G.R. No.

L-67966 September 28, 1984

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MARIO NAVOA, RAFAEL NAVOA, RICARDO SITCHON MACARIO SAGUINZA JOHN DOE and
PETER DOE, defendants-appellants.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee,

Roman Daguna & Associates Law Offices for defendants-appellants.

RESOLUTION

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

In this Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of this Court promulgated on July 31, 1984, which
affirmed the judgment of conviction upon defendants-appellants Mario Navoa, Rafael Navoa, and
Ricardo Sitchon and sentenced them to suffer reclusion perpetua, and to indemnify, jointly and
solidarity, the heirs of the victim, Tomas Izon, in the amount of P30,000.00, the two assigned errors
are that "the basic finding of the Intermediate Appellate Court that the appellants shot and killed the
late Tomas Izon is not supported by the evidence on record," and "that defendant-appellant Mario
Navoa's death on June 14, 1984 properly manifested before the Intermediate Appellate Court on
June 20, 1984, had not been accorded proper legal consideration in the Decision."

The first contention is untenable. The Appellate Court's conclusion that the testimony of Macario
Saguinza, a co-accused turned State witness, is substantially correct was based on a careful and
judicious review of the entire record, specifically based on Exhibits "F", "G", "H" and the testimonies
during the hearing of June 9, 1977. The same is true with the Appellate Court's conclusion that the
minor inconsistencies in the testimony of witness Baltazar de la Rosa strengthened rather than
weakened his credibility.1 Even assuming that the testimony of de la Rosa is without probative value,
still, the unrebutted testimony of Saguinza is more than sufficient to sustain a conviction as it
established not only conspiracy, treachery, and evident premeditation, but even the very motive of
defendants-appellants in perpetrating the crime.

In respect of the second contention, it appears that the accused, Mario Navoa, died on June 14,
1984 due to a cerebro-vascular attack as shown by the Death Certificate attached to the Motion for
Reconsideration. When counsel for the accused manifested the fact before the Appellate Court, on
June 20, 1984. he was unaware that the latter had already certified the case to this Court, which, in
turn, promulgated its Decision on July 31, 1984 unaware of appellant Mario Navoa's death. The
judgment of conviction will thus have to be set aside as against him. However, the plea for
extinguishment of the deceased's civil and criminal liability is without merit. Only his criminal liability
is extinguished by his death but the civil liability remains.2

ACCORDINGLY, 1) the prayer for the acquittal of the two remaining accused is hereby denied; 2)
the dispositive portion of the Decision of this Court promulgated on July 31, 1984, is hereby modified
to read as follows:

WHEREFORE, we affirm the judgment of conviction imposed upon Rafael Navoa

and Ricardo Sitchon and sentence them to suffer reclusion perpetua. And since the
 guilt of Mario Navoa has been established beyond reasonable doubt, his death
during the pendency of this appeal extinguishes only his criminal liability but not his
civil liability, so that, his estate and the accused Rafael Navoa and Ricardo Sitchon
are hereby sentenced to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of the victim,
Tomas Izon in the amount of P30,000.00. With proportionate costs.

SO ORDERED.

SO ORDERED

G.R. No. 72990 November 21, 1991

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MANUEL BADEO, ESPERIDION BADEO, ROGELIO BADEO (at large) and BONIFACIO
TANGPUS (at large), defendants. MANUEL BADEO and ESPERIDION BADEO, defendants-
appellants.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Public Attorney's Office for Manuel Badeo.

FERNAN, C.J.:

In this appeal, father and son Esperidion and Manuel Badeo, seek the reversal of the July 5, 1985
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Leyte, Branch XV at Palo, 1 the dispositive portion of which
reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, finding the two accused Manuel Badeo and
Esperidion Badeo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder and hereby sentences said two
accused to the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, to indemnify the heirs of Cresenciano
Germanes the sum of P30,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency,
and to pay each half of the costs.

It appearing that the two accused Manuel Badeo and Esperidion Badeo were detained since
December 4, 1984, when they were arrested by the police authorities of Tanauan, Leyte,
they should be credited with the full time during which they have undergone preventive
imprisonment, if they agreed voluntarily in writing to abide by the same disciplinary rules
imposed upon convicted prisoners; other wise, they shall be credited with 4/5 only of the time
during which they have undergone preventive imprisonment.

SO ORDERED.

According to the sole prosecution eyewitness Eñega Abrio (Iñega Abreo), at around six o'clock in the
evening of March 21, 1981, she was walking on her way home. Cresenciano Germanes was walking
ahead of her. Near the house of Esperidion Badeo, four men attacked Cresenciano. Being about ten
arms length away, she saw Manuel Badeo hack Cresenciano at the back with a bolo measuring
around fifty-five centimeters in length. Rogelio Badeo then hacked Cresenciano with another long
bolo also at the back. Bonifacio Tangpus followed with a stab at the right portion of Cresenciano's
stomach, after which Esperidion Badeo hacked Cresenciano's back. Cresenciano fell down on his
back. 2

Cresenciano shouted after he had fallen. Noticing that Cresenciano was still alive, Rogelio came back and "finished him off." 3
During the
attack, Eñega was as near to the group at seven arms length. 4 She did not go nearer because she
was afraid. 5 Instead, she ran home taking a shortcut through the property of a certain Adriano. She
immediately informed her husband, Gregorio, about the incident. She told him, however, not to go
out anymore to inform Cresenciano's relatives about the hacking incident, as it was already dark.
She eventually told Cresenciano's relatives about his fate in the morning of the following day,
Sunday. 6

The body of Cresenciano, who was single and 42 years old when he died, was autopsied on March 23, 1981 by Dr. Lesmes C. Lumen, the municipal
health officer of Dagami, Leyte. The following findings appear on the medical certificate (Exh. A) issued by Dr. Lumen:

1. Hacking wound on the skull, from vertex to left temporal area, 10 inches long, 1 inch wide, 2 inches deep with exposure of brain
substance

2. Hacking wound, left supraclavicular area, 2.5 inches long, .5 inch wide, .5 ench deep

3. Hacking wound, extending from left subcostal area to the level of the third rib, 9.5 inches long, 2 inches wide, 1 inch deep

4. Stab wounds at the inframammary area, left

a) 2 inches long, .5 inch wide, 2 inches deep

b) .5 inch long, .5 inch wide, 2 inches deep

c) .5 inchlong, .5 inch wide, 2 inches deep

5. Stab wound, right iliac region, level of the umbilicus, 2.5 inches long, 2 inches wide, 1 inch deep

6. Longitudinal, oblique, abrasion at left iliac region, 2.5 inches long

7. Hacking wound, extending from right to left lumbar areas crossing the vertebral column, 7 inches long, 1 inch wide, 2 inches deep

8. Hacking wound, left suprascapular region, 5 inches long, 2 inches wide, 1.5 inches deep

9. Hacking wound, left shoulder area (deltoid portion), 7 inches long, 3 inches wide, 2 inches deep.

Uldarico Germanes, a nephew of Cresenciano, believed that his uncle was killed by the four because Cresenciano was instrumental in dividing the
land being tenanted by Manuel two portions. One portion was to be retained by Manuel while the other half would be tenanted by him (Uldarico). He
accompanied Cresenciano when the latter told Manuel of the new arrangement. Manuel did not like the arrangement because according to him, he
could still work on the whole area. 7
Manuel Badeo admitted having hacked Cresenciano but averred that he did so in self-defense. According to him, he was at home in the afternoon of
March 21, 1981 as he was cutting the grass in his home in barangay Katipunan. Later in the afternoon, he went to barangay Hilabago to ask for
kerosene from his mother arriving there at past six o'clock in the evening.

While he was at his mother's house, his brother-in-law, Rosito Dumpang and. the latter's nephew Gabriel, passed by. They invited him to go home with
them. As they were walking, they met Cresenciano Germanes behind the copra drier of Manuel's mother. Cresenciano asked him where he was going.
When Manuel answered that he was going home, Cresenciano held him by his shirt and pointed a gun at him. As Manuel was about an arm's length
away, he noticed that Cresenciano was reeking with the smell of tuba.

While pointing the gun at him, Cresenciano threatened to kill Manuel. After telling Cresenciano that they had nothing to fight about, Manuel retreated to
a coconut tree, went around it, drew a bolo and hacked Cresenciano hitting him on the head. Then he stabbed Cresenciano's stomach. Manuel ran
towards Rosito and Gabriel Dumpang who, in turn, "castigated" Cresenciano. Manuel told them to stop punishing Cresenciano but the two did not heed
his advice.

Manuel did not see Eñega Abreo when he hacked Cresenciano. Neither was his father, Esperidion, around. But he noticed that when Rosito hacked
Cresenciano, the latter's pistol fell from his hand. Manuel picked it up and later surrendered it to barangay captain Andrea Olimberio. When Manuel
surrendered to the police authorities, he did not implicate Rosito and Gabriel Dumpang because they had threatened that should he mention their
names, they would kill him. That threat was also the reason why, together with Esperidion, he transferred his residence to Tanauan, Leyte.

Manuel stated in court that Eñega Abreo testified against him because her husband, Sabino (sic), was the first suspect in the killing of Cresenciano as
there was "bad blood" between Sabino and Cresenciano. 8

Andrea Olimberio, who was the barangay captain of barangay Katipunan when the incident occurred, corroborated Manuel's claim that he surrendered
to her. According to Andrea, at about eleven o'clock in the evening of March 21, 1981, Manuel, accompanied by his wife and sister, came to her house
and told her that he had killed Cresenciano Germanes. Manuel surrendered to her a pistol which he had taken from the victim. Andrea knew that the
pistol belonged to Cresenciano because the latter had shown it to her when he drank liquor at
store. 9

Esperidion Badeo, on the other hand, denied being at the scene when the killing occurred. He was then in the mountain in Saransang making
a kaingin on the land owned by Estelita Tangpus. Saransang was more than seven kilometers from barangay Hilabago and the distance could only be
negotiated by foot through a trail used by sled-drawing carabaos. With him in the mountain were Estelita, Rogelio Badeo and Bonifacio Tangpus. He
left the place only on March 22, 1981 when his wife fetched him because his son Manuel had wounded somebody. He went to Hilabago but he
immediately left for the mountain because he was afraid that revenge might be taken on him. 10
Estelita Rubo corroborated
Esperidion's alibi claiming that Esperidion did not leave the kaingin area even after work. 11

Sometime in Jurte, 1981, Esperidion and Rogelio Badeo executed a joint affidavit denying participation in the killing Cresenciano. They affirmed therein
that they had been in the homestead owned by Bonifacio Tangpus since March 14, 1981 when the crime transpired. 12
Bonifacio Tangpus
did not execute any affidavit nor surrender to the authorities. Neither was he apprehended.

For his part, Manuel executed a counter-affidavit dated June 1, 1981 stating that in the afternoon of
March 21, 1981, as he was cutting the grass in his lawn, Sagino Abrio (sic), the husband of Iñiga
(Eñega), approached him and intimated to him that he had a big problem because Iñiga and
Cresenciano were having an illicit relationship. Sagino said that the relationship downgraded his
honor because it was known to everyone their place. Sagino vowed that something would happen to
Cresenciano.

According to the same affidavit, when Manuel arrived at his mother's house to get kerosene, his
mother, Maria Badeo, Estelita Tangpuz (sic), Elena Borja, Cresencio (sic) Germanes and Sagino
Abrio were drinking liquor. As Manuel was about to leave, Germanes forced him to drink liquor. After
taking one glass, Manuel turned to leave but Germanes grabbed his shirt. Sagino then followed
Germanes, hacked him "many times" while telling Manuel that it was a problem he could handle.
Upon seeing that Germanes had a firearm tucked in his waist, Sagino ordered Manuel to get it.
Manuel and Germanes grappled for possession of the firearm and as soon as Manuel took hold of it,
Sagino told him to surrender it to the police. 13

The contents of said counter-affidavit as well as Manuel's insistence at the preliminary investigation that it was Eñega Abrio's husband who was
responsible for Cresenciano Germanes' killing were totally discredited by the investigating fiscal who noted that during Manuel's 20-day detention, he
never mentioned to the police Sagino's involvement in the crime. The investigating fiscal concluded that the rather belated facts revealed by Manuel
were
designed "to coerce or force Eñega Abrio from becoming a witness for the complainant." 14

On February 8, 1982, an information for murder was filed against Manuel, Esperidion and Rogelio Badeo and Bonifacio Tangpus. 15
They were
charged with having conspired to kill and treacherously killing Cresenciano.

On September 24,1984, the assistant provincial fiscal filed a motion for the issuance of
an alias warrant of arrest. 16Through the alias warrant of arrest issued by the court, on December 4,
1984, Manuel Badeo and Esperidion Badeo were apprehended by the police. 17

On arraignment, Manuel pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of homicide while Esperidion pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Manuel invoked the
mitigating circumstances of voluntary plea of guilty 18
and voluntary surrender. However, the court ruled that a plea of
guilty to a lesser offense demanded the conformity of the offended party. 19 Inasmuch as Catalina
Germanes, the mother of the victim, was not agreeable to the plea entered by Manuel, the court
considered the plea as one of not guilty.

After trial, the court rendered the aforementioned decision. Manuel and Esperidion appealed to this
Court contending that the trial court erred in not appreciating the justifying circumstance of self-
defense and the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in favor of Manuel, and in not giving
weight and credence to the alibi of Esperidion.

On August 10, 1990, Esperidion died of cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to pulmonary

tuberculosis at the prison hospital in Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. 20 Inasmuch as no final judgment had
as yet been rendered, in the resolution of August 21, 1991, the case against Esperidion was
dismissed with costs de oficio and entry of judgment was made on August 22, 1991. 21

On September 17, 1991, the Solicitor General filed a motion for the reconsideration of said resolution alleging that while the criminal liability of
appellant Esperidion Badeo had been extinguished by his death pursuant to Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, his civil liability arising from the
criminal offense subsisted in accordance with Articles 1231 and 1161 of the Civil Code in relation to Article 112 of the Revised Penal Code and the
ruling in People vs. Pancho, 145 SCRA 323. Hence, as provided for in Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, upon proper notice, the legal
representatives of the deceased appellant should appear as substitute parties herein insofar as the deceased's civil liability for the crime is
concerned. 22

We find merit in the motion for reconsideration. Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished "by the death
of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs
before final judgment." In People vs. Alison, 23
the Court, upon the recommendation of the then Solicitor General
who was required to comment on the information that appellant Alison had died at the prison
hospital, resolved that, there being no final judgment as yet, "the criminal and civil liability (sic) of
Alison was extinguished by his death."

The Alison resolution was the basis of the resolution in People vs. Satorre 24 similarly dismissing the
case against the deceased appellant. In a separate opinion in the resolution, then Associate Justice
Ramon C. Aquino stated that as to the personal penalties, criminal liability therefor is extinguished
only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment. According to Justice Aquino, the
term " pecuniary penalties" (las pecuniarias) in Article 89 refers to fine and costs as distinguished
from " pecuniary liability" (responsabilidades pecunarias) in Article 38 which include reparation and
indemnity.

As every crime gives rise to a penal or criminal action for the punishment of the guilty party, and also
to a civil action for the restitution of the thing, repair of the damage and indemnification for the
losses 25 whether the particular act or omission is done intentionally or negligently or whether or not
punishable by law, 26 subsequent decisions of the Court held that while the criminal liability of an
appellant is extinguished by his death, his civil liability subsists. 27 In such case, the heirs of the
deceased appellant are substituted as parties in the criminal case and his estate shall answer for his
civil liability. 28

In the light of the foregoing, we reconsider the resolution August 21, 1991 insofar as it considers as extinguished Esperidion Badeo's civil liability, in
order to determine whether or not such liability exist. 29

Well-settled is the rule that where the accused admits having authored the death of the victim and his defense is anchored on self-defense, he must
rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution. 30
Otherwise his conviction is
inescapable. 31

Of the three requisites of self-defense as stated in Article 11 (1) of the Revised Penal Code, namely: (a) unlawful aggression; (b) reasonable necessity
of the means employed to prevent or repel it, and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of person defending himself, the first requisite is
indispensable 32
for without it, there is nothing to prevent or repel. After a close scrutiny of the records,
the Court finds that appellant Manuel Badeo failed to prove unlawful aggression.

Manuel contends that he was the object of Cresenciano's unlawful aggression because the latter
held his shirt and points a gun at him. His testimony, however, was completely uncorroborated. He
failed even to present Cresenciano's gun in evidence notwithstanding his claim that he surrendered
it to the barangay captain and later, to the police. 33 Indeed, we agree with the trial court that if there
really was a gun, Cresenciano would have used it not only against Manuel but also against Rosito
and Gabriel Dumpang. 34

Moreover, the location, number and seriousness of the wounds sustained by Cresenciano belie the claim of self-defense. 35
Of the nine
wounds found on Cresenciano's body, Manuel admitted having inflicted the two wounds which the
physician performed the autopsy considered as fatal: the hacking wound on the skull and the
stabbing wound on the stomach. 36 As such, even without the concerted assistance of the other
accused, Manuel could have nonetheless produced the lethal consequence: the death of
Cresenciano.

Manuel's assertion that the credibility of the sole prosecution eyewitness is questionable is belated if
not baseless. He insists that Eñega had an illicit relationship with the victim and that if her testimony
were true, she would not have lost time in reporting the murder to Cresenciano's relatives. On the
issue of credibility, we find no reason to depart from the settled rule that the findings of the trial court
on the credibility of witnesses should be accorded the highest respect because it had the advantage
of observing the demeanor of witnesses and to discern if a witness was telling the truth. 37 The
imputation of an illicit relationship between the prosecution witness and the victim which was not
shown other than by the counter-affidavit of Manuel and which the investigating fiscal had even
discredited, is not an acceptable evidence insofar as proof of improper motive on the part of Eñega
is concerned. 38 Neither may Eñega's initial reluctance to denounce Manuel and his other co-
accused as the killers immediately after the commission of the crime, affect the probative value of
her testimony, specifically her positive identification of Manuel as one of the perpetrators of the
crime. Usually triggered by fear, such reluctance is common and has been judicially declared not to
affect credibility. 39
However, we agree with the Solicitor General that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be appreciated in favor of Manuel.
Ordinarily, where there has been actual arrest, the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender cannot be invoked. 40
While it is true that
Manuel was arrested with his father on December 4, 1981, the records show that Manuel did
surrender: first, to the barangay captain and, in the morning of March 22, 1981, to the police of
Dagami. 41 In fact, after his surrender, Manuel was detained for twenty days. 42

The killing of Crecenciano is qualified by treachery which is shown by the suddenness by which he was attacked. Under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code, the penalty for murder is reclusion temporal maximum to death. There being one mitigating circumstance, the penalty imposable shall be
the minimum period. 43
Applying the indeterminate sentence law, proper penalty is ten (10) years and one
(1) day of prision mayor maximum as minimum to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1)
day of reclusion temporal maximum as maximum penalty.

Anent Esperidion Badeo's civil liability, we find that there is no basis for its imposition in view of the
absence of a clear showing that he committed the crime imputed to him. 44 Esperidion could not
have been at the scene of the crime because the kaingin area where he had been staying since
January 7, 1983 until he was fetched by his wife on March 22, 1985 45 was a good five-hour hike
away through a trail. 46 Alibi is generally considered a weak defense but it assumes importance
where the evidence for the prosecution is weak and betrays concretenes on the question of whether
or not the accused committed the
crime. 47

In this case, Esperidion was implicated by the uncorroborated testimony of sole prosecution eyewitness Iñego Abrio. Her identification of Esperidion as
one of the perpetrators of the crime is, however, short of the positiveness and reliability essential for conviction. 48
As several people
committed the crime, it is probable that Abrio mistook Esperidion for another person considering that
according to her, the attack was perpetrated when it was already getting dark. This does not
however, totally discredit her entire testimony especially the portion thereof which imputes on
Manuel the authorship of the fatal hacking blows on Cresenciano. Court may believe one part of a
testimony and disbelieve another part. 49

WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court is hereby affirmed insofar as appellant Manuel Badeo is concerned subject to the modifications that he
shall serve the penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayormaximum to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal maximum and indemnify the heirs of Cresenciano Germanes in the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000).

The resolution of August 21, 1991 is hereby reconsidered insofar as it considers as extinguished Esperidion Badeo's civil liability. However, finding that
Esperidion Badeo should be acquitted as he did not commit the crime imputed to him, no civil liability is hereby imposed on him. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 102007 September 2, 1994

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ROGELIO BAYOTAS y CORDOVA, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.

ROMERO, J.:

In Criminal Case No. C-3217 filed before Branch 16, RTC Roxas City, Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova
was charged with Rape and eventually convicted thereof on June 19, 1991 in a decision penned by
Judge Manuel E. Autajay. Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died on February 4, 1992 at
the National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest secondary to hepatic encephalopathy
secondary to hipato carcinoma gastric malingering. Consequently, the Supreme Court in its
Resolution of May 20, 1992 dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal. However, it required the
Solicitor General to file its comment with regard to Bayotas' civil liability arising from his commission
of the offense charged.

In his comment, the Solicitor General expressed his view that the death of accused-appellant did not
extinguish his civil liability as a result of his commission of the offense charged. The Solicitor
General, relying on the case of People v. Sendaydiego 1 insists that the appeal should still be
resolved for the purpose of reviewing his conviction by the lower court on which the civil liability is
based.

Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other hand, opposed the view of the Solicitor General
arguing that the death of the accused while judgment of conviction is pending appeal extinguishes
both his criminal and civil penalties. In support of his position, said counsel invoked the ruling of the
Court of Appeals in People v. Castillo and Ocfemia 2 which held that the civil obligation in a criminal
case takes root in the criminal liability and, therefore, civil liability is extinguished if accused should
die before final judgment is rendered.

We are thus confronted with a single issue: Does death of the accused pending appeal of his
conviction extinguish his civil liability?

In the aforementioned case of People v. Castillo, this issue was settled in the affirmative. This same
issue posed therein was phrased thus: Does the death of Alfredo Castillo affect both his criminal
responsibility and his civil liability as a consequence of the alleged crime?

It resolved this issue thru the following disquisition:

Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is the controlling statute. It reads, in part:

Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. — Criminal

liability is totally extinguished:

1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to

the pecuniary penalties liability therefor is extinguished only when the
death of the offender occurs before final judgment;

With reference to Castillo's criminal liability, there is no question. The law is plain.
Statutory construction is unnecessary. Said liability is extinguished.

The civil liability, however, poses a problem. Such liability is extinguished only when
the death of the offender occurs before final judgment. Saddled upon us is the task of
ascertaining the legal import of the term "final judgment." Is it final judgment as
contradistinguished from an interlocutory order? Or, is it a judgment which is final
and executory?
We go to the genesis of the law. The legal precept contained in Article 89 of the
Revised Penal Code heretofore transcribed is lifted from Article 132 of the Spanish El
Codigo Penal de 1870 which, in part, recites:

La responsabilidad penal se extingue.

1. Por la muerte del reo en cuanto a las penas personales siempre, y

respecto a las pecuniarias, solo cuando a su fallecimiento no hubiere
recaido sentencia firme.

xxx xxx xxx

The code of 1870 . . . it will be observed employs the term "sentencia firme." What is
"sentencia firme" under the old statute?

XXVIII Enciclopedia Juridica Española, p. 473, furnishes the ready answer: It says:

SENTENCIA FIRME. La sentencia que adquiere la fuerza de las

definitivas por no haberse utilizado por las partes litigantes recurso
alguno contra ella dentro de los terminos y plazos legales concedidos
al efecto.

"Sentencia firme" really should be understood as one which is definite. Because, it is

only when judgment is such that, as Medina y Maranon puts it, the crime is confirmed
— "en condena determinada;" or, in the words of Groizard, the guilt of the accused
becomes — "una verdad legal." Prior thereto, should the accused die, according to
Viada, "no hay legalmente, en tal caso, ni reo, ni delito, ni responsabilidad criminal
de ninguna clase." And, as Judge Kapunan well explained, when a defendant dies
before judgment becomes executory, "there cannot be any determination by final
judgment whether or not the felony upon which the civil action might arise exists," for
the simple reason that "there is no party defendant." (I Kapunan, Revised Penal
Code, Annotated, p. 421. Senator Francisco holds the same view. Francisco,
Revised Penal Code, Book One, 2nd ed., pp. 859-860)

The legal import of the term "final judgment" is similarly reflected in the Revised
Penal Code. Articles 72 and 78 of that legal body mention the term "final judgment"
in the sense that it is already enforceable. This also brings to mind Section 7, Rule
116 of the Rules of Court which states that a judgment in a criminal case becomes
final "after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal or when the sentence has
been partially or totally satisfied or served, or the defendant has expressly waived in
writing his right to appeal."

By fair intendment, the legal precepts and opinions here collected funnel down to one
positive conclusion: The term final judgment employed in the Revised Penal Code
means judgment beyond recall. Really, as long as a judgment has not become
executory, it cannot be truthfully said that defendant is definitely guilty of the felony
charged against him.

Not that the meaning thus given to final judgment is without reason. For where, as in
this case, the right to institute a separate civil action is not reserved, the decision to
be rendered must, of necessity, cover "both the criminal and the civil aspects of the
case." People vs. Yusico (November 9, 1942), 2 O.G., No. 100, p. 964. See
 also: People vs. Moll, 68 Phil., 626, 634; Francisco, Criminal Procedure, 1958 ed.,
Vol. I, pp. 234, 236. Correctly, Judge Kapunan observed that as "the civil action is
based solely on the felony committed and of which the offender might be found
guilty, the death of the offender extinguishes the civil liability." I Kapunan, Revised
Penal Code, Annotated, supra.

Here is the situation obtaining in the present case: Castillo's criminal liability is out.
His civil liability is sought to be enforced by reason of that criminal liability. But then, if
we dismiss, as we must, the criminal action and let the civil aspect remain, we will be
faced with the anomalous situation whereby we will be called upon to clamp civil
liability in a case where the source thereof — criminal liability — does not exist. And,
as was well stated in Bautista, et al. vs. Estrella, et al., CA-G.R.
No. 19226-R, September 1, 1958, "no party can be found and held criminally liable in
a civil suit," which solely would remain if we are to divorce it from the criminal
proceeding."

This ruling of the Court of Appeals in the Castillo case 3 was adopted by the Supreme Court in the
cases of People of the Philippines v. Bonifacio Alison, et al., 4 People of the Philippines v. Jaime
Jose, et al. 5 and People of the Philippines v. Satorre 6 by dismissing the appeal in view of the death
of the accused pending appeal of said cases.

As held by then Supreme Court Justice Fernando in the Alison case:

The death of accused-appellant Bonifacio Alison having been established, and

considering that there is as yet no final judgment in view of the pendency of the
appeal, the criminal and civil liability of the said accused-appellant Alison was
extinguished by his death (Art. 89, Revised Penal Code; Reyes' Criminal Law, 1971
Rev. Ed., p. 717, citing People v. Castillo and Ofemia C.A., 56 O.G. 4045);
consequently, the case against him should be dismissed.

On the other hand, this Court in the subsequent cases of Buenaventura Belamala v. Marcelino
Polinar 7 and Lamberto Torrijos v. The Honorable Court of Appeals 8 ruled differently. In the former,
the issue decided by this court was: Whether the civil liability of one accused of physical injuries who
died before final judgment is extinguished by his demise to the extent of barring any claim therefore
against his estate. It was the contention of the administrator-appellant therein that the death of the
accused prior to final judgment extinguished all criminal and civil liabilities resulting from the offense,
in view of Article 89, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. However, this court ruled therein:

We see no merit in the plea that the civil liability has been extinguished, in view of the
provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines of 1950 (Rep. Act No. 386) that
became operative eighteen years after the revised Penal Code. As pointed out by the
Court below, Article 33 of the Civil Code establishes a civil action for damages on
account of physical injuries, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action.

Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil

action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall
proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require
only a preponderance of evidence.

Assuming that for lack of express reservation, Belamala's civil action for damages
was to be considered instituted together with the criminal action still, since both
 proceedings were terminated without final adjudication, the civil action of the
offended party under Article 33 may yet be enforced separately.

In Torrijos, the Supreme Court held that:

xxx xxx xxx

It should be stressed that the extinction of civil liability follows the extinction of the
criminal liability under Article 89, only when the civil liability arises from the criminal
act as its only basis. Stated differently, where the civil liability does not exist
independently of the criminal responsibility, the extinction of the latter by death, ipso
facto extinguishes the former, provided, of course, that death supervenes before final
judgment. The said principle does not apply in instant case wherein the civil liability
springs neither solely nor originally from the crime itself but from a civil contract of
purchase and sale. (Emphasis ours)

xxx xxx xxx

In the above case, the court was convinced that the civil liability of the accused who was
charged with estafa could likewise trace its genesis to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil
Code since said accused had swindled the first and second vendees of the property subject
matter of the contract of sale. It therefore concluded: "Consequently, while the death of the
accused herein extinguished his criminal liability including fine, his civil liability based on the
laws of human relations remains."

Thus it allowed the appeal to proceed with respect to the civil liability of the accused, notwithstanding
the extinction of his criminal liability due to his death pending appeal of his conviction.

To further justify its decision to allow the civil liability to survive, the court relied on the following
ratiocination: Since Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court 9 requires the dismissal of all money
claims against the defendant whose death occurred prior to the final judgment of the Court of First
Instance (CFI), then it can be inferred that actions for recovery of money may continue to be heard
on appeal, when the death of the defendant supervenes after the CFI had rendered its judgment. In
such case, explained this tribunal, "the name of the offended party shall be included in the title of the
case as plaintiff-appellee and the legal representative or the heirs of the deceased-accused should
be substituted as defendants-appellants."

It is, thus, evident that as jurisprudence evolved from Castillo to Torrijos, the rule established was
that the survival of the civil liability depends on whether the same can be predicated on sources of
obligations other than delict. Stated differently, the claim for civil liability is also extinguished together
with the criminal action if it were solely based thereon, i.e., civil liability ex delicto.

However, the Supreme Court in People v. Sendaydiego, et al. 10 departed from this long-established
principle of law. In this case, accused Sendaydiego was charged with and convicted by the lower
court of malversation thru falsification of public documents. Sendaydiego's death supervened during
the pendency of the appeal of his conviction.

This court in an unprecedented move resolved to dismiss Sendaydiego's appeal but only to the
extent of his criminal liability. His civil liability was allowed to survive although it was clear that such
claim thereon was exclusively dependent on the criminal action already extinguished. The legal
import of such decision was for the court to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over the entire
appeal, passing upon the correctness of Sendaydiego's conviction despite dismissal of the criminal
action, for the purpose of determining if he is civilly liable. In doing so, this Court issued a Resolution
of July 8, 1977 stating thus:

The claim of complainant Province of Pangasinan for the civil liability survived
Sendaydiego because his death occurred after final judgment was rendered by the
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, which convicted him of three complex crimes
of malversation through falsification and ordered him to indemnify the Province in the
total sum of P61,048.23 (should be P57,048.23).

The civil action for the civil liability is deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal
action in the absence of express waiver or its reservation in a separate action (Sec.
1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court). The civil action for the civil liability is separate and
distinct from the criminal action (People and Manuel vs. Coloma, 105 Phil. 1287; Roa
vs. De la Cruz, 107 Phil. 8).

When the action is for the recovery of money and the defendant dies before final
judgment in the Court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the
manner especially provided in Rule 87 of the Rules of Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court).

The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money judgment had been
rendered against him by the Court of First Instance, the action survives him. It may
be continued on appeal (Torrijos vs. Court of Appeals, L-40336, October 24, 1975;
67 SCRA 394).

The accountable public officer may still be civilly liable for the funds improperly
disbursed although he has no criminal liability (U.S. vs. Elvina, 24 Phil. 230;
Philippine National Bank vs. Tugab, 66 Phil. 583).

In view of the foregoing, notwithstanding the dismissal of the appeal of the deceased
Sendaydiego insofar as his criminal liability is concerned, the Court Resolved to
continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over his possible civil liability for the money
claims of the Province of Pangasinan arising from the alleged criminal acts
complained of, as if no criminal case had been instituted against him, thus making
applicable, in determining his civil liability, Article 30 of the Civil Code . . . and, for
that purpose, his counsel is directed to inform this Court within ten (10) days of the
names and addresses of the decedent's heirs or whether or not his estate is under
administration and has a duly appointed judicial administrator. Said heirs or
administrator will be substituted for the deceased insofar as the civil action for the
civil liability is concerned (Secs. 16 and 17, Rule 3, Rules of Court).

Succeeding cases 11 raising the identical issue have maintained adherence to our ruling
in Sendaydiego; in other words, they were a reaffirmance of our abandonment of the settled rule that
a civil liability solely anchored on the criminal (civil liability ex delicto) is extinguished upon dismissal
of the entire appeal due to the demise of the accused.

But was it judicious to have abandoned this old ruling? A re-examination of our decision
in Sendaydiego impels us to revert to the old ruling.

To restate our resolution of July 8, 1977 in Sendaydiego: The resolution of the civil action impliedly
instituted in the criminal action can proceed irrespective of the latter's extinction due to death of the
accused pending appeal of his conviction, pursuant to Article 30 of the Civil Code and Section 21,
Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Article 30 of the Civil Code provides:

When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil liability arising from a criminal
offense, and no criminal proceedings are instituted during the pendency of the civil
case, a preponderance of evidence shall likewise be sufficient to prove the act
complained of.

Clearly, the text of Article 30 could not possibly lend support to the ruling in Sendaydiego. Nowhere
in its text is there a grant of authority to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over the accused's
civil liability ex delicto when his death supervenes during appeal. What Article 30 recognizes is an
alternative and separate civil action which may be brought to demand civil liability arising from a
criminal offense independently of any criminal action. In the event that no criminal proceedings are
instituted during the pendency of said civil case, the quantum of evidence needed to prove the
criminal act will have to be that which is compatible with civil liability and that is, preponderance of
evidence and not proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Citing or invoking Article 30 to justify the
survival of the civil action despite extinction of the criminal would in effect merely beg the question of
whether civil liability ex delicto survives upon extinction of the criminal action due to death of the
accused during appeal of his conviction. This is because whether asserted in
the criminal action or in a separate civil action, civil liability ex delicto is extinguished by the death of
the accused while his conviction is on appeal. Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is clear on this
matter:

Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. — Criminal liability is totally
extinguished:

1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary

penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs
before final judgment;

xxx xxx xxx

However, the ruling in Sendaydiego deviated from the expressed intent of Article 89. It allowed
claims for civil liability ex delicto to survive by ipso facto treating the civil action impliedly instituted
with the criminal, as one filed under Article 30, as though no criminal proceedings had been filed but
merely a separate civil action. This had the effect of converting such claims from one which is
dependent on the outcome of the criminal action to an entirely new and separate one, the
prosecution of which does not even necessitate the filing of criminal proceedings. 12 One would be
hard put to pinpoint the statutory authority for such a transformation. It is to be borne in mind that in
recovering civil liability ex delicto, the same has perforce to be determined in the criminal action,
rooted as it is in the court's pronouncement of the guilt or innocence of the accused. This is but to
render fealty to the intendment of Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that "every
person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable." In such cases, extinction of the criminal
action due to death of the accused pending appeal inevitably signifies the concomitant extinction of
the civil liability. Mors Omnia Solvi. Death dissolves all things.

In sum, in pursuing recovery of civil liability arising from crime, the final determination of the criminal
liability is a condition precedent to the prosecution of the civil action, such that when the criminal
action is extinguished by the demise of accused-appellant pending appeal thereof, said civil action
cannot survive. The claim for civil liability springs out of and is dependent upon facts which, if true,
would constitute a crime. Such civil liability is an inevitable consequence of the criminal liability and
is to be declared and enforced in the criminal proceeding. This is to be distinguished from that which
is contemplated under Article 30 of the Civil Code which refers to the institution of a separate civil
action that does not draw its life from a criminal proceeding. The Sendaydiego resolution of July 8,
1977, however, failed to take note of this fundamental distinction when it allowed the survival of the
civil action for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto by treating the same as a separate civil action
referred to under Article 30. Surely, it will take more than just a summary judicial pronouncement to
authorize the conversion of said civil action to an independent one such as that contemplated under
Article 30.

Ironically however, the main decision in Sendaydiego did not apply Article 30, the resolution of July
8, 1977 notwithstanding. Thus, it was held in the main decision:

Sendaydiego's appeal will be resolved only for the purpose of showing his criminal
liability which is the basis of the civil liability for which his estate would be liable. 13

In other words, the Court, in resolving the issue of his civil liability, concomitantly made a
determination on whether Sendaydiego, on the basis of evidenced adduced, was indeed guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of committing the offense charged. Thus, it upheld Sendaydiego's
conviction and pronounced the same as the source of his civil liability. Consequently, although
Article 30 was not applied in the final determination of Sendaydiego's civil liability, there was a
reopening of the criminal action already extinguished which served as basis for Sendaydiego's civil
liability. We reiterate: Upon death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal
action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil
action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as
it is on the criminal.

Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court was also invoked to serve as another basis for
the Sendaydiego resolution of July 8, 1977. In citing Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the Court
made the inference that civil actions of the type involved in Sendaydiego consist of money claims,
the recovery of which may be continued on appeal if defendant dies pending appeal of his conviction
by holding his estate liable therefor. Hence, the Court's conclusion:

"When the action is for the recovery of money" "and the defendant dies before final
judgment in the court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the
manner especially provided" in Rule 87 of the Rules of Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court).

The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money judgment had been
rendered against him by the Court of First Instance, the action survives him. It may
be continued on appeal.

Sadly, reliance on this provision of law is misplaced. From the standpoint of procedural law, this
course taken in Sendaydiego cannot be sanctioned. As correctly observed by Justice Regalado:

xxx xxx xxx

I do not, however, agree with the justification advanced in

both Torrijos and Sendaydiego which, relying on the provisions of Section 21, Rule 3
of the Rules of Court, drew the strained implication therefrom that where the civil
liability instituted together with the criminal liabilities had already passed beyond the
judgment of the then Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court), the Court
 of Appeals can continue to exercise appellate jurisdiction thereover despite the
extinguishment of the component criminal liability of the deceased. This
pronouncement, which has been followed in the Court's judgments subsequent and
consonant to Torrijos and Sendaydiego, should be set aside and abandoned as
being clearly erroneous and unjustifiable.

Said Section 21 of Rule 3 is a rule of civil procedure in ordinary civil actions. There is
neither authority nor justification for its application in criminal procedure to civil
actions instituted together with and as part of criminal actions. Nor is there any
authority in law for the summary conversion from the latter category of an ordinary
civil action upon the death of the offender. . . .

Moreover, the civil action impliedly instituted in a criminal proceeding for recovery of civil liability ex
delicto can hardly be categorized as an ordinary money claim such as that referred to in Sec. 21,
Rule 3 enforceable before the estate of the deceased accused.

Ordinary money claims referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 must be viewed in light of the provisions of
Section 5, Rule 86 involving claims against the estate, which in Sendaydiego was held liable for
Sendaydiego's civil liability. "What are contemplated in Section 21 of Rule 3, in relation to Section 5
of Rule 86, 14 are contractual money claims while the claims involved in civil liability ex delicto may
include even the restitution of personal or real property." 15 Section 5, Rule 86 provides an exclusive
enumeration of what claims may be filed against the estate. These are: funeral expenses, expenses
for the last illness, judgments for money and claim arising from contracts, expressed or implied. It is
clear that money claims arising from delict do not form part of this exclusive enumeration. Hence,
there could be no legal basis in (1) treating a civil action ex delicto as an ordinary contractual money
claim referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and (2) allowing it to survive by filing a
claim therefor before the estate of the deceased accused. Rather, it should be extinguished upon
extinction of the criminal action engendered by the death of the accused pending finality of his
conviction.

Accordingly, we rule: if the private offended party, upon extinction of the civil liability ex
delicto desires to recover damages from the same act or omission complained of, he must subject to
Section 1, Rule 111 16 (1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended) file a separate civil action,
this time predicated not on the felony previously charged but on other sources of obligation. The
source of obligation upon which the separate civil action is premised determines against whom the
same shall be enforced.

If the same act or omission complained of also arises from quasi-delict or may, by provision of law,
result in an injury to person or property (real or personal), the separate civil action must be filed
against the executor or administrator 17 of the estate of the accused pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 87 of
the Rules of Court:

Sec. 1. Actions which may and which may not be brought against executor or
administrator. — No action upon a claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest
thereon shall be commenced against the executor or administrator; but actions to
recover real or personal property, or an interest therein, from the estate, or to enforce
a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property,
real or personal, may be commenced against him.

This is in consonance with our ruling in Belamala 18 where we held that, in recovering damages for
injury to persons thru an independent civil action based on Article 33 of the Civil Code, the same
must be filed against the executor or administrator of the estate of deceased accused and not
against the estate under Sec. 5, Rule 86 because this rule explicitly limits the claim to those for
funeral expenses, expenses for the last sickness of the decedent, judgment for money and claims
arising from contract, express or implied. Contractual money claims, we stressed, refers only
topurely personal obligations other than those which have their source in delict or tort.

Conversely, if the same act or omission complained of also arises from contract, the separate civil
action must be filed against the estate of the accused, pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of
Court.

From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our ruling herein:

1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as
the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of
the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil
liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex
delicto in senso strictiore."

2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same
may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. 19 Article 1157 of the Civil Code
enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the
same act or omission:

a) Law 20

b) Contracts

c) Quasi-contracts

d) . . .

e) Quasi-delicts

3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor
may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of
the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced
either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of
obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.

4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil
action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its
extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the
statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal
case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 21 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any
apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription. 22

Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold that the death of appellant Bayotas
extinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability based solely on the act complained of, i.e.,
rape. Consequently, the appeal is hereby dismissed without qualification.

WHEREFORE, the appeal of the late Rogelio Bayotas is DISMISSED with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 190696 August 3, 2010

ROLITO CALANG and PHILTRANCO SERVICE ENTERPRISES, INC., Petitioners,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

BRION, J.:

We resolve the motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners, Philtranco Service Enterprises,
Inc. (Philtranco) and Rolito Calang, to challenge our Resolution of February 17, 2010. Our assailed
Resolution denied the petition for review on certiorari for failure to show any reversible error
sufficient to warrant the exercise of this Court’s discretionary appellate jurisdiction.

Antecedent Facts

At around 2:00 p.m. of April 22, 1989, Rolito Calang was driving Philtranco Bus No. 7001, owned by
Philtranco along Daang Maharlika Highway in Barangay Lambao, Sta. Margarita, Samar when its
rear left side hit the front left portion of a Sarao jeep coming from the opposite direction. As a result
of the collision, Cresencio Pinohermoso, the jeep’s driver, lost control of the vehicle, and bumped
and killed Jose Mabansag, a bystander who was standing along the highway’s shoulder. The jeep
turned turtle three (3) times before finally stopping at about 25 meters from the point of impact. Two
of the jeep’s passengers, Armando Nablo and an unidentified woman, were instantly killed, while the
other passengers sustained serious physical injuries.

The prosecution charged Calang with multiple homicide, multiple serious physical injuries and
damage to property thru reckless imprudence before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 31,
Calbayog City. The RTC, in its decision dated May 21, 2001, found Calang guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of reckless imprudence resulting to multiple homicide, multiple physical injuries and damage to
property, and sentenced him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of thirty days of arresto menor, as
minimum, to four years and two months of prision correccional, as maximum. The RTC ordered
Calang and Philtranco, jointly and severally, to pay ₱50,000.00 as death indemnity to the heirs of
Armando; ₱50,000.00 as death indemnity to the heirs of Mabansag; and ₱90,083.93 as actual
damages to the private complainants.

The petitioners appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals (CA), docketed as CA-G.R. CR
No. 25522. The CA, in its decision dated November 20, 2009, affirmed the RTC decision in toto. The
CA ruled that petitioner Calang failed to exercise due care and precaution in driving the Philtranco
bus. According to the CA, various eyewitnesses testified that the bus was traveling fast and
encroached into the opposite lane when it evaded a pushcart that was on the side of the road. In
addition, he failed to slacken his speed, despite admitting that he had already seen the jeep coming
from the opposite direction when it was still half a kilometer away. The CA further ruled that Calang
demonstrated a reckless attitude when he drove the bus, despite knowing that it was suffering from
loose compression, hence, not roadworthy.

The CA added that the RTC correctly held Philtranco jointly and severally liable with petitioner
Calang, for failing to prove that it had exercised the diligence of a good father of the family to prevent
the accident.
The petitioners filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari. In our Resolution dated
February 17, 2010, we denied the petition for failure to sufficiently show any reversible error in the
assailed decision to warrant the exercise of this Court’s discretionary appellate jurisdiction.

The Motion for Reconsideration

In the present motion for reconsideration, the petitioners claim that there was no basis to hold
Philtranco jointly and severally liable with Calang because the former was not a party in the criminal
case (for multiple homicide with multiple serious physical injuries and damage to property thru
reckless imprudence) before the RTC.

The petitioners likewise maintain that the courts below overlooked several relevant facts, supported
by documentary exhibits, which, if considered, would have shown that Calang was not negligent,
such as the affidavit and testimony of witness Celestina Cabriga; the testimony of witness Rodrigo
Bocaycay; the traffic accident sketch and report; and the jeepney’s registration receipt. The
petitioners also insist that the jeep’s driver had the last clear chance to avoid the collision.

We partly grant the motion.

Liability of Calang

We see no reason to overturn the lower courts’ finding on Calang’s culpability. The finding of
negligence on his part by the trial court, affirmed by the CA, is a question of fact that we cannot pass
upon without going into factual matters touching on the finding of negligence. In petitions for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, this Court is limited to reviewing only
errors of law, not of fact, unless the factual findings complained of are devoid of support by the
evidence on record, or the assailed judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts.

Liability of Philtranco

We, however, hold that the RTC and the CA both erred in holding Philtranco jointly and severally
liable with Calang. We emphasize that Calang was charged criminally before the RTC. Undisputedly,
Philtranco was not a direct party in this case. Since the cause of action against Calang was based
on delict, both the RTC and the CA erred in holding Philtranco jointly and severally liable with
Calang, based on quasi-delict under Articles 21761 and 21802 of the Civil Code. Articles 2176 and
2180 of the Civil Code pertain to the vicarious liability of an employer for quasi-delicts that an
employee has committed. Such provision of law does not apply to civil liability arising from delict.

If at all, Philtranco’s liability may only be subsidiary. Article 102 of the Revised Penal Code states the
subsidiary civil liabilities of innkeepers, tavernkeepers and proprietors of establishments, as follows:

In default of the persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavernkeepers, and any other persons or
corporations shall be civilly liable for crimes committed in their establishments, in all cases where a
violation of municipal ordinances or some general or special police regulations shall have been
committed by them or their employees. 1avvphil

Innkeepers are also subsidiary liable for the restitution of goods taken by robbery or theft within their
houses from guests lodging therein, or for the payment of the value thereof, provided that such
guests shall have notified in advance the innkeeper himself, or the person representing him, of the
deposit of such goods within the inn; and shall furthermore have followed the directions which such
innkeeper or his representative may have given them with respect to the care of and vigilance over
such goods. No liability shall attach in case of robbery with violence against or intimidation of
persons unless committed by the innkeeper’s employees.

The foregoing subsidiary liability applies to employers, according to Article 103 of the Revised Penal
Code, which reads:

The subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article shall also apply to employers,
teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by their
servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties.

The provisions of the Revised Penal Code on subsidiary liability – Articles 102 and 103 – are
deemed written into the judgments in cases to which they are applicable. Thus, in the dispositive
portion of its decision, the trial court need not expressly pronounce the subsidiary liability of the
employer.3 Nonetheless, before the employers’ subsidiary liability is enforced, adequate evidence
must exist establishing that (1) they are indeed the employers of the convicted employees; (2) they
are engaged in some kind of industry; (3) the crime was committed by the employees in the
discharge of their duties; and (4) the execution against the latter has not been satisfied due to
insolvency. The determination of these conditions may be done in the same criminal action in which
the employee’s liability, criminal and civil, has been pronounced, in a hearing set for that precise
purpose, with due notice to the employer, as part of the proceedings for the execution of the
judgment.4

WHEREFORE, we PARTLY GRANT the present motion. The Court of Appeals decision that
affirmed in toto the RTC decision, finding Rolito Calang guilty beyond reasonable doubt of reckless
imprudence resulting in multiple homicide, multiple serious physical injuries and damage to property,
is AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that Philtranco’s liability should only be subsidiary. No costs.

SO ORDERED.