2004c) requires an applicant to develop, implement, and
maintain a safety program that will reasonably protect health and safety of the public and the environment from the
fire and explosive hazards associated with processing, handling, and storing licensed materials during normal
operations, anticipated operational occurrences, and credible accidents. The reviewers should first consult the ISA
21
Summary (SRP Chapter 3) to identify analyzed operations that have the potential to result in fire or explosion, and
should gain familiarity with the Items Relied On For Safety (IROFS) and complementary management measures
that are proposed to prevent or mitigate any resulting chemical or radiological risks. The fire protection program
must address these process-specific risks, as well as general fire prevention, protection, and management issues.
Although 10 CFR Part 70 does not require a separate fire safety program, an applicant should provide commitments
pertaining to fire safety in the following areas:
Fire safety management includes safety organization, engineering review, fire prevention; inspection, testing, and
maintenance; pre-fire plans; and personnel qualifications, drills, and training.
Fire risk identification includes the Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA) and the ISA Summary.
Facility design includes information on building construction, fire areas, life safety, ventilation, and electrical system
design. The facility design should also consider competing requirements among fire safety and security, criticality,
and environmental concerns.
Process fire safety involves design considerations to prevent an accident or to mitigate the consequences of an
accident resulting from using process chemicals, combustible metals, flammable and combustible liquids and gases,
high-temperature equipment, hot cells and glove boxes, and laboratories.
Fire protection systems include fire detection, alarm, and suppression systems; portable extinguishers; water
supplies; and emergency response organizations.
7.4 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA

An applicant that meets the acceptance criteria defined in this section, or has provided an acceptable alternative,
should be considered to have an acceptable fire safety program.
7.4.1 Regulatory Requirements

The regulatory basis for the fire safety review should be the general and additional contents of application as
required by 10 CFR 70.22 and 70.65 (NRC 2004c). In addition, the fire safety review should focus on to providing
reasonable assurance of compliance with 10 CFR 70.61, 70.62, and 70.64.
7.4.2 Regulatory Guidance

The relevant regulatory guidance for fire safety includes the following NRC and industrial standards:
• NFPA, “Standards for Facilities Handling Radioactive Material,” NFPA Standard 801, latest edition.
• NRC, “Integrated Safety Analysis Guidance Document,” NUREG-1513 (NRC 2001b).
• NRC, ”Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facility Accident Analysis Handbook,” NUREG/CR-6410, (NRC 1998).
7.4.3 Regulatory Acceptance Criteria

Partial acceptability of the application and the ISA Summary will be contingent on the NRC staff’s review of the
applicant’s commitments to control and mitigate fire hazards. The staff will focus on whether the application is risk-
informed, addresses the applicant’s procedures for maintaining an acceptable level of fire safety, and demonstrates
that the applicant is prepared to react quickly and safely to extinguish fires. An applicant may use a graded approach
to define fire safety, but must provide sufficient documentation and commitments to ensure that workers, the public,
and the environment will be adequately protected from fire events. These acceptance criteria may be incorporated in
the information supplied to satisfy SRP Section 3 (ISA) or other SRP sections so long as clear references are
provided (information need not be repeated). The staff’s fire safety specialist will review the application, ISA
Summary, and other documentation, as needed, regarding these acceptance criteria. The reviewer(s) will use
nationally recognized codes and standards to measure reasonable assurance of fire safety. These include, but are not
limited to, the NFPA National Fire Codes, Factory Mutual Research Corporation (FM) Data Sheets and Approval
Guide, United Underwriters Laboratories (UL) Standards and Building Material Directory, American National
Standards Institute (ANSI) Standards; and American Society of Testing and Materials (ASTM) Standards.
Commitments to specified standards will normally be considered an acceptable means of meeting the acceptance
criteria. The NRC staff will review the application regarding the following acceptance criteria:
7.4.3.1 Fire Safety Management Measures

An adequate application documents how the applicant will administer and ensure fire safety at the licensed facility.
22
The application should reflect a commitment to ensure that the IROFS, as identified in the ISA Summary, are
available and reliable, and the facility maintains fire safety awareness among employees, controls transient ignition
sources and combustibles, and maintains a readiness to extinguish or limit the consequences of fire. These measures
are unique to fire safety and, therefore are not included in the acceptance criteria for SRP Section 11, “Management
Measures.” An adequate application identifies a senior-level manager who has the authority and staff to ensure that
fire safety receives appropriate priority. A facility safety committee or fire safety review committee staffed by
managers of different disciplines should integrate facility modifications. (The facility safety committee can do the
work of a fire safety review committee.) As described in the application, day-to-day fire safety should be supervised
by an individual with sufficient practical fire safety experience in nuclear facilities. The “Standard for Fire
Protection for Facilities Handling Radioactive Materials,” NFPA 801, specifies the following fire safety
management measures, including fire prevention; inspection, testing, and maintenance of fire protection systems;
emergency response organization qualifications, drills, and training; and pre-fire plans. An adequate application
documents the fire safety management measures in sufficient detail to identify their relationship to, and functions
for, normal operations; anticipated (off-normal) events; and accident safety (i.e., IROFS). The staff recognizes NFPA
801 as one acceptable standard for fire safety management measures; however the applicant may use other
nationally recognized codes and standards if appropriate. The staff’s fire safety specialist will review the adequacy
of the fire safety management measures presented in the application.
7.4.3.2 Fire Hazards Analysis

See Section 3.1.3 of this report.
7.4.3.3 Facility Design

Building construction, fire area determination, electrical installation, life safety, ventilation, drainage, and lightning
protection are all facility design features that affect fire safety. An adequate application documents the fire safety
considerations used in the general design of the facilities containing licensed material or facilities that impose an
exposure threat to radiological facilities. The staff recognizes NFPA 801 as one standard that specifies acceptable
facility fire safety design criteria; however the applicant may use other nationally recognized codes and standards if
appropriate. The staff’s fire safety specialist will review the adequacy of the facility’s fire safety design.
The following are other specific areas of concern:

• Criticality concerns may exclude water extinguishing systems from process areas. However, during major fire
events, the fire may easily overcome the extinguishing capability of portable extinguishers, and hose lines may be
needed to extinguish the fire. Consequently, applicants should consider using total flooding gaseous systems in
water exclusion areas with significant fire risks. An adequate application addresses the methodology for
extinguishing fires in water-exclusion areas. The staff’s fire safety and criticality specialist will review for adequacy.
• Environmental concerns include the potential for thousands of gallons of fire water to be contaminated with
nuclear material during a fire event. Consequently, diked areas and drainage of process facilities may be needed.
NFPA 801 provides guidance on how to calculate the potential amount of runoff to properly size drainage and
containment systems. An adequate application documents any measures used to control fire water runoff. The staff’s
fire safety and environmental specialists will review the applicant’s fire water retention system for adequacy.
• Physical Security Concerns include the need to design buildings and facilities to provide safe egress in case of fire
or chemical events that could lead to radiological emergencies. Physical security requirements for special nuclear
material (SNM) may inadvertently delay worker egress and fire fighter access. Physical security procedures should
allow offsite fire departments quick and efficient access to fire emergencies. An adequate application documents the
design criteria used for worker egress and procedures for firefighter access. The staff recognizes NFPA 801 as one
standard that specifies acceptable worker egress design criteria; however, the applicant may use other nationally
recognized codes and standards if appropriate. The staff’s fire safety and physical security specialists will review for
adequacy.
• Design and construction of new facilities should: (1) comply with the baseline design criteria (BDC) specified in
10 CFR 70.64(a), (2) comply with the defense-in-depth requirements of 10 CFR 70.64(b), and (3) be consistent with
the guidance provided in NFPA 801 or other appropriate nationally recognized fire protection codes and standards.
The staff’s fire safety specialist will review the adequacy of the fire safety design of new facilities.
7.4.3.4 Process Fire Safety
23
Many hazardous chemicals and processes used by FCF contribute to the fire hazards affecting radiological areas. In
areas that have fire hazards that may threaten licensed material, the application should identify the hazardous
chemicals, processes, and design standards used to ensure fire safety. The staff recognizes NFPA 801 as one standard
that provides acceptable design criteria for radiological process areas that may contain: hazardous material,
laboratories, high-temperature equipment, hot cells, and/or glove boxes. However, the applicant may use other
nationally recognized codes and standards if appropriate. The staff’s fire safety and chemical safety specialists will
review the adequacy of application. The following are a few of the more common hazardous materials used at FCF:
• Anhydrous ammonia is an explosive, flammable, and toxic gas used to make hydrogen.
• Fluorine reacts violently with organic material or metal powders and water vapor.
• Hydrogen is an explosive and flammable gas used in reduction processes.
• Hydrogen peroxide, off-gases hydrogen and oxygen, and is incompatible with some extinguishers.
• Nitric acid, nitrates organic material, which lowers the ignition temperature of combustibles.
• Sulfuric acid absorbs water from organic material in an exothermic reaction, thereby causing ignition.
• Zirconium is a combustible metal that burns at elevated temperatures.
7.4.3.5 Fire Protection and Emergency Response

The application should document the fire protection systems and fire emergency response organizations provided for
licensed facilities. The ISA Summary (see SRP Chapter 3) should identify the fire protection IROFS. An adequate
application describes the fire protection provided for areas in which licensed material is present. The application
should describe which standards the fire protection systems and equipment meet. The staff recognizes the NFPA’s
national fire codes as acceptable standards for the design, installation, testing, and maintenance of the fire protection
systems and equipment. However, the applicant may use other nationally recognized codes and standards if
appropriate.
Facilities with significant fire risks may need a fire emergency response team. One acceptable standard is NFPA 600,
“Industrial Fire Brigades.” However, the applicant may use other nationally recognized codes and standards if
appropriate. If offsite fire departments are needed for facility fire safety, periodic training with the fire departments
is necessary to enable them to become familiar with facility access procedures, facility layout, and pre-fire plans. A
memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the applicant and the fire departments may be necessary to define
the required protection. The staff’s fire safety specialist will review the adequacy of the applicant’s fire protection
and emergency response commitments.
7.5 REVIEW PROCEDURES

7.5.1 Acceptance Review
During the acceptance review, the primary reviewer evaluates the application for completeness as required by 10
CFR Part 70 and determines whether the application addresses the criteria discussed in SRP Section 7.3, “Areas of
Review.” If significant deficiencies in the application are identified, the primary reviewer should recommend the
return of the application or requested additional information before the start of the safety evaluation.
7.5.2 Safety Evaluation
During the safety evaluation, the primary and secondary reviewers evaluate whether the application is adequate to
comprehensively describe the fire safety of the licensed activity as identified in Section 7.3, “Areas of Review,” and
the commitments made in response to the criteria specified in Section 7.4, “Acceptance Criteria.” The staff may
request the applicant or licensee to provide additional information or modify the submittal to meet the acceptance
criteria. Reviewers should note that NFPA 801 uses “administrative control” in a different sense than 10 CFR Part 70
and elsewhere in this SRP. In 10 CFR Part 70, an administrative control is an IROFS if it is the human action
necessary to meet safety performance requirements, and it is supported by management measures (training, QA,
procedures, etc.) that ensure that the action will be taken if needed. In NFPA 801, “administrative controls” are the
training, qualifications, procedures, etc., behind the human action; however these elements are referred to as
“Management Measures” in 10 CFR Part 70, and in this SRP.
7.6 EVALUATION FINDINGS

The staff’s review should verify that the applicant (1) provides sufficient information to satisfy the intent of 10 CFR
Part 70 requirements related to the overall safety program, and (2) is consistent with the fire safety criteria in this
SRP. On the basis of this information, the staff should be able to evaluate whether the application meets the
24
appropriate criteria. As an example, the staff might document the fire safety review in an SER in the following
manner: The applicant has established a fire protection function meeting the acceptance criteria in Chapter 7 of the
“SRP for the Review of a License Application fro a Fuel Cycle Facility.” The function includes a facility safety
review committee responsible for integrating modifications to the facility and a Fire Safety Manager responsible for
day-today program implementation. Fire prevention, inspection, testing, and maintenance of fire protection systems,
and the qualification, drills, and training of facility personnel are in accordance with applicable NFPA codes and
standards. (Note that fire protection training requirements are described in SER Section 11.3.) The applicant has
conducted risk analyses in accordance with NFPA 801, “Standard for Fire Protection for Facilities Handling
Radioactive Material.” The FHAs identified credible fire scenarios that bound the fire risk. The ISA used these
scenarios and identified fire protection IROFS, (in particular, wet pipe sprinkling in the process areas, isolation of
the high-temperature equipment within fire barriers, and a fire brigade meeting NFPA 600, “Industrial Fire
Brigades”). An MOU with the fire department documents the required assistance and the annual exercises.
Procedures are in place to allow the fire department efficient access to process areas during fire emergencies. Worker
egress is designed and maintained in accordance with NFPA 101, “Life Safety Code.”
The staff concludes that the applicant’s capabilities meet the criteria in Chapter 7 of the SRP. The staff concludes
that the applicant’s proposed equipment, facilities, and procedures provide a reasonable level of assurance that
adequate fire protection will be and BDC of 10 CFR Part 70.
25
26
3. Facility Analysis Methods
As shown in Figure 1-1 SAIC will use general information from the NRC (NUREG 1513 and NUREG
1520) to discuss guidance in three areas: FHA, Fire Modeling, and Design Confirmation. The FHA
methods from NUREG-1520 are also covered in Section 3.1.3.
This section discusses the methods for FHA, Fire Modeling, and Design Confirmation that can be used in
Japan. For Fire Modeling, the review of a long-term effort at the NRC to confirm and validate fire
models for reactor facilities is a key topic. Japan should focus on fire models that are validated and
consider the NRC methods for validation discussed in Section 3.2.1 and Section 3.3.
The Section 3.2 discussion on Fire Modeling also shows some examples of methods that are used by
lnstitut de Radioprotection et de Surete Nucleaire (IRSN) and Gesellschaft flier Anlagen-und
Reaktorsicherheit (GRS).
3.1 Fire Hazards Analysis
This Section discusses the FHA methods that have been used in the past and the current methods. Current
Methods are in Subsections 3.1.2, 3.1.3, and 3.1.4. There is also a good example of FHA for the MFFF in
Reference SAIC 2006.
3.1.1 NRC 1992 FCF Guidance for FHA
The older guidance from 1992 (NRC1992) is in Table 3.1-1. Notice that newer guidance in the next
sections is more detailed.
Table 3.1-1 NRC 1992 Guidance for FHA

Table 3.1-1 NRC 1992 Guidance for FHA, Section and Requirement
9. Fire Hazard Analysis

9.1 A FHA of the facility should be performed. Such a systematic analysis should divide the facility into “fire areas”,
and evaluate the fire safety of each area and of the facility as a whole. The analysis should, for each fire areas:
a. Account for all radioactive and combustible materials, including estimates of their heat content;
b. Describe the processes performed and their potential for fire or explosion;
c. Account for the sources of heat and flame;
d. List the fire detection and suppression equipment;
e. Consider credible fire scenarios and evaluate the adequacy of the fire protection measures.
27
Table 3.1-1 NRC 1992 Guidance for FHA, Section and Requirement
The analysis should then either conclude that the facility as a whole is adequately protected or list the deficiencies
that should be corrected.
9.2 The deficiencies identified by the FHA should be corrected expeditiously. The analysis should then be reviewed
by the responsible management official and revised to indicate that it is acceptable.
9.3 The FHA should be updated at periodic intervals (for example, every 2 years) and whenever there has been a
significant modification of the facility, processes, or inventories.
3.1.2 NFPA 801 Guidance for FHA
The FHA guidance from NFPA 801 is from the NFPA 801 Annex B. This annex is not a part of the
requirements of this NFPA document but is included for informational purposes only. The requirements
are:
A thorough analysis of the fire potential is necessary in order to incorporate adequate fire protection into
the facility design. Integrated design of systems is necessary to ensure the safety of the facility and the
operators from the hazards of fire and to protect property and continuity of production. The following
steps are recommended as part of the analysis procedure:
(1) Prepare a general description of the physical characteristics of the facilities that outlines the fire
prevention and fire protection systems to be provided. Define the fire hazards that can exist, and state the
loss-limiting criteria to be used in the design of the facility.
(2) List the codes and standards to be used for the design of the fire protection systems. Include the
published standards of NFPA. Indicate specific sections and paragraphs.
(3) Define and describe the characteristics associated with potential fire for all areas that contain
combustible materials, such as maximum fire loading, hazards of flame spread, smoke generation, toxic
contaminants, and contributing fuels. Consider the use and effect of noncombustible and heat-resistant
materials.
(4) List the fire protection system criteria and the criteria to be used in the basic design for such items
as water supply, water distribution systems, and fire pump safety.
(5) Describe the performance criteria for the detection systems, alarm systems, automatic suppression
systems, manual systems, chemical systems, and gas systems for fire detection, confinement, control, and
extinguishment.
(6) Develop the design considerations for suppression systems and for smoke, heat, and flame
control; combustible and explosive gas control; and toxic and contaminant control. Select the operating
functions of the ventilating and exhaust systems to be used during the period of fire extinguishment and
28
control. List the performance criteria for the fire and trouble annunciator warning systems and the
auditing and reporting systems.
(7) Use the features of building and facility arrangements and the structural design features to
generally define the methods for fire prevention, fire extinguishing, fire control, and control of hazards
created by fire. Fire barriers, egress, fire walls, and the isolation and containment features that should be
provided for flame, heat, hot gases, smoke, and other contaminants should be planned carefully. Outline
the drawings and list of equipment and devices that are needed to define the principal and auxiliary fire
protection systems.
(8) Identify the dangerous and hazardous combustibles and the maximum quantities estimated to be
present in the facility. Consider where these materials can be located appropriately in the facility.
(9) Based on the expected quantities of combustible materials, review the types of potential fires,
their estimated severity, intensity, duration, and the potential hazards created. For each fire scenario
reviewed, indicate the total time from the first alert of the fire hazard until safe control and
extinguishment are accomplished. Describe in detail the facility systems, functions, and controls that will
be provided and maintained during the fire emergency.
Use of fire-retardant paint requires special care. Inconsistent application and exposure to weather can
reduce the effectiveness of fire-retardant coatings. Large timbers are occasionally used to support large
pieces of equipment during storage or maintenance. The size of these timbers makes them difficult to
ignite, and they do not represent an immediate fire threat.
(10) Define the essential electric circuit integrity needed during fire. Evaluate the electrical and cable
fire protection, the fire confinement control, and the fire extinguishing systems that will be needed to
maintain their integrity.
(11) Carefully review and describe the control and operating room areas and the protection and
extinguishing systems provided for these areas. Do not overlook the additional facilities provided for
maintenance and operating personnel, such as kitchens, maintenance storage, and supply cabinets.
(12) Analyze the available forms of backup or public fire protection that can be considered for the
installation. Review the backup fire department, equipment, number of personnel, special skills, and
training needed.
(13) Evaluate the inspection, testing, and maintenance needed to maintain the fire protection system's
integrity, considering the effects of radiation.
(14) Evaluate life safety, protection of critical process/safety equipment, provisions to limit
contamination, potential for radioactive release, and restoration of the facility after a fire.
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3.1.3 NUREG-1520 Guidance for FHA
The FHA requirements are from Section 7.4.3.2: the FHA is done as part of the ISA per NUREG-1513.
Knowing the fire risk allows an applicant to apply the appropriate level of fire protection to ensure the
safety of workers, the public and the environment from fire-induced radiological hazards. To be risk-
informed, a licensee should conduct an FHA for each facility, or part thereof, that, if totally consumed by
fire, could release nuclear material in quantity and form that could cause at least an intermediate
consequence. Other requirements are:
• The FHA should develop bounding credible fire scenarios for each fire area containing
significant fire loading, and then assess the consequences of an unmitigated fire.
• The NRC recognizes NFPA 801 as one standard that provides guidance for conducting FHAs,
however, the applicant may use other nationally recognized codes and standards if appropriate.
• The FHA should include a description, by fire area, of the fuel loading, fire scenarios, methods
of consequence analysis, the potential consequences, and a description of the mitigative controls.
• The FHA is used to identify possible fire initiators and accident sequences leading to
radiological consequences or toxic chemical consequences resulting from interaction with SNM.
• In developing accident sequences that will be reported in the ISA Summary (see NUREG-
1513); the ISA team will consider the FHA results and assign likelihoods of the various events
in the accident sequences. With respect to fire safety, the ISA Summary is acceptable if the
credible fire hazards (e.g., from the FHA) are identified for each process fire, and information is
provided to detail how each fire hazard was considered and addressed (i.e., the management
measures and/or IROFS) for each process accident sequence whose consequence could exceed
the performance requirements. Thus, the FHA is a fundamental tool for evaluating fire hazards
as input to the ISA evaluation. The staff’s fire safety specialist will review the adequacy fire
safety aspects of the ISA Summary.
3.1.4 NRC FDTs for FHA
NRC 2004a describes the fire analysis tools recommended by NRC for more quantitative analysis. Fire
Dynamics Tools (FDTs) are very easy to use spreadsheets and give answers that are suitable for most
analyses. Japan should consider using these easy to use EXCEL spreadsheets rather than complicated
codes for analyses.
30
The NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR), Division of Systems Safety and Analysis
(DSSA), Plant Systems Branch (SPLB), Fire Protection Engineering and Special Projects Section, has
developed quantitative methods, known as FDTs, to assist regional fire protection inspectors in
performing FHAs. These methods have been implemented in spreadsheets and taught at the NRC’s
quarterly regional inspector workshops conducted in 2001–2003. The goal of the training is to assist
inspectors in calculating the quantitative aspects of a postulated fire and its effects on safe NPP operation.
FDTs were developed using state-of-the-art fire dynamics equations and correlations that were
preprogrammed and locked into Microsoft EXCEL spreadsheets.
These FDTs will enable the inspector to perform quick, easy, first-order calculations for the potential fire
scenarios using today’s state-of-the-art principles of fire dynamics. Each FDTs spreadsheet also contains
a list of the physical and thermal properties of the materials commonly encountered in NPPs.
The FDTs are intended to assist fire protection inspectors in performing risk-informed evaluations of
credible fires that may cause critical damage to essential safe-shutdown equipment, as required by the
new reactor oversight process (ROP) defined in the NRC’s inspection manual. In the new ROP, the NRC
is moving toward a more risk-informed, objective, predictable, understandable, and focused regulatory
process. Key features of the new program are a risk-informed regulatory framework, risk-informed
inspections, a significance determination process (SDP) to evaluate inspection findings, performance
indicators, a streamlined assessment process, and more clearly defined actions that the NRC will take for
plants based on their performance.
This NUREG-series report addresses the technical bases for FDTs, which were derived from the
principles developed primarily in the Society of Fire Protection Engineers (SFPE) Handbook of Fire
Protection Engineering, NFPA Fire Protection Handbook, and other fire science literature. The subject
matter of this report covers many aspects of fire dynamics and contains descriptions of the most important
fire processes. A significant number of examples, reference tables, illustrations, and conceptual drawings
are presented in this report to expand the inspector’s appreciation in visualizing and retaining the material
and understanding calculation methods.
The content of the FDTs encompasses fire as a physical phenomenon. As such, the inspector needs a
working knowledge of algebra to effectively use the formulae presented in this report and the FDTs.
Acquired technical knowledge or course background in the sciences will also prove helpful.
31
The information contained in this report is similar to, but includes less theory and detail than, an
undergraduate-level university curriculum for fire protection engineering students. The goal of this report
is to develop a common body of knowledge of fire protection and fire science to enable the inspector to
acquire the understanding, skills, and abilities necessary to effectively apply principles of fire dynamics to
analyze the potential effects of a fire in a commercial NPP.
The FDT will advance the FHA process from an approach s that is primarily qualitative to one that is
more quantitative. The development of this report, the FDTs, and the quarterly inspector workshops
conducted in 2001–2003 is the NRC’s first step in achieving that goal.
Toward that end, on November 22 and 23, 2004, the NRC conducted a 2-day public meeting at the
agency’s headquarters in Rockville, Maryland, with the sole purpose of sharing an “advanced copy” of
NUREG-1805 (NRC 2004b) with all interested stakeholders. The meeting was well-received, and the
participants identified numerous suggestions to further refine both the advanced copy and the
spreadsheets. We thank those stakeholders for their involvement and have made every attempt to include
their valued comments in preparing the final files for the publication of this report.
Fire is a complex subject and transfer of its concepts to useful pursuits is a challenge. We hope that this
report and the FDTs can make a difference in the NRC’s fire protection inspection program, specifically
risk-informed fire protection initiatives such as the SDP and risk-informed inspection of circuits.
The NUREG-1805 (NRC 2004b) FDTs are shown in Table 3.1-2. Notice most areas of interest in fire
analysis are covered.
Table 3.1-2 NUREG-1805 FDT Tools for FHA
FDT by File Name NUREG 1805 Chapter and Related Calculation Method(s)
Chapter 2. Predicting Hot Gas Layer (HGL) Temperature and

02.1_Temperature_NV.xls
Smoke Layer Height in a Room Fire with Natural Ventilation
02.2_Temperature_FV.xls
Method Compartment with Thermally Thick/Thin Boundaries
Chapter 2. Predicting HGL Temperature in a Room Fire with Door
02.3_Temperature_CC.xls Closed or Compartment has Sufficient Leaks to Prevent Pressure
Buildup. Leakage is Ignored
03_HRR_Flame_Height_Burning_ Chapter 3. Estimating Burning Characteristics, of Liquid Pool
Duration_Calculation.xls Fire, Heat Release Rate, Burning Duration and Flame Height
Chapter 4. Estimating Wall Fire Flame Height, Line Fire Flame
04_Flame_Height_Calculations.xls
Height Against the Wall, and Corner Fire Flame Height
32
FDT by File Name NUREG 1805 Chapter and Related Calculation Method(s)
05.1_Heat_Flux_Calculations_Wind_ Chapter 5. Estimating Radiant Heat Flux from Fire to a Target

Free.xls Fuel
05.2_Heat_Flux_Calculations_Wind.xls
Presence of Wind
05.3_Thermal_Radiation_From_
Estimating Thermal Radiation from Hydrocarbon Fireballs
Hydrocarbon_Fireballs.xls
06_Ignition_Time_Calculations.xls Chapter 6. Estimating the Ignition Time of a Target Fuel Exposed
to a Constant Radiative Heat Flux
Chapter 7. Estimating Full-Scale Heat Release Rate of a Cable

07_Cable_HRR_Calculations.xls
Tray Fire
08_Burning_Duration_Soild.xls Chapter 8. Estimating Burning Duration of Solid Combustibles
Chapter 9. Estimating Centerline Temperature of a Buoyant Fire
09_Plume_Temperature_Calculations.xls
Plume
10_Detector_Activation_Time.xls Chapter 10. Estimating Sprinkler Response Time Chapter 11.
Estimating Smoke Detector Response Time Chapter 12.
Estimating Heat Detector Response Time
13_Compartment_ Flashover_ Chapter 13. Predicting Compartment Flashover • Compartment
Calculations.xls Post-Flashover Temperature: Method of Law • Minimum Heat
Release Rate Required to Compartment Flashover
14_Compartment_Over_Pressure_ Chapter 14. Estimating Pressure Rise Attributable to a Fire in a
Calculations.xls Closed Compartment
15_Explosion_Claculations.xls Chapter 15. Estimating the Pressure Increase and Explosive
Energy Release Associated with Explosions
Chapter 16. Calculating the Rate of Hydrogen Gas Generation in
Battery Rooms
• Method of Estimating Hydrogen Gas Generation Rate in Battery
16_Battery_Room_Flammable_Gas_ Rooms, • Method of Estimating Flammable Gas and Vapor
Conc.xls Concentration Buildup in Enclosed Spaces• Method of Estimating
Flammable Gas and Vapor Concentration Buildup in Enclosed
Spaces, • Method of Estimating Flammable Gas and Vapor
Concentration Buildup Time in Enclosed Spaces
17.1_FR_Beams_Columns_ Chapter 17. Calculating the Fire Resistance of Structural Steel
Substitution_Correlation.xls Members • Empirical Correlations • Beam Substitution
17.2_FR_Beams_Columns_Quasi_ Correlation (Spray-Applied Materials) • Column Substitution
Steady_State_Spray_Insulated.xls Correlation (Spray-Applied Materials) • Heat Transfer Analysis
17.3_FR_Beams_Columns_Quasi_ using Numerical Methods Protected Steel Beams and Columns
Steady_State_Board_Insulated.xls (Spray-Applied) • Heat Transfer Analysis using Numerical
17.4_FR_Beams_Columns_Quasi_ Methods Protected Steel Beams and Columns (Board Materials) •
Steady_State_Uninsulated.xls Heat Transfer Analysis using Numerical Methods Unprotected
Steel Beams and Columns
18_Visibility_Through_Smoke.xls Chapter 18. Estimating Visibility Through Smoke
33
3.2 Fire Modeling
This section discusses data and information on the validation of fire models for various situations. This
information can be used in the Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization (JNES) plans for Item 2, Fire
Effects Analysis discussed in Section 5 of this report. Fire modeling in the US and at GRS and IRSN are
discussed. The information from the US is most useful since it describes the V&V of several codes in
several fire situations using the ASTM Standard E 1355, Standard Guide for Evaluating the Predictive
Capability of Deterministic Fire Models (ASTM 2005). A method like ASTM E1355 may also be useful
in Japan (see Section 3.3 for more discussion of ASTM E1355).
The information from GRS and IRSN do not discuss standards that are used and are not as important for
this study and the plans in Section 5. However, GRS did provide data for one of the benchmark tests in
the US V&V discussed in Section 3.2.1. The detailed data for the GRS and IRSN cases is not presented
in this report, the information is summarized. The reader can go to the references for the detailed
information.
3.2.1 US: NRC V&V of Fire Codes
The NRC verification of several fire models is presented in NUREG-1854 (NRC 2007 a-g). NUREG-
1854 is presented in seven volumes. Volume 1, the Main Report, provides general background
information, programmatic and technical overviews, and project insights and conclusions. Volume 2
quantifies the uncertainty of the experiments used in the V&V study of the five fire models considered in
this study. Volumes 3 through 7 provide detailed discussions of the V&V of the following fire models:
Volume 3 Fire Dynamics Tools (FDTs)

Volume 4 Fire-Induced Vulnerability Evaluation, Revision 1 (FIVE-Revl)
Volume 5 Consolidated Model of Fire Growth and Smoke Transport (CFAST)
Volume 6 MAGIC code
Volume 7 Fire Dynamics Simulator (FDS)
Fire modeling and fire dynamics calculations are used in a number of FHA studies and documents,
including Fire Risk Analysis (FRA) calculations; compliance with and exemptions to the regulatory
requirements for fire protection. This includes the risk-informed performance-based (RI/PB) voluntary
fire protection licensing basis. The RI/PB method is based on the NFPA 805, Performance-Based
34
Standard for Fire Protection for Light- Water Reactor Generating Plants. However, it is also useful to
understand codes to be used for FCF.
Reference FPE 2007 provides a good overview of this work by NRC.
The seven volumes of this NUREG-series report provide technical documentation concerning the
predictive capabilities of a specific set of fire dynamics calculation tools and fire models for the analysis
of fire hazards in postulated NPP scenarios. Under a joint MOU, the NRC Office of Nuclear Regulatory
Research (RES) and the EPRI agreed to develop this technical document for NPP application of these fire
modeling tools. The objectives of this agreement include creating a library of typical NPP fire scenarios
and providing information on the ability of specific fire models to predict the consequences of those
typical NPP fire scenarios. To meet these objectives, RES and EPRI initiated this collaborative project to
provide an evaluation, in the form of V&V, for a set of five commonly available fire modeling tools.
The road map for this project was derived from NFPA 805 and the American Society for Testing and
Materials (ASTM) Standard E 1355, Standard Guide for Evaluating the Predictive Capability of
Deterministic Fire Models (see Section 3.3 of this report). These industry standards form the
methodology and process used to perform this study. Technical review of fire models is also necessary to
ensure that those using the models can accurately assess the adequacy of the scientific and technical bases
for the models, select models that are appropriate for a desired use, and understand the levels of
confidence that can be attributed to the results predicted by the models. This work was performed using
state-of-the-art fire dynamics calculation methods/models and the most applicable fire test data. Future
improvements in the fire dynamics calculation methods/models and additional fire test data may impact
the results presented in the seven volumes of this report.
3.2.1.1 Background
Since the 1990s, when it became the policy of the NRC to use risk-informed methods to make regulatory
decisions where possible, the nuclear power industry has been moving from prescriptive rules and
practices toward the use of risk information to supplement decision-making. Several initiatives have
furthered this transition in the area of fire protection. In 2001, the NFPA completed the development of
NFPA Standard 805, Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light- Water Reactor Electric
Generating Plants, 2001 Edition. Effective July 16, 2004, the NRC amended its fire protection
requirements in 10 CFR 50.48(c) (NRC 2004a) to permit existing reactor licensees to voluntarily adopt
fire protection requirements contained in NFPA 805 as an alternative to the existing deterministic fire
35
protection requirements. RI/PB fire protection often relies on fire modeling for determining the
consequence of fires. NFPA 805 requires that the "fire models shall be verified and validated," and "only
fire models that are acceptable to the Authority Having Jurisdiction (AHJ) shall be used in fire modeling
calculations." Objectives " To perform V&V studies of selected fire models using a consistent
methodology (ASTM E 1335) " To investigate the specific fire modeling issue of interest to NPP fire
protection applications " To quantify fire model predictive capabilities to the extent that can be supported
by comparison with selected and available experimental data.
3.2.1.2 Approach and Models

This project team performed V&V studies on five selected models: (1) NRC's NUREG- 1805 FDTs, (2)
EPRI's FIVE-Rev l, (3) NIST’s CFAST, (4) Electricite de France's (EdF) MAGIC, and (5) NIST's FDS.
The team based these studies on the guidelines of the ASTM E 1355, Standard Guide for Evaluating the
Predictive Capability of Deterministic Fire Models. The scope of these V&V studies was limited to the
capabilities of the selected fire models and did not cover certain potential fire scenarios that fall outside
the capabilities of these fire models.
3.2.1.3 Results
The results of this study are presented in the form of relative differences between fire model predictions
and experimental data for fire modeling attributes such as plume temperature that are important to NPP
fire modeling applications. While the relative differences sometimes show agreement, they also show
both under-prediction and over-prediction in some circumstances. These relative differences are affected
by the capabilities of the models, the availability of accurate applicable experimental data, and the
experimental uncertainty of these data. The project team used the relative differences, in combination
with some engineering judgment as to the appropriateness of the model and the agreement between model
and experiment, to produce a graded characterization of each fire model's capability to predict attributes
important to NPP fire modeling applications.
This report does not provide relative differences for all known fire scenarios in NPP applications. This
incompleteness is caused by a combination of model capability and lack of relevant experimental data.
The first problem can be addressed by improving the fire models, while the second problem calls for more
applicable fire experiments. This conclusion confirms the need for more experiments for FCF as planned
by JNES (see Section 5).
36
Experimental data, problem specifications, and insights and peer comment for the international fire model
benchmarking and validation exercises were provided by the Building Research Establishment (BRE) and
the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII) in the United Kingdom, which provided leadership for ICFMP
Benchmark Exercise (BE) #2, as well as GRS and Institut fur Baustoffe, Massivbau und Brandschutz
(iBMB) in Germany, which provided leadership and valuable experimental data for ICFMP BE #4 and
BE #5. Valtion Teknillinen Tutkimuskeskus (VTT) of Finland also assisted with ICFMP BE#2 by
providing pictures, tests reports.
3.2.1.4 Objectives
The purpose of this report is to describe an evaluation of the predictive capabilities of certain fire models
for applications specific to NPPs. These models may be used to demonstrate compliance with the
requirements of 10 CFR 50.48(c) and the referenced NFPA standard, NFPA 805. Engineering analyses
and methods that are applied to demonstrate compliance with the performance criteria in NFPA 805 need
the requisite degree of defensible technical justification, as dictated by the scope and complexity of the
specific application. These analyses should be performed by qualified analysts and should include any
necessary V&V of analytical methods relevant to the specific application.
Section 2.4.1.2 of NFPA 805 states that only fire models acceptable to the AHJ shall be used in fire
modeling calculations. Further, Sections 2.4.1.2.2 and 2.4.1.2.3 of NFPA 805 state that fire models shall
only be applied within the limitations of the given fire model, and shall be V&V’d. Thus, V&V is
necessary to establish acceptable uses and limitations of fire models. In addition, analysts need to justify
the appropriateness of fire model for specific applications. V&V of a calculation method are intended to
ensure the correctness and suitability of the method. Verification is the process to determine that a model
correctly represents the developer's conceptual description. It is used to decide whether the model was
"built" correctly.
Validation is the process to determine that a model is a suitable representation of the real world and is
capable of reproducing phenomena of interest. It is used to decide whether the right model was built. This
project was driven by the following objectives: Conduct a V&V study of the selected fire models using a
consistent methodology (ASTM E 1355, Evaluating the Predictive Capability of Deterministic Fire
Models) for NPP fire protection applications. Quantify predictive capabilities of fire models to the extent
that can be supported by comparison with applicable and available fire experiment data.
37
This study evaluated the following five fire modeling tools: (1) NRC's FDTs (documented in Volume 3 of
the report) (2) EPRI's FIVE-Rev 1 (documented in Volume 4 of the report) (3) NIST’s CFAST
(documented in Volume 5 of the report) (4) EdF’s MAGIC code (documented in Volume 6 of the report)
(5) NIST's FDS (documented in Volume 7 of this report).
3.2.1.5 ASTM E 1355 Approach

This program follows the guidelines of ASTM. E 1355, Evaluating the Predictive Capability of
Deterministic Fire Models, which ASTM International distributes as a guide to evaluate fire models.
That standard identifies four steps in the evaluation of predictive fire models: (1) Define the model and
scenarios or phenomena for which the evaluation is to be conducted. (2) Assess the appropriateness of the
theoretical basis and assumptions used in the model. (3) Assess the mathematical and numerical
robustness of the model. (4) Validate the model by quantifying the uncertainty and relative difference of
the model results in predicting the course of events for specific NPP fire scenarios.
Traditionally, a V&V study reports on the comparison of model results with experimental data from a test
series and, as such, the V&V of the fire model is for the specific tested fire scenarios. V&V studies for the
selected fire models do already exist, but it is necessary to investigate the technical issues specific to the
use of these models in NPP fire modeling applications. In order to accomplish the ASTM E 1355
objectives, the following approach was developed and implemented in this study:
(1) Define a list of typical NPP fire scenarios.
(2) Select test series from which experimental data will be used to perform the quantitative validation.
(3) Select and describe the fire models for which an evaluation can be conducted.
(4) Define fire modeling parameters.
(5) Conduct the quantitative validation study for each fire modeling tool.
(6) Report validation results.
This approach provides a roadmap, to model users and developers for conducting a V&V based on ASTM
E 1355. The scope of this V&V study is limited to the capabilities of the selected fire models. As such,
certain potential fire scenarios in NPP fire modeling applications do not fall within the capabilities of
these fire models and, therefore, are not covered by this study. Examples of such fire scenarios include
high-energy arcing faults and fire propagation between control panels. It is the user's responsibility to
determine whether a model can be applied to each specific fire scenario.
38
ASTM E 1355 establishes a process for conducting a V&V study of a fire model. In general, the process
can be summarized in the following tasks:
• Model and scenario definition documents the model and the scenarios or phenomena of interest
for the V&V study.
• Description of the theoretical basis for the model documents a detailed technical description of
the thermo-physical processes addressed by the fire model.
• Mathematical and numerical robustness documents an evaluation of the numerical
implementation of the model.
• Model sensitivity documents a sensitivity analysis of the model.
• Model evaluation documents the results of the validation study.
There is, however, a technical challenge in implementing these tasks. Specifically, the universe of fire
scenarios in commercial NPPs is large and diverse. Also, scenarios may have characteristics or attributes
that either cannot be modeled using state-of-the-art computational fire models, and/or no experimental
data is available to support a V&V study of that particular characteristic or attribute. Improvements in
these two specific limitations - limited fire modeling capabilities and/or insufficient experimental data -
are needed.
In order to address these challenges, and still perform a V&V study consistent with ASTM E1355, the
following approach was used by the NRC:
(1) Define a list of typical NPP fire scenarios. This list of fire scenarios is intended to be a reflection of
the wide range of fire scenarios found in NPPs or FCF (i.e., the scope of scenarios for which models
would need validation). In the context of this V&V study, the list of scenarios attempts to capture all the
potential fire scenarios and the resulting conditions that could be postulated in practical applications.
However, some conditions in these scenarios cannot be predicted with available models or do not have
any available experimental data to support a quantitative model evaluation.
(2) Select test series from which experimental data will be used to perform the quantitative validation.
The selected test series reflects some of the characteristics of the fire scenarios included in the list
described in item 1 above.
(3) Select and describe the fire models for which an evaluation can be conducted. Consistent with ASTM
E 1355, the description of the selected fire models includes a review of the theoretical basis and
39
fundamental assumptions, an assessment of the mathematical and numerical robustness, and a sensitivity
analysis, as well as validation with experimental data. As suggested earlier, (a) not all the predictive
capabilities of each model have been subjected to the V&V process, and (b) not all the fire-generated
conditions in the library of fire scenarios can be predicted with the capabilities of state-of-the-art models.
(4) Define fire modeling parameters. It is necessary to identify fire-generated conditions for which a
generic validation study can be conducted given the available models and experimental data. Based on the
NPP fire scenarios, capabilities of the selected fire models, and the available experimental data, the
project team identified 13 fire modeling parameters for which a quantitative validation study can be
conducted.
(5) Conduct the quantitative validation study for each fire modeling tool. The quantitative validation
studies are conducted by comparing experimental data with fire modeling tool predictions.
(6) Report validation results. Results from the quantitative validation study are reported as relative
differences for peak experimental measurements and model predictions, as well as graphical comparisons
between experimental measurements and model predictions. Figure 3.2-1 shows this approach. The
following sections describe the steps of this approach in greater detail. This approach is documented and
implemented in the individual volumes using the data from Volume 2. It can be used as a roadmap, to
model users and developers for conducting a V&V for models other than those included in this study.
40
Figure 3.2-1 NRC V&V Method
Note: the Vol. and Sect. references in this figure are for the NRC V&V study (NRC 2002)
NPP Fire Scenarios- Vol. 1, Sect. 2.1

ASTM E3155, Section 7.2
Define Representative NPP fire scenarios
Fire Modeling Codes – Vol. 1, Section 2.3 Fire Experiments – Vol. 1, Section 2.2
(ASTM E1355, Chapters 7, 8, 9 & 10 (ASTM E1355, Sections 11.3.3 & 11.3.4)
Select and describe the fire modeling codes and Define the set of fire experiments that will
the capabilities of the code for which the V&V support the quantitative validation. Notice that
is conducted. the available experiments do not cover all the
identified NPP fire scenarios.
Fire Modeling Parameters – Vol. 1, Section

2.4
Define the attributes of fire scenarios for which
a quantitative V&V can be conducted.
Quantitative V&V – Vol. 1, Section 2.5

(ASTM E1355, Sections 11.3.7 & 11.3.9)
Perform quantitative V&V by comparing
model predictions to experimental data.
Report V&V Results – Vol. 1, Section 2.6

(ASTM E1355, Chapter 12)
Report V&V results in the form of graphical
comparisons and relative differences.
3.2.1.6 Scenarios
The list of fire scenarios presented in this section expands and/or modifies the list originally compiled and
documented by EPRI as part of the development of its "Fire Modeling Guide for Nuclear Power Plant
Applications". The basis for the selection of these fire scenarios is as follows:
• Review the range of possible configurations that contribute to fire scenarios in the US
commercial nuclear industry. The review focused on parameters considered important in the
definition of fire scenarios.
41
• Identify potentially risk-significant fire scenarios through review of the Individual Plant
Examination for External Events (IPEEE) submittals.
• Examine past industry experience with fire modeling in support of regulatory applications
(other than IPEEE) to help define these fire scenarios.
A questionnaire was prepared and distributed to all operating NPPs in the US concerning their experience
with fire modeling. Also, with support from the NRC, industry submittals were searched to identify the
use of fire modeling.
The NRC V&V used many scenarios. The two most similar to FCFs are presented in this report (see
NRC 2002 for descriptions of other scenarios).
Multi-Compartment Corridor
Many commercial NPPs have enclosures with multiple compartments that open into a common space or
corridor. The significance of these enclosures in terms of fire safety varies from plant-to-plant because
they house various mechanical, electrical, waste treatment, or other equipment and/or circuits. Figure 2-7
graphically represents this scenario, which consists of a fire in one compartment affecting targets in an
adjacent compartment.
The multi-compartment corridor considered in this scenario consists of interconnected rooms and
corridors in the same level. These geometries may have soffits between the connecting rooms. The source
of a fire in this scenario may be ignition of an oil pool spilled from a pump in one of the adjacent rooms.
The size of the fire will depend on the type and amount of oil spilled, as well as the area and depth of the
pool itself. The growth of this fire typically will be fast and, depending on the size of the room, the fire
could potentially generate flashover conditions in the room of origin and fire effluent may spill out and
effect targets in adjacent rooms. The ventilation conditions will be natural ventilation, with leakage paths
between compartments around normally closed doors. There may also be mechanical ventilation using
both injection and extraction systems. Targets of interest in these scenarios are often safety-related
equipment and cables located in the corridor outside the room of fire origin, or an adjacent room. These
targets will be subjected to smoke flows migrating out of the room of fire origin.
42
Figure 3.2-2 Multi-compartment Corridor Used in NRC V&V
Multi-Level Building
A typical NPP has locations where multiple elevations in the same building are separated by partial
floors/ceilings, open hatches, or staircases. Typical examples include turbine buildings, pressurized water
reactor (PWR) auxiliary buildings, and boiling-water reactor (BWR) buildings. The multi-level turbine
building in this scenario is a three-level space that includes the turbine deck. (Section 2.1.5 describes a
turbine deck fire scenario.)
This scenario consists of an oil spill fire affecting targets located on a different level. Figure 2-8
graphically represents the scenario, which can apply to turbine buildings with one or more units. The
source of a fire in this scenario may be ignition of an oil pool spilled from an oil tank located under one of
the turbine generators. The size of the fire will depend on the type and amount of oil spilled, as well as the
area and depth of the pool itself. The energy and smoke created will flow through mezzanine opening
between levels. The growth of this fire will be fast. The ventilation conditions will be natural ventilation
via openings on the upper level. There may also be mechanical ventilation using roof-mounted exhaust
fans and/or mechanical supply. Targets of interest in these scenarios may be cables in cable trays located
on the upper levels.
Figure 3.2-3 Multilevel Building used in NRC V&V
43
3.2.1.7 Fire Models Used
There are numerous fire models that have been developed and maintained by various organizations to
predict fire-generated conditions. This study selects the following five of these fire models, which
represent a wide range of capabilities and mathematical and computational sophistication:
• Two libraries of engineering calculations: FDTS and FIVE-Rev 1
• Two two-zone models: CFAST and MAGIC
• One field model: FDS
These particular models were chosen based on the fact that most of them have been used to calculate fire
conditions in NPP fire protection applications, or were developed by stakeholders within the nuclear
industry for NPP fire protection applications. FDS was chosen to represent the most complex types of
models available for fire protection applications. The model attributes are in Table 3.2-1.
Table 3.2-1 Fire Attributes and Model Capabilities

Fire Modeling Attributes Fire Models
FDTs FIVE CFAST MAGIC FDS
HGL Temperature Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
1 Yes Yes
HGL Height Yes NO Yes
Ceiling Jet Temperature NO Yes Yes Yes Yes
Plume Temperature Yes Yes NO Yes Yes
Flame Height Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Radiated Heat Flux to Targets Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Total Heat Flux to Targets NO NO Yes Yes Yes
Total Heat Flux to Walls NO NO Yes Yes Yes
Wall Temperature NO NO Yes Yes Yes
Target Temperature NO NO Yes Yes Yes
Smoke Concentration NO NO Yes Yes Yes
Oxygen Concentration NO NO Yes Yes Yes
Room Pressure NO NO Yes Yes Yes
1 This output was not evaluated because it was not applicable for experiments used in this study.
3.2.1.8 Experimental Data

This section provides a general overview of the test series and experiments selected for this study.
Volume 2 of the report augments this overview by providing detailed descriptions of these experiments.
Some test series included many experiments, from which only a few were chosen for this V&V study.
44
One overriding reason for this is that the sheer amount of data that is generated and must be processed can
be overwhelming, so limiting the number of experiments to consider was necessary. The experiments
within the test series that were chosen are representative of the overall series of tests, as well as
representative of the fire scenarios in NPPs listed above. Volume 2, Section 1.1, has a more complete
explanation for the selection of the experiments.
Factory Mutual & Sandia National Laboratories (FM/SNL) Test Series

A series of fire tests was conducted at SNL under the sponsorship of the NRC in the mid- 1980s.
Specifically, tests were conducted using simple gas-fired burner, heptane pool, methanol pool, and solid
polymethyl-methacrylate (PMMA) fires. Four of these tests were conducted with a full-scale control
room mockup in place. Parameters varied during testing were fire intensity, enclosure ventilation rate, and
fire location. The primary purpose at the time of these tests was to provide data for use in validating
computer fire environment simulation models that would subsequently be used in analyzing NPP
enclosure fire scenarios, .specifically main control room (MCR) scenarios.
These tests were conducted in an enclosure measuring 18.3 m x 12.2 m x 6.1 m (60 ft x 40 ft 20 ft),
which was constructed at the FM fire test facility in Rhode Island. All of the tests utilized forced
ventilation conditions. The ventilation system was designed to simulate typical NPP installation practices
and ventilation rates.
This study used data from only the three tests. For all three tests, the fire source was a propylene gas-
fired burner with a diameter of approximately 0.9 m (2.95 ft), with its rim located approximately 0.1 m
(0.33 ft) above the floor. For FM/SNL Tests 4 and 5, the burner was centered along the longitudinal axis
centerline, 6.1 m (20 ft) laterally from the nearest wall. For FM/SNL Test 2-1, the burner was placed
within simulated electrical cabinets.
The National Bureau of Standards (NBS) Test Series

A total of 45 tests representing 9 different sets of experiments, with multiple replicates of each set, were
conducted in a three-room suite at NBS that is described in detail in NBSIR 88-3752. These tests were
conducted in the mid-1980s as well. NBS is now known as NIST.
The suite consisted of two relatively small rooms, designated here as Rooms 1 and 3, which were
connected via doorways and short connecting passageways to a relatively long corridor, designated as
Room 2. Rooms 1 and 3 opened only onto the corridor (Room 2) via doorways; they did not open to the
45
external environment other than through normal construction leakage paths. The corridor had a doorway
to the external environment, as well as doorways to Rooms 1 and 3.
The fire source, a gas-fired burner, was located against the rear wall of Room 1. The following parameters
were varied in the 9 different sets of experiments:
• fire size, including nominal 100, 300, and 500 kW fires
• door positions, including open and closed doors between the corridor and Room 3, as well as
between the corridor and the external environment in this study, the tests designated as Sets 1, 2,
and 4 in NBSIR 88-3752 are used for comparison.
All three of these sets had a fire source intensity of 100 kW, but the sets differed based on door position.
Specifically, the door between Rooms 1 and 2 was open for all three sets. However, for Set 1, the door
between Room 2 and the external environment was open (providing a source of fresh air to the suite),
while the door between Rooms 2 and 3 was closed (effectively isolating Room 3 from this test).
By contrast, for Set 2, the door between Room 2 and the external environment was closed, as was the
door between Rooms 2 and 3 (again isolating Room 3).
For Set 4, the door between Room 2 and the external environment was open (again providing a source of
fresh air to the suite), as was the door between Rooms 2 and 3. Experimental data used for these
comparisons was obtained in electronic format from NIST. Average values for the nine data sets were
also converted to spreadsheet format, but were not used for these comparisons.
ICFMP Exercise Test Series

As of the date of the V&V, four full-scale fire test series have been completed as part of the ICFMP. The
ICFMP is a separate, but related, project designed to conduct validation studies of fire models from
around the world. ICFMP participants conduct a series -of experiments and provide the data to other
participants in order to compare fire model outputs to experimental data. These test series are referred to
as BEs.
This V&V study includes experimental data from BEs #2, 3, 4, and 5. A brief description of each follows:
• BE #2.: These tests were conducted in the late-1990s. The ICFMP objective of BE #2 was to
examine scenarios that are more challenging for zone models. In particular, these scenarios
included fires in larger room volumes that are representative of turbine halls in NPPs. The tests
46
were conducted inside the VTT Fire Test Hall, which has dimensions of 19 m high x 27 m long
x 14 m wide (62.3 ft x 88.6 ft x 45.9 ft). Each case involved a single heptane pool fire, ranging
from 2 Mega Watts (MW) to 4 MW.
• BE #3. This ICFMP exercise comprised a series of 15 large-scale fire tests, sponsored in part
by the NRC, that were performed at NIST between June 5 and 20, 2003. These tests consisted of
350 kW 1.0 MW, and 2 MW fires in a marinite room with dimensions of 21.7 m x 7.15 m 3.7 m
(71.2 ft x 23.5 ft x 12.1 ft). The room had one door with dimensions of 2 m x 2 m (6.6 ft x 6.6
ft), and a mechanical air injection and extraction system. Ventilation conditions and fire size
were varied among the 15 tests. The numerous experimental measurements included
temperatures in gas layers and surfaces, heat fluxes, and gas velocities, among others (NRC
2006).
• BE #4: This test series was conducted at the iBMB, in Germany in 2003 and 2004. Each of
these tests simulated a relatively large fire in a relatively small concrete room. Only one test
from this series was selected for this study.
• BE #5: This exercise, which was conducted at the iBMB in Germany in 2003 and 2004,
consisted of four large-scale tests inside the same concrete enclosure as BE #4 with realistically
routed cable trays. Only one test was selected for this study.
3.2.1.9 Results: Validation
Table 3.2-2 summarizes the results of this validation study. The predictive capabilities of the models are
graded based on the quantitative values of relative difference between model prediction and experimental
measurements. The validation results show that none of the models have attributes that are RED. This is
because all the models appropriately represent the physics of the scenarios, within the simplifying
assumptions of the calculation method. Most of the correlations employed within the models were
empirically confirmed theoretical derivations of general physical phenomena, as summarized in Chapter 3
of each volume. All of the relative differences that fell significantly outside of the combined uncertainty
could be explained in terms of the simplifying assumptions within the models and the comparison of
these assumptions with the experimental configurations.
47
Table 3.2-2 Results of NRC V&V
Parameter Fire Models
FDTs FIVE- CFAST MAGIC FDS
Rev 1
HGL Temperature Room of origin Yellow+ Yellow+ Green Green Green
(“upper layer
Adjacent room N/A N/A Yellow Yellow+ Green
temperature”)
HGL height (“layer interface height”) N/A N/A Green Green Green
2
Ceiling jet temperature (“target/gas N/A Yellow+ Yellow+ Green Green
temperature”)
Plume Temperature Yellow- Yellow+2 N/A Green Yellow
3
Flame Height Green Green Green Green Yellow1
Oxygen Concentration N/A N/A Green Yellow Green
Smoke Concentration N/A N/A Yellow Yellow Yellow
Room Pressure4 N/A N/A Green Green Green
Target Temperature N/A N/A Yellow Yellow Yellow
Radiant heat flux Yellow Yellow Yellow Yellow Yellow
Total heat flux N/A N/A Yellow Yellow Yellow
Wall Temperature N/A N/A Yellow Yellow Yellow
Total heat flux to walls N/A N/A Yellow Yellow Yellow
Table Notes:
1 . FDS does not use an empirical correlation to predict the flame height. Rather, it solves a set of equations appropriate for
reacting flows and predicts the flame height as the uppermost extent of the combustion zone. This is a challenging calculation
and the Yellow emphasizes that caution should be exercised by users.
2. FIVE approximates the experimental plume as the sum of HGL temperature and the calculated plume temperature and
experimental ceiling jet temperature as the sum of HGL temperature and the calculated ceiling jet temperature. The calculated
plume and ceiling jet temperatures were obtained from the correlations.
3. Flame height models compared with visual observations only.
4. Large experimental uncertainties for room pressure.
3.2.1.10 Results: Verification

All five models have been verified by this study as appropriate for fire protection applications, within the
assumptions for each individual model or sub-model. The project team used guidance in ASTM E 1355
about the theoretical basis and mathematical and numerical robustness to make this determination. The
verification for each model is documented in Volumes 3 through 7. During the process of this study, a
number of modifications and corrections to the five selected fire models were identified and implemented.
These modification and corrections were identified during the validation as a result of trying to interpret
the results. The nature of these modifications and corrections cover a wide range from inconsequential to
48
those that could lead to incorrect result. Descriptions of these modifications can be found in Volume 3
through 7.
3.2.1.11 Summary of Results

This section presents a summary of observations from the results of this study. These observations are
based on review of these results and generally apply to the five fire models considered in this study:
• The experiments considered in this study represent configurations that may be seen in NPP
applications. Not all possible NPP scenarios are evaluated in this study. NRC evaluated only
those scenarios in which suitable experimental data is available. For a variety of reasons,
however, the experimental data is limited. Users should evaluate independently whether the
results of this study are applicable to their specific scenario.
• For the fire scenarios considered in the current validation study, and for the output quantities of
interest, the libraries of engineering calculations (FDTS, FIVE-Rev 1) have limited capabilities.
These libraries do not have appropriate methods for estimating many of the fire scenario
attributes evaluated in this study. The correlations that the libraries do contain are typically
empirically deduced from a broad database of experiments. The correlations are based on
fundamental conservation laws and have gained a considerable degree of acceptance in the fire
protection engineering community. However, because of their empirical nature, they are subject
to many limiting assumptions. The user must be cautious when using these tools.
• The two-zone models performed well when compared with the experiments considered.
Evaluation of the two-zone models showed that the models simulated the experimental results
within experimental uncertainty (see Chapter 6 in Volume 2 of the V&V report, NRC 2002) for
most of the parameters of interest The reason for this may be that the relatively simple
experimental configurations selected for this study conform well to the simple two-layer
assumption that is the basis of these models. However, users must remain cautious when
applying these models to more complex scenarios, or when predicting certain phenomena, like
heat fluxes.
• Evaluation of the FDS model showed that the model simulated the experimental results within
experimental uncertainty (see Chapter 6 in Volume 2) for most of the parameters of interest. The
results of the field model, FDS, are comparable to the results of the two-zone models (CFAST,
Volume 5, and MAGIC, Volume 6), probably because the experimental configurations utilized
in this study contained, in most cases, two distinct layers within the room of origin.
• The decision to use any of these models can depend on many considerations. Real fire
scenarios rarely conform neatly to some of the simplifying assumptions inherent in the models.
49
Although engineering calculations and two-zone models can be applied in instances where the
physical configuration is complex, their accuracy cannot be ensured. Field model predictions can
be more accurate in more of these complex scenarios. However, the time it takes to get and
understand a prediction may also be an important consideration in the decision to use a particular
model for a specific scenario. FDS is computationally expensive and, while the two-zone models
produce answers in seconds to minutes, FDS provides comparable answers in hours to days.
FDS is better suited to predict fire environments within more complex configurations because it
predicts the local effects of a fire.
Like all predictive models, the best predictions come with a clear understanding of the limitations of the
model and of the inputs provided to do the calculations. For calculation of many attributes (see those
attributes categorized as yellow in Table 3-2), caution should be exercised when applying these models.
For the attributes categorized as GREEN, the models are accurate to within the experimental uncertainty
associated with each particular attribute (see Chapter 6 in Volume 2) for the range of conditions (see
Table 2-5) represented by the experiments used in this study.
3.2.1.12 Conclusions
This study provides justification for verification and provides validation via comparisons between
experimental data and predictions from five fire modeling tools. The validation results of this study are
presented in the form of color-coded grades of the predictive capability of fire models for important
parameters for NPP fire modeling applications. These grades are based on the quantitative relative
differences between model predictions and applicable experimental measurements. The predictive
capability considers the uncertainty in the experimental measurements. The use of fire models to support
fire protection decision-making requires understanding of their limitations and confidence in their
predictive capabilities.
The approach used in this study and documented and implemented in the individual volumes can be used
as a roadmap to model users and developers for conducting a V&V for models other than those included
in this study. This approach should be considered by Japan for their long-term plan discussed in Section
5.
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3.2.2 GRS Support for NRC V&V: BE #4 Set up and Data
This section provides and example of GRS data. GRS provided BE data for the NUREG-1824 V&V
discussed in Section 3.2.1. GRS provided experimental data for ICFMP BE #4 and BE #5. The results
for the BE#4 are covered in the various volumes of NUREG-1824 (NRC 2007a-g). The results shown
below are examples from Volume 7 for the FDS.
ICFMP BE #4: BE #4 consists of kerosene pool fire experiments conducted at the iBMB of the
Braunschweig University of Technology in Germany. The results of two experiments were contributed to
the ICFMP.
These fire experiments involve relatively large fires in a relatively small [3.6 m x 3.6 m x 5.7 m (12 ft x
12 ft x 19 ft) concrete enclosure. ICFMP BE #4 consists of two experiments, of which one (Test 1) was
chosen for validation by the NRC in Section 3.2.1. Compared to the other experiments, this fire was
relatively large in a relatively small compartment. Thus, its HGL temperature is considerably higher than
the other fire tests in the ICFMP.
As shown in Figure 3.2-4, the compartment geometry is fairly simple, with most of the objects contained
within it being rectangular and easily conforming to the simple 10-cm uniform grid used by FDS. The
only exception is a cylindrically-shaped waste container located just behind the fire pan, which according
to the simulation, is engulfed by the fire. In the FDS model, the cylindrical barrel is approximated as a
rectangular solid.
Figure 3.2-4 FDS Snapshot of ICFMP BE #4 Experiment at iBMB
51
The HGL temperature prediction in Figure 3.2-5, while matching the experiment in maximum value, has
a noticeably different shape than the measured profile, both in the first 5 minutes and following
extinction. The HGL height prediction is distinctly different in the first 10 minutes and differs by about
30% after that time.
Figure 3.2-5 FDS HGL Temperature Prediction for BE #4
For more results and details for FDS, see Volume 7 of NUREG-1824 (NRC 2007g). For examples of
BE#4 results for other models, see other Volumes 3-6 of NUREG-1824.
3.2.3 GRS and IRSN Support for ICFMP Cable Tray Analysis
This section discusses the results for an NRC evaluation of fire models to study cable tray fires (NRC
2002a). GRS and IRSN helped with this study as part of the ICFMP.
The analysis was done in two parts:

• Part 1: a trash bag fire to analyze the possibility for an ignition of a cable tray for various
distances to the tray
• Part 2: a cable tray fire to evaluate the possibility of a damage of another tray in a certain
distance or on certain evaluations.
The comparison between codes for these cases was used to understand the modeling of the physics in
them. The codes used were: FLAMME-S (IRSN), CFAST (NRC, NIST, VTT, BRE), Containment Code
System (COCOSYS) (GRS), CFX, (GRS), MAGIC (EdF), Analysis of Smoke Movement in Enclosures
(JASMINE) (BRE) and WPIFIRE (Worcester Polytechnic Institute (WPI)).
52
3.2.3.1 Part 1 Analysis
The setup of the Part 1 is provided as an example for this report: For the base case, the distance between
the midpoints of the trash bag and tray A was 2.2 m (.7 ft), the door was closed, and mechanical
ventilation system was off. To make comparisons of code results, simulations for horizontal distances
between the trash bag and tray A of 0.3, 0.9, and 1.5 m (.1, 0.3, and 0.5 ft) were conducted (Cases 1–3).
Simulations were also conducted with (a) the door open and mechanical system turned off; and (b)
mechanical ventilation system on and the door closed (Cases 4-5).
The maximum horizontal distance between the trash bag and the cable tray, which results in the ignition
of the tray, was to be determined by the extrapolation of results for the simulations with the door closed
and mechanical ventilation system off (Base Case to Case 3). The resulting centerline temperature (CL) of
the cable was calculated for these simulations. In addition, the following parameters were reported:
• Upper layer temperature
• Lower layer temperature
• Depth of the HGL
• Heat release rate (HRR)
• Oxygen content5 (upper and lower layer)
• Flow rates through the door and vents
• Radiation flux on the target
• Target surface temperature
• Total heat loss to boundaries
3.2.3.2 Typical Results
Typical results are shown in Table 3.2-3 and Figure 3.2-6. The COCOSYS results are from GRS and
FLAMME-S results are from IRSN. Additional results are in the report (NRC 2002a).
53
Table 3.2-3 Typical Results for NRC Cable Tray Study
1COCOSYS reported temperatures are maximum values at the ceiling.

2FLAMME-S reported target temperatures for Part I are at the end of calculation (600 s).
3JASMINE reported temperatures are the “center top” values which are higher than average “hot layer”
temperatures.
4The crack area was twice the area specified due to grid size used in simulation.
5FDS reported temperature is the maximum value at the ceiling.
6The oxygen concentration from MAGIC are reported as mass percent.
cb: CFAST-BRE
cn: CFAST-NRC/NIST
f: FLAMME_S- IRSN
me: MAGIC-EdF
mc: MAGIC-CTICM
o: COCOSYS- GRS
h: HADCRT
j: JASMINE
s: FDS
x: CFX
Figure 3.2- 6 Example Results: HGL Development, Base Case Part 1
54
3.2.3.3 Conclusions
The international panel concluded that the analysis of the results of the BE demonstrates that current
zone, Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD), and lumped-parameter fire models provide a comprehensive
treatment of most physical phenomena of interest in the scenarios analyzed. The results obtained from
these fire models can provide useful insights for NPP fire safety analysis for the type of scenarios
analyzed.
The equations for mass and energy in the fire models provide a reasonable prediction of the HGL
development and temperatures in the compartment. The fire models generally provide an adequate
method to balance and estimate the concentration of oxygen and combustion products in the
compartment. Mass flows that result from the pressurization of the compartment, and natural or
mechanical ventilation, are reasonably predicted for the zone, CFD, and lumped-parameter models.
Convective and radiative heat fluxes to the boundaries and target are comprehensively treated in the
models. The thermal response of the target is also adequately estimated in the models.
3.3 Design Confirmation using ASTM Standards
The ASTM subcommittee E05.39 on Fire Modeling (later merged into Subcommittee E05.33 on Fire
Safety Engineering in 1996) initiated the development of a set of standard guides in the late 1980s. Four
guides are now available, which cover specific issues pertinent to computer fire modeling:
• ASTM E 1355 addresses evaluating the predictive capability of fire models (ASTM 2005);
• ASTM E 1472 provides guidelines for documenting fire models (ASTM 2007);
• ASTM E 1591 describes procedures to obtain input data for fire models (ASTM 2007a); and
• ASTM E 1895 addresses uses and limitations of computer fire models (ASTM 2007b).
The requirements of these standards are summarized in Table 3.3-1. As discussed in Section 5, Japan
needs to develop standards like these to support the experimental work and code development in the long-
term plan. Although many of the provisions in the guides are applicable to other types of fire models, the
focus is on compartment zone models.
55
Table 3.3-1 ASTM Standards for V&V and Design Confirmation
Table 3.3-1 ASTM Standards for Code V&V
ASTM E 1355 Standard Guide for Evaluating the Predictive Capability of Deterministic Fire Models
1. Scope
1.1 This guide provides a methodology for evaluating the predictive capabilities of a fire model for a specific use. The
intent is to cover the whole range of deterministic numerical models which might be used in evaluating the effects of fires
in and on structures.
1.2 The methodology is presented in terms of four areas of evaluation:
1.2.1 Defining the model and scenarios for which the evaluation is to be conducted,
1.2.2 Verifying the appropriateness of the theoretical basis and assumptions used in the model,
1.2.3 Verifying the mathematical and numerical robustness of the model, and
1.2.4 Quantifying the uncertainty and accuracy of the model results in predicting of the course of events in similar fire
scenarios.
1.3 This standard does not purport to address all of the safety concerns, if any, associated with its use. It is the
responsibility of the user of this standard to establish appropriate safety and health practices and determine the
applicability of regulatory limitations prior to use.
1.4 This guide assumes understanding of the use and limitations of the model under analysis as detailed in Guide E 1895.
1.5 This fire standard cannot be used to provide quantitative measures.
ASTM E 1472 Standard Guide for Documenting Computer Software for Fire Models
1. Scope
1.1 This guide provides information that should be in documentation for computer software prepared for scientific and
engineering computations in fire models and other areas of fire protection engineering.
1.2 The guidelines are presented in terms of three types of documentation: (1) technical document; (2) user’s manual; and
(3) installation, maintenance, and programming manual.
1.3 There are no numerical values stated in this standard. It is recommended that International System of Units (SI) be the
standard in the documentation and development of fire models.
ASTM E 1591 Standard Guide for Obtaining Data for Deterministic Fire Models
1. Scope
1.1 This guide describes data required as input for mathematical fire models.
1.2 Guidelines are presented on how the data can be obtained.
1.3 The emphasis in this guide is on compartment zone fire models.
1.4 The values stated in SI units are to be regarded as the standard.
ASTM E1895 Standard Guide for Determining Uses and Limitations of Deterministic Fire Models
1. Scope
1.1 This guide provides a methodology for the systematic evaluation of deterministic fire models, which may be used in
enclosure fire hazard analyses.
1.2 This guide provides a means of identifying both general and specific limitations of deterministic fire models for
specific applications.
1.3 This guide is intended to assist model developers, model users, and authorities having jurisdiction in assuming the
responsible use of deterministic fire models.
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Evaluating the Predictive Capability of Fire Models
ASTM E 1355 was first approved in 1990 and slightly revised in 1992. A major revision based on work
performed at the NIST resulted in the current edition, which was approved in 1997. The model evaluation
process, according to ASTM E 1355, consists of the following four steps:
1. Define the scenarios for which the evaluation is to be conducted.

2. Validate the theoretical basis and assumptions used in the model.
3. Verify the mathematical and numerical robustness of the model.
4. Evaluate the model, i.e., quantify its uncertainty and accuracy.
Step 1 of the process consists of a description of the fire scenarios for which the evaluation is to be
conducted. Sufficient documentation is necessary to determine whether the model is suitable for the
intended use, i.e., the simulation of fire scenarios of interest. Model documentation prepared according to
the guidelines in ASTM E 1472 contains all the elements needed for a proper evaluation.
Step 2 consists of a detailed review of the theoretical basis of the model, and an assessment of the
correctness of the assumptions that are made and the approaches that are used. An independent expert
who has not been associated with the development of the model should perform this task. In practice,
often only the model developer has enough incentive to conduct such a tedious and time-consuming task.
Step 3 is verification by assessing its mathematical and numerical robustness. Verification can be
performed by comparing model output to analytical solutions of simple problems for which such
solutions exist (e.g., steady-state problems), by checking the computer source code for irregularities and
inconsistencies, and/or by investigating the accuracy and convergence of the numerical solutions of the
model equations.
Step four is usually based on a comparison between model output and experimental data, and provides an
indirect method for validation (step two) and verification (step three) of a model for the scenarios of
interest (described in step one).
It is generally assumed that the model equations are solved correctly, and the terms validation and
evaluation are therefore often used interchangeably. Experimental data for model evaluation can be
obtained from standard fire tests, fire tests conducted as part of the model development and evaluation
57
process, the literature, and/or experience. Three types of uncertainties contribute toward the accuracy of
fire models when quantified by comparing model predictions with experimental data.
The input uncertainty is primarily due to the errors and assumptions for the input data. Sensitivity
analyses are used to identify the critical input parameters, which must be specified with much greater care
than the parameters to which the model is relatively insensitive. A sensitivity analysis of a complex model
might involve a very large number of runs to assess the effect of all input parameters individually and of
possible interactions between different parameters.
Special mathematical techniques can be used to drastically reduce the number of computer model runs
without losing much information.
The model uncertainty is primarily due to the assumptions made by the model, and can be quantified as a
result of the validation process (step two of the evaluation). Full-scale fire test data are subject to
experimental uncertainty. Therefore, discrepancies between model predictions and experimental data
might be, at least partly, due to measurement errors.
There are procedures to determine the precision of standard test methods on the basis of inter-laboratory
trials or round robins (e.g., see ASTM E 691 or International Organization for Standardization (ISO)
5725). Custom, nonstandard, full-scale fire experiments are usually not repeated for cost reasons.
However, the uncertainty of custom test data is probably comparable to that of standard full-scale fire
tests. Round robins of standard full-scale fire test methods have shown that the uncertainty of some
measurements may be as high as ± 30 %.
There are many problems in comparing the results from fire model simulations to data from full-scale fire
experiments. Some of the problems are due to the differences between the form of the recorded
experimental data and the form needed for comparison with model predictions. For example, contrary to
the assumption of pre-flashover compartment fire zone models, there often is not a clear and sharp change
distinguishing the lower and upper gas layers.
Quantifying the agreement between a calculated and measured curve of variable expressed as a function
of time also presents a major challenge. Researchers at NIST have made some recommendations, but
more work is needed to address this problem.
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Documenting Computer Fire Models
ASTM E 1472 was first published in 1992, and re-approved in 1998. This guide requires that computer
fire models be documented with a technical reference, a user’s manual, and a programmer’s guide. The
technical documentation describes the theoretical and mathematical foundations of the model. The user’s
manual provides instructions for installing and operating the software. Sample runs should be included to
allow the user to verify correct operation of the program. The programmer’s guide includes the source
code and instructions for users who want to customize the program. Model documentation prepared
according to ASTM E 1472 contains all the elements that are needed for an evaluation according to
ASTM E 1355.
Data for Computer Fire Models

Computer fire models typically require physical, chemical, and flammability properties of materials
involved in the fire. ASTM E 1591 describes procedures to measure many of these properties, and
includes numerous references to the open literature where property values can be found. ASTM E 1591
was first approved in 1994, and was slightly revised in 2000. A major revision is in progress to extend the
scope to CFD codes and other types of computer fire models.
Use and Limitations of Computer Fire Models

ASTM E 1895 was approved and published in 1997. Several surveys have been published and should be
consulted to determine which models are available.6, 7, 8 ASTM E 1895 provides guidance to model
users on uses and limitations of computer fire models, and thus facilitates the selection of the model that
is most suitable for a particular task. The document also provides guidance to model developers and to
authorities having jurisdiction that review designs based on model calculations.
59
60
4. Facility Design Information
This section discusses facility design information from NRC and DOE for fuel fabrication, reprocessing,
and enrichment facilities. There is also some information from Light Water Reactor (LWR) facilities that
may be useful for FCF.
4.1 Fuel Fabrication Facilities
4.1.1 MFFF
As discussed in Appendix A, the design standards in Appendix A are primarily based on standards for the
MFFF and therefore cover Fuel Fabrication Facilities. The design and evaluation criteria are covered in
detail in previous SAIC work (see SAIC 2007). The study includes standards that are referenced in the
MFFF documents as follows:
• MFFF Construction Authorization Request (CAR), Chapter 7 (DCS 2001)

• MFFF SER, Section 7.7 (NRC 2005)
• NUREG-1718 SRP, Chapter 7, “Fire Protection”, Appendix D, and Appendix E (NRC 2000)
4.1.2 Guidance from NFPA 801
NFPA 801 provides a very brief description of for the design of Nuclear Reactor Fuel Element
Manufacture in Section C.6:
Certain radioactive nuclides are fissile. Neutrons absorbed by such nuclides emit additional neutrons plus
energy, largely in the form of heat. Because more neutrons are emitted than are absorbed, a self-sustained
nuclear chain reaction is possible when certain conditions are met. These conditions include a minimum
quantity of fissile material (critical mass) and other factors such as shape, geometry, reflection, and
moderation (or slowing of neutrons). Fissile materials used in a nuclear reactor are arranged in specific
arrays using fuel elements in order to optimize conditions for fission to take place. When a nuclear chain
reaction takes place where it was not intended, a criticality accident is said to have occurred.
In addition to the hazards of radiation and the potential for accidental criticality, fuel element manufacture
often involves the use of combustible metals, such as uranium and plutonium (Pu), and combustible
61
cladding material such as zirconium. The prevention of fires involving combustible metals requires
special techniques. (See NFPA 480, Standard for the Storage, Handling, and Processing of Magnesium
Solids and Powders; NFPA 481, Standard for the Production, Processing, Handling, and Storage of
Titanium; and NFPA 482, Standard for the Production, Processing, Handling, and Storage of Zirconium.)
It is important to remember that nuclear fuel elements are extremely valuable, and extraordinary
precautions can be necessary to protect them from the effects of an otherwise inconsequential fire.
4.2 Reprocessing Facilities
Standards for reprocessing in the US are very old because the US has not built reprocessing plants since
the 1980’s. These old standards were also very general and did not have much detail like modern
standards and guidance. SAIC reviewed these standards to determine if the requirements are covered by
modern standards like NFPA 801 or the standards in Appendix A. SAIC concludes that if NFPA 801 and
other standards in Appendix A are used for Japan, that the requirements in these old standards are met.
The US is making new standards for reprocessing facilities as part of Global Nuclear Energy Partnership
(GNEP). The American Nuclear Society (ANS) has also formed a committee to see if there are new
standards needed for reprocessing. Japan must follow the development of these standards for lessons
learned and whether to use the new standards.
4.2.1 General Guidance from NFPA 801
NFPA 801 provides a very brief description of for the design of reprocessing facilities in Section C.7:
Reactors generally are capable of utilizing only a very small portion of the fuel contained in their
elements. As a result, it is economical to recover the remaining fuel by processing the so-called spent
elements in specially designed facilities. These facilities contain large quantities of radioactive materials
(fission products) extracted from spent nuclear fuel elements that were produced as by-products during
nuclear fission. Processing operations usually involve large quantities of flammable or corrosive liquids,
or both. Fire and explosion hazards are present, and the possibility of an accidental criticality incident,
although guarded against and remote, also is present.
62
The large quantities of highly radioactive materials present necessitate massive shielding for personnel
safety. Most chemical processing and maintenance operations are conducted entirely by remote controls.
Fire hazards are present during the sawing and chopping of fuel elements containing combustible metals,
either in the form of fuel or cladding, and in the chemical processing operation. Specially designed fire
detection and control systems are used to protect these operations. Ventilating systems should be
arranged to maintain their integrity under fire conditions. Such facilities handling large quantities of
highly radioactive materials demand the application of a high degree of fire protection planning in all
areas.
4.2.2 Guidance from NRC RG 3.16 and RG 3.12
NRC RG 3.16 (NRC 1974) is a very old standard (1974) that is used for Pu processing facilities. Even
though it is very old and it calls out very old standards, it is still used for FCF (for example, MFFF cites
RG 3.16). Table 4.2-1 lists the RG 3.16 requirements. RG also calls out RG 3.12 (NRC 1973a) for
ventilation systems so ventilation system requirements are in Table 4.2-2.
Table 4.2-1 Reg. Guide 3.16 Design for Pu Processing and Fuel Plants
Table 4.2-1 Regulatory Guide 3.16:General Fire Protection Guide for Plutonium Processing and Fuel Fabrication Plants
The principal purposes of a fire protection program for a Pu processing and fuel fabrication plant are the protection
of the general public from radioactive and toxic material, protection of plant personnel, and protection against loss
of confinement.
Structures, systems, and components important to safety should be designed and located so they can continue to
perform their safety functions effectively under credible fire and explosion exposure conditions. Heat-resistant and
noncombustible materials should be used wherever practical throughout the facility, particularly in locations vital to
the functioning of confinement barriers and systems, to methods of controlling radioactive materials within the
facility, and to the maintenance of safety control functions. The adverse effects of fires and explosions on structures,
systems, and components important to safety can be minimized by providing systems with sufficient capacity and
capability for detecting and suppressing explosions and fires and transmitting alarms to one or more central control
areas. It is important in the design of the plant and fire-suppression systems to include provisions to protect against
adverse effects in the event of fire-suppression system operation or failure.
Implementation of the above entails an evaluation of such factors as the expected maximum amount of combustible
material in each area of the plant; severity, intensity, and duration of credible fires; assurance of confinement of
radioactive and other potentially dangerous contaminants; arrangements and structural design features of buildings
for control of smoke, heat, flame, and combustible and explosive gases; and systems for fire detection, confinement,
control, and suppression.
Water should be the principal fire suppressor, and special consideration should be given to selection of water
sources, water distribution systems, fire pumps, and automatic and manual fire extinguishing systems to control and
extinguish a credible fire in any area. Automatic sprinkler or equivalent coverage should be provided throughout the
facility with provisions for special hazard fire control measures where particular hazards exist.
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Incipient fires may be controlled by portable fire extinguishers. This phase of fire control is particularly important,
even though automatic sprinklers have been provided. Consideration should be given to the selection of portable fire
extinguishers suitable for use on specific hazards that may be encountered.
The need for fire detection devices and the type most desirable should be related to combinations of hazards
involved, extinguishing controls available, and public and private fire departments. Various detection devices
operating on different principles for detecting fires are available. These include the principles of fixed temperature,
rate of temperature rise, presence of combustion and pyrolysis products, or various combinations of these principles.
Fire protection systems may be subject to effects of natural phenomena such as seismic motion and floods, missiles,
fire and explosion, and other accidents. These systems should continue to perform their safety functions effectively
under credible accident conditions. Where possible, continuity of fire protection systems should be assured by such
means as standby equipment and fail-safe control systems.
The ability of the systems to perform their safety functions effectively can be assured by periodic testing of safety-
related components during normal operation of the systems to demonstrate their ability to perform at design
efficiency and to verify their availability for emergencies.
An important aspect of a fire protection program is training of a fire-fighting organization and maintenance of its
competence with periodic drills.
The fire protection program should provide for the use of appliances, equipment, and materials listed by such testing
organizations as the UL and the FM as meeting their standards.
Pu processing and fuel fabrication plants should be designed to assure the confinement of hazardous materials
during normal or abnormal conditions including fires and explosions. The release of radioactive material to the
environment or to an area in which levels of radioactivity are normally sufficiently low to permit personnel access
should be reduced to a level as low as practicable in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR Part 20.
General Features
Fire protection systems for Pu processing and fuel fabrication plants should be designed to assure that any credible
fire or explosion will not prevent the operation or use of structures, systems, equipment, and components whose
continued integrity and/or operability are essential to assure confinement of radioactive materials, hereafter
designated as “essential items.”
Building Construction and Facilities

The Pu processing and fuel fabrication plant should be designed and constructed using building components of heat-
resistant and noncombustible material wherever practicable, particularly in locations vital to the functioning of
confinement barriers and systems.
Ventilation Systems
The ventilation systems should be designed to withstand any credible fire and explosion and continue to act as
confinement barriers. Fire protection for ventilation systems is discussed in RG 3.12. (See Table 4.2-2).
Glove Boxes, Hoods, and Other Process Enclosures

Glove boxes and process enclosures should be provided with fire stops in connecting tunnels to prevent the spread
of fire. The fire stops between enclosures should normally be closed. Where operations require that the fire stops be
in the open position, they should be designed to be closed automatically upon operation of the fire-detection system.
Provision should also be made for manual operation of fire stops.
Sprinkler Systems
Automatic water sprinkler coverage using components listed by UL or FM should be provided throughout the
facility except in areas where nuclear criticality or other hazards specifically preclude its use. Nonaqueous systems,
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using components listed by UL or FM should be used in areas not protected by automatic water sprinklers (see
regulatory position C.6) or for other special applications.
Special Automatic Extinguishing Systems

Areas not protected by automatic water sprinklers should be protected by some other fire suppression agents such as
inert gas, carbon dioxide, high-expansion foam, or halogenated organic compounds.
Fire Protection Water Systems

Potable and process water systems should be arranged so they can be shut down without affecting the water supply
to the fire systems. Fire protection water supply and distribution systems required for essential item protection
should be designed and constructed so that continuity of protection in the event of any credible accident conditions
is assured.
The water supply for the permanent fire protection installation should have a minimum of two reliable, independent
sources and sufficient capacity (based on the maximum water demand) for fire fighting until other sources of water
become available. Water supplies containing salt or other materials deleterious to the fire protection systems should
be avoided wherever possible.
Provision should be made for fire detection and alarm systems using components listed by UL or FM. These systems
should consist of fire detectors, signaling devices, and audible and visual indicators in a constantly attended location,
as well as in appropriate locations about the plant. A means should be provided to monitor the status and
functioning of the fire-detection, signal, and alarm systems as well as other fire protection system components
located throughout the plant. Provision should be made for periodic testing and checkout of these systems.
Hydrogen should be premixed to a nonflammable percentage with inert gas prior to introduction into the plant to
control the potential hazard. The storage of unmixed gases should be external to the plant proper. Mixing should be
performed before or at the plant entry point.
Special control should be exercised over the handling of flammable, toxic, and explosive gases, chemicals, and
materials admitted to the Pu handling areas. Solvents and other flammable liquids, other than small quantities in use,
should be stored in a separate building or unexposed storage area.
A QA program should be established for the design, construction, testing, operation, and maintenance of all
structures, systems, equipment, and components of fire protection systems in accordance with the criteria in
Appendix B of 10 CFR Part 50.
Fire emergency procedures should be established for plant personnel. A plant fire protection organization should be
trained and equipped to deal effectively with fire or explosion emergencies. Selected personnel should be
specifically trained in fire-fighting techniques, industrial hygiene, health physics, and nuclear safety. Operating
personnel and new employees should be periodically instructed in the proper use of plant fire-fighting equipment
and emergency fire procedure. Decontamination procedures should be covered in training programs. Drills should
be held periodically.
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Table 4.2-2 Reg. Guide 3.12 Guide for Ventilation
Table 4.2-2 Reg. Guide 3.12: General Design Guide for Ventilation Systems of Plutonium Processing and Fuel
Fabrication Plants
Ventilation systems for a Pu processing and fuel fabrication plant may consist of air supply, recirculating air, process
ventilation, and exhaust air systems together with associated air filters, fans, dampers ducts, and control
instrumentation. The air supply system draws in and conditions fresh air and distributes it throughout the plant. A
portion of supply air enters the process ventilation system through glove boxes, hoods, and other components and is
removed together with other plant air through the exhaust ventilation system which discharges through a stack to the
environment. Part of the occupied-area ventilation air may be recycled to the air supply system through the
recirculating air system.
Ventilation systems are important to safety because they serve as principal confinement barriers in a multiple
confinement barrier system which guards against the release of radioactive or other potentially dangerous materials
during normal or abnormal conditions. Ventilation systems will be subject to variations in operating temperatures
and pressures and to environmental conditions associated with normal operation, maintenance, plant shutdown, and
testing. They may also be subject to effects of natural phenomena such as seismic motion and floods, missiles, fire
and explosion, and other accidents.
The systems must continue to perform their safety functions effectively under all conditions by confining radioactive
or other potentially dangerous materials. The systems must assure that the concentration of radioactive materials in
the effluent gases is as low as practicable.
The continuity of necessary ventilation can be assured by means such as standby equipment and fail-safe control
systems. The ability of the systems to perform their safety functions effectively can be assured by periodic testing of
safety-related components during normal operation of the systems to demonstrate their ability to perform at design
efficiency and to verify their availability for emergencies.
General Safety
a. The ventilation systems should confine radioactive materials within the process areas as close to the point of
origin as practicable. They should also confine and prevent uncontrolled release of radioactive aerosols, noxious
fumes, and vapors into rooms and areas normally occupied by personnel.
b. Confinement of radioactive materials should be provided by multiple zones.
c. Pressure differentials should be maintained between building confinement zones and also between the building
confinement zones and the outside atmosphere to assure that air flow is from zones of lesser potential for
contamination to zones of greater potential for contamination.
d. All ventilation systems should be designed so that the failure of any one component (equipment or control device)
will not affect the continuous operation of the ventilation systems.
e. Onsite emergency power supply systems (EPSS) should be provided to operate the ventilation systems and
components as well as other systems and components important to safety.
f. The ventilation systems should be designed to withstand any credible fire and explosion and continue to act as
confinement barriers.
g. All ventilation systems should be capable of operating during a fire in the areas they ventilate and safely handle
products of combustion through appropriate ventilation channels.
h. The materials of construction for the ventilation systems should be fire resistant to protect against fires occurring
within or without the systems. All filters should be of a fire resistant type and, where applicable, approved by UL.
i. Fire- and smoke-suppression equipment should be so located as to assure that the integrity of final high-efficiency
filters or filter systems is not degraded.
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Table 4.2-2 Reg. Guide 3.12: General Design Guide for Ventilation Systems of Plutonium Processing and Fuel
Fabrication Plants
j. If sources of combustible solvents, gases, and vapors are identified or postulated to be present in a ventilation
system under normal or abnormal conditions, they should be monitored by suitable continuous monitoring systems
as specified in RG 3.7.
k. The ventilation systems should be designed to withstand tornado conditions without loss of confinement
capability.
l. Components of the ventilation systems should be designed to withstand the effects of earthquakes and remain
functional.
2. Occupied-Area Ventilation Systems

Supply air should be properly conditioned and distributed at or near the ceiling to the potentially contaminated areas
of the facility.
3. Process Ventilation Systems

Air or inert gas should enter each ventilated glove box or process enclosure through at least one fire-resistant High
Efficiency Particulate Air (HEPA) filter and be discharged through at least one fire-resistant HEPA filter to exhaust
ductwork leading to a final filter system (see regulatory position C.8.e). The inlet filter prevents any backflow of
contaminants into the work areas, and the outlet filter minimizes contamination of the exhaust ductwork.
4. Fans
Installed spare fans and isolation dampers should be provided for the supply air and exhaust air systems. When any
one fan is inoperative in a system, a backflow damper should automatically isolate the idle fan from the system.
Standby fans should automatically start and have sufficient capacity to maintain minimum system air flow.
5. Ventilation System Construction and Layout

The material of construction for the ventilation systems should be carefully selected according to such safety
considerations as strength to withstand accident conditions; corrosion resistance, particularly when associated with
chemical processes; fire resistance; long operating life to avoid frequent replacement of contaminated equipment;
and smooth surface finish to aid in decontamination.
6. Ventilation System Testing and Monitoring

Provisions should be made so that components of ventilation systems can be tested periodically for operability and
required functional performance. They should include capability for periodic measurement of air flows in exhaust
ducts and in or at equipment, hoods, and glove boxes.
7. Glove Boxes and Other Process Enclosures

Glove boxes should be constructed using the highest quality of materials and workmanship to assure total
containment and minimize leakage. Combustible materials that are an integral part of the glove box should be held
to a minimum.
8. Filtration Systems
Each exhaust filter housing should have a rigid mounting frame for the filter. The complete housing structure should
have minimum leakage from outside to inside, inside to outside, or across the filter sealing barrier (exclusive of the
filter).
A HEPA filtration system serving as a final means of effluent cleaning should have at least two stages of fire-
resistant filters in series in a filter plenum. A heat removal system and a spark arrester should precede the first stage
of filters. If a cooling spray such as a water spray system is used for heat removal, it should be followed by a
combination spark arrester/demister screen to also remove entrained droplets, thereby protecting filters from
plugging and damage. A roughing filter should be mounted behind these components to remove the bulk of the
draft-carried debris so as to avoid loading the HEPA filters installed downstream.
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4.2.3 DOE-STD-1066 Criteria for Reprocessing Facilities
DOE-STD-1066 (NRC 1999) has a very brief discussion of reprocessing FCF in Section 13.6:
To ensure the maintenance of the principal confinement systems within secondary confinement, design
features should include provisions for fire sprinklers, water fog, or other suitable fire protection systems.
This will provide rapid heat removal, reducing both the pressurization of the process cell or canyon and
loading of the ventilation system filters with combustion products.
4.2.4 NFPA 36 Standard for Solvent Extraction Plants
This NFPA requirement was identified in DOE/TIC-11603 (see Section 4.2.6) so NFPA 36 has been
added to the list of standards in Appendix A. This standard is aimed at the general chemical industry but
can also be applied for solvent extraction (SX) in nuclear chemical processing like spent fuel
reprocessing.
This standard was developed at the request of the SX industry in an effort to achieve greater uniformity in
fire protection practices for extraction plants. The purpose of this standard is to provide reasonable
standards for the design and operation of SX processes and extraction plants.
In the development of this standard, the Technical Committee on SX Plants recognized some fundamental
differences between the operation of SX plants and the processing of solvents in other facilities. Many
extraction plants are relatively small units in isolated locations, operated without the benefit of overall fire
protection measures, such as are customary in large solvent processing facilities.
The operator of a SX plant must establish and maintain fire safety esprit de corps among a small number
of employees, as opposed to relying on the established customs of large-scale operations.
There are certain hazards in the combining and separating of solids and solvents that are peculiar to the
SX industry. Also serving as a complicating problem is the potential dust explosion hazard in some areas
of the typical plant. Therefore, the technical committee determined that it would be desirable to give
consideration to practices applicable to either dust-laden or flammable vapor-laden atmospheres.
NFPA 36 was tentatively adopted at the 1957 Annual Meeting of the Association. A revision of this
tentative edition was adopted at the 1958 Annual Meeting. NFPA 36 was officially adopted by the
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Association at its 1959 Annual Meeting. Amendments were adopted in 1962, 1964, 1967, 1972, 1973,
1974, 1978, 1983, 1985, 1988, 1993, 1997, 2001, and 2004.
This 2004 edition of NFPA 36 incorporates the following technical amendments:

(1) Revised definitions of the terms Extraction Process, Flame Arrester, Flammable Liquid (to
correlate with NFPA 30, Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code), Inert Gas, Lower Flammable Limit,
and Upper Flammable Limit
(2) Addition of a definition for Noncombustible Material, extracted from NFPA 220, Standard on
Types of Building Construction
(3) Revised procedures in 4.5.3 for transfer of solvent, to correlate with NFPA 30, Flammable and
Combustible Liquids Code
(4) Revision of 5.3.2 to require the design and construction of solvent storage tanks to comply with
NFPA 30, Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code
(5) Revision of Section 7.4, Drainage and Spill Control, to provide more specific design requirements
for the separation sump
(6) Addition of Figure 7.5.2 to illustrate typical locations for providing vent openings in the
conveying system
(7) Revision of Section 7.6, Cooling Towers, allowing flexibility in locating the various types of
cooling towers relative to the extraction process
(8) Addition of an exception to 8.2.6 that allows a shut-off valve in a normal vent line or an
emergency vent line, if the shut-off valve meets specified criteria
(9) Addition of physical property data for isohexane to Annex B to recognize its use as an extraction
solvent
Table 4.2-3 NFPA 36, Standard for Solvent Extraction Plants,

Table 4.2-3 NFPA 36, Standard for Solvent Extraction Plants, Section and Requirements
Chapter 4 General Requirements
4.1 Scope.
This chapter shall apply to the general operation of SX plants. The provisions of this chapter shall apply to all
buildings, equipment, and operations in SX plants.
Exception: As otherwise provided for in Chapters 5, 6, and 7 of this standard.
4.2 Basic Operating Requirements.
4.2.1 Safe operating practices, including but not limited to start-up and shutdown procedures, shall be the
responsibility of the management operating the extraction plant.
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4.2.2 Operating and maintenance employees shall be instructed in plant operations in general.
4.2.3* Applicable plant regulations shall apply to all visitors and others who enter the plant, both during operating
periods and during shutdown periods.
4.2.4* Repair Authorization. When it is necessary to make repairs to the areas covered by this standard, the work
shall be authorized by the individual in responsible charge of the plant before the work is started. Where hot work is
required, this authorization shall be in writing.
4.3 Sources of Ignition.
4.3.1 Electrical installations shall meet all applicable requirements of NFPA 70, National Electrical Code.
4.3.2 Provisions shall be made for protection against static electricity and lightning as required in other chapters of
this standard.
4.3.3 Smoking. Smoking or other sources of ignition shall not be permitted within the restricted and controlled areas.
Lighters and matches shall not be carried into the restricted or controlled areas of the extraction plant.
4.3.4 Powered vehicles, unless approved for such locations, shall be prohibited within the controlled or restricted
area except by special permission of the individual in responsible charge of the plant.
4.4 Housekeeping.
4.4.1 Flammable liquids not contained in process equipment shall not be stored in the extraction process area except
in small quantities, which shall be stored in approved safety cans.
4.4.2 Waste materials, such as oily rags, other wastes, and absorbents used to wipe up solvent, paints, and oils, shall
be deposited in approved waste cans and removed from the premises not less than once each day.
4.4.3 Dust originating from material in process shall be kept to a minimum.
4.4.4 The space within the restricted and controlled areas shall be kept free of dry grass, weeds, trash, and all
combustible materials, except as allowed for cooling towers in Section 7.6.
4.4.5 Any spills of oil, solvent, or deposits of solvent-bearing material shall be cleaned up immediately and
removed to a safe place.
4.4.6 The discharge or removal of solvent-bearing material shall be recognized as a severe hazard, and operating
procedures shall be established to minimize such occurrences.
4.5 Solvent Transfer Equipment.
4.5.1 Pumps shall be designed for the solvent, the working pressures, and the structural stresses to which they will
be subjected.
4.5.2 Positive displacement pumps shall be provided with bypasses with pressure relief valves discharging back to
the tank or to the pump suction.
4.5.3 Transfer of liquids among vessels, containers, tanks, and piping systems by means of air or inert gas pressure
shall be permitted only under all of the following conditions:
(1) The vessels, containers, tanks, and piping systems shall be designed for such pressurized transfer and shall
be capable of withstanding the anticipated operating pressure.
(2) Safety and operating controls, including pressure relief devices, shall be provided to prevent overpressure
of any part of the system.
(3) Only inert gas shall be used to transfer Class I solvents.
4.5.4 Where practicable, all pumps handling solvent in the processing equipment shall be located on the first floor
level.
4.5.5 Pump houses, if used, shall be of noncombustible construction and ventilated.
4.6 Piping, Valves, and Fittings.
4.6.1 General. All piping, valves, and fittings shall be designed for the working pressures and structural stresses to
which they will be subjected and shall be of steel or other material approved for the service intended.
4.6.2 Pipe Systems. Pipe systems shall be substantially supported and protected against physical damage caused by
expansion, contraction, and vibration.
4.6.3 Process Piping.
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4.6.3.1 Piping shall be pitched to drain to avoid trapped liquids, or suitable drains shall be provided.
4.6.3.2 Armored hose shall be permitted to be used where vibration exists or where frequent movement is
necessary.
4.6.3.3 Aboveground solvent pipe sections 50 mm (2 in.) in size or over shall be welded and flanged. Welding shall
conform to good welding practice.
4.6.4 Drain Valves. Drain valves shall be provided with plugs to prevent leakage.
4.6.5 Pipe Connections. Pipe connections 50 mm (2 in.) and larger to all tanks and vessels shall be bolted flanges
that can be opened and blanked off.
4.6.6 Testing. After installation and before covering or painting, all piping systems, including suction lines, shall be
pressure tested to not less than 1½ times the working pressure, but not less than a gauge pressure of 35 kPa (5 psig)
at the highest point in the system. Tests shall continue for not less than 30 minutes without any noticeable drop in
pressure.
Exception: Vapor lines operating at less than 500 mm (20 in.) of water column need not comply with these
requirements.
4.6.7 Identification of Piping and Equipment. All piping and equipment shall be coded for identification.
4.7 Exits.
4.7.1 An extraction building or open process structure over two stories in height shall be provided with at least two
remotely located means of egress from each floor, one of which shall be enclosed or separated from the process by a
wall that is blank except for doors.
4.7.2 The enclosure or separating wall shall be of masonry or other noncombustible construction.
4.7.3 Self-closing, noncombustible doors, normally kept closed, shall be provided for access to the means of egress.
4.8* Fire Protection.
4.8.1* An approved water spray, deluge, or foam-water system, or a combination of these types of fixed protection
systems, shall be provided to protect the extraction process equipment and structure.
4.8.2* An approved system of automatic sprinklers shall be provided in the preparation area.
4.8.3* A system of yard hydrants shall be provided in accordance with accepted good practice.
4.8.4* Approved portable fire extinguishers of appropriate size and type shall be provided.
4.8.5* Where standpipe and hose protection is installed, combination water fog and straight stream nozzles shall be
provided.
4.8.6 Where explosion prevention systems are used, they shall be installed in accordance with the provisions of
NFPA 69, Standard on Explosion Prevention Systems.
4.8.7 Fire alarm signals shall be relayed or sent to a constantly supervised point on or off the premises.
4.8.8 Where service is available, a public fire alarm box shall be located nearby.
4.9 Start-Up of Extraction Process.
Procedures for extractor start-up shall be established to minimize the hazards resulting from passing through the
flammable range. Inerting shall be permitted to be used to reduce the oxygen content and meet this requirement.
4.10 Emergency Procedures.
4.10.1 All employees shall be trained in the necessary actions to be taken in time of emergency, including
emergency shutdown procedures.
4.10.2 Personnel shall be trained as to the location of exits.
4.10.3 All personnel shall be trained in the use and limitations of each type of fire-fighting equipment on the
premises, including control valves for the water spray systems.
4.10.4 A fire brigade, if established, shall be composed of selected personnel on each shift and shall be trained as a
unit with each person assigned definite responsibilities in case of an emergency.
4.10.5 Periodic drills shall be held to ensure that employees can carry out the procedures in 4.10.1 through 4.10.4.
4.10.6 Emergency safety devices or systems provided in the plant shall be periodically tested in accordance with
established procedures and a record made thereof.
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4.11 Repairs in Restricted and Controlled Areas When Plant Is Operating or Not Purged.
4.11.1 Power Tools. Maintenance operations involving the use of power tools that can produce sources of ignition
shall be prohibited except as provided for in Sections 6.7 and 6.8.
4.11.2 Electrical Equipment. Repairs on live electrical wiring or equipment shall be prohibited. If it is necessary to
replace or repair electrical wiring or equipment, the power shall be disconnected completely, and the switch shall be
locked in an open position.
4.11.3 Welding and Cutting Operations. Welding and cutting, including brazing and soldering operations, shall be
prohibited except as provided for in Sections 6.7 and 6.8.
4.12 Repairs in Restricted and Controlled Areas When Plant Is Shut Down and Purged.
4.12.1* Repairs or alterations to equipment or buildings that can produce ignition sources shall be performed only
when the plant has been shut down and completely purged and has been declared safe by the individual in
responsible charge.
4.12.2 Before purging is initiated, the following steps shall be taken:
(1) Tanks, vessels, piping, and traps shall be emptied of all materials. All such material shall be removed to a
safe location.
(2) All piping and other connections to storage facilities shall be disconnected, plugged, or blanked off.
4.12.3 Purging shall be accomplished by one or more of the methods in 4.12.3.1 through 4.12.3.3.
4.12.3.1 Steam. Vapor freeing shall be permitted to be accomplished by the introduction of steam into the
equipment. All of the following requirements shall be met:
(1) The equipment shall be adequately vented to prevent damage from excessive pressure or vacuum.
(2) Steam supply lines shall be bonded to the equipment.
(3) The rate of supply of steam shall exceed the rate of condensation so that the equipment is heated close to
the boiling point of water.
(4) The equipment shall be steamed long enough to vaporize the residues from all portions.
(5) After steaming, the procedures outlined in 4.12.3.2 shall be followed when hot work is to be performed.
4.12.3.2 Purging with Air. Vapor freeing shall be permitted to be accomplished by purging with air. Continued
purging shall be permitted to maintain a safe atmosphere. All of the following requirements shall be met:
(1) Where fixed ventilating equipment is not provided, air movers shall be permitted to be attached so that air
is drawn in and discharged through the air mover, or air can be introduced through the air mover and discharged
through another opening.
(2) Discharge shall be to a safe location.
(3) Air movers shall be approved for the locations in which they are used.
(4)* Precautions shall be taken to ensure that the air mover is bonded to the equipment to minimize the hazard
of ignition by static electricity. (See also 7.9.5.)
4.12.3.3* Purging with Inert Gas. Vapor freeing shall be permitted to be accomplished by purging with inert gas and
then ventilating with air.
4.12.4 To ensure a safe condition, even on units out of service, tests for the presence of flammable vapors shall be
made with a combustible gas indicator under each of the following conditions:
(1) Before commencing alterations or repairs, including welding, cutting, or heating operations
(2) Immediately after starting any welding, cutting, or heating operations
(3) Frequently during the course of such work
4.12.4.1 All such work shall be stopped immediately when the presence of flammable vapor is indicated.
4.12.4.2 The source of the vapor release shall be located and removed, and the tests required by 4.12.4 shall be
repeated before the work is recommenced.
4.12.5 Upon completion of repairs or alterations, the plant shall be checked by the individual in responsible charge
to ensure that operations can be resumed safely. (See Section 4.9.)
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4.2.5 NRC 1992 Technical Position (FR Vol 50, No. 124)
This reference is referred to as a TP paper and is implemented by NRC GL 95-01 in 1995 (NRC 1995).
The NRC issued the GL to notify addressees about the need to implement a FHA and a Pre-Fire Plan and
require that all addressees provide the NRC a written response to this GL.
The 1992 TP on fire protection provides guidance on ways to minimize such risks from fire. Inside
facility buildings, fire hazard exists not only in the various fuel manufacturing processes, but also in
construction materials, equipment, maintenance operations, and storage and transfer of combustible
materials. It is important to safety to know what fire protection equipment is appropriate for a given
application. The FHA is the tool that enables such important safety-related decisions. It forms the basis
for effective fire protection measures that reduce accident risk and enhance safety.
The TP advises that the facilities should have Pre-Fire Plans. A Pre-Fire Plan contains information to
assist a fire fighting team in an actual emergency situation. It is recommended that the plan be prepared in
consultation with the local fire department, where such offsite assistance is relied upon. The importance
to safety of a Pre-Fire Plan cannot be overemphasized.
The fire fighters' ability to promptly locate ordinary installed hardware, such as a compatible connection
for delivery of water or a sectional valve, may be critical in an emergency situation. The purpose of a Pre-
Fire Plan is to provide exactly such information. The Pre-Fire Plan should also be a training tool for both
the facility's emergency response team and the offsite fire department that is expected to assist the facility
in an emergency.
The guidance is discussed in Table 4.2-4. However, since the guidance is old and has been update by
NFPA 801, only the topics are listed for some items.
Table 4.2-4 NRC 1992 Topics Guidance for FCF
Table 4.2-4 NRC 1992 Topics Guidance on Fire Protection for Fuel Cycle Facilities, Section, Topic or Guidance
Introduction
To be approved by the NRC, any application for a license to possess and use licensed materials at a fuel cycle
facility must provide information showing that the applicant’s proposed equipment, facilities, and procedures are
adequate to protect health and minimize danger to life or property. In the area of fire protection, the staff has in the
past generally accepted compliance with local building codes and proof of insurance as sufficient information for
approval of license applications. In addition, ad hoc measures have been taken in response to the staff’s inspection
findings relating to specific facilities. However, following an accident at a UF6 production facility, the NRC
undertook a major review of the operational safety of FCF. Both the recommendations of the Materials Safety
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Regulation Review Study Group, appointed by the NRC, and an independent staff action to assess operational safety
at each of 12 major FCF licensed by the NRC, led the staff to the finding that fire protection is one of the most
important safety concerns.
Fire Protection Concept

The concept of fire protection presented by this TP consists of measures that will achieve a balance among
the following:
Prevention of fires,
Detection of fires, and
Containment and suppression of fires.
Fire Protection Program

Administrative Controls
Program Management
Plant Audits
Building Construction
Construction Standard
Fire Areas
Exposure Fire Risk
Personnel Egress
Smoke Vents
Hidden Spaces
Lightning Protection
Drainage Provisions
Electric Installations
Ventilation System
Ventilation System Design
HEPA Filters
Barrier Penetrations
Automatic Closing
Heating Furnaces
Process Fire Safety
Some Chemicals and Their Fire Hazards
Nitric Acid
Sulfuric Acid
Anhydrous Ammonia
Hydrogen
Fluorine
Processes Involving Use of Flammable Liquids and Gases
Fire Hazard in the Handling of Uranium Oxides
Machining Operations of Combustible Metals
Incinerators
Boilers and Boiler-Furnaces
Stationary Combustion Engines
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Storage and Handling of Flammable and Combustible Liquids and Gases
Hot Cells
5.10 Glove Boxes
5.10.1 The construction materials for glove boxes may be of the limited combustible type if only
noncombustible process materials are used within them. Otherwise, except for the gloves, the glove box
should be of noncombustible construction.
5.10.2 If combustible materials are used or if there is the possibility of an explosive mixture forming within
the glove box, the relevant guidance provided for hot cells should also apply to glove boxes.
5.10.3 If a number of glove boxes are operated in series, fire dampers should be provided at intervals to
impede propagation of fire.
5.11 Laboratories
6. Fire Detection and Alarm Systems
6.1 Automatic Fire Detectors
6.2 Vapor and Gas Detectors
6.3 Audible and Visible Alarms
6.4 Manual Fire Alarms
7. Fire Suppression Equipment
7.1 Selection of Equipment
7.2 Automatic Sprinkler Systems
7.3 Gas or Foam Suppression Systems
7.4 Standpipe and Hose Systems
7.5 Portable Fire Extinguishers
8. Fire Protection Water System
8.1 Water Supply
8.2 Fire Pump Installation
8.3 Alternative Power for Pumps
8.4 Water Distribution System
9. Fire Hazard Analysis
9.1 A FHA of the facility should be performed. Such a systematic analysis should divide the facility into “fire
areas”, and evaluate the fire safety of each area and of the facility as a whole. The analysis should, for each fire
areas:
a. Account for all radioactive and combustible materials, including estimates of their heat content;
b. Describe the processes performed and their potential for fire or explosion;
c. Account for the sources of heat and flame;
d. List the fire detection and suppression equipment;
e. Consider credible fire scenarios and evaluate the adequacy of the fire protection measures.
The analysis should then either conclude that the facility as a whole is adequately protected or list the deficiencies
that should be corrected.
9.2 The deficiencies identified by the FHA should be corrected expeditiously. The analysis should then be reviewed
by the responsible management official and revised to indicate that it is acceptable.
9.3 The FHA should be updated at periodic intervals (for example, every 2 years) and whenever there has been a
significant modification of the facility, processes, or inventories.
10. Pre-Fire Plan
11. Fire Emergency Response Team
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4.2.6 DOE/TIC - 11603 Guidance
DOE/TIC-11603 (DOE 1986) identifies standards, codes, and guides that address the nuclear safety
considerations pertinent to nuclear facilities. The guidance and criteria provided are directed toward areas
of safety usually addressed in a Safety Analysis Report in 1986- today these are addressed in the ISA.
The areas of safety include, but are not limited to, siting, principal design criteria and safety system
design guidelines, radiation protection, accident analysis, and QA. The guide is divided into two sections:
general guidelines and appendices. Guidelines specific to the various types or categories of nuclear
facilities are presented in the appendices. These facility-specific appendices provide guidelines and
identify standards and criteria that should be considered in addition to, or in lieu of, the general
guidelines.
Table 4.2-5 DOE/TIC-11603 Design for Reprocessing Facilities

The DOE owns and operates a wide variety of nuclear facilities that support national energy, weapons, and
research and development programs involving the use of nuclear material.
DOE-owned nuclear facilities vary considerably in their operating and siting characteristics, risks, and
programmatic goals. A method has been developed for systematically and uniformly identifying the DOE Orders,
design and operational guidelines, codes, standards, and guides that address areas of nuclear safety pertinent to
each type of facility within the broad spectrum of DOE-owned nuclear facilities. The method is based on grouping
the DOE nuclear facilities into categories that are defined by generic facility types. Within a given category, the
DOE nuclear facilities should have generally similar design and/or operating characteristics and risks.
This guide was developed as a source document that identifies design, operation, and safety guidelines that may be
applicable to nuclear facilities in their implementation of the Environmental, Safety, and Health (ES&H) protection
program as it is related to potential radioactive material hazards. It is not intended to be a source document for
nonradioactive toxic or hazardous materials except for interfaces. The guide is divided into two sections: general
guidelines and appendices. Those guidelines that are broadly applicable to most nuclear facilities are presented in
the general guidelines. Guidelines specific to the various types or categories of nuclear facilities are presented in
the appendices. The appendices are tailored to provide more detailed design and safety guidelines for each category
of nuclear facility by referencing applicable sections of the general guidelines portion of the guide and by
providing additional facility-specific guidelines as necessary.
5.4 Fire Protection System
The fire protection system encompasses fire prevention, detection, annunciation, control, confinement,
suppression, and extinguishing in addition to administrative procedures, fire brigade organization, inspection,
maintenance, training, QA and testing. This section provides additional guidelines for the design of fire protection
systems that minimize the potential risk of fire at a nuclear facility.
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5.4.1 Design Guidelines
An assessment should be made early in the design or modification to determine the nuclear facility structures,
systems, and components (SSCs) that should be protected against the effects of fire and explosion. A fire
protection engineer or person knowledgeable in applying the principles of fire protection should then develop a fire
protection system based on the three basic levels of protection that will provide protection against fire and
explosion.
A summary of typical sources of fires which should be considered at a nuclear facility is presented in the table
below.
Typical Nuclear Facility Fire Sources

Class of General Description Major Source of Fire Remarks
Fire
A Fires involving ordinary combustible material Miscellaneous ordinary Ordinary combustibles should
combustibles (e.g., plywood, be minimized by
paper, packing materials) administrative controls
B Fires involving flammable or combustible Hydrogen gas Laboratory chemicals and
liquids, flammable gases, greases, and similar Lubricating and hydraulic oil vehicle fuel are minor sources
materials for this class of fire
Fuel oil
Acids
Plastics
Liquid dielectrics
Acetylene gas
C Fires involving energized electrical equipment Electrical supply and None
distribution systems (e.g.,
transformers, switchgear,
cables, etc.)
Electric motors
Batteries
D Fires involving certain combustible metals Pu Detection and extinguishing
Chemicals agents should be provided in
all glove boxes
Magnesium
The fire protection system requires the integration of component parts encompassing the following three basic
levels of protection to provide defense-in-dept against fire and combustion explosion:
Protection against the occurrence of fires and combustion explosions (includes fire prevention procedures, control
of combustible material, facility design, use of inert gas atmospheres, material selection, and QA requirements).
Rapid detection, annunciation, and extinguishing of fires that are not prevented (includes fire or smoke detection,
alarm, and suppression systems that operate automatically and/or manually).
Minimization of the effects of fires that are not promptly detected and extinguished (includes confinement and
separation features, inert gas systems, and fire resistant designs).
Total reliance should not be placed on a single fire suppression system. Appropriate backup capability should be
provided.
Fire suppression systems used within areas containing fissile material should not result in flooding or in other
conditions that could produce an inadvertent criticality.
Fire suppression systems used within areas containing Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) equipment should not
result in flooding of ESF equipment or otherwise reduce the effectiveness of the affected ESF equipment.
Fire suppression systems located in areas with safety class systems should consider the guidelines of 3.4.2.
Fire protection system equipment should be designed to permit periodic maintenance, testing, and inspection to
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assure the operability of system hardware.
Mechanical and fluid system portions of the fire protection system should meet NFPA requirements with
supplementary design guidance as given in 3.7
The operation or failure of a fire suppression system should not prevent an interfacing safety class system from
completing its safety function when required.
When fire suppression systems are connected to safety class water systems, positive means should be provided for
isolating the non-safety class portions of the fire suppression system during emergencies. Manual or remote-
manual isolation is acceptable if sufficient time is available for operator action.
Administrative procedures and facility design reviews should assure the following:
Noncombustible and fire resistant materials are used wherever practical in the facility. In particular, the structural
shell, its supporting members, and the associated ventilation system that are part of a confinement system should
be designed with the capability of retaining the confinement function during the Design Basis Fire (DBF)
postulated for the facility.
The use of combustible materials is controlled.
Work involving ignition sources (e.g., welding) is conducted under closely controlled conditions (e.g., special
permit system).
Use of water to fight fires in fissile material storage areas should be supervised by qualified individuals consistent
with the requirements for maintaining nuclear criticality safety.
Portions of the fire detection or suppression system that are bypassed or otherwise rendered inoperable during
system maintenance, testing, or repair should be supplemented by suitable fire watches in disarmed areas. A
suitable administrative system should document the inoperable status of portions of the fire protection system.
Required maintenance, testing, and inspection of fire protection system equipment are performed in a timely
manner.
An appendix to the Nonreactor Nuclear Facilities: Standards and Criteria Guide provides supplementary guidelines
specifically applicable to large scale DOE-owned reprocessing facilities. The appendix requires:
Although several uranium and Pu recovery processes have been developed, the PUREX process is the dominant
process. Therefore, this appendix will specifically apply to the PUREX process which is capable of reprocessing
any of a variety of spent fuel and target feed material. In general, the appendix can be applied to facilities using
other SX processes such as REDOX or THOREX.
E5.1 Fire Protection System

E5.1.1 Reprocessing Facility Fire Protection System Guidelines
Typical fire sources at nuclear facilities are summarized in the table above. As a minimum, the fire protection
system should provide protection against fires from these sources and the following additional sources typically
found at a reprocessing facility:
Solvents and solvent vapors.
Zirconium fuel elements cladding hulls.
Ion exchangers (rapid exothermic reaction).
Nitrate-solvent and nitrate-reduction reactions.
The primary confinement system should be constructed of nonflammable materials.
Fire protection is important to the integrity of the confinement. Therefore, reprocessing facility fire protections
system should include the following features:
Automatic redundant fire detection devices should be provided.
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Sprinkler, water-fog, or other suitable systems should be provided within the primary confinement barrier.
The system should provide for rapid removal of heat produced by a fire and should minimize the pressurization of
a cell or canyon as a result of a fire.
The system should rapidly extinguish a fire to minimize the loading of ventilation system filters with combustion
products.
To the extent practical, solvents with high flash points should be selected to minimize the potential fire hazards.
Operational process controls and alarms, as appropriate, should be provided to ensure that process system
temperature is maintained within its specified range.
Electrical installations in locations that are hazardous because of flammable or potentially flammable atmospheres
should be suitably designed to preclude or minimize the introduction of an ignition source by the electrical
equipment.
Primary confinement off-gas treatment systems should be designed to preclude the accumulation of potentially
flammable quantities of hydrogen generated by radiolysis or chemical reactions within process equipment (see E6).
Process enclosures should be provided with fire stops in connecting tunnels. Where operations require the fire
stops to be in an open position, they should be designed to close automatically upon detection of a fire.
4.3 Enrichment Facilities

This section describes the design criteria for enrichment facilities. The focus in Japan is centrifuge
enrichment facilities. This section discusses the centrifuge facilities currently being licensed in the US.
Most of the information is classified but there is some information in the SER related to fire safety. For
this report, the SER for the LES National Enrichment Facility (NEF) is used as the best example to see
the review of the fire design. The SER for the USEC American Centrifuge Plant (ACP) does not have as
much information as the LES/NEF SER. This is probably because the NRC viewed the USEC/ACP
license first and had some lessons learned. So, there was a more complete review for the LES/NEF
license. The fire information is in Chapter 7 of the SER for both enrichment plants.
4.3.1 USEC SER
USEC Inc. submitted an application to the NRC for the ACP on August 23, 2004. On October 7, 2004,
the Commission issued an Order initiating the USEC Inc. proceeding for the ACP. The Order offered an
opportunity for a hearing, provided a licensing schedule, and addressed several policy issues applicable to
uranium enrichment facility licensing.
Safety and Security Licensing Review

On February 7, 2005, NRC completed its initial technical safety and security reviews of the license
application for the proposed ACP and issued a request for additional information (RAI) to USEC Inc. On
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March 9, 2005, USEC Inc. provided responses to the RAIs. The NRC documented its safety and security
reviews in a SER that was issued on September 11, 2006.
The NRC Atomic Safety and Licensing Board held its mandatory hearing in March 2007, and rendered its
decision authorizing the staff to issue a license for the USEC ACP in April 2007. The staff issued the
license on April 13, 2007.
The Lead Cascade

USEC Inc. submitted an application for the Lead Cascade facility on February 11, 2003. On January 27,
2004, a Notice containing the Finding of No Significant Impact and an announcement of the availability
of the Environmental Assessment for USEC Inc.'s license application for its Lead Cascade facility was
published in the Federal Register (FR). The SER for this facility was issued on January 28, 2004. The
NRC issued Material License SNM-7003 to USEC Inc. for this facility on February 24, 2004, after DOE
approved the lease on February 17, 2004, allowing USEC Inc. to refurbish and subsequently operate the
facility in accordance with its license application.
On August 25, 2006, the NRC assumed regulatory oversight of the Lead Cascade facility from the DOE
in accordance with the March 24, 2004, MOU entitled "Cooperation Regarding the Gas Centrifuge Lead
Cascade Facilities at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant." Transition of regulatory oversight from
DOE to the NRC authorizes USEC Inc. to introduce UF6 into the Lead Cascade.
4.3.2 LES SER
License Application
On December 12, 2003, LES submitted a license application and environmental report to NRC for a
proposed gas centrifuge uranium enrichment plant. Full capacity of 3 million Separative Work Units
(SWU)/yr is currently projected for 2013, depending on market demand. On September 2, 2003, LES
announced its site selection as Lea County, New Mexico.
On January 30, 2004, the Commission issued an Order initiating the LES proceeding applicable to its
application for a uranium enrichment plant. The Order offered an opportunity for a hearing, ordered the
use of the new 10 CFR Part 2 hearing procedures and a 30-month licensing Review Schedule, and
addressed several policy issues applicable to uranium enrichment facility licensing.
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On April 19, 2004, NRC provided the staff's initial technical review of the license application that
identified a need for additional information. LES submitted its response to the RAI on May 19, 2004. A
second RAI was sent to LES on April 29, 2004, concerning the preparation of an Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS) for the proposed facility. LES submitted responses to the RAI regarding its
environmental review on May 20, 2004, and June 10, 2004.
On October 20, 2004, an RAI on the decommissioning funding plan was sent to LES. LES provided
responses on December 10, 2004; January 7, 2005; March 3, 2005; March 29, 2005; and April 8, 2005.
The March 29 and April 8 responses contain proprietary information.
On January 28, 2005, an additional RAI on environmental impacts was sent to LES. LES responded to
this request on February 11, 2005.
4.3.3 Enrichment Facility Guidance from the LES SER
The purpose of the SER is to determine, with reasonable assurance, whether the applicant has designed a
facility that provides adequate protection against fires and explosions that could affect the safety of
licensed materials and thus present an increased radiological risk. The review should also establish that
the applicant has considered the radiological consequences of fires and will institute suitable safety
controls to protect workers, the public, and the environment.
The regulatory basis for the fire safety review should be the general and additional contents of
application, as required by 10 CFR 30.33, 10 CFR 40.32, 10 CFR 70.22, and 10 CFR 70.65 (NRC 2004c).
In addition, the fire safety review should focus on providing reasonable assurance of compliance with 10
CFR 70.61, 70.62, and 70.64 (NRC 2004c).
The acceptance criteria for reviews of fire safety are outlined in Sections 7.4.3.1 through 7.4.3.5 of
NUREG-1520 (NRC 2002b).
Table 4.2-5 shows the result of the NRC review of the LES/NEF license. Notice that there are examples
of the fire accidents considered and the IROFS that result (although there are no details).
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Table 4.2-5 Fire Protection Guidance from SER for Enrichment Facility
Table 4.2-5 Fire Protection Guidance for Enrichment Facilities from LES/NEF SER
3.1 Process Fire Hazards and Special Hazards
The applicant plans to use gas centrifuge machines to enrich uranium up to 5 weight (wt.) percent uranium-235 (U
235). The feed material will be UF6, which will be enriched by using 48 enrichment cascades with hundreds of gas
centrifuge machines per cascade. The UF6 normal feed is 0.711 wt. percent U 235; the expected product is a
maximum of 5.0 wt. percent U 235; and the depleted tails are typically 0.2 wt. percent U 235. Enriched and depleted
UF6 streams are withdrawn from the cascade by pumps and returned to a solid phase in product and tails low-
temperature take-off stations, respectively. The remainder of this section describes the NRC staff review of key fire
hazards and risks associated with the proposed facility and gas centrifuge enrichment process.
UF6: UF6 is not flammable and does not disassociate to flammable constituents under conditions at which it will be
handled at the facility. UF6 does not react with oxygen, nitrogen, carbon dioxide, or dry air, but does react with
water or water vapor. Hydrocarbons can be explosively oxidized if they are mixed with UF6 in the liquid state or at
elevated temperatures. For this reason, non-fluorinated hydrocarbon lubricants are not utilized in the UF6 processes
at the facility. UF6 pumps are lubricated using a perfluorinated polyether oil that is referred to by the manufacturer’s
trade name, Fomblin oil.
Hydrogen fluoride (HF) is extremely reactive in both gaseous and aqueous form. HF by itself is not flammable nor
combustible. It can, however, react exothermically with water to generate sufficient heat to ignite nearby
combustibles.
Uranyl Fluoride (UO2F2): UO2F2 is also a byproduct of the chemical reaction of UF6 with water vapor. UO2F2 is
stable in air to 300o C (572o F). It is not flammable nor combustible and will not decompose to combustible
constituents under conditions that will exist at the facility.
Centrifuge Machines and Components: The model TC-12 centrifuge contains a rotor assembly, under a vacuum,
inside an aluminum outer casing. The casing also provides a vacuum enclosure outside the rotor to reduce drag. The
rotor is driven by an electromagnetic motor. The only combustibles of any significance are the electrical cabling
going to the drive motors. Therefore, any fire originating in one of the cascades will most likely result in limited
damage to the centrifuge and its components, resulting in a small release.
Control Room: The control room will be provided with automatic smoke detection throughout. Additionally, the
control room will house the fire alarm control panel and will be continuously staffed. Hand-portable fire
extinguishers will be provided in accordance with NFPAStandard 10 (NFPA, 1994). IROFS boundaries will include
appropriate electrical separation from normal instrument and control functions to ensure that fire-induced spurious
actuations do not occur. Based on the current design, all active engineered components that are IROFS will fail in
the safe configuration. Storage and Handling of UF6: UF6 cylinders are stored or handled in the Uranium Byproduct
Cylinder (UBC) storage pad; the Cylinder Receipt and Dispatch Building (CRDB); the UF6 handling areas; and the
blending and liquid-sampling areas. On the UBC storage pad, fire concerns include the cylinder transport vehicle, a
fire exposure from nearby vegetation, and fire exposure from a nearby vehicle accident. The licensee performed
evaluations of these various fire scenarios and either concluded that they did not pose a threat to the stored cylinders
or that with adequate controls; the threats could be adequately mitigated. In the CRDB, the primary fire concern was
from a truck fire at the loading dock. The licensee also analyzed this and determined that the cylinders could be
adequately protected by storing them at least 1 m [3.3 ft] from the edge of the loading dock. Combustible loadings in
the UF6 handling areas and the blending and liquid-sampling areas are limited and transient combustibles will be
controlled. Therefore, any fire originating in these areas will be limited. In addition, smoke detection and an
interlock with the ventilation system will limit releases to a low-consequence event in the Ventilated Room of the
Technical Services Building (TSB).
Hydrogen Control: Hydrogen is used within the Chemical Laboratory and may be generated at battery-charging
stations in the facility. The laboratory will be protected by one or more of the following features:
• Hydrogen piping will be provided with excess flow control;
• Hydrogen supply will be isolated by emergency shutoff valves interlocked with hydrogen detection in the areas
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served by the hydrogen piping; and
• Natural or mechanical ventilation will be provided to ensure that hydrogen concentrations do not exceed 25
percent of the lower explosive limit (LEL). If mechanical ventilation is provided, it will be continuous or will be
interlocked to start on detection of hydrogen in the area. Mechanical ventilation will also be provided with airflow
sensors, to sound an alarm if the fan becomes inoperative. Hydrogen control in battery-charging stations will be
provided by measures identified in NFPA 70E and ANS) Standard C2 (ANSI, 1981). It is expected that natural or
mechanical ventilation will be provided to ensure that hydrogen concentrations do not exceed 25 percent of the LEL.
If mechanical ventilation is provided, it will be continuous or will be interlocked to start on detection of hydrogen in
the area. Mechanical ventilation will also be provided with airflow sensors, to sound an alarm if the fan becomes
inoperative.
Combustible Material Hazards: Materials of construction for the centrifuge process building, the supporting
buildings, and centrifuge machines and components are predominantly noncombustible (e.g., steel, aluminum,
concrete floors). A minimum of fixed combustibles is expected to be present in the operations areas, and the
applicant plans to control transient combustibles to minimize potential fire hazards. The largest quantity of
combustible material is two 19,000 L (5000 gal.) tanks of diesel fuel located outside. Other quantities of combustible
materials are as follows:
• Silicone oil in the UF6 handling area and the blending and liquid sampling area is contained within the heater and
chiller units associated with the cold traps, with each unit containing approximately 72 L (19 gal.) of oil. Some units
are paired, but each pair is located at least 9 m (30 ft) from any adjacent unit. The staff considers this distance to be
sufficient to limit the potential involvement in a fire to one pair of cold trap heater or chiller units.
• Oxygen gas (oxidizer), acetylene gas, and propane gas in the Mechanical, Electrical, and Instrumentation
Workshop;
• Acetone, toluene, petroleum ether, and peroxide in the Chemical Laboratory; and
• Primus gas, degreaser solvent, penetrating oil, and cutting oil in the vacuum pump rebuild workshop.
The NRC staff has reasonable assurance that the applicant has adequately identified all fire and explosion hazards.
In accordance with guidance provided by NUREG-1520 (NRC 2002b), the applicant has reasonably identified and
evaluated the facility and process hazards and risks associated with the proposed operations. In its review, NRC has
taken into account the potential presence of these combustibles in the various accident scenarios. The identification
of fire hazards and related analyses are documented in the applicant’s “Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA) Summary”
which provides the supporting safety basis for the license application.
7.3.2 Accident Scenarios

The applicant’s ISA Summary describes, qualitatively, the potential credible fire-accident scenarios and associated
risks for the facility. The applicant postulated and evaluated the following key fire-accident scenarios:
• Fire in the Centrifuge Test Facility;

• Fire in the CRDB;
• Fire involving Cylinder Transporters/Movers
• Fire inside the Cascade Halls;
• Fire in the Process-Services Area;
• Fire inside the UF6 handling area/Blending and Liquid Sampling Area;
• Fire inside the TSB; and
• Fire affecting the UBC Storage Pad.
Exterior and interior building explosions as initiating events to accident sequences were evaluated and found to be
highly unlikely, without the need for IROFS.
7.3.2.1 Fire in the Centrifuge Test Facility
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The Centrifuge Test Facility is located in the Centrifuge Assembly Building with the Centrifuge Post-Mortem
Facility. The centrifuge test facility has UF6 contained in stainless steel components and piping. The fire loading in
the centrifuge test area consists of cable insulation, activated carbon, and a low amount of transient combustibles.
Transient combustibles will be controlled by administrative combustible loading controls (IROFS36a). With these
controls and the estimated in-situ fire loading, the applicant determined that the UF6 inventory would not be
released from the stainless steel confinement. The applicant also evaluated the likelihood of a fire propagating into
the area from an adjacent area. Fire propagation will be prevented by rated barriers (IROFS35) between adjacent fire
areas and the Centrifuge Test Facility. Based on the above, the applicant has determined that the likelihood of a fire
being initiated, and of the IROFS failing, so that a release exceeding the consequence threshold of 10 CFR 70.61(b)
or (c) occurs, is highly unlikely.
The staff concludes with reasonable assurance that the applicant has demonstrated that the facility will be in
compliance with the performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61 in the event of a fire in the Centrifuge Test Facility.
7.3.2.2 Fire in the CRDB

All UF6 feed cylinders and empty product and byproduct cylinders enter the facility through the CRDB. The
applicant considered three separate fire scenarios in the CRDB. These fire scenarios were a fire at the CRDB loading
dock, a fire in the CRDB general areas, and a fire involving a cylinder delivery vehicle.
At the CRDB loading dock, UF6 is contained in 48Y, 48X, and 30B cylinders on the loading dock and scales
adjacent to the dock. The most severe fire was postulated to be a vehicle fire at the loading dock. The applicant
evaluated the effect of this fire by calculation and showed that there could be a potential fire threat to UF6 cylinders,
but that this threat could be eliminated by assuring that cylinders were stored with a 1 m (3.3 ft) setback from the
edge of the loading dock. The 1 m (3.3 ft) setback is an administrative control (IROFS36b). Based on the above, the
applicant has determined that the likelihood of a fire being initiated, and of the IROFS failing, so that a release
exceeding the consequence threshold of 10 CFR 70.61(b) or (c) occurs, is highly unlikely. The staff reviewed the
applicant’s calculation and agrees with this assessment.
The CRDB General Areas contain UF6 in 48Y, 48X, and 30B cylinders. Combustible loading is expected to be very
low and transient combustibles will be controlled with IROFS36a. No liquid combustibles are listed for the CRDB
general areas. Hence, a fire with the intensity and duration to heat a large UF6 cylinder to its critical temperature is
not considered credible. Fire propagation will be prevented by rated barriers (IROFS35) between adjacent fire areas
and the CRDB general areas. Based on the above, the applicant has determined that the likelihood of a fire being
initiated, and of the IROFS failing, so that a release exceeding the consequence threshold of 10 CFR 70.61(b) or (c)
occurs, is highly unlikely. The staff agree with this assessment.
At the staff’s request, LES also evaluated a fire involving UF6 cylinders present on a delivery vehicle. U.S.
Department of Transportation regulations require thermal protection (e.g., overpack or other protective assembly),
which will withstand the thermal test criteria, specified in 10 CFR 71.73(c)(4), without rupture of the containment
system, for all off-site UF6 shipments. Hence, both incoming cylinders and outgoing cylinders will be protected by
approved thermal protection. The handling practice for incoming cylinders containing UF6 will be to offload the
integral cylinder in its protective assembly to the loading dock, before opening or removal of the protective
assembly. Outgoing cylinders will be individually loaded into a protective assembly before placement on truck
trailers. The applicant determined that the worst postulated truck fire involving diesel fuel and other combustibles
associated with a truck fire would burn for no more than 22 minutes. Approved protective assemblies (IROFS36h)
are designed to protect a cylinder for 30 minutes in an 800°C (1472°F) hydrocarbon fire. Because of the location of
the cylinder in the assembly on the truck trailer and the duration of the fire, the UF6 cylinders will be adequately
protected from rupture from a truck fire. The staff also evaluated the applicant’s calculation of fire duration and
agrees with the result (NRC, 2005). Based on the above, the applicant has determined that the likelihood of a fire
being initiated, and of the IROFS failing, so that a release exceeding the consequence threshold of 10 CFR 70.61(b)
or (c) occurs, is highly unlikely. The staff agrees with this assessment.
compliance with the performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61 in the event of a fire in the CRDB.
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7.3.2.3 Fire Involving Cylinder Transporters/Movers

The assumed inventory for a fire involving a cylinder transporter/mover is the amount of UF6 in a UF6 cylinder
(48X, 48Y, or 30B) in transit. Only electric drive cylinder transporters will be used for cylinder transport inside of
the proposed facility’s buildings. When filled 30B cylinders are transported outside of the buildings, they are
protected by DOT approved overpacks (IROFS 36h). For other cylinders which may be transported outside of the
buildings by diesel drive transporters, the fuel capacity of the transporters is limited to less than 280 L (74 gal.). This
limit on fuel is IROFS 36c and is described in more detail in Section 7.3.2.8 of this SER. Based on the above, the
applicant has determined that the likelihood of a fire being initiated, and of the IROFS failing, so that a release
exceeding the consequence threshold of 10 CFR 70.61(b) or (c) occurs, is highly unlikely.
compliance with the performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61 in the event of a fire on a cylinder transporter either
inside or outside of the proposed facility’s buildings.
7.3.2.4 Fire in the Cascade Halls

The six cascade halls contain the centrifuges and are located in the Separations Building. The fire scenario inside the
cascade halls is assumed to take place inside a module that holds eight cascades, each cascade containing hundreds
of centrifuges. If the entire module was engulfed in a fire and the total inventory released, a high-consequence event
would result. However, a fire is prevented from propagating into the module by fire barriers (IROFS35). A fire
originating inside the module is presumed to involve the cables feeding the centrifuge drive motors. If transient
combustibles are controlled (IROFS36a), this fire, at worst, is expected to involve one and possibly an adjacent
centrifuge and can be assumed to result in the release of no more than 1 percent of the inventory in the module,
resulting in consequences below the threshold of the 10 CFR 70.61(c) intermediate-consequence limit. Based on the
above, the applicant has determined that the likelihood of a fire being initiated, and of the IROFS failing, so that a
release exceeding the consequence threshold of 10 CFR 70.61(b) or (c) occurs, is highly unlikely. The staff
concludes with reasonable assurance that the applicant has demonstrated that the facility will be in compliance with
the performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61 in the event of a fire in the Cascade Halls.
7.3.2.5 Fire in the Process Services Area

The Process Services Area contains the gas transport equipment (i.e., the piping to the Product Take-Off System and
the piping to the Tails Take-Off System) and the Contingency Dump System. The Process Services Area is located in
the Separations Building. The UF6 inventory in the Process Services Area is UF6 in feed, product, and tails piping
manifolds. In addition, there could be significantly more in the 48 sodium fluoride traps that are part of the
contingency dump system. If the entire Process Services Area was engulfed in a fire and the total inventory released,
a high-consequence event would result. However, a fire is prevented from propagating into the Process Services
Area by fire barriers (IROFS35). A fire originating in the Process Services Area involving expected in-situ
combustibles is considered capable of causing failures in the aluminum piping and manifolds, but not in the
aluminum traps. Combustible loading controls (IROFS36a) are intended to limit additional transient combustibles.
With failure of the piping only, 50 percent of the UF6 is assumed released. This would result in consequences that
are below the 10 CFR 70.61(c) intermediate-consequence limit. Based on the above, the applicant has determined
that the likelihood of a fire being initiated, and of the IROFS failing, so that a release exceeding the consequence
threshold of 10 CFR 70.61(b) or (c) occurs, is highly unlikely.
compliance with the performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61 in the event of a fire in the Process Services Area.
7.3.2.6 Fire in the UF6 Handling Area/Blending and Liquid Sampling Area
Take-Off System. The Blending and Liquid Sampling Area contains the Product Liquid Sampling System and the
Product Blending System. The UF6 inventory in the blending and liquid sampling area of the UF6 Handling Area is
contained in cylinders, piping, manifolds, and hoses. The applicant states that additional uranic material may be
present on the carbon/alumina traps that capture residual traces of UF6 from the various feed, product, and tails
system cold traps. A fire is prevented from propagating into the UF6 Handling Area, and Blending and Liquid
Sampling Area, by fire barriers (IROFS35). A fire originating in these areas with improperly placed combustibles is
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considered capable of failing only a single-cylinder hose.
A fire, involving expected in-situ and transient combustibles, could cause failure in the aluminum piping manifold
and release 50 percent of the inventory feeding one module. This would result in consequences that are below the
70.61 (c) intermediate consequence limit. Severe fires will be prevented by IROFS36a, which will control the
location and the amount of transient combustibles in the area. Based on the above, the applicant has determined that
the likelihood of a fire being initiated, and of the IROFS failing, so that a release exceeding the consequence
compliance with the performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61 in the event of a fire in the UF6 Handling Area, and
the Blending and Liquid Sampling Area.
7.3.2.7 Fire in the TSB

The TSB contains support areas for the facility, such as the Solid Waste Collection Room; Vacuum Pump Rebuild
Workshop; Decontamination Workshop; Ventilated Room; Cylinder Preparation Room; Mechanical, Electrical, and
Instrumentation Workshop; TSB Gaseous Effluent Ventilation System Room; various laboratories; the Control
Room; and monitoring centers. In the TSB, fires were postulated in all uranic material areas and IROFS were found
to be needed in the Solid Waste Collection Room, the Decontamination Workshop, the Ventilated Room, and the
Chemical Laboratory Sample Storage Room.
The uranium inventory in the Solid Waste Collection Room is contained in 12-L (3.2-gal.) metal containers and 210-
L (55-gal.) metal drums. A fire is prevented from propagating into the Solid Waste Collection Room by rated fire
barriers (IROFS35). For a fire originating in the area, and involving expected in-situ and transient combustibles, the
applicant postulates that only a few kg of uranic materials would be present in open containers or drums, during
transfer/packing operations, and driven off, in case of a fire. Preventive measures are to administratively limit
transient combustible loading in areas containing uranic material, to ensure integrity of uranic
components/containers and to limit the quantity of uranic material at risk, to ensure that consequences to the public
are low (IROFS36d). Based on the above, the applicant has determined that the likelihood of a fire being initiated,
and of the IROFS failing, so that a release exceeding the consequence threshold of 10 CFR 70.61(b) or (c) occurs, is
highly unlikely. The uranium inventory in the Decontamination Workshop is contained in up to three 12-L (3.2- gal.)
metal containers and three steel tanks. A fire is prevented from propagating into the room by fire-rated barriers
(IROFS35). For a fire originating in the area, and involving expected in-situ and transient combustibles, the
applicant postulates that only a few kilograms of uranic materials would be present in open containers or drums
during transfer/packing operations, and driven off, in case of a fire. Preventive measures are to administratively limit
transient combustible loading in areas containing uranic material, to ensure integrity of uranic
components/containers and to limit the quantity of uranic material at risk, to ensure that consequences to the public
are low (IROFS36d). Based on the above, the applicant has determined that the likelihood of a fire being initiated,
and of the IROFS failing, so that a release exceeding the consequence threshold of 10 CFR 70.61(b) or (c) occurs, is
highly unlikely. The uranium inventory in the ventilated room is contained in 12-L (3.2-gal.) metal and 210-L (55-
gal.) drums. Additional inventory is present in single 48Y, 48X, or 30B cylinders, present in the room, for valve
maintenance/change-out. Various fire scenarios were postulated for the ventilated room, each with different
combinations of IROFS, consequences, or likelihood. A fire in improperly placed transient combustibles (but with
IROFS36d in effect) could cause failure of the nitrogen hose or vent-line piping used to bleed gas from cylinders
during valve servicing or subsequent nitrogen-pressure tests. This was determined to be a low-consequence event.
Another fire, however, with expected in-situ and transient combustibles within the area, but with the uranic
inventory in open containers, which could be driven off in a fire, is considered to be an intermediate-consequence
event. This postulated accident sequence is reduced to a low consequence sequence by adding a second IROFS
(IROFS37), which is smoke detection interlocked to shut down the building ventilation system. The other sequences
the applicant evaluated assumed various combinations of failure of the combustible loading controls and the smoke
detector and evaluated the resulting consequence level and likelihood. Based on the above, the applicant has
determined that the likelihood of a fire being initiated, and of the IROFS failing, so that a release exceeding the
consequence threshold of 10 CFR 70.61(b) or (c) occurs, is highly unlikely or unlikely, respectively, in accordance
with the performance requirements
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The TSB Chemical Laboratory Sample Storage Room also contains a uranium inventory that could potentially result
in a high consequence. A fire is prevented from propagating into the Chemical Laboratory Sample Storage room by
rated fire barriers (IROFS35). For a fire originating in the Sample Storage Room with controls in place (IROFS36a),
with expected institute and transient combustibles, the consequences would be low. The fire would not have
sufficient combustibles to fail a sample cylinder. Based on the above, the applicant has determined that the
likelihood of a fire being initiated, and of the IROFS failing, so that a release exceeding the consequence threshold
of 10 CFR 70.61(b) or (c) occurs, is highly unlikely.
compliance with the performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61 in the event of a fire in the TSB.
7.3.2.8 UBC Storage Pad

The UBC Storage Pad provides storage for UBCs and 6 months of empty feed cylinders. The UBC Storage Pad
occupies approximately 9 hectares (23 acres) and is sized to accommodate enough cylinders for 30 years of
operation.
For the UBC storage pad, fires were postulated on the transporter, on the UBC perimeter road, and in vegetation off
the property. The fire on the transporter was assumed to be the same fire that NRC staff analyzed in Section 11.3.2.6,
“UF6 Storage Area Fire,” of NUREG-1491 (the SER for LES, not a public document). In this event, the NRC staff
assumed a hydrocarbon pool fire with a temperature of 800°C (1500°F). NRC estimated heat transfer to the cylinder
from this fire and calculated that it calculated that it would require 280 L (74 gal.) of diesel fuel for the fire to burn
for 20 minutes.
The applicant used the results of the NRC staff calculation as a basis for a control under IROFS36c, which limits
fuel in a diesel-fueled UBC transporter to 280 L (74 gal). The applicant will also employ IROFS36e for other
vehicles, which administratively limits transient combustible loading on the UBC storage pad, to ensure cylinder
integrity. For the review, the staff reevaluated the estimation of burning time, assuming 280 L (74 gal) of fuel and a
3.1-m (10-ft) long pool fire approximating a 48X cylinder. The staff calculated about 20 minutes or less of burn time
for conservative assumptions of pool configuration (NRC, 2005). Based on the above, the applicant has determined
that the likelihood of a fire being initiated, and of the IROFS failing, so that a release exceeding the consequence
The applicant performed its own calculations to determine the possible effects of a service vehicle fire on a
perimeter road at the closest point to the UBC. This fire was based on a pool, confined by the access road, formed by
500 L (132 gal.) of diesel fuel contained in the truck along with other truck combustibles. The heat transfer from the
equivalent pool fire was determined to be insufficient to heat the cylinder to the temperature where it might rupture.
A control for fires of this type will be IROFS36f, which will administratively limit designated routes for bulk-
fueling vehicles onsite, to ensure UBC cylinder integrity. Based on the above, the applicant has determined that the
likelihood of a fire being initiated, and of the IROFS failing, so that a release exceeding the consequence threshold
of 10 CFR 70.61(b) or (c) occurs, is highly unlikely.
The applicant also evaluated the fire in the off-site vegetation, by means of a heat-transfer calculation from an
assumed large fire approximately 89 m (292 ft) from the UBC pad. The heat transfer from this fire was also found to
be insufficient to heat the cylinder to a point where it could rupture. The applicant will control this scenario by
IROFS36g, which will administratively limit on-site vegetation fire sources to ensure the integrity of important
targets. Based on the above, the applicant has determined that the likelihood of a fire being initiated, and of the
IROFS failing, so that a release exceeding the consequence threshold of 10 CFR 70.61(b) or (c) occurs, is highly
unlikely.
The staff review of these analyses is documented in an in-office review report (NRC, 2004). The staff concludes
with reasonable assurance that the applicant has demonstrated that the facility will be in compliance with the
performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61 in the event of a fire in the UBC Storage Pad.
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7.3.2.9 Conclusions
The NRC staff has reasonable assurance that the applicant has identified and evaluated all fire related accident
scenarios credible for the proposed centrifuge process. The applicant has reasonably identified and evaluated
possible fire initiators and consequences and has identified IROFS for accident scenarios that could result in
intermediate or large consequences leading to unacceptable performance, in accordance with 10 CFR Part 70, and as
described in guidelines established in NUREG- (NRC 2002b).
7.3.3 IROFS Related to Fire Safety

For preventing or mitigating fire accident scenarios that could lead to unacceptable performance in accordance with
the requirements in 10 CFR 70.61. The applicant has identified a set of IROFS that would ensure that the likelihood
of a fire causing high consequence events is highly unlikely and the likelihood of a fire causing intermediate
consequence events is unlikely. These IROFS are listed in Table 7.3-1.
The NRC staff considers the failure probability indices assigned to these IROFS, with a failure probability index of -
3, to be achievable, with their respective bases, as described in Section 3.8.3 of the ISA Summary. Section 3.8.3 of
the ISA Summary provides proposed surveillance frequencies, safety margins, and other measures that will support
the low-failure probabilities assumed for these measures. All of the above-listed IROFS will also be supported by
the general management measures, as described in Section 3.1.8.3 of the ISA Summary. In conclusion, the staff finds
the selection of accident sequences and the determination of IROFS to be acceptable to satisfy the performance
requirements of 10 CFR 70.61.
The remaining features described in the license application are fire-protection measures that provide overall defense-
in-depth protection of fire safety for operations. The applicant’s ISA Summary has adequately addressed fire risks,
in accordance with the regulation and the guidance established in NUREG-1520 (NRC 2002b).
7.3.4 Facility Fire Protection
7.3.4.1 Fire Safety Management Measures

The Health, Safety and Environmental manager is responsible for fire protection and is assisted by the Industrial
Safety Manager, who is responsible for day-to-day safe operation of the facility, including fire safety. The Industrial
Safety Manager is assisted by fire safety personnel who are trained in fire protection and have nuclear fire-safety
experience. The fire protection staff is responsible for:
• Fire protection program and procedural requirements;

• Fire prevention activities (i.e., administrative controls and training);
• Maintenance, surveillance, and quality of the facility fire protection features;
• Control of design changes, as related to fire protection;
• Documentation and record-keeping, as related to fire protection;
• Organization and training of the fire brigade; and
• Pre-fire planning.
Fire prevention at the facility consists of administrative controls to: (a) govern the handling of transient
combustibles; (b) control ignition sources; (c) ensure that open flames or combustion generated smoke is not used
for leak-testing; (d) conduct periodic fire prevention inspections; (e) perform periodic house-keeping inspections;
and (f) implement a system to control the disarming of fire-detection or fire-suppression systems. The inspection,
testing, and maintenance of fire-protection systems will comply with industry standards. The applicant’s
Description of IROFS
IROFS35 -3 Automatic closure of fire-rated-barrier opening protections (e.g., doors, dampers, penetration seals), to
ensure that the integrity of area fire barriers prevents fires from propagating into areas containing uranic material.
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IROFS36a -3 Administratively limit transient combustible loading in areas containing uranic material, to ensure
integrity of uranic material components/containers and limit the quantity of uranic material at risk, to ensure that
consequences to the public are low.
IROFS36b -3 Administratively limit storage of UF6 cylinders in the CRDB, to ensure $ 1-m (3-ft) setback from the
edge of the loading dock.
IROFS36c -3 Administratively limit on-site UF6 cylinder transporters/movers, to ensure only use of electric drive or
diesel power with a fuel capacity of less than 280 L (74 gal.).
IROFS36d -3 Administratively limit transient combustible loading in areas containing uranic material, to ensure
integrity of uranic material components/containers and limit the quantity of uranic material at risk, to ensure that
consequences to the public are low.
IROFS36e -3 Administratively limit transient combustible loading on the UBC Storage Pad, to ensure cylinder
integrity.
IROFS36f -3 Administratively limit designated routes for bulk-fueling vehicles on-site, to ensure UBC cylinder
integrity.
IROFS36g -3 Administratively limit on-site vegetation fire sources, to ensure integrity of important targets.
IROFS36h -3 Use of cylinder overpack/thermal protective assemblies
IROFS37 -2 Automatic trip of the Ventilated Room heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) and isolation
from on smoke detection, and Ventilated-Room-design leakage limited to ensure offsite exposure from building
outflow maintains consequences to the public low.
ISA Summary has adequately addressed fire safety management measures, in accordance with the guidance
established in NUREG-1520 (NRC 2002b). In addition, the applicant’s fire safety management measures meet the
requirements of 10 CFR 30.33, 10 CFR 40.32, 10 CFR 70.22, 10 CFR 70.64, and 10 CFR 70.65 as they pertain to
the fire protection aspects of the facility.
7.3.4.2 Facility Passive-Engineered Fire-Protection Systems

Buildings containing UF6 are the TSB, CRDB, Cascade Halls, Blending and Liquid Sampling Areas, and the
Centrifuge Assembly Building (including the Centrifuge Test and Centrifuge Post Mortem Area), which are of pre-
cast concrete-frame and concrete-panel construction. This construction is classified as Type I-443, in accordance
with NFPA 220. This means that the exterior and bearing walls, interior-bearing walls supporting more than one
floor, columns supporting more than one floor, and structural members supporting more than one floor, have a fire
resistance of at least 4 hours. All interior-bearing walls, columns, and structural members supporting one floor only,
or a roof only, shall have a fire resistance of at least 3 hours. Floors have a resistance of at least 3 hours and roofs
have a fire resistance of at least 2 hours.
The Administration Building, Fire Water Pump Building, and the Central Utilities Building are unprotected steel-
frame buildings, with insulated metal panel exterior walls, and with built-up roofing on a metal deck roof. The
Visitor Center and the site security buildings is also unprotected steel frame with insulated metal-panel exterior
walls and built-up roofing on a metal deck roof. The above buildings are classified as Type II-000, in accordance
with NFPA 220. This means that all structural members are of non-combustible or limited combustible construction,
but no fire rating is required. The applicant’s ISA Summary has adequately addressed passive engineered fire
protection systems, in accordance with the guidance established in NUREG-1520 (NRC 2002b). In addition, the
applicant’s passive engineered fire protection systems meet the requirements of 10 CFR 30.33, 10 CFR 40.32, 10
CFR 70.22, 10 CFR 70.64, and 10 CFR 70.65 as they pertain to the fire protection aspects of the facility.
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7.3.4.3 Facility Active-Engineered Fire-Protection Systems
Fire Alarm System

Each building of the facility is equipped with a listed modular, multi-zone fire alarm control panel installed in
accordance with NFPA 72. Each panel has a dual power supply, consisting of normal building power and backup
power, by either 24-hour battery or the facility uninterruptible power supply (UPS). Sprinkler system and hose-
station water-flow detection are connected to separate control-panel zone modules. Fire-detector and manual-pull
station-alarm circuits are also on separate modules. Each zone module has separate alarm and trouble contacts for
connection to the central alarm panel in the Control Room. Activation of a fire detector, manual-pull station, or
water-flow detector results in an audible and visual alarm at the building control panel and the central alarm panel.
The central alarm panel, located in the control room, is a listed, microprocessor-based addressable console. The
central alarm panel has dual power supplies, consisting of normal building power and backup power by either 24-
hour battery or the facility UPS. The central alarm panel monitors all functions associated with the individual alarm
panels and fire pump controllers. All alarm and trouble functions are audibly and visually annunciated by the central
alarm panel and automatically recorded via printout. Failure of the central alarm panel will not result in failure of
any building-alarm control-panel functions.
The following conditions are monitored by the central alarm console through the fire pump controllers
• Pump running;
• Pump failure to start;
• Pump controller in off or manual position;
• Battery failure;
• Diesel overspeed;
• Diesel high engine-jacket coolant temperature;
• Diesel low oil pressure; and
• Battery charger failure.
Both pumps are maintained in the automatic-start position at all times, except during periods of maintenance and
testing. Remote manual-start switches are provided in the Control Room adjacent to the alarm console. Fire pumps
can only be shut off at the controllers.
Portable Fire Extinguishers

Portable fire extinguishers are installed throughout all buildings, in accordance with NFPA 10 (NFPA, 1994).
Multipurpose fire extinguishers are provided generally for Class A (ordinary combustibles); Class B (flammable and
combustible liquids); and Class C (electrical equipment) fires. Specialized extinguishers are located in areas
requiring protection of particular hazards. Wheeled extinguishers are provided for use in water-exclusion areas. In
areas with moderator control issues, the extinguishers are filled with carbon dioxide or dry chemical.
Fire-Water Supply
The facility fire-water supply consists of two 946,000-L (250,000-gal.) water storage tanks designed and constructed
in accordance with NFPA 22 (NFPA, 1996c). Within each tank, 473,000-L (125,000-gal.) are reserved for fire
protection. Fill and makeup to the tanks are from the city water supply to the site, and the water supply is capable of
filling either tank within an 8-hour period. The fire pumps consist of two diesel-driven 3785-Lpm (1000-gpm), at
10.35-bar (150-psia), pumps. Both pumps are horizontal centrifugal pumps designed and installed in accordance
with NFPA 20 (NFPA, 1996b). The maximum anticipated fire demand is 3785 Lpm (1000 gpm), based on 1892 Lpm
(500 gpm) from a building-sprinkler system, plus 3785 Lpm (500 gpm) for hose streams, for a duration of 2 hours.
The combination of two water tanks and two fire pumps provides 100 percent redundancy for fire protection. In
addition to fixed standpipes and fire hose stations, the facility will be provided with fire hose on mobile apparatus or
at strategic locations throughout the facility. The amount of hose provided will be sufficient to ensure that all points
within the facility will be able to be reached by at least two 38-mm (1½-in.) diameter hoses and one 64-mm (2 ½-
in.)-diameter backup hose, consistent with NFPA 1410. These lines will have a minimum nozzle pressure of 4.5 bar
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(65 psia) for the 38-mm (1 ½-in.) hose, and 6.9 bar (100 psia) for the 64-mm (2 ½-in.) hose.
Engineered Automatic Fire-Suppression Systems

Wet pipe sprinkler systems are provided in the following buildings:
• Administration Building;
• Central Utilities Building; and
• Fire Pump House
These systems are designed and tested in accordance with NFPA 13 (NFPA, 1996a). Sprinkler-system control valves
are monitored under a periodic inspection program, and their proper positioning is supervised in accordance with
NFPA 801 (NFPA, 2003).
Fire-rated enclosures are provided for several chemical traps on the second floor of the Process Services Area, in
each Separations Building Module. These enclosures will be protected with a gaseous-suppression system. The type
of system used will be determined in the final design and will either be a carbon dioxide system designed in
accordance with NFPA 12 or a clean-agent system designed in accordance with NFPA 2001
The NRC staff concludes that the applicant has reasonably determined the required fire protection features for
preventing or mitigating fire-accident scenarios that could lead to unacceptable performance, in accordance with the
requirements in 10 CFR 70.61.
The applicant’s ISA Summary has adequately addressed active engineered fire protection systems, in accordance
with the guidance established in NUREG-1520 (NRC 2002b). In addition, the applicant’s active-engineered fire
protection systems meet the requirements of 10 CFR 30.33, 10 CFR 40.32, 10 CFR 70.22, 10 CFR 70.64, and 10
CFR 70.65 as they pertain to the fire protection aspects of the facility.
7.3.4.4 Fire Safety and Emergency Response

The facility will maintain a fire brigade made up of employees trained in fire fighting techniques, first aid
procedures, and emergency response. The fire brigade is organized, operated, trained and equipped in accordance
with NFPA 600 for incipient fire fighting capability. The intent of the facility fire brigade is to be able to handle all
minor fires and to provide a first response effort designed to supplement the local fire department for major fires at
the plant.
The plant fire brigade, working with the plant’s emergency operations center, will coordinate offsite fire department
activities to ensure moderator control and criticality safety. The fire brigade is staffed so that there is a minimum of
five brigade members available per shift. Periodic training is provided to off-site assistance organization personnel
in the facility emergency training procedures. Facility emergency response personnel meet at least annually with
each off-site assistance group, to accomplish training and review items of mutual interest, including relevant
changes to the program. A MOU between LES and the City of Eunice, New Mexico Fire and Rescue Agency, and
the City of Hobbs, New Mexico, Fire Department defines the fire-protection and emergency-response commitments
between the organizations. The Eunice Fire and Rescue Agency is the initial response agency and can respond
between 11 and 15 minutes. The department has three pumpers, three grass trucks, one tanker, and a roster of
approximately 20 volunteers. The Hobbs Fire Department can respond in about 25 to 30 minutes. The Hobbs Fire
Department has five pumpers, one ladder truck, three grass trucks, one tanker, and a roster of about 70 paid
personnel.
The NRC staff concludes with reasonable assurance that the on-site fire brigade, on-site water supply, on-site hose
lines, and mutual aid from adequately equipped fire departments can provide defense-in-depth protection from
releases from all identified credible fire scenarios and satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR 70.64(b), and are in
accordance with the guidance in NUREG-1520 (NRC 2002b). In addition, the applicant’s emergency response
capability meets 70.65 as they pertain to the fire protection aspects of the facility.
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7.4 EVALUATION FINDINGS
The dominant fire risk to safety and health of workers and the public for the proposed process is a fire that could
lead to loss of confinement of UF6. This includes a fire damaging the centrifuge machines and piping that provide
UF6 confinement, or UF6 cylinders inside or on the outdoor storage pad. The applicant’s submittals provide
sufficient information, in accordance with requirements of 10 CFR 30.33, 10 CFR 40.32, 10 CFR 70.22, and 10
CFR 70.65, regarding potential fire hazards, consequences, and required controls for the proposed processes. The
NRC staff determined that the applicant demonstrated compliance with the performance requirements of 10 CFR
70.61 for fire protection related to postulated accident scenarios. The applicant has identified a reasonable set of
IROFS and defense-in-depth protection to ensure acceptable risks within the performance requirements of 10 CFR
70.61.
Based on the design of the facility, relative to fire protection and the designation of IROFS and measures that
provide defense-in-depth, the staff concludes with reasonable assurance that the facility also meets the requirements
of 10 CFR 30.33, 10 CFR 40.32, 10 CFR 70.22, and 10 CFR 70.64 (a)(3), regarding BDC for protection against
fires and explosions, and 10 CFR 70.64 (b) defense-in-depth.
4.4 Light Water Reactors
SAIC reviewed key criteria and guidance for LWRs to see if there was any design criteria and
information for LWR that would also apply to FCF. It is interesting that many of the same experts that
support fire standards for LWR are also the experts for the FCF. Therefore, it is unlikely that there are
any requirements in LWR that are not used in FCF. However, SAIC reviewed the fire protection criteria
to see if there are any NFPA or other standards that are used in LWR that were not in the standards that
SAIC used in previous studies. There were some Tier 1 standards to add, see discussion in Appendix A.
NRC has been implementing RI/PB Fire Protection in the US. The Commission approved the 10 CFR
50.48(c) rule in May 2004 (NRC 2004a), and published the rule in June. It took effect in July. The
Commission also allowed the staff to use its discretion in enforcing certain fire protection issues for
plants transitioning to the new rule. The enforcement discretion provided an incentive for licensees to
adopt NFPA 805. Subsequently, by the end of April 2006, operators of 41 reactors had sent letters of
intent indicating their commitment to adopt the voluntary standard. Two nuclear stations, Oconee and
Shearon Harris, volunteered to be pilot plants for the transition to NFPA 805. Consequently, the staff
kicked off the pilot implementation in August 2005. The staff observed transition efforts at Duke Power
in November 2005 and Progress Energy in March 2006. More observations are planned at these plant
sites. To aid plants in their transition to the new rule, NRC staff is working with industry to develop a
Frequently Asked Questions program.
Significance Determination Process (SDP)
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The NRC has revised its process for evaluating the significance of fire protection deficiencies found
during inspections. This process is based on a simplified fire PRA. NRC inspectors can easily use the
SDP to obtain an assessment of the risk significance of a finding. The NRC has also developed
quantitative FHA methods, in NUREG-1805 (NRC 2004b), for the fire protection significance
determination process.
4.4.1 Regulatory Guide 1.189
This RG has been developed to provide a comprehensive fire protection guidance document and to
identify the scope and depth of fire protection that the staff would consider acceptable for nuclear plants
currently operating as of January 1, 2001. This guide may be used for licensee self-assessments and as the
deterministic basis for future rulemaking. RI/PB alternatives to the guidance presented in this RG may be
acceptable to the NRC staff.
SAIC’s review of this standard showed it is almost all related to LWR. However there were some Tier 1
NFPA standards in RG 1.189 (NRC 2001) that were added to Appendix A.
4.4.2 IAEA Fires for NPP NS-G-1.7
The International Atomic Agency (IAEA) provides some general ideas on fire protection as shown in
Table 4.4-1. However, the guidance is very general and there are no new insights for FCF.
Table 4.4-1 IAEA Fire Guidance

FIRE PREVENTION
2.7. Fire loads4 in NPPs should be kept to the minimum by the use, as far as practicable, of suitable non-
combustible materials; otherwise, fire retardant materials should be used.
2.8. The number of ignition sources should be minimized in the design.
2.9. The design and construction of each plant system should, as far as practicable, ensure that its failure does not
cause a fire.
2.10. Items important to safety whose malfunction or failure could result in unacceptable releases of radioactive
material should be protected from natural phenomena that could give rise to a fire, such as lightning.
2.11. Design measures should be implemented to provide for the proper storage of transient combustible materials
that arise during operation, either away from items important to safety or otherwise protected.
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DETECTION AND EXTINGUISHING OF FIRES
2.12. Fire detection and fire fighting systems should be provided, with the necessary systems being defined by the
FHA (paras 3.20–3.27). The systems should be designed to provide a timely alarm in the event of fire, and/or its
speedy extinguishing. This will minimize the adverse effects on items important to safety and to personnel.
2.13. Fire fighting systems are required to be automatically initiated where necessary, and systems are required to be
designed and located so as to ensure that their rupture or spurious5 operation does not significantly impair the
capability of structures, systems and components important to safety, and does not simultaneously affect redundant
safety groups, thereby rendering ineffective the measures taken to meet the ‘single failure’6 criterion.
2.14. Fire fighting systems should be designed and located to ensure that neither their intentional nor their spurious
operation jeopardizes protection against criticality events.
2.15. Consideration should be given in the design to the potential for errors in the operation of extinguishing
systems. Consideration should also be given to the effects of discharges from systems in locations adjacent to fire
compartments (para 3.9) and from adjacent fire cells (para. 3.17).
2.16. Suitable emergency lighting and communications equipment should be provided to support the operation of
manual fire fighting activities.
CONFINEMENT OF FIRES AND MITIGATION OF THE EFFECTS OF FIRES
2.17. To follow the recommendations of para. 2.1, the concept of sufficient segregation of redundant parts of safety
systems should be adopted. This ensures that a fire affecting one division of a safety system would not prevent the
execution of the safety function by another division. This should be achieved by locating each redundant division of
a safety system in its own fire compartment or at least in its own fire cell7 (paras 3.8–3.19). The number of
penetrations between fire compartments should be minimized.
2.18. The effects of postulated fires should be analyzed for all areas containing safety systems and all other locations
that constitute a fire hazard to safety systems. In the analysis, the functional failure of all safety systems within the
fire compartment, or fire cell, in which the fire is postulated should be assumed, unless they are protected by a
qualified fire barrier designed to, or able to, withstand the consequences of the fire. Exceptions should be justified.
2.19. Fire detection systems, fire extinguishing systems and support systems such as ventilation and drainage
systems should, as far as practicable, be independent of their counterparts in other fire compartments. The purpose
of this is to maintain the operability of such systems in adjacent fire compartments (paras 6.5–6.10).
COMBINATIONS OF EVENTS
2.20. A random combination of events may represent an extremely unlikely scenario that should be shown in the
probabilistic safety analysis to be sufficiently rare as to be able to be discounted, rather than being taken as a
postulated accident.
2.21. In the design of fire protection systems and equipment, some combinations of fire and other postulated
initiating events likely to occur independently of a fire should be taken into account. For example, concerning the
combination of a loss of coolant accident and an independent fire, the post-event recovery period should be taken
into account while the near term period, including the occurrence of the event and the startup of mitigation systems,
may be excluded.
2.22. A postulated initiating event should not lead to a fire with consequences for safety systems. Possible causes of
fires, such as severe seismic events or the disintegration of a turbine, should be addressed in the FHA, and special
design provisions (e.g. use of cable wraps, detection systems and suppression systems) should be made as necessary.
In the FHA, special attention should be paid to hot equipment and/or to the potential failure of circuits conveying
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flammable liquids and gases.
2.23. Fire protection systems and equipment that need to maintain a functional capability (their integrity and/or their
functional capability and/or their operability) despite the effects of the postulated initiating event should be
identified, adequately designed and qualified.
2.24. Fire protection systems that do not need to maintain a functional capability following a postulated initiating
event should be designed and qualified so as not to fail in a way that threatens nuclear safety.
FIRES OF EXTERNAL ORIGIN
2.25. Regardless of the origin of the fire under consideration (i.e. whether of internal or external origin), the design
concept described and recommendations made in this Safety Guide should be followed.
2.26. It should be confirmed that fires of external origin (and consequential smoke and heat propagation) do not
modify the basic assumptions as stated in this Safety Guide (e.g. the occurrence of one fire at a time) or prevent field
operators, fire teams or an external fire brigade from performing their tasks.
2.27. The plant should be designed to prevent the effects of fires of external origin from hindering the performance
of necessary safety functions. For example, the ventilation system should be designed to prevent smoke and heat
from external fires from entering buildings containing items important to safety.
2.28. Recommendations and guidance on design considerations for fires of external origin are provided in a separate
reference.
PROTECTION AGAINST EXPLOSION HAZARDS
2.29. Explosion hazards should be eliminated by design, as far as practicable. Priority should be given to design
measures that prevent or limit the formation of explosive atmospheres.
2.30. Flammable gases and liquids and combustible materials that could produce or contribute to explosive mixtures
should be excluded from fire compartments and fire cells and also from areas adjacent to them or connected to them
by ventilation systems. When this is not practicable, quantities of such materials should be strictly limited, adequate
storage facilities should be provided and reactive substances, oxidizers and combustible materials should be
segregated from each other. Cylinders of compressed flammable gases should be securely stored in dedicated
compounds that are located away from main plant buildings and provide appropriate protection from local
environmental conditions. Consideration should be given to the provision of automatic systems for the detection of
fire and flammable gases and of automatic fire extinguishing systems to prevent a fire induced explosion from
affecting items important to safety in other buildings.
2.31. Explosion hazards should be identified for fire compartments and fire cells, and for other locations that
constitute a significant explosion hazard to these areas. Chemical explosions (explosions of gas mixtures, including
explosions of oil filled transformers), explosions induced by fire exposure and physical explosions (rapid air
expansion through high energy arcing) should be considered. Consequential effects of postulated initiating events
(e.g. the rupture of pipes conveying flammable gases) should be taken into account in the identification of explosion
hazards.
2.32. Physical explosion hazards, such as those created by high voltage electric arcing, should be minimized by the
appropriate selection of electrical components (e.g. breakers) and by system design, to limit the probability,
magnitude and duration of potential electric arcs.
2.33. If an explosive atmosphere cannot be avoided, appropriate design or operating provisions should be
implemented to minimize the risks: the limitation of the volumes of explosive gases, the elimination of ignition
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sources, adequate ventilation rates, the appropriate choice of electrical equipment designed for use in an explosive
atmosphere, inerting, explosion venting (e.g. blow-out panels or other pressure relief devices) and separation from
items important to safety. Equipment that needs to maintain its functionality following a postulated initiating event
should be identified and adequately designed and qualified.
2.34. The risk of explosions induced by fire exposure such as boiling liquid expanding vapor explosions (BLEVEs)
should be minimized by means of separation between potential fire exposures and potentially explosive liquids and
gases, or by active measures such as fixed water based fire suppression systems designed to provide cooling and
vapor dispersion. Consideration should be given to the blast overpressure and missiles generated by BLEVEs, and to
the potential for the ignition of flammable gases at a location distant from the point of release, which could result in
the explosion of a gas cloud.
2.35. Explosion hazards that cannot be eliminated should be identified and design provisions to limit the
consequences of an explosion (overpressure, missile generation or fire) should be implemented. The consequential
effects of postulated explosions on safety systems should be assessed against the objectives of para. 2.1. Access and
rescue routes for operating personnel (in the MCR and supplementary control room) should also be assessed. Special
design provisions should be made if necessary.
4.4.3 NFPA 804
The need for fire protection in nuclear power facilities has been demonstrated in a number of incidents,
including the Browns Ferry Fire in 1975 and other more recent incidents in the US and abroad. PRAs of
existing plants have shown that fire represents one of the largest single contributors to the possibility of
reactor damage. This document represents a comprehensive consensus of baseline fire protection
requirements for all aspects of advanced LWR electric generating plants, including their design,
construction, operation, and maintenance.
1.1 Scope.
This standard specifies the minimum fire protection requirements for existing light water NPPs
during all phases of plant operation, including shutdown, degraded conditions, and
decommissioning.
1.2 Purpose.
Protecting the safety of the public, the environment, and plant personnel from a plant fire and its
potential effect on safe reactor operations is paramount to this standard. The fire protection
standard shall be based on the concept of defense-in-depth. Defense-in-depth shall be achieved
when an adequate balance of each of the following elements is provided:
(1) Preventing fires from starting
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(2) Rapidly detecting fires and controlling and extinguishing promptly those fires that do occur,
thereby limiting fire damage
(3) Providing an adequate level of fire protection for SSCs important to safety, so that a fire that
is not promptly extinguished will not prevent essential plant safety functions from being
performed
4.4.4 NFPA 805
The 2001 edition of NFPA 805 was the first edition of this standard. NFPA 805 replaced NFPA 803,
Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Nuclear Power Plants. NFPA 805 is a performance-based
standard that describes the methodology for applying performance-based requirements, fundamental fire
protection program design and elements, determination of fire protection systems and features, and fire
protection during decommissioning and permanent shutdown.
1.1 Scope.
This standard specifies the minimum fire protection requirements for existing light water NPPs during all
phases of plant operation, including shutdown, degraded conditions, and decommissioning.
1.2 Purpose.
Protecting the safety of the public, the environment, and plant personnel from a plant fire and its potential
effect on safe reactor operations is paramount to this standard. The fire protection standard shall be based
on the concept of defense-in-depth. Defense-in-depth shall be achieved when an adequate balance of each
of the following elements is provided:
(2) Rapidly detecting fires and controlling and extinguishing promptly those fires that do occur,
thereby limiting fire damage
(3) Providing an adequate level of fire protection for SSCs important to safety, so that a fire that is
not promptly extinguished will not prevent essential plant safety functions from being performed
1.3 Goals.
1.3.1 Nuclear Safety Goal. The nuclear safety goal shall be to provide reasonable assurance that a fire
during any operational mode and plant configuration will not prevent the plant from achieving and
maintaining the fuel in a safe and stable condition.
1.3.2 Radioactive Release Goal. The radioactive release goal shall be to provide reasonable assurance that
a fire will not result in a radiological release that adversely affects the public, plant personnel, or the
environment.
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1.3.3* Life Safety Goal. The life safety goal shall be to provide reasonable assurance that loss of life in
the event of fire will be prevented for facility occupants.
1.3.4 Plant Damage/Business Interruption Goal. The plant damage/business interruption goal shall be to
provide reasonable assurance that the risks of fire are acceptable with regard to potential economic
consequences.
1.4 Performance Objectives.
1.4.1 Nuclear Safety Objectives. In the event of a fire during any operational mode and plant
configuration, the plant shall be provided with the following:
(1) Reactivity control, which is the capability of rapidly achieving and maintaining subcritical
conditions
(2) Fuel cooling, which is the capability of achieving and maintaining decay heat removal and
inventory control functions
(3) Fission product boundary, which is the capability of preventing fuel clad damage so that the
primary containment boundary is not challenged
1.4.2 Radioactive Release Objective. Either of the following objectives shall be met during all operational
modes and plant configurations:
(1) Containment integrity is capable of being maintained.
(2) The source term is capable of being limited.
1.4.3 Life Safety Objectives. The life safety objectives shall be to protect occupants not intimate with the
initial fire development from loss of life and improve the survivability of those who are intimate with the
fire development, as well as to provide protection for essential and emergency personnel.
1.4.4 Plant Damage/Business Interruption Objectives. In order to meet the plant damage/business
interruption goals, the following objectives shall be met during all operational modes and plant
configurations.
(1) Potential property damage due to fire shall be limited to an acceptable level as determined by the
owner/operator.
(2) Potential business interruption (plant downtime) due to fire shall be limited to an acceptable level
as determined by the owner/operator.
1.5 Performance Criteria.
1.5.1 Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. Fire protection features shall be capable of providing
assurance that, in the event of a fire, the plant is not placed in an unrecoverable condition.
1.5.2 To demonstrate the capability required by 1.5.1, the following performance criteria shall be met:
98
(1) Reactivity Control. Reactivity control shall be capable of inserting negative reactivity to achieve
and maintain subcritical conditions, and inserting shall occur rapidly enough such that fuel design limits
are not exceeded.
(2) Inventory and Pressure Control. With fuel in the reactor vessel, head on and tensioned, inventory
and pressure control shall be capable of the following:
(a) Controlling coolant level such that level indication is maintained in the pressurizer for a PWR
(b) Maintaining or rapidly restoring reactor water level above top of active fuel for a BWR such that
fuel clad damage as a result of a fire is prevented
(3) Decay Heat Removal. Decay heat removal shall be capable of removing sufficient heat from the
reactor core or spent fuel such that fuel is maintained in a safe and stable condition.
(4) Vital Auxiliaries. Vital auxiliaries shall be capable of providing the necessary auxiliary support
equipment and systems to assure that the systems required under 1.5.2(1), 1.5.2(2), 1.5.2(3), and 1.5.2(5)
are capable of performing their required nuclear safety function.
(5)* Process Monitoring. Process monitoring shall be capable of providing the necessary indication to
assure the criteria addressed in 1.5.2(1) through 1.5.2(4) have been achieved and are being maintained.
1.5.3 Radioactive Release Performance Criteria. Radiation release to any unrestricted area due to the
direct effects of fire suppression activities (but not involving fuel damage) shall be as low as reasonably
achievable and shall not exceed applicable 10 CFR 20 limits.
1.5.4 Life Safety Criteria. The following performance criteria shall be met during all operational modes
and plant configurations:
(1) Provision of safe egress and/or area of refuge for occupants other than essential personnel
(2) Provision of protection, including emergency lighting, for essential personnel to perform
necessary safety functions as a result of a fire event
(3) Provision of protection for essential personnel, providing necessary emergency services during or
following a fire
1.5.5* Plant Damage/Business Interruption Criteria. In order to meet the individual plant damage/business
interruption objectives, the following criteria shall be satisfied as described below:
(1) The probable maximum loss (PML) shall not exceed an acceptable level as determined by the
owner/operator.
(2) The business interruption (plant downtime) due to a PML fire event shall not exceed an
acceptable level as determined by the owner/operator.
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4.4.5 ANI Fire Assessment
The American Nuclear Insurers do not provide any criteria or standards for fire protection but do show
data for fires at NPP world wide (ANI 2001). This report shows and in-depth analysis of all insurance
payments and claims from 1966 to 2000. Fires are about ¼ of all the accidents in nuclear facilities where
insurance companies had to pay. So, fire is a very significant accident for nuclear facilities. Therefore,
fire standards are very important for FCF and NPP.
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5. Plans for the Future
This section discusses how the information in Sections 2, 3, and 4 can be used to support the long-term
plan to develop fire protection guidance for FCF shown in Figure 5-1. The plan in Figure 5-1 was
provided to SAIC in file “JR-10-07004 Fire study schem r3 doc.doc” in February 2008.
This section also discusses how the information in Sections 2, 3, and 4 can also approach for making the
fire prevention standard for the MFFF JMOX. The JMOX plan was provided to SAIC on EXCEL
worksheet and in “JR20003 Schedule.xls” in February 2006. The requirements for the JMOX plan are in
Figure 5-2.
Recommendations for the work items in Figures 5-1 and 5-2 are discussed in separate sections below.
A. General Recommendations
A1. It is a challenge to make high level standards for all FCF as in Figure 5-1 while at the same time
making detailed standards for JMOX as in Figure 5-2. However, the JMOX work provides a good test
case to apply standards in Japan. Japan must:
• Use the MFFF experience in the US including the standards and ISA (see report SAIC 2007)
• use the JMOX experience and lessons learned to guide the development general requirements
for all FCF.
A.2. Japan should form technical committees with representatives from industry for various purposes:
• to make a standard like NFPA 801 in Appendix B
• apply international expertise for the V&V of codes and the experiments
A.3. The plans in Figure 5-1 and 5-2 require the collection and management of large amounts of data.
There must be a way to organize this data in a KMS as discussed in Section 6. Figure 5-1 should include
a work item to develop the KMS.
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B. “Research and making fire protection standard for FCF” and “Fire Protection Guide” in Figure
5-1
Also applies to Figure 5-2, Item 3 and 4
B1. This report provides high level guidance in NFPA 801 in Appendix B and a list of standards in
Appendix A that provide a good structure for “Developing of Fire Protection Standard for Nuclear Fuel
Cycle Facility” that is the main task in “Regulatory Guide of Fire Protection” in Figure 5-1. Japan should
develop similar standards as follows:
• Start with a general high level standard like NFPA 801
• then make other standards in a graded approach first trying to achieve standards like the Tier 1
NFPA standards in Appendix A,
• then make Tier 1 other non-NFPA standards,
• then make Tier 2 standards. Use Japan industry standards where possible. If Tier 2 standards
are not available use the US standards.
B2. Use the HEPA standards and practices that are covered in the previous SAIC report on MFFF (SAIC
2005 and 2006).
B3. As discussed in Section 4.2, the US is making new standards as part of GNEP. Japan must follow the
development of these standards for lessons learned and whether to use the new GNEP standards.
C. “NFC Fire Hazards Analysis” in Figure 5-1

Also applies to Figure 5-2, Item 4
C1. Use the methods in Section 3.1 to make procedures for FHA in Japan.
C2. As discussed in Section 4.4, NPP fire methods have limited use in FCF. The fire PRA methods for
reactors such as in NRC 2005a-b are focused on Core Damage Frequency (CDF) and may not apply well
in FCF. Use the ISA method (NUREG-1513, NRC 2001b) and design methods like MFFF in reference
SAIC 2005 and 2006.
C3. JNES should make general guidance like the SRP like NUREG-1520 (see Section 2.4) as the
procedure for how to do the FHA and measure and judge that the FCF has good fire protection.
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D. “Experimental Studies” and “Experiment Data” in Figure 5-1
Also applies to Figure 5-2, Items 2(2)-2(4)
D1. Experimental studies should be based on a set of BEs that are set before the experiments and code
development begins. The ICFMP discussed in Section 3.2 is a good example to follow.
D2. The KMS must have the ability to compare results from many experiments from many people.
Therefore a standard like ASTM E1591 (see Section 3.3) should be established and used.
D3. Existing experiment data from previous work like the ICFMP should also be obtained, formatted
using the standard way like ASTM E1591 to present and store the data, and then placed in the KMS.
E. “Development of Analysis Method (Fire Analysis Code)”, Figure 5-2, Item 2(1).
E1. Add code development to Figure 5-1 to be sure it is integrated in the plan.
E2. When possible, use codes that are already accepted and validated based on the NRC V&V in Section
3.2.1.
E3. The development and validation of the computer codes as in Item 2(1) in Figure 5-2 must follow a
method similar to the NRC V&V method discussed in Section 3.2.1. To do this Japan must make a
standard similar to ASTM E1135 (and supporting ASTM standards) discussed in Section 3.3
E4. Make a standard or guidance for the codes that can be used and in which cases to use them. This is
similar to ASTM E1895 discussed in Section 3.3.
103
Figure 5-1 Plan for Fire Protection Guide for FCF
104
Figure 5-2 Work Items from Plan for MOX FCF
2. Fire effects analysis for the equipments Analysis on glove box (GB) fire development, fire effects, and its extinction
with containment performance in MOX
fuel processing facility -adding new data obtained from test to existing methods and data
Development of fire analysis code and fire database

・Enhancement of test data method using zone model code
(1) Development of analysis
Code ・Establishment of test data method using field model code
method (Fire analysis code)
・Development of fire database, adding new test data to existing data ・
Activity: Upgrading code improvement according to reflection of the test data
Assessment on the fire damage of GB building caused by ignition sources placed inside and outside GB
(2) GB fire damage
Acquisition of the limit value data showing loss of containment performance
assessment
Activity: Simulation analysis according to reflection of PICSEL test data and JNES test data
Indoor fire analysis caused by the ignition source (GB, etc.)

Fire analysis (3) Assessment of fire ・Analysis on fire development by setting parameters such as ventilating condition, equipment arrangement,
utilizing actual behavior in confined position of ignition source
sized model compartment (Process room) ・Analysis of the effects on neighboring rooms
Activity: Upgrading code and simulation analysis, reflected by PRISM test data
(4) Fire expansion analysis
toward neighboring rooms, ・Analysis on fire expansion toward several neighboring rooms caused by the ignition source in process room
analysis of the effects on ・Analysis on the soot effects and heated wind effects on ventilation system and emission system
ventilation system and Activity: Development of assessment method
emission system
(5) Analysis on released Analysis on migration of aerosol (MOX powder) in fire disaster
Nuclide
source term assessment in Activity: Parameter analysis reflected by foreign and domestic test data
migration
fire disaster
・Simulating fire extinction (for process room, GB, ventilation system)
Extinction
(6) Simulation analysis for ・Simulation controlling ventilation system and emission system (the system controlled by damper and air
fire extinction volume)
Activity: Simulating analysis reflected by foreign and domestic test data
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Figure 5-2 continued
Plan Item 3. Integrated assessment of NPPs

regarding fire prevention standard
Based on test and effect assessment, individual heat assessments are carried out on the marginal condition of
NPPs fire system
Plan Item 4. Making of Fire Protection
Standard
Fire prevention standard to be considered Design standard for fire prevention
Equipment standard, Fire prevention equipment, Fire prevention system for entire facility, Fire mitigation
equipment
Design standard for fire prevention equipment
Preparing procedure and standard for fire prevention
Preparing fire extinction procedure in a fire
Preparing maintenance standard for containment equipment (GB, etc.)
Primary examination for fire prevention (1) Definition of potential fire property provided in process room (Definition of the objects and events for fire
standard hazard)
(2)Required performance of fire prevention system
Fire detection, Fire containment, Alarm, Systems for automatic and manual extinction, chemical
extinction, gas extinction
(3)Design requirement for controlling fire
Control soot load, heat load
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6. Knowledge Management System Design
The plan in Section 5 requires the collecting and managing many documents and a large amount of data.
This section discusses the conceptual design and specification of a KMS to allow users to easily find
information related to fire protection standards, special reports, modeling development, modeling results,
and experimental results.
6.1 Requirements
The requirements are from the contract agreement for this report that says the KMS is a relational
database with active links to allow users to easily find information.
The KMS will include the following control data:

o Regulatory guide (USA, EURO country, JAPAN)
o Literature
o Experiment data
o Codes
o Procurements
o Project documents
o and Others.
The KMS will include the following functional requirements:

o Information search
o Visualization of the necessary information at Fire Tests (e.g. creating time-
dependent graph of test conditions, heating value, temperature, pressure, heating
quantity of radiation, etc.)
o Interface between numerical data and analysis code
o Linkage on the web
o Multiple task management among multiple groups (e.g. information sharing,
disclosure management, schedule management)
o Project management including update of shared information like website,
progress management, multiple task management, etc.
6.2 Conceptual Design and Specification Development Method

SAIC used its experience on KMS, records management, and data bases to develop the conceptual design
and specification in this report. When possible SAIC recommends using commercially available or “open
source” software for KMS. This reduces costs by reducing the amount of programming that is needed.
To develop the specification, SAIC did prototype testing using the open source code “ScrewTurn_Wiki”
to understand if open source codes can meet the requirements in Section 6.1.
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The steps for the specification development are shown in Figure 6-1.
Step 1 KMS Definition: To do the design, SAIC defined the control data as shown in Table 6-1. SAIC
also defined the ways that the functional requirements could be done as in Table 6-2.
Table 6-1 Data Definitions

Data Requirement Types of Documents Source of document
1. Regulatory guide Text documents (Note 1) Public documents from regulators
(USA, Europe country, Japan).
Standards from providers or a web
based service like IHS (see Table 6-
2, Item 4).
2. Literature Text Documents, Technical Reports Conference proceedings, reports
from project subcontractors
(preferred in pdf), presentations, etc.
3. Experiment data Experiment conditions Data to support analysis as shown in
Output data from tests Section 3.2. Data should be in a
common format using a Standard like
ASTM E 1591 (see Section 3.3)
4. Codes Analysis codes for fires (see Section Because of copyright and license
3.2 for examples) issues the codes
5. Procurements Purchase orders and contracts Procurement officials
6. Project documents Scope of Work, schedules, costs, etc Project management team
Note 1. Text documents may be in pdf, MSword, or .txt. Some pdf may be “image type” and cannot be
easily searched.
Table 6-2 Functional Requirement Definitions

Functional Requirement Description Definition
1. Information search All documents will be searchable (unless they are image files, then
the input document will have to be converted to searchable text using
Optical Character Recognition [OCR]).
2. Visualization of the necessary If data is properly configured (use ASTM E1591) the data can be
information at Fire Tests (e.g. creating downloaded and graphed from many different experiments, codes,
time-dependent graph of test and organizations (see Figure 3.2-6 as an example).
conditions, heating value,
temperature, pressure, heating Existing experiment data from previous work like the ICFMP should
quantity of radiation, etc.) also be obtained, formatted using the standard way like ASTM E1591
to present and store the data, and then placed in the KMS.
3. Interface between numerical data The KMS will use output from the codes that are in the proper form
and analysis code per the data format that is prescribed using a method like ASTM
E1591. It is unlikely that the KMS can interface between the code
and the code output. The KMS can be used to set up proper input
files for most codes and accept the output files.
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Functional Requirement Description Definition
4. Linkage on the web The KMS must interface to the web to download standards from
various sources including standards providers like IHS
http://www.ihs.com/. Standards provider should have a
representative in Japan.
Communication among users is via web.
5. Multiple task management among Information sharing among various project groups in different
multiple groups (e.g. information languages. Information can be password protected to limit
sharing, disclosure management, disclosure.
schedule management)
6. Project management including Interface to a project management tool like MSProject
update of shared information like
website, progress management,
multiple task management, etc.
Step 2: Conceptual Design and Key Features
The conceptual design is to use a very flexible program like the famous Wikipedia program. The
Wikipedia codes are free and are “open source” code to reduce costs. The Wikipedia code is very good to
input many types of documents and data. Wikipedia makes it easy for many people to add documents and
data. Wikipedia allows “editors” to review the input information to approve adding it. SAIC downloaded
many types of the Wikipedia code and began to test if it will work. SAIC likes a version called
“ScrewTurn_Wiki” that is in the .net programming environment (this makes it easy to change).
ScrewTurn_Wiki also allows the user to add other functions such as going to a website to look at codes
and standards.
SAIC decided on the key features for the system to operate. The key features are :
• Easily extensible and capable to add graphing features

• Able to use database
• Able to download or display documents of various formats (.PDF, .DOC, .XLS)
• Web-Based
• Easy to deploy
• Simple User Management by password hierarchy
• Multiple languages for the user interface including Japanese
• Can interface with libraries at various program participants and people that provide standards
like IHS.
109
There are at least 20 different open source versions of wiki software that may be used for organizing
information. Each of these has different strengths and weaknesses depending on the intended purpose.
All of these programs are web based, using a web browser to access and modify the information
contained within them.
The advantage of using a .net program is the availability of numerous tools to provide graphical display of
numerical data. Given a standardized format for data, the software can provide a graphing wizard to
guide the user through the process of displaying a graph. A further advantage of the .net platform is the
ease of deployment. In most cases, simply copying the files onto the web server (assuming a MS
Windows machine) and enabling web sharing of the directory will be all the setup that is required.
Step 3: Prototype Testing
SAIC performed prototype testing to understand the capability needed for the KMS. The prototype test
used the “ScrewTurn_Wiki” program with the user interface as shown in Figure 6-1.
SAIC expects a typical entry for a fire protection document will consist of a short synopsis of the content
of the document, a link to the document, and a list of applicable references for the document along with
links to those references.
110
Figure 6-1 Prototype Testing User Interface
111
112
7. References
Reference documents are listed by the originator and the year. Regulations are listed by the regulation
number. References in this section are provided on a compact disc (CD) separately.
Most of the standards that are in Appendix A have been provided by SAIC on previous tasks. Standards
added for this report are the ASTM standards and are on the CD for this report.
The NFPA standards including NFPA 801 have been provided on an NFPA CD in 2007.
ANI 2001 “Nuclear Property Insurance Fire Loss Experience Associated with the Global Nuclear
Industry”, William G. Wendland, American Nuclear Insurers, West Hartford Connecticut.
ASTM 2005 “Standard Guide for Evaluating the Predictive Capability of Deterministic Fire Models”, ASTM
Standard E 1355, American Society of Testing and Materials, May 2005.
ASTM 2007 “Guide for Documenting Computer Software for Fire Models”, ASTM Standard E 1472,
American Society of Testing and Materials, April 2007.
ASTM 2007a “Guide for Obtaining Data for Deterministic Fire Models”, ASTM Standard E 1591, American
Society of Testing and Materials, February, 2007.
ASTM 2007b “Guide for Determining Uses and Limitations of Deterministic Fire Models”, ASTM Standard
E 1895, American Society of Testing and Materials, February 2007.
DCS 2001 “Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility – Construction Authorization Request”; Duke Cogema
Stone & Webster, February 2001.
DOE 1986 “Nonreactor Nuclear Facilities: Standards And Criteria Guide”, Brynda, W.J., Junker, L., Karol,
R.C., Lobner, P.R., Goldman, L.A, DOE/TIC-11603, Brookhaven National Laboratory,
September 1986.
DOE 1989 “General Design Criteria”, DOE Order 6430.1a, US Department of Energy, 1989.
DOE 1999 “DOE Standard – Fire Protection Design Criteria”; DOE-STD-1066-99; 1999.
FPE 2007 “Verification and Validation- How to Determine the Accuracy of Fire Models”, Fire Protection
Engineering (magazine), Spring 2007.
NRC 1973 “Design, Construction and Testing of High-Efficiency Air Filtration Systems for Nuclear
Application”, Regulatory Guide 3.2, US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1973.
NRC 1973a “General Design Guide for Ventilation Systems of Plutonium Processing and Fuel Fabrication
Plants”; Regulatory Guide 3.12, US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1973.
NRC 1974 “General Design Guide for Plutonium Processing and Fuel Fabrication Plants”; Regulatory
Guide 3.16, US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, January 1974
NRC 1975 “Reactor Safety Study – An Assessment of Accident Risks in U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power
Plants”, WASH-1400 (NUREG-75/014), 1975
NRC 1989 “Guidance on the Management Controls/Quality Assurance, Requirements for Operation,
Chemical Safety and Fire Protection of Fuel Cycle Facilities”,. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Federal Register, Volume 54, No, 53, March 21, 1989.
NRC 1989a “A Summary of Nuclear Power Plant Fire Safety Research at Sandia National Laboratories”,
1975- 1987, NUREG/CR-5384, Steven P. Nowlen, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque,
New Mexico, December, 1989.
NRC 1992 “Guidance on Fire Protection of Fuel Cycle Facilities. Nuclear Regulatory Commission”,
Federal Register, Volume 57, No, 154, August 10, 1992.
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NRC 1995 “NRC Generic Letter 95-01, NRC Staff Technical Position on Fire Protection for Fuel cycle
Facilities”, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, DC January 26, 1995..
NRC 1998 “Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facility Accident Analysis Handbook” – Final Report; NUREG-6410,
1998.
NRC 2000 “Standard Review Plan for the Review of an Application for a Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel
Fabrication Facility” – Final Report; NUREG-1718, 2000.
NRC 2001 “Fire Protection For Operating Nuclear Power Plants”, Regulatory Guide 1.189, US Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, 2001.
NRC 2001a “International Collaborative Project to Evaluate Fire Models for Nuclear Power Plant
Applications: Summary of 2nd Meeting”, NUREG/CP-0173, July 2001
NRC 2001b “Integrated Safety Analysis Guidance Document”, NUREG-1513, May 2001
NRC 2002 “International Collaborative Project to Evaluate Fire Models for Nuclear Power Plant
Applications: Proceedings of the 5th Meeting”, NUREG/CP-0181, Held at the National Institute
of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, Maryland, May, 2002.
NRC 2002a “Evaluation of Fire Models for Nuclear Power Plant Applications: Cable Tray Fires,
International Panel Report”, NUREG-1758, June 2002.
NRC 2002b “Standard Review Plan for the Review of a License Application for a Fuel Cycle Facility”,
NUREG-1520, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, DC, March 2002.
NRC 2004 “Knowledge Base for Post-Fire Safe-Shutdown Analysis (Draft for Comment)”, NUREG-1778
Draft For Comment, January 2004.
NRC 2004a “Fire Protection” 10 CFR 50.48, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1994. (Adoption of NFPA
805 on page 741)
NRC 2004b “Fire Dynamics Tools (FDTs) Quantitative Fire Hazard Analysis Methods for the U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission Fire Protection Inspection Program (Final Report)”, NUREG-1805,
Dec 2004.
NRC 2004c “Domestic Licensing of Special Nuclear Material”, 10 CFR 70, Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, 2004.
NRC 2004d “Fire Protection Program For Nuclear Power Facilities Operating Prior To January 1, 1979” 10
CFR 50, Appendix R, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1994.
NRC 2005 “Final Safety Evaluation Report on the Construction Authorization Request for the Mixed
Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility at the Savannah River Site, SC” Revision 1; Docket No. 70-
3098; Duke Cogema Stone & Webster, LLC; US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of
Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards; March 2005.
NRC 2005a-b “EPRI/NRC-RES Fire PRA Methodology for Nuclear Power Facilities: Summary and
Overview, NUREG/CR-6850 V1- V2”, Sept 2005.
NRC 2006 “Report of Experimental Results for the International Fire Model Benchmarking and Validation
Exercise #3”, NUREG/CR-6905, May 2006.
NRC 2007a-g “Verification and Validation of Selected Fire Models for Nuclear Power Plant Applications”.
NUREG-1824, Volumes 1-7, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear
Regulatory Research (RES), Rockville, MD, 2007, and Electric Power Research Institute
(EPRI), Palo Alto, CA, May 2007.
SAIC 2005 “Glovebox Confinement Study”, Revision 1, Report SAIC 2005j, Science Applications
International Corporation, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, April 20, 2005.
SAIC 2006 “Fire Accidents in MFFF”, Revision 1, Report SAIC 2006i, Science Applications International
Corporation, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, March 20, 2006.
114
SAIC 2007 “Fire Protection Studies Task 1: Analysis Of Fire Standards, Final Report”, SAIC 2007l,
Science Applications International Corporation, Oak Ridge, Tennessee , March 16, 2007.
115
116
APPENDIX A FIRE STANDARDS
This appendix contains the standards that Japan should use to set up standards. See the discussion in
Section 5. As discussed in Section 1 of the main report, SAIC has studied the man documents in this
report to identify additional standards that may have been missed in previous SAIC studies (SAIC 2007).
A.1 Original Standards List
The original SAIC study included standards that are referenced in the MFFF documents as follows:
• MFFF CAR from Duke, Cogema, Stone and Webster (DCS), Chapter 7 (DCS 2001)
• MFFF SER, Section 7.7 (NRC 2005)
• NUREG-1718 SRP, Chapter 7, “Fire Protection”, Appendix D, and Appendix E (NRC 2000)
The SRP lists more standards than the CAR and SER. This is because the SRP must address all of the
possible standards that could be used in any facility. The CAR and SER address only systems that are
actually planned for MFFF.
The referenced documents above provided standards in four categories shown below:
1. Organization and Conduct of Operations (1.Conops)

2. Features and Systems (2. F&S)
3. Preliminary Fire Hazard Analysis (3. FHA)
4. Design Bases of the Principal Structures, Systems and Components (PSSCs) (4. DB)
A.2 Original Method
The documents and standards that are directly called out in the references in Section A.1 are called “First
Tier” or “Tier 1” standards. The Tier 1 standards reference other standards that are not directly
referenced by the documents in Section A.1. These standards are called “Second Tier” or “Tier 2”
standards. Tables were prepared to Tier 1 and Tier 2 documents.
Notice that standards are always changing. So there are some cases where the standard is “withdrawn”
and replaced by another. Or in some cases, a special standard is made part of a larger standard. For
A-1
example, NFPA 50, 50A, and 50B are withdrawn and were put in NFPA 55 in 2003. Sometimes, people
continue to reference withdrawn standards but usually old documents are not updated. For example, the
SER was not updated to remove 50, 50A, and 50B.
Selecting Tier 2 Standards
In many cases, the NFPA or other Tier 1 standards discuss the standards to design and build other
building systems such as HVAC. This is because the design standards like HVAC usually discuss how to
design the systems so they do not cause fires. However, the fire information in these standards is small
and design standards for these systems are not in the standards in Appendix A.
The Tier 1 standards cover many situations and facilities. Many of the standards referenced by the Tier 1
standards shown in Appendix A do not apply to FCF. Many are also general guides for building design
or system design that does not directly apply to fire protection. So, the Tier 2 list of standards was
reduced to standards for fire protection for this study. Therefore all of more than 500 referenced
standards shown in the Tier 1 and Tier 2 standards in Table A-1 and A-2 are not needed for this analysis.
SAIC selected a part of the Tier 1 references based on these criteria:
• The general criteria are to select standards specifically related to fire protection in FCF.
• Detailed design information for equipment is not included:
o Mechanical equipment such as handbooks for gears for pumps, pumps, etc. are not
included
o Electrical design like UL 1004 for electric motors or other UL standards for typical
products or building materials
• Handbooks and design guides are not included in Tier 2 because they are for US design
methods. They are not codes and standards but only have recommended ways that an engineer
may do a design detail.
• Other Tier 1 references not included:
• Standards for sizes such as those from Manufacturers Standardization Society (MSS) of the
valve and fittings
• Standards for facilities like health care facilities, pesticide factories, linen handling facilities,
liquefied petroleum (LP) gas facilities, residences, etc.
• ISO standards are not covered since they are redundant to standards in the US
A-2
• Standards for Definitions of terms
• Standards related to how to makes signs or labels from American Society of Mechanical
Engineers (ASME) or UL
• Details of how to do laboratory tests for UL or ASTM.
• Standards for measurements systems such as metric
• UL 555 says how to use a fire damper but the reference on exactly how to design and make the
damper in UL is not in Tier 2.
• Standards from Canada Underwriters Laboratories of Canada (ULC) or Canadian Standards
Association (CSA)
• CFR related references because these are laws, not standards
• Standards for energy efficiency standards
• Standards for civil engineering of buildings and structural analysis of buildings
• Transportation-related standards such as for ships, in automobile repair shops, airports, etc.
A.3 Revised Method
The objective for the method in this report is to identify additional standards.
Step 1: The standards from the original study (SAIC 2007) were moved to Tables A-1 through A-3 of
this report.
Step 2: The documents in this report were reviewed for additional standards. The documents reviewed
were:
o DOE : DOE 1066 (NRC 1999), DOE/TIC-11603 (DOE 1986)

o LWR/NPP: RG 1.189, NFPA 804, NFPA 805
o Enrichment: LES SER, USEC SER
o NFPA 801
Step 3. Additional standards are added to the tables. The additional Tier 1 NFPA standards that were
identified are show in the table below:
A-3
New Tier 1 NFPA Standards
Source for New New Standard
Standard
LES SER NFPA 1410, “Standard on Training for Initial Emergency Scene Operations,” 2000.
RG 1.189
NFPA 801 NFPA 1500, Standard on Fire Department Occupational Safety and Health Program
NFPA 804
NFPA 805
RG 1.189 NFPA 1620, “Recommended Practice for Pre-Incident Planning.”
RG 1.189 NFPA 1961, “Standard on Fire Hose.”
RG 1.189 NFPA 1962, “Standard for the Care, Use, and Service Testing of Fire Hose Including
Couplings and Nozzles.”
USEC SER NFPA 241, “Standards for Safeguarding Construction, Alteration, and Demolition
NFPA 801 Operations,”
NFPA 804
NFPA 805
DOE/TIC-11603 NFPA 36, “Solvent Extraction Plants”

NFPA 801 NFPA 430, Code for the Storage of Liquid and Solid Oxidizers, 2000 edition.
DOE/TIC-11603 NFPA 497, “Recommended Practice for Classification of Class I Hazardous Locations for
Electrical Installations in Chemical Plants”
RG 1.189 NFPA 701, “Standard Methods of Fire Tests for Flame-Resistant Textiles and Films.”
NFPA 801
NFPA 804
NFPA 805
USEC SER NFPA 75, “Standard for Protection of Electronic Computer/Data Processing Equipment,”
RG 1.189
NFPA 801
NFPA 804
RG 1.189 NFPA 92A, “Recommended Practice for Smoke Control Systems.”
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Table A-1 Tier 1 NFPA Standards
NFPA Standard Summary Why and basis
Standard 10, 1.1 Scope. All nuclear facilities use portable fire extinguishers.
“Standard for The provisions of this standard apply to the selection, installation, inspection,
Portable Fire maintenance, and testing of portable extinguishing equipment. SER 7-10 DB
Extinguishers.” 1.1.1 Portable fire extinguishers are intended as a first line of defense to cope CAR 7-10 DB
1998. with fires of limited size. SRP 7.0-13 DB
1.1.2 The selection and installation of extinguishers is independent of whether
the building is equipped with automatic sprinklers, standpipe and hose, or
other fixed protection equipment.
1.1.3 The requirements given herein are minimum.
1.1.4 The requirements do not apply to permanently installed systems for fire
extinguishment, even where portions of such systems are portable (such as
hose and nozzles attached to a fixed supply of extinguishing agent).
1.2 Purpose.
This standard is prepared for the use and guidance of persons charged with
selecting, purchasing, installing, approving, listing, designing, and
maintaining portable fire-extinguishing equipment.
Standard 101 1.1 Scope. All nuclear facilities are designed to make sure people can
“Life Safety 1.1.1 Title. NFPA 101, Life Safety Code, shall be known as the Life Safety escape.
Code.” 1997. Code®, is cited as such, and shall be referred to herein as “this Code” or “the
Code.”
1.1.2 Danger to Life from Fire. The Code addresses those construction, SER 7-6 F&S
protection, and occupancy features necessary to minimize danger to life from SRP 7.0-10 F&S
the effects of fire, including smoke, heat, and toxic gases created during a
SRP 7.0-9 DB
fire.
1.1.3 Egress Facilities. The Code establishes minimum criteria for the design CAR 7-4, 7-20 F&S
of egress facilities to allow prompt escape of occupants from buildings or,
where desirable, into safe areas within buildings.
1.1.4 Other Fire-Related Considerations. The Code addresses other
considerations that are essential to life safety in recognition of the fact that
life safety is more than a matter of egress. The Code also addresses protective
features and systems (F&S), building services, operating features,
maintenance activities, and other provisions in recognition of the fact that
achieving an acceptable degree of life safety depends on additional safeguards
to provide adequate egress time or protection for people exposed to fire.
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1.1.5* Considerations Not Related to Fire. The Code also addresses other
considerations that, while important in fire conditions, provide an ongoing
benefit in other conditions of use, including non-fire emergencies.
1.1.6 Areas Not Addressed. The Code does not address the following:
(1)* General fire prevention or building construction features that are
normally a function of fire prevention codes and building codes
(2) Prevention of injury incurred by an individual due to that
individual's failure to use reasonable care
(3) Preservation of property from loss by fire
1.2 Purpose.
The purpose of this Code is to provide minimum requirements, with due
regard to function, for the design, operation, and maintenance of buildings
and structures for safety to life from fire. Its provisions will also aid life
safety in similar emergencies.
Standard 11, 1.1 Scope. If foam systems are used for fire protection this standard is
"Standard for 1.1.1 This standard covers the design, installation, operation, testing, and used.
Low Expansion maintenance of low-, medium-, and high-expansion foam systems for fire
Foam." protection. MFFF does not have foam systems but the SRP calls this
1.1.2 It is not the intent of this standard to specify where foam protection is standard in case foam systems are used.
required.
1.2 Purpose. SRP 7.0-13 DB
1.2.1 This standard is intended for the use and guidance of those responsible
for designing, installing, testing, inspecting, approving, listing, operating, or
maintaining fixed, semi-fixed, or portable low-, medium-, and high-expansion
foam fire-extinguishing systems for interior or exterior hazards.
NFPA 110, 1.1 Scope. Emergency and standby power systems must be design and
Standard for This standard covers performance requirements for emergency and standby built safety. The y must also be reliable because they often
Emergency and power systems providing an alternate source of electrical power to loads in provide power for fire fighting water pumps for suppression
Standby Power buildings and facilities in the event that the primary power source fails. systems like in NFPA 13 or for alarm systems like in NFPA
Systems, 2002 1.1.1 Power systems covered in this standard include power sources, transfer 72.
edition. equipment, controls, supervisory equipment, and all related electrical and
mechanical auxiliary and accessory equipment needed to supply electrical SER 5-91 DB
power to the load terminals of the transfer equipment. SER 5-91 Conop
s
1.1.2 This standard covers installation, maintenance, operation, and testing
requirements as they pertain to the performance of the EPSS.
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1.1.3 This standard does not cover the following:

(1) Application of the EPSS
(2) Emergency lighting unit equipment
(3) Distribution wiring
(4) Utility service, when such service is permitted as the EPSS
(5) Parameters for stored energy devices
1.1.4 This standard does not establish criteria for stored energy systems.
1.1.5 The selection of any of the following is not within the scope of this
standard:
(1) Specific buildings or facilities, or both, requiring an EPSS
(2) Specific loads to be served by the EPSS
(3)* Assignment of type, class, or level to any specific load
1.2 Purpose.
This standard contains performance requirements for an EPSS.
1.2.1 It is the role of other NFPA standards to specify which occupancies
require an EPSS and the applicable level, type, and class. This standard does
not specify where an EPSS is required.
1.2.2 This standard also is intended to provide guidance for inspectors,
designers, installers, manufacturers, and users of EPSSs and to serve as a
vehicle for communication between the parties involved. It is not intended as
a design manual.
1.2.3 Compliance with this standard is not intended to exempt the parties
involved from their respective responsibilities for the design, installation,
maintenance, performance, or compliance with other applicable standards and
codes.
Standard 111, 1.1 Scope. This applies to backup power systems that use batteries like
“Stored 1.1.1 This standard shall cover performance requirements for stored electrical UPS.
Electrical energy systems providing an alternate source of electrical power in buildings
Energy and facilities in the event that the normal electrical power source fails. SER 5-11 DB
Emergency and 1.1.2 Systems covered in this standard shall include power sources, transfer
Standby Power equipment, controls, supervisory equipment, and accessory equipment,
Systems.” 1996. including integral accessory equipment, needed to supply electrical power to
the selected circuits.
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1.1.3 This standard shall cover installation, maintenance, operation, and

testing requirements as they pertain to the performance of the stored
emergency power supply system (SEPSS).
1.1.4 Exclusions.
1.1.4.1 This standard shall not cover the following:
(1) Application of the SEPSS
(2) Distribution wiring
(3) Systems having total outputs less than 500 VA or less than 24 V
(4) Emergency lighting unit equipment
(5) Nuclear sources, fuel cells, solar systems, and wind stored-energy
systems
1.1.4.2 The following shall not be within the scope of this standard:
(1) Specific buildings or facilities, or both, requiring an SEPSS
(2) Specific loads to be served by the SEPSS
(3) Type, class, or level to be assigned to any specific load
1.2 Purpose.
1.2.1 This standard shall provide performance requirements for SEPSS and
also shall be used in conjunction with other standards.
1.2.2 It shall be the role of other NFPA standards to specify which
occupancies require an SEPSS and the applicable level, type, and class.
1.2.3 This standard shall not specify where an SEPSS is required.
1.2.4 This standard shall provide guidance for inspectors, designers,
installers, manufacturers, and users of an SEPSS and shall serve as a basis for
communication between the parties involved.
1.2.5 This standard shall not be considered a design manual.
1.2.6 Compliance with this standard shall not absolve the parties involved of
their respective responsibilities for the design, installation, maintenance,
performance, or compliance with other applicable standards and codes.
1.2.7 The installation of a stored-energy system(s) conforming to this
standard shall ensure that alternate power is available to minimize life safety
hazards resulting from power loss to certain continuous chemical or industrial
processes, computer controlled systems, emergency lighting, and the like.
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Standard 11A, Scope: If foam systems are used for fire protection this standard is
"Standard for This standard includes minimum requirements for the installation, design, operation, testing, and used.
Medium- and maintenance of medium- and high-expansion foam systems. MFFF does not have foam systems but the SRP calls this
High-Expansion Now covered in NFPA 11 standard in case foam systems are used.
Foam Systems."
SRP 7.0-13 DB
Standard 12, 1.1 Scope. MFFF and many nuclear facilities use CO2 systems.
“Standard on 1.1.1 This standard contains minimum requirements for carbon dioxide fire-
Carbon Dioxide extinguishing systems. SER 7-6 Conops
Extinguishing 1.1.2 It includes only the necessary essentials to make the standard workable SRP 7.0-13 DB
Systems." in the hands of those skilled in this field. CAR 7-9, 7-20 DB
1.2 Purpose.
1.2.1 This standard is prepared for the use and guidance of those charged
with the purchasing, designing, installing, testing, inspecting, approving,
listing, operating, or maintaining of carbon dioxide fire-extinguishing
systems, in order that such equipment will function as intended throughout its
life.
1.2.3 Only those with the proper training and experience shall design, install,
inspect, and maintain this equipment.
Standard 13, 1.1 Scope. MFFF and all nuclear facilities use water systems as in this
“Standard for This standard shall provide the minimum requirements for the design and standard. Nuclear facilities also use other non-water
the Installation installation of automatic fire sprinkler systems and exposure protection systems to avoid criticality.
of Sprinkler sprinkler systems covered within this standard.
Systems.” 1996. 1.2 Purpose. There are other detailed standards for the pipe, pumps, and
1.2.1 The purpose of this standard shall be to provide a reasonable degree of other equipment to be used.
protection for life and property from fire through standardization of design,
installation, and testing requirements for sprinkler systems, including private This is one of the most common standards used in the US
fire service mains, based on sound engineering principles, test data, and field for fire protection.
experience.
1.2.2 Sprinkler systems and private fire service mains are specialized fire CAR 7-3 DB
protection systems and shall require knowledgeable and experienced design CAR 7-8 DB
and installation.
SER 7-9 DB
SRP 7.0-13, E-3 DB
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Standard 14, 1.1 Scope. Stand pipes feed sprinkler systems (like NFPA 13) and for
“Standard for 1.1.1 This standard covers the minimum requirements for the installation of manual fire fighting.
the Installation standpipes and hose systems. MFFF and all nuclear facilities use this standard for piping.
of Standpipes 1.1.2 This standard does not cover requirements for periodic inspection,
and Hose testing, and maintenance of these systems. SRP 7.0-12 DB
Systems.” 1996. 1.2 Purpose. CAR 7-4, 7-20 DB
1.2.1 The purpose of this standard is to provide a reasonable degree of SER 7-9, 7-10, DB
protection for life and property from fire through installation requirements for
standpipes and hose systems based on sound engineering principles, test data,
and field experience.
NFPA 1410, 1.1 Scope. LES SER

Standard on 1.1.1* This standard contains the minimum requirements for evaluating RG 1.189
Training for training for initial fire suppression and rescue procedures used by fire
Initial department personnel engaged in emergency scene operations.
Emergency 1.1.2 This standard specifies basic evolutions that can be adapted to local
Scene conditions and serves as a standard mechanism for the evaluation of
Operations minimum acceptable performance during training for initial fire suppression
and rescue activities.
1.2 Purpose.
1.2.1* This document is a training standard designed to provide fire
departments with an objective method of measuring performance for initial
fire suppression and rescue procedures using available personnel and
equipment.
1.2.2 Nothing herein is intended to restrict any jurisdiction from exceeding
these minimum requirements.
Standard 15, 1.1 Scope. Most facilities and MFFF have some spray systems.
"Standard for 1.1.1 This standard provides the minimum requirements for the design,
Water Spray installation, and system acceptance testing of water spray fixed systems for
Fixed Systems fire protection service and the minimum requirements for the periodic testing SRP 7.0-13, DB
for Fire and maintenance of ultra high-speed water spray fixed systems. E-3
Protection." 1.1.2 Water spray fixed systems shall be specifically designed to provide for
effective fire control, extinguishment, prevention, or exposure protection.
1.1.3 This standard shall not apply to water spray protection from portable
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nozzles, sprinkler systems, monitor nozzles, water mist suppression systems,

explosion suppression, or other means of application covered by other
standards of NFPA.
1.2 Purpose.
The purpose of this standard shall be to provide the minimum requirements
for water spray fixed systems based upon sound engineering principles, test
data, and field experience.
NFPA 1500, 1.1 Scope. NFPA 801

Standard on Fire This standard shall contain minimum requirements for a fire–service-related NFPA 804
Department occupational safety and health program. NFPA 805
Occupational 1.2 Purpose.
Safety and 1.2.1 The purpose of this standard shall be to specify the minimum
Health Program requirements for an occupational safety and health program for a fire
department.
1.2.2 This standard shall specify safety requirements for those members
involved in rescue, fire suppression, emergency medical services, hazardous
materials operations, special operations, and related activities.
1.2.3* The AHJ shall identify which performance objectives of this standard
existing programs or policies meet.
1.2.4 Nothing herein shall be intended to restrict any jurisdiction from
exceeding these minimum requirements.
Standard 16, 1.1 Scope. Deluge foam is a special type of system that is not used in
"Standard for 1.1.1 This standard contains minimum requirements for the design, MFFF.
the Installation installation, and maintenance of foam-water sprinkler and spray systems.
of Deluge These systems shall be designed with the required density for either foam or These systems are not in MFFF therefore this is only called
Foam-Water water application as the controlling factor, depending on the design purpose out by the SRP.
Sprinkler and of the system. It is not the intent of this standard to specify where foam-water
Foam- Water sprinklers and spray protection is required. The determination of where foam- SRP 7.0-13 DB fire suppression
Spray Systems." water sprinklers and spray systems are required shall be made in accordance
with such applicable standards as NFPA 30, Flammable and Combustible
Liquids Code, and NFPA 409, Standard on Aircraft Hangars.
1.1.2* This standard shall apply only to systems using low-expansion foam.
1.2* Purpose.
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The purpose of this standard is to provide a reasonable degree of protection

for life and property from fire through installation requirements for foam-
water sprinkler and spray systems based on sound engineering principles, test
Standard 16A, Withdrawn. Now covered by NFPA 111. This is a special kind of foam system that can be used.
"Standard for
the Installation These systems are not in MFFF therefore this is only called
of Closed-Head out by the SRP.
Foam Water
Sprinkler SRP 7.0-13 DB
Systems."
NFPA 1620, 1.1 Scope. RG 1.189

Recommended This document provides criteria for evaluating the protection, construction,
Practice for Pre- and operational features of specific occupancies to develop a pre-incident
Incident plan that should be used by responding personnel to manage fires and other
Planning emergencies in such occupancies using the available resources.
1.1.1 Chapter 1 through Chapter 10 of this document provide general
information, philosophies, and principles that might or might not be
applicable to all occupancies.
1.1.2* The AHJ should determine the level of planning appropriate for the
jurisdiction and the property being pre-planned.
1.1.3 Chapter 11 through Chapter 20 provide information addressing special
or unique characteristics of specific occupancy classifications.
1.2* Purpose.
The primary purpose of this document is to aid in the development of a pre-
incident plan to help responding personnel effectively manage emergencies
with available resources and should not be confused with fire inspections,
which monitor code compliance.
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NFPA 1961, 1.1 Scope. RG 1.189

Standard on Fire This standard shall define the design and construction requirements for new
Hose fire hose, the testing required to verify the design and construction, and the
inspection and testing required of all new fire hose.
1.2* Purpose.
The purpose of this standard shall be to establish the minimum requirements
for new fire hose.
NFPA 1962, 1.1 Scope. RG 1.189
Standard for the This standard shall apply to the inspection, care, and use of fire hose, fire
Inspection, hose couplings, and fire-fighting nozzles; the service testing of fire hose; and
Care, and Use the associated record-keeping.
of Fire Hose, 1.2 Purpose.
Couplings, and The purpose of this standard is to provide requirements for the inspection,
Nozzles and the care, and use of fire hose, couplings, and nozzles and the testing of fire hose
Service Testing so that the reliability of fire hose and nozzles is increased when they are used
of Fire Hose at an incident.
Standard 20, 1.1 Scope. Usually the pumps that provide water for fire suppression
"Standard for 1.1.1 This standard deals with the selection and installation of pumps use centrifugal pumps. MFFF uses them.
the Installation supplying liquid for private fire protection.
of Centrifugal 1.1.2 The scope of this document shall include liquid supplies; suction,
Fire Pumps." discharge, and auxiliary equipment; power supplies, including power supply
arrangements; electric drive and control; diesel engine drive and control; CAR 7-11 DB
steam turbine drive and control; and acceptance tests and operation. SRP 7.0-12 DB
(cont’d) 1.1.3 This standard does not cover system liquid supply capacity and
pressure requirements, nor does it cover requirements for periodic inspection,
testing, and maintenance of fire pump systems.
1.1.4 This standard does not cover the requirements for installation wiring of
fire pump units.
1.2 Purpose.
The purpose of this standard is to provide a reasonable degree of protection
for life and property from fire through installation requirements for stationary
pumps for fire protection based upon sound engineering principles, test data,
and field experience.
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Standard 2001, 1.1 Scope. Many nuclear facilities and MFFF use clean systems for
“Standard on This standard contains minimum requirements for total flooding clean agent computer rooms and also for processes where water, foam
Clean Agent fire extinguishing systems. It does not cover fire extinguishing systems that or CO2 may cause problems. Halon is one type of agent-
Extinguishing use carbon dioxide or water as the primary extinguishing media, which are there are others.
Systems.” 1996. addressed by other NFPA documents.
1.2 Purpose.
1.2.1 The agents in this standard were introduced in response to international CAR 7-9 DB
restrictions on the production of certain halon fire extinguishing agents under CAR 7-9 Conops
the Montreal Protocol signed September 16, 1987, as amended. This standard SER 7-19 Conops
is prepared for the use and guidance of those charged with purchasing,
designing, installing, testing, inspecting, approving, listing, operating, and SER 5-92, 7-9 DB
maintaining engineered or pre-engineered clean agent extinguishing systems, SRP 7.0-13 DB
so that such equipment will function as intended throughout its life. Nothing
in this standard is intended to restrict new technologies or alternate
arrangements provided the level of safety prescribed by this standard is not
lowered.
1.2.2 No standard can be promulgated that will provide all the necessary
criteria for the implementation of a total flooding clean agent fire
extinguishing system. Technology in this area is under constant development,
and this will be reflected in revisions to this standard. The user of this
standard must recognize the complexity of clean agent fire extinguishing
systems. Therefore, the designer is cautioned that the standard is not a design
handbook. The standard does not do away with the need for the engineer or
for competent engineering judgment. It is intended that a designer capable of
applying a more complete and rigorous analysis to special or unusual
problems shall have latitude in the development of such designs. In such
cases, the designer is responsible for demonstrating the validity of the
approach.
Standard 22, 1.1 Scope. Many nuclear facilities have water storage tanks for water
Standard for This standard provides the minimum requirements for the design, for fire suppression systems like those in NFPA 13. Tanks
Water Tanks for construction, installation, and maintenance of tanks and accessory equipment must be reliable so the tanks are built to this standard.
Private Fire that supply water for private fire protection, including the following:
Protection, 1998 (1) Gravity tanks, suction tanks, pressure tanks, and embankment- CAR 7-10, 7- DB
edition. 11
supported coated fabric suction tanks
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(2) Towers
(3) Foundations
(4) Pipe connections and fittings
(5) Valve enclosures
(6) Tank filling
(cont’d) (7) Protection against freezing
1.2 Purpose.
The purpose of this standard is to provide a basis for the design, construction,
operation, and maintenance of water tanks for private fire protection. Nothing
in this standard shall prevent the use of systems, methods, or devices that are
equivalent in quality, strength, fire resistance, effectiveness, and durability to
those prescribed by this standard, provided technical documentation is made
available to the AHJ that demonstrates equivalency, and the system, method,
or device is appropriate for the intended purpose.
Standard 220, 1.1 Scope. MFFF buildings that have principal SSCs are designed as
“Standard on This standard defines types of building construction based on the Type 1 Facilities. Most nuclear facilities are Type 1.
Types of combustibility and the fire resistance rating of a building's structural
Building elements. Fire walls; nonbearing exterior walls; nonbearing interior partitions; SER 7-3 DB
Construction.” fire barrier walls; shaft enclosures; and openings in walls, partitions, floors, CAR 7-3 DB
1995. and roofs are not related to the types of building construction and are
SRP 7.0-9 DB
regulated by other standards and codes, where appropriate.
1.2 Purpose.
This standard provides definitions for standard types of building construction.
Standard 221 1.1 Scope. MFFF and all nuclear facilities have fire walls.
“Fire Walls and This standard specifies requirements for the design and construction of high
Fire Barrier challenge fire walls, fire walls, and fire barrier walls including protection of CAR 7-5 DB
Walls.” 1997. openings and penetrations. SER 7-8 DB
1.2 Purpose. SER 5-92, 7-18 DB
This standard prescribes minimum requirements for the design and
construction of high challenge fire walls, fire walls, and fire barrier walls for
use in providing safety to life and protection of property from fire.
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Standard 24, 1.1.1 This standard shall cover the minimum requirements for the installation MFFF and all nuclear facilities have water mains that
“Standard for of private fire service mains and their appurtenances supplying the following: supply fire water to the systems listed. This standard is
the Installation (1) Automatic sprinkler systems very common in the US and has many callouts for pipe and
of Private (2) Open sprinkler systems valve details.
Service Mains (3) Water spray fixed systems
and their (4) Foam systems
Appurtenances. (5) Private hydrants SER 7-9 DB
” 1995.
(6) Monitor nozzles or standpipe systems with reference to water SRP 7.0-12 DB
supplies CAR 7-10, 7-11 DB
(7) Hose houses
1.1.2 This standard shall apply to combined service mains used to carry
water for fire service and other uses.
1.2 Purpose.
The purpose of this standard shall be to provide a reasonable degree of
protection for life and property from fire through installation requirements for
private fire service main systems based on sound engineering principles, test
NFPA 241, 1.1* Scope. USEC SER
Standard for This standard shall apply to structures in the course of construction, NFPA 801
Safeguarding alteration, or demolition, including those in underground locations. NFPA 804
Construction, 1.2 Purpose. NFPA 805
Alteration, and This standard is intended to prescribe minimum safeguards for construction,
Demolition alteration, and demolition operations in order to provide reasonable safety to
Operations life and property from fire during such operations.
Standard 25, This document establishes the minimum requirements for the periodic MFFF and all nuclear facilities must inspect and maintain
“Standard for inspection, testing, and maintenance of water-based fire protection systems, the fire suppression systems. These systems are usually
the Inspection, including land-based and marine applications. The types of systems addressed PSSC.
Testing, and by this standard include, sprinkler, standpipe and hose, fixed water spray, and
Maintenance of foam water. Included are the water supplies that are part of these systems, CAR 7-8 Conops
Water-Based such as private fire service mains and appurtenances, fire pumps and water
Fire Protection storage tanks, and valves that control system flow. The document also SER 7-10 Conops
Systems.” 1998. addresses impairment handling and reporting. This standard applies to fire
protection systems that have been properly installed in accordance with SRP 7.0-13 Conops
generally accepted practices. Where a system has not been installed in
accordance with generally accepted practices, the corrective action is beyond
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the scope of this standard. The corrective action to ensure that the system
performs in a satisfactory manner shall be in accordance with the appropriate
installation standard.
1.2 Purpose.
The purpose of this document is to provide requirements that ensure a
reasonable degree of protection for life and property from fire through
minimum inspection, testing, and maintenance methods for water-based fire
protection systems. In those cases where it is determined that an existing
situation involves a distinct hazard to life or property, the AHJ shall be
permitted to require inspection, testing, and maintenance methods in excess
of those required by the standard.
Standard 251, This standard provides methods of fire tests for the fire-resistive properties of MFFF and all nuclear facilities usually require building
"Standard building members and assemblies. materials be tested to this standard. “Fire resistance” is
Methods of 1.2 Purpose. required. This standard calls out many detailed test that are
Tests of Fire 1.2.1 This standard describes methods to evaluate the duration for which the in ASTM standards.
Endurance of types of assemblies noted in 1.3.1 contain a fire, retain their structural
Building integrity, or exhibit both properties, depending on the type of assembly SRP 7.0-25 DB
Construction involved during a predetermined test exposure.
and Materials." 1.2.2 It is the intention of this standard that fire resistance ratings be based on
performance during the period of exposure and not be used to determine
suitability for use after fire exposure.
1.2.3 The results of these tests are one factor in assessing fire performance of
building construction and assemblies.
Standard 253, 1.1.1 This fire test response standard describes a procedure for measuring Building materials must have fire resistance. This standard
“Standard Test critical radiant flux behavior of horizontally mounted floor covering systems requires that the materials must be tested for the heat
Method for exposed to a flaming ignition source in a graded, radiant heat energy generated. This information is used in fire analyses.
Critical Radiant environment within a test chamber.
Flux of Floor 1.1.2 This fire test response standard measures the critical radiant flux at MFFF and all nuclear facilities usually require building
Covering flameout and provides a basis for estimating one aspect of fire exposure materials be tested to this standard. This standard calls out
Systems Using behavior for floor covering systems. many detailed test that are in ASTM standards.
a Radiant Heat 1.2 Purpose. SER 7-3 DB
Energy Source.” 1.2.1 The standard was developed to simulate an important fire exposure
1995. CAR 7-3 DB
component in fires that develop in corridors or exit ways of buildings and is
not intended for routine use in estimating flame spread behavior of floor
SRP 7.0-9 DB
covering in building areas other than corridors or exit ways.
1.2.2 This fire test response standard is designed to provide a basis for
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estimating one aspect of the fire exposure behavior of a floor covering system
installed in a building corridor.
1.2.3 The test environment simulates conditions that have been observed and
defined in full-scale corridor experiments.
Standard 30, 1.1 Scope. MFFF and all nuclear facilities usually use flammable
“Flammable and 1.1.1 This code shall apply to the storage, handling, and use of flammable materials. This standard defines flammable materials and
Combustible and combustible liquids, including waste liquids, as herein defined and how to safely handle them. This is a common standard.
Liquids Code.” classified.
1996. 1.1.2 This code shall not apply to the following: CAR 7-3 Conops
(1) Any liquid that has a melting point equal to or greater than 37.8°C SRP 7.0-11, Conops
(100°F) or that does not meet the criteria for fluidity given in the definition 7.0-14
for liquid in Section 1.7
SER 7-12, 7-16 Conops
(2) Any liquefied gas or cryogenic liquid as defined in Chapter 3
(3) Any liquid that does not have a flash point, but which is capable of
burning under certain conditions; such liquids include certain halogenated
hydrocarbons and certain mixtures of flammable or combustible liquids and
halogenated hydrocarbons
(4) Any aerosol product
(5) Any mist, spray, or foam
1.1.3 This code shall also not apply to the following:
(1) Transportation of flammable and combustible liquids as governed by
the U.S. Department of Transportation
(2) Storage, handling, and use of fuel oil tanks and containers connected
with oil-burning equipment
1.2 Purpose.
The purpose of this code shall be to provide reasonable requirements for the
safe storage and handling of flammable and combustible liquids.
Standard 31, 1.1 Scope. Oil systems are usually used in nuclear facilities. This
"Standards for 1.1.1 This standard shall apply to the installation of stationary oil-burning standard calls out many other standards for design details of
Installation of equipment and appliances, including but not limited to industrial-, piping, tanks, etc.
Oil Burning commercial-, and residential-type steam, hot water, or warm air heating
Equipment." plants; domestic-type range burners and space heaters; and portable oil- SRP 7.0-14 DB
burning equipment.
1.1.2 This standard shall also apply to all accessory equipment and control
systems, whether electric, thermostatic, or mechanical, and all electrical
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wiring connected to oil-fired equipment.

1.1.3 This standard shall also apply to the installation of oil storage and
supply systems connected to oil-fired equipment and appliances.
1.1.4 This standard shall also apply to those multi-fueled appliances in which
fuel oil is one of the optional fuels.
1.1.5* This standard shall not apply to internal combustion engines, oil
lamps, or portable devices not specifically covered in this standard.
1.2 Purpose.
The purpose of this standard is to provide minimum requirements for the safe
installation of oil-fired stationary equipment and appliances and all related
equipment so as to prevent fires and explosions.
NFPA 36, 1.1 Scope. DOE/TIC-11603
Standard for 1.1.1* This standard shall apply to the commercial scale extraction
Solvent processing of animal and vegetable oils and fats by the use of Class I
Extraction flammable hydrocarbon liquids, hereinafter referred to as “solvents.”
Plants 1.1.2 This standard shall also apply to any equipment and buildings that are
located within 30 m (100 ft) of the extraction process.
1.1.3 This standard shall also apply to the unloading, storage, and handling of
solvents, regardless of distance from the extraction process.
1.1.4 This standard shall also apply to the means by which material to be
extracted is conveyed from the preparation process to the extraction process.
1.1.5 This standard shall also apply to the means by which extracted
desolventized solids and oils are conveyed from the extraction process.
1.1.6 This standard shall also apply to preparation and meal finishing
processes that are connected by conveyor to the extraction process, regardless
of intervening distance.
1.1.7* This standard shall not apply to the storage of raw materials or
finished products.
1.1.8 This standard shall not apply to extraction processes that use liquids
that are miscible with water.
1.1.9 This standard shall not apply to extraction processes that use flammable
gases, LP gases, or nonflammable gases.
1.1.10 This standard shall prohibit the use of processes that employ oxygen-
active compounds that are heat or shock sensitive, such as certain organic
peroxides, within the area defined in 1.1.2.
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1.2 Purpose.
The purpose of this standard shall be to provide the following:
(1) Requirements for the design, construction, and operation of
extraction processes that utilize Class I flammable hydrocarbon liquids
(2) Requirements for the prevention of fire and explosion in extraction
processes and in associated preparation and meal finishing areas
(3) A means by which plant fire protection and supervisory personnel
can evaluate the processes and operations under their control
(4) Guidance to regulatory and inspection officials in determining
whether a given facility is being operated in accordance with good practice
(5) A workable set of standards for the use of design engineers,
architects, and others in the planning and design of new installations
NFPA 37, 1.1 Scope. Combustion engines or gas turbines are used in many
Standard for the This standard establishes criteria for minimizing the hazards of fire during the nuclear facilities for emergency power or emergency fire
Installation and installation and operation of stationary combustion engines and gas turbines. water pumps. The engines are installed per this standard.
Use of 1.2 Purpose.
Stationary This standard provides minimum fire safety requirements for the installation SER 5-91 DB
Combustion and operation of stationary combustion engines and gas turbines.
Engines and
Gas Turbines,
2006 edition.
NFPA 430, 1.1 Scope. NFPA 801
Code for the 1.1.1 This code shall apply to the storage and handling of oxidizers that are
Storage of liquid or solid at ambient conditions.
Liquid and 1.1.1.1 This code shall not apply to the storage of solid and liquid oxidizers
Solid Oxidizers for normal use on the premises of one- and two-family dwellings.
1.1.1.2 Separate chapters shall specify requirements for storage of oxidizers
by class where the quantities stored are greater than the stated minimums.
1.1.1.3* For quantities of a class of oxidizer that are less than the minimum
covered by the separate chapter for that class, those parts of that chapter
pertaining to fire prevention and compatibility as well as all of Chapter 4 of
this code shall be used as requirements.
1.1.2 This code shall not apply to explosives or blasting agents, which are
covered by NFPA 495, Explosive Materials Code; to ammonium nitrate,
which is covered in NFPA 490, Code for the Storage of Ammonium Nitrate;
or to organic peroxides, which are covered in NFPA 432, Code for the Storage
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of Organic Peroxide Formulations.

1.1.3 The quantity and arrangement limits in this code shall not apply to the
storage of oxidizers in process areas at plants where oxidizers are
manufactured.
1.1.3.1 This code shall not apply to the storage of solid and liquid oxidizers
in existing buildings used for the storage of oxidizers at manufacturing plants.
1.1.4 The quantity and arrangement limits in this code shall not apply to
facilities that use ammonium perchlorate in the commercial manufacture of
large-scale rocket motors.
1.2* Purpose.
The purpose of this code shall be to provide requirements for the safe storage
of commercially available strengths of liquid and solid oxidizers.
Standard 45, 1.1 Scope. MFFF and all nuclear facilities usually have laboratories to
“Standard for 1.1.1 This standard shall apply to laboratory buildings, laboratory units, and test samples for quality. There could be flammable
Fire for laboratory work areas whether located above or below grade in which chemicals covered by this standard.
Laboratories chemicals, as defined, are handled or stored.
Using 1.1.2 This standard shall not apply to the following: SER 7-13 DB
Chemicals.” (1)* If conditions (a) and (b) exist, this standard shall not apply: SER 7-13 Conops
1996. (a) Laboratory units that contain less than or equal to 4 L (1 gal) of SRP 7.0-15 Conops
flammable or combustible liquid
(b) Laboratory units that contain less than 2.2 standard m3 (75 scf) of
flammable gas, not including piped-in low-pressure utility gas installed in
accordance with NFPA 54, National Fuel Gas Code
(2) Laboratories that are pilot plants
(3) Laboratories that handle only chemicals with a hazard rating of zero
or one, as defined by NFPA 704, Standard System for the Identification of the
Hazards of Materials for Emergency Response, for all of the following:
health, flammability, and instability
(4) Laboratories that are primarily manufacturing plants
(5) Incidental testing facilities
(6) Physical, electronic, instrument, laser, or similar laboratories that use
chemicals only for incidental purposes, such as cleaning
(7) Laboratories that work only with radioactive materials, as covered
by NFPA 801, Standard for Fire Protection for Facilities Handling
Radioactive Materials
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(8) Laboratories that work only with explosive material, as covered by

NFPA 495, Explosive Materials Code
1.1.3 This standard contains requirements, but not all-inclusive requirements,
for handling and storage of chemicals where laboratory-scale operations are
conducted and shall not cover the following:
(1) The special fire protection required when handling explosive
materials (See NFPA 495, Explosive Materials Code.)
(2) The special fire protection required when handling radioactive
materials
1.2 Purpose.
1.2.1 The purpose of this standard shall be to provide basic requirements for
the protection of life and property through prevention and control of fires and
explosions involving the use of chemicals in laboratory-scale operations.
1.2.2 This standard is designed to control hazards and protect personnel from
the toxic, corrosive, or other harmful effects of chemicals to which personnel
might be exposed as a result of fire or explosion.
1.2.3 The goal of this standard shall be to achieve a comprehensive
laboratory fire prevention and protection program to prevent injury or death
to occupants and emergency response personnel.
1.2.4 The objectives of this standard shall be as follows:
(1) Limit injury to the occupants at the point of fire origin
(2) Limit injury to emergency response personnel
(3) Limit property loss to a maximum of a single laboratory unit
1.2.5 It is not the objective of this standard to address financial losses such as
business interruption or property loss when the loss of a laboratory unit is
unacceptable.
Standard 482, Now covered by NFPA 484 MFFF and fuel fabrication facilities use zirconium. This
“Production, standard is applied. The issue is the possible zirconium
Processing, dust.
Handling and
Storage of CAR 7-4 Conops
Zirconium.” SER 7-11 Conops
1996.
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Standard 484 1.1 Scope. All materials that may have dust problems (like zirconium
“Standard for This standard shall apply to the production, processing, finishing, handling, in NFPA 482) are now in this standard.
Combustible storage, and use of all metals and alloys that are in a form that is capable of
Metals” combustion or explosion. This is NOT called out by the CAR, SER and SRP.
1.1.1 The procedures in Chapter 4 shall be used to determine whether a metal However, NFPA 482 is called out.
is in a noncombustible form.
1.1.2 Combustible Powder or Dust. This is a new standard that substitutes for 482. Callouts for
1.1.2.1 This standard also shall apply to operations where metal or metal 482 are:
alloys are subjected to processing or finishing operations that produce
combustible powder or dust. CAR 7-4 Conop
1.1.2.2 Operations where metal or metal alloys are subjected to processing or s
SER 7-11 Conop
finishing operations that produce combustible powder or dust shall include, s
but shall not be limited to, machining, sawing, grinding, buffing, and
polishing.
1.1.3* Metals, metal alloy parts, and those materials, including scrap, that
exhibit combustion characteristics of aluminum, alkali metals, magnesium,
tantalum, titanium, or zirconium shall be subject to the requirements of the
metal whose combustion characteristics they most closely match.
1.1.4 Metals and metal alloy parts and those materials, including scrap, that
do not exhibit combustion characteristics of alkali metals, aluminum,
magnesium, niobium, tantalum, titanium, or zirconium are subject to the
requirements of Chapter 10.
1.1.5* This standard shall not apply to the transportation of metals in any
form on public highways and waterways or by air or rail.
1.1.6 This standard shall not apply to the primary production of aluminum,
magnesium, and lithium.
1.1.7 This standard shall apply to laboratories that handle, use, or store more
than ½ lb of alkali metals or 2 lb aggregate of other combustible metals
excluding alkali metals.
1.1.8 All alkali metals and metals that are in a form that is water reactive
shall be subject to this standard.
1.2 Purpose.
The objective of this standard shall be to minimize the occurrence of and
resulting damage from fire or explosion in areas where combustible metals or
metal dusts are produced, processed, finished, handled, stored, and used.
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NFPA 497, 1.1 Scope. DOE/TIC/11603

Recommended 1.1.1 This recommended practice applies to those locations where flammable
Practice for the gases or vapors, flammable liquids, or combustible liquids are processed or
Classification of handled; and where their release into the atmosphere could result in their
Flammable ignition by electrical systems or equipment.
Liquids, Gases, 1.1.2 This recommended practice provides information on specific
or Vapors and of flammable gases and vapors, flammable liquids, and combustible liquids,
Hazardous whose relevant combustion properties have been sufficiently identified to
(Classified) allow their classification into the groups established by NFPA 70, National
Locations for Electrical Code® (NEC®), for proper selection of electrical equipment in
Electrical hazardous (classified) locations. The tables of selected combustible materials
Installations in contained in this document are not intended to be all-inclusive.
Chemical 1.1.3 This recommended practice applies to chemical process areas. As used
Process Areas in this document, a chemical process area could be a large, integrated
chemical process plant or it could be a part of such a plant. It could be a part
of a manufacturing facility where flammable gases or vapors, flammable
liquids, or combustible liquids are produced or used in chemical reactions, or
are handled or used in certain unit operations such as mixing, filtration,
coating, spraying, and distillation.
1.1.4 This recommended practice does not apply to situations that could
involve catastrophic failure of or catastrophic discharge from process vessels,
pipelines, tanks, or systems.
1.1.5 This recommended practice does not apply to oxygen-enriched
atmospheres or pyrophoric materials.
1.2 Purpose.
The purpose of this recommended practice is to provide the user with a basic
understanding of the parameters that determine the degree and the extent of
the hazardous (classified) location. This recommended practice also provides
the user with examples of the applications of these parameters.
1.2.1 Information is provided on specific flammable gases and vapors,
flammable liquids, and combustible liquids, whose relevant properties
determine their classification into groups. This will assist in the selection of
special electrical equipment for hazardous (classified) locations where such
electrical equipment is required.
A-24
1.2.2 This recommended practice is intended as a guide and should be

applied with sound engineering judgment. Where all factors are properly
evaluated, a consistent area classification scheme can be developed.
Standard 50, All of these are now in NFPA 55 See NFPA 55.
"Standard for 50
Bulk Oxygen SRP 7.0-11 Conops
Systems at
Consumer 50A
Sites." CAR 7-4 DB
SER 7-13 DB
Standard 50A, SER 7-13 Conops
“Standard for SRP 7.0-11 DB
Gaseous SRP 7.0-11 Conops
Hydrogen
Systems at 50B
Consumer SRP 7.0-11 Conop
Sites.” 1999. s
Standard 50B,
"Standard for
Liquefied
Hydrogen
Systems at
Consumer
Sites."
Standard 51, 1.1 Scope. MFFF and all nuclear facilities usually these systems for
"Standard for 1.1.1 This standard applies to the following: repairs or system changes. This standard defines and how
Oxygen-Fuel (1) Design and installation of oxygen–fuel gas welding and cutting to safely handle them.
Gas Systems for systems and allied processes except for systems meeting the criteria in 1.1.5
Welding, (2) Utilization of gaseous fuels generated from flammable liquids under SRP 7.0-11 Conops
Cutting, and pressure when such fuels are used with oxygen
Allied (3) Storage, on the site of a welding and cutting system installation, of
Processes." the following:
(a) Gases to be used with such systems where more than one cylinder
each of oxygen and fuel gas are stored in any single storage area [This
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category includes storage of more than one cylinder each in any single
storage area even though all such stored cylinders may be intended for use in
systems of the kind described in 1.1.5(1).]
(b) Calcium carbide
1.1.2 Unless specifically indicated otherwise, the term welding and cutting
systems shall be considered to include allied processes in this standard.
(cont’d) 1.1.3 When only a portion of a fuel gas system is to be used for welding,
cutting, or allied processes, only that portion of the system need comply with
this standard.
1.1.4 When only a portion of an oxygen system is to be used with fuel gas for
welding, cutting, or allied processes, only that portion of the system need
comply with this standard.
1.1.5 This standard shall not apply to the following:
(1) Systems consisting of a single cylinder not exceeding 120 ft3 of
oxygen and a single cylinder not exceeding 120 ft3 of fuel gas used for
welding and cutting
(2) Systems in which fuel gases are not to be used with oxygen, as
described in NFPA 54, National Fuel Gas Code, and NFPA 58, Liquefied
Petroleum Gas Code
(3) The manufacture of gases and the filling of cylinders
(4) Storage of empty cylinders
(5) Compressed air–fuel gas systems
1.2 Purpose.
The purpose of this standard is to reduce the risk of fires and explosions in
oxygen–fuel gas cutting and welding systems.
Standard 54, 1.1 Scope. MFFF and most nuclear facilities use natural gas for
"National Fuel 1.1.1 Applicability. heating and for systems like furnaces. Most facilities do
Gas Code." 1.1.1.1 This code is a safety code that shall apply to the installation of fuel not have LP systems as in this standard.
gas piping systems, appliances, equipment, and related accessories as shown
in 1.1.1.1(A) through 1.1.1.1(D). SRP 7.0-14 DB
(A) Coverage of piping systems shall extend from the point of delivery to the
appliance connections. For other than undiluted LP gas systems, the point of .
delivery shall be considered to be the outlet of the service meter assembly or
the outlet of the service regulator or service shutoff valve where no meter is
provided. For undiluted LP gas systems, the point of delivery shall be
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considered to be the outlet of the final pressure regulator, exclusive of line gas
regulators, in the system.
(B) The maximum operating pressure shall be 125 psi (862 kPa).
Exception No. 1: Piping systems for gas–air mixtures within the flammable
range are limited to a maximum pressure of 10 psi (69 kPa).
(cont’d) Exception No. 2: LP-Gas piping systems are limited to 20 psi (140 kPa),
except as provided in 5.5.2.
(C) Piping systems requirements shall include design, materials, components,
fabrication, assembly, installation, testing, inspection, operation, and
maintenance.
(D) Requirements for appliances, equipment and related accessories shall
include installation, combustion, and ventilation air and venting.
1.1.1.2 This code shall not apply to the following items (reference standards
for some of which appear in Annex L):
(1) Portable LP-Gas appliances and equipment of all types that are not
connected to a fixed fuel piping system
(2) Installation of farm appliances and equipment such as brooders,
dehydrators, dryers, and irrigation equipment
(3) Raw material (feedstock) applications except for piping to special
atmosphere generators
(4) Oxygen–fuel gas cutting and welding systems
(5) Industrial gas applications using such gases as acetylene and
acetylenic compounds, hydrogen, ammonia, carbon monoxide, oxygen, and
nitrogen
(6) Petroleum refineries, pipeline compressor or pumping stations,
loading terminals, compounding plants, refinery tank farms, and natural gas
processing plants
(7) Large integrated chemical plants or portions of such plants where
flammable or combustible liquids or gases are produced by chemical
reactions or used in chemical reactions
(8) LP-Gas installations at utility gas plants
(9) Liquefied natural gas (LNG) installations
(10) Fuel gas piping in power and atomic energy plants
(11) Proprietary items of equipment, apparatus, or instruments such as
gas generating sets, compressors, and calorimeters
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(12) LP-Gas equipment for vaporization, gas mixing, and gas

manufacturing
(13) LP-Gas piping for buildings under construction or renovations that is
not to become part of the permanent building piping system — that is,
temporary fixed piping for building heat
(14) Installation of LP-Gas systems for railroad switch heating
(15) Installation of LP-Gas and compressed natural gas (CNG) systems
on vehicles
(16) Gas piping, meters, gas pressure regulators, and other appurtenances
used by the serving gas supplier in distribution of gas, other than undiluted
LP-Gas
(17) Building design and construction, except as specified herein
(18) Fuel gas systems on recreational vehicles manufactured in
accordance with NFPA 1192, Standard on Recreational Vehicles
(19) Fuel gas systems using hydrogen as a fuel
(20) Construction of appliances
1.1.2 Other Standards. In applying this code, reference shall also be made to
the manufacturers’ instructions and the serving gas supplier regulations.
Standard 55, 1.1 Scope. Nuclear facilities may use these systems. MFFF does not
“Standard for 1.1.1 Applicability. This standard shall apply to the installation, storage, use, have such systems but could have them so this is called out
Compressed and and handling of compressed gases and cryogenic fluids in portable and in the SRP.
Liquefied Gases stationary containers, cylinders, equipment, and tanks in all occupancies.
in Portable 1.1.2 Exemptions. This standard shall not apply to the following: Standards 50, 50A, and 50B are now here.
Cylinders.” (1)* Off-site transportation of materials covered by this standard
1998. (2) Storage, use, and handling of radioactive gases in accordance with CAR 7-4 Conops
NFPA 801, Standard for Fire Protection for Facilities Handling Radioactive SER 7-13 Conops
Materials SRP 7.0-11 Conops
(3) Storage, use, and handling of medical compressed gases at health
care facilities in accordance with NFPA 99, Standard for Health Care
Facilities
(4)* Except for Chapter 9, storage, use, and handling of bulk oxygen in
medical gas systems at health care facilities
(5) Systems consisting of cylinders of oxygen and cylinders of fuel gas
used for welding and cutting in accordance with NFPA 51, Standard for the
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Design and Installation of Oxygen–Fuel Gas Systems for Welding, Cutting,

and Allied Processes
(6) Acetylene cylinders in acetylene cylinder charging plants in
accordance with NFPA 51A, Standard for Acetylene Cylinder Charging Plants
(cont’d) (7) Ethylene oxide containers stored, handled, or used for sterilization
and fumigation in accordance with NFPA 560, Standard for the Storage,
Handling, and Use of Ethylene Oxide for Sterilization and Fumigation
(8) Flammable gases used as a vehicle fuel when stored on a vehicle
(9) Storage, use, and handling of liquefied and nonliquefied compressed
gases in laboratory work areas that are in accordance with NFPA 45, Standard
on Fire Protection for Laboratories Using Chemicals
(10) Storage, use, and handling of LP gases in accordance with NFPA 58,
Liquefied Petroleum Gas Code
(11) Storage, use, and handling of gases within closed-cycle refrigeration
systems complying with the mechanical code
(12) LNG storage at utility plants under NFPA 59A, Standard for the
Production, Storage, and Handling of LNG
(13) LNG handled as a vehicle fuel under NFPA 57, Liquefied Natural
Gas (LNG) Vehicular Fuel Systems Code
(14) CNG handled as a vehicle fuel under NFPA 52, Compressed Natural
Gas (CNG) Vehicular Fuel Systems Code
1.2 Purpose.
The purpose of this standard shall be to provide fundamental safeguards for
the installation, storage, use, and handling of compressed gases and cryogenic
fluids in portable and stationary containers, cylinders, and tanks.
Standard 58, 1.1 Scope. MFFF and most nuclear facilities do not have LP systems
"Standard for This code applies to the storage, handling, transportation, and use of LP-Gas. as in this standard.
Storage and 1.3 Application.
Handling of 1.3.1 Application of the Code. This code shall apply to the operation of all This is called out by the SRP in case these systems exist. It
Liquefied LP-Gas systems including the following: is not likely these systems are in facilities so it is odd to see
Petroleum (1) Containers, piping, and associated equipment, when delivering LP- this standard is called out.
Gases." Gas to a building for use as a fuel gas.
(2) Highway transportation of LP-Gas. SRP 7.0-11 Conops
(3) The design, construction, installation, and operation of marine
terminals whose primary purpose is the receipt of LP-Gas for delivery to
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transporters, distributors, or users except for marine terminals associated with

refineries, petrochemicals, gas plants, and marine terminals whose purpose is
the delivery of LP-Gas to marine vessels.
(4)* The design, construction, installation, and operation of pipeline
terminals that receive LP-Gas from pipelines under the jurisdiction of the
U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), whose primary purpose is the
receipt of LP-Gas for delivery to transporters, distributors, or users. Coverage
shall begin downstream of the last pipeline valve or tank manifold inlet.
1.3.2 Non-application of Code. This code shall not apply to the following:
(1) Frozen ground containers and underground storage in caverns
including associated piping and appurtenances used for the storage of LP-
Gas.
(2) Natural gas processing plants, refineries, and petrochemical plants.
(3) LP-Gas (including refrigerated storage) at utility gas plants (see
NFPA 59, Utility LP-Gas Plant Code).
(4) Chemical plants where specific approval of construction and
installation plans, based on substantially similar requirements, is obtained
from the AHJ.
(5)* LP-Gas used with oxygen.
(6)* The portions of LP-Gas systems covered by NFPA 54 (ANSI
Z223.1), National Fuel Gas Code, where NFPA 54 (ANSI Z223.1) is adopted,
used, or enforced.
(7) Transportation by air (including use in hot air balloons), rail, or
water under the jurisdiction of the DOT.
(8)* Marine fire protection.
(9) Refrigeration cycle equipment and LP-Gas used as a refrigerant in a
closed cycle.
(10) The manufacturing requirements for recreational vehicle LP-Gas
systems that are addressed by NFPA 1192, Standard on Recreational Vehicles.
(11) Propane dispensers located at multiple fuel refueling stations shall
comply with NFPA 30A, Code for Motor Fuel Dispensing Facilities and
Repair Garages.
A-30
Standard 600, 1.1 Scope. MFFF and nuclear facilities use brigades or fire
“Standard on 1.1.1 This standard contains minimum requirements for organizing, departments for manual fire fighting. There are many
Industrial Fire operating, training, and equipping industrial fire brigades. It also contains references for the equipment that is needed to protect fire
Brigades.” minimum requirements for the occupational safety and health of industrial fighters.
1996. fire brigade members while performing fire fighting and related activities.
1.1.2 This standard shall apply to any organized, private, industrial group of CAR 7-16 Conops
employees having fire-fighting response duties, such as emergency brigades, SRP 7.0-15 Conops
emergency response teams, fire teams, and plant emergency organizations. SER 7-10, 7- Conops
13
1.1.3 This standard shall not apply to industrial fire brigades that respond to
fire emergencies outside the boundaries of the industrial site where the off-
site fire involves unfamiliar hazards or enclosed structures with layout and
contents that are unknown to the industrial fire brigade.
1.1.4 This standard shall not apply to medical response, confined space
rescue response, and hazardous material response activities.
1.2 Purpose.
The purpose of this standard is to provide minimum requirements for
organization, operation, training, and occupational safety and health for
industrial fire brigades.
Standard 69, 1.2 Purpose. MFFF and nuclear facilities usually have some flammable
“Standard on 1.2.1 This standard shall cover the minimum requirements for installing gases. This standard requires that special electrical systems
Explosion systems for the prevention of explosions in enclosures that contain flammable must be used per NFPA 70.
Prevention concentrations of flammable gases, vapors, mists, dusts, or hybrid mixtures.
Systems.” 1997. 1.2.2 This standard shall provide basic information for design engineers, SER 7-12 DB
operating personnel, and authorities having jurisdiction. SRP 7.0-10, DB
7.0-11
Standard 70, NEC covers electric conductors and equipment installed within or on public All facilities in the US use the standard electrical code. It
“National and private buildings or other structures, including mobile homes and includes how to design for special cases like around
Electric Code.” recreational vehicles, floating buildings; and other premises such as yards, flammable or explosive materials.
1999. carnivals, parking and other lots and industrial substations; conductors that This standard is very long and references hundreds of other
connect the installations to a supply of electricity; and other outside standards and codes. It covers general electrical system
conductors and equipment on the premises; optical fiber cable; buildings used design, installation, and testing so the references are not
by the electric utility, such as office buildings, warehouse, garages, machine used for Tier 2.
shops, and recreational buildings that are not an integral part of a generating
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plant, substation, or control center.

SRP 7.0-10, DB
E-2
SER 7-4, 7-5 DB
NFPA 701, 1.1* Scope. RG 1.189

Standard 1.1.1 Test Method 1. NFPA 801
Methods of Fire 1.1.1.1 Test Method 1 shall apply to fabrics or other materials used in NFPA 804
Tests for Flame curtains, draperies, or other window treatments. Vinyl-coated fabric blackout NFPA 805
Propagation of linings shall be tested according to Test Method 2.
Textiles and 1.1.1.2 Test Method 1 shall apply to single-layer fabrics and to multilayer
Films curtain and drapery assemblies in which the layers are fastened together by
sewing or other means. Vinyl-coated fabric blackout linings shall be tested
according to Test Method 2.
1.1.1.3 Test Method 1 shall apply to the following textile items:
(1) Table skirts
(2) Table linens
(3) Display booth separators
(4) Textile wall hangings
1.1.1.4 Test Method 1 shall not apply to specimens having an areal density
greater than 700 g/m2 (21 oz/yd2).
1.1.1.5 For the purposes of Test Method 1, the terms curtains, draperies, or
other types of window treatments, where used, shall include, but not be
limited to, the following items:
(1) Window curtains
(2) Stage or theater curtains
(3) Vertical folding shades
(4) Roll-type window shades
(5) Hospital privacy curtains
(6) Window draperies
(7) Fabric vertical shades or blinds
(8) Horizontal folding shades
(9) Swags
(10) Fabric horizontal shades or blinds
1.1.2 Test Method 2.
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1.1.2.1 Test Method 2 (flat specimen configuration) shall be used for fabrics,
including multilayered fabrics, films, and plastic blinds, with or without
reinforcement or backing, with areal densities greater than 700 g/m2 (21
oz/yd2).
1.1.2.2 Test Method 2 shall be used for testing vinyl-coated fabric blackout
linings and lined draperies using a vinyl-coated fabric blackout lining.
1.1.2.3 Test Method 2 shall be used for testing plastic films, with or without
reinforcement or backing, when used for decorative or other purposes inside a
building or as temporary or permanent enclosures for buildings under
construction.
1.1.2.4 Test Method 2 shall apply to fabrics used in the assembly of awnings,
tents, tarps, and similar architectural fabric structures and banners.
1.1.3 Test Methods 1 and 2.
1.1.3.1 When durability to cleaning or weathering is claimed, the textile or
material shall be tested for flame propagation as produced and after being
subjected to the applicable cleaning or exposure procedures, in accordance
with Chapter 16.
1.1.3.2 For materials that are to be applied to surfaces of buildings or backing
materials that are to be used in buildings as interior finishes, the test textiles
and films shall be tested and classified in accordance with NFPA 255,
Standard Method of Test of Surface Burning Characteristics of Building
Materials, or NFPA 265, Standard Methods of Fire Tests for Evaluating Room
Fire Growth Contribution of Textile Coverings on Full Height Panels and
Walls, whichever is required by the AHJ.
1.2* Purpose.
1.2.1 The purpose of Test Methods 1 and 2 shall be to assess the propagation
of flame beyond the area exposed to the ignition source.
1.2.2 Test Methods 1 and 2 shall not be deemed to indicate whether the
material tested resists the propagation of flame under more severe fire
exposure conditions or when the material is used in a manner that differs from
the test conditions.
Standard 72, 1.1 Scope. All facilities in the US use this standard for alarm systems.
“National Fire 1.1.1 NFPA 72 covers the application, installation, location, performance, There are many requirements and references to other
Alarm Code.” inspection, testing, and maintenance of fire alarm systems, fire warning standards and codes for detailed designs.
1996. equipment and emergency warning equipment, and their components.
1.1.2 The provisions of this chapter apply throughout the Code unless CAR 7-6 DB
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otherwise noted. SER 5-92, 7- DB

5, 7-19
1.2* Purpose.
SRP 7.0-12, DB
1.2.1 The purpose of this Code is to define the means of signal initiation, E-2
transmission, notification, and annunciation; the levels of performance; and
the reliability of the various types of fire alarm systems.
1.2.2 This Code defines the features associated with these systems and also
provides information necessary to modify or upgrade an existing system to
meet the requirements of a particular system classification.
1.2.3 This Code establishes minimum required levels of performance, extent
of redundancy, and quality of installation but does not establish the only
methods by which these requirements are to be achieved.
1.2.4* This Code shall not be interpreted to require a level of fire protection
that is greater than that which would otherwise be required by the applicable
building or fire code.
NFPA 75, 1.1 Scope. USEC SER

Standard for the This standard covers the requirements for the protection of information RG 1.189
Protection of technology equipment and information technology equipment areas. NFPA 801
Information 1.2* Purpose. NFPA 804
Technology The purpose of this standard is to set forth the minimum requirements for the
Equipment protection of information technology equipment and information technology
equipment areas from damage by fire or its associated effects — namely,
smoke, corrosion, heat, and water.
Standard 780, 1.1 Scope. MFFF, nuclear facilities and all industrial facilities require
“Lightning 1.1.1 This document shall cover traditional lightning protection system lightening protection.
Protection installation requirements for the following:
Code.” 1997. (1) Ordinary structures CAR 7-4 DB
(2) Miscellaneous structures and special occupancies SER 5-3, 7-6 DB
SRP 7.0-10 DB
(3) Heavy-duty stacks
(4) Watercraft
(5) Structures containing flammable vapors, flammable gases, or liquids
that give off flammable vapors
1.1.2* This document shall not cover lightning protection system installation
requirements for the following:
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(1) Explosives manufacturing buildings and magazines

(2) Electric generating, transmission, and distribution systems
1.1.3 This document shall not cover lightning protection system installation
requirements for early streamer emission systems or charge dissipation
systems.
1.2 Purpose.
The purpose of this standard shall be to provide for the safeguarding of
persons and property from hazards arising from exposure to lightning.
Standard 80, 1.1 Scope. MFFF and most nuclear facilities have windows in the fire
“Standard for This standard regulates the installation and maintenance of assemblies and walls and fire barriers. The windows must be specially
Fire Windows.” devices used to protect openings in walls, floors, and ceilings against the designed to maintain the fire resistance of the wall or fire
1999. spread of fire and smoke within, into, or out of buildings. barrier
1.1.1 With the exception of fabric fire safety curtain assemblies, this standard
addresses assemblies that have been subjected to standardized fire tests. (See
Chapter 20.)
1.1.2 Incinerator doors, record room doors, and vault doors are not covered
in this standard.
1.1.3 Requirements for horizontally sliding, vertically sliding, and swinging
doors as used in this standard do not apply to hoistway doors for elevators
and dumbwaiters. CAR 7-6 DB
1.1.4 This standard does not cover fire-resistant glazing materials and SER 5-92, 7- DB
horizontally sliding accordion or folding assemblies fabricated for use as 8, 7-18
walls and tested as wall assemblies in accordance with NFPA 251, Standard SRP 7.0-11 DB
Methods of Tests of Fire Resistance of Building Construction and Materials.
1.2 Purpose.
1.2.1 The purpose of this document is to set national standards for the
installation and maintenance of assemblies used to protect openings in walls,
floors, and ceilings to prevent or retard the spread of fire and smoke within,
into, or out of buildings.
1.2.2 This document is also intended to give guidance to AHJs so they can
determine in the field if an assembly meets the requirements and standards
outlined in this document and if maintenance standards have been maintained.
1.2.3 It is not the purpose of this standard to establish the degree of
protection required or to constitute the approval of any product.
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Standard 801, 1.1 Scope. The NFPA knows that MFFF and nuclear facilities have
“Standards for 1.1.1 This standard addresses fire protection requirements intended to reduce special requirements so this standard was made. It is
Facilities the risk of fires and explosions at facilities handling radioactive materials. general guidance. There were many NRC people on the
Handling These requirements are applicable to all locations where radioactive materials NFPA committee.
Radioactive are stored, handled, or used in quantities and conditions requiring government
Material.” 1998. oversight and/or license (e.g., NRC or DOE) to possess or use these materials CAR 7-3 Conops
and to all other locations with equal quantities or conditions. CAR 7-3 DB
1.1.2 This standard shall not apply to commercial power reactors that are CAR 7-5 DB
covered by NFPA 804, Standard for Fire Protection for Advanced Light CAR 7-20 DB
Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants, and NFPA 805, Performance- SER 5-89 DB
Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Electric SER 5-92 DB
Generating Plants. SER 7-9 DB
1.2 Purpose. SER 7-12 DB
1.2.1 Responsibilities. This standard shall provide requirements and guidance SER 7-16 DB
for personnel responsible for the design, construction, operation, and SER 5-86, 5- Conops
regulation of facilities that involve the storage, handling, or use of radioactive 96, 7-
materials. 15, 11-
36
1.2.2 Defense-in-Depth. SER 7-8, 7- DB
1.2.2.1 This standard shall be based on the concept of defense-in-depth. 18
1.2.2.2 Defense-in-depth shall be achieved when a balance of each of the SRP 7.0-15 Conops
following elements is provided:
(2) Detecting fires rapidly and controlling and extinguishing promptly
those fires that do occur, thereby limiting damage and consequences
(3) Providing a level of fire protection for structures, systems, and
components so that a fire that is not promptly extinguished will not prevent
essential facility functions from being performed
Standard 80A 1.1 Scope. This standard is used for MFFF, nuclear facilities, and all
“Recommended This recommended practice addresses separation distances between buildings industrial facilities to reduce possible fires from other
Practice for to limit exterior fire spread based on exterior openings and other construction facilities nearby.
Protection of features.
Buildings from 1.2 Purpose. SER 7-3 DB
Exterior Fire These recommendations are intended to provide a reasonable level of CAR 7-4 DB
Exposures.” protection for combustibles within and on the exterior of a building exposed SRP 7.0-9 DB
1996. to an external building fire while effective fire-fighting activity is being
contemplated.
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Standard 85 1.1 Scope. This standard was revised to include many other standards
“Boiler and This code shall apply to single burner boilers, multiple burner boilers, stokers, about burners and fuel that have been withdrawn.
Combustion and atmospheric fluidized-bed boilers with a fuel input rating of 3.7 MWt
Systems (12.5 million Btu/hr) or greater, to pulverized fuel systems, and to fired or MFFF, nuclear facilities, and industrial facilities all use this
Hazards Code” unfired steam generators used to recover heat from combustion turbines [heat standard for their heating systems or steam systems.
recovery steam generators (HRSGs)].
1.1.1 This code shall cover design, installation, operation, maintenance, and This is not called out by the CAR, SER and SRP but is
training. included because NFPA 8501 is called out.
1.1.2 This code shall cover strength of the structure, operation and
maintenance procedures, combustion and draft control equipment, safety SRP 7.0-15 DB
interlocks, alarms, trips, and other related controls that are essential to safe
equipment operation.
1.1.3 Coordination of the design and operating procedures of the boiler
furnace or HRSG system and any flue gas cleanup systems downstream of the
post-combustion gas passes shall be required. Such coordination shall include
requirements for ensuring a continuous flow path from the combustion air
inlet through the stack.
1.1.4 Chapter 5, Single Burner Boilers, covers single burner boilers that fire
the following fuels:
(1) Natural gas as defined in 3.3.71.10.
(2)* Other gas having a calorific value and characteristics similar to
natural gas
(3) Fuel oil of Grades 2, 4, 5, or 6
(4) Gas and oil that are fired simultaneously for fuel transfer
(5) Gas and oil that are fired simultaneously and continuously
1.1.5 Chapter 6, Multiple Burner Boilers, covers multiple burner boilers
firing one or more of the following:
(1) Gas fuel, as defined in 3.3.71.7 and 3.3.71.10
(2) Oil fuel, as defined in 3.3.71.3
(3) Pulverized coal fuel, as defined in 3.3.71.2.1 and simultaneous firing
of more than one fuel
1.1.6 Chapter 7, Atmospheric Fluidized-Bed Boilers, covers atmospheric
fluidized-bed boilers.
1.1.7* Chapter 8, Heat Recovery Steam Generators, covers (HRSG) systems.
1.1.8 Chapter 9, Pulverized Fuel Systems, covers pulverized fuel systems,
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(cont’d) beginning with the raw fuel bunker, which is upstream of the pulverizer and
the point at which primary air enters the pulverizing system, and terminating
at the point where pressure can be relieved by fuel being burned or collected
in a device that is built in accordance with this code. The pulverized fuel
system shall include the primary air ducts, which are upstream of the
pulverizer, to a point where pressure can be relieved.
1.1.9 Chapter 10, Stokers, covers boilers using a stoker to fire the following
fuels:
(1) Coal
(2) Wood
(3) Refuse-derived fuel (RDF)
(4) Municipal solid waste (MSW)
(5) Other solid fuels
1.1.9.1 Where solid fuel is fired simultaneously with other fuels (e.g., a solid
fuel stoker fired in combination with gas, oil, or pulverized auxiliary fuel),
additional controls and interlocks shall include those covered in Chapters 5, 6,
and 9.
Exception No. 1: The purge requirements of Chapters 5 and 6 shall not be
required when the stoker is firing and the boiler is on-line. In those cases, if
no cooling air is being provided to the auxiliary burners, a purge of their
associated air supply ducts shall be provided.
Exception No. 2: Where oil or gas is fired in a supervised manual system in
accordance with Chapter 5, the excessive steam pressure interlock shall not
be required.
1.2* Purpose.
The purpose of this code shall be to contribute to operating safety and to
prevent uncontrolled fires, explosions, and implosions in equipment described
in Section 1.1.
1.2.1 This code shall establish minimum requirements for the design,
installation, operation, training, and maintenance of pulverized fuel systems,
boilers, HRSGs, and their systems for fuel burning, air supply, and
combustion products removal.
1.2.2 The code shall require the coordination of operating procedures, control
systems, interlocks, and structural design.
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1.2.3 This code shall not be used as a design handbook.

1.2.3.1 A designer capable of applying more complete and rigorous analysis
to special or unusual problems shall have latitude in the development of such
designs.
1.2.3.2 In such cases, the designer shall be responsible for demonstrating and
documenting the validity of the proposed design.
Standard 8501, Covers minimum requirements for the design, installation, operation and Some facilities may use large systems to provide steam.
'Standard for maintenance of single burner oil or gas-fired boilers rated at 10,000 pounds of This covers those systems. It does not apply to MFFF but
Single Burner steam per hour and above. is called out in the SRP. This standard has been withdrawn
Oil Operation." and is no longer used.
Withdrawn, now in NFPA 85.
SRP 7.0-15 DB
Standard 86C, This standard shall apply to Class C industrial furnaces, atmosphere MFFF and many nuclear facilities use furnaces for
“Industrial generators, and atmosphere supply systems. Also included are furnaces with processing and this standard covers how the furnaces are
Furnaces Using integral quench tanks or molten salt baths. designed, installed and operated.
a Special Within the scope of this standard, an oven shall be any heated enclosure
Processing operating at approximately atmospheric pressure and used for commercial CAR 7-4 DB
Atmosphere.” and industrial processing of materials. SER 7-13 DB
1995. Within the scope of this standard, an integral quench tank shall be a container
that holds a quench medium into which metalwork is immersed for various
heat treatment processes. The work load remains under a protective
atmosphere from the time it leaves the heating zone until it enters the quench
medium.
Within the scope of this standard, a molten salt bath furnace shall be any
heated container that holds a melt or fusion composed of one or more
relatively stable chemical salts that form a liquid-like medium into which
metalwork is immersed for various processes that include, but are not limited
to, heat treating, brazing, stripping, and descaling.
This standard shall not apply to the following:
(1) Coal or other solid fuel-firing systems
(2) Listed equipment with a heating system(s) that supplies a total input not
exceeding 150,000 Btu/hr (44 kW). (See definition of Listed.)
Purpose.
Because the heat processing of materials can involve a serious fire and
explosion hazard that can endanger the furnace and the building in which the
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process is located and possibly the lives of employees, adequate safeguards

shall be provided as appropriate for the location, equipment, and operation of
such furnaces.
Standard 90A, 1.1 Scope. MFFF, nuclear facilities, and all industrial facilities must
"Standard for This standard shall cover construction, installation, operation, and design HVAC systems so that fire and smoke cannot spread
the installation maintenance of systems for air conditioning and ventilating, including filters, through the system.
of Air ducts, and related equipment, to protect life and property from fire, smoke,
Conditioning and gases resulting from fire or from conditions having manifestations similar This is called out by the CAR, SER and SRP.
and Ventilating to fire.
Systems." 1.2 Purpose.
This standard shall prescribe minimum requirements for safety to life and
property from fire. These requirements shall be intended to accomplish the
following:
(1) Restrict the spread of smoke through air duct systems within a
building or into a building from the outside
(2) Restrict the spread of fire through air duct systems from the area of
fire origin, whether located within the building or outside
(3) Maintain the fire-resistive integrity of building components and
elements such as floors, partitions, roofs, walls, and floor- or roof-ceiling
assemblies affected by the installation of air duct systems
(4) Minimize the ignition sources and combustibility of the elements of
the air duct systems
(5) Permit the air duct systems in a building to be used for the additional
purpose of emergency smoke control
NFPA 92A, 1.1 Scope. RG 1.189
Standard for This standard shall apply to the design, installation, acceptance testing,
Smoke-Control operation, and ongoing periodic testing of dedicated and non-dedicated
Systems smoke-control systems.
Utilizing 1.2 Purpose.
Barriers and 1.2.1 The purpose of this standard shall be to establish requirements for
Pressure smoke-control systems that use pressure differences across barriers to
Differences accomplish one or more of the following:
(1) Inhibit smoke from entering stairwells, means of egress, smoke
refuge areas, elevator shafts, or similar areas
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(2) Maintain a tenable environment in smoke refuge areas and means of

egress during the time required for evacuation
(3) Inhibit the migration of smoke from the smoke zone
(4) Provide conditions outside the smoke zone that enable emergency
response personnel to conduct search and rescue operations and to locate and
control the fire
(5) Contribute to the protection of life and to the reduction of property
loss
1.2.2 The requirements specifying the conditions under which a smoke-
control system shall be provided are addressed by other codes and standards.
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Table A-2 Tier 1 Other Non-NFPA Standards
Standard Summary Why and basis
ASTM D 1929 1.1 This fire test response test method covers a laboratory determination of Plastics are not a common material in MFFF or other
Standard Test the flash ignition temperature and spontaneous ignition temperature of nuclear facilities to reduce the combustible load. However,
Method for plastics using a hot-air furnace. plastics should have high ignition temperatures determined
Determining 1.3 This standard is used to measure and describe the response of materials, by this standard.
Ignition products, or assemblies to heat and flame under controlled conditions, but
Temperature of does not by itself incorporate all factors required for fire hazards or fire risk SER 7-11 F&S
Plastics, 1986 assessment of materials, products, or assemblies under actual fire conditions.
This test method and ISO 871-1996 are identical in all technical details.
ASTM E 84, 1.1 This fire-test-response standard for the comparative surface burning Building materials in MFFF and nuclear facilities should
Standard Test behavior of building materials is applicable to exposed surfaces such as walls have materials with slow flame fronts to ensure the fire
Method for and ceilings. The test is conducted with the specimen in the ceiling position does not spread. This is tested per this standard.
Surface Burning with the surface to be evaluated exposed face down to the ignition source..
Characteristics 1.2 The purpose of this test method is to determine the relative burning SER 7-3 F&S
of Building behavior of the material by observing the flame spread along the specimen. CAR 8-3 F&S
Materials, 2004. Flame spread and smoke developed index are reported. However, there is not SRP 7.0-9 F&S
necessarily a relationship between these two measurements.
1.7 This standard is used to measure and describe the response of materials,
products, or assemblies to heat and flame under controlled conditions, but
does not by itself incorporate all factors required for fire-hazard or fire-risk
assessment of the materials, products, or assemblies under actual fire
conditions.
ASTM E 119, 1.1 The test methods described in this fire-test-response standard are Building materials in MFFF and nuclear facilities should
Standard Test applicable to assemblies of masonry units and to composite assemblies of have materials with slow flame fronts to ensure the fire
Methods for structural materials for buildings, including bearing and other walls and does not spread. This is tested per this standard.
Fire Tests of partitions, columns, girders, beams, slabs, and composite slab and beam
Building assemblies for floors and roofs. They are also applicable to other assemblies CAR 7-5 F&S
Construction and structural units that constitute permanent integral parts of a finished SER 7-8 F&S
and Materials, building. SER 7-18 FHA
2000a.
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does not by itself incorporate all factors required for fire hazard or fire risk
assessment of the materials, products or assemblies under actual fire
conditions.
1.4 These test methods prescribe a standard fire exposure for comparing the
test results of building construction assemblies. The results of these tests are
one factor in assessing predicted fire performance of building construction
and assemblies. Application of these test results to predict the performance of
actual building construction requires the evaluation of test conditions.
DOE STD- The development of this Standard reflects the fact that national consensus This covers all areas of fire protection for DOE nuclear
1066-99, Fire standards and other design criteria do not comprehensively or, in some cases, facilities like MFFF. Notice it covers gloveboxes.
Protection adequately address fire protection issues at DOE facilities.
Design Criteria, This Standard provides supplemental fire protection guidance applicable to SER 7-20 DB
1999. the design and construction of DOE facilities and site features (such as water SRP 7.0-2 DB
distribution systems) that are also provided for fire protection. It is intended
to be used in conjunction with the applicable building code, NFPA Codes and
Standards, and any other applicable DOE construction criteria.
This Standard replaces certain mandatory fire protection requirements that
were formerly in DOE 5480.7A, "Fire Protection," and DOE 6430.1A,
"General Design Criteria." (DOE 1989). It also contains the fire protection
guidelines from two (now canceled) draft standards: "Glove Box Fire
Protection" and "Filter Plenum Fire Protection." (Note: This Standard does
not supersede the requirements of DOE 5480.7A and DOE 6430.1A where
these DOE Orders are currently applicable under existing contracts.)
FM Guide The Approval Guide lists thousands of products and services tested and FM FM tests materials and equipment for fire safety. FM
Factory Mutual Approved, and contains essential engineering data and technical information “lists” materials that are safe. IF possible materials and
System on the application and use of listed products. equipment for MFFF and nuclear facilities are “FM listed”.
Approval The lists have thousands of items.
Guide-
Equipment, CAR 7-3 F&S
Materials, SER 7-3 F&S
Services, and SRP 7.0-9 F&S
Conservation of
Property
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IEEE 383 In the IEEE-383 fire test, cables are supported by a one foot wide vertical This is the method to test cables for fir resistance. Cables
IEEE Standard rack eight feet high. The cables are positioned in the center six inches of the that have good fire resistance using this test should be used.
for Type Test of rack, spaced one-half cable diameter apart. The rack is centered in an eight Although originally intended for cables essential for
Class 1E foot cube enclosure recommended by UL. A ten inch ribbon burner fuel with emergency operations in NPPs, this test procedure is used
Electric Cables, an air-propane mixture ignites the cable with a 21 K W (70,000 BTU/hr) for other non-reactor facilities.
Field Splices, flame. The burner is positioned 2 feet above the floor and 9 to 12 inches of CAR 7-3 DB
and cable are exposed to the direct flames for 20 minutes. Cables on which flame SER 7-5 DB
Connections for extends above the top of the 8 foot rack fail this test.
Nuclear Power In general, the cables selected as samples for qualification must be
Generating representative of the family of cables being qualified and of installed
Stations configurations. This may require that individual insulated conductors, multi-
conductor jacketed cables or jacketed single conductor cables be part of the
test program. Both aged and unaged samples should be selected. These
samples will be required to be exposed to thermal aging, radiation aging,
design basis event DBE conditions, and to pass post DBE tests.
IEEE 384 This standard describes the independence requirements of the circuits and Ensures that PSSC systems have reliable operation if two
Standard equipment comprising or associated with Class 1E systems. It sets forth independent electrical and control systems are need.
Criteria for criteria for the independence that can be achieved by physical separation and
Independence electrical isolation of circuits and equipment that are redundant, but does not
of Class 1E address the determination of what is to be considered redundant. Although originally intended for cables essential for
Equipment and emergency operations in NPPs, this test procedure is used
Circuits for other non-reactor facilities.
SER 7-5 DB
IEEE 484 Recommended design practices and procedures for storage, location, Need for design of the batteries used in the standby
Recommended mounting, ventilation, instrumentation, preassembly, assembly, and charging electrical system.
Practice for of vented lead-acid batteries are provided. Required safety practices are also
Installation included. These recommended practices are applicable to all stationary SER 7-13 DB
Design and applications. However, specific applications, such as emergency lighting
Installation of units, semi portable equipment, and alternate energy applications, may have
Vented-Lead other appropriate practices and are beyond the scope of this recommended
Acid Batteries practice.
for Stationary
Applications
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IEEE 690 Direction for the design and installation of safety related electrical cable Although originally intended for NPPs, these design guides
IEEE Standard systems, including associated circuits, in nuclear power generating stations is and standards are also used for non-reactor facilities.
for the Design provided. Guidance for the design and installation of those non-safety related
and installation cable systems that may affect the function of safety related systems is also SRP 7.0-22 DB
of Cable provided.
Systems for
Class 1 E This standard discusses the fire protection needed for 1E emergency systems
Circuits in and references NFPA standards for fire protection and alarm systems as
Nuclear Power follows:
Generating
Stations 9. Cable-Penetration Fire Stops, Fire Breaks, and System Enclosures
This clause establishes requirements for the selection and application of
cable-penetration fire stops, cable fire breaks, and cable-system enclosures
(cocoons) for cable systems for Class 1E circuits.
10. Fire-Detection Systems

This clause establishes requirements for the selection and application of fire-
detection systems for cable systems for Class 1E circuits. The application
requirements are as follows:
a) Automatic fire-detection devices shall be installed in accordance with
NFPA 72, in areas of high cable concentration.
b) Fire-detection systems shall be electrically supervised to comply with
requirements of NFPA 70, Article 760 and NFPA 72.
11. Fire-Extinguishing Systems

This clause establishes requirements for the selection and application of fire-
extinguishing systems protecting cable systems for Class 1E circuits.
UL 555 1.1 These requirements cover fire dampers that are intended for use where air MFFF and all nuclear facilities all use fire dampers in the
Standard for ducts penetrate or terminate at openings in walls or partitions; in air transfer ventilation systems to prevent fires from spreading. This
Safety Fire openings in partitions; and where air ducts extend through floors as specified standard calls out many other standards for detailed deign
Dampers, 1999. in the Standard for Installation of Air-Conditioning and Ventilating Systems, and testing of fire dampers. This is a very commonly
NFPA 90A. Fire dampers are intended for installation in accordance with standard for industrial facilities.
codes such as the Building Official Code Administrators (BOCA) National
Mechanical Code, Southern Building Code Congress International, Inc. SER 5-92, 7-18 DB
(SBCCI) Standard Mechanical Code, International Congress of Building
Officials (ICBO) Uniform Mechanical Code, and the International SRP 7.0-11, E-4 DB
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Mechanical Code.
1.2 Fire dampers are evaluated for use as either:
a) Fire Dampers for Static Systems - For HVAC systems that are
automatically shut down in the event of a fire or for air transfer openings in
walls or partitions,
b) Fire Dampers for Dynamic Systems - For HVAC systems that are
operational in the event of a fire, or
c) Combination Fire and Smoke Dampers - For locations in HVAC systems
where a fire damper and a smoke damper are required at a single location.
1.3 Under these requirements a fire damper is subjected to a standard fire
exposure, controlled to achieve specified temperatures throughout a specified
time period, followed by the application of a specified standard hose stream.
This exposure by itself is not representative of all fire conditions; conditions
vary with changes in the amount, nature, and distribution of fire loading,
ventilation, compartment size and configuration, and heat sink characteristics
of the compartment. These requirements provide a relative measure of fire
performance of fire damper assemblies under these specified fire exposure
conditions. Any variation from the construction or conditions that are tested
such as method of installation and materials has the potential to substantially
change the performance characteristics of the fire damper assembly.
1.4 Fire dampers for static systems (no air flow through the damper) are
intended to close automatically upon the detection of heat by a heat
responsive device.
1.5 Under these requirements combination fire and smoke dampers and fire
dampers for dynamic systems are exposed to standardized heat and airflow
conditions and are evaluated for dynamic closure under these conditions.
1.6 Combination fire and smoke dampers shall also comply with the
applicable requirements in the Standard for Smoke Dampers, UL 555S.
1.7 Fire dampers for dynamic systems are intended for use where the airflow
is operational at the time of fire, such as in a smoke control system, or from
other situations in which the fan system is operational at the time of a fire.
1.8 Where fire dampers are required in ducts that penetrate fire barriers and
where the duct is also used as part of a smoke control system, the system
designer shall ascertain which type of fire damper is appropriate for the
application. Fire dampers for dynamic systems are evaluated only for
dynamic closure under heated airflow conditions. Combination fire and
smoke dampers that have an elevated temperature rating are evaluated for
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dynamic closure under heated airflow conditions and they are also evaluated
to operate under heated air conditions.
1.9 Tests conducted in accordance with these requirements are intended to
demonstrate the performance of fire dampers during the period of fire test
exposure and are not intended to determine acceptability of fire dampers for
use after exposure to fire.
1.10 It is the intent that tests conducted in accordance with the test methods
described herein develop data to enable regulatory authorities to determine
the acceptability of fire damper assemblies for use in locations where fire
resistance of a specified duration is required.
1.11 Fire dampers are intended to close automatically upon the detection of
heat by the use of a fusible link or other heat responsive device.
1.12 These requirements do not cover:
a) Performance of the fire damper assembly in walls, partitions, or floors
constructed of materials other than those tested.
b) The performance of the fire damper assembly when installed using
methods other than those fire tested.
c) Measurement of heat transmission through a fire damper assembly.
d) Measurement of the degree of control or limitation of the passage of smoke
or products of combustion through the fire damper assembly.
UL 586 1.1 These requirements cover high-efficiency, particulate, air-filter units Like all building materials air filters should be fire resistant
High Efficiency intended for the removal of very fine particulate matter (not less than 99.97 if possible, should not generate smoke if burned, and should
Air Filtration percent of 0.3 micron diameter particles) from the air of industrial and have low flame spread. This is the UL test for HEPA filters.
Units laboratory exhaust and ventilating systems. IT IS NOT FOR THE FILTER EFFICIENCY TEST-It is for
UL 586 defines procedures for confirming the performance of HEPA filters. fire resistance.
It also defines minimum construction components, airflow and resistance
parameters, testing equipment and a minimum criterion flame test.1.3 These SRP 7.0-10, F&S
requirements do not cover multiple assembly air filter units. E-4
UL 900, 1.1 These requirements cover tests to determine combustibility and the Like all building materials air filters should be fire resistant
Standard for amount of smoke generated for air filter units of both washable and if possible, should not generate smoke if burned, and should
Safety Air Filter throwaway types used for removal of dust and other airborne particles from have low flame spread. This is the UL test for filter
Units, 1994. air circulated mechanically in equipment and systems installed in accordance materials. MFFF and nuclear facilities use filters that have
with the Standards for Installation of Air Conditioning and Ventilating good properties based on these tests.
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Systems, NFPA 90A (Other Than Residence Type), and for Installation of
Warm Air Heating and Air Conditioning Systems, NFPA 90B (Residence SRP E-4 F&S
Type).
1.2 Since the combustibility and smoke generation of an air filter unit, after a
period of service, depends upon the nature and quantity of the material
collected by the filter, the test requirements of this standard, for classification
purposes, apply only to air filter units in a clean condition. Consequently,
when filters are susceptible to the accumulation of combustible deposits, it is
intended that maintenance and inspection practices should be followed as
proposed in Appendix B of NFPA 90A.
UL This lists the names of companies authorized to use the UL Mark on or in Like FM discussed above, nuclear facilities should use
Underwriters connection with products which have been evaluated by UL and found to be building materials that are “UL listed”.
Laboratories in compliance with UL’s requirements. These companies, as well as the
Building manufacturers and submitters of the products, have entered into an Agreement CAR 7-3 F&S
Materials with UL to use the UL Mark only on or in connection with products SER 7-3 F&S
Directory manufactured in compliance with UL’s requirements. It should be noted that SRP 7.0-9 F&S
UL certified products of different makes or model designations are not
necessarily equivalent in quality or performance. The appearance of catalog
or model numbers or other specific product designations on the shows that:
(1) representative samples of these products have been submitted to UL and
found to comply with the applicable requirements, and that (2) the
manufacturer has been authorized to use the appropriate UL Mark on their
products.
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Table A-3 Tier 2 Standards
ACI 216.1/TMS This American Concrete Institute (ACI)/The Masonry Society (TMS) Building materials in MFFF and nuclear facilities should
0216.1, Standard standard describes acceptable methods for determining the fire resistance of have materials with good heat and flame resistance. This is
Method for concrete and masonry assemblies and structural elements including walls, the method to determine the fire resistance.
Determining floor and roof slabs, beams, columns, lintels, and masonry fire protection for
Fire Resistance structural steel columns. These methods shall be used for design and
of Concrete and analytical purposes and shall be based upon the fire exposure and applicable
Masonry end-point criteria of ASTM E 119. This standard does not apply to composite
Construction metal deck floor or roof assemblies.
Assemblies,
1997.
ANSI S3.2, This standard is a revision of the American National Standard Method for This standard covers the volume and clarity of the PA
Method for Measurement of Monosyllabic Word Intelligibility, ANSI S3.2-1960 (R1982). systems used for emergencies. People must be able to hear
Measuring the The standard provides three alternative sets of lists of English words to be announcements over the noise of the facility equipment and
Intelligibility of spoken by trained talkers over the speech communication system to be machinery.
Speech Over evaluated. The selection of the particular set of word lists depends upon the
Communications purpose and constraints of the test situation. Trained listeners record the
Systems, 1995. words they hear. The fraction of the words they identify correctly is the
measure of the intelligibility of speech over the system. The system may
consist of the air and the room or outdoors in face-to-face communications;
the equipment and environments used in telephony, public address systems
(PA), or ordinary radio; or complex systems of environment, equipment, and
air, wire, fiber, radio, and water paths used in some military, space, remote, or
emergency communications. The standard specifies test materials that have
been thoroughly validated. The standard also specifies methods for selecting
and training the talkers and listeners; for designing, controlling, and reporting
the test conditions; and for analyzing and reporting the test results.
ANSI Z49.1, Covers all aspects of safety and health in the welding environment, Fire safety during welding prevents fires in facilities.
Safety in emphasizing oxygen gas arc welding processes with some coverage given to
Welding, resistance welding. It contains information on protection of personnel and the
Cutting, and general area, ventilation, fire prevention and protection, and confined spaces.
Allied A significant section is devoted to precautionary information, showing
Processes, 1999. examples, and an extensive bibliography is included.
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ANSI/AIHA Establishes guidelines for the design and operation of laboratory ventilation This American Industrial Hygiene Association (AIHA)
Z9.5, Laboratory systems to help personnel avoid overexposure to harmful or potentially standard covers flow in normal operation and also requires
Ventilation, harmful contaminants in the laboratory that the system can handle smoke from fires.
2003.
API 650, This American Petroleum Institute (API) standard is designed to provide the Oil tanks to store fuel must be fire resistant to avoid major
Welded Steel petroleum industry with tanks of adequate safety and reasonable economy for fires. Use proper materials and construction for fire
Tanks for Oil use in the storage of petroleum, petroleum products, and other liquid products resistance.
Storage, 1998. commonly handled and stored by the various branches of the petroleum
industry. It is intended to help purchasers and manufacturers in ordering,
fabricating, and erecting tanks. Standard 650, Tenth Edition, covers material,
design, fabrication, erection, and testing requirements for vertical, cylindrical,
aboveground, closed- and open-top, welded steel storage tanks in various and
capacities for internal pressures approximating atmospheric pressure, but a
higher internal pressure is permitted when additional requirements are met.
This standard applies only to tanks whose entire bottom is uniformly
supported; and to tanks in non-refrigerated service, that have a maximum
operating temperature of 90 deg C.
API Standard This standard covers the normal and emergency vapor venting requirements Petroleum storage tanks must be vented to prevent
2000, Venting for above ground liquid petroleum or petroleum products storage tanks, and combustible or explosive vapors.
Atmospheric above ground and underground refrigerated storage tanks designed for
and Low- operation at pressures from vacuum through 15 pounds per square inch gauge
Pressure Storage (1.034 bar gauge).
Tanks, 5th
edition, 1998.
ASCE/SFPE 29, Standard Calculation Methods for Structural Fire Protection provides The methods to calculate fire resistance is needed for fire
Standard methods of calculating the fire resistance of selected structural members and analysis.
Calculation barrier assemblies using structural steel, plain concrete, reinforced concrete,
Methods for timber and wood, concrete masonry, and clay masonry. These methods are
Structural Fire intended to provide architects, engineers, building officials, and others with
Protection, calculation methods that give fire resistance results equivalent to those in
2005. ASTM E119. The development of this Standard represents a joint effort
between the Structural Engineering Institute of American Society of Civil
Engineers (ASCE) and the Society of Fire Protection Engineers. The
Standard includes standard methods for determining the following: structural
fire protection calculations; fire resistance of plain and reinforced concrete
construction; fire resistance of timber and wood structural elements; fire
resistance of masonry; and fire resistance of structural steel construction.
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ASME AG-1- Provides requirements for the performance, design, construction, acceptance This standard says that nuclear air cleaning systems must
1994, Code on testing, and QA of equipment used as components in nuclear safety-related be fire resistant and survive DBFs.
Nuclear Air and air and gas treatment systems in nuclear facilities.
Gas Treatment
(revision of
ASME AG-1-
1991)
ASME B 31.3, This Code contains requirements for piping typically found in petroleum This is the widely used code to design piping systems for
Process Piping, refineries; chemical, pharmaceutical, textile, paper, semiconductor, and process systems in the US. B31.3 describes the materials,
2002. cryogenic plants, and related processing plants and terminals. The fabrication, and installation methods. Piping is made to be
requirements cover materials and components, design, fabrication, assembly, fire resistant.
erection, examination, inspection, and testing of piping. This Code applies to
piping for all fluids including raw, intermediate, and finished chemicals;
petroleum products; gas, steam, air and water; fluidized solids; refrigerants;
and cryogenic fluids. Also included is piping which interconnects pieces or
stages within a packaged equipment assembly
ASME B This standard covers the standardization of dimensions of welded and Fire suppression systems and the supplies for the systems
36.10M, Welded seamless wrought steel pipe for high or low temperatures and pressures. The must use high-quality materials per this standard. This is
and Seamless word pipe is used as distinguished from tube to apply to tubular products of one type of pipe that can be used.
Wrought Steel dimensions commonly used for pipeline and piping systems.
Pipe, 1996.
ASME B16.4, This Standard for gray iron threaded fittings, Classes 125 and 250 covers: (a) Fire suppression systems and the supplies for the systems
Cast Iron pressure-temperature ratings (b) size and method of designating openings of must use high-quality materials per this standard. This is a
Threaded reducing fittings (c) marking (d) material (e) dimensions and tolerances (f) specification for the threads on iron pipe.
Fittings, Class threading, and (g) coatings
125 and 250,
1992.
ASME NQA 1, This Standard provides requirements and guidelines for the establishment and This is the main quality system used in nuclear facilities
Quality execution of QA programs during siting, design, construction, operation and and applies to fire protection systems design, fabrication,
Assurance decommissioning of nuclear facilities. This Standard reflects industry installation, and maintenance. .
Program experience and current understanding of the QA requirements necessary to
Requirements achieve safe, reliable, and efficient utilization of nuclear energy, and
for Nuclear management and processing of radioactive materials. The Standard focuses
Power Plants.3 on the achievement of results, emphasizes the role of the individual and line
management in the achievement of quality, and fosters the application of
these requirements in a manner consistent with the relative importance of the
item or activity.
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ASTM A 120, 1.1 This specification covers seamless and welded black and hot-dipped Fire suppression systems and the supplies for the systems
Specification for galvanized steel pipe in nominal pipe size (NPS) 1/8 to NPS 26 [Diameter must use high-quality materials per this standard. This is
Welded and Nominal (DN) 6 to DN 650] (Note 1), inclusive, with nominal wall thickness one type of pipe that can be used.
Steel Pipe, 1996. (Note 2) as given in Table X2.2 and Table X2.3. It shall be permissible to
furnish pipe having other dimensions provided that such pipe complies with
all other requirements of this specification. Supplementary requirements of an
optional nature are provided and shall apply only when specified by the
purchaser.
Note 1—The dimensionless designators NPS [DN] have been substituted in
this specification for such traditional terms as "nominal diameter," "size," and
"nominal size."
Note 2—The term nominal wall thickness has been assigned for the purpose
of convenient designation, existing in name only, and is used to distinguish it
from the actual wall thickness, which may vary over or under the nominal
wall thickness.
1.2 This specification covers the following types and grades:
1.2.1 Type F—Furnace-butt-welded, continuous welded Grade A,
1.2.2 Type E—Electric-resistance-welded, Grades A and B, and
1.2.3 Type S—Seamless, Grades A and B.
1.3 Pipe ordered under this specification is intended for mechanical and
pressure applications and is also acceptable for ordinary uses in steam, water,
gas, and air lines. It is suitable for welding, and suitable for forming
operations involving coiling, bending, and flanging, subject to the following
qualifications:
1.3.1 Type F is not intended for flanging.
1.3.2 If Type S or Type E is required for close coiling or cold bending, Grade
A is the preferred grade; however, this is not intended to prohibit the cold
bending of Grade B pipe.
1.3.3 Type E is furnished either non-expanded or cold expanded at the option
of the manufacturer.
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ASTM A 234, 1.1 This specification covers wrought carbon steel and alloy steel fittings of Fire suppression systems and the supplies for the systems
Standard seamless and welded construction covered by the latest revision of ASME must use high-quality materials per this standard. This is
Specification for B16.9, B16.11, MSS SP-79, and MSS SP-95. These fittings are for use in one type of pipes and fittings that can be used.
Piping Fittings pressure piping and in pressure vessel fabrication for service at moderate and
of Wrought elevated temperatures. Fittings differing from these ASME and MSS
Carbon Steel standards shall be furnished in accordance with Supplementary Requirement
and Alloy Steel S58 of Specification A 960/A 960M.
for Moderate 1.2 Optional supplementary requirements are provided for fittings where a
and High greater degree of examination is desired. When desired, one or more of these
Temperature supplementary requirements may be specified in the order.
Service, 2004.
ASTM A 254, 1.1 This specification covers double-wall, copper-brazed steel tubing suitable Fire suppression systems and the supplies for the systems
Standard for general engineering uses, particularly in the automotive, refrigeration, and must use high-quality materials per this standard. This is
Specification for stove industries for fuel lines, brake lines, oil lines, heating and cooling units, one type of pipes and fittings that can be used.
Copper Brazed and the like.
Steel Tubing,
2002.
ASTM A 312, 1.1 This specification covers seamless, straight-seam welded, and heavily Fire suppression systems and the supplies for the systems
Standard cold worked welded austenitic stainless steel pipe intended for high- must use high-quality materials per this standard. This is
Specification for temperature and general corrosive service. one type of pipes and fittings that can be used.
Seamless Note 1—When the impact test criterion for a low-temperature service would
Welded and be 15 ft lb [20 J] energy absorption or 15 mils [0.38 mm] lateral expansion,
Heavily Cold some of the austenitic stainless steel grades covered by this specification are
Worked accepted by certain pressure vessel or piping codes without the necessity of
Austenitic making the actual test. For example, Grades TP304, TP304L, and TP347 are
Stainless Steel accepted by the ASME Pressure Vessel Code, Section VIII Division 1, and by
Pipes, 2004. the Chemical Plant and Refinery Piping Code, ANSI B31.3, for service at
(cont’d) temperatures as low as -425 °F [-250 °C] without qualification by impact
tests. Other AISI stainless steel grades are usually accepted for service
temperatures as low as -325 °F [-200 °C] without impact testing. Impact
testing may, under certain circumstances, be required.
1.2 Grades TP304H, TP309H, TP309HCb, TP310H, TP310HCb, TP316H,
TP321H, TP347H, and TP348H are modifications of Grades TP304,
TP309Cb, TP309S, TP310Cb, TP310S, TP316, TP321, TP347, and TP348,
A-53
and are intended for service at temperatures where creep and stress rupture
properties are important.
1.3 Optional supplementary requirements are provided for pipe where a
greater degree of testing is desired. These supplementary requirements call
for additional tests to be made and, when desired, it is permitted to specify in
the order one or more of these supplementary requirements.
1.4 lists the standardized dimensions of welded and seamless stainless steel
pipe as shown in ANSI B36.19. These dimensions are also applicable to
heavily cold worked pipe. Pipe having other dimensions is permitted to be
ordered and furnished provided such pipe complies with all other
requirements of this specification.
1.5 Grades TP321 and TP321H have lower strength requirements for pipe
manufactured by the seamless process in nominal wall thicknesses greater
than 3/8 in. [9.5 mm].
Note 2—The dimensionless designator NPS has been substituted in this
standard for such traditional terms as "nominal diameter," "size," and
"nominal size."
ASTM A 36, 1.1 This specification covers carbon steel shapes, plates, and bars of Fire suppression systems and the supplies for the systems
Standard structural quality for use in riveted, bolted, or welded construction of bridges must be supported on high-quality materials per this
Specification for and buildings, and for general structural purposes. standard.
Carbon 1.2 Supplementary requirements are provided for use where additional testing
Structural Steel, or additional restrictions are required by the purchaser. Such requirements
2005. apply only when specified in the purchase order.
1.3 When the steel is to be welded, a welding procedure suitable for the grade
of steel and intended use or service is to be utilized. See Appendix X3 of
Specification A 6/A 6M for information on weldability.
ASTM A 513, 1.1 This specification covers electric-resistance-welded carbon and alloy steel Fire suppression systems and the supplies for the systems
Standard tubing for use as mechanical tubing. must be properly welded when they are installed.
Specification for 1.2 This specification covers mechanical tubing made from hot- or cold-
Electric- rolled steel.
Resistance- 1.3 This specification covers round, square, rectangular, and special shape
Welded Carbon tubing.
and Alloy Steel 1.4 Optional supplementary requirements are provided and when desired,
Mechanical shall be so stated in the order.
Tubing, 2000.
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ASTM C 411, 1.1 This test method covers the determination of the performance of This test shows how insulation will work in fires to protect
Standard Test commercial sizes of both block and pipe forms of thermal insulating systems and components from fires.
Method for Hot- materials when exposed to simulated hot-surface application conditions. The
Surface term "hot-surface performance" has reference to a simulated use-temperature
Performance of test in which the heated testing surface is in a horizontal position.
High- 1.2 This test method refers primarily to high-temperature insulations that are
Temperature applicable to hot-side temperatures in excess of 200°F (93°C). It is used for
Thermal materials such as preformed insulations, insulating cements, blankets, and the
Insulation, 1997. like, by proper laboratory preparation of the samples.
ASTM C 636, 1.1 This practice covers the installation of suspension systems for acoustical Suspended ceilings can cause higher fire loads and may
Standard tile and lay-in panels. It is applicable to contractors whose services are also cause problems with fire suppression systems such as
Practice for utilized for installing acoustical ceilings and to other trades if their activities those in NFPA 13. This standard ensures that suspended
Installation of are responsible for interference with ceiling components or performance as ceilings do not impact fire protection.
Metal Ceiling defined in this recommended practice.
Suspension 1.2 While the practices described in this document have equal application to
Systems for rated fire-resistive suspension systems, additional requirements may have
Acoustical Tile been imposed to obtain the fire endurance classification of particular floor-
and Lay-In ceiling or roof-ceiling assemblies. These details should be obtained from the
Panels, 2004. manufacturers.
[Chapter 9] 1.3 Similarly, additional detailing may be necessary to meet sound
9.2.1.3.3.2. attenuation requirements when ceiling plenums extend over contiguous
rooms. These, too, should be obtained from the manufacturer of the
acoustical material employed.
ASTM C 852 This guide defines criteria for the design of GB systems to be used for the ASTM withdrew this standard in January 2006. There are
Standard Design handling of Pu in any form or isotopic composition or when mixed with other many other standards for GBs and all address fire
Criteria for elements or compounds. protection.
Plutonium 1. Scope.
Gloveboxes 1 This guide defines criteria for the design of GB systems to be used for the
handling of Pu in any form or isotopic composition or when mixed with other
elements or compounds. This guide does not apply to large scale commercial
GBs although many of the criteria contained herein are relevant. Not included
in the criteria are systems auxiliary to the GB systems such as utilities,
ventilation, alarm, and waste disposal. Also not addressed is the massively
shielded (concrete)-type enclosure or open-face hoods, although the same
A-55
basic design considerations might apply. The scope of this guide excludes
specific license requirements relating to provisions for criticality prevention,
hazards control, safeguards, packaging, and material handling.
ASTM D 2220- Scope This standard for wire insulation provides the insulation
68, Vinyl 1.1 This specification covers a thermoplastic insulation of poly(vinyl must be fire resistant.
Chloride Plastic chloride) or the copolymer of vinyl chloride and vinyl acetate.
Insulation for 1.2 This insulation is recommended for use in power and control circuits at
Wire and Cable temperatures not higher than 75°C. At a thickness of 15 mils (0.38 mm),
application is limited to voltage ratings below 300 V, and to dry locations. At
a thickness of 30 mils, the application range is widened to dry or wet
applications, and to a voltage rating of 600 V.
ASTM D 92, 1.1 This test method describes the determination of the flash point and fire There are many material properties that must be determined
Standard Test point of petroleum products by a manual Cleveland open cup apparatus or an by testing. Knowing the flashpoints of materials is
Method for automated Cleveland open cup apparatus. important to analyze fire protection. Design of the fire
Flash and Fire Note 1—The precisions for fire point were not determined in the current protection systems must ensure flashpoints are not
Points by inter-laboratory program. Fire point is a parameter that is not commonly exceeded.
Cleveland Open specified, although in some cases, knowledge of this flammability
Cup, 1998. temperature may be desired.
1.2 This test method is applicable to all petroleum products with flash points
above 79C (175F) and below 400C (752F) except fuel oils.
Note 2—This test method may occasionally be specified for the
determination of the fire point of a fuel oil. For the determination of the flash
points of fuel oils, use Test Method D 93. Test Method D 93 should also be
used when it is desired to determine the possible presence of small, but
significant, concentrations of lower flash point substances that may escape
detection by Test Method D 92. Test Method D 1310 can be employed if the
flash point is known to be below 79C (175F).
ASTM D 93, 1.1 These test methods cover the determination of the flash point of There are many material properties that must be determined
Standard Test petroleum products in the temperature range from 40 to 360°C by a manual by testing. Knowing the flashpoints of materials is
Methods for Pensky-Martens closed-cup apparatus or an automated Pensky-Martens important to analyze fire protection. Design of the fire
Flashpoint by closed-cup apparatus. protection systems must ensure flashpoints are not
Pensky-Martens 1.2 Procedure A is applicable to distillate fuels (diesel, kerosene, heating oil, exceeded. This is another method rather than ASTM D 92.
Closed Cup turbine fuels), new lubricating oils, and other homogeneous petroleum liquids
Tester, 2000. not included in the scope of Procedure B.
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1.3 Procedure B is applicable to residual fuel oils, cutback residua, used
lubricating oils, mixtures of petroleum liquids with solids, petroleum liquids
that tend to form a surface film under test conditions, or are petroleum liquids
of such kinematic viscosity that they are not uniformly heated under the
stirring and heating conditions of Procedure A.
1.4 These test methods is applicable for the detection of contamination of
relatively nonvolatile or nonflammable materials with volatile or flammable
materials.
ASTM E 108, 1.1 This fire-test-response standard covers the measurement of the relative There are many material properties that must be determined
Standard Test fire characteristics of roof coverings under simulated fire originating outside by testing. Fire properties for roof materials are determined
Methods for Fire the building. It is applicable to roof coverings intended for installation on by this standard.
Tests of Roof either combustible or noncombustible decks when applied as intended for
Coverings, use. The following test methods are included:
2004. 1.1.1 Intermittent flame exposure test.
1.1.2 Spread of flame test.
1.1.3 Burning brand test.
1.1.4 Flying brand test.
1.1.5 Rain test.
1.2 Three classes of fire test exposure are described:
1.2.1 Class A Tests are applicable to roof coverings that are effective against
severe test exposure, afford a high degree of fire protection to the roof deck,
do not slip from position, and do not present a flying brand hazard.
1.2.2 Class B Tests are applicable to roof coverings that are effective against
moderate test exposure, afford a moderate degree of fire protection to the roof
deck, do not slip from position, and do not present a flying brand hazard.
1.2.3 Class C Tests are applicable to roof coverings that are effective against
light test exposure, afford a light degree of fire protection to the roof deck, do
not slip from position, and do not present a flying brand hazard.
ASTM E 814, 1.1 This test method is applicable to through-penetration fire stops of various Penetrations for wires, cables, and pipes in MFFF and
Standard Test materials and construction. Fire stops are intended for use in openings in fire- nuclear facilities must be sealed with fire resistant material.
Method for Fire resistive walls and floors that are evaluated in accordance with Test Methods This is the test to measure the resistance.
Tests of E 119.
Through- 1.2 Tests conducted in conformance with this test method record fire-stop
Penetration Fire performance during the test exposure; but such tests shall not be construed to
Stops, 2002. determine suitability of the fire stop for use after test exposure.
1.3 This test method also measures the resistance of fire stops to an external
A-57
force stimulated by a hose stream. However, this test method shall not be
construed as determining the performance of the fire stop during actual fire
conditions when subjected to forces such as failure of cable support systems
and falling debris.
1.4 The intent of this test method is to develop data to assist others in
determining the suitability of the fire stops for use where fire resistance is
required.
does not by itself incorporate all factors required for fire-hazard or fire-risk
assessment of materials, products, or assemblies under actual fire conditions
ASTM E 1321, 1.1 This fire test response standard determines material properties related to There are many material properties that must be determined
Standard Test piloted ignition of a vertically oriented sample under a constant and uniform by testing. Ignition and flame spread are important to judge
Method for heat flux and to lateral flame spread on a vertical surface due to an externally the fire resistance of a material and also to do modeling.
Determining applied radiant-heat flux.
Material Ignition 1.2 The results of this test method provide a minimum surface flux and
and Flame temperature necessary for ignition and for lateral spread an effective material
Spread thermal inertia value, and a flame-heating parameter pertinent to lateral flame
Properties, 2002. spread.
1.3 The results of this test method are potentially useful to predict the time to
ignition, and the velocity of lateral flame spread on a vertical surface under a
specified external flux without forced lateral airflow. Use the equations in
that govern the ignition and flame-spread processes and which have been
used to correlate the data.
1.4 This test method is potentially useful to obtain results of ignition and
flame spread for materials. Data are reported in units for convenient use in
current fire growth models.
ASTM E 1354, 1.1 This fire-test-response standard provides for measuring the response of There are many material properties that must be determined
Standard Test materials exposed to controlled levels of radiant heating with or without an by testing. Heat and smoke release are important to judge
Method for Heat external igniter. the fire resistance of a material and also to do modeling.
and Visible 1.2 This test method is used to determine the ignitability, HRRs, mass loss
Smoke Release rates, effective heat of combustion, and visible smoke development of
Rates for materials and products.
Materials and 1.3 The rate of heat release is determined by measurement of the oxygen
Products Using consumption as determined by the oxygen concentration and the flow rate in
an Oxygen the exhaust product stream. The effective heat of combustion is determined
Consumption from a concomitant measurement of specimen mass loss rate, in combination
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Calorimeter, with the HRR. Smoke development is measured by obscuration of light by
2002. the combustion product stream.
1.4 Specimens shall be exposed to heating fluxes in the range of 0 to 100
kW/m2. External ignition, when used, shall be by electric spark. The value of
the heating flux and the use of external ignition are to be as specified in the
relevant material or performance standard. The normal specimen testing
orientation is horizontal, independent of whether the end-use application
involves a horizontal or a vertical orientation. The apparatus also contains
provisions for vertical orientation testing; this is used for exploratory or
diagnostic studies only.
1.5 Ignitability is determined as a measurement of time from initial exposure
to time of sustained flaming.
ASTM E 1529, 1.1 The test methods described in this fire-test-response standard are used for There are many material properties that must be determined
Determining determining the fire-test response of columns, girders, beams or similar by testing. The response of these building structure
Effects of Large structural members, and fire-containment walls, of either homogeneous or materials in a fire must be known. The building cannot
Hydrocarbon composite construction, that are in facilities subject to large hydrocarbon pool collapse in a fire so good fire resistance is needed.
Pool Fire on fires.
Structural 1.2 It is the intent that tests conducted in accordance with these test methods “Pool fires” will be rare in nuclear facilities because the
Members and will indicate whether structural members of assemblies, or fire-containment systems with hydrocarbons are well designed and
Assemblies, wall assemblies, will continue to perform their intended function during the maintained. However, pool fires are important in terrorist
2003. period of fire exposure. These tests should not be construed as implying events like 9-11 in the US.
suitability for use after fire exposure.
1.3 These test methods prescribe a standard fire exposure for comparing the
relative performance of different structural and fire-containment wall
assemblies under controlled laboratory conditions. The application of these
test results to predict the performance of actual assemblies when exposed to
large pool fires requires a careful engineering evaluation.
1.4 These test methods may be useful for testing other items such as piping,
electrical circuits in conduit, floors or decks, and cable trays. Because failure
criteria and test specimen descriptions are not provided in these test methods,
testing these types of items will require appropriate specimen details and end-
point or failure criteria.
1.5 Limitations -These test methods do not provide the following:
1.5.1 Full information on the performance of assemblies constructed with
components or of dimensions other than those tested.
1.5.2 An evaluation of the degree to which the assembly contributes to the
fire hazard through the generation of smoke, toxic gases, or other products of
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combustion.
1.5.3 Simulation of fire behavior of joints or connections between structural
elements such as beam-to-column connections.
1.5.4 Measurement of flame spread over the surface of the test assembly.
1.5.5 Procedures for measuring the test performance of other structural
shapes (such as vessel skirts), equipment (such as electrical cables, motor-
operated valves, etc.), or items subject to large hydrocarbon pool fires, other
than those described in 1,1.
1.5.6 The erosive effect that the velocities or turbulence, or both, generated in
large pool fires has on some fire protection materials.
1.5.7 Full information on the performance of assemblies at times less than 5
min because the rise time called out in Section 5 is longer than that of a real
fire.
1.6 These test methods do not preclude the use of a real fire or any other
method of evaluating the performance of structural members and assemblies
in simulated fire conditions. Any test method that is demonstrated to comply
with Section 5 is acceptable.
ASTM E 1591, 1.1 This guide describes data required as input for mathematical fire models. Material properties, building design and other data are
Standard Guide 1.2 Guidelines are presented on how the data can be obtained. needed for zone fire models. This standard tells the way
for Obtaining 1.3 The emphasis in this guide is on compartment zone fire models. that data must be collected and documented and the QA
Data for 1.6 This fire standard cannot be used to provide quantitative measures. methods.
Deterministic
Fire Models,
2000.
ASTM E 1725, These test methods cover fire-test-response. There are many material properties that must be determined
Standard Test 1.2 These fire-test-response test methods provide information on the by testing. Electrical cables, wires, breakers and other
Methods of Fire- temperatures recorded on the electrical system component within a fire- systems will burn and fail Causing loss of power and other
Resistive Barrier resistive barrier system during the period of exposure. problems. This test determines the fire resistance for the
Systems for 1.3 This standard is used to measure and describe the response of materials, barriers such as cable trays, conduits, cabinets, panels and
Electrical products, or assemblies to heat and flame under controlled conditions, but other components that house the electrical components.
System does not by itself incorporate all factors required for fire hazard or fire risk
Components assessment of the materials, products, or assemblies under actual fire
conditions
1.4 Potentially important factors and fire characteristics not addressed by
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these test methods include, but are not limited to:
1.4.1 The performance of the fire-resistive barrier system constructed with
components other than those tested.
1.4.2 An evaluation of the functionality of the electrical system within the
fire-resistive barrier system.
1.4.3 An evaluation of the ampacity of the electrical system within the fire-
resistive barrier system.
1.4.4 An evaluation of the smoke, toxic gases, corrosivity, or other products
of heating.
1.4.5 A measurement of the flame spread characteristics over the surface of
the fire-resistive barrier system.
1.4.6 An evaluation of through-penetration sealing methods.
1.4.7 Combustibility of materials in the fire-resistive barrier system or of the
electrical system components.
1.4.8 The need for supports beyond those normally required.
1.4.9 Environmental conditions in the area of service.
ASTM E 1966, 1.1 This fire-test-response test method measures the performance of joint This applies to joints in floors and walls. There are many
Standard Test systems designed to be used with fire rated floors and walls during a fire material properties that must be determined by testing.
Method for Fire- endurance test exposure. The fire endurance test end point is the period of Joints are filled with gaskets or other materials that are fire
Resistive Joint time elapsing before the first performance criteria is reached when the joint resistant. Joints are a “weak point” in the walls and floors
Systems, 2001. system is subjected to one of two time-temperature fire exposures. To prevent the spread of fire. Fire resistance is determined
1.2 The fire exposure conditions used are either those specified by Test using this standard.
Method E119 for testing assemblies to standard time-temperature exposures
or Test Method E1529 for testing assemblies to rapid-temperature rise fires.
1.3 This test method specifies the heating conditions, methods of test, and
criteria for the evaluation of the ability of a joint system to maintain the fire
resistance where hourly rated fire-separating elements meet.
1.4 Test results establish the performance of joint systems during the fire-
exposure period and shall not be construed as having determined the joint
systems suitability for use after that exposure.
1.5 This test method does not provide quantitative information about the joint
system relative to the rate of leakage of smoke or gases or both. However, it
requires that such phenomena be noted and reported when describing the
general behavior of joint systems during the fire endurance test but is not part
of the conditions of compliance.
1.6 Potentially important factors and fire characteristics not addressed by this
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test method include, but are not limited to:
1.6.1 The performance of the fire-resistive joint system constructed with
components other than those tested.
1.6.2 The cyclic movement capabilities of joint systems other than the
cycling conditions tested.
.
ASTM E 603, 1.1 This guide addresses means of conducting full-scale fire experiments that Modeling is a key way to understand the effects of fires.
Standard Guide evaluate the fire-test-response characteristics of materials, products, or Experiments are used reconstruct what happened (as in 9-
for Room Fire assemblies under actual fire conditions. 11), simulate fire action to understand fire behavior in a
Experiments, 1.2 It is intended as a guide for the design of the experiment and for the use specific case, research to understand the basic science , and
2001. and interpretation of its results. The guide is also useful for establishing make standards for materials in fires. This standard guides
laboratory conditions that simulate a given set of fire conditions to the the design and performance of tests.
greatest extent possible.
1.3 This guide allows users to obtain fire-test-response characteristics of
materials, products, or assemblies, which are useful data for describing or
appraising their fire performance under actual fire conditions.
1.3.1 The results of experiments conducted in accordance with this guide are
also useful elements for making regulatory decisions regarding fire safety
requirements. The use for regulatory purposes of data obtained from
experiments conducted using this guide requires that certain conditions and
criteria be specified by the regulating authority.
1.5 Room fire experiments are a means of generating input data for computer
fire models and for providing output data with which to compare modeling
results.
1.6 One of the major reasons for conducting room fire experiments is as an
experimental means of assessing the potential fire hazard associated with the
use of a material or product in a particular application. This should be borne
in mind when designing nonstandard experiments.
1.7 A rationale for conducting room fire experiments is the case when
smaller-scale fire tests inadequately represent end-use applications.
1.8 A further rationale for conducting room fire experiments is to verify the
results obtained with smaller scale tests, to understand the scaling parameters
for such tests.
1.9 Room fire tests can be placed into four main categories: reconstruction,
simulation, research, and standardization.
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ASTM E 84, 1.1 This fire-test-response standard for the comparative surface burning There are many material properties that must be determined
Standard Test behavior of building materials is applicable to exposed surfaces such as walls by testing. Building materials can be ignited by exposure
Method for and ceilings. The test is conducted with the specimen in the ceiling position to flame then have surface burning that spreads. This
Surface Burning with the surface to be evaluated exposed face down to the ignition source. standard tests the fire response (time required and
Characteristics The material, product, or assembly shall be capable of being mounted in the temperature for ignition, flame spread) for materials.
of Building test position during the test. Thus, the specimen shall either be self-
Materials, 2004. supporting by its own structural quality, held in place by added
ASTM F 442, 1.1 This specification covers CPVC pipe made in standard thermoplastic pipe There are many material properties that must be determined
Standard dimension ratios and pressure rated for water. Included are criteria for by testing. CPVC pipe may carry process liquids that may
Specification for classifying CPVC plastic pipe materials and CPVC plastic pipe, and burn or cause other problems in a fire. The properties of the
Chlorinated Poly requirements and test methods for materials, workmanship, dimensions, CPVC pipe must be known.
(Vinyl Chloride) sustained pressure, burst pressure, flattening, and extrusion quality. Methods
(CPVC) Plastic of marking are also given. Note 1The CPVC pipe covered by this In nuclear facilities CVPC is not used for flammable
Pipe (SDR-PR), specification is covered in Specification D 2241. materials. Metal pipes are used.
1999. 1.2 The products covered by this specification are intended for use with the
distribution of pressurized liquids only, which are chemically compatible with
the piping materials. Due to inherent hazards associated with testing
components and systems with compressed air or other compressed gases
some manufacturers do not allow pneumatic testing of their products. Consult
with specific product/component manufacturers for their specific testing
procedures prior to pneumatic testing.
American This standard contains the essential welding variables for carbon steel in the Pipes used in fire suppression systems such as in NFPA 13
Welding Society thickness range of 1/8 through 1-1/2 inch, using Argon plus 25% Carbon must be properly welded per this standard.
(AWS) B2.1, Dioxide shielded gas metal arc welding (short circuiting transfer mode) for
Specification for the root followed by Argon plus 2% Oxygen shielded gas metal arc welding
Welding (spray transfer mode) for the balance. It cites the base metals and operating
Procedures and conditions necessary to make the weldment, the filler metal specifications,
Performance and the allowable joint designs for groove welds. This welding procedure was
Qualification, developed primarily for pipe applications.
2005.
AWS B2.2, This standard provides the requirements for qualification of brazing Pipes in fire suppression systems may require brazing.
Standard for procedure specifications, brazers, and brazing operators for manual, Some process systems may also use brazing. This standard
Brazing mechanized, and automatic brazing. The brazing processes included are torch is the proper way to braze metals.
Procedure and brazing, furnace brazing, induction brazing, resistance brazing, dip brazing,
Performance and infrared brazing. Base metals, brazing filler metals, brazing fluxes,
Qualification, brazing atmospheres, and brazing joint clearances are also included.
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1991.
AWS D10.9 Replaced by AWS B2.1-00 “Standard for Welding Procedure and Many pipes in fire suppression systems use welded pipe.
Standard for the Performance Qualification American Welding Society”, 2000 The welding procedure and the qualifications for the people
Qualification of This universal qualification document is an excellent tool to ensure that weld or inspect welds are in this standard.
Welding economical quality. Covers all welding processes and an exhaustive array of
Procedures and materials used in metal fabrication. Indispensable for those who design and
Welders for manufacture non-code products but who may also be performing to ISO
Piping and 9000. Spells-out requirements for the qualification of welding procedures and
Tubing, 1980. the requirements for the performance qualification of welders and welding
operators for manual, semiautomatic, machine and automatic welding.
American Water This standard covers 3- to 48-in. (76- to 1,219-mm) gray-iron and/or ductile- Iron pipes may be used in fire suppression water supply
Works iron fittings to be used with ductile-iron pipe for water. Requirements for systems such as those in NFPA 13. This is the standard for
Association fittings with mechanical joints and flanged joints are listed in Tables 1 such pipe and how to connect the pipes using fittings.
(AWWA) C110, through 20 at the end of this standard. This standard may also be used for
Ductile Iron and fittings with push-on joints or such other joints as may be agreed on at the
Gray Iron time of purchase.
Fittings, 2003.
AWWA C111, This standard covers rubber-gasket joints of the following types for ductile- Iron pipes may be used in fire suppression water supply
Rubber-Gasket iron pressure pipe and ductile-iron and gray-iron fittings, valves, hydrants, systems such as those in NFPA 13. This is the standard for
Joints for and other appurtenances for water supply service: mechanical joint; push-on how to join the pipes using gaskets and “push on” flanges.
Ductile Iron joint; flanged joint; and modifications to push-on and mechanical joints. The .
Pressure Pipe main purpose of this standard is to provide the minimum requirements for
and Fittings, rubber-gasket joints for ductile-iron pressure pipe and ductile-iron and gray-
2000. iron fittings, including requirements and inspection.
AWWA C115, This standard describes 3-in. through 64-in. flanged ductile-iron pipe with Iron pipes may be used in fire suppression water supply
Flanged Ductile ductile-iron or gray-iron threaded flanges for water supply service. Flanged systems such as those in NFPA 13. This is the standard for
Iron Pipe with pipe and flanges are rated for a maximum working pressure of 250 psi (1,720 how to join the pipes using threaded systems and bolts.
Ductile Iron or kPa). However, 12-in. and smaller flanged joints with ductile-iron flanges
Gray Iron may be rated for a maximum working pressure of 350 psi (2,413 kPa).
Threaded Appendixes A, B, and C cover bolts, gaskets, installation, typical pipe/flange
Flanges, 1999. thread construction, and wall pipe.
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AWWA C150, This standard covers the thickness design of ductile iron pipe complying with Iron pipes may be used in fire suppression water supply
Thickness the requirements of ANSI/AWWA C151/A21.51, Ductile Iron Pipe, systems such as those in NFPA 13. This is the standard for
Design of Centrifugally Cast, for Water. Included are: an outline of the design procedure the pipe thickness and size. Weld size and methods assume
Ductile Iron and an example; and, the basis of design or design method. The bulk of the a particular pipe metal thickness.
Pipe, 2002. standard comprises tables that list thicknesses for standard laying conditions
and certain depths of cover, water working pressure, working pressures and
maximum depths of cover for standing laying conditions and standard
pressure classes, and special thickness classes of ductile iron pipe.
AWWA C151, This standard covers 3-in. through 64-in. (76 mm through 1,600 mm) ductile Iron pipes may be used in fire suppression water supply
Ductile Iron iron pipe, centrifugally cast, for water, with push-on joints or mechanical systems such as those in NFPA 13. This is the standard for
Pipe, joints. Requirements for pipe covered by this standard are discussed in the the pipe itself and how it is made and inspected. This
Centrifugally text and are shown in tables and figures. This standard may be used for pipe ensures the pipe is high quality.
Cast for Water, with such other types of joints as may be agreed upon at the time of purchase.
2002. Section 1 discusses scope, purpose, and application. Sections 2 and 3 list
references and definitions. Section 4 lists requirements, including:
permeation; general requirements; coatings and linings; tolerances or
permitted variations; weighing pipe; and, marking pipe. Section 5 discusses
verification, including: inspection; test procedures, additional control tests by
the manufacturer, foundry records, additional tests required by the purchaser,
defective specimens and retests and rejection.
AWWA C153, This standard covers 3-in. through 64-in. (76-mm through 1,600-mm) ductile- Iron pipes may be used in fire suppression water supply
Ductile-Iron iron compact fittings to be used with ductile-iron pipe or pipe made of other systems such as those in NFPA 13. This is the standard for
Compact materials with similar outside diameters (ODs) for conveying water. “compact fittings” that are used in tight spaces. Similar to
Fittings for Minimum working pressures by size range are given. Fittings are adequate ASTM C 110 and C 111.
Water Service, for the rated working pressure plus a surge allowance of 100 psi or a surge
2000. allowance of half the rated working pressure, whichever is less. Fittings with
mechanical joints are listed in this standard for the 3-in. through 48-in. sizes.
The standard also may be used for fittings of these sizes with push-on joints
or other joints as agreed on at the time of purchase.
AWWA C200, This standard covers electrically butt-welded, straight seam or spiral seam Steel pipes may be used in fire suppression water supply
Steel Water Pipe steel pipe, 6 in. (150 mm) and larger, for transmission and distribution of systems such as those in NFPA 13. This is the standard for
6 in. and Larger, water, including fabrication of pipe, requirements of welding operations, the pipe itself and how it is made and inspected. This
1991. permissible variations of weight and dimensions, preparation of ends, ensures the pipe is high quality.
fabrication of specials, inspection, and test procedures.
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AWWA C206, This standard covers manual, semiautomatic, and automatic field welding by Steel pipes may be used in fire suppression water supply
Field Welding of the metal arc-welding processes for steel water pipe manufactured in systems such as those in NFPA 13. The welding procedure
Steel Water accordance with ANSI/AWWA C200, Standard for Steel Water Pipe--6 In. and the qualifications for the people that weld or inspect
Pipe, 1991. (150 mm) and Larger. This standard covers field welding of three types of welds are in this standard. This is for welding in
circumferential pipe joints; lap joints, butt joints, and butt-strap joints. Other construction- not for fabrication.
welding required in field fabrication and installation of specials and
appurtenances is also discussed. The design of field welded joints is not
covered. This standard recognizes ANSI/AWS D1.1 and ANSI/ASME Sec. V
as supporting documents that provide more specific information. Welding of
gasketed joints may require modification to the parameters of this welding
standard.
AWWA C207, This standard covers two types of slip-on flanges, ring type and hub type, that Steel pipes may be used in fire suppression water supply
Steel Pipe may be used interchangeably if the dimensions given in the standard are used. systems such as those in NFPA 13. This is the standard for
Flanges for The standard also covers blind flanges. The flange types and the tables that the flanges used. .
Waterworks describe them are: Ring-type, slip-on flanges (Tables 2, 5, and 6); Hub-type,
Service — Sizes slip-on flanges (Tables 3 and 4); and Blind flanges (Table 7). Unless
4 in. Through otherwise specified by the purchaser, the manufacturer will select the type to
144 in., 1986. be used. The purpose of this standard is to provide purchasers and
manufacturers minimum material requirements and dimensions for a variety
of steel flanges for attachment to steel water pipe and fittings.
AWWA C600, This standard covers the minimum requirements for the installation of Iron pipes may be used in fire suppression water supply
Installation of ductile-iron water mains and their appurtenances, including materials, systems such as those in NFPA 13. This is the standard for
Ductile Iron dimensions, tolerances, and testing procedures. Installations that require how to hang the pipe from hangers, place pipe in concrete,
Water Mains and special attention, techniques, and materials are not discussed. make feed through walls and floors, or bury the pipe.
Their
Appurtenances,
1999.
AWWA C900, This standard covers 4-in. through 12-in. (100 mm through 300 mm) PVC pipes may be used in fire suppression water supply
Polyvinyl polyvinyl chloride (PVC) pressure pipe and fabricated fittings with cast-iron- systems such as those in NFPA 13. This is the standard for
Chloride (PVC) pipe-equivalent (CI) OD dimensions and with wall-thickness-dimension the sizes and properties of such pipe.
Pressure Pipe, 4 ratios (DRs) 14, 18, and 25. The purpose of this standard is to provide
in. Through 12 direction and guidance for manufacturing, testing, selecting, and purchasing
in. (100 mm PVC pressure pipe and fabricated fittings for underground water distribution
Through 300 systems.
mm), for Water
and Other
Liquids, 1997.
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AWWA C906, This standard describes polyethylene (PE) pressure pipe made from materials PE pipes may be used in fire suppression water supply
Polyethylene conforming to standard PE code designations PE 2406, PE 3406, and systems such as those in NFPA 13 in certain circumstances.
(PE) Pressure PE3408. The pipe is primarily intended for use in transporting potable water This is the standard for the sizes and properties of such
Pipe and in either buried or aboveground installations. The standard describes 10 DRs pipe. Note that nuclear facilities usually use metals pipe.
Fittings, 4 in. for NPSs ranging from 4 in. (100 mm) through 63 in. (1,575 mm). Pipe ODs
(100 mm) conform to the OD dimensions of iron pipe sizes (IPS) (OD-based, IPS), to
Through 63 in. those established by the ISO, or to those established for DI equivalent ODs .
(1575 mm) for
Water
Distribution and
Transport, 1999.
AWWA M11, A This manual provides a review of experience and design theory regarding Steel pipes may be used in fire suppression water supply
Guide for Steel steel pipe used for conveying water. Chemistry, Casting and Heat Treatment, systems such as those in NFPA 13. Steel pipes are also
Pipe Design and discussion of stress evaluation in spiral-welded pipe , steel grades and Charpy used to carry toxic or hazardous fluids. This is the way to
Installation, 3rd test requirements for pipe with wall thicknesses greater than 1 - 2 in. (12.7 install steel pipe systems, hang the pipe, make feed through
edition, 1989. mm); calculations for external fluid pressure, consideration of pipe stiffness walls, etc.
added by the cement-mortar coating and lining; values of E' used for
calculation of pipe deflection, installation of flanged joints, and thrust-
restraint design calculations
Compressed Gas Primarily for the guidance of users of compressed gases in cylinders, This is the methods for handling gases in tanks and bottles
Association although some general precautions are included for tank car handling. that may be used for welding or process operations. Poor
(CGA) P-1, Safe Presents basic rules for safe handling and regulations applying to compressed handling can cause accidents and fires.
Handling of gases. This new edition has been extensively updated with the most current
Compressed regulations and practices.
Gases in
Containers,
2000.
CGA V-1, Detailed dimension drawings of 115 valve outlet connections for nearly 268 Compressed gas systems may carry flammable or other
Standard different products. Covers threaded connections, yoke outlets, and the Pin dangerous gases. This standard shows the exact way that
Compressed Gas Index Safety System for flush outlet valves of the yoke type used for medical pipes, tubing and hoses can be safely connected to prevent
Cylinder Valve gases. The scope of this standard is to provide connections that minimize the leaks or failures.
Outlet and Inlet possibility of hazardous misconnections between non-compatible gases. This
Connections, is accomplished by providing detailed drawings and gas assignments for
2002. outlet connections and the test protocol by which these and future
connections are approved.
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Note: Many IEEE standards for nuclear reactors (“generating stations”) are applied to non-reactor facilities or other industrial facilities. This is because the
IEEE standards developed for reactors are quite good for fire protection, safety, and reliability. IEEE standards are often based on experience.
IEEE 1185, Installation methods to improve cable installation practices in generating stations are Careful installation ensures no damage to the cables
IEEE Guide for provided. These include cable lubrication methods, conduit-cable pulling charts, and wires that can start fires.
Installation pull rope selection criteria, pulling attachment methods, and alternative methods to
Methods for traditional cable pulling tension monitoring. This guide supplements 422-1986 and
Generating 690-1984, which provide specific cable installation limits. This guide may also be of
Station Cables. benefit to cable pulling crews in commercial and industrial facilities when similar
cable types and raceways are used.
IEEE 1202, A test protocol and the performance criteria to determine the flame propagation Like the ASTM tests for materials, IEEE has a
IEEE Standard tendency of cables in a vertical cable tray. It applies to single insulated and multi- standard for testing fire resistance of cables and
for Flame conductor cables is established. The test consists of exposing cable samples to a wires in cable trays.
Testing of theoretical 20 kW (70 000 Btu/hr) flaming ignition source for a 20 min duration.
Cables for Use The test facility, test sample requirements, test procedure, and evaluation of results
in Cable Tray in are covered.
Industrial and Scope
Commercial This standard provides a protocol for exposing cable samples to a theoretical 20 kW
Occupancies (70 000 Btu/hr) flaming ignition source for a 20 min test duration. The test
determines the flame propagation tendency of single conductor and multi-conductor
cables intended for use in cable trays in industrial and commercial occupancies.
IEEE 323, IEEE The basic requirements for qualifying Class 1E equipment and interfaces that are to 1E for reactors is the strongest electrical system
Standard for be used in nuclear power generating stations are described in this standard. The design in the US. This standard is how to qualify the
Qualifying Class principles, methods, and procedures described are intended to be used for qualifying system and components for DBEs including fires. It
1E Equipment equipment, maintaining and extending qualification, and updating qualification, as is used with many other standards for individual
for Nuclear required, if the equipment is modified. The qualification requirements in this components like the cables, wires, barriers (cabinets,
Power standard, when met, demonstrate and document the ability of equipment to perform conduit, cable tray), etc.
Generating safety function(s) under applicable service conditions including DBE, reducing the
Stations risk of common-cause equipment failure.
IEEE 493, The design of reliable industrial and commercial power systems is of considerable 1E requirements for reactors are too strong and
Recommended interest to many people. Prior to 1962, a qualitative viewpoint was taken when expensive for most commercial applications. This s
Practice for the attempting to achieve this objective. Surveys from the 1970s were the basis for the the recommendation for commercial and non-safety
Design of reliability data contained in IEEE Std 493-1980. Six additional IEEE reliability systems This standard is how to qualify the system
Reliable surveys have been conducted and published during the 1980s and have been updated and components for DBEs including fires. It is used
Industrial and in this revision of IEEE Std 493-1997. The 1990 edition included pertinent tutorial with many other standards for individual
Commercial reliability material and the cost of power interruptions data. components like the cables, wires, barriers (cabinets,
Power Systems conduit, cable tray), etc.
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IEEE 634, Cable This standard is applicable to fire stops of various materials and construction. Cable Penetrations in fire walls or other fire barriers must
Penetration Fire penetration fire stops are intended for use in fire-resistive barriers. Tests conducted have strong fire resistance to ensure the barrier is not
Stop in conformance with this standard will record the performance of fire stops during breached and the fire cannot spread. This standard is
Qualification the test exposure. The resistance of a fire stop to an external force imposed by a how to tests the design and materials in penetrations.
Test hose stream or water spray will also be considered in this standard. The intent of this
standard is to develop data to assist in determining the suitability of a fire stop for
use where fire resistance is required
NFPA 1, 1.1 Scope. This is a very general, top level l NFPA standard that
Uniform Fire 1.1.1 The scope includes, but is not limited to, the following: describes most of the aspects of good fire protection
Code™, 2003 (1) Inspection of permanent and temporary buildings, processes, equipment, design and fire safety. It uses references to other
edition. systems, and other fire and related life safety situations NFPA standards for details. It shows how all the
(2) Investigation of fires, explosions, hazardous materials incidents, and other NFPA standards are organized to cover all aspects of
related emergency incidents fire safety.
(3) Review of design and construction plans, drawings, and specifications for
life safety systems, fire protection systems, access, water supplies, processes, and
hazardous materials and other fire and life safety issues
(4) Fire and life safety education of fire brigades, employees, responsible
parties, and the general public
(5) Existing occupancies and conditions, the design and construction of new
buildings, remodeling of existing buildings, and additions to existing buildings
(6) Design, alteration, modification, construction, maintenance, and testing of
fire protection systems and equipment
(7)* Access requirements for fire department operations
(8) Hazards from outside fires in vegetation, trash, building debris, and other
materials
(9) Regulation and control of special events including, but not limited to,
assemblage of people, exhibits, trade shows, amusement parks, haunted houses,
outdoor events, and other similar special temporary and permanent occupancies
(10) Interior finish, decorations, furnishings, and other combustibles that
contribute to fire spread, fire load, and smoke production
(11) Storage, use, processing, handling, and on-site transportation of flammable
and combustible gases, liquids, and solids
(12) Storage, use, processing, handling, and on-site transportation of hazardous
materials
(13) Control of emergency operations and scenes
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(14) Conditions affecting fire fighter safety
1.2 Purpose.
The purpose of this Code is to prescribe minimum requirements necessary to
establish a reasonable level of fire and life safety and property protection from the
hazards created by fire, explosion, and dangerous conditions.
NFPA 105, 1.1 Scope. Smoke doors must prevent smoke spread using
Standard for the This standard shall prescribe minimum requirements for smoke door assemblies for gaskets or other ways to stop smoke leaks. This
Installation of use in providing safety to life and protection of property from smoke. keeps fire escape paths free of smoke to protect
Smoke Door 1.2*Purpose. people.
Assemblies, The purpose of this standard shall be to provide a means to restrict the movement of
2003 edition. smoke through door assemblies in order to maintain a tenable environment.
NFPA 1081, 1.1 Scope. Fire brigades respond to fire alarms and fight fires
Standard for This standard identifies the minimum job performance requirements (JPRs) manually. These people must be properly trained
Industrial Fire necessary to perform the duties as a member of an organized industrial fire brigade and can become “professional” fire fighters per this
Brigade Member providing services at a specific facility or site. standard.
Professional 1.2 Purpose.
Qualifications, The purpose of this standard is to specify the minimum JPRs for industrial fire
2001 edition. brigade members. It is not the intent of the standard to restrict any jurisdiction from
exceeding these requirements.
NFPA 12A, 1.1 Scope. This standard is like NFPA for water suppression
Standard on This standard contains minimum requirements for total flooding Halon 1301 fire systems but it is for halon. Halon is usually used for
Halon 1301 Fire extinguishing systems. It includes only the essentials necessary to make the standard computer rooms.
Extinguishing workable in the hands of those skilled in this field. Only those skilled in this work
Systems, 1997 are competent to design, install, maintain, decommission, and remove this
edition. equipment. It might be necessary for many of those charged with purchasing,
inspecting, testing, approving, operating, and maintaining this equipment to consult
with an experienced and competent fire protection engineer to effectively discharge
their respective duties.
1.2 Purpose.
This standard is prepared for the use and guidance of those charged with purchasing,
designing, installing, testing, inspecting, approving, listing, operating, maintaining,
decommissioning, and removing halogenated agent extinguishing systems (Halon
1301), so that such equipment will function as intended throughout its life. Nothing
in this standard is intended to restrict new technologies or alternate arrangements
provided the level of safety prescribed by this standard is not lowered.
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1.2.1 Pre-engineered systems (packaged systems) consist of system components
designed to be installed according to pre-tested limitations as approved or listed by a
testing laboratory. Pre-engineered systems sometimes incorporate special nozzles,
flow rates, methods of application, nozzle placement, and pressurization levels that
sometimes differ from those detailed elsewhere in this standard. All other
requirements of the standard shall apply. Pre-engineered systems shall be installed
to protect hazards within the limitations that have been established by the testing
laboratories where listed.
NFPA 1403, 1.1 Scope. Fire brigades and fire fighters must be trained and
Standard on This standard shall contain the minimum requirements for training fire suppression part of the training is to put the fire fighters in
Live Fire personnel engaged in fire-fighting operations under live fire conditions. realistic situations wit smoke and flame.
Training 1.1.1 The minimum requirements for training shall comprise a basic system that can
Evolutions, 2002 be adapted to local conditions to serve as a standard mechanism for live fire
edition. training.
1.2 Purpose.
The purpose of this standard shall be to provide a process for conducting live fire
training evolutions to ensure that they are conducted in safe facilities and that the
exposure to health and safety hazards for the fire fighters receiving the training is
minimized.
NFPA 1451, 1.1 Scope. Fire brigades and fire fighters must use trucks and
Standard for a 1.1.1 This standard shall contain the minimum requirements for a fire service vehicles that are driven and operated per this
Fire Service vehicle operations training program. standard.
Vehicle 1.1.2 This standard shall outline the development of a written training program,
Operations including the organizational procedures for training, vehicle maintenance, and
Training identifying equipment deficiencies; and for design, financing, and other areas.
Program, 2002 1.1.3 The knowledge and skills required of safety, training, maintenance, and
edition. administrative officers charged with developing and implementing the operations
training program shall also be outlined within this standard.
1.2 Purpose.
1.2.1 The purpose of this standard shall be to specify the minimum requirements for
a fire service vehicle operations training program, including procedures for those
members that drive or occupy fire service vehicles.
1.2.2 The achievement of the objectives of this performance standard shall be
intended to help prevent crashes, injuries, and fatalities involving fire service
vehicles.
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NFPA 17, 1.1 Scope.
Standard for Dry This standard includes minimum requirements for dry chemical fire-extinguishing
Chemical systems that discharge dry chemical from fixed nozzles or hand hose lines by means
Extinguishing of expellant gas.
Systems, 1998 1.2 Purpose.
edition. This standard is prepared for the use and guidance of those charged with the
purchasing, designing, installing, testing, inspecting, approving, listing, operating,
or maintaining of dry chemical fire-extinguishing systems in order that such
equipment will function as intended throughout its life.
NFPA 17A, 1.1 Scope. These systems are mainly used for cooking systems
Standard for Wet The provisions of this standard apply to the design, installation, operation, testing, with grease. However, it is possible to use this
Chemical and maintenance of pre-engineered wet chemical fire extinguishing systems that standard for special cases in nuclear facilities.
Extinguishing discharge wet chemical from fixed nozzles and piping by means of expellant gas. It
Systems, 2002 contains only the essential requirements and recommendations needed to make the
edition. standard workable in the hands of those skilled in this field.
1.2 Purpose.
This standard is prepared for the use and guidance of those charged with the
purchasing, designing, installing, testing, inspecting, approving, listing, operating,
or maintaining of pre-engineered wet chemical fire-extinguishing systems in order
that such equipment will function as intended throughout its life.
NFPA 18, 1.1 Scope. Wetting agents are used to apply protective foams or
Standard on This standard addresses qualification tests, methods of evaluation, and general rules films onto materials to increase fire resistance. This
Wetting Agents, for application of wetting agents and wetting agent solutions as related to fire standard describes how to apply the foams so they
2006 edition. control and extinguishment. stick well to the materials.
1.2 Purpose.
This standard provides the requirements for the performance and use of wetting
agents as related to fire control and extinguishment and is prepared for the guidance
of the fire services, authorities having jurisdiction, and others concerned with
judging the acceptability and use of any wetting agent offered for such a purpose.
NFPA 1911, 1.1 Scope. Fire pumps must be maintained and reliable and this
Standard for This standard shall cover the service testing of fire pump systems on automotive fire is the test for the pumps to show they work properly.
Service Tests of apparatus.
Fire Pump 1.2 Purpose.
Systems on Fire This standard shall establish the site, environmental, and equipment requirements
Apparatus, 2002 for proper pump system performance testing, as well as the frequency and
edition. procedures to be followed in performing tests.
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NFPA 1961, 1.1 Scope. Fire hose used for manual fire fighting must meet
Standard on Fire This standard shall define the design and construction requirements for new fire this standard.
Hose, 2002 hose, the testing required to verify the design and construction, and the inspection
edition. and testing required of all new fire hose.
1.2* Purpose.
The purpose of this standard shall be to establish the minimum requirements for new
fire hose.
NFPA 1962, 1.1 Scope. Fire hoses and the couplings must be inspected and
Standard for the This standard shall apply to the inspection, care, and use of fire hose, fire hose maintained per this standard.
Care, Use, and couplings, and fire-fighting nozzles; the service testing of fire hose; and the
Service Testing associated record-keeping.
of Fire Hose 1.2 Purpose.
Including The purpose of this standard is to provide requirements for the inspection, care, and
Couplings and use of fire hose, couplings, and nozzles and the testing of fire hose so that the
Nozzles, 1998 reliability of fire hose and nozzles is increased when they are used at an incident.
edition.
NFPA 1963, 1.1 Scope. Fire hoses need to be standardized and the fittings
Standard for Fire This standard gives the performance requirements for new fire hose couplings and are also standardized. This way hoses and fittings
Hose adapters with nominal sizes from ¾ in. (19 mm) through 8 in. (200 mm) and the are interchangeable.
Connections, specifications for the mating surfaces.
2003 edition. 1.2 Purpose.
The purpose of this standard is to provide a uniform standard for safe couplings and
adapters for the users of fire hose connections.
NFPA 1971, 1.1 Scope. Fire fighters must have proper clothing and
Standard on 1.1.1 This standard shall specify the minimum design, performance, testing, and apparatus to protect them per this standard.
Protective certification requirements for structural fire fighting protective ensembles and
Ensemble for ensemble elements that include coats, trousers, coveralls, helmets, gloves, footwear,
Structural Fire and interface components.
Fighting, 2000 1.1.2 This standard shall specify the minimum design, performance, testing, and
edition. certification requirements for proximity fire fighting protective ensembles and
ensemble elements that include coats, trousers, coveralls, helmets, gloves, footwear,
and interface components.
1.1.7 Certification of compliant structural fire fighting protective ensembles,
compliant proximity fire fighting protective ensembles, and compliant elements of
both ensembles to the requirements of this standard shall not preclude certification
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to additional appropriate standards where the ensemble or ensemble element meets
all the applicable requirements of each standard.
1.2Purpose.
1.2.1 The purpose of this standard shall be to establish minimum levels of
protection for fire fighting personnel assigned to fire department operations
including but not limited to structural fire fighting, proximity fire fighting, rescue,
emergency medical, and other emergency first responder functions.
1.2.3 Controlled laboratory tests used to determine compliance with the
performance requirements of this standard shall not be deemed as establishing
performance levels for all situations to which personnel can be exposed.
NFPA 1981, 1.1 Scope. Part of the equipment to protect fire fighters is the
Standard on 1.1.1 This standard shall specify the minimum requirements for the design, SCBA or SAR specified to this standard.
Open-Circuit performance, testing, and certification of open-circuit self-contained breathing
Self-Contained apparatus (SCBA) and combination open-circuit SCBAand supplied air respirators
Breathing (SCBA/SAR) for fire and emergency services personnel.
Apparatus for 1.1.2 This standard shall specify the requirements for SCBA as detailed in Section
Fire and 1.3, Application.
Emergency 1.1.3 This standard shall not specify requirements for other types of self-contained
Services, 2002 breathing apparatus.
edition. 1.1.4 Nothing herein shall restrict any jurisdiction or manufacturer from exceeding
these minimum requirements.
1.2 Purpose.
1.2.1 The purpose of this standard shall be to establish minimum levels of
protection for fire and emergency services personnel from immediately dangerous to
life and health (IDLH) atmospheres..
NFPA 1982, 1-1 Scope. PASS is the radio or other ways to communicate
Standard on 1-1.1This standard shall specify minimum design, performance, and certification with fire fighters. PASS must be per this standard.
Personal Alert requirements and test methods for all Personal Alert Safety Systems (PASS) to be
Safety Systems used by fire fighters and other emergency services personnel who engage in rescue,
(PASS), 1998 fire fighting, and other hazardous duties.
edition. 1-1.2 This standard shall apply to the design, manufacturing, and certification of all
new PASS including, but not limited to, Stand-Alone PASS and SCBA-Integrated
PASS. This standard shall not apply to any PASS manufactured to previous editions
of this standard.
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1-2.1 PURPOSE
The purpose of this standard shall be to provide minimum requirements for all PASS
including, but not limited to, PASS that are designed as a stand-alone device or as a
device that is integrated with an SCBA, that are intended to be utilized by fire
fighters and other emergency services personnel during emergency operations, and
that emit an audible alarm signal to summon aid in the event the PASS user becomes
incapacitated or needs assistance.
NFPA 204, 1.1 Scope. Fire fighters may use emergency fans or other
Standard for 1.1.1 This standard shall apply to the design of venting systems for the emergency systems to clear smoke to fight the fire. This is the
Smoke and Heat venting of products of combustion from fires in buildings. standard for those systems.
Venting, 2002 1.1.2 This standard shall not specify under which conditions venting is to be
edition. provided or required.
NFPA 214, 1.1 Scope. This only applies if the tower has combustible
Standard on This standard applies to fire protection for field-erected and factory-assembled materials. Most towers would not be made of
Water-Cooling water-cooling towers of combustible construction or those in which the fill is of flammable materials or have flammable contents in
Towers, 2005 combustible material. nuclear facilities.
edition. 1.2 Purpose.
The purpose of this standard is to provide a reasonable degree of protection for life
and property from fire where water-cooling towers are located.
NFPA 241, 1.1 Scope. Fires often occur during these types of operations.
Standard for This standard shall apply to structures in the course of construction, alteration, or This standard discusses how fires can be prevented
Safeguarding demolition, including those in underground locations. during construction and demolition.
Construction, 1.2 Purpose.
Alteration, and This standard is intended to prescribe minimum safeguards for construction,
Demolition alteration, and demolition operations in order to provide reasonable safety to life and
Operations, property from fire during such operations.
2000 edition.
NFPA 252, 1.1 Scope. Fire doors must be as fire resistant as the barrier
Standard This standard prescribes standardized fire and hose stream test procedures that apply where they are located. This standard is how to test
Methods of Fire to fire door assemblies intended to be used to retard the spread of fire through door doors and is used by fire-resistant door
Tests of Door openings in fire-resistive walls. manufacturers.
Assemblies, 1.2 Purpose.
2003 edition. 1.2.1 The purpose of this standard is to prescribe specific fire and hose stream test
procedures for fire door assemblies in order to standardize a method for determining
the degree of fire protection provided by such assemblies in retarding the spread of
fire (flame, heat, and hot gases) through door openings in fire-resistive walls.
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NFPA 255, 1.1 Scope. This test determines building material characteristics
Standard 1.1.1 This standard describes a method of testing the comparative surface burning for flame spread. It also covers smoke generation.
Method of Test characteristics of building materials with regard to flame spread and smoke The results allow a user to compare two materials to
of Surface developed. say which one id the most fire resistant.
Burning 1.1.2 This test method is applicable to any type of building material that by its own
Characteristics structural quality or the manner in which it is applied is capable of supporting itself
of Building in position, or is supported in the test furnace, in the thickness recommended for
Materials, 2000 use.
edition. 1.2 Purpose.
1.2.1 The purpose of the test is to determine the comparative surface burning
characteristics of the material under test by evaluating the flame spread over its
surface and the resulting visible smoke, when exposed to a test fire, thus
establishing a basis on which surface burning characteristics of different materials
can be compared without specific consideration of all end-use parameters that might
affect the surface burning characteristics.
1.2.2 In this test method, flame spread and visible smoke information is recorded
and used to assess a flame spread index and a smoke developed index.
1.2.3 This test method shall not be used to evaluate the fire resistance of materials
or assemblies.
NFPA 256, 1.1 Scope. All building materials must be fire resistant. This
Standard These test methods shall measure the relative fire characteristics of roof coverings standard covers test to show roof materials are fire
Methods of Fire under a simulated fire originating outside a building. resistant.
Tests of Roof 1.2 Purpose.
Coverings, 2003 The tests shall be done to demonstrate the relative performance of materials under
edition. the test exposure involved.
NFPA 257, 1.1 Scope. All building materials must be fire resistant. This
Standard on Fire 1.1.1 This standard prescribes standardized fire and hose stream test procedures that standard covers test to show windows and glass
Test for Window apply to the evaluation of fire window assemblies, including windows, glass block, block materials are fire resistant.
and Glass Block and other light-transmitting assemblies intended to retard the spread of fire through
Assemblies, openings in fire resistance–rated walls.
2007 edition. 1.1.2 This standard is not to be construed as determining the suitability of fire
window assemblies for continued use after fire exposure.
1.1.3 This standard provides a standardized method for comparing the performance
of fire window assemblies.
1.2 Purpose.
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1.2.1 This standard prescribes specific standardized fire and hose stream test
procedures for determining the fire protection rating of window assemblies, glass
block, and other light-transmitting assemblies used in openings in fire resistance–
rated walls.
1.2.2 This standard provides a means for evaluating the ability of a window, glass
block, or other light-transmitting assemblies to remain in a wall opening during a
prescribed fire test exposure, followed by the application of a hose stream.
1.2.4 The tests described herein expose a specimen to a standard fire exposure that
is controlled to achieve specified temperatures throughout a specified time period,
which then is followed by the application of a specified standard hose stream.
1.2.7 This standard does not provide the following:
(1) Full information regarding the performance of a specific fire window
assembly where installed in walls constructed of materials other than those tested
(2) Evaluation of the degree to which the fire window assembly contributes to
the fire hazard by generation of heat and other products of combustion
(3) Measurement of the fire window assembly's ability to control or limit the
passage of smoke through the assembly
NFPA 259, 1.1 Scope. The amount of heat given off at 750 degrees is one
Standard Test This method of test shall provide a means of determining, under controlled way to judge if the material is good to prevent fire s
Method for laboratory conditions, the potential heat of building materials subjected to a defined from spreading. The result of this test is another way
Potential Heat of high-temperature exposure condition. to decide if a building material should be used.
Building 1.2* Purpose.
Materials, 2003 This test method shall yield a property-type measurement of the amount of heat that
edition. can potentially be given off by building materials when they are exposed to a heat
source at 750°C.
NFPA 286, 1.1 Scope. This test shows if building materials in the interior of
Standard This standard describes a method for determining the contribution of interior finish facilities contributes to fire growth. Most nuclear
Methods of Fire materials to room fire growth during specified fire exposure conditions. facilities do not have these kinds of materials,
Tests for 1.1.1 This method is intended for the evaluation of the flammability characteristics however. The amount of finish materials (like
Evaluating of wall and ceiling interior finish, other than textile wall coverings, where such paneling or curtains) are minimized in nuclear
Contribution of materials constitute the exposed interior surfaces of buildings. facilities to reduce the combustible load. This
Wall and Ceiling 1.1.2 This fire test method is not intended for the evaluation of fire endurance of mainly applies to residences or offices.
Interior Finish to assemblies, nor is it intended for the evaluation of the effect of fires that originate
Room Fire within a wall assembly.
Growth, 2000 1.1.3 This standard specifies three types of specimen mounting, depending on the
edition. application of the interior finish material, as follows:
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(1) Three walls (for interior finish to be used on walls only)
(2) Three walls and the ceiling (for interior finish to be used on walls and
ceilings)
(cont’d) (3) The ceiling alone (for interior finish to be used on ceilings only)
1.2 Purpose.
1.2.1 This method of test measures certain fire performance characteristics of
interior finish materials in an enclosure under specified fire exposure conditions.
1.2.2 This method of test determines the potential extent to which the interior finish
materials contribute to fire growth in a room, including the heat and smoke released,
the combustion products released, and the potential for fire spread beyond the room,
under the particular conditions simulated.
1.2.3 The method of test provides the following:
(1) Extent of fire growth in the fire test room
(2) Rate of heat release by the specimen
(3) Total heat released by the specimen
(4) Time to flashover in the fire test room if flashover occurs
(5) Time to flame extension beyond the doorway of the fire test room if flame
extension occurs
(6) Total heat flux incident to the floor of the fire test room
(7) Upper level gas temperature in the fire test room
(8) Smoke obscuration, as determined in the exhaust duct
(9) Production of carbon monoxide, as determined in the exhaust duct
(10) Emissions of other combustion gases, as determined in the exhaust duct
1.2.4 This method does not provide data that can be generalized to apply to rooms
or spaces of different shapes, sizes, and ventilation.
1.2.5 The performance observed in the test is based on the test conditions.
1.2.6 If a test specimen is exposed to a different environment, as in an actual fire,
the performance of the specimen can be different.
1.2.7 The method of test does not provide the following:
(1) Full information concerning toxicity of combustion gases
(2) Fire resistance of wall–ceiling systems
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NFPA 37, 1.1 Scope. Combustion engines or gas turbines are used in
Standard for the This standard establishes criteria for minimizing the hazards of fire during the many nuclear facilities for emergency power or
Installation and installation and operation of stationary combustion engines and gas turbines. emergency fire water pumps. The engines are
Use of 1.2 Purpose. installed per this standard.
Stationary This standard provides minimum fire safety requirements for the installation and
Combustion operation of stationary combustion engines and gas turbines.
Engines and Gas
Turbines, 2006
edition.
NFPA 496, 1.1 Scope. Classified areas such as those where there are
Standard for 1.1.1 This standard applies to purging and pressurizing for the following: flammable vapors may use enclosures (cabinets,
Purged and (1) Electrical equipment located in areas classified as hazardous by Article 500 conduit, etc) that are pressurized to keep the vapors
Pressurized or Article 505 of NFPA 70 from leaking in and causing fires and explosions.
Enclosures for (2) Electrical equipment containing sources of flammable vapors or gases and These systems are rare in nuclear facilities. Most
Electrical located in either classified or unclassified areas nuclear facilities are designed to contain flammable
Equipment, (3) Control rooms or buildings located in areas classified as hazardous by materials and vapors so there are few if any
2003 edition. Article 500 or Article 505 of NFPA 70 “classified” areas.
(4) Analyzer rooms containing sources of flammable vapors or gases and
located in areas classified as hazardous by Article 500 or Article 505 of NFPA 70
1.1.2* This standard does not apply to electrical equipment located in:
(1) Areas classified as Class I, Zone 0
(2) Areas classified as Class III
(3) Areas where flammable liquids may be splashed or spilled on the electrical
equipment
1.2 Purpose.
This standard provides information on the methods for purging and pressurizing
enclosures to prevent ignition of a flammable atmosphere. Such an atmosphere may
be introduced into the enclosure by a surrounding external atmosphere or by an
internal source. By these means, electrical equipment that is not otherwise
acceptable for a flammable atmosphere may be utilized in accordance with Article
500 or Article 505 of NFPA 70.
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NFPA 5000®, 1.1 Scope. This standard is used in conjunction with NFPA 101,
Building 1.1.1 General. The Code addresses construction, protection, and occupancy features The Life Safety Code and describes how the building
Construction necessary to minimize danger to life and property. must be designed to avoid collapse during fires.
and Safety 1.1.2 Code Title. The provisions of this document shall constitute and be known as
Code®, 2003 NFPA 5000, Building Construction and Safety Code, hereinafter referred to as “this
edition. Code” or “the Code.”
1.2* Purpose.
The purpose of the Code is to provide minimum design regulations to safeguard life,
health, property, and public welfare and to minimize injuries by regulating and
controlling the permitting, design, construction, quality of materials, use and
occupancy, location, and maintenance of all buildings and structures within the
jurisdiction and certain equipment specifically regulated herein.
NFPA 51B, 1.1 Scope. Welding operations or “hot cutting” with torches can
Standard for Fire 1.1.1 This standard shall cover provisions to prevent loss of life and property from cause fires. NFPA describes how to perform these
Prevention fire or explosion as a result of hot work. operations safely without causing fires. One key
During Welding, 1.1.2 Installation and operation of arc cutting and welding equipment and operation item is a “fire watch” that is a person with a fire
Cutting, and of gas cutting and welding equipment shall be in accordance with ANSI Z49.1, extinguisher that just watches for hot materials
Other Hot Work, Safety in Welding, Cutting, and Allied Processes. during the operation.
2003 edition. 1.2 Purpose.
This standard shall provide guidance for persons, including outside contractors and
property managers, who manage, supervise, and perform hot work.
NFPA 654, 1.1 Scope. Many materials can cause dusts that become
Standard for the 1.1.1 This standard shall apply to all phases of the manufacturing, processing, flammable. Zirconium dust is an example for
Prevention of blending, pneumatic conveying, repackaging, and handling of combustible nuclear facilities. This standard describes how to
Fire and Dust particulate solids or hybrid mixtures, regardless of concentration or particle size, control these dusts.
Explosions from where the materials present a fire or explosion hazard.
the 1.1.2 The owner/operator shall be responsible for implementing the requirements in
Manufacturing, this standard.
Processing, and 1.2 Purpose.
Handling of The purpose of this standard is to prescribe technical requirements for safety to life
Combustible and property from fire and explosion and to minimize the resulting damage from a
Particulate fire or explosion.
Solids, 2006
edition.
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NFPA 704, 1.1 Scope. Fire brigades and fire fighters must know if the area
Standard System This standard shall address the health, flammability, instability, and related hazards they are entering has hazardous materials that could
for the that are presented by short-term, acute exposure to a material under conditions of hurt them. This standard describes how to describe
Identification of fire, spill, or similar emergencies. the hazards in posters or placards and where the
the Hazards of 1.2 Purpose. posters must be located.
Materials for 1.2.1 This standard shall provide a simple, readily recognized, and easily
Emergency understood system of markings that provides a general idea of the hazards of a
Response, 2001 material and the severity of these hazards as they relate to emergency response.
edition. 1.2.2 The objectives of the system shall be as follows:
(1) To provide an appropriate signal or alert and on-the-spot information to
safeguard the lives of both public and private emergency response personnel
(2) To assist in planning for effective fire and emergency control operations,
including cleanup
(3) To assist all designated personnel, engineers, and plant and safety
personnel in evaluating hazards
1.2.3 This system shall provide basic information to fire-fighting, emergency, and
other personnel, enabling them to easily decide whether to evacuate the area or to
commence emergency control procedures.
1.2.4 This system also shall provide those personnel with information to assist in
selecting fire-fighting tactics and emergency procedures.
NFPA 75, 1.1 Scope. Computers and instrumentation and control systems
Standard for the This standard covers the requirements for the protection of information technology require special fire protection design as in this
Protection of equipment and information technology equipment areas. standard.
Electronic 1.2 Purpose.
Computer/Data The purpose of this standard is to set forth the minimum requirements for the
Processing protection of information technology equipment and information technology
Equipment, equipment areas from damage by fire or its associated effects — namely, smoke,
1999 edition. corrosion, heat, and water.
NFPA 750, 1.1 Scope. Water mist systems are a special type of suppression
Standard on This standard contains the minimum requirements for the design, installation, system similar to the typical water sprinkler systems
Water Mist Fire maintenance, and testing of water mist fire protection systems. This standard does in NFPA 13. They are used for fires that may be
Protection not provide definitive fire performance criteria, nor does it offer specific guidance very hot (such as pool fires) where the mist blocks
Systems, 2000 on how to design a system to control, suppress, or extinguish a fire. Reliance is the oxygen or where sprinkler systems like NFPA 13
edition. placed on the procurement and installation of listed water mist equipment or would cause the fire to spread.
systems that have demonstrated performance in fire tests as part of a listing process.
1.2 Purpose.
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1.2.1 The purpose of this standard is to provide protection for life and property
from fire through the standardization of design, installation, maintenance, and
testing requirements for water-based fire suppression systems that use a specific
spray (mist) that absorbs heat, displaces oxygen, or blocks radiant heat to control,
suppress, or extinguish fires as required by the application.
NFPA 86, 1.1 Scope. Many nuclear facilities including MFFF use
Standard for 1.1.1 This standard applies to Class A, Class B, Class C, and Class D ovens, dryers, furnaces. Furnaces must meet this standard for fire
Ovens and and furnaces, thermal oxidizers, and any other heated enclosure used for processing safety.
Furnaces, 1999 of materials and related equipment.
edition. 1.1.1.1 The terms ovens, dryers, and furnaces are used interchangeably and also
apply to other heated enclosures used for processing of materials.
1.1.2 Within the scope of this standard, a Class A, Class B, or Class C oven is any
heated enclosure operating at approximately atmospheric pressure and used for
commercial and industrial processing of materials.
1.1.3 A Class A oven can utilize a low-oxygen atmosphere.
1.1.4 This standard applies to bakery ovens and Class A ovens, in all respects, and
where reference is made to ANSI Z50.1, Bakery Equipment — Safety
Requirements, those requirements shall apply to bakery oven construction and
safety.
1.1.5 This standard applies to atmosphere generators and atmosphere supply
systems serving Class C furnaces and to furnaces with integral quench tanks or
molten salt baths.
1.1.6* This standard applies to Class D ovens and furnaces operating above
ambient temperatures to over 5000°F (2760°C) and at pressures normally below
atmospheric to 10-8 torr (1.33 × 10-6 Pa).
1.1.7 This standard does not apply to the following:
(1) Coal or other solid fuel-firing systems (2) Listed equipment with a
heating system(s) that supplies a total input not exceeding 150,000 Btu/hr (44 kW)
1.2 Purpose.
This standard provides the requirements for furnaces to minimize the fire and
explosion hazards that can endanger the furnace, the building, or personnel.
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NFPA 91, 1.1 Scope. These exhaust systems ensure that flammable vapors
Standard for 1.1.1 This standard provides minimum requirements for the design, construction, cannot collect and deflagrate or detonate. Usually
Exhaust Systems installation, operation, testing, and maintenance of exhaust systems for air process systems are designed to avoid explosive
for Air conveying of vapors, gases, mists, and noncombustible particulate solids except as mixtures. Defense in depth can be provided by
Conveying of modified or amplified by other applicable NFPA standards. adding additional exhaust systems per this standard.
Vapors, Gases, 1.1.2 This standard does not cover exhaust systems for conveying combustible
Mists, and particulate solids that are covered in other NFPA standards
Noncombustible 1.2 Purpose.
Particulate The purpose of this standard is to provide technical requirements for exhaust
Solids, 2004 systems that will achieve the following results:
edition.
(1) Provide safety to life and property from fires and explosions
(2) Minimize the damage in the event that such fires and explosions occur
UL 1093, These requirements cover the construction and performance, exclusive of NFPA 10 specifies this type of extinguisher can be
Standard for performance during fire tests, of portable halon type fire extinguishers. Halon type used. This UL standard specifies how the
Halogenated fire extinguishers are intended to be utilized in accordance with the Standard for extinguisher should be designed and fabricated.
Agent Fire Portable Fire Extinguishers, NFPA 10. Manufacturers for extinguishers must meet this
Extinguishers, The requirements for performance during fire testing of halon type fire extinguishers standard.
2005. are specified in the Standard for Rating and Fire Testing of Fire Extinguishers,
ANSI/UL 711.
UL 154, 1.1 These requirements cover the construction and performance, exclusive of
Standard for performance during fire tests, of portable carbon-dioxide fire extinguishers. Carbon-
Carbon-Dioxide dioxide fire extinguishers are intended to be utilized in accordance with the
Fire Standard for Portable Fire Extinguishers, NFPA 10 and the National Fire Code of
Extinguishers, Canada.
2005.
UL 299, 1.1 These requirements cover the construction and performance, exclusive of
Standard for Dry performance during fire tests, of portable dry chemical and dry powder (Class D)
Chemical Fire fire extinguishers. Dry chemical and dry powder fire extinguishers are intended to
Extinguishers, be utilized in accordance with the Standard for Portable Fire Extinguishers,
2005. ANSI/NFPA 10 and with the National Fire Code of Canada.
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APPENDIX B NFPA 801 REQUIREMENTS
As discussed in Section 2 and Section 5, NFPA 801 can be the key basis to begin standards for FCF in
Japan. This appendix contains the requirements for NFPA 801.
B-1
Table B-1 NFPA 801 Requirements
NFPA 801 Topic Key Requirements
Chapter 1 Administration 1.1 Scope.
1.1.1* This standard addresses fire protection requirements intended to reduce the risk of fires and explosions at
facilities handling radioactive materials. These requirements are applicable to all locations where radioactive materials
are stored, handled, or used in quantities and conditions requiring government oversight and/or license (e.g., NRC or
DOE) to possess or use these materials and to all other locations with equal quantities or conditions.
1.1.2 This standard shall not apply to commercial power reactors that are covered by NFPA 804, Standard for Fire
Protection for Advanced Light Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants, and NFPA 805, Performance-Based Standard
for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants.
1.2 Purpose.
1.2.1* Responsibilities. This standard shall provide requirements and guidance for personnel responsible for the design,
construction, operation, and regulation of facilities that involve the storage, handling, or use of radioactive materials.
1.2.2 Defense-in-Depth.
1.2.2.1 This standard shall be based on the concept of defense-in-depth.
1.2.2.2 Defense-in-depth shall be achieved when a balance of each of the following elements is provided:
(2) Detecting fires rapidly and controlling and extinguishing promptly those fires that do occur, thereby limiting
damage and consequences
(3) Providing a level of fire protection for structures, systems, and components so that a fire that is not promptly
extinguished will not prevent essential facility functions from being performed
1.3* Application.
These requirements shall be applicable to all locations where radioactive materials that meet the thresholds established
in 10 CFR 30 are stored, handled, or used, in quantities and conditions requiring government oversight and/or license
(e.g., NRC or DOE) to possess or use these materials, and to all other locations with equal quantities or conditions.
1.4 Retroactivity.
1.4.1 The provisions of this standard shall be considered necessary to provide a reasonable level of protection from loss
of life and property from fire. They reflect situations and the state of the art at the time the standard was issued.
1.4.2 Unless otherwise noted, the provisions of this standard shall not be applied retroactively, except in those cases
where it is determined by the AHJ that the existing situation involves a distinct hazard to life, property, or the
environment.
1.4.3 Any alteration, installation of new equipment, or change in occupancy shall meet the requirements for new
construction, except where approved by the AHJ.
1.4.4 Only the altered, renovated, or modernized portion of an existing building, system, or individual component shall
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be required to meet the provisions of this standard that are applicable to new construction.
1.5 Equivalency.
1.5.1 Nothing in this standard is intended to prevent the use of systems, methods, or devices of equivalent or superior
quality, strength, fire resistance, effectiveness, durability, and safety as alternatives to those prescribed by this standard,
provided technical documentation is submitted to the AHJ to demonstrate equivalency, and the system, method, or
device is approved for the intended purpose.
1.5.2 The specific requirements of this standard shall be permitted to be modified by the AHJ to allow alternative
arrangements that will secure as nearly as practical the level of fire protection intended by this document.
1.5.3 In no case shall a modification afford less fire protection than that which, in the judgment of the AHJ, would be
provided by compliance with the corresponding provisions contained in this standard.
1.5.4 Alternative fire protection methods accepted by the AHJ shall be considered as conforming with this standard.
1.6* Units and Formulas.
1.6.1 SI Units. Metric units of measurement in this standard shall be in accordance with the modernized metric system
known as the International System of Units (SI).
1.6.2* Primary and Equivalent Values. If a value for a measurement as given in this standard is followed by an
equivalent value in other units, the first stated value shall be regarded as the requirement.
1.6.3 Conversion Procedure. SI units have been converted by multiplying the quantity by the conversion factor and then
rounding the result to the appropriate number of significant digits.
Chapter 2 Referenced The documents or portions thereof listed in this chapter are referenced within this standard and shall be considered part
Publications of the requirements of this document.
Chapter 3 Definitions The definitions contained in this chapter shall apply to the terms used in this standard. Where terms are not included,
common usage of the terms shall apply.
3.2 NFPA Official Definitions.
Chapter 4 Fire Protection

Programs
4.1 Management Policy and 4.1* Management Policy and Direction.
Direction Management shall establish policies and institute a program to promote life safety, the conservation of property and
essential equipment, the protection of the environment, and the continuity of operations through provisions of fire
prevention and fire protection measures at each facility.
4.1.1 Administrative controls for changes in processes, equipment, or facilities shall be developed to include fire
protection concerns.
4.1.2 For the life of the facility, the administrative controls for facilities shall be reviewed and maintained to reflect
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current conditions and updated periodically
4.2 Fire Hazards Analysis Fire Hazards Analysis.
See Annex B, Fire Hazards Analysis.
4.2.1 A documented FHA shall be initiated at the beginning of the design process or when configuration changes are
made to ensure that the fire prevention and fire protection requirements of this standard have been evaluated.
4.2.2 This evaluation shall consider the facility's specific design, layout, and anticipated operating needs.
4.2.3 The evaluation shall consider acceptable means for separation or control of hazards, the control or elimination of
ignition sources, and the suppression of fires.
4.2.4* For existing facilities, a documented FHA shall be performed for all areas of the facility.
4.2.5 The evaluation shall consider the storage and use of radioactive materials, as their release under fire or explosion
conditions can result in a severe hazard.
4.3 Fire Prevention Program Fire Prevention Program.
A written fire prevention program shall be established and shall include the following:
(1) Fire safety information for all employees and contractors, including familiarization with procedures for fire
prevention, emergency alarm response, and reporting of fires
(2)* Documented facility inspections conducted at least monthly, including provisions for remedial action to correct
conditions that increase fire hazards
(3)* A description of the general housekeeping practices and the control of transient combustibles
(4) Control of flammable and combustible liquids and gases and oxidizers in accordance with the applicable
documents referenced in Section 7.1
(5)* Control of ignition sources including, but not limited to, grinding, welding, and cutting
(6)* Fire reports, including an investigation and a statement on the corrective action to be taken
(7)* Fire prevention surveillance
(8) The restriction of smoking to designated and supervised areas of the facility
(9)* Construction, demolition, and renovating activities that conform to the requirements of NFPA 241, Standard
for Safeguarding Construction, Alteration, and Demolition Operations, such as the following:
(a) Scaffolding, formworks, decking, and partitions used inside buildings shall be noncombustible or fire-retardant
treated.
(b) If wood is used, it shall be one of the following:
i. Listed, pressure-impregnated, fire-retardant lumber
ii. Treated with a listed fire-retardant coating
iii. Timbers 15.2 cm × 15.2 cm (6 in. × 6 in.) or larger
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(c) Tarpaulins (fabrics) and plastic films shall be certified to conform to the weather-resistant and flame-resistant
materials described in NFPA 701, Standard Methods of Fire Tests for Flame Propagation of Textiles and Films.
4.4 Testing, Inspection, and Testing, Inspection, and Maintenance.
Maintenance 4.4.1 Upon installation, fire protection systems and features shall be inspected and tested in accordance with the
applicable documents referenced in Section 6.7.
4.4.2 Testing, inspection, and maintenance shall be documented by means of written procedures, with the results and
follow-up actions recorded, and specific acceptance criteria shall be provided for each test.
4.5 Impairments (equipment that Impairments.
cannot be used) 4.5.1 A written procedure shall be established to address impairments to fire protection systems and shall include the
following:
(1) Identification, tagging, and tracking of impaired equipment
(2) Identification of personnel to be notified
(3) Determination of needed compensatory fire protection and fire prevention measures
4.5.2 Impairments to fire protection systems shall be managed to minimize the duration of the equipment outage.
4.5.2.1 If the impairment is planned, all necessary parts and personnel shall be assembled prior to removal of the
protection system(s) from service.
4.5.2.2 When an unplanned impairment occurs, or when a system has discharged, the repair work or fire protection
system restoration shall be expedited.
4.5.3 Once repairs are completed, tests shall be conducted to ensure that full fire protection equipment capabilities are
restored and operational.
4.5.4 Following restoration to service, those parties previously notified of the impairment shall be advised.
4.6 Emergency response Emergency Response.
A written emergency response plan shall be developed and shall include the following:
(1) Response to fire alarms and fire systems supervisory signals
(2) Notification of personnel identified in the plan
(3) Evacuation from the fire area of personnel not directly involved in fire-fighting activities
(4)* Coordination with security forces, radiation protection personnel, and other designated personnel for the
admission of public fire department and other emergency response agencies
(5)* Fire extinguishment activities, particularly those that are unique to the facility handling radioactive materials
(6) The effects of fire-fighting water on such areas, assuming disruption of the contents by accident or by fire hoses
(7) Requirements for training, drills, and exercises to verify the adequacy of the emergency response plan,
including practice sessions coordinated around previously developed valid emergency scenarios particular to the facility
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4.7 Facility Fire Emergency Facility Fire Emergency Organization.
Organization 4.7.1 A facility fire emergency organization in accordance with the requirements of NFPA 600, Standard on Industrial
Fire Brigades, or NFPA 1500, Standard on Fire Department Occupational Safety and Health Program, shall be
provided.
4.7.2 The size of the facility and its staff, the complexity of fire-fighting problems, and the availability and response
time of an off-site fire department shall determine the composition of the facility fire emergency organization.
4.7.3 Facility fire emergency organization training requirements and drill frequencies necessary to demonstrate
proficiency shall be implemented in accordance with the emergency response plan in Section 4.6.
4.7.4 Drills shall be critiqued and documented.
4.7.5 Two-way communications for the facility fire emergency organization shall be provided if required by the Federal
Housing Administration (FHA).
4.8 Pre-fire Plans Pre-Fire Plans.
4.8.1* Detailed pre-fire plans for all site fire areas shall be developed for assisting the facility fire emergency
organization.
4.8.2 Pre-fire plans shall be reviewed and updated to reflect the current facility conditions.
4.8.3* Pre-fire plans shall be made available to the facility fire emergency organization.
Chapter 5 General Facility Design

5.1 Special considerations (mainly Special Considerations.
contamination) The design of facilities handling radioactive materials shall incorporate the following:
(1) Limits on areas and equipment subject to contamination
(2) Design of facilities, equipment, and utilities to facilitate decontamination
5.2 Location with Respect to Other Location with Respect to Other Buildings and Within Buildings.
buildings 5.2.1 Facilities having quantities of radioactive materials that can become airborne in the event of fire or explosion shall
be segregated from other important buildings or operations.
5.2.2 Attention shall be given to the location of intakes and outlets of air-cleaning systems to reduce contamination
potential.
5.3 Contamination Control Contamination Control.
5.3.1 Temporary containment structures shall be of noncombustible materials or flame-resistant materials described in
NFPA 701, Standard Methods of Fire Tests for Flame Propagation of Textiles and Films.
5.3.2 The facility shall be designed to provide construction that confines a potential radiation contamination incident
and shall include surface finishes that are easy to clean.
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5.4 Fire Area Determination The facility shall be subdivided into separate fire areas, as determined by the FHA, for the purposes of limiting the
(Usually requires analysis and data) spread of fire, protecting personnel, and limiting the consequential damage to the facility.
5.5 Construction Buildings in which radioactive materials are to be used, handled, or stored shall be fire resistant or noncombustible
(Type I or Type II in accordance with NFPA 220, Standard on Types of Building Construction).
5.6 Openings in fire Barriers Openings in fire barriers shall be protected consistent with the designated fire resistance rating of the barrier including,
but not limited to, mechanical and electrical penetrations, building construction joints, and HVAC penetrations.
5.6.2 Fire doors and fire windows used in fire barriers shall be installed and maintained in accordance with NFPA 80,
Standard for Fire Doors and Fire Windows.
5.6.3 Penetration seals provided for electrical and mechanical openings shall be listed to meet the requirements of
ASTM E 814, Fire Tests of Through-Penetration Fire Stops, or UL 1479, Fire Tests of Through-Penetration Fire Stops.
5.7 Shielding Shielding.
5.7.1 Any permanent or temporary shielding materials shall be noncombustible.
5.7.2 Where noncombustible materials cannot be used, fire protection measures shall be provided as determined by the
FHA.
5.8 Interior Finish Interior wall and ceiling finish in areas processing or storing radioactive materials shall be Class A, in accordance with
NFPA 255, Standard Method of Test of Surface Burning Characteristics of Building Materials.
5.8.2 Interior floor finish in areas processing or storing radioactive materials shall be Class I, in accordance with NFPA
253, Standard Method of Test for Critical Radiant Flux of Floor Covering Systems Using a Radiant Heat Energy Source.
5.9 Heating, Ventilation and Air Heating, Ventilating, and Air Conditioning.
Conditioning 5.9.1* General.
5.9.1.1 The design of the ventilation shall be in accordance with NFPA 90A, Standard for the Installation of Air-
Conditioning and Ventilating Systems; NFPA 90B, Standard for the Installation of Warm Air Heating and Air-
Conditioning Systems; and NFPA 91, Standard for Exhaust Systems for Air Conveying of Vapors, Gases, Mists, and
Noncombustible Particulate Solids.
5.9.1.2 Where shutdown of the ventilation system is not permitted, fire dampers shall not be required for ventilation
duct penetrations, and an alternative means of protecting against fire propagation shall be provided.
5.9.2 Ductwork.
5.9.2.1 Ductwork from areas containing radioactive materials, passing through nonradioactive areas, shall be of
noncombustible construction and shall be protected from possible exposure fires by materials having a fire resistance
rating as determined by the FHA.
5.9.2.2 Where the corrosive nature of the effluents conveyed precludes the use of metallic ducts, other materials listed
for this application shall be permitted.
5.9.3 Filters.
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5.9.3.1* Air entry filters shall have approved filter media that produce a minimum amount of smoke (UL Class I) when
subjected to heat.
5.9.3.2 Roughing or prefilters, where necessary, shall be constructed of noncombustible materials.
5.9.3.3* Where combustible filters or particulates are present in the ventilation system, additional fire protection
features shall be provided as determined by the FHA.
5.9.4 High-Efficiency Particulate Air (HEPA) Filtration Systems.
5.9.4.1 All HEPA filtration systems shall be analyzed in the FHA.
5.9.4.2 HEPA filtration systems shall be provided with fire detection when required by the FHA.
5.9.4.3* Fixed fire suppression shall be provided when required by the FHA.
5.9.5 Smoke Control.
5.9.5.1* Fresh-air inlets shall be located to reduce the possibility of smoke, toxic materials, or radioactive contaminants
being introduced.
5.9.5.2 Fresh-air inlets shall be located where it is most unlikely for radioactive contaminants to be present.
5.9.5.3 Smoke, corrosive gases, and the nonradioactive substances that are released by a fire shall be vented from their
place of origin directly to a safe location.
5.9.5.4 Radioactive materials that are released by fire shall be confined, removed from the exhaust ventilation airstream,
or released under controlled conditions.
5.9.5.5* Smoke control systems shall be provided for fire areas based on the FHA.
5.9.5.6 Smoke exhaust from areas that at any time contain radioactive substances shall not be ventilated outside the
building.
5.9.5.7 Smoke control systems for such areas shall be connected to treatment systems to preclude release of radioactive
substances.
5.9.5.8* Enclosed stairwells shall be designed to minimize smoke infiltration during a fire.
5.9.5.9* Where natural convection ventilation is used, the smoke and heat ventilation shall be provided in accordance
with the FHA.
5.9.5.10* The ventilation system shall be designed, located, and protected such that airborne corrosive products or
contamination shall not be circulated.
5.9.5.11 The power supply and controls for mechanical ventilation systems shall be located outside the fire area served
by the system or protected from fire damage.
5.9.5.12 Fire suppression systems shall be installed to protect filters that collect combustible material, unless the
elimination of such protection is justified by the FHA
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5.10 Drainage Drainage.
CAUTION: For facilities handling fissionable materials, areas where water can accumulate shall be analyzed for
criticality potential.
5.10.1* Drainage or containment shall be provided and accomplished by one or more of the following methods:
(1) Floor drains
(2) Floor trenches
(3) Open doorways or other wall openings
(4) Curbs for containing or directing drainage
(5) Equipment pedestals
(6) Pits, sumps, and sump pumps
5.10.2 The provisions for drainage design in areas handling radioactive materials and in any associated drainage
facilities (e.g., pits, sumps, and sump pumps) shall be sized to accommodate all of the following:
(1) The spill of the largest single container of any flammable or combustible liquid used or stored in the area
(2) The credible volume of discharge (as determined by the FHA) for the suppression system operating for a period
of 30 minutes where automatic suppression is provided throughout
(3) The volume based on a manual fire-fighting flow rate of 1893 L/min (500 gpm) for a duration of 30 minutes
where automatic suppression is not provided throughout, unless the FHA demonstrates a different flow rate and duration
(4) The contents of piping systems and containers that are subject to failure in a fire where automatic suppression
is not provided throughout
(5) Credible environmental factors, such as rain and snow, where the installation is outside
5.10.3 Floor drainage from areas containing flammable or combustible liquids shall be trapped to prevent the spread of
burning liquids beyond the fire area.
5.10.4 Where gaseous fire suppression systems are installed, floor drains shall be provided with seals, or the fire
suppression system shall be sized to compensate for the loss of fire suppression agents through the drains.
5.11 Emergency Lighting Emergency Lighting.
5.11.1 Emergency lighting shall be provided for means of egress in accordance with NFPA 101®, Life Safety Code®.
5.11.2 Emergency lighting shall be provided for critical operations areas, such as areas where personnel are required to
operate valves, dampers, and other controls in an emergency.
5.12 Lightening Protection Lightning Protection.
Lightning protection, where required, shall be provided in accordance with NFPA 780, Standard for the Installation of
Lightning Protection Systems.
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5.13 Electrical Systems Electrical Systems.
5.13.1* Less-hazardous dielectric fluids shall be used in place of hydrocarbon-based insulating oils for transformers and
capacitors located inside buildings or where they are an exposure hazard to important facilities.
5.13.2* All electrical systems shall be installed in accordance with NFPA 70, National Electrical Code
5.14 Storage Storage.
5.14.1 General. Chemicals, materials, and supplies shall be stored in separate storerooms located in areas where no work
with radioactive materials is conducted.
5.14.2 Continuous Use Materials. Those quantities of chemicals, materials, and supplies needed for immediate or
continuous use shall be permitted to be available for use.
5.14.3 Storage of Radioactive Materials.
5.14.3.1 Care shall be exercised in selecting the locations for the storage of radioactive material.
5.14.3.2* Consideration shall be given to the storage of radioactive compressed gases, if any, as their release under fire
or explosion conditions can result in a severe life safety threat and loss by contamination.
5.14.3.3 Storage facilities for such gases shall be designed with consideration given to the specific characteristics of the
gases.
5.15 Plant Control, Computer, and Plant Control, Computer, and Telecommunications Rooms.
Telecommunications Rooms Plant control, computer, and telecommunications rooms shall meet the applicable requirements of NFPA 75, Standard
for the Protection of Electronic Computer/Data Processing Equipment.
5.16 Life Safety NFPA 101®, Life Safety Code®, shall be the standard for life safety from fire in the design and operation of facilities
handling radioactive materials, except where modified by this standard.
Chapter 6 General Fire Protection

Systems and Equipment
6.1 General Considerations General Considerations.
6.1.1* A FHA shall be performed to determine the fire protection requirements for the facility.
6.1.2 Automatic sprinkler protection shall be provided unless the FHA in Section 4.2 dictates otherwise.
6.1.3 As determined by the FHA, special hazards shall be provided with additional fixed fire protection systems.
6.1.4* For locations where fissile materials might be present and could create a potential criticality hazard, combustible
materials shall be excluded.
6.1.5 If combustible materials are unavoidably present in a quantity sufficient to constitute a fire hazard, water or
another suitable extinguishing agent shall be provided for fire-fighting purposes.
6.1.6 Fissile materials shall be arranged such that neutron moderation and reflection by water shall not present a
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criticality hazard
6.2 Water Supply General.
6.2.1.1 The water supply for the permanent fire protection installation shall be based on the largest fixed fire
suppression system(s) demand, including the hose-stream allowance, in accordance with NFPA 13, Standard for the
Installation of Sprinkler Systems.
6.2.1.2 For common service water/fire protection systems, the maximum anticipated service water demand shall be
added to the fire protection demand.
6.2.1.3 The fire protection water supply system shall be arranged in conformance with NFPA 20, Standard for the
Installation of Stationary Pumps for Fire Protection; NFPA 22, Standard for Water Tanks for Private Fire Protection;
and NFPA 24, Standard for the Installation of Private Fire Service Mains and Their Appurtenances, as applicable.
6.2.2 Water Tanks and Pumps. Where an auxiliary supply is required by the FHA, each supply shall be capable of
meeting the requirements of 6.2.1.
6.2.2.1 Where multiple fire pumps are required, the pumps shall not be subject to a common failure, electrical or
mechanical, and shall have capacity to meet the fire flow requirements determined by 6.2.1 with the largest pump out of
service.
6.2.2.2* Fire pumps shall be automatic-starting with manual shutdown.
6.2.2.3 The manual shutdown shall be only at the pump controllers.
6.2.2.4* If tanks are for dual-purpose use, they shall be arranged to provide the water supply requirements as
determined by 6.2.1 for fire protection use only.
6.2.2.5* Where water tanks are used, they shall be filled from a source capable of replenishing the supply for the fire
protection needs in an eight-hour period.
6.2.3 Multiple Water Supplies. If multiple water supplies are used, each water supply shall be connected to the fire main
by a separate connection that is arranged and valve-controlled to minimize the possibility of multiple supplies being
impaired simultaneously.
6.3 Valve Suppression Valve Supervision.
All fire protection water system control valves shall be monitored under a periodic inspection program (see Chapter 4)
and shall be supervised in accordance with NFPA 13, Standard for the Installation of Sprinkler Systems; NFPA 16,
Standard for the Installation of Foam-Water Sprinkler and Foam-Water Spray Systems; NFPA 24, Standard for the
Installation of Private Fire Service Mains and Their Appurtenances; NFPA 25, Standard for the Inspection, Testing, and
Maintenance of Water-Based Fire Protection Systems; or NFPA 72®, National Fire Alarm Code®; as applicable
6.4 Supply Mains and Hydrants Supply Mains and Hydrants.
6.4.1 Supply mains and fire hydrants as required by the FHA shall be installed on the facility site in accordance with
NFPA 24, Standard for the Installation of Private Fire Service Mains and Their Appurtenances.
6.4.2 Where required by the FHA, the supply mains shall be looped and sized to supply the flow requirements as
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determined by 6.2.1.
6.5 Standpipe and Hose Systems Standpipe and Hose Systems.
6.5.1 Standpipe and hose systems as required by the FHA shall be installed in accordance with NFPA 14, Standard for
the Installation of Standpipe, Private Hydrant, and Hose Systems.
6.5.2 Spray nozzles having shutoff capability and listed for use on electrical equipment shall be provided on hose
located in areas near energized electrical equipment.
6.6 Portable Fire Extinguishers Portable Fire Extinguishers.
Fire extinguishers shall be installed in accordance with NFPA 10, Standard for Portable Fire Extinguishers.
6.7 Fire Suppression Systems and Fire Suppression Systems and Equipment.
Equipment 6.7.1* Fire suppression systems and equipment shall be provided in all areas of a facility as determined by the FHA.
6.7.2 Where fire suppression systems are required, the design, installation, maintenance, and testing of such systems
shall be in accordance with the following NFPA standards, as applicable: NFPA 11, Standard for Low-Expansion Foam;
NFPA 11A, Standard for Medium- and High-Expansion Foam Systems; NFPA 12, Standard on Carbon Dioxide
Extinguishing Systems; NFPA 12A, Standard on Halon 1301 Fire Extinguishing Systems; NFPA 13, Standard for the
Installation of Sprinkler Systems; NFPA 14, Standard for the Installation of Standpipe, Private Hydrant, and Hose
Systems; NFPA 15, Standard for Water Spray Fixed Systems for Fire Protection; NFPA 16, Standard for the
Installation of Foam-Water Sprinkler and Foam-Water Spray Systems; NFPA 17, Standard for Dry Chemical
Extinguishing Systems; NFPA 17A, Standard for Wet Chemical Extinguishing Systems; NFPA 25, Standard for the
Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance of Water-Based Fire Protection Systems; NFPA 750, Standard on Water Mist Fire
Protection Systems; and NFPA 2001, Standard on Clean Agent Fire Extinguishing Systems.
6.7.3 The selection of the extinguishing agent system shall be based upon the following:
(1) Type of hazard
(2) Effect of agent discharge on equipment
(3) Health hazards
(4) Cleanup after agent discharge
(5) Effectiveness of agent in suppressing fire
(6) Cost of agent, including life cycle costs
(7) Availability of agent
(8) Criticality safety
(9) Environmental impact
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6.8 Fire Alarm systems Fire Alarm Systems.
6.8.1 Fire detection and automatic fixed fire suppression systems shall be equipped with local audible and visual
notification appliances with annunciation on the main fire control panel or at another constantly attended location in
accordance with NFPA 72®, National Fire Alarm Code®.
6.8.2 Automatic fire detectors shall be installed in accordance with NFPA 72®, National Fire Alarm Code®, and as
required by the FHA.
6.8.3 The fire alarm system for the facility shall provide the following:
(1) Manual fire alarm system by which employees can report fires or other emergencies
(2) Facility-wide alarm system by which personnel can be alerted of an emergency
(3) Means to notify the off-site fire department
6.9 Unattended facilities Unattended Facilities.
6.9.1 The FHA shall determine the amount of fire protection necessary if it identifies that a delayed response or lack of
communications in an unattended facility can result in a major fire spread prior to the arrival of fire-fighting personnel.
6.9.2 Remote annunciation of the fire-signaling panels shall be transmitted to one or more constantly attended locations.
Chapter 7 Special Hazards in

Nuclear Facilities
7.1 General General.
7.1.1 Flammable and combustible liquids shall be stored and handled in accordance with NFPA 30, Flammable and
Combustible Liquids Code.
7.1.2 Flammable and combustible gases shall be stored and handled in accordance with NFPA 50, Standard for Bulk
Oxygen Systems at Consumer Sites; NFPA 50A, Standard for Gaseous Hydrogen Systems at Consumer Sites; NFPA
54, National Fuel Gas Code; NFPA 55, Standard for the Storage, Use, and Handling of Compressed and Liquefied
Gases in Portable Cylinders; and NFPA 58, Liquefied Petroleum Gas Code.
7.1.3 Solid and liquid oxidizing agents shall be stored and handled in accordance with NFPA 430, Code for the Storage
of Liquid and Solid Oxidizers.
7.1.4 Combustible metals shall be stored and handled in accordance with NFPA 480, Standard for the Storage,
Handling, and Processing of Magnesium Solids and Powders; NFPA 481, Standard for the Production, Processing,
Handling, and Storage of Titanium; and NFPA 482, Standard for the Production, Processing, Handling, and Storage of
Zirconium.
7.1.5 Fire protection for laboratories involved with radioactive materials shall be in accordance with NFPA 45,
Standard on Fire Protection for Laboratories Using Chemicals.
7.1.6 Ovens, furnaces, and incinerators involved with radioactive materials shall be in accordance with the requirements
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of NFPA 82, Standard on Incinerators and Waste and Linen Handling Systems and Equipment; NFPA 86, Standard for
Ovens and Furnaces; NFPA 86C, Standard for Industrial Furnaces Using a Special Processing Atmosphere; and NFPA
86D, Standard for Industrial Furnaces Using Vacuum as an Atmosphere.
7.1.7 Combustion and safety controls and interlocks shall be tested after maintenance activities, and at other intervals in
accordance with the equipment manufacturer's recommendations.
7.1.8* Accident Involving Fissionable Materials. Fissile materials shall be used, handled, and stored with provisions to
prevent the accidental assembly of fissile material into critical masses.
7.2 Hospital (does not apply) Hospitals.
7.2.1 The appropriate form of fire protection for areas where radioactive materials exist in hospitals shall be based on
the FHA.
7.2.2 Precautions shall be taken, as required, if the radioactive materials are stored or used in ways that cause them to be
more susceptible to release from their containers.
7.3 Uranium enrichment, Fuel Uranium Enrichment, Fuel Fabrication, and Fuel Reprocessing Facilities.
Fabrication and Fuel Reprocessing 7.3.1 General. Special hazards related to fire problems shall be controlled by at least one of the following:
(General)
(1) Location
(2) Safe operating procedures
(3) Fixed protection systems
(4) Inerting
(5) Any other methods acceptable to the AHJ
7.3.2* Flammable and Combustible Liquids and Gases.
7.3.2.1 In enclosed spaces in which combustible gas could accumulate outside of the storage vessels, piping, and
utilization equipment, combustible-gas analyzers that are designed for the specific gas shall be installed.
7.3.2.1.1 The analyzer shall be set to alarm at a concentration no higher than 25 percent of the LEL.
7.3.2.2 Flammable and combustible liquids in enclosed spaces in which vapors have the potential to accumulate outside
of the storage vessels, piping, and utilization equipment shall be installed with combustible-vapor analyzers appropriate
for the vapors generated.
7.3.2.2.1 The analyzer shall be set to alarm at a concentration no higher than 25 percent of the LEL.
7.3.2.3 Safety controls and interlocks for combustible, flammable liquids and flammable gases and their associated
delivery systems shall be tested on a predetermined schedule and after maintenance operations.
7.3.2.4 Hydraulic fluids used in presses or other hydraulic equipment shall be the fire-resistant fluid type.
7.3.2.5 Solvents.
7.3.2.5.1* Where a flammable or combustible solvent is used, it shall be handled in a system that does not allow
uncontrolled release of vapors.
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7.3.2.5.2 Approved operating controls and limits shall be established.
7.3.2.5.3 An approved fixed fire-extinguishing system shall be installed or its absence justified to the satisfaction of the
AHJ.
7.3.2.5.4* Solvent distillation and recovery equipment for flammable or combustible liquids shall be isolated from areas
of use by three-hour fire barriers.
7.3.2.5.5* In order to ensure the operation of process evaporators, such as Plutonium Uranium Reduction and
Extraction (PUREX), means shall be provided to prevent entry of water-soluble solvents into the evaporators.
7.3.3 Pyrophoric Materials.
7.3.3.1* Operating controls and limits for the handling of pyrophoric materials shall be established to the satisfaction of
the AHJ.
7.3.3.2 A supply of an extinguishing medium shall be available in all areas where fines and cuttings of pyrophoric
materials are present. (See Section 7.1.)
7.4 Hot Cells, Caves, Gloveboxes, Hot Cells, Caves, Glove Boxes, and Hoods.
and Hoods 7.4.1 All cells, caves, glove boxes, and hoods shall be provided with a means of fire detection if used in the handling of
pyrophoric materials, oxidizers, or organic liquids.
7.4.2* Fire suppression shall be provided in all cells, caves, glove boxes, and hoods that contain combustible metals or
organic liquids in quantities that have the potential to cause a breach of the hot cells, glove boxes, hoods, or caves.
7.4.3 Hot Cells and Caves.
7.4.3.1 Hot cells and caves shall be of noncombustible construction.
7.4.3.2 Where hydraulic fluids are used in master slave manipulators, fire-resistant fluids shall be used.
7.4.3.3 Combustible concentrations inside the cells and caves shall be kept to a minimum.
7.4.3.4 Where combustibles are present, a fixed extinguishing system shall be installed in the cell or cave.
7.4.3.5 If explosive concentrations of gases or vapors are present, an inert atmosphere shall be provided, or the cell or
cave and its ventilation system shall be designed to withstand pressure excursions.
7.4.4* Glove Boxes and Hoods.
7.4.4.1 The glove box, windows, and hoods shall be of noncombustible construction.
7.4.4.2 The number of gloves shall be limited to the minimum necessary to perform the operations.
7.4.4.3 When the gloves are not being used, they shall be tied outside the box.
7.4.4.4 When the gloves are no longer needed for operations, they shall be removed and glove port covers installed.
7.4.4.5 Doors shall remain closed when not in use.
7.4.4.6 The concentration of combustibles shall be limited to the quantity necessary to perform the immediate task.
7.4.4.7 Where combustibles are present, a fire suppression system or fixed inerting system shall be provided.
7.4.4.8 If fixed extinguishing systems are utilized, the internal pressurization shall be calculated in order to prevent
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gloves from failing or being blown off.
7.4.4.9* A means shall be provided to restrict the passage of flame between glove boxes and hoods that are connected.
7.4.5 Research and Production Reactors.
7.4.5.1 Reactivity control shall be capable of inserting negative reactivity to achieve and maintain subcritical conditions
in the event of a fire.
7.4.5.2 Inventory and pressure control shall be capable of controlling coolant level such that fuel damage as a result of a
fire is prevented.
7.4.5.3 Decay heat removal shall be capable of removing heat from the reactor core such that fuel damage as a result of
fire is prevented.
7.4.5.4 Vital auxiliaries shall be capable of performing the necessary functions in the event of a fire.
7.4.5.5 Process monitoring shall be capable of providing the necessary indication in the event of a fire.
Chapter 8 Fire Protection During

Shutdown and Decommissioning
8.1 Application Application.
This chapter shall apply to facilities or those portions therein that have permanently ceased operations.
8.1.1 As decommissioning progresses, the fire protection systems and features necessary to protect personnel,
emergency responders, nuclear materials, and the environment shall be maintained.
8.1.2 The requirements of this chapter shall be applied in addition to the applicable requirements of NFPA 241,
Standard for Safeguarding Construction, Alteration, and Demolition Operations
8.2 Fire Protection Program Fire Protection Program.
The facility shall continue to maintain a fire protection plan as specified by Chapter 4.
8.2.1 This plan shall continue a fire protection program that supports the shutdown and decommissioning plan.
8.2.2 The fire protection plan, commensurate with the changes in fire hazards and the potential release of hazardous and
radiological materials to the environment, shall establish the following:
(1) Controls governing the identification of fire hazards and the changes in fire mitigation strategies resulting from
permanent shutdown and decommissioning
(2) Controls governing fire area boundaries or barriers used to isolate areas with significant hazards
(3) Controls governing the testing, maintenance, and operability of required fire protection systems and features
(4) Administrative controls governing general fire prevention activities, such as control of combustibles and
ignition sources
(5) Controls governing facility features necessary for occupant life safety and personnel evacuation in the event of
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a fire
(6) Controls governing fire detection and notification, fire-fighting capabilities, and emergency response
8.3 Fire Hazards Analysis Fire Hazards Analysis.
The evaluation of fire hazards, fire risks, and the requirement of fire protection and life safety systems and features shall
be documented in a FHA. (See Section 4.2.)
8.4 Maintaining Fire Protection Maintaining Fire Protection Capability.
Capability The fire protection plan and program elements shall be maintained during permanent shutdown and facility
decommissioning, commensurate with the changes in fire hazards and the potential release of hazardous and radiological
materials to the environment.
8.4.1* Means of Egress Features. Facility means of egress features shall be maintained consistent with the requirements
for facilities under construction as required by the FHA.
8.4.2 Water Supply.
8.4.2.1 An adequate and reliable fire protection water supply, distribution system, and fire hydrants shall be
provided/maintained.
8.4.2.2 Heat shall be provided to protect the fire-fighting water supply, distribution, and delivery systems (e.g., water
tanks, fire pumps, and standpipe systems).
8.4.3* Automatic Suppression Systems.
8.4.3.1 Automatic fire suppression systems (typically automatic sprinklers) required to protect personnel, emergency
responders, and the environment shall be maintained as primary protection.
8.4.3.2 Heat shall be provided to prevent wet pipe systems from freezing as required by NFPA 13, Standard for the
Installation of Sprinkler Systems.
8.4.3.3 The suppression systems for a given facility area shall not be rendered inoperable until the system is no longer
relied upon to mitigate the fire hazards present as documented in the FHA.
8.4.4 Standpipes and Hose Systems. Existing standpipe and hose systems shall remain functional to support facility
shutdown and decommissioning activities as required by the FHA.
8.4.5 Fire Detection, Alarm, and Notification.
8.4.5.1 A means for detecting a fire at or within the facility, alerting personnel to evacuate the facility, providing
notification to a constantly attended location, and initiating emergency response shall be maintained during permanent
shutdown and decommissioning.
8.4.5.2* Where no automatic fire detection or suppression system exists, a means for manually notifying building
occupants and summoning emergency responders of a fire event shall be provided.
8.4.6 Fire Confinement.
8.4.6.1 Fire barriers shall be maintained as necessary to isolate fire hazards; aid in the ability to contain, fight, and
control a fire effectively; protect personnel evacuation routes; and minimize the release of hazardous and radiological
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materials during the course of permanent shutdown and decommissioning.
8.4.6.2 Evaluation of fire barriers shall be documented in the FHA.
8.4.7 Portable Fire Extinguishers. Portable fire extinguishers shall be provided in accordance with the FHA.
8.4.8 Emergency Response. Emergency response capability as specified in Chapter 4, commensurate with the changes
in fire hazards and the potential release of hazardous and radiological materials to the environment, shall be maintained
during permanent shutdown and decommissioning as required by the FHA.
8.4.9* Pre-Fire Plans.
8.4.9.1 The pre-fire plan requirements of Section 4.8 shall be maintained during permanent shutdown and
decommissioning.
8.4.9.2 Revisions to the pre-fire plans shall be made when changes in occupancy, hazard, or activity occur that affect
emergency response strategies.
Annex A Explanatory Material Annex A is not a part of the requirements of this NFPA document but is included for informational purposes only. This
annex contains explanatory material, numbered to correspond with the applicable text paragraphs
Annex B Fire Hazards Analysis See Section 3.1 of this report
Annex C Sources of Radiation- Fire Problems.
the Nature of the Fire Problem C.2.1 Facilities handling radioactive materials should be designed and operated with special recognition given to the
properties of radioactive materials. The effects of the presence of radioactive substances on the extent of loss caused by
fire or explosion include the following:
(1) Possible interference with manual fire fighting due to the fear of exposure of fire fighters to radiation
(2) Possible increased delay in salvage work and in resumption of normal operations following fire, explosion, or
other damage due to radioactive contamination and the subsequent need for decontamination of buildings, equipment,
and materials
(3) Possible increase in the total damage due to buildings and equipment contaminated beyond the point where
they are usable
C.2.2 Radioactive materials can be expected to melt, vaporize, become airborne, or oxidize under fire conditions. None
of these alterations will slow or halt radioactivity. It is conceivable that certain radioactive materials under fire
conditions might be converted to radioactive vapor or oxidized to a radioactive dust or smoke. This dust or smoke could
be carried by air currents and subsequently deposited on other parts of the burning buildings or even on neighboring
buildings or land. These aggravated loss and personal injury characteristics of radioactive materials justify a high degree
of protection against fire and explosion at those facilities where these potential hazards exist. The use of the least
combustible building components and equipment is highly desirable in those areas where radioactive materials are to be
stored or used. Some form of automatic protection, such as automatic sprinklers, is highly advantageous wherever
combustibles are encountered. The installation of automatic extinguishing systems reduces the need for personnel
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exposure to possible danger, starts the fire control process automatically, sounds an alarm, and makes efficient use of the
available water supply. However, caution should be exercised to ensure that the hazards of criticality and reactivity are
considered.
C.2.3 Some commonly encountered radionuclides are pyrophoric (e.g., uranium, Pu) and, as such, should be given
special consideration. Radionuclides generate heat and might need to be cooled in storage; these also require special
consideration.
C.2.4 In view of the possibility of the spread of radioactive materials during a fire, certain precautions and procedures
should be incorporated into emergency planning for fire-fighting operations.
C.2.5 The property manager should keep the local fire department advised of the locations and general nature of
radioactive materials available. Emergency planning is essential so that fire fighters can function at maximum efficiency
without exposure to harmful radiation and without unwarranted fears of the radiation hazard that can inhibit the fire-
fighting effort. Where criticality incidents or exposure to radioactive materials is possible, mutual aid arrangements
should maximize the use of on-site expertise. Specific provision should be made where necessary by the property
manager and the fire department for monitoring service, protective clothing, and respiratory protective equipment, the
need for which should be determined by the nature of the specific hazard. The radiation hazard usually can be
anticipated in emergency planning studies.
Annex D Informational These are references that are interesting but are not required by NFPA 801.
References
B-19
B-20

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080320 MMMM Fire Standards Final R1.doc

LIST OF FIGURES ...................................................................................................................................... 5

2. Guidance for All Fuel Cycle Facilities .......................................................................................... 17

3. Facility Analysis Methods ............................................................................................................. 27

4. Facility Design Information........................................................................................................... 61

5. Plans for the Future...................................................................................................................... 101

6. Knowledge Management System Design .................................................................................... 107

APPENDIX A FIRE Standards................................................................................................................. A-1

APPENDIX B NFPA 801 REQUIREMENTS ......................................................................................... B-1

Fire Standards Additional Fire Fire Standards to be

All references are public documents.

Fire Modeling Methods and Data

2.1 History of Fire Protection Standards for Nuclear Facilities

1979 Browns Ferry Fire

1986 Sequoya Fuels Problem:

2.1.1 NRC Fire Analysis History

During the 1990s the studies were:

2.1.2 History of NFPA 801

2.2 General Guidance from NFPA 801

2.3 General Guidance from NUREG 1520 and NUREG-1513

7.2 RESPONSIBILITY FOR REVIEW

7.3 AREAS OF REVIEW

7.4 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA

7.4.1 Regulatory Requirements

7.4.2 Regulatory Guidance

7.4.3 Regulatory Acceptance Criteria

7.4.3.1 Fire Safety Management Measures

7.4.3.2 Fire Hazards Analysis

7.4.3.3 Facility Design

The following are other specific areas of concern:

7.4.3.4 Process Fire Safety

7.4.3.5 Fire Protection and Emergency Response

7.5 REVIEW PROCEDURES

7.6 EVALUATION FINDINGS

3.1 Fire Hazards Analysis

3.1.1 NRC 1992 FCF Guidance for FHA

Table 3.1-1 NRC 1992 Guidance for FHA

9. Fire Hazard Analysis

3.1.2 NFPA 801 Guidance for FHA

3.1.4 NRC FDTs for FHA

Table 3.1-2 NUREG-1805 FDT Tools for FHA

Chapter 2. Predicting Hot Gas Layer (HGL) Temperature and

05.1_Heat_Flux_Calculations_Wind_ Chapter 5. Estimating Radiant Heat Flux from Fire to a Target

Chapter 7. Estimating Full-Scale Heat Release Rate of a Cable

18_Visibility_Through_Smoke.xls Chapter 18. Estimating Visibility Through Smoke

3.2.1 US: NRC V&V of Fire Codes

Volume 3 Fire Dynamics Tools (FDTs)

Reference FPE 2007 provides a good overview of this work by NRC.

3.2.1.2 Approach and Models

3.2.1.5 ASTM E 1355 Approach

NPP Fire Scenarios- Vol. 1, Sect. 2.1

Fire Modeling Parameters – Vol. 1, Section

Quantitative V&V – Vol. 1, Section 2.5

Report V&V Results – Vol. 1, Section 2.6

Table 3.2-1 Fire Attributes and Model Capabilities