The Modern Yugoslav Conflict 1991-1995 Perception, deception and dishonesty Brendan O'Shea (Cass Contemporary Security Studies Series Also available as a printed book see title verso for ISBN detailsTHE MODERN YUGOSLAV CONFLICT 1991-1995 In this book the author bridges the gup between the common perception of the modem ‘Yugoslav conilict as porrayed im the media and the actual grim reality with whici he was desimg as a European Menitor on the ground. Drawing on original source material fom bot the United Nations (UN) and the European Conmmunity Monitor Mission (ECMM), he critically re-examines the programme of violence which ermpted m 1991 and eventually culminated in 1995 im the vicious dismemberment of a sovereign federal republic with a seat at the United Nations General Assembly. In doing so, he highlights the duplicitous behaviour of all parties to the conilicr; the double standards employed taroughout by the United States im ts foreigm policy; the lengtns to which the Sarajevo goverment manipulated the mternational media to promote a “victim” status; the contempt i watch UN peacekeepers were ultimately held by all sides: and the manner in wwhich Radovan Karadzic was sacrificed atthe altar of political expediency when tie real culprits were Slododin Milosevic and his acolyte, General Ratko Mlailic. This book, the first comprehensive evaluation of the contlict by an ELI Monitor, tells the story of the ‘moder Yugoslav conilict, 1991-1995, from the unique perspective of one who was tere, drawing on all of the authors* pullished work to date Brendlan O'Shea is an officer of commmdant ranks (major) m the Irish Defence Forces, swith 29 years’ military service, He served in the Former Yugoslavia with the ECMM and farer with the Organtsation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) as an international election observer, He has also served on a number of occasions with the United Nations in the Middle East and holds 4 Ph.D. in History from University College Cork where he teaches Humanitarian Law and Huemanitatian InterventionCASS CONTEMPORARY SECURITY STUDIES SERIES MILITARY STABILITY IN BUROPE The CFE meaty Jane MO.Shaip MACMILLAN, KHRUSHCHEV AND THE BERLIN CRISIS, 1958-1960 Kathleen Newman US NUCLEAR NON- PROLIFERATION POLICY 1989-1997 Tess Oxenstierna NATO'S SECRET ARMY Cperation Glaudio and terrorism in Westen Europe Daniel Ganser ‘THE US, NATO AND MILITARY BURDEN-SHARING Stephen Cimbala and Peter Forster RUSSIAN GOVERNANCE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY Geo-strategy, geopolitics and governance ring Tsakova THE FOREIGN OFFICE AND FINLAND 1938-1940 Diplomatic sideshow Craig Gerrard RETHINKING THE NATURE OF WAR Edited ty Isabelle Duyvesteyn and Jan Angstrom THE MODERN YUGOSLAV CONFLICT 1991-1995 Perception, deception and dishonesty Brendan O'SheaTHE MODERN YUGOSLAV CONFLICT 1991-1995 Perception, deception and dishonesty Brendan O'Shea a FRANK CASS LONDON * NEW YORKFirst published 2008 by Frank Cass 2 Pak Squaze, Millon Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 ARN This ection published in the Taylor & Francis eLibrary, 2005, "To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Rouiledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please goto hilp: vw. ebookstore.tand. co.uk.” ‘Simultaneously published in the USA and Cavada by Frenk Cass 270 Madison Ave, New Vork, NY 10016 Frank Cassis an in print cfthe Taylor & Francis Group ©2005 Brendan O'Shea All ighis reserved. No pat of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or uilised in any form or bby amy elecienic, mechanical, or other mems, now known or heceafler invented, including photocopying and recording, orn any information slomage er retrieval system, withcut pemnission in-writing fear the publishers, British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this bockis available fiom ‘he British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data O'Shea, Brendan The Modem Yugoslay Conflict, 1991-1995: perception, deception and dishonesty’Brendan OShea—Ist ed. p. ex. Trcludes bibliographical references md index. 1. Yugoslav War, 1991-1995. 2. Tust war doctrine T Title, DRISI3.083 2005 $49.703—de2? 2064013320. ISBN 0-203-00298-9 Master e-book ISBN ISBN 0-415.35705-S (Print Eston)Having established that Yugoslavia was a big lie, the Great Manipulators and their well equipped teams (composed of writers, journalists, sociologists, psychiatrists, philosophers, political scientists, and...generals!) began the process of dismantling the big hie. And then they stopped to rest fom their work and suddenly noticed that the country was still whole. So then they get about dismantling the country. But in order 10 ayaiken the dormént national consciousness it was necessary quickly to establish differences: in what way were we different, that is better than them, Colleagues, uiversity teachers, linguists, joumalists, writers, historians, psychiarists, worked fervently the teams to secure the dormant, lost, regressed national identity New words began to enter the language of the media; etanically clean (‘eritory, team, side, workforce) as opposed to ethmcally imclean ones. “Clean” and “Unclean’ quicky spread to the ‘dimy war’ with accompinying formulations (cleansing terrain, ethnic cleansmg). Every day new mags of Yugoslavia surfaced im the media with differently coloured patches: everyone experienced some colour and patch as tareateaing. And of their own accord people began 10 proffer their own behinds, asking the Great ‘Manipulators (the fathers of thetr nation, thetr defenders their Leaders) to brand them, Duibravka Ugresic, The Culture ef Liesam nen CONTENTS ‘The main protagonists Abbreviations Introduetion 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 The End State Notes Select bibtiography Index 90 BI 167 176THE MAIN PROTAGONISTS Serbia Slobodan Milosevic Presidem Mirjana Markovic Wife of Milosevic Borisay Jovic Former President of Yugoslavia General Veliko Kadijevic Defence Minister of Yugoslavia Croatia Franjo Tudpmn President Gojko Susak Minister for Defence Mate Grate Foreign Minister from 1993 General Janko Babetko Chief ofthe General Staff ‘The Republi of Srpska Krajina Milan Maric Presiden Borislay Mikelic Prime Minister Milan Babic Foreten Minister General Milan Celeketic Chief of Staff Bosnia-Hercegovina Alia eibegovie President Ejup Gantc Deputy President Hams Silajdzic Prime Minister Muhamed Saci’bey Aminassador 10 the UN General Sefer Haliovic Commander ofthe Amy General Rasim Defic Successor to Halilovic Bihac Pocket Fikret Abdic Founder Autonomous Provirice General Atif Dudakovic Commander, 5th Corps, 1993-1996 Republie Srpska Radovan Karadzic President General Ratko Mladic Commander of the Army General Manejlo Milovanovic Chief of StaffCroatian Community of Hereeg-Bosna Mate Boban President Kesimir Zulbak President of the Mustin/Croat Federation in 1994 General Tihomir Blaskic Commander of the Army (HV) General Zarko Tole Chief of Siatf Montenegro Momir Bulatovic Prosidom Slovenia Mila Kucan President Macedonia Kio Giligorov President The United Nations Civilian Boutros Boutros. Ginali Secretary-General ‘Yasushi Akashi Special Representative Military General Lewis MacKenzie UN Conmménder in Sarsjevo in 1992 General Phillipe Morillon UN Commander in Bosnia in 1993 General Sir Michael Rose UN Commander in Bosnia in 1954 General Rupert Smith UN Commander in Bosnia m 1995 General Bernard Janvier UNPROFOR Commander, 1994/95 Lieutenant Colonel Bob Stewart Commander I Battalion, Cheshire Regiment ‘The European Community Monitor Mission (ECMM) Ambassador Jean Paul von Head of Mission from I July t0 Stulpnagle 31 December 1994 Ambassador Albert Turrot Head of Mission fom | January to 30 June 1995 Klaus Krammer Head of Operations Division m 1994 Jein Michel Happe Head of Operations Division in 1995 The Mediators Lord Peter Césrington Carl Bilt Colin Doyle Charles Redman Lord David Owen Peser Galbraith Cyrus Vance Richard Holirooke Thorvald Stoltenberg timmy Carter ‘Vitali ChurkinABBREVIATIONS Military Anmija ‘Bestian Muslim Army BSA ‘Bosnian Setb Army HV (Croatian Amy FVO Bosnian Croat Amy INA The Olé Yugostay National Army SARSK Seibian Ary of the Republic of Sepska Krajina Political APWE ‘Autenoraus Province of Westem Bosnia (Fikret Abdic} HDZ (Croatian Democratic Union (Frarjo Tucimar} SDA Party of Deenocratic Action (Alija Iaetbegovic} sps Serbian Democratic Paty (Radovirn Karadzic} International EC European Community ECMM ‘Buropean Consmunity Momitor Mission ECF European Community Task Foree (Human itrian} Ter International Committee of the Red Crass NATO [Novth Atlantic Treaty Organisation NGO UN UNHCR ‘United Nations High Commission fbr Reftgees UNMO. United Nations Military Gbserver ‘UNPROFOR, ‘United Nations Protection Ponce ‘UNSC United Nations Security CouseilINTRODUCTION In the Ociober 1997 issue of the Amoriean Historical Review, Sarah A. Keni, wrote that readers snould not seek the ‘truth’ m relation 10 the Former Yugoslavia’s wars of dissolution because she believed it was an exercise best left to politicians, who purported to know it, and the Almighty, whom she hoped actually did. She went on to state nat Bosnia tad confounded the international community and raised crucial questions about existing tneruments for conilict resolution because specialists had failed 1 achieve agreement on even a simple mterpreration of the facts. She further identified that few sauthors had presented either the Bosmian Croat ar Bosnian Ser side of the story and tat simply attempting to categorise the contlict legally lad become a hotly disputed issue— the Bosnian Mushims believed they had fought m 4 war of ageression, while the Bosnizm Ses, on the other hand, were adamant they had fought civil war.” Sarah Kent's aseessment was comect on all counts. Throughout the wars of dissolution, and in the conflict-resolution phase thereafier, attempting 10 establish the “truth’ of what happened became an almost impossible task. Eack party had their own concept of the truth, their own version of events, and their own interpretation of Balke Inistory. Equally, those tncernationals who came to help brought with them a variety oF preconceptions and agendas, and, depending on what they actually experienced on the ground, then went away to write thetr memorrs doggedly determmed ro support one side othe other. Very few found themselves in positions whereby they could monitor the big picture and thereby offer balanced objective assessment and evaluation In September 1964 T was selected to join the European Community Monitor Mission (ECMM) m the Former Yugoslavia and after a time as a monitor and team leader mn easter Slavonia, and then ag a monitor in the Krajima near Bihac, [ was appointed to the Headquarers’ Staff in Zagreb as the offiver responsible for evaluating and reporting on the war in Bosnia together with the general situation ta Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia and Kosovo. In this capacity [ was afforded the opperumity to work with the “big picture’, were my job was to make some senge of the conflict im order to better taform the policy-makers of the European Union. Our reports eventually found their way to EU HQ im Brussels, the foreign ministries of all EU governments and to the United Nations in New York However, it also became apparent at am early stage that irrespective of what my colleagues and T actually weote, in the world ofreaipoiick individual agendas were sill pursued relemilessly with the best and worst exanrple unquestionably emg Germany's single-minded determmation to recognise Croatia when the Badinter Commission, Lord Carringnon and EC monitors cn the ground all advised against it‘The modern Yugoslav conflict 1991-1995 2 Equally, when former US president Jimmy Carter and Radovan Karadzic “had ‘managed to secure the Cessation of Hostiltes Agreement (COMA) in December 1994 1 believed this success could and should have been Halt upon im a serious and mesningfal ‘way. Unfortunately the leaders of the international community thought otherwise and followed their own agendas, determining that there would be no place for an indicted war criminal at the peace-conference table—and a unique possibility for progress was squandered. Nevertheless, ECMM continued to gather imformation and make evaluations. With teams spread right throughout the region, daily, weekly, monthly, and special reports on the military, political, economic and himmamtarian situations came floodig mro the Ineadquarters m Zagrely and were processed through 4 complex evahiation system. Thereafter asgestments and predictions were distributed intemationally and either aceepted or rejected by those who read them. ECMM’s mission statement was simple. ‘We were i theatre 10 observe and report at firs: hand on the Former Yugoslavia’s wars of dissolution—and for the most part Iam satisfied that we did it well However, it was also during this time that I first became aware of the chasm which existed between the common perception of the conflict as portayed im most of the popular media and the acrual gran reality which [was dealing wath on the ground. There was a difference, and m miny mstences it was huge In order to aildress these issues, therefore, and drawing on all resources available, including original unclassified material fom ‘both UN and ECMM sources, this book seeks 10 wdentify the origin of the Former Yugoslavia's wars of dissolution and thereafter critically examme the programme of violence which erupted between 1991 and 1995 culmmating eventually im the vicious dismemberment of 4 sovereign federal republic with a seat atthe United Nations, It also seeks to identify tne duplicitous behaviour of all parties to the conflict; the double standards employed throughout by the Umted States i its foretgm policy: the fengths 10 which the Sargjevo government manipulated the intemational media 10 promote a ‘victim’ status, the content in which UN peacekeepers were ultimately held by all parties to the contlter; and the mamer tn which Karadzic was sacrificed atthe altar of political expediency when the real culprits were Slobodan Milosevic and his acolyte General Ratko Mladic, whose barbicous behaviour in the eastem Bosnia towns of Srebrenica and Zepa in July 199S is now well documented by the international community. The ease agains: Karaaic has always een a separaze mater and debate continues a5 to whether or not he deserves tobe vilified in the same manner Karadzic’s indicoments relate primarily 10 the fact that ag per the Constitution of the Republic Srpska le was de jer the "Superior Aufhocity” within that so called *State” and as such the “buck is deemed 10 stop at his desk’. AS far ag the international community ‘was concemed it had a scapegoat. Karadnic was typecast as 4 psychopath, # butcher and the architect of genocide and the campaign to bring him to justice served as a convenient distraction from criticism of the imtemational community itself and its sbysmal failure to either convince or coerce any of the parties to the conflict to respect even the basic tzneg of mtemitional humammarian law. Perception was everyting. Gutlt had been assigned,’ That Karadzic might well have had a significantly lesser case to answer was never even considered,Introduction 3 For the duration of the 1991 Gulf War journals, would-be authors, academies and the media all found their movement on the batdlefield strictly controlled. by specially appointed Coalition media liaison officers. Most were adamant that when the next contlict erupted they would never again accept the same restrictions—and right on cue Yugoslavia imploded enablmg himdreds of joumatisis and media personnel 10 descend first on Slovenia, then on Zagreb, and therea‘ter on Sarajevo. This time around most were prepared to take ieredible risks im order 10 ferret cut the ‘truth’ and many died because they paid tnsutficient attention to their owm basic safety. Others lost objectivity i their reporting as they came fave to face with scenes of savagery and brutality. Slaughterhouse by David Rieff® A Hitness to Genacide oy Roy Gutman and Seasons in Hell by Ed ‘Vulliarny,!°all recount winat the authors believed they discovered im north-central Bosnti daring. 1992 when they visited prison camps run by the Bosniém Serbs. Generating public outrage became their objective m the hope tat Westem governments might be compelled to intervene. As far as they were concemed there wis only one truth—these were concentration carmps of the Second World War era. Ed Vulliamy was clear: “There is 10 auiemp: [in this book] to be objective towards the perpetratocs of Bosnia's ethnic carnage snd those who appease them.” Equally, Ricf? was unapologetic for his failure to be dispassionate in the face of what Ine perceived to be mags murder, and he later went s0 far as to accuse agents of the intemational community of distorting reports fom the groumd in order to maintain the fine that all parties to the conflict were equally 10 blame. What Rief? and his colleagues failed to appreciate was that by standig one pace removed from the coniict the key intemational figures, and their agents scattered throughout the region, were far better placed to make balanced evaluations and assessments, In this regard Lewis MacKenzie, Michacl Rose, Bob Stewart, Milos Stankovic, ‘Yasushi Akashi, David Owen, Cyrus Vance, Thorvald Stoltenberg and Lord Carrington all formed the view that none of the parties were imocent winen tt came to the violemt dismemberment of Yugoslavia, All were dezmed to have copious amounts of blood on their hands, an assessment which was amply supported by thousands of reports compiled by both ECMM and LINPROFOR operatives deployed in towns and villages right across the former republics. My own experience copper-fastened this view and [ algolutely concur with David Owen’s assessment that ‘never before have Thad to operate in such a climate of dishonour, propaganda, and digsembling. Many of the people with whom Unad to deal in former Yugoslavia were literally strangers tothe truth"? By failing 10 attribute all blame to the Serbs (he they im Croatia, Bosnia or Kosovo) accusations were then levelled that those expressing an altemative view were ‘anti Muslim”—something which was patently untrue, However, when some memiyers of the intemational community took matters furtner and tried 10 expose the devious double games being played throughout by the Szajevo government they in fact risked death or personal reribution. One such example was the former UN civil affars officer m Sarsjevo, Philip Comin, who admitied that ox 13 huly 1995 the Sarajevo government minister, Hasan Muratovic, actually threatened to kill him if he continued working: with the Bosnian Seri, a job for which he was specifically employed by the UN." And indeed T experienced these tactics myself in February 1995 when the then mayor of Eugejno, Dvezd Mlaco, threatened both myself and te oters members of an ECMM‘The modern Yugoslav conflict 1991-1995 team when we asked him @ series of questions in relation to the distridution of Jhumanitarian aid Tn the course of this research T have focused on the work of those who had no axe io grind in Yugoslavia save a conrpelting desire to find a peaceful resolution ofthe conflict. Thelieve that itis m the written work of soldiers, monitors, force commanders, peace. tuilders, humanitarian workers cad human rights observers thatthe truth cant be found — if it can be found at all. These were the people who came to know and anderstand all of the parties to the contticr and they compiled 4 thorough picture of exactly who was cperatiag to what agentla, In short, these were the people who lived and worked at the coal-face for almost four and a half years and 4 consistency rims right through their ‘writmag which ta may opinion isnot found elsewhere For example, when General Rose states that throughout 1994 Ratko Mladic travelled to Belgrade each Tuesday and took his orders directly ftom the INA HQ there (translate: Milosevic) | believe him because I know how that piece of information was obraimed and processed." Equally, when Pailiy Corwin writes that by the end of Jume 1995 Mladic, Gnd not Karadzic) was m change m the Republic Srpska, and that he briefed General Rupert Smith to this effect on 25 lune stating that Karadzic had by then become merely figurehead, this corroborates Rose's earlier assessment '* Corwin’ also wrote to Yasushi Akashi on 28 hme 1995 stating that the Sarajevo government was imereasimgly using the cover of UN facilities, as well ag hospitals and schools, to provoke Bosnian Serb counter-attacks."* This assessment is again consistent with several of Rose’s own evahuations, a8 itis with tepors fom the Dutch battalion immediately prior 10 the fall of Srebrenica tat July In the same vein, one of the more critical incidents of the entire wir wis the bread queue massacre in Sarajevo on 25 May 1992 after which General Lewis MacKenzie's assessment became the focus of mtensive critique by those who had other agendas to follow. Writing in his diary two days beforehand he had noted. ‘Watching TV news (BBC and CNN) one gets the impression the Serbs ae 100 per cent to blame. Some of the reports are unfbalamced, ised! on what swe know. Serbs bear a majority of responsitility but Lzetoegovic has dome sm excellent job mobilizing world opinion on his side, which covers up his hidden agenda. I'm convinced he wants massive international military intervention.” ‘Taen, when the bom went off, he wrote: Disaster in Sarsjevo. People lied up for bread were attacked and at least seventeen killed, The Presidency claims twas a Serb mortar attack. Serbs claim it was a set-up using explosives. Our people tell us there were « rmmiber of things that didn’t fit. The street had been blocked off just before the incident. Once the crowed was fet m and had lined up the media appeared but kept their distance. The attack took place and the media were immediately on the scene. The majority of the people Killed were “tame” Serbs. Wro knows? The only tang for sure is that imocent people were killed!Introduction In Pac, the only thing for certain was that this assessment would turn our to be perfectly consistent with several other reports compiled subsequently as the war went on, which indicated clearly that not everything was black, white or straightforward. Aenrpes 10 discredit MacKenzie have contimied to this very day, but taken m the content of the conilict ag a whole, and the duplicitous ehaviour of the Serajevo govermment aroughout, Iam saiistied that his version of 25 May was thea, and still is, most probably correct, In fact, following mother mortar attack on the marketplace in Sarajevo abmost nwo years lator on 3 February 1994, in which 68 civilians were killed, Akashi woote tothe UN secretiry-general, Boutros Boutros-Ginal, stating thatthe mortar could have been fired by the Bosnian Muslims in order to induce NATO intervention, Boutros-Ghali informed the US secretary of state, Warren Christopher, accordingly, who replied that he had seen ‘many intelligence reports which went both ways. There are several otter similar examples. Understanding te bariarty of the fighting was also something no journalist managed to capture fully either, However, Milos Stankovic provides am insight like no other when, swritmag on the 1992 Croat-Muslim war in central Bosmia, he recorded the words ofa local interpreter, Edi Letic, who was fighting inthe trenches Ten inthis tench with a radio and with whole load of other Mustiens The Croats are charging us, firing, and we're firmg hack, and then suddenly some:hing saps. Everyone around me leaps up screaming and shouting, mad, with red rage, They drop their rifles and charge forward swith axes, knives, meat cleavers and bayonets and they hack away at each other. That's what it's like here. [t's not enough 10 shoot. Better to make 4 veil job of tt with anes and knives,"? Similar accounts from Anthony Loyd revedl the imhumanity of the conflict and make it clear beyond doubt that the Serbs did not have a monopoly on savagery. Working in central Bosnia during the winter of 1993, Loyd, a retired British army officer, witnessed three Muslim soldiers reuming to their own Imes having been released by the Bos Croats, Now forced back across no-min’s land they furched unnaturally arp the hillside. Theie hands were strapped to their waists. Improvised claymore ‘mines were attached to thetr chests and linked to the Croat houses by coils of wire that unravelled slowly with each step of their robotic progress, The human bombs were returning home. As the distince narrowed 4 [Muslim] officer shouted at hig men to shoot them. They refused. Some of the soldiers ran ack from the trench to their bunkers, There were three individual explosions $0 close together as t0 roll imto one promacted taunderous roar that bounced echoes berneen te cold black hills. Blood, shrapnel, and tissue sprayed the trees. For a few seconds there was silence, A couple of soldiers peered cautiously over the edge ofthe trench Im the shredded, amkle high scrub before them they could make out three pairs of lees. It was all that was left of thetr friends.”‘The modern Yugoslav conflict 1991-19956 When the war eventually spread to Bihac Pocket the first available information came from ECMM teams operating oa the ground, and reports filed by Hugh O’Doaovan represent the best evidence of impartial war reporting that I have ever seen. His work was followed in turn by that of Mark Ethermgton, Klaus Kramer and Bill Foxton, as the conilict evolved over three years. Between them they contributed to the compilation of & huge database of information vhict is richer than anything the print media had to offer and far less biased than the glowing reports of Sth Comps” successes produced by others taroughout the ped OF greater value in the context of this study, however, are the original letters and dispatches which I managed to collec: durtag my period in theatre. The comespondence berween Karadzic and Akashi subsequent to Boutros-Gialt's refusal to meet with Karadzic on 30 November 1994 ig particularly iflumimating.” as is the letter in which Akaghi is eventually forced to include 4 map defmestmg where the UN declared “safe area” of Bias was actually supposed to be. Later, at the hegiaming of August 1995, the supposedly imminent collapse of Bihac was used by the Croats and their American advisers as the excuse 10 launch the full sweight of the Croatian army against the Krajina Serbs when in fact no such collapse was spout to take place. This is clear from ECMM reports of that time which dicated tat the Pocket was not about 10 fall. Nevertheless the attacks commenced, leading to the conclusion that some other agenda was at work —and it was, In an interview with Tim Ripley on 21 December 1997 US ambassador to Croatia, Peter Galbraith, admitted that the Croatians had told lim they were about to go to war snd that given the attacks on Bihac (which were not in fact dbout 10 cause a collapse of tne Sth Comps of the Bosnisn army) the US decided not to dispute thetr right to intervene. Splitting hairs on the issue Galbcaith went on to say. Tt was mot an agreement, just a ‘no objection’... On Ist August we issued a detmitive demarche to Tudyman. We said “whatever you do ig your decision but if you do not givea warning you will face sanctions” ‘We stressed that this did not constnite 4 “green ligt’, amd that the Croats on their own must protect Ser’ civilians anid UN personel, It was “ao light’ at all In reality President Tudjman interpreted all ofthis as a definite green light and promotly set about conducting the largest ethmic-cleansing operation of them all. By the time his soldiers were fimished over 300,000 Croatian (Krajina) Serie had been brutally driven from theit homes, If there was ever any doubt what actually constituted the special position of Serbs mm Croan society, as enunciated m the Croatian Constitution, there ‘was absolutely none now—ad nobody intervened to stop this outrage, which was captured live on imtemational TV. In fact, but for the presence of EC monitors on the ground in Bihac history might well have recorded that Tudyman’s attack was justified i order to save the safe ares. Having filed thet reports throughout the period, and stored them safely in ECMMs database in Zagreb, that inte:prettion is not now possible, Sadly forthe entire Krajina Seri population, wao were condemmed to life as refugees in Serbia and beyond, this provides litle consolation. As far as they are concerned Tudhman got his way, Croatia 1s now ethnically clean, and the main players im theIntroduction 7 intemational community raised not one finger to help them. This is how they perceive theie reality now. Unfortunately, itis also the tuth—and few ifany waat io know of theie plight Accondingly, the prpose of thig book is to record the story of Yugoslavia’s dissolution from the perspective of those wao worked at the coal-face—atrending ‘meetings, arranging body and prisoner exchanges, organising humanitarian aid convoys, observing: and reporting as each shot was fired, and often endmg up bemg shot at themselves. There was no monopoly on tmuth m Yugoslavia and this book makes 110 exclusive claims, Rather it seeks to uncavel what transpired in order to search for truth while accepting completely that in order to find it one must first do bottle with what Dubravka Ugresic correctly identthed as ‘The Culture cf Lies”.1991 ‘The Karadjordjevo meeting Responding to repeated attempts by Slobodan Milosevic 10 circumvent, and then mmimipulate the federal presidency im pursuit of hig own agendas, Croatia and Slovenia signed a Mutual Defeace Accord in February 1991 in what effectively was the first step on the road to secession.’ Identifying the commencement of disintegration, Aliya Irethegovic, the president of Bosnia-Hercegovina, continued to argue the case for a federal state but the architects of anarchy had already moved on. Meeting at Tito's old fumting lodge im Karadjordjevo, Vejvodma, on 25 March Tudjman and Milosevic nad already made plans to carve up the tegion, leaving “alittle bit of Bosnia for the Muslims’, sa Tudjmam later put it” OF course this was nor a new idea—a similar proposal had been negotiated back im August 1939 in order to faviltate the pacticipation ofthe ten Croat leader Vladko Macsk 18 a cosltion government wih his conservative Serb counterpict, Drapisa Gyetkovic.” The difference mm 1991 was that this new deal had been negotiated in secret The only ‘matter reaming, unresolved, apparently, was how to tmplement it. This task was left £0 the then Csoatian prime minister, Hrvcje Sarinic, and Milosevic’s counsellor, Silja Avramov, who met on it feast 30 further occasions to discuss the population trmsters ‘which would be necessary t0 effect it? In armeeting atte time wits Ambassador Zimmerman, Unettegovic remurked that “IF Croatia goes independent Bosnia will be destroyed."* This was a profound forecast, and together with Kino Gligoroy, the president of Macedonia, he went to a meeting of the federal presidency im Belgrade on 5 April and proposed 4’new mechanism where’sy the Federation could be held together. Notwithstanding the presence at the meetiag of an EC delegation, the proposals fell on deaf ears. Milosevic and Jovic had already decided tnat all Serb (including the Bosnism Ser’s) should now live in one stare, and Tudyman was preaching, a hudicrous philogoplay that Bosnia had always been a part of Croatia and that i fact the Bosnian Muslims really considered themselves to be Croats.ist 9 ‘Violence erupts As summer approached the seeds of conflict began to germinate, Milun Kucan had set ‘mid-hme now ag his deadime for Slovene secession and he begin the ongimisation of peramilitary units which would be employed to defend the new republic. In Croatia the situation was also tense—but for different reasons. A number of Serb villages had ‘mobilised self-defence militias and on | April the village of Glina, SO km south-west from Zagreb, declared tts secession from Croatia. This was followed by the similar secession of 28 other Serb communities im the ‘municipality of Sisak, and the following day barricades went up around Serb villages in easter Slavonia tn the vieinny of Vukovar, Osijek, Vinkevet and Dal. Then, to make miaters worse, Vejslav Seseh,” a radical politician and paramiizary leader from Serbia, arrived m Borovo Selo on the outskirts of Vukovar allegedly responding 10 a request for |netp from the local Sera militia ladder Vukasin Sosicocanin, He brought with him a group of paramilitary fighters who lad been armed by the Serbian police? the relationship here between Seselj and the Belgrade urhorities 1§ of critical importance. Reflectmg on the matter im 1994 Seselj was unambiguous: “Our first contact with the police was m the summer of 1991. Then we begin to ceive arms cirecily. The first man who we had such contacts with was [Minal]] Kertes. Later when the army entered the war the army gave ‘weapons tous. We were given inusses /sc7, and a barracks and seated on these busses we went to the front,” This connection establishes a direct Tink to Milosevic because Kertes was one of Milosevic’s closest aides. 1: was Keries who masterminded the mass demonstrations in ‘Vejvodina wich led to the collapse of the goverament there on 5 October 1988: it was Keertes who rose high in the ranks of the new government which subsequently emerged it ‘was Kertes whom Milosevic appointed as Serbia's chief customs officer in 1994; and it wag Kertes who bank-rolled the later stages of the Milosevic regime uml it ‘mally collapsed on 5 Ocrober 2001." Kertes was there at the begimig and there at the end, He ‘was one of the very few to actieve that dubious distinction. OF course, Kertes was no: operating slone—back im 1991 he was ably assisted in recruiting these so-called ‘volunteers’ by the then Serbian interior minister, Radmito Bogdanovic, the secret police chie’, Jovica Stanisie, and his two deputies, Franko Simaiovie (‘Frenki’) and Radovan Sicjicic (‘Badza’)’' For the kes of Seselj it was comforting to know that the full weight of Serbia’s political apparatus was squarely behind him, and in December 1991 all volunteer imits, melding tine Chetniks, were filly integrated into the JNA order of battle.” The overall situation m Croatia was now deteriorating by the hour and came to a head on 8 April wlien it was announced in Zagreb that the courts martial of Martin Spegelj and the “Virovitica Four” had been discontinued i response 10 mass demonstrations and riors co the streets. This sent the wrong message entirely to the simple Serb peasants of eastern Slavonta who genuinely believed that the Croats, aided and abetted by Germany, were ‘row about 10 attack them, These fears were imcreased by the rhetoric of Sesel, and gained further credence when they wimessed the hurried amival of other groups of “volunteers”. Both Serbs and Croats m Croatia were now genuinely and legitimately‘The modem Yugoslav contiet I991-1995 19 aftaid for their lives, and escapades lise that undertaken by Tudjman’s defence mimister served only to confirm their worst nightmares, On | May Defence Minister Susak had gone to Osijek and, enlisting the aid of the police chief, Josip Rechil-Kir, went on 4 night-time excursion to Borovo Selo m order 10 fire three missiles into an aprtment complex m the predominantly Ser> suburb of Vukovar. For many Serbs this legitimised the presence of Sescli’s thugs, and the following day two bus-loads of Croatian police were ambushed in the centre of Borove Selo—12 died and a further 22 were wounded. Croatia was now steadily sliding towards full scale civil war as the extremists on both sides 100k control, 4 fact evidenced by the death of Rechil-Kir himself, who, having, subsecquently voiced his oijections to what Susak and his colleagues fad done, was then ‘murdered by 4 local HDZ activist, Anim Gudelj, who tren made a “miraculos” escape from the region notwithstanding that several police road blocks were actually sited in cloge proxrmity to him at the trme, Five years later Susi would deny that he had anything to do with the firing of rockers into Borovo Selo. Fe did, however, admit that he had been in the area at the time, and confirmed that he had ‘visited the Croatian soldiers, and crawled for three hours in the ‘muti towards ihe barricades’ /° This ‘explanation’ serves only to taise further questions, sand it most certainly does not rebut the testimony of Jadanka Rechil-Kir m relation to ‘no bears responsibility for tine cold-blooded rmurder of her husband From this point onwards the flames of eitnic hatred would be vigorously fiauned by political leaders on all sides and at all levels, and literally withm days botn communities became engulfed in a crisis, the origins of which they barely wmderstood. Harassment, fntimidacton, ti-for-tatkillmes and imdiscrimmate attacks on towns, villages and private Tnouses, quickly became the norm, Law and order effectively died in Croatia on the night that Josip Rechil- Kir was murdered. In umdem with the growing violence the result of @ referendhn in Croatia published con 20 May established that 92 per cent of those who voied did ot want to remain within federal Yugoslavia, and the imveilmg of the new Croatian National Guard on 28 May indicated clearly that Tudjman too had passed the pomt of no return, noowithstanding tat Seri autonomous regions were, springing up all over the place—Knin, Plitvice, Pakrac and Vukovar to name but four. Declarations of independence Against thig volatile political backdrop James Baler, US secretary of state, arrived in Belgrade on 21 me fresh ftom the Conference on Security and Co-cperation in Europe (CSCE later OSCE) meeting m Berlin where a resolution had been adapted calling, forthe ‘democratic development, unity, and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia and continued dialogue derween all panies’!” The message he delivered to Milosevic was straightforward—the US and OSCE did noe support dissolution and all parties should ‘work to find a resolution. Ambassador Zimmerman is clear that there was no ambiguity. “The message was simple’, he says. ‘Baker told him dissolution was not am option.”® This was consistent swith what President Bush had already told Federal Prime Minister Markovic on 28 March1111 shen he said that the US would no: encourage or reward those who broke up the country Baker then sweat to Tudjman and Kucan and told them the same story, emphasising that the US would noe support unilateral secession—bur his message fll on deaf ears.” Four days later, on 25 June, Sloventa and Croatia declared themselves sovereign and independent states and at 8 pm. that evening, on the tenth amniverséry of the alleged apparition of the Virgin Mary in the Bosaian-Croat tovm of Medjugorge, and speaking 10 a packed Croitian Sabor in Zagreb, resident Tudjman declared that we was “ealing on all parlimentary democracies to recognise the wall of the Croatian people 2 jor the society of free and independent nations". Later that evening the Slovenes did the same, and fighting, began almost immediately when at Milosevic’s biddmg the remnemts of the Federal State Council, presided over by Jovic, aporoved Federal Prime Minister Ante Markovic’s directive that the JNA intervene in order to protect Yugoslavia’s rternational borders, And thus the dissolution of Yugoslavia commenced when all the old border crogsmgs and customs posts with the West fl mio divect Slovene control and goods i transit and customs revenue became forfeited 10 the Slovene exchequer. The ten-day vate which followed was a half-hearted affair with neither the INA noe Milosevic having the stomach for all-out conflict. Armoured units did move rato Slovenia 01 27 hime following @ main axis from Karlovac and Zagreb to Ljubljana, with a second axis firther north from Varazdin, fut the fighting which ensued could only be described 4s “pacchy’, given tat all main roads tno Sloventa were mmed and the secondary routes ‘were covered by fire at critical points.” Eventually, after an ill-fated ten-day adventure m which little military progress was made, and 37 Yugoslay army and 12 Slovene deaths were recorded, the INA gave up. Taat the campaign concluded as quickly as tt did was an tmeresing story. Five months previously, on 24 January to be exact,” Kucan and Milosevic had discussed a potential Slovene breakaway and the Serbian president agreed to allow the Slovenes to depart on condition that Kucan supported Serbia's clatn to incomporate all Serb-populated areas elsewhese in Yugostavia into Serbia proper. “We both Know what is going to happen’, Milosevic said, “You Slovenes want to Teave, so let's make a deal. Let's rewrite the constitution and extend the right 10 secede, not just 10 the repuilics, but to all etnaic groups as well." But Kucan knew that « promise ftom Milosevie was all but worthless and was aware that armoured columas were oa the way ftom Croatia, At $ am. on the moraing of 27 hme he went on Slovene Television to confirm his decision to fight. “The Republic of Slovenia will take all necessary measures 10 defend our mdeyendence against the ‘Yugoslav army’, he said. In the first few hours the JNA had tried 10 deploy pst under 2,000 troops (mostly untrained conscripts) to the border crossings, but this had been resisted. The bulk of INA troops garrisoned im Slovenia remamed confined to their barracks, which from the army’s perspective proved to be a huge tactical mistake because very quickly the ad frac Slovene militia (perhaps 35,000 lightly armed volunteers) encircled these barracks and effectively rapped the occupants side. Colonel Aksantijevic, a INA commander in Ljubljana, admitted as much later on, and when it became clear that any resupply by air would ‘almost certamly be shot down, the only ceptions open to the fedecal troops were to fight their way into the country, and out of taeit ‘barracks, ifm fact they had the stomach for tt—and im the majority of cases they did not‘The modem Yugoslav contiet I991-1995 12 The Slovenes also scored major victory im the propaganda war amd quickly had the intemational media reporting Serb atrocities when nothing of the sort was taking place. This was achieved by skilful media manipulation, and the hurdreds of joumahsts wio descended on Ljubljana were made mos: welcome. Thereatier they were corralled imto a bunker beneath the Ministry of Information (allegedly for their own safety) and fed a steady diet of events waking plaoe above ground—fiom the Slovene pesspective. The Serbs were portrayed ag violent commumists who dropped cluster bombs on imocent ervilians, the struggle being thus portrayed as one between Good (im the guise oF Slovenes and Croats) and Evil (personified by the Secbs). In this way a fictional blow-by- How account of the ten-day war was fed to the meta y a team of young multilingual patriotic volunteers (mostly amiversity students aged between 20 and 30), and, rmable (and/or wnvilling) to venture over-ground to. confirm these stories, when editorial dleadfines arrived the oficial Slovene version of evenis was broadcast as faci, Equally, when selected journalists (ie. those disposed to the Slovene struggle) were allowed to venture up into the streets much of what they witnessed was stige-manaped and choreographed. Not for the first time in the Balkans truth had become the first casualty of war—and it would 101 be the fast occasion either Asan EC delegation of foreign ministers was dispatched to Zagreb, General Kadijevic, ‘was proposing massive military mtervention m Slovenia at the Yugoslav State Council in Belgrade. On the verge of rattiving this course of action, Serbia's representative, Borisay Jovic, then voied ‘no’ and vetoed the plan. He later admitted that ‘Serbia had no teritorial clatms theve. It was an ethnically pure repuilic—no Serbs. We couldn’t care less if they left Yugoslavia. With Slovenia out of the way we could dictate terms to the Croas.” However, this admission contains a number of suths. Fitst, it would fave been impossible to justify a military clamp-down im Slovenia on the basis of relieving an copressed mmority because there was none. Second, the Slovenes had far more in common—culturally, economically and geographically—with their Tian and Austrian neighbours than they ever had with Belgrade. Third, Milosevic probably believed he sui Tada deal with Kucan vis-d-vis is plans for Croatia, and there was n0 need to jeopardise it. And fourth, the Slovenes hat! already won the media war by opening up their country ‘o journalists from all over the world and then successfully feeding them their owa side of the story. In fact, Slovene propaganda was 0 successful that Hans Dietrich Genscher, the Germian foreign minister, was invited to Ljubljana at the stat of the war and fed a steady diet of Slovene perspective. When he then went before a press conference he accused the INA of “rimming. amok” in Slovenia, This accusation was totally untrue, but it served its purpose, as indeed did calls from Senator Bob Dole m Washington demendmg that Milosevic halt his supposedly violent crackdown on democracy and human rights Cleirly Dole had iitle understanding of reality on the ground either—inut the damage was done. Intemational public opinion had been formed and the Slovenes were home free. Milosevie’s decision to let Kucan go was utilitarian —he had no strategic interests in Slovenia, However, Croatia would be a different matter altogether.19113 The quest for recognition Initially the United States contiqued to suppor the concept of an integrated federal Yugoslavia as Lawrence Eaglelnmger, at the State Department, and Marlin Fitzwater, a the White House, threw therr collective weigit firmly benind Federal Prime Minister Markovic as he set about preservmg the imity of his country. The European Commumiry, of the other hand, called upon the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) 10 dispatch sn mvestigation team to the region 4s in internal row broke out over hhow to deal with the situation, Germany, m the persons of Chancellor Kohl and Hans Dierrich Genscher, begin to advocate recognition of 4 right 10 self-detennimetion for Groatia and Slovenia which they meoreecily claimed to be contamed m the UN Charter. Britain, France, Spain and Italy, on the other hand, contmued 10 support the concept of an integrated federal Yugoslav state, AS a compromise, a toika of EC foscign ministers, Gianni de Michelis (Taly), Jaques Poor (Luxembourg) and Hans Van den Broek (the Netherlands) were dispatched 10 Belgrade m an attempt to find a solution, Pror to departure m Luxembourg, Foreign Minister Poos declared to the assembled press comps that “This is the hour of Europe; it is riot the hour of the Americans”. Europeans had decided to take the ball andl rum wath it— snd they would live to repret it “Croatia can't just walk eu’, Milosevic told the trio, “600,000 Serbs five there and they want to stay in Yugoslavia” ’—and as far as he was concemed that was the end of the matter. For the troika, optimism about their mission was soon replaced by pragmatism, then by pessimism, and eventually by sheer frustration. Yugoslavia was certainly Europe's problem, but there was no cvious solution and the omens were not ocd. Ina parallel move Genscher attempted t0 broker a munber of ceasefires in Slovenia but failed miserably, while Volker Ruthe, the chainnan of the ruling Cristian Demoscats 1 Germany, continued to call for international recognition of Croatia and Slovenia in clear disregard for official EC policy on the matter, Tension between France and Germany then begin to vise on this issue and only subsided slightly when the trois appeared 19 make some progress (On 29 hme, four days after declaring independence, Croatia and Slovenia agreed to suspend their departure from the Federation for three months to see if some progress could be made—but fighting continued nonetheless. The following day Stipe Mesic, Crowt, became president of the Yugoslav Federation, Serbia having previously blocked |his ayointment since 17 May, and im Slovenia the JNA recalled all operational troops to barracks. One could have been forgiven for thing that some progress was im Fact berg, ‘made The Brioni Agreement ‘Watching events unfold on TV back in Belgrade Milosevic quickly understood that Serb ambitions were nt best served by images of INA fighter aircraft dropping bombs on‘The modem Yugoslav contiet I991-1995 14 Ljubljana or Brink airport, and therefore quickly agreed to talks between representatives from the European Community, Croatia, Slovenia, Serbia and the federal government. These took place on the island of Brijuni just off the Istrian coast from the port of Puls, v7 July. The document which all parties signed was to hecome known as the Brijumi (or Brioni) Agreement and allowed, for the first me, a deployment of Europedm Commurity ‘monitors (ECMM) to supervise the withdrawal of the INA from Slovene teritory Little elge was agreed, but Europe's interest i the repion was now clearly established and henceforward new EC montiors would fly the blue flag with 12 gold stars right across Yugoslavia in support of an agreement which from day one meat tovally diferent thmgs to the various parties involved. It certainly mest little or nothing to the INA tank units operating im eastern Slavonia who shelled the centre of Osijek that very same evening, The war im Croatia had begum i spite of Brioni but the EC mn particular, and the intemational community in general, would be slow to admit that a real tragedy was begiming to unfold Nevertheless, ag July wore on it intially appeared that some political progress was being made, The first ever EC Ministerial Conference on Yugoslavia coavened in The Hague on the 10th, the Earopean Conrmunity Monitor Mission (ECMM) established its permanent headquarters in the relative hnuury of Hotel “T” fm the south-eastern suburbs of ‘Zagre’ on the 13th, and the Presidium of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia amoxnced cov the 18th thar the JNA would withdraw to Serbia and Bosnta-Hercegovina within three ‘montis, On tine ground, however, the reality was different as inter-ethnic violence continued to erupt throughout Croatia with the INA actively supporting local Serb communities on the pretext of mterposing between bota sides. For example, the police stations m_Glma and Kozibrod were attacked on 2 July. The following day a huge column of armowed vehicles poured into eastern Slavonia from Seria and two soldiers and ten civilians quickly lost their lives. Then on te might of 6 July General Kathjevic: and Milosevic appeared together on Belgrade TV calling all clizens wo come 10 the defence oF Yugoslavia. ‘War in Croatia Against this huckdrop President Tudpman walked out of the Federal Presidium session emg eld m Ohrid, Macedonia, on 22 huly, forcing the EC Council of Foreign Ministers to reconvene in Brussels on the 29 in the presence of the federal Yugoslav prime iimister, Ante Markovic, his foreign secretary, Budmir Loncar, and representatives from Bosnia-Hercegovina and Macedonia. A six-point peace plan was unveiled, but fighting continued in all the disputed regions of Croatta as etimic polarisation comtmued. Red Cross figures indicated that by the end of July 1991 48,000 Croats and 31,000 Saris had fled their homes in Croatia, te majority of which were then systematically destroyed” The sacking of the Croat village of Kijevo typitied what was happenmg countrywide A further example was the village of Skela where Serb irregulars massacred several people and every house was systematically destroyed. For both sides ania was fast becommg the best form of defence, and calls by the ICRC for restraimt were having no effect whatever Certainly the overall political and military situation198115 was confused, but this neither absolved nor mitigated the criminal behaviour being pespetrated by key players in the emerging conflict. Tere was also 4 body of customary ttemational law in existence im 1991 which govemed the conduct of armed conilict. The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ‘nad rattied all four Geneva Conventions on 21 April 1950 and Additional Protocols 1 and Ton 17 April 1990. All senior military and political leaders throughout the six republics and two fattonomous provinces should have understood therr lepal obligations when they decided 1 plunge their peoples imo what became a savage and bloody war Unfortunately most of them simply didnot care Ifa defence is open to any of them it would probably revolve around the proposition tat at this point im time tntemnational law itself was defective because dependmg on how you defined the actual situation on the ground you could end up with completely differemt legal consequences. In $0 far as thig argument goes 1 would most likely hinge on ‘whether the fighting in 1991 constituted an international or internal armed conflict, Either way, Arutcle 3, common to all four Geneva Conventions, governs the treament of persons not involved in the fighting, and Additional Protocol IT of 1977 elaborates on these prohibitions—particularly m-velation to attacks en. civilians. Customary international law then supplements these Conventions and in this way becornes ‘absolute law’ with all parties to tne conthet, trespective of how they might choose to define their involvement, bound by itemational humanitarian Law (IHL) and thereafter accountable for their actions. By targeting civilians and persons fons de combar the essential provisions of common Amicle 3 and Protocol 2 were clearly violated, and no justification can be offered by any of the perpetrators, either for what they did or the discriminate ‘manner in which they did it ‘Worthless agreements ‘With the conflict mensifying in Croatia, and the remainder of Yugoslavia im the throes of dismemberment, the International Conference on Yugoslavia managed 10 convince all six republics to send representatives to the Netherlands where, on 5 November at The Hague, all delegations signed up to a ‘Statement on Respect for Fhumanitarian Prmctples” which contained 4 summary of the basic nules of mtemational humanitarian law (the law applicable m armed conflict) The following day Croatia and the federal Yugostay authorities concluded a further agreement under the auspices of the European Community waich dealt specifically with creating 4 mechanism for exchanging persons who had heen dertamed up to that port by Doth sides, Three weeks later a further “Memorandhm of Understandmg” was sigmed rm Geneva under ICRC auspices by representatives of tne Federal Authorities in Belerade, the INA, and the governments of both Croatia and Serbie in which virwally afl TAL general prmeiples were acknowledged, and the ICRC was even given responsibilty for setting up a commission to mvestigate allegations of [HL violation. At fave value, then, one could certainly have ben forgiven for thinking thatthe parties to the contlicr actually wished 10 imvoke the “rule of law’ im order 10 regulate their dispute, and to alleviate an evolving humm tragedy waich the ICRC was now estimating to tvoive 4 displacement of over 48,000 Croats and 31,000 Serts im Croatia alone. In‘The modem Yugoslav contiet I991-1995 16 fact, six months later both sides signed an addendum 10 the Memorsndum® which purported to take account of Croatia's recognition by the European Union and the consequent recruement by both sides to apply the full rigours of THL; that is, customary ‘international law, the four Geneva Conventions, and Protocol [°° Demonising the Serbs 1t was also a this point that a campaign began in Gesmany to demonise the Serbs. Led by the conservative daily newspaper, Franifieter Aligemeine Zettung (FAZ), its editor Johann Georg Reismuller Lamched daily attacks in which he described the Serbs as “oriental militarist Bolsheviks who had no place im the European Community’ "In the Bundestag the leader of the Green Party, Joschka Fischer, doubled on this sentiment and screamed for a dissvowal of pactiisin mv order to ‘combat Auschwitz’, m effect equating, all Serbs with the Nazis Theteafier politicians across the spectrum voiced the opinion that now was the time 10 shoulder the military responsibility for deafmg with tats pecblem, and soon thereafier, in the name of humum rights, Germany abolisined its ban on conducting military operations ourside che NATO defensive arena’! Within weeks the effeer of this propaganda had spread far and wide and taken firm hold in the minds of those who only wished to see the coailict in terms of "black and white”, Unfortunately for the Serbs tae evolving common perception was not assisted m any way by the antics of several eccente and brutal military commanders. Enter Ratko Mladic In 1991 the commander of the Knin Corps of the Yugoslav army (JNA) in the Krajima region of Croatia was busy fighting what he believed to be a war of liberation for the ethnic Sevbs whose ancestors had lived there for humdreds of years amd waho now had 10 wish 10 become second-class citizens in what they perceived to be an emerging fascist Crostin state. With the social and political fabric of Yugoslavia crumbling all around Inim this officer strode to centre stage and begin to play a leading role in the develoging, conic, Just tumed 48, the colonel’s name was Ratko Mladic, Mladic was bor on 12 Marcia 1943 im the village of Bozinovici, near Kalimovik, im easter Hercegovina, Two yeuts later his father had been killed while leading a partisan aniack on an Ustashe village, and this appears to have left an mdelible mark’ on his personality. Motivated by the memory of ts “heroic sacrifice” the young Mladic left Jnome at 15 and enlisted as an apprentice m tne military-industrial school at Zemu. Later Jae moved on to the military academy m Belgrade and was commissioned as a second lieutenant im 1965 at the age of 22 ‘A varied career followed—platoon commander in Skogje, battalion commander in Kumanovo, trigade commander in Stip, chief of staff of the INA’s 9th Corps in Knin, and in 1991 he became its commander. Unsrakably loyal to Tito and the communist ideology while it served his purposes, Mladic progressed swiftly through the ranks and199117 was ready and waiting for a1 opportunity to avenge the death of hig father when war eventually broke put He quickly ditched the old commmist doctrine and re-emerged as 4 Serb officer woricmg to defend Serb people agains fascists and fimdementalists. This was very much the ideology bemg preached by the regime m Belgrade and Mladic soon became identified as someone vito could be relied upon when the going got tough. Accordingly hhis methods were fequently overlooked by his political masters, and ag the conflict spread Ratko Mladic was well on his way to becoming 4 modem Balkan legend—for all the wrong reasons. By this stage he had already opened several detention centres and the unfortunate people, both male and female, whom he incarcerated im places like Bileca and Stara Grattiska, were systematically taped, starved, beaten and shot. There were no excuses for the savagery whici took place and no explanation will ever be adequate A divided European response By now Europe was s0 hopelessly divided on what ro actually do in Yugoslavia that the possibility of an agreed political position effectively became umattamable. France advocated the deployment of EC troops under a Wester European Linon (WWEU) flag 10 smpport the monitors already deployed on the ground. However, waen the Germans expressed an interest m this proposal the British immediately became suspicious and epposed it Accordingly, by the time the EC foreign ministers reassembled in The Hague on 7 September 15 per cent of Croatia had fallen to Serly control. OF couse there was 10 shortage of new proposals—a new meeting of the CSCE; the involvement of the UN; rmilitary intervention: and last but not least, recognition of Croatia and Slovenia—but there was still no consensus and no identifiable common EC policy. The one decision waich the foreiga ministers did actually make was not to recogmise any teritoral change achieved in Yugoslavia by force. However, this was immediately “misintespreted” in Belgrade to justify ongoing military action in Cooatia, which in turn served only to escalate the situation firtner. In response the Croatian and Slovene foreign ministers ravelled t0 Bor i August for a meeimg. with Foreign Minister Genscher. ‘While notamg of substance emerged, Genscher did threaten the Yugoslav ambassador i Bonn with immediate German recognition of Croatia ifthe fighting failed to stop. (On 28 August the EC finally issued what effectively amounted 10 an ultimatum to the six republics, demanding that they either agree 10 am immediate ceasefire or accept punitive international economic: and military action. Surprisingly this waming was hneeded, at least officially, and when Flas Van den Broek managed to secure Serbian compliance a ceasefire was signed im Belgrade on 2 September. In the longer term, Tnowever, the only tangible result of this agreement was a visible terease tn the number of EC monitors on the ground. and the eatension of their mandate to Croatia, On the battlefields nobody paid te slightest attentien—and the fighting went on‘The modem Yugoslav contiet I991-1995 18 Trouble looms in Bosnia Meanwhile, the situation in the hitherto peaceful republic of Bosnia-Heroegovina had also begun to change. In mid-August President Abija [zethegovic. amounced that it was algo his intention 1 hold a referendum on the matter of his comtry’s mdependence, becinsge as matters currently stood he felt he had no other option. Radovan Karadzic, leader of the Bosnian Serbs, was already having discussions in Belgrade about the creation of a “Greater Serbia’ which would inclide Serbia proper, the Krajma regions of Croatia, Kosovo, Vefvodina and huge chunks of Bosnia. In this scheme Croatia was to be compensated by getting those tracts in Bosnia populated by Bosnism Croats, and the Muslims could more ar less fend for themselves Iretbegovic also knew that tf the situation i Croatia deteriorated much firther Bosnia could not remain unatfected, especially if the bulk of the INA currently deployed in Croatia were eventually withdrawn into Bosnian towns like Banja Luka, Zenica, Tuzla and Sarajevo, So having imitially supported the continuation of the Yugoslav Federation and the policies of Markovic and Loncar, he too decided the time had come to plo: a new futur, In theory Bosnia should have stood a berter chance of survival as an integrated entity becinse no one ethic grouping had 4 mzjorty. The election results of November 1990 yielded 86 seats for the Muslims (SDA), 70 seats for the Ser's (SDS) and 45 seats forthe Groats (HDZ), and theoretically future Bosnian politics should have revolved around shifting coalitions and democratic values. But that was not to be. On 4 September a gang of Bosnian Serbs killed two Muslims in clashes near the town of Bratunac, and this was followed a few days later by the declaration of a Seri autoncmous region on the Bosnian Montenegrin border. The fragmentation of Bosnia had begun and Milosevic was once again in the thick of it. Ina taped conversation with Karadzic, a transcript of which was produced to Federal Prime Minister Markovie on 19 September, evidence of Milogevic’s myolvement in Bosnia was clear for all to see, Lord Carrington takes control On 3 September in The Hague, Lord Carrington, the former UK forcign secretary and former secretary. general of NATO, was appoiied chairmin of the Peace Conference on Yugoslavia. Signs were ominous fom the besiming wien his frst attempt to organise some dialogue was rewarded by Slovenia's and Croatta’s formal secession ftom federal ‘Yugoslavia on 7 September. Then, while Europe concentrated on the establishment of Commission to determine criteria for granting intemational recognition.” Macedonia voted for independence, the INA tmutally dispersed a civil protest of 15,000 ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, the Krajina Serbs succeeded in cutting Croatia in two when they capnured the Maslenica bridge on the Dalmatian coast north of the city of Zadar, and Federal President Mesic publicly accused the INA of having effectively carried out a coup as they now refused to take amy orders fom him,1981 19 It was against this backdrop of violence, compounded by a statement from US. Secretary of State Baker attributing responsibility for the current bloodsited direcily to the INA! and with one-third of Croan umder Seri contol, that on 17 September Carrmgren prochced his first ceasefire plan in the town of Igalo, in Montenegro, and, remaricably, minaged 10 convince Tudjrman, Milosevic and Kadijevic to sigm it. However, the ik was asely dry on the paper before the Yugoslav navy began a blockade of all Csoatia’s Dalmatian ports and Federal Prime Minister Markovic took the unprecedented step of calling on General Kadijevic, the INA's commander-in-chief and Yugoslavia’s defence ‘minister, to resign. Significantly, on 22 September Kadijevic rejected this call on the basis that as he understood the situation Yugoslavia no longer existed, and the army wag now taking certain decisions into its own hands. This included the contmued shellimg of Vukovar and Osijek, assisting local militias in eastem and westem Slavonia, mounting air attacks against Zagrel, and Launching naval bombardments agains the cities of Zadar and Split. Carimgton’s first ceasefire lay in tatters} In the wake of this fuilwe the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution 713 embargoing the sale and delivery of weapons and military equrpment 10 all parties in Yugoslavia. Accompanied by a statement fom the US secretary of state, in which he accused the INA of complicity with Serb militias and tregular forces in Croatia, this was nor just another ritual condemnation, fn fact, when talcen mn tinder with the arms embargo it actually represented a turning point in US policy because it also recogmised that hope for the continuation of a federal state was fast disappearing. Throughout the autumn of 1991 mmerous farther attempts 10 stop the fightmg proved unsuccessful, and a major row developed between Federal Prime Mmister Markovic and Milosevic over the use of the INA in what Markovic now regarded as essentially Serbia expansionism m Croatia. His assessment was correct, espectally since Kadijevic. was firmly installed in the Milosevic cammp. In fact the JNA and Serbia had come to represen? one and the same thing—different sides of the same coin—and with a predominance of Sering inthe officer corps perception and reality quickly became one Nevertheless, Lord Carrington continued his attemprs to bring the sides together, and again cn 4 October ne minaged to acquire the signatures of both Milosevic and Tudjmen to a ceasefire—but it altered fitele on the ground. Interestingly, Ser’ indifference to this latest agreement was exennplitied by an meident waich occurred a few days later when, vvithout waming, the INA launched an air raid on Zagrely and bombed the presidential palace which contained at the time President Tudjman, Federal President Stipe Mesic and Federal Prime Minister Ante Marovic. Nobody was injured, but it clearly would have mattered little 10 the JNA leadership if three oF the most senicr political Figures i ‘Yugoslavia had been killed ‘Vukovar falls As the year drew to a close more attempts were made in The Hague on 10 October 10 negotiate a JNA withdrawal from Croatia; these came to nothing. Five days later Tudhman and Milosevic. were summoned 10 Moscow for consultations with Mikhail Gorbacitey and Boris Yeltsin, but this achieved litle, The EC then threatened economic‘The modem Yugoslav contiet 1991-1998 29 semctions if the republics failed to agree on @ loose type of confederation, but this ‘warning also fell on deaf ears. Meanwhile, the frst assembly of ethnic Albanian leaders took place im Kosovo, the Bosnian Serbs walked out of the Republican assembly m Sarsjevo and established their own parliament m the ski resort of Pale, and extreme paranoia 100k hold of General Kathjevic when the German government amounced tat they were almost ready to recognise Croatia and Slovenia:” Incredibly he proclaimed that Germany was about to attack Yugoslavia for the died time that century! ‘And shen, to make a bad situation worse, on the. 18 November the iowa of Vukovar in easter Slavonia finally fell to the combined Ser’ forces after an 86-day siege. This once ‘eautiful town on the harks of the Danube river was ‘liberated’ by turning it into a pile of rubble. What was predominantly a Croat town before the conflict now became almost tovally Serb iy virtue of the facts that (4) tt was located with the evolving Republic of Supska Krajina; (b) the JNA had flattened all resistance in conjunction with Samtening the town itself, snd (¢) virtually the entire Croat population packed their hugs and left, having decided tiney would fare better as displaced persons in camps and hostels mm Crostia rather than remain as second-class citizens in the physical, social and political debris which ance was their home town, Those who remained were condemned to a fife of existential boredom devoid of money and food with nothing save sheets of white plastic emblazoned with “UNHCR™ logos to block up their empty broken window frames winich had been shor 10 pieces by tae JNA guamters on the far side of the river, After three months of battle Croatian losses swere 2,000 dead, 800 missing, 3,000 captured, 42,852 people displaced and 25.580 out oF 28,184 houses damaged or destroyed” Losses on the JNA side were still umconfirmed as late 4s 2001, but were probably less ‘han 2,000. The Croats fought long and hard to retain coatrol of Vukovar. They dug in and fought savagely”? until eventually overwhelmed by superior firepower. Michael Ignatieff ig correct m his criticism of the INA when he identified that they could have bypassed Vukovar and sent their tanks down the Highway of Brotherttood and Unity all the way to Zagreb ad they wimnted 10. Instead they chose 10 sit on the far side oF the Danube and pound Vukovar into rubble, Ignatieff also corectly identified that the emtire event was a product of the ‘politics of nate’ ?"and this probably goes a long way towards explainmg why the post-“ltberation” treatment of those Croats still remaining in Vukovar’s hospital became the subject of a ‘war crimes tnvestigation. Over a period of three days the surviving Croats were rounded up by the conquering forces of the INA and tae paramilitary thugs authorised by Milosevic to jom them. Lmed up, and made to walk to detention centres, the paramilitaries pulled people out of the line at random clarming they were ‘war criminals’, and the new security chief im the city, Major Veselm Slhivancanin, stood by and permitted iall ro happen On 20 November the killing started when those alseady selected were taken 10 the Ovcara farm near Perova Gora outside Vukovar and systematically executed. OF the 15,000 people Known to have remained in the town when the siege ended, 3.000 were soon reported missing presumed dead. Two hundred and sixty-one of them, mostly patients from the hospital, ended up beneath the congealed mud of the Oveara farm as Milosevie’s acolytes and henchmen murdered, raped and pillaged their way through ‘Vukovar and its hinterland drunk on the rhetoric of ethnic haired, Back in Belgrade198121 most ordinicy people could furely believe what was happening as Radio Television Serbia (RTS) spat out nightly broadcasts portaying the Serbian nation rising up to defend isself from iis enemies “And it worked! For the ordiary people watching RT'S each night this convoluted and contrived “reality” was pumped into their living rooms m much the same way as a programme called Insurrection celebrating the 1916 rising was drip-fed to an unsuspecting Trish population in 1966. And they, like us, began to believe it, In fact the RTS campaign became so one-sided that the miependent radio station B92 commissioned a film called Fukavar 1997 ia an aitempt to show the other side of the story and thereby deconstruct the government's concept of ‘Iigeration’ —Inut alas t00 late “Without the role played by TV the war would not even have happened, or at least it would not have been so bloody’, contended novelist Filip David correctly 10 B92"° The key protslem was that Milosevic had now come 10 control virtually the entire electronic ‘media in Serbia and thereby ensured that whatever message he chose to deliver received rio widespread criticiem. In Croatia the media was also being manipulated om similar fashion, with tae plight of Vukovar receiving equally distorted coverage on Hrvatska Television (HTV). Agaim 4 feature film on Vukovar was made and ran for months t cinemas tinroughout the country delivering the Croatian perspective and accusing the Seti of hemous acts of bararity. Subsexquemt films depicted the existential boredom of taose displaced from Vukovar and now living im railway carriages im the town of Vinkovsi One particular scene shows a father taking his young. som to the front fie to look st their burned-out home close to the water tower in Vukovar. While they are looking a Ser’ sniper spots them and mercilessly takes the life of the father with one bullet 10 the head That the front lines were not configured in such a way as to allow this type of activity bothered no one, aor did the fact that the water tower in Vukovar could not be observed with such clarity from anywhere in Vinizovei. Reality had become distorted for the Croats too, but very few were prepared to question the propaganda diet they were fed. Dubrovnik Meanwhile, on the Adriatic coast, smother saga was unfolding in Dubrovnik where JNA srullery continued firing primarily against Croatian military units. The city had first been attacked on 26 September just as the fourth round of Lord Carrington’s peace talks commenced in The Hague. Four days later the Vugoslay navy setup 4 maritime blockade snd theveafier the city was on the receiving end of daily shelling, Meanwhile, representatives from the Croatian army and the INA were busily trying 19 ‘uammer out details of a ceasefire hack at ECMM HQ im Zagre’.’*and General Kadijevic and President Tuejman immersed themselves in a process to achieve agreement on the withdrawal of all INA troops fom Croatia within 30 days.” However, heavy shellmg was reported again on 18 and 20 October and culmimated m the arrival of 4 UNESCO delegation to the city on 25 October at the very moment INA general Strugar was allegedly demanding its surrender. And so it went on, with images of Dubrovnik broadcast nightly on CNN‘The modem Yugoslav contiet I991-1998 22 Like all other aspects of this war reality was not quite a8 presented im the media. In fact, evidence has now emerged that the so-called ‘devastation’ of Dubrovaik was for the ‘most part 4 staged event. Certarnly shells were fired at the city and its environs on a regular basis, but Florence Hamish Levingotm is adémant that the Croats piled tyres tehind the walls ofthe old city and then ser them on fire to create the impression that the city was ablaze asa result of shelling, ‘These pictures were then captured from out at sea by CNN and other networks, who im turn broadcast them ag fact without confirmmg their veracity.” Levinsoin’s version of events is corroborated by Professor J.P. Maher of Northeastern University, Chicago, wi stares that he actually walked through the old city on 25 March 1992 and found only evidence of ‘slight damage’. The city had certainly not been destroyed.** Perhaps this explains the failure of the Croatian authorities to lodge any serious claim that the JNA shelling was not justified by military necessity and therefore constituted a prave breach of the Geneva Conventions! Recognition Meanwhile, at the end of November smother ceasefire agreement was signed im Geneva snd Resolution 721 was passed by the UN Security Council authorising the deployment of up to 10,000 UN peacekeepers in Croatia—but the resolve of some of the main players swag now faltering. On 5 December Stipe Mesic, the federal president, resigned. For lnm it was sirmple—"Yugoslavia no longer exists’, ne said. There was 10 pomt going: on Fifteen days later Prime Minister Markovic followed suit having failed to curtal the federal budget allocation 10 the INA. for 1992. For Markovic, federal Yugoslavia was rrow 4 fost cause, In tandem with these resignations pressure to recognise Croatia and Slovenia txternationally contimued to mount ind resulted im a decision by the EC foreign ‘ministers on 16 December to grant recognition cfier 15 January 1992, provided both republics had: ‘accepted the UN Charter and CSCE Helsinki Accords, bb guaranteed the rights of ethic minorities, respected internationally recognised borders, upheld arms control and disarmament treaties, and e supported political resolution of disputes Nevertheless, three days later, and apparently without any consultation with her EC partners, Germany went ahead of her ow volition and formally recognised Croatia and Slovenia. This no doubt came as a very timely Chrismas present for President Tudjman, ind was cervataly desigmed to appease the 700,000 strong Croatian community domiciled within Germany itself It also underlined the tension and divergence within the Europe Conmmumity itself, This umconditional amd unilateral recognition agpeared 10 fly m the face of the Radiater Commission, whiéa had only just published its findings the day before the German arouncement, Badinter clearly stated that only Slovenia and Macedonia fulfilled the Commission's criteria for ecogmition and he rejected Croatia's claim on the indisputable grounds that the administration in Zagrel was not in full control of all its199123 territory, and that the rights of Croatia’s minorities, particularly the Krajina Serbs, were not adequately safeguarded. Cromnitams will argue to this day that the Krajina Serbs were accorded special uaramcees to civil liberty under the Croarian Constitution, and this ig tue. But Serbs, on the oter hand, argue cogently that it was precisely this “special” status which ensured they would always be teated as second-class citizens. And if one takes that in tandem swith the programme of demotion and expulsion of Serbs From jobs in oth the public and private sectors at the time, then it’s nor particularly difficult to see thetr point of view The Croatian (Krajina) Serbs did have valid concerns in 1991, and these should have been addressed properly by the new ruling admimistration. They were not addressed because Croatian society had become completely polarised and concerning oneself with the welfare of Serbs was not 4 route to political or social sucess. The Croatian legislature's failure to develop its constitutional Law at chs time in a manner coasistenmt with proper gusrantees of civil, political and human rights for all her citizens was lamemable. Making special cases, whatever the motivation, served only to further alienate the already apprehensive See community scattered throughout the country. Had sincere and determmed efforts been made ro accommodate the Krajina Serhs, and thereby allay thetr genuine fears, the outcome might have len totally different. Instead old fears ind old scores re-emerged i a climate of evolving hatred and anger, and for tis situation the leadership of the HDZ, and Franjo Tudyman m particular, bear & huge responsibility, ‘When it was most needed they displayed no political or moral judgement waaisoever. Equally, while the German decision to recognise was probably permissible withm the terms of mtemational law, it certamly appeared to make a public mockery of the Badinter Report and completely imdermined the ability of the EC Council of Ministers 10 formulate a common policy on Yugostavia. All the rules were discarded with German recognition of Croatia and Slovenia, and the legitimate claim of Macedonia was completely ignored. Four years later, when Lord Carrington was asked to review the continuing conflict, he was adamant that the single diggest mistake in the whole sorry sequence of events was Germany's decision to accelerate international recogmition of Croatia, and the corresponding fail of the European Community 10 resist it!" This 1997 Report on State Practice and International Lave in relation to Unilateral Secession, lames Crawford, Whewell Professor of Intemational Law at the University of Camisidge, clearly states that m intemational practice there is no recognition of umilzeral right to secede based on a majority vote of the population of a sub-division or teritory, wheter or not that population constitutes one cr more “peoples” im the ordinary sense of the word However, the European Community foreign ministers were nowhere as clear in thei tamking, and im a “special report” wnitten by the political section of ECMM durmg the German presidency in December 1994 evaluating the process it is stated that “the denial of recognition nad an increasmely counter-productive effect on the peace efforts. Only two reactions were possible: 10 lock the Serb policy of force by military means, or at feast mtemanionalize the conthct by formally recogmizig the tmperiled repuilic. Seria ‘was using the negotiations ag a diplomatic shield to continue te war and the arms embargo enabled her to g0 unpunished.” The report goes on 1 state that ‘it became clear to EC memiver states that the recognition of the republics seeking mdependence could no longer be delayed...it was‘The modem Yugoslav confiet I991-1998 24 nly a matter of choosing the time and modaliries®*~imd it also claims that the initial decision to recognise them was taken at a meeting of EC forcign ministers in the Dutch town of Haarzutlens on 6 October 1991. Four days later the Dutch foreign minister met with Tudjman and Milosevic m The Hague and told them that there was now a ‘time limit of one month or at tne most two", and ar the next meeting of Foreign ministers im Brussels co 25 Ociober a decision was taken that if Milosevic continued in his atternpts to block the reeogmition process then they would contimue without hirn®® Thereafter it appears that Lord Carrington was operating in parallel, ut nor in tandem, with the foreign mimisters. While they were all 1m agreement on the “principles for a political solution’ they were certainly not at one in relation 10 the modalities. fn fact, the evidence suggests that this may well have been a deliberate tactic, because when Carrington temporarily suspended negotiations with Belgrade the report states that the Council of Foreign Ministers took this as ‘proof that ‘it was futile to wait any longer’S” ‘When Badinter then produced his report on 7 December the Council took from it what it swanted to hear and the German imtempreration was that it was the Serbian leadership itself that, by systematically unchaining Serb nationalism since 1987, had made the decisive contribution im undermming the multimational state created by Tit. Equally, the report states that Germany was satisfied that Croatia had fulfilled the snain condition for recogmition when it meluded special provisions for the Krajina Serie fv tts Constitution, but it omits to mention that these very provisions fell well short of full integrated citizenship, and also short of the Badinter criteria which demanded that any republic to be recognised should be in full control ofall of tts teritory Im summary, then, it appears that imespective of Carrington’s work on the ground the EC Council of Foreign Ministers, presided over by Hans van den Broek but driven by Germany, was pushing aloag towards recognition of Croatia regardless. The choice, it claimed, was simple—eitner suport the Croats militarily im them fight against the Serie lo recognise them. In this context Carrington’s work was rendered all but nrelevant However, the fact that three years later German civil servanis were still issuing position papers m order to explain their decisions and persisting im attempts to rutiish Carrington and his work speaks volumes. It also raises the question Of what might have teen achieved had the EC Council of Foreiga Ministers actually een operating, im tandem with Carrington, and not, as it now transpires, blatantly working against bien? Given this level of instability within the European Community, and Carrington’s Jatown opposition to the decision of 16 Devember, perhaps it wag not surprismp that Milan Babic, the mayor of Knin, responded on 19 December by declaring, the establishment of a Republic of Srpska Krajma which he clamed would now amalgamate with the previously announced ‘autonomous region’ of easter Slavonia, Baranja and swestern Srijem. Babic, representing over 300,000 people, had just taken comrol of one. third of Croatia! The followmg day, and not wantmg to be left out of developments, the Bosnian Serbs announced that they too were opting for independence, and on 22 December Alia Ietbegovic, fally understanding what was about to unfold, requested the ‘immediate deployment of UN troops in Bosnia. The Sarajevo goverment was now rapped in a catch-22 situation: 4 push for recognition would inevitably alienate the Bosnian Serbs, but acceptance of the new onder would find them a mmortty within a Greater Seria. Ejrp Gantc, Izetbegovie's depur summed up the dilemma when he explained: ‘of course we are going to move ahead with199125 recognition. With Croatia and Slovenia now gone we can’t consign Bosnia to 4 mmcated ‘Yugoslavia controlled by Serbia.” Izetbegovic, for hispart, was also given to understand that if a referen-durm produced 4 simple majority in favour of mdependence then Germamy would recogmise Bosmia als. This left him with Hobson's choice: either stay m what remained of Yugoslavia dominated by Milosevic and Serbia, or hold the referendum, secure the required majority, ‘and alienate Bosnia’s 1.3 million Serbs in the process.”1992 The Vanee plan On 2 January 1992 Croatia formally accepted the Vance plan, the authorities m Belgrade having agreed to it om New Year's Eve. What was envisaged involved. the implementation of a ceasefire, deployment of up to 14,000 UN peacekeepers (military, civilizn and police), and the withdrawal of the INA and Serb regulars from Croatia. The areas to come under UN control would be called LIN Protected Areas (UNPAs), and once the ternational troops were deployed on the ground a process of local demilitarisation swould commence permitting in urn the safe retum of thousands of displaced people At this pom, however, the Krajina Serbs controlled atmos: one-third of Croatia and ‘had no intention of giving any of it back. The Croats for thetr part were equally intransigent, They wanted all of it and were completely unconcerned where theit Ser’ brothers might end up m the process It was Alja [zerbegovic. who came out most strongly in favour of Vance, although its terms had only peripheral applicability to Bosnia. However, it did propose to locate the new UN force headquarters in Sazjevo, together with a small number of military servers, and this, he believed, would prove crucial to preventing war m Bosnia m the longer term. Other Bosniam officials were less confident snd appealed direcily to the UN to deploy troops immediately im Bosnia as 4 pre-emptive measure, but this appeal was ignored. Instead a truce was sigmed on 2 Jamuary in Sarajevo between Defence Minister Gejko Susak, on behalf of Croatia, and General Raseta representing the INA. This became effective at 6 pm. the following evenmg, but tne plight of Bosnia was ignored.” In the climate of relative calm which followed, politicians from all sides hegan 10 consider “Vance’ with a view to interpreting it to their own advantage. Milan Babic at first rejected tt out of hand, but on 9 February a high-level delegaion led by Milogevic’s messengers Branko Kostic. and General Blageje Adzic, the INA chief of staff, arived i Knin, Immediately they addressed the Krajima parliament and convinced it to surpport the ta, PeBulic then ted to arginine a referendum on the matter but the partament voted to impeach him. Seventeen days later Babic. was gone and Goran Hadzic became the new president of the Republic of Sroska Krujina, Not surprisingly his first decision involved pledame support for the Vance plan, 4 policy that prevailed amongst the Krajina Serie virtually unl the very end?199227 ‘When the ceasefire appeired to be holding President Tudjman claimed he was giving, the plac his unconditional support, but this outburst may well have had more to do with the euphoria which prevailed m Zagreb following Croatia's recogmition by the EC on 15 January, and the overt support they were now obtaining from Germany, than on anything, bse, For his part Milosevic publicly advised all Serbs to co-operate with the UN, and in what appeared to be a public act of good faith he ensured the departure of General Kadijevic as federal defence minister. This new situation was not, of course, without incident, Ceasefize violations continued, although the scale and fiequenoy were considerably reduced, and a major tragedy befell ECMM on 7 January wren one of tir white helicopters, with five monitors on board, was mistakenly shot down by a INA jet fighter over the village of Podrute, i the north of Croatia near the town of Varazdin Ironically they were on their way 10. mecting in Belgrade atthe tim. Meanwhile, im Bosnia, [zetnegovic was faced with new developments, Taking the lead from their Krajins brothers, the Bosnian Serbs had declared their own autonomy oa the basis that the Bosnian government supposedly no longer represented the interests of Bosnia-Hercegovina’s Serbian people in international forums. Then there were accurate reports of a meeting om 11 January between President Tudjman and a promment member of the Bosnian Ser leadership, Nikola Koljevic, at which the partition of Bosnia between Seri and Croats was allegedly discussed. Paranoia broke out mn Sarajevo. More designs on partition Waren Zinmennan, tne US ambassador, ig quite adamam that both Tudjman and Milosevic made no effort whatever to conceal their designs on Bosnia from him, and at ‘meetmg m the antimm of 1991 Tudjman faumched into a policy statement on tie matter: “They're dangerous fundamentalists and they're using Bosnia as a beachhead to spread their ideology throughout Europe and even the US’, he said. “The civilized nations should {join together to repel this [Muslim] threat. Bosmia has never had ny real existence. It should be divided between Serbia and Croatia, This allegation was totally without foundation of course! but that didn’t worry President Tucjrman who was in fact merely spouting the same kind of chetovc first argued by Croats like Ante Starcevic in the L860: when he claimed that Greater Croatia actully sretched all the way to the Bulgarian border.” Clearly there was no point letting the truth get in the way of his expansionist aspications, and at a second meeting with Zimmerman early m January 1992 Tudjman continued the argument by spendimg over an hour trying to convince the ambassador that Boswia should be divided. This time he claimed that the Sarsjevo government actually mtended to flood the country with 500,000 Turks and that Irethegovic had a secret policy to reward Large families m order that within 4 few years Muslims would form the majority group? He went on toclaim that [zetbegovic’s plans mcluded the creation of something called “The Zetra’, a swathe of tervitory dominated by Muslims stretching ‘rom Bosnia through Kosovo to the Sindzak of Novi Pazar on the Montenegrin border, and then on inte Turkey. He further claimed that Izetbegovic was im fact notimg more than a‘The modem Yugoslav contiet I991-1995 28 “fundamentalist front man for the Turks’ and that it was all a conspiracy to create a “Greater Bosnia,” In response Zimmennan warned that the Lited States would not supgom any division of Bosnta but Tudjman ignored the message and continued that Bosmia, “doesn’t realy exist—it was created by colonial powers and reaffirmed by the commumists’? When asked liow he could possibly do business with Serbia’ on this venture while their proxies, the Krajina Serbs, controlled one-third of Croatia, Tudjman came up with an even greater gem of wistlom when he said: “Because I rust Milosevic." Faced with this scenario Izethegovie was forced to take some titative, althougia the best he could offer was yet another proposal to tum Yugoslavia mto an association of six independent republics. However, on thig occasion he also called for a referendum 10 decide the question of Bostia’s own mdeyendence, someting which would ultimately signal the beginning of the end for Bosnia because it played right into the hands of Radovan Karadzic and nig sponsor im Belgrade, Here for the first time it could be reagonably argued that the Serhs did indeed have some Kind of a quasi legal right 10 remain in federal Yugoslavia if they clearly wished to do so. And the reason was simple —tinere were I$ mithon of them. However, it was also alnmdanily clear that an accommodation of this nature would prove impossible 10 achieve beciuse the demographic spread was such that all ethnic groupings—Mustim, Croat, Serir and others—were what could best be described as ‘mixed’, Bosnia-Hlercegovina was for the most part a multi-ethnic society and it would be virtually impossible to draw lines on 4 map and divide tt all up unless 4 huge voluntary transmigration of people commenced and/or they were encouraged to move by the employment of military force. In the srg of 1992, while coercion tacries had mot yet commenced, the antics of all sides ensured that the cowry remained, on course for upheaval, and talks about partition continued 0 keep the situation volatile.” ‘Violence erupts in Sarajevo Far more distuubing, however, was the bombing of the sixteeath-century Ferhadija ‘mosque in Bina Luka just two weeks before the referendum. This signalled the start of indiscriminate attacks on Muslim property right across Bosnia and should have been read iv tandem with what Karadzic was now spouting to anyone who would fisten to him, ‘If the Bosnian government continues its efforts 10 gam mdependence’, he threatened, ‘one ‘ation will disappear." Instead, Tzetbegovic claimed that the bombings and intimidation were the work of extremists and urged his supporters not to blame the Serb people. If this swag his gemurme perception, and the evidence suggests that it was, then he was totally and utterly meorect. The magic consequence, however, was that no alarm bells began toring within the international community and no EC govemment took any action because ne ne really understood the mentality of the mata leaders, or the potential they possessed to generate catastrophe, Tt was in this context that the constitutional referendum on Bosaia’s independence, im compliance with the EC criteria for recognition, 100k place over two days at the end oF February 1992," and of the 63 per cent who vored, 99-4 per cent of them opted to secede from Yugoslavia. Most Serbs (32 per cent of tne total population) followed Karadzic’s199229 advice and boycotted the proceedings, leaving, the Serb leadership to amounce that if Bosttia was recognised internationally they would militarily defend the territory they now hneld. On 1 March the first shoxs were fired m Sarajevo when gunmen opened fire on a Seriy wedding party which was marchmg through the predommamtly Muslim neighbourhood of Bascarsija. The bridegroom's father was killed and an Orthodox priest wounded. * lzetbegovic immediately condemned the murder, and Selim Hadzibajric, the mayor of old Sarajevo, apologised, but to no avail. Having threatened before the referendum tat Norther treland would look fike 4 holiday camp compared with what Bosnia was gomg, to tum into, Karadzic now believed his prophecy to be vindicated and claimed that the murder was evidence of what would hagpen on a large scale to the Bosnian Ser’ population. Within hours Bosnisn Serb thugs iad set up barricades all over the ity and in some cases were conducting their owa patrols armed with hunting rifles, machine guns and anti-tank rockets, This was not a spontaneous reaction—the speed with whic armed thugs appeared on the streets confirmed that, In an Grobocjenje commentary the following day Gordana Knezevic and Rasim Cerimagic suggested that the whole incident had probably been set-up orchestrated from the begimamg by the Bosnian Ser> leadership. The paper was vilified for such suggestion, but right from the curser it wag clear that the story was probally rig”? Nevertheless, [zethegovic persisted with the argument that he had an elecioral mandate ftom his people, and, disregarding the growing civil unrest, he proclaimed the independence of Bosnia-Hercegovma on 3 March ‘The Cutilherio plan Realising that disaster was now imeuiing, a variety of Westem diplomats lamched themselves into a series of initiatives designed to contain the situation, if not resolve it Cyrus Vance was firs off the mark and managed to get all sides togerher m Sarajevo on 6 March pledgmg to resolve their differences by peacefitl means. Three days later Lord Carrington assembled Croat and Muslin delegates in Brussels and for the firs time succeeded im getting them to talc about the concept of a “federation structure’ for Bosnia However, the main effort was laumched on 18 March when the Portuguese foreign rmmister, Jose Pires Cuntherio, mroduced what was to become Known as the *Cutilherio an " The plin envisaged that Bosnia would be composed of three constituent units, based on national principles, using the Swiss cantons as a model, and taking account of economic, geographic and other considerations. [t would remain an integrated amitary state and hone of tne constituent pars would encourage or support teritortal claims that ‘might be made by neighbouring states; that is, Croana and Serbia. Free elections would take place, human rights would be respected, and freedom of political and religious expression would be guaranteed. To ensure that these prmemples had equal application within each region a tribunal composed of representatives. from all ethmic groupings, together with mdependemt intemational observers, would ensure compliance. Then, for ihe firs time, a map was produced proposing the division of Bosnia-Hercegovina mto three cantons, and a debate‘The modem Yugoslav contiiet 1991-1995 39 began which was to see map after map produced im the coming, years—euch being more problematic than the one befor. But for now Cutilherio's proposals represented the first serious attempt to resolve the proflem rather than just contain i, and the sincerity of his proposals was reflected m the fact that all three leaders signed up to them m Sarajevo without reser vation—Izetbegovic for the Muslims, Karadzic for the Serbs and Stepan Klujic for the Croats, Alas, this collective goodwill lasted just one week and by 25 March Tzetbvegovie was backtracking furiously, msisting that the division of Bosnia along etinic fines should be rejected at all costs. He further stated that he had only signed the plan because the EC had rade acceptance of it a precondition for international recognition, something which he could never subsequently substantiate ‘Two days later the Bosnian Seris also decided to go their own way, and a meeting of their so-called ‘parliament’ in Pale approved « constitution for their new “Serbian Republic of Bomia-Hercegovina’ (Republic Srpska) which they ultimately hoped to incorporate to an all-Serb state of Yugoslavia. Within nine days both sides had moved from a common position to ones wiiich were diamerrically opposed, thereby leaving Catilherto's pin destined for the garage bin and war about 10 engulf them all. Marehing for peace The signs were ominous early on the moming of Sunday, 5 April, when several Ser’ members of the Sarsjevo police department failed to report for duty. They had disappeared the previous evening and taken weapons and equioment with them. In other places across the city Ser’ workers also stayed at home. Ar midday a demonstration for peace got underway from the suinn’> of Dobrinja and by the time they reached the perament buildmg several thousand people had jomed i. However, armed Serie ‘manning barricades across the Miljacka river in Grbavica were not impressed and fired some sors in the air. incensed by this action a numer of demonswrators approached the bridge, but the Serbs responded by firmg into the crowd. Suada Dilherovic was hit and died shortly afiervards, Many others were wounded. ‘AL thig port the crowd moved away from the bridge and stormed the parliament tuilding, with 2,000 of them staying there overnight. The following morning. further crowds arrived and by midday the plaza outside was thronged with people. Then, just afier | p.m, gunsho's rang out from the upper floors and the roof of tie Holiday Tan across the street. Panic broke out as people lay bleeding and wounded all over the place. Tere was mo question as 10 Wao was responsible. The Holiday Im was under control of the Sern, Democratic Party; its leader Radovan Karadzic; and is pack of bodyguards. "For once there was no confusion between perception snd reality. Left with no other option, Tzetbegovic now appealed to his followers 10 mobilise and ironically his structions were issued at the very time both the EC and US decided to recognise the independeace of BosniaFlercegovina. Immediately the two Ser members of the collective Bosnian presidency, Nikola Kohevie and Biljana Plavsic, resigned and walked out to take up promiment positions i the new Republic Srpska. There would be no going tack.198231 Throughout the comny heavy fighting erupted as people of common ethic origin banded together and armed themselves with vhatever they could muster in an attempt to defend their towns, villages and homes from those on the other sides waom they believed were attempting to redkaw the map of Bosnia and put demarcation lines im places where none had! ever existed before Shootings were reported ftom several places as each side made preemptive strikes against the others. The Croats took the town of Kupres from the Serbs and then tumed their attention to expanding the size of thetr enclaves in Muslim-held central Bosnia. The Serbs attacked the Croats in Bosanski Brod while also intensifying their shelling of Mostar. Sarajevo was hit repeatedly, and Cutilherio and Vance continued trying 10 negotiate 4 new ceasefire waich was 10 sooner agreed by the pohticiams om 12 April tan the military decided to ignore at and fightmg continued on the ground. The manmer in which the town of Bosanska Krupa in the Bitac Pocket tegion of north-west Bosnia stumiled mio war was typical of the country as a whole with local Ser’ militias now at liberty 10 use tanks, artillery, mortars, anti-aircraft gums and helicopters, more or less at will, thus leaving the beleaguered Muslims in the unenviable position of trying to hold the time with just the handful of rusty muskets, am assortment of shooting rifles, and whatever bits and pieces they could manage to pilfer from the JNA in the days before they left ‘The CSCE and the US State Department issued stem wamings to the Serbs on 20 April, but nobody listened. Then Lord Carrington and Cutifaerio thought that they had successfully trokered 4 deal on 23 April, but the military ignored them too. At UN Ineadquarters in New York several delepations demanded that the secretary-general, Boutros Boutros-Giali, should immediately send UN troops 10 Bosnia, He refused on the basis that there was no peace to keep, leaving the Bosnian presidency to call on the JNA. to leave the country. The Serb generals refused, claimmg that they were entitled to defend Serb-controlled areas, In the midst of this confusion Serbia and Montenegro proclaimed the formatioa of « new Yugoslavia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and Milosevic actually renounced Yugoslavia’s claims on any other teritories—hur nobody believed him. Likewise Karadzic’s claim that he no longer had any aspiration to umify the Republic Srpska with Serbia proper, but was now intent on developing a separate state, was greeted with equal disbelie®.[t was perfecrly clear thatthe old Balkan maxim, “the only truth ts the lie” sil ‘nad direct application im modem Yugoslay politics. As the situation in Sarajevo contimued to deteriorate Izethegovic had a narrow escame on 2 May and was fortunate to avoid imprisonment when ne was arrested bby Serb militiamen at an impromptu checkpoint. However, after UNPROFOR officers intervened hnis release was secured, thereby allowing, him to sign a muce with the JNA three days fater, Alas, this limited success was overshadowed by news filtering through from Austria ‘which indicated that Karadzic and the new Bosnian Croat leader Mate Boban had met in Graz. on 6 May and agreed to stop fighting one another and then partition Bosmia on ethic fines, By this pot the general security situation had become go had that the EC felt it ‘necessary to order the evacuation of its monitors from Sarzjevo, and EC ambussadoss were withdrawn from Belgrade, Warren Zimmerman was recalled to Washington, and the‘The modem Yugoslav contiet I991-1995 32 CSCE, while sul allowing repre-sematives fem Belgrade to attend sts meetings, brnted them from participating in debates on the war. ‘And then to compound the situation further the UN secretary-general refused to commit any peacekeeping troops to Bosnia, other than the UNPROFOR headquarters personnel who were already deployed im Sarajevo under the Vance plan, because of what fhe claimed to be the “brutal pitch of che fighting’—and then on 13 May he further proposed that this group leave as well This was quite understandable, given the graphic reports which were origmatmg fom all over Bosnia detailing 4 phenomenon which ‘would ecome known as “etimic cleansmg’—the forved migration of whole commumities a3 a result of threats, direct violence and oppression. For example, 83 Muslims were reported as rounded up and shot im Zaklopace.” and a further 50 were Killed near ‘Zvomis. Additionally, am ICRC relief convoy was ambushed en route to Sarajevo and its leader, Frederic Maurice, killed on 18 May. These represented just some of the statistics for 4 48-hour period im May, by which time UNHCR reports estimated that 1.2 milfion people in Bosnia had become refugees or disolaced persons, and the casualty figures since March had risen to a tagecring 2,225 killed, 7,660 wamded and 2,555 missmg,” Sadako Ogata, the senior UNHCR offical tn ‘he region, further estimated that in addition to Bosnia there wese now 598,000 refugees im Croatia, 70,000 im Slovenia, 382,000 im Serna, 48,000 im Montenegro and 69,000 m the UNPAS im Croatia, Her waming that “we may find ourselves stranded with an open ended relief programme and a massive permanent refugee problem in the heatt of Europe’ proved to be prophetic It was i this context that the UN General Assembly 100% its decision to admit Bosnt, Croatia and Slovenia as fill members ofthe Linited Nations Organisation m the hope tat official recognition would make it clear to all manner of Serbs that further agitation and violence was pointless. James Baker, US secretary of state, followed this lead on 22 May by ordering the closure of Yugoslavia’s consulates m tne US and the expulsion of her ‘military ataches from Washington. It was hardly surprising, therefore, thar the tone of the Lishon Peace Conference which began on 24 May should be decidedly anti-Ser’, and with James Baker castigating, Europe for its mactivity and lack of progress, pressure started to mount for the imposition of arange of political and economic sanctions The bread queue massaere Then, on following day, 25 May, with the Conference in full session, reports began 10 filter through of an incident which iad just happened im Sarajevo. Civilisms queumg, for tread in Vase Miskina Steet, m the heart of the city, had been shelled, ind the grapaic pictures which were flashed around the world provided the anti-Ser’ brigade with ample evidence to condemm Karadzic and his supporters. Seventeen people died that day and over 160 others were wounded when a salvo of mortars smashed into the tightly packed street and the Bosnian Muslim delegation, led by Haris Sildzic, walked out of the building in provest However, when the matter was investigated by the UN it became very unclear whether the tncident had in fact been perpetrated by the Serbs at all. The poor people of Sarajevo198233 could just a8 easily have been shelled by their own troops, on the istructions of their own goverament, im order 10 provoke international reaction ia Lison—and have the Seris condemned for it. This was unequivocally the view of General Lewis MacKenzie ‘wo by now had set up UNPROFOR cperations on the ground in the city, and as far as Ine was concerned the events on 25 May merely confirmed this, Colin Doyle, Lord Catsington’s special envoy, who was a participant at the conference in Lisbon when the news from Sarajevo came in also believed that as far as the Sarajevo leadership were concerned mmtemational military intervention was what they wanted and they sarw it ag the key 10 their survival They were convinced that having achieved recognition the international community would now mtervene militarily to protect their sovereignty against Seri aggression and that ‘Lin the pursuit of this goal the Muslim interest m a negotiated sertlement was less than enthusiastic. The meze possibility of some sort of intervention, especially a US iilitary one, encouraged them to contmue military action rather than concentrate on the peace negotiations.” The attack on the bread queue caused an mmediate cessation of the pedce talks, and the prospect of a negotiated settlement with the Serbs was [suecessfully?] removed from the agenda. Whatever te truth of the matter m Sarajevo that afternoon, the Serbs got all the bad press that was gong, because for night-thinking people it was simply meonceivable that the Bosnian Mustims would shell their own people, or alternatively fre at the Serbs om the centre of the city in order to provoke them into firing back once they had located the original gum position. On 27 May there had been no ourgomg fire from the area of the bread queue in the market. This leaves only two possibihities. Ether the Serbs did fire and were meredibly accurate with what are notoriously taceurate weapons. Or altematively somebody else detonated an explosive device in pursuit ofa political agenda, UNPROFOR officers im Sarajevo did not believe the Serbs were to blame; MacKenzie is om record as stating tnat is people told him “a number of things did not fit’; Doyle in Lisbon was far ftom convinced either; and both Lord David Owen and Yossef Bodansky have seen fit to record theic reservations in book form.”fn any evaluation ofthis mcident itis therefore incumbent to ask why all these people were unable to accep: the common ‘media perception of an meident whica was flashed around the world and became mstant realy. ‘What was not revealed to anyone at the time was that lurking in the background wese the hands of Ruder Frm Inc, the US public relations firm which the Sarajevo goverment had retained stice they first saw what they had achieved for the Slovenes in 1991.7" A single message was broadcast ftom Sarajevo that day—the Serbs were 10 ‘Hamme, and anyone wito offered a different version (including MacKenzie) was vilified as beimg anti-Muslim, Thete was to be no debate om this issue and within days the UN's own report at the tombmgyexplosion disappeared and remains of such sensitivity thar it camo: he accessed from UN resources. The author has also spoken to one UN offical who was muolved i the tavestigation, but he remams imwilling t0 confirm or deny anything lest he be denied fature employment m the UN. ‘When these very questions were put directly to Haris Silajdzic, the Bosnian prime mnmister, by the BBC's John Simpson in the course of 4 Panorama mvestigation in January 1995, Silajdzic either refused to answer or claimed it was all anti-Muslim‘The modem Yugoslav contiet I991-1995 34 propaganda. His denials, such as they were, served only to make the case against him stroager and to perpetuate confusion, But therein lies the whole problem of understandmg Balke politics at the end of the twentieth century because tn the majority of cases the only truth is still the fie, The events on Vase Miskina Street would be repeated again and agama a3 the conflict went on. Confusion would continue to reign, and atvibuting actual responsibility would remain an impossible task. And thanks to medi genecated perception, and good public relations by the Sarajevo government, rightly or swrongly the Serbs would continue to tke the blame. Thete was, however, one iateresting development in Lisbon which has until now gore unreported. By the time Sky News flashed pictures ofthe carnage m Sarajevo around the world the Peace Conference had been im session foreigint days and was making very litle progress. The four negotiators, Cutilherio, Soarez, Darwin and Doyle, had become more than a Tittle tired of the altertating hourly’ sessions during which the Serbs, Muslims and Crows were equally umprepared ro make the slightest compromise twas more than a litre surprising, then, when Radovan Karadzic stormed into the ‘oom shouting, “We did not do it, we did not doit.” Jose Cutierio (vino would later be appointed secretary-general of the Westem European Union) turned to fim and said: “Tt really doesn’t matter whether you did or not. You will be blamed for it anyway.” With Karadzic m a vulnerable position and an agitated state, Colm Doyle setzed the coporumity and suggested that he would have to concede something tingible if his credibility was to be restored. Doyle suggested that Sarajevo airport should be reopened fmmedhately and put under UN control Karadzic. was outraged at this suggestion and laumched into 4 tirade of abuse against the UN, accusing them of smugelig arms to the Bosmian Muslims, but Doyle, am Irish army officer, vas equally appalled at this allegation and proceeded to make it very clear to the Serb’ leader that his position was becoming more untenable by the minute Eventually Karadzic calmed down and before he left the room had signed an agreement to reopen Sarajevo aisport the following week, tae details of which would be sorted out by General MacKenzie and his staff. [Nevertineless the Bosnian Serbs lost badly as a result ofthe bread queue massacre, and ‘Westem leaders 100k from this mcident only what they needed to justify and bolster their ovm policies, prejudices and political positions. Unfortunately for the Serbs this incident im Sarajevo also coincided with renewed shellmg in and around Dubrovnik and the resumption of hostilities herween the INA and the Croatian army along the Dalmatian coast on 29 May. ‘Yer again few reporters displayed any interest m the facts of the matter, which indicated that in fact it had been Croatian oops who aad renewed this particular campaign in an attempt to push INA units away from the coast and thereby re-open the anly road into the area which they had deemed critical for theis owa re-sugply operations So the INA had m fact only been responding to Croatian attemps to relocate the front fine and this version of events might have helped explain way shells were droping in the vicinity of Dubrownik™—tut nobody was interested im that type of mrerpretation because once again it did not fit the perception TV networks wished to peddle to their unsuspecting international audience. That their case should have been treated more equitably is not an issue—it is 4 fact There were after ll 13 million of them and by any standard one cares 10 employ they199245 were enticled to their point of view, and to have it aived. The problem was, however, nat they never managed to put this case before the intemational community, and whatever marginal support they might have had was lost when one report after snotier was published citmg horrific evidence of something which came to be known as “ethnic cleansing? Ethnic cleansing The term itself conceded the actuality and reality of the situation Pecause there was nothing remotely ‘clean’ about this barbaric process. Although it all sounded clinical, seaitised and even painless, in reality the programme was both savage and brutal. Pain and torture, bot physical ind mental, and of am mtensity and scale unimaginable: m ‘modem civilised Westem society, became the sadistic tools used to evict mimdreds of thousands of Muslims, Croats and Serhs from towns and villages where thetr ancestors had lived for generations. Tr started first m the towns nearest to the border with Serbia proper where yet again groups of so-called “volunteers” arrived from Belgrade to promote what they considered tp be the pan-Ser> cause, Behaving in like manner to the original ‘yolunteers* who had descencled on eastern Slavonia in 1990, these latest recruts quickly became 4 law unto themselves with the local political authorities either iemormg what was happening. or actly supporimg it, while the Serb-dommated local police and miliary were protably glad of some assistance, at least intially. Thereafier, as events began to gpiral out of control, most of Bosnian Serb officialdom became implicated by association with the ‘volunteers’, and the easier cption for most of them was sinrply to go along. with wat was happening. Few if any had the courage to speak out in opposition, and even if someone had it would probibly have made no difference The most novable of the *voluntee:” groups operating in eastern Bosnia at this time was 4 gang of thugs fom Belgrade called Arkin’s Tigers. These were a mob of pathological crimmals led by a self-styled anarchist called Zelico Ramjatovic, who later became a member of the Serbian parliament represeating Kosovo—which of cousse Was 85 per cent ethic, Allanian! These thugs, wao hatl previously involved themselves m the siege of Vukovar i 1991, decided to once agam pursue the goal of Ser’ supremacy by violently suibjugating all minority apposition they encountered. In the climate of fear, uncertainty and ignorance waich peevailed at che time thei possibilities were endless as they exploited the confused situation to the maximum, Initially they aligned themselves with the local police or militia on the pretext of protecting the Ser’ community from potential attack, bur then commenced a campaign of systemanc terror against Muslims and Croats m their mmediate vicinity. Where the Muslims decided to resist what was happening they then had to contend with General Mladic and his JNAsupported military who were every bit as methodical as Arkan i subjugating anyone who dared confront them" For those Muslims who remained in Bosnian Serb-controlled areas the regime they endured had become intolerable, There are no excuses whatsoever foc what was allowed to happen, nor cam there be any absolution for thoge who permitted it to continue, but by Balkan standards this was nothing new and most of the adult population had seen it all‘The modem Yugoslav coniet I991-1995 36 before during the Second World War. For mmy of the pempetrators it was simply 4 case of the boot now being on the other foot ‘The question arises as to whether Karadzic and the Bosnian Serb political leadership Jonew what was going on? The answer is that tt would have been virtually impossiole for them not to, wiaich im tum begs the question of wast if anything, they could reasonably have been expecied to do about it? Would a public condemnation have made any difference? Peotanly not Equally, the concept of “right and weong’, as understood in the Judaeo-Christim tradition, had never much to do with reality in Yugoslav politics where history was, and still is, often justified on the basis of the lst atrocity. So the Bosnigm Ser> leadership said snd did nothing. However, the critical issue here is whom the international community decided ro hold responsible for the atrocities taking place across the country. Tt was not Radovan Karadzic who was smgled out for eritcism, nor was it the Republic Srpska against which economic sanctions were imposed. Instead, when the UN Security Coxe met im New York on 31 May it acted with a clear conscience based on the relevant infoemation available to it and passed UNSC Resolution 757 which imposed economic sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro—the regime of Slobodan Milosevic. The vote was 13-0. Even Russia could not defend what at face value appeared to be indefensible behaviour. The goverment im Sarajevo had also succeeded in having its position legitimised st the highest levels, The politics of lies, hate and double-think had become the standard all round. And 4 mass exodus Of terrified, stmple, ordinary people had begun. Their ony cerme, by and large, lad been to worship 4 different God and to be percetved 48 a threat. Unforumately it was all about 10 get worse, ‘With sanctions nov in place Milosevic suggested that if this was the price to be paid for keeping all Serbs together then s0 be it, but [zethegovic decided that enough was enough and proclammed a state of war to exist m Bosnia, ordering 4 general mobilisation cn 20 June, Karadzic, foe his part, continued to offer one ceasefire plan after another, but nome of them ever came to anything langely because his target audience never kept sn pea channel on waich to zeceive him, Eventually, on 29 lune, and following on directly from the visit of President Mitierand 10 Sarajevo, the UN sectetary-general agreed to the deployment of peacekeeping troops m Bosnia. By now, though, there was no prospect whatsoever of immediate peace. The three ethnic groups were all busy setting up thetr own republics, the latest of waich was the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna (CRHB).” and the best that new peacekeepers could hope to achieve would be to mterpose between the Factions and uy to keep them api. ‘As July wore on every political action which took place was interpreted by the Ser’g as justification fo reaction. Tudjman and Tzetbegovic succeeded in signing a variety of ageeements waich brought the two governments closer together, but in response the Sets continued with the military campaign, ancl im Bosnia particularly contmued the systematic removal of thousimds of non-Serb people fom their homes and communities.” Those who survived this appalling treamment were lucky. By midAugust almost 2 rmillion Bosnians had been driven ftom their homes; thousands were killed or missing; and those still alive were either on the move, mcarcerated mn prison camps or sleeping m199237 temporary accommodation. Euroze wag wimessing the largest forced movement of people since the days of the Third Reich.” Th Sarajevo, Izetbegovic now pleaded for Westem military intervention and the posttionmg of troops along the Drina river (Bosmia’s border wit Serbia), fut the mam focus of the UN's operations involved keeping, Sara-jevo's airport operational m order 10 receive and distribute humanitarian aid, On 17 July Lord Carrington managed 10 get the tree warring leaderships to round-table talks m London and agreement was reached 10 begin 4 14-day ceasefire prior 10 substantive talks thereafter. Withm three days the ceasefire vas in shreds, and no heavy weapons had deen surrendered, However, it was at tas poimt that General MacKenzie began looking at the posstality of setting up a regular LUN peacekeeping mission and suggested that 40,000 troops would be needed to do tat job im Sarjevo alone. As a stop-gap measure the UN secretary-general tasked UNPROFOR on 2 July to sei up heavy weapoas collection points ‘The prison camps ‘When the parties did come back to the table in London on 28 July new EC proposals 10 tum Bosnia-Heccegovina into a series of cantons, similar to Switzerland, were again rejected out oF hand by Haris Silajdzic, the Bosnian prime minister. Instead the conference became consumed with a totaly different issue which arose from media reports that the Bosnian Serbs were operating ‘somcentation camps" m which Muslim Drisoners were being detamed and maltreated: ‘When this was put to Karadzic at the London Peace Conference he refuted all allegations and mvited anyone who wanted to visit the camps to do s0*" If he personally Jew of prisoner abuse itis mconcetvble that he would have made this public gesture, but the revelation of the existence of these camps, and apparent confirmation by US agencies, did icepatable damage to the Serb cause and consolidated the emerging perception that the Ser’g were hasically evil people. From that day forward Karadzic’s credibility as an mtemational statesman evaporated and for as long as he made any attempt 10 justify the existence of the camps he remained contaminated by them. In this context much was also made of the fact that the bulk of these so-called ‘detention centres’ were located im the north-west comer of Bosnia, im close proximity to the infamous Second World War cirmp at lasenovac, and it was alleged by many commentators that this in some way represented a manifestation of evil reicarate, The fact that it was Croatian Ustashe who had rim Jasenovac was ignored completely ta the tush to demonise the Serbs. When the first journalists were eventually admitted to the Omarska iron-ore processing plant im August they reported scenes allegedly not seen anywhere in Europe since 1945. They reported on men caged like animals, with heads shaved and ribs promudmg from fimished bodies, barely able to move and unable to adjust their eves to direct sunlight, They claimed they had found thousands of Muslim men crammed into the equivalent of a huge chicken coop, immobile for 24 hours of the day, fying m ther own excrement, overpowered and overcome by claustraphoinia and the stench, with some dying slowly of asphyxiation. On top of all that there were allegations of all kinds oF arocity, with some allegedly perpetrated by the tmates upon one smotner, and while this‘The modem Yugoslav contiet I991-1995 38 was bad enough it was farther alleged to be far worse for those prisoners who were removed from the group because these unfortunates were then set upon by elements within the sadistic regime which rar these places. Killing, torture, humnihation and savage cruelty were allegedly the order of the day—everyday—and hundreds of years of pent-arp historical hatred were apparently let loose in a daily toment of sadistic abuse and ‘maltreatment, not justia Oxvarska but in several other similar places as well The names Keraterm, Luka, Susica, Manjaca and Tmopleje all held terible significance for those wnfornmate enough to be dersined within them. And it was not confined to the men. In schools, halls and kage private houses all over the countey Muslim women and children were rounded up and imprisoned m appalling conditions and subsequently set upon by their guards and other Serb soldiers. It was as if these Serve believed that by defiling them they were trampling a people into extinction and thereby ensuring that they would never rise again. It had, of course, exactly the opposite effect and tis explams the continuing hatred which predominates Bosnian Muslim thinking right 10 the present day. There iso debate about the existence of these camps, and volumes have been written recordimg in graphic detail wat journalists found when they visited them. People were lulled, women were raped, others were abused im one way or another. However, itis also a fact that in all wars prisoners are taken, they are detamed, amd in spite of the existence of legal conventions goveming how prisoners and detarnees should be treated, rarely if ever is this subject a priority for commanders in the context ofthe main war effort mn civil wars it 18 even less so and invariably the task of managing these prisons becomes the responsibility of people who were already on the finge of their owm society prior to the war, have no legal traming whatever, never previously wore a uniform of any tescription and have quickly become divorced from whatever they previously perceived to be reality. This was the case m Bosnia where the ICRC identified and recorded that by 1 Sepember 1992 prison camps bemg rim by all three sides im the conflict had the following numbers of registered detainees: Groatian-controtied camps (913) Bosanski Brod 19 Mostar prison 192 ‘Ljubuski " oss Bro Krinija 382 Capijtsa 30 Livno prism 58 Serb-coniratied camps (8,326) Bilkea 456 Marjaca 2.884 Tanopalje 3500 Omarska 200, Batovie 1.280199239 Muslim-contvolled camps (916) Zenica prison ut Visoko 10 Celebici W Kanjie 180 This also a fact that journalists and others were shocked at what they found in these camps, and the mates they iterviewed recounted stories which could not have been contrived. Countless people died in detention and countless others were abused—but it happened on all three sides. The Serbs fad more detainees and correspondingly the ‘mumnbers killed ancl abused were greater. For this they were agportioned the lion's share of guilr, and based on numbers alone tas point ts not arguable. However, the manner in ‘which the Serbs as a nation were demonised certainly is Tn Seasons in Hell Ed Vullizmy recounts what he discovered im novih-central Bosnia daring the simmer of 1992 (there are several other similar accounts), and it isa shocking tale of man’s tiiuménity to-man and woman. At Tropolje he met Fikret Alic, a young ‘man with a famished torso and xylophone rib cage, waom_Vulliamy claimed inad been starved into this dismal malnourished condition after $2 days of imprisonment in Keraterm. This was correct. He also claimed that this tmage of Alic had now become the symbol of the war. This was correct algo because picrires of Alic subsequently appeared tn publications worldwide. What Vuliamy did not mention (and of which he was perhaps unaware atthe tims) was that Alte was suffering from tuberculosis and had been for some time. His famished condition was not due solely to his mcarceration, and when one locked more closely at the photography it became quite clear that those standing in the background behind him were not similarly mafnourished. Equally, the fence betind which they were standing was of the single strand bared wire variety with the nails on the inside! Therefore neither the structure of the fence, the nature ofthe prison, tie number of the detainees, nor the general condition of the majority of prisoners in any of these camps coald im any way be equated or compared to the real concentration camps of the Second World War. This was not Belsen, fais was not Auschvwit this was no: Stuthoff, and i hitherto unpublished ECMM Report complied by EC monitors Barney Mayhew and Charles McLeod provides a less emotive, better-balanced snd more relevant account of wnat wag actually taking place. ‘Writing im the Financia! Times taroughout this period, Judy Dempsey comuborated virtually all of ECMM?s findings. However, she also discovered am issue of Fpacha, the weekly magazine of Serbia's (Milosevic’s) Socialis Party, which contaed the following passage: ‘Tis region (north west Bosnia) is now cleared of Croats and Mustims Our Amny surrounds Muslim villages. IF the Muslims do not ratse the wwhite flag we vaze the villages to the ground, Serb villages will be futlt tere... Those people not from mixed mariages can go 10 Izetbegovic, or to Croatia. Those fom mixed marriages who have not fired at Serbs can‘The modem Yugoslav contiet I991-1995 49 choose to remain, In Kotor Varos (once 4 town of 36,000 east of Banja Lika) there aze-n0 longer ethnic minorities Dempsey went on to identity that all sides were mvolved in this “cleansing” nd also reported that the Muslim-rim camp i Konjic, previously identified by the ICRC as containing 130 detainess, now contained over 3,000 Bosnian Serbs who were imprisoned ina damp, dank, dark, disused railway turmel. What she did not elaborate upon, perhaps becinse she did not make the comection, was the fact thar by publisamg “progress reports’ on ettnic cleansing in Epocka Milosevic and his cohorts effectively endorsed what by now had become a clear and unambiguous policy. The army referred to as ‘our amy’ was the newly formed Bosnian Seriy army (BSA), staffed and equipped ftom Belgrade and fed by General Ratco Mladic. Mladic had become the leader of this group because Milosevic promoted him into the job. The chain of command for “our anny” was very simple: it ran ftom the thugs om the streets to the commanders who supervised them, to the general staff of the BSA, 10 Ratko Mladic, and, finally, to Slobodan Milosevic himself, Radovan Karadzic may have been ‘nominally the president of the RS and de jurethe commmander-in-chief of the BSA, but he did not have any de facto position within iis cham of conmnd, 4 pom which arose again snd again for taose who wished to see it. In this context, then, the question arises as 10 ‘who bears ultimate responsibility For what happened in Kozarac? Kovaeevie and Kozarac Born on 10 February 1941 in the village of Bozic, near Priedor, in north-west Bosnia Hercegovina, Milim Kovacevic spent his firs years mtemed with his mother m the Second World War Csoatian concentration camp at Jasenovac where tens of thousands of Serie, Jews and gypsies were being systematically exterminated. By 1992 he had risen to become an anaestnenst by profession and also vice-president of the local Serbien Democratic Party’s “Krizm Stab’ (Crisis Committee) in Prijedor OF course nis “official ne” was prone to change dependmg on whom he was talking to. One day he was the "executive mayor’, the next he was the ‘city manager’, and the day after he could he the “president of the mumicipal council". But by whatever title one chose to address him Kovacevic was in charge and not much happened in Prijedor that he Thad not authorised. It was fom thig “exalted” position, that he empowered himself to oversee a wholesale aktsratian to the demographic balatoe in the tov, witch prioe to that Jnad been the second largest city m northern Bosnia with a population of 112,000—over half of whom were Muslims, ‘With Bosnia spizaling out of control, nationalist Serbs led by Kovacevic organised « night-time coup against the elected Mustim autnorities and the following morning, had taken control of the town and surroundig rmumicipality. There was little f any fighting, Tre Serbs contvolled the local territorial defence units, which were well «med, and consequently the Muslims offered litle or no resistance, They were not prepared Soe a fight; they were not prepared for war; and they were certamly not prepared for the cerminal savagery which followed.198241 Once Kovacevic ind his cohorts had control of Prijedor and its Iinterland the majority of the region’s Muslim men were marched off into several ad five prison camps— Keraterm, Omarska and others. Many Muslim women were mearverated m a camp at Tmepolje where rape and torture were carried out. Them they tumed ther attention to the neariy town of Kozarac, just six miles away, which had 4 population of 25,000, the ‘majority of whom were Muslim, The town was quickly surrounded by Serb tanks and on 12M May 15 shells impacted m the town every minute, having whistled through the air fiom 12 differen: divecuens. The cleansing of Kozarag tamed out to be one of zhe most vicious episodes of civilian slaughter in the entire war” OF course Kovacevic did mot accomplish all of this on his own. He was ably assisted by 4 variety of underlings, not least amongst whom were the likes of the now-convicted war criminal Dusan Tadic, and the self-styled “police chie?” of Prijedor, Simo Deljaca However, it is crucial to point out at this juncture that when in August 1992 Radovan Karadzic authorised the mtemational media to ravel to Prijedor to visit the prison camps seittered nearby st was Milan Kovacevie and his colleagues the journalists discovered to Ye clearly in charge of the region—including the camps themselves." Life in norh-cenzal Hosni m the summer of 1992 was savage, brutal, primitive and aribal, Kovacevie told Ed Vulliamy tha & was, ia his opinion, ‘a great vim for the Serb nation’ Tr was nor. It was evil personified, and in this regard the journalists and reporting agencies were as one. Por once there was no divergence between perception and realty In late August Lara Marlowe managed to travel as far as Kozarac and found Serb militiamen now sitting in houses amongst the personal effects of the former Muslim residents. She spoke 10 one of them, Dragan Zameklaar, and discovered the complexities of the whole cleansing phenomenon: 1 feel nothing for the Muslims who lived m che house we have taken Muslims moved meo our ome m Kladus [the town of Veli Kladuse in the Bihac region). They killed my uncle fast spring. How would you feel if you saw Muslims slit your uncle's chroat or you saw them throw Serb women and old people out of windows? The house we butl: m Kladusa Jad ten rooms aad a basement but now six of us live in a use with just four rooms." Marlowe went on to meet Zamaklaar’s mothe, ‘ther, grandmother, sister and brother, al of whom had no income and spent most of their ime sizing in the house trying to figure out what had actually happened to them. She also discovered that notwithstanding the tt- forzat manure of the conflict, and however those involved might rationalise their predicament, in actual fact all of them were oaly succeeding in impoverishing one aorher Karadzie’s culpability ‘The matier of Radovan Karatzic’s culpability in all of this now needs toe examined. In the frst instance itis a matter of fact that he had no direct or personal control over the‘The modem Yugoslav contiet I991-1998 42 actual camps themselves, and there is direct evidence that he issued instructions to his amy commanders in June 1992 ordering them 10 obey the rules of international Tumanitarian fa. There ig also the undisputed fact that when journalists first accused him of nmming “concentration camps’ he immediately invited the international media to come and visit them, which is how Gutman, Vulliamy, Buras and all the others, actually got permission to go to Omarska and Tmopole in the first place. Accordingly, it is not at all clear vwhether back in 1992 Karadzic individually, or in concert with others, planned, instigated, ordered, or otherwise aided and abetted tthe planning, preparation, and execution of, the persecutions on political and religious grounds, of Bosnian Muslim ind Bosmtan Croat civilians, or knew, or had reason to know that subordinates were about to do he same or ad done so, and failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures 10 prevent such Acts or to pumish the pemerrators thereof, In fact itis perfectly arguable that he made a reasonable effort to stop what was taking place in the cannps, but this reality was certamly not perceived by those who filed their copy, and Wester editors had already decided anyway wao the good and tne bad guys actually were Granted, if ene accepts that ‘the commuander-in-chief is always responsible for all his men do and fail t0 do” then the case agaist Karadzic 1s closed. If, however, one is prepared to concede that ine never had full control over Kovacevie and others hike him, and failed to take action agains. them because he genuinely failed to comprehend the eravity oF what was taking place, or actually thougint people were obeying his order of 13 “hme, then perhaps he should be allowed to plead to lesser charges. But that also depends of course on how you interpret other things he did m the course of the following three years International reaction to the prison camps August 1992 was marked by continumg imtemational outrage over the discovery of the camps in the Serb-controlled areas of Bosnia, and the US State Department was first off the mark t0 condemn Karadzic and immediately began to call forthe establishment of war crimes tribunal, [mages of Serb atrocities were flashed around the globe, ensurmg that from now on it would hecome virtually impossible for the intemational community to retain any objectivity in their dealings with Karadzic, notwithstandig, that he had issued further orders to his subordinaies.”* Yet again there is evidence to suggest that Karadzic did indeed issue these and other orders io his subordinates, but in the media this swas tgmored. The Serbs would never again ger the benefit of the doubt in all that wag to follow, even on occasions wien they were periecly entitled 10 it ‘That said, there were some writers who chose to challenge the Ruder Finn Ine. version of events, and im 1999 Norma von Ragenfeld Feldman set about a comprenensive deconstruction of what Pulitzer prize winners John Burns and Roy Gutman had been198243 ‘writing. Firstly, anackmg Burng and the repos he fled fe the New York Times, Feldman ‘vas critical of the fact that thom ‘aes perspective fie had been far too close to the residency im Sarajevo and mot gzjective ta his continual condenmation of tne Serbs for all kinds of atrocity. She also claims that in Guaman’s cage much of his reporting was Ipased onze testimonies of just two witnesses and 4s such it amounted to ile more tn earsay.?® Ceriainly Bums relied heavily on the story of a Seid soldier, Borislav Hera, 10 lenny the criminal aehaviour of the Serbs, and Gutman was deeply concerned at wit lhe perceived to de the loc of Fikret Alte. Whether ther reporting was sufficiently researched (imespective of their prize winning) is now 4 moot point, and one can legitimately ask whether even taken im the context of the time some deeper probing should have boon undertaken, Bur the main issue concems the manner in which their ‘work was exploited by che PR people in Sarajevo wio in the early days of August, following the visit of a ITN news cew to Omarska and Trnepolje, mmediacely generated sn mternational debate comparing tne camps to tose of the Nazis, and the overall situation io the Holocaust! The Serb regime was not comparable to that of the Nazis, nor was it correct 19 compare the general situation on the ground to the Holocaust. Certainly criminal aces were perperated m the conflict up to that pont, but they were perperared by all sides The critical difference was tnst Ser abuses were more widespread and the Sarajevo goverment was adept at managing the intemational media. Feldman's assessment was that the steady seam of information issuing from Muslim (goverment) officials was extremely biased. She called it ‘a stream of misinformation, twnsted ‘acts, and decetving Photwgraphe’, and her assessment 1s supported m large measure by oth ECMM and MacKenzie, i is also supported by the Franc journalist Jagues Merlino (deputy editor- in-chief ef France 2 TV) who examined the connection Petween the media and public pinion im the Former Yugoslavia at this time and conchuded that 4 mumier of news reports were deliberately aimed at misinforming the international) public, In fact fe went om to claim that « large number of accusations made agamst ie Serbs were unfounded, o ar least greatly exaggerated, and following sv merview with James Harff of Ruder Fim Inc. he stated that he was frightened and profoundly saddened to find thar so many invellecuals had allowed themselves to be duped by an indistinct American who was simply a professional PR man doing his jo>, and domg it wtinout any remorse, and taming only about the profits 10 come is way’ Equally, tne US journalist Peter Brock’s accusations of pack reporting and journalistic negligence m the medi caused immediate comtroversy—but there was more Than a Ting of turn toi. He claimed that the meds campaign vilifying the Sere, and designed to force Wester govemmens to intervene militarily, was an unprecedented and unrelenting onslaught combining modera media tecimiques with advocacy journalism, In ocher words, comisination of hold headlines, mult-page spreads of gory photographs and gruesome video footige designed to shock Westem leaders mio reaction on the Mslim side. The reality was that all sides im the conflict ran detention camps. Some were worse than otters. The Serb camps were of the kind that could be found in any war zone worldwide. They were not nice places. Prisoners were starved, beaten amd sometimes alld. And rapes did take place. But this was nor the Holocaust and the Seros were not‘The modem Yugoslav contiet I991-1995 44 Nazis. Unfornmately, however, this typecasting stuck and the damage to the Serb cause vwas done long befoce they even realised it, The media had struck the first decisive blow inthe bate for the heares amd minds of the Wester puilic and thetr political masters Ian attempt to introduce some ‘balance ito the equenton an Expert Commission was established pursuant to UNSC Resolution 780 of 6/10/92 to examine i detail the question of detention camps in Bosnia and it visited ten prisonidetention camps taroughout Bosnia, reporting blatant human rights violations by all sides ® This finding was always predictable because 10 one side ever nad a monopoly on savagery m any Previous Balkan conflict either, but the tntemational political establishment was not impressed. Instead there were contmued screams for renibution against the Serbs, typified perhaps by the reaction of Lawrence Eagleburger, the US deputy secretary of state, who began calling for war crimes investigations" Another distortion of reality was also exposed at this time when General MacKenzie identified Tzetbegovie’s strategy and tactics, In spite of MacKenzie’s best efforts he Czethegovie) would not meet with Karadzic to discuss anything. He was walling 10 talk 10 Belgrade, or the INA, oc the UN—but never Karadzic. In this way he sought 10 delegitimise the Bosniin Ser leader and again he was successful. He also sought by every availdole means to have the arms embargo hfted, or Failing that 10 have his own troops equipped covertly. When asked if there was anything which would immediately improve the situation, MacKenzie was unequivocal: “Yes—and the Presidency [of Bosaia] will hate to hear me say this: negotiations with tae Serbian side within Bosnia.” ‘When asked about whether the different leaders actually had control of what was |uppeamg on the ground he had this to say: “There are large mimbers of dividuals and units that are out of contol. But they are out of control within 4 defined chain of command. There’s ample evidence of units operating to their own agenda," ‘And when asked why he refused to blame the Serbs for all of Bosmia’s ills he ‘maintained that the situation was more complex than that: “What we now see fom the Bostiaa Presidency's side is that it is in their interests to keep the thing going and get the Serbs to retaliate m order to convince the mternational commumity that mtervemtion is 4 good idea. So I blame bot sides.” MacKenzie had correctly idemtified thatthe itolerance emanattg from Sarajevo was every bit ag bad as anything coming fom Pale, but this assessment flew in the face of the preferred international perception which portrayed Izetbegovic as legitimate, sincere, Tnonest, peace-loving and an elderly statesman. Sarajevo's public relations operation pushed this perception imrelentmely, and it was cructal 10 there strategy. When Karadzic, actually made an offer to return 10 negotiations on II July his call was effectively ignored. He had called for the three parties to sit down together, claiming that he controlled 70 per cent of Bosmia now but only wanted 64 per cent However, [zetbegovic completely ignored this offer of talks and called instead. for intemational military force to be used agaist the Serbs. There is the possibilty (perhaps probability), of course, that [zetnegovic. was correct in his evaluation and that Karadzic ‘may not have been serious anyway, but 0 taternanional pressure ws brouglnt to bear cn Iretbegovic to explore the proposals, and all one cam de now 1s speculate on what might have been, For those who would claim that Karadzic might well have been sincere in his proposals (and the author is one of them), then this episode potentially represents another199245 eppornmity which was lost, and the blame for that loss did mot, on tig occasion, ie with the Serbs. But there were fe, ifany, who wanted to take this approach. Instead the West continued a antic search for its own solution, with senior politicians amd diplomats stumbling from one peace conference to another. Each new agreement was heralded 4s the fimal solution but mevitably yielded nothing, and on 25 August Lord Carrington resigned, having spent almost a year trying unsuccessfully to find a peaceful resolution to the conilict. He summed up his frustrations with the whole provess as follows: All those leaders—almost without exception will agree to anything They'll put their name to any bit of paper with not the smallest mtention of doing anytiimg whatever about it. There's no good faith im practically my of the people | dealt with there. I's much more difficult to negotiate with people who don't mean what they say, decause how do you negotiate? Carrington algo identified very clearly that as far as he was concerned the international community was also culpable Joc recognising Croatia and Slovenia before all osher ‘matters were seid. From the outset the prospect of recognition fad been the one real instrument to keep the parties engaged m the negotiating proces. As 4 result of that December decision (by Germany) the original concept of the Peace Conference unraveled and we had no real leverage which we could tring 10 bear. Certainly Carrington had 4 poitt of view in this regard and his own perceived fatlure bore ‘heavily upon him. With the benefit of himdsight itis possible ro say that his assessment of the situation was probably correct. What was not obvious to him at the time was way the peties, and paricularly the Muslims, operated as they did. That would become obvious to the man who replaced iim—Lord David Owen, the former UK fireigm secretary and farterly leader of the SDP. So the talking continued and the next attempt 10 solve Bosmia’s problems by discussion took place between 26 and 28 August, and became known as the London Conference. All the mam players and representatives of over thirty other mterested states attended and decided that any attempt to find a solution to the conflict should now be co- cndmated by both the EC and the UN. To this end Lord Owen for the EC and Cyrus Vance for the UN were appointed 4s co chairmen of a Permanent Peace Conference. The Bosnian Ser’ apreed to lift the siege of Sarajevo and other towns, to close detention camps, to co-operate with humanitarian relief operations ind to tura over their heavy weapons to the UN, Tae smerational commanity, for is ar, reatfrmed its eommitment not 10 recognise any tecvitorial gains achieved by force and put in place a no-‘ly zone over Bosnia” As the Conference closed Milosevie expressed nis hopes for a successful implementation oF the accord jut stated that he really had litte control over the activities of the Bosnia Serie. This was not ue. Dr Karadzic was equally adamant that his people had nothimg 10‘The modem Yugoslav contiet I991-1995 46 do with attacks on Sarajevo, and this was not tue either. Whatever the motivation for these denials—it was not clear then and itis less so now—the meeting was barely over before Lawrence Eapleinrger was agam planting doubt and articulanng his worst-case scenario by stating that he “did nt have any particular confidence that Milosevic would live up to his end of the bargain’ Once again he might have made a greater contribution had he let Milosevic and Karadzic carry on with their gamesmanship and said nothing to distract them, In any event it was not the Sevbs who chose to escalate the situation on the ground that evening as the conference broke up. Instead it was Croatian paramilitary elements wi slaughtered 53 women and children in an attack on a convoy of buses near Mostar, and Ietbegovic’s own Armijs who cut down 20 Serbs as they were attermpting to flee the easter enclave of Gorazde, and no dour that news gave the Serb leaders something 10 thik about as they made thei way home from London They were also probably mterested in the news that the Wester European Union (WEL) had decided to-make over 5,000 soldiers available to the UN for the protection of ‘humazitarian convoys in Bosnia, although no decision to do this had yet been made by the UN, and perhaps this mifuenced them on 3D August 10 call off their four-month siege of Gocazde As the Peace Conference moved on io Geneva” the handing over of heavy weapons proved to be a little more complicated than was originally envisaged because neither side ‘was willing to part company with all oftheir equipment, On tap of that the leadership of the HVO announced that they also intended 10 remove themselves from the jurisdiction of the Bosnian government and called for the division of the country ito three distinct entities. This particularly uthetpful amouncement was prompted by their belie that the Bosaian Croats could now adequately defend themselves, thanks to recent deliveries of weapons and troops ftom their sponsors im Zagreb. Such was Croatia's “good faa’ response to the London proposals. into this simmering cauldron the UN now decided to deploy 6,000 more troops to protect humanitarian activities in Bosnia, bringing the total troop levels to 12,080 m Croatia and 7,500 tm Bosnia ‘We had now arrived at « point where the incemational solution to each new escalation of the conflict seemed to be to throw more roops at it without necessarily giving: them smy clear directive as to what they might be expected to do. Equally, im Croatia all was not well either ag violations of the Vance plan ceasefire were bemg reported daily by ECMM and the UN, ind engomg activities by Ser’ paramilitaries m eastern Slavonia continued to change the etinic balance of the region. In Baranja, for example, tne Serb proportion of the population had jurmped from 25 per cent before the war to over 70 per cent now, as Croats continued to be expelled m order to make way for Seri refugees from elsewhere im the country, and from paris of Bosnia as wall, While the Croatian authorities m Zagrely were outraged at what was hagpentng, and made huge political capital out oft in the mternational media, it must be pointed out that Croats were performing exactly the sime type of ethic cleansing im western Slavonia in places like Pakrac, Daruvar and along tine mfimous Dragovic Road.” The evidence im all of these areas was ieontrovertible, end remained $0 well into 1995, with the broken shells of thousands of houses lying derelict and empty, deliberately destroyed to ensure that the previous, legitimate and legal oceupsnts could never return199247 In any event, on 18 September all sides managed 10 commence the firs round of talks a5 agreed in London, but any possibility of progress was dealt a severe blow when Karadzic begin outliming his plans 10 resolve matters peacefully by dividing. up Bosnia between Croatia and Serbia. Needless to say this was unacceptable to the Muslims, and Ietbegovic immediately departed for the UN im New York where he denounced any plan that would reward ethnic cleansing, He remained there long enough to witness the expulsion of Yugoslavia from the General Assembly on 22 September—the first such mstance in the history of the UN— and the establishment of the UN's own investigation into the camps.” ‘With fighting contmuing im several places more foreign troops arrived im theatre, 2.400 of them from Brita, but the only real contribution the internanonal commiurity could still make was to pump im additional humanitarian aid. EC president Jaccnues Delors sanctioned a increase in the flow of food and medical aid to a toral of USS600 million for 1992, but forthe Sarajevo government this could never be enough and Haris Silajdzic, the Bosnian prime minister, continued to appeal forthe arms embargo to be ffted. And at one level he had a case The Armijs could not be compared to either the HVO or the BSA, boti of which had sponsors across the borders. The Muslims were stuck ia the middle with no sponsor, litle oF no ecquipment, and they were quite unable 10 resist any serious operations thal were ‘mounted agaist them because im many places they were still nothing more than mafia gangs in disguise. And they veze also faced with the dilemma that even if peschance the Armija were upgraded, the Croats (HVO), and more particularly the Serbs (BSAA) would then almost certainly use this as justification to escalate their own operations even farther. Ths catch-22 situation led some im Sarajevo to suggest tat it was perhaps better to tolerate this imbalance in the relative sivengths of forces, and thereby contain the conilict, rather thin achieve parity and risk a huge escalation—but they were minority Then as October drew to a close tensions between the Armija and the HVO continued to surface. In the wake of bitter clashes berween the sides at Novi Travnik and at Gomji ‘Vasuf, a climate of mutual distrust developed which culminated in point-blank refusal by the’ Armija to accept HVO assistance in defence of the central Bosnian town of Jace against a concentrated Serb attack. While both sides skirmished with one another, the Seti advanced on Jajce, took the towa, and up to 30,000 Muslims were forced to pack what few belongings they could find and then flee the town and its hmterland. Thereafter they began to pour mto Travmik, Vitez and the Lasva valley, places waich were it m0 way able o accommodate them, ‘Most mrernational observers were unable to comprehend why the Muslims and Croats ‘ad failed to combine tm the face of ais new Ser’ onslaught, but in fact they had litle iF any knowledge of what was really taking place on the ground. Lieutenant Colonel Bob Stewart and hig battalion of Cheshires now found themselves caught right im the middle of this human disaster as they attempted to deploy ta the area and set a headquarters at 4 school complex in Vitez. While ne first Britisa rocps were settling into an environment of confusion, disorder and fear, which was deteriorating further by the day, the latest set of proposals from Owen and Vance were being offered to the three warring parties in Geneva on 27 October. These were of hile mterest to the poor misfortumate people now suatiing m Travmik and elsewhere who had rim from their homes with nothing save the‘The modem Yugoslav contiet I991-1995 48 clothes on their fucks and the few miserable possessions they could carry. The entire social structure of the area quickly disintegrated and the inability of Muslims and Croats to pull together in the face of such appalling adversity sind ial This mransigence would dominate rekntons between the two from this point onwards and it served to justify all attennpis to exterminate one snotiner, as well ag validating ‘ejection of all attempts to implement some kind of federal political system. As far as the Muslims were concemed the Serbs might have been amexing huge tracts of land in central Bosnia, but the HVO were doing exacily the same im the south culminating in ‘heir eventually taking control of Mostar City on 25 October and then proclaiming it to be the capital of tne Croatian community of Herceg- Bosna And then, ag if 10 complete the polarisation, news began to filter through that the leaders oF the Bosnian and Krajma Serbs had got topether inthe railway town of Pijedor, in north-west Bosnia, and signed an agreement designed to unite both entities pohtcally, create a jomt mutitary and legal system, and thereafter fulfil tneir aspiration for the ‘unification of the whole Serbian nation’, Jajce fell on 3 November, and Bosnian goverment officials walled out of discussions with Vance and Owen m Geneva. It was clear there would not be any sign of peace before Chrisimas—but nobody felt mclined 10 predict what the new year would bring. In Bihac, for exarmple, over 200 people were now dead nd 1,600 wounded. This typited the overall situation—with the Mustoms taking ‘most of the casualties, But the advent of winter, and with the first falls oF snow imminent, saw ihe overall situation across the comrry begin to stabilise 10 some extent as all sides concentrated on surviving the next few months. The UN immersed itself im discussions on lifting the arms embargo, enforcing no-ily zones and implementing naval blocicades. This was due in m0 small measure to sustained pressure from Istinic countries to have current policy revised. However, no change was made, mainly Pecause neither Lord Owen nor Cyrus ‘Vance would agree to it. Owen suggested on 6 November that any lifting of the arms embargo would be equivalent to “pouring oil on an already buraing fire’. Vance, foe his pt, algo rejected the pressure on 13 November om the basis that “it taxed credulity to suggest that fifting the arms embargo for only one of the parties would be either Feastole or desirable” Nevertheless, at the political level Izetbegovic, Tudjman and Boban did hold a variety of meetings and exchanged several documents with the expressed intention of strengthening political, economic and military ties between the three groupings im the face of a common enemy. This unforumately did litle to pacify any of tnetr military personnel on the ground, resulting in clashes at Prozor berween the Armija and the HVO. ‘which claimed the lives of 30 people; m addition, large parts ofthe town were destroyed Boutros Bourros-Ghali’s report to the Security Council on 24 November on the situation pertaining in Croatia did not seem 10 worry any of them unduly either, but it was quite danming in is fmdimgs. Among other things he reported that ‘murders, burning and demolition of houses, destruction of churches, killing of cattle and domestic animals, and anmed robberies and assaults were aimed at members of national minorities’—that is, the Serbs However, in spite of all this an interesting meeting took place in Sarajevo, though it went largely unmoriced as a consecquence. On the 26¢h, the new Croatian chief of the General Statf, General Janko Bobetko, had lengthy discussions with the new supreme1992 49 commander of the BSA, General Ratko Mladic. The detail ofthe tls remains unimown, ‘ut it was highly significant that Bobetko felt able to represent all Croat forces (HV and HIVO) and that Mlathe was able to represent all Serbs (BSA and SARSK). This clarifies the relationship between the HV and HVO at this time and for all that happened subsequently. [t also clarifies the cham of command and puts the head of that chain firmly in Zagreb. The rekaionship between Mladic and the RSI was never a matter for speciation. His personal mvolvernent im establisiing the SARSK im the first place, and Inis contimied close contacts with the Knim leadership, give substance to the popular belief that Mladic would never abandon Krajina, As events unfolded this would prove to be yer another lie “And go as 1992 drew 10 a close the prospect of a settlement seemed as far away as ever. The Organisation of Islamic States began to call for military intervention im Bosnia and the arming of the Muslims as UNHCR figures indicated that there were now 3 million refugees displaced within the Former Yugoslavia, with 17 million of them in Bosnia, President Tudjman continued to push for Western military intervention to halt ‘what he regarded as Serb aggression, both in parts of Croatia and in Bosnia, and he also called for the international supervision of Serbia’s borders to ensure that supphes were prevented firm coming across These calls represented classic double-think as far as Tudyman was concemed because Ine conveniently omitted 19 mention that his own troops were involved im their own expansionist endewours in eastem Hercegovina against the Bosnian Serbs, These activities resulted im the proclamation of a very strong warning from Belgrade that ifthe HV/HIVO failed to desist, the JNA would be employed direcily agamnst them im order 10 preserve the integrity of the Montenegrin bard. On the political front the year ended with Milosevic under severe pressure in Belgrade as the new federal president, Cosic, threw his weight beind Federal Prime Mimister Panic on 14 December in the latter's attempt 10 oust Milosevic at the forthcoming presidential election in Serbia, And as another round of peace talks got under way in Geneva on 16 December, Lawrence Eagleburger was again on the anti-Serb bandwagon, this time seeking the miiciment of a list of people whom he wanted tried before ‘Nuremberg’ type miunal; needless to say the names of Milosevic and Karadzic were right there at the top of it. Having also demanded the enforcement of a ‘no-ily zone” and a liting of the arms embirgo, he then took it upon himself 10 speak on behalf of the ‘West’, declaring “we [?] nave concluded that the deliberate flaunting of Security Council resolutions and the London Agreememts, ly the Seriy authorities, is not only producing am intolerable and deterioratmg situation mside the Former Yugoslavia, tt also begiming to threaten the framework of stability m the new Europe”. He concluded iy msistmg tinat the West ‘would stand for nothing short of the restoration of the imdependent state of Bosnia-Hercegovina, with its territory undivided and intact; the return of all refugees to their homes and villages; and indeed a day of reckoning for those found guilty of erimes sagzanst humanity Eaglebumper hat! in fact hit upon a key issue without, Tsuspect, actually realising it, He corectly identified the ertmimal behaviour of the Serbs but omitted to criticise the equally criminal activities ofthe other two parties. In so doing he effectively gave both the Croats and Mustims his blessing to contmue with their policies of exacting retribution and de _facto endorsed what they were doing on the groxmd, By failing to state that ald of the‘The modem Yugoslav contiet I991-1995 50 parties to the conther were guilty to some degree or other, Eagleburger gave the Philosophy of hawved and vengeance as practised in the Balkans both his personal and Official stamps of approval, which m turn served only to further inflame an already volatile situation. [F nothing else tats spoke volumes dour the vacuarn that had hecome US foreign policy tthe region at the time As the year drew to a close Tudjmman, Taetbegovic, Vance, Owen and Mate Boban met in Zagreb on 17 December to hammer out an agreed postion that could be brought tothe Peace Conference: the UN Security Coumeil was directed by the General Assemoly on 18 December to review the arms embargo and consider the possibility of military intervention agains: Serbia and Montenegro; Radovan Karadzic, a Montenegrin psychiatrist, was elected the first president of the Republic of Srpska on 19 December; Slobodan Milosevic was re-elected as president of Serbia oa 20 December,” on 28 December President Bush began threatening the Serbs that the US was ready t0 use force against them; and all intscested parties assembled in Geneva in order to be presented with anew map of Bosnia waich sought to divide the coutry mto ten largely autonomous provinces under a loosely organised centtal goverament. This was 0 be the new territorial and constitutional solution for Bostia and Hercegovina amd quickly became Janowm as the *Vance-Owen plan’ Tninal hopes for success were high, but soon evaporated when news began 10 filter trough that over 10,000 Muslim troops were gathered to the south of Sarajevo, on Mount tgman, in preparation for an assault on the city in order to lift the siege which had been rumiing now for nine months. The fact that this mifitary activity was permitted to take place at this particular time certainly calls into question the sincerity of Izetbegovic and his immediate entourage vis-d-vis the entire peace process ia which the memational community was heavily investing both time and money, Tn this regard, on New Year's Eve Boutros Boutros-Ghali and Cyrus Vance flew to Sarajevo to plead with Izerbegovic im the hope that he would cal off his planned New “Year offensive against the Serbs, but instead of thanking them for their efforts as they ‘nade their way through the city siveets bystanders hurled aluuse at them and called them fascists and criminals, among other things. Arguably the situation was not omproved when later that evenmg, Boutros-Ghali spoke to the mtemational press cons and addressed the people of Sarajevo by saying: ‘T understand your frustration, but you have a situation [here] that i better than ten other places in the world. I can give you alist you vant it These words of wisdom were not any comfort or consolation to the hundreds of hnefpless people whom he was addressmg. Exposed 10 te bitter cold of Bosnta’s winter, devoid of gas to heat their homes, and fighting 10 defend their place i the queues for tread and water, the people of Sarajevo were not impressed with the secretary-general Tetbegovic was well aware that this was the case, and from his perspective what harm if Ine exploited the discomfort. The problem was thar both Bourros-Ghali and Vance had come to help, and in spite of a worsening predicament the Sarajevo government were completely reluctant 10 take it. This was no accident. It was 4 policy decision. Other agendas were being followed198251 Annex A. REPUBLIKA SRPSKA PRESIDENCY Number: 01-53/92 Date ne B 1992 Duplicate issued: 21-3292 Jn accordance with Article 174, Section I, Paragroph 14 cf the Law an the Army cf the Sorb Republic cf Bosnia and Herzegovina (C;ficial Herald cf the Serb Pecple in BiH mumber: 192}, the President cf the Presidency cf the Serb Republic cf Bosnia and Herzegovina hereby enacts the following Order regarding the implementation cf international war law conventions in the Army cf the Serb Republic cf Bosnia and Herzegovina I The Army cf the Serb Republic cf Bosnia and Herzegovina (ihe Army } and the Serbian Ministry cf Taternal fairs in armed con flcter ply and respeet the International war fave conventions. international war law conventions referred to in Article | abave are understood to include the following: international agreements signed or rat fied or otheruise endorsed ty the former Soctatist Federal Republic cf Yiegoslavia; customs and conventions of aiternational war law, generaly recognized prine ples cf international var lave. 2 Responsible for the implementation cf international war law conventions are commanders and commanding « ficers cf the Army as well as every member fie Army or other armed formation participating ix armed cperations. The commanding fiver ts responsibte for imitating procedures for the tssuance cfa sentence én accordance with the law against individuals in violation cf international var law conventions, 3 The Minister cf Defense cf the Serb Republic cf Bosnia and Herzegovina ts herety authorized to fssue instructions for treatment ¢f war prisoners. 4 Training ta be scheduled reguiar'y in onder to familiarize members ef the Army with international war law comvenitons, S This orcor becomes «fective on the day itis published in the ‘Cficéal Heratd cf the ‘Sarb Pocple in BH and an tntegrat part cf this order are instructions for treatment cf war prisoners, RESIDENT SERB REPUBLIC OF BOSNiA AND HERZEGOVINA Dr Radovan Karadzic‘The modem Yugoslav contiet I991-1995 $2 Annex B REPUBLIKA SRPSKA RESIDENCY Number: 61-536/92 Date: August 19,1992 10 THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE REPUBLIRA SRPSKA ARMY, THE MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND ALL SECURITY SERVICE HEADQUARTERS Jn accordance with our act cf June 13, 1992 regarding respect cf international war conventions, Lagain Order I That alt sut jects realize their responsibility 19 adhere to international fuonanitarian law, espectalty Articles 3 and 4 cf the Geneva Comvention; 2 That orders be issued to all fighters and all emplcyecs cf the Minisoy cf internal ‘fet to respect prisoners, etitians, medical facilites, private and pubic facilites, the emblem cf the Red Cross and personnel and prcpery

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