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1 IGNORANTIA PORTALIS LEGIS ACADEMIC YEAR 2016-2017

Order of the CFI was set aside and the Court


CIVIL PROCEDURE ordered respondent Judge to try the criminal charge
against private respondent Mariano without delay.
CASES
Other Stuff:
 Jurisdiction of a court is conferred by the
JURISDICTION Constitution or statutes in force at the time of the
commencement of the action
 The criminal case was filed on December 18,
1974, and the law in force vesting jurisdiction
upon the court was the Judiciary Act of 1948,
1. PEOPLE vs. MARIANO 71 scra 600 which provides that the CFI shall have
original jurisdiction in all criminal cases in
which the penalty provided by law is
Facts: imprisonment for more than 6months or fine
Private respondent Mariano, a Liaison Officer of of more than Php 200. Estafa falls
Municipal Mayor Nolasco received in behalf of the thereunder.
Municipality of San Jose del Monte, Bulacan,  General Order No. 49, dated October 6
several feet of electric cables and cable power from 1974, redefines the jurisdiction of military
USAID/NEC. Instead of delivering said items to the tribunals, but estafa and malversation are not
Municipality, respondent appropriated and enumerated therein; the Military Commission
converted the same for his personal use. Thereafter, is therefore not vested with jurisdiction over
the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan filed an information estafa cases.
charging the private respondent with the offense of  Jurisdiction, defined
estafa. Accused moved to quash the information on  Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and
the grounds that the Court lacked jurisdiction to try determine a cause — the right to act in a
the case; that the criminal liability had been case. (Herrera vs. Barretto)
extinguished; that the information contained  Jurisdiction is the right of a Judge to
averments which, if true, would constitute a legal pronounce a sentence of the law in a case or
excuse; and that the items which were subject issue before him, acquired through due
matter of the information were the same items for process of law; it is the authority by which
which the Mayor of San Jose del Monte had been judicial officers take cognizance of and
indicted and convicted of malversation of public decide cases. (Bouvier)
property by the Military Tribunal. Private respondent  Jurisdiction is the right to put the wheels of
claimed that since the case against Mayor Nolasco justice in motion and to proceed to the final
had already been decided by the Military Tribunal, determination of a cause upon the pleadings
the Court of First Instance had lost jurisdiction over and evidence. (Wabash R. Co. vs. Duncan)
the case against him.  Criminal Jurisdiction is necessarily the
authority to hear and try a particular offense
Ruling of CFI of Bulacan (Respondent Court): and impose the punishment for it. (Moran)
Respondent court granted the motion to quash on
the ground that since the Military Commission first
took cognizance of the case, it had already lost
jurisdiction to pass a new upon the same subject 2. AUYONG HIAN vs. CTA
matter.

The People of the Philippines sought a review of the


order granting the motion to quash the information. This is a petition for review of the resolution of the
respondent Court of Tax Appeals in CTA Case No.
Issue: WON civil courts and military courts exercise 1560 dismissing the appeal interposed by petitioner
concurrent jurisdiction over the offense of estafa Auyong Hian (Hong Whua Hang) from the decision
of the Commissioner of Customs, dated December
Held: NO, the situation does not involve two 7, 1964, which affirmed the decision of the Collector
tribunals vested with concurrent jurisdiction over a
of Customs of the Port of Manila, dated April 23,
particular crime so as to apply the rule that the court
1963, in Seizure Identification No. 6669 declaring
or tribunal which first takes cognizance of the case
acquires jurisdiction thereof exclusive of the other. forfeited in favor of the government 600 hogsheads
Estafa and malversation are two separate and of Virginia leaf tobacco that had been imported by
distinct offenses, and in the case at bar the accused Auyong Hian and ordering the sale of the said
in the estafa case (respondent Mariano) is different tobacco.
from the accused in the alleged malversation case
(the municipal mayor). Issue: The principal question that this Court has to
resolve in the instant case is whether or not the
Court of Tax Appeals has correctly held that it

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has no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal or part of law administered by the Bureau of
interposed by petitioner Auyong Hian from the Customs; (Republic Act 1125; Emphasis supplied.)
decision of the Commissioner of Customs,
which affirmed the decision of the Collector of The record shows that petitioner Auyong Hian has
Customs in Seizure Identification No. 6669. properly brought this case on appeal to the Court of
Tax Appeals in accordance with the above-quoted
Held: Court of Tax appeals has exclusive jurisdiction provisions of law. The subject matter of the appeal
over appeal from decision of commissioner of is perfectly within the power of the Court of Tax
customs in proceedings for forfeiture of illegally Appeals to hear and decide.
imported merchandise.
In the case of "Government of the Philippine Islands,
The "jurisdiction" of a court refers to the power of a et al. v. Gale, et al.," 24 Phil. 95, this Court declared
court to hear and determine a case. To ascertain that
whether a court has jurisdiction or not the provisions
of the law should be inquired into. The law pertinent The Collector of Customs when sitting in forfeiture
to the resolution of the question before Us is found proceedings, as provided in Act 355 (now Republic
in the provisions of Sections 2313 and 2402 of the Act 1937 — the Tariff and Customs Code),
Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines constitutes a tribunal upon which the law
(Republic Act 1937) and in Section 7 of Republic Act expressly confers jurisdiction to hear and
No. 1125, as follows: determine all questions touching the forfeiture
and further disposition of the subject matter of
SEC. 2313. Review by Commissioner. — The such proceedings .... (Emphasis supplied.)
person aggrieved by the decision or action of the
Collector in any matter presented upon protest or by The Court of Tax Appeals declared itself without
his action in any case of seizure may, within fifteen jurisdiction to entertain the appeal of Auyong Hian
days after notification in writing by the Collector of upon the ground that the Supreme Court had already
his action or decision, give written notice to the ruled that the importation of the 600 hogsheads of
Collector of his desire to have the matter reviewed tobacco was illegal, and that it cannot review, revise,
by the Commissioner. Thereupon the Collector shall much less overrule the decision of the Supreme
forthwith transmit all the records of the proceedings Court.
to the Commissioner, who shall approve, modify or
reverse the action or decision of the Collector and We believe that the stand taken by the Court of Tax
take such steps and make such orders as may be Appeals is not correct. It appears to Us that the Court
necessary to give effect to his decision. (Republic of Tax Appeals had overlooked the fact that the
Act 1937.) appeal of Auyong Hian from the decision of the
Commissioner of Customs had raised not only the
SEC. 2402. Review by Court of Tax Appeals. — The question of the legality of the importation but also
party aggrieved by a ruling of the Commissioner in other matters which called for a ruling by the Court
any matter brought before him upon protest or by his of Tax Appeals in the exercise of its appellate
action or ruling in any case of seizure may appeal to jurisdiction — especially the question of whether the
the Court of Tax Appeals, in the manner and within tobacco thus imported were goods the importation of
the period prescribed by law and regulations. which was relatively prohibited or absolutely
prohibited, and also the question regarding the
Unless an appeal is made to the Court of Tax disposal of the tobacco that was thus seized.
Appeals in the manner and within the period
prescribed by laws and regulations, the action or This Court recognizes the exclusive jurisdiction of
ruling of the Commissioner shall be final and the Court of Tax Appeals over appeals in
conclusive. (Republic Act 1837.) administrative proceedings in connection with
importations. Indeed, the proceedings before the
SEC. 7. Jurisdiction. — The Court of Tax Appeals Collector of Customs, the appeal before the
shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction to Commissioner of Customs, and the appeal before
review by appeal, as herein provided. — the Court of Tax Appeals deal with administrative
aspects of importation. While the Court of Tax
xx x x x x x x x Appeals is considered as a judicial body, its
functions are to pass upon administrative
(2) Decisions of the Commissioner of Customs in decisions of the Commissioner of Customs, the
cases involving liability for customs duties, fees or Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the
other money charges; seizure, detention or release provincial or city Boards of Assessment
of property affected; fines, forfeitures or other Appeals.
penalties imposed in relation thereto; or other
matters arising under the Customs Law or other law The case as brought by Auyong Hian to the Court of
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Tax Appeals involves questions relating to the recovery of ownership of the property located in
seizure, forfeiture and the disposition of the 600 Pangasinan, which is outside the territorial
hogsheads of tobacco in question. As has been jurisdiction of the trial court.
adverted to, the matter regarding the sale of the
tobacco was included in the appeal of Auyong Hian
from the decision of the Commissioner of Customs. Ruling of IAC:
IAC affirmed the RTC’s order of dismissal
The act of selling the seized tobacco as well as the
seizure thereof are matters that are governed by the Issue: WON the trial court may motu proprio dismiss
Tariff and Customs Code, the enforcement of which a complaint on the ground of improper venue
law is under the administration of the Bureau of
Customs. Hence the Court of Tax Appeals has Held: NO.
jurisdiction over appeals from the decisions of the  The motu proprio dismissal of petitioner's
Commissioner of Customs in connection with the complaint by respondent trial court on the ground
enforcement of the Tariff and Customs Code. We of improper venue is plain error, obviously
find, therefore, that in spite of the ruling laid attributable to its inability to distinguish between
down in the Barcelona and Arca cases that the jurisdiction and venue. Questions or issues
importation of the 600 hogsheads of the tobacco relating to venue of actions are governed by Rule
in question was illegal the Court of Tax Appeals 4 of the Revised Rules of Court. The laying of
is not precluded from entertaining the appeal venue is procedural rather than substantive.
filed by Auyong Hian from the decision of the Provisions relating to venue establish a relation
between the plaintiff and the defendant and not
Commissioner of Customs, said appeal having
between the court and the subject matter. Venue
raised issues that require resolution or ruling by the relates to trial not to jurisdiction, touches more of
Court of Tax Appeals, and they are issues which the convenience of the parties rather than the
could not have been decided by this Court in those substance of the case. Jurisdiction treats of the
two cases. We hold that the Court of Tax of Appeals power of the court to decide a case on the merits;
has jurisdiction to entertain the aforestated appeal while venue deals on the locality, the place where
by Auyong Hian, and it should proceed to determine the suit may be had.
and decide said appeal.  Dismissing the complaint on the ground of
improper venue is not the appropriate course of
In view of the foregoing, the resolutions of June 22, action because venue in inferior courts may be
1965, August 31, 1965 and September 18, 1965, in waived expressly or impliedly. Unless and until the
CTA Case No. 1560, appealed from, are set aside; defendant objects to the venue in a motion to
and this case is remanded to the Court of Tax dismiss, the venue cannot be truly said to have
Appeals for further proceedings and decision. No been improperly laid, as for all practical intents and
purposes, the venue, though technically wrong,
costs. It is so ordered.
may be acceptable to the parties for whose
convenience the rules on venue had been devised.
The trial court cannot pre-empt the defendant's
3. DACOYCOY vs. IAC
prerogative to object to the improper laying of the
venue by motu proprio dismissing the case.
 In the instant case, even granting for a moment
Facts: that the action of petitioner is a real action,
Petitioner Jesus Dacoycoy filed before the RTC of respondent trial court would still have jurisdiction
Antipolo Rizal a complaint against private over the case, it being a regional trial court vested
respondent Rufino De Guzman praying for the with the exclusive original jurisdiction over "all civil
annulment of two (2) deeds of sale involving a parcel actions which involve the title to, or possession of,
of riceland situated in Barrio Estanza, Lingayen, real property, or any interest therein . . ." in
Pangasinan, the surrender of the produce thereof accordance with Section 19 (2) of Batas
and damages for private respondent's refusal to Pambansa Blg. 129. With respect to the parties,
have said deeds of sale set aside upon petitioner's there is no dispute that it acquired jurisdiction over
demand the petitioner Jesus Dacoycoy, the moment he
Before summons could be served on private filed his complaint for annulment and damages.
respondent, the RTC Executive Judge issued an Respondent trial court could have acquired
order requiring counsel for petitioner to confer with jurisdiction over the private respondent, either by
respondent trial judge on the matter of venue. his voluntary appearance in court and his
submission to its authority, or by the coercive
Ruling of RTC: power of legal process exercised over his person.
RTC dismissed the complaint on the ground of
improper venue after the said conference. It found,
based on the allegations of the complaint, that
petitioner's action is a real action as it sought not
only the annulment of the deeds of sale but also the

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(Unrep., 100 Phil. 1098) (Rep. of the Phil. Digest,


4. RUPERTO vs. TORRES Vol. 1, Certiorari, Sec. 22, p. 430).

In Ruperto v. Torres, the Court laid down the test of


determining whether an administrative body is 5. BACALSO vs. RAMOLETE
exercising judicial functions or merely investigatory
functions applies to an administrative body
authorized to evaluate extradition documents. If the FACTS:
only purpose for investigation is to evaluate
evidence submitted before it based on the facts and The private respondents filed an "Ex-parte motion to
circumstances presented to it, and if the agency is or-der the clerk of court, Atty. Vicente Miranda, to
not authorized to make a final pronouncement transfer civil case No. 7278, from branch V to Branch
affecting the parties, then there is an absence of VII, Barili, Cebu", alleging that in virtue of the
judicial discretion and judgment. Thus, the role of Administrative Order No. 302 of the Department of
the administrative body is limited to an initial finding Justice, Series of 1962, as amended by
of whether or not the extradition petition can be filed Administrative Order No. 337, an additional branch
in court. The court has the power to determine was created, the Department of Justice ordered that
whether or not the extradition should be all cases originating from Toledo and other southern
effected. The evaluation procedure (in contrast to towns of this province should be heard by the said
ordinary investigations) may result in the deprivation branch; that this case involves mining claims which
of liberty of the prospective extraditee or accused are situated in Toledo City, within the jurisdiction of
(Sec. 2[c] of PD 1069) at 2 stages: the said branch at Barili, Cebu.
However, record shows that this case was filed, long
1) provisional arrest of the prospective extraditee before the said Branch VII at Barili, Cebu was
pending the submission of the request created by law, and since then several important
This is because the Treaty provides that in case of incidents have taken place, one of which was a
urgency, a contracting party may request the motion to Dismiss the Complaint for lack of
provisional arrest of the person sought pending jurisdiction, which motion was resolved by this court
presentation of the request (Par. 1, Art. 9 of the RP- denying the same. Several motions for
US Extradition Treaty) to prevent flight but he shall reconsiderations had been submitted to, and
be automatically discharged after 60 days (Par. 4 of considered and resolved by this court.
the RP-US Extradition Treaty) or 20 days (Sec. 20[d] ISSUE:
PD 1069) if no request is submitted. Otherwise, he
can be continuously detained, or if not, subsequently WON the respondent Judge presiding over branch V
rearrested (Par. 5, Art 9, RP-US Extradition Treaty) of the CFI of Cebu has lost jurisdiction to try and
decide the said case by virtue of the Administrative
Orders Nos. 302 and 337 of the Secretary of Justice,
2) Temporary arrest of the prospective extraditee transferring the cases assigned in branch V, one of
during the pendency of the extradition petition in which is the case No. 7278, to branch VII of the
court (Sec. 6, PD 1069). same court which is stationed at Barili, Cebu.
RULING:
The peculiarity and deviant characteristic of the
evaluation procedure is that: The jurisdiction is vested in the court, not in the
1) there is yet no extradite; BUT judges. And when a case is filed in one branch
2) it results in an administrative if adverse to the jurisdiction over the case does not attach to the
person involved, may cause his immediate branch or judge alone, to the exclusion of the other
incarceration branches. Trial may be held or proceedings continue
by and before another branch or judge. It is for this
It has been held that a special civil action reason that Section 57 of the Judiciary Act expressly
of certiorari "would not lie to challenge action of the grants to the Secretary of Justice, the administrative
‘Integrity Board’ set up by Executive Order No. 318 right or power to apportion the cases among the
of May 25, 1950, because that board, like the later different branches, both for the convenience of the
Presidential Complaints and Action Commission, parties and for the coordination of the work by the
was not invested with judicial functions but only with different branches of the same court. The
power to investigate charges of graft and corruption apportionment and distribution of cases does not
in office and to submit the record, together with involve a grant or limitation of jurisdiction; the
findings and recommendations, to the President." jurisdiction attaches and continues to be vested in
Ruperto v. Torres, G.R. No. L-8785, Feb. 25, 1957 the Court of First Instance of the province, and the
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trials may be held by any branch or judge of the stockholders of the corporation, such as accepting
court. dividends and are attending stockholders’ meetings.
SC ruled that the SEC, and not the CFI, has the
It is a settled rule that jurisdiction is conferred only
jurisdiction to try the case at bar, thereby affirming
by the Constitution or the law. It cannot be fixed by
the allegation of the private respondents that they
the will of the parties; it cannot be acquired through,
are sued in an intra-corporate dispute.
enlarged or diminished by any act of omission of the
parties. Constitutionally viewed, apportionment of DOCTRINE:
jurisdiction is vested in Congress.
- Jurisdiction over the subject matter is
conferred by the Constitution or by the law.
6. ZAMORA vs. CA - The question of jurisdiction can be raised at
any time, even on appeal.

FACTS: 7. FILIPINO vs. PALANCA


Petitioners organized an unregistered partnership
called Medina People’s Cockpit Association in 1967.
A decade after their establishment, a corporation FACTS: An action was instituted by petitioner to
called Medina Recreation Center Incorporated was foreclose a mortgage upon property of defendant.
created, where the properties of the former After 7 years after the confirmation of the public sale,
unregistered partnership was transferred. a motion was made by the administrator of the estate
Petitioners alleged that there are irregularities in the of the original defendant to set aside the order of
transfer of properties. They (petitioners) filed a default and the judgment in favor of plaintiff, and to
complaint against the private respondents first in the vacate all the proceedings on the basis that the court
Security and Exchange Commission, and later, with had never acquired jurisdiction over the defendant,
the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) considering that defendant was a nonresident at the
of Misamis Oriental. time of the institution of the present action, or over
the subject of the action. CFI denied the motion.
Petitioners first claimed that they are stockholders of
the said corporation. By such allegation, the CFI ISSUE: Whether or not the CFI acquired jurisdiction
dismissed their complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The over the case.
petitioners then filed a motion to strike out and
RULING: Yes. In a foreclosure proceeding against a
amend their statement that they are stockholders of
the said corporation. Defendants (herein private nonresident owner it is necessary for the court to
respondents) filed a motion for reconsideration to ascertain the amount due as prescribed in sec. 256
dismiss the amendment and the original complaint of the Code of Civil Procedure and to make an order
for lack of jurisdiction, but was denied by the CFI. requiring the defendant to pay the money into court
They then reiterated their motion to the CA, but was which the CFI complied. The question of the
again denied. The defendants further filed to the SC sufficiency of publication or notice in a case of this
a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and preliminary kind is a question affecting the jurisdiction of the
injunction. SC issued a temporary restraining order court, and the court is sometimes said to acquire
enjoining the CFI from further proceedings, and jurisdiction by virtue of the publication. In the case at
referred the decision to the respondent court. bar, an order for publication was accordingly
obtained from the CFI and publication was made in
CA RULING: due form in a newspaper of the city of Manila.
The CA ruled in favor of the private respondents by
denying the motion to strike out and amend that 8. DE JESUS vs. GARCIA
statement of the petitioners, and further finds that the
petitioners are suing as stockholders of the said
corporation.
FACTS:
ISSUE:
Petitioners are co-owners of a party, together with
Whether the SEC or the CFI has the jurisdiction over Maxima de Jesus and Salvador Barrios. Maxima
the case was made the administrator of the property where
Shell Company is a lessee. In their contract, 10% of
SC RULING: the rentals is deducted by Maxima to the total
SC affirms with the findings of the CA that petitioners payment of rent for her administration fee.
are suing as stockholders of the corporation. Basing
from the complaint first filed in the SEC, there were
evidences proving that they are considered as
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Shell, the lessee, pays its rent to Maxima, and Mercedes Inigo later sold and transferred her
Maxima delivers the respective shares of her co- ownership of the land to Juan Bosquit and herein
owners thereafter. private respondent Jesus Wee Eng. TCT No. T-5454
was cancelled and another title, TCT No. 13659, was
Petitioners then sought to deprive Maxima of her
issued on 28 May 1964 jointly in the names of the
10% compensation by instructing Shell to pay
two vendees.
directly to them instead of Maxima.
On 17 December 1966, Bosquit and Wee entered
Respondent judge issued an ex-parte, a writ of
into a deed of exchange with the City Government of
preliminary injunction ordering Shell to pay Maxima
Davao. Bosquit and Wee exchanged a portion of
the monthly rentals, and Maxima shall retain her
their Lot 502-C-9 for also a portion of Lot No. 502-
10% compensation and distribute the respective
C-il under TCT No. T-5788 in the name of the city.
shares of her co-owners.
The transaction was authorized and approved by the
The question of jurisdiction is raised thereafter. City Council of Davao.
Hence, this original action of certiorari and
On 22 July 1977, Wee, herein private respondent,
prohibition filed by petitioners.
filed a complaint (docketed Civil Case No. 10363)
ISSUE: against petitioners in the then Court of First Instance
of Davao, Branch III, for recovery of the real property
Whether the court of the respondent judge has the in question. On 08 September 1978, after the
jurisdiction to issue an ex-parte and writ of petitioners had filed their answer, the court
preliminary injunction. appointed Orville 0. Bueno, a duly licensed geodetic
SC RULING: engineer, its commissioner to conduct a relocation
survey of the boundaries of the land. In his report,
The subject matter of this case comes within the dated 27 November 1978, Bueno stated that -
concept of specific performance of contract – by
which the jurisdiction to try such resides in the Court x x x portions of about two-thirds (2/3) of the houses
of First Instance. Specific performance is not of Lolita Amigo and that of Estelita Vda. de Salinas
capable of pecuniary estimation. is inside of Lot 502-C-9-B, Psd-i 1-000258, covered
by TCT No. T-5304l, issued in the name of Jesus
Further, it is stated in Section 2, Rule 58 of the Rules Wee Eng; the remaining one-third of it lies on the
of Court road widening and the creek respectively.[5]
A preliminary injunction may be granted Whereupon, private respondent sought an
by the court where the action or proceeding is amendment of his complaint which was allowed by
pending. If the action or proceeding is pending the lower court on 13 November 1979.[6] As so
in the Court of Appeals or in the Supreme Court, amended, the complaint prayed not only for the
it may be issued by said court in any member recovery of real property and damages but also for
thereof. an abatement of nuisance[7] over the portion of the
improvements introduced by petitioners that
Therefore, the City Court, having no jurisdiction over
encroached on the sidewalk of Leon Garcia Street.
the case, does not have the power to grant a writ of
preliminary injunction. ISSUE: Whether or not the court a quo acquired
jurisdiction over the subject matter and their person
DOCTRINE:
in the case at bench.
- Section 2, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court.
RULING AND RATIO:
- Cases by which the subject matter is not
capable of pecuniary estimation is within the YES. Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case
jurisdiction of the CFI (now RTC) is conferred by law[19] and determined by the
- allegations of the complaint. It should hardly be of
any consequence that the merits of the case are
9. AMIGO vs. CA later found to veer away from the claims asseverated
by the plaintiff. The suit below is aimed at recovering
real property, an action clearly well within the
FACTS: jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.[20]
Incidentally, petitioners assertion that the litigated
Petitioners Lolita Amigo and Estelita vda. de Salinas lots belong in ownership to the city government and
leased in 1961 from Mercedes Inigo, a parcel of not to private respondent is not borne out by the
land, also known as Lot 502-C-9, Psd-l0752, located evidence on record. On the contrary, it appears that
along Leon Garcia St., Agdao District, Davao City, private respondent has been, and still is; the
registered in the lessors name under TCT No. T- registered owner of both Lot 502-C-9-B and Lot 502-
5454. Petitioners constructed their houses on the lot.
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C-i 1-A, respectively, under TCT No. T-53041 and where it was originally attached. However, the boy
TCT No. T-53042. did not screw the weight to its proper place and
instead placed it inside his back pocket. A derby
Neither may petitioners feign absence ofjurisdiction
discovered the half-pound weight inside the pocket,
over their persons. Jurisdiction over the person of
removed it, and the boy was not allowed to
the defendant in a civil action is acquired either by
participate in the 3rd race inspite of the efforts of the
his voluntary appearance in court and his
father to talk with derby officials.
submission to its authority or by service of
summons.[22] In this case, by their filing of an As a result, the father filed a complaint for actual,
answer and later an amended answer, petitioners moral and exemplary damages with RTC alleging
must be deemed to have formally and effectively that the arbitrary disqualification of his son “became
appeared before the lower court. a nightmare.”
A voluntary appearance is a waiver of the necessity TRIAL COURT- Dismissed the complaint.
of a formal notice. An appearance in whatever form,
COURT OF APPEALS- affirmed the decision,
without expressly objecting to the jurisdiction of the
however with the changes in the Justices presiding
court over the person, is a submission to the
over the case, the trial court’s decision was
jurisdiction of the court over the person. While the
reversed.
formal method of entering an appearance in a cause
pending in the courts is to deliver to the clerk a ISSUE:
written direction ordering him to enter the
appearance of the person who subscribes it, an WON, generally, in a privarte sports competition a
appearance may be made by simply filing a formal court may substitute its judgment for that made by
motion, or plea or answer. This formal method of the competition’s officials in the interpretation and
appearance is not necessary. (Italics supplied.) enforcement of competition rules

Unlike the question ofjurisdiction over the subject HELD:


matter which may be invoked at any stage of the No. There was nothing unfair in the officials’
proceedings (even on appeal), the issue enforcement of the soap box derby rules. The soap
ofjurisdiction over the person of the defendant, box derby race is a privately sponsored event with
however, as has been so held lately in La Naval rules and regulations which mirror the same rules
Drug Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[24] must be and regulations followed by international soap box
seasonably raised, and it can well be pleaded in a derby competitions. If legal notions were allowed to
motion to dismiss or by way of an affirmative defense intrude at every level in the enforcement of rules of
in an answer. The records bear out the fact that private (or even public) sporting events, there will
petitioners have allowed the issue ofjurisdiction to result anarchy and chaos, as virtually every decision
pass unquestioned until the rendition of the by an umpire, or referee or sports judge could be
judgment. It is now too late in the day for petitioners subject to question and every disqualification based
to assail the jurisdiction of the lower court over their on a clear-cut rule would be qualified by the
person, a somersault that neither law nor policy will presence or absence of good faith or bad faith or the
sanction. question of motive or intent. Spectators will then
have to await the result of sporting events not from
10. PHILIPPINE SOAP BOX DERBY vs. CA rafters or media, but from announcements made by
judges through court personnel reading aloud legal
decisions. Unless a clear case is found for arbitrary
and brazen violations or applications of sports rules
FACTS: by officials and sponsors themselves, and no such
Petitioner, a duly organized non-stock corporation, thing happened here, it is best for courts to prudently
held a soap box derby, wherein one of the leave things where they are.
participants was Jose Yabut, son of herein
respondent. He won 1st place in one of the morning 11. RAMON FELIPE JR vs. LEUTERIO
races wand was qualified to run for the 2nd race. He
was weighed while seated on his race car and was
found overweight by the derby officials. The derby
rules provide that the maximum combined weight of Facts: On March 12, 1950 an inter-collegiate
car and driver should not exceed 206 lbs. The derby oratorical competition was held in Naga City. Felipe
officials removed a half-pound weight at the back of was one of the Judges and was the chairman. Nosce
was awarded the first price and Imperial the second
the soap box car, which was handed to the boy and
price. Imperial addressed a letter to the Board of
the boy gave it to his father. The boy lost in the 2nd Judges protesting the verdict and alleged that one of
race. Thereafter, the father returned the weight to the judges committed a mathematical error on
the boy in order that it could be screwed back to
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computing the scores. The Board refused to amend of the powers vested in him by the State Council of
their award, Imperial filed a complaint in court. She Governors, as well as the Rules of Procedure, Gov.
asserts that she should have ranked 3rd place in the Huang changed the venue of the election from Little
vote, which makes her score 9 or the First place. Theater to Admiral Hotel, made with no objections.

Issue: whether or not the courts have the authority However, So and some members of the Council of
to reverse the award of the board of judges of an Past District Governors continued to hold and
oratorical competition. supervise an illegal election at the old site where
voting and non-voting delegates and alternates were
Held: No. allowed to cast their votes without ballots, ballot
boxes or issuance of valid accreditation papers. The
No rights to the prizes may be asserted by the election in Admiral Hotel supervised by Gov. Huang
contestants, because their's was merely the
declared Josefa the Governor-elect, but defendant
privilege to compete for the prize, and that privilege
did not ripen into a demandable right unless and until Lions Club International unlawfully recognized So as
they were proclaimed winners of the competition by the winner.
the appointed arbiters or referees or judges. Josefa filed an action for the issuance of writ of
preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining
Granting that Imperial suffered some loss or injury,
order enjoining So from assuming the powers and
yet in law there are instances of "damnum absque
injuria". This is one of them. If fraud or malice had prerogatives of the office of Governor and Lions Club
been proven, it would be a different proposition. But International from recognizing and proclaiming So
then her action should be directed against the as the Governor
individual judge or judges who fraudulently or
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE- Granted the writ
maliciously injured her. Not against the other judges.
and TRO filed for by Josefa. So filed motion to
By the way what is here in stated must not be dismiss which was denied, but the court set aside
understood as applying to those activities which the the said restraining order.
government has chosen to regulate with the creation COURT OF APPEALS- Affirmed, ruled in favor of
of the Games and Amusements Board in Executive
herein respondents (Josefa).
Order No. 392, Series 1950.
ISSUE:
Judgment. In view of all the foregoing, we are of the
opinion and so declare, that the judiciary has no WON courts of justice may take cognizance of the
power to reverse the award of the board of judges of instant case
an oratorical contest. For that matter it would not
interfere in literary contests, beauty contests and HELD/DOCTRINE:
similar competitions. No. The general rule of non-interference in the
internal affairs of association wherein the courts
will not interfere with the internal affairs of an
12. LIONS CLUB INTERNATIONAL vs. unincorporated association so as to settle disputes
AMORES between members, or questions of policy, discipline,
or internal government, is however subject to
exceptions, only in the following cases:
FACTS: 1) when law and justice so require;
Josefa, respondent, and So, petitioner, filed their 2) when there is fraud, oppression, or bad
certificates of candidacy for the position of District faith;
Governer of Lions Club International District 301-AI
for the fiscal year 1982-83. Before the election, an 3) the action complained of is capricious,
agreement was executed between Josefa and So for arbitrary, or unjustly discriminatory;
the purpose of avoiding an expensive, full-blown 4) property or civil rights are invaded and
election contest, whereby So withdrew his certificate there is arbitrariness, fraud or collusion;
of candidacy in favor of Josefa, and said withdrawal
was duly accepted by Governor Huang. However, 5) the proceedings in question are violative
news items were published conveying the idea that of the laws of the society or the law of the
So had not withdrawn from the gubernatorial land, as by depriving a person of due process
raceamong others. It also further alleged that armed of law;
men by force and intimidation prevented known
6) there is lack of jurisdiction on the part of
leaders and followers of Josefa from entering the
the tribunal conducting the proceedings,
Plenary Session; and forced by the deteriorate
where the organization exceeds its powers,
peace and order in the convention hall and by virtue
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or where the proceedings are otherwise the respondent Court dismissed the case on the
illegal. ground of estoppel by prior judgment.

Absent any of said exceptions, the decision of the ISSUE: W/N the Cadastral court shall take
governing body or established private tribunal of the cognizance over the case instituted by the
association is binding and conclusive and not petitioners
subject to review or collateral attack in courts.
HELD:
The instant controversy between petitioner So and No.
respondent Josefa falls within the ambit of the rule
of judicial non-intervention or non-interference. The Section 112 of Act 496 confers authority upon the
elections in dispute, the manner by which it was land registration court to order the cancellation,
conducted and the results thereof, is strictly the alteration or amendment of a certificate of title but
internal affair that concerns only the Lions withdraws from the Court the power to pass
association and/or its members, and the Court find upon any question concerning ownership of the
from the records that the same was resolved within registered property, or any incident where the
the organiztion of Lions Clubs International in issues involved have become controversial.
accordance with the Constitution and By-Laws
Moreover, it may hardly be questioned that the
which are not immoral, unreasonable, contrary to
issues raised by the petitioners in their petition to
public policy, or in contravention of the laws of the cancel TCT No. 68568 refer to the ownership or
land. title over the property covered thereby. The said
petition presented before the respondent Court in
13. CALIMLIM vs. HON. RAMIREZ the exercise of its limited jurisdiction as a cadastral
court, the question of who should be considered the
true and lawful owner of the parcel of land embraced
in said title. The petitioners alleged therein that they
FACTS: are the true owners of the property, and that TCT
Independent Mercantile Corporation filed a No. 68568 which they sought to cancel was issued
petition in the respondent Court to compel Manuel as a result of the errors which were not of their own
Magali to surrender the owner's duplicate of TCT No. making. In short, the petition raised a highly
9138 in order that the same may be cancelled and a controversial matter which is beyond the judicial
new one issued in the name of the said corporation. competence of a cadastral court to pass upon or to
Not being the registered owner and the title not being adjudicate.
in his possession, Manuel Magali failed to comply
with the order of the Court directing him to surrender It is neither fair nor legal to bind a party by the result
the said title. This prompted Independent Mercantile of a suit or proceeding which was taken cognizance
Corporation to file an ex-parte petition to declare of in a court which lacks jurisdiction over the same
TCT No. 9138 as cancelled and to issue a new title irrespective of the attendant circumstances. The
in its name. The said petition was granted by the filing of an action or suit in a court that does not
respondent Court and the Register of Deeds of possess jurisdiction to entertain the same may not
Pangasinan issued a new title in the name of the be presumed to be deliberate and intended to secure
corporation, TCT No. 68568. Petitioner, upon a ruling which could later be annulled if not favorable
learning that her husband's title over the parcel of to the party who filed such suit or proceeding.
land had been cancelled, filed a petition with the Instituting such an action is not a one-sided affair. It
respondent Court, sitting as a cadastral court, can just as well be prejudicial to the one who filed
praying for the cancellation of TCT No. 68568 but the action or suit in the event that he obtains a
the court dismissed the petition. favorable judgment therein which could also be
Petitioner thereafter filed in the LRC Record attacked for having been rendered without
No. 39492 for the cancellation of TCT No. 68568 but jurisdiction. The determination of the correct
the same was dismissed therein. Petitioners then jurisdiction of a court is not a simple matter. It can
resorted to the filing of a complaint in for the raise highly debatable issues of such importance
cancellation of the conveyances and sales that had that the highest tribunal of the land is given the
been made with respect to the property, covered by exclusive appellate jurisdiction to entertain the
TCT No. 9138, against Francisco Ramos who same. The point simply is that when a party commits
claimed to have bought the property from error in filing his suit or proceeding in a court that
Independent Mercantile Corporation. Private lacks jurisdiction to take cognizance of the same,
respondent Francisco Ramos, however, failed to such act may not at once be deemed sufficient basis
obtain a title over the property in his name in view of of estoppel. It could have been the result of an
the existence of an adverse claim annotated on the honest mistake, or of divergent interpretations of
title thereof at the instance of the herein petitioners. doubtful legal provisions. If any fault is to be imputed
Francisco Ramos filed a Motion to Dismiss on the to a party taking such course of action, part of the
ground that the same is barred by prior judgment or blame should be placed on the court which shall
by statute of limitations. Resolving the said Motion, entertain the suit, thereby lulling the parties into
believing that they pursued their remedies in the
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correct forum. Under the rules, it is the duty of the Surety moved to quash the writ on the
court to dismiss an action "whenever it appears gorund that the same was issued without the
that the court has no jurisdiction over the required summary hearing provided by Rules of
subject matter." (Sec. 2, Rule 9, Rules of Court.) Court.The Court denied the motion.
Should the court render a judgment without
jurisdiction, such judgment may be impeached COURT OF APPEALS- Granted Surety’s motion
or annulled for lack of jurisdiction (Sec. 30, Rule asking for an extension of time within which to file a
132, Ibid), within ten (10) years from the finality motion for reconsideration.
of the same. (Art. 1144, par. 3, Civil Code.)
2 days later, Surety filed a Motion to Dismiss,
The inequity of barring the petitioners from for lack of jurisdiction, alleging substantially that the
vindicating their right over their property in Civil Case appellees action was filed with CFI of Cebu on July
No. SCC-180 is rendered more acute in the face of 19, 1948 for the recovery of the sum of P1,908 only;
the undisputed fact that the property in question that a month before Judiciary Act of 1948 had
admittedly belonged to the petitioners, and that the already become effective, Sec. 88 of which placed
title in the name of the private respondent was the within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior
result of an error committed by the Provincial Sheriff courts all civil actions where the value of the subject-
in issuing the deed of sale in the execution
matter or the amount of the demand does not
proceeding. The justness of the relief sought by
exceed P2,000, exclusive of interests and costs; that
herein petitioners may not be ignored or rendered
futile by reason of a doctrine which is of highly the CFI therefore had no jurisdiction to try and
doubtful applicability herein. decide the case. CA certified the case to the SC.
ISSUE:
WON respondents herein can invoke lack of
14. TIJAM vs. SIBONGHANOY
jurisdiction to dismiss the case against them
HELD:
FACTS: No. It is an undisputed fact that the action
commenced by appellees in the CFI of Cebu against
Barely one month after the effectivity of the Judiciary
Sibonghanoy spouses was for the recovery of the
Act of 1948, spouses Tijam commenced a civil
sum of P1,908 only—an amount within the original
action against spouses Sibonghanoy to recover from
exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts in accordance
them a sum of P1,908, with legal interest.
with the provisions of the Judiciary Act of 1948 which
CFI of Cebu—issued a writ of attachment against had taken effect about a month prior to the date
defendants’ propertues, but the same was soon when the action was commenced. True also is the
dissolved upon filing of a counter-bond by the rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is
defendants and the Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., conferred upon the courts exclusively by law, and as
Inc. (Surety). the lack of it affects the very authority of the court to
take cognizance of the case, the objection may be
The Court rendered a judgment in favor of raised at any stage of the proceedings. However,
the plaintiffs, and after the same had become final considering the facts and circumstances of the
and executory, upon motion of the latter, the Court present case, the Surety is now barred by laches
issued a writ of execution against the defendants. from invoking this plea at this late hour for the
The writ having been returned unsatisfied, purpose of annuling everything done heretofore in
the plaintiffs moved for the issuance of a writ of the case with its active participation. The action was
execution against Surety’s bond against which the commenced in the CFI of Cebu on July 19, 1948,
Surety filed a written opposition for failure to execute almost 15 years before Surety filed its motion to
and absence of demand upon Surety for the dismiss in January 12, 1963 raising the question of
payment of the amount due under the judgment. The lack of jurisdiction for the first time. Upon filing of the
Court denied the motion for execution. first motion for execution against the counter-bond
the Surety not only filed a written opposition thereto
A necessary demand was made, and upon praying for its denial but also asked for an affirmative
failure of the Surety for the satisfaction of the relief—that it be relieved of its liability under the
judgment, the plaintiff filed a 2nd motion for counter-bond upon the grounds relied upon in
execution against the counterbond. During the support of its opposition—lack of jurisdiction of the
hearing, the Court, upon motion of Surety’s counsel, court a quo not being one of them.
granted the latter a period of 5 days within which to
answer the motion. Surety failed to file such answer, Laches—is the negligence or omission
and the Court granted the motion for execution and to assert a right within a reasonable
the corresponding writ was issued. time, warranting a presumption that the

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party entitled to assert it either has - further seeks leave of Court that
abandone it or declined to assert it. the recommended bail bond of
P15,000.00 that she is
The fact of this case show that from the time posting in cash be accepted
Surety became a quasi-party on Jul 31, 1948, it  The said motion asked by Miriam was
could have raised the question of the lack of granted by the court:
jurisdiction of the CFI of Cebu to take - Miriam my post bail
cognizance of the present action by reason of - Her physical appearance is not
the sum of money involved which, according to required until JUNE 5
the law then in force, was within the original  On MAY 21- respondent Ombudsman
exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed Vasquez filed a manifestation that Santiago
to do so. Instead, at several stages of the appeared before his office on May 20
proceedings in the court a quo as well as in the  Due to such manifestation, the
CA, it invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to Sandiganbayan issued an order
obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case rescheduling her arraignment from June 5 to
for final adjudication on the merits. It was only May 27
after an adverse decision was rendered by the  On MAY 24- Santiago filed before the SC a
petition for certiorari and prohibition with
CA that it finally woke up to raise the question
preliminary injunction, and a subsequent
of jurisdiction. Were we to sanction such
addendum thereto, seeking to enjoin the
conduct on its part, we would in effect be Sandiganbayan and the RTC from
declaring as useless all the proceedings had in proceeding with Criminal Cases
the present case since it was commenced on  Such petition was granted by SC and issued
July 19, 1948 and compel the judgment a TRO against RTC and SANDIGANBAYAN
creditors to go up their Cavalry once more. The Rationale: Her arraignment was
inequity and unfairness of this is not only patent rescheduled to an earlier date which
but revolting. may ignore her to ask for other reliefs
that she may avail
 On January 18, 1992: SC reversed its MAY
15. SANTIAGO vs. VASQUEZ 24 decision
- SC dismissed the petition for
Certiorari filed by Santiago
FACTS: - Lifted the TRO previously granted
 On SEPT 1992: Santiago filed a MOTION
 A “Motion to Restrain the Sandiganbayan FOR RECONSIDERATION which was
from Enforcing its Hold Departure Order with subsequently denied
Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary  MEAN WHILE!!! SANDIGAN BAYAN issued
Restraining Order and/or Preliminary a HOLD DEPARTURE order against
Injunction, with Motion to Set Pending Santiago
Incident for Hearing” was filed by MIRIAM RATIONALE of the ORDER:
DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO immediately Santiago announced (MEDIA ) she
before the Supreme court without following will leave the country for academic
the hierarchy of courts purposes (U.S.)
 On May 13, 1991 a criminal case was filed ISSUES:
against Santiago for allegedly violation RA 1. Did the respondent court acquired
3019 otherwise known as Anti-Graft and jurisdiction over her person considering
Corruption Practices Act. that she has neither been arrested nor has she
 On May 14 – the Sandiganbayan issued a voluntarily surrendered, aside from the fact that
warrant of arrest with bail of P15,000.00 she has not validly posted bail since she never
against Santiago personally appeared before said court?
The lawyer of Santiago thereafter filed an 2. Did the Sandiganbayan disregard the rule of
"Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of Cash judicial comity when it issued the hold
Bail Bond for and in Behalf of Dr. Miriam departure order?
Defensor-Santiago," 3. Whether the filing of the special civil action
- As a result of the vehicular for certiorari divested the Sandiganbayan of
collision, she suffered extensive its jurisdiction over the case
physical injuries which 4. Whether the hold departure order violates
required surgical intervention her right to due process, right to travel and
- Santiago seeks leave of Court freedom of speech. ( The hold departure
- that she be considered as having order was issued by Sandiganbayan in its
placed herself under the own instance)
jurisdiction of Court, 5. Whether leaving for abroad to pursue further
studies is a sufficient justification for the

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impairment of her constitutional right to + There is no reason why


travel. it should not apply to a
Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, TRO.
the right to travel may be impaired only when Rationale: even in cases
so required in the interest of national where an appeal is taken
security, public safety or public health, as from a judgment
may be provided by law dismissing an action on
6. Whether the petitioner can disregard the the merits, the appeal
hierarchy of courts and immediately go to SC does not suspend the
judgment, hence the
general rule applies that a
SUPREME COURT: temporary injunction
ISSUE 1: terminates automatically
- Yes , respondent court has on the dismissal of the
jurisdiction over the person of the action.
accused and validly posted bail
- petitioner is deemed to have ISSUE 3:
voluntarily submitted herself to - The original and special civil
the jurisdiction of respondent action filed with this Court is, for
court upon the filing of her all intents and purposes, an
aforequoted "Urgent Ex-parte invocation for the exercise of its
Motion for Acceptance of Cash supervisory powers over the
Bail Bond for and in behalf of Dr. lower courts.
Miriam Defensor-Santiago - It does not have the effect of
- Petitioner cannot claim otherwise divesting the inferior courts of
for, by her own jurisdiction validly acquired over
representations, she is estopped the case pending before them
from asserting the contrary after - The mere pendency of a special
she had earlier recognized the civil action for certiorari,
jurisdiction of the court and commenced in relation to a case
caused it to exercise that pending before a lower court,
jurisdiction over the afore stated does not even interrupt the
pleadings she filed therein. course of the latter when there is
ISSUE 2: no writ of injunction restraining it.
- Santiago claims that ISSUE 4:
Sandiganbayan disregard the - Courts possess certain inherent
rule of judicial comity when it powers which may be said to be
issued the hold departure order implied from a general grant of
while her MOTION FOR jurisdiction, in addition to those
RECONSIDERATION was still expressly conferred on them
pending before the SC - Hence, the court has powers to
Judicial Comity: term where the issue interlocutory orders such as
courtesy of the court that respects HOLD DEPARTURE orders to
a judicial decisions of another protect its jurisdiction
state (international law principle) ISSUE 5:
- Santiago is WRONG - A court has the power to prohibit
- SC already dismissed/denied her a person admitted to bail from
motion for Reconsideration leaving the Philippines
- Section 4, Rule 39 of the Rules of ISSUE 6:
Court provides that, unless
otherwise ordered by the court, a - It is a judicial policy that SC will
judgment in an action for not entertain direct resort to it
injunction shall not be stayed unless the redress desired
after its rendition and before an cannot be obtained in the
appeal is taken or during the appropriate courts or where
pendency of an appeal. exceptional and compelling
+ And, the rule is that the circumstances justify availment of
execution of a judgment a remedy within and calling for
decreeing the dissolution the exercise of our primary
of a writ of preliminary jurisdiction.
injunction shall not be - Parties with pending cases
stayed before an appeal is should apply for permission to
taken or during the leave the country from the very
pendency of an appeal
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same courts who issued the hold - Some of the adjoining lots were the
departure order. properties of Bartola Pero, the deceased
grandmother of Juliana Parel, one of the
HELD: THE MOTION IS DENIED
defendants and a portion of it was the
DOCTRINE(S) land of Roman Pacleb (no document of
1. An order of dissolution of an injunction may ownership), the predecessors-in-interest
be immediately effective (immediately of the defendant Juliana Pacleb Parel.
executory), even though it is not final. A - During the cadastral survey, the said
dismissal, discontinuance, or non-suit of an parcels of land were consolidated into
action in which a restraining order or one parcel of land under one Tax
temporary injunction has been granted
Declaration but with different Lot
operates as a dissolution of the restraining
order or temporary injunction and no formal numbers. Plaintiffs tried to assert their
order of dissolution is necessary to effect ownership when defendants cut down
such dissolution. trees and tried to bulldoze the land
2. Consequently, a special order of the court is subject of controversy sometime in 1968.
necessary for the reinstatement of an
injunction. There must be a new exercise of
 The parties admitted the identity of the
judicial power. parcels of land
3. Hold departure order is but an exercise of
court's inherent power to preserve and to RTC:
maintain the effectiveness of its jurisdiction
over the case and the person of the accused.  The plaintiffs has not proven their ownership
and possession of the subject lots
 The defendants are in actual possession of
16. PADRE vs. CA the land in dispute. Being in actual
possession under claim of ownership, it is
presumed that defendants are the owners

FACTS: CA:

 Original Action: Quieting of Title of 2 parcels  Ordered the plaintiffs to vacate the subject
of land land

According to the PLAINTIFFS (PADRE):


- The land was originally owned by Jose ISSUES:
Padre until a time when he gave the land
1. Whether the respondent court has the
to Fausta Padre (there is no document
authority to convert the action from quieting
showing transfer) and the latter declared
of title to accion plenaria de posession (
the land for taxation purposes in her
accion publiciana)
name
NOTE: Wala g chika g unsa pag convert from
- 1966: she sold a portion of the land to
quieting title to accion publiciana
Avelino Paranada married to Vicente
Viernes.
2. Whether the lower courts or only the Director
- The late Jose Padre had been in
of lands have the authority to decide on
possession of the same up to the time it
issues involving prior possession
was given to Fausta.
Fausta is also in possession of the
disputed property until the years 1973,
1974 and 1975 when Juliana Pacleb SC: ON ISSUES 1 AND 2
Parel began to cut down trees on the - After voluntarily submitting a cause and
land. encountering an adverse decision on the
According to the defendants: merits, it is too late for the loser to
question the jurisdiction or power of the
- The disputed parcel of land was formerly court (The plaintiffs only questioned the
owned by the late Silvestre Paa who sold competence and jurisdiction of the court
it to Blas Pacleb (there is no deed of after it rendered an adverse decision
transfer or conveyance) - The authority given to the Lands
Department over the disposition of public
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lands does not exclude the courts from 3. The contract cannot be reformed anymore
their jurisdiction over possessory actions, since the spouses are no lonher the owner
the public character of the land of the lot and the contract clearly reflected
notwithstanding. This is such an action the intentions of the party.
and the fact that on her complaint - The real object of the contract is really
respondent claimed the lands in Lot 19.
ownership did not change the nature of - Lucky homes only made an error in
her action. The allegation of ownership physically identifying the lot.
should be regarded as a mere 4. To allow reformation and swapping will
surplusage. leave lucky homes with nothing and the
- Neither is the court persuaded into spouses will unjustly enrich themselves
accepting petitioners' contention that the  Then, the spouses went to the CA raising
appellate Court seriously erred in that Housing and Land Use Regulatory
converting the action from quieting of title Board (HLURB) has the proper jurisdiction
into accion publiciana, because in order of the case and not the RTC
to afford complete relief to the parties, the
court may determine incidentally the CA: MAINTAINED RTC
ownership, or the status of the legal title - The spouses are estopped from
to the property, of the right to the questioning the jurisdiction of the case
possession thereof
ISSUE: WHETHER THE SPOUSES ARE
HELD: PETITION DISMISSED ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE
JURISDICTION OF THE TRIAL COURT
17. SPS GONZAGA vs. CA SUPREME COURT:
YES

FACTS: - A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of


a court to secure affirmative relief
 The spouses bought Lot 19 from LUCKY against his opponent and, after
HOMES obtaining or failing to obtain such relief,
 The said lot was mortgaged by the spouses repudiate, or question that same
to SSS jurisdiction
- It was petitioners themselves who
 However, LUCK HOMES mistakenly
invoked the jurisdiction of the court a
identified LOT 19 as LOT 18 quo by instituting an action for
 Hence, the spouses constructed their house reformation of contract against private
on LOT 18 respondents.
 LUCKY HOMES informed the spouses - It appears that, in the proceedings
about the error before the trial court, petitioners
 The spouses then offered to buy lot 18 and vigorously asserted their cause from
start to finish. Not even once did
continued to stay on the lot
petitioners ever raise the issue of the
 When the spouses defaulted in paying SSS: court’s jurisdiction during the entire
the latter then foreclosed the LOT 19 it proceedings which lasted for two years
being the lot mortgaged. A new title was
then issued in favour of SSS
 The Spouses went to lucky homes asking 18. MANILA BANKERS LIFE
INSURANCE CORP. vs. EDDY
that for swapping of lots and reformation of
NG KOK WEI
contract.
 However, LUCKY homes refused
FACTS:
Hence, the spouses filed a case before the
RTC  Eddy Ng Kok Wei (respondent) is a
Singaporean businessman who ventured
RTC: DISMISSED THE CASE into investing in the Philippines.
1. The spouses are no longer the owner of  In a Letter of Intent addressed to Manila
Bankers Life Insurance Corporation,
LOT 19.
petitioner, expressed his intention to
2. They are also not the owner of lot 18 since purchase a condominium unit at Valle Verde
they only offered to buy the said lot
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Terraces. and in addition to its powers provided for in


 Respondent paid the reservation fee then Presidential Decree No. 957, the National
eventually paid 90% of the purchase price. Housing Authority [now Housing and Land
 Petitioner executed a Contract to Sell in favor Use Regulatory Board (HLURB)][ shall have
of the respondent. exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide
 The contract expressly states that the cases of the following nature:
subject condominium unit shall substantially
be completed and delivered to the C. Cases involving specific performance of
respondent within fifteen (15) months from contractual and statutory obligations filed by
February 8, 1989 or on May 8, 1990. buyers of subdivision lots or condominium
 April 5, 1990, petitioner informed respondent units against the owner, developer, dealer,
of the substantial completion of his broker or salesman.
condominium unit, however, due to various
uncontrollable forces (such as coup d etat It is the HLURB which has jurisdiction over the
attempts, typhoon and steel and cement instant case. Complaints for specific performance
shortage), the final turnover is reset to May with damages by a lot or condominium unit buyer
31, 1990. against the owner or developer falls under the
 July 5, 1990, He found the unit still exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB.
uninhabitable for lack of water and electric
facilities. While it may be true that the trial court is without
 Petitioner issued another notice advising jurisdiction over the case, petitioners active
respondent scheduled to move in on August participation in the proceedings estopped it from
22, 1990. assailing such lack of it. It is an undesirable
 October 5, 1990, respondent returned to the practice of a party participating in the proceedings
Philippines only to find that his condominium and submitting its case for decision and then
unit was still unlivable. He was constrained accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and
to send petitioner a letter dated November attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse.
21, 1990 demanding payment for the
damages he sustained. But petitioner  Petitioner failed to raise the question of
ignored such demand. jurisdiction before the trial court and the
RTC Appellate Court. In effect, petitioner
confirmed and ratified the trial courts
 Respondent filed with the Regional Trial jurisdiction over this case. Certainly, it is
Court, a complaint against the former for now in estoppel and can no longer
specific performance and damages, question the trial courts jurisdiction.
 During the pendency of the case, respondent
finally accepted the condominium unit and on
April 12, 1991, occupied the same. Thus, Factual findings of the trial court are given weight
respondents cause of action has been when supported by substantial evidence and carries
limited to his claim for damages. more weight when affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
 RTC found the petitioner liable for payment Whether or not petitioner incurred delay and
of damages due to the delay in the thus, liable to pay damages as a result thereof,
performance of its obligation to the are indeed factual questions.
respondent.
CA: The jurisdiction of the Court in a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of is limited to
 CA - affirmed in toto the trial courts award reviewing only errors of law, not of fact, unless the
of damages in favor of the respondent.
factual findings being assailed are not supported by
evidence on record or the impugned judgment is
 Petitioner filed a motion for
based on a misapprehension of facts. These
reconsideration but was denied by the CA
SC: exceptions are not in the case

ISSUE : WON the trial court has jurisdiction over THUS, the petition is DENIED. Decision of Court of
the instant case. Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO.

HELD : Trial Court has jurisdiction.


19. US vs. CANETE
On petitioners contention that the trial court has no
jurisdiction over the instant case, Section 1 (c) of
Presidential Decree No. 1344, as amended, FACTS:
provides:
 The appellants Simeon Canete and others
SECTION 1. In the exercise of its functions published a charge in writing against Father
to regulate the real estate trade and business Acebedo, a parish priest of Leyte, who they
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accused of maladministration and privileged communications, if made without actual


misappropriation of funds and property of the malice, is the settled doctrine of the courts of the
church of Dagami under his charge, United States and of Great Britain.
drunkenness, taking indecent liberties of
women of his congregation, illicit relations In the case at bar, the communication in question
and general immoral and indecent behavior. was in no proper sense a private communication as
 The publication was defamatory in character it was clearly made with the intention and in the hope
and admitted by the appellants. They based that it would be followed by a public investigation.
their defense upon an attempt to prove the
charges were true and the contention that The court is convinced that the conduct of
the communication was privileged. defendants in making the complaint which has led to
 The appellants were found guilty of the crime these prosecutions has conformed to the conditions
of libel as rendered by the CFI. upon which the qualified privilege they claim may be
 Hence, this appeal from such judgment. enjoyed for they acted without actual malice. Thus,
the judgment of the trial court in is reversed and the
ISSUE: appellants are acquitted.

Which court has jurisdiction in matters purely


ecclesiastical in nature.
20. PROVIDENT TREE FARMS INC. (PTFI)
HELD: vs. HON. BATARIO AND AJ
INTERNATIONAL CORP (AJIC)
It is the established doctrine of the American
courts that in matters purely ecclesiastical the
decisions of the proper church tribunals are DOCTRINE:
conclusive upon the civil tribunals. A church member
Cases before the BOC must be fully fleshed out
who is expelled from membership by the church
authorities, or a priest or minister who is by them before it prior to elevating the issues to a regular
deprived of his sacred office, is without remedy in court in keeping with the exhaustion of
the civil courts, which will not inquire into the administrative remedies. (primary jurisdiction)
correctness of decisions of the ecclesiastical FACTS:
tribunals. (Landis vs. Campbell, 79 Mo., 433;
Watson vs. Garvin, 54 Mo., 364; Stack vs. O'Hara,  PTFI is a Phil corporation engaged in
98 Penn., 213.) The right of such ecclesiastical industrial tree planting. It supplies to a local
tribunals to try members offending against the match manufacturer solely for production of
canons of conduct established by the church being matches.
thus recognized it is reasonable that their decisions  There’s a state policy to encourage qualified
should be privileged, however derogatory they may persons to engage in industrial tree
be to the reputation of the persons affected. plantation under Revised Forestry Code
which provides a set of incentives to
Persons who join churches . . . voluntarily submit corporations like PTFI and is a qualified ban
themselves to the jurisdiction of these bodies, and in against importation of wood.
matters of faith and individual conduct affecting their  Respondent, AJIC, imported matches from
relations as members thereof subject themselves to Indonesia which the BOC released which
the tribunals established by those bodies to pass violates the Revised Forestry Code’s ban of
upon such questions, and, if aggrieved by a decision importing wood and wood-derivated
against them, made in good faith by such products.
judicatories they must seek their redress within the
organization, as provided by its laws or regulations. RTC:
(Landis vs. Campbell, supra.)
 PTFI filed with the RTC of Manila a complaint
The right of ecclesiastical tribunals to hear and for injunction and damages with prayer for a
decide cases involving the conduct of their officers TRO against Commissioner of Customs to
and members being recognized, and this of prohibit the latter from importing matches.
necessity involving immunity from charges of libel  AJIC moved to dismiss the complaint
and slander based upon statements made in good alleging that:
faith by the members of such tribunals and by parties o The Commissioner of Customs and
or witnesses giving evidence before them not the regular court has exclusive
(York vs. Pease, 68 Mass., 282), a like immunity jurisdiction to determine the legality
must be extended to person who, in good faith, make of an importation.
charges, written or oral, to the church authorities, o The release of importations had
intended to provoke an investigation concerning the rendered injunction moot and
conduct or character of a member, officer, or academic.
minister of the institution. That such charges are
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o The prayer for damages has no basis ruling is essential to comply with the
as the Commissioner’s acts are in purposes of the regulatory statute
accordance with law. administered (Pambujan Sur United
o The complaint for injunction cannot Mine Workers v. Samar Mining Co.,
stand it being only a provisional relief Inc., 94 Phil. 932, 941 [1954].)
and not a principal remedy.
 PTFI opposed the motion to dismiss.
In this era of clogged court dockets,
 AJIC’s motion to dismiss was denied.
the need for specialized
 AJIC filed a motion for reconsideration and
administrative boards or
the Court reconsidered and dismissed the
case on the ground that it had no commissions with the special
jurisdiction to determine what are legal or knowledge, experience and
illegal importations. capability to hear and determine
promptly disputes on technical
 PTFI seeks to set aside the order of matters or essentially factual matters,
respondent court and prays for the subject to judicial review in case of
continuation of the hearing of the case grave abuse of discretion, has
contending that what was brought before the become well indispensable . . . .
trial court was a civil case for injunction for
the purpose of securing compliance with the The court cannot compel an agency to do a
provision of the RFC. particular act or to enjoin such act which is within its
prerogative, except when in the exercise of its
ISSUE: authority it gravely abuses or exceeds its jurisdiction.
In the case at bench, we have no occasion to rule on
Whether or not the Bureau of Customs holds the issue of grave abuse of discretion or excess of
jurisdiction in the matter of wood product jurisdiction as it is not before us.
importation.
Thus, the order of the RTC was affirmed and
HELD:
the petition for review was denied.
The only subject of this incentive is a ban
against importation of wood and wood products
which is to be enforced by Bureau of Customs since 21. INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES, INC. vs
it has under the Tariff and Customs Code the CA
exclusive original jurisdiction over seizure and
forfeiture cases. To allow the regular court to direct
the Commissioner is clearly an interference with the FACTS:
exclusive jurisdiction of the BOC. Industrial Enterprises Inc. (IEI) was granted a coal
operating contract by the Government through the
PTFI’c correspondence with the BOC Bureau of Energy Development (BED) and Ministry
contesting the legality of match importations may of Energy for the exploration of five coal blocks
already take the nature of administrative comprised the so-called "Giporlos Area” in Eastern
proceedings the pendency of which would preclude Samar.
the court from interfering with it under the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction. IEI was later on advised that in line with the objective
of rationalizing the country's over-all coal supply-
demand balance . . . the logical coal operator in the
In Presidential Commission on Good area should be the Marinduque Mining and Industrial
Government v. Peña, 20 the court held that —
Corporation (MMIC), which was already developing
the coal deposit in another area (Bagacay Area).
. . . . under the "sense-making and Thus, IEI and MMIC executed a Memorandum of
expeditious doctrine of primary Agreement whereby IEI assigned and transferred to
jurisdiction . . . the courts cannot or MMIC all its rights and interests in the two coal
will not determine a controversy blocks which are the subject of IEI's coal operating
involving a question which is within contract.
the jurisdiction of an administrative
tribunal, where the question However, IEI filed an action for rescission of the
demands the exercise of sound Memorandum of Agreement with damages against
administrative discretion requiring the MMIC and the then Minister of Energy Geronimo
special knowledge, experience, and Velasco before the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Branch 150, alleging that MMIC took possession of
services of the administrative tribunal
the subject coal blocks even before the
to determine technical and intricate
Memorandum of Agreement was finalized and
matters of fact, and a uniformity of approved by the BED; that MMIC discontinued work
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thereon; that MMIC failed to apply for a coal Sec. 11 of P.D. No. 1206, dated October 6, 1977
operating contract for the adjacent coal blocks; and states that the BED, as the successor to the Energy
that MMIC failed and refused to pay the Development Board is tasked with the function of
reimbursements agreed upon and to assume IEI's establishing a comprehensive and integrated
loan obligation as provided in the Memorandum of national program for the exploration, exploitation,
Agreement. IEI also prayed that the Energy Minister and development and extraction of fossil fuels, such
be ordered to approve the return of the coal as the country's coal resources; adopting a coal
operating contract from MMIC to petitioner, with a development program; regulating all activities
written confirmation that said contract is valid and relative thereto; and undertaking by itself or through
effective, and, in due course, to convert said contract service contracts such exploitation and
from an exploration agreement to a development, all in the interest of an effective and
development/production or exploitation contract in coordinated development of extracted resources.
IEI's favor.
That law further provides that the powers and
RTC’s ruling: functions of the defunct Energy Development Board
In a summary judgment, the Trial Court ordered the relative to the implementation of P.D. No. 972 on
rescission of the Memorandum of Agreement, coal exploration and development have been
declared the continued efficacy of the coal operating transferred to the BED, provided that coal operating
contract in favor of IEI; ordered the reversion of the contracts including the transfer or assignment of
two coal blocks covered by the coal operating interest in said contracts, shall require the approval
contract; ordered BED to issue its written affirmation of the Secretary (Minister) of Energy (Sec. 12, P.D.
of the coal operating contract and to expeditiously No. 1206).
cause the conversion thereof from exploration to
development in favor of IEI; directed BED to give due P.D. No. 972 also provides that “Each coal operating
course to IEI's application for a coal operating contract herein authorized shall . . . be executed by
contract; directed BED to give due course to IEI's the Energy Development Board.”
application for three more coal blocks; and ordered
the payment of damages and rehabilitation Primary Jurisdiction
expenses. In recent years, it has been the jurisprudential trend
to apply the doctrine of primary jurisdiction in many
CA’s ruling: cases involving matters that demand the special
CA reversed the RTC. It held that the rendition of competence of administrative agencies. It may occur
the summary judgment was not proper since there that the Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of
were genuine issues in controversy between the a particular case, which means that the matter
parties, and more importantly, that the Trial Court involved is also judicial in character. However, if the
had no jurisdiction over the action considering that, case is such that its determination requires the
under Presidential Decree No. 1206, it is the BED expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of the
that has the power to decide controversies relative proper administrative bodies because technical
to the exploration, exploitation and development of matters or intricate questions of facts are involved,
coal blocks. then relief must first be obtained in an administrative
proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the
ISSUE: courts even though the matter is within the proper
Whether or not the civil court has jurisdiction to hear jurisdiction of a court. This is the doctrine of primary
and decide the suit for rescission of the jurisdiction. It applies "where a claim is originally
Memorandum of Agreement concerning a coal cognizable in the courts, and comes into play
operating contract over coal blocks. whenever enforcement of the claim requires the
resolution of issues which, under a regulatory
HELD: scheme, have been placed within the special
No. The Bureau of Energy Development (BED) has competence of an administrative body, in such
jurisdiction. case the judicial process is suspended pending
The jurisdiction of the BED to pass upon any referral of such issues to the administrative
question involving the Memorandum of Agreement body for its view" (United States v. Western Pacific
between IEI and MMIC, revolving as it does around Railroad Co., 352 U.S. 59, Emphasis supplied).
a coal operating contract, should be sustained.
However, in the application of the doctrine of Clearly, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction finds
primary jurisdiction, it does not call for the application in this case since the question of what
dismissal of the case. It need only be suspended coal areas should be exploited and developed and
until after the matters within the competence of the which entity should be granted coal operating
BED are threshed out and determined. Thereby, the contracts over said areas involves a technical
principal purpose behind the doctrine of primary determination by the BED as the administrative
jurisdiction is salutarily served. agency in possession of the specialized expertise to
act on the matter. The Trial Court does not have the
The Court Resolved to DENY the petition. competence to decide matters concerning activities
relative to the exploration, exploitation, development
and extraction of mineral resources like coal. These
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issues preclude an initial judicial determination. It having itself filed similarly its own counterclaim with
behooves the courts to stand aside even when the court a quo.
apparently they have statutory power to proceed in
recognition of the primary jurisdiction of an ISSUE/S:
administrative agency. 1. Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over
the person.
2. Whether or not the court a quo has
22. LA NAVAL DRUG jurisdiction over the subject matter.
CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HELD:
(1) Jurisdiction over the person must be seasonably
raised, i.e., that it is pleaded in a motion to dismiss
FACTS: or by way of an affirmative defense in an answer.
Respondent Yao was the owner of a commercial Voluntary appearance shall be deemed a waiver of
building, a portion of which is leased to herein this defense. The assertion, however, of affirmative
petitioner. However, during the renewal of the defenses shall not be constructed as an estoppel or
contract of lease, the two disagreed on the rental as a waiver of such defense.
rate, and to resolve the controversy, they submitted
their disagreement to arbitration. Two arbitrators (2) Where the court itself clearly has no jurisdiction
(Almarez and Sabile) has been appointed by the over the subject matter or the nature of the action,
parties while the appointment of the third arbitrator the invocation of this defense may be done at any
(Tupang ) was held in abeyance because La Naval time. It is neither for the courts nor the parties to
Drug instructed its arbitrator to defer the same until violate or disregard that rule, let alone to confer that
its Board of Directors could convene and approved jurisdiction, this matter being legislative in character.
Tupang’s appointment . This was theorized by the Barring highly meritorious and exceptional
respondent as dilatory tactics, hence, he prayed that circumstances, such as hereinbefore exemplified,
a summary hearing be conducted and direct the 2 neither estoppel nor waiver shall apply.
arbitrators to proceed arbitration in the accordance
with the Contract of Lease and the applicable In the case at bench, the want of jurisdiction by the
provisions of the Arbitration law, by appointing and court is indisputable, given the nature of the
confirming the appointment of the Third Arbitrator, controversy. The arbitration law explicitly confines
and that the Board of Three Arbitrators be ordered the court's authority only to pass upon the issue of
to immediately convene and resolve the controversy whether there is or there is no agreement in writing
before it. providing for arbitration. In the affirmative, the
statute ordains that the court shall issue an order
CA’s Ruling: (no mention of the lower court) "summarily directing the parties to proceed with the
The respondent court announce that the two arbitration in accordance with the terms thereof." If
arbitrators chose Mrs. Eloise R. Narciso as the third the court, upon the other hand, finds that no such
arbitrator and ordered the parties to submit their agreement exists, "the proceeding shall be
position papers on the issue on whether or not dismissed." The proceedings are summary in
respondent Yao’s claim for damages may be nature.
litigated upon in the summary proceeding for
enforcement of arbitration agreement. All considered, the court a quo must then refrain
from taking up the claims of the contending parties
In moving for reconsideration of the said Order, for damages, which, upon the other hand, may be
petitioner argued that in Special Case No. 6024, the ventilated in separate regular proceedings at an
respondent court sits as special court exercising opportune time and venue. The circumstances
limited jurisdiction and is not competent to act on obtaining in this case are far, we hold, from justifying
respondent Yao’s claim for damages, which poses the application of estoppel against either party.
an issue litigable in an ordinary civil action.
The decision of the Court of Appeals and the orders
However, respondent court was not persuaded by of the trial court in question are SET ASIDE. The
petitioner’s submission, hence, it denied the court a quo, in the instant proceedings, is ordered to
motion for reconsideration. While the appellate DESIST from further hearing private respondent's
court agreed with petitioner that , under Republic claim, as well as petitioner's counterclaim, for
Act No. 876, a court, acting within the limits of its damages.
special jurisdiction, may in this case solely
determine the issue whether the litigants should
proceed or not to arbitration, it, however considered 23. REYES vs. DIAZ
petitioner in estoppel from questioning the
competence of the court to additionally hear and
decide in the summary proceedings private FACTS:
respondent’s claim for damages, it (petitioner) Both parties agreed that if the due filing of the
protestant’s certificate of candidacy is proven, the

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trial court would have no jurisdiction except to 1. On June 26, 1990 petitioner Garcia was elected
dismiss the case. to the Board of Directors of the UCPB to fill a
vacancy therein as a PCGG nominee;
ISSUE:
Whether or not the question of jurisdiction that may 2. Almost three (3) years later, petitioner Garcia
arise would be one of jurisdiction over the subject received a letter from PCGG Chairman Gunigundo
matter or jurisdiction over the issue. asking him to resign from the UCPB Board in order
that a replacement might be made in his stead;
HELD:
There is no such question of jurisdiction over the 3. Garcia refused to resign and instead asserted in
subject matter. his reply letter his membership in the Davao City
Chapter of the COCOFED and, therefore, his
In order that a court may validly try and decide a representation of the coconut planters of Davao City;
case, it must have jurisdiction over the persons of
the parties. But in some instances, it is said that the 4. PCGG Chairman Gunigundo informed Garcia
court should also have jurisdiction over the issue, through letter (and two other directors) that his
meaning thereby that the issue being tried and membership in the Board of Directors of UCPB had
decided by the court be within the issues raised in been terminated upon instruction by the Office of the
the pleadings. But this kind of jurisdiction should be President.
distinguished from jurisdiction over the subject-
matter the latter being conferred by law and the 5. By a letter Garcia (together with two other
former by the pleadings. Jurisdiction over the issue, directors whose services as directors had also been
unlike jurisdiction over the subject-matter, may be terminated) wrote PCGG Chairman Gunigundo
conferred by consent either express or implied of the reiterating their refusal to step down from the Board
parties. (Rule 17, sec. 4, Rules of Court.) and announced that they would wait for the next
regular stockholders' meeting since, according to
Although an issue is not duly pleaded it may validly Garcia, he had a fixed term as a director; In the same
be tried and decided if no timely objection is made letter, Garcia further stated that since he and his
thereto by the parties. This cannot be done when fellow directors were not mere agents of the PCGG,
jurisdiction over the subject-matter is involved. In their removal would have to be done in the manner
truth, jurisdiction over the issue is an expression of provided by the Corporation Code, that, at all events,
a principle that is involved in jurisdiction over the the PCGG cannot change the composition of the
persons of the parties. Where, for instance, an issue Board of Directors of sequestered corporations;
is not duly pleaded in the complaint, the defendant
cannot be said to have been served with process as
6. At a special meeting of the Board of Directors —
to that issue. (Cf. Atkins etc. Co. vs. Domingo, 44
which petitioner Garcia claims to have been held
Phil. 680). At any rate, whether or not the court has
without notice to him — petitioner and another
jurisdiction over a specific issue is a question that
director were deemed terminated as members of the
requires nothing except an examination of the
UCPB Board and were duly replaced, petitioner
pleadings, and this function is without such
Garcia in particular by respondent Cesar A. Sevilla;
importance as call for the intervention of this Court.

Furthermore, this question of jurisdiction is 7. While he may have been elected to the Board
unsubstantial. It is well-settled rule that the institution through the action of the Board, petitioner claims that
of suffrage is of public, not private, interest, and the he can be removed therefrom only by a vote of the
court may examine all the ballots after the ballot stockholders representing 2/ 3 of the outstanding
boxes are opened in order to determine which are capital stock at a regular stockholders' meeting or at
legal and which are illegal, even though neither of a special stockholders' meeting called for that
the parties raised any question as to their illegality. purpose.

This case was remanded to the Court of Appeals for 8. The petitioner then filed with the Sandiganbayan
further proceedings on 20 August 1993 a petition for
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, damages and
attorney's fees with preliminary injunction and a
24. GARCIA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order against the PCGG, Cesar Sevilla, and others.

The chief issue raised in this case is whether the 9. Perceiving that the issue raised was not just the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the special civil propriety of the petitioner's separation or removal as
actions of prohibition, mandamus, and quo warranto. director of the UCPB but the court's own jurisdiction
over the subject matter, the Sandiganbayan set the
petition for hearing on the issuance of a restraining
FACTS:
order with the issue of jurisdiction indicated as
primordial.

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10. The Sandiganbayan (First Division) promulgated allegations therein have nary a bearing on the
its decision dismissing the petition because the question of whether or not the sequestered shares
issues presented by the petitioner refer solely to the in UCPB are ill-gotten by the specified defendants in
election or appointment of directors in a corporation Civil Case No. 0033 pending before respondent
and, therefore, within the original and exclusive Sandiganbayan"; "it is thus evident that the subject
jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange matter of the petition below refers to the corporate
Commission under Section 5(c) of P.D. 902-A, as act of the UCPB Board and not that of PCGG's as a
amended." It found such issues as having "nothing public or government entity.
to do, except very peripherally, with the PCGG's
functions of preserving property under sequestration As this Court sees it, the larger and more crucial
or of determining the ill-gotten character of propriety issue in this case is not just the separation or
[sic] already under sequestration." removal of the petitioner as a director of the UCPB
representing the PCGG, but, as stated in the
11. His motion for the reconsideration of the decision exordium of this ponencia, the jurisdiction of the
having been denied in the resolution of the Sandiganbayan over the special civil actions of
Sandiganbayan , the petitioner then filed the instant prohibition, mandamus, and quo warranto.
petition. He asks this Court to give due course to the
petition and to order the Sandiganbayan "to exercise Jurisdiction, which is the authority to hear and the
jurisdiction over the petition for right to act in a case, is conferred by the Constitution
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, etc. and by law. Although the Sandiganbayan, a
constitutionally-mandated court, is a regular court, it
Petitioner’s contention: has, nevertheless, only a special or limited
jurisdiction. As the Sandiganbayan puts it in the
The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over his petition challenged decision:
because (1) "the acts complained of are direct and
overt acts of the respondent PCGG in relation to its its jurisdiction encompasses only those
powers and functions of sequestration," (2) the enumerated under Section 4 of
petitioner's cause of action against the PCGG "arose P.D. No. 1606 as amended and those
from its act of removing and directing the Board to provided in special laws such as
elect his replacement," and (3) the PCGG as the R.A. No. 7080 on "Plunder" and the enabling
conservator of sequestered UCPB shares of stock, enactments of Presidential Commission on
directly exercised its power of sequestration of the Good Government (PCGG) particularly
UCPB shares of stock. He further contends that Executive Order No. 14 as amended (May 7,
since the PCGG is the "real party in interest" and it 1986), especially Secs. 1 and 2 thereof
was its "act . . . in abruptly removing the petitioner which read:
from his position and its urgent importunings that
prompted UCPB Board of Directors to elect Cesar Sec. 1. Any provision of the law to the
Sevilla in his place," then, the SEC would have no contrary notwithstanding, the
jurisdiction over his petition since the PCGG, "as co- Presidential Commission on Good
equal body, is a co-equal entity over which actions Government, with the assistance of
the SEC has no power of control." the Office of the Solicitor General and
other government agencies, is
Private respondents’ contention: hereby empowered to file and
prosecute all cases investigated by it
They maintain that the controversy falls within the under Executive Order No. 1, dated
exclusive and original jurisdiction of the SEC since February 12, 1986, and Executive
it involves a protest against a corporate act to Order No. 2, dated March 12, 1986,
replace a member of the Board of Directors. as may be warranted by its findings.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT Sec. 2. The Presidential Commission


SANDIGANBAYAN HAS JURISDICTION OVER on Good Government shall file all
THE PETITION FOR such cases, whether civil or criminal,
PROHIBITION, MANDAMUS,QUO WARRANTO, with the Sandiganbayan, which shall
ETC. FILED BY PETITIONER. have exclusive and original
jurisdiction thereof.
HELD:
Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by P.D.
Its arguments to support the negative of the Nos. 1860 and 1861, provides as follows:
proposition are actually anchored not on the
Sandiganbayan's lack of jurisdiction to issue the Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. — The Sandiganbayan shall
extraordinary writs but on the fact that the petition in exercise:
SB No. 0154 "essentially assails the validity of
Resolution No. 66-93 of the UCPB Board which (a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
removed petitioner as a director thereat" and "the involving:
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(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as (2) Section 9[1] of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,
amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980,
and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. to the Court of Appeals (then Intermediate
1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of Appellate Court);
the Revised Penal Code;
(3) Section 21[1] of the said Act, to Regional
(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by Trial Courts;
public officers and employees in relation to
their office, including those employed in (4) Section 5[1] of Republic Act No. 6734, or
government-owned or controlled the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region
corporations, whether simple or complexed in Muslim Mindanao, to the newly created
with other crimes, where the penalty Shari'ah Appellate Court; and
prescribed by law is higher than prision
correccional or imprisonment for six (6) (5) Article 143[e], Chapter I, Title I, Book IV
years, or a fine of P6,000.00;PROVIDED, of Presidential Decree No. 1083, or the Code
HOWEVER, that offenses or felonies of Muslim Personal Law, to Shari'ah District
mentioned in this paragraph where the Courts.
penalty prescribed by law does not
exceed prision correccional or imprisonment With respect to petitions for quo
for six (6) years or a fine of P6,000.00 shall warranto and habeas corpus, original jurisdiction
be tried by the proper Regional Trial Court, over them is expressly conferred to this Court by
Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Section 5(1), Article VIII of the Constitution and to
Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court. the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts
by Section 9(1) and Section 21(1), respectively, of
(b) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction: B.P. Blg. 129. In the absence then of a specific
statutory grant of jurisdiction to issue the said
(1) On appeal, from the final extraordinary writs, the Sandiganbayan, as a court
judgments, resolutions or orders of with only special and limited jurisdiction, cannot
the Regional Trial courts in cases exercise jurisdiction over the petition for
originally decided by them in their prohibition, mandamus and quo warranto filed by
respective territorial jurisdiction. petitioner.

(2) By petition for review, from the


final judgments, resolutions or orders
of the Regional Trial Courts in the
exercise of their appellate jurisdiction 25. PEOPLE vs. CFI
over cases originally decided by the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts, in their respective JUDGMENT; deemed valid even if promulgated
jurisdiction. after the expiration of the judge's temporary detail in
a vacant branch
It is settled that the authority to issue writs
of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus involves the FACTS:
exercise of original jurisdiction which must be
expressly conferred by the Constitution or by law. In 1. Private respondent Gregorio Malco was
the Philippine setting, the authority to issue Writs charged before the then Court of First
of Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus involves the Instance of Quezon with attempted rape, and
exercise of original jurisdiction. It is never derived by raffled to Branch X of the same court then
implication. Indeed, while the power to issue the writ presided by Judge Mapalad A. Nañadiego.
of certiorari is in some instance conferred on all On 15 October 1977, after the defense
courts by constitutional or statutory provisions,
rested, the case was submitted for decision.
ordinarily, the particular courts which have such
power are expressly designated. However, on 17 April 1978, Judge
Nañadiego retired without deciding the case.
Thus, our Courts exercise the power to issue Writs 2. Meanwhile, Judge Juan B. Montecillo,
of Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus by virtue of Presiding Judge of Branch III, was
express constitutional grant or legislative designated pro tempore to take over Branch
enactments. To enumerate: X. Among the cases submitted to him for
decision was this case of respondent-
(1) Section 5[1], Article VIII of the 1987
appellee Gregorio Malco.
Constitution conferred upon this Court such
jurisdiction; 3. On 9 June 1978, Judge Conrado R. Antona
was appointed Presiding Judge of Branch X.
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He took his oath and assumed office the when a complaint or information is filed before one
following day, 3 terminating ipso facto the branch or judge, jurisdiction does not attach to said
temporary designation of Judge Montecillo. branch of the judge alone, to the exclusion of the
4. On 20 June 1978, Special Deputy Clerk of others. Judge Montecillo penned the decision on 22
Court Mateo M. Cabangon promulgated said May 1978 while his temporary designation at Branch
decision of Judge Montecillo acquitting X expired only on 10 June 1978 when Judge Antona
private respondent Malco of attempted rape. qualified for the position. And, Judge Montecillo was
still an incumbent judge of the Court of First Instance
On 30 June 1978, Special Counsel Hjalmar
of Quezon, being then the permanent judge of
P. Quintana moved to set aside the judgment
Branch III, at the time his decision was promulgated.
of acquittal. Thus, he continued to possess authority to dispose
5. On 10 July 1978, Judge Antona denied the of the case. In fact, even after his temporary
motion on the ground that the trial court was designation, he continued to have authority and
without jurisdiction "to review and declare could decide the case as it was one of those
illegal the actuation of a co-equal Court." submitted to him for decision during his detail. A trial
6. On 8 August 1978, the Motion for judge whose temporary detail to a vacant branch has
Reconsideration was likewise denied, thus expired remains to be the incumbent judge of the
sustaining the acquittal of private branch of the court where he is permanently
respondent. This prompted Provincial Fiscal assigned. Thus, he may still decide cases submitted
Dante H. Diamante, with authority from the to him for decision during his temporary detain in the
Office of the Solicitor General, to institute the vacant branch even after the vacancy has been
present petition contending in essence that filled. In one case, it was held that it was not unusual
the decision of Judge Montecillo was null and for a judge who did not try a case to decide it on the
basis of the record since the trial judge who tried the
void since he was no longer judge-designate
case may have already died or retired. In fact, as
of Branch X when his decision was
early as 1915, this Court already ruled that "[t]here
promulgated as Judge Antona had already
is no law which prohibits a judge from deciding a
been appointed and qualified. Still, the case because he did not see some of the witnesses
Solicitor General, tasked to submit the Brief when they testified therein. In the absence of any
for Petitioner, maintained that the express prohibition of this kind, we cannot imply
appointment and qualification of Judge one." The Court also said then —"[T]o-day, when
Antona to preside over Branch X had the stenographers are employed in the courts in the trial
effect of immediately terminating the of cases and when a complete, authentic record of
temporary assignment of Judge Montecillo everything that transpires during the trial is kept and
thereto, hence, his decision promulgated when from said record, every one . . . may read . . .
after the expiration of his temporary detail said record, and be informed fully of every act,
was null and void and that, as a objection, or exception taken or made during the
consequence, the trial court then presided by trial, there seems to be but little reason for asserting
Judge Antona should have set aside the that one qualified person may not be able to reach a
just and fair conclusion from said record . . . Every
judgment of acquittal penned by Judge
person may ascertain for himself the correctness of
Montecillo.
any disputed fact in said record."
ISSUE: WON the judgment of acquittal penned As if realizing the practicability and validity of this
by a trial judge detailed to a vacant branch of the procedure, the Supreme Court En Banc issued a
court but promulgated after a permanent judge Resolution dated 10 February 1983 laying down the
has been duly appointed to the vacancy is valid. guidelines in the distribution of cases in the
HELD: implementation of the Judiciary Reorganization Act
of 1981 (B.P. Blg. 129) par. I, subpar. 1, of which
In the instant case, the judgment of acquittal penned provides — "1. Cases already submitted for
by Judge Montecillo must be declared valid. It is not decision shall be decided by the Judge to whom they
necessary that he be the presiding judge of Branch were submitted, except cases submitted for decision
X at the time his decision was promulgated since to judges who were promoted to higher courts or to
even after the expiration of his temporary those who are no longer in the service."
designation at Branch X he continued to be an
incumbent of Branch III. After all, where a CFI (now Quite apparently, the foregoing provisions does not
Regional Trial Court) is divided into several state that the judge to whom the case was submitted
branches, each of the branches is not a court distinct for decision must be the same judge who heard the
and separate from the others. Jurisdiction is case, totally or partially, although that would be ideal.
vested in the court, not in the judges, so that It does not even require that he heard any of the
witnesses for the parties. As may be noted, the
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pertinent portion of the Resolution of 10 February case of failure to vacte , a summary action for
1983 merely requires that the judge who pens the ejectment is proper. Since the allegations in the
decision is still an incumbent judge., i.e., in this case, complaint are sufficient to establish a cause of action
a judge of the same court, albeit now assigned to a for unlawful detainer , a judgement can be validly
different branch, at the time the decision is rendered. Since the decision of MTC is consistent
promulgated. with that for unlawful detainer, MTC decision is
REINSTATED.

26. SUMULONG vs. CA DOCTRINE : The lack of cause of action, which is a


ground for a motion to dismiss, must appear on the
face of the complaint (from the allegations in the
FACTS: complaint). A complaint should not be dismissed for
Sumolong entered into a contract of lease with insuffiency unless it appears clearly from the face of
Jopson Corporation over a parcel of land which the complaint that the plaintiff is not entiled to any
Jopson is using as a parking lot for its supermarket. relief under any state of facts which could be proved
The contract provides that incase Jopson abandons from the facts alleged. Though the allegations in the
the property , the lease contract shall be complaint are ambiguous, indefifnite or uncertain but
automatically terminated. Jopson ceased its nevertheless a cause of action can be made out
operation for 2 years and Sumolong took therefrom and the plaintiff would be entitled to
possession of the property. Inland Trailways recover in any aspect of the fact or any combination
misrepresented to Sumolong that Jopson had of the factd alleged.
resumed operations under the name of Inland
supermarket. Because of this misrepresentation,
Summolong was misled into accepting the check 27. SADOL vs. PILIPINAS KAO INC.
payment from Inland and allowed inand to reposses
property. When Sumolong learned of the
misrepresentation, he demanded Inland to vacate FACTS:
property. Inland misrepresented to SUmolong that Sadol was recruited as laborer by Vega&Co and was
they are ready to enter into a lease contract with him assigned in Pilipinas Kao particularly at the Pit
so Sumolong allowed inland to take over the subject burning area. He was summarily dismissed so he
lot. However Inland maliciously failed to enter into a filed a complaint for reinstatement and backwages
lease contract with plaintiff and failed to deliver the with DOLE. The labor arbitier odered the parties to
agreed monetary consideration. Despite repeated submit their position papers but only Sadol
demands, Inland refused to vacate prompting complied.
Sumolong to file a case of forcible entry by stealth
and strategy. LABOR ARBITER - Vega&Co are solidarily liable to
Sadol for his separation pay computed at one month
MTC - Granted. MTC ordered Inland to vacate the for every year of service. Saldol was not reinstated
subject property and pay compensation for the use so he appealed to the NLRC
of the premises. MTC disregarded the defense of
Inland that the proper action should have been for NLRC – MODIFIED. Pilipinas Kao ordered to
unlawful detainer. reinstate Saldol with full backwages. Pilipinas Kao
appealed but was dismissed for having been filed
RTC- Reversed. Case is not of forcible entry out of time
because Sumolong was not in prior physical and
actual possession of the property. Motion for Reconsideration by Pilipinas Kao – PKI
raised its defense that Saldol voluntarily abandoned
CA- Affirmed. Lack of cause of action for forcible his job to look for another job and filed the case 3
entry. years after his alleged dismissal.
Decision of Labor Arbiter REVERSED. Case
ISSUE: dismissed for lack of merit.
1.WON there is cause of action for forcible entry.
2. if not, WON complaint contains sufficient ISSUE:
allegations for unlawful detainer WON the Motion for Reconsideration should not
have been entertained as its raises issues for the
RULING : first time on appeal which were not raised before the
Cause of action is not for forcible entry because the labor arbiter and the appeal was filed put of time.
allegations does not amount to stealth and strategy.
However the allegations sufficiently establish a HELD:
cause of action for unlawful detainer. The While it is correct that the failureof Pilipinas Kai to
possession of inland was by virtue of Sumulongs appeal on time, the NLRC may no longer amend,
tolerance because Inland promised to negotitate a modify and set aside the judgement rendered by the
contract of lease. Possesssion by tolerance is lawful labor arbiter, this is only correct insofar as PKI is
but the occupant must vacate upon demand and in concerened. Since Saldol has filed a timely appeal

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before the NLRC , NLRC has acquired jurisdiction to the filing of the complaint herein. Defendant was
give due course to his appeal. Even if PKI’s appeal placed under the jurisdiction of said court, upon the
was filed out of time, the rules of technicality must service of summons by publication.
yield to the broader interest of justice. It is only by
giving due course to the motion for reconsideration This is an action in rem, for it concerns the
(which was timely filed) that the NLRC may be able status of the parties herein, and status affects or
to equitably evaluate the conflicting versions of facts binds the whole word. The res in the present case is
by the parties. Thus the NLRC has acquired the relation between said parties, or their marriage
jurisdiction over the issues raised by PKI in its tie. Jurisdiction over the same depends upon the
motion for reconsiderarion. The factual finding of the nationality or domicile of the parties, not the place of
NLRC are conclusive to the SC as they are celebration of marriage, or the locus celebrationis.
supported by substantial evidence. Case Plaintiff here is a citizen of the Philippines, domiciled
DISMISSED.
therein. His status is, therefore, subject to our
jurisdiction, on both counts.
28. RAYRAY vs. CHAE KYUNG LEE The prevailing rule is, accordingly, that a court has
jurisdiction over the res, in an action for
annulment of marriage, provided, at least, one of
Facts:
the parties is domiciled in, or a national of, the
Plaintiff Lazaro Rayray seeks the annulment of his forum. Since plaintiff is a Filipino, domiciled in the
marriage to defendant Chae Kyung Lee. Inasmuch Philippines, it follows that the lower court had
as, the latter's whereabouts is unknown, and she jurisdiction over the res, in addition to its jurisdiction
was formerly a resident of Pusan, Korea, summons over the subject-matter and the parties. In other
was served by publication. Thereafter, plaintiff words, it could validly inquire into the legality of the
moved that defendant be declared in default, she not marriage between the parties herein.
having filed an answer. The trial court dismissed the
plaintiff's complaint, upon the ground: (1) that the
court could not nullify a marriage contracted abroad;
and (2) that the facts proven do not warrant the relief 29. PENA AND MARCOS vs. JUAN
prayed for. A reconsideration of this decision having
been denied, plaintiff appealed to the Court of
Appeals, which certified the case to the Supreme
Facts: On January 23, 1978, petitioner filed with
Court, the jurisdiction of the lower court being in
respondent Judge a manifestation and motion that it
issue in the appeal.
be "allowed to withdraw from this case and charging
In relation thereto, the court a quo found that it had lien be recorded against the properties of Mr.
no jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of plaintiff's Baroom now aboard MV San Vicente (Vessel) for
marriage to the defendant, it having been unpaid professional fees and reimbursement
solemnized in Seoul, Korea. expenses.”

In this petition for certiorari and prohibition with


preliminary injunction, petitioner law firm seeks the
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction
annulment of the order of respondent Judge of the
over the res.
Court of First Instance of Manila in Civil Case No.
105048 dated August 25, 1978 which approved the
sale of the subject cargo and prays instead that the
RULING: writ of preliminary attachment over the same
Yes, the trial court has jurisdiction. In order property issued by Hon. Gregorio Pineda of the
that a given case could be validly decided by a court Court of First Instance of Rizal in Civil Case No.
of justice, it must have jurisdiction over (1) the 28710 be allowed to remain in force.
subject-matter of the litigation; (2) the person of the
parties therein; and (3) in actions in rem or quasi-in- Issue
rem, the res. 1. Did the court have jurisdiction? Yes.
The subject-matter of the present case is 2. Did the court have jurisdiction over Baroom, a non
the annulment of plaintiff's marriage to the resident alien? Yes.
defendant, which is within the jurisdiction of our
courts of first instance, and, in Manila, of its Court 3. Did the court have jurisdiction over the res
of Juvenile and Domestic Relations. (Cargo)? Yes.

The same acquired jurisdiction over plaintiff 4. Once a court acquires jurisdiction over the case
herein by his submission thereto in consequence of and the res, its order to have the res sold pendent
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lite does it constitute interference over the The reason for the rule is obvious. An attachment
jurisdiction of another court to which an attorney proceeding is for the purpose of creating a lien on
subsequently filed a claim for attorney’s fees against the property to serve as security for the payment of
a defendant in the case before the former? No. the creditors' claim. Hence, where a lien already
exists, as in this case a maritime lien, the same is
5. May Petitioner enforce its attorney’s lien? No.
already equivalent to an attachment. Moreover,
Held: since the property subject of the action for the
enforcement of the maritime liens was already in the
1. Suffice it to say that an action based upon an oral possession of private respondent, there is no need
contract of transportation of goods by water is an for seizure for the court to obtain jurisdiction over the
action in admiralty which comes under the original rest.
and exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of First
Instance irrespective of the value of the cargo. 4. We find no abuse of discretion in issuing the
questioned order of August 25, 1978, and therefore
2. As to the person of Baroom, it is to be conceded the instant petition should be dismissed. It could not
that at the initial stage of the proceeding in the Court be claimed that the act of respondent Judge in
of First Instance of Manila prior to the issuance of issuing the said order amounts to interference with
the order of April 28, 1977 directing the sale of the the writ of attachment dated February 28, 1978
property and petitioner's firing of various pleadings, issued by Judge Pineda, for by the time the said writ
said court did not have jurisdiction over Baroom. was issued, respondent Judge had already control
Baroom was a non-resident alien and he was and disposition of the case. The order of August 25,
beyond the reach of the court's legal processes. But 1978 was but an implementation of the earlier order
since the action is brought principally for the of April 28, 1977 directing the sale of the cargoes on
enforcement of maritime lien against the property of the ground of extreme necessity as the cargoes as
defendants who failed to pay the charter hire fee, found by respondent Judge upon ocular inspection
and therefore the same is in the nature and were in danger of deteriorating and losing their
character of a proceeding quasi in rem, jurisdiction market value and the vessel was also in danger of
over defendant Baroom is not essential. An action sinking. By then, respondent Judge had also issued
quasi in rem has been defined as "an action between the order dated July 19, 1977 approving a Deed of
parties where the direct object is to reach and Sale of subject cargoes.
dispose of property owned by them or of some
interest therein. 5. The liens for attorney's fees and expenses apply
only on the funds or documents of clients which
If however, the defendant is a non-resident and, lawfully come to the possession of the counsel
remaining beyond the range of the personal process (called retaining lien) and to all judgments secured
of the court, refuses to come in voluntarily, the court by the counsel (called charging lien). In his
never acquires jurisdiction over the person at all. manifestation and motion before respondent Judge,
Here the property itself is in fact the sole thing which petitioner is claiming for his charging lien But it
is impleaded and is the responsible object which is should be noted that at the time of its filing, the
the subject of the exercise of judicial power. It follows orders of April 27, 1977 ordering the sale of the
that the jurisdiction of the court in such case is based cargoes and July 19, 1977 approving the Deed of
exclusively on the power which, under the law, it Sale of cargoes were already in existence and both
possesses over the property; and any discussion were in fact in favor of private respondent. It is
relative to the jurisdiction of the court over the person curious to note that petitioner never questioned said
of the defendant is entirely apart from the case. orders on appeal or by a special civil action.
Petitioner's client in fact even abandoned its case.
At any rate, defendant Baroom filed later, aside from Hence, having no favorable judgment that could be
a motion to dismiss, an answer with counterclaim anticipated, the charging lien has no leg to stand on.
praying that plaintiff be directed to deliver the Perhaps because it was aware of its predicament
cargoes of defendant Baroom to Jeddah and to pay that petitioner filed an independent action for
damages, etc. and a cross- claim against Sierra recovery of its professional fees and for
Madre, thereby abandoning any question on reimbursement of expenses which would have been
jurisdiction over the person and submitting himself to proper, except that the ownership of the property
the jurisdiction of the court. sought to be attached was questionable and the
same was already sold by respondent court. But just
3. As regards jurisdiction over the res, We hold that
as We had said before, petitioner should have filed
respondent acquires jurisdiction over it. Where a
its claim for professional fees in respondent's court
property is burdened by a lien, a writ of attachment
for said court has the exclusive jurisdiction to
is no longer necessary in order that jurisdiction over
determine the real owner of the cargoes. We hasten
the property may be obtained by the court.
to add, however, that the action should not be for a
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charging lien, but a simple complaint in (1) Yes. The foreclosure of a mortgage is a quasi
intervention for recovery of professional in rem proceeding. The defendant for whom
services and reimbursement of expenses, thus publication is made appears, the action
avoiding multiplicity of suits. becomes, as to him, personal action (the
property attached remains liable). If there is
Petition is dismissed no appearance and no service of process on
him, the case becomes in rem the only effect
30. BANGKO ESPANOL FILIPINO vs. of which is to subject the property attached
PALANCA to the payment of the defendant which the
court may find to be due to the plaintiff. Thus,
in foreclosure proceeding against the
Facts: El Banco Espanol-Filipino instituted an action property of a nonresident mortgagor who
to foreclose a mortgage which was executed by the fails to come in and submit himself personally
original defendant, Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng, to the jurisdiction of the court: (I) the
as security for a debt. At the time of the mortgage,
jurisdiction of the court is derived from the
the estimated the value of the property in question
power which it possesses over the property;
was P292,558, P75,000 in excess of the
(II) jurisdiction over the person is not
indebtedness. After the execution of this instrument
by the mortgagor, he returned to China, his native acquired and is nonessential; (III) the relief
country; and there he died. Since the defendant was granted by the court must be limited to such
a nonresident at the time of the institution of the as can be enforced against the property
action, notice of the foreclosure proceeding is to be itself. In proceedings in rem or quasi in rem
done thru publication (Sec 399 of the Code of Civil against a nonresident who is not served
Procedure). Under the said section, it required that, personally within the state, and who does not
“,the judge must direct a copy of the summons and appear, the relief must be confined to the res,
complaint to be forthwith deposited by the clerk in and the court cannot lawfully render a
the post-office, postage prepaid, directed to the personal judgment against him. The failure of
person to be served, at his place of residence”. A the clerk of the CFI to mail the proper papers
question is raised as to whether the clerk complied does not impair or defeat the jurisdiction of
with this order. An affidavit signed by Bernardo, an the court.
employee of the bank’s attorney, showed that he had
deposited in the Manila post-office a registered
(2) Yes, the sending of notice by mail was
letter, addressed to Tanquinyeng, containing copies
complied with when the court made the
of the complaint, plaintiff's affidavit, summons, and
the order of the court directing publication. It appears order. It is the duty of the owner of real
from the postmaster's receipt that Bernardo probably estate, who is a nonresident, to take
used an envelope obtained from the clerk's office, as measures that in some way he shall be
the receipt purports to show that the letter emanated represented when his property is called into
from the office. The cause proceeded without the requisition, and if he fails to do this, and fails
defendant appearing thus judgment was rendered to get notice by the ordinary publications
against him by default. Since defendant failed to pay, which have usually been required in such
the property was sold to the bank for P110,200 and cases, it is his misfortune, and he must abide
was confirmed by the court. 7 years after the the consequences. It can be inferred from
confirmation Vicente Palanca, as administrator of the facts that a man who has placed a
the estate, requested the court to set aside the order mortgage upon a property and has gone
and vacate the judgment on the basis that the court away is supposed to have knowledge that
had never acquired jurisdiction over the defendant the mortgage was foreclosed and property
or over the subject of the action. This was denied.
sold. It is permissible to consider the
probability that the defendant may have
Issues:
(1) WON the court acquired the necessary
received actual notice of these proceedings.
Furthermore, there is a delay in asking for the
jurisdiction to enable it to proceed with the
foreclosure of the mortgage relief. The delay in the appointment of the
administrator and institution of this action is
(2) WON those proceedings were conducted in
such manner as to constitute due process of a circumstance which is imputable to the
law parties in interest. The failure of the clerk to
mail the notice, if in fact he did so fail in his
Ruling: duty, is not such an irregularity, as amounts
to a denial of due process of law; and hence

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in our opinion that irregularity, if proved, individual only although it concerns the right to a
would not avoid the judgment in this case. tangible thing.
Notice was given by publication in a
newspaper and this is the only form of notice Private respondent's action for reconveyance and
cancellation of title being in personam, the judgment
which the law unconditionally requires.
in question is null and void for lack of jurisdiction over
the person of the deceased defendant Ching Leng.
Verily, the action was commenced thirteen (13)
31. CHING vs. CA years after the latter's death. As ruled by this Court
in Dumlao v. Quality Plastic Products, Inc. (70 SCRA
475 [1976]) the decision of the lower court insofar as
the deceased is concerned, is void for lack of
FACTS:
jurisdiction over his person. He was not, and he
could not have been validly served with summons.
Sps. Nofuente sold a property to Ching Leng and the
He had no more civil personality. His juridical
latter registered the property in his name, his postal
personality, that is fitness to be subject of legal
address was in Pasay City. After some time, Ching
relations, was lost through death (Arts. 37 and 42
Leng died in Boston and his legitimate son, Alfredo
Civil Code).
Ching, was appointed administrator of his estate. 13
years after the death of Ching Leng, a suit was
commenced by private respondent Pedro Asedillo
against the former for the reconveyance of said 32. DUMLAO vs. QUALITY PRODUCTS
property. INC.

An amended complaint was made by private


respondent alleging “that on account of the fact that
FACTS: CFI rendered a judgment ordering
the defendant has been residing abroad up to the
defendants to pay solidarily Quality Plastic
present, and it is not known whether the defendant
is still alive or dead, he or his estate may be served Products a sum plus the legal rate of interest. Upon
by summons and other processes only by defendants’ failure to pay the amount of the
publication.” Summons by publication was made judgment and after the decision had become final,
through “Economic Monitor”, newspaper of general the lower court ordered the foreclosure of the
circulation in Province of Rizal, Pasay City. Since no surety bond and the sale at public auction of the
responsive pleading was filed after the lapse of 60 land of Oria which he had given as security under
days, judgment on the merits in favor of private the bond. All testamentary heir in Oria’s duly
respondents was made. Consequently, the title of probated will sued Quality for the annulment of the
Ching Leng was cancelled and transferred to private judgment against Oria and execution against his
respondent who sold the same to Villa Esperanza land.
Dev., Inc.Petitioner learned of the decision, and so
he filed a petition to set it aside as null and void for ISSUE: Whether or not the court has jurisdiction
lack of jurisdiction; over the person of the deceased Oria.

ISSUE: RULING: No. As far as Oria was concerned, the


lower court’s judgment against him is void for lack
WON the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the subject of jurisdiction over his person. He was not, and he
matter and the parties. could not have been, validly served with summons.
He had no more civil personality. His juridical
RULING: capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of
legal relations was lost through death (Arts 37 and
An action to redeem, or to recover title to or 42, Civil Code).The lower court erred in ruling that
possession of, real property is not an action in rem or since Soliven’s counsel also appeared as counsel
an action against the whole world, like a land for Oria, there was a voluntary appearance which
registration proceeding or the probate of a will; it is
enabled the court to acquire jurisdiction over Oria,
an action in personam, so much so that a judgment
therein is binding only upon the parties properly as contemplated in sec. 23, Rule 14 of the Revised
impleaded and duly heard or given an opportunity to Rules of Court. Soliven’s counsel could not have
be heard. Actions in personam and actions in validly appeared for a dead co-defendant. Estoppel
rem differ in that the former are directed against has no application to this case.
specific persons and seek personal judgments,
while the latter are directed against the thing or
property or status of a person and seek judgments 33. DEVEZA v. MONTECILLO
with respect thereto as against the whole world. An
action to recover a parcel of land is a real action but
it is an action in personam, for it binds a particular FACTS

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On February 5, 1960, petitioners Carmen Deveza, termination of the right to hold


Dorotea Cabrera, and Felino Cabrera filed with the possession, by virtue of any contract,
Justice of the Peace (now MTC) Court of Tiaong, express or implied, or the legal
Quezon, an unlawful detainer suit against private representatives or assigns of any such
respondent Paterno Chumacera. According to the landlord, vendor, vendee, or other
complaint petitioners are the owners of a parcel of person, may, at any time within one (1)
year after such unlawful deprivation or
riceland in San Isidro, Quezon, evidenced by TCT.
withholding of possession, bring an
The petitioners averred that the respondent owns a action in the proper inferior court against
piece of land which adjoins the northwest portion of the person or persons unlawfully
their property. withholding or depriving of possession, or
A relocation survey took place on June 1959, during any person or persons claiming under them,
for the restitution of such possession,
which it was discovered that private respondent
together with damages and costs.....
Chumacera had been occupying, knowingly or
unknowingly, about 3,000 square meters of the
There is nothing in the complaint that would indicate
northwest portion of petitioners' land.
that petitioners were deprived of possession of the
When informed by the petitioners of his unlawful disputed land "by force, intimidation, threat, strategy,
possession and asked to vacate the land, or stealth" which would bring them within the
Chumacera refused. definition of “forcible entry” nor is there an allegation
that respondent withheld possession of the land
Complaint prayed for the respondent to vacate the "after the expiration or termination of the right to hold
land and turn over possession to petitioners; plus possession by virtue of any contract, express or
payment of reasonable compensation worth P1,000, implied.”
attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and costs.
Sec. 1 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court further
Chumacera moved to dismiss complaint on the provides that an action for unlawful detainer must be
ground of lack of jurisdiction. brought within 1 year after such deprivation or
MTC’s ruling: withholding of possession. The period is to be
counted from the start of the illegal possession.
MTC respondent judge Montecillo dismissed the
case for lack of jurisdiction. There was no mention in the complaint as to when
the unlawful possession began, except that the
Petitioners then commenced a petition for plaintiffs discovered such on June 16, 1959. There
mandamus in the CFI of Quezon to compel is thus no way of knowing, upon the averments of
respondent judge to hear and decide on the merits the complaint, how defendant's (respondent
of the case. Chumacera's) possession started or continued. The
complaint, accordingly, does not show facts which
CFI’s ruling:
would give the municipal court of Tiaong jurisdiction
CFI found that respondent judge acted properly, and to entertain this case, either as forcible entry or
thus dismissed petition for mandamus. unlawful detainer.

Petitioners appealed directly to the SC. However, respondent Chumacera in his brief
pointed out that, based on the oral arguments,
ISSUE: petitioners made an admission that respondent had
Whether or not the MTC had jurisdiction to hear the been in possession of the land for more than one
case year prior to the filing of the complaint. Petitioners
did not deny said averment of fact. For this very
HELD: reason and the fact that the period of such unlawful
deprivation does not clearly appear on the
The MTC has no jurisdiction over the case.
complaint, this case should be dismissed,
Sec. 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides:
The proceedings under Rule 70 are essentially
summary in nature. The present case does not fit
SECTION 1. Who may institute
proceedings, and when. — Subject to the into the summary nature of the remedies envisioned
provisions of the next succeeding section, a in Rule 70. The situation here presented requires a
person deprived of the possession of full-blown inquiry to determine who has the better
any land or building by force, right to the possession or ownership of the land.
intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth,
As the court declared in a previous case, an inferior
or a landlord, vendor, vendee, or other
person against whom the possession, of court should reject a complaint for forcible entry and
any land or building is unlawfully detainer "right at the outset", if it is already clear that
withheld after the expiration or that court has no jurisdiction thereon.
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30 IGNORANTIA PORTALIS LEGIS ACADEMIC YEAR 2016-2017

Petition denied. CFI decision affirmed. ISSUE: Whether the probate court should be
allowed to continue the hearing on the ownership of
the fishing boat or whether that question should be
34. LACHENAL vs. SALAS
left to the determination of the Caloocan court where
the subsequent separate action (now in the pre-trial
FACTS: stage) for the recovery of the motorboat is pending.
RULING AND RATIO:
Victorio Lachenal died on November 20, 1969. His
testate estate is pending settlement in the Court of THE Court ruled that that the title to the fishing boat
First Instance of Rizal, Pasig, Branch I (Special should be determined in Civil Case No. 3597
Proceeding No. 5836). His son, Ildefonso Lachenal, because it affects the lessee thereof, Lope L. Leonio,
was named executor of his will. Among the the decedent's son-in-law, who, although married to
his daughter or compulsory heir, is nevertheless a
properties included in the inventory of his estate is a
third person with respect to his estate. "The
fishing boat called Lachenal VII.
administrator may not pull him against his will, by
motion, into the administration proceedings."
On April 1, 1971 the executor filed in that proceeding
a motion to require the spouses Lope L. Leonio and This case falls under the general rule that questions
Flaviana Lachenal-Leonio to pay the rentals for the as to title to property cannot be passed upon in the
lease of Lachenal VII and to return the boat to testate or intestate proceeding but should be
ventilated in a separate action. Where a party in a
Navotas, Rizal for drydocking and repair.
probate proceeding prays for the inclusion in, or
exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property,
Mrs. Leonio, who was a daughter of the testator, the probate court may provisionally pass upon the
opposed the executor's motion. She countered with question without prejudice to its final determination
a motion to exclude the fishing boat from the in a separate action.
decedent's estate. She claimed that she is the owner
The Court of First Instance is a court of general
of the boat because she purchased it from her father
original jurisdiction invested with power to take
in 1967. The executor opposed the motion for
cognizance of all kinds of cases: civil cases, criminal
exclusion. cases, special proceedings, land registration,
guardianship, naturalization, admiralty and
The probate court in its order of January 28, 1972 insolvency cases. Probate jurisdiction includes all
designating a commissioner to receive the evidence matters relating to the settlement of estates and the
of the parties relative to the ownership of the probate of wills of deceased persons (Sec. 599, Act
motorboat. Mrs. Leonio had already finished the 190), particularly the administration of the
presentation of her evidence before the decedent's estate, the payment of his debts,
commissioner. questions as to collation or advancements to the
heirs, the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, and
The executor did not present his countervailing the partition and distribution of the estate.
evidence. Instead, on July 8, 1975 he and the
testator's other children named Flora, Elias and 35. ONG vs. PAREL
Irenea, and the children of a deceased child filed in
the Caloocan City Branch of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal an action against the Leonio FACTS
spouses and the other three children of the testator
named Crispula, Modesto and Esperanza, for the Petitioner Antonio Ong owns Mansion House
recovery of the motorboat Lachenal VII, allegedly Restaurant in Iloilo City. Private respondent Rowena
valued at P150,000, together with back rentals and Reteracion, president of the Mansion House
damages (Civil Case No. 3597). Genuine Labor Union, filed a request with Regional
Office No. VI of the Ministry of Labor and
Employment (MOLE) in Iloilo City for the inspection
On July 20, 1975 the said plaintiffs in Civil Case No.
of the petitioner's restaurant due to petitioner’s
3597 filed in the probate court their own motion to
failure to comply with certain labor standards laws.
exclude the said motorboat from the decedent's
estate on the ground that the probate court has no An on-the-spot inspection of petitioner’s business
jurisdiction to decide the question as to its ownership premises was conducted by representatives of
because that matter has to be resolved by the MOLE’s regional office. Petitioner was not able to
present his business records so he was given
Caloocan court where Civil Case No. 3597 is
another five days to present said records.
pending.

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31 IGNORANTIA PORTALIS LEGIS ACADEMIC YEAR 2016-2017

Inspection resulted in the interview of 13 employees xxx


who signed an affidavit supporting the charges of
non-compliance with certain labor standards against The original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and
petitioner. decide cases involving said claims pertains to the
labor arbiters alone.
During MOLE’s second visit to the business
premises, petitioner Ong was not able to present the Original jurisdiction means jurisdiction to take
records for a second time. cognizance of a cause at its inception, try it and pass
judgment upon the law and facts. Exclusive
On August 1986, public respondent issued a jurisdiction precludes the Idea of co-existence and
subpoena requiring petitioner to submit records. refers to jurisdiction possessed to the exclusion of
Petitioner still failed to comply up to the last day of others.
presenting employment records for inspection.
Article 128 of the Labor Code provides for the
The result of MOLE’s investigation showed the
visitorial and enforcement power of the Secretary of
petitioner Ong did indeed fail to comply with certain
Labor, Minister of Labor, and their authorized
labor standards law. Public respondent issued Final representatives (i.e. MOLE Regional Director),
Order for Compliance, whereby petitioner Ong is giving them the power to “investigate any fact,
ordered to pay the sum of 254,841.26php condition or matter which may be necessary to
representing the claims of 13 workers. determine violations or which may aid in the
enforcement of the Labor Code.”
Petitioner wrote the public respondent a request for
reconsideration due to lack of jurisdiction and denial
However MOLE regional director's power to visit the
of due process. establishment of the employer extends only
Public respondent denied motion for insofar as checking compliance with labor
reconsideration. A writ of execution for the money standard laws is concerned. If the inspection
results in a finding that the employer has
claims was issued by public respondent.
violated certain labor standard laws, then, the
Ong then filed with the SC a petition averring that the regional director must order the necessary
regional director acted without and in excess of his rectifications. However, this does not include
jurisdiction for taking cognizance of money claims. adjudication of money claims clearly within the
ambit of the labor arbiter's authority under
ISSUE Article 217 of the Code.

WON Ministry of Labor and Employment has As to the issue of denial of due process, petitioner
jurisdiction over money claims. was not deprived of due process. Petitioner Ong was
HELD given an extension for submitting the required
employment records when he failed to furnish them
Petition granted. Jurisdiction over money claims during the first on-the-spot evaluation. It is settled
is vested in the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, not that there is no denial of due process where the
the MOLE. petitioner was afforded an opportunity to present his
case.
Article 217 of the Labor Code enumerates the cases
falling under the jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the
National Labor Relations Commission, to wit: 36. VILLEGAS vs. LEGASPI

Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the


Commission. — (a) The Labor Arbiters shall This case is a consolidation of two cases involving
have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to the issue of whether or not a member of the National
hear and decide within thirty (30) working Assembly (Congress) can appear as counsel before
days … :
any court inferior to a court with appellate
jurisdiction.
xxx
* The consolidated cases reached the Supreme
3. All money claims of workers, including Court on Petition for certiorari and prohibition
those based on non-payment or
underpayment of wages, overtime Facts of Case 1:
compensation, separation pay and other
benefits provided by law or appropriate On September 27, 1979, a complaint for annulment
agreement, except claims for employees' of bank checks and damages was filed by Raul A.
compensation, social security, medicare Villegas against the Vera Cruz spouses and
and maternity benefits; Primitivo Cania Jr. before the Court of First Instance
of Cebu. An answer was filed by private respondents

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32 IGNORANTIA PORTALIS LEGIS ACADEMIC YEAR 2016-2017

through their counsel, Assemblyman Valentino First Instance with appellate jurisdiction over all
Legaspi, a member of the Batasang Pambansa. cases arising in City and Municipal Courts in their
Raul Villegas challenged the appearance of Legaspi respective provinces except over appeals from
as counsel of record on the ground that he is barred cases tried by Municipal judges of provincial capitals
under the Constitution from appearing before Courts or City judges. Thus, it is rather clear that Courts of
of First Instance, which are essentially trial courts or First Instance, by virtue of a specific bestowal by the
courts with original jurisdiction. Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, can be Courts
with appellate jurisdiction.
RTC: In an Order dated February 27, 1980; the
judge denied the disqualification of Assemblyman Since the respective Courts of First Instance in these
Legaspi, as well as the Motion for Reconsideration two cases before which Assemblymen Legaspi and
filed thereafter. Fernandez appeared as counsel, took cognizance of
the suits in the exercise of their exclusive original
Facts of Case 2:
and not appellate jurisdiction, both Assemblymen
Edgardo P. Reyes filed, on July 3, 1979, a civil case must be barred from appearing as counsel before
before the Court of First Instance of Rizal against said Courts in accordance with the Constitutional
N.V. Verenigde Buinzenfabrieken Excelsior-De provision.
Maas and private respondent Eustaquio T.C. Acero.
Assemblyman Estanislao Fernandez appeared as Held: WHEREFORE, granting the Writs prayed for,
counsel for Excelsior. His appearance was also the Order issued on February 27, 1980 by the Court
questioned on the ground that it is barred by the of First Instance of Cebu, Branch II, in Civil Case No.
Constitition because Fernandez is also a member of R-18857, is hereby set aside, and Attorneys
Estanislao A. Fernandez and Valentino Legaspi
the Batasang Pambansa.
hereby declared prohibited from appearing as
Issue: Whether or not members of the Batasang counsel before the Court of First Instance of Rizal
Pambansa can appear as counsels before any court (Pasig), Branch XXI, in Civil Case No. 33739, and
inferior to a court with appellate jurisdiction (CFIs). before the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch II,
in Civil Case No. r-18857, respectively. The
Ruling: Article 8, Section 11 of the 1973 Constitution Restraining Order issued heretofore in L-53869 is
reads: No member of the Batasang Pambansa shall hereby made permanent.
appear as counsel without appellate jurisdiction…
Clearly, what is prohibited to a Batasang Pambansa
member is “appearance as counsel” before any 37. AGUSTIN vs. BACALAN
court without appellate jurisdiction.
**Court of origin: City Court of Cebu
“Appearance” has been defined as “voluntary
submission to a court’s jurisdiction.” Appellate Court: Court of First Instance

“Counsel” means “a lawyer appointed or engaged to Facts:


advise and represent in legal matters a particular The case started when a complaint for ejectment
client, public officer, or public body.” with damages was filed by plaintiff-appellant
Thus, “appearance as counsel” is a voluntary Agustin, as administrator of his wife’s estate, against
submission to a court’s jurisdiction by a legal defendant-appellee Bacalan, before the City Court
advocate. Judging from the prescribed criteria it can of Cebu.
be said that both Assemblymen are counsels to their In his complaint, plaintiff asked that defendant, who
clients. is a lessee of a one-door ground floor space in the
The next question to be answered is: are the Courts building owned by plaintiff’s late wife, be ordered to
of First Instance where Assemblyman Legaspi and immediately vacate the leased premises and to pay
Fernandez appear as counsel of record, Courts with plaintiff the sum of PhP 2,300.00 representing
appellate jurisdiction? arrearages in rentals plus the corresponding rentals
until defendant actually vacates the place, attorney’s
The essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction is that fees, expenses, and costs.
it revised and corrects the proceedings in a case
already instituted. It means jurisdiction to review the In his answer, the defendant included a counter-
judgment of an inferior court. And that it calls for and claim alleging that the present action was “clearly
demand previous legitimate jurisdiction by a court of unfounded and devoid of merits, as it is tainted with
origin. malice and bad faith on the part of the plaintiff for he
knows that defendant does not have rentals in
By law, the Courts of First Instance are Courts of arrears, but notwithstanding this knowledge, plaintiff
general original jurisdiction. However, the Judiciary filed the present action merely to annoy, vex,
Act of 1948, as amended, bestowed the Courts of embarrass and inconvenience the defendant.”

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33 IGNORANTIA PORTALIS LEGIS ACADEMIC YEAR 2016-2017

Defendant then further stated that because of the of Cebu, should be treated as having been deemed
unwarranted and malicious filing of the said action, waived. It is as though it has never been brought
he suffered and will continue to suffer, actual and before trial court. It may not be entertained on
moral damages in the amount of no less than PhP appeal.
50,000.00; PhP 10,000.00 in concept of exemplary
The amount of judgment therefore, obtained by the
damages. In addition, defendant wants plaintiff to
defendant-appellee on appeal, cannot exceed the
pay him the sum of PhP 3,500.00 as attorney’s fees.
jurisdiction of the court in which the action began.
City Court of Cebu: it dismissed the counterclaim Since the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over
and ordered the defendant to vacate the premises in the defendant’s counterclaim in excess of the
question and to pay the plaintiff the sum of PhP jurisdictional amount, the appellate court, likewise,
3,887.10 as unpaid back rentals and the sum of PhP acquired no jurisdiction over the same by its
150.00 as attorney’s fees. decisions or otherwise. Appellate jurisdiction being
only a continuation of the exercise of the same
The defendant then filed an appeal with the Court of
judicial power, which has been executed in the court
First Instance of Cebu.
of original jurisdiction, also presupposes that the
Court of First Instance: reversed the City Court of original and appellate courts are capable of
Cebu’s ruling ordering plaintiff to pay defendant a participating in the exercise of the same judicial
sum total of PhP 16,000.00 for damages and power. It is the essential criterion of appellate
attorney’s fees. jurisdiction that it revises and corrects the
proceedings in a cause already instituted, and does
The plaintiff-appellant took no appeal and the not create that cause.
decision lapsed into finality and became executory.
When a writ of execution was issued, plaintiff’s It is a well-settled rule that when a court transcends
counsel filed for reconsideration. The motion was the limits prescribed for it by law and assumes to act
denied. where it has no jurisdiction, its adjudications will be
utterly void and of no effect either as an estoppel or
Thereafter, with the aid of new counsel, the plaintiff- otherwise. The Court of First Instance, in the case at
appellant filed a complaint for the declaration of bar, having awarded judgment in favor of the
nullity of the decision of the CFI in the ejectment defendant-appellee in excess of its appellate
case on the ground that the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction to the extent of PhP 6,000.00 over the
jurisdiction was null and void from the beginning as maximum allowable award of PhP 10,000.00, the
it granted relief in the total sum of PhP 16,000.00 excess is null and void and of no effect.
which is clearly beyond the jurisdiction of the City
Court of Cebu. Section 88 of the Judiciary Act of The nullity of such portion of the decision in question,
1948, as amended, limits the jurisdiction of the city however, is not such as to affect the conclusions
courts in civil cases to PhP 10,000.00 as the reached by the court in the main case for ejectment
maximum amount of the demand. as the court’s decision over the main action will
remain unaffected.
A motion to dismiss was filed by the defendant and
was sustained by the court because it believes that Held: WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of
the present complaint of the plaintiff fails to allege a First Instance of Cebu, Branch III in Civil Case No.
valid cause of action as the same is only a clear R-12430 for ejectment is hereby DECLARED NULL
attempt to utilize the remedy for the annulment of the AND VOID insofar as it awards damages on the
judgment rendered by the Court to offset the adverse defendant-appellee's counterclaim in excess of
effects of failure to appeal. P6,000.00 beyond its appellate jurisdiction. The
decision in all other respects is AFFIRMED. The
Plaintiff-appellant then filed a motion for order of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch
reconsideration and was denied, prompting him to V dismissing Civil Case No. R-13462 for declaration
file an appeal before the CA. of nullity of judgment with preliminary injunction is
CA: in a resolution, certified the same to the SC on hereby MODIFIED, Civil Case No. R-13462 is
the ground that it involves pure questions of law. ordered DISMISSED insofar as the decision sought
to be annulled upholds the defendant's right to
Issue: Whether or not the Court of First Instance possession of the disputed property. The
may, in an appeal, award the defendant-appellee’s defendant's counterclaim for damages is GRANTED
counterclaim in an amount exceeding or beyond the to the extent of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00)
jurisdiction of the court of origin. PESOS. The grant of SIX THOUSAND (P6,000.00)
PESOS in excess of such amount is hereby declared
Ruling:
NULL and VOID, for having been awarded beyond
The defendant-appellee’s counterclaim beyond PhP the jurisdiction of the court.
10,000.00, the jurisdictional amount of the city Court

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34 IGNORANTIA PORTALIS LEGIS ACADEMIC YEAR 2016-2017

38. ST. ANNE MEDICAL CENTER vs. by the complaining employees of the hospital. In
PAREL denying reconsideration, Director Parel held that the
hospital (that is, its owner) had been given ample
opportunity "to effect restitution and rectify [the]
Facts: violations" 3 found against it. In the same order, he
ordered the issuance of a writ of execution.
This case stemmed from a complaint filed on Forthwith, Dr. Fernandez petitioned this Court. The
February 9, 1987 by Raquel Hit, et al., against St. petition, for certiorari and prohibition, was brought in
Anne Medical Center with postal address at Cadiz the name of "St. Anne Medical Center", as petitioner,
City, for the following causes of actions: although it does not appear that it is a juridical entity.
4 Under the Rules of Court, "[o]nly natural or juridical
1. Underpayment of the basic minimum wage persons or entities authorized by law may be parties
having paid only P10.00/day; in a civil action." 5 In view of the serious questions
involved, though, and as will be seen hereafter, the
2. Under payment of ECOLA having paid only Court bypasses technical distinctions in this case
P170.00 per month; and impleads the planters' association, the real
owner of the hospital and hence, the real party in
3. Non-payment of overtime pay in excess of 40 interest, as the petitioner. Under the Rules likewise,
hours while working for 6 days a week; "[p]arties may be . . added by order of the court . . .
on its own initiative at any stage of the action and on
4. Underpayment of 13th month pay under P.D. such terms as are just. 6
851;
In addition to the petitioners' fundamental objection
5. Underpayment of regular holiday, special that they were denied due process, the jurisdiction
holiday, rest day premium pay and underpayment of of the Regional Director of the Department of Labor
overtime pay; and and Employment, in this case, Director Parel, as
stated earlier, to act on the money claims, is assailed
6. Non-payment of ECOLA during sick leave in the petition.
and maternity leave with pay.

The management, thru Dr. Jose P. Fernandez, 39. REPUBLIC vs. ASUNCION
Medical Director and Administrator of the above-
mentioned hospital, was instructed to effect
restitution and/or correction within 10 days specified
in the Notice of Inspection Results copy of which was FACTS:
furnished to him. Records show however that
management failed to comply with the instruction. A Section 46 of Republic Act No. 6975 (An Act
subpoena Duces Tecum was issued directing the establishing the Philippine National Police) provides
management to submit to this Office all employment that "criminal cases involving PNP members shall be
records and payrolls to determine the extent of within the exclusive jurisdiction of the regular
violations discovered. Again, management failed to courts”.
comply notwithstanding the fact that they received
the said subpoena and their failure was unjustified. Private respondent Alexander Dionisio y Manio, a
Incidentally, only xerox copies of the payrolls and member of the Philippine National Police (PNP)
daily time records for the months of April 1984, assigned to the Central Police District Command
November 1985 and December 1986 were Station 2 in Novaliches, Quezon City, was
submitted prompting this Office to determine the dispatched by his Commanding Officer to Dumalay
extent of violations based on available data and Street in Novaliches to respond to a complaint that a
complainants' interviews. person was creating trouble there. Dionisio
proceeded to that place, where he subsequently
shot to death T/Sgt. Romeo Sadang.
Issue: Whether or not there is jurisdiction of the
Regional Director of the Department of Labor and Pursuant to Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of
Employment to act on money claims. Court, the Office of the City Prosecutor filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City an
Held: No. Information charging Dionisio with the crime of
homicide.
Dr. Jose Fernandez, director of St. Anne Medical
Center, then sought reconsideration, alleging that The respondent Judge dismissed the case "for re-
Director Parel erred in imposing the money award: filing with the Sandiganbayan" on the ground that the
(1) in the absence of notice and hearing; (2) that the Sandiganbayan, and not the Regional Trial Court,
said award was not supported by evidence; and (3) has jurisdiction over the case.
that there was pending with the National Labor
Relations Commission an Identical complaint filed

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Petitioner insists that the dismissal of the criminal by the private respondent in the course of the latter's
case "for refiling with the Sandiganbayan" was mission.
erroneous because Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975
vests the exclusive jurisdiction in criminal cases The Court ordered the respondent Judge to conduct
involving PNP members only in the "regular courts" a preliminary hearing to determine whether the
which excludes the Sandiganbayan since it is, crime charged was committed by the private
constitutionally and statutorily, a "special court" and respondent in relation to his office, and if he
not a regular court. determines that the crime charged was committed
by the private respondent in relation to his office, the
ISSUE: court shall direct the respondent Judge to transmit
the records of the case to the Sandiganbayan.
Whether or not the term "regular courts" includes the Otherwise, the court shall direct him to set aside the
Sandiganbayan. challenged orders and to proceed with the hearing
of the case and to render judgment thereon.
HELD:

Yes. The Court held that the regular courts referred 40. HEIRS OF ROMAN SORIANO vs. CA
to in Sec. 46 of RA 6975 includes the
Sandiganbayan which has exclusive original
jurisdiction to try offenses on felonies committed by
public officers in relation to their office, whether - Legal and Equitable Jurisdiction -
simple or complex with other crimes where the FACTS: A parcel of land was originally owned by
penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision
Adriano Soriano who died intestate. In 1967, his
correccional (Sec. 4, par. c, PD 1606).
heirs leased the property to the de Vera spouses for
a period of 15 years. The contract provided that
What is contemplated in the law is the regular civil
court to the exclusion of non-regular courts such as Roman Soriano, one of the children of the late
military courts which had previous jurisdiction over Adriano, will be the caretaker of the property during
police officers. The police force being civilian in the period of the lease.
character should be under the jurisdiction of the civil
During the effectivity of the lease contract,
court. The mandate of Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975
the heirs of Adriano entered into an extrajudicial
is to divest courts-martial of any jurisdiction over
criminal cases involving PNP members and to return settlement of his estate. The land was assigned to
or transfer that jurisdiction to the civil courts. Adriano’s 7 children who sold their shares, except
Ramon, to the Abalos spouses who later registered
Regular courts are those within the judicial their title to the 6/7 portion of the property.
department of the government, namely, the
The de Vera spouses ousted Ramon as
Supreme Court and such lower courts as may be
caretaker. Ramon filed a case for reinstatement in
established by law. Per Section 16, Chapter 4, Book
II of the Administrative Code of 1987, such lower an Agrarian Court which rendered a decision
courts "include the Court of Appeals, authorizing the ejectment of Roman. On appeal, the
Sandiganbayan, Court of Tax Appeals, Regional decision was reversed by the CA and it became final
Trial Courts, Shari'a District Courts, Metropolitan and executory. However, before it was executed, the
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Circuit parties entered into a post-decisional agreement
Trial Courts, and Shari'a Circuit Courts." wherein the de Vera spouses allowed Roman to
sublease the property until the termination of the
However, for the Sandiganbayan to have jurisdiction original lease in 1982. The agreement was approved
over a case, it must be alleged in the information that by the Agrarian Court in an order in 1972.
the public officers or employees committed the crime
in relation to their office. This allegation is necessary In 1983, after the expiration of the original
because of the unbending rule that jurisdiction is lease and the sub-lease in favor of Roman Soriano,
determined by the allegations of the the Abalos spouses filed a case for unlawful detainer
information. Even before considering the penalty against Roman but it was dismissed on motion of the
prescribed by law for the offense charged, it is thus Abalos spouses. In 1984, they filed with the same
essential to determine whether that offense was Agrarian Court, a motion for execution of the post-
committed or alleged to have been committed by the decisional order embodying the agreement of
public officers and employees in relation to their Roman and the de Vera spouses allowing the former
offices.
to sublease the property. The motion prayed that the
Abalos spouses be placed in the use and enjoyment
In this case, it was not alleged in the information that
of the leased premises jointly with Ramon and to
the crime was committed in relation to the office of
the public officer. There is no indication at all that the levy so much of Ramon’s property to answer for the
trouble-maker was the victim and that he was shot reasonable compensation for the use and
occupation by Roman of the 6/7 share of the Abalos
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spouses in the leased premises w/c is reasonably executed. Further, the agreement sought to be
computed at P8,000 annually from 1982. Ramon enforced was approved by the court in 1972. 11
filed a motion to suspend hearing on the rental years had already passed until the motion for
demanded by the Abalos spouses until after the execution was filed in 1984. The Rules of Court
hearing on the other issues raised in his opposition provide that the execution of a judgment or a final
to the motion for execution are resolved, which are: order may be made by motion within 5 years from
(1) that the Abalos spouses were not parties to the the date it becomes final and executory. After the
compromise agreement; (2) that the compromise lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the
agreement sought to be executed had already been statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced
implemented; and (3) that the action to enforce the only by an ordinary action. Furthermore, it is
compromise agreement had already prescribed. indubitable that the agreement sought to be
executed had already been executed by the parties.
The motion to suspend hearing on the issue
The obligations of spouses de Vera and of Roman
of rentals was denied. Roman’s MR was denied.
under sublease agreement had already been
Roman filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
complied with. At the time the motion for execution
with the CA w/c sought the nullification of the order
was filed, the sublease contract had already expired.
of the Agrarian Court denying his motion for
Hence, there was nothing more to execute.
suspension of the hearing on the issue of rentals and
the resolution denying his motion for The application by the trial court of its equity
reconsideration. jurisdiction is misplaced. Equity is available only in
the absence of law and not as its replacement. All
Roman died in 1985.
abstract arguments based only on equity should
The CA denied the petition. It quoted, with yield to positive rules (judicial rules of procedure),
approval, the order of the Agrarian Court: “Equity which pre-empt and prevail over such persuasions.
has been defined as a complement of legal Moreover, a court acting without jurisdiction cannot
jurisdiction, that which seeks and do complete justify its assumption thereof by invoking its equity
justice where courts of law, through the inflexibility of jurisdiction.
their rules and want of power to adopt their
Accordingly, petition is GRANTED. The
judgments to the special circumstances of case, are
Decision appealed from is SET ASIDE. The motion
incompetent to do so. Ramon has been enjoying the
for execution filed in the Agrarian Court is DENIED.
use and occupation of the property from the time his
sub-lease contract expired in 1982 without paying
any compensation or rental. He has been enriching 41. TORIBIA LAMAGAN vs. HON. DE LA
himself at the expense of the Abalos spouses who CRUZ
are now the owners of 6/7 portion of the property.
Equity therefore demands that Ramon should pay
the reasonable compensation for his use and - Jurisdiction and Exercise of Jurisdiction -
occupation of said 6/7 portion of the property now
pertaining to the Abalos spouses.” FACTS: Respondent Cosme Follosco, as plaintiff,
filed a complaint for ejectment and damages against
Not satisfied with the decision of the CA, the petitioner Toribia Lamagan and her husband
heirs of Roman brought this petition on the ground Ambrosio Leonor (now deceased), as defendants, in
that the CA gravely abused its discretion when it the lower court presided by respondent Judge, Hon.
upheld the Agrarian Court Judge in assuming Rafael de la Cruz. Follosco prayed of the lower court
jurisdiction over the issue of fixing rental despite the that it order defendants to vacate the 48-hectare
fact that the compromise agreement sought to be portion of his land “illegally occupied” by them and to
enforced had already been complied with. restore possession thereof to him. In answer to
ISSUE: WON equity jurisdiction is applicable in this Follosco’s complaint, petitioner Lamagan and her
case late husband, as defendants, claimed that they and
their predecessors-in-interest were in open and
RULING: NO. The filing of a motion for execution of adverse possession of the property since 1890; that
the post decisional agreement between the de Vera Follosco’s title was acquired through fraud and
spouses and Roman was not the property remedy. deceit; and that the land should be deemed held in
The relief demanded by the Abalos spouses can trust by Follosco for them. As counterclaim,
properly be asked for in an unlawful detainer or in defendants prayed for reconveyance of the disputed
other property proceedings. The Agrarian Court land to them on theory that the same should be
erred in not dismissing outright the motion for deemed as held in trust by Follosco for them.
execution filed by the Abalos spouses. Said court
had no jurisdiction to entertain propositions outside During the direct examination of petitioner’s late
of the scope of the agreement sought to be husband, as first witness for the defendants,
Follosco’s counsel objected to a question dealing
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with the ownership of the land and manifested a rendered by the trial court on the merits of the
continuing objection to all similar questions which case
would elicit evidence of alleged ownership of 2. A line must be drawn between errors of
defendants, on the ground that Follosco’s title was judgment and errors of jurisdiction. An error
already indefeasible and beyond judicial review. of judgment is one which the court may
Respondent court ruled that all questions tending to commit in the exercise o its jurisdiction. An
error of jurisdiction renders an order or
elicit proof of ownership other than those which will
judgment void or voidable. Errors of
prove a better and earlier issued Torrens Title duly
jurisdiction are reviewable on certiorari;
registered in favor of the defendants shall be barred errors of judgment, only by appeal. Let us not
and be not heard and sustained Follosco’s objection lose sight of the true function of the writ of
to defendants’ line of questioning. certiorari – to keep an inferior court within the
bounds of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from
Petitioner claims that the effect of respondent court’s
committing such a grave abuse of discretion
resolution was to totally prevent her from adducing amounting to excess of jurisdiction. And
at the trial any further evidence in support of her abuse of discretion must be so grave and
defense to the action for ejectment and of her patent to justify the issuance of the writ. But
counterclaim for reconveyance of the disputed land there are exceptional cases where certiorari
such as her documentary evidence, allegedly had been entertained despite the existence
consisting, inter alia, of a possessory information of the remedy of an appeal. But in those
title in the name of one Mariano Lamagan, deed of cases, either public welfare and the
sale by Mariano Lamagan in favor of Nicolas advancement of public policy so dictate, or
Cambiado, deed of sale of Nicolas Cambiado in the broader interests of justice so require, or
favor of Leoncio Lamagan (petitioner’s father). Her appeal was not considered the appropriate
motion for reconsideration having been denied by remedy, such as in appeals from orders of
preliminary attachment or appointment of
the trial court’s order, she asked respondent court to
receiver. In People v. Abalos, the Court
suspend further proceedings in the case below
granted as an exception a writ of certiorari
pending her elevation of the disputed ruling for against the trial court’s ruling rejecting a
review by the appellate courts and respondent court rebuttal evidence for the prosecution,
acceded accordingly. pointing out that once the accused has been
acquitted, there is no means to secure a
Petitioner accordingly filed her petition for certiorari
review by appeal, no matter how erroneous
with the CA which dismissed the same for failure to
the action of the lower court may have been.
state a cause of action for the following reasons: (1) No equally compelling reason has been
the petitioner is permitted to present evidence which advanced by the petitioner as would place
will indubitably show a better right and (2) the issue her case within the exceptions.
does not appear to be within the ambit of a writ of 3. Assuming that the trial court erred in rejecting
certiorari. The appellate court, in denying petitioner’s petitioner’s proffered evidence, petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration, noted that the recourse is clear under the long established
counterclaim for reconveyance has already rules, to wit, to make a formal offer of the
prescribed. evidence under Rule 132, Section 35, stating
on the record what a party or witness would
Hence this appeal to which the Court gave due have testified to were his testimony not
course on the strength of petitioner’s urgent plea for excluded, as well as attaching to the records
relief from the virtual refusal of the trial court to hear any rejected exhibits. The Court has long
defendants in their defense, violative of due process. noted that it is the better practice to unite with
the record the exhibits which have been
ISSUE: Did the appellate court commit any grave rejected and that such rejected or excluded
error, correctible by certiorari, in refusing to review exhibits should have been permitted by the
on certiorari the trial court’s disputed ruling in the judge a quo to be attached to the record even
case below? if not admitted in evidence, so that in case of
an appeal, the court ad quem may thus be
RULING: NO. The appellate court’s dismissal of the able to examine said exhibits and to judge
petition was in full accord with the rules and whether or not their rejection was erroneous.
applicable jurisdiction of the Court and must be
affirmed.
Accordingly, the resolution appealed from is hereby
1. Ruling of the trial court on procedural AFFIRMED and the petition is DISMISSED.
questions and on admissibility of evidence
during the course of the trial are interlocutory
in nature and may not be the subject of 42. SERAFIN DELA CRUZ vs. IAC
separate appeal or review on certiorari, but
are to be assigned as errors and reviewed in
the appeal properly taken from the decision
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- Jurisdiction and Exercise of Jurisdiction -


FACTS: Herein petitions (Serafin Dela Cruz, Eladio
Macenas, and Rodrigo Diaz) filed a complaint for
annulment and cancellation of 4 transfer certificates
43. VICTORINO DAY vs. RTC OF
of title with damages in the CFI. It was assigned to
ZAMBOANGA
respondent Judge, Hon. Antonio Solano. After
summons was served, herein private respondents
(Eden de Baradi and Jose Baradi) immediately filed
their Motion to Dismiss on the sole ground of lack of FACTS:
jurisdiction of the court to take cognizance of the said
Victorino Day is the registered owner of a parcel of
case. Herein petitioners in due time filed their
land situated at Tomas Claudio St., Zamboanga
Opposition to Motion to Dismiss invoking paragraph
City. Private respondent Go Chu is the owner of a
[b] of Section 44 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 as
building constructed on the said lot. Private
amended. Respondent Judge issued an Order
respondent was asked by petitioner to peacefully
denying the private respondents’ motion to dismiss
vacate and remove that portion of the former’s
for lack of merit. Private respondents filed their
building standing on the latter’s lot. Due to private
Motion for Reconsideration contending among other
respondent’s refusal to vacate the premises, on April
things that the court has no jurisdiction over the
17, 1982, petitioner instituted a formal complaint
case. Herein petitioners filed their pleading in
against respondent with the Office of the Barangay
Opposition thereto. The respondent Judge issued an
Chairman, Zone I, Zamboanga City. As no amicable
Order in favor of private respondents and granted
settlement could be reached in the case, the
the Motion for Reconsideration thereby revoking his
Barangay Chairman, on April 20, 1982, issued a
previous order. As a consequence, petitioners’
certification that conciliation of the dispute at the
complaint was dismissed. Petitioners filed their own
barangay level had failed. On October 16, 1984,
Motion for Reconsideration wherein they submitted
petitioner agreed to accept P1,000.00 from private
and insisted that the court has the exclusive and
respondent as rental for the use of his lot from 1979
original jurisdiction to pass upon the issue raised in
to December 1984. As petitioner had received the
petitioners’ complaint. Private respondents in due
P1,000.00 as compensation for respondent’s use of
time filed their opposition. The respondent Judge
his land, respondent claimed the existence of a
issued an Order denying the petitioners’ Motion for
lease contract between them. Respondent Go Chu,
Reconsideration.
however, failed to prove the existence of a formal or
Petitioners filed with respondent Intermediate even verbal contract of lease. On January 15, 1985,
Appellate Court a petition for certiorari, prohibition petitioner again made another demand on private
and mandamus instead of appealing from the order respondent to remove the building. Because of
dismissing the complaint for annulment of titles. The private respondent’s adamant and continued refusal
appellate court denied the petition for lack of merit. to vacate the disputed lot, petitioner filed on March
25, 1985 an action for unlawful detainer with
This petition for certiorari filed before the Supreme application for a writ of preliminary mandatory
Court rests on the allegation that the respondent injunction. Apparently, petitioner Day did not use the
Intermediate Appellate Court abused its discretion former Barangay Certification in commencing the
amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it dismissed said suit against private Respondent. On April 15,
the petition “without even a comment from private 1986, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of
respondents.” petitioner Day. On April 23, 1986, without having first
ISSUE: WON an erroneous order or decision filed a motion for reconsideration, private
rendered by a court with jurisdiction can be corrected respondent Go Chu filed an original action for
by certiorari certiorari with respondent court, against Judge
Cabato and petitioner Victorino Day. Pending
RULING: NO. Where the Court has jurisdiction over hearing of the application for preliminary injunction,
the subject matter, as respondent Judge Antonio respondent court issued a temporary restraining
Solano has in this case, the orders or decision upon order in the case.On May 12, 1986, petitioner filed
all questions pertaining to the cause are orders or his Answer and Opposition to the Petition, to which
decisions within its jurisdiction, and however private respondent filed a reply. On May 27, 1986,
erroneous they may be, they cannot be corrected by respondent court issued an order resolving all the
certioriari. This special civil action does not lie where matters and issues in the petition in favor of herein
the remedy by appeal has been lost because said petitioner Day, that the petition on its main is "lacking
remedy cannot take the place of an appeal. in merit except that there are still certain matters
Accordingly, the petition is DENIED. which the respondent court would like to resolve
after hearing thereon." The application for
preliminary injunction was likewise denied and the
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hearing of the main petition was set on June 24, appoint a receiver and it has jurisdiction to issue a
1986. At the said hearing, respondent court gave the writ of preliminary injunction in either forcible entry
parties opportunity to adduce additional arguments or unlawful detainer cases." (Regalado, Remedial
on the merits of the case. They, however, submitted Law Compendium, Second Revised Edition, p. 33).
the case for decision without further arguments, "Under the present law, an inferior court has
relying therefore on the pleadings and documents on jurisdiction to grant provisional remedies in proper
record. On July 8, 1986, however, respondent court cases. These proper cases would be:
issued another order granting the petition for
1) Preliminary attachment under Rule 57, provided
certiorari and setting aside the decision of Judge
the principal action is within its jurisdiction such as
Cabato of the Municipal Trial Court. In connection
an action for recovery of personal property valued at
therewith, the parties were directed to submit their
not more than P20,000.00; an action for recovery of
dispute before the Lupong Tagapayapa pursuant to
a sum of money not exceeding P20,000.00; an
the requirements of PD 1508. Petitioner’s motion for
action of forcible entry and unlawful detainer.
reconsideration was denied on June 25, 1987.
Hence the petition. 2) Preliminary injunction under Rule 58 in both
ISSUES: forcible entry and unlawful detainer also in cases
mentioned in the preceding paragraph."
1) Whether or not the respondent court may modify
Third issue: hird issue centers on the applicability of
or reverse its own order (of May 27, 1986) after the
prior conciliation proceedings pursuant to P.D. 1508,
lapse of 15 days from its issuance;
section 6 of which reads as follows: Sec. 6.
2) Whether or not B.P. 129 allows the plaintiff in an Conciliation, pre-condition to filing of complaint. --No
unlawful detainer case to apply for a writ of complaint, petition, action or proceeding involving
preliminary injunction; any matter within the authority of the Lupon as
provided in Sec. 2 hereof shall be filed or instituted
3) Whether or not prior conciliation proceedings
in court or any other government office for
pursuant to P.D. 1508 is applicable to petitioner’s
adjudication unless there has been a confrontation
suit in the Municipal Trial Court;
of the parties before the Lupon Chairman or the
4) Whether or not respondent court may entertain Pangkat and no conciliation or settlement has been
the petition for review on certiorari when the proper reached as certified by the Lupon Secretary or the
remedy is ordinary appeal; Pangkat Secretary, attested by the Lupon or
Pangkat Chairman, or unless the settlement has
5) Whether or not respondent court, in a petition for been repudiated. However, the parties may go
certiorari, may entertain procedural questions or directly to court in the following cases:
questions of facts or substance already decided by
the lower court; and (1) where the accused is under detention;

6) Whether or not respondent court may grant a Writ (2) where a person has otherwise been deprived of
of Certiorari on grounds other than those specified personal liberty calling for habeas corpus
under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. proceedings;

HELD: (3) actions coupled with provisional remedies such


as preliminary injunction, attachment, delivery of
First issue: The test to ascertain whether an order is personal property and support pendente lite; and
interlocutory or final is: does it leave something to be
done in the court with respect to the merits of the (4) where the action may otherwise be barred by the
case? If it does, it is interlocutory; if it does not, it is Statute of Limitations.
final." In the instant case, it is evident that the
It is clear from the foregoing that prior conciliation
respondent court resolved no new or other matter in
proceedings as mandated by P.D. 1508 were
the order of July 8, 1986. Such being the case, it
inapplicable to the petitioner’s suit before the
necessarily follows that the order of May 27, 1986
Municipal Trial Court of Zamboanga City, the action
should be deemed as a final order in so far as the
being for ejectment with application for a writ of
issues resolved therein are concerned. Thus, the
preliminary mandatory injunction. P.D. 1508
respondent court was without jurisdiction to modify
provides that an action "coupled with provisional
or reverse the earlier order after the expiration of
remedies such as preliminary injunction," etc. does
fifteen (15) days from and after receipt thereof by the
not require conciliation proceedings as a pre-
parties, considering that there was no motion for
condition for filing an action in court. The case of
reconsideration filed by then private respondent Go
petitioner being an exception to the requirement of
Chu.
prior conciliation by P.D. 1508, it was not necessary
Second issue: B.P. 129 provides: "provided the main for petitioner to first secure the necessary
action is within its jurisdiction, an inferior court can
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certification to file action from the proper barangay


court. 44. FULE vs. HON. PANO

Fourth issue: The court disagreed on private


respondent's belief that the action he filed before the
respondent Regional Trial Court was both an original FACTS:
action for certiorari and a petition for certiorari as a 1. On April 26, 1973 Amado G. Garcia died, he
mode of appeal. Applying Sec. 22 of B.P. 129 owned property in Calamba, Laguna.
(governing law in the matter of appeals from the 2. On May 2, 1973, Virginia G. Fule field with
CFI Laguna a petition for letters of
inferior courts to the Regional Trial Courts),
administration and ex parte appointment as
decisions of inferior courts may be elevated to the
special administratix over the estate. Motion
Regional Trial Court only by ordinary appeal, that is, was granted.
by filing a Notice of Appeal with the inferior court. a. there was an allegation that the wife
The said proviso does not admit of any other mode was Carolina Carpio
of elevating decisions of inferior courts to the 3. Preciosa B. Garcia, wife of deceased, and in
Regional Trial Court presumably to carry out the behalf of their child: Agustina B. Garcia
purpose of B.P. 129 which is to simplify judicial opposed, which was denied by CFI.
procedure to effect a speedy administration of a. Preciosa alleged that Fule was a
justice. creditor of the estate, and as a mere
illegitimate sister of the deceased is
Fifth issue: The court held that respondent court has not entitled to succeed from him
no jurisdiction in a certiorari case to entertain 4. CA reversed and annulled the appointment
procedural questions or questions of facts or of Fule.
substance already passed upon by the lower court. a. Preciosa became special
This is a procedural question or a question of fact administratrix upon a bond of P30k.
which cannot be raised or corrected in a certiorari
case, but should be assigned as error and reviewed ISSUES:
in the appeal properly taken from the decision a.) Venue v. jurisdiction
rendered by the trial court on the merits of the case. b.) What does the word “resides” in Revised Rules
of Court Rule 73 Section 1 Mean?
It is therefore clear that respondent court erred in
c.) Who is entitled?
reversing the lower court’s findings regarding the
sufficiency of the Barangay Certificate of 1982. It
HELD/RATIO:
was an error for the respondent court to rule upon a
a.) RULE 73
question of fact or procedural question already SECTION 1. “if the decedent is an inhabitant of
decided by the lower court. the Philippines at the time of his death, whether
Sixth issue: The court ruled in the negative regarding a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or
the question on whether or not the respondent court letters of administration granted, and his estate
can grant a writ of certiorari on grounds other than settled at the CFI in the province in which he
those specified under Sec. 1, Rule 65 of the Rules resides at the time of his death,
of Court.In an original action for certiorari under Sec.
1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the grounds for the And if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the
issuance of the Writ of Certiorari are as follows: CFI of any province in which he had estate.

(a) Lack of jurisdiction; The court 1st taking cognizance of the settlement
(b) Grave abuse of discretion; and of the estate of a decedent shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.
(c) When the court acts without or in excess of The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it
jurisdiction. depends on the place of residence of the
decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall
Clearly, the only grounds which may serve as the
not be contested in a suit or proceedings, except
basis for the respondent court to raise the writ of
in an appeal from that court, in the original case,
certiorari are lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the
discretion by the inferior court or that the said inferior
record.”
court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in its
appreciation of the barangay certification as
Fule’s own submitted Death Certificate shows that
constituting sufficient compliance with P.D. 1508.
the deceased resided in QC at the time of his death,
WHEREFORE, finding merit in the appeal of
therefore the venue of Laguna was improper.
petitioner, the assailed order of the respondent court
is hereby SET ASIDE and the order of the Municipal
Venue is subject to waiver (RULE 4 SECTION 4),
Trial Court of Zamboanga City, Branch II in Civil
but Preciosa did not waive it, merely requested for
Case No. 3717 (169-11) is hereby REINSTATED.
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alternative remedy to assert her rights as surviving but the preference of Preciosa is with sufficient
spouse. reason – the widow would have the right of
succession over a portion of the exclusive property
However, venue is distinct from “jurisdiction” of the decedent, besides her share in the conjugal
which is conferred by Judiciary Act of 1948, as partnership.
amended to be with CFIs independently from the
place of residence of the deceased. For such reason, she would have as such, if not
more, interest in administering the entire estate
RULE 79 correctly than any other next of kin.
SECTION 2, demands that the petition should show
the existence of jurisdiction to make the appointment DISPOSITION: Fule’s petition DENIED.
sought, and should allege all the necessary facts
such as death, name, last residence, existence,
45. MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY vs.
situs of assets, intestacy, right of person who seeks
ATTORNEY-GENERAL
administration as next of kin, creditor or otherwise to
be appointed.
FACTS:
b.) Resides – ex vi termini “actual residence” This is a case of appeal from CFI Tarlac’s judgment
- Elastic and should be interpreted in the light dismissing the action before it on motion of the
of the object or purpose of the statute or rule plaintiff upon the ground that the court had no
in which it is employed. jurisdiction of the subject matter.
- Same meaning as “inhabitant”.
- Popular sense – the personal, actual or Manila Railroad Co. began an action in CFI Tarlac
physical habitation of a person, actual for the condemnation of real estate located in Tarlac.
residence or place of abode This is for construction of a railroad line “from
- Must be more than temporary Paniqui to Tayug in Tarlac,” as authorized by law.
Before beginning the action, Manila Railroad had
Distinguished from caused to be made a thorough search in the Office
of the Registry of Property and of the Tax where the
“legal residence or domicile” – requires bodily lands sought to be condemned were located and to
presence and an intention to make it one’s whom they belonged. As a result of such
domicile. investigations, it alleged that the lands in question
were located in Tarlac. After filing and duly serving
c.) Preciosa is prima facie entitled to the the complaint, the plaintiff, pursuant to law and
appointment of special administratrix. pending final determination of the action, took
possession of and occupied the lands described in
The New Rules RULE 80 SECTION 1 broadened the
the complaint, building its line and putting the same
basis for appointment of special administrator
in operation.
(temporarily) to take possession and charge of the
estates of the deceased until the questions causing Manila Railroad gave notice to the defendants that a
the delay are decided and (regular) executors or motion would be made to the court to dismiss the
administrators appointed. action upon the ground that the court had no
jurisdiction of the subject matter, it having just been
Old rules basis ay: appeal of allowance of ascertained by the plaintiff that the land sought to be
disallowance of a will; condemned was situated in the Province of Nueva
Ecija, instead of the Province of Tarlac, as alleged in
New: added - “xxx delay in granting letters the complaint.
testamentary or of administration by any cause
(includes parties cannot agree among themselves) The trial court dismissed the action on the based that
including an appeal of allowance of disallowance of CFI of a given province has no given power or
a will, the court may appoint a xxx” authority where the land is located in another
province, and that no such power, authority, or
The discretion to appoint a special administrator or jurisdiction can be conferred by the parties. Thus,
not is with the probate court, the paramount the case was appealed.
consideration is the beneficial interest of the
appointee in the estate of the decedent.
ISSUE:
In re: Fule, it is not required that the administratrix be 1. Whether CFI of Tarlac has power and
entitled to share in the estate of the decedent – only
authority to take cognizance of
that one is entitled to the administration;

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condemnation of real estate located in court and the subject, but between the plaintiff and
another province the defendant. It relates not to jurisdiction but to trial.
2. Whether Sec. 377[1] of the Code of Civil It simply gives to defendant the unqualified right, if
Procedure and Act. No. 1258 are applicable he desires it, to have the trial take place where his
and so the CFI has no jurisdiction. land lies and where, probably, all of his witnesses
live. Its object is to secure to him a convenient trial.
HELD:
The fact that such a provision appears in the
1. YES. procedural law at once raises a strong presumption
that it has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the
As provided under the Philippine Commission, the court over the subject matter. It becomes merely a
CFI has an original jurisdiction in all civil actions matter of method, of convenience to the parties
which involve the title to or possession of real litigant. If their interests are best subserved by
property, or any interest therein, or the legality of any bringing in the Court Instance of the city of Manila an
tax, impost, or assessment, except actions of action affecting lands in the Province of Ilocos Norte,
forcible entry into, and detainer of lands or buildings. there is no controlling reason why such a course
should not be followed. The matter is, under the law,
It is apparent that the jurisdiction does not depend
entirely within the control of either party. The
upon the locality. Other provisions are intended not
plaintiff’s interests select the venue. If such selection
to limit the jurisdiction of the court but it simply
is not in accordance with section 377, the defendant
arrange for the convenient and effective transaction
may make timely objection and, as a result, the
of business in the courts and do not relate to their
venue is changed to meet the requirements of the
power, authority, or jurisdiction over the subject
law.
matter of the action.
Section 377 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not
Certain statutes confer jurisdiction, power, or
applicable to actions by railroad corporations to
authority. Other provides for the procedure by which
condemn lands; and that, while with the consent of
that power or authority is projected into judgment.
defendants express or implied the venue may be laid
The one class deals with the powers of the Court in
and the action tried in any province selected by the
the real and substantive sense while the other with
plaintiff nevertheless the defendants whose lands lie
the procedure by which such powers are put into
in one province, or any one of such defendants, may,
action. The purpose of such a procedure is not to
by timely application to the court, require the venue
restrict the jurisdiction of the court over the subject
as to their, or, if one defendant, his, lands to be
matter, but to give it effective facility in righteous
changed to the province where their or his lands lie.
action. Its proper aim is to facilitate the application of
In such case the action as to all of the defendants
justice to the rival claims of contending parties. It
not objecting would continue in the province where
was created not to hinder and delay but to facilitate
originally begun. It would be severed as to the
and promote the administration of justice. It does not
objecting defendants and ordered continued before
constitute the thing itself which courts are always
the court of the appropriate province or provinces.
striving to secure to litigants. It is designed as the
While we are of that opinion and so hold it can not
means best adopted to obtain that thing. if that
affect the decision in the case before us for the
power is not exercised in conformity with the
reason that the defendants are not objecting to the
provisions of the procedural law, purely, the court
venue and are not asking for a change thereof. They
attempting to exercise it loses the power to exercise
have not only expressly submitted themselves to the
it legally. This does not mean that it loses jurisdiction
jurisdiction of the court but are here asking that that
of the subject matter. It means simply that he may
jurisdiction be maintained against the efforts of the
thereby lose jurisdiction of the person or that the
plaintiff to remove it.
judgment may thereby be rendered defective for lack
of something essential to sustain it. Moreover, the principles which we have herein laid
down we do not apply to criminal cases. They seem
2. NO.
to rest on a different footing. There the people of the
Ratio Sec. 377 contains no express inhibition state is a party. The interests of the public require
against the court. The prohibition provided therein is that, to secure the best results and effects in the
clearly directed against the one who begins the punishment of crime, it is necessary to prosecute
action and lays the venue. The court, before the and punish the criminal in the very place, as near as
action is commenced, has nothing to do with it either. may be, where he committed his crime. As a result it
The plaintiff does both. Only when that is done does has been the uniform legislation, both in statutes and
the section begin to operate effectively so far as the in constitutions, that the venue of a criminal action
court is concerned. The prohibition is not a limitation must be laid in the place where the crime was
on the power of the court but on the rights of the committed. While the laws here do not specifically
plaintiff. It establishes a relation not between the and in terms require it, we believe it is the
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established custom and the uniform holding that considering that jurisdiction to issue this
criminal prosecutions must be brought and extraordinary writ is also possessed by the
conducted, except in cases especially provided by Court of Appeals as well as the Regional
law, in the province where the crime is committed. Trial Court of the district.
The judgment must be REVERSED and the case
HELD:
REMANDED to the trial court with direction to
proceed with the action according to law. 1. YES

The defendants' answer appears on its face to


46. VERGARA vs. HON. SUELTO tender issues. It purports to deal with each of the
material allegations of the complaint, and either
specifically denies, or professes lack of
FACTS: knowledge or information to form a belief as to
them. It also sets up affirmative defenses. But
Petitioner Vergara filed in the Municipal Trial Court the issues thus tendered are sham, not genuine.
of Davao City an action for illegal detainer against
Their disavowal of the plaintiff's ownership of the
the private respondents. The petitioner alleged that
building occupied by them also cannot be
he owns a commercial building which the private
genuine. They had each been occupying those
respondents occupied it as lessees. They entered
three (3) sections for years and been paying
into a contract and agreed to pay monthly rentals.
rentals therefor to the petitioner. Their answer
However, the private respondent defaulted in their
contains their admission that the petitioner has
payment which prompted the petitioner’s lawyer in
title over the land on which the building stands.
sending demand letter which consists of demanding
the private respondents to pay their unpaid rentals, Also patently sham is their professed ignorance
terminate their contract and to vacate the leased of the joint letter sent by them to the petitioner.
premises. The court believes that either they wrote the
The private respondents sent a reply to the petitioner letter or they did not, either way, they cannot but
confirming their commitment to leave the premises have knowledge of it. To say that they are
but to give them an extension to be able to find new ignorant of it is palpable dishonesty.
space.
However, the private respondents wrote another So, too, their denial of ever having paid rents to
letter which contains an acknowledgement that the the plaintiff is fictitious. The facts on records
petitioner owns the premises and their status as shows an official receipt issued to defendant
lessees but they refuse to vacate because the lot Montebon.
where the building stands forms part of a tract of land Finally, their affirmative defense, in which they
which was ordered reverted to the public domain. assert title in themselves over the land on which
The petitioner reiterates his demand to let the private the petitioner's building stands, is also sham,
respondents vacate but the reply having gone even an absurdity. They base their claim on a
unheeded, he initiated the proceeding to Office of judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court in
Brgy. Captain but there was no conciliation. So he an entirely separate action in which title over a
instituted an ejectment suit. large tract of land of which the petitioner 's once
The private respondents answered it by denying the formed a part had been annulled, and the land
petitioner’s ownership, that the contract entered by ordered reverted to the public domain. But
them is null and void, they are not paying any rental neither the petitioner nor the respondents are
fees, they do not have any knowledge any letter parties to this action.
about their promise to vacate and they occupy the
lands as owners. In any event, the claim is utterly irrelevant to the
The petitioner then filed a Motion for Summary ejectment suit at bar, which involves merely the
Judgment. This was objected by the respondents by question of whether or not their possession of
filing an Opposition to Motion for Summary the petitioner's premises had become illegal in
Judgment and Motion to Dismiss. virtue of their extended failure to pay rentals and
The MTC denied the motion to dismiss. Accordingly, their refusal to vacate the premises and pay
the ownership of the petitioner has not been denied those arrears despite due demand. They are
instead the respondent insisted their claim of moreover estopped to dispute the petitioner's
ownership of the land to be a ground for a dismissal title. The tenant is not permitted to deny the title
of this case for the court's lack of jurisdiction. The of his landlord at the time of the commencement
court believes that the case is an Unlawful detainer of the relation of landlord and tenant between
in which they have the authority to resolve. However, them.
the MTC denied the Motion for Summary Judgment.
2.
ISSUE:
The remedy of mandamus or other extraordinary
1. Whether summary judgment is proper writ against a municipal court can be obtained
2. Whether the writ of mandamus filed against from the Court of Appeals or Regional Trial Court
the MTC to Supreme Court is proper of the district, both of which tribunals share this
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Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to issue the writ. As Whether or not a Court of First Instance or a branch
a matter of policy such a direct recourse to the thereof, has jurisdiction to annul or set aside, for
SC should not be allowed. The Supreme Court alleged irregularities an execution sale, held by
is a court of last resort. Its original jurisdiction to virtue of a decision rendered by anotherCourt of First
issue the so-called extraordinary writs should be Instance or a branch thereof, and subsequently to
exercised only where absolutely necessary or order the return of the properties sold at public
where serious and important reasons exist auction to the judgment debtor
therefor.
Held:
In the case at bar, however, to apply the policy Pursuant to the policy of judicial stability, the
by referring the action to the Regional Trial Court judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction may not
of the district would serve no useful purpose. It be interfered with by any court of concurrent
would on the contrary work injustice to the jurisdiction. No court has the power to interfere by
petitioner to whom the relief rightly due has injunction, with the judgments or decrees of a court
already been withheld for many years. The case of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction having equal
having been filed before this Court as early as power to grant the relief sought by injunction. For the
1986, and having already been subject of an simple reason that the power to open, modify or
extensive exchange of pleadings, it should and vacate a judgment is not only possessed by, but is
will now be decided without further delay. restricted to the court in which the judgment was
WHEREFORE, the Order of the respondent rendered. For obvious reasons, the matter should
Judge denying the petitioner's (plaintiff's) motion have been laid to rest, but private respondent
for summary judgment, and that declining to instead again filed a complaint with the Court of First
reconsider the same, are hereby annulled and Instance of Rizal, Branch XXXIII, raising the very
set aside. Said respondent Judge is hereby same issues which were already decided by the
commanded forthwith to render a summary Court of First Instance, Branch XIII with finality. It is
judgment in favor of the petitioner (plaintiff) an important fundamental principle in Our judicial
against the private respondents (defendants). system that every litigation must come to an end.
Access to the courts is guaranteed. But there must
be a limit thereto. Once a litigant's rights have been
47. NGO BUN TIONG vs. HON. SAYO adjudicated in a valid final judgment of a competent
court, he should not be granted an unbridled license
to come back for another try. The prevailing party
Facts: should not be harassed by subsequent suits. For, if
endless litigations were to be encouraged,
The case originated from a decision of the Court a unscrupulous litigants will multiply in number to the
First Instance of Manila, Branch XIII in a case detriment of the administration of justice.
entitled “Caltex (Phil.) Inc. vs. Pilares Construction
Co.” ordering among others, the payment by the
defendant to the plaintiff of the sum of P67,052.32 48. SCHNECKENBERGER vs. MORAN
plus interests, attorney's fees and costs.Said
decision became final and execution thereof
commenced with an execution sale for the
purpose.Meanwhile, the case was appealed up to Facts:
the Supreme Court. Pending proceedings in the
latter court,private respondent filed a complaint with The petitioner Schneckenberger is a consul
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch of Uruguay at Manila on June 11, 1934. He was
XXXIII,Caloocan City, against herein petitioner and subsequently charged with the crime of falsification
Emilio Z. Reyes for "Declaration of Nullity of of a private document on the CFI of Manila.
theAuction Sale and Damages" and a Motion to
Annul Certificate of Sale and to declare alleged He objected to the jurisdiction of the court on
auction sale with the Court of First Instance of the ground that both constitution of the US and Phils.
Manila, Branch XIII as null and void. The said court the CFI/RTC has no jurisdiction to try him.
rendered judgment issuing a writ of preliminary
RTC: His objection was overruled
prohibitory and mandatory injunction restraining
defendants from pulling out or removing any such (Hence, this petition in the SC for a writ of prohibition
property of the plaintiff from its compound, and with a view to preventing CFI from taking cognizance
ordering defendants to return immediately such of the Crim. Action against him)
equipments and properties now in their possession
which were removed or hauled by them by virtue of Issue: WoN the original jurisdiction possessed and
the sale allegedly had between them. This order of exercised by the SC at the time of the adoption of
the CFI, Branch XXXIII is now being assailed. the constitution was exclusive

Issue: Ruling: It results that the original jurisdiction


possessed and exercised by the Supreme Court of
the Phils. at the time of the adoption of the
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Constitution was not exclusive of, but concurrent presents evidences that were not filed before
with, that of the Courts of First Instance. because of the mistakes of his previous lawyers
The provision in the constitution when construed Ruling:
does not suggest that the SC jurisdiction to try cases
Consequently, the receipts and other
affecting ambassadors, public ministers and consuls
documents constituting his evidence which he failed
is exclusive. Diplomatic immunity cannot be invoked,
to present in the Sandiganbayan are entitled to be
as consuls do not have that kind of privilege. The
appreciated, however, by that forum and not this
consul must be tried like a normal person who
court, for the general rule is that we are not tries of
committed a crime here.
facts.
The laws in force in the Philippines prior to the
Basically, the SC granted the Omnibus
inauguration of the Commonwealth conferred upon
Motion and considered the presentation of the
the Courts of First Instance original jurisdiction in all
petitioner’s evidences for purposes of equity and
criminal cases to which a penalty of more than six
just. The petitioner should not suffer and risk his
months’ imprisonment or a fine exceeding one
liberty because of the mistake of his previous
hundred dollars might be imposed.
counsel. However, the SC clearly expresses that it
So basically, both RTC/CFI and SC has concurrent is not a trier of facts. Hence, it remanded the case to
jurisdiction to try the petitioner. the Sandiganbayan wherein the evidences are to be
appreciated.
49. DE GUZMAN vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
50. PNB vs. CA

Facts: The petitioner has a case against him in FACTS:


Sandiganbayan for violation of Sec. 3 of Anti-Graft
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration to the
and Corrupt Practices Act for his alleged failure to
CA alleging that their right to appeal may not be
account for P200,000.00 received for certain official
training programs of the DOA. The sandiganbayan denied for a mere 3 day delay in filing the Notice of
and the court found the petitioner guilty as his guilt Appeal especially when respondents substantial
was established by the lone prosecution witness rights have not been prejudiced by such delay and
Josephine Angeles testimony that no such training demand that the case be tried on the merits and not
programs were hel at the designated places and
on the technicality.
petitioner’s failure to present a single receipt to
support a due due disbursement of the P200,000.00, Petitioners aver that the date to be considered is
resulting from his former lawyer’s insistence in filing January 28 when petitioners counsel received it and
a demurrer to evidence despite prior leave for that
not January 23 when it was received and signed by
purpose having been denied by the Sandiganbayan.
The petitioner’s new counsel filed in his behalf an a PNB employee Catalino Sandoval, of the Mailing
Omnibus Motion For Leave to Vacate First Motion Division.
For Reconsideration In the Light of the present
Developments And to consider Evidence Presented RTC ruled against the letter contended receipt on
Herein and to set aside Conviction. In this Omnibus January 28 since PNB’s counsel thru the Legal
Motion petitioner seeks to be relieved from what he Department is estopped from questioning the validity
considers in the serious and costly mistake of his of the service of the decision to him not having
former lawyers in demurring to the prosecution questioned before the validity and efficacy of service
evidence after court leave was denied, the effect of
thru the mailing division of PNB (he admitted that
which deprived him of presenting before sa
Sandiganbayan the pieces of documentary evidence PNB also received copies).
that would have completely belied the accusation.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioners received the copy of
Attached in the motion are photocopies of the list of
expenses and receipts showing the disbursement of the decision of the RTC on January 28 (counsel) or
the P200k for training programs. Petitioner now January 23 (PNB employee)? // Whether or not Atty.
appeals to the court sense of justice and equity that Perez authorized Sandoval to receive copies in
these documents be summoned and appreciated by behalf of him?
the Court itself or by the Sandiganbayan after
remanding the case thereto, if only to give him the RULING: It is established that Sandoval’s authority
final chance his innocence. is to merely receive mails as an employee of the
Issue: WoN the Supreme Court has jurisdiction bank and that the decision of the Trial Court was a
over the case as the petitioner’s Omnibus Motion registered mail intended for Atty. Avamor Perez, in
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his capacity as counsel for petitioners and not as an claimants have claimed lots for there was lack of
jurisdiction in the RTC.
employee of the PNB.
In civil case GR 109645, Molina was upheld as the
The service of the decision of the RTC through
owner of the disputed lots erroneously promulgated
Sandoval was not proper due to the prescribed rules by Judge Tirso Velasco of the RTC. The court heard
in the RoC Sec. 7 & 4 of Rule 13. The general rule and decided the reconstitution case without having
is that service by registered mail is complete upon acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter, which
receipt of the addressee. was the issue of G. R. No. 112564.
There was a clear violation of RA 26, in which Judge
However, the court finds that Sandoval had authority
Velasco failed to give notice to all indispensable
to receive mails in behalf of Atty. Perez The date of parties named in the statute, specifically Ortigas that
receipt is on January 23 and the 15 day was the winner-owner in three separate cases
reglementary period is counted thereon. decided prior to the reconstitution case. Molina was
also guilty of forum shopping.
However, because of the length of the case, the SC
decides to grant the tardy appeal of 3 days after the There is no debate about the fact that the land being
claimed by Molina lies within that titled in the name
15 day reglementary period for to bar the appeal
of Ortigas and its predecessor-in-interest. Now, the
would be inequitable due to… Motion for latter's documents of ownership have been passed
Reconsideration is granted! upon, and sanctioned and sustained by this Court
more than once.
51. ORTIGAS vs. VELASCO, MOLINA vs.
JUDGE OF RTC AND MANILA 52. MANALO vs. GLORIA
BANKING CORPORATION
(Consolidated Cases)
FACTS:

FACTS: Petitioner Dolores V. Molina filed with the Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari and
RTC the reconstitution of her Transfer Certificate of Mandamus before the Supreme Court urging the SC
Title she alleged that the original copy was lost to render judgment to order the respondent
during a fire at the office of the Quezon Register of Secretary of Science and Technology to pay the
back wages of the petitioner for the period from April
Deeds, the duplicate title still in her possession.
16, 1988, the date she was illegally dismissed, to
Molina then moved to withdraw her petition stating
June 14, 1989, the date she was reinstated and to
her necessary trip to the US for 10 months. pay the petitioner the salary equivalent to the salary
Four months later, petitioner filed an ex part motion of a Planning Assistant from the time of her
for revival of her case and that her duplicate of title reinstatement and thenceforward.
was missing, she had secured a certification for the
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition should
LMB a record of her property in a microfilm negative.
be dismissed.
By order, respondent Judge Velasco granted the
petition and in a separate order declared the RULING:
amended petition sufficient in form and substance
and set it for hearing. Yes, the petition should be dismissed. The
Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue writs
Ortigas & Co. learned of the case by accident and of certiorari (as well as prohibition, mandamus, quo
filed a formal opposition thereto. In the supplemental warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is not
pleading, Ortigas & Co. averred that multiple exclusive. It is shared by the Supreme Court with
syndicates have been taking advantage of the fire of Regional Trial Courts, which may issue the writ,
the Quezon Register of Deeds and that petitioner enforceable in any part of their respective regions.
was one of them filing several petitions claiming This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to
ownership of various lands. be taken as according to parties seeking any of the
writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of
Respondent Judge Velasco of the RTC ruled in favor
the court to which application therefor will be
of petitioner.
directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That
ISSUE: Whether the RTC had jurisdiction to hear heirarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals,
and decide the reconstitution case of Molina? and should also serve as a general determinant of
the appropriate forum for petitions for the
RULING: The court erred in granting the petitioner,
extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that
Dolores Molina, for the reconstitution of her lost judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that
Original Certificate of Title in which various
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petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs MfR could be resolved, AIA filed another motion for
against first level ("inferior") courts should be filed
execution which was granted.
with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the
latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation Petitioner filed an appeal to the CA assailing the
of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue validity of the Compromise Agreement— denied. CA
these writs should be allowed only when there are
contends that the compromise agreement was final
special and important reasons therefor, clearly and
specifically set out in the petition. and executory unless a motion is filed to set aside
the compromise on the ground of fraud, mistake,
(Note: the case was dismissed because the
duress, in which event, an appeal may be taken from
hierarchy of courts was not observed. The
petition should have been filed first with the the order denying the motion.
RTC) Another appeal was taken to the SC with the same
issues.
53. DOMINGO vs. CA
ISSUE: Where should have the petitioner filed her
motion against the compromise agreement?
FACTS:
RULING: A judgment rendered in accordance with a
Domingo was one of the tenant-occupants of the compromise agreement is immediately executory as
Gonzales Estate. Through the Rural Progress there is no appeal from such judgment. A
Administration (RPA), the tenants along with compromise may however be disturbed and set
petitioner instituted an action in the Court of First aside for vices of consent or forgery. Hence, where
Instance for the expropriation of the Gonzales Estate an aggrieved party alleges mistake, fraud, violence,
where its decision ruled in favor of the Republic, on intimidation, undue influence, or falsity in the
appeal to the CA, was affirmed. execution of the compromise embodied in a
judgment,an action to annul should be brought
Ownership of the land transferred from the Republic before the CA, in accordance with BP129, which
-> RPA -> Peopless Homesite and Housing gives that court exclusive original jurisdiction over
Corporation (PHHC), whose President ordered the actions for annulment of actions of RTC’s.
sale of bigger portion of the lots other than to the
bona fide occupants of the estate. Here, petitioner filed an action to annul the
compromise agreement with the RTCon the ground
Petitioner along with the 51 tenants filed an action to of forgery. Clearly then petitioner has forfeited her
compel the Republic through the PHHC to sell the right to challenge the compromise agreement not
lots to them pursuant to the case, subsequently, only because for her failure to appeal to the order of
respondent Araneta Institute of Agriculture (AIA) dismissal but more so because she ventilated her
[intervenor] field a complaint of intervention on the remedy to the wrong court which had no jurisdiction
basis of a Kasunduan whereby it posits a sale or to annul a judgment of a concurrent court. DENIED.
transfer of the estate to AIA by the 52 tenants.

RTC approved the Compromise Agreement, it was


assailed by the PHHC in a petition for Certiorari and
prohibition to the CA but was dismissed. Some of the 54. MORALES vs. CA
13 tenants who entered into an agreement with
PHHC and the petitioner herein filed separate
proceedings, to annul the decision while the FACTS:
petitioner filed a civil case for the latter, all were
- Ernesto Morales was arrested for selling and
dismissed.
delivering 0.4587 grams of
Counsel for AIA filed a Motion for Issuance of a Writ Metamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu).
of Execution of the partial decision (transfer of lots to
- Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
AIA) and was approved by the RTC. PHHC ordered
ground that the RTC had no jurisdiction to
to transfer and deliver titles and lots to AIA.
try the case considering that pursuant to
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the
Section 20 of R.A. No. 7659 as construed
same was denied. In the meantime, even before the
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in People v. Simon, the penalty imposable INVOLVING ONLY 0.4587 GRAMS


for the offense charged should not OF SHABU.
exceed prision correccional or six (6) 1STISSUE:
years and under R.A. No. 7691 it is the SUPREME COURT RULING:
Metropolitan Trial Court which has
jurisdiction over the case. - Under B.P. Blg. 129, the Court of
Appeals has concurrent original
RULING IN THE RTC: jurisdiction with the Supreme Court
and with the Regional Trial Court to
- RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss issue writs of certiorari, mandamus,
prohibition, habeas corpus, and quo
Explanation: as a general rule, cases warranto.
punishable with penalties of not more than six (6) - These are original actions, not
years are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the modes of appeals.
Metropolitan Trial Courts.
- Since what the petitioner filed was a
Exceptions: Regional Trial Courts under Section special civil action for certiorari under
39 of Republic Act No. 6425, the Dangerous Rule 65, the Court of Appeals
Drugs Act of 1972, shall have concurrent has original jurisdiction
original jurisdiction over all cases involving 2ND ISSUE:
offenses punishable under this Act.
- A violation of Republic Act No. 6425, - The exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
although punishable by a penalty of less than Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in
six (6) years, falls within the jurisdiction of the criminal case( as invoked by petitioner to
Regional Trial Court. have jurisdiction) does not cover those cases
which by provision of law fall within the
RULING IN THE CA: exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional
Trial Courts regardless of the prescribed
- (OSG) agreed with the petitioner that the
penalty. ( Please see jurisdiction of RTC and
RTC had no jurisdiction to try the criminal MTC)
case.
- the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction over In short, even if a case is punishable by
the special civil action for certiorari, as the imprisonment not exceeding six years
same involved only the question of (i.e., prision correccional, arresto mayor,
jurisdiction of an inferior court, hence, or arresto menor), jurisdiction thereon is retained
by the Regional Trial Courts or the
cognizable by the Supreme Court
Sandiganbayan
- The OSG then recommended that the case
be elevated to the Supreme
- the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition
for certiorari for lack of jurisdiction over the 55. RAYMUNDO vs. CA
action and agreed with the Solicitor General

ISSUE/S
Facts:
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT
OF APPEALS HAS JURISDICTION Petitioner, Raymundo is an owner/occupant of the
TO ENTERTAIN A PETITION Galleria de Magallanes Condo. The Admin of said
FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE condo discovered that Raymundo made an
65 OF THE RULES OF COURT unauthorized installation of glasses at the balcony of
WHERE THE ISSUE IS THE his unit which is considered a violation of the Master
JURISDICTION OF Deed and Declaration of Restriction of the
RESPONDENT RTC JUDGE TO Corporation.
TRY THE ALLEGED VIOLATION
OF R.A. 6425; AND The admin reported said violation to the BOD. A
II. WHETHER OR NOT letter was sent for the removal of the illegal and
RESPONDENT RTC unauthorized installation.
JUDGE/COURT HAS Petitioner refused.
JURISDICTION TO TRY ALLEGED
VIOLATION OF SECTION 15, IN Respondent Galleria filed a complaint for mandatory
RELATION TO SECTION 20, ART. injuction.
III OF R.A. 6425, AS AMENDED,
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Raymundo filed a motion to dismiss on the ground counsels," it appears that only the latter were
that: given notice. None was sent to the parties
themselves.
1. RTC has no jurisdiction over the case since
a complaint for mandatory injunction is within
- Judge Sison proceeded with the pretrial
the exclusive jurisdiction of the MTC.
conference as scheduled. Respondent nor
2. That the pecuniary claim of the complaint its counsel was present, the judge, declared
was only attorney’s fees of 10,000, hence, private respondent in de fault and authorized
MTC has jurisdiction. petitioners to present their evidence ex parte

RTC: denied the motion and rendered decision in - Respondent moved for a reconsideration
favor of Galleria. and explained that their absence at the
CA: likewise dismissed petitioner’s petition for pretrial conference was because he had
certiorari and prohibition. been told by Judge Aliposa that a new date
for the pretrial would be set to the Regional
Issue: WON the RTC has jurisdiction over the case. Trial Court of Makati and Judge Deodoro J.
Held: Sison, would take over and would "adjust the
hearing schedule
YES.
The SC held that RTC has jurisdiction because RULING IN THE CA
the action to remove the illegal and unauthorized
installation of glasses at a condo unit is not - Respondent filed a petition for certiorari in
capable of pecuniary estimation and falls under the Court of Appeals. The appellate court
the exclusive jurisdiction of RTC. gave due course to the petition, noting that
no notice of the pretrial had been sent to the
Basis of the decision: refer to Sec. 19 of BP 129 parties themselves as required
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. —
- The appellate court cited the policy of the law
Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive to discourage judgments by default
original jurisdiction:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library ISSUE/S AND CONTENTION BY
In all civil actions in which the subject of the PETITIONERS
litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
- Petitioners contend that the appellate court
In determining whether an action is one of the erred in holding that no notice of the pretrial
subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary had properly been made, because the order
estimation, the criterion is first to ascertain the nature of the trial court referred to a "hearing"
of the principal action or remedy sought. and no copy of the order had been given to
the parties.
A claim of attorney’s fees is only incidental to its
principal cause of action and therefore not - Petitioners contend that, respondent's
determinative of jurisdiction of the court. reason for his failure to attend the pretrial
was not lack of knowledge of the pretrial, but
of excusable neglect.

56. BEMBO vs. CA RULING OF THE SC

FACTS: - Sufficiency of the written notice of pretrial is


- Petitioners, spouses Ricardo and Nicolasa irrelevant where the evidence shows that the
Bembo, filed for declaratory relief in the counsel and the parties actually knew of the
Regional Trial Court at Dagupan City pretrial.

- Pre-trial was set by the Court but was reset - private respondent admitted that a copy of
the order resetting the pretrial conference on
- Presiding judge, Falloran issued an order December 6, 1993, had been served on him
stating that "the hearing of this case" is on and that he notified private respondent
December 6, 1993, at 2 o'clock in the
afternoon. Although the order directed the - The trial court could certainly not be faulted
clerk of court to "notify the parties and for declaring private respondent as in default.
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Although he had been advised by Judge the second judge acts in the first place of the first
Aliposa to wait for further orders from Judge judge in the same proceeding.
Sison
Pursuant to the policy of judicial stability, the
judgment of the competent court jurisdiction may not
- Stare Decisis in the case of Trocio be interfered with by any court of concurrent
v. Labayo: "No merit attaches to the jurisdiction. For the same reason, the power to open,
contention of petitioner that the notice as to modify or vacate a judgment is not only possessed
the hearing scheduled for October 14 should by, but restricted to the court which judgment was
specify that it was for a pretrial. A hearing as rendered.
known to the law is not confined to a trial but
Petition granted.
embraces the several stages of a litigation. It
does not preclude pretrial."

- The trial court acted within its discretion and 58. SANTOS vs. BAYHON
correctly held private as in de fault, and it was
error for the appellate court to issue the writ
of certiorari. Facts: In this petition for certiorari with preliminary
injunction/temporary restraining order, Labor Arbiter
Ariel C. Santos (herein petitioner) questions the
57. GUITEREZ vs. CA jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court to issue a writ
of preliminary junction to prevent the enforcement of
Facts: the writ of execution in a labor case, and said
Judge's order dated May 31, 1989 citing him
Petitioners Guiterez filed an action for partition (petitioner) for indirect contempt and ordering his
with the RTC of Urdaneta Branch 36 against arrest for disobeying the injunction.
respondents. The first case was dismissed by virtue
of an order stating that when the case was called for On November 6, 1985, a decision was rendered by
pre-trial conference, none of the plaintiffs together Labor Arbiter Ceferina Diosana in NLRC-NCR Case
with their counsels appeared and the case is hereby No. 1-313-85 entitled, "Kamapi vs. Poly-Plastic
dismissed with prejudice. Products and/or Anthony Ching," in favor of Kamapi.
The decision was affirmed in toto by the National
Petitioners Guiterez filed a second case on RTC Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) on August 18,
Urdaneta Branch 37 (note the the first case is 1987. After the decision had become final and
Branch 36). The same private respondents were executory, Kamapi obtained a writ of execution
again the plaintiffs. against the properties, consisting of machineries
and equipment, of Poly-Plastic Products or Anthony
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the
Ching. However, respondent Priscilla Carrera filed a
ground that the 2nd case was barred by prior
third party claim alleging that Anthony Ching had
judgment in the first case (res judicata). The
sold the machinery and pieces of equipment to her.
defendants motion and motion for reconsideration
Nevertheless, the public auction sale proceeded on
was denied.
March 29, 1988. It was conducted by Deputy Sheriff
CA- affirmed RTC Branch 37 (second court) Jaime Pambuan in the presence of Carrera and her
counsel after the judgment creditor had posted an
Defendants the came to SC on the contention the indemnity bond of P115,000 in favor of the deputy
RTC branch 37 and CA erred in not dismissing the sheriff to answer for any damage that he may incur
second case. should it be found later that the third-party claim is
Issue: valid and lawful.

1. Whether the second RTC court (of equal rank) On April 4, 1988, Carrera filed in the Regional Trial
had authourity to modify/ rectify the order of the first Court of Manila (Civil Case No. 88-44154) her claim
RTC court ? to the levied properties and obtained a temporary
restraining order enjoining Labor Arbiter Diosana
Held: and NLRC Deputy Sheriff Pambuan from issuing a
certificate of sale over the levied properties.
The principle has been announced that a judge of
a branch of one court should not annul the order of Santos and Pambuan filed a motion to dismiss the
a judge of another branch of the same court civil case on the ground that the RTC did not have
(meaning the same judicial district) because both of jurisdiction over the labor case, for exclusive
them are judges of the same category who act jurisdiction is vested in the NLRC (Art. 255, Labor
coordinately and independently, except of course, if
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Code) and no injunction or restraining order may be When a third-party, or a stranger to the action,
issued by any court or entity in a labor dispute. asserts a claim over the property levied upon, the
claimant may vindicate his claim by an independent
RTC Ruling: On April 22, 1988, Judge William
action in the proper civil court which may stop the
Bayhon of RTC, Manila, issued an order enjoining
execution of the judgment on property not belonging
Labor Arbiter Ceferina Diosana and sheriff Jaime
to the judgment debtor.
Pambuan from enforcing the writ of execution
against the properties claimed by Camera pending
the determination of the validity of the sale made in 59. OBLEA ET AL vs. CA
her favor by the judgment debtor Poly-Plastic
Products and Anthony Ching.
On May 31, 1989, Judge William Bayhon issued an FACTS
order declaring Santos guilty beyond reasonable
The controverted lot, designated as Lot 1, Block 2,
doubt of indirect contempt, ordering his immediate
was formerly a part of a mother lot covered by TCT
arrest, sentencing him to seven (7) days in jail, and
No. 26604 of the Register of Deeds of Cabanatuan
to pay a fine of P1,000 with subsidiary imprisonment
City, containing an area of 83,325 square meters
in case of insolvency. He further ordered the return
and registered in the names of Manuel Melencio
of the machineries and equipment of Priscilla
(1/3), Pura Melencio (1/3) and Wilfredo Wico and
Camera.
Mariabelle M. Wico (1/3). Subsequently, TCT No.
Santos forthwith elevated the matter to this Court for 26604 was cancelled and in lieu thereof TCT No.
review on the ground that Judge Bayhon's arrest 65031 was issued in the name of petitioner Ramon
order dated May 31, 1989 is a nullity because Art. S. Melencio who became a co-owner with Pura
254 of the Labor Code prohibits the issuance of an Melencio and the Wicos by virtue of a deed of sale
injunction or restraining order 'in any case involving executed in his favor by his now deceased father
or growing out of labor disputes . . . except as Manuel Melencio. On 6 June 1958 subject lot was
otherwise provided in Articles 218 and 264 of this bought by private respondent Juan S. Esteban from
Code." Article 218 speaks of the power of the Mauricio Ramos who claimed to have acquired the
Commission to issue an injunction due to a labor property from Ursula Melencio, the alleged
dispute, while Art. 264 refers to the power of the administratrix of the estate of Manuel and Pura
same Commission to issue injunction in case of Melencio. 2 Meanwhile, petitioner Romeo V. Oblea
strikes or lockouts. Petitioner alleges further that leased a building located on the subject lot from a
Judge Bayhon has no jurisdiction to cite petitioner certain Marius Esteban, an alleged son of private
for contempt, for the case grew out of a labor respondent Juan S. Esteban. Oblea eventually
dispute. bought from Marius the lot on which the building
stood. 3 As a consequence, on 4 July 1991 Esteban
Respondents, on the other hand, claim that Judge filed an ejectment suit against petitioner Oblea in the
Bayhon has jurisdiction over the third party claim for Municipal Trial Court of Cabanatuan City docketed
respondent Carrera was never a party in the labor as Civil Case No. 10588. On 3 April 1992, the case
dispute between Anthony Ching (judgment debtor) was decided by Judge Romeo G. Mauricio in favor
and the members of the Kamapi (judgment of Esteban and against petitioner Oblea who was
creditors), and she had no employer-employee ordered to vacate the premises and pay rental
relationship with any of them. arrears from January 1983, as well as litigation
Issue: WON RTC has jurisdiction over the injuction expenses and attorney's fees in the total sum of
to the writ of execution for the properties owned by P8,000.00. On appeal, the Regional Trial Court of
Polyplastic Products Cabanatuan City rendered judgment on 26 March
1993 modifying the MTC decision by ordering Oblea
Ruling: Yes. the Regional Trial Court of Manila had to pay rentals only from 2 March 1988, but sustaining
jurisdiction to stop by injunction the National Labor the MTC in other respects. On 3 June 1993, the
Relations Commission's sheriff from proceeding with registered owners 4 sold the disputed lot to petitioner
the auction sale of the property claimed by the Oblea. Afterwards, Oblea together with Ramon
private respondent, to satisfy the claims of the labor Melencio, Pura Melencio and Wilfredo Wico and
union against the Poly-Plastic Products. Mariabelle Wico filed before the Regional Trial Court
an action for quieting of title against Esteban,
The general rule that no court has the power to
docketed as Civil Case No. 1536. They contended
interfere by injunction with the judgments or decrees
that the deeds of sale executed by Mauricio Ramos
of another court with concurrent or coordinate
in favor of Juan Esteban and by Ursula Melencio in
jurisdiction possessing equal power to grant
favor of Mauricio Ramos were a nullity. The
injunctive relief, applies only when no third-party
ejectment case, Civil Case No. 10588, was in the
claimant is involved (Traders Royal Bank vs.
meantime appealed to the Court of Appeals by way
Intermediate Appellate Court, 133 SCRA 142).
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of petition for review, which petition was dismissed


by the appellate court on 2 July 1993. Upon remand Facts: Jesus Jalbuena entered into a verbal lease
of the records to the court of origin, and on motion of contract with Uldarico Inayan, for one year
Esteban, the prevailing party, MTC Judge Hipolito renewable for the same period. Inayan was allowed
directed execution and issued the corresponding to continue with the lease from year to year. Corazon
writ to enforce the final and executory judgment in Jalbuena de Leon is the daughter of Jesus and
the ejectment suit. the transferee of the subject property. Inayan
ceased paying the agreed rental and instead,
The execution was however thwarted when asserted dominion over the land. When asked by
petitioners Romeo Oblea and Ramon Melencio filed De Leon to vacate the land, he refused to do so,
another petition before the Regional Trial Court of prompting De Leon to file a complaint before the
Cabanatuan City for certiorari and prohibition with RTC for "Termination of Civil Law Lease; Recovery
application for a temporary restraining order and of Possession, Recovery of Unpaid Rentals and
Damages. Inayan claimed tenancy dispute thus the
preliminary injunction, docketed as Civil Case No.
lower court issued an order adopting the procedure
1676-AF. On 22 November 1993 the Executive in agrarian cases but still rendered decision
Judge thereof issued a temporary restraining order Declaring the lease contract between plaintiff and
to stop the enforcement of the writ of execution defendant as a civil law lease, and that the same has already
issued by Judge Hipolito. On 6 April 1994 however been terminated due to defendant's failure to pay his
Judge Adriano I. Tuason, Acting Presiding Judge of rentals from 1983 up to the present. On appeal to
Br. 27, lifted and canceled the restraining order the CA, Inayan raised the sole issue of jurisdiction
earlier issued, thus paving the way for the execution and alleged that the lower court, acting as Court
of the judgment in the ejectment case. Undeterred of Agrarian Relations, had no jurisdiction over
by the reversal, petitioners elevated their case to the the action. The CA, at first affirmed the trial court's
appellate court which on 27 September 1994 decision, but when an MR filed by Inayan it then set
dismissed their appeal, the reason being that the aside its earlier decision and dismissed the civil case
for want of jurisdiction. In its amended decision, the
eviction case had long become final and executory
appellate court held that petitioner's complaint below
and that the various actions taken by petitioners
was anchored on acción interdictal, a summary action
were merely designed to delay execution. for recovery of physical possession that should have
Issue: WON MTC has jurisdiction to proceed with been brought before the proper inferior court.
the ejectment case over the same property which is
Issue: Whether or not the RTC then acting as a
the subject of an action to quiet title in the RTC?
court of agrarian relations employing
RULING: Yes The argument is untenable. It must be agrarian procedure had jurisdiction to try the suit
stressed that the sole issue in an action for unlawful filed by De Leon?
detainer is physical or material possession, i.e.,
Held: Yes. Jurisdiction of the court over the subject
possession de facto and not possession de jure.
matter is conferred only by the Constitution or by
This is settled doctrine. Resultantly, the pendency of
law. It is determinable on the basis of allegations in
an action for quieting of title before the Regional Trial the complaint. In order to determine whether the
Court does not divest the city or municipal trial court court below had jurisdiction, it is necessary to first
of its jurisdiction to proceed with the ejectment case ascertain the nature of the complaint filed before it.
over the same property. The subsequent acquisition A study of the complaint instituted by petitioner in the
of ownership by petitioners is not a supervening lower court reveals that the case is, contrary to the
event that will bar the execution of the judgment in findings of the respondent appellate court, not one
said unlawful detainer case, the fact remaining that of unlawful detainer. Clearly, the case involves more
when judgment was rendered by the MTC in the than just the issue of possession. It was necessary
ejectment case, petitioner Oblea was a mere for the trial court below to determine whether the
possessor of the subject lot. Similarly, the fact that lease was civil and not an agricultural or tenancy
petitioners instituted a separate action for quieting of relationship and whether its termination was in
order. A detainer suit exclusively involves the issue
title is not a valid reason for defeating the execution
of physical possession. The case at bar, however,
of the summary remedy of ejectment. On the
did not concern merely the issue of possession but
contrary., it bolsters the conclusion that the eviction as well, the nature of the lease contracted by
case did not deal with the issue of ownership which petitioner's predecessor-in-interest and private
was precisely the subject matter of the action for respondent. It likewise involved the propriety of
quieting of title before the Regional Trial Court of terminating the relationship contracted by said
Cabanatuan City. With the finality of the decision in parties, as well as the demand upon defendant to
the ejectment case, execution in favor of the deliver the premises and pay unpaid rentals,
prevailing party has become a matter of right; its damages and incidental fees. Where the issues of
implementation mandatory. It cannot be avoided. the case extend beyond those commonly involved in
unlawful detainer suits, such as for instance, the
respective rights of parties under various contractual
60. DE LEON vs. CA arrangements and the validity thereof, the case is
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converted from a mere detainer suit to one (1) In all civil actions in which the subject of
"incapable of pecuniary estimation," thereby placing the litigation is incapable of pecuniary
it under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the estimation;
regional trial courts (formerly the courts of first
instance). Not being merely a case of ejectment, the (2) In all civil actions which involve the title to,
regional trial court possessed jurisdiction to try and or possession of, real property, or any
resolve the case. interest therein, where the assessed value of
property involved exceeds Twenty thousand
pesos (P20,000.00). . .

61. MEDOZA vs. HON. TEH xxx xxx xxx

(4) In all matters of probate, both testate


FACTS: and intestate . . . .
Likewise, Section 33 of the same law
Petitioner "for herself and as administratrix of the provides that:
intestate estate" of her deceased husband filed Metropolitan Trial Court shall exercise:
before the RTC of Batangas a complaint for (1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil
"reconveyance of title involving parcels of lot in actions and probate proceedings, testate
Batangas and damages with petition for preliminary and intestate . . . .
injunction".
The above law is clear. An action for reconveyance,
Private respondents filed their "answer with motion which involves title to property worth millions of
to dismiss” alleging among others that the complaint pesos, such as the lots subject of this case, is
states no cause of action and that petitioner's cognizable by the RTC. Likewise falling within its
demand had already been paid. They filed another jurisdiction are actions "incapable of pecuniary
pleading entitled "motion to dismiss" invoking, lack estimation," such as the appointment of an
of jurisdiction, lack of cause of action, estoppel, administratrix for an estate. Even the Rules on
laches and prescription. In support of their argument venue of estate proceedings (Section 1 of Rule 73 )
of lack of jurisdiction, private respondents contend impliedly recognizes the jurisdiction of the RTC over
that a special proceedings case for appointment of petitions for granting of letters of administration. On
administratrix of an estate cannot be incorporated in the other hand, probate proceedings for the
the ordinary action for reconveyance. Furthermore, settlement of estate are within the ambit of either the
they argued that since petitioner's husband resided RTC or MTC depending on the net worth of the
in Quezon City at the time of his death, the estate. By arguing that the allegation seeking such
appointment of the estate administratrix should be appointment as administratrix ousted the RTC of its
filed in the RTC of that place in accordance with jurisdiction, both public and private respondents
Section 1 Rule 73 of the Rules of Court. Accordingly, confuse jurisdiction with venue. Section 2 of Rule 4
it is their argument that the RTC of Batangas has no as revised by Circular 13-95 provides that actions
jurisdiction over the case. involving title to property shall be tried in the province
where the property is located, in this case, —
The RTC of Batangas thru respondent Judge Teh Batangas. The mere fact that petitioner's deceased
"dismissed without prejudice" the complaint for lack husband resides in Quezon City at the time of his
of jurisdiction "on the ground that the rules governing death affects only the venue but not the jurisdiction
an ordinary civil action and a special proceeding are of the Court.
different." Accordingly, the lower court found it
unnecessary to discuss the other grounds raised in
the motion to dismiss.
62. PNB vs. PINEDA
ISSUE:
WON in an action for reconveyance, an allegation
seeking appointment as administratrix of an estate,
would oust the RTC of its jurisdiction over the whole Facts:
case.
The Arroyo Spouses obtained a loan of P580K from
RULING: PNB to purchase 60% of the subscribed capital
stock, and thereby acquire the controlling interest of
We rule in the negative. Section 19 of B.P. 129 as Tayabas Cement Company, Inc. (TCC). As security
amended by RA 7691 provides: for said loan, the spouses executed a real estate
mortgage over a parcel of land known as the La
Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. — Regional Trial Vista property.
Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction:
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TCC filed with petitioner bank an application and


agreement for the establishment of an 8 year ISSUE:
deferred letter of credit (L/C) for $7M in favor of Toyo
Menka Kaisha to cover the importation of a cement (1) Whether or not TCC's liability has been
plant machinery and equipment. Upon approval of extinguished by the repossession of PNB of the
the application and opening of an L/C by PNB in imported cement plant machinery and equipment.
favor of Toyo Menka Kaisha for the account of TCC,
the Arroyo spouses executed a surety agreement. (2) (Civ Pro issue) : Whether or not the issuance
The imported cement plant machinery and of Writ of Preliminary injunction is proper.
equipment arrived from Japan and were released to
TCC under a trust receipt agreement. Subsequently,
Toyo Menka Kaisha made the corresponding HELD:
drawings against the L/C as scheduled. (1) The Supreme Court ruled in favour of the PNB.
PNB's possession of the subject machinery and
TCC, however, failed to remit and/or pay the equipment being precisely as a form of security
corresponding amount covered by the drawings. for the advances given to TCC under the Letter
Thus, pursuant to the trust receipt agreement, PNB of Credit, said possession by itself cannot be
notified TCC of its intention to repossess the considered payment of the loan secured
imported machinery and equipment for failure of thereby. Payment would legally result only after
TCC to settle its obligations under the L/C. PNB PNB had foreclosed on said securities, sold the
foreclosed the real estate mortgages executed by same and applied the proceeds thereof to TCC's
the spouses Arroyo in TCC’s favor. PNB contends loan obligation. Mere possession does not
that the sale of La Vista was made to satisfy not only amount to foreclosure for foreclosure denotes
the amount owed by the spouses on their personal the procedure adopted by the mortgagee to
loan but also the amount of expenses owed by said terminate the rights of the mortgagor on the
spouses as sureties of TCC. Branch V of the CFI of property and includes the sale itself
Rizal rendered judgement in favour of PNB and
ordered the foreclosure sale. The Arroyos oppose (2.) No. The reason for striking down the writ of
the foreclosure. PNB filed a supplemental petition on preliminary injunction complained of is that it
August 13, 1975 requesting the Sheriff's Office to interfered with the order of a co-equal and
proceed with the sale of the subject real properties coordinate court. Since Branch V of the CFI of Rizal
however, Acting Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff had already acquired jurisdiction over the question
Diana L. Dungca issued a resolution finding that the of foreclosure of mortgage over the La Vista property
questions raised by the parties required the and rendered judgment in relation thereto, then it
reception and evaluation of evidence, hence, proper retained jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other
for adjudication by the courts of law. Since said coordinate courts over its judgment, including all
questions were prejudicial to the holding of the incidents relative to the control and conduct of its
foreclosure sale, she ruled that her "Office, ministerial officers, namely the sheriff thereof. The
therefore, cannot properly proceed with the foreclosure sale having been ordered by Branch V
foreclosure sale unless and until there be a court of the CFI of Rizal, TCC should not have filed
ruling on the aforementioned issues. PNB filed with injunction proceedings with Branch XXI of the same
the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, Branch V CFI, but instead should have first sought relief by
a petition for mandamus against said Diana Dungca proper motion and application from the former court
in her capacity as City Sheriff of Quezon City to which had exclusive jurisdiction over the foreclosure
compel her to proceed with the foreclosure sale of proceeding.
the mortgaged properties. The petition was granted.
This doctrine of non-interference is premised on the
principle that a judgment of a court of competent
Before the decision could attain finality, TCC filed on jurisdiction may not be opened, modified or vacated
September 14, 1976 before the Court of First by any court of concurrent jurisdiction.
Instance of Rizal, Pasig, Branch XXI a
complaint against PNB, Dungca, and the Provincial
Furthermore, we find the issuance of the preliminary
Sheriff of Negros Occidental and Ex-Officio Sheriff
injunction directed against the Provincial Sheriff of
of Bacolod City seeking, inter alia, the issuance of a
Negros Occidental and ex-officio Sheriff of Bacolod
writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the
City a jurisdictional faux pas as the Courts of First
foreclosure of the mortgages over the La Vista
Instance, now Regional Trial Courts, can only
property and Hacienda Bacon as well as a
enforce their writs of injunction within their
declaration that its obligation with PNB had been
respective designated territories.
fully paid by reason of the latter's repossession of
the imported machinery and equipment. On October
5, 1976, the CFI, thru respondent Judge Gregorio
Pineda, issued a restraining order and on March 4,
1977, granted a writ of preliminary injunction. PNB's 63. GUTIERREZ vs. CA
motion for reconsideration was denied. The
petitioner filed a petition for certiorari.
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FACTS: The first case was an action for partition on judgment is not only possessed by, but
parcels of land covered by OCT 20005 filed with the restricted to the court in which the judgment
RTC Branch 46 of Urdaneta. This case was was rendered.
dismissed dues to the non-appearance of the
plaintiffs together with their counsel during the pre-
trial conference. The second case was filed with the
64. RCBC vs. HON. ISNANI
RTC Branch 47 of Urdaneta for annulment of
documents, ownership and possession also covered
Facts:
by TCT No. 20005. Defendants filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground that the second case was A few days after the effectivity of Republic Act No.
barred by the prior judgment in the first case. 7691, amending Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, private
However, the motion was denied. Defendants went respondent Lolita Encelan filed a complaint in Makati
on certiorari to the CA which denied their petition. RTC to recover damages from petitioner in the
amount of $5,000 or its Philippine peso equivalent of
ISSUES:
approximately PHP 137,675.00. Petitioner
(1) Whether or not res judicata is applicable in thereupon moved to dismiss the case for lack of
the case at bar. jurisdiction on the ground that the complaint was
(2) Whether or not the denial of the motion to cognizable by the Metro Manila MTC, not the RTC,
dismiss on the ground of res judicata by RTC the principal demand prayed for not being in excess
Branch 47 “modified or rectified” the earlier of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00).
decision of RTC Branch 46 which dismissed
its case for non-appearance of the plaintiffs Respondent RTC Judge Lucia V. Isnani, instead of
or their counsel during the pre-trial dismissing the complaint, transferred the case to the
conference. MTC. Upon learning of the transfer, petitioner sought
(with the MTC) a reconsideration thereof.
Respondent MTC Judge Navarro-Quiambao issued
RULING: an Order denying the motion.
(1) Yes. A party cannot by varying the form of
Hence, this petition.
action or adopting a different method of
presenting his case escape the operation of Issue:
the principle that one and the same cause of
action shall not be twice litigated. It is well- W/N respondent RTC judge is correct in
settled that a party cannot, by varying the transferring the case to the MTC.
form of action or adopting a different method
Held:
of presenting his case, escape the operation
of the principle that one and the same cause Under R.A. 7691:
of action shall not be twice litigated. The test
of identity of causes of action lies not in the A. Civil actions and settlement of estate
form of an action but on whether the same proceedings, testate or intestate, including the grant
evidence would support and establish the of provisional remedies when warranted, where the
former and the present causes of action. value of the personal property, estate, or amount of
the demand does not exceed One Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00), or Two Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00) in Metro Manila,
(2) No. The order of RTC Branch 46 was an
exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind,
adjudication on the merits by a competent attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs (the
court and could no longer be “modified or amount of which must be specifically alleged),
rectified” after it had become final and shall, after the effectivity of R.A. 7691, be filed with
executory, much less by another court of the metropolitan and municipal trial courts.
equal rank only, and that there was an
identity of cause of action, subject-matter B. Civil actions or a settlement of estate
and parties in the first and second cases. The proceedings, aforesaid, pending with regional trial
court that issued the original order of courts which have already reached the pretrial stage
dismissal was not the same court that sought at the time of the effectivity of R.A. 7691 shall remain
to change it later in the order of Branch 47. with said courts for proper disposition. The transfer
Pursuant to the policy of judicial stability, the of pending cases (which have already reached the
judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction pretrial stage) to metropolitan or municipal trial
may not be interfered with by any court of courts may be allowed, however, provided the
following conditions concur; viz.:
concurrent jurisdiction. For the same reason,
the power to open, modify or vacate a

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(a) The case is cognizable by the municipal of Lot 4221 from Pascual Hornilla (Son of Gutierrez)
or metropolitan trial court under the present and another lot from Santiago Asi. Buenaventura
provisions of the Act; and then sold Lot 4221 to his nephew, Cipriano Ramirez
for P2,500.00, with the same description as the
(b) The parties agree to the transfer of January 4, 1961 sale, with the exception of the
the case from the regional trial court to boundary on the east; which was changed from
the municipal or metropolitan trial court. "Juana Gutierrez" to "Buenaventura An" to reflect
the acquisition by private respondent of the adjoining
C. R.A. 7691 took effect on 15 April 1994. Cases Lot 4215. Cipriano Ramirez occupied the lot by
filed on or after such effectivity date must accord with observing the boundaries stated in the document of
the new jurisdictional mandate; a disregard thereof sale.
shall constitute a ground for the dismissal of the
action or proceeding for lack of jurisdiction. In 1979, Cipriano Ramirez sold the lot 4221 to
petitioner Miguel Semira for P20,000.00. However,
In the instant case, the principal demand prayed for the area stated in the deed was 2,200 square meters
in the complaint filed with the Makati RTC, is only for and not 822.5 appearing in the previous documents.
US$5,000.00, or approximately P137,675.00 in As delimited by its boundaries, the lot is actually
Philippine currency, and thusly within the exclusive 2,200 sq. meters as confirmed by Taysan Cadastral
jurisdiction of the Metro Manila MTCs. Instead of Mapping Survey.
ordering the transfer of the complaint to the MTC,
respondent RTC judge, therefore, should have Miguel Semira then entered the premises. However,
dismissed the case prayed for by petitioner for lack a complaint for forcible entry was filed against him
of jurisdiction. by private respondent in the MCTC of Taysan-
Lobo. The latter claimed that the area of Lot 4221
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is was 822.5 square meters only and that the excess
GRANTED. The appealed order of RTC Judge Lucia of 1,377 square meters forcibly occupied by
V. Isnani denying petitioner's motion to dismiss and petitioner formed part of Lot 4215. Petitioner admits
transferring the case instead to the MTC and the having entered the disputed portion but denies
order issued by MTC Judge Felicidad Y. Navarro- having illegally done so. In his answer, petitioner
Quiambao (to whom the case was transferred), claims ownership over the property by invoking the
denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration, are deed of sale in his favor by Cipriano Ramirez.
hereby set aside. The complaint against petitioner is
hereby ordered DISMISSED without prejudice, MCTC ruled in favor of petitioner while RTC and CA
however, to petitioner's instituting an original action ruled in favor of private respondent
with the court of proper jurisdiction. No costs.
Issue:
SO ORDERED.
W/N the question of ownership is necessary in
determining rightful possession of the area in
dispute.
65. SEMIRA vs. CA
Held:

Facts: Yes, the question of ownership is necessary in the


case at bar. The court agree with the position of
Juana Gutierrez owned a parcel of land, designated petitioner and sustain the Municipal Circuit Trial
as Lot 4221, which she sold to private respondent Court in holding that in the case at bench the issue
Buenaventura An for P850.00 executed on 4 of possession cannot be decided independently of
January 1961. Aside from the estimated area of the question of ownership. Hence, it reversed the
822.5 square meters appearing in the deed of sale, Court of Appeals as well as the Regional Trial
the following boundaries of the lot are also stated: on Court.
the north, by Taysan-Lobo-Sto. Niño-Pinagbayanan
and Sto. Niño-Dagatan Road (Junction or B.P. Blg. 129 provided that metropolitan trial courts,
Intersection road); on the east, by Sto. Niño- municipal trial courts, and municipal circuit trial
Pinagbayanan Road and Juana Gutierrez; on the courts, without distinction, may try cases of forcible
south, by Sto. Niño School site; and, on the west, by entry and detainer even if the question of ownership
Sto. Niño-Dagatan Road. Thereafter, private is raised in the pleadings and possession could not
respondent entered the premises observing thereby be resolved without deciding the ownership.
the boundaries of the property and not the area
given. In in the case at bar, the question of who has prior
possession hinges on the question of who the real
Subsequently, private respondent acquired two owner of the disputed portion is. And the latter, in
other parcels of land, Lot 4215 located on the east turn, depends on whether such portion is part of Lot

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4215 of private respondent or of Lot 4221 of Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint for
petitioner. improper venue. He alleged that since private
respondent was not a resident of the Philippines, the
The court applied the rule in Art. 1542 of Civil Code complaint should be filed in the place where
which states that in the sale of real estate, made for petitioner, the defendant, resides which is in Gubat,
a lump sum and not at the rate of a certain sum for Sorsogon. The trial court denied the motion to
a unit of measure or number, and besides dismiss after finding that private respondent was
mentioning the boundaries, which is indispensable merely temporarily out of the country and did not
in every conveyance of real estate, its area or lose his legal residence in Rosales, Pangasinan.
number should be designated in the contract, the Petitioner then alleged that the CA, affirming the
vendor shall be bound to deliver all that is lower court's decision, committed gross error and
included within said boundaries, even when it grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed the
exceeds the area or number specified in the petition despite petitioner's overwhelming evidence
contract. that the venue of private respondent's action was
improperly laid.
Therefore, it is held that what should be rightfully
owned by the petitioner is dependent upon the actual Issue: Whether or not respondent is a resident of
boundaries of Lot 4221 and not the stated area, the Philippines, upon which venue may be set.
which according to private respondent is only 822.5
sq. meters instead of 2,200 sq. meters. The Held: NO.
petitioner then in turn, being the owner of the
disputed area, is the rightful possessor. It is undisputed that private respondent left for the
United States on April 25, 1988 before the complaint
It should be emphasized, however, that the case is was filed on June 26, 1989. 12 This fact is expressly
merely an action for forcible entry and that the issue admitted in the complaint itself where private
of ownership was decided for the sole purpose of respondent states that he "is [sic] . . . a resident of
resolving priority of possession. Hence, any Poblacion Rosales, Pangasinan before he went to
pronouncement made affecting ownership of the the United States where he now lives in 4525 Leata
disputed portion is to be regarded merely as Lane, La Cantada, LA 91011." Furthermore, the
provisional, hence, does not bar nor prejudice an special power of attorney in favor of Crispin A.
action between the same parties involving title to the Domingo was drawn and executed by private
land. respondent on February 18, 1988 before the
Philippine Consul in Los Angeles, California. 13 In
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the CA affirming that said special power of attorney, private respondent
of the RTC in toto is REVERSED and SET ASIDE declared that he was a resident of Los Angeles,
and another one entered REINSTATING, California.
AFFIRMING and REITERATING the Decision of the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Taysan-Lobo, Private respondent was not a mere transient or
Batangas, with costs against private respondent occasional resident of the United States. He fixed his
Buenaventura An. place of abode in Los Angeles, California and stayed
there continuously and consistently for over a year
at the time the complaint was filed in Rosales,
SO ORDERED.
Pangasinan. 15

Contrary to the lower courts' finding, the temporary


nature of private respondent's "working non-
66. VEHER vs. CA immigrant" visa did not make him a non-resident of
the United States. There is no showing as to the date
Facts: his temporary employment in the United States
ended. 16 There is likewise no showing, much less
June 26, 1989 private respondent Roy R. Domingo, any allegation, that after the filing of the complaint,
represented by his attorney-in-fact, Crispin A. private respondent actually returned to the
Domingo, filed with the RTC a complaint against Philippines and resumed residence in Rosales,
petitioner Jose Baritua as owner and operator of the Pangasinan. In fact, petitioner's claim that private
J.B. Bus Lines. Private respondent sought to recover respondent resided in the United States
actual and exemplary damages after a bus owned continuously and consistently since 1988 until the
by petitioner rammed private respondent's car along present has not been refuted.
the Maharlika Highway, Sto. Tomas, Batangas on
January 19, 1988. In his complaint, private In view whereof, the petition is granted and the
respondent alleged that he is a Filipino, of legal age, decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and set
married and a resident of Poblacion Resales, aside.
Pangasinan before he went to the United States
where he now lives at 4525 Leata Lane, La Cantada
LA 91011.

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67. DIU vs. CA Respondent Court of Appeals set aside the


judgment of the Regional Trial Court, on the ground
FACTS: that there had been no compliance with Presidential
Decree No. 1508, with this ratiocination:
On several occasions from January 8, 1988 up to
and until April 18, 1989, private respondent Patricia It is, therefore, clear that if efforts of
Pagba purchased on credit various articles of the barangay captain to settle the
merchandise from petitioners' store at Naval, Biliran, dispute fails, the Pangkat ng
all valued at P7,862.55, as evidenced by receipts of Tagapagkasundo shall be constituted
goods marked as Annexes "A" to "O" of petitioner's with the end in view of exploring all
Manifestation filed in the trial court, dated August 9, possibilities of amicable settlement. If
1991. Private respondents failed to pay despite no conciliation or settlement has
repeated demands. been reached pursuant to the
aforesaid rules, the matter may then
Petitioners brought the matter before the Barangay be brought to the regular courts.
Chairman of Naval and the latter set the case for
hearing, but private respondents failed to appear. In the case at bar, it has been
When the case was again set for hearing, the parties established that there was no valid
appeared but they failed to reach an amicable conciliation proceeding between the
settlement. Accordingly, the barangay chairman parties. The efforts of the barangay
issued a Certification to File Action. 3 Petitioners then captain of Catmon, Naval, Biliran to
filed their complaint for a sum of money before the mediate the dispute between the
Municipal Trial Court of Naval. parties having failed, the Pangkat ng
Tagapamayapa should have been
The MTC dismissed the complaints of petitioners constituted for purposes of settling
and ruled in favor of the respondents. The MTC also the matter.
resolved the issue on whether or not there was
compliance with the provisions of Presidential Hence, petitioners filed an appeal by certiorari from
Decree No. 1508 on conciliation. In resolving the the judgment of the Court of Appeals before the SC.
said issue the MTC held that:
ISSUE: Whether or not the confrontations before the
While petitioners could have prevented the Barangay Chairman of Naval satisfied the
trial court from exercising jurisdiction over requirement therefor in Presidential Decree No.
the case by seasonably taking exemption 1508.
thereto, they instead invoked the very same
jurisdiction by filing an answer and seeking HELD:
affirmative relief from it. What is more, they
participated in the trial of the case by cross- YES. SC ruled in favor of petitioners.
examining the respondent. Upon this
premise, petitioner cannot now be allowed In the case at bar, it is admitted that the parties did
belatedly to adopt an inconsistent posture by have confrontations before the Barangay Chairman
attacking the jurisdiction of the court to which of Naval although they were not sent to the pangkat
they had submitted themselves voluntarily. as the same was not constituted. Their meetings
with said barangay chairman were not fruitful as no
Petitioners appealed to the RTC. The RTC did not amicable settlement was reached.
find it necessary to pass upon the issue of the
alleged non-compliance with Presidential Decree From the foregoing facts, it is undeniable that there
No. 1508 but, instead, decided the appeal on the was substantial compliance with Presidential
merits. Accordingly, it rendered judgment in favor of Decree No. 1508 which does not require strict
herein petitioners and ordered private respondent technical compliance with its procedural
Patricia Pagba to pay the former the amount of requirements. Under the factual antecedents, it
P7,862.55 plus legal interest from July, 1991, cannot be said that the failure of the parties to
P1,000.00 as attorney fees, and the costs of suit. appear before the pangkat caused any prejudice to
the case for private respondents considering that
Private respondents then went to the Court of they already refused conciliation before the
Appeals, raising just two issues, viz.: (1) whether or barangay chairman and, as will hereafter be
not the Regional Trial Court erred in not making a discussed, their sham insistence for a meeting
factual finding that herein petitioners did not comply before the pangkat is merely a ploy for further delay.
with Presidential Decree No. 1508; and (2) whether We are thus forced to remind them that technicalities
or not said Regional Trial Court erred in not should not be made to desert their true role in our
dismissing the appeal or case for non-compliance justice system, and should not be used as
with the mandatory provisions of Presidential obstructions therein.
Decree No. 1508.

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The failure of private respondents to specifically because Virgilio works for a company that did not
allege that there was no compliance with the pay the retainers’ fees of the owner of JRB. Thus,
barangay conciliation procedure constitutes a they were forced to vacate and look for another
waiver of that defense. All that they alleged in their
place.
Answer in the trial court was that "the complaint
states no cause of action" without giving even the
Respondents on the other hand moved to dismiss on
semblance of any reason to support or explain that
allegation. On the other hand, they admitted the the ground of improper venue pursuant to their lease
confrontations before the barangay chairman in contract stating that the venue of action was in a
paragraph 13 of their Answer. 17 court of competent jurisdiction in Pasay City.

Since private respondents failed to duly raise that Petitioners, in their opposition to the motion to
issue, their defense founded thereon is deemed dismiss alleged that their cause of action is not
waived, especially since they actually did not pursue based on the lease contract and it follows that the
the issue before the case was set for hearing. Also, case is not covered by the venue stipulation. They
the conciliation procedure under Presidential contend that it is governed by the general rule as to
Decree No. 1508 is not a jurisdictional venue stated in Rule 4, Sec 2 (b). They also alleged
requirement and non-compliance therewith that assuming arguendo that the stipulation applies,
cannot affect the jurisdiction which the lower
it cannot operate as a
courts had already acquired over the subject
matter and private respondents as defendants
therein. limit to venue but merely provides for an additional
forum.
HENCE, the judgment of the RTC is hereby
REINSTATED. RTC dismissed the same for improper venue. CA
affirmed it as well.

Issue: Whether the suit was filed in the proper


RULE 1 venue.

GENERAL PROVISIONS Held:

No.
Venue by agreement, waiver of right under Rule


4,Sec2 (b)

It has been held that stipulations limiting venue is


1. VIRGILIO GESMUNDO vs. JRB valid and binding on the contracting parties based on
REALTY
Rule 4 Sec. 3.

Venue by agreement, waiver of right is valid In the present case, it is manifest from the parties’
contract that the venue of any action which they
Key points: might bring are the courts of competent jurisdiction
in Pasay City, whether the action is for “breach of the
Real property is located in Pasay, action was filed in
lease agreement or damages or any other cause.”
Makati. Action was for damages but the contract of
lease stipulated that breach under the lease It can clearly be inferred that the parties intended to
agreement shall be filed in the court of Pasay City. limit to the courts of appropriate jurisdiction in Pasay
City as venue between them and those claiming
Facts: 
On April 7, 1980, Petitioner Virgilio
under them. This acts as waiver of their right to
Gesmundo and respondent JRB Realty entered into institute action in the courts provided for in Rule 4,
a lease contract covering Room 116, Blanco Suites, Sec. 2 (b).
at 246 Villaruel St. Pasay City. They stipulated that
When stipulation is merely provision of additional
“xxx the venue for all suits, whether for breach
forum
hereof or damages or any cause between the
LESSOR and the LESSEE, and persons claiming This case differs from previous cases an example of
under each, being the courts of appropriate which is Polytrade v. Blanco where there was a
jurisdiction in Pasay City. xxx” stipulation that “the parties agree to sue and be sued
in the city of Manila” in which the court held that such
In 1993, petitioners filed a complaint in the RTC of
statement only provided for an additional forum in
Makati for damages against respondents. They
the absence of any qualifying or restrictive words.
alleged that they had been in possession of the
leased premises but that their lease was terminated
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On the other hand, in this present case, the certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Her
stipulation was like that in Hoechst v Torres where petition was denied for lack of merit on January 26,
the parties agreed that “in case of any litigation 1977 but, upon our reconsideration of the denial,
arising out of the agreement, the venue of any action given due course on May 6, 1977, with the parties
shall be in the competent courts of the Province of being required to file their respective
Rizal” in which the court held that no further memoranda. Only the private respondents did so
stipulations were necessary to elicit the thought that despite the extension granted to but not availed of
both parties agreed to sue and be sued ONLY in the by the petitioner. The case was considered
province of Rizal. submitted for decision without the memorandum.

The fact that neither of the parties reside in Pasay Issue: WON petitioner has been deprived of her day
City is of no moment in this case since the parties in court because of a strict adherence to procedural
stipulated the venue without regard to their rules and as a consequence prevented from
residence. defending her substantive rights?

Ruling: petitioner's counsel did not comply with the


requirements of the Rules of Court when he sent the
2. LIMPOT vs. CA telegraphic motion for postponement; that he did not
rectify the deficiency even if he had sufficient time to
do so before the hearing sought to be postponed;
Facts: Private respondents filed a complaint for that it was therefore not improper for the trial court to
quieting of title and recovery of possession against consider the case submitted for decision on the
the petitioner in CFI Southern Leyte. After they basis of the evidence presented so far by the parties;
presented one witness, Atty Alfar, petitioner’s that the petitioner had and enjoyed the chance to be
counsel, asked for a postponement because he fell heard through her motion for reconsideration and
from a bus. On the day of the scheduled hearing, the her subsequent motion for new trial; that the alleged
motion was opposed by the respondents for lack of erors sought to be reviewed were reversible only in
notice and failure to indicate the date of the an ordinary appeal, that this appeal was, however,
resetting. Judge Ara-ula denied the motion and said not filed on time; and that the petition for certiorari
he would continue with the hearing scheduled the with the respondent court could not be resorted to by
following day. However, instead of proceeding with the petitioner as a substitute for her dismissed
the trial on that date, he required the petitioner, who appeal. The respondent court was therefore correct
was present without counsel, to submit proof within in denying the said petition. The petitioner has only
five days that the respondents had been notified of herself to blame if judgment was rendered against
the motion for postponement. No proof was her. There are many instances that she did not
submitted. The trial judge issued an order declaring comply with the procedure or that she was accorded
the case submitted for decision on the basis of the the right to due process.
evidence so far presented. Atty Alfar filed for an MR (1) She was heard by the trial court in its MR. If it
on the ground of excusable negligence and/or nevertheless did not accept her explanation of
honest mistake, alleging that his client had honest mistake or excusable negligence, this did
misunderstood his telegram asking her to notify the not signify that she was denied due process as
private respondent herself as he did not have she claims. If the trial court was not convinced
enough money for the additional telegrams. Atty that she had a meritorious case, this too did not
Alfar was replaced by Atty. Alfafara, as counsel.
mean that she was deprived of her day in court.
Decision on the merits was rendered on March
(2) Atty. Alfaro had all of ten days after sending his
15,1973, and a copy thereof was received by the
telegrams to file a regular motion for
petitioner. On April 16, 1973, she filed a motion for
new trial, which was denied on May 14, 1973. She postponement, with copies furnished to the
was notified of the denial on May 25, 1973. The private respondents, conformably to the Rules of
petitioner filed her notice of appeal and appeal bond Court. He did not do so.
on May 31, 1973, and the original record on appeal (3) The trial court was not under any obligation to
the following day, June 1, 1973. Private respondents brief Atty Alfafara on the progress of the case,
filed a motion to dismiss the petitioner's appeal on the records of which were available to him for his
the ground of tardiness. The trial court dismissed the own examination. It was for him-or his assistant
appeal and ordered the issuance of a writ of if he had any-to examine such records for
execution. Petitioner elevated the case on certiorari whatever he needed or wanted to know.
to the CA, which was denied. The MR was likewise (4) The motion for new trial filed by the petitioner
denied on Aug 30, 1976. Notice of this denial was was deficient in form because it did not comply
received on September 13, 1976, by the petitioner, with Rule 37, section 2, of the Rules of Court. No
who came to this Court on November 9, 1976, for afndavit of merit was attached, as required, to
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support the claim of honest mistake or excusable respondents prayed for the change of the first name
negligence when she failed to notify the private of said minor adoptee to Aaron Joseph, the same
respondents of the telegraphic motion for being the name with which he was baptized in
postponement. keeping with religious tradition, and by which he has
(5) The petitioner claims it was March 25, 1973 that been called by his adoptive family, relatives and
she was notified of the decision, but the correct friends since May 6, 1993 when he arrived at private
date found was March 23, 1973, as established respondents residence.
by the certification made by the postmaster of
Cebu City and the registry return card. From the The RTC granted the petition for adoption of Kevin
date it was received, the petitioner filed a motion Earl Bartolome Moran and simultaneously granted
for new trial 24 days after. Then from May 25, the prayer therein for the change of the first name of
1973, the day the defendant received a copy of said adoptee to Aaron Joseph, to complement the
the Order denying her motion for new trial to surname Munson y Andrade which he acquired
June 1, 1973, the day she filed and submitted consequent to his adoption. Petitioner opposed the
her Record on Appeal, a period of eight (8) days inclusion of the relief for change of name in the same
had elapsed. Adding this eight (8) days to the petition for adoption objecting to the joinder of the
twenty-four (24) days will give a total of thirty-two petition for adoption and the petitions for the change
(32)days. So that when defendant filed her of name in a single proceeding, arguing that these
Notice of Appeal and Appeal Bond on May 31, petition should be conducted and pursued as two
1973 and the Record on Appeal on June 1, 1973, separate proceedings.
it was already beyond the reglementary period of
thirty (30) days within which a party may be Petitioner argues that a petition for adoption and a
allowed to appeal petition for change of name are two special
(6) To rectify her tardiness, petitioner ask that her proceedings which, in substance and purpose, are
subsequent petition for certiorari with the different from and are not related to each other,
respondent court as a substitute for her lost being respectively governed by distinct sets of law
appeal. This is not permitted. Where an appeal and rules. Petitioner further contends that what the
would have been an adequate remedy but it was law allows is the change of the surname of the
lost through petitioner's inexcusable negligence, adoptee, as a matter of right, to conform with that of
certiorari is not in order. The act that she sought the adopter and as a natural consequence of the
to file an ordinary appeal clearly shows that she adoption thus granted. If what is sought is the
herself believed that the claimed errors of the change of the registered given or proper name, and
trial court were appropriate for review only in that since this would involve a substantial change of
appeal and not by certiorari. It is obvious that one’s legal name, a petition for change of name
when she subsequently filed the petition for under Rule 103 should accordingly be instituted,
certiorari after her appeal had been dismissed with the substantive and adjective requisites therefor
for tardiness, she was availing herself'of the being conformably satisfied.
second remedy only as a substitute for her lost
Private respondents, on the contrary, admittedly
appeal. The petitioner forgets that the two
filed the petition for adoption with a prayer for
remedies are mutually exclusive and not
change of name predicated upon Section 5, Rule 2
alternative or successive.
which allows permissive joinder of causes of action
in order to avoid multiplicity of suits and in line with
the policy of discouraging protracted and vexatious
3. REPUBLIC vs. HON. HERNANDEZ litigations. It is argued that there is no prohibition in
the Rules against the joinder of adoption and change
FACTS: of name being pleaded as two separate but related
causes of action in a single petition.
Private respondent spouses, Van Munson y Navarro
and Regina Munson y Andrade, filed a petition to ISSUE:
adopt the minor Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran, duly
alleging therein the jurisdictional facts required by WON the court a quo erred in granting the prayer for
Rule 99 of the Rules of Court for adoption, their the change of the registered proper or given name
qualifications as and fitness to be adoptive parents, of the minor adoptee embodied in the petition for
as well as the circumstances under and by reason of adoption.
which the adoption of the aforenamed minor was
sought. In the very same petition, private RULING:

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The change of name of the child from Kevin Earl context. It should not be misconstrued or
Bartolome to Aaron Joseph should not be treated misinterpreted to extend to inferences beyond the
strictly, it appearing that no rights have been contemplation of law and jurisprudence.
prejudiced by said change of name. The strict and
meticulous observation of the requisites set forth by 4. DE GUZMAN vs. CA
Rule 103 of the Rules of Court is indubitably for the
purpose of preventing fraud, ensuring that neither
State nor any third person should be prejudiced by
FACTS: On September 15, 1988, petitioner filed a
the grant of the petition for change of name under
said rule, to a petitioner of discernment. complaint for damages and other equitable reliefs in
the trial court. More than seven (7) years ago,
Clearly, the law allows the adoptee, as a matter of several checks were issued by plaintiff to defendant
right and obligation, to bear the surname of the in exchange for cash which probably amounted to
adopter, upon issuance of the decree of adoption. It P280,900.00. In due time, these checks were either
is the change of the adoptees surname to follow that fully paid, settled, extinguished or condoned by
of the adopter which is the natural and necessary agreement of the parties, and for which reason,
consequence of a grant of adoption and must plaintiff did not anymore redeem the checks
specifically be contained in the order of the court, in precisely because they have been close and mutual
fact, even if not prayed for by petitioner. friends.
However, the given or proper name, also known as Lately, however, plaintiff received from defendant's
the first or Christian name, of the adoptee must lawyer a demand letter dated 1988. The claim of
remain as it was originally registered in the civil
P568,541.00 is not due and owing from the plaintiff
register. The creation of an adoptive relationship
to the defendant. Defendant has kept possession of
does not confer upon the adopter a license to
change the adoptees registered Christian or first the alleged checks amounting to P280,900.00 at the
name. The automatic change thereof, premised expense of plaintiff and since the obligation
solely upon the adoption thus granted, is beyond the thereunder has either been fully or wholly paid,
purview of a decree of adoption. Neither is it a mere settled, extinguished, or condoned by agreement of
incident in nor an adjunct of an adoption proceeding, the parties, defendant holds them without just or
such that a prayer therefor furtively inserted in a legal ground and is bound to return them to plaintiff.
petition for adoption, as in this case, cannot properly
be granted. On October 8, 1988, private respondent filed a
motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of cause of
The situation presented in this case does not warrant action and prescription. On November 24, 1988 the
exception from the Rules under the policy of liberal trial court dismissed the complaint for failure to state
construction thereof in general, and for change of
a cause of action. On January 30, 1990, the Court of
name in particular, as proposed by private
respondents and adopted by respondent Appeals rendered its decision dismissing the appeal
judge. Liberal construction of the Rules may be with costs against petitioner.
invoked in situations wherein there may be some ISSUE: WON the complaint lacks cause of action.
excusable formal deficiency or error in a pleading,
provided that the same does not subvert the RULING: NO. From the allegation of the complaint
essence of the proceeding and connotes at least a in this case it appears that, (1) petitioner has a
reasonable attempt at compliance with the Rules. primary right, Because of having paid his obligation
Utter disregard of the Rules cannot justly be to private respondent, to have the checks he issued
rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal to cover the amount returned to him or otherwise
construction.
cancelled by private respondent; and (2) the primary
The Court is not impervious to the frustration that right of was violated when private respondent
litigants and lawyers alike would at times encounter demanded payment of a settled obligation relying on
in procedural bureaucracy but imperative justice the very checks of petitioner he had not returned.
requires correct observance of indispensable Consequently, on account of such demand for
technicalities precisely designed to ensure its proper payment for an obligation duly settled, the petitioner
dispensation. It has long been recognized that strict thereby suffered damages and should be afforded
compliance with the Rules of Court is indispensable
such relief as prayed for in the complaint.
for the prevention of needless delays and for the
orderly and expeditious dispatch of judicial business. A cause of action is the fact or combination of facts
The liberality with which this Court treats which affords a party a right to judicial interference
matters leading up to adoption insofar as it carries in his behalf. An action means an ordinary suit in a
out the beneficent purposes of adoption and ensures court of justice, by which one party prosecutes
to the adopted child the rights and privileges arising another for the enforcement or protection of a right,
therefrom, ever mindful that the paramount or the prosecution or redress of a wrong. The cause
consideration is the overall benefit and interest of the of action must always consist of two elements: (1)
adopted child, should be understood in its proper the plaintiff's primary right and the defendant's
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corresponding primary duty, whatever may be the allegation that the payment made to BAID was not
subject to which they relate — person, character, credited from the mortgagor’s account.
property or contract; and (2) the delict or wrongful
ISSUE: Whether or not the judge is guilty of gross
act or omission of the defendant, by which the
ignorance of the law.
primary right and duty have been violated. The
cause of action is determined not by the prayer of RULING: Yes. The Court ruled that as a judge, he
the complaint but by the facts alleged. must know how to apply the different laws to the
different kinds of sale. In the case at bar, this
The term right of action is the right to commence and
involves an extrajudicial foreclosure sale of a real
maintain an action. 5 In the law on pleadings, right
estate mortgage executed by PQL in favor of BAID.
of action is distinguished from cause of action in that
If respondent is in doubt as to the proper venue of
the former is a remedial right belonging to some
the foreclosure sale, the judge should have referred
persons, while the latter is a formal statement of the
to Act No. 3135 and not to the Rules of Court. The
operative facts that give rise to such remedial right.
said law provides that the foreclosure sale cannot be
The former is a matter of right and depends on the
made legally outside the province in which the
substantive law, while the latter is a matter of
property is situated. Since the property is in Manila,
statement and is governed by the law of procedure.
the same cannot be sold outside the said place.
Furthermore, the parties stipulated in the Deed of
Real Estate Mortgage that if the properties are in the
The right of action springs from the cause of action,
province, sale shall be held at the capital thereof.
but does not accrue until all the facts which
With the law and the intention of the parties,
constitute the cause of action have occurred. There
respondent judge therefore had no valid reason to
can be no right of action until there has been a wrong
entertain doubt as to the propriety of the venue. It is
— a violation of a legal right — and it is then given
noteworthy that extrajudicial foreclosure sale is not
by the adjective law.
an action similar to what is contemplated in Rule 4
of ROC (Venue of Actions). Sec. 1 of Rule 2 defines
5. SUPENA vs. DELA ROSA an action as an ordinary suit in a court of justice, by
which a party sues another for the enforcement or
protection of a right or the prevention or redress of a
FACTS: On 1 April 1993, mortgagee BPA wrong. The determinative or operative fact which
Agricultural Development Bank (BAID) petitioned converts a claim into an “action or suit” is the filing of
the Ex- Officio Sheriff of Manila to foreclose the the same with a court of justice. An extrajudicial sale
mortgaged property of mortgagor PQL Realty is filed not in a court of justice but with the Office of
Incorporated (PQL). The Ex-Officio Sheriff issued the Sheriff. If the executive judge comes into play,
the notice of foreclosure and caused the necessary he merely exercises administrative supervision over
publication relative to the sale. Nevertheless, a day the sheriff, and this does not change the fact that the
before the scheduled public auction sale, Hon. extrajudicial foreclosure sale is not an action or suit.
Rosalio de la Rosa, the Executive Judge of RTC of Any venue stipulation in the contract, although
Manila, issued an order holding in abeyance the said considered valid and enforceable, does not
sale based on the ex-parte motion filed by PQL. supersede the general rule set forth in Rule 4. In the
Consequently, Mr. Rodrigo Supena, President of absence of qualifying or restrictive words in the
BAID, filed a complaint charging respondent Judge stipulation they should be considered merely as an
de la Rosa with gross ignorance of the law for agreement on additional forum, not as limiting venue
issuing the order. Complainant avers the restraining to the specified place. It is not exclusive but
order was issued without due process of law permissive.
(meaning, without a proper case filed, no notice and
hearing and without a bond from which the Note: There are three different types of sales and
mortgagee may seek compensation or restitution for which are governed by the following laws: 1.
damages it may suffer due to the improper Ordinary execution sale – Rule 39 of the Rules of
cancellation of the auction sale). He further contends Court on Execution, Satisfaction and Effect of
that the ground relied upon by the exparte motion, Judgments 2. Judicial foreclosure sale - Rule 68 of
i.e, the parties have agreed to hold the foreclosure the Rules, captioned Foreclosure of Mortgage 3.
proceeding in Makati and not in Manila, is patently Extrajudicial foreclosure sale - Act No. 3135, as
without merit. It is complainant’s argument that amended by Act No. 4118, otherwise known as "An
venue is fixed by law and cannot be the subject of a Act to Regulate the Sale of Property under Special
stipulation. On the other hand, respondent maintains Powers Inserted in or Annexed to Real Estate
that the order was proper to determine two issues, Mortgages"
to wit: (1) whether the venue is improperly laid in the
light of a stipulation in the parties Loan Agreement,
and (2) to determine the veracity of mortgagor’s
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certiorari, is the proper remedy for the petitioner in


RULE 2 assailing the dismissal order.
CAUSE OF ACTION Hence, this petition to review the respondent
appellate court's decision.

ISSUE: WON the CA erred in affirming the dismissal


1. HEIRS OF ILDELFONSO by the trial court of the complaint for damages on the
COSCOLLUELA SR INC vs. RICO ground of lack of cause of action
GENERAL INSURANCE CORP
HELD: YES!!!
FACTS:
After a review of the records, the Court finds that the
Petitioner, Heirs of Ildefonso Coscoluella, Inc. is a allegations set forth in the complaint sufficiently
domestic corporation and the registered owner of an establish a cause of action. The following are the
Isuzu KBD Pick-up truck bearing Motor No. 663296 requisites for the existence of a cause of action: (1)
and Plate No. LTV-FAW-189. The vehicle was a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and
insured with the private respondent Rico General under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an
obligation on the part of the named defendant to
Insurance Corporation for a consideration of
P100,000.00 excluding third party liability under respect, or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or
Commercial Vehicle Policy No. CV-122415 per omission on the part of the said defendant
Renewal Certificate No. 02189. The premiums and constituting a violation of the plaintiff's right or a
other expenses for insurance paid covered the breach of the obligation of the defendant to the
period from October 1, 1986 to October 1, 1987. plaintiff. (Cole v. Vda. de Gregoria, 116 SCRA 670
[1982]; Baliwag Transit, Inc. v. Ople, G. R. No.
57642, March 16, 1989)
On August 28, 1987 and within the period covered
by the insurance, the insured vehicle was severely
The facts as alleged clearly define the existence of
damaged and rendered unserviceable when fired
upon by a group of unidentified armed persons at a right of the petitioner to a just claim against the
Hacienda Puyas, Barangay Blumentritt, Murcia, insurer for the payment of the indemnity for a loss
Negros Occidental. In the same incident, four due to an event against which the petitioner's vehicle
persons died. was insured. The insurance contract mentioned
therein manifests a right to pursue a claim and a duty
on the part of the insurer or private respondent to
Petitioner filed its claim of P80,000.00 for the repair
compensate the insured in case of a risk insured
of the vehicle but private respondent, in a letter
against. The refusal of the insurer to satisfy the claim
dated October 8, 1987, refused to grant it. As a
and the consequent loss to the petitioner in incurring
consequence, the petitioner was prompted to file a
the cost of acquiring legal assistance on the matter
complaint with the Regional Trial Court, 6th Judicial
constitutes a violation or an injury brought to the
Region, Branch 47 at Bacolod City, docketed as Civil
petitioner.
Case No. 4707, to recover the claim of P80,000.00
plus interest and attorney's fees.
There is, therefore, a sufficient cause of action upon
which the trial court can render a valid judgment.
The private respondent filed a motion to dismiss
(Tañedo v. Bernad, et al; G. R. No. 66520, August
alleging that the complaint lacks a cause of action
30, 1988).
because the firing by armed men is a risk excepted
under the provisions in the insurance policy. For
them, the firing was "an indirect consequence of The Court is very much cognizant of the principle
rebellion, insurrection or civil commotion." The that a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to
petitioner opposed the motion, saying that the state a cause of action stated in the complaint
quoted provision does not apply in the absence of an hypothetically admits the truth of the facts therein.
official governmental proclamation of any of the The Court notes the following limitations on the
above-enumerated conditions. hypothetical admission:

The trial court ordered the dismissal of the complaint The hypothetical admission is
for lack of cause of action stating that the damage however limited to the relevant and
material facts well pleaded in the
arose from a civil commotion or was a direct result
thereof. (Rollo, p. 37) complaint and inferences fairly
deducible therefrom. The admission
does not extend to conclusions or
Thereafter, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari
interpretations of law: nor does it
with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court
cover allegations of fact the falsity of
denied the petition, affirmed the trial court's
which is subject to judicial notice. (U.
dismissal order, and also ruled that an appeal in the
Bañez Electric Light Co. v. Abra
ordinary course of law, not a special civil action of
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Electric Cooperative, Inc., 119 SCRA accept the checks for deposit and to credit them to
90 [1982]) the account of said Plastic Corporation, inspite of the
fact that the checks were crossed and payable to
Applying the above principle, we hold that the private petitioner Bank and bore no indorsement of the
respondent's motion to dismiss hypothetically latter. The defendants filed their separate Motions to
admits the facts alleged in the complaint. We do not Dismiss alleging a common ground that the
find anything in the complaint which does not complaint states no cause of action. The RTC
deserve admission by the motion since there are no granted the defendants' Motions to Dismiss. The
"conclusions or interpretations of law" nor Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.
"allegations of fact the falsity of which is subject to
judicial notice." It is clear that the complaint does no ISSUE: WON petitioner Bank has a cause of action
more and no less than state simply that the van was against any or all of the defendants, in the alternative
damaged due to the firing by unidentified armed or otherwise.
men. Since the complaint does not explicitly state
nor intimate civil strife which private respondent HELD: No, the petitioner bank has no cause of
insists to be the cause of the damage, the motion to action against the defendants.
dismiss cannot go beyond the admission of the facts
stated and inferences reasonably deducible from A cause of action is defined as an act or omission of
them. Any other assertion by the private respondent one party in violation of the legal right or rights of
is subject to proof. Meanwhile, the sufficiency of the another. The essential elements are: (1) legal right
petitioner's cause of action has been shown since, of the plaintiff; (2) correlative obligation of the
admitting the facts alleged, a valid judgment can be defendant; and (3) an act or omission of the
rendered. defendant in violation of said legal right.

WHEREFORE, considering the foregoing, the The normal parties to a check are the drawer, the
petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the payee and the drawee bank. Courts have long
respondent Court of Appeals affirming the dismissal recognized the business custom of using printed
order by the Regional Trial Court is hereby checks where blanks are provided for the date of
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let the case be issuance, the name of the payee, the amount
remanded to the lower court for trial on the merits. payable and the drawer's signature. All the drawer
has to do when he wishes to issue a check is to
SO ORDERED. properly fill up the blanks and sign it. However, the
mere fact that he has done these does not give rise
to any liability on his part, until and unless the check
2. DEVELOPMENT BANK OR RIZAL vs. is delivered to the payee or his representative. A
SIMA WEI negotiable instrument, of which a check is, is not
only a written evidence of a contract right but is also
a species of property. Just as a deed to a piece of
FACTS: land must be delivered in order to convey title to the
In consideration for a loan extended by petitioner grantee, so must a negotiable instrument be
Bank to respondent Sima Wei, the latter executed delivered to the payee in order to evidence its
and delivered to the former a promissory note, existence as a binding contract. Section 16 of the
engaging to pay the petitioner Bank or order the Negotiable Instruments Law, which governs checks,
amount of P1,820,000.00 with interest at 32% per provides in part:
annum. Sima Wei made partial payments on the
note, leaving a balance of P1,032,450.02. Sima Wei Every contract on a negotiable instrument is
issued two crossed checks payable to petitioner incomplete and revocable until delivery of the
Bank drawn against China Banking Corporation. instrument for the purpose of giving effect thereto. .
The said checks were allegedly issued in full ..
settlement of the drawer's account evidenced by the Thus, the payee of a negotiable instrument acquires
promissory note. These two checks were not no interest with respect thereto until its delivery to
delivered to the petitioner-payee or to any of its him. Delivery of an instrument means transfer of
authorized representatives. possession, actual or constructive, from one person
to another. Without the initial delivery of the
For reasons not shown, these checks came into the instrument from the drawer to the payee, there can
possession of respondent Lee Kian Huat, who be no liability on the instrument. Moreover, such
deposited the checks without the petitioner-payee's delivery must be intended to give effect to the
indorsement (forged or otherwise) to the account of instrument.
respondent Plastic Corporation, at the Balintawak
branch, Caloocan City, of the Producers Bank. The allegations of the petitioner in the original
Cheng Uy, Branch Manager of the Balintawak complaint show that the two (2) China Bank checks,
branch of Producers Bank, relying on the assurance were not delivered to the payee, the petitioner
of respondent Samson Tung, President of Plastic herein. Without the delivery of said checks to
Corporation, that the transaction was legal and petitioner-payee, the former did not acquire any right
regular, instructed the cashier of Producers Bank to or interest therein and cannot therefore assert any
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cause of action, founded on said checks, whether CA: Reversed the RTC and remanded the case for
against the drawer Sima Wei or against the further proceedings
Producers Bank or any of the other respondents
. Issue: WON the claim in the allegation in the
complaint of private respondent has already
prescribed and has no sufficient cause of action
3. FAR EAST MARBLE INC vs. CA because the phrase “repeated requests and
demands for payment” is not sufficient to state a
Facts: cause of action

· In 1976, petitioner Fareast Marble received from Ruling: No, the claim in petitioner’s complaint has
private respondent (the former Commercial Trust not prescribed and petitioner has a valid cause of
Bank Company which was absorbed by BPI) the action.
following, viz:
Complaint is a concise statement of the ultimate
(1) several loans evidenced by promissory notes; facts constituting the plaintiff’s cause or causes of
AND action.

(2) the former was extended by the latter credit


facilities in the form of Trust Receipts;
What then are the ultimate facts which BPI had to
· Petitioner Tabuenas (Ramon and Luis) allege in its complaint so as to sufficiently establish
executed in favor of BPI a “continuing guaranty” its cause of action?
whereby they bound themselves, jointly and
A cause of action consists of three elements:
severally, to answer for the loan obligations of Far
East to the bank; (1) the legal right of plaintiff;
· Far East failed to pay its obligations (both the (2) the correlative obligation of the defendant; and
promissory note and the trust receipts) and Ramon
and Luis Tabuenas also did not comply with their (3) the act or omission of the defendant in violation
solidary liability under the “continuing guaranty”; of said legal right.

· As a result, in 1987, private respondent BPI These elements are manifest in BPI’s complaint,
filed a complaint for foreclosure of chattel mortgage where it alleged that:
with replevin against petitioners; (1) for valuable consideration, BPI granted several
· Far East filed a compulsory counterclaim where loans, evidenced by promissory notes, and
it admitted the genuineness and due execution of the extended credit facilities in the form of trust receipts
promissory notes but alleged further that it has to Far East;
already prescribed, so it raised the defense of (2) Said promissory notes and trust receipts had
prescription and lack of cause of action; it also matured; and
denied that BPI made prior demands for payment;
(3) Despite repeated demands, Far East failed and
· BPI filed an opposition to the motion to hear refused to pay.
affirmative defenses, alleging that its cause of action
against Far East have not prescribed, since within Clearly then, the general allegation of BPI that
10 year from the time its cause of action accued, “despite repeated requests and demands for
various written extrajudicial demands were made by payment, Far East has failed to pay” is sufficient to
BPI to Far East; establish BPI’s cause of action. Besides,
prescription is not a cause of action; it is a defense,
Lower court rulings: which having been raised should be supported by
RTC: competent evidence.

· dismissed the complaint based on prescription A complaint is sufficient if it contains sufficient notice
and lack of cause of action of the cause of action even though the allegation
may be vague or indefinite, for in such case, the
ratio: Apart from the fact that the complaint failed to recourse of the defendant would be to file a motion
allege that the period of prescription was interrupted, for a bill of particulars.
the phrase “repeated requests and demands for
payment” is vague and incomplete so as to establish The circumstances of BPI extending loans and
in the minds of defendant, or to enable the court to credits to Far East and the failure of the latter to pay
draw a conclusion, that demands or and discharge the same upon maturity are the only
acknowledgments of debt were made that could ultimate facts which have to be pleaded, although
have interrupted the period of prescription. the facts necessary to make the mortgage validly
enforceable must be proven during the trial.
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In fine, the finding of the trial court that prescription The firmly settled rule is that strangers to a
has set in is primarily premised on a misappreciation contract cannot sue either or both of the
of the sufficiency of BPI’s allegation as discussed. contracting parties to annul and set aside the
The records will show that the hearing conducted by contract. Nonetheless, he who is not the party
the trial court was merely pro forma and the trial obligated principally or subsidiarily in a contract may
judge did not sufficiently address the issue whether perhaps be entitled to an action for nullity, if he is
prejudiced in his rights with respect to one of the
or not a demand for payment in fact made by BPI
contracting parties; but, in order that such be the
and duly received by herein petitioner Far east.
case, it is indispensable to show the detriment which
positively would result to him from the contract in
which he had no intervention. Gaw Ching does not
4. MALABANAN vs. GAW CHING
fall within such exception. First, Gaw Ching had no
legal right of preemption in respect of the house and
FACTS: lot involved. The subject piece of land is located
outside the Urban Land Reform Zones declared in
Mr. Jabit has previously entered into an oral P.D. 1517 which entitles the lessee to a right of
contract of lease with respondent Gaw Ching; When preemption or redemption if he has built his home
Mr. Jabit died, petitioner, daughter, continued the thereon and resided for at least 10 years thereat.
lease but the rental was increased from P700.00 to
P1,000.00 per month; There was no written contract 2.) No, respondent is not entitled to the damages
with regards to the duration of the lease between Mr. awarded by the IAC.
Jabit and respondent; Subsequently thereafter,
petitioner informed respondent that she was selling Firstly, the order of condemnation or demolition had
the house and lot for P5,000.00 per square meter; been issued by the proper authorities (Office of the
Respondent argued that the price is prohibitive; City Engineer) which order was valid and subsisting
nonetheless, petitioner maintained her proposition; at the time the demolition was carried out. Second,
Respondent, nothwithstanding the aforementioned, it is the owner of the building or installation to be
still tried to pay his rental dues but petitioner refused demolished who may appeal an order of demolition
to accept; hence, he deposited the same in a bank, to the Secretary of Public Works and Highways. At
as advised by his counsel; After letters of notice that bar, Gaw Ching is merely a lessee. Third, the action
petitioner will sell the subject property should filed by respondent to annul the sale was with
respondent opt not to buy the same, the property preliminary injunction which the RTC denied; hence,
was subsequently sold to Leonidas Senolos; it was only after such denial that demolition was
Verious notices was sent by petitioner to vacate the continued. Lastly, Gaw Ching had ample notice of
said property; Petitioner then caused the said demolition order and had adequate time to remove
property to be demolished; hence, respondent filed his belongings from the premises if he was minded
an action to annul sale with damages between to obey the order of demolition. He chose not to obey
Senolos and petitioner. that order. If he did suffer any losses – the trial court
did not believe his claims that he did – he had only
Lower court ruling: himself to blame.

RTC: declared the validity of the sale; respondent


was given ample opportunity to exercise right of first 5. CRUZ ET AL vs. FILIPINAS
refusal INVESTMENT AND FINANCE CORP.

IAC: Reversed the decision of the RTC; the majority Facts:


held that the transaction between petitioner was
vitiated by fraud, deceit and bad faith allegedly Petitioner Ruperto Cruz purchased on installments
causing damage to respondent; hence, annulled the one (1) unit of Isuzu Diesel bus from Far East
deed of sale and ordered petitioner to pay Motors. Petitioner issued a promissory note as
respondent P350,000.00 in damages (moral, evidence of his indebtedness to Far East Motors. To
exemplary and actual) secure such promissory note, chattel mortgage was
ISSUE: instituted on the said vehicle. Since no
downpayment was made by Cruz, an additional
1.) Wether respondent has been prejudiced in his security was required by Far East Motors. The
right so as to give him the right of action to annul additional security was given by plaintiff Felicidad de
the sale; Reyes over her land which at that time was
mortgaged to DBP. Later, Far East Motors assigned
2.) Wether respondent is entitled to said damages all its rights and interests to the Deed of Chattel
as awarded by the IAC; Mortgage and Deed of Real Estate Mortgage to
respondent, with due notice of assignment to the
HELD:
petitioners. Subsequently, petitioner defaulted on
1.) No, respondent was not prejudiced in his right the promissory note so respondent foreclosed the
by reason of the sale of said property. chattel mortgage on the bus. However, the proceeds
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from the chattel mortgage were insufficient to proceeding in a court of justice to secure one’s
discharge fully the indebtedness. Preparatory to rights; the prosecution of some demand in a court of
extra-judicially foreclosing the real estate mortgage justice; the means by which men litigate with each
on Reyes’ land, defendant paid DBP her unpaid other; the means that the law has provided to put the
balance. Petitioner Reyes sent a letter demanding cause of action into effect.”
cancellation of her real estate mortgage, but
Considering the purpose for which the prohibition
defendant did not heed so the former instituted a suit
contained in Article 1484, the word “action” used
against the latter for cancellation of said real estate
therein may be construed as referring to any judicial
mortgage.
or extrajudicial proceeding by virtue of which the
Lower court rulings: vendor may lawfully be enabled to exact recovery of
the supposed unsatisfied balance of the purchasing
RTC: sustained petitioner and declared that the
price form the purchaser or his privy. Certainly, an
extrajudicial foreclosure of the chattel mortgage on
extrajudicial foreclosure of a real estate mortgage is
the bus barred further action against the additional
one such proceeding.
security put up by Reyes
Ratio of the lower court: 6. HERMANOS vs. DELA RIVA
There is no controversy that, involving as it does a
sale of personal property on installments, the
pertinent legal provision in this case is Article 1484 SYLLABUS
of the Civil Code, to wit: “Art. 1484. In a contract of 1. JUDGMENT ORDERED ENTERED UNDER
RULES 33 AND 34 OF RULES OF SUPREME
sale of personal property the price of which is
COURT IN HARMONY WITH SECTION 506 OF
payable in installments, the vendor may exercise
CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE; WHO MUST
any of the following remedies: ENTER. — In the last part of the decisions of this
(1) Exact fulfillment of the obligation, should the court in appealed cases there is usually an order
vendee fail to pay; directing the entry of a judgment in accordance with
the opinion, and then the return of the record to the
(2) Cancel the sale, should the vendee’s failure to court of origin for proper proceedings and the same
pay cover two or more installments; is addressed, not to the court of origin, but to the
clerk of the same Supreme Court.
(3) Foreclose the chattel mortgage on the thing sold,
if one has been constituted, should the vendee’s 2. ID.; EXECUTION; TIME; DATE FROM WHICH
failure to pay cover two or more installments. In this COMPUTED. — In a case decided by the court on
case, he shall have no further action against the appeal, the true judgment of legal effect is that
purchaser to recover any unpaid balance of the entered by the clerk of said court pursuant to the
price. Any agreement to the contrary shall be void. dispositive part of its decision, and from the date of
said judgment entered by the clerk the period of five
Defendant brought the present appeal immediately years mentioned in section 443 of the Code of Civil
to the Supreme Court arguing, among others, that Procedure must be computed, within which
the law speaks of “action”, the restriction should be execution can be issued upon the judgment.
confined only to the bringing of judicial suits or
proceedings in court. 3. ID.; ACTION TO ENFORCE IT; PRESCRIPTION;
COMPUTATION. — The action to enforce a
Issue: judgment prescribes in ten years. The period is
computed from the date the judgment was entered
WON the action referred in Art. 1484 is confined only and not from the expiration of the first five years
to those actions where there is a judicial suit or following said data.
proceeding in court
Ruling: Facts:
No, the “action” referred to in Art. 1484 is not limited
to judicial suits or proceedings. A judgment was rendered by the SC on January 12,
1909 in the CFI of Manila. The parties were notified
The word ‘action’ is without a definite or exclusive of the judgment on February 13, 1909 and the
meaning. It has invariably been defined as: “the legal records was returned to the CFI of origin, the same
demand of one’s right, or rights; the lawful demand having been recorded and filed in said court on
of one’s right in a court of justice; the legal and February 15, 1909.
formal demand of one’s rights from another person
On the January 25, 1909, the plaintiff, winner in the
or party, made and insisted on in a court of justice; a
previous case, presented his bill of costs in the Court
claim made before a tribunal; an assertion in a court of First Instance, to which the case had been
of justice of a right given by law; a demand or legal returned.
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remanding the case to the court of origin. And as a


On the 24th of February, 1914, the plaintiff moved matter of fact, the clerk of the Supreme Court on
the Court of First Instance to enter judgment in February 3, 1909, entered the judgment required by
accordance with said decision of this court which said court to be entered.
modified the judgment involved in that appeal,
sentencing the defendant to pay plaintiff, instead of Therefore the judgment entered by the Court of First
P94,222.50, the sum of P93,963.30 with interest Instance on February 26, 1914, is not the judgment
thereon at 8 per cent per annum from January 1, ordered by the Supreme Court to be entered, for
1906, with costs. Granting this motion, the Court of such judgment had already been entered by the
First Instance rendered judgment in harmony with clerk of this court on February 3, 1909. Such a
the opinion of this court. judgment of the Court of First Instance under date of
February 26, 1914, was and is an unnecessary
On March 19, 1918, a writ of execution was issued proceeding and has no legal effect.
upon that judgment, which was returned unsatisfied
to the Court of First Instance, no property of the The true and legally effective judgment is the one
defendant having been found. entered by the clerk of the Supreme Court on
February 3, 1909. And from this date the five years
On the 5th of November of the same year a new mentioned in section 443 of the Code of Civil
execution was issued, of which no return appears to Procedure must be, and are computed, which
have been made. section provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

On the 15th of February, 1922, the plaintiff brought "The party in whose favor judgment is given, may, at
suit against the same defendant, praying that any time within five years after the entry thereof,
judgment be rendered reviving, and giving effect to have a writ of execution issued for its enforcement,
the judgment in question. as hereinafter provided."cralaw virtua1aw library

Issues: Therefore the writs of execution issued in the year


1918 were issued long after the period of five years
1. Whether the period of five years fixed by section fixed by the legal provision just quoted and
443 of the Code of Civil Procedure within which an consequently they have no legal effect.
execution can be issued upon a judgment must be
computed from February 26, 1914, the date of the 2.
judgment entered by the Court of First Instance or It would be necessary to determine when the period
from January 12, 1909, the date of the judgment of of prescription of said judgment has begun to run.
the Supreme Court.
Section 43, No. 1, of the Code of the Civil Procedure
2. WON the action filed by plaintiff is tenable or has provides:
it prescribed. (The complaint filed on Feb 15, 1922
from which this appeal in the SC originated) "Civil actions other than for the recovery of real
property can only be brought within the following
Ruling: periods after the right of action
accrues:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
1.
It is necessary to determine the legal effect of the "1. Within ten years: An action upon an agreement,
judgment entered by the Court of First Instance on contract, or promise in writing, or upon the judgment
February 26, 1914. or decree of a court. . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library

It is argued that as in this decision it is ordered that Section 447 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides:
judgment be entered in accordance therewith, the
Court of First Instance, at the instance of the plaintiff, "Enforcement of judgment after lapse of five years.
entered such a judgment on February 26, 1914. But — In all cases, a judgment may be enforced after the
such an order of this court was not, and could not lapse of five years from the date of its entry, and
have been, addressed to the Court of First Instance, before the same shall have been barred by any
because right after that order it was directed that, statute of limitation, by an action instituted in regular
after the entry of such a judgment in accordance with form, by complaint, as other actions are instituted.”
the decision, the record be remanded to the court of
origin for proper proceedings. Under these orders it It must be noted in the first place that we must not
was impossible for the Court of First Instance to lose sight of the provisions concerning the
enter judgment before the record of the case was prescription; and construing said section 447, the
remanded thereto. conclusion one arrives at is that after the expiration
library of the five years within which execution can be
issued upon a judgment, the winning party can
The judgment that the Supreme Court ordered revive it only in the manner therein provided so long
entered in accordance with its decision was the one as the period of ten years does not expire from the
to be entered by the clerk of said court before date of said judgment, according to section 43, No.
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1, of the same Code. is due to any one; the prescribed mode of enforcing
a right in the proper tribunal; a remedial instrument
In the second place, it cannot be said that the cause of justice whereby redress is obtained for any wrong
of action of the winning party to enforce a judgment committed or right withheld; a proceeding in court,
accrues only after the expiration of the five years whether of equity or law; a suit or process by which
within which he may obtain an execution. The right a demand is made of a right, in a court of justice; a
of said winning party to enforce the judgment against
proceeding at law to enforce a private right or to
the defeated party, begins to exist the moment the
redress a private wrong; a civil proceeding taken in
judgment is final; and this right consists in having an
execution of the judgment issued during the first five a court of law to enforce a right; a judicial proceeding
years next following, and in commencing after that for the prevention or redress of a wrong; a
period the proceeding provided in section 447 to proceeding by one party against another to try their
revive it, and this latter remedy can be pursued only mutual rights; an ordinary proceeding in a court of
before the judgment prescribes, that is to say, during justice by which one party prosecutes another for the
the five years next following. enforcement or protection of a right, the redress or
prevention of a wrong, or the punishment of a public
In the third place, if it is held that after the expiration offense; a judicial proceeding which will, if
of the five years within which execution can be prosecuted effectually, result in a judgment." (1
issued upon a judgment, the winning party has still Corpus Juris, pp. 924, 925.)
ten years within which to revive it, then the judgment
would not prescribe until after fifteen years, which is
against No. 1 of section 43 of the same Code. or
reconciling these two provisions, there being no
other way of reconciling them than to say that after 7. JIMENEZ vs. CAMARA
the expiration of the first five years next following the
judgment, there remain to the victorious party only
another five years to revive it. Overview:
The rule is that where the covenant or contract is
Prescription is a matter of positive legislation and entire and the breach total, there can be only one
cannot be established by mere implications or action.
deductions.
Facts:
As a consequence of all of the foregoing, the writs of · Petitioner (including Vicente Jimenez, later
execution issued in the year 1918 upon the judgment attorney-in-fact of Golez) are owners of 24 lots which
of February 3, 1909, are of no legal effect and the they mortgaged with PNB;
herein complaint filed February 15, 1922, was · Because they were not able to pay, PNB
presented after said judgment has prescribed. foreclosed the property with right of redemption;
· Petitioners renounced their right of redemption
Wherefore the conclusion is inevitable that the of the said lot to Adriano Golez
plaintiff has no right to bring this action and its · In order to redeem said property to the bank,
complaint must be dismissed. petitioner and Golez obtained the intervention and
services of Carmelo Camara;
Notes: · A contract was then executed between PNB
Definition of “action”: and Camara where the former promised to sell all his
rights and interests in the mortgaged properties to
the latter for P55,160.00;
"Many definitions of the term ’action’ have been
· Since conformity of judgment debtors was
given by the courts. It has been defined as the legal needed, conformity was given by petitioner, subject
demand of one’s right, or rights; the lawful demand to the condition that Camara should reconvey to
of one’s rights, or rights; the lawful demand of one’s Adriano Golez whatever rights and interests Camara
rights in the form given by law; a demand of a right may acquire from the bank;
in a court of justice; the lawful demand of one’s right · A lease contract between the petitioners and
in a court of justice; the legal and formal demand of Golez, on one side, and Camara, on the other, was
one’s rights from another person or party, made and made for the 7 lots for two years ending on
insisted on in a court of justice; a claim made before November 1941 while the other 17 lots remained in
a tribunal; an assertion in a court of justice of a right possession of the petitioners;
given by law; a demand or legal proceeding in a · Consequently, Camara paid of all the debts of
court of justice to secure one’s rights; the petitioners to the bank and a deed of absolute sale
was made in Camara’s favor and he registered all 24
prosecution of some demand in a court of justice; the
lots under his name, without notice to the petitioners,
means by which men litigate with each other; the notwithstanding his commitment under said
means that the law has provided to put the cause of contracts (to reconvey them to Adriano Golez);
action into effect; the formal means or method of · After the expiration of the lease contract,
pursuing and recovering one’s right in a court of Camara refused to relinquish possession of the 7
justice; the rightful method of obtaining in court what
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lots, a complaint was filed before the CFI of Negros


Occ. PARTIES TO CIVIL
· CFI decided in favor of Camara but SC,
subsequently, decided in favor of Golez (the lease
ACTIONS
contract was merely to accommodate redemption of
the subject property from the PNB) and the SC
ordered Golez to pay Camara the necessary
payment for redemption; 1. TATAD vs. GARCIA
· So, in compliance, Golez deposited with the CFI
of Negros Occ. a PNB Cashier’s Check but another Facts:
question was raised by Camara at the CFI:
(1) won deposit in check was valid, and In 1989, DOTC planned to construct an LRT line
(2) won reconveyance is for the whole 24 lots or only along EDSA to be called as EDSA LRT III. The Build-
7 of them; Operate-Transfer (BOT) Law, which provides two
· The CFI sustained the validity of deposit in schemes for the financing, construction and
check and the reconveyance for the 24 lots;
operation of gov’t projects through private
· Camara appealed the CFI decision until it
investment: BOT or Build-Transfer (BT).
eventually reached the SC again;
· While pending in the SC, assignees of Golez In accordance with the BOT Law and to set the
filed in CFI of Negros Occ against Camara, the EDSA LRT III Project, DOTC issued orders creating
reconveyance of the 17 remaining lots; the prequalification and the technical committee.
Camara filed a motion to dismiss on ground of
Among the bidders, only the EDSA LRT Consortium,
violation of splitting of causes of action;
organized under the Hong Kong Laws, met the
Lower court ruling: requirements. Now, EDSA LRT Corp entered an
CFI of Negros Occ: Dismissed the complaint. agreement to build, lease and transfer a LRT under
There is splitting of cause of action since their BOT Law.
predecessor in interest (Adriano Golez) has already
In a letter, Exec. Sec Drilon informed Sec. Prado that
sought for recovery of the 7 lots and also demanded
therein the reconveyance of the other 17 lots. the president cannot grant the requested approval
for some reasons that DOTC failed to follow some
Issue: WON there is splitting of causes of action rules under BOT Law.
The DOTC and private respondent re- negotiated
Ruling: Yes, there was a splitting of causes of
the agreement. Being aware that DOTC has full
action.
authority to sign the agreement without need of
*petitioner contention* approval by the president. Again, both entered into
Petitioners (assignees of Golez) argue that there is a supplemental agreement to the revised
no splitting of causes of action because the issue agreement, now the DOTC represented by Sec.
involved in the one previous case was for recovery Garcia, submitted it to President Ramos and thus the
of possession of the 7 lots subject of the lease two agreements were approved.
contract which already expired while the present
case is for the reconveyance of the 17 lots Under the agreement, PR shall undertake and
mentioned in the contract where Camara is to finance the entire project required for a complete
convey all rights and interests in the property he may operational LRT system. DOTC shall pay PR rentals
obtain from the bank. on a monthly basis through a letter of credit. After 25
years and DOTC completed payment of the rentals,
This is not exactly the case. The two contracts are ownership shall be transferred to the latter for a
not separate from or independent of each other. consideration of only U.S. $1.00.
They are both part of a single transaction: to carry
out and facilitate the redemption from the PNB of the On 1994, an act amending certain sections of BOT
mortgaged properties. The lease contract was Law took effect expressly recognizes BLT scheme
resorted to provide a mode of payment to the bank and allows direct negotiation of BLT contract.
of the delivery of 1,000 piculs of sugar a year, which
is the agreed rental of 7 of the mortgaged lots. Petitioner asserted that the two agreements
executed before were unconstitutional and illegal.
In fine, both actions are founded on one and the
same contract, and the rule is that where the Respondents claimed that petitioners are not the
covenant or contract is entire and the breach total, real parties-in-interest and have no legal standing to
there can be only one action. institute the present petition.
Petitioners however argue that the action was filed
by them in their capacity as Senators and as
RULE 3 taxpayers.

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Issue: WON the petitioners are the real parties-in- as members of Congress and as taxpayers and
interest or have legal standing in the case? concerned citizens of the Philippines.
Held:
Facts: Pursuant to R.A. No. 1169, as amended by
Yes. The prevailing doctrines in taxpayer’s suits are B.P. Blg. 42, PSCO was granted the authority to hold
to allow taxpayers to question contracts entered into and conduct "charity sweepstakes races, lotteries
by the national government or government-owned or and other similar activities," the PCSO decided to
control corporations allegedly in contravention of the establish an on- line lottery. Sometime before Mar
law and to disallow the same only when municipal 1993, after learning of PSCO’s plan of on-line lottery
contracts are involved. For as long as the ruling in system, Berjaya Group Berhad, a large company
Kilosbayan on locus standi is not reversed, we have from Malaysia engaged in successful lottery
no choice but to follow it and uphold the legal operations, thru its subsidiary, Sports Toto Malaysia,
standing of petitioners as taxpayers to institute the with its affiliate International Totalizator Systems,
present action. Inc, an American company engaged in computer
systems, softwares, terminals, training and other
The agreements are however valid
 technical services to the gaming industry, offered its
Although the Court gave way to the petition, the services to PSCO. Berjaya organized with some
same was still denied. The Court held that the Filipino investors a Philippine corporation known as
agreements entered into by DOTC in the exercise of the PGMC, which "was intended to be the medium
its governmental function being the primary through which the technical and management
regulating branch of the government in the services required for the project would be offered
promotion of dependable and coordinated networks and delivered to PCSO. PSCO issued a Request for
of transportation and communications services. It is Proposal (RFP) for the lease contract to operate the
the Executive department, DOTC, has the power, on-line lottery system. Some of the pertinent
authority and technical expertise determine provisions of the RFP are as follows:
whether or not a specific transportation or  PSCO shall lease the facilities. All receipts
communication project beneficial to people. The from ticket sales shall be turned over directly
discretion to award a contract is vested in the to PCSO. All capital, operating expenses and
government agencies entrusted with that function. expansion expenses and risks shall be for
the exclusive account of the Lessor
Government officials are presumed to perform
 The Lessor shall be a domestic corporation,
their functions with regularity and strong
with at least sixty percent (60%) of its shares
evidence is necessary to rebut this presumption.
Petitioners have not presented evidence on the owned by Filipino shareholders
reasonable rentals to be paid by the parties to each  Upon expiration of the lease, the Facilities
other . shall be owned by PCSO without any
additional consideration

2. KILOS BAYAN INC vs. GUINGONA


Considering the above citizenship requirement, the
PGMC claims that the Berjaya Group "undertook to
This is a special civil action for prohibition and
reduce its equity stakes in PGMC to 40%, originally
injunction, with a prayer for a temporary restraining
75% foreign stockholdings. PGMC submitted its bid
order and preliminary injunction, which seeks to
to the PSCO. On Oct 1993, the Office of the
prohibit and restrain the implementation of the
President gave PGMC the go-signal to operate the
"Contract of Lease" executed by the Philippine
country's on-line lottery system. Kilos Bayan sent a
Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and the
letter to Pres. Ramos opposing the on-line lottery
Philippine Gaming Management Corporation
system on the basis of serious moral and ethical
(PGMC) in connection with the on- line lottery
considerations. Media reported the Malacanang will
system. Kilos Bayan avers that it is a non-stock
push through with the operation and PCSO which
domestic corporation composed of civic-spirited
will operate the lottery while the winning corporate
citizens, pastors, priests, nuns, and lay leaders who
bidders are merely "lessors”. Petitioners claim that
are committed to the cause of truth, justice, and
the Office of the President gravely abused its
national renewal. The rest of the petitioners, except
discretion by approving and entering into the
Senators Freddie Webb and Wigberto Tañada and
contract.
Representative Joker P. Arroyo, are suing in their
capacities as members of the Board of Trustees of
According to petitioners, PSCO is prohibited from
KILOSBAYAN and as taxpayers and concerned
holding and conducting lotteries "in collaboration,
citizens. Senators Webb and Tañada and
association or joint venture with any person,
Representative Arroyo are suing in their capacities
association, company or entity"; under Act No. 3846
and established jurisprudence, a Congressional
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franchise is required before any person may be meaning and import of the phrase "except for
allowed to establish and operate said the activities mentioned in the preceding
telecommunications system; less than 60% Filipino- paragraph (A)," namely, "charity
owned and/or controlled corporation, like the PGMC, sweepstakes races, lotteries and other
is disqualified from operating a public service, like similar activities.
the said telecommunications system; and, PGMC is
not authorized by its charter and under the Foreign The PCSO cannot share its franchise with
Investment Act (R.A. No. 7042) to install, establish another by way of collaboration, association
and operate the on-line lotto and or joint venture. Neither can it assign,
telecommunications systems. PGMC alleged that it transfer, or lease such franchise. It has been
is merely an independent contractor and not in said that "the rights and privileges conferred
collaboration with PCSO. under a franchise may, without doubt, be
assigned or transferred when the grant is to
Issue: the grantee and assigns, or is authorized by
(1) WON petitioners has locus standi? statute. On the other hand, the right of
(2) WOM the contract of lease was valid? transfer or assignment may be restricted by
statute or the constitution, or be made
Ruling: subject to the approval of the grantor or a
(1) Yes. The rule on locus standi has been governmental agency, such as a public
liberalized. In line with the liberal policy of this utilities commission, exception that an
Court on locus standi, ordinary taxpayers, existing right of assignment cannot be
members of Congress, and even association impaired by subsequent legislation. It may
of planters, and non-profit civic organizations also be pointed out that the franchise granted
were allowed to initiate and prosecute to the PCSO to hold and conduct lotteries
actions before this Court to question the allows it to hold and conduct a species of
constitutionality or validity of laws, acts, gambling. It is settled that "a statute which
decisions, rulings, or orders of various authorizes the carrying on of a gambling
government agencies or instrumentalities. activity or business should be strictly
construed and every reasonable doubt so
We find the instant petition to be of
resolved as to limit the powers and rights
transcendental importance to the public. The
claimed under its authority.
issues it raised are of paramount public
interest and of a category even higher than Sec. 1 of RA 1169 is violated,
those involved in many of the aforecited notwithstanding its denomination or
cases. The ramifications of such issues designation as a (Contract of Lease). We are
immeasurably affect the social, economic, neither convinced nor moved or fazed by the
and moral well-being of the people even in insistence and forceful arguments of the
the remotest barangays of the country and PGMC that it does not because in reality it is
the counter-productive and retrogressive only an independent contractor for a piece of
effects of the envisioned on-line lottery work. Whether the contract in question is one
system are as staggering as the billions in of lease or whether the PGMC is merely an
pesos it is expected to raise. The legal independent contractor should not be
standing then of the petitioners deserves decided on the basis of the title or
recognition and, in the exercise of its sound designation of the contract but by the intent
of the parties, which may be gathered from
discretion, this Court hereby brushes aside
the provisions of the contract itself. Animus
the procedural barrier which the respondents
hominis est anima scripti. The intention of the
tried to take advantage of.
party is the soul of the instrument. A careful
analysis and evaluation of the provisions of
(2) No, for violated Sec 1 RA 1169 which the contract and a consideration of the
prohibits the collaboration, association or contemporaneous acts of the PCSO and
joint venture of PCSO’s franchise. The PGMC indubitably disclose that the contract
language of the section is indisputably clear is not in reality a contract of lease under
that with respect to its franchise or privilege which the PGMC is merely an independent
"to hold and conduct charity sweepstakes contractor for a piece of work, but one where
races, lotteries and other similar activities," the statutorily
the PCSO cannot exercise it "in proscribed collaboration or association, in
collaboration, association or joint venture" the least, or joint venture, at the most, exists
with any other party. This is the unequivocal between the contracting
parties. Collaboration is defined as the acts
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of working together in a joint within a range of 15% above and 15% below the
63 LTFRB official rate for a period of one (1) year.
project. Association means the act of a
number of persons in uniting together for
some special purpose or business. 64 Joint On December 5, 1990, private respondent Provincial
venture is defined as an association of Bus Operators Association of the Philippines, Inc.
persons or companies jointly undertaking (PBOAP) filed an application for fare rate increase.
some commercial enterprise; generally all An across-the-board increase of eight and a half
centavos (P0.085) per kilometer for all types of
contribute assets and share risks.
provincial buses with a minimum-maximum fare
range of fifteen (15%) percent over and below the
PCSO has only its franchise to offer, while proposed basic per kilometer fare rate, with the said
the PGMC represents and warrants that it minimum-maximum fare range applying only to
has access to all managerial and technical ordinary, first class and premium class buses and a
expertise to promptly and effectively carry fifty-centavo (P0.50) minimum per kilometer fare for
out the terms of the contract. And, for a aircon buses, was sought.
period of eight years, the PGMC is under
obligation to keep all the Facilities in safe Sometime in March, 1994, private respondent
condition and if necessary, upgrade, replace, PBOAP, availing itself of the deregulation policy of
and improve them from time to time as new the DOTC allowing provincial bus operators to
technology develops to make the on-line collect plus 20% and minus 25% of the prescribed
lottery system more cost-effective and fare without first having filed a petition for the
competitive; exclusively bear all costs and purpose and without the benefit of a public hearing,
announced a fare increase of twenty (20%) percent
expenses relating to the printing, manpower,
of the existing fares. Said increased fares were to be
salaries and wages, advertising and
made effective on March 16, 1994.
promotion, maintenance, expansion and
replacement, security and insurance, and all On March 16, 1994, petitioner KMU filed a petition
other related expenses needed to operate before the LTFRB opposing the upward adjustment
the on-line lottery system; undertake a of bus fares. LTFRB issued one of the assailed
positive advertising and promotions orders dismissing the petition for lack of merit.
campaign for both institutional and product
lines without engaging in negative Petitioner KMU anchors its claim on two (2) grounds.
advertising against other lessors; bear the First, the authority given by respondent LTFRB to
salaries and related costs of skilled and provincial bus operators to set a fare range of plus
qualified personnel for administrative and or minus fifteen (15%) percent, later increased to
technical operations; comply with procedural plus twenty (20%) and minus twenty-five (-25%)
and coordinating rules issued by the PCSO; percent, over and above the existing authorized fare
and to train PCSO and other local personnel without having to file a petition for the purpose, is
and to effect the transfer of technology and unconstitutional, invalid and illegal. Second, the
establishment of a presumption of public need in
other expertise, such that at the end of the
favor of an applicant for a proposed transport service
term of the contract, the PCSO will be able to without having to prove public necessity, is illegal for
effectively take over the Facilities and being violative of the Public Service Act and the
efficiently operate the on-line lottery system. Rules of Court.
The latter simply means that, indeed, the
managers, technicians or employees who In its Comment, private respondent PBOAP, while
shall operate the on-line lottery system are not actually touching upon the issues raised by the
not managers, technicians or employees of petitioner, questions the wisdom and the manner by
the PCSO, but of the PGMC and that it is only which the instant petition was filed. It asserts that the
after the expiration of the contract that the petitioner has no legal standing to sue or has no real
PCSO will operate the system interest in the case at bench and in obtaining the
reliefs prayed for.

3. KMU LABOR CENTER vs. GARCIA In their Comment filed by the Office of the Solicitor
General, public respondents DOTC Secretary Jesus
B. Garcia, Jr. and the LTFRB asseverate that the
petitioner does not have the standing to maintain the
FACTS:
instant suit. They further claim that it is within DOTC
and LTFRB's authority to set a fare range scheme
Secretary of DOTC, Oscar M. Orbos, issued and establish a presumption of public need in
Memorandum Circular No. 90-395 to then LTFRB applications for certificates of public convenience.
Chairman, Remedios A.S. Fernando allowing
provincial bus operators to charge passengers rates
ISSUE:

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75 IGNORANTIA PORTALIS LEGIS ACADEMIC YEAR 2016-2017

WON Petitioner KMU has the standing to sue.


4. OPOSA vs. FACTORAN
RULING:

We find the instant petition impressed with merit. FACTS: Petitioners, all minors duly
Petitioner KMU has the standing to sue. represented by their respective parents, filed
a petition to cancel all existing timber license
The requirement of locus standi inheres from the agreements (TLAs) in the country and to
definition of judicial power. Section 1 of Article VIII of cease and desists from receiving, accepting,
the Constitution provides:
processing, renewing or approving new
timber license agreements. This case is filed
xxx xxx xxx
not only on the appellants’ right as taxpayers,
but they are also suing in behalf of succeeding
Judicial power includes the duty of
the courts of justice to settle actual generations based on the concept of
controversies involving rights which “intergenerational responsibility” in so far as
are legally demandable and the right to a balanced and healthful ecology
enforceable, and to determine is concerned. Together with the Philippine
whether or not there has been a Ecological Network (PENI), petitioners
grave abuse of discretion amounting presented scientific evidence that
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the deforestation have resulted in a host of
part of any branch or instrumentality environmental tragedies. One of these is the
of the Government. reduction of the earth’s capacity to process
carbon dioxide, otherwise known as the
In Lamb v. Phipps, 7 we ruled that judicial power is
“greenhouse effect.”
the power to hear and decide causes pending
between parties who have the right to sue in the
courts of law and equity. Corollary to this provision ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners have
is the principle of locus standi of a party litigant. One legal standing
who is directly affected by and whose interest is
immediate and substantial in the controversy has the HELD: Yes. The petitioners have locus
standing to sue. The rule therefore requires that a standi on the case as a taxpayers’ (class)
party must show a personal stake in the outcome of suit. The subject matter of complaint is of
the case or an injury to himself that can be redressed common and general interest to all the
by a favorable decision so as to warrant an citizens of the Philippines. The court found
invocation of the court's jurisdiction and to justify the difficulty in ruling that the appellants can,
exercise of the court's remedial powers in his
for themselves, and for others file a class
behalf. 8
suit. The Court as well found that the
petitioner minors can represent their
In the case at bench, petitioner, whose members
had suffered and continue to suffer grave and generation as well as generations yet
irreparable injury and damage from the unborn. They can, for themselves, for
implementation of the questioned memoranda, others of their generation and for the
circulars and/or orders, has shown that it has a clear succeeding generations, file a class suit.
legal right that was violated and continues to be Their personality to sue in behalf of the
violated with the enforcement of the challenged succeeding generations can only be based
memoranda, circulars and/or orders. KMU on the concept of intergenerational
members, who avail of the use of buses, trains and responsibility insofar as the right to a
jeepneys everyday, are directly affected by the balanced and healthful ecology is
burdensome cost of arbitrary increase in passenger concerned.
fares. They are part of the millions of commuters
who comprise the riding public. Certainly, their rights
must be protected, not neglected nor ignored.
5. ST. ANNE MEDICAL CENTER vs.
PAREL
Assuming arguendo that petitioner is not possessed
of the standing to sue, this court is ready to brush
aside this barren procedural infirmity and recognize
the legal standing of the petitioner in view of the FACTS: A complaint was filed by Raquel Hit, et al.,
transcendental importance of the issues raised. And against St. Anne Medical Center for underpayment
this act of liberality is not without judicial precedent. of the basic minimum wage, underpayment of
As early as the Emergency Powers Cases, this ECOLA, non-payment of overtime pay,
Court had exercised its discretion and waived the underpayment of 13th month pay, underpayment of
requirement of proper party. regular holiday, rest day premium, underpayment of

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overtime pay, and non-payment of ECOLA during filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal (now
sick leave and maternity leave with pay. RTC) a petition for administration of the estate of
The management, thru Dr. Jose P. Fernandez, deceased Ching Leng. Such petition was granted.
Medical Director and Administrator of the
abovementioned hospital, was instructed to effect Thirteen (13) years after Ching Leng's death, a
restitution and/or correction within 10 days specified suit against him was commenced by private
in the Notice of Inspection Results copy of which was respondent Pedro Asedillo with the Court of First
furnished to him. Records show however that Instance of Rizal (now RTC) for reconveyance of
management failed to comply with the instruction. A the abovesaid property and cancellation of T.C.T. in
subpoena duces tecum was issued directing the his favor based on possession.
management to submit to the Office (DOLE
Regional Office) all employment records and RTC DECISION: A judgment by default was
payrolls to determine the extent of violations rendered in favor of the plaintiff Asedillo and
discovered. Again, management failed to comply against the defendant; declaring Pedro Asedillo to
notwithstanding the fact that they received the be the true and absolute owner of the property
subpoena and their failure was unjustified. covered by T.C.T.; ordering to issue, in lieu thereof,
Incidentally, only Xerox copies of the payrolls and a new transfer certificate of title over the said
DTRs were submitted prompting the Office to property in the name of the plaintiff Pedro Asedillo.
determine the extent of violations based on available
data and complainants’ interviews. CA: Petitioner filed an original petition for certiorari
with the CA - Denied
The extent of violations stood at THREE MILLION
FIFTYNINE THOUSAND AND EIGHT HUNDRED Private respondent Pedro Asedillo died during the
TWENTY-NINE AND 57/100 PESOS pendency of the case with the Court of Appeals.
(P3,059,829.57). Director Parel ordered St. Anne
Medical Center to restitute to its 127 employees and
Hence, the instant petition. Petitioner contended that
pay the above-mentioned amount.
trial court’s decision was null and void for lack of
Dr. Jose Fernandez, director of St. Anne Medical
jurisdiction.
Center, then sought reconsideration which was
denied by Director Parel thus, prompting the former
to file a petition before the SC for certiorari and ISSUE: WON an action for reconveyance of
prohibition. The petition was brought in the name of property and cancellation of title is in personam and,
"St. Anne Medical Center”, as petitioner although it if so, would a dead man and/or his estate be bound
does not appear that it is a juridical entity. by service of summons and decision by publication

ISSUE: WON St. Anne Medical Center can be the RULING:


petitioner at the case at bar.
YES. An action for reconveyance of property and
RULING: NO. Under the Rules of Court, "[o]nly cancellation of title is IN PERSONAM.
natural or juridical persons or entities authorized by
law may be parties in a civil action." The Court An action to redeem, or to recover title to or
impleaded the planters' association, the real owner possession of, real property is not an action in rem
or an action against the whole world, like a land
of the hospital and hence, the real party in interest,
registration proceeding or the probate of a will; it is
as the petitioner. Under the Rules likewise, "[p]arties
an action in personam, so much so that a judgment
may be . . added by order of the court . . . on its own therein is binding only upon the parties properly
initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms impleaded and duly heard or given an opportunity to
as are just. be heard. Actions in personam and actions in rem
differ in that the former are directed against specific
persons and seek personal judgments, while the
6. CHING vs. CA latter are directed against the thing or property or
status of a person and seek judgments with respect
thereto as against the whole world. An action to
recover a parcel of land is a real action but it is an
FACTS:
action in personam, for it binds a particular individual
only although it concerns the right to a tangible thing
In May 1960, an OCT was issued to spouses (Ang Lam v. Rosillosa, supra).
Maximo Nofuente and Dominga Lumandan.
Private respondent's action for reconveyance and
By virtue of a sale to Ching Leng, a Transfer cancellation of title being in personam, the judgment
Certificate of Title was issued and T.C.T. of Nofuente
in question is null and void for lack of jurisdiction over
was deemed cancelled. the person of the deceased defendant Ching Leng.
Verily, the action was commenced thirteen (13)
Ching Leng died in Boston, Massachusetts, United years after the latter's death. As ruled by this Court
States of America. His legitimate son Alfredo Ching in Dumlao v. Quality Plastic Products, Inc. (70 SCRA
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77 IGNORANTIA PORTALIS LEGIS ACADEMIC YEAR 2016-2017

475 [1976]) the decision of the lower court insofar as in the Philippines. The Church and its properties
the deceased is concerned, is void for lack of belong solely to the Roman Catholic Church and is
jurisdiction over his person. He was not, and he used by such for religious purposes. The evidence
could not have been validly served with summons. in this case does not also show that the municipality
He had no more civil personality. His juridical has, as such, any right of whatever in the property in
personality, that is fitness to be subject of legal question. It has produced no evidence of ownership.
relations, was lost through death (Arts. 37 and 42
Civil Code). It, therefore, follows that in 1898, and prior to the
treaty of Paris, the Roman Catholic Church had by
DISPOSITIVE: PREMISES CONSIDERED, (1) the law the exclusive right to the possession of this
instant petition is hereby GRANTED; (2) the church and it had the legal right to administer the
appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby same for the purposes for which the building was
REVERSED and SET ASIDE; (3) the trial court's consecrated. It was then in the full and peaceful
decision dated June 15, 1979 and the Order dated possession of the church with the rights aforesaid.
September 2, 1980 reinstating the same are hereby That these rights were fully protected by the treaty of
declared NULL and VOID for lack of jurisdiction Paris is very clear. That treaty, in article 8, provides,
and (4) the complaint in Civil Case No. 6888-P is among other things, as follows:
hereby DISMISSED.
And it is hereby declared that the relinquishment or
cession, as the case may be, to which the preceding
7. BARLIN vs. RAMIREZ paragraph refers, can not in any respect impair the
property or rights which by law belong to the
peaceful possession of property of all kinds, or
FACTS: provinces, municipalities, public or private
establishments, ecclesiastical or civic bodies, or any
The defendant, Ramirez, having been appointed by other associations having legal capacity to acquire
as parish priest by the plaintiff, took possession of and possess property in the aforesaid territories
the church on 5th of July, 1901. He administered it renounced or ceded, or of private individuals, or
as such under the orders of his superiors until 14th whatsoever nationality such individuals may be.
day of November, 1902. His successor having been
then appointed, the latter made a demand to the It is not necessary, however, to invoke the provisions
defendant for the delivery to him of the church, of that treaty. Neither the Government of the United
convent, and cemetery, and the sacred ornaments, States, nor the Government of these Islands, has
books, jewels, money, and other properties of the ever attempted in any way to interfere with the rights
church. The defendant instead sent by a written which the Roman Catholic Church had in this
document refusing to make such delivery, stating building when Spanish sovereignty ceased in the
that "the town of Lagonoy, in conjunction w/ the Philippines. Any interference that has resulted has
parish priest of thereof, has seen fit to sever been caused by private individuals, acting without
connection with the Pope of Rome and his any authority from the Government.
representatives in these Islands, and to join the
Filipino Church, the head of which is in Manila.

The plaintiff later on brought an action against 8. RALLA vs. RALLA


defendant alleging in his amended complaint that
the Roman Catholic Church was the owner of said Facts:
properties. He asked for the restoration of the
Rosendo, father of Pablo (petitioner) and Pedro
possession thereof and that the defendant render an
account of the property which he had received and (respondent), executed a will disinheriting Pedro and
which was retained by him, and for other relief. The leaving everything he owned to Pablo, to whom he
answer of the defendant, Ramirez, in addition to a said he had earlier sold a part of his property for
general denial of the allegation of the complaint, P10,000.00. Rosendo himself filed for the probate of
admitted that he was in the possession and the will but, pendente lite, died on October 1, 1960.
administration of the property described therein with On November 3, 1966, the probate judge converted
the authority of the municipality of Lagonoy and of the case into an intestate proceeding. The order
the inhabitants of the same, who were the lawful (Nov. 3) was eventually set aside when a creditor of
owners of the said property.The CFI-Ambos the deceased filed a petition for the probate of
Camarines ruled in favor of the plaintiff. Rosendo’s will. The last will and testament of
Rosendo was allowed on June 7, 1982, along with
ISSUE: WON the Roman Catholic Church has
the disinheritance of Pedro. The disinheritance was
juridical personality
disapproved by the CFI, but the decision was
HELD: Yes. reversed by the CA after finding that the requisites
for a valid disinheritance were present. The decision
The court decided to hold its decision in favor of the became final after the motion for reconsideration in
Catholic Church because of its Juridical Personality
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the SC was submitted beyond the reglementary on March 28, 1993 that resulted in a decision of
period. “NOT GUILTY” in his favor, the Chairman of the UP
Board of Regents, without notice to the petitioner,
Concomitant to the probate of Rosendo’s will, Pedro called another meeting the following day to
filed on May 19, 1972, a complaint to annul the deliberate on the Chairman’s Motion for
transaction (sale of property by Rosendo to Pablo) Reconsideration, which this time resulted in a
on the ground that it was simulated. The original decision of “GUILTY.” Upon petition, Nadal was
decision in the CFI declared the sale null and void, granted his action for mandamus with preliminary
but it reversed itself upon reconsideration. On injunction.
appeal, the CA declared the sale null and void.
Hence, this case. ISSUE:

Issue: Weather Nadal was denied due process.

Was the CA correct in annulling the deed of sale HELD:


executed by Rosendo Ralla in favor of Pablo?
No. It is gross error to equate due process in the
Ruling:
instant case with the sending of notice of the March
The SC did not anymore rule on the validity of sale. 29, 1993 BOR meeting. University rules do not
With the CA’s approval of the disinheritance of require the attendance in BOR meetings of
Pedro, and with the resolution being final, Pedro lost individuals whose cases are included as items on
the agenda of the Board. At no time did respondent
his interest in the case. As the remaining sole heir,
complain of lack of notice given to him to attend any
Pablo had the right to inherit the totality of his father's of the regular and special BOR meetings where his
estate after payment of all its debts. Even if it be case was up for deliberation.
assumed that the deed of sale was indeed invalid,
the subject-matter thereof nevertheless devolved Let it not be forgotten that respondent aspires to join
upon Pablo as the universal successor of his father the ranks of professionals who would uphold truth at
Rosendo. all costs so that justice may prevail. Nadal has
sufficiently proven to have violated his undertaking
The real party-in-interest is the party who stands to to divulge all information needed when he applied for
be benefited or injured by the judgment or the party the benefits of the STFAP. Unlike in criminal cases
entitled to the avails of the suit. "Interest" within the which require proof beyond reasonable doubt as
meaning of the rule means material interest, an basis for a judgment, in administrative or quasi-
interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as judicial proceedings, only substantial evidence is
distinguished from mere interest in the question required, that which means a reasonable mind might
involved, or a mere incidental interest. As a general accept relevant evidence as adequate to support a
rule, one having no right or interest to protect cannot conclusion.
invoke the jurisdiction of the court as a party-plaintiff
in an action.
10. GALAROSA vs. VALENCIA

9. UP REGENTS vs. LIGOT


Facts:
FACTS:
Basically the main issue here is only how to properly
The UP Board of Regents imposed on Nadal the interpret Section 494 of the Local Government Code
penalties of suspension for one year, non-issuance of 1991, which says:
of any certificate of good moral character during the
suspension and/or as long as Nadal has not “Sec. 494. Ex officio Membership in
reimbursed the STFAP benefits he had received Sanggunians. — The duly elected presidents of the
with 12% interest per annum and non-issuance of Liga [ng mga Barangay] at the municipal, city and
his transcript of records until he has settled his provincial levels, including the component cities and
financial obligations with the university. The municipalities of Metropolitan Manila, shall serve as
disciplinary action is meted after finally rendering a ex-officio members of the sanggunian bayan,
guilty verdict on Nadal’s alleged willfull withholding sanggunian panglunsod, and sanggunian
of the following information in his application for panlalawigan, respectively. They shall serve as such
scholarship tantamount to acts of dishonesty, viz: (1) only during their term of office as presidents of the
that he has and maintains a car and (2) the income liga chapters, which in no case shall be beyond the
of his mother in the USA in support of the studies of term of office of the sanggunian concerned.”
his brothers.
Raul Galarosa is a president of the Katipunang
Nadal complained that he was not afforded due
Bayan of the municipality of Sorsogon. Like the LGC
process when, after the Board Meeting on his case
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of 1991, the(old) LGC of 1983 or BP 337 grants as ABC presidents have not yet ended, their term of
Galarosa the right to serve as ex-officio member of office as members of the sangguniang bayan has
the Sangguniang Bayan. However, when the new expired.However, Galarosa can legally and validly
LGC of 1991 finally took effect, private respondent hold over as a member of the sangguniang bayan of
Rodolfo Lasay (the incumbent barangay captain of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, until the election of the first set
barangay Gimaloto of the municipality of Sorsogon of officers of the liga ng mga barangay, unless he is
and an aspirant for the position of president of the sooner removed for cause.
ABC of the said municipality)filed a case against
Galarosa in his capacity as taxpayer questioning the On the issue of standing, Lasay, as a taxpayer, has
right of Galarosa to remain as an ex-officio member the locus standi to have it resolved because a
of the Sangguniang Bayan. He posited the theory decision against Galarosa would mean that he is not
that the term of office of Galarosa as an ex officio entitled to receive his salary and other benefits as a
member of the SB of Sorsogon is coterminous with member of the SB and any such payment to him
that, of the said SB which expired on 30 June 1992; beyond 30 June 1992 would be illegal.
hence there was a need for the new election of an
ABC representative. Lasay then prayed for the Lasay brought the action in his capacity as a
issuance of a temporary restraining order enjoining barangay captain who is seeking the presidency of
the SB of Sorsogon from recognizing Galarosa as the ABC of Sorsogon and in his capacity as a
an ex officio member thereof and from allowing him taxpayer. The Court agrees with Galarosa and the
to participate in its deliberations, for the holding in Office the Solicitor General that with respect to the
abeyance of Galarosa’s salaries. first, Lasay does not have the legal standing to
institute the action for he is a mere aspirant to the
In its Answer, the SB of Sorsogon, represented by presidency of the ABC and his right thereto is a mere
the Provincial Prosecutor, asked for the dismissal of expectancy. The Court rules, however, that as a
the petition because (a) Lasay "has no legal right to taxpayer he has a sufficient legal standing, because
file the petition or the petition "is based on pure the injunction he prayed for is founded on what he
speculative rights” believed to be an illegal disbursement of public funds
of his municipal government.
RTC – in favor of Lasay
Unable to accept the decision, Galarosa filed a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
11. TANPINGCO vs. IAC
Issue:
Whether Galarosa can continue to serve as a
member of the SB after 30 June 1992. Relevant Facts:
Parties:
Held: Espiridion Tanpingco – tenant-lessee in a parcel of
agricultural riceland.
No.
Benedicto Horca – owner of the parcel of agricultural
The LGC of 1991 does not explicitly provide that Riceland. He donated the Riceland in favor of the
upon its effectivity the katipunan ng mga barangay Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports as a
under B.P Blg. 337 automatically became the liga ng school site of the Buenavista Barangay High School.
He openly ordered Tanpingco to vacate the
mga barangay under the LGC and then the president
premises and is determined to oust Tanpingco from
of the ABC automatically became the president of the same.
the liga whose term as ex-officio member of the first
sangguniang bayan un the1987 constitution is Nature of the Case – Complaint for payment of
coterminous with that of the other regular members disturbance compensation before RTC.
if the SB on until 30 June, 1992 pursuant to section
494 of the LGC in relation to section 2 Article XVIII Case called for pre-trial.
of the 1987 constitution 20 and section 5 of RA No. RTC gave Horca time to file and answer.
6636.absent such explicitness and considering (1) Horca filed instead a Motion to Dismiss.
that the opening clause of section 491 is expressed - Horca’s contention: Complaint states no cause of
in the 1991 and (2) thatsection 494 speaks of “duly action. Horca not the real party-in-interest having
elected presidents of the liga” thereby clearly already donated the subject land.
- Horca bolsters his claim that he is not the real party-
implying as election after the organization of the liga,
in-interest on Section 10 of Republic Act No. 3844
the conclusion to be drawn is that the legislature
(Code of Agrarian Reforms of the Philippines) which
never intended that section 494 would apply to the provides that:
incumbent presidents of the katipunang bayan. o . . . In the case the agricultural lessor sells, alienates
Accordingly, while ABC presidents could remain as or transfers the legal possession of the landholding,
the purchaser or transferee thereof shall be
such after 30 June 1992 because their term of office
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subrogated to the rights and substituted to the riceland and build a public high school thereon until
obligation of the agricultural lessor. after there is payment of the disturbance
- Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports, as donee, compensation in accordance with Section 36 (1) of
became the new lessor of the agricultural lessee by R.A. No. 3844, as amended.
operation of law and is therefore the real party-in-
interest against whom the claim for disturbance Doctrine:
compensation should be directed. If the party sued upon is not the proper party,
RTC: granted Horca’s Motion to Dismiss. any decision that may be rendered against him
Tanpingco – filed a Motion for Reconsideration would be futile, for it cannot be enforced or
RTC: denied Motion for Recon executed. The effort that may be employed will
Tanpingo filed appeal before IAC. be wasted.
o Contends that Horca must file an answer and not a Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court requires
Motion to Dismiss. that every action must be prosecuted in the
Sec. 17. of PD 946 states: Pleading, Hearing, name of the real party-in-interest. A corollary
Limitation on Postponements. — The defendant proposition to this rule is that an action must be
shall file answer to the complaint (not a motion to brought against the real party-in-interest, or
dismiss), within a non-extendible period of ten (10) against a party which may be bound by the
days from service of summons . . . judgment to be rendered therein. The real party-
IAC dismissed Tanpingco’s appeal. in-interest is one who stands to be benefited or
o The rationale of the rule requiring a defendant in an be injured by the judgment, or the party entitled
agrarian case to file an answer and not a motion to to the avails of the. If the suit is not brought
dismiss is to expedite the proceedings. The filing of against the real party-in-interest, a motion to
the motion to dismiss and the granting thereof by the dismiss may be filed on the ground that the
lower court based upon indubitable grounds complaint states no cause of action.
precisely expedited the proceedings and conforms
with the spirit and intention of P.D. 946
Tanpingco filed petition for review from the
decision of the IAC
IIssue:
WON Horca is the real party-in-interest.
12. US vs. REYES

Held:
NO. FACTS:
We agree with the contentions of the private
respondent. The petitioner should have impleaded Respondent Nelia Montoya, an American Citizen,
the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports as the worked as an ID checker at the US Navy Exchange
party-defendant. A donation, as a mode of acquiring (NEX) at the US Military Assistance Group
ownership, results in an effective transfer of title over (JUSMAG) headquarters in Quezon City. She’s
the property from the donor to the donee and once a married to Edgardo Montoya, a Filipino-American
donation is accepted, the donee becomes the serviceman employed by the US Navy & stationed in
absolute owner of the property donated. San Francisco.
As an incident of ownership therefore, there is Petitioner Maxine is an American Citizen employed
nothing to prevent a landowner from donating his at the JUSMAG headquarters as the activity
naked title to the land. However, the new owner must exchange manager.
respect the rights of the tenant. Jan. 22, 1987 – Montoya bought some items from
Under the Code of Agrarian Reform, the law the retail store Bradford managed, where she had
explicitly provides that the leasehold relation is not purchasing privileges. After shopping & while she
extinguished by the alienation or transfer of the legal was already at the parking lot, Mrs. Yong Kennedy,
possession of the landholding. a fellow ID checker approached her & told her that
The donation of the land did not terminate the she needed to search her bags upon Bradford’s
tenancy relationship. However, the donation itself is instruction. Montoya approached Bradford to protest
valid. the search but she was told that it was to be made
In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion and on all JUSMAG employees on that day. Mrs.
so hold that the trial court correctly dismissed the Kennedy then performed the search on her person,
complaint for payment of disturbance compensation bags & car in front of Bradford & other curious
because the private respondent is not the real party- onlookers. Nothing irregular was found thus she was
in-interest. allowed to leave afterwards.
Considering that the tenant in the case at bar is Montoya learned that she was the only person
willing to accept payment of disturbance subjected to such search that day & she was
compensation in exchange for his right to cultivate informed by NEX Security Manager Roynon that
the landholding in question, the real issue is who NEX JUSMAG employees are not searched outside
should pay the compensation. We rule that the the store unless there is a strong evidence of a
Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports as the new wrong-doing. Montoya can’t recall any circumstance
owner cannot oust the petitioner from the subject
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that would trigger suspicion of a wrong-doing on her Bradford filed a Petition for Restraining Order. SC
part. She is aware of Bradford’s propensity to granted TRO enjoining RTC from enforcing decision.
suspect Filipinos for theft and/or shoplifting. Montoya claims that Bradford was acting as a civilian
Montoya filed a formal protest w/Mr. Roynon but no employee thus not performing governmental
action was taken. functions. Even if she were performing
governmental acts, she would still not be covered by
Montoya filed a suit against Bradford for damages the immunity since she was acting outside the scope
due to the oppressive & discriminatory acts of her authority. She claims that criminal acts of a
committed by petitioner in excess of her authority as public officer/employee are his private acts & he
store manager. She claims that she has been alone is liable for such acts. She believes that this
exposed to contempt & ridicule causing her undue case is under RP courts’ jurisdiction because act
embarrassment & indignity. She further claims that was done outside the territorial control of the US
the act was not motivated by any other reason aside Military Bases, it does not fall under offenses where
from racial discrimination in our own land w/c is a US has been given right to exercise its jurisdiction
blow to our national pride & dignity. She seeks for and Bradford does not possess diplomatic immunity.
moral damages of P500k and exemplary damages She further claims that RP courts can inquire into the
of P100k. factual circumstances & determine WON Bradford is
May 13, 1987 – Summons & complaint were served immune.
on Bradford but instead of filing an answer, she
along with USA government filed a motion to dismiss ISSUES/RATIO:
on grounds that: (1) this is a suit against US w/c is a
foreign sovereign immune from suit w/o its consent
and (2) Bradford is immune from suit for acts done 1. WON the case is under the RTC’s jurisdiction -
in the performance of her official functions under YES
Phil-US Military Assistance Agreement of 1947 &
Military Bases Agreement of 1947. They claim that Intervention of a third party is discretionary upon the
US has rights, power & authority w/in the bases, Court. US did not obtain leave of court to intervene
necessary for the establishment, use & operation & in the present case. Technically, it should not be
defense thereof. It will also use facilities & areas w/in allowed to intervene but since RTC entertained its
bases & will have effective command over the motion to dismiss, it is deemed to have allowed US
facilities, US personnel, employees, equipment & to intervene. By voluntarily appearing, US must be
material. They further claim that checking of deemed to have subjected itself to RTC’s
purchases at NEX is a routine procedure observed jurisdiction.
at base retail outlets to protect & safeguard
merchandise, cash & equipment pursuant to par. 2 2. WON RTC committed a grave abuse of discretion
& 4(b) of NAVRESALEACT SUBIC INST. 5500.1. in denying Bradford’s motion to dismiss. - NO

July 6, 1987 – Montoya filed a motion for preliminary Petitioners failed to specify any grounds for a motion
attachment claiming that Bradford was about to to dismiss enumerated in Sec. 1, Rule 16, Rules of
leave the country & was removing & disposing her Court. Thus, it actually lacks cause of action. A
properties w/intent to defraud her creditors. Motion cause of action is necessary so that Court would be
granted by RTC. able to render a valid judgment in accordance with
July 14, 1987 – Montoya opposed Bradford’s motion the prayer in the complaint. A motion to dismiss w/c
to dismiss. She claims that: (1) search was outside fails to state a cause of action hypothetically admits
NEX JUSMAG store thus it’s improper, unlawful & the truth of the allegations in the complaint. RTC
highly-discriminatory and beyond Bradford’s should have deferred the resolution instead of
authority; (2) due to excess in authority and since her denying it for lack of merit. But this is immaterial at
liability is personal, Bradford can’t rely on sovereign this time since petitioners have already brought this
immunity; (3) Bradford’s act was committed outside petition to the SC.
the military base thus under the jurisdiction of
Philippine courts; (4) the Court can inquire into the 3. WON case at bar is a suit against the State. - NO
factual circumstances of case to determine WON
Bradford acted w/in or outside her authority. Long kau ang discussion sa case but mao jud ni
important
RTC granted Montoya’s motion for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary attachment and later on issued Doctrine of state immunity is expressed in Art. XVI,
writ of attachment opposed by Bradford. Montoya Sec. 3 of the 1987 Constitution. This immunity also
allowed to present evidence & Bradford declared in applies to complaints filed against officials of the
default for failure to file an answer. RTC ruled in state for acts allegedly performed by them in
favor of Montoya claiming that search was discharge of their duties since it will require the state
unreasonable, reckless, oppressive & against to perform an affirmative act such as appropriation
Montoya’s liberty guaranteed by Consti. She was of amount to pay damages. This will be regarded as
awarded P300k for moral damages, P100k for a case against the state even if it has not be formally
exemplary damages & P50k for actual expenses. impleaded. But this is not all encompassing. It’s a
different matter where the public official is made to
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account in his capacity as such for acts contrary to qualified to apply for the award nor to purchase said
law & injurious to rights of plaintiff. State authorizes lot under Ordinance 149. It was also claimed that
only legal acts by its officers. Action against officials after the sale between Tamayo and the City of
by one whose rights have been violated by such acts Bacolod, Tamayo maliciously filed a case for
is not a suit against the State w/in the rule of unlawful detainer against Aposaga and Santiguer
immunity of the State from suit. The doctrine of state before the Municipal Court of the city.
immunity cannot be used as an instrument for
perpetrating an injustice. It will not apply & may not City of Bacolod and Tamayo filed their respective
be invoked where the public official is being sued in answers, denying that the Secretary of the Mayor
his private & personal capacity as an ordinary was absent during the alleged period when Isabel
citizen. This usually arises where the public official was unable to deposit the required 20% of the total
acts w/o authority or in excess of the powers vested cost which made her lose any of the preferential
in him. A public official is liable if he acted w/malice
rights that she might have had.
& in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority or
jurisdiction. (Shauf vs. CA) Also, USA vs. Guinto 5 years after Isabel filed the complaint, she filed a
declared that USA is not conferred with blanket motion to withdraw declaring that she had already
immunity for all acts done by it or its agents in the been paid for all her claims in the case, hence, she
Philippines merely because they have acted as
is no longer interested to prosecute.
agents of the US in the discharge of their official
functions. In this case, Bradford was sued in her The lower court issued an order dismissing the
private/personal capacity for acts done beyond the complaint of Sustiguer for lack of cause of action.
scope & place of her official function, thus, it falls
w/in the exception to the doctrine of state immunity. ISSUE:

4. WON Bradford enjoys diplomatic immunity. - NO W/N Edith Sustiguer is a real party in interest
RULING
First of all, she is not among those granted
diplomatic immunity under Art. 16(b) of the 1953 No. The real party in interest is the party who stands
Military Assistance Agreement creating the to be benefited or injured by the judgment or the part
JUSMAG. Second, even diplomatic agents who entitled to the avails of the suit. “Interest” within the
enjoy immunity are liable if they perform acts outside meaning of the rule means material interest, an
their official functions (Art. 31, Vienna Convention on interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as
Diplomatic Relations).
distinguished from the mere interest in the question
HELD: Petition denied. TRO lifted. involved, or a mere incidental interest. As a general
rule, one having no right or interest to protect cannot
invoke the
13. SUSTIGUER vs. TAMAYO jurisdiction of the court as a party-plaintiff in action.

Facts: When Isabel Aposaga’s withdrawal from the case


was allowed by the lower court, the mere allegations
The City Government of Bacolod acquired 42 of Edith Sustiguer that she has a preferential right to
lots and turned them into a subdivision. The rules purchase the disputed lot on the basis of the fact that
for the sale of the lots to its qualified occupants were she actually occupied the same together with Isabel
laid down in Ordinance 149 which stated that there Aposaga does not give rise to a cause of action
shall be only one buyer or awardee for a sub lot. One independent from that which has been withdrawn.
of those lots (Lot 379-B-34) was adversely occupied Appellant Edith cannot claim an interest to protect
by Edith Santiguer and Isabel Aposaga. In over the lot as she is not a real party-in-interest who
pursuance to said Ordinance, the lot in question was would be benefited or injured by the judgment in the
eventually awarded to the latter, Isabel. However, event trial proceeded in the instant case. The
she was ultimately unable to effect the sale because interest appellant had, if any, on the disputed lot
cannot be categorized as material interest within the
she missed the deadline to pay the requisite 20%
meaning of Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court
down payment .She alleged that when she was
considering that it is contingent upon the final
about to pay to the Secretary of the Mayor, she was execution of the contract of sale on installment in
advised to come back at a later time because the favor of Isabel Aposaga upon compliance wit the
Secretary was out of town. requirements of Ordinance 149.
The City Government of Bacolod subsequently sold
the lot (Lot 379-B-34) to a certain Jose Tamayo.
14. BOARD OF OPTOMETRY vs. COLET
Edith Santiguer and Isabel Aposaga jointly filed a
complaint for annulment of the sale on installment Facts:
and award of said to Tamayo claiming that he is not

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● RA 8050 which is the Revised Optometry IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN FINDING THAT


Law of 1995 was made into law by the PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAVE LOCUS
president on June 7 1995. STANDI TO FILE THE PETITION A QUO
● On July 1995, private respondents filed in
Issue: whether or not the private respondents have
RTC of Manila a petition for declaratory relief
and for prohibition and injunction with a locus standi to question the constitutionality of RA
prayer for a TRO. 8050
● They alleged among others that RA 8050 Held: NO. A real party in interest under Section
derogates the fundamental right to due 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court is a party who stands
process as it authorizes optometrists to to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit,
engage in acts of practice within the zone of or the party entitled to the avails of the suit
medical practice through permitted use of
diagnostic pharmaceutical agents thereby In the case at bench, since OPAP, COA,
exposing and subjecting those who avail of ACMO, and SMOAP were not shown to be juridical
the services of optometrists to risk of entities, they cannot, be deemed real parties in
impairment of vision, resultant blindness, or interest. Moreover, since the names of private
loss of life. respondents Miguel Acebedo, Miriam F.
● They then prayed for an issuance of a writ of Llave, and Republica A. Panol do not appear in the
preliminary injunction which forbids the registration books of the Board of Optometry as
herein petitioners, their agents and authorized optometry practitioners in the Philippines,
employees from performing or undertaking they do not have the requisite personal and
any act in implementation of RA 8050. substantial interest in the case. Even further,
● among the original petitioners were Acebedo although private respondents Roberto Rodis, Jr.,
optical, optometry practitioner association of
Cyril Corales, and Elmer Villarosa claim to be
the Philippines (OPAP), Cenevis Optometrist
association (COA), Association of Christian- practicing optometrists, the petition in Civil Case No.
Muslim Optometrist (ACMO) and Southern 95-74770 is bereft of any allegation to make them
Mindanao Optometrist association, real parties in interest to challenge the
(SMOAP), each allegedly represented by its constitutionality of R.A. No. 8050.
president.
● TR
● On august 1 1995, RTC issued a TRO *Neither may the private respondents be allowed at
enjoining the respondents from enforcing or this late stage to seek refuge under the doctrine
implementing RA 8050 until further orders of allowing taxpayers suits. While they claimed their
the court. petition in Civil Case No. 95-74770 was a taxpayers
● On august 11 1995, the petitioners herein
suit, and although this Court, in a catena of cases,
filed an opposition to the application for
has shown liberality in granting locus standi to
preliminary injunction and alleged among
others that: taxpayers in taxpayers suits, the private respondents
No proper ground exists to have not adequately shown that this liberality must
warrant the issuance of the writ be extended to them. Their plea of injury or damage
because is nothing but a sweeping generalization.

a. Petitioners have not


shown their legal 15. SMITH, BELL AND CO vs. CA
existence or capacity to
file the case
FACTS:
b. Petitioners have misled
the court into believing
that an act is being done The plaintiffs, doing business under the style of
in the implementation of Tic Hin Chiong, Importer, bought and imported to the
RA 8050 tending to make Philippines products from the firm Chin Gact Co.,
the judgment ineffectual Ltd. of Taipei,Taiwan. The shipment of the products
● RTC grants the writ of preliminary injunction, was insured by the defendant First Insurance Co.
which enjoined the defendants in that petition "against all risks" at port of departure with the note
and their representatives should refrain from "Claim, if any, payable in U.S. currency at Manila”
enforcing and/or implementing RA 8050 or and with defendant Smith, Bell, and Co. stamped at
its code of ethics. the lower left side of the policy as "Claim Agent." The
Petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari and
cargo arrived at the Port of Manila carrying vessel
prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary
and landed at port. Thereafter, the entire cargo was
injunction and/or TRO and alleged among others
discharged to the local arrastre contractor, Metroport
that RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED
Services Inc. with a number of the cargo in apparent
HIS DISCRETION AND/OR ACTED WITHOUT OR
bad order or condition. The plaintiff secured the
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services of a cargo surveyor to conduct a survey of decision cannot be enforced or executed. Section 2,
the damaged cargo and the surveyor's report Rule 3 of the Rules of Court identifies who the real
showed material amount of damage and loss. parties-in-interest are, thus:

The plaintiff filed with Smith, Bell, and Co., Inc. Sec. 2. Parties in interest. — Every action
a formal statement of claim with proof of loss and a must be prosecuted and defended in the
demand for settlement of the corresponding value of name of the real party in interest. All
the losses. After purportedly conveying the claim to persons having an interest in the subject of
its principal, Smith, Bell, and Co., Inc. informed the the action and in obtaining the relief
plaintiff by letter that its principal offered only 50% of demanded shall be joined as plaintiffs. All
the claim as redress, on the alleged ground of persons who claim an interest in the
discrepancy between the amounts contained in the controversy or the subject thereof adverse
shipping agent's reply and of the claimant. The offer to the, plaintiff, or who are necessary to a
not being acceptable to the plaintiff, the latter wrote complete determination or settlement of the
Smith, Bell, & Co. expressing his refusal to the questions involved therein shall be joined
"redress" offer contending that the discrepancy was as defendants.
a result of loss from vessel to arrastre to consignees'
warehouse\which losses were still within the "all risk" The cause of action of private respondent is based
insurance cover. on a contract of insurance which as already shown
was not participated in by petitioner. It is not a
No settlement of the claim having been made. "person who claim(s) an interest adverse to the
The plaintiff then caused the instant case to be filed. plaintiff" nor is said respondent "necessary to a
complete determination or settlement of the
Now Petitioner rejects liability under the said questions involved" in the controversy. Petitioner is
insurance contract, claiming that: (1) it is merely an improperly impleaded for not being a real-party-
agent and thus not personally liable to the party with interest.
whom it contracts on behalf of its principal; (2) it had
no participation at all in the contract of insurance;
and (3) the suit is not brought against the real party- 16. PELTAN DEVELOPMENT vs. CA
in-interest.
Note: failure to state a cause of action, who are the
RTC ruled against petitioner disposed of the real parties-in-interest in an action to cancel a
main issue by citing a case it decided in 1987, where torrens title.
petitioner was also a party-litigant. In that case,
Facts: Araujo filed against 11 defendants a
respondent Court held that petitioner as resident
complaint for cancellation of titles and damages.
agent of First Insurance Co. Ltd. was "authorized to
Thereafter, the complaint was amended by including
settle claims against its principal. Its defense that its
or impleading as the 12th defendant the City
authority excluded personal liability must be proven
Townhouse Development Corporation.
satisfactorily. " The ruling continued with the
statement that "the interest of justice is better served xxx… The amended complaint are as follows:
by holding the settling or claim agent jointly and
severally liable with its principal." 1. Araujo are applicants of a free patent over a
parcel of land which they had for many years
ISSUE: been OCENCO.

2. Thereafter, the improvements they made


Whether or not a local settling or claim agent of
a disclosed principal — a foreign insurance were illegally bulldozed and destroyed by
company — can be held jointly and severally liable persons led by defendant Espinosa.
with said principal.
3. Same persons forcibly and physically drove
them out.
RULING:
4. The approval of the free patent application
Not Real Party-In-Interest have been held abeyance despite of
absence of any opposition thereto, because
Being a mere agent and representative,
of the alleged existence of several opposed
petitioner is also not the real party-in-interest in this
certificates title thereon by Peltan
case. An action is brought for a practical purpose,
that is, to obtain actual and positive relief. If the party Development, Inc. Transfer Cert. Title.
sued is not the proper party, any decision that may
be rendered against him would be futile, for the
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5. Araujo discovered that the TCT of Peltan cause of action (plaintiff’s right) is not present in
were all derived from an alleged OCT of the instant case.
spouses Gana, which Araujo claimed to be
Futhermore, allowing repeated suits seeking to
fictitious and spurious, hence the TCT should nullify the OCT will bring to naught the principle
be null and void. of indefeasibility of titles issued under the
Torrens System of land registration.
6. They file this complain not only because they
have been materially prejudiced by the 2. WON Araujo is a real party-in-interest?
existence of the spurious tilte, but also
because as citizens and taxpayers they have No, Araujo is not the proper party to initiate
legitimate interest in the disposition of proper suit.
alienable lands of the State. The complaint, praying as it did for the
cancellation of the transfer certificates on the
Araujo then prayed for: ground of spurious OCT and assailed its validity.
1. Cancellation of TCT and damages as While, they did not pray for reversion did not
well as other equitable reliefs. pray for the reversion of the land to the
government, the prayer would result to
Peltan filed a Motion for Preliminary Hearing on reverting back the land to government under
Affirmative Defenses mainly on the ground that the the Regalian Doctrine.
complaint states no cause of action against them. It
The principal relief prayed for is the
claimed that Araujo are not real parties in interest in
cancellation of title this averment negates the
the action as they do not assert any present and
existence the right. For it would appear
subsisting title of ownership over the property in
therefrom that whatever right might have been
question. That the Solicitor General was the real
violated belonged to the government which can
party-in-interest.
only be represented by the Solicitor General and
RTC: The trial court dismissed the complaint, not to Araujo.
holding that Araujo were not the real party in interest
Motion to Dismiss granted without prejudice
and that they had no cause of action against Peltan.
in pursuing administrative relief.
CA: Reversed and set aside the order of RTC,
holding that the 2 elements of cause of action were 17. BARFEL vs. CA
present in the complaint.
1. Araujo primary right. (OCENCO and free FACTS :
patent) On June 19, 1987, the defendants, as
2. The delict or wrong act of the defendant sellers, and plaintiff corporation, as buyer, and
which violated the right of Araujo. (forcibly represented by its President, plaintiff Zaragoza,
driving Araujo out) concluded an Agreement to Buy/Sell two (2) parcels
of land with two (2) houses erected thereon. Said
The CA ruled that the prayer of cancellation Agreement bears the expressed stipulation, among
of torrens title does not negate the presence others, that "The seller will apply the payment of the
of the elements of the cause of action. It also cash portion of the purchase price to the removal of
held that the trial court erred in accepting the any and all liens on the properties. . . .
allegations of Peltan that only the Solicitor
General could file an action for cancellation Plaintiff paid the amount of P100,000 as
of tilte. down payment upon signing of the aforesaid
Agreement. The defendants repeatedly warranted
Issues: 2 issues
that except for a mortgage in favor of the Bank of the
1. WON Araujo has a cause of action over Philippine Islands (BPI) and the Deed of Restrictions
Peltan? annotated at the back of the titles mentioned above,
the subject properties are "free from any liens and
No, Araujo has no cause of action over Peltan encumbrances".
(see Rule 16, Section 1 (g)
Sometime on June 24, 1987, plaintiffs found
Araujo possession of land and their pending out that defendants made a blatant
application for a free patent thereon did not vest
misrepresentation it was discovered that the subject
in them a right superior to a valid title of Peltan
properties have a second mortgage with the
originating from the OCT. The first element of
PISO/Central Bank in the amount of P2,571,400.00.

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Informed of this discovery defendant Victor S. CA: affirmed the RTC (according to CA the
Barrios advised plaintiff that the second mortgage emended complaint was not meant to delay the
obligation is or has been reduced to only P54,000.00 proceedings.)
and gave assurance that he will submit the
ISSUE:
necessary documents to support the same so that a
legal valid and acceptable arrangement could be Whether an amendment to the complaint
worked out with the Central Bank for the release of pleading a cause of action against a new or
said second mortgage; . . . . under the date of June additional party can be allowed after the private
29, 2987, the Philippine Savings Bank (PSB), gave respondents (as plaintiffs) had rested their case and
a notice that it has approved plaintiff corporation's petitioners (as defendants) had commenced the
application for the loan with which to pay subject presentation of their evidence.
properties under the Agreement to Buy/Sell, subject
to certain terms and conditions, principal of which is HELD :
a security of real estate mortgage upon the subject No. The SC ruled for the Petitioners and
properties in favor of PSB. In this connection, the reversed the CA.
PSB also sent separate letters of
undertaking/commitment to the defendants and the A "real interest" has been defined as "a
BPI detailing a workable arrangement to present substantial interest, as distinguished from a
consummate the transaction whereby new titles to mere expectancy or a future, contingent,
the subject properties would first be transferred to subordinate or consequential interest."
the plaintiff corporation and the mortgage in favor of Complete relief by private respondents
PSB are to be annotated thereon. Once done, the against petitioners may be had even if PISO/Central
PSB would directly pay BPI from the proceeds of the Bank were not impleaded as party defendant in the
loan granted to plaintiff corporation the mortgage original case. PISO is not an indispensable or
obligation due to it in the amount of P857,539.36, necessary party without whom no final
and also pay the defendants the balance of the determination can be had of the action for
purchase price in the amount of P3,642,460.64 net specific performance with damages. (Sec. 7, Rule
of what has been paid to BPI. The defendants 3, Rules of Court).
expressed their conformity to the aforementioned
arrangement as shown in their letter to the BPI dated Private respondents maintain that PISO is a
July 8, 1987. proper party under sec. 8, Rule 3 of the Revised
Rules of Court. The provision invoked reads:
Plaintiffs consequently received information
that defendants have been negotiating with other Section 8. Joinder of proper parties. — When
parties for the sale of the properties in question. The persons who are not indispensable but who ought to
undisputed fact is that defendants, in evident bad be parties if complete reliefs is to be accorded as
faith and in malicious breach of contract, deliberately between those already parties, have not been made
failed and/or refused to comply with their contractual parties and are subject to the jurisdiction of the court
obligation of securing the release of the second as to both service of process and venue, the court
mortgage on the subject properties thereby shall order them summoned to appear in the action.
effectively preventing the consummation of the sale
As far as the complaint for specific
to the damage and prejudice of the plaintiffs. Pre-
performance and damages is concerned, complete
trial was concluded by the trial court. Plaintiffs
relief maybe accorded between private respondents
therein (herein private respondents) presented
and petitioners (as original parties) without the
evidence and rested their case.
presence of the second mortgagee (PISO bank). If
During defendants' (herein petitioners') complete relief to herein private respondents is the
presentation of evidence, private respondents filed a ultimate aim of the RTC ruling, why did it not include
motion for a leave to file an amended complaint and BPI as (proper) party defendant, since after all, there
motion to admit the same. The amendment is an allegation in the original complaint that BPI
consisted of impleading PISO bank as additional refused to go along with the transaction because of
party defendant and compel it to accept payment of petitioner's representations. Moreover, the
the existing second mortgage from private amendment sought by private respondents, which is
respondent Reginas, since allegedly no complete to include a new party defendant at a late stage in
relief can be had unless the second mortgage in the proceeding is not a formal but a substantial one.
favor of said PISO bank is released. Private respondents will have to present additional
evidence on the PISO second mortgage. The effect
RTC: admitted amended complaint
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would be to start trial anew with the parties recasting satisfy the money judgment against her husband is
their theories of the case. As a general policy, null and void

liberality in allowing amendments is greatest in the
early stages of a law suit, decreases as it progresses Despite this, TCT of the property was issued in
and changes at times to a strictness amounting to a petitioners name. Respondents moved for
prohibition. This is further restricted by the condition reconsideration but was denied. CA ruled in favor of
Respondent. Hence this petition for certiorari.
that the amendment should not prejudice the
adverse party or place him at a disadvantage.
Issue: Whether or not the judgment debt of private
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is respondent Luis R. Narciso is a conjugal debt for
GRANTED. The decision appealed from is which the conjugal partnership property can be held
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let this case be answerable.
remanded to the court of origin for continuation of
Ruling:
the presentation of evidence by herein petitioners
(as defendants) in Civil Case No. 17875.
Article 161 of the New Civil Code provides that the
conjugal partnership shall be liable for:

(1) All the debts and obligations contracted by the


18. G-TRACTORS vs. CA husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership,
and those contracted by the wife, also for the same
Facts: Luis R. Narciso is a businessman. He purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind
entered into a contract of hire of heavy equipment the partnership.
with petitioner G-Tractors under the terms of which
the latter leased to the former tractors for the There is no question that private respondent Luis R.
purpose of constructing switchroads and hauling Narciso is engage in business as a producer and
felled trees at the jobsite of Narciso's logging exporter of Philippine mahogany logs. He operates
concession at del Gallego, Camarines Sur. The a logging concession at del Gallego, Camarines Sur
contract provided for payment of rental for the use of and holds office right in the conjugal dwelling at 208
said tractors. Respondent Luis failed to pay. Thus an Retiro Street, Talayan Village, Quezon City, Metro
action was filed in court to collect unpaid rentals for Manila, where he and his family reside. His account
leased tractors and damages in the CFI of Rizal. with petitioner G-Tractors, Inc. represents rentals for
Despite a compromise agreement entered into by the use of petitioner's tractors which he leased for
said parties, respondent again defaulted. His the purpose of constructing switchroads and hauling
residence at 208 Retiro Streey, Quezon City was felled trees at the jobsite of the logging concession
then levied upon. At the public sale, the petitioner at del Gallego, Camarines Sur which is not his
bought the property and a lease contract was exclusive property but that of his family. There is no
entered thereon by parties for respondent’s doubt then that his account with the petitioner was
continued use of the residence. brought about in order to enhance the productivity of
said logging business, a commercial enterprise for
gain which he had the right to embark the conjugal
On March 31, 1976, Josefina Salak Narciso and her partnership.
husband Luis R. Narciso filed a complaint in the
same Court of First Instance of Quezon City for Lastly, the contention that the conjugal partnership
"declaration of nullity of levy on execution and is not liable because the obligation contracted by the
auction sale of plaintiff's conjugal property with husband is personal in nature is not applicable in this
damages and injunction Respondents alleged that case. The record shows that Luis R. Narciso is a
whatever transpired in Civil Case No. Q-19173 could producer and exporter of Philippine mahogany logs
be binding only on the husband Luis R. Narciso and and that the bulldozers leased to him was used for
could not affect or bind the plaintiff-wife Josefina the construction of switchroads for logging. It is very
Salak Narciso who was not a party to that case; that clear, therefore, that the obligations were contracted
the nature of the Sheriff's sale clearly stated that only in connection with his legitimate business as a
the property of the husband may be sold to satisfy producer and exporter in mahogany logs and
the money judgment against him; that the conjugal certainly benefited the conjugal partnership. Justice
property of the plaintiffs-spouses could not be made J.B.L. Reyes is very liberal in interpreting Art. 161 of
liable for the satisfaction of the judgment in Civil the Civil Code when he declared in Luzon Surety
Case No. Q-19173 considering that the subject Co., Inc. versus de Garcia (30 SCRA 118) that the
matter of said case was never used for the benefit of words in said article "all debts and obligations
the conjugal partnership or of the family; and that the contracted by the husband for the benefit of the
levy of the wife's share in the conjugal property to conjugal partnership "do not require that actual profit

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or benefit must accrue to the conjugal partnership and possession of the vessel was forthwith turned
from the husband's transaction", but it suffices that over to SCHII and its agent, Mayad Shipping Lines.
the transaction should be one that normally would Trigon and Mayad, as agent of SCHII, entered into a
produce such benefit for the partnership. Bareboat Charter Party under which Trigon was to
drydock said vessel for repairs. The Charter Party
In the case of Cobb-Perez vs. Lantin, citing the case provided that repair bills for labor and materials not
of Abella de Diaz vs- Erlanger and Galinger, and exceeding P250,000 would be for the charterer's
Javier vs. Osmena, this court ruled- account and any amount in excess would be for the
owner's account. Trigon said it incurred repair
The aforesaid obligation was contracted in the expenses amounting to P1,992,862.55 and so
purchase of leather used in the shoe manufacturing claimed an existing maritime lien on the vessel in the
business of the petitioner husband. Said business is amount of P1,742,862.55. Petitioner then filed a
an ordinary commercial enterprise for gain, in the special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with
pursuit of which Damaso Perez had the right to the CA for the six orders, which was dismissed.
embark the partnership. It is well settled that the Petitioner elevated the case to the SC to ask for the
debts contracted by the husband for and in the reversal of the CA in upholding the said orders. The
exercise of the industry or profession by which he assailed orders are as follows:
contributes to the support of the family cannot be  On July 21, 1986, Judge Tomol, Jr. of RTC
deemed to be his exclusive and private debts. Cebu, issued a writ of preliminary attachment
(Emphasis supplied)
upon the filing of a bond. The sheriff then
The husband is the administrator of the conjugal attached the motor vessel as well as the
partnership and as long as he believes he is doing bank accounts of the petitioner.
right to his family, he should not be made to suffer  On July 24, 1986, the petitioner filed an
and answer alone. So that, if he incurs an urgent ex parte motion to dissolve the writ of
indebtedness in the legitimate pursuit of his career preliminary attachment. On the same date,
or profession or suffers losses in a legitimate the trial court issued a second order allowing
business, the conjugal partnership must equally Trigon to act as depository of the attached
bear the indebtedness and the losses, unless he vessel and to temporarily operate it.
deliberately acted to the prejudice of his family. Such  On July 28, 1986, the petitioner filed a joint
is the nature of the judgment debt of private motion to dismiss the complaint and to
respondent Luis R. Narciso to petitioner. discharge the attachment. On August 1,
Consequently, the conjugal partnership of gains of
1986, the trial court, in a third order, excluded
private respondents Narcisos, must answer for the
the other properties, real or personal, and
same.
monies as well as bank deposits in the name
of petitioner, thereby leaving only the vessel
19. TAY CHUN SUY vs. CA under attachment.
 The joint motion to dismiss the complaint and
Facts: Judge Tupas of RTC Davao, rendered to discharge the attachment was denied in a
judgment in Civil Case No. 15,970 ordering the fourth order issued on August 13, 1986.
defendant therein, Sta. Clara Lumber Co., Inc., to  A motion for reconsideration of the order
pay Tay Chun Suy, as plaintiff, the principal sum of dated August 1, 1986, filed by the petitioner
P181,194.90 with 12% as interest. Such decision
on August 11, 1986, was also denied in a fifth
became final and executory, and a writ of execution
order dated August 14, 1986.
was issued, pursuant to which the motor vessel Sta.
Clara I, owned by Sta. Clara, was levied upon. The  Nothing daunted, the petitioner filed a motion
vessel with its accessories was sold at the auction for reconsideration of the orders dated July
sale to petitioner as the highest bidder for 21, August 13 and August 14, 1986, but this
P317,000.00 and a sheriff's certificate of sale was too was denied in the sixth order dated
issued in his favor. October 8, 1986.

In another case, Civil Case No. CEB-5162, Petitioner alleged that there is no ground to justify
Philippine Trigon Shipyard Corporation filed in the the order of attachment under Sec 1, Rule 57. Trigon
RTC Cebu City a complaint for a sum of money and alleged that Tan Chun Suy and the Sheriff of Davao
damages, , against Sta. Clara Housing Industries, City knew that St. Clara was no longer the owner and
Inc. (SCHII), Mayad Shipping Lines, herein possessor of the vessel at the time Civil Case 15,970
petitioner Tay Chun Suy, and the Provincial Sheriff was rendered and that the award decision and that
(Davao City). It was alleged that Sta. Clara Lumber the vessel was sold to Tay Chun Suy at a shockingly
mortgaged the property to DBP which was later low bid price of P50,000.00 (although the Sheriff's
foreclosed and bought by Trigon at the auction sale certificate of sale indicated P317,000.00) despite the
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fact that the vessel was easily worth P5,000,000.00. this provisional remedy. The time which such
The petitioner also claims that since he was not a a hearing would take could be enough to
party to the Bareboat Charter Party, the private enable the defendant to abscond with or
respondent did not have a sufficient cause of action dispose of his property before a writ of
against him. The petitioner also complains that the attachment is issued. While it is true that
writ of preliminary attachment was wrongfully issued property in the custody of the law may not be
because it was based only on the general allegations interfered with without the permission of the
contained in the private respondent's application proper court, this rule is confined to cases
where the property belongs to the defendant
Issue: or where the defendant has proprietary
(1) WON petitioner is an indispensible party? (I interests. We have held that when the sheriff,
think mao ra ni marelate sa ato lesson) acting beyond the bounds of his office,
(2) WON the preliminary attachment was seizes a stranger's property, the rule does
properly issued? not apply and interference with his custody is
not considered interference with another
Ruling: none of the six assailed orders is flawed with court's order of attachment.
error so as to call for their reversal. On the contrary,
the respondent Court of Appeals was correct in In a separate action filed by a third party who
upholding them, each being within the competence claims to be the owner of the property
and sound discretion of the trial courts. attached, the court may render judgment
(1) Yes. Under Sec 7, Rule 3, petitioner is an ordering the sheriff or whoever is in
indispensible party. An indispensable party is possession of the attached property to
one with such an interest in the controversy deliver it to the plaintiff or desist from seizing
it. In such action, the court may issue an
that a final decree would necessarily affect
interlocutory order, upon the filing of such
his rights, such that the courts cannot
bond as may be necessary, to release the
proceed without his property pending final adjudication of the
presence. Unquestionably, any judgment title.
covering the disposition of the vessel would
unavoidably affect the petitioner as its Under Section 17 of Rule 39, a third person
purchaser at the auction sale. who claims property levied upon to
(2) Yes. Trigon's affidavit, as well as its implement a judgment may vindicate such
complaint, contained specific details as claim by action. Obviously, a decision
required by the Rule to justify the issuance of declaring him to be the owner of the property
the writ. Petitioner claims that the private would not constitute interference with the
respondent, as well as the respondent power or processes of the court that
judges and sheriff, failed to show that a copy rendered the judgment sought to be
of the writ of preliminary attachment issued enforced. The aforementioned principles are
by the Cebu court was filed with the Davao applicable to attachment, and even though
Trigon filed Civil Case No. CEB-5162 against
court, which had custodia legis of the motor
the petitioner only to enforce a maritime lien
vessel, and that a notice of the attachment
and not to claim ownership of the vessel.
had been served upon the actual custodian
of the motor vessel. However, there is the Attachment is in the nature of a proceeding in
presumption that official duty has been rem. It is against the particular property. The
regularly performed. Moreover, the record attaching creditor thereby acquired specific
will show that the notice of attachment was lien upon the attached property which ripens
served upon the sheriff of the Davao court into a judgment against the res when the
who was then the actual custodian of the order of sale is made. Such a proceeding is
vessel sought to be attached. in effect a finding that the property attached
is an indebted thing and a virtual
In attachment cases, the absence of notice condemnation of it to pay the owner's debt.
or hearing is allowed on the ground that the The law does not provide the length of time
defendant might abscond with or dispose of an attachment lien shall continue after the
his property before a writ of attachment is rendition of judgment, and it must therefore
actually issued. The judge before whom the necessarily continue until the debt is paid, or
application is made has full discretion in sale is had under execution issued on the
considering the supporting evidence judgment or until judgment is satisfied, or the
proffered by the applicant. As a matter of attachment discharged or vacated in some
fact, a hearing would defeat the purpose of manner provided by law. It has been held
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that the lien obtained by attachment stands There being no annulment declared by a competent
upon as high equitable grounds as a court, NDC's and AMEX's title of ownership over the
mortgage lien shares cannot be collaterally attacked. Besides, Civil
Case No. 15707 is for reconveyance, not annulment;
the complaint does not allege any act or omission by
20. NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT CO vs. CA NDC and AMEX in derogation of any legal right
belonging to Tan, et al. Hence, the complaint fails to
FACTS: Private respondents filed a complaint state a cause of action. (b) The requisites of implied
against the Central Bank of the Philippines (CB), the trust, an argument invoked in the complaint, are not
National Development Company (NDC) and the present. The original assignees were not fiduciaries
American Express Bank, Ltd. (AMEX) for the with respect to the questioned shares of stocks. The
reconveyance of shares of stock in the International shares involved were assigned to them for value;
Corporate Bank (Interbank) with damages and a said assignees did not acquire, misapply or
prayer for the issuance of a restraining order. misappropriate the same by mistake or fraud. The
complaint makes no allegation that the shares were
obtained by fraud or mistake. (c) The cause of
The amounts of moral damages and attorney's fees action, if any, is clearly barred by prescription. If
sought were not specified; however, in their prayer, indeed the consent of Tan to the deeds of
they asked the Court that the CB be ordered to pay assignment was obtained through force or duress at
them moral damages and attorney's fees in such a time when he was under military detention and
amount as may be proved during the trial. On 19 custody, such duress ceased when he was
January 1987, the trial court, issued a temporary eventually released by the military on 27 December
restraining order prohibiting petitioners AMEX and 1977. Pursuant to Article 1391 of the Civil Code, he
NDC from disposing of or transferring their shares of should have filed the complaint for annulment within
stock in Interbank. four (4) years from such release. (d) Finally, Civil
Case No. 15707 is an action involving corporate
shares of stock between parties who both claim to
On 29 September 1989, NDC and AMEX filed with be stockholders of the same corporation.
the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and
prohibition under Rule 65 challenging the adverse
orders of the trial court; they prayed for the dismissal Pursuant to Section 5 of P.D. No. 902-A, it is the
of Civil Case and for the issuance of a restraining Securities and Exchange Commission which has
order to enjoin further proceedings therein. Earlier original and exclusive jurisdiction thereon. Private
however, more specifically on 5 April 1989, the respondents herein moved to reconsider said
respondent Court (First Division) promulgated its decision. An undated resolution penned by Justice
decision in the petition filed by the CB, granting the Nicolas Lapeña, Jr., denied the motion; however,
petition and ordering the dismissal of the complaint Associate Justice Emeterio Cui indicated his dissent
in Civil Case insofar as the CB is concerned. Herein and submitted a dissenting opinion.
private respondents then filed with this Court a
petition for review to set aside the said decision.
ISSUE: WON the original assignees, the Disini
companies, are indispensable parties and are
On 30 April 1990, the Sixth Division of the needed to be impleaded in the complaint for the final
respondent Court promulgated its Decision in C.A.- determination of the instant case
G.R. SP No. 18865 granting the petition and
ordering the dismissal of Civil Case No. 15707. It
ruled that: (a) NDC and AMEX are not the original RULING: The petition is impressed with merit. As to
assignees, but subsequent transferees, of the the lack of cause of action and prescription, the fate
questioned shares of stock; Tan, et al. should have of the private respondents had long been sealed. In
filed the complaint for annulment of the the 18 March 1991 decision of this Court entitled
assignments, which they claimed to have been "Vicente T. Tan, et al. versus The Honorable Court
made under duress against the original assignees. of Appeals, et al.," docketed as G.R. No. 90365 and
Assuming that duress did exist, it merely made the resulting from the private respondents' petition for
assignments voidable; without a judgment for review of the respondent Court's decision in C.A.-
annulment on that ground, the assignments remain G.R. SP No. 12706 granting the CB's petition for
valid and binding and may even be ratified under certiorari and ordering the dismissal of Civil Case
Article 1390 of the Civil Code. No. 15707, this Court ruled that: (a) a cause of action
for reconveyance of the shares in question can only
exist against the original assignees and (b) private

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respondents' cause of action, if any, had already 21. NOCOM vs. CAMARINO
prescribed. As to the first, it states: "On the question
of cause of action, the Court notes that as the FACTS: (G.R. No. 161029) Respondent Oscar
complaint itself avers, the petitioners’ shares in the Camerino and respondents-intervenors Efren
Continental Bank were assigned to the firms already Camerino, Cornelio Mantile, the deceased Nolasco
above specified (which Herminio Disini allegedly Del Rosario, represented by Mildred Del Rosario,
controlled), and not to the Central Bank. It is and Domingo Enriquez were the tenants who were
therefore fairly obvious that if any claim for tilling on the parcels of land planted to rice and corn
reconveyance may be prosecuted, it should be previously owned by Victoria Homes, Inc. Without
prosecuted against the Disini companies.” notifying the respondents, Victoria Homes, Inc. sold
the said lots to Springsun Management Systems
Corporation. Subsequently, SMSC mortgaged to
This observation becomes even more appropriate in Banco Filipino (BF) the said lots as collaterals for its
the case of the petitioners because they did not have loans. As SMSC failed to pay the loans due, BF
any transaction with either the private respondents extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage and, later,
or the Disini companies. NDC and AMEX derived was adjudged the highest bidder and SMSC
their rights from the CB and the NDC, respectively. redeemed the lots from BF. Respondents filed a
Except for the allegation in paragraph 22 of private complaint against SMSC and BF for
respondents' complaint in Civil Case No. 15707 that Prohibition/Certiorari, Reconveyance/Redemption,
petitioners herein, having actual or constructive Damages, Injunction with Preliminary Injunction and
notice of the fraudulent acquisition of the shares by Temporary Restraining Order. RTC found
the Disini corporations, are obligated under the respondents to be tenants who have been tilling on
principle of constructive trust to reconvey to them the subject land planted to rice and corn since 1967
such shares including the corresponding stock/cash and, thus, authorized them to redeem the subject
dividends earned, there is nothing therein that even lots. CA affirmed with modification the RTC by
remotely intimates that petitioners had violated any declaring the respondents to be tenants or
of the private respondents' right. This is an essential agricultural lessees on the disputed lots and, thus,
element of a cause of action. entitled to exercise their right of redemption, but
deleted the award of P200, 000 attorney’s fees for
lack of legal basis. (Present G.R. No. 182984)
This Court cannot divine the reason or cause why Petitioner Mariano Nocom gave the respondents
private respondents did not implead the original several Philtrust Bank Managers Checks amounting
assignees in Civil Case No. 15707. For purposes of to P500, 000 each, which the latter enchased,
reconveyance of the questioned shares of stock, representing the price of their inchoate and
they are the indispensable parties. No final contingent rights over the subject lots which they
determination of the case between the private sold to him. With the marital consent of their wives,
respondents and the impleaded agents (CB, NDC executed an Irrevocable Power of Attorney which
and AMEX) can be had without the said original was notarized. Respondent Oscar Camerino filed a
assignees because the reliefs prayed for against complaint against petitioner, captioned as Petition to
said impleaded defendants are precisely anchored Revoke Power of Attorney. The turnover of the titles
on the voidability or nullity of the deeds of to the properties in his favor, and the payment of
assignments flowing from contracts to which these attorney’s fees and other legal fees. Respondent,
impleaded defendants are not parties. Joinder of alleged that the contents of the said document were
indispensable parties is mandatory and a complaint not explained to him and that he and co-respondents
may be dismissed if an indispensable party is not were asked by their counsel, Atty. Arturo S. Santos,
impleaded in the complaint. Section 7, Rule 3 of the to sign a document with the representation that it
Rules of Court provides: "SECTION 7. Compulsory was urgently needed in the legal proceedings
joinder of indispensable parties. -- Parties in interest against SMSC. Petitioner countered that on
without whom no final determination can be had of September 3, 2003, Atty. Santos informed him of the
an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or desire of his clients, herein respondents, to sell and
defendants." When an indispensable party is not assign to him their inchoate and contingent rights
before the court, the action should be and interests over the subject lots because they
dismissed.Ordinarily, however, a reasonable were in dire need of money and could no longer wait
opportunity to amend the pleading must be given, until the termination of the proceedings as SMSC
and the action should not be dismissed, except when would probably appeal the CAs Decision to this
the plaintiff fails or refuses to include said party, or Court. Respondents Efren Camerino, Cornelio
the latter cannot be sued. Mantile and Mildred Del Rosario, in her capacity as
legal heir and representative of Nolasco Del
Rosario, filed a Motion for Leave of Court to Admit
the Complaint-in-Intervention with the attached
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Complaint-in-Interventionseeking the nullification of 22. MYRON PAPA vs. VALENCIA


the Irrevocable Power of Attorney for being contrary
to law and public policy. Their Complaint-in-
Intervention alleged that they had a legal interest in FACTS: In this petition for review on certiorari under
the subject matter of the controversy and would Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner Myron C.
either be directly injured or benefited by the Papa seeks to reverse and set aside 1) the Decision
judgment; that they were co-signatories or co- dated 27 January 1992 of the Court of Appeals
grantors of respondent Oscar Camerino in the which affirmed with modification the decision of the
Irrevocable Power of Attorney they executed in favor trial court; and 2) the Resolution dated 22 April 1992
of the same court, which denied petitioner's motion
of the petitioner; that their consent was vitiated by
for reconsideration of the above decision.
fraud, misrepresentation, machination, mistake and
undue influence perpetrated by their own counsel Private respondents A.U. Valencia and Co., Inc. and
and the petitioner. The RTC admitted the Complaint- Felix Peñarroyo filed with the RTC a complaint for
in-Intervention and also granted the Motion for specific performance against herein petitioner Myron
Summary Judgment because a meticulous scrutiny C. Papa, in his capacity as administrator of the
of the material facts admitted in the pleadings of the Testate Estate of one Angela M. Butte.
parties reveals that there is really no genuine issue
of fact presented therein. RTC rendered a Summary The complaint alleged that petitioner Myron C. Papa,
Judgment annulling the Irrevocable Power of acting as attorneyinfact of Angela M. Butte, sold to
Attorney for being contrary to law and public policy. respondent Peñarroyo, through respondent
CA affirmed the trial courts Joint Order and Valencia, a parcel of land, and covered by a TCT;
Summary Judgment. that prior to the alleged sale, the said property,
together with several other parcels of land likewise
ISSUE: WON the CA is correct in not voiding the owned by Angela M. Butte, had been mortgaged by
assailed summary judgment for failure of the her to the Associated Banking Corporation (now
respondents to implead an indispensable parties. Associated Citizens Bank); that after the alleged
sale, but before the title to the subject property had
been released, Angela M. Butte passed away; that
despite representations made by herein
HELD: In Domingo v. Scheer, the Court explained respondents to the bank to release the title to the
that the non-joinder of an indispensable party is not property sold to respondent Peñarroyo, the bank
a ground for the dismissal of an action. Section 7, refused to release it unless and until all the
Rule 3 of the Rules, as amended, requires mortgaged properties of the late Angela M. Butte
indispensable parties to be joined as plaintiffs or were also redeemed; that in order to protect his
defendants. The joinder of indispensable parties is rights and interests over the property, respondent
mandatory. Without the presence of indispensable Peñarroyo caused the annotation on the title of an
parties to the suit, the judgment of the court cannot adverse claim.
attain real finality. Strangers to a case are not
bound by the judgment rendered by the court. The The complaint further alleged that it was only upon
the release of the title to the property, respondents
absence of an indispensable party renders all
Valencia and Peñarroyo discovered that the
subsequent actions of the court null and void. mortgage rights of the bank had been assigned to
There is lack of authority to act not only of the one Tomas L. Parpana (now deceased), as special
absent party but also as to those present. The administrator of the Estate of Ramon Papa, Jr., since
responsibility of impleading all the indispensable then, herein petitioner had been collecting monthly
parties rests on the petitioner or plaintiff. However, rentals in the amount of P800.00 from the tenants of
the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a the property, knowing that said property had already
ground for the dismissal of an action. Parties may been sold to private respondents; that despite
be added by order of the court on motion of the repeated demands from said respondents, petitioner
party or on its own initiative at any stage of the refused and failed to deliver the title to the property.
action and/or such times as are just. If the petitioner Thereupon, respondents Valencia and Peñarroyo
or plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable filed a complaint for specific performance, praying
that petitioner be ordered to deliver to respondent
party despite the order of the court, the latter may
Peñarroyo the title to the subject property (TCT
dismiss the complaint or petition for the petitioner or
28993); to turn over to the latter the sum of
plaintiffs failure to comply therefor. The remedy is P72,000.00 as accrued rentals as of April 1982, and
to implead the non-party claimed to be the monthly rental of P800.00 until the property is
indispensable. In the present case, the RTC and delivered to respondent Peñarroyo; to pay
the CA did not require the respondents to implead respondents the sum of P20,000.00 as attorney's
Atty. Santos as party-defendant or respondent in fees; and to pay the costs of the suit.
the case.
In his Answer, petitioner admitted that the lot had
been mortgaged to the Associated Banking

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Corporation (now Associated Citizens Bank). He Ramon Papa, Jr. has over the property may still
contended, however, that the real party in interest be enforced regardless of the change in
was the Testate Estate of Angela M. Butte, which ownership thereof.
should have been joined as a party defendant; and
that, if as alleged in the complaint, the property had
been assigned to Tomas L. Parpana, as special 23. QUILISADIO vs. CA
administrator of the Estate of Ramon Papa, Jr., said
estate should be impleaded.
FACTS:
Upon his motion, herein private respondent Delfin
Jao was allowed to intervene in the case. Making During their marriage, spouses Catalino Quilisadio
common cause with respondents Valencia and and Isabel Dagar acquired the parcel of land in
Peñarroyo, respondent Jao alleged that the subject question. The said spouses died before the Second
lot which had been sold to respondent Peñarroyo World War, survived by their six legitimate children,
through respondent Valencia was in turn sold to him. namely, Francisco, Tiburcio, Agripino, Teodora,
He, therefore, prayed that judgment be rendered in Fernando and Maximino.
favor of respondents, the latter in turn be ordered to
execute in his favor the appropriate deed of On December 24, 1946, the disputed land was sold
conveyance covering the property in question and to to the respondent Primo Conejos by Fernando
turn over to him the rentals which aforesaid Quilisadio, Rustica Quilisadio (daughter of Agripino
respondents sought to collect from petitioner Myron Quilisadio) and Tranquilino Tasan (grandson of
V. Papa. Tiburcio Quilisadio). After the said sale, respondent
Conejos took possession of the whole lot and since
For his part, petitioner, as administrator of the then he has been enjoying it to the exclusion of the
Testate Estate of Angela M. Butte, filed a thirdparty petitioners.
complaint against herein private respondents,
spouses Arsenio B. Reyes and Amanda Santos. He On September 26, 1968, a complaint for recovery
averred that due to nonpayment of real estate tax of ownership and possession of registered land,
said property was sold at public auction the City legal redemption and damages was filed with the
Treasurer of Quezon City to the respondent Reyes Court of First Instance of Leyte. At the time of the
spouses and that the 1 year redemption period had filing of the complaint, Francisco, Tiburcio. and
expired. Petitioner prayed that judgment be Agripino were both deceased. Francisco was
rendered canceling the tax sale to respondent survived by his children, petitioners Salvador,
Reyes spouses; restoring the subject property to him Timoteo, Lorenzo, Jose, Juanita, Celestina and
upon payment by him to said respondent Reyes Leodegario. Tiburcio was survived by petitioners,
spouses of the amount of P14,000.00, plus legal Crecida, alias Sidang, Silvino, alias Binoy and
interest. Nestorio. Agripino was survived by Rustica and
petitioner Adelina.
ISSUE: WON the estate of Angela M. Butte and the
estate of Ramon Papa, Jr. are indispensable parties The complaint alleged, among others, that
in this case. respondent Conejos, in bad faith, bought some
undivided interests, rights and participation of the
RULING: NO. the estate of Angela M. Butte is not petitioners' co-owners in the land in question on
an indispensable party. Under Section 3 of Rule 3 of December 24, 1946.
the Rules of Court, an executor or administrator may
sue or be sued without joining the party for whose On July 28, 1969, the petitioners filed a motion to
benefit the action is presented or defended, thus: admit an amended complaint which included
respondent corporation as party-defendant on the
Sec. 3. Representative parties. — A trustee of an allegation that five hectares of the disputed land
express trust, a guardian, executor or administrator, had been leased by respondent Conejos to the said
or a party authorized by statute, may sue or be sued corporation.
without joining the party for whose benefit the action
is presented or defended; but the court may, at any The respondent corporation, in its answer, set up
stage of the proceedings, order such beneficiary to the following affirmative defenses: that the
be made a party. An agent acting in his own name petitioners had no cause of action against it
and for the benefit of an undisclosed principal may because it was merely a lessee of respondent
sue or be sued without joining the principal except Conejos and under the legal concept of lease, it
when the contract involves things belonging to the was not necessary that respondent Conejos be the
principal. owner of the land subject of the lease for legal,
physical and actual possession by Conejos was
Neither is the estate of Ramon Papa, Jr. an sufficient; that being merely a lessee, it does not
indispensable party without whom, no final claim ownership nor possession of the land in
determination of the action can be had. Whatever question so that the petitioners misjoined it as a
prior and subsisting mortgage rights the estate of party-defendant in the instant case involving the

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issue of ownership; and that the respondent 1934 until present, petitioner, by itself and through
Conejos made an implied warranty to maintain its predecessors-in-interest, had been performing
respondent corporation's possession during the the annual assessment work required by law, filing
duration of the lease and pursuant thereto, the the corresponding affidavits of assessment work
former executed an affidavit making him exclusively with the office of the mining recorder and paying real
liable for the damages the case at bar would cause. estate taxes on the mining claims. Petitioner had
applied for a patent on the claims, and the Bureau of
After trial on the merits, the lower court found the Mines approved and recognized the company's
petitioners "guilty of laches" and ruled that they rights over the mining claims.
"have lost whatever rights they may have by
prescription." On 16 October 1978, petitioner filed with the Bureau
of Mines an application for mining lease over the
The appellate court affirmed lower court’s decision. claims, with a reservation that "(t)he filing of the
application for mining lease was without prejudice to
The appellate court further held that respondent the rights of the applicant and its predecessors-in-
corporation, being merely a lessee on a portion of interest in and all the mineral claims object thereof
the land in question, should not have been included acquired under the provisions of the Act of Congress
as party-defendant in the petitioner's complaint. of July 1, 1902, . . . ."
Later on, thirty-seven (37) of the fifty-three (53)
ISSUE: WON the respondent corporation should individual defendants filed an answer denying the
not have been impleaded at all for lack of cause of material allegations of the complaint. Herein private
action respondent Jose Chuatengco then filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint, asseverating that the
complaint did not state a cause of action.
HELD:
Chuatengco cited Section 1 of Presidential Decree
No. 1214 which directed "(h)olders of subsisting and
Respondent Corporation is a proper party in the valid patentable mining claims, lode or placer,
petitioner’s case. located under the provisions of the Act of Congress
of July 1, 1902, as amended, shall file a mining lease
On the issue of whether respondent corporation application . . . within one (1) year from the approval
should have been impleaded or not in the of this Decree, and upon the filing thereof, holders of
petitioners' case of recovery of ownership and the said claims shall be considered to have waived
possession of the land in question, we hold that their rights to the issuance of mining patents
since the respondent corporation is a proper party therefor: Provided, however, That the non-filing of
in the petitioners' case for complete relief to be the application for mining lease by the holders
accorded in case of a favorable judgment, it was thereof within the period (therein) prescribed (would)
discretionary for the lower court to include the said cause the forfeiture of all . . . rights to the claim."
corporation as a proper party and not as an
indispensable party as the petitioners had made it The trial court granted the motion to dismiss;
appear. (See Rule 3, Section 8, Rules of Court). whereupon, petitioner filed an appeal with
Proper or necessary parties must be joined in order respondent court which affirmed the RTC's decision.
to adjudicate the whole controversy and avoid Here then is the instant petition.
multiplicity of suits. (Seno v. Mangabat, 156 SCRA
113 [1987] citing Palarca v. Baguisi, 38 Phil. 177
[1918]). ISSUE:

Whether or not the action can proceed without


having joined the indispensable parties
24. UNITED PARACLE MINING COMPANY
vs CA HELD: No.

FACTS: The Solicitor General filed a comment and motion,


alleging that when petitioner appealed the trial
Petitioner United Paracale Mining Company filed a court's order of dismissal, only private respondent
complaint against the Director of Lands and fifty- Chuatengco was named adverse party; the Director
three (53) other individual defendants, alleging, of Lands was not included.
among other things, that the company was the
owner of some forty- nine (49) mining claims located Section 7, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court
in Paracale, Camarines Norte, having located and provides:
perfected the claims under the provisions of the
Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 624, as amended. Sec. 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties.
These mining claims were thereby supposed to be — Parties in interest without whom no final
private property of the company and segregated determination can be had of an action shall be joined
from the mass of the public domain. Since 1930 and either as plaintiffs or defendants.

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An action cannot proceed unless the indispensable Subsequently, the RTC held in abeyance the pre-trial
parties are joined; that joinder is mandatory and, hearing for 15 days pending Atty. Emata’s third party
unless such indispensable parties are impleaded, complaint against Filinvest. However, Emata did not
the case must be dismissed. Clearly, the Director of file the said third party complaint, hence the Court
Lands is an indispensable party to the case, and his proceeded with the trial without joining Filinvest. RTC
omission is fatal to the cause of herein petitioner. ruled in favor of SSI and ordered to Emata to deliver
the car to SSI and pay the amount claimed plus
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs interest, and attorneys’ and bonding fees. The IAC
against petitioner. affirmed the RTC’s decision. Emata raise to the SC that
the trial court erred in requiring him to file a third- party
complaint against Filinvest, instead of impleading the
latter either as party plaintiff or defendant based on
25. EMATA vs IAC Sec. 10, Rule 3, Rules of Court. He insisted that
Filinvest is the real party in interest and should have
Facts: been impleaded.
Atty. Emata purchased a car thru installments from Issue:
Violago Motor Sales Corporation.
Whether or not Filinvest was the real party in interest
Emata paid a down payment of P 14,982.00 and and whether or not the RTC erred in not impleading
executed in favor of the seller a promissory note and Filinvest.
a chattel mortgage over the car as security for the
Ruling:
payment of the note.
No. Filinvest was not a real party in interest and the
The promissory note stipulates that the borrower
RTC did not err in not impleading Filinvest. Sec. 12,
owes the principal sum of P 57,204.00, which
Rule 6, Rules of Court provides that a third-party
amount includes interest at 12% per annum based
complaint is "a claim that a defending party may, with
on the diminishing balance, the said principal sum,
leave of court, file against a person not a party to the
to be payable, without need of notice or demand, in
action, called the third- party defendant, for
installments of the amounts following and at the
contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other
dates hereinafter set forth, to wit: P 1,589.00 monthly
relief in respect of his opponent's claim." Obviously,
for 36 months from September 25, 1978 to August
a third-party complaint against Filinvest, had
25, 1981.
petitioner filed the same, would be a claim in respect
The promissory note further stipulated that interest at of the plaintiffs claim since the former arises from the
14% per annum shall be added on each unpaid same transaction on which the plaintiffs claim is
installment from maturity hereof until fully paid. based, that is, the promissory note which was
eventually assigned to private respondent. Petitioner
After the execution of said documents, Violago cannot rely on the provisions of Section 10, Rule 3
endorsed the promissory note and assigned the because, obviously and necessarily, such unwilling
chattel mortgage to Filinvest Credit Corporation party must be a real party in interest. In the case at
(hereafter, Filinvest for short). Three years later, bar, Filinvest's position and the evidence thereon
Filinvest assigned to private respondent was that it was not a real party in interest, as it was
Servicewide Specialists, Inc. (SSI) the remaining no longer entitled to the avails of the suit by reason
installment balance due on and corresponding to the of the anterior assignment it made in favor of SSI.
period from February 25, 1981 to August 25, 1981.
Alleging non-payment of five (5) consecutive
installments from February 25 to June 25, 1981, SSI
initiated the case in the trial court for a writ of replevin 26. HEIRS OF GALVEZ vs CA
to effect the seizure of the car or, alternatively, for
the payment by petitioner of the sum of P 11,332.40,
with interest thereon of fourteen percent (14%) per FACTS:
annum from July 10, 1981 until fully paid and, Mendoza who is now managing the cockpit arena
additionally, for attorney's fees and costs of suit. which is Balagtas Sports Arena seeks to renew the
Emata, in his answer, alleged that the chattel license and secure a new permit for the said
mortgage was intended to cover only the unpaid property. In connection to the said plans, Mendoza
paid P4, 625.00 but the incumbent mayor Dr.
balance of the purchase price amounting to P
Nemencio Galvez remitted the same to the treasurer
34,958.00, which his installments, plus the down
who accepted it but did not issue an official receipt
payment, have already overpaid by P 9,388.22. He
for the reason that the Balagtas Sports Arena
further alleged usurious rates charged by Filinvest. He
allegedly failed to pay their taxes amounting to P400,
consequently set up a counterclaim against Filinvest 000.00. Mendoza requested that they be given the
for various items of damages and attorney's fees all license and permit requested for but was not granted
amounting to more than P 1,100,000.00. with such.
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Mendoza then pleaded that they shall be given RULE 4


permission to operate while waiting for the license
and permit. Still no favorable action on the matter
VENUE OF ACTIONS
has been granted by Mayor Galvez. Despite the
demands on the part of Mendoza the same was to
no avail. Thus, mendoza filed a petition with the
Philippine Gamefowl Corporation (PGC) who then
1. PBC vs TENSUAN
wired Mayor Galvez and the other officials stating
that the cockpit was allowed temporary operation
pending hearing of the aforestated petition inasmuch
as the refusal to issue a business permit was without Facts:
any valid ground.
Philippine Banking Corporation, filed a complaint
The Sangguniang Bayan issued a resolution which with prayer for preliminary attachment on against
has been reviewed by the Sangguniang private respondents Brinell Metal Works Corporation
Panlalawigan which ordered the closure and and Spouses Jose and Nally Ang, for collection of a
cessation of operations of private respondent loan evidenced by two (2) promissory note with the
Mendozas cockpit until payment of the proper RTC of Makati. Petitioner filed the case in Makati
municipal taxes from 1980 to 1984 shall have been where petitioner holds it residence, pursuant to
effected. Thus the case has been filed in RTC. Section 2 (b) of Rule 4. RTC of Makati issued an
order granting the petitioner's prayer for the
ISSUES: issuance of writ of preliminary attachment. Private
1.) Whether a substitution of parties in the petition respondents filed with the respondent court a motion
for mandamus and prohibition as provided under to dismiss on the grounds of (a) lack of jurisdiction
Rule 3, Section 18 of the Rules of Court, should have over the persons of the defendants; and (b) improper
been effected. venue. They claim that summons was served on
defendant corporation's customer who was not
HELD: authorized to receive the same for and in behalf of
No, we have ruled time and again that no man shall the corporation. They likewise object to the venue
be affected by a proceeding to which he is a claiming that the plaintiffs complaint is based on two
stranger. It is a fundamental doctrine of law that a promissory notes which commonly declare, among
party, to be affected by a personal judgment must others:
have a day in court and an opportunity to be heard.
To rule otherwise would be to render nugatory the
“I/we hereby expressly submit to the jurisdiction of
due process clause of the Constitution.
the courts of Manila, any legal action which may
arise out of this promissory note.”
It has been clearly emphasized by the court that, in
as much as no such substitution was effected, the
mandamus petition cannot prosper in the absence of RTC – granted the motion to dismiss on grounds of
a supplemental pleading showing that the impropriety of venue
successors of Mayor Galvez and the members of the Petitioner - motion for reconsideration
Sangguniang Bayan of Balagtas, Bulacan, had
adopted or had continued or threatened to adopt or RTC – denied motion for reconsideration
continue the action of their predecessors in
enforcing the assailed resolution which ordered the Petitioner – petition for review on certiorari
closure of the subject cockpit arena.
Issue:
In fact, there is reason to believe petitioners claim Whether or not the respondent court erred in holding
that the appointed OIC no longer pursued the that the venue was improperly laid.
closure policy of Mayor Galvez so that the
corresponding license and permit to operate the Held:
Balagtas Sports Arena were subsequently granted.
Thus, the mandamus petition should have been The lower court erred in granting the motion to
dismissed for non-compliance with the substitution dismiss on the ground of improper venue.
procedure pursuant to Rule 3, Section 18 of the
As a general rule, all personal actions may be
Rules of Court.
commenced and tried where the defendant or any of
the defendants resides or may be found, or where
the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the
election of the plaintiff. However, by written
agreement of the parties, the venue of an action may
be changed or transferred from one province to
another. Besides when improper venue is not

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objected to in a motion to dismiss it is deemed 2. The venue of the case had been properly
waived. In other words, venue is waivable. It is laid at Pampanga in the light of private
procedural, not a jurisdictional matter. It is intended respondents' earlier declaration that
to provide convenience to the parties, rather than Quezon City is their true residence.
restrict their access to the courts. The rules on venue
simply arrange for the convenient and effective HELD: YES
transaction of business in the courts and do not
RATIO:
relate to their power, authority or jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the action. 1.
Qualifying or restrictive words which would indicate  Simex International v. CA: Court stressed the
that Manila and Manila alone is the venue are totally fiduciary nature of the relationship between a
absent therefrom. It simply is permissive. The bank and its depositors and the extent of
parties solely agreed to add the courts of Manila as
diligence expected of it in handling the
tribunals to which they may resort. They did not
accounts entrusted to its care.
waive their right to pursue remedy in the courts
o Depositor expects the bank to treat
specifically mentioned in Section 2(b) of Rule 4. The
case can be filed in Makati where petitioner holds its his account with the utmost fidelity,
residence. whether it consists only of a few
hundred pesos or of millions.
o Bank must record every single
2. BPI vs IAC transaction accurately, down to the
last centavo, and as promptly as
possible. This has to be done if the
FACTS: account is to reflect at any given time
the amount of money the depositor
Arthur had a personal checking account in the QC
branch of the Commercial Bank and Trust Company can dispose of as he sees fit,
of the Philippines (CBTC). Later, Arthur & Vivienne confident that the bank will deliver it
Canlas (Sps. Canlas) opened a joint current as and to whomever he directs.
account. o A blunder on the part of the bank,
such as the dishonor of a check
The “new account” teller of the bank took out from without good reason, can cause the
the bank’s files the old signature card of Arthur for depositor not a little embarrassment
use as ID and reference. By mistake, she placed
if not also financial loss and perhaps
the old personal account number of Arthur on
even civil and criminal litigation.
the deposit slip for the new checking account of
the spouses. (so the initial deposit of P2,250 for the o The point is that as a business
joint checking account was miscredited to Arthur's affected with public interest and
personal account) because of the nature of its functions,
the bank is under obligation to treat
When Vivienne issued a check for P1,639.89 in and the accounts of its depositors with
another check for P1,160, one of the checks was meticulous care, always having in
dishonored for insufficient funds and a penalty of mind the fiduciary nature of their
P20 was deducted. The bank tried to call them but
relationship.
the bank could not because they actually reside in
Porac, Pampanga.
 The bank is not expected to be infallible but
The Spouses files a complaint for damages against in this instance, it must bear the blame for not
CBTC. During the pendency of the case, BPI and discovering the mistake of its teller despite
CBTC were merged. the established procedure requiring the
RTC: BPI to pay damages to the Spouses papers and bank books to pass through a
battery of bank personnel whose duty it is to
IAC: Bank grossly negligent. Modified award check and countercheck them. The bank's
BPI argument: it was not negligent nor should it be lone witness, Antonio Enciso, casually
liable for its employee’s inadvertence because NCC declared that "the approving officer does not
1173 only requires it to exercise the diligence of a have to see the account numbers and all
good father of family those things. Those are very petty things for
the approving manager to look into."
ISSUE:
1. Whether the Bank was grossly negligent
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2. Venue enforcement of this contract shall be brought within


the City of Manila, Philippines . . ."
 Personal actions may be instituted in the
RTC of the province where the defendant or Pet. Nasser managed to buy the hereditary shares
plaintiff resides, at the election of the plaintiff of the Matute heirs for an amount of 660,000. Out of
(ROC 4.2[b]). the promissory notes, pet. Nasser had a balance of
 Here, there was ample proof that the 697,016.55 which was unpaid.
residence of the plaintiffs is Porac, Respondent Aurora filed a complaint for sum of
Pampanga. money with Application for Writ of Preliminary
 The city address of Mrs. Canlas's parents Attachment before the CFI - Pampanga. It was
was placed in their application for a joint granted upon a bond of 20,000 put up by
checking account at the suggestion of the respondents.
new accounts teller to facilitate mailing of the
Sheriff of Manila issued a notice of garnishment
bank statements and communicating.
against Nasser. Upon the motion by Canlas
 No waiver of their provincial residence for spouses, Respondent Judge Sarmiento issued an
purposes of determining the venue of an order executing the Order of attachment until the
action against the bank. balance of 697,016 is realized.

From the full text: Chief of Police attached the petitioner’s property
except for the leasehold rights which were exempt
On the question of venue raised by petitioner, it is from the execution.
evident that personal actions may be instituted in the
Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Pet. Nasser filed an urgent Motion to Dismiss, the
the province where the defendant or any of the ground of which is Improper Venue, and another
defendants resides or may be found, or where the motion which is Motion to Dissolve the Order of
plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election Attachment on the ground that it was improperly
of the plaintiff (Section 2[b], Rule 4 of the Rules of issued. Respondent Canlas spouses opposed the
Court). In this case, there was ample proof that the motions. Both motions of Nasser were denied by
residence of the plaintiffs is B. Sacan, Porac, Respondent Judge. Instead of an answer, pet.
Pampanga (p. 117, Rollo). The city address of Mrs. Nasser filed an urgent Motion for Reconsideration.
Canlas' parents was placed by the private
Respondent Judge declared Pet. Nasser in default,
respondents in their application for a joint checking allowing the Respondent Canlas spouses to
account, at the suggestion of the new accounts present evidence ex-parte. Next day, respondent
teller, presumably to facilitate mailing of the bank judge ordered judgment in favor of the Canlas
statements and communicating with the private spouses and payment of Pet. Nasser of the sum of
respondents in case any problems should arise money plus interest.
involving the account. No waiver of their provincial
residence for purposes of determining the venue of Respondent Judge motu proprio set aside the order
an action against the bank may be inferred from the of default, appearing Nasser having filed an Urgent
so-called "misrepresentation" of their true residence. Ex-parte Motion to Lift the Order of Default.

Pet. Nasser filed in the lower court another urgent


3. NASSER vs CA motion setting aside and revoking the order of
Respondent Judge on the earlier decision. Resp.
Facts: Canlas spouses opposed. Pet. Nasser filed a “reply”
Petitioner Nasser was a lessee in several haciendas
in Davao Oriental, owned by the Estate of Don Respondent Judge issued two orders (1) holding in
Amadeo Matute Olave. Matias Matute, co- abeyance the resolution of the motion relieving the
administrator of the Olave Estate executed (1) an Chief of Police (2) denying the MR of Petition
original Contract of Lease dated Feb 10, 1965 Nasser.
expiring on Aug 10,1970 and (2) a Supplemental
Contract for a period of 5 years after the expiration Petitioner Nasser filed a petition for certiorari directly
of the original contract. Both contracts are in favor of to SC. Sc remanded the case to the CA.
Petitioner Nasser. CA – denied Nasser’s petition.
Meanwhile, during an earlier date, Pet. Nasser filed
Apr25,1966 – Pet. Nasser executed 3 promissory in a co-equal court of Davao Oriental a complaint for
notes, in favor of Matute, amounting to 819,000. injunction against Chiefs of Police of Generoso and
Feb7,1967 – Matute assigned, sold, transferred and San Isidro.
set over to Respondent Aurora Rivera – Canlas, all
above described promissory notes with express Chiefs of Police filed an opposition on the ground
conformity of Pet. Nasser. The promissory note that the CFI- Davao Oriental lacks jurisdiction and
contained the stipulation: "Any action involving the the complaint has no cause of action.
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attach all the properties of the party against whom it


On the same court, Pet. Nasser filed an annulment may be issued within the province not exempt from
of promissory notes against the Canlas spouses. execution.
Nasser also filed a supplemental complaint with
Urgent Motion for a grant of a writ of Preliminary Finally, it is settled that a verified statement
Injunction Ex-parte and Urgent Motion for incorporated in the complaint without a separate
Restraining Order. Both motions were granted by affidavit is sufficient and valid to obtain the
the CFI- Davao Oriental Judge Bullecer. attachment (Tolentino v. Carla, et al., 66 Phil. 140-
143). Thus, under the same ruling, the verified
Canlas spouses and Chiefs of Police filed a petition complaint in the case at bar entitled "Application for
for certiorari before the CA against Judge Bullecer. a Writ of Preliminary Attachment" which specifically
CA ruled in favor of Canlas spouses and Chiefs of stated that to avoid redundancy and repetition, the
Police. affidavit of the plaintiffs as required under Section 3,
Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court is dispensed
Several alleged to be dummies of Nasser filed cases with, as the matters to be treated and contained
before CFI- Davao Oriental Judge Bullecer therein are already incorporated and made part of
against respondents. the complaint, duly verified by them, has
undoubtedly substantially complied with the
CA issued an order enjoining the CFI-Davao requirements of the Rules and the court to which the
Oriental from entertaining cases concerning the application for the attachment was filed has
impeding and obstruction of CFI – Pampanga’s writ jurisdiction to issue the writ prayed for (Central Capiz
of preliminary injunction. v. Salas, 43 Phil., 30 [1922]).

CA rendered decision making permanent the CFI – 3. Aside from the fact, that it has already been
Pampanga’s writ of preliminary injunction. settled, that stipulations in a contract which specify
a definite place for the institution of an action arising
Petitioner Nasser filed MR. Denied. Hence, this in connection therewith, do not, as a rule, supersede
petition the general rule on the matter set out in Rule 4 of the
Rules of Court, so that it should be construed merely
ISSUE: WON the writ of preliminary attachment
as an agreement on an additional forum, not as
issued by the CFI – Pampanga (in favor of Canlas)
limiting venue to the specified place (Western
may be enjoined in the decision of CFI – Davao
Oriental (in favor of Nasser) – primary issue of the Minolco Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 167 SCRA
case 592 [1988]), Nasser has in effect waived his
objection thereto, by: (a) his motion to dismiss based
WON the appointment of the Chief of Police of on the court's lack of authority to issue the Order of
Governor Generoso, Davao Oriental as Special Attachment but on the non-observance of
Sheriff to serve and implement the Order of requirements of the Rules; (b) his motion to lift order
Attachment was erroneous – issue in relation to Rule of default; and (c) his answer with counterclaim fled
57 in the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga. Consequently, it is immaterial as to
WON the venue was improperly laid, subject Civil whether or not there is a novation of contract in th is
Case No. 3641 having been filed in Pampanga case
instead of in Manila as stipulated;
HELD: Petition Dismissed for lack of merit. CA decision is
1. No. affirmed.
It is doctrinal that no court has the power to interfere
by injunction with the judgment or order of another
court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction (Ngo
Bun Tiong v. Sayo, 163 SCRA 237 [1988]; Investors 4. SWEET LINES INC vs TEVES
Finance Corporation v. Ebarle, 163 SCRA 60 [1988];
Municipality of Malolos v. Libangang Malolos, Inc., FACTS:
164 SCRA 290
[1988]) Private respondents Atty. Leovigildo Tandog
and Rogelio Tiro, contractors by professions, bought
2. No. tickets for Voyage 90 to Tagbilaran City at branch
It is likewise evident that respondent judge did not office of Petitioner Sweet Lines, Inc., a shipping
err in deputizing the Chief of Police of Governor company transporting inter-island passengers and
Generoso, as special sheriff under Section 2, Rule cargoes, at Cagayan de Oro City. Respondents
57 of the Revised Rules of Court where the former were to board petitioner's vessel, M/S "Sweet Hope"
is expressly authorized to require not only the sheriff bound for Tagbilaran City through the port of Cebu.
but also other officers of the province or the sheriffs Upon learning that the vessel was not proceeding to
or other proper officers of different provinces in this
Bohol, since many passengers were bound for
case, the Chief of Police of Governor Generoso, to
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Surigao, private respondents, went to the branch


office for proper relocation to M/S "Sweet Town”.
Facts:
Said vessel was already filled to capacity, so they
were forced to agree "to hide at the cargo section to ● plaintiff sued defendant on four cases of
avoid inspection of the officers of the Philippine action to recover the purchase price of
Coastguard." rawhide that was delivered by the plaintiff to
Private respondents alleged that they were, the defendant.
during the trip," "exposed to the scorching heat of the ● plaintiff corporation has its principal office
sun and the dust coming from the ship's cargo of and place of business in Makati, Rizal.
corn grits," and that the tickets they bought at ● Defendant is a resident of Meycauayan,
Cagayan de Oro City for Tagbilaran were not Bulacan.
honored and they were constrained to pay for other ● Defendant moved to dismiss upon the
tickets. ground of improper venue.
CFI of Misamis Oriental - Private ● He claims that by contract, suit may only be
respondents sued petitioner for damages and for lodged in the courts of Manila.
breach of contract of carriage. ● The Bulacan court overruled him. He did not
answer the complaint. In consequence, a
Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint on default judgment was rendered in favor of the
the ground of improper venue. The motion is plaintiff, ordering defendant to pay the
premised on the condition (Condition 14) printed at
purchase price with interests and attorney’s
the back of the tickets which stated “any and all
fees.
actions arising out of the conditions and provisions
of this ticket, irrespective of where it is issued, shall ● Defendant appealed.
be filed in the competent courts in the City of ISSUE: whether or not venue was properly laid in
Cebu.” the province of Bulacan where defendant is a
resident.
Held: No.
ISSUE: Is the condition on the tickets valid and
enforceable as regards the limitation on venue? ● An accurate reading of the stipulation, "The
parties agree to sue and be sued in the
Courts of Manila," does not preclude the
RULING: filing of suits in the residence of plaintiff or
defendant.
Condition No. 14 is subversive of public policy on ● The plain meaning is that the parties merely
transfers of venue of actions. For, although venue consented to be sued in Manila.
may be changed or transferred from one province to ● Qualifying or restrictive words which would
another by agreement of the parties in writing t to
indicate that Manila and Manila alone is the
Rule 4, Section 3, of the Rules of Court, such an
venue are totally absent therefrom.
agreement will not be held valid where it practically
● We cannot read into that clause that plaintiff
negates the action of the claimants, such as the
private respondents herein. The philosophy and defendant bound themselves to file suits
underlying the provisions on transfer of venue of with respect to the last two transactions in
actions is the convenience of the plaintiffs as well as question only or exclusively in Manila.
his witnesses and to promote 21 the ends of justice. ● For, that agreement did not change or
Considering the expense and trouble a passenger transfer venue. It simply is permissive.
residing outside of Cebu City would incur to ● The parties solely agreed to add the courts
prosecute a claim in the City of Cebu, he would most of Manila as tribunals to which they may
probably decide not to file the action at all. The resort. They did not waive their right to
condition will thus defeat, instead of enhance, the pursue remedy in the courts specifically
ends of justice. Upon the other hand, petitioner has mentioned in Section 2(b) of Rule 4.
branches or offices in the respective ports of call of
its vessels and can afford to litigate in any of these
places. Hence, the filing of the suit in the CFI of Section 2 (b), Rule 4 of the Rules of Court on venue
Misamis Oriental, as was done in the instant case, of personal actions triable by courts of first instance
will not cause inconvenience to, much less — and this is one — provides that such "actions may
prejudice, petitioner. be commenced and tried where the defendant or any
of the defendants resides or may be found, or where
the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the
5. POLYTRADE CORP vs BLANCO election of the plaintiff." Qualifying this provision in

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Section 3 of the same Rule which states that venue Lines. Domingo sought to recover actual and
may be stipulated by written agreement — "By exemplary damages after a bus owned by petitioner
written agreement of the parties the venue of an rammed private respondent’s car along the
action may be changed or transferred from one Maharlika Highway, Sto. Tomas, Batangas. In his
province to another." complaint, private respondent alleged that he was a
resident of Poblacion Rosales, Pangasinan before
Defendant places his case upon Section 3 of Rule 4 he went to Los Angeles, California, USA.
just quoted. According to defendant, plaintiff and
Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint for
defendant, by written contracts covering the four improper venue. He alleged that since private
causes of action, stipulated that: "The parties agree respondent was not a resident of the Philippines, the
to sue and be sued in the Courts of Manila." This complaint should be filed in the place where
agreement is valid.3 Defendant says that because of petitioner, the defendant, resides which is in Gubat,
such covenant he can only be sued in the courts of Sorsogon. The trial court denied the motion to
Manila. We are thus called upon to shake meaning dismiss after finding that private respondent was
from the terms of the agreement just quoted. merely temporarily out of the country and did not
lose his legal residence in Rosales, Pangasinan.
But first to the facts. No such stipulation appears in The CA affirmed the decision.
the contracts covering the first two causes of action.
The general rule set forth in Section 2 (b), Rule 4, ISSUE:
governs, and as to said two causes of action, venue Was there improper venue?
was properly laid in Bulacan, the province of
HELD:
defendant's residence.
YES.
The stipulation adverted to is only found in the
agreements covering the third and fourth causes of A complaint for damages is a personal
action. Renuntiatio non praesumitur. action. Section 2 (b) of Rule 4 of the Revised Rules
of Court provides that the complaint in personal
Illuminating on this point is Engel vs. Shubert actions may be filed in the place where the
Theatrical Co., 151 N.Y.S. 593, 594. And this, defendant resides or may be found, or where the
became there the stipulation as to venue is along plaintiff resides, at the option of the plaintiff. The
lines similar to the present. Said stipulation reads: plaintiff or the defendant must be residents of the
"In case of dispute, both contracting parties agree to place where the action has been instituted at the
submit to the jurisdiction of the Vienna courts." And time the action is commenced. The residence of a
the ruling is: "By the clause in question the parties party must be his personal, actual or physical
habitation or his actual residence or abode. There
do not agree to submit their disputes to the
must be physical presence and actual stay thereat.
jurisdiction of the Viennese court, and to those This physical presence must be more than
courts only. There is nothing exclusive in the temporary and must be with continuity and
language used. They do agree to submit to the consistency.
Viennese jurisdiction, but they say not a word in
restriction of the jurisdiction of courts elsewhere; and Private respondent left for the United States
whatever may be said on the subject of the legality before the complaint was filed. The special power of
attorney in favor of Crispin A. Domingo was drawn
of contracts to submit controversies to courts of
and executed before the Philippine Consul in Los
certain jurisdictions exclusively, it is entirely plain
Angeles, California. In said special power of
that such agreements should be strictly construed, attorney, private respondent declared that he was a
and should not be extended by implication." resident of Los Angeles, California. Private
Venue here was properly laid. respondent was not a mere transient or occasional
resident of the United States. He fixed his place of
abode in Los Angeles, California and stayed there
continuously and consistently for over a year at the
time the complaint was filed in Rosales, Pangasinan.
Contrary to the lower courts finding the temporary
nature of private respondents working non-
immigrant visa did not make him a non-resident of
the United States. There is no showing as to the date
his temporary employment in the United States
6. BARITUA vs CA
ended. There is also no showing, that after the filing
of the complaint, private respondent returned to the
FACTS:
Philippines and resumed residence in Rosales,
Private respondent Roy Domingo, represented by Pangasinan. In fact petitioners claim that private
his attorney-in-fact, Crispin Domingo, filed with the respondent resided in the United States
RTC of Pangasinan a complaint against petitioner continuously and consistently since 1988 until the
Jose Baritua as owner and operator of the J.B. Bus present has not been refuted. When the complaint
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was filed in Rosales, Pangasinan, not one of the deviation from the Rules and did not invalidate
parties was a resident of the town. Private the pleading. Thus, this petition for certiorari.
respondent was a resident of Los Angeles,
California while his attorney-in-fact was a resident of
Cubao, Quezon City. Petitioner’s business address
Issue: W/N the contention of the CA and RTC is
according to private respondent is in Pasay City,
although petitioner claims he resides in Gubat, correct? (YES) Petition is dismissed.
Sorsogon.

Ruling: First, because a special civil action of


certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 is not the
RULE 6 proper remedy when no errors of jurisdiction are
raised in the petition .
KINDS OF PLEADING
Secondly, the Court of Appeals correctly held that
Sabio's "Counter-Complaint" is a compulsory
counterclaim, not a third-party complaint, hence, no
1. AURELIO vs CA separate filing fee may be required for asserting it.

Facts: Sisters Ma. Esperanza Ledonio-Aurelio and In Arturo Balbastro, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, 48
Ma. Victoria A. Ledonio-Yao, without joining their SCRA 231, we ruled that "The crucial characteristics
respective husbands, together with their mother, of a third-party complaint under Section 12, Rule 6
brothers and sister filed in the Regional Trial Court of the Rules of Court, is that the original defendant
of Quezon City a complaint against the spouses is attempting to transfer to the third-party defendant,
Camilo D. Sabio and Ma. Marlene A. Ledonio-Sabio, the liability asserted against him by the original
Gerardo A. Ledonio, Jr., Edgar A. Ledonio and plaintiff." There is no attempt here on the part of the
Salvador A. Ledonio, for annulment and rescission private respondents to transfer to the petitioners the
of contract, recovery of possession, reconveyance liability asserted by the plaintiffs against them. By
and damages. joining the plaintiffs' husbands as co-defendants
of their wives under the "counter-complaint," the
private respondents merely complied with the
The defendants filed a 66-page "Answer with general rule that married women may not sue or
Compulsory Counter-Complaint" demanding be sued alone without joining their husbands
payment of P150 million in moral, nominal, and (Sec. 4, Rule 3, Rules of Court).
exemplary damages for the plaintiffs' defamatory
and libelous allegations in their complaint, and
impleading as "counter-defendants," Leonardo Inasmuch as, if the counter-complaint should
A. Aurelio, husband of plaintiff Ma. Esperanza prosper, the award for damages to Attorney Sabio
Ledonio-Aurelio, and Yao Bun Shiong husband may have to be satisfied out of the assets of the
of plaintiff Ma. Victoria A. Ledonio Yao, because conjugal partnerships of the original plaintiffs (Art.
they allegedly have not only been advisers and 163, Civil Code), then necessarily, their husbands
consultants of their wives, but conspired and (the "counter-defendants"), as administrators of their
confederated with them and also actively respective conjugal partnerships, should be brought
participated in the acts and events leading to the into the suit as formal parties (Sec. 4, Rule 3, Rules
case. of Court). By joining the husbands as additional
counter-defendants in the counter-claim against
their wives (the original plaintiffs), instead of filing a
The counter-defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss separate action against the husbands, multiplicity of
and Expunge from the Records the counter- suits is thereby avoided.
complaint. The motion was denied by the RTC. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. 2. VDA DE CHUA vs IAC
It held that the counter-complaint was in fact a
compulsory counterclaim, hence, no separate
filing fee may be required for asserting it; that
the designation of the pleading as a FACTS: Defendant Herminigilda Herrera executed
"Compulsory Counter-Complaint" instead of a Contract of Lease in favor of Tian On (sic) (or Sy
"Compulsory Counterclaim" was not a fatal Tian On) whereby the former leased to the latter Lots
for a term of ten (10) years, renewable for another
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five (5) years. The contract of lease contains a


stipulation giving the lessee an option to buy the
leased property and that the lessor guarantees to
1. GOLANGCO vs CA
leave the possession of said property to the lessee
for a period of ten (10) years or as long as the lessee
faithfully fulfills the terms and conditions of their
contract. In accordance with the said contract of FACTS:
lease, the lessee, Tian On, erected a residential
A petition for annulment of marriage was filed by
house on the leased premises.
private respondent Lucia Carlos Golangco against
Within four (4) years from the execution of the said petitioner Rene UyGolangco before the Regional
contract of lease the lessee, Sy Tian On, executed a Trial Court of Makati, Branch 144. The couple had
Deed of Absolute Sale of Building in favor of Chua two children, Justin Rene and Stefan Rafael. During
Bok, the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs the proceedings of the case, a hearing for
herein, whereby the former sold to the latter the custody pendente lite of the two children was held. In
aforesaid residential house. When the Original an order dated July 21, 1994, the trial court awarded
Contract of Lease expired in 1960, Chua Bok and the two children to Lucia while Rene was given
defendant Herminigilda Herrera, through her alleged visitation rights of at least one week in a month.
attorney-in-fact executed a lease contract. Thereafter Rene questioned the order dated July 21,
1994 with the Court of Appeals. The Court of
Defendant Herrera through her attorney-in-fact, Mrs. Appeals, however, dismissed the petition and
Luz Tormis, who was authorized with a special instead affirmed the order of the trial court. Not
power of attorney, sold the lots in question to contented, Rene appealed the resolution of the
defendants-spouses, Vicente and Victoria Go. The Court of Appeals affirming the order dated July 21,
defendants-spouses were able to have aforesaid 1994 before this Court, and the case was docketed
sale registered with the Register of Deeds of the City as G.R. No. 120831. On July 17, 1995, the Court
of Cebu and the titles of the two parcels of land were resolved to dismiss the petition for failure of
transferred in their names. petitioner Rene to show that grave abuse of
Thereafter, or on November 18, 1977, plaintiffs filed discretion had been committed by the appellate
the instant case seeking the annulment of the said court.
sale between Herminigilda Herrera and spouses
Vicente and Victoria Go, alleging that the On August 15, 1995, Lucia filed with the trial
conveyance was in violation of the plaintiffs' right of court a motion for reconsideration with prayer for the
option to buy the leased premises as provided in the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. She
Contract of Lease and that the defendants-spouses sought redress due to an alleged incident on July 5,
acted in bad faith in purchasing the said lots knowing 1995, in which her estranged husband physically
fully well that the said plaintiffs have the option to buy abused their son Justin. On said date, he allegedly
those lots. went to the art class of Justin at 2167 Paraiso Street,
Dasmarinas Village, Makati. When they met, he
ISSUE: WON RTC has jurisdiction in ordering the asked his son to kiss him, but Justin refused. Irked
petitioners' ejectment from the premises in question by his sons reaction, Rene hit him which produced
and the demolition of the improvements introduced contusions.[5]
thereon.
Due to the incident, a criminal complaint for
RULING: Yes, the RTC has jurisdiction. Clearly the slight physical injuries was filed on July 1995 against
Court of First Instance had jurisdiction over actions Rene by his son Justin with the Metropolitan Trial
which involve the possession of real property or any Court of Makati on the basis of Justins complaint-
interest therein, except forcible entry and detainer affidavit. On August 16, 1995, the trial court issued
actions. A counterclaim is considered a complaint, a temporary restraining order[6] against him and set
only this time, it is the original defendant who the hearing of the motion. The spouses thereafter
becomes the plaintiff. It stands on the same footing presented their respective evidence and
and is to be tested by the same rules as if it were an witnesses. In an order dated October 4, 1995, the [7]

independent action. Hence, the same rules on trial court granted the writ of preliminary injunction
jurisdiction in an independent action apply to a restraining Rene from seeing his children.
counterclaim.
Aggrieved, Rene filed a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court before
the Court of Appeals (docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No.
38866), alleging grave abuse of discretion on the
RULE 7 part of the trial court in issuing the October 4, 1995
PARTS OF A PLEADING order.

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In a resolution dated January 10, 1996, the and two objectives were sought; thus, forum-
Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for violation shopping cannot be said to exist in the case at bar.
of Circular No. 28-91 on non- forum
shopping.[8] Hence, this petition.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby
PARTIALLY GRANTED. The decision of the Court
ISSUE: of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. No. 38866 dated January
10, 1996, is SET ASIDE. The order dated October 4,
whether or not petitioner violated the rule on
1995, issued by the court a quo is hereby
non- forum shopping.
AFFIRMED in toto.
Costs against petitioner.
RULING:
SO ORDERED.
There is forum-shopping whenever, as a result
of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a
favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari)
from another.
In this case, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition questioning the order dated October 4,
1995, on the ground that there was a petition for
review filed before this Court (G.R. No. 120381)
questioning the order dated July 21, 1994 regarding
the award of custody of the two children to Lucia.
In this case, it was clear that the issues raised
in the two petitions, that is, first questioning the order
dated July 21, 1994 and second, the order dated
October 4, 1995 are distinct and different from one
another.
In First Philippine International Bank v. Court of
Appeals, this Court had the occasion to lay down the
test to determine whether there is a violation of the
rule on forum-shopping:

Consequently, where a litigant (or one representing


the same interest or person) sues the same party
against whom another action or actions for the
alleged violation of the same right and the
enforcement of the same relief is/are still pending,
the defense of litispendentia in one case is a bar to
the others; and, a final judgment in one would
constitute res judicata and thus would cause the
dismissal of the rest. xxx.

xxx x xx x xx

Ultimately, what is truly important to consider in


determining whether forum-shopping exists or not is
the vexation caused the courts and parties-litigant by
a party who asks different courts and/or
administrative agencies to rule on the same or
related causes and/or grant the same or
substantially the same reliefs, in the process
creating the possibility of conflicting decisions being
rendered by the different fora upon the same
issues. xxx.

In sum, two different orders were questioned,


two distinct causes of action and issues were raised,
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE COMPILATION

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