Sps. Estacion vs Secretary of DAR ISSUE Whether PD 946 is applicable in the case of the Sps.

Estacion (NO)

G.R. No. 163361 | March 12, 2014 | REYES, J. HELD

TOPIC: Jurisdiction is determined by the law in force at the time off the
commencement of the action (gdluck sa recit!!)
RECIT-READY
Spouses Estacion had 2 parcels of land that the government took away for
agricultural purposes. They thus sue the DAR for just compensation in RTC
Negros Occidental which was a Special Agrarian Court. DAR filed a motion to
dismiss. Spouses said you can’t do that under PD 946 which reorganized the
Court of Agrarian Relations. Issue is if this law still applied at that time. The
SC said no because at the time that the Spouses filed, the RTC Negros was
already an SAC, hence what is applicable is the Rules of Court and Rules of
Civil Procedure which allowed defendants to file a motion to dismiss instead
of an answer to their complaint.
FACTS
In September 1995, Sps. Estacion (Jose & Angelina) filed for a petition for just
compensation with the RTC of Negros Oriental (acting as a Special Agrarian
Court or SAC) alleging that the 2 parcels of land they owned were included in
the Operation Land Transfer program of PD No. 27 in Feb 1974 even though
it didn’t have any tenants and was primarily devoted to crops other than rice
and corn. Their properties were awarded to tenants who are now enjoying it
for agrarian purposes. The spouses thus pray for just compensation or for the
repossession of their land. Public respondents DAR and Land Bank of the
Philippines filed a motion to dismiss stating that the SAC had no jurisdiction
and the Spouses had no cause of action. The Sps. Estacion said the motion to
dismiss was a prohibited pleading under Sec 17 of PD 946.
Sec 17 of PD 946 states that the defendant should file an answer to the
complaint and not a motion to dismiss. This is misplaced because at the time
that petitioners filed their case in 1995, PD 946 which reorganized the Court
of Agrarian Relations was already superseded by RA 6657 which created the
SACs. In this case, the RTC of Negros Oriental was acting as a SAC. The Rules
of Court, therefore, was the rule of procedure applicable to the cases filed
before it. Under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, and even under the present
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, a motion to dismiss is not a
prohibited pleading. Consequently, the SAC had every right to admit and
resolve the motions to dismiss filed by respondents LBP and PNB.
OTHER CONCLUSIONS OF THE COURT
(1) PNB already had title to the properties as the Spouses failed to redeem it
in 1 year. The government validly took it away pursuant to EO 407 which
directed all government-owned and -controlled corporations to surrender
to the DAR all landholdings suitable for agriculture.
(2) The SC did not agree with the CA’s dismissal of the case based on the
Spouses’ failure to exhaust all their admin remedies before filing a case of
just compensation directly with the SAC. Based on Sec 75 of RA 6657, the
SAC has exclusive and original jurisdiction to determine just compensation
to landowners under the Act. The determination of just compensation is
essentially a judicial function, which is vested in the RTC acting as SAC. It
cannot be lodged with administrative agencies such as the DAR. Accordingly,
the issue of the validity of the EJ foreclosure of PNB is outside the
jurisdiction of the SAC.

In May 1998, petitioners filed an amended petition to include PNB as a

respondent as the land in question had already been mortgaged in Oct 1974
to PNB. This was EJ foreclosed on December 1974. The SAC granted PNB’s
motion to dismiss agreeing that they had already acquired rights over the
property. Motion for recon denied. CA agreed with SAC. Motion for recon also
denied.
BPI Family Savings Bank Inc vs Sps Yujuico
G.R. No. 175796 | July 22, 2015
SUMMARY: Spouses Yujuico executed a mortgage contract in favor of
Citytrust (predecessor-in-interest of BPI). Spouses defaulted and so BPI
extrajudicially foreclosed the properties. BPI was the highest bidder and
then it filed a case to recover deficiency in RTC of Makati. The properties
were located in Manila. Spouses alleged that the venue is improper and the
case must be filed in Manila. The Court held that filing a case in Makati is
proper because action for claiming deficiency is a personal action. . The
venue of a personal action is the place where the plaintiff or any of the
principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal
defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he
may be found, at the election of the plaintiff, for which reason the action is
considered a transitory one. On the other hand, a real action is to be
commenced and tried in the proper court having jurisdiction over the area
wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated, which
explains why the action is also referred to as a local action
FACTS:
On August 22, 1996, the City of Manila filed a complaint against the
respondents for the expropriation of five parcels of land located in Tondo,
Manila and registered in the name of respondent Teresita Yujuico. Two of
the parcels of land, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 261331
and TCT No. 261332, were previously mortgaged to Citytrust Banking
Corporation, the petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest, under a First Real
Estate Mortgage Contract. On June 30, 2000, the Regional Trial Court in
Manila (Manila RTC) rendered its judgment declaring the five parcels of land
expropriated for public use. The judgment became final and executory on
January 28, 2001 and was entered in the book of entries of judgment on
March 23, 2001. The petitioner subsequently filed a Motion to Intervene in
Execution with Partial Opposition to Defendant’s Request to Release, but
the RTC denied the motion for having been “filed out of time.” Hence, the
petitioner decided to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgage constituted on
the two parcels of land subject of the respondents’ loan. After holding the
public auction, the sheriff awarded the two lots to the petitioner as the
highest bidder at ₱10, 000, 000.00. Claiming a deficiency amounting to P18,
522155.42, the petitioner sued the respondents to recover such deficiency
in the Makati RTC (Civil Case No. 03-450). The respondents moved to
dismiss the complaint on several grounds, namely: that the suit was barred
by res judicata; that the complaint stated no cause of action; and that the
plaintiffs claim had been waived, abandoned, or extinguished. In the reply,
respondents objected and alleged that the venue is improper.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not improper venue as a ground for objection maybe raised
at anytime? NO.
2. Whether or not a claim for deficiency in an extrajudicial foreclosure is a
real action? NO.
RATIO:
1. We underscore that in civil proceedings, venue is procedural, not
jurisdictional, and may be waived by the defendant if not seasonably raised
either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer. Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules
of Court thus expressly stipulates that defenses and objections not pleaded
either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. As it
relates to the place of trial, indeed, venue is meant to provide convenience
to the parties, rather than to restrict their access to the courts. In other
words, unless the defendant seasonably objects, any action may be tried by
a court despite its being the improper venue.
2. It is basic that the venue of an action depends on whether it is a real or a
personal action. The determinants of whether an action is of a real or a
personal nature have been fixed by the Rules of Court and relevant
jurisprudence. According to Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, a real
action is one that affects title to or possession of real property, or an
interest therein. Thus, an action for partition or condemnation of, or
foreclosure of mortgage on, real property is a real action. The real action is
to be commenced and tried in the proper court having jurisdiction over the
area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated,
which explains why the action is also referred to as a local action. In
contrast, the Rules of Court declares all other actions as personal actions.
Such actions may include those brought for the recovery of personal
property, or for the enforcement of some contract or recovery of damages
for its breach, or for the recovery of damages for the commission of an
injury to the person or property. The venue of a personal action is the place
where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the
defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a
non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the
plaintiff, for which reason the action is considered a transitory one.

Based on the distinctions between real and personal actions, an action to

recover the deficiency after the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real property
mortgage is a personal action, for it does not affect title to or possession of
real property, or any interest therein.
Lahom v. Sibulo 1
G.R. No. 143989 July 14, 2003
FACTS:
A childless couple adopted the wife's nephew and brought him up as their
own. In 1972, the trial court granted the petition for adoption, and ordered
the Civil Registrar to change the name Jose Melvin Sibulo to Jose Melvin
Lahom. Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition to rescind the decree of
adoption, in which she averred, that, despite the her pleas and that of her
husband, their adopted son refused to use their surname Lahom and
continue to use Sibulo in all his dealing and activities. Prior to the institution
of the case, in 1998, RA No. 8552 went into effect. The new statute deleted
from the law the right of adopters to rescind a decree of adoption (Section
19 of Article VI).
These turn of events revealing Jose's callous indifference, ingratitude and
lack of care and concern prompted Lahom to file a petition in Court in
December 1999 to rescind the decree of adoption previously issued way
back on May 5, 1972. When Lahom filed said petition there was already a
new law on adoption, specifically R.A. 8552 also known as the Domestic
Adoption Act passed on March 22,1998, wherein it was provided that:
"Adoption, being in the interest of the child, shall not be subject to
rescission by the adopter(s). However the adopter(s) may disinherit the
adoptee for causes provided in Article 919 of the Civil Code" (Section 19).
ISSUE: Whether or not the subject adoption still be revoked or rescinded by
an adopter after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552, and if in the affirmative,
whether or not the adopter’s action prescribed.
RULING:
Jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of
the commencement of the action. The controversy should be resolved in
1
http://skinnycases.blogspot.com/2013/10/lahom-vs-sibulo.html
the light of the law governing at the time the petition was filed. In this case,
it was months after the effectivity of RA 8552 that Lahom filed an action to
revoke the decree of adoption granted in 1972. By then the new law had
already abrogated and repealed the right of the adopter under the Civil
Code and the family Code to rescind a decree of adoption. So the rescission
of the adoption decree, having been initiated by Lahom after RA 8552 had
come into force, could no longer be pursued.
Besides, even before the passage of RA8552, an action to set aside the
adoption is subject to the five year bar rule under Rule 100 of the Rules of
Court and that the adopter would lose the right to revoke the adoption
decree after the lapse of that period. The exercise of the right within a
prescriptive period is a condition that could not fulfill the requirements of a
vested right entitled to protection. Rights are considered vested when the
right to the enjoyment is a present interest, absolute, unconditional and
perfect or fixed and irrefutable. The concept of a "vested right" is a
consequence of the constitutional guarantee of due process that expresses
a present fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice is protected
against arbitrary state action. While adoption has often been referred to in
the context of a "right", it is not naturally innate or fundamental but rather
a right merely created by statute. It is more of a privilege that is governed
by the state's determination on what it may deem to be for the best interest
and welfare of the child. Matters relating to adoption, including the
withdrawal of the right of the adopter to nullify the adoption decree, are
subject to State regulation. Concomitantly, a right of action given by a
statute may be taken away at any time before it has been exercised.
But an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of adoption, can
always for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise
accruing to an undeserving child, like denying him his legitime, and by will
and testament, may expressly exclude him from having a share in the
disposable portion of his estate.