G.R. No.

L-12105 January 30, 1960
TESTATE ESTATE OF C. O. BOHANAN, deceased.
PHILIPPINE TRUST CO., executor-appellee,
vs.
MAGDALENA C. BOHANAN, EDWARD C. BOHANAN, and
MARY LYDIA BOHANAN, oppositors-appellants.
in the same amount of cash and of shares of mining stock
similar to those given to testator's grandson; (3) legacies of
P6,000 each to his (testator) son, Edward Gilbert Bohana, and
his daughter, Mary Lydia Bohanan, to be paid in three yearly
installments; (4) legacies to Clara Daen, in the amount of
P10,000.00; Katherine Woodward, P2,000; Beulah Fox,
P4,000; and Elizabeth Hastings, P2,000;

Jose D. Cortes for appellants.
Ohnick, Velilla and Balonkita for appellee.
LABRADOR, J.:
Appeal against an order of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, Hon. Ramon San Jose, presiding, dismissing the
objections filed by Magdalena C. Bohanan, Mary Bohanan and
Edward Bohanan to the project of partition submitted by the
executor and approving the said project.
On April 24, 195 0, the Court of First Instance of Manila, Hon.
Rafael Amparo, presiding, admitted to probate a last will and
testament of C. O. Bohanan, executed by him on April 23,
1944 in Manila. In the said order, the court made the following
findings:
According to the evidence of the opponents the
testator was born in Nebraska and therefore a citizen
of that state, or at least a citizen of California where
some of his properties are located. This contention in
untenable. Notwithstanding the long residence of the
decedent in the Philippines, his stay here was merely
temporary, and he continued and remained to be a
citizen of the United States and of the state of his
pertinent residence to spend the rest of his days in
that state. His permanent residence or domicile in the
United States depended upon his personal intent or
desire, and he selected Nevada as his homicide and
therefore at the time of his death, he was a citizen of
that state. Nobody can choose his domicile or
permanent residence for him. That is his exclusive
personal right.
Wherefore, the court finds that the testator C. O.
Bohanan was at the time of his death a citizen of the
United States and of the State of Nevada and
declares that his will and testament, Exhibit A, is fully
in accordance with the laws of the state of Nevada
and admits the same to probate. Accordingly, the
Philippine Trust Company, named as the executor of
the will, is hereby appointed to such executor and
upon the filing of a bond in the sum of P10,000.00, let
letters testamentary be issued and after taking the
prescribed oath, it may enter upon the execution and
performance of its trust. (pp. 26-27, R.O.A.).
It does not appear that the order granting probate was ever
questions on appeal. The executor filed a project of partition
dated January 24, 1956, making, in accordance with the
provisions of the will, the following adjudications: (1) one-half of
the residuary estate, to the Farmers and Merchants National
Bank of Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. in trust only for the
benefit of testator's grandson Edward George Bohanan, which
consists of several mining companies; (2) the other half of the
residuary estate to the testator's brother, F.L. Bohanan, and his
sister, Mrs. M. B. Galbraith, share and share alike. This consist
It will be seen from the above that out of the total estate (after
deducting administration expenses) of P211,639.33 in cash,
the testator gave his grandson P90,819.67 and one-half of all
shares of stock of several mining companies and to his brother
and sister the same amount. To his children he gave a legacy
of only P6,000 each, or a total of P12,000.
The wife Magadalena C. Bohanan and her two children
question the validity of the testamentary provisions disposing of
the estate in the manner above indicated, claiming that they
have been deprived of the legitimate that the laws of the form
concede to them.
The first question refers to the share that the wife of the
testator, Magdalena C. Bohanan, should be entitled to
received. The will has not given her any share in the estate left
by the testator. It is argued that it was error for the trial court to
have recognized the Reno divorce secured by the testator from
his Filipino wife Magdalena C. Bohanan, and that said divorce
should be declared a nullity in this jurisdiction, citing the case
of Querubin vs. Querubin, 87 Phil., 124, 47 Off. Gaz., (Sup, 12)
315, Cousins Hiz vs. Fluemer, 55 Phil., 852, Ramirez vs.
Gmur, 42 Phil., 855 and Gorayeb vs. Hashim, 50 Phil., 22. The
court below refused to recognize the claim of the widow on the
ground that the laws of Nevada, of which the deceased was a
citizen, allow him to dispose of all of his properties without
requiring him to leave any portion of his estate to his wife.
Section 9905 of Nevada Compiled Laws of 1925 provides:
Every person over the age of eighteen years, of
sound mind, may, by last will, dispose of all his or her
estate, real and personal, the same being chargeable
with the payment of the testator's debts.
Besides, the right of the former wife of the testator, Magdalena
C. Bohanan, to a share in the testator's estafa had already
been passed upon adversely against her in an order dated
June 19, 1955, (pp. 155-159, Vol II Records, Court of First
Instance), which had become final, as Magdalena C. Bohanan
does not appear to have appealed therefrom to question its
validity. On December 16, 1953, the said former wife filed a
motion to withdraw the sum of P20,000 from the funds of the
estate, chargeable against her share in the conjugal property,
(See pp. 294-297, Vol. I, Record, Court of First Instance), and
the court in its said error found that there exists no community
property owned by the decedent and his former wife at the time
the decree of divorce was issued. As already and Magdalena
C. Bohanan may no longer question the fact contained therein,
i.e. that there was no community property acquired by the
testator and Magdalena C. Bohanan during their converture.
Moreover, the court below had found that the testator and
Magdalena C. Bohanan were married on January 30, 1909,
and that divorce was granted to him on May 20, 1922; that
sometime in 1925, Magdalena C. Bohanan married Carl Aaron
and this marriage was subsisting at the time of the death of the
testator. Since no right to share in the inheritance in favor of a
divorced wife exists in the State of Nevada and since the court
1
below had already found that there was no conjugal property
between the testator and Magdalena C. Bohanan, the latter
can now have no longer claim to pay portion of the estate left
by the testator.
The most important issue is the claim of the testator's children,
Edward and Mary Lydia, who had received legacies in the
amount of P6,000 each only, and, therefore, have not been
given their shares in the estate which, in accordance with the
laws of the forum, should be two-thirds of the estate left by the
testator. Is the failure old the testator to give his children two-
thirds of the estate left by him at the time of his death, in
accordance with the laws of the forum valid?
The old Civil Code, which is applicable to this case because
the testator died in 1944, expressly provides that successional
rights to personal property are to be earned by the national law
of the person whose succession is in question. Says the law on
this point:
Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in
respect to the order of succession as well as to the
extent of the successional rights and the intrinsic
validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by the
national law of the person whose succession is in
question, whatever may be the nature of the property
and the country in which it is found. (par. 2, Art. 10,
old Civil Code, which is the same as par. 2 Art. 16,
new Civil Code.)
In addition, the other appellants, children of the testator, do not
dispute the above-quoted provision of the laws of the State of
Nevada. Under all the above circumstances, we are
constrained to hold that the pertinent law of Nevada, especially
Section 9905 of the Compiled Nevada Laws of 1925, can be
taken judicial notice of by us, without proof of such law having
been offered at the hearing of the project of partition.
As in accordance with Article 10 of the old Civil Code, the
validity of testamentary dispositions are to be governed by the
national law of the testator, and as it has been decided and it is
not disputed that the national law of the testator is that of the
State of Nevada, already indicated above, which allows a
testator to dispose of all his property according to his will, as in
the case at bar, the order of the court approving the project of
partition made in accordance with the testamentary provisions,
must be, as it is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellants.
Paras, Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo and Endencia,
JJ., concur.
Barrera, J., concurs in the result.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

In the proceedings for the probate of the will, it was found out
and it was decided that the testator was a citizen of the State of
Nevada because he had selected this as his domicile and his
permanent residence. (See Decision dated April 24, 1950,
supra). So the question at issue is whether the estementary
dispositions, especially hose for the children which are short of
the legitime given them by the Civil Code of the Philippines, are
valid. It is not disputed that the laws of Nevada allow a testator
to dispose of all his properties by will (Sec. 9905, Complied
Nevada Laws of 1925, supra). It does not appear that at time of
the hearing of the project of partition, the above-quoted
provision was introduced in evidence, as it was the executor's
duly to do. The law of Nevada, being a foreign law can only be
proved in our courts in the form and manner provided for by
our Rules, which are as follows:

SEC. 41. Proof of public or official record. — An

official record or an entry therein, when admissible for
any purpose, may be evidenced by an official
publication thereof or by a copy tested by the officer
having the legal custody of he record, or by his
deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in
the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has
the custody. . . . (Rule 123).

We have, however, consulted the records of the case in the

court below and we have found that during the hearing on
October 4, 1954 of the motion of Magdalena C. Bohanan for
withdrawal of P20,000 as her share, the foreign law, especially
Section 9905, Compiled Nevada Laws. was introduced in
evidence by appellant's (herein) counsel as Exhibits "2" (See
pp. 77-79, VOL. II, and t.s.n. pp. 24-44, Records, Court of First
Instance). Again said laws presented by the counsel for the
executor and admitted by the Court as Exhibit "B" during the
hearing of the case on January 23, 1950 before Judge Rafael
Amparo (se Records, Court of First Instance, Vol. 1).
2

G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967
TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.
PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS,
oppositors-appellants,
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.
Vicente R. Macasaet and Jose D. Villena for oppositors
appellants.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for heirs-appellees E.
A. Bellis, et al.
Quijano and Arroyo for heirs-appellees W. S. Bellis, et al.
J. R. Balonkita for appellee People's Bank & Trust Company.
Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta for appellee A. B. Allsman.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely of law,
from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila dated
April 30, 1964, approving the project of partition filed by the
executor in Civil Case No. 37089 therein.1äwphï1.ñët
The facts of the case are as follows:
Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of
Texas and of the United States." By his first wife, Mary E.
Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children:
Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in
infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis
Allsman; by his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived
him, he had three legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter
S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had three
illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and
Miriam Palma Bellis.
On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the
Philippines, in which he directed that after all taxes, obligations,
and expenses of administration are paid for, his distributable
estate should be divided, in trust, in the following order and
manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b)
P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr.,
Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each
and (c) after the foregoing two items have been satisfied, the
remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first
and second wives, namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry A. Bellis,
Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman, Edwin G. Bellis,
Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal
shares.1äwphï1.ñët
Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a
resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will was admitted to
probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila on September
15, 1958.
The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will,
paid all the bequests therein including the amount of
$240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock to Mary E. Mallen
and to the three (3) illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria
Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis, various amounts
totalling P40,000.00 each in satisfaction of their respective
legacies, or a total of P120,000.00, which it released from time
to time according as the lower court approved and allowed the
various motions or petitions filed by the latter three requesting
partial advances on account of their respective legacies.
On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration,
the executor submitted and filed its "Executor's Final Account,
Report of Administration and Project of Partition" wherein it
reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary E.
Mallen by the delivery to her of shares of stock amounting to
$240,000.00, and the legacies of Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria
Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis in the amount of
P40,000.00 each or a total of P120,000.00. In the project of
partition, the executor — pursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of the
testator's Last Will and Testament — divided the residuary
estate into seven equal portions for the benefit of the testator's
seven legitimate children by his first and second marriages.
On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma
Bellis filed their respective oppositions to the project of partition
on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as
illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the
deceased.
Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him,
proof of service of which is evidenced by the registry receipt
submitted on April 27, 1964 by the executor.1
After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other
pertinent pleadings, the lower court, on April 30, 1964, issued
an order overruling the oppositions and approving the
executor's final account, report and administration and project
of partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied
the national law of the decedent, which in this case is Texas
law, which did not provide for legitimes.
Their respective motions for reconsideration having been
denied by the lower court on June 11, 1964, oppositors-
appellants appealed to this Court to raise the issue of which
law must apply — Texas law or Philippine law.
In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even
discuss, the doctrine of renvoi, applied by this Court in Aznar v.
Christensen Garcia, L-16749, January 31, 1963. Said doctrine
is usually pertinent where the decedent is a national of one
country, and a domicile of another. In the present case, it is not
disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a
domicile thereof at the time of his death.2 So that even
assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule providing that the
domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should govern, the
same would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine
law, but would still refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas
has a conflicts rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae)
calling for the application of the law of the place where the
properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties
here involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence,
however, of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it
should not be presumed different from ours.3 Appellants'
position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi. As
stated, they never invoked nor even mentioned it in their
arguments. Rather, they argue that their case falls under the
circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Article 17 in
relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code.
3
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render
applicable the national law of the decedent, in intestate or
testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the
order of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e)
the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the
capacity to succeed. They provide that —
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is
subject to the law of the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions,
both with respect to the order of succession and to the
amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic
validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated
by the national law of the person whose succession is
under consideration, whatever may he the nature of
the property and regardless of the country wherein
said property may be found.
ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10 — now Article
16 — of the Civil Code states said national law should govern.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a
citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of
Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly,
since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the
amount of successional rights are to be determined under
Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to
the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in
toto, with costs against appellants. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal,
Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.

ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the

law of the nation of the decedent. Footnotes

1He
Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph later filed a motion praying that as a legal heir he
three, of the Civil Code, stating that — be included in this case as one of the oppositors-
appellants; to file or adopt the opposition of his sisters
to the project of partition; to submit his brief after
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or paying his proportionate share in the expenses
property, and those which have for their object public incurred in the printing of the record on appeal; or to
order, public policy and good customs shall not be allow him to adopt the briefs filed by his sisters — but
rendered ineffective by laws or judgments this Court resolved to deny the motion.
promulgated, or by determinations or conventions
agreed upon in a foreign country. 2San Antonio, Texas was his legal residence.
prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code 3Lim
afore-quoted. This is not correct. Precisely, Congress deleted vs. Collector, 36 Phil. 472; In re Testate Estate of
the phrase, "notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next Suntay, 95 Phil. 500.
preceding article" when they incorporated Art. 11 of the old
Civil Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil Code, while reproducing
without substantial change the second paragraph of Art. 10 of
the old Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must have been their
purpose to make the second paragraph of Art. 16 a specific
provision in itself which must be applied in testate and intestate
succession. As further indication of this legislative intent,
Congress added a new provision, under Art. 1039, which
decrees that capacity to succeed is to be governed by the
national law of the decedent.

It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good

customs may be involved in our System of legitimes, Congress
has not intended to extend the same to the succession of
foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter
alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's
national law. Specific provisions must prevail over general
ones.

Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two
wills — one to govern his Texas estate and the other his
Philippine estate — arguing from this that he intended
Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that
such was the decedent's intention in executing a separate
Philippine will, it would not alter the law, for as this Court ruled
in Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a
foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be
distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with his
national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be