People of the Philippines vs.

Reggie Bernardo
G.R. No. 198789
June 3, 2013

Facts:

Accused, Reggie Bernardo was charged with the complex crime of murder with attempted murder under the following
information:

That in the morning of July 27, 2006 along the national highway within the vicinity of Brgy. 21, San Marcos, Sarrat, Ilocos
Norte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually, helping with John Doe whose true names and identities are not yet certain at this time,
with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation and with the use of an illegally possessed firearm, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot to death one Efren Calumag y Antonio and inflict grazing gunshot
wounds (abrasion) upon Reah B. Calumag, thus, commencing the execution of the crime of Murder by overt acts but did
not perform all the acts that would produce the same by reason of some cause other than their own spontaneous
desistance.

Bernardo, pleaded not guilty to the charge thereafter trial on the merits ensued.

Reah, testified that after the shooting and treatment at the hospital, she went to the Sarrat Police Station upon being
informed by the Dingras police chief that they had in their custody a person who fitted the description one of the
assailants as given by her. Reah positively pointed to Bernardo as the shooter.

Bernardo interposed the defense of denial and alibi. He alleged that he was inside the District Jail of Batac, Ilocos Norte
when the crime was committed on July 27, 2006. He was originally a prisoner of the district jail and was ordered to be
release on July 21, 2006. He claimed that because he had nowhere to go, he asked and was permitted by the Jail Warden
to stay in jail. With the Jail warden’s permission, he went to Cabugao, Ilocos Sur on July 22, 2006 but returned to the
district jail the following morning. He narrated on the day of the incident, he washed his clothes in the morning and later
on helped preparing lunch. Afterwards, three jail guards accompanied him to the PAG-IBIG Office in Laoag City using the
district jail service. They even dropped by Chairman Pungtilan’s residence to request for a certification and there they
were told that a shooting incident was reported over the radio. The self imposed extension of his stay allegedly lasted
until July 28, 2006.

Issue: Whether or not the defense of denial and alibi by Bernardo shall prosper

Held:

Bernardo asserts alibi and denial as defenses. He argues that he was in jail when the crime was committed. Such alibi,
while corroborated by the testimonies of some Batac District Jail Guards, cannot prevail over the positive identification
made by Reah pinpointing Bernardo as one of the malefactors who shot Efren to death. The identification of Bernardo as
an assailant was positively and credibly established by the prosecution in this case. It has been settled that affirmative
testimony is far stronger than a negative testimony especially when it comes from the mouth of a credible witness.
Absent clear and convincing evidence, alibi and denial are negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in
law.

Further, for alibi to prosper, it must be proved, not only that the assailant was in another place when the crime was
committed, but that it was physically impossible for him to be present at the crime scene or its immediate vicinity at the
time of its commission altogether. In this case, Bernardo claims the physical impossibility of having committed the crime
for the reason that he was still in jail when it was perpetrated. He was ordered released by the RTC of Batac on July 21,
2006; hence, he was no longer a detention prisoner during the commission of the crime. The Batac District Jail is in the
same province where the crime was committed and could be easily reached within thirty to forty minutes from
Barangay San Marcos, Sarrat, Ilocos Norte. Having been discharged from jail, Bernardo was also free to move around
and was not subject to strict monitoring. This was bolstered by the finding of the RTC that there was no record that
Bernardo stayed in jail on the day the crime was perpetrated. Undisputedly, there was no physical impossibility for
Bernardo to leave his cell and be present at the shooting incident.

Manila Electric Company vs. Heirs of Spouses Dionisio Deloy and Praxedes Martonito represented by Policarpio Deloy
G.R. No. 192893
June 5, 2013

Facts:

Respondents are the owners, by way of succession of a parcel of land consisting of 8,550 square meters located in Trece
Martires City. On November 12, 1965, Dionisio Deloy donated a 650-square meter portion of the subject land to the
Communciations and Electricity Development Authority (CEDA) for the latter to provide cheap and affordable electric
supply to the province of Cavite. A deed of donation was executed to reflect and formalize the transfer.

Sometime in 1985, CEDA offered for sale to MERALCO, its electric distribution system, including all rights and privileges
necessary for providing electrical service in Cavite. This was embodied in a Memorandum of Agreement which was
signed by both parties and at the same day of June 28, 1985 a Deed of Absolute Sale was executed in favor of Meralco,
the latter being the new owner occupied the subject land.

On October 11, 1985, MERALCO wrote a letter to Dionisio requesting the latter’s permission for the continued use of the
subject land as a substation site. Parties were not able to reach any agreement. Respondents offered to sell the subject
land to MERALCO but their offer was rejected.

For said reason, respondents demanded that MERALCO vacate the subject land on or before June 15, 2003. Despite
written demand, MERALCO did not move out of the subject land. Thus respondents through its representative were
constrained to file the complaint for unlawful detainer.

MERALCO countered that CEDA as the owner of the subject land by virtue of the deed of donation executed by Dionisio,
lawfully sold to it all rights necessary for the operation of the electric service in Cavite by way of a deed of sale on June
28, 1985. MERALCO stressed that the condition of providing affordable electricity to the people of Cavite, imposed in the
deed of donation between Dionisio and CEDA, was still being observed and complied with. Thus MERALCO, claimed that,
being CEDA’s successor-in-interest, it had legal justification to occupy the subject land.

The MTCC rendered a decision dismissing respondents’ complaint against MERALCO. It ruled that it had no jurisdiction
over the case because it would require an interpretation of the deed of donation making it one not capable of pecuniary
estimation.

Issue: Whether or not the MTCC acquires jurisdiction over the case
Whether or not MERALCO recognized the right of possesion of the subject land by the Delo’s

Held:

Jurisdiction of MTCC

When the issue of ownership is raised in an ejectment case, the first level courts are not ipso facto divested of its
jurisdiction. Section 33(2) of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691 provides:

Sec. 33 Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. –
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

xxxx

(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer: Provided, That when, in such cases,
the defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved
without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of
possession.[underscoring supplied]

xxxx

In this regard, Section 16, Rue 70 of the Rules of Court allows the first level courts, in ejectment cases, to provisionally
determine the issue of ownership for the sole purpose of resolving the issue of physical possession.

Sec. 16 Resolving Defense of Ownership – When the defendant raises the defense of ownership in his pleadings and the
question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine
the issue of possession

Accordingly, it is unquestionably clear that the first level courts are clothed with the power to preliminarily resolve
questions on the ownership of real property, if necessary, to arrive at the proper and complete determination of the
question on physical possession or possession de facto.
Right of Possession
Evidently, by these two documents (referring to the letters sent by MERALCO to the Delo’s), MERALCO acknowledged
that the owners of the subject land were the Deloys. It is clear as daylight. The first letter was written barely four (4)
months after the deed of sale was accomplished. As observed by the CA, MERALCO never disputed the declarations
contained in these letters which were even marked as its own exhibits. Pursuant to Section 26, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Evidence, these admissions and/or declarations are admissible against MERALCO.

Sec. 26 Admissions of a party – The act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence
against him.

In Heirs of Bernardo Ulep v. Ducat, it was written, thus:

x x x Being an admission against interest, the documents are the best evidence which affords the greatest certainty of
facts in dispute. The rationale for the rule is based on the presumption that no man would declare anything against
himself unless such declaration was true. Thus, it is fair to presume that the declaration corresponds with the truth, and
it is his fault if it does not.

Guided by the foregoing rules and jurisprudence, the Court holds that the letter and the internal memorandum
presented, offered and properly admitted as part of the evidence on record by MERALCO itself, constitute an admission
against its own interest. Hence, MERALCO should appropriately be bound by the contents of the documents.

Rodrigo Rontos y Dela Torre vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 188024
June 5, 2013

Facts:

On October 19, 2003, PO1 Pacis and PO1 Labaclado was dispatched by the Anti-Illegal Drugs Task Force to conduct
surveillance in Sampaloc St., Camarin Caloocan City due to reports of illegal drug activity in the said area. Upon arrival in
the area, PO1 Pacis and PO1 Labaclado notice petitioner standing about five meters away from them, apparently
preoccupied with scrutinizing two plastic sachets in his hand.

Upon coming closer, they saw the plastic sachets appeared to contain a white crystalline substance similar to shabu. PO1
Pacis approached petitioner and confiscated the plastic sachets. Thereafter, he introduced himself as a police officer and
informed petitioner of the offense the latter had committed. The two police officers informed petitioner of his
constitutional rights, while he just remained silent.7 PO1 Pacis marked the plastic sachets with his initials "JCP-1" and
JCP-2" and placed them in a makeshift envelope.

They then brought petitioner to the station and turned him over to PO2 Masi together with the plastic sachets. PO2
Masi conducted an investigation and prepared a request for a laboratory examination10 of the contents of the plastic
sachets. PO1 Pacis brought the request and the plastic sachets to the crime laboratory, and forensic chemist Police
Inspector Jessie dela Rosa (P/Insp. dela Rosa) conducted the examination. The tests on the contents of the plastic
sachets yielded a positive result for methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug more commonly known as
shabu.

A Complaint14 for violation of Section 11 (possession of dangerous drugs), Article II of R.A. 9165, was drawn up and
referred15 to the city prosecutor for the filing of charges before the court.

On the other hand, petitioner narrated a different version of the incident. According to him, on the date and time
mentioned, he was at home with his parents, sister, nephews and a visitor named Cassandra Francisco (Cassandra) when
PO1 Pacis and PO1 Labaclado suddenly barged in.16 The police officers searched the house, claiming that they were
looking for something. When the search proved fruitless, they arrested petitioner and Cassandra and detained them at
the Drug Enforcement Unit in Camarin, Caloocan City. Cassandra was later released when her uncle allegedly gave
money to the police officers.

Issue: Whether or not the arrest of petitioner is illegal

Whether or not the seized drugs are admissible as evidence in court

Held:

Issue on warrantless arrest

We acquit petitioner on the ground of reasonable doubt. We cannot uphold the contention of petitioner that his
warrantless arrest was illegal. The CA correctly ruled that his failure to question the legality of his arrest before entering
his plea during arraignment operated as a waiver of that defense. "It has been ruled time and again that an accused is
estopped from assailing any irregularity with regard to his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to move for the quashal
of the information against him on this ground before his arraignment."

In his arraignment before the trial court, petitioner never raised any issue and instead "freely and voluntarily pleaded
Not Guilty to the offense charged. Thus, he was estopped from raising the issue of the legality of his arrest before the
trial court, more so on appeal before the CA or this Court.

Issue on the admissibility of the seized drugs

xxxx

On the basis of the nonobservance of the rules of procedure for handling illegal drug items, we resolve to acquit
petitioner on the ground of reasonable doubt.

In illegal drugs cases, the identity and integrity of the drugs seized must be established with the same unwavering
exactitude as that required to arrive at a finding of guilt. The case against the accused hinges on the ability of the
prosecution to prove that the illegal drug presented in court is the same one that was recovered from the accused upon
his arrest.

The procedure set forth in Section 21 of R.A. 9165 is intended precisely to ensure the identity and integrity of dangerous
drugs seized. This provision requires that upon seizure of illegal drug items, the apprehending team having initial
custody of the drugs shall (a) conduct a physical inventory of the drugs and (b) take photographs thereof (c) in the
presence of the person from whom these items were seized or confiscated and (d) a representative from the media and
the Department of Justice and any elected public official (e) who shall all be required to sign the inventory and be given
copies thereof.

This Court has emphasized the import of Section 21 as a matter of substantive law that mandates strict compliance. It
was laid down by Congress as a safety precaution against potential abuses by law enforcement agents who might fail to
appreciate the gravity of the penalties faced by those suspected to be involved in the sale, use or possession of illegal
drugs. Under the principle that penal laws are strictly construed against the government, stringent compliance therewith
is fully justified.

Here, the procedure was not observed at all. Where it is clear that Section 21 was not observed, as in this case, such
noncompliance brings to the fore the question of whether the illegal drug items were the same ones that were allegedly
seized from petitioner.

xxxx

We cannot, in good conscience, affirm the conviction of petitioner for possession of illegal drugs if the police officer
charged with the preservation of the evidence cannot even be certain in the identification of the envelope that was
presented in court. As held in Dolera v. People, there also exists in the present case a reasonable likelihood of
substitution, in that the two plastic sachets that tested positive for shabu and were presented in court were not the
items allegedly seized from petitioner.1âwphi1 This possibility of substitution is fatal for the prosecution, for there is
then a failure to prove the identity of the corpus delicti beyond reasonable doubt.

People of the Philippines vs. Ernesto Gani y Tupas

G.R. No. 195523
June 5, 2013

Facts:

Sometime February 21, 1997, the victim, AAA, who was then only five (5) years old, was harvesting vegetables with her
elder brother at Sitio Bayogbayog, Barangay Bulata, Cauayan, Negros Occidental. While they were busy with their work,
appellant, who is their uncle, arrived carrying a knife. Subsequently, he instructed AAA's brother to go home ahead.
After the latter left, appellant approached AAA and, right then and there, removed her underwear, placed himself on
top of her and inserted his penis into her vagina. After having sexual intercourse with AAA, appellant drew out his knife
and slashed her vagina causing her serious injury. Thereafter, appellant left. AAA then went home and recounted her
ordeal to her grandmother. AAA was then brought to the health center for first aid treatment and later to Bacolod City
for further medical care. Subsequently, AAA's aunt, Leticia Alingasa filed, in her behalf, a Criminal Complaint against
appellant.

Appellant interposed the defense of alibi claiming that he was in Quezon City at the time that AAA was raped. He
pointed to his brother-inlaw, Ermelo Alingasa, as the one who committed the rape.

Issue: Whether or not appellant’s defense of denial and alibi shall prosper

Held:

Alibi is an inherently weak defense because it is easy to fabricate and highly unreliable. To merit approbation, the
appellant must adduce clear and convincing evidence that he was in a place other than the situs criminis at the time
when the crime was committed, such that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime
when it was committed. In this case, appellant failed to prove that it was physically impossible for him to be at the crime
scene on February 21, 1997. His token defense, during his direct examination, that he was in Quezon City when the
victim was raped is hardly credible because he failed to prove the physical impossibility of his presence at the scene of
the crime when it was committed. On the contrary, he admitted, when he was cross-examined, that he was, in fact, in
the same locality (Sitio Bayogbayog, Barangay Bulata) when AAA was raped.

At any rate, settled is the rule that alibi and denial cannot prevail over the positive and categorical testimony and
identification of an accused by the complainant. Positive identification where categorical and consistent and without any
showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over a denial which, if not
substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law. They
cannot be given greater evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by ABUSAMA M. ALID, Officer-in-Charge, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

- REGIONAL FIELD UNIT XII (DA-RFU XII), vs. ABDULWAHAB A. BAYAO, OSMEÑA I. MONTAÑER, RAKMA B. BUISAN,
HELEN M. ALVAREZ, NEILA P. LIMBA, ELIZABETH B. PUSTA, ANNA MAE A. SIDENO, UDTOG B. TABONG, JOHN S.
KAMENZA, DELIA R. SUBALDO, DAYANG W. MACMOD, FLORENCE S. TAYUAN, in their own behalf and in behalf of the
other officials and employees of DA-RFU XII,
G.R. No. 179492
June 5, 2013

Facts:

Petitioner Department of Agriculture–Regional Field Unit XII (DARFU XII) is a government office mandated to implement
the laws, policies, plans, programs, rules, and regulations of the Department of Agriculture in its regional area, while
respondents are officials and employees of DA-RFU XII.1
On March 30, 2004, Executive Order (E.O.) No. 304 was passed designating Koronadal City as the regional center and
seat of SOCCSKSARGEN Region. It provides that all departments, bureaus, and offices of the national government in the
SOCCSKSARGEN Region shall transfer their regional seat of operations to Koronadal City.

On April 1, 2005 Department of Agriculture Undersecretary for Operations Edmund J. Sana thru a Memorandum
directed Officer-in-charge (OIC) and Regional Executive Director of DA-RFU XII Abusama M. Alid to effect the transfer of
the administrative, finance and operations base of RFU XII from Cotabato to Koronadal City in compliance with Executive
Order No. 304.

Private respondents thru a memorandum dated April 22, 2005 addressed to DA Secretary Arthur Yap opposed the
implementation of the April 1, 2005 memorandum.

They alleged that in 2004, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo made a pronouncement during one of her visits in
Cotabato City that the regional seat of Region 12 shall remain in Cotabato City.6 Only three departments were not
covered by the suspension of E.O. No. 304, namely, the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), Department of Tourism
(DOT), and Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE).

Respondents alleged further in their Memorandum to the DA Secretary that on March 7, 2005, they appealed to the
Secretary of Agriculture that the implementation of E.O. No. 304 be held in abeyance. A copy of the Petition was
attached to the Memorandum. It cited reasons such as the huge costs the physical transfer will entail and the plight of
employees who have already settled and established their homes in Cotabato City.

On May 17, 2005, OIC Abusama M. Alid held a meeting and ordered the transfer of the regional office to ATI Building in
Tantangan and Tupi Seed Farm in Tupi, both located in South Cotabato and Uptown, Koronadal City, to be carried out on
May 21, 2005.

This prompted respondents to file on May 18, 2005 a Complaint for Injunction with Prayer for Issuance of Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 of Cotabato City.

The trial court granted respondents' Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction. Aggrieved, petitioner went to the Court
of Appeals via Rule 65 on the ground that the assailed Order of the trial court is contrary to the pronouncement of this
Court in DENR v. DENR Region 12 Employees. However, the Court of Appeals dismissed the Petition for Certiorari for
failure of petitioner to resort to a Motion for Reconsideration of the assailed trial court Order.

In their comment, Respondents counter that a Petition via Rule 45 is not the proper remedy to assail the disputed
Resolutions. They allege that the assailed Court of Appeals Resolution dismissing the Petition for Certiorari for failure of
the petitioners to file a Motion for Reconsideration is not a "final order or resolution" contemplated by Rule 45. It is not
an adjudication on the merits. In fact, the Court of Appeals did not even attempt to resolve the propriety of the issuance
of the assailed trial court Order. In any case, respondents argue that petitioner’s failure to file a Motion for
Reconsideration is fatal. They contend that this is a condition sine qua non for a Petition under Rule 65, and none of the
exceptions are present in this case.
Issue: Whether or not a Petition via Rule 45 is the proper remedy to assail the disputed resolutions

Held:

A dismissal by the Court of Appeals of a Petition via Rule 65 for failure to file a Motion for Reconsideration may be
assailed via Rule 45. Unlike a Petition via Rule 45 that is a continuation of the appellate process over the original case, a
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is an original or independent action.

The settled rule is that a Motion for Reconsideration is a condition sine qua non for the filing of a Petition for
Certiorari.36 Its purpose is to grant an opportunity for the court to correct any actual or perceived error attributed to it
by re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case.37

This rule admits well-defined exceptions as follows:

Concededly, the settled rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non for the filing of a petition for
certiorari.

Its purpose is to grant an opportunity for the court to correct any actual or perceived error attributed to it by the re-
examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case. The rule is, however, circumscribed by well-defined
exceptions, such as (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the
questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the
same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the
question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject
matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless;
(e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case,
relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the
proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceeding were ex parte or in which
the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is
involved.

Allen Macasaet, Nicolas V. Quijano, Jr., Isaias Albano, Lily Reyes, Janet Bay, Jesus R. Galang and Randy Hagos vs.
Francisco R. Co, Jr.,
G.R. No. 156759
June 5, 2013

Facts:

On July 3, 2000, respondent, , sued Abante Tonite, a daily tabloid of general circulation; its Publisher Allen A. Macasaet;
its Managing Director Nicolas V. Quijano; its Circulation Manager Isaias Albano; its Editors Janet Bay, Jesus R. Galang and
Randy Hagos; and its Columnist/Reporter Lily Reyes (petitioners), claiming damages because of an allegedly libelous
article petitioners published in the June 6, 2000 issue of Abante Tonite. The suit, was raffled to Branch 51 of the RTC,
which in due course issued summons to be served on each defendant, including Abante Tonite, at their business
address.

RTC Sheriff Raul Medina proceeded to the stated address to effect the personal service of the summons on the
defendants. But his efforts to personally serve each defendant in the address were futile because the defendants were
then out of the office and unavailable. He returned in the afternoon of that day to make a second attempt at serving the
summons, but he was informed that petitioners were still out of the office. He decided to resort to substituted service of
the summons, and explained why in his sheriff’s return dated September 22, 2005.

On October 3, 2000, petitioners moved for the dismissal of the complaint through counsel’s special appearance in their
behalf, alleging lack of jurisdiction over their persons because of the invalid and ineffectual substituted service of
summons. They contended that the sheriff had made no prior attempt to serve the summons personally on each of
them in accordance with Section 6 and Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. They further moved to drop Abante
Tonite as a defendant by virtue of its being neither a natural nor a juridical person that could be impleaded as a party in
a civil action.

At the hearing of petitioners’ motion to dismiss, Medina testified that he had gone to the office address of petitioners in
the morning of September 18, 2000 to personally serve the summons on each defendant; that petitioners were out of
the office at the time; that he had returned in the afternoon of the same day to again attempt to serve on each
defendant personally but his attempt had still proved futile because all of petitioners were still out of the office; that
some competent persons working in petitioners’ office had informed him that Macasaet and Quijano were always out
and unavailable, and that Albano, Bay, Galang, Hagos and Reyes were always out roving to gather news; and that he had
then resorted to substituted service upon realizing the impossibility of his finding petitioners in person within a
reasonable time.

Issue: Whether or not the court acquired jurisdiction over the petitioners

Held:

There is no question that Sheriff Medina twice attempted to serve the summons upon each of petitioners in person at
their office address, the first in the morning of September 18, 2000 and the second in the afternoon of the same date.
Each attempt failed because Macasaet and Quijano were "always out and not available" and the other petitioners were
"always roving outside and gathering news." After Medina learned from those present in the office address on his
second attempt that there was no likelihood of any of petitioners going to the office during the business hours of that or
any other day, he concluded that further attempts to serve them in person within a reasonable time would be futile. The
circumstances fully warranted his conclusion. He was not expected or required as the serving officer to effect personal
service by all means and at all times, considering that he was expressly authorized to resort to substituted service should
he be unable to effect the personal service within a reasonable time. In that regard, what was a reasonable time was
dependent on the circumstances obtaining. While we are strict in insisting on personal service on the defendant, we do
not cling to such strictness should the circumstances already justify substituted service instead. It is the spirit of the
procedural rules, not their letter, that governs.

In reality, petitioners’ insistence on personal service by the serving officer was demonstrably superfluous. They had
actually received the summonses served through their substitutes, as borne out by their filing of several pleadings in the
RTC, including an answer with compulsory counterclaim ad cautelam and a pre-trial brief ad cautelam. They had also
availed themselves of the modes of discovery available under the Rules of Court. Such acts evinced their voluntary
appearance in the action.

MR. ALEXANDER "LEX" ADONIS, represented by the CENTER FOR MEDIA FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY (CMFR),
through its Executive Director, MRS. MELINDA QUINTOS-DE JESUS; and the NATIONAL UNION OF JOURNALISTS OF
THE PHILIPPINES (NUJP), through its Chairperson, MR. JOSE TORRES, JR., vs. UPERENTENDENT VENANCIO TESORO,
DIRECTOR, DAVAO PRISONS AND PENAL FARM, PANABO CITY, DIGOS DAVAO DEL NORTE
G.R. No. 182855
June 5, 2013

Facts:

In Criminal Case No. 48679-2001, Adonis was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Davao City (RTC), Branch 17 for
Libel, filed against him by then Representative Prospero Nograles. He began serving his sentence at the Davao Prisons
and Penal Farm on February 20, 2007.

A second libel case, docketed as Criminal Case No. 48719-2001 was likewise filed against Adonis by Jeanette L. Leuterio,
pending before the RTC of Davao City, Branch 14.

On December 11, 2007, the Board of Pardons and Parole (BPP) issued an order for the Discharge on Parole of seven (7)
inmates in various jails in the country, which included Adonis. The said document was received by the City Parole and
Probation Office of Davao on May 2, 2008.

Meanwhile, on January 25, 2008, this Court issued Administrative Circular No. 08-2008, the subject of which is the
"Guidelines in the Observance of a Rule of Preference in the Imposition of Penalties in Libel Cases."

In view of these developments, Adonis, on April 18, 2008 filed with the RTC Branch 17 a Motion to Reopen Case (With
Leave of Court), praying for his immediate release from detention and for the modification of his sentence to payment
of fine pursuant to the said Circular.

On May 26, 2008, in Criminal Case No. 48719-2001 before the RTC Branch 14, Adonis moved for his provisional release
from detention. The motion was granted by Presiding Judge George Omelio in open court and he was allowed to post
bail in the amount of P5,000.9Subsequently on even date and after Adonis filed a cash bond and an undertaking, the
trial court issued an Order directing the Chief of Davao Penal Colony "to release the accused Alexis Adonis unless he is
being held for some other crimes or offenses." On the same date, the said order was served to the respondent, but the
release of Adonis was not effected.

On May 30, 2008, Adonis filed the instant petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus alleging that his liberty was
restrained by the respondent for no valid reason.

The respondent consequently filed his Comment. Adonis then filed on October 27, 2008 an Urgent Motion to Resolve
and on November 7, 2008 a Manifestation and Motion, reiterating all his previous prayers.

On February 11, 2009, the Court received the letter from the respondent, informing the Court that Adonis had been
released from confinement on December 23, 2008 after accepting the conditions set forth in his parole and with the
advise to report to the City Parole and Probation Officer of Davao.

Issue: Whether or not the Petition for Habeas Corpus filed by respondent is with merit

Held:

Section 4, Rule 102 of the Revised Rules of Court provides when a writ must not be allowed or discharge authorized, to
wit:

SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized.― If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his
liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a
court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the
order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be
discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be
held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person
suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.

In the instant case, Adonis was convicted for libel by the RTC Branch 17, in Criminal Case No. 48679-2001. Since his
detention was by virtue of a final judgment, he is not entitled to the Writ of Habeas Corpus. He was serving his sentence
when the BPP granted him parole, along with six (6) others, on December 11, 2007. While it is true that a convict may be
released from prison on parole when he had served the minimum period of his sentence; the pendency of another
criminal case, however, is a ground for the disqualification of such convict from being released on parole. Notably, at the
time he was granted the parole, the second libel case was pending before the RTC Branch 14. In fact, even when the
instant petition was filed, Criminal Case No. 48719-01 was still pending. The issuance of the writ under such
circumstance was, therefore, proscribed. There was basis for the respondent to deny his immediate release at that time.

People of the Philippines vs. Romeo Bustamante y Aliganga

G.R. No. 189836
June 5, 2013
Facts:

At about lunch time or thereafter on February 17, 1997, AAA was alone in the second floor in their house when the
appellant arrived. Her younger brother Jayjun was playing outside while her mother went to clean their ginger garden.
The appellant laid her down on the floor and removed her shorts and panty. He then removed his pants, went on top of
her and inserted his penis into her vagina. Appellant removed his penis after he ejaculated and told her not to report
what had happened. Appellant forced her and she was not able to resist because she was still young during that time.
She reported the incident to her mother and the police.

Accused-appellant was therefore charged with the crime of rape. Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to the
charge against him.

Appellant testified that in the early morning on February 7, 1997, he went to Tuguegarao with his daughter, AAA. He
went to Mrs. Lolit Casauay, his employer, and Sgt. Poli to tell them his problem regarding AAA and her cousin having sex.
Sgt. Poli advised appellant to go to Alcala Police to have his problem entered in the blotter and to go back to him after.
They stayed in Tuguegarao the whole day and went back to x x x, Alcala, Cagayan about 7:00 o’clock in the evening.
When they were approaching their house, Purita Torrado called for AAA and told appellant that he was a traitor. Purita
Torrado and brothers, Rogelio and Amador Torrado, then entered his house, mauled him and tied his hands. Thereafter,
policemen arrived and brought him to the Municipal Hall of Alcala, Cagayan without informing him why. His daughter
AAA charged him of the heinous crime of rape because his wife and brothers-inlaw harbored ill feelings against him,
blaming him to have spread the rumor that Rogelio Torrado was the father of the child of his own sister Purita Torrado.
Before February 17, 1997, his daughter AAA admitted to him that she had sexual relations with her cousin Randy
Torrado for which reason he went to Tuguegarao to help AAA file a complaint against said Randy Torrado. It was after
they came from Tuguegarao that his daughter AAA charged him with rape.

On cross-examination, appellant testified that he did not report any barangay official that Randy Torrado sexually
molested his daughter x x x , but went to a person Ernie Fiesta who was not a barangay official. He admittedly told his
problem to Sgt. Poli who asked AAA questions but the same was not entered in the blotter of the Cagayan Police
Provincial Office.

On re-direct, appellant further testified that it was his daughter AAA who told him that Randy Torrado molested her so
he brought her to Tuguegarao the following day, February 17, 1997. He was not able to enter it in the blotter of Alcala
police as directed by Sgt. Poli because when they arrived in Maraburab, Alcala from Tuguegarao, his brothers-inlaw
mauled him. He did not file any charges against his brothers-in-law.

Police Inspector Carlos T. Poli testified as follows: He was then the Assistant Chief Investigator at the Cagayan Police
Provincial Headquarters on February 17, 1997. Appellant, with his daughter AAA went to him. Appellant told him that his
daughter was molested by a nephew of his wife but he could not recall the name. He advised appellant to have the
incident reported to, and entered in the blotter of, the Alcala Police Station where the incident took place and to return
for investigation. He talked to AAA who admitted that there was truth to the report that she was molested and that
there was a second occasion. He did not enter the report in the blotter because they did not have a blotter so he advised
appellant to have the case entered in the blotter of Alcala Police. The report was not recorded because appellant only
sought his advice and that he would first talk to his wife as the suspect was her relative. Admittedly, he invited the wife
of appellant to his office upon the request of her in-laws who pitied and considered the appellant as their son. He asked
the wife if she could help but the latter could not do it because her brother and sister were interested to pursue the
case.

The last witness for the defense was Lolita Casauay who testified, thus: she knew appellant who was the mechanic of
her brother. On February 13, 1997, he met the appellant who asked her advice regarding his daughter who was sexually
molested. She told the appellant to go to the police to enter the incident in the blotter. The appellant went to Sgt. Poli
for this purpose. On February 17, 1997, the appellant and AAA went to her house in Caggay, Tuguegarao. AAA
voluntarily related to her that she was molested by her cousin Randy Torrado. In March 1997, she learned of the charge
of rape against the appellant. When she saw the appellant in jail, she went to Maraburab, Alcala, Cagayan, and called for
the wife and daughter of the appellant. She asked the wife why the appellant was incarcerated and the former felt guilty
of what happened to the latte

Issue: Whether or not AAA’s testimony is credible

Held:

In his appeal, appellant maintains that the accusation against him is baseless and untrue. He claims that, as evidenced by
the victim’s own testimony, AAA filed a false complaint of rape against him mainly due to her ill feelings towards him
brought about by his purported repeated physical maltreatment of the victim.

The appeal is without merit.

It appears that the crux of appellant’s appeal centers on the credibility of AAA’s testimony. Accordingly, appellant
implores this Court to review the same and render a judgment reversing his conviction for the crime of rape.

It is settled in jurisprudence that in a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted solely on the basis of the
testimony of the victim that is credible, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things.
Jurisprudence is likewise instructive that the factual findings of the trial court, especially on the credibility of the rape
victim, are accorded great weight and respect and will not be disturbed on appeal.

In the case at bar, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found AAA to be a credible witness and her testimony
worthy of full faith and credit. After a careful review of the records of this case, we find no reason to deviate from the
findings of the lower courts.

Henry L. Sy vs. Local Government of Quezon City

G.R. No. 202690
June 5, 2013

Facts:
On November 7, 1996, the City, through then Mayor Ismael Mathay, Jr., filed a complaint for expropriation with the RTC
in order to acquire a 1,000 sq. m. parcel of land, owned and registered under the name of Sy (subject property), for the
benefit of the residents of Barangay Balingasa, Balintawak, Quezon City.

On March 18, 1997, pursuant to Section 198 of Republic Act No. 7160 (RA 7160), otherwise known as the "Local
Government Code of 1991," the City deposited the amount of P241,090.00 with the Office of the Clerk of Court,
representing 15% of the fair market value of the subject property based on its tax declaration.

During the preliminary conference on November 8, 2006, Sy did not question the City’s right to expropriate the subject
property. Thus, only the amount of just compensation remained at issue.

On July 6, 2006, the RTC appointed three (3) commissioners to determine the proper amount of just compensation to be
paid by the City for the subject property. Subsequently, Commissioners Ostaco and Alcantara, in a Report dated
February 11, 2008, recommended the payment of P5,500.00 per sq. m., to be computed from the date of the filing of
the expropriation complaint, or on November 7, 1996. On the other hand, Commissioner Salinas filed a separate Report
dated March 7, 2008, recommending the higher amount of P13,500.00 per sq. m. as just compensation.

RTC, citing the principle that just compensation must be fair not only to the owner but to the expropriator as well,
adopted the findings of Commissioners Ostaco and Alcantara and thus, held that the just compensation for the subject
property should be set at P5,500.00 per sq. m.

Dissatisfied, Sy filed an appeal with the CA. The CA however affirmed the findings of RTC

Aggrieved, Sy moved for reconsideration which was denied in the Resolution dated July 16, 2012 for being filed out of
time. The City also filed a motion for reconsideration which was equally denied for lack of merit.

Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the CA correctly dismissed Sy’s motion for reconsideration for being filed out of time

Held:

At the outset, the Court observes that Sy’s motion for reconsideration was filed out of time and thus, was properly
dismissed by the CA. Records show that, as per the Postmaster’s Certification, the CA’s January 20, 2012 Decision was
received by Sy on January 26, 2012 and as such, any motion for reconsideration therefrom should have been filed not
later than fifteen (15) days from receipt,29 or on February 10, 2012.30 However, Sy filed his motion for reconsideration
(subject motion) a day late, or on February 13, 2012,31 which thus, renders the CA decision final and executory.

In this regard, it is apt to mention that Sy’s counsel, Atty. Tranquilino F. Meris (Atty. Meris), claims that his secretary’s
inadvertent placing of the date January 27, 2012, instead of January 26, 2012, on the Notice of Decision constitutes
excusable negligence which should therefore, justify a relaxation of the rules.
The assertion is untenable.

A claim of excusable negligence does not loosely warrant a relaxation of the rules. Verily, the party invoking such should
be able to show that the procedural oversight or lapse is attended by a genuine miscalculation or unforeseen
fortuitousness which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against so as to justify the relief sought. The standard of
care required is that which an ordinarily prudent man bestows upon his important business. In this accord, the duty
rests on every counsel to see to adopt and strictly maintain a system that will efficiently take into account all court
notices sent to him.

Applying these principles, the Court cannot excuse Atty. Meris’ misstep based on his proffered reasons. Evidently, the
erroneous stamping of the Notice of Decision could have been averted if only he had instituted a credible filing system in
his office to account for oversights such as that committed by his secretary. Indeed, ordinary prudence could have
prevented such mistake.

Be that as it may, procedural rules may, nonetheless, be relaxed for the most persuasive of reasons in order to relieve a
litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure
prescribed. Corollarily, the rule, which states that the mistakes of counsel bind the client, may not be strictly followed
where observance of it would result in the outright deprivation of the client’s liberty or property, or where the interest
of justice so requires.

As applied in this case, the Court finds that the procedural consequence of the above-discussed one-day delay in the
filing of the subject motion – which, as a matter of course, should render the CA’s January 20, 2012 Decision already
final and executory and hence, bar the instant petition – is incommensurate to the injustice which Sy may suffer. This is
in line with the Court’s observation that the amount of just compensation, the rate of legal interest, as well as the time
of its accrual, were incorrectly adjudged by both the RTC and the CA, contrary to existing jurisprudence. In this respect,
the Court deems it proper to relax the rules of procedure and thus, proceed to resolve these substantive issues.

People of the Philippines vs. Moises Caoile

G.R. No. 203041
June 5, 2013

Facts:

Plaintiff-appellee in two separate Amended informations filed before the RTC charged with two counts of Rape of a
Demented Person under Article 266-A par. 1(d) of the Revised Penal Code.

During the trial AAA, categorically and positively pointed to Plaintiff-appellee as the one who raped her.

Caoile is now attacking the credibility of AAA, and claims that she might not be a mental retardate at all, having been
able to give categorical and straightforward answers during her testimony.
Issue: Whether or not AAA’s testimony should be given credibility

Held:

Caoile’s insistence, to escape liability, that AAA is not a mental retardate, cannot be accepted by this Court.

The fact that AAA was able to answer in a straightforward manner during her testimony cannot be used against her. The
capacity of a mental retardate to stand as a witness in court has already been settled by this Court. In People v. Castillo,
we said:

It bears emphasis that the competence and credibility of mentally deficient rape victims as witnesses have been upheld
by this Court where it is shown that they can communicate their ordeal capably and consistently. Rather than
undermine the gravity of the complainant’s accusations, it even lends greater credence to her testimony, that, someone
as feeble-minded and guileless could speak so tenaciously and explicitly on the details of the rape if she has not in fact
suffered such crime at the hands of the accused. Moreover, it is settled that when a woman says she has been raped,
she says in effect all that is necessary to show that she has been raped and her testimony alone is sufficient if it satisfies
the exacting standard of credibility needed to convict the accused. (Citations omitted.)

Joselito C. Borromeo vs. Juan T. Mina

G.R. No. 193747
June 5, 2013

Facts:

Petitioner filed a Petition dated June 9, 20036 before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Office (PARO) of Isabela, seeking
that: (a) his landholding over the subject property (subject landholding) be exempted from the coverage of the
government’s OLT program under Presidential Decree No. 27 dated October 21, 19727 (PD 27); and (b) respondent’s
emancipation patent over the subject property be consequently revoked and cancelled.8 To this end, petitioner alleged
that he purchased the aforesaid property from its previous owner, one Serafin M. Garcia (Garcia), For various reasons,
however, he was not able to effect the transfer of title in his name. Subsequently, to his surprise, he learned that an
emancipation patent was issued in respondent’s favor without any notice to him.

Petitioner filed a subsequent Petition dated September 1, 2003 also with the PARO which contained identical allegations
as those stated in his June 9, 2003 Petition (PARO petitions) and similarly prayed for the cancellation of respondent’s
emancipation patent.

After due investigation, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) Joey Rolando M. Unblas issued a finding that the
subject property was erroneously identified by the same office as the property of petitioner’s father, the late Cipriano
Borromeo. In all actuality, however, the subject property was never owned by Cipriano Borromeo as its true owner was
Garcia – notably, a perennial PD 27 landowner– who later sold the same to petitioner.
Based on these findings, the MARO recommended that: (a) the subject landholding be exempted from the coverage of
the OLT; and (b) petitioner be allowed to withdraw any amortizations deposited by respondent with the Land Bank of
the Philippines (LBP) to serve as rental payments for the latter’s use of the subject property.

The Ruling of the PARO

In an undated Resolution, the PARO adopted the recommendation of the MARO. Aggrieved, respondent filed an
administrative appeal to the DAR Regional Director.

The Ruling of the DAR Regional Director

On November 30, 2004, DAR Regional Director Renato R. Navata issued an Order, finding that petitioner, being the true
owner of the subject property, had the right to impugn its coverage from the government’s OLT program. Further,
considering that the subject property was erroneously identified as owned by Cipriano Borromeo, coupled with the fact
that petitioner's total agricultural landholdings was way below the retention limits prescribed under existing agrarian
laws, he declared the subject landholding to be exempt from OLT coverage.

While affirming the PARO's Decision, the DAR Regional Director did not, however, order the cancellation of respondent’s
emancipation patent. He merely directed petitioner to institute the proper proceedings for such purpose before the DAR
Adjudication Board (DARAB).

Consequently, respondent moved for reconsideration, challenging petitioner's ownership of the subject property for
lack of sufficient basis to show that his averred predecessor-in-interest, Garcia, was its actual owner. In addition,
respondent pointed out that petitioner never filed a protest against the issuance of an emancipation patent in his favor.
Hence, petitioner should be deemed to have slept on his rights on account of his inaction for 21 years.

The aforesaid motion was, however, denied in the Resolution dated February 10, 2006, prompting respondent to
elevate the matter to the DAR Secretary.

The Ruling of the DAR Secretary

On September 12, 2007, then DAR Secretary Nasser C. Pagandaman issued DARCO an Order affirming in toto the DAR
Regional Director’s ruling. Undaunted, respondent filed a petition for review with the CA.

The Ruling of the CA

In a Decision dated April 30, 2010, the CA reversed and set aside the DAR Secretary's ruling. It doubted petitioner’s claim
of ownership based on the 1982 deed of sale due to the inconsistent allegations regarding the dates of its notarization
divergently stated in the two (2) PARO Petitions, this alongside the fact that a copy of the same was not even attached
to the records of the case for its examination. In any case, the CA found the said sale to be null and void for being a
prohibited transaction under PD 27 which forbids the transfers or alienation of covered agricultural lands after October
21, 1972 except to the tenant-beneficiaries thereof, of which petitioner was not. It also held that petitioner cannot
mount any collateral attack against respondent’s title to the subject property as the same is prohibited under Section 48
of the Presidential Decree No. 1529 (PD 1529), otherwise known as the "Property Registration Decree."

Petitioner moved for reconsideration which was, however, denied in a Resolution dated September 13, 2010.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner’s change of theory on appeal is allowed

Held:

The Court first resolves the procedural matter.

Settled is the rule that a party who adopts a certain theory upon which the case is tried and decided by the lower courts
or tribunals will not be permitted to change his theory on appeal,30 not because of the strict application of procedural
rules, but as a matter of fairness. Basic considerations of due process dictate that theories, issues and arguments not
brought to the attention of the trial court would not ordinarily be considered by a reviewing court, except when their
factual bases would not require presentation of any further evidence by the adverse party in order to enable him to
properly meet the issue raised, such as when the factual bases of such novel theory, issue or argument is (a) subject of
judicial notice; or (b) had already been judicially admitted,34 which do not obtain in this case.

Records show that petitioner changed his theory on appeal with respect to two (2) matters:

First, the actual basis of his ownership rights over the subject property, wherein he now claims that his ownership was
actually based on a certain oral sale in 1976 which was merely formalized by the 1982 deed of sale; and

Second, the status of respondent as tenant of the subject property, which he never questioned during the earlier stages
of the proceedings before the DAR but presently disputes before the Court.

Clearly, the factual bases of the foregoing theories require the presentation of proof as neither of them had been
judicially admitted by respondent nor subject of judicial notice. Therefore, the Court cannot entertain petitioner’s novel
arguments raised in the instant petition. Accordingly, he must rely on his previous positions that (a) his basis of
ownership over the subject property rests on the 1982 deed of sale; and (b) that respondent’s status as the tenant of
the subject property remains undisputed.

People of the Philippines vs. Jose Armando Cervantes Cachuela and Benjamin Julian Cruz Ibanez
G.R. No. 191752
June 10, 2013

Facts:
The prosecution’s evidence revealed that on July 23, 2004, Ibañez went to Weapons System Corporation (WSC, and told
Henessy Auron, WSC’s Secretary and Sales Representative. Ibañez inquired from Henessy about the schedule and the
rates of WSC’s firing range and the amount of the membership fee of its gun club. He also asked the days when there
are many people in the firing range, and whether Henessy was WSC’s only female employee

July 26, 2004, Henessy arrived at WSC and rang the doorbell, but no one opened the door. She went to the back of the
office where the firing range was located, and called Zaldy Gabao, another employee of WSC. Zaldy answered from
inside the store but Henessy did not understand what he said. Henessy returned to the front door and called again.
Zaldy replied that he could not open the door because his hands were tied. Henessy called Raymundo Sian, the
company’s operations manager, and informed him that Zaldy’s hands had been tied. After one hour, the police arrived;
tand opened the gate at the back using acetylene. Upon entering, they saw that Zaldy had been handcuffed to the vault.
Zaldy informed the police that the company’s gunsmith, Rex Dorimon, was inside the firing range. The police entered the
firing range, and saw the lifeless body of Rex who suffered several gunshot wounds on the head, thorax and abdomen,
caused by a .45 pistol

The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) received an information from an asset that the group of Cachuela was
involved in the robbery of WSC and in the killing of one of its employees; and that Cachuela had been looking for
prospective buyers of firearms. The NBI formed an entrapment team and proceeded to Bacoor, Cavite to execute the
operation. Upon their arrival, Melvin Nabilgas approached them and told them that he had been sent by Cachuela and
Ibañez to look for buyers of firearms. The police introduced themselves and told Nabilgas that they were conducting an
entrapment operation against the suspects of the robbery at WSC. Nabilgas surrendered to the police, and gave the
names of the other persons involved in the crime.

Thereafter, the asset contacted Cachuela and informed him that Nabilgas had already talked to the buyers, and that
they would like to see the firearms being sold. Cachuela set up a meeting with the buyers at a gasoline station in Naic,
Cavite. NBI and the asset went to the agreed place. The NBI agents arrested Cachuela before he could make any move.
The agents recovered four (4) firearms7 from Cachuela’s house, including a .9 mm Bernardelli with serial number T1102-
03E000151.8

The NBI conducted a follow-up operation on Ibañez whom the asset also contacted. Upon meeting, the agents asked
whether the guns had legal documentation; they then arrested Ibañez when they sensed that he was already becoming
suspicious. The agents recovered two guns from Ibañez, viz.: a .45 Glock 30 with serial number FML 245 and a .45 Llama
with serial number 04490Z.9

At the NBI Main Office, Zaldy pointed to the appellants, during a police line-up, as the persons responsible for the
robbery at WSC and for the killing of Rex. Nabilgas also executed a handwritten confession implicating the appellants
and Zaldy in the crime.

The prosecution filed an Information for robbery with homicide before the RTC against the appellants, Nabilgas and
Zaldy, docketed as Criminal Case No. 04-0943. The accused all pleaded not guilty on arraignment. Trial on the merits
ensued thereafter. During trial, Zaldy died.
Issue: Whether or not the out-of-court identification and extrajudicial confession is valid

Held:

As to the out-of-court identification

Lino testified that Zaldy identified the appellants as the persons involved in the robbery of WSC and in the killing of Rex
in a police line-up held at the NBI Main Office on Taft Avenue, Manila. We note that Zaldy did not testify in court since
he was brought to the National Center for Mental Health, and subsequently died there during the trial. For this reason,
we examine with greater scrutiny Lino’s testimony regarding Zaldy’s alleged out-of-court identification.

People v. Algarme17 explains the procedure for out-of-court identification and the test to determine its admissibility, as
follows:

Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done thru show-ups where the suspect alone
is brought face-to-face with the witness for identification. It is done thru mug shots where photographs are shown to
the witness to identify the suspect. It is also done thru line-ups where a witness identifies the suspect from a group of
persons lined up for the purpose x x x In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of
suspects, courts have adopted the totality of circumstances test where they consider the following factors, viz.: (1) the
witness' opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness' degree of attention at that time; (3)
the accuracy of any prior description, given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the
identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and the identification; and, (6) the suggestiveness of the
identification procedure. [italics and emphasis supplied]

In the present case, Lino merely stated that Zaldy, during a police line-up, identified the appellants as the persons
involved in the robbery of WSC and in the killing of Rex. Lino did not state when the line-up took place; how this line-up
had been conducted; who were the persons in the line-up with the appellants (if there were indeed other persons
included in the line-up); and whether the line-up was confined to persons of the same height and built as the appellants.
Lino likewise did not indicate who accompanied Zaldy before and during the line-up, and whether there had been the
possibility of prior or contemporaneous improper insinuations on Zaldy regarding the appearance of the appellants.

To our mind, Lino’s failure to state relevant details surrounding the police line-up is a glaring omission that renders
unreliable Zaldy’s out-ofcourt identification. No way exists for the courts to evaluate the factors used in determining the
admissibility and reliability of out-of-court identifications, such as the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at
the identification; the length of time between the crime and the identification; and the suggestiveness of the
identification procedure. The absence of an independent in-court identification by Zaldy additionally justifies our strict
treatment and assessment of Lino’s testimony.

Extrajudicial Confession of Nabilgas

The records also bear out that Nabilgas executed an extrajudicial confession18 at the NBI Main Office, where he
implicated the appellants and Zaldy in the crime charged. During trial, he repudiated this confession, and claimed that
he had been tortured by the NBI agents, and that he was forced to copy a previously prepared statement.

After a careful examination of the evidence on hand, we hold that Nabilgas’ extrajudicial confession is inadmissible in
evidence. The Court has consistently held that an extrajudicial confession, to be admissible, must satisfy the following
requirements: "(1) the confession must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the assistance of a competent and
independent counsel, preferably of the confessant's choice; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in writing."

We point out that Nabilgas was already under custodial investigation by the authorities when he executed the alleged
written confession. "A custodial investigation is understood x x x as x x x any questioning initiated by law enforcement
authorities after a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant manner.
x x x It begins when there is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and the investigation has started to focus
on a particular person as a suspect, i.e., when the police investigator starts interrogating or exacting a confession from
the suspect in connection with an alleged offense.

In People v. Rapeza, we explained that the lawyer called to be present during custodial investigations should, as far as
reasonably possible, be the choice of the individual undergoing questioning. If the lawyer is furnished by the police for
the accused, it is important that the lawyer should be competent, independent and prepared to fully safeguard the
constitutional rights of the accused, as distinguished from one who would merely be giving a routine, peremptory and
meaningless recital of the individual's constitutional rights.

After a close reading of the records, we rule that Nabilgas’ confession was not made with the assistance of a competent
and independent counsel. The services of Atty. Melita Go, the lawyer who acted in Nabilgas’ behalf, were provided by
the very same agency investigating Nabilgas – the NBI itself; she was assigned the task despite Nabilgas’ open
declaration to the agency’s investigators that he already had a lawyer in the person of Atty. Donardo Paglinawan. Atty.
Paglinawan confirmed this fact when he stated that he was already representing Nabilgas at the time his client made the
alleged confession. Nabilgas also testified that Atty. Go did not disclose that she was a lawyer when she was called to
assist him; she merely represented herself to be a mere witness to the confession. There was also nothing in the records
to show that Atty. Go ascertained whether Nabilgas’ confession was made voluntarily, and whether he fully understood
the nature and the consequence of his extrajudicial confession and its impact on his constitutional rights.

To be sure, this is not the kind of assistance required of lawyers in a custodial investigation. "An ‘effective and vigilant
counsel’ necessarily and logically requires that the lawyer be present and be able to advise and assist his client from the
time the confessant answers the first question asked by the investigating officer until the signing of the extrajudicial
confession."22 In addition, the extrajudicial confession of Nabilgas was not corroborated by a witness who was present
at the time the written confession was made. We note in this regard that the prosecution did not present Atty. Go at the
witness stand despite hints made during the early stages of the trial that she would be presented.

At any rate, Nabilgas’ extrajudicial confession is inadmissible in evidence against the appellants in view of the res inter
alios acta rule. This rule provides that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of
another. Consequently, an extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant and is not admissible against his or
her co-accused because it is considered as hearsay against them.

An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an admission made by a conspirator under Section 30, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court. This provision states that the act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy, and during its
existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than
such act or declaration. Thus, in order that the admission of a conspirator may be received against his or her co-
conspirators, it is necessary that: (a) the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission itself; (b) the
admission relates to the common object; and (c) it has been made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the
conspiracy.23

This exception, however, does not apply in the present case since there was no other piece of evidence presented, aside
from the extrajudicial confession, to prove that Nabilgas conspired with the appellants in committing the crime charged.
Conspiracy cannot be presumed and must be shown as distinctly and conclusively as the crime itself. Nabilgas, in fact,
was acquitted by the trial court due to insufficiency of evidence to prove his participation in the crime.

People of the Philippines vs. Gloria Calumbres y Auditor

G.R. No. 194382
June 10, 2013

Facts:

On 6 April 2004, at around 5:30 p.m., SPO1 Reynaldo Dela Victoria (SPO1 Dela Victoria), the prosecution’s lone witness,
was in his office at the Special Operation Unit of the City Drug Enforcement Unit at the Cogon Public Market in Cagayan
de Oro City when an informant reported to him that someone was selling shabu at Sto. Niño, Brgy. 31.

SPO1 Dela Victoria then hired a faux-buyer, giving the latter five twenty-peso bills marked money, and, riding a trisikad,
the duo proceeded to the area that the informant described. SPO1 Dela Victoria claimed to have positioned himself at a
strategic place where he could see the transaction. He saw his poseur-buyer handing something to Gloria Calumbres
(Calumbres) after receiving something from the latter; the poseur-buyer’s pre-arranged signal followed, prompting him
to immediately approach Calumbres. He ordered her not to move, "police mi, ayaw lihok," shocking the accused into
disbelief. He took the money from Calumbres and retrieved the suspected shabu from the faux-buyer who was standing
two meters away.

SPO1 Dela Victoria brought Calumbres to his office at the Cogon Market for booking. He claimed he recorded the
incident in the police blotter, prepared a request for laboratory analysis of the confiscated item and allegedly took a
photograph, which, according to his testimony, was not developed, however, due to budget constraints.1

A laboratory report on the confiscated item showed the white substance to be shabu.
Calumbres maintained her innocence and presented this defense:

Calumbres was at the ACCP Used Clothing Enterprise (ukay-ukay) when she snatched a wallet of a man, a customer of
the store. She was caught, however, when the man’s wife saw what she did. She was brought to the police station at
Precinct 2 in the Cogon Market where Police Inspector Celso Montel interrogated her.

Minutes later, SPO1 Dela Victoria arrived. He investigated her and told her he was the one in charge in the security of
the area where she snatched the wallet. He promised her release if she would give him three cell-phone units. At that
time, however, she had none. She just arrived from Iligan City and the man from whom she snatched the wallet was
supposedly her first victim.

Calumbres’ defense was corroborated by Relian Abarrientos (Abarrientos), a store employee who witnessed the whole
incident. Abarrientos testified that in April 2004, a woman tried to snatch a wallet from a man inside the store. The
man’s wife caught her and the snatcher was detained at the Cogon Police Station. Abarrientos claimed that this was the
only incident that happened in the store.

Issue: Whether or not SPO1 Dela Victoria’s testimony should be given credibility

Held:

While it is hornbook doctrine that the evaluation of the trial court on the credibility of the witness and the testimony is
entitled to great weight and is generally not disturbed upon appeal, such rule does not apply when the trial court
overlooked, misapprehended, or misapplied facts of weight or substance that would point to a different conclusion. In
the instant case, these circumstances are present, that, when properly appreciated, would warrant the acquittal of the
accused.

First, that Calumbres was arrested and brought to Precinct 2 at the Cogon Police Station, after she was caught snatching
a man’s wallet, was duly recorded in its police blotter.3 The police blotter shows that she was arrested due to
pickpocketing, a fact which was also corroborated by the testimony in open court of the store-employee who witnessed
the whole incident.

The circumstance of Calumbres’ arrest and the charge as reflected in the police blotter at Precinct 2 which was for
pickpocketing, when compared to the succeeding charge for the sale of illegal drugs which was blottered at the Special
Operation Unit of the City Drug Enforcement Unit casts serious doubt as to her culpability to the crime of illegal sale of
shabu. The same crimes were committed and blottered on the same day, separated only by hours. There was no record
that while in custody in the police station that she was released. Rather, the succeeding records reveal that she was
already being charged for illegal sale of shabu, this time at the Special Operation Unit of the City Drug Enforcement Unit,
which happens to be also located in Cogon Market.
Amando P. Contes vs. Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas), Victory M. Fernandez, Julio E. Sucgang and Nilo Igtanloc
G.R. No. 187896-97
June 10, 2013

Facts:

The case stemmed up in a case filed by petitioner against respondents for violation of Sec. 3 (C) of Republic Act No. 3019
or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and misconduct. Petitioner alleged that during the period of 29 March 2006
to 1 April 2006, respondents utilized a heavy equipment grader owned by the Province of Aklan in levelling a portion of
his land. Petitioner claimed that the portion of the land destroyed has an area of 1.125 square meters and that several
fruit trees were destroyed. Petitioner impleaded Fernandez for the latter's failure to ascertain from the Barangay
Captain whether the roads sought to be levelled were barangay roads. and for issuing a driver's trip ticket to the Grader
Operator.

From the decision of the Ombudsman dismissing the case filed by petitioner, the latter filed a Motion Consideration
which was unfortunately denied by the Ombudsman. Hence, petitioner file an appeal via petition for review on
certiorari, pursuant to Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act, assailing the denial of his motion for reconsideration by the
Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas).

Issue: Whether or not decisions or orders by the Ombudsman appealable by way of Petitioner for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45.

Held:

Petitioner, in filing this petition for review, committed a procedural misstep which warrants an outright dismissal.

Petitioner misconstrued Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989 and disregarded prevailing
jurisprudence. Section 27 provides, in part, that:

In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives, or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed
to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the
order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

This provision, insofar as it provided for appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 from the decisions or orders of the
Ombudsman in administrative cases, had been declared unconstitutional by this Court as early as in the case of Fabian v.
Desierto.4 We ruled in Fabian that appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary
cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43, in line with the regulatory philosophy
adopted in appeals from quasi-judicial agencies in the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.

Jurisprudence accords a different treatment with respect to an appeal in a criminal case filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman. We made the pronouncement in Acuña v. Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon6 that the remedy of an
aggrieved party in criminal complaints before the Ombudsman is to file with this Court a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65.

Considering that the case at bar was a consolidation of an administrative and a criminal complaint, petitioner had the
option to either file a petition for review under Rule 43 with the Court of Appeals or directly file a certiorari petition
under Rule 65 before this Court. Neither of these two remedies was resorted to by petitioner.

By availing of a wrong remedy, this petition merits an outright dismissal.

Heirs of Marcelo Sotto, represented by Lolibeth Sotto Noble, Et. Al vs. Matilde S. Palicte
G.R. No. 159691
June 13, 2013

Facts:

The first case (Matilde S. Palicte v. Hon. Jose O. Ramolete, et al., No. L-55076, September 21, 1987, 154 SCRA 132) held
that herein respondent Matilde S. Palicte (Matilde), one of four declared heirs of Filemon, had validly redeemed the four
properties pursuant to the assailed deed of redemption, and was entitled to have the title over the four properties
transferred to her name, subject to the right of the three other declared heirs to join her in the redemption of the four
properties within a period of six months.

The second was the civil case filed by Pascuala against Matilde (Civil Case No. CEB-19338) to annul the former’s waiver
of rights, and to restore her as a co-redemptioner of Matilde with respect to the four properties (G.R. No. 131722,
February 4, 1998).

The third was an incident in Civil Case No. R-10027 (that is, the suit brought by the heirs of Carmen Rallos against the
Estate of Sotto) wherein the heirs of Miguel belatedly filed in November 1998 a motion for reconsideration praying that
the order issued on October 5, 1989 be set aside, and that they be still included as Matilde’s co-redemptioners. After the
trial court denied their motion for reconsideration for its lack of merit, the heirs of Miguel elevated the denial to the CA
on certiorari and prohibition, but the CA dismissed their petition and upheld the order issued on October 5, 1989.
Thence, the heirs of Miguel came to the Court on certiorari (G.R. No. 154585), but the Court dismissed their petition for
being filed out of time and for lack of merit on September 23, 2002.

The fourth was The Estate of Don Filemon Y. Sotto, represented by its duly designated Administrator, Sixto Sotto
Pahang, Jr. v. Matilde S. Palicte, et al. (G.R. No. 158642, September 22, 2008, 566 SCRA 142), whereby the Court
expressly affirmed the ruling rendered by the probate court in Cebu City in Special Proceedings No. 2706-R entitled
Intestate Estate of the Deceased Don Filemon Sotto denying the administrator’s motion to require Matilde to turn over
the four real properties to the Estate of Sotto.
The fifth is this case. It seems that the disposition by the Court of the previous cases did not yet satisfy herein petitioners
despite their being the successors-in-interest of two of the declared heirs of Filemon who had been parties in the
previous cases either directly or in privity. They now pray that the Court undo the decision promulgated on November
29, 2002, whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) declared their action for the partition of the four properties as already
barred by the judgments previously rendered, and the resolution promulgated on August 5, 2003 denying their motion
for reconsideration.

Issue: Whether or not the case should be dismissed for forum shopping

Held:

xxx

For this the fifth case to reach us, we still rule that res judicata was applicable to bar petitioners’ action for partition of
the four properties.

Res judicata exists when as between the action sought to be dismissed and the other action these elements are present,
namely; (1) the former judgment must be final; (2) the former judgment must have been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties; (3) the former judgment must be a judgment on the merits; and (4)
there must be between the first and subsequent actions (i) identity of parties or at least such as representing the same
interest in both actions; (ii) identity of subject matter, or of the rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being
founded on the same facts; and, (iii) identity of causes of action in both actions such that any judgment that may be
rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under
consideration

xxx

Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment or decree on the merits rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction is conclusive about the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits and on all points and matters
determined in the previous suit. The foundation principle upon which the doctrine rests is that the parties ought not to
be permitted to litigate the same issue more than once; that when a right or fact has been judicially tried and
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, so long as it remains unreversed, it should be conclusive upon the
parties and those in privity with them in law or estate.18

Section 47 (b) Rule 39 of the Rules of Court institutionalizes the doctrine of res judicata in the concept of bar by prior
judgment, viz:

Section 47. Effect of judgments and final orders.—The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court of the
Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows:

xxxx
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter
that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title
subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same
title and in the same capacity; and

xxxx

The doctrine of res judicata is an old axiom of law, dictated by wisdom and sanctified by age, and founded on the broad
principle that it is to the interest of the public that there should be an end to litigation by the same parties over a subject
once fully and fairly adjudicated. It has been appropriately said that the doctrine is a rule pervading every well-regulated
system of jurisprudence, and is put upon two grounds embodied in various maxims of the common law: one, public
policy and necessity, which makes it to the interest of the State that there should be an end to litigation –interest
reipublicae ut sit finis litium; the other, the hardship on the individual that he should be vexed twice for one and the
same cause – nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa. A contrary doctrine would subject the public peace and
quiet to the will and neglect of individuals and prefer the gratification of the litigious disposition on the part of suitors to
the preservation of the public tranquillity and happiness.19 The doctrine is to be applied with rigidity because:

x x x the maintenance of public order, the repose of society, and the quiet of families require that what has been
definitely determined by competent tribunals shall be accepted as irrefragable legal truth. So deeply is this principle
implanted in xxx jurisprudence that commentators upon it have said, the res judicata renders white that which is black
and straight that which is crooked. Facit excurvo rectum, ex albo nigrum. No other evidence can afford strength to the
presumption of truth it creates, and no argument can detract from its legal efficacy.20

What we have seen here is a clear demonstration of unmitigated forum shopping on the part of petitioners and their
counsel. It should not be enough for us to just express our alarm at petitioners’ disregard of the doctrine of res judicata.
We do not justly conclude this decision unless we perform one last unpleasant task, which is to demand from
petitioners’ counsel, Atty. Makilito B. Mahinay, an explanation of his role in this pernicious attempt to relitigate the
already settled issue regarding Matilde’s exclusive right in the four properties. He was not unaware of the other cases in
which the issue had been definitely settled considering that his clients were the heirs themselves of Marcelo and
Miguel.1âwphi1 Moreover, he had represented the Estate of Sotto in G.R. No. 158642 (The Estate of Don Filemon Y.
Sotto v. Palicte).

Under the circumstances, Atty. Mahinay appears to have engaged in the prejudicial practice of forum shopping as much
as any of his clients had been. If he was guilty, the Court would not tolerate it, and would sanction him. In this regard,
forum shopping, according to Ao-as v. Court of Appeals,21 may be committed as follows:

As the present jurisprudence now stands, forum shopping can he committed in three ways: (1) filing multiple cases
based on the same cause of action and with the same prayer, the previous case not having been resolved yet (litis
pendentia); (2) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and the same prayer, the previous case having
been finally resolved (res judicata); and (3) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action but with different
prayers (splitting of causes of action, where the ground for dismissal is also either litis pendentia or res judicata). If the
forum shopping is not considered willful and deliberate, the subsequent cases shall he dismissed without prejudice on
one of the two grounds mentioned above. However, if the forum shopping is willful and deliberate, both (or all, if there
are more than two) actions shall be dismissed with prejudice.

People of the Philippines vs. Joel Rebotazo y Alejandro

G.R. No. 192913
June 13, 2013

Facts:

The NBI based on a redible information, planned a buy-bust operation for the arrest of the appellant for selling
prohibited drugs.

Torremocha introduced him to appellant. After a brief conversation, Diaz told appellant that he was interested in buying
shabu and handed to him the P300 marked money. In exchange, appellant handed to Diaz a plastic sachet containing
white crystalline substance.

Upon completing the transaction, Diaz executed the pre-arranged signal by removing his cap. Dungog and Cimafranca
then rushed to Diaz and appellant’s location and effected the latter’s arrest. Appellant was subjected to a body search,
and, in the process, voluntarily informed the NBI agents that he had another sachet of shabu inside one of his socks.
Dungog recovered the said sachet, as well as some money from appellant’s wallet, including the marked money given by
Diaz. Dungong also marked the two (2) plastic, photographs were also taken of appellant with the seized items. After
being informed of his constitutional rights, appellant was brought to the NBI office.

At the NBI office, Dungog conducted an inventory of the seized items in the presence of appellant, media representative
Maricar Aranas, and a representative from the Department of Justice. The NBI Dumaguete Chief likewise prepared a
letter request for laboratory examination of the seized substance, which Dungog brought to the Philippine National
Police Crime Laboratory, Negros Oriental Provincial Office.

Police Inspector Josephine L. Llena received the request and examined the specimen, which tested positive for
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride.

Issue: Whether or not the buy-bust operation is valid

Held:

Appellant questions the NBI’s lack of coordination with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA). Allegedly, the
NBI failed to send a filled-out pre-coordination form by facsimile message, as required by R.A. 9165 and its
implementing rules and regulations.21 Because of this omission, appellant argues that the buy-bust operation should be
considered unauthorized, and his subsequent arrest illegal. The evidence supposedly obtained thereby must be declared
inadmissible.22 Hence, the cases of drug-pushing and possession of prohibited drugs must fall together.23
On the part of the prosecution, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) insists that there is nothing in the law that
requires the prosecution to present the marked money. The non-presentation does not create any hiatus in the
evidence, provided that the prosecution adequately proves the sale.24 Moreover, as against the straightforward and
consistent testimonies of its witnesses, the supposed inconsistencies cited by appellant refer only to minor and
insignificant details that do not destroy the prosecution’s case.25 On the lack of coordination with the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA), the OSG asserts that it does not violate appellant’s constitutional right against illegal
arrests, because there is nothing in R.A. 9165 that mandatorily requires coordination with the PDEA.26

Buy-bust operations are legally sanctioned procedures, provided they are undertaken with due regard for constitutional
and legal safeguards.

At the outset, buy-bust operations are legally sanctioned procedures for apprehending drug peddlers and distributors.
These operations are often utilized by law enforcers for the purpose of trapping and capturing lawbreakers in the
execution of their nefarious activities.27 A busy-bust operation is one form of entrapment employed by peace officers as
an effective way of apprehending a criminal in the act of committing an offense,28 and must be undertaken with due
regard for constitutional and legal safeguards.29

However, as we have observed in People v. Garcia,30 while this kind of operation has been proven to be an effective
way to flush out illegal transactions that are otherwise conducted covertly and in secrecy, it has a significant downside
that has not escaped the attention of the framers of the law. It is susceptible to police abuse, the most notorious of
which is its use as a tool for extortion. Thus, in People v. Tan, courts have been exhorted to be extra vigilant in trying
drug cases, lest an innocent person is made to suffer the unusually severe penalties for drug offenses.

Jurisprudence has consistently held that the procedural safeguards enunciated in Section 21 of R.A. 9165 must be strictly
observed, among which are provided as follows:

Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of
Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,

Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. – The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all
dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper
disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom
such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and
the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory
and be given a copy thereof;
(2) Within twenty-four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs,
controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment, the
same shall be submitted to the PDEA Forensic Laboratory for a qualitative and quantitative examination;

Saint Mary Crusade To Alleviate Poverty of Brethren Foundation vs. Hon. Teodoro Riel, acting Presiding Judge, RTC
Branch 85, Quezon City
G.R. No. 176508,
January 12, 2015

FACTS:
The petitioner claimed in its petition for reconstitution that the original copy of OCT No. 1609 had been burnt and lost in
the fire that gutted the Quezon City Register of Deeds in the late 80’s. Initially, respondent Judge gave due course to the
petition, but after the preliminary hearing, he dismissed the petition for reconstitution through the first assailed order of
September 12, 2006,2 to wit:
With the receipt of Report dated July 14, 2006 from Land Registration Authority (LRA) recommending that the petition
be dismissed, and considering the Opposition filed by the Republic of the Philippines and University of the Philippines,
the above-entitled petition is hereby ordered DISMISSED.
On October 11, 2006, the petitioner moved for reconsideration of the dismissal, attaching the following documents to
support its petition for reconstitution, namely: (1) the copy of the original application for registration dated January 27,
1955; (2) the notice of initial hearing dated June 23, 1955; (3) the letter of transmittal to the Court of First Instance in
Quezon City; (4) the copy of the Spanish Testimonial Title No. 3261054 dated March 25, 1977 in the name of Eladio
Tiburcio; (5) the copy of Tax Assessment No. 14238; and (6) the approved Plan SWD-37457.
On February 5, 2007, the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of any cogent or justifiable ground to
reconsider.4
Hence, on February 22, 2007, the petitioner came directly to the Court alleging that respondent Judge had "unfairly
abused his discretion and unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which is specifically enjoined upon him as a
duly [sic] under Rule 7, Section 8, of the Revised Rules of Court;" that "in finally dismissing the herein subject Petition for
Reconsideration, respondent Honorable Acting Presiding Judge has acted without and in excess of his authority and with
grave abuse of discretion to the further damage and prejudice of the herein petitioner;" and that it had no other remedy
in the course of law except through the present petition for certiorari and mandamus

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner availed the proper remedy.

HELD:
NO.

Certiorari, being an extraordinary remedy, is granted only under the conditions defined by the Rules of Court. The
conditions are that: (1) the respondent tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi judicial functions has acted
without or inexcess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction;
and (2) there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Without jurisdiction
means that the court acted with absolute lack of authority; there is excess of jurisdiction when the court transcends its
power or acts without any statutory authority; grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise
of judgment as to be equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction; in other words, power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and such exercise is so patent or so gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal either to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law.

The petition for certiorari and mandamus did not show how respondent Judge could have been guilty of lacking or
exceeding his jurisdiction, or could have gravely abused his discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Under
Section 1221 of Republic Act No. 26, the law on the judicial reconstitution of a Torrens title, the Regional Trial Court (as
the successor of the Court of First Instance) had the original and exclusive jurisdiction to act on the petition for judicial
reconstitution of title. Hence, the RTC neither lacked nor exceeded its authority in acting on and dismissing the petition.
Nor did respondent Judge gravely abuse his discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction considering that the
petition for reconstitution involved land already registered in the name of the UP, as confirmed by the LRA. Instead, it
would have been contrary to law had respondent Judge dealt with and granted the petition for judicial reconstitution of
title of the petitioner

With the questioned orders of the RTC having finally disposed of the application for judicial reconstitution, nothing more
was left for the RTC to do in the case. As of then, therefore, the correct recourse for the petitioner was to appeal to the
Court of Appeals by notice of appeal within 15 days from notice of the denial of its motion for reconsideration. By
allowing the period of appeal to elapse without taking action, it squandered its right to appeal. Its present resort to
certiorari is impermissible, for an extraordinary remedy like certiorari cannot be a substitute for a lost appeal. That the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari is not an alternative to an available remedy in the ordinary course of law is clear from
Section 1 of Rule 65, which requires that there must be no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. Indeed, no error of judgment by a court will be corrected by certiorari, which corrects only
jurisdictional errors

The filing of the instant special civil action directly in this Court is in disregard of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
Although the Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals in issuing the writ of certiorari, direct resort is
allowed only when there are special, extraordinary or compelling reasons that justify the same. The Court enforces the
observance of the hierarchy of courts in order to free itself from unnecessary, frivolous and impertinent cases and thus
afford time for it to deal with the more fundamental and more essential tasks that the Constitution has assigned to it.
There being no special, important or compelling reason, the petitioner thereby violated the observance of the hierarchy
of courts, warranting the dismissal of the petition for certiorari.

Ruben Manalang, et al. vs. Spouses Bienvenido and Mercedes Bacani

G.R. No. 156995,
January 12, 2015

FACTS:
Upon the relocation and verification survey of petitioners’ lot, the latter found out the respondents has encroached in
the former’s land. Respondent refused to vacate the encroached portion which prompted the petitioners to file an
action for unlawful detainer. The MTC dismissed the case which was later reversed by the RTC. The CA however
reinstated the MTC’s decision stating that the RTC violated the second paragraph of Section 18, Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC had authority to receive additional evidence on appeal in an ejectment cases.

HELD:

No. The appeal has no merit. To start with, the RTC, in an appeal of the judgment in an ejectment case, shall not conduct
a rehearing or trial de novo. In this connection, Section 18, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court clearly provides:

Sec. 18. Judgment conclusive only on possession; not conclusive in actions involving title or ownership. — x xx.

The judgment or final order shall be appealable to the appropriate Regional Trial Court which shall decide the same on
the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had x xx submitted by the parties or required by the Regional Trial
Court. Hence, the RTC violated the foregoing rule by ordering the conduct of the relocation and verification survey “in
aid of its appellate jurisdiction” and by hearing the testimony of the surveyor, for its doing so was tantamount to its
holding of a trial de novo. The violation was accented by the fact that the RTC ultimately decided the appeal based on
the survey and the surveyor’s testimony instead of the record of the proceedings had in the court of origin.

Neil B. Aguilar And Ruben Calimbas vs. Lightbringers Credit Cooperative

G.R. No. 209605,
January 12, 2015

FACTS:

A collection for sum of money was instituted against petitioners in which the MTC and the RTC ruled in favor of the
respondents. On appeal, the CA dismissed the case stating that the petition was formally defective because the
“verification and disclaimer of forum shopping” and the “affidavit of service” had a defective jurat for failure of the
notary public to indicate his notarial commission number and office address. Moreover, the entire records of the case,
inclusive of the oral and documents evidence, were not attached to the petition in contravention of Section 2, Rule 42 of
the Rules of Court.

ISSUE:

(1) Whether or not the CA correctly dismissed the petition on purely technical grounds;
(2) Whether or not a defendant who failed to attend the pre-trial conference may still participate in the case
notwithstanding the order of the trial court for plaintiff to present evidence ex-parte;

HELD:

(1) On the sole assignment of error, the Court agrees with the petitioners that Section 2, Rule 42 does not require that
the entire records of the case be attached to the petition for review. The provision states:
Sec. 2. Form and contents. – The petition shall be filed in seven (7) legible copies, with the original copy intended for the
court being indicated as such by the petitioner, and shall (a) state the full names of the parties to the case, without
impleading the lower courts or judges thereof either as petitioners or respondents; (b) indicate the specific material
dates showing that it was filed on time; (c) set forth concisely a statement of the matters involved, the issues raised, the
specification of errors of fact or law, or both, allegedly committed by the Regional Trial Court, and the reasons or
arguments relied upon for the allowance of the appeal; (d) be accompanied by clearly legible duplicate originals or true
copies of the judgments or final orders of both lower courts, certified correct by the clerk of court of the Regional Trial
Court, the requisite number of plain copies thereof and of the pleadings and other material portions of the record as
would support the allegations of the petition. [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]
The abovequoted provision enumerates the required documents that must be attached to a petition for review, to wit:
(1) clearly legible duplicate originals or true copies of the judgments or final orders of both lower courts, certified correct
by the clerk of court of the Regional Trial Court; (2) the requisite number of plain copies thereof; and (3) of the pleadings
and other material portions of the record as would support the allegations of the petition. Clearly, the Rules do not
require that the entire records of the case be attached to the petition for review. Only when these specified documents
are not attached in the petition will it suffer infirmities under Section 3, Rule 42, which states:
Sec. 3. Effect of failure to comply with requirements. – The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing
requirements regarding the payment of the docket and other lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof of service of the
petition, and the contents of and the documents which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for the
dismissal thereof.
In Canton v. City of Cebu, the Court discussed the importance of attaching the pleadings or material portions of the
records to the petition for review. “[P]etitioner’s discretion in choosing the documents to be attached to the petition is
however not unbridled. The CA has the duty to check the exercise of this discretion, to see to it that the submission of
supporting documents is not merely perfunctory. The practical aspect of this duty is to enable the CA to determine at
the earliest possible time the existence of prima facie merit in the petition.” In that case, the petition was denied
because the petitioner failed to attach the complaint, answer and appeal memorandum to support their allegation.
In Cusi-Hernandez v. Diaz, a case where the petitioner did not attach to her petition for review a copy of the contract to
sell that was at the center of controversy, the Court nonetheless found that there was a substantial compliance with the
rule, considering that the petitioner had appended to the petition for review a certified copy of the decision of the MTC
that contained a verbatim reproduction of the omitted contract.
Recently, in Galvez, v. CA, it was held that attaching the other records of the MTC and the RTC were not necessary
based on the circumstances of the case. The petitioner therein was not assailing the propriety of the findings of fact by
the MTC and the RTC, but only the conclusions reached by the said lower courts after their appreciation of the facts. In
dealing with the questions of law, the CA could simply refer to the attached decisions of the MTC and the RTC.
Thus, the question in the case at bench is whether or not the petitioners attached the sufficient pleadings and material
portions of the records in their petition for review. The Court rules that the petition was in substantial compliance with
the requirements.
The assignment of error⁠ in the petition for review clearly raises questions of fact as the petitioners assail the
appreciation of evidence by the MCTC and the RTC. Thus, aside from the decisions and orders of the MCTC and the RTC,
the petitioners should attach pertinent portions of the records such as the testimony of the sole witness of respondent,
the copies of the cash disbursement vouchers and the PNB checks presented by respondent in the MCTC. In the petition
for review, the petitioners attached respondent’s complaints before the MCTC which contained the photocopies of the
cash disbursement vouchers and PNB checks. These should be considered as ample compliance with Section 2, Rule 42
of the Rules of Court.
(2) Nevertheless, instead of remanding the case to the CA, this Court deems it fit to rule on the merits of the case to
once and for all settle the dispute of the parties.
The rule is that a court can only consider the evidence presented by respondent in the MCTC because the petitioners
failed to attend the pre-trial conference on August 25, 2009 pursuant to Section 5, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court.⁠ The
Court, however, clarifies that failure to attend the pre-trial does not result in the “default” of the defendant. Instead, the
failure of the defendant to attend shall be cause to allow the plaintiff to present his evidence ex parte and the court to
render judgment on the basis thereof.
The case of Philippine American Life & General Insurance Company v. Joseph Enario discussed the difference between
non-appearance of a defendant in a pre-trial conference and the declaration of a defendant in default in the present
Rules of Civil Procedure. The decision states:
Prior to the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, the phrase “as in default” was initially included in Rule 20 of the old
rules, and which read as follows:
Sec. 2. A party who fails to appear at a pre-trial conference may be non-suited or considered as in default.
It was however amended in the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Justice Regalado, in his book REMEDIAL LAW
COMPENDIUM, explained the rationale for the deletion of the phrase “as in default” in the amended provision, to wit:
1. This is a substantial reproduction of Section 2 of the former Rule 20 with the change that, instead of defendant being
declared “as in default” by reason of his non-appearance, this section now spells out that the procedure will be to allow
the ex parte presentation of plaintiff’s evidence and the rendition of judgment on the basis thereof. While actually the
procedure remains the same, the purpose is one of semantical propriety or terminological accuracy as there were
criticisms on the use of the word “default” in the former provision since that term is identified with the failure to file a
required answer, not appearance in court.
If the absent party is the plaintiff, then his case shall be dismissed. If it is the defendant who fails to appear, then the
plaintiff is allowed to present his evidence ex parte and the court shall render judgment on the basis thereof. Thus, the
plaintiff is given the privilege to present his evidence without objection from the defendant, the likelihood being that the
court will decide in favor of the plaintiff, the defendant having forfeited the opportunity to rebut or present his own
evidence.
The pre-trial cannot be taken for granted. It is not a mere technicality in court proceedings for it serves a vital objective:
the simplification, abbreviation and expedition of the trial, if not indeed its dispensation. More significantly, the pre-trial
has been institutionalized as the answer to the clarion call for the speedy disposition of cases. Hailed as the most
important procedural innovation in Anglo-Saxon justice in the nineteenth century, it paved the way for a less cluttered
trial and resolution of the case. It is, thus, mandatory for the trial court to conduct pre-trial in civil cases in order to
realize the paramount objective of simplifying, abbreviating and expediting trial.
In the case at bench, the petitioners failed to attend the pre-trial conference set on August 25, 2009. They did not even
give any excuse for their non-appearance, manifestly ignoring the importance of the pre-trial stage. Thus, the MCTC
properly issued the August 25, 2009 Order, allowing respondent to present evidence ex parte.
The MCTC even showed leniency when it directed the counsels of the parties to submit their respective position papers
on whether or not Aguilar and Calimbas could still participate in the trial of the case despite their absence in the pre-trial
conference. This gave Aguilar and Calimbas a second chance to explain their non-attendance and, yet, only respondent
complied with the directive to file a position paper. The MCTC, in its Order, dated April 27, 2011, properly held that since
the proceedings were being heard ex parte, Aguilar and Calimbas had no right to participate therein and to cross-
examine the witness.
Thus, as it stands, the Court can only consider the evidence on record offered by respondent. The petitioners lost their
right to present their evidence during the trial and, a fortiori, on appeal due to their disregard of the mandatory
attendance in the pre-trial conference.

__________________________________________

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs. HEIRS OF SATURNINO Q.
BORBON, AND COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 165354,
January 12, 2015

FACTS:

NAPOCOR entered a property located in Barangay San Isidro, Batangas City in order to construct and maintain
transmission lines. Respondents heirs of Saturnino Q. Borbon owned the property. NAPOCOR filed a complaint for
expropriation in the Regional Trial Court in Batangas City (RTC), seeking the acquisition of an easement of right of way
over a portion of the property.

The respondents staunchly maintained that NAPOCOR had not negotiated with them before entering the property and
that the entry was done without their consent; nonetheless, they tendered no objection to NAPOCOR’s entry provided it
would pay just compensation not only for the portion sought to be expropriated but for the entire property whose
potential was greatly diminished, if not totally lost, due to the project.

During the pendency of an appeal, NAPOCOR filed a Manifestation and Motion to Discontinue Expropriation
Proceedings, informing that the parties failed to reach an amicable agreement; that the property sought to be
expropriated was no longer necessary for public purpose because of the intervening retirement of the transmission lines
installed on the respondents’ property; that because the public purpose for which such property would be used thereby
ceased to exist, the proceedings for expropriation should no longer continue, and the State was now duty-bound to
return the property to its owners; and that the dismissal or discontinuance of the expropriation proceedings was in
accordance with Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the expropriation proceedings should be discontinued or dismissed pending appeal.

HELD:

Yes. The dismissal of the proceedings for expropriation at the instance of NAPOCOR is proper.
The fundamental basis then of all actions brought for the expropriation of lands, under the power of eminent domain, is
public use. That being true, the very moment that it appears at any stage of the proceedings that the expropriation is
not for a public use, the action must necessarily fail and should be dismissed, for the reason that the action cannot be
maintained at all except when the expropriation is for some public use. That must be true even during the pendency of
the appeal or at any other stage of the proceedings. If, for example, during the trial in the lower court, it should be made
to appear to the satisfaction of the court that the expropriation is not for some public use, it would be the duty and the
obligation of the trial court to dismiss the action. And even during the pendency of the appeal, if it should be made to
appear to the satisfaction of the appellate court that the expropriation is not for public use, then it would become the
duty and the obligation of the appellate court to dismiss it.
Verily, the retirement of the transmission lines necessarily stripped the expropriation proceedings of the element of
public use. To continue with the expropriation proceedings despite the definite cessation of the public purpose of the
project would result in the rendition of an invalid judgment in favor of the expropriator due to the absence of the
essential element of public use.
In view of the discontinuance of the proceedings and the eventual return of the property to the respondents, there is no
need to pay “just compensation” to them because their property would not be taken by NAPOCOR. Instead of full
market value of the property, therefore, NAPOCOR should compensate the respondents for the disturbance of their
property rights from the time of entry until the time of restoration of the possession by paying to them actual or other
compensatory damages.
This should mean that the compensation must be based on what they actually lost as a result and by reason of their
dispossession of the property and of its use, including the value of the fruit trees, plants and crops destroyed by
NAPOCOR’s construction of the transmission lines. Considering that the dismissal of the expropriation proceedings is a
development occurring during the appeal, the Court now treats the dismissal of the expropriation proceedings as
producing the effect of converting the case into an action for damages. For that purpose, the Court remands the case to
the court of origin for further proceedings. The court of origin shall treat the case as if originally filed as an action for
damages.

VIRGILIO C. BRIONES vs. COURT OF APPEALS and CASH ASIA CREDIT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 204444
January 14, 2015

FACTS:

The instant case arose from a Complaint dated August 2, 2010 filed by Virgilio C. Briones (Briones) for Nullity of
Mortgage Contract, Promissory Note, Loan Agreement, Foreclosure of Mortgage, Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No.290846, and Damages against Cash Asia before the RTC. For its part, Cash Asia filed a Motion to Dismiss
dated August 25, 2010, praying for the outright dismissal of Briones’s complaint on the ground of improper venue. In
this regard, Cash Asia pointed out the venue stipulation in the subject contracts stating that “all legal actions arising out
of this notice in connection with the Real Estate Mortgage subject hereof shall only be brought in or submitted to the
jurisdiction of the proper court of Makati City.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion in ordering the outright dismissal of Briones’s complaint on the
ground of improper venue.

HELD:

Yes. The general rule is that the venue of real actions is the court which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the real
property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated; while the venue of personal actions is the court which has
jurisdiction where the plaintiff or the defendant resides, at the election of the plaintiff. As an exception, jurisprudence in
Legaspi v. Rep. of the Phils. instructs that the parties, thru a written instrument, may either introduce another venue
where actions arising from such instrument may be filed, or restrict the filing of said actions in a certain exclusive venue,
viz.:
The parties, however, are not precluded from agreeing in writing on an exclusive venue, as qualified by Section 4 of the
same rule. Written stipulations as to venue may be restrictive in the sense that the suit may be filed only in the place
agreed upon, or merely permissive in that the parties may file their suit not only in the place agreed upon but also in the
places fixed by law. As in any other agreement, what is essential is the ascertainment of the intention of the parties
respecting the matter.
As regards restrictive stipulations on venue, jurisprudence instructs that it must be shown that such stipulation is
exclusive. In the absence of qualifying or restrictive words, such as "exclusively," "waiving for this purpose any other
venue," "shall only" preceding the designation of venue, "to the exclusion of the other courts," or words of similar
import, the stipulation should be deemed as merely an agreement on an additional forum, not as limiting venue to the
specified place.34 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In this relation, case law likewise provides that in cases where the complaint assails only the terms, conditions, and/or
coverage of a written instrument and not its validity, the exclusive venue stipulation contained therein shall still be
binding on the parties, and thus, the complaint may be properly dismissed on the ground of improper venue.35
Conversely, therefore, a complaint directly assailing the validity of the written instrument itself should not be bound by
the exclusive venue stipulation contained therein and should be filed in accordance with the general rules on venue. To
be sure, it would be inherently consistent for a complaint of this nature to recognize the exclusive venue stipulation
when it, in fact, precisely assails the validity of the instrument in which such stipulation is contained.
In this case, the venue stipulation found in the subject contracts is indeed restrictive in nature, considering that it
effectively limits the venue of the actions arising therefrom to the courts of Makati City. However, it must be
emphasized that Briones' s complaint directly assails the validity of the subject contracts, claiming forgery in their
execution. Given this circumstance, Briones cannot be expected to comply with the aforesaid venue stipulation, as his
compliance therewith would mean an implicit recognition of their validity. Hence, pursuant to the general rules on
venue, Briones properly filed his complaint before a court in the City of Manila where the subject property is located.
SENATOR JINGGOY EJERCITO ESTRADA, vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, FIELD INVESTIGATION OFFICE, Office of the
Ombudsman, NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION and ATTY. LEVITO D. BALIGOD
G.R. Nos. 212140-41,
January 21, 2015

FACTS:

On 25 November 2013, the Ombudsman served upon Sen. Estrada a copy of the complaint in OMB-C-C-13-0313, filed by
the NBI and Atty. Baligod, which prayed, among others, that criminal proceedings for Plunder as defined in RA No. 7080
be conducted against Sen. Estrada. Sen. Estrada filed his counter-affidavit in OMB-C-C-13-0313 on 9 January 2014.

Sen. Estrada’s made a request, such request was made "[p]ursuant to the right of a respondent ‘to examine the
evidence submitted by the complainant which he may not have been furnished’ (Section 3[b], Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court) and to ‘have access to the evidence on record’ (Section 4[c], Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman). However such request was denied.

ISSUE:

Whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in denying Estrada’s request resulting in violation of his
constitutional right to due process.

HELD:

NO. Considering the facts narrated above, the Ombudsman’s denial in its 27 March 2014 Order of Sen. Estrada’s
Request did not constitute grave abuse of discretion. Indeed, the denial did not violate Sen. Estrada’s constitutional
right to due process.

There is no law or rule which requires the Ombudsman to furnish a respondent with copies of the counter-
affidavits of his co-respondents. Sen. Estrada, however, fails to specify a law or rule which states that it is a
compulsory requirement of due process in a preliminary investigation that the Ombudsman furnish a respondent
with the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents.

The Ombudsman, in furnishing Sen. Estrada a copy of the complaint and its supporting affidavits and documents, fully
complied with Sections 3and 4 of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, and Section4, Rule II of the
Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, Administrative Order No. 7. Both the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure and the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman require the investigating officer to furnish
the respondent with copies of the affidavits of the complainant and affidavits of his supporting witnesses. Neither of
these Rules require the investigating officer to furnish the respondent with copies of the affidavits of his co-respondents.
The right of the respondent is only“ to examine the evidence submitted by the complainant,” as expressly stated in
Section 3(b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. This Court has unequivocally ruled in Paderanga that
“Section 3, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure expressly provides that the respondent shall only
have the right to submit a counter-affidavit, to examine all other evidence submitted by the complainant and,
where the fiscal sets a hearing to propound clarificatory questions to the parties or their witnesses, to be afforded an
opportunity to be present but without the right to examine or cross-examine.” Moreover, Section 4 (a, b and c) of Rule II
of the Ombudsman’s Rule of Procedure, read together, only require the investigating officer to furnish the
respondent with copies of the affidavits of the complainant and his supporting witnesses. There is no law or rule
requiring the investigating officer to furnish the respondent.

Reicon Realty Builders Corporation vs. Diamond Dragon Realty and Management
G.R. No. 204796,
February 4, 2015

FACTS:

Diamond filed a complaint for breach of contract with damages against the defendants. Aggrieved, Reicon elevated the
matter to the CA via petition for certiorari taken under ascribing grave abuse of discretion Judge Quinagoran of the RTC
in not dismissing Diamond’s complaint. CA required Reicon to show cause as to why its petition for certiorari should not
be dismissed for its failure to acquire jurisdiction over the person of Diamond, as private respondent. It appears that the
CA’s earlier Resolution addressed to Diamond, with address at “Suite 305, AIC Burgundy Empire Tower, ADB Ave., cor.
Garnet 50 Road, Ortigas Center 1605 Pasig City” was returned to it, with the notation “RTS-Moved Out.” In its
Compliance, Reicon stated that the address “Suite 305, AIC Burgundy Empire Tower, ADB Avenue corner Garnet Road,
Ortigas Center, Pasig City” was Diamond’s address on record, the civil case from which the certiorari petition originated.

ISSUE:

WON the CA erred in dismissing Reicon’s petition outright for non-compliance with the rules on service.

HELD:

Yes. The CA erred when it dismissed Reicon's certiorari petition outright for non-compliance with Section 3, Rule 46 of
the Rules as well as the rule on service upon a party through counsel under Section 2, Rule 13 of the Rules. The service
of said pleading upon the person of the respondent, and not upon his counsel, is what the rule properly requires, as in
this case.

SEC. 4. Jurisdiction over the person of respondent, how acquired. - The court shall acquire jurisdiction over the person of
the respondent by the service on him of its order or resolution indicating its initial action on the petition or by his
voluntary submission to such jurisdiction.

A punctilious review of the records, particularly of the certiorari petition filed by Reicon before the CA, shows that it
contains the registry numbers corresponding to the registry receipts as well as the affidavit of service and/or filing of the
person who filed and served the petition via registered mail on behalf of Reicon. These imply that a copy of Reicon' s
certiorari petition had been served to the R TC as well as to Diamond through its address at "Suite 305 AIC Burgundy
Empire Tower, ADB Avenue comer Gamet Road, Ortigas Center, Pasig City," in compliance with Section 13,65 Rule 13 of
the Rules on proof of service as well as with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 46 above-quoted.

On this score, the Court notes that Diamond declared the aforesaid address as its business address in its complaint
before the RTC, and that there is dearth of evidence to show that it had since changed its address or had moved out.
Hence, Reicon cannot be faulted for adopting the said address in serving a copy of its certiorari petition to Diamond in
light of the requirement under Sections 3 and 4, Rule 46 of the Rules as above-cited, which merely entails service of the
petition upon the respondent itself, not upon his counsel.

The underlying rationale behind this rule is that a certiorari proceeding is, by nature, an original and independent action,
and, therefore not considered as part of the trial that had resulted in the rendition of the judgment or order complained
of. Hence, at the preliminary point of serving the certiorari petition, as in other initiatory pleadings, it cannot be said
that an appearance for respondent has been made by his counsel. Consequently, the requirement under Section 2,69
Rule 13 of the Rules, which provides that if any party has appeared by counsel, service upon him shall be made upon his
counsel, should not apply.

Thus, the CA erred when it dismissed Reicon's certiorari petition outright for non-compliance with Section 3, Rule 46 of
the Rules as well as the rule on service upon a party through counsel under Section 2, Rule 13 of the Rules. The service
of said pleading upon the person of the respondent, and not upon his counsel, is what the rule properly requires, as in
this case.

SPOUSES ROLANDO AND HERMINIA SALVADOR vs. SPOUSES ROGELIO AND ELIZABETH RABAJA AND ROSARIO
G.R. No. 199990,
February 4, 2015

FACTS:

Spouses Salvador through its agent, Gonzales, entered into a contract of sale of their property in favor of Spouses
Rabaja, with payments being made by Spouses Rabaja to Gonzales, but the latter did not give the payments to Spouses
Salvador. This prompted Spouses Salvador to file an ejectment suit with claims for unpaid lease, against Spouses Rabaja,
which was granted by the Court. Spouses Rabaja then filed for the rescission of the contract of sale, and demanded for
the return of the amount paid by them to Gonzales, but Spouses Salvador failed to attend, prompting the petitioners to
be heard ex parte.

ISSUE:

WON the rescission suit may disturb the judgment on the ejectment suit.

HELD:
NO. The garnishment against Spouses Rabaja was an entirely different case, and it does not concern the rescission case
which is on appeal before this Court

The CA ruled that Spouses Salvador misled the Court when they improperly cited CA-G.R. SP No. 89260 to prove their
entitlement to the said amount. Both courts erred in their ruling. First, the garnishment of the amount of P593,400.00
against Spouses Rabaja was pursuant to the CA decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 89259, an entirely different case involving an
action for ejectment, and it does not concern the rescission case which is on appeal before this Court. Moreover, the
decision on the ejectment case is final and executory and an entry of judgment has already been made. Nothing is more
settled in law than that when a final judgment is executory, it thereby becomes immutable and unalterable. The
judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be
an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court
which rendered it or by the highest Court of the land. The doctrine is founded on consideration of public policy and
sound practice that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments must become final at some definite point in time.

The March 31, 2006 CA decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 89259 has long been final and executory and cannot any more be
disturbed by the Court. Public policy dictates that once a judgment becomes final, executory and unappealable, the
prevailing party should not be denied the fruits of his victory by some subterfuge devised by the losing party. Unjustified
delay in the enforcement of a judgment sets at naught the role and purpose of the courts to resolve justiciable
controversies with finality.

HERMINIO M. DE GUZMAN, vs. TABANGAO REALTY INCORPORATED,

G.R. No. 154262,
February 11, 2015

FACTS:

Petitioners applied for, and were granted, authority to distribute oil and lubricating products manufactured and
marketed by Filipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (FSPC). In the course of their business, petitioners purchased on
credit oil and lubricating products from FSPC, but they eventually failed to pay for their credit purchases from FSPC.
Thus, FSPC filed a complaint for sum of money against them. The court ordered petitioners to pay FSPC, who levied upon
a parcel of land owned by petitioners, which was subsequently auctioned off and bought by herein respondent.
Petitioners were unable to repurchase the property; hence, the purchase became final.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners may still exercise their right to repurchase the property.

HELD:
No. Rule 39, Section 33 of the 1997 Rules of Court, as amended, provides that if no redemption be made within one (1)
year from the date of the registration of the certificate of sale, the purchaser is entitled to a conveyance and possession
of the property; or, if so redeemed whenever sixty (60) days have elapsed and no other redemption has expired, the last
redemptioner is entitled to the conveyance and possession; but in all cases the judgment obligor shall have the entire
period of one (1) year from the date of the registration of the sale to redeem the property. Upon the expiration of the
right of redemption, the purchaser or redemptioner shall be substituted to and acquire all the rights, title, interest and
claim of the judgment obligor to the property as of the time of the levy. Respondent was already substituted to and
acquired all the rights, title, interest, and claim of the Spouses De Guzman to the subject property on April 13, 1989,
when the one-year redemption period expired.

ROBERT and NENITA DE LEON, vs. GILBERT and ANALYN DELA LLANA,
G.R. No. 212277 ,
February 11, 2015

FACTS:

Petitioners leased the property of respondents, the lease contract had a term of five years and contained a stipulation
that any case arising from the same shall be filed in the courts of Davao City only. Gilbert claimed that Robert and Gil
failed to pay their rental arrears to him and refused to vacate the subject property, despite repeated demands, thus, the
first ejectment complaint. MCTC-Nabunturan-Mawab dismissed the first ejectment complaint, holding that the undated
lease contract was a relatively simulated contract and, as such, non-binding but granting arguendo that the lease
contract is not simulated, the dismissal of Gilbert’s complaint was still in order on the ground of improper venue given
that the parties expressly agreed that any dispute arising from the same shall be brought before the courts of Davao City
only, to the exclusion of other courts, which does not obtain in this case. Prompting respondents to file a second
ejectment case against petitioners, this time with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Davao City, Branch 2.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the second ejectment complaint was barred by prior judgment.

HELD:

Yes. The Court rules that res judicata, in the concept of bar by prior judgment, applies in this case. There is a bar by prior
judgment where there is identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action between the first case where the
judgment was rendered and the second case that is sought to be barred. As the records would show, the MCTC-
Nabunturan-Mawab, dismissed the first ejectment complaint filed by Gilbert against Robert and Gil for the reason that
the undated lease contract entered into by Gilbert and Robert was relatively simulated and, hence, supposedly non-
binding on the parties. To explicate, this pronouncement was made in reference to the cause of action raised in the first
ejectment complaint – that is, the alleged breach of the same lease contract due to non-payment of rent. Therefore, to
find that the said contract was simulated and thereby non-binding negates the cause of action raised in the said
complaint, hence, resulting in its dismissal.

DIANA YAP-CO vs. SPOUSES WILLIAM T. UY and ESTER GO-UY

G.R. No. 209295,
February 11, 2015

FACTS:

Respondents purchased a property at a public auction, and after the lapse of the allowable period for redemption,
respondents were issued a Final Deed of Sale, which they registered with the Registry of Deeds of Manila on June 17,
2009. Respondents, however, were unable to secure their new title after being informed that one had already been
issued in favor of herein petitioner Diana Yap-Co (petitioner) who supposedly acquired the property through an
execution sale. CA granted respondents’ petition and annulled the RTC’s dismissal. It further directed that the testimony
of Ester Go-Uy be reinstated into the records and a full-blown trial of the case be conducted due to the failure of
respondents’ counsel to attend the court hearings scheduled on March 1 and 22, 2012, as well as to notify his clients of
said hearing dates to enable them to travel all the way from Aurora, Isabela to Manila in order to attend the same,
should not bind respondents because they appear to have legitimate grievances in the action for annulment of title filed
with the RTC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in favoring UY on considerations of equity, notwithstanding the rule on failure to
prosecute a case diligently under Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court.

HELD:

No. Petitioner failed to show that the CA committed reversible error in setting aside the dismissal of Civil Case No. 09-
122374 and directing the RTC to conduct a full-blown trial of the case. Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court provides
that "[i]f plaintiff fails to appear at the time of the trial, or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or
to comply with these rules or any order of the court, the action may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon
the court’s own motion. This dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise
provided by the court." However, the application of the foregoing rule is not, to the Court’s mind, warranted in this case
since, as correctly found by the CA, respondents’ counsel acted negligently in failing to attend the scheduled hearing
dates and even notify respondents of the same so as to enable them to travel all the way from Aurora, Isabela to Manila
and attend said hearings. Verily, relief is accorded to the client who suffered by reason of the lawyer’s palpable mistake
or negligence and where the interest of justice so requires.33 Concurring with the CA, the Court finds that respondents
would be deprived of the opportunity to prove the legitimacy of their claims if the RTC’s dismissal of the case – on a
procedural technicality at that, which was clearly caused by the palpable negligence of their counsel – is sustained.
Considering that respondents appear to have legal and factual bases for their grievance, it would better serve the higher
interest of substantial justice to allow the parties’ conflicting claims to be resolved on the merits.

ATTY. SEGUNDO B. BONSUBRE, JR., vs. ERWIN YERRO, ERICO YERRO and RITCHIE YERRO
G.R. No. 205952,
February 11, 2015

FACTS:

This case stemmed from a criminal complaint for estafa filed by petitioner against respondents Erwin Yerro, EricoYerro,
and Ritchie Yerro. Although a Compromise Agreement was reached between petitioner and respondents relative to the
civil aspect of the case, the prosecution failed to furnish the RTC a copy of the same and file the necessary motion as
manifested. As a result, the RTC, in an Order dated September 18, 2001, dismissed the case for failure of the prosecution
to comply with the court’s directive, as well as to take any further step to prosecute the case, in view of the accused’s
constitutional right to speedy trial. On June 15, 2004, or more than 2 years from the issuance of the September 18, 2001
Dismissal Order, petitioner, through a new collaborating counsel, Atty. Bernarditto M. Malabago (Atty. Malabago), filed
a motion for reconsideration, claiming that he learned of the September 18, 2001 Dismissal Order only on June 7, 2004,
and that he believed in good faith that the case was merely archived in accordance with the terms of the Compromise
Agreement.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner was denied of due process.

HELD:

NO. A dismissal grounded on the denial of the right of the accused to speedy trial has the effect of acquittal that would
bar the further prosecution of the accused for the same offense. Perforce, the September 18, 2001 Dismissal Order
grounded on the denial of respondents’ right to speedy trial is a final order that is not appealable and is immediately
executory. While the remedy of certiorari may be availed of in order to challenge the judgment or order of acquittal,
petitioner must prove that the trial court, in acquitting the accused, committed not merely errors of judgment, but grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In this case, no such grave abuse of discretion can be
attributed to the RTC in dismissing the case for denial of the respondents’ right to speedy trial. Aside from the lapse of
two (2) years and nine (9) months from the time the case was dismissed to the time petitioner sought for a
reconsideration of the same, it is also not disputed that it was petitioner who caused the inordinate delay.
Pilipinas Sheli Petroleum Corporation and Petron Corporation vs. Rorams Internation Gases.
G.R. 189669
February 16, 2015

FACTS:

Upon information that Romars International Gases Corporation (respondent) was selling, offering for sale, or distributing
liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) by illegally refilling the steel cylinders manufactured by and bearing the duly registered
trademark and device of respondent Petron, and after the paralegal investigation team hired by petitioners Pilipinas
Shell Petroleum Corporation and Petron Corporation confirmed the existence of the same at their premises in Baao,
Camarines Sur, the petitioner requested the National Bureau of Investigation to investigate the activities of respondent
for the purpose of apprehending and prosecuting establishments conducting illegal refilling, distribution and/or sale of
LPG products using the same containers of Petron and Shell, which acts constitute a violation of Section 168, in relation
to Section 170 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8293, otherwise known as the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines,
and/or Section 2 of R.A. No. 623, otherwise known as An Act To Regulate the Use of Duly Stamped or Marked Bottles,
Boxes, Casks, Kegs, Barrels and Other Similar Containers. Upon investigation, the NBI also discovered that the trucks
coming to and from the respondent’s premises also delivered its merchandise to “Edrich Enterprises” located at 272
National Highway, San Nicolas, Iriga City. Thereat, they were able to buy from the store and were issued official
receipts. Based on the foregoing, the NBI, in behalf of petitioners, filed separate applications for search warrants for
violation of Section 155.1 in relation to Section 170 of Republic Act 8293 against the respondent and the occupants of
the premises before the Regional Trial court of Naga City. On October 23, 2002, the latter court issued Search Warrants
2002-27 and 2002-28, which were implemented by the NBI on the same day, resulting in the seizure of items described
in the search warrants.

Respondent then filed a Motion to Quash Search Warrant Nos 2202-27 and 2002-28, averring as grounds (a) there was
no probable cause; (b) there had been a lapse of four weeks from the date of the test-buy to the date of the search and
seizure operations; (c) most of the cylinders seized were not owned by respondent but by a third person; and (d) Edrich
Enterprises is an authorized outlet of Gasul and Marsflame. Initially, the RTC denied the motion to quash, but
respondent’s new counsel filed an Entry of Appearance with Motion for Reconsideration, this time raising for the first
time the issue of the RTC-Naga City’s lack of jurisdiction since the alleged crime was committed in a place within the
territorial jurisdiction of RTC-Iriga City, and the NBI and petitioners did not state any compelling reason to justify the
filing of the same in a court which had no territorial jurisdiction over the crime in accordance with Section 2, Rule 126 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. This time, the RTC granted the motion for reconsideration and quashed the
search warrants. On petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, the latter affirmed the RTC order. Hence, the
petitioner elevated the case to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

1WON the venue of an application for search warrant is jurisdictional;

2. WON the Court of Appeal erred in not applying the omnibus motion rule when it affirmed the RTC order granting the
motion for reconsideration based on an issue raised therein for the first time.
HELD:

1. NO. The venue of an application for search warrant is not jurisdictional.

As held by the court an application for a search warrant is not a criminal action. The foregoing explanation shows why
the CA arrived at the wrong conclusion. It gravely erred in equating the proceedings for applications for search warrants
with criminal actions themselves. As elucidated by the Court, proceedings for said applications are not criminal in nature
and, thus, the rule that venue is jurisdictional does not apply thereto. Evidently, the issue of whether the application
should have been filed in RTC-Iriga City or RTC-Naga, is not one involving jurisdiction because, as stated in the afore-
quoted case, the power to issue a special criminal process is inherent in all courts.
2. YES. The Court of Appeals erred in not applying the omnibus motion rule.
The more pressing question that would determine the outcome of the case is, did the RTC-Naga act properly in taking
into consideration the issue of said defect in resolving respondent's motion for reconsideration where the issue was
raised for the very first time? The record bears out that, indeed, respondent failed to include said issue at the first
instance in its motion to quash. Does the omnibus motion rule cover a motion to quash search warrants?

The omnibus motion rule embodied in Section 8, Rule 15, in relation to Section 1, Rule 9, demands that all available
objections be included in a party's motion, otherwise, said objections shall be deemed waived; and, the only grounds the
court could take cognizance of, even if not pleaded in said motion are: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b)
existence of another action pending between the same parties for the same cause; and (c) bar by prior judgment or by
statute of limitations. It should be stressed here that the Court has ruled in a number of cases that the omnibus motion
rule is applicable to motions to quash search warrants. Furthermore, the Court distinctly stated in Abuan v. People, that
"the motion to quash the search warrant which the accused may file shall be governed by the omnibus motion rule,
provided, however, that objections not available, existent or known during the proceedings for the quashal of the
warrant may be raised in the hearing of the motion to suppress .

In accordance with the omnibus motion rule, therefore, the trial court could only take cognizance of an issue that was
not raised in the motion to quash if, (1) said issue was not available or existent when they filed the motion to quash the
search warrant; or (2) the issue was one involving jurisdiction over the subject matter. Obviously, the issue of the defect
in the application was available and existent at the time of filing of the motion to quash.

Department of Environment and Natural Resources vs. United Planners Consultants

G.R. No. 212081,
February 23, 2015

FACTS:

For failure to pay its obligation under the Consultancy Agreement despite repeated demands, respondent instituted a
Complaint against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court. Upon motion of respondent, the case was subsequently
referred to arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clause of the Consultancy Agreement. The Arbitral Tribunal rendered
its Award dated May 7, 2010 (Arbitral Award) in favor of respondent.

Petitioner moved to quash the writ of execution, positing that respondent was not entitled to its monetary claims. It also
claimed that the issuance of said writ was premature since the RTC should have first resolved its May 19, 2010 Motion
for Reconsideration and June 1, 2010 Manifestation and Motion, and not merely noted them, thereby violating its right
to due process.

The RTC denied petitioner’s motion to quash, it found no merit in petitioner’s contention that it was denied due process,
ruling that its May 19, 2010 Motion for Reconsideration was a prohibited pleading under Section 17.2,42 Rule 17 of the
CIAC Rules. It explained that the available remedy to assail an arbitral award was to file a motion for correction of final
award pursuant to Section 17.143 of the CIAC Rules, and not a motion for reconsideration of the said award itself.44 On
the other hand, the RTC found petitioner’s June 1, 2010 Manifestation and Motion seeking the resolution of its May 19,
2010 Motion for Reconsideration to be defective for petitioner’s failure to observe the three-day notice rule.45 Having
then failed to avail of the remedies attendant to an order of confirmation, the Arbitral Award had become final and
executor.

Court of Appeals dismissed the certiorari petition on two (2) grounds, namely: the petition essentially assailed the merits
of the Arbitral Award which is prohibited under Rule 19.7 of the Special ADR Rules; and the petition was filed out of
time, having been filed way beyond 15 days from notice of the RTC’s July 9, 2012 Order, in violation of Rule 19.28 in
relation to Rule 19.8 of said Rules which provide that a special civil action for certiorari must be filed before the CA
within 15 days from notice of the judgment, order, or resolution sought to be annulled or set aside.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in applying the provisions of the Special ADR Rules, resulting in the dismissal of petitioner’s
special civil action for certiorari.

HELD:

No. The CA is correct on dismissing the petition based on applying the provisions of the Special ADR rules. During the
confirmation proceedings, petitioners did not oppose the RTC’s confirmation by filing a petition to vacate the Arbitral
Award under Rule 11.2 (D)71 of the Special ADR Rules. Neither did it seek reconsideration of the confirmation order in
accordance with Rule 19.1 (h) thereof. Instead, petitioner filed only on September 10, 2012 a special civil action for
certiorari before the CA questioning the propriety of (a) the RTC Order dated September 12, 2011 granting respondent’s
motion for issuance of a writ of execution, and (b) Order dated July 9,2012 denying its motion to quash. Under Rule
19.26 of the Special ADR Rules, "[w]hen the Regional Trial Court, in making a ruling under the Special ADR Rules, has
acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
and there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a party may file a
special civil action for certiorari to annul or set aside a ruling of the Regional Trial Court."
Note that the special civil action for certiorari described in Rule 19.26 above may be filed to annul or set aside the
following orders of the Regional Trial Court.

a. Holding that the arbitration agreement is in existent, invalid or unenforceable;

b. Reversing the arbitral tribunal’s preliminary determination upholding its jurisdiction;
c. Denying the request to refer the dispute to arbitration;
d. Granting or refusing an interim relief;
e. Denying a petition for the appointment of an arbitrator;
f. Confirming, vacating or correcting a domestic arbitral award;
g. Suspending the proceedings to set aside an international commercial arbitral award and referring the case back to the
arbitral tribunal;
h. Allowing a party to enforce an international commercial arbitral award pending appeal;
i. Adjourning or deferring a ruling on whether to set aside, recognize and or enforce an international commercial arbitral
award;
j. Allowing a party to enforce a foreign arbitral award pending appeal; and
k. Denying a petition for assistance in taking evidence.
Thus, for failing to avail of the foregoing remedies before resorting to certiorari, the CA correctly dismissed its petition.

People of the Philippines and AAA vs. Court of Appeals 21st Division, Mindanao Station, et al.
G.R. 183652,
February 25, 2015

FACTS:

Regional Trial Court found some of the accused guilty and acquitted the others for the crime of rape. Aggrieved, the
accused (herein Private respondents) that were found guilty, brought the case to the Court of Appeal. On appeal the
Court of appeals reversed the decision of the trial court finding the accused guilt consequently acquitting the accused.
Thus the AAA the victim filed a certiorari under Rule 65, question the reversal of the decision of trial court.

ISSUE:

WON a judgement of acquittal is immediately final and executor and the prosecution cannot appeal the acquittal
because of the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.

HELD:

YES. As a general rule, the prosecution cannot appeal or bring error proceedings from a judgment rendered in favor of
the defendant in a criminal case. The reason is that a judgment of acquittal is immediately final and executory, and the
prosecution is barred from appealing lest the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy be violated.
Section 21, Article III of the Constitution provides:

Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law
and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.
Despite acquittal, however, either the offended party or the accused may appeal, but only with respect to the civil
aspect of the decision. Or, said judgment of acquittal may be assailed through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court showing that the lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed not merely reversible errors of
judgment, but also exercised grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, or a denial of due
process, thereby rendering the assailed judgment null and void. If there is grave abuse of discretion, granting
petitioner’s prayer is not tantamount to putting private respondents in double jeopardy.

YUK LING ONG vs. BENJAMIN T. CO

G.R. No. 206653,
February 25, 2015

FACTS:

Respondent indicated that petitioner’s address was 23 Sta. Rosa Street, Unit B-2 Manresa Garden Homes, Quezon City.
RTC issued summons. In his Server’s Return, process server Rodolfo Torres, Jr. stated that substituted service of
summons with the copy of the petition was effected after several futile attempts to serve the same personally on
petitioner. The said documents were received by Mr.Roly Espinosa, a security officer. Also petitioner alleged that
respondent committed extrinsic fraud because, as seen in Civil Case No. CV-01-0177, he deliberately indicated a wrong
address to prevent her from participating in the trial;

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Trial Court validly acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner.

HELD:

NO. The server’s return utterly lacks sufficient detail of the attempts undertaken by the process server to personally
serve the summons on petitioner. The server simply made a general statement that summons was effected after several
futile attempts to serve the same personally. The server did not state the specific number of attempts made to perform
the personal service of summons; the dates and the corresponding time the attempts were made; and the underlying
reason for each unsuccessful service. He did not explain either if there were inquiries made to locate the petitioner, who
was the defendant in the case. These important acts to serve the summons on petitioner, though futile, must be
specified in the return to justify substituted service.

The server’s return did not describe in detail the person who received the summons, on behalf of petitioner. It simply
stated that the summons was received "by Mr. Roly Espinosa of sufficient age and discretion, the Security Officer
thereat." It did not expound on the competence of the security officer to receive the summons.
Also, aside from the server’s return, respondent failed to indicate any portion of the records which would describe the
specific attempts to personally serve the summons. Respondent did not even claim that petitioner made any voluntary
appearance and actively participated in Civil Case No. 02-0306.

The case of Robinson v. Miralles, cited by the CA, is not applicable. In that case, the return described in thorough detail
how the security guard refused the sheriff’s entry despite several attempts. The defendant in the said case specifically
instructed the guard to prevent anybody to proceed to her residence. In the present case, the attempts made by the
process server were stated in a broad and ambiguous statement.

The CA likewise erred in ruling that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty could be applied in
the case at bench. This p resumption of regularity, however, was never intended to be applied even in cases where there
are no showing of substantial compliance with the requirements of the rules of procedure. Such presumption does not
apply where it is patent that the sheriff's or server's return is defective. As earlier explained, the server's return did not
comply with the stringent requirements of substituted service of summons.

Given that the meticulous requirements in Manotoc were not met, the Court is not inclined to uphold the CA's denial of
the petition for annulment of judgment for lack of jurisdiction over the person of petitioner because there was an invalid
substituted service of summons. Accordingly, the decision in Civil Case No. 02-0306 must be declared null and void.

DAVID M. DAVID vs. FEDERICO M. PARAGAS, JR.

G.R. No. 176973,
February 25, 2015

FACTS:

David, Paragas and Lobrin agreed to venture into a business in Hong Kong (HK). They created Olympia International, Ltd.
(Olympia) under HK laws.

Conflict arose regarding their monetary transactions. Subsequently there was a compromise agreement between David
and Olympia. The RTC approved the compromise agreement between the parties

The CA reversed the RTC’s approval of the compromise agreement. It explained that the agreement entered into by
David, Lobrin and Datoy was invalid for two reasons: First, the agreement was between David and Olympia, which was
not a party in the case.

ISSUE:

Whether a compromise agreement can be the basis of dismissal or withdrawal of a complaint and counterclaims if it
was entered into with a non-party to the suit.
HELD:

No. A compromise agreement is a contract whereby the parties make reciprocal concessions in order to resolve their
differences and, thus, avoid or put an end to a lawsuit. They adjust their difficulties in the manner they have agreed
upon, disregarding the possible gain in litigation and keeping in mind that such gain is balanced by the danger of losing.
It must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs and public policy, and must have been freely and intelligently
executed by and between the parties. A compromise agreement may be executed in and out of court. Once a
compromise agreement is given judicial approval, however, it becomes more than a contract binding upon the parties.
Having been sanctioned by the court, it is entered as a determination of a controversy and has the force and effect of a
judgment.

Verily, a judicially approved compromise agreement, in order to be binding upon the litigants with the force and effect
of a judgment, must have been executed by them. In this case, the compromise agreement was signed by David in his
capacity as the complainant in the civil case, and Olympia, through Lobrin as its agent. The agreement made plain that
the terms and conditions the “parties” were to follow were agreed upon by David and Olympia. Datoy and Paragas
never appeared to have agreed to such terms for it was Olympia, despite not being a party to the civil case, which was a
party to the agreement. Despite this, David claims that the concessions were made by Olympia on behalf of the non-
signatory parties and such should be binding on them.

It is very clear from the order of July 21, 2003 that the agreement being referred to as having been approved is not the
Compromise Agreement but the agreement of the parties to dismiss the claims and counterclaims against each other.
This is obvious when the order stated that it is within the right of the parties to amicably settle the issues even if subject
Compromise Agreement had not been entered into. Clearly, it was not the Compromise Agreement that was approved,
because precisely it involved Olympia, but the underlying agreement between the parties to withdraw their claims
against each other which are personal to them in nature. As noted by the trial court, even without the Compromise
Agreement, parties could still settle the case amicably and withdraw the claims against one another which is precisely
what the parties did.

Swire Realty Development vs. Yu

G.R. No. 207133,
March 9, 2015

FACTS:

Petitioner and the respondent entered into a Contract to Sell covering one residential condominium unit for P7.5
million payable in equal monthly installments and likewise purchased a parking slot in the same condominium building
for P600,000.00. Respondent paid the full purchase price of the unit while she made a down payment for the parking lot.
However, notwithstanding full payment of the contract price, petitioner failed to complete and deliver the subject unit
on time. This prompted respondent to file a Complaint for Rescission of Contract with Damages before the Housing and
Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) Expanded National Capital Region Field Office (ENCRFO). The HLURB ENCRFO
dismissed respondent’s complaint, hence respondent elevated the matter to the HLURB Board of Commissioners. The
Board reversed and set aside the ruling of the HLURB ENCRFO and ordered the rescission of the Contract to Sell, said
decision was received by the petitioner on April 17, 2006 and instead of an appeal, it opted to file a Motion for
Reconsideration on April 28, 2006, but the same was denied by the HLURB Board of Commissioners in a Resolution
dated June 14, 2007. Unfazed, petitioner appealed to the Office of the President (OP) on August 7, 2007.

ISSUE:

Whether petitioner’s appeal was timely filed before the Office of the President.

HELD:

No. The period to appeal the decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners to the Office of the President has long
been settled in the case of SGMC Realty Corporation v. Office of the President, as reiterated in the cases of Maxima
Realty Management and Development Corporation v. Parkway Real Estate Development Corporation and United
Overseas Bank Philippines, Inc. v. Ching. In the aforementioned cases, the Court ruled that the period to appeal
decisions of the HLURB Board of Commissioners is fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof pursuant to Section 15 of PD
No. 957 and Section 2 of PD No. 1344 which are special laws that provide an exception to Section 1 of Administrative
Order No. 18.

The Court noted that indeed there are special laws that mandate a shorter period of fifteen (15) days within which to
appeal a case to public respondent. First, Section 15 of Presidential Decree No. 957 provides that the decisions of the
National Housing Authority (NHA) shall become final and executory after the lapse of fifteen (15) days from the date of
receipt of the decision. Second, Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 1344 states that decisions of the National Housing
Authority shall become final and executory after the lapse of fifteen (15) days from the date of its receipt. The latter
decree provides that the decisions of the NHA is appealable only to the Office of the President. Further, we note that the
regulatory functions of NHA relating to housing and land development has been transferred to Human Settlements
Regulatory Commission, now known as HLURB. x x x

Concomitantly, Section 1 of Administrative Order No. 18 [23] provides that the time during which a motion for
reconsideration has been pending with the ministry or agency concerned shall be deducted from the period for appeal.
Petitioner received the HLURB Board Resolution denying its Motion for Reconsideration on July 23, 2007 and filed its
appeal only on August 7, 2007. Consequently therefore, petitioner had only four days from July 23, 2007, or until July 27,
2007, within which to file its appeal to the OP as the filing of the motion for reconsideration merely suspended the
running of the 15-day period. However, records reveal that petitioner only appealed to the OP on August 7, 2007, or
eleven days late. Ergo, the HLURB Board of Commissioners’ decision had become final and executory on account of the
fact that petitioner did not promptly appeal with the OP.
Norma V. Javate vs. Spouses Renato J. Tiotuico
G.R. No. 187606,
March 9, 2015

FACTS:

Petitioner was the owner of a one thousand square meter parcel of land in Mabalacat, Pampanga, which she mortgaged
to Guagua Rural Bank (Bank) as security for the loan she obtained from the said Bank. Petitioner failed to pay her
obligation and the Bank foreclosed the mortgage. The subject lot was sold at public auction where the Bank was the
highest bidder. A certificate of sale was then issued in favor of the Bank. After the one-year redemption period has
expired without petitioner having redeemed the disputed property, the Bank consolidated its ownership over the same.
As a consequence, the title covering the said lot was cancelled, and in lieu thereof, a new title was issued in the name of
the Bank. Subsequently, herein respondent spouses bought the subject lot from the Bank. A new title was later issued in
the name of respondent spouses.

Respondent spouses filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), which
was ruled in favor of respondent spouse. Subsequently Petitioner then filed with the CA a special civil action for
certiorari ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in allowing the implementation of the questioned
writ however was denied by the CA.

ISSUE:

Whether the respondents are entitled, as a matter of right, to the issuance of a writ of possession when they merely
bought the subject property through private transaction and not through land registration proceedings, judicial
foreclosure and extrajudicial foreclosure.

HELD:
Yes, respondents were entitled for the issuance of a writ of possession. In the case of Okabe vs. Saturnino, the Supreme
Court sustained the issuance of a writ of possession issued by the RTC to enable a third-party purchaser to obtain
possession of the subject property which was extrajudicially foreclosed. It held that it is but logical that Section 33, Rule
39 of the Rules of Court be applied to cases involving extrajudicially foreclosed properties that were bought by a
purchaser and later sold to third-party-purchasers after the lapse of the redemption period. The remedy of a writ of
possession, a remedy that is available to the mortgagee-purchaser to acquire possession of the foreclosed property from
the mortgagor, is made available to a subsequent purchaser, but only after hearing and after determining that the
subject property is still in the possession of the mortgagor. Unlike if the purchaser is the mortgagee or a third party
during the redemption period, a writ of possession may issue ex-parte or without hearing. In other words, if the
purchaser is a third party who acquired the property after the redemption period, a hearing must be conducted to
determine whether possession over the subject property is still with the mortgagor or is already in the possession of a
third party holding the same adversely to the defaulting debtor or mortgagor. If the property is in the possession of the
mortgagor, a writ of possession could thus be issued. Otherwise, the remedy of a writ of possession is no longer
available to such purchaser, but he can wrest possession over the property through an ordinary action of ejectment.
To be sure, immediately requiring the subsequent purchaser to file a separate case of ejectment instead of a petition for
the issuance of a writ of possession, albeit not ex-parte, will only prolong the proceedings and unduly deny the
subsequent purchaser of possession of the property which he already bought.

CECILIA RACHEL V. QUISUMBING vs. LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, MA. VICTORIA V. CARDONA AND NORBERTO DELA
CRUZ, IN THEIR CAPACITIES AS CHAIRPERSON AND MEMBERS, RESPECTIVELY, OF THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS
G.R. No. 209283,
March 11, 2015

FACTS:

The petitioner was accused of commission of certain acts of malfeasance or misfeasance constituting misconduct,
dishonesty, oppression, grave abuse of authority and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service, all in violation of
the Civil Service Laws and Rules and the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.

Petitioner filed for dismissal but, without waiting for the CHR to act on her motion, the petitioner filed on October 16,
2013, the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition before this Court.

Respondents argued that the petitioner availed of the wrong remedy when she filed the special civil action for certiorari
to assail the Show Cause Order since CHR was not engaged in judicial or quasi-judicial functions when they issued said
order.

ISSUE:

WON the petitioner is entitled to the issuance of the writs of certiorari and prohibition.

HELD:

NO. Petitioner is not entitled to the issuance of the writ. The present petition became moot and academic insofar as the
CHR proceedings have already been terminated.
CHR did not engage in judicial or quasi-judicial functions; they did not adjudicate the rights and obligations of the
contending parties but simply undertook to initiate the investigation of the allegations against the petitioner. The
inquiry was not a quasi-judicial proceeding, where offenses were charged, parties were heard and penalties were
imposed. It was at most, an exercise of fact-finding investigation, which is entirely distinct and different from the
concept of adjudication. The power to initiate an investigation and to refer the matter to the Office of the Ombudsman
is within the power of the CHR as an entity with its own distinct personality and is recognized by no less than the
Constitution. Thus, the CHR did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in its actions.
Sps. Norberte vs. Sps. Mejia and/or their heirs represented by Mejia-Querubin
G.R. No. 182886,
March 9, 2015

FACTS:

Review under Rule 45 for CA ruling of remand to the RTC. A 160-square-meter parcel of land located in the Calaanan
District, Caloocan City which was previously owned by Edgardo Ongsiaco who sold it to Sps. Legaspi.

On March 28, 1988, the Sps Legaspi sold the lot in favor of petitioners. However, on July 6, 1990, the Sps Legaspi again
sold the same property, this time to respondents. On June 6, 2003, upon payment of the balance of the purchase price,
a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of the Sps Norberte was executed. Since the demand was left unheeded, they filed a
complaint for ejectment on November 6, 2003.

MeTC dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction since, under the circumstances, the summary action for unlawful
detainer was no longer available because of prescription and the proper action should have been accion publiciana.

ISSUE:

(1) WON the proper action is unlawful detainer or accion publiciana

(2) WON Atty. Quimpo should be held in contempt of court for failure to furnish the court the names and addresses of
the legal representatives of the Spouses Mejia, who both died during the course of the proceedings.

HELD:

(1) Actions for unlawful detainer and forcible entry must be filed within one (1) year from the date possession is lost,
while accion publiciana may be filed only after the expiration of that period but within the period prescribed in the
statute of limitations. An accion publiciana may only be filed with the RTC, while a complaint, for unlawful detainer or
forcible entry may only be filed with the first level courts.

Sps Norberte’s cause of action accrued on March 28, 1998. Unfortunately, they filed their complaint for ejectment only
on November 6, 2003. However, the RTC should not have dismissed the case. Rather, it should have tried it as one for
accion publiciana, as if it had originally been filed with it, in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section 8, Rule 40 of the
Rules of Court. It likewise failed to state any findings of facts and conclusions of law on which it based its affirmance of
the MeTC Decision.

(2) Atty. Quimpo should be reprimanded for her failure and refusal to furnish the courts of the names and addresses of
the spouses' legal representatives despite the death of Felicisimo Mejia on June 23, 2004, and of Elvira Mejia on March
23, 2005. An ejectment case survives the death of a party and the death of the Spouses Mejia did not extinguish the
action for ejectment instituted against them. That action, not being a purely personal one, survived their deaths and
their heirs can take their place to protect and represent their interests therein

Ma. Elena R. Divinagracia as Administratrix of the Estate of the Late Santiago C. Divinagracia vs. Coronacion Parilla, et
al.
G.R. No. 196750,
March 11, 2015

FACTS:

Santiago bought a land but had the condition that he will only pay the remaining balance of P337,887.73 upon the
partition of the subject land. However, Santiago was not able to have TCT No. T-12255 cancelled and the subject
document registered because of 3 co-heirs’s refusal to surrender the said title. So Santiago to file a Complaint for judicial
partition and for receivership.

The RTC found that Santiago became a co-owner of the subject land and, as such, has the right to demand the partition
of the same. The CA dismissed the case. It held that Felcon’s siblings, as well as Maude’s children, are indispensable
parties to the judicial partition of the subject land and, thus, their non-inclusion as defendants in Santiago’s complaint
would necessarily result in its dismissal

ISSUE:

WON the CA correctly:

(1) ruled that Felcon’s siblings and Cebeleo, Sr. and Maude’s children are indispensable parties to Santiago’s complaint
for judicial partition; and
(2) Dismissed Santiago’s complaint for his failure to implead said omitted heirs.

HELD:

(1) An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the court’s action in the litigation, and without
whom no final determination of the case can be had. The party’s interest in the subject matter of the suit and in the
relief sought are so inextricably intertwined with the other parties’ that his legal presence as a party to the proceeding is
an absolute necessity. In his absence, there cannot be a resolution of the dispute of the parties before the court which is
effective, complete, or equitable.

Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court requires that all persons interested in the property shall be joined as defendants.
All the co-heirs and persons having an interest in the property are indispensable parties; as such, an action for partition
will not lie without the joinder of the said parties.

A reading of Santiago’s complaint shows that as regards Mateo, Sr.’s interest, only Felcon was impleaded, excluding
therefrom his siblings and co-representatives. In fine, the absence of the aforementioned indispensable parties in the
instant complaint for judicial partition renders all subsequent actions of the RTC null and void for want of authority to
act, not only as to the absent parties, but even as to those present.

(2) However, the CA erred in ordering the dismissal of the complaint on account of Santiago’s failure to implead all
the indispensable parties in his complaint. The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of
an action. At any stage of a judicial proceeding and/or at such times as are just, parties may be added on the motion of a
party or on the initiative of the tribunal concerned. If the plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the
order of the court, that court may dismiss the complaint for the plaintiff’s failure to comply with the order. The remedy
is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable.

Leticia Naguit Aquino, Melvin Naguit, et al. vs Cesar B. Quiazon, Amanda Quizon, et al.
G.R. No. 201248,
March 11, 2015

FACTS:

Petitioners alleged ownership of a 557 sq. m. lot by virtue of sale and possession for more than 119 yrs. In June 2005,
respondents sent demand letters on the basis of a title. So petitioners filed for removal of cloud of title. Respondents
raised the affirmative defenses of "lack of cause of action, prescription, and res judicata."
The predecessors-in-interest of petitioners were among the oppositors in the land registration proceeding but,
nevertheless, after the trial, the subject lot was awarded, decreed and titled in favor of respondents' predecessor-in-
interest. Respondents also claim res judicata considering that predecessors-in-interest of petitioners had earlier filed a
similar case for quieting of title against respondents, docketed as Civil Case No. 5487, which the RTC-Br. 56 dismissed.

The CA dismissed petitioners' appeal. It explained that under Section 6, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, a court is allowed
to conduct a preliminary hearing, motu proprio, on the defendant's affirmative defenses, including the ground of "lack
of cause of action or failure to state a cause of action."

ISSUE:

WON the CA erred in affirming the dismissal of petitioners' complaint on the ground of lack of cause of action or failure
to state a cause of action.

HELD:

The ground of "failure to state a cause of action" has been frequently confused with the ground of "lack of cause of
action," and this is the situation prevailing in the present case. The former refers to the insufficiency of allegation in the
pleading, the latter to the insufficiency of factual basis for the action. Failure to state a cause may be raised in a Motion
to Dismiss under Rule 16, while lack of cause may be raised any time. Dismissal for failure to state a cause can be made
at the earliest stages of an action. Dismissal for lack of cause is usually made after questions of fact have been resolved
on the basis of stipulations, admissions or evidence presented. (Dabuco vs CA)

Although the two grounds were used interchangeably, it can be gleaned from the decisions of both the trial court and
the CA that respondents' defense of "lack of cause of action" was actually wrongly treated as a "failure to state a cause
of action," which is a ground for a motion to dismiss under Rule 16. The ground of "lack of cause of action," however, is
not one of the grounds for a motion to dismiss under Rule 16, and hence, not proper for resolution during a preliminary
hearing held pursuant to Section 6. The factual matters raised by respondents in their affirmative defense arguing the
non-existence of a cause of action, should have been duly resolved during a trial on the merits of the case.
The familiar test for determining whether a complaint did or did not state a cause of action against the defendants is
whether or not, admitting hypothetically the truth of the allegations of fact made in the complaint, a judge may validly
grant the relief demanded in the complaint. In determining the existence of a cause of action, only the statements in the
complaint may properly be considered.

The reception and the consideration of evidence on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action, has
been held to be improper and impermissible. Section 6, therefore, does not apply to the ground that the complaint fails
to state a cause of action. The trial court, thus, erred in receiving and considering evidence in connection with this
ground.

Although neither the RTC or the CA ruled on the affirmative defenses of prescription and res judicata, it appears that this
case could not have been dismissed on these grounds. First, an action to quiet title is imprescriptible if the plaintiffs are
in possession of the property, which is the situation prevailing in the present case. Second, there appears to be no res
judicata nor a violation of the prohibition against forum shopping considering that Civil Case No. 5487 had been
dismissed, without prejudice, years before petitioners initiated their complaint for quieting of title.
Remanded

Saturnino Novecio, et al. vs Hon. Rodrigo F. Lim, Jr., as Chairman, Hon. Leocia R. Dimagiba, etc., et al./Vergelio
Rosales, et al. vs Hon. Rodrigo F. Lim, Jr., etc., et al.
G.R. No. 193809,
March 23, 2015

FACTS:

The respondents filed complaints for forcible entry with damages against petitioners. The petitioners allegedly planted
crops, erected makeshift shelters, and continue to plant and /or improve the shelters as of the filing of the complaints
for forcible entry, all without the consent and/or against the will of the respondents. Petitioners claim to have been in
possession for two years already.

The MTC ruled in favor the petitioners. The MTC found that the respondents anchored their alleged prior possession on
the fact that they have applied title for the land as shown by a certification authorizing land survey with no other
evidence. RTC reversed this ruled that the respondents were the actual occupants of the property in litigation long
before the petitioners had taken possession of the same property. The RTC ordered the petitioners' ejectment. Then
subsequently the CA denied their prayer.

The petitioners argue that the CA denied their prayer for preliminary injunction despite the pressing need for it to
prevent grave and irreparable injury to them. They emphasize that the records clearly show that they were the prior
possessors of the subject lot. In fact, the lot has been their home and source of livelihood for several years prior to the
institution of the forcible entry cases.

ISSUE:

WON the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, when it denied the
petitioners' prayer for preliminary injunction.

HELD:

YES. The Supreme Court ruled that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied the prayer
for preliminary injunction without explanation and justification

Remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 is appropriate. In a prayer for preliminary injunction, the plaintiff is not required to
submit conclusive and complete evidence. He is only required to show that he has an ostensible right to the final relief
prayed for in his complaint.

In this case, the petitioners have adequately shown their entitlement to a preliminary injunction. First, the relief
demanded consists in restraining the execution of the RTC decision ordering their ejectment from the disputed land.
Second, their ejectment from the land from which they derive their source of livelihood would work injustice to the
petitioners. Finally, the execution of the RTC decision is probably in violation of the rights of the petitioners, tending to
render the MTC judgment dismissing the forcible entry cases ineffectual.

Under this factual backdrop, we conclude that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied the prayer for
preliminary injunction without explanation and justification.

The grant of preliminary injunction would have only been provisional and would not be conclusively determinative of
the principal action. The issuance of the writ would have served its purpose, i.e., to preserve the status quo or to
prevent future wrongs in order to preserve and protect the interests of the petitioners during the pendency of the
action.

Teofilo B. Adolfo vs Fe T. Adolfo

G.R. No. 201427 ,
March 18, 2015
FACTS:

A judicial separation of property was filed pursuant to Article 135(6) of the Family Code. Respondent contended that
while she remained married to petitioner, she is the sole owner of the subject property which is her paraphernal
property which she inherited from her mother; that petitioner is a lazy bum, gambler, drunkard, wife abuser, and
neglectful father. Out of a series of transactions, the title was registered under “FE M. TUDTUD, x x x married to Teofilo
Adolfo.” Respondent says that the inclusion of petitioner’s name in TCT 18368 does not make him a co-owner of the
property, but was merely necessary to describe respondent’s civil status.

As a defense in another case involving a deed of sale by respondent, subject property was declared conjugal property of
her marriage with petitioner; since petitioner did not sign the deed of sale in favor of the Gingoyons as he was in Davao
at the time and knew nothing about the sale, the sale was null and void.

On September 5, 2005, petitioner filed a Motion for Judgment Based on the Pleadings, stating that since respondent
failed to answer his request for admission, the matters contained in the request are deemed admitted pursuant to Rule
26, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; and that on account of said admission, a hearing on the merits
becomes unnecessary and, instead, Rule 34 of the 1997 Rules on judgments on the pleadings should apply. Petitioner
thus prayed that the trial court render judgment in his favor based on the pleadings. RTC then ruled for partition.

RTC ruled that, in the case of a summary judgment, issues apparently exist – i.e.. facts are asserted in the complaint
regarding which there is as yet no admission, disavowal or qualification; or specific denials or affirmative defenses are in
truth set out in the answer – but the issues thus arising from the pleadings are sham, fictitious, not genuine, as shown by
[affidavits], depositions or admissions. In other words, as a noted authority remarks, a judgment on the pleadings is a
judgment on the facts as pleaded, while a summary judgment is a judgment on the facts as summarily proven by
affidavits, depositions or admissions.”

However, the CA reversed it basing their judgment in yet another case involving Road Right of Way where defendant-
appellee alone signed the compromise agreement ceding a portion of the subject lot. In arriving at the above conclusion,
the CA held that the trial court cannot treat petitioner’s motion for judgment on the pleadings as one for summary
judgment. In other words, a judgment on the pleadings is a judgment on the facts as pleaded, while a summary
judgment is a judgment on the facts as summarily proved by affidavits, depositions, or admissions.

ISSUE:

WON Court of Appeals erred in deciding the case on a question of substance not in accord with law, Rule 26 of the 1997
Rules, and applicable jurisprudence.

HELD:

NO. The CA did not err, hence this Court denies the Petition.
Judgment on the pleadings is proper “where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material
allegations of the adverse party’s pleading.” Summary judgment, on the other hand, will be granted “if the pleadings,
supporting affidavits, depositions, and admissions on file, show that, except as to the amount of damages, there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law

An answer would “fail to tender an issue” if it “does not deny the material allegations in the complaint or admits said
material allegations of the adverse party’s pleadings by confessing the truthfulness thereof and/or omitting to deal with
them at all. Now, if an answer does in fact specifically deny the material averments of the complaint and/or asserts
affirmative defenses (allegations of new matter which, while admitting the material allegations of the complaint
expressly or impliedly, would nevertheless prevent or bar recovery by the plaintiff), a judgment on the pleadings would
naturally be improper.

On the other hand, “whether the issues raised by the Answer are genuine is not the crux of inquiry in a motion for
judgment on the pleadings. It is so only in a motion for summary judgment. In a case for judgment on the pleadings,
the Answer is such that no issue is raised at all. The essential question in such a case is whether there are issues
generated by the pleadings.” “A ‘genuine issue’ is an issue of fact which requires the presentation of evidence as
distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or false claim. When the facts as pleaded appear uncontested or
undisputed, then there is no real or genuine issue or question as to the facts, and summary judgment is called
for.”48cralawred

In rendering summary judgment, the trial court relied on respondent’s failure to reply to petitioner’s request for
admission, her admission in Civil Case No. MAN-2683, as well as its May 15, 2002 Decision declaring that the subject
property is a conjugal asset. It took judicial notice of the proceedings in said case. While there is nothing irregular with
this – as courts may “take judicial notice of a decision or the facts prevailing in another case sitting in the same court if
(1) the parties present them in evidence, absent any opposition from the other party; or (2) the court, in its discretion,
resolves to do so” – the trial court however disregarded the fact that its decision was then the subject of a pending
appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 78971. It should have known that until the appeal is resolved by the appellate court, it would
be premature to render judgment on petitioner’s motion for judgment on the pleadings; that it would be presumptuous
to assume that its own decision would be affirmed on appeal. One of the issues raised in the appeal is precisely whether
the subject property is conjugal, or a paraphernal asset of the respondent. Thus, instead of resolving petitioner’s motion
for judgment on the pleadings, the trial court should have denied it or held it in abeyance. It should have guided
petitioner to this end, instead of aiding in the hasty resolution of his case.

FELILIBETH AGUINALDO AND BENJAMIN PEREZ, vs. REYNALDO P. VENTUS AND JOJO B. JOSON,
G.R. No. 176033,
March 11, 2015

FACTS:
On December 2, 2002, private respondents Reynaldo P. Ventus and Jojo B. Joson filed a Complaint-Affidavit3 for estafa
against petitioners Aguinaldo and Perez before the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Manila.
On July 16, 2003, an Information charging petitioners with the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) of the
RPC was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila.

On July 31, 2003, Perez was arrested, so he filed an Urgent Motion for Reduction of Bail, which the public respondent
granted in an Order of even date. On the same day, petitioners filed through counsel a Very Urgent Motion to Recall or
Quash Warrants of Arrest, alleging that the Resolution dated February 25, 2003 referring to the resolution of the
Assistant City prosecutor indicting petitioners has not yet attained finality, and that they intended to file a motion for
reconsideration.

Petitioners jointly filed with the OCP of Manila their “Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for the Withdrawal of the
Information Prematurely Filed With the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, City of Manila.
Then public respondent issued an Order granting the motion for withdrawal of information, and directing the recall of
the arrest warrant only insofar as Aguinaldo was concerned, pending resolution of her motion for reconsideration with
the OCP.

On January 16, 2004, the OCP of Manila, through ACP Antonio M. Israel, filed a Motion to Set Case for Trial, considering
that petitioners' motions for reconsideration and for withdrawal of the information have already been denied for lack of
merit. Acting on the prosecution's recommendation for the denial of petitioners' motions for reconsideration and
withdrawal of the information, and its motion to set the case for trial, the public respondent issued an Order dated
March 15, 2004 directing the issuance of a warrant of arrest against Aguinaldo and the setting of the case for
arraignment. Petitioners filed an Urgent Motion to Cancel Arraignment and Suspend Further Proceedings, until their
petition for review before the DOJ is resolved with finality. Petitioners reiterated the same prayer in their Urgent Motion
for Reconsideration

The public respondent granted petitioners' urgent motion to cancel arraignment and suspend proceedings, and motion
for reconsideration.

On June 23, 2004, Levita De Castro, through the Law Firm of Lapeña and Associates, filed a Motion to Reinstate Case and
to Issue Warrant of Arrest. De Castro alleged that she was the private complainant in the estafa case that had been
ordered archived. Petitioners filed an Opposition with Motion to Expunge, alleging that De Castro is not a party to the
said case, which is in active file, awaiting the resolution of their petition for review before the DOJ.

Public respondent issued an Order granting the Motion to Reinstate Case and to Issue Warrant of Arrest

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Quash Warrant of Arrest.
The public respondent issued an Order denying petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Quash Warrant
of Arrest, and setting petitioners' arraignment, as the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure (or Rules of Court) allows
only a 60-day period of suspension of arraignment. Citing Crespo v. Mogul, he also ruled that the issuance of the warrant
of arrest is best left to the discretion of the trial court. He also noted that records do not show that the DOJ has resolved
the petition for review, although photocopies were presented by De Castro.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, attributing grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the public respondent.

ISSUE:

(1) WON the Court of Appeals erred in reinstating the case and issuance of warrant of arrest based on an application by
person not party to the case.
(2) WON the provision of Section 11, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court limiting the suspension for arraignment to only sixty
(60) days is merely directory; thus, it cannot deprive petitioners of their procedural right to due process, as their petition
for review has not yet been resolved by the DOJ.
(3) WON such precipitate filing of the Information and issuance of a warrant of arrest put petitioners at the risk of
incarceration without the preliminary investigation having been completed because they were not afforded their right
to file a motion for reconsideration of the DOJ resolution

HELD:

1. YES. The CA erred in reinstating the case and in the issuance of the warrant. Records show that De Castro is not even
a private complainant, but a mere witness for being the owner of the vehicles allegedly used by petitioners in defrauding
and convincing private respondents to part with their P260,000.00. Thus, the public respondent should have granted
petitioners' motion to expunge, and treated De Castro's motion as a mere scrap of paper with no legal effect, as it was
filed by one who is not a party to that case

2. The Court disagrees with petitioners' contention that the provision of Section 11 (c), Rule 116 of the Rules of Court
limiting the suspension for arraignment to only sixty (60) days is merely directory; thus, the estafa case against them
cannot proceed until the DOJ resolves their petition for review with finality.

In Samson v. Judge Daway, the Court explained that while the pendency of a petition for review is a ground for
suspension of the arraignment, the aforecited provision limits the deferment of the arraignment to a period of 60 days
reckoned from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office. It follows, therefore, that after the expiration of said
period, the trial court is bound to arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer arraignment.

In Diño v. Olivarez, the Court held that it did not sanction an indefinite suspension of the proceedings in the trial court.
Its reliance on the reviewing authority, the Justice Secretary, to decide the appeal at the soonest possible time was
anchored on the rule provided under Department Memorandum Order No. 12, dated 3 July 2000, which mandates that
the period for the disposition of appeals or petitions for review shall be seventy- five (75) days.

While rules of procedure are liberally construed, the provisions on reglementary periods are strictly applied,
indispensable as they are to the prevention of needless delays, and are necessary to the orderly and speedy discharge of
judicial business. After all, rules of procedure do not exist for the convenience of the litigants, and they are not to be
trifled with lightly or overlooked by the mere expedience of invoking “substantial justice.” Relaxation or suspension of
procedural rules, or the exemption of a case from their operation, is warranted only by compelling reasons or when the
purpose of justice requires it. No such reasons were presented by petitioner.

3. On the third issue, the Court is likewise unconvinced by petitioners' argument that the precipitate filing of the
Information and the issuance of a warrant of arrest put petitioners at the risk of incarceration without the preliminary
investigation having been completed because they were not afforded their right to file a motion for reconsideration of
the DOJ resolutio

Petitioners in this case were afforded their right to move for reconsideration of the adverse resolution in a preliminary
investigation when they filed motions. Both petitioners cannot, therefore, claim denial of their right to a complete
preliminary investigation as part of their right to due process. After all, “[d]ue process simply demands an opportunity to
be heard. Due process is satisfied when the parties are afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their
respective sides of the controversy. Where an opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or through
pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process.”

Jose "Pepe" Sanico vs People of the Philippines and Jennifer Son-Tenio

G.R. No. 198753
March 25, 2015

FACTS:

Petitioner was criminally charged for trespassing. After being convicted by MCTC, he filed a Notice of Appeal. But he
failed to file the Memorandum of Appeal so the RTC dismissed the case with prejudice. A new laywer for Sanico was
provided. Sanico filed for reconsideration stating that the failure resulted because he had been beset with problems due
to his wife’s debilitating illness which eventually claimed her life, as well as his counsel, Atty. Baring’s own medical
condition which caused her to forget how she got this case and whom to contact as principal counsel hereof.

ISSUE:

WON the RTC erred in dismissing the case for failure to file Memorandum of Appeal.

HELD:

YES. The RTC was guilty of the prejudicial error of misapplying the Rules of Court in its dismissal of the appeal timely
made by the petitioner. In dismissing the appeal for the sole reason that he did not file the memorandum on appeal, the
RTC wrongly relied on Section 7, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court, which authorizes the dismissal of the appeal once the
appellant fails to file the memorandum on appeal.

Section 7. Procedure in the Regional Trial Court.

(a) ***

(b) Within fifteen (15) days from such notice, it shall be the duty of the appellant to submit a memorandum which shall
briefly discuss the errors imputed to the lower court, a copy of which shall be furnished by him to the adverse party.
Within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the appellant’s memorandum, the appellee may file his memorandum. Failure of
the appellant to file a memorandum shall be a ground for dismissal of the appeal.

(c) ****

Rule 122 of the Rules of Court, which specifically governed appeals in criminal cases. The relevant portions of Rule 122
are the following:

Section 3. How appeal taken.—

(a) The appeal to the Regional Trial Court, or to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the
exercise of its original jurisdiction, shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment
or final order appealed from and by serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party.

The failure to file the memorandum on appeal is a ground for the RTC to dismiss the appeal only in civil cases. The same
rule does not apply in criminal cases, because Section 9(c), supra, imposes on the RTC the duty to decide the appeal “on
the basis of the entire record of the case and of such memoranda or briefs as may have been filed” upon the submission
of the appellate memoranda or briefs, or upon the expiration of the period to file the same. Hence, the dismissal of the
petitioner’s appeal cannot be properly premised on the failure to file the memorandum on appeal.

Adoracion Carolino ( Spouse and in substitution of the deceased Jeremias Carolino) vs. Gen. Generoso Senga et. al
G.R. No. 189649,
April 20, 2015

FACTS:

Jeremias A. Carolino, petitioner's husband, retired from the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) with the rank of
Colonel, pursuant to the provisions of RA No. 3404. He started receiving his monthly retirement pay in the amount of
P18,315.00 in December 1976 until the same was withheld by respondents in March 2005 because of the loss of his
Filipino citizenship. He could avail of re-entitlement to his retirement benefits by complying with the requirements of
the Dual Citizenship Act.

It appeared that the termination of Jeremias' pension was approved by the Chief of Staff. The AFP Judge Advocate
General opined that under RA No. 340, retired military personnel are disqualified from receiving pension benefits once
incapable to render military service as a result of his having sworn allegiance to a foreign country. It was also mentioned
that termination of retirement benefits of pensioner of the AFP could be done pursuant to the provisions of Presidential
Decree (PD) No. 16388 which provides that the name of a retiree who loses his Filipino citizenship shall be removed
from the retired list and his retirement benefits terminated upon such loss.

Jeremias filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, a Petition for Mandamus against Gen. Generoso Senga,
et.al, seeking reinstatement of his name in the list of the AFP retired officers, resumption of payment of his retirement
benefits under RA No. 340, and the reimbursement of all his retirement pay and benefits

ISSUE:

Whether or not petition for mandamus is the proper remedy?

HELD:

Petitioner correctly availed of the remedy of mandamus to compel the reinstatement of his pension and benefits from
the AFP under RA 340 as PD 1638 was not applicable to him.

Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court lay down under what circumstances petition for mandamus may be filed, to wit:

SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus. - When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully
excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified
petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the
respondent, immediately or at some other time to be specified by the court, to do the act required to be done to protect
the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the
respondent.

A writ of mandamus can be issued only when petitioner's legal right to the performance of a particular act which is
sought to be compelled is clear and complete. A clear legal right is a right which is indubitably granted by law or is
inferable as a matter of law. A doctrine well-embedded in our jurisprudence is that mandamus will issue only when the
petitioner has a clear legal right to the performance of the act sought to be compelled and the respondent has an
imperative duty to perform the same. The remedy of mandamus lies to compel the performance of a ministerial duty. A
purely ministerial act or duty is one that an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner,
in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of its own judgment upon the
propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer, and gives him the right to
decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial.

The petition for mandamus filed by petitioner's husband with the RTC was for the payment of his terminated retirement
benefits, which has become vested, and being a ministerial duty on the part of the respondents to pay such claim,
mandamus is the proper remedy to compel such payment.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies calls for resort first to the appropriate administrative authorities
in the resolution of a controversy falling under their jurisdiction before the same may be elevated to the courts of justice
for review. However, the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies need not be adhered to when the question
is purely legal. This is because issues of law cannot be resolved with finality by the administrative officer. Appeal to the
administrative officer would only be an exercise in futility. Here, the question raised is purely legal, i.e., what law should
be applied in the payment of retirement benefits of petitioner's husband. Thus, there was no need to exhaust all
administrative remedies before a judicial relief can be sought.

CITYSTATE SAVINGS BANK, INC., Petitioner, vs. MAXIMIANO P. AGUINALDO, Respondent.

G.R. No. 200018 ,
April 6, 2015

Facts:

Aguinaldo claimed that he is the owner and possessor of a property situated in Parañaque City. He discovered that a
certain Rolando Mojica, Jr. had fraudulently obtained a certificate of title over the same property in the latter's name.
Aguinaldo filed a complaint for the nullification of the against Mojica; he likewise caused the annotation of a notice of lis
pendens in the said title.

The Regional Trial Court rendered a judgment in favor of Aguinaldo declared the title of Mojica null and void. However,
before Aguinaldo discovered the existence of Mojica’s title, Mojica had already executed a real estate mortgage over the
subject property in favor of Citystate Savings Bank, Inc. as security for a loan. Citystate extrajudicially foreclosed the
property and consolidated its title to the subject property.

Thus, Aguinaldo filed a Complaint for annulment of title against Citystate. Citystate asserted that it was the real and
registered owner of the subject property, having purchased the same at public auction.

After the parties have presented their respective evidence, but before the presentation of rebuttal evidence, Aguinaldo
filed a Motion to Admit Amended Complaint. Aguinaldo impleaded Syndica as Citystate's co-defendant and added the
following allegations: (a) that Citystate filed a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Possession; (b) that a writ of
possession was illegally issued which resulted in Aguinaldo's ejectment and the demolition of the latter's house; (c) that
the said ejectment and demolition resulted in actual damages amounting to P3,500,000.00, moral damages and
exemplary damages to Aguinaldo; and (d) that Citystate sold the subject property to Syndica who acquired the same in
bad faith. Aguinaldo asserted that the amendments on the complaint were necessary to afford complete r\elief to the
parties.

The RTC issued an Order denying the motion to admit Aguinaldo's amended complaint on the ground that the
amendments substantially altered the cause of action and will only delay the resolution of the case.

ISSUE:
1. WHETHER OR NOT A PROPOSED AMENDED COMPLAINT WHICH SUBSTANTIALLY ALTERS THE ORIGINAL CAUSE OF
ACTION AND WOULD CAUSE DELAY MAY BE ADMITTED;

2. WHETHER OR NOT A REFUSAL BY THE TRIAL COURT TO ALLOW AMENDMENT OF COMPLAINT AFTER IT FINDS THE
SAME TO ONLY CAUSE UNDUE DELAY IN THE DISPOSITION OF THE CASE CONSTITUTES GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION;

3. WHETHER OR NOT THE LEGALITY OR VALIDITY OF THE ISSUANCE AND IMPLEMENTATION OF A WRIT OF POSSESSION
AS UPHELD BY THE CA IN A SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION OF CERTIORARI MAY BE QUESTIONED OR ASSAILED IN A CASE FOR
NULLIFICATION OF TITLE. OTHERWISE STATED, WHETHER OR NOT THE LEGALITY OF A WRIT OF POSSESSION MAY BE
ATTACKED IN A NULLIFICATION OF TITLE CASE WITHOUT VIOLATING THE PRINCIPLE OF RES JUDICATA; AND

4. WHETHER OR NOT THE ADMISSION OF [AGUINALDO'S] AMENDED COMPLAINT VIOLATES THE PRINCIPLE OF RES
JUDICATA.

HELD:

The petition is denied.

Section 3, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court provides that:

SEC. 3. Amendments by leave of court. Except as provided in the next preceding section, substantial amendments may
be made only upon leave of court. But such leave may be refused if it appears to the court that the motion was made
with intent to delay. Orders of the court upon the matters provided in this section shall be made upon motion filed in
court, and after notice to the adverse party, and an opportunity to be heard.

The clear import of amendment in Section 3, Rule 10 is that under the new rules, "the amendment may (now)
substantially alter the cause of action or defense." This should only be true, however, when despite a substantial change
or alteration in the cause of action or defense, the amendments sought to be made shall serve the higher interests of
substantial justice, and prevent delay and equally promote the laudable objective of the rules which is to secure a "just,
speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding."

Thus, granting arguendo that the amendment of the complaint in civil case would substantially alter or change the cause
of action or defense in said controversy, this Court nonetheless holds that in the higher interest of substantial justice,
the introduction of amendments to the complaint is apropos at this particular instance to forestall further delay in the
resolution of the actual merits of the parties' respective claims and defenses. It is well-settled that amendment of
pleadings is favored and should be liberally allowed in the furtherance of justice in order to determine every case as far
as possible on its merits without regard to technicalities. Courts are in place to adjudicate controversies with the end in
view of rendering a definitive settlement, and this can only be done by going into the very core and to the full extent of
the controversy in order to afford complete relief to all the parties involved.
The Court notes that when the instant case was instituted, Aguinaldo's prayer was for the nullification of Citystate's
certificate of title. He claims that the property over which said title was issued, is owned and possessed by him, while
Citystate's certificate of title emanated from another title, which had been adjudged a nullity for having been issued
fraudulently. However, during the pendency of the case for annulment of title against Citystate, several intervening
circumstances rendered the original relief sought by Aguinaldo inadequate.

The amended complaint effected no change in the cause of action, defense, or theory of the case since it remained to be
an action for the nullity of a title that was erroneously issued in another's name.

A perusal of original complaint shows that essentially, cause of action is founded on the fact that he is the true and
registered owner of the property which was fraudulently registered in the name of Citystate. A reading of the additional
allegations in the amended complaint shows that it merely supplements the inadequate allegations of cause of action
stated in the original complaint. It merely strengthens the original cause of action by providing a more detailed account
thereof, which then puts in clearer perspective the second and third elements of his cause of action.

There was no change in the cause of action, defense or theory of the case, in both the original and the amended
complaints, as the action is still for the annulment of title.

xxxx

Second, the amendment of the complaint would not result in unnecessary delay. The introduction of amendments to
the complaint is proper at this particular instance to avert any further delay in the resolution of the case.

The inclusion of Syndica as additional defendant x x x is necessary for the effective and complete resolution of the case
and in order to accord all parties the benefit of due process and fair play in just one proceeding. Thus, the need to
amend the complaint to forestall any further need to institute other actions or proceedings.

In any case, a substantial alteration in the cause of action or defense is not a bar to amend the original complaint so long
as the amendment is not meant for delay.

LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK, TOMAS CLEMENTE, JR., AND OSCAR RAMIREZ vs. ERLINDA KRISHNAN
G.R. No. 203530,
April 13, 2015

FACTS:

Petitioners Luzon Development Bank, Tomas Clemente, and Oscar Ramirez are the respondents in the complaint for
Collection of Sum of Money and Damages filed by respondent Erlinda Khrishnan. Respondent Erlinda claimed that she is
a client of respondent bank wherein she maintained several accounts including time deposits. On several occasions,
when respondent Erlinda presented her Time Deposits Certificates amounting to P28,597,472.70 for payment because
they have become due, petitioners refused to honor them for the reason that they were fraudulent. Respondent Erlinda
likewise applied for a Preliminary Writ of Attachment which the RTC granted.

Respondent judge issued an Order directing respondent Erlinda to file a new attachment bond in the amount of
P35,000,000.00 and petitioners to file a counterbond within ten days from notice of the filing and approval of the bond
of respondent Erlinda. Respondent Erlinda filed her attachment bond on June 25, 2009 in the amount of P35,000,000.00
through Visayan Surety and Insurance Corporation which was approved by respondent on July 7, 2009.

Petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion praying that a hearing be held to determine the sufficiency of the attachment bond
and they be allowed to deposit Certificates of Title of real property, and the issuance of the writ of attachment be held
in abeyance.

Petitioners filed a motion to admit bank property in lieu of counterbond which was opposed by respondent Erlinda.

Respondent judge issued an Order reinstating the Writ of Attachment for failure of petitioners to file the required
counterbond. Respondent judge also issued an amended Reinstated Writ of Attachment directing respondent Sheriff
Oscar L. Rojas to attach the real estate or personal properties of petitioners in the amount of P28,597,472.70. On June
30, 2011, the sheriff served the Notice of Garnishment and the Amended Reinstated Writ of Attachment.

Petitioners filed an urgent motion to recall, suspend or hold in abeyance and re-examination of the amended reinstated
writ of preliminary attachment of June 27, 2011 which was opposed by respondent Erlinda. Respondent Sheriff issued a
Sheriffs Partial Report. Thereafter, petitioners filed this petition for certiorari x x x.

The CA dismissed petitioners' certiorari petition and affirmed the Orders of the RTC reinstating the Writ of Attachment
for failure of petitioners to file the required counter-bond.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners have the option to deposit real property, in lieu of cash or a counter-bond, to secure any
contingent lien on its property in the event respondent wins the case

HELD:

In their petition, petitioners contend that it has the option to deposit real property, in lieu of cash or a counter-bond, to
secure any contingent lien on its property in the event respondent wins the case. They argue that Section 2 of Rule 57
only mentions the term "deposit," thus, it cannot only be confined or construed to refer to cash. We rule in the negative.

Section 2, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court explicitly states that "[a]n order of attachment may be issued either ex parte or
upon motion with notice and hearing by the court in which the action is pending, or by the Court of Appeals or the
Supreme Court, and must require the sheriff of the court to attach so much of the property in the Philippines of the
party against whom it is issued, not exempt from execution, as may be sufficient to satisfy the applicant's demand,
unless such party makes deposit or gives a bond as hereinafter provided in an amount equal to that fixed in the order,
which may be the amount sufficient to satisfy the applicant's demand or the value of the property to be attached as
stated by the applicant, exclusive of costs."

Section 5 of the same Rule likewise states that "[t]he sheriff enforcing the writ shall without delay and with all
reasonable diligence attach, to await judgment and execution in the action, only so much of the property in the
Philippines of the party against whom the writ is issued, not exempt from execution, as may be sufficient to satisfy the
applicant's demand, unless the former makes a deposit with the court from which the writ is issued, or gives a counter-
bond executed to the applicant, in an amount equal to the bond fixed by the court in the order of attachment or to the
value of the property to be attached, exclusive of costs."

From the foregoing, it is evidently clear that once the writ of attachment has been issued, the only remedy of the
petitioners in lifting the same is through a cash deposit or the filing of the counter-bond. Thus, the Court holds that
petitioner's argument that it has the option to deposit real property instead of depositing cash or filing a counter-bond
to discharge the attachment or stay the implementation thereof is unmeritorious.

One of the ways to secure the discharge of an attachment is for the party whose property has been attached or a person
appearing on his behalf, to post a counterbond or make the requisite cash deposit in an amount equal to that fixed by
the court in the order of attachment.

While it is true that the word deposit cannot only be confined or construed to refer to cash, a broader interpretation
thereof is not justified in the present case for the reason that a party seeking a stay of the attachment under Section 5 is
required to make a deposit in an amount equal to the bond fixed by the court in the order of attachment or to the value
of the property to be attached. The proximate relation of the word "deposit" and "amount" is unmistakable in Section 5
of Rule 57. Plainly, in construing said words, it can be safely concluded that Section 5 requires the deposit of money as
the word "amount" commonly refers to or is regularly associated with a sum of money.

PRISCILO B. PAZ, vs. NEW INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL UNIVERSALITY, INC.,

G.R. No. 203993
April 20, 2015

FACTS:

Petitioner, as the officer-in-charge of the Aircraft Hangar at the Davao International Airport, Davao City, entered into a
Memorandum of Agreement with Captain Allan J. Clarke (Capt. Clarke), President of International Environmental
University, whereby for a period of four (4) years the former shall allow the latter to use the aircraft hangar space at the
said Airport "exclusively for company aircraft/helicopter."

Eventually, petitioner complained in a letter addressed to "MR. ALLAN J. CLARKE, International Environmental
Universality, Inc. x x x" that the hangar space was being used "for trucks and equipment, vehicles maintenance and
fabrication," instead of for "company helicopter/aircraft" only, and thereby threatened to cancel the MOA if the
"welding, grinding, and fabrication jobs" were not stopped immediately.

Several letters were sent to "MR. ALLAN J. CLARKE, Chairman, CEO, New International Environmental University, Inc. x x
x," strongly demanding the latter to immediately vacate the hangar spac, but no action from the latter was sought.

Respondent New International Environmental Universality, Inc. filed a complaint against petitioner for breach of
contract before the RTC.

In his defense, petitioner alleged, among others, that respondent had no cause of action against him as the MOA was
executed between him and Capt. Clarke in the latter’s personal capacity.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Capt. Clarke should have been impleaded as an indispensable party

HELD:

Second, whether or not Capt. Clarke should have been impleaded as an indispensable party was correctly resolved by
the CA which held that the former was merely an agent of respondent. While Capt. Clarke’s name and signature
appeared on the MOA, his participation was, nonetheless, limited to being a representative of respondent. As a mere
representative, Capt. Clarke acquired no rights whatsoever, nor did he incur any liabilities, arising from the contract
between petitioner and respondent. Therefore, he was not an indispensable party to the case at bar.

The CA had correctly pointed out that, from the very language itself of the MOA entered into by petitioner whereby he
obligated himself to allow the use of the hangar space "for company aircraft/helicopter," petitioner cannot deny that he
contracted with respondent. Petitioner further acknowledged this fact in his final letter, where he reiterated and
strongly demanded the former to immediately vacate the hangar space his "company is occupying/utilizing."

Section 2161 of the Corporation Code explicitly provides that one who assumes an obligation to an ostensible
corporation, as such, cannot resist performance thereof on the ground that there was in fact no corporation. Clearly,
petitioner is bound by his obligation under the MOA not only on estoppel but by express provision of law. As aptly raised
by respondent in its Comment to the instant petition, it is futile to insist that petitioner issued the receipts for rental
payments in respondent’s name and not with Capt. Clarke’s, whom petitioner allegedly contracted in the latter’s
personal capacity, only because it was upon the instruction of an employee. Indeed, it is disputably presumed that a
person takes ordinary care of his concerns, and that all private transactions have been fair and regular. Hence, it is
assumed that petitioner, who is a pilot, knew what he was doing with respect to his business with respondent.
SAN LORENZO RUIZ BUILDERS AND DEVELOPERS GROUP, INC. and OSCAR VIOLAGO vs. MA. CRISTINA F. BAYANG
G.R. No. 194702
April 20, 2015

FACTS:

On April 15, 2000, petitioner SLR Builders (then known as Violago Builders, Inc), as seller, and respondent Ma. Cristina F.
Bayang (Cristina), as buyer, entered into a "contract to sell" of a sixty (60)-square meter lot in Violago Homes Parkwoods
Subdivision, located in Barangay Payatas, Quezon City.

Upon full payment of the monthly amortizations on the purchased lot, Cristina demanded from SLR Builders the
execution of the deed of absolute sale and the lot’s certificate of title but the latter failed to deliver, prompting Cristina
to file a complaint for specific performance and damages against SLR Builders and its President, Oscar Violago before the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB).

Housing and Land Use Arbiter Atty. Joselito F. Melchor ruled in Cristina’s favor. The petitioners appealed Arbiter
Melchor’s decision to the HLURB Board of Commissioners. The Board dismissed and denied, respectively, the
petitioners’ appeal and subsequent motion for reconsideration. The petitioners then brought their case to the Office of
the President (OP), which was docketed as O.P. Case No. 06-D-160.

The OP dismissed the petitioners’ appeal for having been filed out of time. The petitioners moved to reconsider and
argued that the "fresh period rule" should be applied to their case.

ISSUE:

Whether the "fresh period rule" in Neypes applies to administrative appeals, such as an appeal filed from a decision of
the HLURB Board of Commissioners to the Office to the President.

HELD:

We DENY the petition. It is settled that the "fresh period rule" in Neypes applies only to judicial appeals and not to
administrative appeals. The "fresh period rule" only covers judicial proceedings under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:
The "fresh period rule" in Neypes declares:

To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the
Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial
Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.

The "fresh period rule" shall apply to Rule 40 (appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts); Rule
41 (appeals from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court); Rule 42 (appeals from the
Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals); Rule 43 (appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals); and
Rule 45 (appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court). Obviously, these Rules cover judicial proceedings under the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure.

The subject appeal, i.e., appeal from a decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners to the OP, is not judicial but
administrative in nature; thus, the "fresh period rule" in Neypes does not apply.

Section 2, Rule XXI of the BLURB Resolution No. 765, series of 2004, prescribing the rules and regulations governing
appeals from decisions of the Board of Commissioners to the Office of the President, pertinently reads:

Section 2. Appeal. - Any party may, upon notice to the Board and the other party, appeal a decision rendered by the
Board of Commissioners to the Office of the President within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof, in accordance with
P.D. No. 1344 and A.O. No. 18 Series of 1987.

The pendency of the motion for reconsideration shall suspend the running of the period of appeal to the Office of the
President.

Corollary thereto, paragraph 2, Section 1 of Administrative Order No. 18, series of 1987, provides that in case the
aggrieved party files a motion for reconsideration from an adverse decision of any agency/office, the said party has the
only remaining balance of the prescriptive period within which to appeal, reckoned from receipt of notice of the decision
denying his/her motion for reconsideration.

ROWENA C. DE LEON v. LOLITA CHU

G.R. No. 186522, September 2, 2015
Second Division
Brion,J.
Subject: Remedial Law

Rowena C. De Leon filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Gapan against Lolita Chu. Rowena demanded
Lolita's surrender of the Transfer Certificate of Title covering a 50-square meter parcel of land in San Roque, Cabiao,
Nueva Ecija. The case was raffled to Branch 35 and docketed as LRC Case No. 1322.

On 17 May 2000, Lolita and Domingo filed a case against Rowena before the RTC of Gapan for the annulment of the
Deed of Sale dated 19 March 1993, and for the cancellation of TCT No. 228526. The case was raffled to Branch 87 and
docketed as Civil Case No. 2257. Lolita and Domingo claimed that on 17 December 1990, Domingo sold to Lolita his 600-
square meter portion of a parcel of land [Lot G-2-A]. They executed the Deed of Absolute Sale on the same date. Before
leaving for Japan on 5 September 1992, Lolita entrusted the document to Rowena. Thereafter, Rowena allegedly forged
their signatures in certain documents to make it appear that Domingo transferred a 50-square meter portion of the land
to Rowena. Rowena used the falsified documents to subdivide the portion as Lot No. G-2-A-1-A and to register it in her
name under TCT No. 228526.
On 14 July 2000, Lolita filed her answer in LRC Case No. 1322. She denied the accusations and alleged that her and
Domingo’s signatures in the 19 March 1993 Deed of Sale had been forged. In her answer in Civil Case No. 2257, Rowena
admitted that Domingo executed the deed of sale only in favor of Lolita. However, she claimed: (1) that she had already
paid Domingo consideration for the 50-square meter portion; and (2) that the three of them had an internal
arrangement not to include her (Rowena) in the deed of sale because the Bureau of Lands had not yet approved the
subdivision plan for Domingo’s property. She further claimed that she executed the allegedly forged documents upon
the advice and consent of Lolita.

On 29 January 2001, Lolita filed a Motion to Suspend the Proceedings in LRC Case No. 1322 due to the pendency of Civil
Case No. 2257, which results, she claimed, would determine the disposition of the first case (Case No. 1322).

RTC denied the Motion to Suspend the Proceedings in LRC Case No. 1322 because that case had been filed ahead of Civil
Case No. 2257. Upon motion of both parties to Civil Case No. 2257, this case was nonetheless consolidated with LRC
Case No. 1322 per Order. The consolidated case was assigned to Branch 35.

After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered its decision on 28 August 2006, in favor of Lolita and Domingo, after finding
that Rowena had falsified their signatures.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in rendering a decision not in accord with existing laws
and applicable jurisprudence by dismissing L.R. CASE NO. 1322 and instead giving due course to CIVIL CASE NO. 2257
despite the fact that appellees are guilty of forum shopping?

2. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court
despite the fact that no complete relief can be had in the instant case for the respondent’s failure to include in her
complaint an indispensable party?

Ruling:
1. No.
Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court prescribes the rule on certificates of non-forum shopping. To wit:

Section 5. Certification against forum shopping. – x x x Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be
curable by mere amendment or the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case
without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission of a false certification or
non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to
the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and
deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct
contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions. (emphasis supplied) A violation of the abovementioned
rule – other than through willful and deliberate forum shopping – does not authorize the RTC to dismiss a case
without motion and hearing.5 Even the submission of a false certification of non-forum shopping does not
automatically warrant dismissal of the case, even if it might constitute contempt of court. Significantly, the petitioner
did not move for the dismissal of the petition in Civil Case No. 2257 or to cite the respondents for indirect contempt. She
also failed to show that the respondents committed willful and deliberate forum shopping. Instead, she raised the issue
of forum shopping and non-compliance with Rule 7, Section 5 only on appeal.

This Court is mindful of the rule that trial courts may dismiss a case motu proprio on the ground of litis pendentia,
among other things. This rule is found in Rule 9, Section 1 of the Rules of Court:

Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. – Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or
in the answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that the
court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another pending action between the same parties for the
same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim.
(emphasis supplied)

However, the ground for dismissal must be evident from the pleadings or from the evidence on record before a Court
can dismiss a case motu proprio. In the present case, the petitioner should have brought the pendency of LRC Case No.
1322 to the attention of the Court in Civil Case No. 2257 to cause the dismissal of the latter case. Instead, she agreed to
consolidate the two cases. With the Consolidation of Civil Case No. 2257 and LRC Case No. 1322, there was no longer
“another action between the same parties for the same cause”; the potential ground for dismissal for litis pendentia had
been rendered moot. Clearly, the Court of Appeals did not err in denying her appeal.

2. No.
The second issue is a new issue that was not raised before the RTC or the CA. It is a settled rule that no questions will be
entertained on appeal unless it has been raised in the lower court. Points of law, theories, issues, and arguments not
brought to the attention of the lower court need not be, and ordinarily will not be considered by a reviewing court, as
they cannot be raised for the first time at that late stage.6In any case, the cited failure to implead the Register of Deeds
is not fatal to the case. The Register of Deeds is merely a nominal party who does not need to participate in the
proceedings to adjudicate the rights of the petitioner and the respondents.

Republic of the Philippines v. Principalia Managemnet and Personnel Consultants, Inc.

G.R. No. 198426, September 2, 2015
Second Division
Del Castillo, J.
Subject: Administrative Law; Remedial Law

Facts:
Principalia, a recruitment agency, was found by the POEA to have collected from complainant Alejandro Ramos an
excessive placement fee. It was thus declared to have violated Section 2(b), Rule I, Part VI7 of the 2002 POEA Rules and
Regulations (POEA Rules), a serious offense which carries the penalty of cancellation of license for the first offense.
Accordingly, upon Principalia’s receipt of the aforesaid Order on June 24, 2009, the POEA immediately cancelled its
license based on Section 5, Rule V, Part VI of the POEA Rules, viz.:
Stay of Execution. The decision of the Administration shall be stayed during the pendency of the appeal; Provided that
where the penalty imposed carries the maximum penalty of twelve months suspension or cancellation of license, the
decision shall be immediately executory despite the pendency of the appeal. Provided further that where the penalty
imposed is suspension of license for one month or less, the decision shall be immediately executory and may only be
appealed on ground of grave abuse of discretion. (Emphasis supplied)

Principalia sought to stay the implementation of the POEA Order by filing with the RTC of Mandaluyong City a Complaint
for Injunction with Application for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary
Prohibitory and Mandatory Injunction. It contended that the immediate cancellation of its license not only deprived it of
due process but also jeopardized the deployment of hundreds of overseas Filipino workers. That same day, the
Executive Judge of RTC Mandaluyong issued a 72-hour TRO10 to allow the deployment of six workers who were already
scheduled to leave for work abroad. In the meantime, Principalia appealed the POEA Order with the Office of the
Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE Secretary)

On July 22, 2009, POEA filed with the RTC a Motion to Dismiss based on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction, failure to
exhaust administrative remedies and forum-shopping. According to it, (1) it is the DOLE Secretary and not the RTC
which has jurisdiction over cases assailing POEA Orders which direct the cancellation of license of a recruitment agency;
(2) assuming that the RTC has j jurisdiction, Principalia nevertheless failed to exhaust administrative remedies since it
failed to first seek recourse from the DOLE; and, (3) Principalia committed forum-shopping when it also later appealed
the POEA Order with the DOLE.

Issue: Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the injunction case?

Ruling:
No. At the outset, it must be noted that the Petition is dismissible for being moot and academic. It should be recalled
that what impelled Principalia to file the main action for injunction was the June 8, 2009 POEA Order directing the
immediate cancellation of its license. Since Principalia could not then engage in recruitment activities because of the
said Order, it resorted to the RTC to question and seek to enjoin such immediate cancellation for the obvious reason
that it wanted to continue the operation of its business. Significantly, however, Principalia, to date, is a POEA-accredited
recruitment agency licensed to do business until April 1, 2016.24 As things stand, therefore, Principalia has no more
claim for relief against POEA since this has been mooted by the latter’s renewal of its license to do business. In fact and
as mentioned, Principalia already moved for the dismissal of the injunction case before the RTC which the said court
correctly granted.

“A case becomes moot and academic when, by virtue of supervening events, there is no more actual controversy
between the parties and no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits.”
In Arevalo v. Planters Development Bank, the Court expounded:

The Constitution provides that judicial power ‘includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable.’ The exercise of judicial power requires an actual case
calling for it. The courts have no authority to pass upon issues through advisory opinions, or to resolve hypothetical or
feigned problems or friendly suits collusively arranged between parties without real adverse interests. Furthermore,
courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually challenging.
As a condition precedent to the exercise of judicial power, an actual controversy between litigants must first exist. An
actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial
resolution, as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. There must be a contrariety of legal
rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence. (Emphases supplied)

However, the Court agrees with the Republic that while the case has indeed been rendered moot, it can still pass upon
the main issue for the guidance of both bar and bench. It is settled that courts will decide a question otherwise moot
and academic if the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. In stressing that the RTC is bereft of jurisdiction to
entertain the injunction case, the Republic avers that it is the POEA which has original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear
and decide all pre-employment cases which are administrative in character involving or arising out of violations of
recruitment regulations, or violations of conditions for the issuance of license to recruit workers, under Section 3(d) of
Executive Order No. 24728 (EO 247) and as reiterated in Section 1, Rule I, Part VI of the 2002 POEA Rules.29 On the
other hand, the remedy of an appeal/petition for review of an Order issued by the POEA in the exercise of such exclusive
jurisdiction is lodged exclusively with the DOLE Secretary as provided under Section 1, Rule V, Part VI of the 2002 POEA
Rules. Notably, however, nothing in EO 247 and the 2002 POEA Rules relied upon by the Republic provides for the grant
to a recruitment agency of an injunctive relief from the immediate execution of penalties for serious offenses (e.g.,
cancellation of license to operate, suspension of license for a maximum period of 12 months). Conversely, they do not
deprive the courts of the power to entertain injunction petitions to stay the execution of a POEA order imposing such
penalties.The Court thus agrees with the CA in holding that the RTC can take cognizance of the injunction complaint,
which “is a suit which has for its purpose the enjoinment of the defendant, perpetually or for a particular time, from the
commission or continuance of a specific act, or his compulsion to continue performance of a particular act.”31 Actions
for injunction and damages lie within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the RTC pursuant to Section 1932 of
BatasPambansaBlg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by RA 7691.33While
“[w]ell-entrenched is the rule that courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of the
government agency entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special and technical training and
knowledge of such agency,”34 it is not entirely correct to say that an action by an administrative agency, such as in the
case at bar, cannot be questioned in an injunction suit. It has been held that “[c]ourts cannot enjoin an agency from
performing an act within its prerogative, except when in the exercise of its authority it gravely abused or exceeded its
jurisdiction.”35 Indeed, administrative decisions on matters within the executive jurisdiction can be set aside on proof
of grave abuse of discretion, fraud, or error of law, and in such cases, injunction may be granted.36The Republic further
argues that Principalia committed forum-shopping when it sought relief both from the RTC and the DOLE Secretary. The
Court, however, finds otherwise. What Principalia questioned before the DOLE Secretary was the merits of the case
which brought about the POEA’s issuance of its order cancelling Principalia’s license. Whereas before the RTC, the relief
sought by Principalia is limited to enjoining the POEA from immediately enforcing such cancellation. Clearly, the reliefs
sought by Principalia from the Decision 8 G.R. No. 198426 two fora were different and this negates forum-shopping.37
Neither would the RTC, in resolving the injunction suit, encroach upon the DOLE Secretary's authority since Principalia
was not asking the said court to prohibit the DOLE Secretary from resolving the appeal before it or for Principalia to be
allowed to continue operating its business regardless of the judgment in the appeal. Anent the failure of Principalia to
observe the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies, suffice it to say that this principle admits of
exceptions,38 and notably, Principalia raised one of these exceptions, i.e., deprivation of due process, as an issue in its
suit. And since this issue is a question of fact which the Court can only determine after the trial is had, the RTC was
correct in not dismissing the case and in allowing the same to proceed to trial. Significantly, this likewise goes true with
respect to the main relief for injunction. As the elements for its issuance, i.e., (1) there must be a right to be protected;
and (2) the acts against which the injunction is to be directed are violative of said right, are matters that must be proved
during trial, the RTC merely acted in its judicial sphere when it proceeded to try the case.

Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC) v. Hon. Orlando C. Casimiro

G.R. No. 206866, September 2, 2015
First Division
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
Subject: Criminal Procedure/ Remedial Law

Facts:
The instant case arose from a Joint-Affidavit filed by Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC) through its duly-
authorized officers, Alexander N. Dojillo and Israel A Bondoy charging private respondents of the crimes of Direct Bribery
and Corruption of Public Officials, defined and penalized under Articles 210 and 212 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC),
respectively, as well as violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019, entitled the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. Specifically, private respondents were being sued in the following capacities: (a) Cu (together with
members of his family) as the 85 .99% owner of Bicol Development Bank, Inc. (BDBI); ( b) Zate as Chairman/President of
BDBI; and ( c) Apelo as a former employee of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) who acted as the Bank Officer-In-
Charge that examined BDBI's books and records and as one of the assistants of Bank Officer-In-Charge Evangeline C.
Velasquez in connection with the Reports of Examination of BDBI' s books and records. The Joint-Affidavit averred that
PDIC, acting as statutory receiver, took over the affairs of BDBI after the BSP Monetary Board ordered its closure. As
statutory receiver, PDIC purposedly went on to gather, preserve, and administer its records, assets, and liabilities for the
benefit of its depositors and creditors. In the course of the receivership, Arsenia T. Gomez (Gomez) - a former Cashier,
Service Officer, and Treasurer of BDBI until its closure -went to the PDIC and submitted an Affidavit outlining the alleged
irregularities committed by private respondents when BDBI was still in operation. According to Gomez, Cu instructed
her to take money from the vault in the amount of P30,000.00 and to deposit the same to Apelo's bank account in
Philippine National Bank -Legazpi City Branch. When Gomez asked for the reason, Cu replied "Professional Fee natin sa
kanya yan." On further orders/directives from Cu and Zate, additional deposits were made to Apelo's bank account on
two (2) separate dates, specifically April 20, 2007 and October 3, 2007, in the respective amounts of P60,000.00 and
P50,000.00. After the deposits were made, Gomez was initially instructed to cover the unofficial and unbooked cash
disbursements in favor of Apelo by placing such amounts in BDBI's books as "Other Cash Items;" and thereafter, to
regularize and remove from BDBI's books such disbursements by including them in the other accounts of BDBI until they
were completely covered.

In this regard, Gomez averred that in the course of her employment with BDBI, she does not know of any official or
legitimate transactions that would warrant BDBI to disburse the aforesaid amounts in favor of Apelo. However, speaking
from personal experience, Gomez noticed that Cu would always receive an "advance warning" about a surprise
examination on BDBI by BSP. During such time and until the actual arrival of the BSP examiner, Cu would instruct BDBI
employees on how to cover the possible findings/exceptions of the BSP examiner on the books of BDBI. In addition, Cu
shall deliver cash in BDBI' s vault in order to make it appear that the cash listed in the books reflect the actual cash in
vault; and after such examination, Cu will take the cash he delivered to BDBI' s vault and return it to the source. In view
of Gomez's revelations, PDIC decided to file the instant criminal complaint against private respondents.

Ombudsman dismissed the criminal complaint for lack of probable cause. Hence, this instant petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in finding no probable cause to indict private respondents
of the crimes charged?

Ruling:
Yes.
At the outset, it must be stressed that the Court has consistently refrained from interfering with the discretion of the
Ombudsman to determine the existence of probable cause and to decide whether or not an Information should be filed.
Nonetheless, this Court is not precluded from reviewing the Ombudsman's action when there is a charge of grave abuse
of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of
jurisdiction. The Ombudsman's exercise of power must have been done in an arbitrary or despotic manner which must
be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or
to act at all in 1 in contemplation of the law. The Court’s pronouncement in Ciron v. Gutierrez is instructive on this
matter, to wit:

x x x this Court's consistent policy has been to maintain non-interference in the determination of the Ombudsman of
the existence of probable cause, provided there is no grave abuse in the exercise of such discretion. This observed policy
is based not only on respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of
the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, the functions of the Court will be seriously hampered by
innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman
with regard to complaints filed before it, in much the same way that the courts would be extremely swamped with cases
if they could be compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each
time they decide to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied).

Verily, preliminary investigation is merely an inquisitorial mode of discovering whether or not there is reasonable basis
to believe that a crime has been committed and that the person charged should be held responsible for it. Being merely
based on opinion and belief, a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient
evidence to secure a conviction. "[A preliminary investigation] is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of
[the prosecution's] evidence. The presence or absence of the elements of the crime is evidentiary in nature and is a
matter of defense that may be passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits." Hence, "the validity and merits of a
party's defense or accusation, as well as the admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated during trial
proper than at the preliminary investigation level.”

Spouses Javier v. Spouses Pineda

G.R. No. 186204, September 2, 2015
Third Division
Peralta, J.

Facts:
Petitioners filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Cabanatuan City (MTCC), a Complaint against respondents for
Ejectment, pertinent portions of which contain the following allegations:

Plaintiffs are the absolute owners of a parcel of land at Bakod Bayan, Cabanatuan City with an area of 740 square meters
and in prior physical possession of the entire property. That the defendants unlawfully entered a portion of said land
and arrogated unto themselves ownership thereof by enclosing the same with concrete hollow blocks (chb) fence.

Issues:
1. Whether the action filed by petitioners qualify as one for forcible entry based on the allegations in the complaint?
2. Whether the remedy of petitioners should be an action for recovery of possession and not one for ejectment?
3. Which court has jurisdiction in a boundary dispute?

Ruling:
No
At the outset, it should be made clear that there is absolutely no issue regarding the MTCC's jurisdiction to take
cognizance of petitioner's complaint for ejectment. It is true that petitioners alleged in their complaint that they had
prior possession of the contested area and, thus, the MTCC properly acted on the case, conducting the necessary
summary proceedings. However, after their respective pleadings and evidence were presented by the contending
parties before the MTCC as a trial court, it found that the case actually involved a boundary dispute, and thus, the MTCC
dismissed the case. It should be emphasized that the dismissal was not due to lack of jurisdiction of the court over the
complaint, but rather, due to petitioners' failure to prove that they had a proper case for ejectment. The case was
dismissed on the ground of lack of merit, not lack of jurisdiction. Likewise, the MTCC and the CA are correct that
the meat of the controversy between herein parties is the actual boundaries or the metes and bounds of their
respective lots. On this matter, Manalang v. Bacani is quite instructive: x x x a boundary dispute must be resolved in
the context of accion reivindicatoria, not an ejectment case. The boundary dispute is not about possession, but
encroachment, that is, whether the property claimed by the defendant formed part of the plaintiff’s property. A
boundary dispute cannot be settled summarily under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the proceedings under which are
limited to unlawful detainer and forcible entry. In unlawful detainer, the defendant unlawfully withholds the possession
of the premises upon the expiration or termination of his right to hold such possession under any contract, express or
implied. The defendant’s possession was lawful at the beginning, becoming unlawful only because of the expiration or
termination of his right of possession. In forcible entry, the possession of the defendant is illegal from the very
beginning, and the issue centers on which between the plaintiff and the defendant had the prior possession de
facto.6Opposing possessory rights over certain areas of adjacent lots, arising from claims of ownership thereof, cannot
be resolved in a summary action such as an ejectment suit.7 The issues involved in such a controversy should be fully
threshed out in an action like accion reivindicatoria,8 especially when plaintiff fails to establish actual prior possession.
In a much earlier ruling of this Court, it was already held therein that “[i]f [a party] is indeed the owner of the premises
subject of this suit and she was unlawfully deprived of the real right of possession or the ownership thereof, she should
present her claim before the regional trial court in an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria, and not before the
municipal trial court in a summary proceeding of unlawful detainer or forcible entry.
CLT REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. HI-GRADE FEEDS CORPORATION
G .R. No. 160684, September 2, 2015
FIRST DIVISION
Perez, J.

Facts:
The properties in dispute were formerly part of the notorious Maysilo Estate left by Gonzalo Tuason, the vastness of
which measures 1,660.26 hectares, stretching across Caloocan City, Valenzuela, and Malabon, covered by five (5)
mother titles or Original Certificate of Title (OCT). One of the mother titles is OCT No. 994, the mother title in dispute.
Later on, smaller lots forming part of the Maysilo Estate were sold to different persons. Several subsequent subdivisions,
consolidations, and one expropriation of the Estate, spawned numerous legal disputes, living-up to the name “Land
ofCaveat Emptor.
The conflict arose due to an overlapping of the properties of CLT and Hi-Grade, which prompted CLT to file a case for
Annulment of Transfer Certificates of Title, Recovery of Possession, and Damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Caloocan City against Hi-Grade.
The parties’ OCTs No. 994 contain different dates of registration, namely:

CLT’s OCT No. 994 is dated 19 April 1917

Hi-Grade’s OCT No. 994 is dated 3 May 1917

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on behalf of the Republic and in representation of the Administrator of the
Land Registration Authority, filed a Petition for Intervention. The OSG averred that its intervention is indispensable as it
is pursuant to its duty to preserve the integrity of the Torrens system of registration and to protect the Assurance Fund,
in connection with which it can initiate necessary actions for the annulment of titles irregularly and fraudulently issued.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it took judicial notice of the Senate Report
2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it admitted the Office of the Solicitor
General’s Petition for Intervention?
3.Which of the OCTs 994, that dated 19 April 1917 or that dated 3 May 1917, is the valid title?

Ruling:
1. No.
CLT misses the point. Taking judicial notice of acts of the Senate is well within the ambit of the law. Section 1 of Rule 129
of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:

SECTION 1 . Judicial notice, when mandatory. — A court shall take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence,
of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government and symbols of nationality,
the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and history
of the Philippines, the official acts of legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of
nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions. (1a) (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts that judges may properly take and act on without proof because these
facts are already known to them;13 it is the duty of the court to assume something as a matter of fact without need of
further evidentiary support.14 Otherwise stated, by the taking of judicial notice, the court dispenses with the traditional
form of presentation of evidence, i.e. the rigorous rules of evidence and court proceedings such as cross-examination.

The Senate Report, an official act of the legislative department, may be taken judicial notice of.
2. Yes.
Intervention is only allowed before or during trial. Citing Sps. Oliva v. CA, CLT argues that the Petition for Intervention
was time-barred for having been filed beyond the period prescribed in Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, i.e.,
before rendition of judgment. In Oliva, the Court clarified that intervention is unallowable when the case has already
been submitted for decision, when judgment has been rendered, or when judgment has already became final and
executory. And, intervention is only allowed when the intervenors are indispensable parties.

The Republic is not an indispensable party in the instant litigation. An indispensable party is a party-in-interest without
whom no final determination can be had of an action, and who shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants. Here,
even without the Republic as participant, a final determination of the issues can be attained.

3.
Hi Grade Title.
A title can only have one date of registration, as there can only be one title covering the same property. The date of
registration is reckoned from the time of the title’s transcription in the record book of the Registry of Deeds. Therefore,
the date appearing on the face of a title refers to the date of issuance of the decree of registration, as provided in
Sections 41 and 42 of the Land Registration Act or Section 40 of the P.D. 1529:

Section 41.Immediately upon the entry of the decree of registration the clerk shall send a certified copy thereof, under
the seal of the court to the register of deeds for the province, or provinces or city in which the land lies, and the register
of deeds shall transcribe the decree in a book to be called the “Registration Book,” in which a leaf, or leaves, in
consecutive order, shall be devoted exclusively to each title. The entry made by the register of deeds in this book in each
case shall be the original certificate of title, and shall be signed by him and sealed with the seal of the court. x x x

Section 42. The certificate first registered in pursuance of the decree of registration in regard to any parcel of land shall
be entitled in the registration book, “original certificate of title, entered pursuant to decree of the Court of Land
Registration, dated at” (stating the time and place of entry of decree and the number of case). This certificate shall take
effect upon the date of the transcription of the decree. Subsequent certificates relating to the same land shall be in like
form, but shall be entitled “Transfer from number” (the number of the next previous certificate relating to the same
land), and also the words “Originally registered” (date, volume, and page of registration). (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)
Therefore, as the date of transcription in the record book of the Registry of Deeds is 3 May 1917, we rule that the
genuine title is the title of Hi-Grade.

As we have priorly pronounced, any title that traces its source to a void title, is also void. The spring cannot rise higher
than its source. Nemo potest plus juris ad alium transferre quam ipse habet. All titles that trace its source to OCT No. 994
dated 19 April 1917, are therefore void, for such mother title is inexistent. CLT so traces its title to OCT No. 994 dated 19
April 191 7, the title of CL T is void.

PHILIPPINE INC. v. BICHARA, Respondent. PEREZ

G.R. No. 213729, September 2, 2015
First Division
Perlas-Bernabe, J.

Facts:
On October 28, 1968, PAL hired Bichara as a flight attendant. Sometime in 1971, PAL implemented a retrenchment
program. By April of that year, Bichara voluntarily resigned. On May 15, 1975, he was rehired.

On August 1993, Bichara was included in PAL's Purser Upgrading Program in which he graduated on December 13, 1993.
As flight purser, he was required to take five (5) check rides for his performance evaluation and earn at least an 85o/o
rating for each ride. However, Bichara failed in the two (2) check rides with ratings of 83.46% and 80.63%.

Consequently, on March 21, 1994, Bichara was demoted to the position of flight steward.7 On March 22, 1994, Bichara
appealed his demotion to PAL, but no action was taken; hence, he filed a complaint for illegal demotion against PAL
before the NLRC-Regional Arbitration Branch.

Labor Arbiter Ricardo C. Nora (LA Nora) issued a Decision (June 16, 1997 Decision) declaring Bichara's demotion as
illegal, and accordingly, ordered PAL to reinstate Bichara to his position as flight purser. PAL filed an appeal before the
NLRC and later before the CA, both of which, however, upheld LA Nora's finding. PAL no longer appealed to the Court,
thus, it rendered the June 16, 1997 Decision final and executory on February 5, 2004.

During the pendency of the illegal demotion case before the CA, however, or on July 15, 1998, PAL implemented
another retrenchment program that resulted in the termination of Bichara's employment. This prompted him, along
with more than 1,400 other retrenched flight attendants, represented by the Flight Attendants and Stewards Association
of the Philippines (FASAP), to file on June 22, 1998, a separate complaint for unfair labor practice, illegal retrenchment
with claims for reinstatement and payment of salaries, allowances, backwages, and damages against PAL which remains
pending as of this time.

On July 9, 2005, Bichara reached the 60 year-old compulsory retirement age under the PAL-FASAP Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA).
On January 31, 2008, Bichara filed a motion for execution of LA Nora's June 16, 1997 Decision, which PAL opposed by
arguing that the "complaint for illegal demotion was overtaken by supervening events, i.e., the retrenchment of
[Bichara] in 1998 and his having reached [the] compulsory retirement age in 2005.

LA Ruling: Labor Arbiter Antonio R. Macam (LA Macam) granted Bichara's motion for execution, thus, directing the
issuance of a writ of execution against PAL and/ or a certain Jose Garcia to jointly and severally pay Bichara: (a)
separation pay in lieu of reinstatement equivalent to one (1) month's pay for every year of service counting from
October 28, 1968 up to the present, excluding the period from April 1, 1971 until May 15, 1975, or a period of 35 years;
and (b) attorney's fees in the amount of P20,000.00.

LA Macam declared that, notwithstanding the pendency before this Court of the illegal retrenchment case, i.e., FASAP
case, Bichara's termination was invalid, given that: (a) PAL did not use a fair and reasonable criteria in effecting the
retrenchment; ( b) PAL disregarded the labor arbiters' rulings in the illegal demotion and illegal retrenchment cases
which were both immediately executory; and ( c) retrenchment was made during the pendency of the illegal demotion
case without the permission of the court where the case was pending. For these reasons, Bichara was entitled to
reinstatement to his position as flight purser. However, since Bichara may no longer be reinstated in view of his
compulsory retirement in accordance with the CBA, LA Macam, instead, ordered PAL to pay Bichara separation pay with
the salary base of a flight purser.

NLRC Ruling: NLRC reversed and set aside LA Macam's February 4, 2009 Order and denied the motion for execution for
being moot and academic, considering Bichara's compulsory retirement in 2005, without prejudice to the latter's
entitlement to backwages and retirement benefits of a flight steward pursuant to this Court's final decision in the FASAP
case.

At the outset, the NLRC ruled that Bichara's reinstatement could have taken effect, if at all, only on January 31, 2008
when he sought the execution of the said relief. In this light, his reinstatement and corresponding backwages prior to
said date must therefore be based on the salary rate and other benefits attached to the position of flight steward to
which he was demoted/reverted. However, it declared that reinstatement is no longer possible as the same was
rendered moot and academic when he compulsorily retired in 2005. On the other hand, the NLRC concluded that the
matter of payment of monetary benefits is not for it to order since it is a relief pertaining to the pending FASAP case; as
such, Bichara should pursue payment of backwages when the decision in the FASAP case is due for execution. In this
relation, the NLRC remarked that LA Macam exceeded his authority in awarding separation pay in lieu of reinstatement,
since such relief is not contemplated in the decision sought to be executed, i.e., the June 16, 1997 Decision.

CA Ruling: reversed and set aside the NLRC's ruling. It did not find LA Macam to have exceeded his authority in ordering
the payment of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement since, in a long line of cases, this Court has consistently held that
when reinstatement is not possible due to over age, payment of separation pay is in place. The CA, however, observed
that since Bichara was one of the retrenched employees involved in the FASAP case, this Court's Decision dated October
2, 2009, wherein it ruled that the retrenchment was illegal and thereby stated that "[f]light attendants who have
reached their compulsory retirement age of retirement shall receive backwages up to the date of their retirement only,"
should be made to apply. Thus, instead of separation pay, Bichara is entitled to backwages from the time of his
retrenchment up to the time he reached the compulsory retirement age of 60. In addition, since the June 16, 1997
Decision, rendered in the illegal demotion case, had already become final and executory, he is entitled to salary
differentials of a flight purser from a flight attendant from March 21, 1994, i.e., the date of his demotion, up to the time
of his retrenchment in July 1998. He is also entitled to retirement benefits in accordance with the existing CBA at the
time of his retirement.

Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in reversing the NLRC 's Decision and thereby awarding Bichara the aforementioned
monetary awards?

Ruling:
A judgment should be implemented according to the terms of its dispositive portion is a long and well-established rule.
As such, where the writ of execution is not in harmony with and exceeds the judgment which gives it life, the writ has pro
tanto no validity.

A companion to this rule is the principle of immutability of final judgments, which states that a final judgment may no
longer be altered, amended or modified, even if the alteration, amendment or modification is meant to correct what is
perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law and regardless of what court renders it. Any attempt to insert,
change or add matters not clearly contemplated in the dispositive portion violates the rule on immutability of
judgments.43 But like any other rule, this principle has exceptions, namely: (1) the correction of clerical errors; (2) the
so-called nunc pro tune entries which cause no prejudice to any party; (3) void judgments; and ( 4) whenever
circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and ineguitable.

PAL's supervening retrenchment of its employees, which included Bichara, in July 1998, and his compulsory retirement
in July 2005, however, prevent the enforcement of the reinstatement of Bichara to the position of flight purser under
the June 16, 1997 Decision. Nonetheless, since this Decision had already settled the illegality of Bichara's demotion with
finality, this Court finds that Bichara should, instead, be awarded the salary differential of a flight purser from a flight
steward from the time of his illegal demotion on March 21, 1994 up until the time he was retrenched in July 1998.
Notably, unlike LA Macam's award of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement, the award of salary differential is not
dependent on the validity of his termination, as it is, in fact, intrinsically linked to the illegality of Bichara's demotion.
Hence, with this direct relation, there should be no obstacle in rendering this award.

Further, it should be pointed out that the principle of immutability of judgments, from which the above-stated rule on
writ of executions proceed, allow courts, as an exception, to recognize circumstances that transpire after the finality of
the decision which would render its execution unjust and inequitable and act accordingly. Thus, in view of the
supervening events above-mentioned, this Court deems the award of salary differential to be the just and equitable
award under the circumstances herein prevailing. Jurisprudence holds that courts may modify or alter the judgment to
harmonize the same with justice and the facts when after judgment has been rendered and the latter has become final,
facts and circumstances transpire which render its execution impossible or unjust, as in this case.

SM Land, Inc. v. Bases Conversion and Development Authority

G.R. No. 203655, September 7, 2015
Special Third Division
Velasco, Jr., J.
Subject: Remedial Law

Facts:
There exists between SMLI and BCDA a perfected agreement, embodied in the Certification of Successful Negotiations,
upon which certain rights and obligations spring forth, including the commencement of activities for the solicitation for
comparative proposals.

Under the agreement and the National Economic Development Authority Joint Venture Guidelines (NEDA JV Guidelines),
the BCDA is duty-bound to proceed with and complete the competitive challenge after the detailed negotiations proved
successful. However, the BCDA cancelled the competitive challenge prior to its completion which gravely abused its
discretion for having acted arbitrarily and contrary to its contractual commitment to SMLI, to the damage and prejudice
of the latter.

The cancellation of the competitive challenge, in violation not only of the agreement between the parties but also of the
NEDA JV Guidelines, was only due to BCDA’s whims and caprices, and is correctible by the extraordinary writ of
certiorari. Hence the respondent-movant urge this Court to reconsider its August 13, 2014 Decision by filing a and to
Admit the Attached Second Motion for Reconsideration (With Motion for the Court en banc to Take Cognizance of this
Case and/to Set the Case for Oral Argument Before the Court en banc).

Issue: Whether or not the Second Motion for Reconsideration of the respondent- movant be granted?

Ruling:

No.
With the foregoing disquisitions, respondent-movants’ second motion for reconsideration, as its first, is totally bereft of
merit. There exists no argument “in the higher interest of justice” that would convincingly compel this Court to even
admit the prohibited pleading. It also then goes without saying that this Division does not find cogent reason to elevate
the matter to the Court en banc. Furthermore, it is well to note that the Court’s ruling in this case has already attained
finality and an Entry of Judgment has correspondingly been issued. The Court, therefore, no longer has jurisdiction to
modify the Decision granting SMLI’s petition for its finality and executoriness consequently rendered it immutable and
unalterable.

The rationale behind the rule is explained in Manila Electric Company v. Barlis, thusly:

“The propriety or acceptability of such a second motion for reconsideration is not contingent upon the averment of
“new” grounds to assail the judgment, i.e., grounds other than those theretofore presented and rejected. Otherwise,
attainment of finality of a judgment might be staved off indefinitely, depending on the party’s ingeniousness or
cleverness in conceiving and formulating “additional flaws” or “newly discovered errors” therein, or thinking up some
injury or prejudice to the rights of the movant for reconsideration. “Piece-meal” impugnation of a judgment by
successive motions for reconsideration is anathema, being precluded by the salutary axiom that a party seeking the
setting aside of a judgment, act or proceeding must set out in his motion all the grounds therefor, and those not so
included are deemed waived and cease to be available for subsequent motions. For all litigation must come to an end at
some point, in accordance with established rules of procedure and jurisprudence. As a matter of practice and policy,
courts must dispose of every case as promptly as possible; and in fulfillment of their role in the administration of justice,
they should brook no delay in the termination of cases by stratagems or maneuverings of parties or their lawyers.”

Indeed, all cases are to eventually reach a binding conclusion and must not remain indefinitely afloat in limbo.
Otherwise, the exercise of judicial power would be for naught if court decisions can effectively be thwarted at every turn
by dilatory tactics that prevent the said rulings from attaining finality. Hence, the Court has taken a conservative stance
when entertaining second motions for reconsideration, allowing only those grounded on extraordinarily persuasive
reasons and, even then, only upon express leave first obtained.

As proscribed under Sec. 3, Rule 15 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court: SEC. 3. Second motion for
reconsideration. – The Court shall not entertain a second motion for reconsideration, and any exception to this rule can
only be granted in the higher interest of justice by the Court en banc upon a vote of at least two-thirds of its actual
membership. There is reconsideration “in the higher interest of justice” when the assailed decision is not only legally
erroneous, but is likewise patently unjust and potentially capable of causing unwarranted and irremediable injury or
damage to the parties. A second motion for reconsideration can only be entertained before the ruling sought to be
considered becomes final by operation of law or by the Court’s declaration.
In the Division, a vote of three Members shall be required to elevate a second motion for reconsideration to the Court
En Banc. (emphasis added)

Succinctly put, the concurrence of the following elements are required for a second motion for reconsideration to be
entertained:

1.The motion should satisfactorily explain why granting the same would be in the higher interest of justice;

2.The motion must be made before the ruling sought to be reconsidered attains finality;

3.If the ruling sought to be reconsidered was rendered by the Court through one of its Divisions, at least three (3)
members of the said Division should vote to elevate the case to the Court En Banc; and

4.The favorable vote of at least two-thirds of the Court En Banc’sactual membership must be mustered for the second
motion for reconsideration to be granted.

Unfortunately for respondent-movants, the foregoing requirements do not obtain in the case at bench. To begin with,
there are no extraordinarily persuasive reasons “in the higher interest of justice” on which the instant second motion for
reconsideration is anchored on.

Republic of the Philippines v. Rev. Claudio R. Cortez, Sr.

G.R. No. 197472, September 7, 2015
Second Division
Del Castillo, J.
Subject: Remedial Law

Facts:
Respondent Rev. Claudio R. Cortez, Sr. (Rev. Cortez), a missionary by vocation engaged in humanitarian and charitable
activities, established an orphanage and school in Punta Verde, Palaui Island, San Vicente, Sta. Ana, Cagayan. He
claimed that since 1962, he has been in peaceful possession of about 50 hectares of land located in the western portion
of Palaui Island in Sitio Siwangag, Sta. Ana, Cagayan which he, with the help of Aetas and other people under his care,
cleared and developed for agricultural purposes in order to support his charitable, humanitarian and missionary works.

On May 22, 1967, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Proclamation No. 201 reserving for military purposes a parcel of
the public domain situated in Palaui Island. Pursuant thereto, 2,000 hectares of the southern half portion of the Palaui
Island were withdrawn from sale or settlement and reserved for the use of the Philippine Navy, subject, however, to
private rights if there be any.

On August 16, 1994, President Fidel V. Ramos issued Proclamation No. 447 declaring Palaui Island and the surrounding
waters situated in the Municipality of Sta. Ana, Cagayan as marine reserve.

On June 13, 2000, Rev. Cortez filed a Petition for Injunction with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction against Rogelio C. Biñas (Biñas) in his capacity as Commanding Officer of the Philippine Naval
Command in Port San Vicente, Sta. Ana, Cagayan.

RTC Ruling: Granted the application for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. However, the same pertained to five
hectares (subject area) only, not to the whole 50 hectares claimed to have been occupied by Rev. Cortez and make the
injunction final and permanent.

Issue: Whether Rev. Cortez is entitled to a final writ of mandatory injunction?

Ruling:
No.
“Injunction is a judicial writ, process or proceeding whereby a party is directed either to do a particular act, in which case
it is called a mandatory injunction, [as in this case,] or to refrain from doing a particular act, in which case it is called a
prohibitory injunction. “It may be the main action or merely a provisional remedy for and as an incident in the main
action.”

“The main action for injunction is distinct from the provisional or ancillary remedy of preliminary injunction.” A
preliminary injunction does not determine the merits of a case or decide controverted facts. Since it is a mere
preventive remedy, it only seeks to prevent threatened wrong, further injury and irreparable harm or injustice until the
rights of the parties are settled. “It is usually granted when it is made to appear that there is a substantial controversy
between the parties and one of them is committing an act or threatening the immediate commission of an act that will
cause irreparable injury or destroy the status quo of the controversy before a full hearing can be had on the merits of
the case.” A preliminary injunction is granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to judgment or final order.
For its issuance, the applicant is required to show, at least tentatively, that he has a right which is not vitiated by any
substantial challenge or contradiction. Simply stated, the applicant needs only to show that he has the ostensible right
to the final relief prayed for in his complaint.

On the other hand, the main action for injunction seeks a judgment that embodies a final injunction. A final injunction is
one which perpetually restrains the party or person enjoined from the commission or continuance of an act, or in case of
mandatory injunctive writ, one which confirms the preliminary mandatory injuction. It is issued when the court, after
trial on the merits, is convinced that the applicant is entitled to have the act or acts complained of permanently
enjoined. Otherwise stated, it is only after the court has come up with a definite pronouncement respecting an
applicant’s right and of the act violative of such right, based on its appreciation of the evidence presented, that a final
injunction is issued. To be a basis for a final and permanent injunction, the right and the act violative thereof must be
established by the applicant with absolute certainty.

Indeed, the RTC endeavored to provide a narrow distinction between a preliminary injunction and a final injunction.
Despite this, the RTC apparently confused itself. For one, what it cited in its Decision were jurisprudence relating to
preliminary injunction and/or mandatory injunction as an ancillary writ and not as a final injunction. At that point, the
duty of the RTC was to determine, based on the evidence presented during trial, if Rev. Cortez has conclusively
established his claimed right (as opposed to preliminary injunction where an applicant only needs to at least tentatively
show that he has a right) over the subject area. This is considering that the existence of such right plays an important
part in determining whether the preliminary writ of mandatory injunction should be confirmed. Surprisingly, however,
the said Decision is bereft of the trial court’s factual findings on the matter as well as of its analysis of the same vis-a-vis
applicable jurisprudence. As it is, the said Decision merely contains a restatement of the parties’ respective allegations
in the Complaint and the Answer, followed by a narration of the ensuing proceedings, an enumeration of the evidence
submitted by Rev. Cortez, a recitation of jurisprudence relating to preliminary injunction and/or specifically, to
mandatory injunction as an ancillary writ, a short reference to the IPRA which the Court finds to be irrelevant and finally,
a conclusion that a final and permanent injunction should issue. No discussion whatsoever was made with respect to
whether Rev. Cortez was able to establish with absolute certainty his claimed right over the subject area. Section 14,
Article VIII of the Constitution, as well as Section 1 of Rule 36 and Section 1, Rule 120 of the Rules on Civil Procedure,
similarly state that a decision, judgment or final order determining the merits of the case shall state, clearly and
distinctly, the facts and the law on which it is based. Pertinently, the Court issued on January 28, 1988 Administrative
Circular No. 1, which requires judges to make complete findings of facts in their decision, and scrutinize closely the legal
aspects of the case in the light of the evidence presented, and avoid the tendency to generalize and to form conclusion
without detailing the facts from which such conclusions are deduced.

Clearly, the Decision of the RTC in this case failed to comply with the aforestated guidelines.

Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State. Hence, “[a]ll lands not appearing
to be clearly under private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Also, public lands remain part of the
inalienable land of the public domain unless the State is shown to have reclassified or alienated them to private
persons.” To prove that a land is alienable, the existence of a positive act of the government, such as presidential
proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation report of Bureau of Lands investigators; and
a legislative act or a statute declaring the land as alienable and disposable must be established.
In this case, there is no such proof showing that the subject portion of Palaui Island has been declared alienable and
disposable when Rev. Cortez started to occupy the same. Hence, it must be considered as still inalienable public domain.
Being such, it cannot be appropriated and therefore not a proper subject of possession under Article 530 of the Civil
Code. Viewed in this light, Rev. Cortez’ claimed right of possession has no leg to stand on. His possession of the subject
area, even if the same be in the concept of an owner or no matter how long, cannot produce any legal effect in his favor
since the property cannot be lawfully possessed in the first place.

Bureu of Customs v. The Honorable Agnes Vst Devanadera, Acting Secretary, DOJ, et.al.
G.R. No. 193253, September 8, 2015
En Banc
Peralta, J.
Subject: Tax Law; Remedial Law

Facts:
Private respondent UNIOIL Petroleum Philippines, Inc. is engaged in marketing, distribution, and sale of petroleum, oil
and other products, while its co-respondent OILINK International, Inc. is engaged in manufacturing, importing, exporting,
buying, selling, or otherwise dealing in at wholesale and retails of petroleum, oil, gas and of any and all refinements and
by-products thereof.

Commissioner Napoleon L. Morales of petitioner Bureau of Customs (BOC) issued Audit Notification Letter(ANL),
informing the President of OILINK that the Post Entry Audit Group (PEAG) of the BOC will be conducting a compliance
audit, including the examination, inspection, verification and/or investigation of all pertinent records of OILINK's import
transactions for the past three (3)-year period.

A pre-audit conference was held between the BOC Audit Team and the representatives of OILINK. During the
conference, the Audit Team explained to OILINK representatives the purpose of the post-entry audit and the manner by
which it would be conducted, and advised it as to the import documents required for such audit.

OILINK submitted to the Audit Team the requested documents. However, the Audit Team requested OILINK to submit
the other documents stated in the List of Initial Requirements for Submission. But OILINK failed to comply which
resulted to the filing of administrative case against it.

On September 20, 2007, an Order was issued by the Legal Service of the BOC,
submitting the case for resolution in view of OILINK's failure to file its Answer within the prescribed period.

On December 14, 2007, the Legal Service of the BOC rendered a Decision finding that OILINK violated Section IV.A.2(c)
and (e) of CAO 4-20047 when it refused to furnish the Audit Team copies of the required documents, despite repeated
demands. Pursuant to the Decision, Commissioner Morales, in a letter of even date, directed the President of OILINK to
pay the BOC the administrative fine of 2,764,859,304.80 for violation of CAO No. 4-2004, in relation to Section 2504 of
the TCCP.
On March 13, 2008, Atty. Noemi B. Alcala, Officer-in-Charge, Collection Service, Revenue and Monitoring Group, sent a
final demand letter for OILINK to settle the administrative fine, otherwise, the BOC will be compelled to file the
necessary legal action and put in force Section 150811 of the TCCP against its succeeding shipments to protect the
government's interest.

On April 23, 2008, a Hold Order was issued by Horacio P. Suansing, Jr., District Collector, Port of Manila, against all
shipments of OILINK for failure to settle its outstanding account with the BOC and to protect the interest of the
government pursuant to Section 1508 of the TCCP.

On May 2, 2008, Rochelle E. Vicencio, Corporate Administrative Supervisor of UNIOIL, citing the existing Terminalling
Agreement with OILINK for the Storage of UNIOIL's aromatic process oil and industrial lubricating oils (collectively, “base
oils”), requested District Collector Suansing Jr. to allow it to withdraw base oils from OILINK's temporarily closed
Terminal.

On May 6, 2008, Commissioner Morales granted the request of UNIOIL to withdraw its base oils stored at OILINK's
terminal/depot.

On May 9, 2008, a Warrant of Seizure and Detention (WSD) was issued by District Collector Suansing Jr., directing the
BOC officials to seal and padlock the oil tanks/depots of OILINK located in Bataan.

On May 12, 2008, Kenneth C. Pundanera, Operations Manager of UNIOIL, requested Zaldy E. Almoradie, District
Collector of Mariveles, Bataan, for permission to release UNIOIL-owned products from OILINK's storage terminal. In the
same request letter, District Collector Almoradie approved the release of the above petroleum products through a
handwritten note.

On May 15, 2008, Pundanera wrote a clarificatory letter pursuant to the verbal instruction of District Collector
Almoradie to explain the withdrawal of products from the Terminal of OILINK.

In a complaint-affidavit dated December 15, 2008, Atty. Balmyrson M. Valdez, a member of the petitioner BOC's Anti-Oil
Smuggling Coordinating Committee that investigated the illegal withdrawal by UNIOIL of oil products consigned to
OILINK, valued at 181,988,627.00 with corresponding duties and taxes in the amount of 35,507,597.00, accused the
private respondents of violation of Sections 360118 and 3602,19 in relation to Sections 250320 and 2530, paragraphs f
and l (3), (4) and (5), of the TCCP.

In a letter dated December 15, 2008, Commissioner Morales referred to the Office of Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R.
Zuño the said complaint-affidavit, together with its annexes, for preliminary investigation. During the said investigation,
BOC's counsel appeared and all of the private respondents submitted their respective counter-affidavits.

In a Resolution dated May 29, 2009, public respondent Arman A. De Andres, State Prosecutor of the Department of
Justice (DOJ), recommended the dismissal of the complaint-affidavit for lack of probable cause. The Resolution was
approved by public respondents Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Pedrito L. Rances and Chief State Prosecutor Zuño. On
automatic review, the Resolution was affirmed by then Secretary of Justice Raul M. Gonzales.
Dissatisfied, the BOC filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the public respondent, the Acting Secretary
of Justice Agnes VST Devanadera, in a Resolution dated December 28, 2009.

On March 11, 2010, the BOC filed a petition for certiorari with the CA.

In the Resolution dated March 26, 2010, the CA dismissed outright the petition due to procedural defects: The instant
petition (i) contains no explanation why service thereof was not done personally (Sec. 11, Rule 13, 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure); (ii) shows that it has no proper verification and certification against forum shopping and (iii) the docket and
other lawful fees payment is short by P1,530.00.26

In the Resolution dated August 4, 2010, the CA denied the private respondents' motion for reconsideration of the
March 26, 2010 Resolution, as follows:

We made a cursory examination of the petition filed in this case as well as the whole rollo of the case. It is our finding
that, up to the date hereof, the petitioner has not duly submitted to this Court another set of petition with a
certification against forum shopping embodied therein or appended thereto. Thus, the petition really suffers from a fatal
defect until now, and so, the petitioner has to bear the consequence thereof.
The CA stressed that procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance may
have resulted in prejudice to a party's substantive rights. Like all rules, they are required to be followed except only
when, for the most persuasive of reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate
with the degree of thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed. While it is true that litigation is not
a game of technicalities, this does not mean that Rules of Court may be ignored at will and at random to the prejudice of
the orderly presentation and assessment of the issues and their just resolution.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the Honorable CA erred when it denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration solely on the ground
that it did not receive the second and complete copy of the Petition containing the Verification and Certification Against
Forum Shopping?

2. Whether or not the CA has certiorari jurisdiction over the resolution of the Acting Secretary of Justice, affirming the
dismissal of the complaint-affidavit for violation of provisions of the TCCP due to lack of probable cause?

Ruling:

1. Yes.
Despite the BOC's failed attempt to comply with the requirement of verification and certification against forum
shopping, the Court cannot simply ignore the CA's perfunctory dismissal of the petition on such sole procedural ground
vis-à-vis the paramount public interest in the subject matter and the substantial amount involved, i.e., the alleged illegal
withdrawal of oil products worth 181,988,627.00 with corresponding duties and taxes worth 35,507,597.00. Due to the
presence of such special circumstances and in the interest of justice, the CA should have at least passed upon the
substantive issue raised in the petition, instead of dismissing it on such procedural ground. Although it does not condone
the failure of BOC to comply with the said basic requirement, the Court is constrained to exercise the inherent power to
suspend its own rules in order to do justice in this particular case.

Given that the petition for certiorari should have been filed with the CTA, the mistake committed by the BOC in filing
such petition before the CA may be excused. In this regard, Court takes note that nothing in R.A. No. 1125, as amended
by R.A. No. 9282, indicates that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 may be filed with the CTA. Despite the enactment
of R.A. No. 9282 on March 30, 2004, it was only about ten (10) years later in the case of City of Manila v. Hon. Grecia-
Cuerdo that the Court ruled that the authority of the CTA to take cognizance of such petitions is included in the powers
granted by the Constitution, as well as inherent in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. While the rule on perfection
of appeals cannot be classified as a difficult question of law, mistake in the construction or application of a doubtful
question of law, as in this case, may be considered as a mistake of fact, excusing the BOC from the consequences of the
erroneous filing of its petition with the CA.

2. No. CTA has jurisdiction not CA.

The elementary rule is that the CA has jurisdiction to review the resolution of the DOJ through a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court on the ground that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of his discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.32 However, with the enactment of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9282, amending
R.A. No. 112534 by expanding the jurisdiction of the CTA, enlarging its membership and elevating its rank to the level of
a collegiate court with special jurisdiction, it is no longer clear which between the CA and the CTA has jurisdiction to
review through a petition for certiorari the DOJ resolution in preliminary investigations involving tax and tariff offenses.

Since the Court ruled in City of Manila v. Hon. Grecia-Cuerdo that the CTA has jurisdiction over a special civil action for
certiorari questioning an interlocutory order of the RTC in a local tax case via express constitutional mandate and for
being inherent in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, it can also be reasonably concluded based on the same
premise that the CTA has original jurisdiction over a petition for certiorari assailing the DOJ resolution in a preliminary
investigation involving tax and tariff offenses.

If the Court were to rule that jurisdiction over a petition for certiorari assailing such DOJ resolution lies with the CA, it
would be confirming the exercise by two judicial bodies, the CA and the CTA, of jurisdiction over basically the same
subject matter – precisely the split-jurisdiction situation which is anathema to the orderly administration of justice. The
Court cannot accept that such was the legislative intent, especially considering that R.A. No. 9282 expressly confers on
the CTA, the tribunal with the specialized competence over tax and tariff matters, the role of judicial review over local
tax cases without mention of any other court that may exercise such power.

Concededly, there is no clear statement under R.A. No. 1125, the amendatory R.A. No. 9282, let alone in the
Constitution, that the CTA has original jurisdiction over a petition for certiorari. By virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution, vesting judicial power in the Supreme Court and such lower courts as may be established by law, to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government, in relation to Section 5(5), Article VIII thereof, vesting upon it the power to promulgate rules concerning
practice and procedure in all courts, the Court thus declares that the CA's original jurisdiction over a petition for
certiorari assailing the DOJ resolution in a preliminary investigation involving tax and tariff offenses was necessarily
transferred to the CTA pursuant to Section 7 of R.A. No. 9282,40 and that such petition shall be governed by Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court, as amended. Accordingly, it is the CTA, not the CA, which has jurisdiction over the petition for
certiorari assailing the DOJ resolution of dismissal of the BOC's complaint-affidavit against private respondents for
violation of the TCCP.

Watercraft Venture Corporation v. Alfred Raymond Wolfe

G.R. No. 181721, September 9, 2015
Third Division
Peralta, J.
Subject: Remedial Law

Facts:
Watercraft is engaged in the business of building, repairing, storing and maintaining yachts, boats and other pleasure
crafts at the Subic Bay Freeport Zone, Subic, Zambales.

Sometime in June 1997, Watercraft hired respondent Alfred Raymond Wolfe (Wolfe), a British national and resident of
Subic Bay Freeport Zone, Zambales, as its Shipyard Manager. During his empolyment, Wolfe stored the sailboat, Knotty
Gull, within Watercraft's boat storage facilities, but never paid for the storage fees.

On March 7, 2002, Watercraft terminated the employment of Wolfe. Wolfe, then, pulled out his sailboat from
Watercraft's storage facilities after signing a Boat Pull-Out Clearance dated June 29, 2002 where he allegedly
acknowledged the outstanding obligation of Sixteen Thousand Three Hundred and Twenty-Four and 82/100 US Dollars
(US$16,324.82) representing unpaid boat storage fees for the period of June 1997 to June 2002. Despite repeated
demands, he failed to pay the said amount.

Thus, on July 7, 2005, Watercraft filed against Wolfe a Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money with Damages with an
Application for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Attachment.

RTC Ruling: granted the ex parte Application of the Writ of attachment.

CA Ruling: Declared the Writ of Attachment null and void.

Issues:
1. Whether the ex-parte issuance of the preliminary attachment by the trial court in favor of the petitioner is valid?

2. Whether the allegations in the affidavit of merit concerning fraud are sufficient to warrant the issuance of a
preliminary attachment by the trial court in favor of the petitioner?

Ruling:

1. No.
A writ of preliminary attachment is defined as a provisional remedy issued upon order of the court where an action is
pending to be levied upon the property or properties of the defendant therein, the same to be held thereafter by the
sheriff as security for the satisfaction of whatever judgment that might be secured in the said action by the attaching
creditor against the defendant. However, it should be resorted to only when necessary and as a last remedy because it
exposes the debtor to humiliation and annoyance. It must be granted only on concrete and specific grounds and not
merely on general averments quoting the words of the rules. Since attachment is harsh, extraordinary, and summary in
nature, the rules on the application of a writ of attachment must be strictly construed in favor of the defendant.

For the issuance of an ex-parte issuance of the preliminary attachment to be valid, an affidavit of merit and an
applicant's bond must be filed with the court in which the action is pending. Such bond executed to the adverse party in
the amount fixed by the court is subject to the conditions that the applicant will pay:
(1) all costs which may be adjudged to the adverse party; and
(2) all damages which such party may sustain by reason of the attachment, if the court shall finally adjudge that the
applicant was not entitled thereto.

As to the requisite affidavit of merit, Section 3, Rule 57of the Rules of Court states that an order of attachment shall be
granted only when it appears in the affidavit of the applicant, or of some other person who personally knows the facts:
1.that a sufficient cause of action exists;
2.that the case is one of those mentioned in Section 117 hereof;
3.that there is no other sufficient security for the claim sought to be enforced by the action; and
4.that the amount due to the applicant, or the value of the property the possession of which he is entitled to recover, is
as much as the sum for which the order is granted above all legal counterclaims,

2. No.

The mere filing of an affidavit reciting the facts required by Section 3, Rule 57, however, is not enough to compel the
judge to grant the writ of preliminary attachment. Whether or not the affidavit sufficiently established facts therein
stated is a question to be determined by the court in the exercise of its discretion.“The sufficiency or insufficiency of an
affidavit depends upon the amount of credit given it by the judge, and its acceptance or rejection, upon his sound
discretion.”

In Liberty Insurance Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the Court explained that to constitute a ground for attachment in
Section 1(d), Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, it must be shown that the debtor in contracting the debt or incurring the
obligation intended to defraud the creditor.

A debt is fraudulently contracted if at the time of contracting it, the debtor has a preconceived plan or intention not to
pay. “The fraud must relate to the execution of the agreement and must have been the reason which induced the other
party into giving consent which he would not have otherwise given.”

Fraudulent intent is not a physical entity, but a condition of the mind beyond the reach of the senses, usually kept
secret, very unlikely to be confessed, and therefore, can only be proved by unguarded expressions, conduct and
circumstances. Thus, the applicant for a writ of preliminary attachment must sufficiently show the factual circumstances
of the alleged fraud because fraudulent intent cannot be inferred from the debtor's mere non-payment of the debt or
failure to comply with his obligation. The particulars of such circumstances necessarily include the time, persons, places
and specific acts of fraud committed. An affidavit which does not contain concrete and specific grounds is inadequate to
sustain the issuance of such writ. In fact, mere general averments render the writ defective and the court that ordered
its issuance acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.

In this case, Watercraft's Affidavit of Preliminary Attachment does not contain specific allegations of other factual
circumstances to show that Wolfe, at the time of contracting the obligation, had a preconceived plan or intention not to
pay. Neither can it be inferred from such affidavit the particulars of why he was guilty of fraud in the performance of
such obligation. To be specific, Watercraft's following allegation is unsupported by any particular averment of
circumstances that will show why or how such inference or conclusion was arrived at, to wit: “16. For failing to pay for
the use [of] facilities and services - in the form of boat storage facilities - duly enjoyed by him and for failing and refusing
to fulfill his promise to pay for the said boat storage fees, the Defendant is clearly guilty of fraud x x x.” It is not an
allegation of essential facts constituting Watercraft's causes of action, but a mere conclusion of law.

Le Soleil Int’l. Logistic Co., Inc., et.al. v. Vicente Sanchez

G.R. No. 199384, September 9, 2015
First Division
Perez, J.
Subject: Remedial Law

Facts:
On 16 September 2011, the CA issued a Resolution dismissing the Petition for Certiorari filed by petitioners for failing to
perfect their petition for certiorari within the 60-day reglementary period provided under the Revised Rules of Court.

The Court resolves to dismiss the petition outright on the following grounds:

First, the petition was filed three (3) days late on September 5, 2011. Under Section 4, Rule 65 Revised Rules of the Civil
Procedure, as amended by AM No. 07-7-12-SC, petitions for certiorari must be filed strictly within 60 days from notice of
the judgment or order denying their motion for reconsideration. Having received a copy of June 4, 2011 Resolution
denying the motion for reconsideration of the assailed April 25, 2011 Decision on July 24, 2011, petitioners had up to
September 2, 2011 only to file the petition for certiorari.

Second, the petition contains no statement of the specific material dates showing when petitioners received a copy of
the assailed April 25, 2011 Decision of the court a quo when a motion for reconsideration was filed, contrary to Section
3, Rule 46 of the 1997 Rules.

Third, the petition does not state the date of issue of petitioners’ counsel’s Mandatory Continuing Legal Education
(MCLE) Certificate of Compliance, as required under Bar Matter No. 1922, dated June 3, 2008.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the CA erred in not exercising its equity jurisdiction as enunciated by jurisprudence on the matter?

Ruling:

1. No.

The general rule is that a timely appeal is the remedy to obtain reversal or modification of the judgment on the merits.
This is true even if one of the errors to be assigned on appeal is the lack of jurisdiction on the part of the court rendering
the judgment over the subject matter, or the exercise of power by said court is in excess of its jurisdiction, or the making
of its findings of fact or of law set out in the decision is attended by grave abuse of discretion. In other words, the
perfection of an appeal within the reglementary period is mandatory because the failure to perfect the appeal within
the time prescribed by the Rules of Court unavoidably renders the judgment final as to preclude the appellate court
from acquiring the jurisdiction to review the judgment.

The pertinent rules on the perfection of a petition for certiorari is set forth under Section 4 of Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC.
Petition for certiorari should be instituted within a period of 60 days from notice of the judgment, order, or resolution
sought to be assailed. The 60-day period is inextendible to avoid any unreasonable delay that would violate the
constitutional rights of parties to a speedy disposition of their case. Rules of procedure must be faithfully complied with
and should not be discarded with the mere expediency of claiming substantial merit. As a corollary, rules prescribing the
time for doing specific acts or for taking certain proceedings are considered absolutely indispensable to prevent
needless delays and to orderly and promptly discharge judicial business. By their very nature, these rules are regarded as
mandatory.

Aniceto Uy v. CA
G.R. No. 173186, September 16, 2015
Third Division
Jardeleza, J.
Subject: Remedial Law

Facts:
Carmencita Naval-Sai (Naval-Sai) is the owner of a parcel of land covered by TCTs No. T-58334 and No. T-58335, Lots No.
54-B-8 (LRC) and No. 54-B-9 respectively.

Subsequently, Naval-Sai sold Lot No. 54-B-7 (LRC) to a certain Bobby Adil on installment, on the condition that the
absolute deed of sale will be executed only upon full payment. Adil failed to pay the amortization, forcing him to sell his
unfinished building on the property to spouses Francisco and Louella Omandac.

Meanwhile, Naval-Sai borrowed money from a certain Grace Ng. As security, Naval-Sai delivered to Ng TCTs No. T-58334
and No.T-58335 covering Lots No. 54-B-8 and No. 54-B-9, respectively. Ng, on the other hand, borrowed money from
petitioner and also delivered to the latter the two titles to guarantee payment of the loan.

Sometime thereafter, Naval-Sai learned that petitioner filed a case for recovery of possession (Civil Case No. 1007)
against Francisco Omandac which Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Kidapawan City ruled in favor of petitioner. Naval-Sai filed
a motion for new trial before the Court of Appeals, arguing that her signature in the purported deed of sale presented in
the case between her and petitioner was a forgery. Civil Case No. 1007, however, became final and executory in 2001.

The spouses Omandac were ejected from the property and petitioner gained possession of the same. In July 1999,
Naval-Sai filed a Complaint for Annulment of Deed with Damages before the same Branch 17 of the RTC in Kidapawan
City against petitioner. The subject of the complaint was the deed of sale allegedly executed between Naval-Sai and
petitioner involving Lots No. 54-B-8 and No. 54-B-9. Naval-Sai prayed that the deed of sale be declared null and void ab
initio because the alleged sale between her and petitioner was a forgery. Naval-Sai argued that she never sold the lots
and that her signature in the purported deed of sale is spurious.

Naval-Sai filed an Amended Complaint. She asserted that the subject TCTs were already cancelled by virtue of the deed
of sale. TCT No. T-62446 was issued in lieu of TCT No. T-58334 and TCT No. T-62447 replaced TCT No. T-58335. Hence,
the Amended Complaint added as a relief the declaration of TCTs No. T-62446 and No.T-62447, which were registered in
the name of petitioner, as null and void ab initio. Unlike the original complaint, however, the Amended Complaint was
not signed by Naval-Sai, but by her counsel.

Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred when it ruled that there was substantial compliance with the requirements on
Certification for Non-Forum Shopping?

Ruling:

No

A certification against forum shopping is a peculiar and personal responsibility of the party, an assurance given to the
court or other tribunal that there are no other pending cases involving basically the same parties, issues and causes of
action. It must be executed by the party-pleader, not by his counsel. If, however, for reasonable or justifiable reasons,
the party-pleader is unable to sign, he must execute a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) designating his counsel of record
to sign on his behalf.

Here, the original complaint contained a proper verification and certification against forum shopping duly signed by
Naval-Sai as plaintiff. The verification and certification in the amended complaint, on the other hand, was only signed by
her counsel, Atty. Norberto L. Ela. Atty. Ela was not authorized to sign on behalf of Naval-Sai, as in fact, she assigned
one Rodolfo Florentino as agent. The Court of Appeals pointed out that in the certification in the amended complaint,
Atty. Ela specified that it should be taken and read together with the original complaint. The Court of Appeals took this
as a cautionary move on the part of Naval-Sai, justifying the relaxation of the rules on the ground of substantial
compliance. We find, however, that this cautionary move is ineffectual because under the Rules of Civil Procedure, an
amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. For all intents and purposes, therefore, the original complaint
and its verification and certification ceased to exist. This, notwithstanding, we find there was still substantial compliance
with the Rules.

Eduardo Bandillon, et.al. v. La Filipina Uygongco Corporation

G.R. No. 202446, Septmeber 16, 2015
Third Division
Peralta, J.
Subject: Remedial Law

Facts:
Eduardo Bandillion, et al. (employees) are truck drivers and employees of respondent La Filipina Uygongco Corporation
(LFUC). They filed a complaint for violation of labor standard laws against the latter before the DOLE Region VI. Upon
inspection, a finding of "no violation" was made by the Labor Enforcement Officer, a finding that was upheld on appeal
to the DOLE-VI Regional Director, who stated the same in an Order dated December 1, 1998.

The employees filed an appeal with the Secretary of Labor and Employment (DOLE Secretary). Thus, on June 4, 2003,
Acting DOLE Secretary Manuel G. Imson issued an Order overturning the previous order of the DOLE-VI Regional Director
finding LFUC liable for underpayment of wages, non-payment of holiday pay, rest day pay, and overtime pay.

Upon a denial of its motion for reconsideration by DOLE Secretary Patricia A. Sto. Tomas, LFUC filed a petition for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court denied the petition, however, and affirmed the decision of the
DOLE Secretary. The motion for reconsideration filed by LFUC was likewise denied by the court.
Thus, the case was elevated to this Court via a petition for certiorari but the same was dismissed by this Court. LFUC's
motion for reconsideration was likewise denied with finality in a Resolution. Then, Entry of Judgment was issued by
Court.

Consequently, as the employees filed a Motion for Execution before the DOLE Region VI to enforce the DOLE Secretary's
Order of June 4, 2003, it was discovered that Regional Director Carlos L. Boteros, on August 28, 2006, had already issued
an Order directing LFUC to pay the total amount of Php3,345,657.94 or Php88,043.63 for each of the employees in
differentials on wages, holiday pay, rest day pay and overtime pay. The DOLE Region VI then issued a Writ of Execution.

LFUC moved for the writ to be recalled, but the same was merely “noted without action” by the DOLE-VI Regional
Director, in a letter dated August 1, 2008.

After being served with the writ, LFUC filed a Petition for certiorari and injunction dated August 15, 2008 with the Court
of Appeals, seeking to set aside the writ of execution.

Subsequently, LFUC was served a copy of the Order dated August 28, 2006. Thus, on September 30, 2008, LFUC filed
with DOLE Region VI a Motion for Reconsideration (treated as an Appeal) of the Order dated August 28, 2006 of
Regional Director Boteros, wherein it called the said order a “Compliance Order” that was allegedly issued in grave
abuse of discretion for it deprived LFUC of its right to due process since the latter was not given the opportunity to
adduce evidence to refute the workers' allegations, specifically the latter's monetary claims.

The motion for reconsideration filed before DOLE Region VI was denied by Regional Director Aida Estabillo in a Decision
dated December 15, 2008. From that decision, LFUC filed an appeal to the DOLE Secretary via a Notice of Appeal and a
Memorandum of Appeal dated December 30, 2008.

On July 8, 2011, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution denying LFUC's application for Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) and submitting the case for decision.

The Court of Appeals found that the office of the DOLE-VI Regional Director arrived at its computations of the payment
due to the workers without any evidence from the parties, and without considering the fact that the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) has a final decision upholding as valid the dismissal of most of the employees. Hence, the
appellate court held that due process was not observed and ordered the case remanded to the DOLE-VI Regional
Director for the reception of evidence in order to properly compute the monetary claims of the employees.

The employees filed a motion for reconsideration of the appellate court's decision but, in the other assailed
Resolution33 dated May 24, 2012, the same was denied.

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari filed by the employees.

Issue:
1. Whether or not the petition filed by the petitioner is defective?
2. Whether or not the LFUC committed forum shopping?

Ruling:

1. No.
According to prevailing jurisprudence, neither the fact that Payda alone signed the petition's verification and
certification against forum shopping, nor the fact that the SPA authorizing the filing of the petition was not signed by all
petitioners, invalidate nor render the petition defective, as the present case is one of those instances when the rules are
interpreted more liberally in order to attain substantial justice. We hold that Payda's lone signature and the SPA signed
by most of the petitioners already substantially comply with the requirements for a properly and validly filed petition.
Indeed, Payda alone signed the verification and certification against forum shopping – as the person authorized in the
SPA to do so – but instead of rendering the petition defective or invalid, this Court, as it has previously ruled in Altres, et
al. v. Empleo, et al. regards the same as already in substantial compliance with the rules. In that case, it was held that in
certain instances, the signature of even just one person out of many petitioners in the verification and certification
against forum shopping can be deemed as enough to meet the requirements of the rules.

In sum, the Court laid down the guidelines as follows:

For the guidance of the bench and bar, the Court restates in capsule form the jurisprudential pronouncements already
reflected above respecting non-compliance with the requirements on, or submission of defective, verification and
certification against forum shopping:

1)A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the requirement on or submission of defective verification,
and non-compliance with the requirement on or submission of defective certification against forum shopping.
2 )As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein does not necessarily render the pleading fatally
defective. The court may order its submission or correction or act on the pleading if the attending circumstances are
such that strict compliance with the Rule may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be served thereby.

3) Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of
the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the petition have been
made in good faith or are true and correct.

4) As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein, unlike in verification, is
generally not curable by its subsequent submission or correction thereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rule on the
ground of “substantial compliance” or presence of “special circumstances or compelling reasons.”

5) The certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or petitioners in a case; otherwise, those
who did not sign will be dropped as parties to the case. Under reasonable or justifiable circumstances, however, as
when all the plaintiffs or petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense, the
signature of only one of them in the certification against forum shopping substantially complies with the Rule.

6) Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be executed by the party-pleader, not by his counsel. If,
however, for reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party-pleader is unable to sign, he must execute a Special Power of
Attorney designating his counsel of record to sign on his behalf. x x x

2. Yes.

We agree that respondent LFUC's filing of a motion for reconsideration before the DOLE-VI Regional Director rendered
moot and academic its petition for certiorari then pending with the Court of Appeals; as such, LFUC's failure to withdraw
the petition or to even notify the appellate court of the motion for reconsideration filed before the DOLE amounts to a
violation of the rules against forum shopping.
There is no question that as a result of LFUC’s pursuit of the two simultaneous remedies, the rulings of the Court of
Appeals on the petition for certiorari and the DOLE Secretary on LFUC’s motion for reconsideration are now essentially
conflicting, as the former bars any execution and instead directs a further hearing of certain evidence, while the latter
states that such evidence had the chance to be heard and execution should now proceed as a matter of course. Such
conflict is exactly the scenario that the rules against forum shopping try to avert.

Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc. v. Julia T. Aligway

G.R. No. 201793, September 16, 2015
Second Division
Del Castillo, J.
Subject: Labor Law; Remedial Law

Facts:

The Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc. (PTC), for and in behalf of its foreign principal, the Norwegian Crew
Management (NCM), employed Demetrio as chief cook on board the vessel Amasis.

Demetrio alleged that prior to his deployment, he underwent pre-employment medical examination (PEME) and was
declared fit to work. Thereafter, while aboard the vessel, he suffered from “vomiting, anorexia, weight loss, and
palpitations followed by dizziness and a feeling of lightheadedness.” As a result, on April 22, 2009, he was medically
repatriated. This condition allegedly rendered him incapacitated to work again as a seafarer but the PTC and the NCM
refused to pay him disability benefits.

LA Ruling: Dismiss the Complaint.

NLRC Ruling: affirmed the dismissal.
CA Ruling: Directed respondents to pay Demetrio full disability benefits

Issue: Whether the CA erred in holding that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying Demetrio’s appeal
and in affirming the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit?

Ruling:

Yes.

As a rule, in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law can be raised and be
reviewed by this Court. However, this rule admits of exceptions and one such exception is where the Court may make its
own evaluation of the evidence adduced by the parties because the factual findings of the tribunals or courts a quo are
in conflict with each other. In this case, the LA, as affirmed by the NLRC, found that Demetrio was not entitled to
disability benefits, among other claims, and dismissed his complaint for lack of merit. The CA ruled otherwise. Thus,
because of the conflicting findings of fact of the LA and NLRC, on one hand, and of the CA, on the other, this Court has to
exercise its mandated authority to examine the evidence on record.

Under Section 20(B) of the 2000 POEA SEC, for disability to be compensable, (1) the seafarer’s injury or illness must be
work-related; and (2) the work-related injury or illness must have existed during the term of his employment contract.
Hence, the seafarer must not only show that he suffers from an illness or injury that rendered him permanently or
partially disabled, but he must also prove that there is a causal relation between his illness or injury and the work for
which he had been engaged.
This Court has held that a person who claims entitlement to the benefits provided by law must establish his right thereto
by substantial evidence or “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.”

This Court cannot grant a claim for disability benefits without such substantial evidence because to do so would be
offensive to due process. Hence, the burden is on the seafarer to prove that he suffered from a work-related injury or
illness during the term of his contract.

In this case, Demetrio failed to discharge this burden. He failed to prove the required causal connection between his
stomach cancer and his work as chief cook aboard the vessel.

Igliceria Vda. De Karaan v. Atty. Salvador Aguinaldo, et.al.

G.R. No. 182151, September 21, 2015
First Division
Sereno, CJ.
Subject:

Facts:
Petitioner filed a Complaint against respondents before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City. The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. Q-99-38762. In her Complaint, petitioner sought payment of damages for the alleged
destruction of the cottages and other structures inside Fine Sand Beach Resort, which she owned and operated.

Respondents filed a Manifestation and Motion to seeking the dismissal of the case on the following grounds: (a) forum
shopping; (b) lack of jurisdiction over the person of deceased respondent Angel Aguinaldo and over nonresidents Pedro
and Concepcion Aguinaldo; and ( c) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.

Respondents again emphasized the failure of petitioner to disclose the existence of: (i) OMB-1-99-0870 and OMB 1-99-
0900, two cases for malicious mischief she had filed against them before the Ombudsman; and (ii) Case No. 7345, a civil
action for right of way allegedly involving the same property and the same parties. The RTC denied the motion of the
respondents in a Resolution dated 11 April 2003 noting that their arguments had already been passed upon by the in
their first motion to dismiss.

Issue:
Whether the filing of Civil Case No. 7345 constituted forum shopping on the part of petitioner?

Ruling:
No.

Forum shopping is committed when multiple suits involving the same parties and the same causes of action are filed,
either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment through means other than
appeal or certiorari. In Guerrero v. Director, Land Management Bureau, the Court explained the three modes in which
forum shopping is committed:

Forum shopping can be committed in three ways: (1) by filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with
the same prayer, the previous case not having been resolved yet (which makes the cases susceptible to dismissal based
on litis pendentia); (2) by filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and the same prayer, the previous case
having been finally resolved (which makes the subsequent case susceptible to dismissal based on res judicata); and (3)
by filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action, but with different prayers (which amounts to splitting of
causes of action, which renders the cases susceptible to dismissal on the ground of either litis pendentia or res judicata).

Notwithstanding the established identity of parties, the Court still finds the CA's finding of forum shopping unjustified.
There is merit in petitioner's argument that the causes of action and reliefs sought in the two cases differ substantially.

The instant case for damages is premised on a cause of action for quasi-delict arising from the demolition of structures
inside petitioner's beach resort.

On the other hand, Civil Case No. 7345 involves a claim for easement of right of way over respondents' property in
Morong, Bataan, based on Article 649 of the Civil Code.

Jesus Velasquez v. Spouses Cruz

G.R. No. 191479, September 21, 2015
First Division
Perez, J.
Subject: Agrarian; Remedial Law

Facts:

Spouses Cruz are the registered owners of a parcel of land situated at Barangay Sta. Monica in Hagonoy, Bulacan.
Respondent filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession with Accounting and Damages against petitioner Jesus
Velasquez. Respondents alleged in their Complaint that petitioner's father-in-law, Bernabe Navarro (Navarro) was a
tenant in said lot until 6 April 1985 when the latter relinquished his tenancy rights by virtue of a Sinumpaang Salaysay;
that no other person was installed as tenant of the farmland; that they discovered that petitioner entered the farmland
without their knowledge and consent; that from 1985 up to the time of the filing of the complaint, petitioner never paid
a single centavo as rent for the use of the land; and that they leased the farmland to a certain Godofredo Tosco in 1995
but petitioner refused to vacate the property. Respondents prayed for the surrender of possession of the property to
them and for accounting and damages.

In his Answer with Motion to Dismiss, petitioner contended that jurisdiction pertains to the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) because in the instant controversy is an agrarian dispute. Petitioner asserted that
he was assisting Navarro in tilling the land since 1975. He claimed that he continued working on the land after the death
of Navarro. Petitioner defended his non-payment of rentals due to the fact that the subject land has lost its suitability
for agricultural production, thus, his non-payment is not a ground for dispossession. As a further justification to the non-
payment of rentals, petitioner emphasized that since the implementation of the Operation Land Transfer, he is deemed
to be the owner. of the subject land and respondents had no more right to demand rentals. Petitioner claimed that he
was identified as a farmer-beneficiary and has since been paying amortizations to Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP).

Issue: Whom between the DARAB and the RTC, has jurisdiction over the case?

Ruling:

RTC has jurisdiction.

Well-entrenched principle that the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter on the existence of the action is
determined by the material allegations of the complaint and the law, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is
entitled to recover all or some of the claims or reliefs sought therein. A court does not lose its jurisdiction over a case by
the simple expedient of a party raising as a defense therein the alleged existence of a tenancy relationship between the
parties. The court continues to have the authority to hear and evaluate the evidence, precisely to determine whether or
not it has jurisdiction, and, if, after hearing, tenancy is shown to exist, it shall dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.

For DARAB to have jurisdiction over the case, there must be tenancy relationship between the parties. Tenancy
relationship is a juridical tie which arises between a landowner and a tenant once they agree, expressly or impliedly, to
undertake jointly the cultivation of a land belonging to the landowner, as a result of which relationship the tenant
acquires the right to continue working on and cultivating the land. The existence of a tenancy relationship cannot be
presumed and allegations that one is a tenant do not automatically give rise to security of tenure.

Frederick F. Felipe v. MGM Motor Trading Corporation

G.R. No. 191849, September 23, 2015
First Division
Perez, J.
Subject: Civil Law; Commercial Law; Remedial Law

Facts:
Petitioner Frederick Felipe filed a case against respondents MGM Motors, Inc. (MGM Motors) and Ayala General
Insurance Corporation (Ayala Insurance), for Specific Performance and Damages, he claimed that he purchased on
installment basis a Nissan Terrano Wagon through MGM Motors’ authorized representative Jane Sarmiento (Sarmiento).

Petitioner allegedly gave a P200,000.00 downpayment and P5,000.00 reservation fee to Sarmiento. He further issued
seven (7) Allied Bank checks, each bearing the amount of P24,165.00 payable to MGM Motors. On 14 May 1997, MGM
Motors delivered the subject vehicle to petitioner. He then insured the vehicle with Ayala Insurance and paid a
premium.

On 15 November 1997, the subject vehicle, while parked along Adriatico Street in Manila, was reportedly lost. He tried
to claim from Ayala Insurance but the latter refused to pay its liability causing damages to petitioner. On the other hand,
MGM Motors refused to produce, despite repeated demands, the document of sale by installment covering the vehicle.

Issue:
Whether the trial court correctly granted the demurrer to evidence and subsequently dismissed the complaint?

Ruling:
Yes.
A demurrer to evidence is a motion to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of evidence and is presented after the
plaintiff rests his case. It is an objection by one of the parties in an action, to the effect that the evidence which his
adversary produced is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain the issue.

Rule 33, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

Section 1. Demurrer to evidence.––After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence, the defendant
may move for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If his
motion is denied, he shall have the right to present evidence. If the motion is granted but on appeal the order of
dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed to have waived the right to present evidence.

The essential question to be resolved in a demurrer to evidence is whether the plaintiff has been able to show that he is
entitled to his claim, and it is incumbent upon the trial court judge to make such a determination.

A review of the dismissal of the complaint naturally entails a calibration of the evidence to determine whether the
material allegations of the complaint were sufficiently backed by evidence. We have repeatedly stressed that the
remedy of appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court contemplates only questions of law, not of fact.

The questions on whether the sale was on cash or installment basis and whether petitioner had insurable interest on the
subject car are evidently questions of fact which are beyond the purview of the instant petition.

Well-established is the rule that the burden of proof lies on the party who makes the allegations. There is no dispute
that the only pieces of evidence admitted in court are the testimony of Alberto and the receipt showing MGM Motors
receiving P200,000.00 from petitioner as partial payment of the subject car. The allegation that the purchase of the
vehicle was on an installment basis was not supported by any evidence. The receipt of a partial payment does not suffice
to prove that the purchase was made on an installment basis. Petitioner did not present any document to prove said
allegation while MGM Motors produced a sales invoice wherein it was stated that the mode of payment is “COD” or
cash on delivery.

In the same vein, petitioner failed to substantiate his allegation against Ayala Insurance. Petitioner has the burden of
proof to show that a loss occurred and said loss was covered by his insurance policy. Considering that the trial court
only admitted two pieces of evidence in petitioner's favor and none of those tend to prove loss of the subject car and
coverage thereof under the insurance policy, petitioner is not entitled to the reliefs he had prayed for.

Ilaw Buklod ng Manggagawa (IBM) Nestle Phils., Inc. Chapter v. Nestle Phils. Inc.
G.R. No. 198675, September 23, 2015
Third Division
Peralta, J.
Subject:

Facts:
On January 13, 1997, herein petitioner union staged a strike against herein respondent company's Ice Cream and Chilled
Products Division, citing, as grounds, respondent's alleged violation of the collective bargaining agreement (CBA),
dismissal of union officers and members, discrimination and other unfair labor practice (ULP) acts.

As a consequence, respondent filed with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a Petition for Injunction with
Prayer for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order, Free Ingress and Egress Order, and Deputization Order.

On January 20, 1997, a temporary restraining order was issued by the NLRC. Thereafter, on February 7, 1997, the NLRC
issued a preliminary injunction.
On February 26, 1997, respondent filed a Petition to Declare Strike Illegal. Subsequently, on April 2, 1997, then
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) Acting Secretary, issued an Order assuming jurisdiction over the strike
and certifying the same to the NLRC.

On June 2, 1997, petitioner union filed a petition for certiorari with this Court, questioning the above order of the Acting
DOLE Secretary. However, after a series of conciliation meetings and discussions between the parties, they agreed to
resolve their differences and came up with a compromise.

On August 6, 1998, the parties filed a Joint Motion to Dismiss stating that they are no longer interested in pursuing the
petition for injunction filed by respondent as a consequence of the settlement of their dispute.

On October 12, 1998, the NLRC issued its Decision approving the parties' compromise agreement and granting their
Joint Motion to Dismiss.

On January 25, 2010, or after a lapse of more than eleven (11) years from the time of execution of the subject MOA,
petitioners filed with the NLRC a Motion for Writ of Execution contending that they have not been paid the amounts
they are entitled to in accordance with the MOA.

Issue: Whether petitioners' claim is already barred by prescription?

Ruling:

Yes.

The most relevant rule in the instant case is Section 8, Rule XI, 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the NLRC which
states that:

Section 8. Execution By Motion or By Independent Action. - A decision or order may be executed on motion within five
(5) years from the date it becomes final and executory. After the lapse of such period, the judgment shall become
dormant, and may only be enforced by an independent action within a period of ten (10) years from date of its finality.

In the same manner, pertinent portions of Sections 4 (a) and 6, Rule III, of the NLRC Manual on Execution of Judgment,
provide as follows:

Section 4. Issuance of a Writ. - Execution shall issue upon an order, resolution or decision that finally disposes of the
actions or proceedings and after the counsel of record and the parties have been duly furnished with the copies of the
same in accordance with the NLRC Rules of Procedure, provided:

a) The Commission or Labor Arbiter shall, motu proprio or upon motion of any interested party, issue a writ of
execution on a judgment only within five (5) years from the date it becomes final and executory. x x x

xxx xxx xxx

Section 6. Execution by Independent Action. - A judgment after the lapse of five (5) years from the date it becomes final
and executory and before it is barred by prescription, may only be enforced by an independent action.
Similarly, Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which can be applied in a suppletory manner, provides: Sec. 6.
Execution by motion or by independent action. - A final and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion
within five (5) years from the date of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of
limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. The revived judgment may also be enforced by motion within five
years from the date of its entry and, thereafter, by action before it is barred by the statute of limitations.

Article 1144 of the Civil Code may, likewise be applied, as it provides that an action upon a written contract must be
brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues.

It is clear from the above law and rules that a judgment may be executed on motion within five years from the date of
its entry or from the date it becomes final and executory. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the
statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. If the prevailing party fails to have the decision enforced
by a mere motion after the lapse of five years from the date of its entry (or from the date it becomes final and
executory), the said judgment is reduced to a mere right of action in favor of the person whom it favors and must be
enforced, as are all ordinary actions, by the institution of a complaint in a regular form.

In the present case, the five-and ten-year periods provided by law and the rules are more than sufficient to enable
petitioners to enforce their right under the subject MOA. In this case, it is clear that the judgment of the NLRC, having
been based on a compromise embodied in a written contract, was immediately executory upon its issuance on October
12, 1998. Thus, it could have been executed by motion within five (5) years. It was not. Nonetheless, it could have been
enforced by an independent action within the next five (5) years, or within ten (10) years from the time the NLRC
Decision was promulgated. It was not. Therefore, petitioners' right to have the NLRC judgment executed by mere motion
as well as their right of action to enforce the same judgment had prescribed by the time they filed their Motion for Writ
of Execution on January 25, 2010.

Vigilantibus, non dormientibus, Jura subveniunt -Laws come to the assistance of the vigilant, not of the sleeping.

Lucena B. Rallos v. Honorable Justice Gabriel T. Ingles, et.al.

G.R. No. 202515, September 28, 2015
Third Division
Peralta, J.
Subject: Provisional Remedy

Facts:

Sometime in 1997, the heirs of Rev. Fr. Vicente Rallos (Fr. Rallos ), which include petitioner herein, together with the
heirs of Ramon Rallos and Socorro Sy, Lourdes Rallos and Magdaleno Sy, and Remedios Rallos and Porferio Adama filed a
Complaint against the City Government of Cebu (Cebu City) for forfeiture of improvements on or payment of fair market
value of Lot Nos. 485-D and 485-E, which are situated at M.H. Aznar Street, Cebu City.

After trial, the RTC ruled that the subject lots are not road lots but are privately-owned lots which were appropriated by
the city government for public use without the benefit of expropriation and without payment of just compensation.
January 14, 2000 Decision: defendant liable to pay plaintiffs just compensation for Lot No. 485-D and Lot No. 485-E
which were appropriated by defendant for public use without the benefit of expropriation; Assigned 3 Board
Commissioner to determine the amount of just compensation (1 designated by the defendant,1 designated by the
plaintiff, 1 as chairman of the board of commissioners)

Cebu City elevated the case to CA; CA denied.

On March 26, 2012, Cebu City filed a Rule 47 Petition with prayer for temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of
preliminary injunction (WPI), in order to annul the RTC Decision dated January 14, 2000 and July 24, 2001 as well as the
February 5, 2001 Order and March 21, 2002 Consolidated Order.

Cebu City asserted that the complainants in Civil Case No. CEB-20388 committed extrinsic fraud for deliberately
suppressing a document denominated as Convenio, which contained a stipulation pour autrui whereby Lot Nos. 485-D
and 485-E were supposed to be donated by Fr. Rallos or his heirs and assigns in favor of Cebu City. It claimed that it was
only in July 2011 that Cebu City learned of the existence of the Convenio, which was duly approved by a Court of First
Instance in a Decision dated October 18, 1940, and of the testate proceeding of Fr. Rallos in Special Proceeding No.
1017-R, which did not include the subject lots among the distributable assets of the decedent.

CA in a Resolution issued TRO penned by Associate Justice Ramon Paul L. Hernando, with Associate Justices Pampio A.
Abarintos and Victoria Isabel A. Paredes concurring. Thereafter, a hearing on the prayer for a WPI was conducted.

Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the respondents are guilty of indirect contempt?

Ruling:

No.

A reading of them easily shows that the questioned resolutions exhaustively explained their factual and legal bases.
Apparently, the respondent Justices concerned promulgated the questioned resolutions with prudence and fairness, and
upon due consideration of the surrounding circumstances. Contrary to the posture of Rallos, therefore, the respondent
Justices' issuance of the questioned resolutions was not tainted by bias, negligence or any improper motives. Moreover,
the respondent Justices conducted a hearing before issuing the writ of preliminary injunction in favor of Cebu City. In
that hearing, the counsels of the parties attended, and were granted ample opportunity to argue for their respective
sides.

Resolution was issued to prevent grave injustice to Cebu City in case the disputed lots will be adjudicated in its favor.
Such application of judicial discretion is consistent with the directive of Administrative Circular No. 10-200023 to
exercise utmost caution, prudence and judiciousness in the issuance of writs of execution to satisfy money judgments
against government agencies and local government units.

Ethel Acampado, et. al. v. Spouses Cosmilla

G.R. No. 198531, September 28, 2015
First Division
Perez, J.
Subject: Remedial Law

Facts:
The present petition stems from the Petition for the Declaration of the Nullity of Document filed by respondents against
petitioners before the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan. In their Amended Complaint, respondents Spouses Cosmilla alleged that the
sale of their share on the subject property was effected thru a forged Special Power of Attorney (SPA) and is therefore
null and void.
Decision, 31 March 2005: After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered a decision dismissing the complaint of the
respondents for failure to prove by preponderance of evidence that the signatures of the respondents in the SPA were
forged.

6 May 2005: respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration seeking for the reversal of the earlier RTC Decision.

Order, May 16, 2005: denied the MR for failure of the respondents to comply with the requirement of notice of hearing
as required under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Ascribing grave abuse of discretion, respondents elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals by filing a Petition for
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with prayer for Preliminary Injunction and TRO seeking to annul and set aside the
RTC Order dated 16 May 2005.

Decision, 27 October 2006: Court of Appeals dismissed the petition filed by the respondents.

Respondent file Motion for Reconsideration

Resolution, June 28, 2007: CA reversed its earlier decision and allow the relaxation of the procedural. Hence, the
appellate vacated the May 16, 2005 Order.

Resolution, 19 August 2011: the CA denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioners.

Issue:
Whether or not the CA gravely erred and committed reversible error in issuing Resolution dated June 28, 2007 and
August 19, 2011 which, in effect reconsidered its own Decision dated October 27, 2006 dismissing the Petition for
Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus with prayer for preliminary injunction and TRO of respondents?

Ruling:
Yes.

The Motion for Reconsideration is a contentious motion that needs to comply with the required notice and hearing and
service to the adverse party as mandated by the following provisions of the Revised Rules of Court:
RULE 15. SEC. 4. Hearing of motion. -Except for motions which the court may act upon without prejudicing the rights of
the adverse party, every written motion shall be set for hearing by the applicant. Every written motion required to be
heard and the notice of the hearing thereof shall be served in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party
at least three (3) days before the date of hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter notice.

SEC. 5. Notice of hearing. -The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all parties concerned, and shall specify the time
and date of the hearing which must not be later than ten (10) days after the filing of the motion.

EC. 6. Proof of service necessary. No written motion set for hearing shall be acted upon by the court without proof of
service thereof.

The foregoing requirements --that the notice shall be directed to the parties concerned, and shall state the time and
place for the hearing of the motion --are mandatory, and if not religiously complied with, the motion becomes pro
forma. A motion that does not comply with the requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court is a
worthless piece of paper which the clerk of court has no right to receive and which the court has no authority to act
upon. The logic for such requirement is simple: a motion invariably contains a prayer which the movant makes to the
court which is usually in the interest of the adverse party to oppose. The notice of hearing to the adverse party is
therefore a form of due process; it gives the other party the opportunity to properly vent his opposition to the prayer of
the movant. In keeping with the principles of due process, therefore, a motion which does not afford the adverse party
a chance to oppose should simply be disregarded. Principles of natural justice demand that a right of a party should not
be affected without giving it an opportunity to be heard.

Failure to comply with the required notice and hearing is a fatal defect that is deleterious to respondents cause.

Rapid Manpower Consultants, Inc. v. Eduardo P. De Guzman

G.R. No. 187418, September 28, 2015
First Division
Perez, J.
Subject: Remedial Law

Facts:
Respondent Eduardo P. De Guzman was employed as an air conditioner and refrigerator technician by Omar Ahmed Bin
Bichr in Saudi Arabia, thru its agent, petitioner Rapid Manpower. The parties entered into a 2-year employment contract
wherein De Guzman shall be paid a monthly salary of SR 1, 500.00. He was deployed from May 18, 2000-May 2002.

On 18 September 2002, De Guzman filed a complaint for non-payment of salaries/wages from October 2001 to June
2002, vacation pay, underpayment of salaries/wages (from SRl,500 to SRl,300), and travel expenses.

LA Ruling: rendered a Decision in favor of De Guzman.

NLRC Ruling: reversed; failed to substantiate his claim for non-payment and underpayment of wages.

De Guzman filed a Motion for Reconsideration, employer has the burden to prove that he paid the correct wages.

NLRC Resolution: Granted the motion for reconsideration. Reinstated the decision of the LA.

Aggrieved, Rapid Manpower filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for issuance of Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)
and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the Court of Appeals.

CA Ruling: Dismissed the Petition of Rapid for failure to file a Motion for Reconsideration granting the MR of De Guzman
in NLRC Resolution.

Issue: Whether the petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals should be dismissed for failure to file a motion for
reconsideration before the NLRC?

Ruling:

As a general rule, a motion for reconsideration is an indispensable condition before an aggrieved party can resort to the
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The rationale for the rule is that the law intends to
afford the NLRC an opportunity to rectify such errors or mistakes it may have committed before resort to courts of
justice can be had. However, jurisprudence allows exceptions to the rule in the following cases:
a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction;
b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly ' raised and passed upon by the lower court,
or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court;
c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the
interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the petition is perishable;
d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless;
e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief;
f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is
improbable;
g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due . process;
h) where the proceeding was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and i) where the issue
raised is one purely of law or public interest is involved.

The second exception applies in the instant case. The NLRC, in its 24 September 2008 Resolution was given the
opportunity to reevaluate its findings and reconsider its ruling when De Guzman himself filed a motion for
reconsideration assailing the 18 August 2005 NLRC resolution denying his monetary claims. The issues raised in the
certiorari proceedings are similar to those passed upon and considered by the NLRC.

We ruled that "the NLRC was already given the opportunity to review its ruling and correct itself when the respondent
filed its motion for reconsideration of the NLRC's initial ruling in favor of petitioner. In fact, it granted the motion for
reconsideration filed by the respondent and reversed its previous ruling and reinstated the decision of the Labor Arbiter
dismissing the complaint of the petitioner. It would be an exercise in futility to require the petitioner to file a motion for
reconsideration since the very issues raised in the petition for certiorari, i.e. whether or not the petitioner was
constructively dismissed by the respondent and whether or not she was entitled to her money claims, were already duly
passed upon and resolved by the NLRC. Thus, the NLRC had more than one opportunity to resolve the issues of the case
and in fact reversed itself upon a reconsideration. It is highly improbable or unlikely under the circumstances that the
Commission would reverse or set aside its resolution granting a reconsideration." We apply said ruling in the case under
consideration. The NLRC Resolution subject of the petition for certiorari was in response to a motion ·for
reconsideration filed by De Guzman. To require Rapid Manpower to file another motion for reconsideration would be
futile because the very issues raised in the motion for reconsideration had already been evaluated by the NLRC.

Sergio R. Osmeña III v. Power Sector Assets & Liabilities Management, et.al.
G.R. No. 212686, September 28, 2015
Third Division
Villarama, Jr., J.
Subject:

Facts:

Respondent Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation (PSALM) is a government-owned and
controlled corporation created by virtue of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9136, otherwise known as the Electric Power Industry
Reform Act (EPIRA) of 2001.

SPC is a joint venture corporation between Salcon Power Corporation and Korea Power Corporation (Kepco). TPVI is a
subsidiary of Aboitiz Power, the power generation company of the Aboitiz Group.

In a direct recourse to this Court, Senator Sergio R. Osmefia III (petitioner) seeks to enjoin the sale of the Naga Power
Plant Complex (NPPC) to respondent SPC Power Corporation (SPC) resulting from the latter's exercise of the right to top
the winning bid of respondent Therma Power Visayas, Inc. (TPVI), and to declare such stipulation in the Lease
Agreement as void for being contrary to public policy.

Issues:

(1) Is certiorari the proper remedy and was it timely filed?

(2) Does petitioner possess legal standing to institute the present action questioning the validity of SPC’s right to top?

(3) Do right to top provisions in the land lease agreements entered into by PSALM contravene public policy on
competitive bidding?

(4) Did PSALM gravely abuse its discretion in allowing SPC’s exercise of the right to top under the LBGT-LLA?

Ruling:

1. No.
The Constitution under Section 1, Article VIII expressly directs the Judiciary, as a matter of power and duty, not only to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable but, to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. We thus have the duty to take cognizance of allegations of grave abuse of discretion
in this case, involving the sale by PSALM of a power plant, which supposedly contravenes the policy on competitive
public bidding.

R.A. No. 9136 created PSALM for the principal purpose of undertaking the mandated privatization of all disposable
assets of the NPC as well as IPP contracts in an optimal manner. Such disposition is made subject to all existing laws,
rules and regulations. Thus, the implementing rules of R.A. No. 9136 provided guidelines in the privatization to be
conducted by PSALM, among which are:

(a) The Privatization value to the National Government of the NPC generation assets, real estate, other disposable
assets as well as IPP contracts shall be optimized;

xxxx

(d) All assets of NPC shall be sold in an open and transparent manner through public bidding, and the same shall
apply to the disposition of IPP contracts; x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

Specifically Section 51 (m) of the EPIRA empowered PSALM “[t]o restructure the sale, privatization or disposition of NPC
assets and IPP contracts and/or their energy output based on such terms and conditions which shall optimize the value
and sale prices of said assets.” Any act of PSALM that violates these provisions and other applicable laws may
constitute grave abuse of discretion.

However, the implementation of EPIRA may not be restrained or enjoined except by order issued by this Court.
Petitioner’s resort to this Court to obtain an order enjoining PSALM’s privatization of the NPPC through SPC’s invalid
exercise of its right to option, was therefore proper and justified.

2.

Yes.

We have held that legislators have the standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by
the Constitution in their office and are allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which they claim
infringes their prerogatives as legislators. In this case, there was no allegation of usurpation of legislative function as
petitioner is suing in his capacity as Chairperson of the Committee created pursuant to Section 62 of R.A. No. 9136. Such
position by itself is not sufficient to vest petitioner with standing to institute the present suit. Notably, the enumerated
functions of the Committee under the aforesaid provision are basically “in aid of legislation.” Notwithstanding, the
Court leans on the doctrine that “the rule on standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for nontraditional
plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter
is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest.” When the
proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen satisfies the requirement
of personal interest.
The privatization of power plants in a manner that ensures the reliability and affordability of electricity in our country
pursuant to the EPIRA is an issue of paramount public interest. Petitioner has underscored the effect of the right to top
provision in preventing a competitive public bidding for the NPPC. While the alleged detrimental result referred to the
severe power shortage that occurred in only one region, PSALM had admitted that the right to top provisions are also
found in several other land lease agreements.

In the light of the foregoing considerations, we hold that petitioner possesses the requisite legal standing to file this
case.

3.

Yes.

A right to top is a variation of the right of first refusal often incorporated in lease contracts. When a lease contract
contains a right of first refusal, the lessor is under a legal duty to the lessee not to sell to anybody at any price until after
he has made an offer to sell to the latter at a certain price and the lessee has failed to accept it. The lessee has a right
that the lessor’s first offer shall be in his favor. While sometimes referred to as a “first option to buy” or “option of first
refusal,” a right of first refusal is not an option contract.

The three principles of public bidding are: (1) the offer to the public; (2) an opportunity for competition; and (3) a basis
for comparison of bids. As long as these three principles are complied with, the public bidding can be considered valid
and legal.

In this case, all potential bidders were aware of the existence of SPC’s right to top as duly disclosed in the Bidding
Procedures for the 3rd Round of Bidding for the NPPC. TPVI did not question the said right to top and participated in the
bidding where SPC was also a bidder. Emerging as the winning bidder, TPVI nevertheless knew that the acceptance of its
bid was subject to SPC’s exercise of the right to top by confirming its exercise of the right of first refusal and paying the
amount of the winning bid plus five percent (5%). Notwithstanding compliance with the conduct of bidding and
procedures, we hold that SPC’s right to top under the LBGT-LLA is void for lack of a valid interest or right to the object
over which the right of first refusal is to be exercised. First, the property subject of the right of first refusal is outside the
leased premises covered by the LBGT-LLA. Second, the right of first refusal refers not only to land but to any property
within the vicinity of the leased premises, as in this case, an entire power plant complex (NPPC) and the land on which it
is built. And third, while SPC cited concerns regarding security, right of way or other operational requirements, these are
clearly not analogous to a lessee’s legitimate interest on the property being leased. Indeed, acquisition of a three coal-
fired thermal plants with far greater generating capacity than the gas turbine plant currently owned by SPC will not be
merely for purposes of the latter’s reasonable access, security or present operational needs. Besides, no such right or
interest may be invoked by SPC because, as confirmed by PSALM itself, SPC never operated the Naga LBGT.